

UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

18 July 2005

TO: WASIQ, ABDUL HAQ

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF WASIQ, ABDUL HAQ

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee served as Deputy Minister of Intelligence in the Taliban Intelligence Service.

2. The detainee served as acting Minister of Intelligence when Qari Ahmadullah was away from Kabul performing his duties as governor of Tahar province.

3. The detainee was a participant in military operations in Konduz.

4. Detainee used Icom radios and provided information on communications security procedures within the Taliban Intelligence Department.

b. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee arranged to have an Egyptian al Qaida member, Hamza Zobir, teach Taliban intelligence officers about intelligence work.

2. The detainee gave a suspected Afghani arms smuggler a Codan high frequency radio set for safekeeping. The suspected arms smuggler allegedly had many weapons caches near Ghazni.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF WASIQ, ABDUL HAQ

a. At the time of his capture, the detainee claims he was attempting to assist the U.S. in capturing Mullah Mohammed Omar. He claims if the Americans had not arrested him, then they might have captured Mullah Mohammed Omar and the detainee's supervisor, Qari Ahmadullah, head of Taliban Intelligence.

b. Detainee has very few citations, primarily for non-aggressive infractions including physical training in cell, leading prayer; making excessive noise; and periodically refusing medications, food, and showers.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

1 November 2005

TO: AL MATRAFI, ABDALLAH AIZA

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL MATRAFI, ABDALLAH AIZA

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
 1. From 1987 to 1989, the detainee was a rifleman in the Mujahideen Army in Jalalabad, Afghanistan.
 2. The detainee participated in the first jihad in Afghanistan fighting the Russians on the front line for one and a half years.
 3. After the first jihad in Afghanistan, the detainee was at Sharm Shar in Jalalabad, Afghanistan along with several future al Qaida leaders including Usama Bin Laden.
 4. In 1421 Hijri, the detainee met with Sheikh Abdallah Al-Rayis who proposed that the detainee establish the Al-Wafa office and open religious institutes in Afghanistan.
 5. Shaykh 'Abdalah Al-Rayyis was Al-Wafa's founder and main financier.
 6. Al-Wafa has been identified as a terrorist organization on the United States Department of State's Terrorist Exclusion List.
 7. In 1421 Hijri, the detainee traveled to Afghanistan, by way of Syria and Iran, to establish Al-Wafa in Afghanistan.
 8. In 1421 Hijri, the detainee stayed at a Taliban guesthouse in Herat, Afghanistan.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL MATRAFI, ABDALLAH AIZA

9. In 1421 Hijri, the detainee traveled to Kandahar where he met the Afghan Minister of Education. The detainee returned to Saudi Arabia to discuss the outcome of his trip to Afghanistan with Sheikh Al-Rayis.

10. In 2001, the detainee established Al-Wafa offices in Kabul and Herat, Afghanistan.

11. The detainee stated that he headed the Al-Wafa office in Kandahar, Afghanistan.

12. The detainee admitted that he was director of the Al-Wafa organization in Afghanistan.

13. The detainee stated, "Nothing happened in Al-Wafa without my knowledge."

14. In 2001, an Al-Wafa employee met with a microbiologist inside the Kandahar, Afghanistan, Al-Wafa office and authorized four to five thousand United States dollars for the purchase of medical laboratory equipment.

15. The microbiologist was developing anthrax for al Qaida.

16. In approximately March 2001, the detainee was approached to discuss potential Al Wafa funding for Taliban Ministry of Communication and Electricity projects in Afghanistan.

17. In approximately August 2001, Al-Wafa purchased vehicles and heavy equipment for the Taliban.

18. After September 11 2001, Al-Wafa arranged for several individuals from Mecca, Saudi Arabia, to enter Afghanistan through Iran at the Zahedan border.

19. The detainee stated that Al-Wafa assisted those who wanted to enter Afghanistan via Iran.

20. The detainee paid others to transport Arabs and Russians from Iran to Afghanistan.

21. The detainee provided a cover to smuggle Usama Bin Laden operatives and sympathizers to Afghanistan to participate in jihad. The operatives crossed the border into Afghanistan using an Al-Wafa cover.

22. Al-Wafa provided employment opportunities in its three offices in Kandahar, Kabul, and Herat for individuals who are connected to the Usama Bin Laden network.

23. Basic military training with AK-47's and rocket-propelled grenades was conducted inside the Al-Wafa offices in Kabul.

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24. Al-Wafa provided financial support to al Qaida after the United States attack in Afghanistan.

25. In approximately November 2001, the detainee attempted to purchase a missile.

26. The detainee stated that Al-Wafa was purchasing the rocket to use against the Northern Alliance's attack on the Taliban.

27. Approximately two days prior to Ramadan, 2001, the detainee traveled with three other Al Wafa members to Khowst and Jalalabad, Afghanistan, and then crossed the border into Pakistan.

28. The detainee was arrested by Pakistani police at the Lahore, Pakistan Airport on 11 December 2001.

29. The detainee was identified by a foreign government agency as a high priority due to the detainee's recruiting activity.

b. Training

1. The detainee attended basic military training in Turkham, Afghanistan. He received AK-47 and rocket propelled grenade training.

c. Connections/Associations

1. During Ramadan 2000 (27 Nov to 27 Dec 2000), the detainee met with Usama Bin Laden in Kandahar, Afghanistan and discussed opening Al-Wafa offices in Afghanistan. The detainee delivered a verbal letter from several sheikhs, including Sheikh Al-Rayis, to Usama Bin Laden. Usama Bin Laden gave the detainee a letter to assist him in establishing religious institutes.

2. In approximately July 2001, the detainee met with Usama Bin Laden at Usama Bin Laden's house in Kandahar, Afghanistan. They discussed the disagreements between Al-Wafa and al Qaida.

3. The detainee's name was found on a computer in a suspected al Qaida safe house in Islamabad, Pakistan.

4. While the detainee was head of Al-Wafa in Afghanistan, he had a number of conversations with Mohammed Omar, a.k.a. Mullah Omar.

d. Intent

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1. The detainee stated that he would lead his tribe in exacting revenge against the Saudi Arabian and United States governments, and he would kidnap four to five Americans at a time and sever their heads.

2. The detainee stated, "Not only am I thinking about threatening the American public, but the whole world."

e. Detainee Actions and Statements

1. The detainee stated, "I swear to God what you are doing, you will pay. You will experience a greater tragedy than September 11th."

2. The detainee shouted, "Yes I am a member of al Qaida and I took orders from Usama Bin Laden." The detainee added, "I am a terrorist. Yes I am very proud to be a terrorist."

f. Other Relevant Data

1. A former Al-Wafa employee identified the detainee as the director of Al-Wafa for Afghanistan and Pakistan.

2. A former Al-Wafa employee identified the detainee as the Kabul-based director of Al-Wafa operations in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

3. An individual stated it was common knowledge that Al-Wafa delivered weapons and supplies to Afghan fighters in Tora Bora. Al Wafa provided money of all currencies, including United States dollars to those fighters who needed it.

4. A former Al-Wafa volunteer stated that he gave his passport and money to the detainee for safekeeping at the Al-Wafa office in Kabul, Afghanistan.

5. The detainee stated that there is no relation between the al Qaida and Al-Wafa organizations, explaining that al Qaida disliked Al-Wafa and both organizations were in disagreement.

6. The detainee stated that Al-Wafa disagreed with the five principals of al Qaida.

7. The detainee stated that Al-Wafa has no connection with any terrorist organization in any form.

8. An al Qaida facilitator identified the detainee as having problems with Usama Bin Laden because the detainee had come to do charity work in Afghanistan and was funded by the Saudi royal family, who Usama Bin Laden rejected and denounced. The detainee would take Saudis from al Farouq and try to send them back to Saudi Arabia.

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9. Al Farouq was an al Qaida funded training camp.
 10. The detainee stated that there is no relation between the al Qaida and Al-Wafa organizations, explaining that al Qaida disliked Al-Wafa and both organizations were in disagreement.
4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a. The detainee stated he is not an enemy of the United States and it is a shame that he is being detained.
 - b. The detainee stated he was against the September 11, 2001 bombings of the World Trade Center because those who died in the bombings were innocent civilians.
5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

5 October 2005

TO: FAZL, MULLAH MOHAMMAD

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF FAZL, MULLAH MOHAMMAD

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee was a former Army Chief of Staff. His ethnicity is Kakar and he was a resident of Uruzgan. The detainee was a key Taliban commander, who participated in significant operations. He has a long record of human rights abuses.

2. On November 2001, the date of his capture, the detainee was in the Balkh province delivering weapons and food to troops in preparation to engage opposition forces when he was ordered by the Minister of Defense to surrender to General Dotsum.

3. The detainee reported that he was a member of the Taliban.

4. The detainee along with other Taliban soldiers traveled the Yarganaak Pass from Konduz to Masar-e-Sharif to surrender to Dostam's troops.

b. Training

1. The detainee is a member of the Taliban and was responsible for the deployment of military troops to specific front line locations in Takhar province.

2. The detainee gave a description of his duties as a Taliban commander that consisted of logistical support, which included delivering food, money and weapons to his troops. The detainee stated that he was in control of 1,200 men at one time.

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3. The detainee estimated that approximately 3,000 troops were assigned to the frontlines while he held this position when the initial fighting took place in October 2001.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee stated that the Taliban supported the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). Three years ago the leader of the IMU had a meeting with the leader of the Taliban government in Kandahar, Afghanistan. During this meeting the Taliban agreed to support the IMU with money, weapons and logistical support for soldiers from the IMU.

2. The detainee's direct commanders were Jumna Namangani, who was responsible for foreign troop deployment and Mullah Obaidullah, the Taliban Defense Minister. Both of these individuals were incarcerated following the surrender.

3. The detainee was identified as a Taliban Army Chief, who worked for Mulla Omar along with other Taliban Army Commanders.

4. Prior to his surrender, the detainee confirmed that he had communications with Mulla Omar for supplies for his troops.

d. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee emphasized the need for a third party government or force to intervene with the future of Afghanistan.

2. The detainee had little direction on where to send soldiers and therefore randomly sent troops to various locations with little knowledge of actual military needs.

3. The detainee lost his left lower leg sometime in 1997 after stepping on a land mine.

4. The detainee said he had no knowledge pertaining to the cultivation, production or transportation of opium or heroin.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. When asked if he attended a meeting where he spoke to several leaders in Herat, Afghanistan, the detainee denied that he made a statement that he was planning to defend Afghanistan to repel any possible attacks by the United States. The detainee reiterated that Jumna Namangani was in charge of all foreign fighters and did not know if Namangani had any connection with the al Qaida.

b. The detainee claimed he never met Usama bin Laden or any of the al Qaida leadership or members.

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c. The detainee claimed that the attacks on the United States were not part of the jihad he was fighting and if he were released, he would not want to go back to Afghanistan. Instead, he would want to go to Saudi Arabia to raise his family.

d. The detainee's troops knew they could not fight the United States and would have to answer questions when they were captured. The detainee emphasized his willingness to help the United States.

e. The detainee said he did not want to be involved with any more fighting.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

29 June 2005

TO: UL SHAH, ZIA

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF UL SHAH, ZIA

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. After Ide 2000, the end of Ramadan, the detainee traveled from Karachi to Quetta Pakistan, then to Kandahar and Kabul, Afghanistan, changing buses in each city. The detainee stayed one night by himself in Kabul, Afghanistan.

2. The detainee says that he had four other brothers that were also drivers for the Taliban. He claims that these are his actual brothers, not just Muslim brothers.

3. The detainee transported personnel, weapons, food and supplies.

4. Additional materials the detainee transported consisted of cooking oil, bullets, heavy coats, and blankets.

5. The detainee was identified as being a member of the Harakat Ul-Jihad-I-Islami.

6. The detainee admits to interacting with possible Pakistani Inter Services Intelligence Directorate (ISID) spies working for Taliban and Harakat Ul-Jihad-I-Islami forces that reported to their leader Sajjad.

b. Connections/Associations

1. Shams Afgani is a friend of detainee who sold irons in Karachi, Pakistan and told him that Afghanistan needed drivers.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF UL SHAH, ZIA

2. Shams Al Afghani is originally from the Tora Bora region and was identified as being in charge of military operations and various fighters located in the valley of the Tora Bora region.

3. The detainee stated that while employed as a driver with the Taliban, he received his pay from either Kari Saleem or Muleela Bhai.

4. Qari Saleem is the head of a madrassa used by Harakat Ul-Jihad-I-Islami member Sajjad, who would frequently attend and hold meetings at the madrassa.

5. Sajjad is a member of the Taliban and a team leader in the Harakat Ul-Jihad-I-Islami. Sajjad held regular meetings in Qari Saleem's madrassa with about twenty to thirty people from the Harakat Ul-Jihad-I-Islami.

6. The Harakat Ul-Jihad-I-Islami is a Sunni extremist group founded to fight in the jihad against the Soviets. It's made up primarily of Pakistanis and foreign Islamists.

7. The Lashkar-e Tayiba is the armed wing of the Pakistan-based religious organization, Markaz-ud-Dawa-wal-irshad, an anti-US missionary organization formed in 1989. It was added to the US Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Asset Control's list, which includes organizations that are believed to support terrorist groups

8. The detainee admits to hearing about Baba Shams, local administrator of the Taliban.

9. The detainee provided additional information regarding other senior Taliban leaders. He described Juma Bahai, an Uzbek and the leader of the Taliban in Kawajaghar. Juma was in charge of all Arabs and foreigners such as Pakistanis and Afghans.

c. Other Relevant Data

1. Two of detainee's superiors were Qari Saleem and Muleela Bhai.

2. Qari Saleem was commander of the Punjabi troops in the Konduz region. He coordinated troop and supply movements from the school to forward areas in Tangi, Bangi Taqar and Khawajaghar. He also controlled all finances for the operation.

3. The Taliban forces used a school in Konduz as a headquarters and transition point for troops deployed in the Konduz region. Recruits, weapons, ammunition and food supplies were delivered from the school to forward areas north and east of Konduz.

4. The detainee surrendered to the Northern Alliance in Konduz on the tenth day of Ramadan. He drove his truck to Mazar-e-Sharif to surrender.

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5. The detainee escaped his captors shortly after surrendering and hid in a warehouse in some nearby woods until he was recaptured.

6. Besides the Harakat Ul-Jihad-I-Islami, the detainee was able to identify other Islamic groups known to him, the Jaish-e Muhammed, Harakat-Ul-Mujahedin and Laskar-e Tayyiba.

7. The Harakat ul Mujahidin is a Pakistan-based Islamic militant organization.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee claims he was never introduced to anyone higher than Qari Saleem.

b. The detainee denied ever receiving training from the Taliban and he claims he was not aware of any training camps for Taliban or al Qaida fighters nearby.

c. Detainee states he has never met Usama Bin Laden and doesn't know where he's located.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

17 November 2005

TO: AL JUDI, MAJID ABDALLAH

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL JUDI, MAJID ABDALLAH

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. In mid-November 2001 the detainee carried \$2,000 United States Dollars and traveled from Jeddah, Saudi Arabia via Bahrain and Tehran, Iran to Kandahar, Afghanistan.

2. The detainee was recruited to work for al Wafa in Afghanistan.

3. The detainee lived in the al Wafa office in Kandahar, Afghanistan.

4. The detainee was handed over to United States Forces with al Qaida documents in his possession.

b. Connections/Associations

The detainee's name was found on a document recovered from a suspected al Qaida safehouse in Karachi, Pakistan.

c. Other Relevant Data

The detainee claimed that while in Afghanistan he was involved in two food distribution runs to outlying villages near Kandahar.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL JUDI, MAJID ABDALLAH

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee stated that when he is released, he would go home to his family in Mecca, find a wife, get married and work in his family's clothing store.

b. The detainee stated that he wants to go home to Mecca and be like his brothers and sisters and have a family and never leave Mecca. The detainee has dreams of expanding the family business to include selling clothing and fabric.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

13 September 2005

TO: GHAZI, FAHED ABDULLAH AHMAD

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF GHAZI, FAHED ABDULLAH AHMAD

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
 1. The detainee was motivated to serve the Dawa and spread the word of the Koran as he believes that it is a Muslim's obligation.
 2. The detainee claims he traveled to Sanaa, Yemen and met with Sheik Muqbil to discuss the validity of a Fatwa. Sheik Muqbil issued a Fatwa that stated Muslims had a right to train themselves for self-defense against enemies.
 3. Sheik Muqbil and a few other "Brotherhood" movement supporters recognize Usama Bin Ladin as their leader. Sheik Muqbil was responsible for the jihadist movement in the geographical region of Sa'dah, Yemen.
 4. Sheik Muqbil advised the detainee to go for training in Afghanistan. Since he did not have any money for the trip Sheik Muqbil gave the detainee 500 to 600 United States dollars.
 5. Sheik Muqbil instructed the detainee to go to the Jama'ah al Tabligh Mosque in Sanaa where he could get a visa and a plane ticket to Pakistan. Since the detainee was still in the twelfth grade Sheik Muqbil told him to wait until after graduation to make travel arrangements. A year later the detainee went to the mosque, left his passport and some money and later returned to obtain his passport, visa and a ticket.
 6. The detainee flew from Sanaa, Yemen through Dubai, United Arab Emirates, to Karachi, Pakistan. He spent one night in a hotel then traveled to Quetta, Pakistan where he stayed for two nights at the Lukanda Hotel.

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7. The detainee crossed the border into Afghanistan. He taught the children in the villages around Spin Buldak, Kandahar, Kabul, Afghanistan.

8. The detainee went to Jalalabad, Afghanistan by bus where he taught in another village for about two weeks. From there he went to Khost, Afghanistan, where he stayed in various villages for about two months.

9. The detainee met a man named Asadullah who arranged for a guide to take the detainee back to Pakistan. The detainee eventually joined a group of 27 to 30 other people headed for the Pakistan border. The detainee paid the guide 200 to 300 rupees.

10. The detainee claims he crossed the border back into Pakistan and surrendered to the authorities. The authorities accused him of being a terrorist trying to escape from Afghanistan. He did not have his passport or anything else when he crossed into Pakistan. All he took was his Koran and about 700 Pakistani rupees.

b. Training

1. The detainee trained at the al Farouq training camp for nine days before hearing the news about September 11th.

2. The detainee was recognized as training at the al Farouq training camp on or around April 2001. He received training on how to shoot the Kalashnikov, the PK machine gun, the rocket propelled grenade launcher (RPG), and how to detonate explosives.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee spent four days at the Nabras guesthouse in Kandahar, Afghanistan where his passport and money were taken from him.

2. The Nabras guesthouse was used by fighters heading to the al Farouq training camp and by Usama Bin Laden. Arabs bound for training would gather at the guesthouse until about 25-30 were in the group and then they were transported to al Farouq. Bin Laden would come to Nabras to greet the fighters before they went to training. At Nabras, passports, money, tickets and other important documents were taken from each person.

3. The detainee stayed at the Azzam guesthouse in Kabul, Afghanistan for 35 days where he received additional training until the bombing started.

4. Hamza al Ghamdi ran the Azzam guesthouse in Kabul and is an intelligence agent who has been in Afghanistan for almost 15 years and has traveled to Bosnia and Chechnya for jihad.

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Hamza al Ghamdi is recognized as one of Usama Bin Ladin's most trusted people and reported directly to him.

d. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee traveled to Tora Bora and stayed there for 27 days to one month. He went with a group of men that included Sabi' who is the group trainer from al Farouq and the only person with a Kalashnikov.

2. The detainee was chosen to go to Tora Bora and become one of Usama Bin Ladin's bodyguards. Individuals from al Farouq would either go to Tora Bora to be one of Bin Ladin's bodyguards or they went to Kabul to await further assignment. The detainee was also recognized as a fighter in the KTAL region.

3. The detainee was recognized as one of Usama Bin Ladin's bodyguards and a member of his "dirty thirty" and a fighter in Tora Bora, Afghanistan.

4. The detainee was seen at Tora Bora carrying a Kalashnikov.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. During the time he traveled in Yemen, Pakistan and Afghanistan, the detainee says he had not heard anyone speak about recruiters for fighting in Afghanistan against the enemies of Islam. He also doesn't believe that there is currently a jihad.

b. An al Qaida operative and facilitator did not name the detainee as a Bin Laden bodyguard.

c. A chief al Qaida recruiter, planner, and top strategist did not identify the detainee.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

20 October 2005

TO: UTHMAN, UTHMAN ABDUL RAHIM MOHAMMED

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF
UTHMAN, UTHMAN ABDUL RAHIM MOHAMMED

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee voluntarily traveled from Yemen to Quetta, Pakistan where he stayed in a Taliban house in March 2001. The detainee admitted to seeing an assault weapon in the Taliban house during his stay.

2. The detainee voluntarily traveled from Quetta, Pakistan to Kandahar, Afghanistan in March 2001.

3. The detainee traveled between Khowst and Kabul, Afghanistan to teach the Koran for about 9 months starting sometime after March 2001.

4. The detainee stated that a Sheik financed his travel to Afghanistan with approximately 1000 United States dollars.

5. The detainee stated that his teacher from Al Farqan Institute introduced him to the Sheik.

6. The detainee claims he went to Afghanistan to teach the people the right ways of Islam.

b. Training

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A long-time Mujahid identified the detainee as someone who attended advanced training at Tarnak Farm near Kandahar, Afghanistan.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee met a Pakistani male who provided him with directions written in both Arabic and Urdu detailing how to reach the Taliban House in Quetta, Pakistan.
2. The Pakistani male has been identified as being at the Arab guesthouse in Kandahar and at the al Farouq and Tarnak Farms advanced training camps.
3. The detainee was seen at Usama Bin Laden's home in Kandahar, Afghanistan.
4. The detainee is associated with two suspects in the USS Cole bombing in Yemen.
5. The detainee studied the Koran for three years at the Farqan Institute, where he met a fellow detainee.
6. The fellow detainee from the Farqan Institute was a bodyguard for Usama Bin Laden and he was always by Bin Laden's side.
7. The detainee and Usama Bin Laden's body guard have been identified as part of the "Dirty Thirty" who caught trying to cross in to Pakistan from Afghanistan on 15 December 2001 and are suspected al Qaida members.
8. The detainee's name was on a document containing a list of names and safety-deposit boxes. The list was recovered from raids of a suspected al Qaida safe house.

d. Other Relevant Data

1. The Afghani guides took the group of thirty Arabs to the outskirts of Bershnia, Pakistan and departed. Once at the border, the Pakistani Police picked up the thirty Arabs and the detainee told the police that he wanted to go to the Yemeni Embassy but instead the detainee was taken to a Pakistan Prison in Peshawar where he was eventually handed over to the Americans.
2. The detainee denied being captured but stated that he and the other members of his group turned themselves into the Pakistan Police Force in Parchinar, Pakistan. The following day the detainee and the entire group was arrested and transferred to a prison facility in Peshawar.
3. A foreign government has identified the detainee and several Yemenis as fleeing Afghanistan and probably affiliated with al Qaida.

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4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
 - a. The detainee denied that anyone in particular influenced him to go to Afghanistan.
 - b. The detainee denied membership in or being affiliated in any way with either the Taliban or al Qaida.
 - c. The detainee does not know why the Yemeni government has labeled him an al Qaida member.
 - d. The detainee stated that he had no idea why the Yemeni government would have his name on a list of jihadist holding a Yemeni passport that had traveled to Afghanistan.
 - e. The detainee denied ever carrying a weapon while in Afghanistan.
 - f. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on September 11th and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States interests.
 - g. The detainee stated he did not go to Afghanistan to fight but to teach the Koran. The detainee stated killing women and children was against his religion and he would only fight others in self-defense.
5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

27 September 2005

TO: AL ALAWI, MUAZ HAMZA AHMAD

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL ALAWI, MUAZ HAMZA AHMAD

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee traveled to Afghanistan to seek martyrdom, fighting for his faith.

2. The detainee stated that Jihad is part of his religion and many generations of his family have participated in Jihad.

3. The detainee acted as the Imam at a Kandahar Taliban guesthouse.

4. The detainee purchased traditional Afghani clothing in an attempt to blend into the populace.

5. The detainee attended a Jam't al Tabligh gathering at the Maki mosque.

b. Training

1. The detainee took basic training at the al Farouq training camp.

2. The detainee was trained in the operation of rocket propelled grenade launchers and fired one round at the Khalid Center.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee traveled through Pakistan and Afghanistan staying at Taliban guesthouses.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL ALAWI, MUAZ HAMZA AHMAD

2. The detainee was taken by the Taliban fighters across the Pakistan-Afghanistan border.
3. The detainee was issued a Kalashnikov rifle, ammunition and two grenades at the Khalid Center.
4. The detainee was identified as a truck driver on the front lines fighting the Northern Alliance.
5. The detainee was a bodyguard for Usama bin Laden.
6. The detainee was observed with Usama bin Laden in the KTAL region.
7. The detainee departed Tora Bora shortly after Usama bin Laden with others.
8. The detainee was observed fighting for Sheik al Libi, the overall military leader in the Tora Bora mountains.
9. The detainee fought under the command of Abd al Hadi al Iraqi and Abu al Haiz al Masri.

d. Detainee Actions and Statements

1. The detainee surrendered his passport to a Taliban guesthouse operator.
 2. The detainee exchanged currency for U.S. \$100 bills.
 3. The detainee threatened to kill an interpreter at Guantanamo Bay upon his release from detention.
 4. The detainee was arrested after crossing the Pakistani border without a passport.
 5. The detainee has staged a hunger strike since his interment at Guantanamo Bay.
4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a. The detainee denied participating in fighting while in Afghanistan.
 - b. The detainee denied knowledge of al Qaida and the Taliban and claimed to not have met Usama bin Laden.
 - c. The detainee denied meeting or serving as a bodyguard for Usama bin Laden.

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d. The detainee denied being a member of the Taliban or fighting against the Northern Alliance forces.

e. The detainee denied being a member of al Qaida.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

4 October 2005

TO: AL ANSI, MUHAMMAD AHMAD ABDALLAH

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL ANSI, MUHAMMAD AHMAD
ABDALLAH

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
 1. The detainee learned of the Dawa from several sheikhs he heard in Sanaa, Yemen, including Sheikh Muqbil al Wadi whom he met at the al Khayr mosque in Sanaa.
 2. The detainee arranged with two fellow acquaintances to fly to Pakistan and make their way to Afghanistan to teach Islam.
 3. One of the detainee's friends who accompanied him to Afghanistan obtained 37,000 to 40,000 Riyals from Sheik Muqbil al Wadie.
 4. The detainee and his acquaintances flew to Dubai, then Karachi, Pakistan and then Quetta, Pakistan. The next day they crossed the border into Afghanistan.
 5. The detainee was identified as being present at the Khana Gulem Bechey guesthouse in Afghanistan.
 6. Another individual said the detainee was in Tora Bora for one month before he was captured.

b. Training

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL ANSI, MUHAMMAD AHMAD ABDALLAH

1. A senior al Qaida Commander said he recognized the detainee as someone he had seen in either Kabul or one of the camps in Afghanistan, possibly the Farouq camp between 1998 and 2000.

2. A senior al Qaida operative provided information on al Qaida participants in a 1999 elite training course at Mes Aynak camp in Lowgar, Afghanistan. He said the detainee was one of Usama Bin Laden's bodyguards beginning in mid-2000. Two months before 11 September 2001, he took the detainee and others to Karachi, Pakistan to teach them English and American behaviors. He stated that all of Usama Bin Laden's bodyguards were arrested two weeks before the fall of Kabul.

3. The same senior al Qaida operative identified the detainee as one of the martyrs who had been readied for the al Qaida's Southeast Asia hijacking plan of 11 Sept 2001. He also said Usama Bin Laden picked United States. airlines, citizens, and military installations as targets.

c. Connections/Associations

1. Abu Basir al Yemeni was a close friend with the detainee in Yemen as well as in Afghanistan. Abu Basir is known to be the personal secretary to Usama Bin Laden and was a trusted guard.

2. The detainee became a bodyguard for Usama Bin Laden in late 1999 or early 2000. He remained in that position for approximately one year.

3. The detainee was seen in July 2000 guarding Usama Bin Laden at Kandahar airport. The detainee shared a room with others in Kandahar. This house was known as the "gathering of six". Hamza al Qatari, a close associate of Usama Bin Laden who dealt with finances, stayed at this compound.

4. A senior al Qaida Lieutenant says the detainee was a guard for Usama Bin Laden. The Lieutenant saw the detainee at a guesthouse in 2001 when he went to visit Usama Bin Laden. He is certain about seeing the detainee.

5. The detainee was a bodyguard for Usama Bin Laden and was seen in Tora Bora with a handgun and a Beka.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee steadfastly denied any involvement in or knowledge of al Qaida activities while in Afghanistan or Pakistan.

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- b. The detainee claimed he has never received any formal or informal military training and was never issued or carried a weapon while in Afghanistan or Pakistan. He also claimed no enmity towards the United States.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

9 September 2005

TO: AL HIKIMI, AHMED UMAR ABDULLAH

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL HIKIMI, AHMED UMAR
ABDULLAH

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee said that in 1999 he was not practicing being a devout Muslim and was smoking a lot when he met a guy name Ahmed Al Ajami, who gave him advice on how to be a better Muslim. Ajami told him that he should repent by going to a Muslim country to teach children the Koran.

2. Ajami told the detainee to go to see Sheik Moqbil Al Wadae, a well-known Muslim religious scholar from Sadah, Yemen.

3. The detainee decided to get a Yemeni passport with 1969 as his date of birth. This was the year of birth that would make him too old to enlist in the Army. He went to the Taiz government office and paid approximately 10,000 Yemen Riyals for the passport and paid a bribe to change his year of birth from 1972 to 1969.

4. Sheik Wadae financially supported the detainee's travel to teach the Koran, because he did not have any money. Wadae gave him 5,000 Saudi Riyals (11,000 United States Dollars) to help with his travels.

5. Shaykh Muqbil Bin Hadi Al-Wadi'a, and a few other "Brotherhood" movement supporters, recognized Usama Bin Ladin as their leader. Wadi'a was responsible for the jihadist movement in the geographical region of Sa'dah, Yemen.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL HIKIMI, AHMED UMAR ABDULLAH

6. The detainee was given a choice of where to travel and decided on Afghanistan, because he heard that Afghanistan was very poor and needed help.

7. The detainee paid 2000 Yemeni Riyals for a document stating he had a medical problem; without this he wouldn't be able to travel to Pakistan. He then went to the Yemeni Minister of Interior to get his medical paper stamped for validity.

8. The detainee went to the Pakistani Embassy, showed his passport, medical paper and 1600 Yemeni Riyals to get a visa. He later had to pay 400 Yemeni Riyals for someone to write, in English, the purpose of his visit to Pakistan and his background biographical information.

9. After two-three weeks, the detainee decided to go to Afghanistan for the first time and went back to Sana'a, Yemen to buy an airline ticket for a flight to Karachi, Pakistan.

10. The detainee arrived in Karachi and exchanged some money for Pakistani money and looked for an Arabic speaking cab driver to take him to Peshawar, Pakistan. Sheik Wadae told him to go to Khvost, and Peshawar was the closest Pakistani city to Khvost.

11. After the detainee arrived in Khvost he went to the local market where he met a man named Kari Mohammed Khan. They decided that they would teach together in and around Khvost and Kabul, Afghanistan.

12. During the summer of 1999, and after eight months of teaching in Afghanistan and running out of money, the detainee returned to Taiz, Yemen.

13. In February 2001, nine months prior to Ramadan in November 2001, the detainee decided to go back to Afghanistan, for the second time to teach the Koran.

14. The detainee said that he went the same route to Afghanistan as he did on his first trip, Sana'a, to Karachi, to Peshawar, to Miram Shah to Khvost where he again went to Kari Mohammed Khan's house.

15. The detainee went back to the same Sana'a hospital and paid 200 Yemeni Riyals to Abdul, who gave an unknown doctor 2000 Yemeni Riyals for another medical document. Then he went to the Pakistani Embassy where he paid 1000 Yemeni Riyals to another unknown man to get a Pakistani visa.

16. The detainee was arrested while trying to cross into Pakistan from Afghanistan on December 2001 with 30 suspected al Qaida members.

b. Connections/Associations

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL HIKIMI, AHMED UMAR ABDULLAH

1. The detainee is suspected of being a member of al Qaida due to his association with the Kandahar, Afghanistan airport. It is known that those individuals linked with the Kandahar airport were automatically associated with being a member of Usama Bin Ladin's group.

2. The detainee was seen in Tora Bora and is a suspected member of Usama Bin Ladin's "dirty thirty". Several of these individuals are thought to have been bodyguards for Bin Laden.

c. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee's name, passport and a ticket was found on a list of al Qaida Mujahidin, and the contents of their "trust" accounts, found on files recovered from various computer media seized during raids against al Qaida associated safe houses.

2. The detainee, identified as Mullah Haji Rohullah, was seen on the front lines in Northern Afghanistan fighting for the Taliban against the Northern Alliance.

3. A senior al Qaida lieutenant recognized the detainee as someone he saw in Kabul and/or Kandahar, Afghanistan prior to the 11 September 2001 attacks and he was known to frequent the Bayt al-Salama guesthouse.

4. The al-Salaam guesthouse, "house of peace", was a lodging house that al Qaida ran for members and distinguished visitors to Qandahar.

5. The detainee was recognized as someone who fought in the Taloqan area of Northern Afghanistan for approximately one month. He lived at a safe house, or Madahfa owned by Hamzah Al Qati. Al Qati's Madahfa was approximately three kilometers from the front line.

6. The detainee was recognized again from the al Qaiti guesthouse in mid-2001.

7. The detainee traveled to Kabul and then to Jalalabad, Afghanistan. In Jalalabad, his duties were to transport clothing and supplies from there to Tora Bora, which he did until the bombing of Jalalabad. After the bombing he fled to Tora Bora and fought in the Al Wady-Mahghan region.

8. The detainee was identified as a driver on the Taliban front lines during late 1999 through early 2000.

9. An al Qaida operative identified the detainee as Abu Hammam whom he first saw in Kabul, Afghanistan at al Farouq Camp in 1999. He said the detainee would drive from the front line to the mountains with food for the brothers. Also, he would sometimes have other brothers that would switch out with others already in the mountains.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL HIKIMI, AHMED UMAR ABDULLAH

10. Weapons training was conducted on numerous weapons at al-Farouq. Students learned how to assemble and disassemble each weapon. They received training on the AK-47, AKM and PK machine gun. They learned to fire from sitting, kneeling and standing positions and became familiar with the RPG-7.

11. The detainee may have been spotted at a guesthouse in Kandahar, Afghanistan.

12. The detainee was recognized as someone who was captured at Tora Bora.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee says that he is not a member of al Qaida and only heard about it on television. He noted that he thinks Usama Bin Ladin is bad and knows that the United States has a problem with Bin Ladin. He claims that he has never met Bin Ladin and he does not know his "path".

b. The detainee says that he has not heard of any future attacks on the United States and does not know anyone who has knowledge or was involved in past attacks on the United States.

c. Sheik Wadae told the detainee not to fight in Afghanistan, because fighting was against Muslims and he was only there to teach. He agreed to not fight.

d. The detainee claims he has never been trained on any weapon and has no prior arrests.

e. The detainee had no problem with America or Americans and claims that he never had military-style training and that he attended no training camps in Afghanistan. He also says that he never handled or fired a weapon in Afghanistan and never fought in Afghanistan. He claims he only went to Afghanistan to teach the Koran.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

13 October 2005

TO: ABD AL MUJAHID, MAHMOUD ABD AL AZIZ

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF
ABD AL MUJAHID, MAHMOUD ABD AL AZIZ

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
 1. The detainee claimed that he was in Afghanistan on a Quranic missionary visit.
 2. The detainee indicated that Mukhtar al Qadasi arranged his travel from Yemen to Karachi, Pakistan. The detainee and Mukhtar al Qadasi traveled together.
 3. In July 2001, Mukhtar al Qadasi told the detainee it was time to go Afghanistan.
 4. Another detainee claims that either he or one of his acquaintances facilitated the detainee's travel to Afghanistan in late 1999 or early 2000.
 5. In Karachi, the detainee and Mukhtar al Qadasi were met by a friend of Sheikh Mufeed, a Yemeni identified as Khaled al Barakani. The detainee and two other men boarded a bus and traveled to Quetta, Pakistan.
 6. The detainee and Mukhtar al Qadasi were driven in a public car to the border of Afghanistan and Pakistan. When they arrived at the border, they got out of the car and crossed the border on foot into Buldak, Afghanistan.
 7. The detainee was seen at the Kandahar safehouse maintained by Al Qaida. Arabs who came to Kandahar for military training at the al Farouq training camp used this safehouse in particular.

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8. The detainee was seen at the Al Nibras guesthouse in Kabul, Afghanistan. The guesthouse was used to temporarily house new people being sent to training camps.

9. The detainee was seen in Tora Bora.

b. Training

1. The detainee was seen at al Farouq in May/June of 2000.

2. The al Farouq training camp was funded by al Qaida. The camp was more advanced than other training camps in Afghanistan.

3. The detainee was seen in the al Farouq training camp. While there the detainee was not convinced to fight against the Northern Alliance.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee became a bodyguard of Usama bin Laden shortly after the USS Cole bombing. The detainee remained a bodyguard for one year until al Qaida withdrew to Tora Bora. The detainee's older brother, Riyadh al Mujahid, was a veteran bodyguard of Usama Bin Laden.

2. A bodyguard for Usama bin Laden identified the detainee as one of Usama bin Laden bodyguards.

3. The detainee was seen several times with Usama Bin Laden between 23 October 2001 and 12 November 2001 in Kabul, Khost, and Jalalabad.

4. The detainee was captured with 30 suspected al Qaida members when they tried to cross into Pakistan from Afghanistan on 15 Dec 2001.

d. Intent

1. The detainee stated Christians and Jews are infidels and do not believe in the true God. He asserted that only Muslims are the true believers and advocated jihad to protect Muslim countries from invaders.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee denied attending al Farouq Training Camp and denied ever participating in any military training while in Afghanistan.

b. The detainee denied being a Usama Bin Laden bodyguard, denied swearing bayat to Usama Bin Laden and claimed he never saw anyone swear bayat to Usama Bin Laden.

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5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

22 September 2005

TO: AHMED, FARUQ ALI

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AHMED, FARUQ ALI

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee traveled from Tirez through Dubai, United Arab Emirates, to Karachi, Pakistan. He stayed at a hotel in Karachi before traveling to Quetta, Pakistan where he went to the Taliban office and met Abu Malak.

2. Abu Malak took the detainee to Kabul, Afghanistan after a three-day stop in Kandahar, Afghanistan and introduced the detainee to Abdul Rahman at the Wazir Akbar Mosque in Kabul. The detainee claims he taught the Koran to children at the mosque from approximately May to August 2001.

3. The detainee stayed at a house in Kabul that was used by Taliban officials to live in while in Kabul on business.

4. The detainee gave Abdul Rahman his passport for safekeeping while he stayed in Afghanistan and he did not retrieve it before departing for Pakistan.

5. Abdul Rahman used to work for the Taliban.

6. The detainee was identified as a Yemeni mujahideen who was captured at Tora Bora.

7. The detainee was seen wearing camouflage and carrying an AK-47 at Usama Bin Laden's private airport in Kandahar, Afghanistan.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AHMED, FARUQ ALI

b. Training

1. The detainee received no military training in Yemen because he paid a bribe to get out of his obligatory military service.
2. An admitted al Qaida travel facilitator identified the detainee as a Yemeni who traveled to Afghanistan in April 2001 and attended the al Farouq training camp.

c. Connections/Associations

1. On his way to the Pakistani border the detainee recognized some fellow Yemeni men in a group of refugees and joined them. The men he recognized were Abdul Malak, Osman, and Majed. The detainee remembered the men from their visits to his high school classes in Tirez, Yemen.
2. The Furqan Institute was a meeting and recruiting ground for jihadist in Yemen. Many Yemeni al Qaida members have links to the institute, specifically a number of the al Qaida members involved in the 12 October 2002 attack on the U.S.S. Cole.
3. An admitted Usama Bin Laden (UBL) bodyguard identified Abdul Malak as a bodyguard very close to UBL who introduced UBL to his fourth wife. He also identified Huthayfa Uthman as a Yemeni he heard was a UBL bodyguard for 20-30 days and fought on the front lines in Kabul. He also identified Majed as a bodyguard who was with UBL before he disappeared in Tora Bora as well as fought on the Kabul front lines in January 2001.
4. An admitted al Qaida travel facilitator identified the detainee's three friends as Usama Bin Laden bodyguards.
5. Another detainee identified Abdul Malak and Majed as Usama Bin Laden bodyguards. He also identified Uthman as a Yemeni mujahideen who was with him when he was captured at Tora Bora.
6. The detainee was identified as one of the 30 mujahideen who fled Tora Bora together after UBL left the area. The detainee was also seen many times at the Kandahar guesthouse.
7. A document listing 324 Arabic names, aliases, and nationalities was recovered from safe house raids associated with suspected al Qaida in Karachi, Pakistan. This list contains the detainee's name, nationality Yemeni, and passport.
8. A name matching the detainee's was listed on a radio brevity code sheet taken from suspected al Qaida members near Takhteh Pol, Afghanistan, on 24 November 2001.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AHMED, FARUQ ALI

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. An admitted UBL bodyguard identified the detainee as someone who came to Afghanistan only two to three weeks before the bombing began. He said the detainee is not known as an al Qaida member and spent his time in Afghanistan memorizing the Koran.

b. If released, the detainee would like to play soccer, get married, get his own house and find a job in Yemen. He does not feel any animosity towards the United States. He feels the people involved with the September 11, 2001 attacks should be held accountable for their actions. He would not want to harm any Americans.

c. The detainee denied he was a bodyguard for UBL. He has only seen UBL in pictures and believes he is a "bad" man deserving of punishment.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

15 June 2005

To: AL EDAH, MOHAMMED AHMAD SAID

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL EDAH, MOHAMMED AHMAD
SAID

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee took leave of absence from his job and traveled to Pakistan in July 2001.

2. The detainee's travel arrangements were made by his sister's husband (his brother-in-law) and assisted by the husband's friend.

3. The detainee's sister, Amani Ahmad Said Al-Adahi, was married to Riyadh Abu Al-Aziz Abd Al-Wali Al-Mujahid, a known UBL bodyguard.

4. The detainee had intentions of going to the front lines to fight.

b. Training

1. The detainee traveled to al Farouq and is knowledgeable of all the Yemeni trainers at al Farouq.

2. The detainee was identified by an al Qaida member as a light weapons instructor at al Farouq Training Camp in Kabul, Afghanistan, during the timeframe of January to February 2000.

3. The detainee was identified by an al Qaida member as having received training at the al Farouq Camp in Qandahar, Afghanistan, but was expelled.

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c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee was identified as a probable Usama Bin Laden bodyguard and was seen at the Al Nibras guesthouse in Khandahar several days before a visit by Usama Bin Laden. At the time, the detainee was accompanied by four other armed bodyguards of his own.

2. The detainee was one of the individuals responsible for security checks at the Nibras Guesthouse prior to Usama Bin Laden's visit in mid 2001. When he arrived, he was accorded respect and would only speak directly with the leader of the guesthouse.

3. The Niberas and Hassan are al Qaida guesthouses on the outskirts of Kandahar, Afghanistan. The Niberas guesthouse was used for new recruits who were on their way into the al Farouq Camp in order to receive tassesey (basic) training.

4. The detainee was identified by an al Qaida member as arriving in Afghanistan on July 2001 with his sister for the purpose of making arrangements for his sister's wedding.

5. The detainee and his family had excessive contact with senior al Qaida members and organizations via telephone. The family of the detainee has made an extremely high amount of international phone calls from Yemen to numbers inside Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and the United Kingdom. The detainee could not explain why his spouse and sister made over 80 phone calls to a number linked to a senior al Qaida facilitator.

d. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee was present in Kabul, Afghanistan during the American air raids and described how intense and devastating the bombing was. The detainee could not explain why he stayed in the combat zone ten days after the U.S. air strikes began.

2. The detainee was arrested by Pakistani Military authorities.

3. The detainee had in possession at the time of capture a silver A159W Casio watch which has been used in bombings that have been linked to al Qaida and radical Islamic terrorist improvised explosive devices.

4. The detainee injured his right arm and side while fleeing to Kandahar but claims the injuries are the results of him slipping off a motorcycle and not while engaging in combat.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL EDAH, MOHAMMED AHMAD SAID

a. The detainee advised that he took no part in the fighting in Afghanistan. According to the detainee, he is not a very religious person and definitely not a terrorist. He also states that he did not have any contact with al Qaida or Taliban officials.

b. The detainee stated that he was not asked to become a fighter.

c. The detainee adamantly stated that he had taken no part in fighting in Afghanistan and that he was there only to find medical treatment for his sister.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

22 September 2005

TO: AL YAFI, AL KHADR ABDALLAH MUHAMMED

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL YAFI, AL KHADR ABDALLAH
MUHAMMED

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee was seen in Tora Bora.
2. The detainee was on the front line in Kabul, Afghanistan.
3. The detainee fled Afghanistan in early December 2001, and was arrested when he crossed the border by Pakistani border guards.

b. Training

1. The detainee served two and a half years in the Yemeni army.
2. The detainee studied for six months at al Dimaj Institute.
3. The Dimaj Institute is a known terrorist training center.

c. Connections/Associations

1. A senior al Qaida Lieutenant recalled possibly seeing the detainee at the al Zubayr guesthouse prior to the 11 September 2001 attacks.
2. A senior al Qaida commander recalled seeing the detainee in a Kabul, Afghanistan, guesthouse.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL YAFL, AL KHADR ABDALLAH MUHAMMED

3. A bodyguard of Usama Bin Laden saw the detainee at an Arab compound in Kandahar, Afghanistan.

4. The detainee's name was found in a document listing al Qaida members.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

The detainee stated he never fought against the Northern Alliance, has never met Usama Bin Laden and never attended the Dimaj Institute.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

20 July 2005

TO: QADER IDRIS, IDRIS AHMED ABDU

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF QADER IDRIS, IDRIS AHMED ABDU

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee decided to go to Afghanistan in April 2001, at the suggestion of Mohammad Al Qadi, Imam of the Al Khair Mosque.

2. Al Qadi provided the detainee a plane ticket and approximately \$100 for his trip.

b. Connections/Associations

1. Prior to departure, Al Qadi told the detainee that a man identified as Abdul Razzaq Mohammad would meet him at the airport in Karachi. Abdul Razzaq took the detainee to a hotel and traveled with him to Quetta, Pakistan.

2. A known Yemeni al Qaida member revealed that in October 2000 Abd Al Razzaq Al Najjar (aka Abu Salih Al Yemeni) twice covered his travel expenses to Afghanistan.

3. A known Saudi al Qaida member identified Abd Al Razzaq Al-Najjar (aka Abu Salih Al Yemeni) as a Yemeni who collected funds in Saudi Arabia and recruited for al Qaida.

4. The detainee said he met an individual identified as Rosi Khan in Khost. Khan arranged for the detainee to stay at a room and later took the detainee to a group of thirty people leaving for Pakistan.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF QADER IDRIS, IDRIS AHMED ABDU

5. Information gathered in November 2003 states that the former Taliban area commander in Kabul, Afghanistan, has formed a new hit and run group in the Zabul Province. One of the Taliban commanders in this group was Mullah Rosikhan.

6. The detainee joined the group of thirty Arabs, which was being organized by Muhammad Anis, who promised to help the detainee and others raise funds to permit their return to Yemen once the party reached Pakistan. They were all apprehended once they reached the Parachinar border checkpoint.

7. Mohammed Annas is a known alias for Ali Hamza Ismail, media coordinator for Usama bin Laden. Ismail was captured along with 29 other Arabs in December 2001 by Pakistan authorities.

c. Other Relevant Data

If allowed to return to Yemen, the detainee hopes to return to his previous job at the Ministry of Agriculture and complete his college degree. The detainee stated he has fulfilled his obligation to teach the Koran and he has no intention of pursuing any further Koranic teaching opportunities.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

- a. The detainee denied going to fight or train in Afghanistan and said he has never fired a weapon of any kind. He continues to say he went to Afghanistan to teach the Koran.
- b. The detainee denied ever receiving any military or weapons training while in Afghanistan.
- c. The detainee denied ever having any membership in, or ties with the Taliban or al Qaida.
- d. The detainee stated he only interacted with the local Afghani people while teaching the Koran. He does not recall having any interaction with other Arabs.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

24 October 2005

TO: IDRIS, IBRAHIM OTHMAN IBRAHIM

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF IDRIS, IBRAHIM OTHMAN IBRAHIM

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
 1. Around 1988 the detainee traveled to Afghanistan to fight against the Soviet Union.
 2. The detainee fought with the Mujahideen in Afghanistan prior to Usama Bin Laden's al Qaida organization being formed.
 3. The detainee has been with al Qaida since the early 1990's.
 4. The detainee returned to Sudan after the war against the Soviet Union.
 5. The detainee was at the al Qaida guesthouse in Khartoum, Sudan during the years that Usama Bin Laden and a large portion of al Qaida were operating out of Khartoum.
 6. When al Qaida relocated to Sudan, the detainee became a messenger for Usama Bin Laden taking messages back and forth between Khartoum, Sudan and Mecca and Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.
 7. The detainee swore a bayat to Usama Bin Laden around 1994.
 8. The detainee traveled to Pakistan and Afghanistan sometime after 1994.
 9. The detainee traveled alone from Sudan to Karachi, Pakistan. He then took a bus to Quetta, Pakistan. He used his Sudanese passport to gain entry into Afghanistan making his way

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to Kandahar, Afghanistan. The detainee took a taxi from Kandahar to Kabul, Afghanistan near Bagram.

10. The detainee was seen in 1999 at the Carti Barwan guesthouse for Arabs in Afghanistan.

11. The detainee was seen on the Taliban front lines around late 1999 or early 2000 working as a doctor and also in charge of a house.

12. The detainee was seen at the al Farouq camp after the USS Cole attack in October 2000.

13. In February 2001, the detainee was seen at the al Farouq camp living in a tent and having a house built in the camp next to the mosque meaning that he was an important figure at the camp.

14. The detainee fought with the Taliban against the Northern Alliance for two years in Afghanistan prior to the start of the U.S. bombing.

15. The detainee fought with the Taliban under the command of al Qaida.

16. The detainee was seen on the Taliban front near the Murad Bik line, approximately 10 kilometers outside Kabul where he was overseeing all wounded from the fighting.

17. The detainee stated that he has killed people in battle while fighting against the Northern Alliance.

18. The detainee was identified as an interrogator who worked for the Taliban and al Qaida in Afghanistan.

b. Training

1. The detainee trained in an al Qaida camp in the middle of 1988.

2. The detainee trained on the Kalashnikov, Beka machine gun and mortars.

3. The detainee taught first aid at al Farouq.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee stated that that Usama Bin Laden visited al Farouq where the detainee spoke to Bin Laden and shook his hand.

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2. The detainee has been identified on an al Qaida membership list.

d. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee stated that he got into a car with some Taliban and drove towards the border of Afghanistan and Pakistan where he split from the group at the border and surrendered himself to the Pakistani Army.

2. The detainee was turned over to U.S. custody on December 26, 2001.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on September 11, 2001.

b. The detainee denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.

c. The detainee was asked whether he had any knowledge of planning of internal uprisings at the Guantanamo Detention Facility, with negative results.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

25 October 2005

TO: AL MUDHAFFARI, ABDEL QADIR HUSSEIN

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL MUDHAFFARI, ABDEL QADIR
HUSSEIN

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

The detainee wanted a struggle or jihad and chose to travel to Afghanistan rather than Palestine.

b. Training

A facilitator thought the detainee went to al Farouq as soon as he arrived in Afghanistan.

c. Connections/Associations

1. A facilitator responsible for moving money and fighters to and from Afghanistan stated he facilitated the travel of the detainee from Yemen to Afghanistan.

2. The detainee studied under Sheik Muqbil al Wadi. Al Wadi is a supporter of the Taliban and jihad.

3. An al Qaida operative identified the detainee as a trainer at an advanced training course. The detainee taught topography and weapon use to all the classes at the advanced training camp.

4. A low level al Qaida operative identified the detainee as a security guard for Usama Bin Laden.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL MUDHAFFARI, ABDEL QADIR HUSSEIN

5. A trusted al Qaida operative identified the detainee as a person in Mullah Omar's compound around 2000.

6. A facilitator stated the detainee went to Afghanistan in late 1999 or early 2000. He also stated the detainee had been a guard of Usama Bin Laden since approximately August 2001.

7. A facilitator stated the detainee is a friend of a close associate and trusted guard of Usama Bin Laden. The detainee was also the friend of another detainee.

8. The other detainee was seen many times at Usama Bin Laden's house.

9. The facilitator stated he did not know what the detainee did between his arrival in Afghanistan and the time he became a bodyguard, but he did not think he fought on the line.

10. Foreign Government Service information indicates the detainee was a weapons instructor and served as a bodyguard when he accompanied Usama Bin Laden to Kabul.

d. Other Relevant Data

The detainee was detained while trying to cross into Pakistan from Afghanistan on 15 December 2001 with 30 suspected al Qaida members.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The facilitator stated he did not think the detainee ever fought with the Taliban because he was against the Taliban.

b. The detainee stated that he felt the attacks on the World Trade Center and the other attacks in America that day were wrong. He stated that Islam did not permit people to kill innocent people, and it was wrong to declare war on them.

c. The detainee stated he never fought in the Afghan war against anyone.

d. The detainee said the Taliban did not recruit him to fight in the war against America.

e. The detainee said he had never heard of Usama Bin Laden's fatwa against the United States and claimed he never met Usama Bin Laden. He also stated he had no association with the Taliban or al Qaida.

f. The detainee decided to go to Afghanistan to spread the "truth" to the people of Afghanistan.

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF
AL MUDHAFFARI, ABDEL QADIR HUSSEIN**

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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**Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba**

3 November 2005

To: ABDU AHMED, MAJID

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ABDU AHMED, MAJID

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee learned of the Afghan jihad. In his second year at the Farqan Institute he decided to fight for the Taliban.

2. The detainee heard about jihad at the Mosque he attended and fell in love with the idea of dying for the sake of God.

3. The detainee telephoned Sheik al-Wadi and received a fatwa to go to Afghanistan for jihad.

4. The detainee fought for the Taliban for two years.

b. Connections/Associations

1. Upon his arrival in Quetta, Pakistan, the detainee stayed in a Taliban safehouse.

2. Upon his arrival in Kabul, Afghanistan, the detainee stayed in a Taliban safehouse.

3. Another detainee states that the detainee became a bodyguard for Usama Bin Laden around August 2001.

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4. The detainee stayed in a Taliban safehouse named "Otagh" in Kabul as he retreated from the front lines.

5. The detainee was with Usama Bin Laden in Tora Bora after the fall of Jalalabad.

6. The detainee arrived in Kabul, Afghanistan and spent time at the Hamza al Qa'eti guesthouse.

7. The detainee was observed in Kandahar and Kabul with other Usama Bin Laden bodyguards.

8. The detainee was seen in the Madafa, in Kandahar.

c. Intent

1. The detainee wanted to go directly to the Taliban front lines and be killed.

2. The detainee was excited about the fighting and wanted to engage the enemy but was not allowed to leave his unit. The detainee was willing to die and wanted to fight.

d. Detainee Actions and Statements

1. The detainee said the September 11, 2001 attacks in the United States were a direct result of unfair United States policies in place worldwide. The detainee then compared the killing of the innocent civilians in the World Trade Center to the non-combatants killed in Afghanistan and Iraq.

2. The detainee called the interviewing agents, "Infidels", and made statements advocating death to Infidels.

3. When asked where he would go if released, the detainee replied that he would go anywhere he wanted and it was none of our business.

4. The detainee stated that all Americans are infidels and they will go to hell. He advised that Americans do not believe in God or the prophet Mohammed. When asked his opinion of Muslim Americans, the detainee responded that Muslim Americans were not true Muslims and would go to hell as well. In addition, Jews and Christians are infidels regardless whether or not they are "People of the Book".

5. The detainee stated that Usama Bin Laden is a sheik and commander of all Muslims. He is a good Muslim and fights against the unbelievers.

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6. When asked about how he was captured, the detainee stated he was captured because America is a strong nation and controls the world. He said that God will torture the Americans because they are corrupt.

7. The detainee stated that the attacks on American on September 11, 2001 were very small in scale and he wishes for greater destruction and torture to fall upon Americans. He also reported he hates Americans because they are all infidels and corrupt.

8. The detainee stated that Americans killed innocent Muslims in Afghanistan.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee denied any association or affiliation with the Taliban or al Qaida. The detainee denied ever having stayed at the Madafa house in Kabul.

b. The detainee denied being a bodyguard for Usama Bin Laden and claimed to have never seen Usama Bin Laden.

c. The detainee denied ever being trained to fight.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

27 October 2005

TO: SHALABI, ABDUL RAHMAN

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SHALABI, ABDUL RAHMAN

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee served in the Taliban and fought on the front line against Massoud.

2. The detainee traveled to Peshawar, Pakistan from Medina, Saudi Arabia via Zahran, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Karachi, Pakistan. He then traveled to Khowst, Afghanistan via Torkhom, Pakistan and Jalalabad, Afghanistan.

b. Training

1. The detainee was reported to have trained at the Khalden camp.

2. The detainee was in the al Farouq training camp when coalition forces bombed it. The detainee was seriously wounded in the back and shoulder by shrapnel from the bombing.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee taught at a madrassa funded by Taliban leader Mullah Omar. The madrassa was located in Kandahar, Afghanistan.

2. The detainee was identified as a person who possibly had close ties to Usama bin Laden.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SHALABI, ABDUL RAHMAN

3. The detainee was observed with Usama bin Laden at a stone house built into a mountain in the Tora Bora region. The detainee was carrying a PK automatic machine gun when observed.

4. The detainee was known as a Usama bin Laden security guard. The detainee was observed in Kabul and Jalalabad, Afghanistan approximately ten times with Usama bin Laden between 23 October 2001 and 12 November 2001.

5. The detainee became a bodyguard for Usama bin Laden after 1998.

6. The detainee was armed with an AK-47 while at Tora Bora and made preparations with the other bodyguards for the arrival of bin Laden. The detainee was observed speaking directly with, eating with and being with Usama bin Laden at all times while bin Laden was in Tora Bora.

7. As of the year 2000, the detainee was working as a bodyguard for Usama bin Laden. The detainee was reported normally to be armed with an AK-47 assault rifle and possibly a pistol. The detainee also wore vest that carried two grenades and approximately four spare magazines for the AK-47. The detainee was seen acting as a bodyguard for bin Laden in February 2001.

8. A two page Arabic document containing names and telephone numbers of possible Taliban and/or al Qaida personnel and a request to transfer \$4000 United States dollars from the detainee to another individual was retrieved from an al Qaida training camp.

d. Other Relevant Data

The detainee is included on a foreign government's list of high priority detainees at Guantanamo Bay.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

- a. The detainee denied knowing anyone affiliated with al Qaida.
- b. The detainee denied having ever been taught to wage jihad against the United States.
- c. The detainee denied that any group or organization including the Taliban or al Qaida either directed the detainee or gave him permission to travel to Afghanistan.
- d. The detainee stated he does not know anyone who knows or works for Usama bin Laden or the bin Laden family. He stated he has never met Usama bin Laden or heard him speak.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SHALABI, ABDUL RAHMAN

e. The detainee stated he never received any weapons or military training in his life and he does not know of any such camps in Afghanistan or Saudi Arabia.

f. The detainee stated he did not agree with the killing of civilians, as it is against Islamic law and his religion would never condone an act like this. He further stated that Usama bin Laden was a "murderer".

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

16 November 2005

To: AL HASAN, SAMIR

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL HASAN, SAMIR

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

The detainee was told that he could live a simple life in Afghanistan and make more money. With this in mind the detainee decided to travel to Afghanistan to fight in the Jihad.

b. Training

1. The detainee claims that he was trained on the use of the Kalashnikov in a place called ad Dahna located about thirty minutes outside Taiz.

2. The training was conducted every Friday for four weeks. The training consisted of static firing and did not include any maneuver training.

3. The detainee claims to have gone straight to the front lines upon his arrival in Afghanistan.

4. An associate of the detainee claims that the detainee attended al Farouq and became a bodyguard in August 2001.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee advised that he was in Afghanistan as a relief worker for the Islamic Relief Organization.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL HASAN, SAMIR

2. The detainee claims that the relief organization has no central headquarters, no national level sponsor, no specific name, no associated logo or symbol. There were a total of five people employed by the organization.

3. The detainee claims that the organization he worked for was not affiliated with al Wafa, Ighathat al-Islami al-Kuwaitia (Kuwaiti Islamic Aid) or International Islamic Relief Organization.

4. An admitted bodyguard of Usama Bin Laden who was with Usama Bin Laden at Tora Bora identified a person who might be the detainee as a member of Usama Bin Laden's guard force.

5. The detainee told an associate that he (the detainee) had been a soldier with the Taliban.

6. The detainee's name and contents of his "trust" account were found on computer media seized in an al Qaida associated safe house.

7. The detainee stayed at a nice house in Kabul owned by the Taliban for approximately one week.

d. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee stated that all the information he previously provided on 19 February 2004 was deceiving.

2. The detainee claims after a week, he traveled north of Kabul to a military camp approximately two miles from the front lines with the Northern Alliance. The detainee was issued a Kalashnikov and provided jackets that held ammunition and weapons upon his arrival at the camp.

3. The detainee claims that he remained at his assigned post and pulled guard duty but never saw any Northern Alliance soldiers. The detainee claims that he did hear gunshots and fighting in the distance but his position never came under attack from the Northern Alliance.

4. The detainee stated that everyday at approximately 1600 or 1700, a vehicle would arrive at the house he stayed at and transport him and others to the front lines.

5. The detainee claims that he was not a member of the Taliban however, he did want to remain in their good graces so the detainee went to the front lines.

6. An associate of the detainee claims that he knew the detainee from Tora Bora where the detainee was a front line fighter in Baghram.

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7. An associate of the detainee saw him at the Kandahar guesthouse.
4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
 - a. The detainee claims that he has never taken a bayat (pledge or oath).
 - b. The detainee claims that he has never been to al Farouq and does not know anyone who has been there.
 - c. The detainee stated that once released, he would like to return to Yemen and get his previous job at the factory.
 - d. The detainee claims that he does not have any enemies and he considers Americans his friends.
 - e. The detainee claims that he does not know Usama Bin Laden and does not claim any loyalty to him.
 - f. The detainee claimed not to be a part of al Qaida and had not heard of it before his trip to Afghanistan.
 - g. The detainee claimed he never engaged in battle with Northern Alliance or American troops while in Afghanistan.
 - h. The detainee stated he didn't support the fighting between the Taliban and the Northern Alliance because Islam prohibits Muslims from fighting each other.
 - i. The detainee stated he came to Afghanistan for employment, start a family and he never had any intention of fighting.
5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

25 October 2005

TO: ABU GHANIM, MOHAMMED RAJAB SADIQ

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ABU GHANIM, MOHAMMED RAJAB
SADIQ

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
 1. The detainee traveled to Bosnia in late 1994 for the purpose of joining the jihad.
 2. The detainee stated he traveled to Afghanistan to fight with the Taliban.
 3. The detainee stated that it does not matter whether one is a Taliban member or not, it was perfectly acceptable to travel to Afghanistan to join jihad.
 4. The detainee was asked if he had sworn allegiance to anyone while in Afghanistan. He claimed he did not, but did state he would fight with his life.
 5. The detainee said he used his true name passport to travel from Yemen to Bosnia. He traveled from Sanaa, Yemen, to Damascus, Syria and continued on to Istanbul, Turkey.
 6. While in Turkey, the detainee obtained a visa for travel to Bosnia from the Croatian Embassy. From Istanbul, the detainee traveled to Ankara. Once in Ankara, the detainee claimed that an individual, who supposedly facilitated the detainee's travel to Bosnia via Zagreb, Croatia, met him.
 7. The detainee went to Katibat al-Mujahidin, Mujahidin Battalion Headquarters in Zenica, Bosnia-Herzegovina. Once at Zenica, the detainee said he turned over all his personal belongings to an individual who was in charge of the guesthouse.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ABU GHANIM, MOHAMMED RAJAB SADIQ

8. The detainee stated he traveled from Yemen to Afghanistan, leaving Yemen approximately six months prior to Ramadan, 2001. The detainee traveled from Sanaa to Karachi to Afghanistan.

9. The detainee claimed he wanted to go to Afghanistan because it was an Islamic state.

10. The detainee later claimed he traveled from Sana'a, Yemen, to Kabul, Afghanistan, via Karachi and Quetta, proceeding directly to the front lines north of Kabul, where he spent just under a year.

11. The detainee claimed his job was just to attack anyone who attacked him. He never visited Kabul, and never left the front lines.

12. When the detainee arrived into Afghanistan he joined the Mujahidin fighters and fought against Dostum's Forces in the north.

13. The detainee was at the Duserag frontline six to seven months.

14. The detainee fought at Duserag, against the Northern Alliance. The detainee then left and traveled to Garabal.

b. Training

1. The detainee stated that he did not need any additional training before heading to the frontline because of his participation in Bosnia.

2. The detainee stated he received his weapon upon arrival at the frontlines.

3. The detainee spent about one month training in Bosnia and spent eleven months fighting.

4. From the guesthouse in Zenica, the detainee claimed he went to a training camp possibly in Mehrez.

5. The detainee was trained on handling AK-47's and Rocket Propelled Grenade launchers.

6. The detainee claims that he has never heard of any training camp anywhere in Afghanistan. He claimed to receive his weapons training in Bosnia and so had no need to attend another in Afghanistan.

7. The detainee joined the Yemeni Civil War fight at the age of 19. He claimed he received basic training from the Yemeni Army. The detainee trained in Kalashnikovs and basic

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ABU GHANIM, MOHAMMED RAJAB SADIQ

combat skills. The detainee fought in the Yemeni Civil War for two years, fighting in the northern part of Yemen the entire time.

8. After the detainee finished his month long training in Bosnia, he traveled to the northern part of Bosnia to what he called the Zeravich area. The detainee fought in the Zeravich area for six months.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee was identified by a source as being one of Usama bin Laden's security guards.

2. The detainee was identified by several sources as a bodyguard for Usama bin Laden.

3. The detainee was identified by an individual that knew him to be part of a group that was seen around Usama bin Laden in different locations. The detainee was seen carrying a Kalashnikov rifle.

4. The detainee was identified by an important facilitator as having been in Bosnia in 1995, Yemen from 1996-2000 and Afghanistan in February or March 2001. The detainee is reported to have joined the Guard Force in August 2001 and may have gone to Tora Bora.

5. The detainee talked to an individual about going to Afghanistan and this individual paid for the detainee's trip. The detainee stated the individual supported the Taliban ideology but does not know if he was a Taliban member.

6. The detainee advised that he was given money for his ticket to Karachi by someone that the detainee knew. The detainee first approached the individual about going to fight in Chechnya, but was told there was no way to get him there.

7. The individual gave the detainee the money to go to Afghanistan because of the individual's support for jihad and approving of the Taliban regime.

8. The detainee claims he fought with the Taliban while in Afghanistan. He saw the United States drop bombs during the United States campaign in November of 2001.

9. The detainee fought with the Mujahidin fighters that fought under the support of the Bosnian army. The detainee went back to Yemen when the Dayton Accords were signed.

d. Intent

The detainee made the following comment: "If I were free, no one would be able to stop me from doing what I want to do, not even your intelligence people. If you cooperate with me, I

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will write down everything I know. As you have already noticed from your intelligence people, you couldn't stop what has already happened. The information I have already given is no longer important. All I need is to be left alone at my home to be able to do what I want to do. My information is so important and so dangerous, your intelligence and your FBI would never even imagine it, but I know".

e. Other Relevant Data

1. When the Taliban fell, the detainee went to a guesthouse belonging to someone he met on the front lines, stayed there 20 days, then walked to the Pakistani border, where he was captured with about 30 others.
2. The detainee was among other Yemeni citizens who around November 1999, were arrested on conspiracy to commit terrorism charges.
3. The detainee remained in custody during that time, where he was questioned about plans to undertake operations against Yemeni government and western interests.
4. The detainee claimed that he had contact with an agency, which had recruited him to undertake sabotage operations in Yemen.
5. The detainee also admitted that, although originally loyal to Bin Laden, the planned activities contravened a Bin Laden order that jihadists refrain from terrorist operations in Yemen, Pakistan and Sudan.
6. The detainee departed Bosnia after the Dayton agreement was signed in about November 1995.
7. The detainee spoke of information concerning a serum that causes the body's muscles to deteriorate, and will cause it's victim to die.
8. The detainee previously stated he had information that was so dangerous, we needed to hear it right away. The detainee later denied ever having said that, and blames it on the linguists, saying their translations are not correct.
9. When the detainee was asked how he knew a certain al Wafa official, he claims to know this information because of family ties.
10. The detainee advised that he joined the Taliban, not al Wafa.
11. The detainee was arrested in Bayt Habra, Yemen, for stealing and spent approximately eight months in a Yemen jail.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ABU GHANIM, MOHAMMED RAJAB SADIQ

12. The detainee also spent eight to nine months in a Saudi Arabian jail. The arrest stemmed from an attempt to smuggle weapons into Saudi Arabia with al Qaida associates.

13. The detainee claimed only being a fighter assisting the Taliban.

14. The detainee doesn't want to return to Yemen because of being falsely accused of a crime for which he was imprisoned for eight and a half months. Supposedly it was this imprisonment that led him to leave the country.

15. The detainee claims a family member had something to do with the bombing of the USS Cole.

16. The detainee stated there would be a future attack on America bigger than 11 September 2001. All Americans will pay for their actions against the Muslim detainees in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.

17. The detainee stated it was up to God when he was going to get out of Guantanamo Bay, Cuba and that he was perfectly happy here serving God.

18. When asked about his fighting experience in the Zeravich area, the detainee stated he did not really see much action and claimed he very seldom came in contact with the enemy. The detainee stated when he did come in contact with the enemy he would fire into the area where he thought the enemy was, and most likely the enemy would run away.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee stated he had nothing to do with al Wafa. It was a story he had made up because he was being beaten.

b. The detainee denied ever meeting or even seeing Usama bin Laden. He only knows of him through the media.

c. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001.

d. The detainee denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ABU GHANIM, MOHAMMED
RAJAB SADIQ**

continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

1 August 2005

TO: ABDALLAH, SAYF BIN

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ABDALLAH, SAYF BIN

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee admitted he went to Afghanistan as a mujahid to fight with the Taliban.

2. The detainee stated that while in Afghanistan for jihad, he utilized the alias Sayf Bin Abdallah.

3. The detainee was sent to Kabul, Afghanistan, where he spent four weeks at the Dar al Aman safehouse.

4. The Taliban then gave the detainee an AK-47 and bullets before flying him to Kundas, Afghanistan. From there, he was transported to the front lines at Khaoujaghar, Afghanistan.

5. One day prior to Ramadan, the detainee and others were told to withdraw towards Kandahar. The detainee was wounded during this trip and spent approximately 18 days in a hospital in Kandahar. He then withdrew to Khowst where he spent one night in a makeshift hospital.

b. Training

1. The detainee attended weapons handling training at Jabl Esabr ("Mountain of Patience") Camp. A Yemeni with the alias Abu Imed supervised these sessions.

2. The detainee stated he was trained on the AK-47, RPG, and the heavy machine gun (DSHK) while in Afghanistan.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ABDALLAH, SAYF BIN

c. Connections/Associations

1. In early interviews, the detainee claimed that the primary reason he started thinking about going to Afghanistan to do the jihad were tapes he had viewed of a blind Egyptian sheik, Abd Al-Hamid Kishk, who was advocating doing the jihad in Afghanistan.

2. Once when the detainee was listening to some religious tapes in the mosque in Via Baretto in Turin, an Arab named Nur Al-Din approached him, encouraging the detainee to go to Afghanistan.

3. The detainee and two other men obtained their tickets together at a travel agency in Milan, Italy.

4. A travel agency in Milan organized trips for Islamic militants traveling from Italy through Iran to Afghanistan.

5. The detainee and two other men met with an official of the Taliban Ministry of Foreign Affairs located at Herat, Afghanistan. The official had the men change into local Afghani clothing.

6. The detainee was identified by a known al Qaida member as serving in Afghanistan under Rida al Tunesi, the head of the Tunisian al Qaida faction in Afghanistan.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the U.S. prior to their execution on September 11th.

b. The detainee admitted to hearing far-off sounds of battle but denied participating in any combat actions while at his outpost.

c. The detainee repeatedly claims he does not know his recruiter or travel companions.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

19 October 2005

TO: BARAYAN, MAJID AL

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF BARAYAN, MAJID AL

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
 1. While in England in 1995 the detainee visited the Finsbury Park Mosque on several occasions.
 2. Although the detainee claims to have traveled to Malaysia to see tourist sights in approximately January 2001, he could not provide locations or sights where he visited.
 3. In early 2001 the detainee was at Usama Bin Laden's private airport in Kandahar, Afghanistan.
 4. Another detainee identified the detainee as a mujahideen from Jeddah, Saudi Arabia that he met at Kandahar.
 5. A detainee identified the detainee as being on the front lines near Taloqon, Afghanistan in April 2001. The detainee was assigned to an anti-aircraft artillery weapon.
 6. The detainee resided in a Taliban guesthouse in Kandahar, Afghanistan.
 7. The detainee resided in a Taliban guesthouse in Kabul, Afghanistan.
 8. Although the detainee claims to have taught children in an orphanage, he does not know the name of the orphanage. The detainee could not recall any of the orphans' names nor could he remember how many orphans were there. The detainee was unable to provide any concrete information regarding this orphanage.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF BARAYAN, MAJID AL

9. An al Qaida member identified the detainee as an al Qaida trained Arab fighter who was fighting the Northern Alliance at Tolaquin when the 11 September 2001 attacks occurred.

10. Another detainee identified the detainee as a member of al Qaida.

11. In October 2001 an al Qaida member saw the detainee at a safe house in Kabul and later in Tora Bora fighting in the KTAL region.

12. The detainee was armed with an AK-47 at Tora Bora.

13. A foreign government identified the detainee on a watch and arrest list for his trip to Chechnya.

b. Training

In early 2001 the detainee received basic training at the al Farouq training camp. Training included weapons training, basic commando course, topography and explosives.

c. Connections/Associations

The detainee was captured with a group of 30 men while trying to cross into Pakistan from Afghanistan on 15 December 2001. The group of 30 men included mujahideen, known al Qaida members and Usama Bin Laden bodyguards.

d. Intent

In April 2003 the detainee tried to organize a fatwa on Lima block. The Fatwa stated that if the Americans cut anyone's beard then all the detainees on Lima block should refuse to say anything at all to interrogators and should spit on all the guards.

e. Detainee Actions and Statements

1. The detainee remarked that the United States deserved what they got on 11 September 2001.

2. The detainee expressed admiration for the Taliban. The detainee said that Mullah Omar is a very good man who did a lot of good things for the people of Afghanistan.

3. The detainee said it is part of his duty as a Muslim to learn to fight and defend Islam.

f. Other Relevant Data

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF BARAYAN, MAJID AL

When the detainee was asked if things were confusing during the fighting, with people running up the hills and back down again and many people dying, he replied, "yes." When the detainee was asked if he fired at the Americans, he replied, "No, not at the Americans; we could not see them."

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee denied receiving any type of training at any camp in Afghanistan and further denied any connection or loyalty to al Qaida or Usama Bin Laden.

b. The detainee denied being in Tora Bora.

c. The detainee indicated that the citizens of the United States are hard working and that there lifestyle is good and he would not want to harm the United States. The detainee stated he does not like the terrorist attacks that occurred in the United States on 11 September 2001.

d. The detainee agreed with the idea that the United States is a super power and that they should use its powers to keep world peace.

e. The detainee said he has never met Usama Bin Laden and he has never heard of his fatwa against the Jews and Crusaders, which authorized and commanded Muslims to kill Americans, wherever they find them.

f. The detainee said he is unfamiliar with Usama Bin Laden's messages or his beliefs.

g. The detainee stated he believes the terrorist attack on 11 September 2001 was wrong.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

29 July 2005

TO: AL MURBATI, ISSA ALI ABDULLAH

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL MURBATI, ISSA ALI ABDULLAH

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
 1. The detainee heard about U.S. bombings in Afghanistan and he felt it was a Muslim obligation to go to Afghanistan to help.
 2. The detainee was placed in jail five separate times for seventy-two hours because of nonpayment of his debt by a judge whose name he could not recall.
 3. The detainee stated that while in Bahrain, he was affiliated with Al Tabligh.
 4. Al Tabligh is most likely identifiable with the Jamaat al Tabligh, a legitimate Islamic missionary organization based in Pakistan and believed to be used as a cover for action by Islamic extremists.
 5. The detainee was asked to deliver an envelope containing \$3,000 USD in \$100 bills to Sheik Monsoor at the El Makki Mosque in Karachi.
 6. The detainee boarded a bus headed for Pashawar. The Pakistanis arrested him and took \$1,000 USD.
 7. The detainee has been identified by two individuals as a high level member of al Qaida.
 - b. Training

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL MURBATI, ISSA ALI ABDULLAH

1. The detainee served 12 years with the Bahraini Defense Force (BDF). In the summer of 1993, he received training on aircraft arms systems at Lowery AFB, Colorado for approximately two and a half months.

2. The detainee has been identified by another individual as being at the al Farouq training camp.

3. The al Farouq training camp was funded by al Qaida and therefore was more advanced than other training camps in Afghanistan.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee has used the alias Abu Ali.

2. The detainee was identified as a follower of Abu Sayyaf. The detainee met Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines in 1997 to discuss getting money to Arabs in Afghanistan.

3. The detainee was persuaded to go to Afghanistan for the jihad by Sheik Mustafa. Mustafa was a member of the Jamaat al Tabligh.

4. Sheikh Mansur worked for Jamaat al Tabligh at the al Makki Mosque in Karachi, Pakistan.

5. The detainee said there was a Pakistani man named Mohammed Bashir who drove him in a mini-van from Karachi, Pakistan to Kandahar, Afghanistan. Bashir is possibly associated with Jamaat al Tabligh, and works out of the al Makki mosque.

6. The detainee was injured in the neck, shoulder and leg in a grenade accident. Two others might have been killed in the accident.

d. Intent

1. The detainee felt the United States was wrong for attacking the Taliban because the U.S. never provided any evidence to support that UBL or al Qaida was involved with the Taliban government.

2. The detainee was questioned about his affiliation and belief in al Qaida and Usama Bin Laden (UBL). He would not directly answer any of the questions dealing with either al Qaida or UBL.

3. The detainee spoke to the interviewers in English and said: "Fuck you Americans! Bin Laden will get all of you Americans as he has already killed a lot of you."

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL MURBATI, ISSA ALI
ABDULLAH**

e. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee has admitted lying in past interviews. He originally stated he traveled to Afghanistan to help provide humanitarian aid. There are many inconsistencies in his story.

2. The detainee has given various accounts of his story in the past, and therefore it is difficult to assess which story is the real one.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee denies his involvement with al Qaida or any other terrorist group. He claims that he was in Afghanistan conducting relief and charity work for the Afghan people.

b. The detainee has not attended any training camps or received any type of terrorist or military training since he left the Bahrain Air Force.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

23 June 2005

TO: AL MAHAYAWI, SAUD DAKHIL ALLAH MUSLIH

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF
AL MAHAYAWI, SAUD DAKHIL ALLAH MUSLIH

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee was seen at Qandahar and identified as a mujahid from Jeddah.

2. The detainee's name was found on a floppy disk seized during a raid on an alleged al Qaida residence in Pakistan on 11 Sep 02.

3. The detainee's name was found on a hard drive associated with Khalid Shaykh Muhammed. The hard drive was seized during a raid in Pakistan on 1 Mar 03.

4. The detainee claims affiliation with the Tabliq Jamat, but was a fighter at Tora Bora.

5. Jama'at Al Tablighi is a Pakistan based Islamic missionary organization used as a cover to mask travel and activities of terrorists, including members of al Qaeda.

6. The detainee was arrested as part of a group referred to as the "Dirty 30." Many of those captured were either Usama bin Laden bodyguards or had direct association with Usama bin Laden.

b. Intent

The detainee was an al Qaida trained fighter at a guard post in the valley between Tora Bora and Jalalabad, armed with an AK-47. The detainee fired his weapon when he came under fire from Afghans in the valley.

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c. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee was arrested in Saudi Arabia for attempting to create a new jihad organization in A'wkadin, Ethiopia. His name was on the list of those forbidden to travel for five years per decree, dated 23 Feb 1998, and he was also on the watch and arrest list for his trip to Chechnya, per ministerial decree dated 21 Feb 2002.

2. After their arrest in Pakistan, the Pakistani Warden of the prison informed the group that the best thing they could tell U.S. forces when interrogated was they were in Afghanistan to teach the Koran.

3. The detainee did not have his passport when he was arrested. He stated he had left it in Abdullah's village.

4. The detainee made his own arrangements and paid for his travel to Afghanistan.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. When asked by investigators what the detainee knew of the attack against the US, he was remorseful and stated that a good Muslim would not attack innocent people.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

21 June 2005

TO: AL ZAYLA, MUHAMMED YAHIA MOSIN

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL ZAYLA, MUHAMMED YAHIA
MOSIN

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
 1. The detainee wished to travel to Chechnya and fight with fellow Muslims.
 2. The detainee specifically sought out military training to allow him to fight in Chechnya.
 3. The detainee was advised that prior to traveling to Chechnya to fight, he was required to obtain military training. The detainee was advised to contact Ali-Mahood when he was ready to begin his military training in Afghanistan.
 4. Ali-Mahood assisted the detainee in obtaining a travel visa for Pakistan and in making travel arrangements.
 5. Ali-Mahood's name was provided to the detainee by Salih Elharbi. Elharbi had previously fought in Chechnya and was encouraging Saudis to go to Chechnya.
 6. The detainee traveled from Riyadh, Saudi Arabia to Afghanistan via Kuwait; Lahore, Pakistan; and Quetta, Pakistan.
 7. The detainee served for approximately five months on the front lines north of Kabul.
 8. The detainee withdrew from the front lines around Kabul in November 2001.
 9. The detainee was identified as being at Tora Bora.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL ZAYLA, MUHAMMED YAHIA MOSIN

10. The detainee was part of a group of thirty individuals captured while trying to cross into Pakistan from Afghanistan on 15 December 2001. Several of these individuals are thought to have been bodyguards for Usama Bin Laden.

b. Training

1. The detainee trained at al Faruq training camp approximately 4 1/2 months prior to September 11, 2001.

2. The detainee left Al Faruq training camp two weeks prior to completion of his training in order to obtain first hand battle experience.

3. The detainee received training at the front lines on the assembly and disassembly of AK-47 rifles, as well as the rocket-propelled grenade launcher.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee stayed at the Daftar Taliban Madafa guesthouse in Quetta for several days.

2. Daftare Taliban is a Taliban office in Quetta, Pakistan, helping Arabs cross the border into Afghanistan by coordinating travel and lodging for a fee. The Taliban office advises Arabs to stay at houses in Kabul and Kandahar, Afghanistan, during travel.

3. The detainee stayed at the Al Ansar guesthouse which was run by Abu Khaloud. Abu Khaloud arranged for his training at the al Farouq camp.

d. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee was unable to explain why most of his group of thirty had the same cover story for leaving Afghanistan, which several have admitted to being false.

2. The detainee had three \$100 U.S. bills in his possession at the time of capture, and was unable to explain why some of the other individuals he was captured with also had \$100 U.S. bills.

3. The detainee initially stated he traveled to Afghanistan to perform missionary service.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee advised that he has no interest in traveling to Chechnya and that he has never had hard feelings towards the Americans.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL ZAYLA, MUHAMMED YAHIA MOSIN

b. The detainee was looking for some adventure in his life and he regrets ever leaving Saudi Arabia.

c. The detainee wished that he had never left his family to go to Afghanistan and he thinks that his time here as a detainee is God's punishment for leaving his family.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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**Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba**

1 Jun 2005

To: AL HARBI, SALIM SULIMAN

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL HARBI, SALIM SULIMAN

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee traveled to Afghanistan in 1990/1991 for the Jihad.
2. The detainee sold his automobile to finance his trip to Afghanistan.
3. The detainee went to Afghanistan because he was advised drugs in Afghanistan were abundant and cheap to buy.
4. In early 2001, the detainee left home to seek an improved life in Afghanistan.
5. The detainee left Saudi Arabia in late 2001 to avoid his creditors.

b. Training

The detainee has experience using a rifle.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee's alias was in the pocket litter of a Mujahadeen traveling from Bosnia to Croatia in 1996.
2. After the detainee decided to go to Afghanistan, he was introduced to Darwish al Said, who facilitated the detainee's travel.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL HARBI, SALIM SULIMAN

3. Darwish al Sayid is also known as Abu Hashim.
4. Abu Hashim al-Sayyid Darwish's name appears on a list of al Qaida martyrs that was discovered on a computer hard drive seized during the capture of a senior al Qaida operative.
5. The detainee stated that while living in Khowst, he was approached in a local market by a member of the Tablighi Jamaat. The two men traveled with other members of Tablighi Jamaat around Khowst to spread the word of Islam.
6. The detainee acknowledged that the Tablighi Jamaat might have been interested in recruiting someone similar to him to exploit his skills involving fraud, theft, drug trafficking, and travel.
7. The Tablighi Jamaat is also known as the Jama'at al-Tabligh. Many al Qaida operatives have joined the Jama'at al-Tabligh in order to travel in the guise of Islamic missionaries.

d. Intent

1. The detainee decided to leave Afghanistan after he controlled his drug habit. He traveled to Peshawar, Pakistan, with two Afghani men who were members of the Tablighi Jamaat. The detainee stayed with one of the men for three days at his home in Peshawar, and refused to provide further details on his capture.
2. The detainee took a taxi to the Afghanistan/Pakistan border, crossed the border on foot, and was detained by Pakistani authorities shortly after entering Pakistan.
3. The detainee was injured in a motorcycle accident, so he headed to Pakistan to seek medical attention. After walking for six to seven hours towards the Afghanistan/Pakistan border, the detainee was intercepted by Pakistani authorities.
4. The detainee claims he was on a bus that was hit during a United States air raid and received a head wound which left him unconscious for two days. An Afghan escorted him to the border crossing at Miramshah where he was apprehended by Pakistani authorities.
5. The detainee stated that Americans make a mockery of Islam, and Americans are at war with the detainees.
6. During an attempt to restrain the detainee, he kicked a guard in the head. The incident stemmed from the guards' response to the detainee turning a table over during an interview.
7. This detainee has a history of aggressive behavior towards detention personnel. The detainee has been disciplined numerous times for assault, harassing the guards, failure to comply, inciting disturbances, and hostile acts. He has threatened to kill the guards and interpreters. The

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detainee has taught other detainees how to fight, and has been found with a sharpened rock and metal strip inside his cell.

e. Other Relevant Data

1. A foreign government service stated the detainee was jailed in Makkah after some financial problems with Interpol in 1419 (1998/1999).

2. The detainee was in prison in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia for about one month and was then transferred to a prison in United Arab Emirates. He was imprisoned approximately seventeen months for defrauding a satellite cellular phone company of cellular phones, which he sold on the open market.

3. The detainee spent two years in prison for stealing and possession of a controlled substance.

4. According to United States Customs documents, the detainee traveled to the United States on June 16, 2001.

5. A foreign government service identified the detainee as a priority target.

6. The detainee stated he lost his passport in Khowst.

7. The detainee stated the Saudi Arabian Government sent his brother to the United States to attend college about 20 years ago.

8. The detainee stated he does not have a brother working at the Saudi Arabia Consulate in New York City.

9. Detainee denied he has or had, at any time, a brother living in the United States.

10. The detainee alluded to having knowledge pertaining to incidents that would be considered war crimes, but refused to discuss them.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee maintains he was not answering a fatwa or a call to jihad.

b. Because the Saudi Mullahs ruled that it was appropriate, the detainee did not object to the use of American troops in Afghanistan.

c. The detainee claims no knowledge of the Taliban, al Qaida, or prior knowledge of the 11 Sep 2001 attacks.

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d. The detainee stated he was not approached by members of the Tablighi Jamaat to join forces with the Taliban, al Qaida or any other Islamic Fundamentalist movements. He said the Tablighi Jamaat strictly conducted missionary type work.

e. When the detainee heard that the Americans were coming to Afghanistan, he decided to leave. He wanted nothing to do with the fighting, and had no weapon while he was living in Afghanistan.

f. The detainee denies knowing how to fight, or instructing other detainees how to fight.

g. The detainee claims that if released, he would like to return home to Mecca, Saudi Arabia, to live with his brothers and sisters and work. He said he would never set foot in Afghanistan again.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

28 June 2005

TO: AL WAHAB, MUSA ABED

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL WAHAB, MUSA ABED

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee received a fatwa to conduct Da'wa activity in Afghanistan.

2. The detainee admitted he voluntarily traveled from Saudi Arabia to Afghanistan in 2001.

3. The detainee used his own money to pay for his trip to Afghanistan.

4. The detainee was captured with a group of 30 individuals that include some of Usama Bin Laden's bodyguards and a weapons trainer.

b. Training

1. The detainee was reported to have attended a known terrorist training camp from July to September 2001.

c. Intent

1. The detainee was reported to have been in Tora Bora, where Arab fighters were ordered to assemble after September 2001.

2. The detainee was reported to be an Emir of a group of fighters in Tora Bora.

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3. The detainee was seen with an Arab military division outside of their military building in Konduz, Afghanistan.

d. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee is on a foreign government watch list for his trip to Chechnya.

2. The detainee was jailed for his participation in a theft with two Nigerians who were deported.

3. The detainee spent 2 ½ years in Saudi prison accused by another prisoner of being involved in a theft of property.

4. The detainee left his passport and some money behind in Afghanistan.

5. The detainee was designated by the Saudi Ministry of Interior as a "high priority" detainee.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. A foreign government service believes the detainee to be of low intelligence or law enforcement value to the United States and also unlikely to pose a terrorist threat to the US or its interests.

b. The detainee claimed to have no knowledge of any war or armed conflict taking place in Afghanistan.

c. The detainee said that the Afghani who convinced him to go to Afghanistan was not a member of the Taliban.

d. The detainee claimed not to recognize al Qaida or al Wafa. The detainee advised that he read an article in a Saudi newspaper that mentioned that Usama Bin Laden was wanted by the authorities in Saudi Arabia, but did not know why they sought him. He was not aware of any fatwas issued by Bin Laden.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

20 October 2005

TO: AL UWAYDHA, SULTAN AHMED DIRDEER MUSA

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL UWAYDHA, SULTAN AHMED
DIRDEER MUSA

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee procured travel to Afghanistan through Karachi and Quetta, Pakistan.

2. In Afghanistan, the detainee stayed in Gazni, Kandahar, Khost, Medan Shari and Kabul.

3. The detainee stayed at the Omar Ibn Khatab Mosque in Gazni, Afghanistan.

4. The detainee was seen at a guesthouse in Kandahar and at Usama Bin Laden's house.

5. The detainee was identified by an al Qaida operative as having been one of Bin Ladin's bodyguards.

6. The detainee was identified by an al Qaida operative as having been with Usama Bin Laden in Kandahar, Kabul, and Tora Bora.

b. Training

The detainee was identified by a senior al Qaida planner as having received training at al Farouq.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL UWAYDHA, SULTAN AHMED DIRDEER MUSA

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee's uncle was identified by a senior al Qaida planner as an al Qaida bodyguard and driver.
2. The detainee was identified as a probable bodyguard for Usama Bin Laden.
3. The detainee's name was on a list of al Qaida Mujahidin and the contents of their "trust" accounts found on computer media recovered during raids against al Qaida-associated safehouses in Rawalpindi and Karachi.

d. Detainee Actions and Statements

The detainee was known for his ability to fix weapons, particularly the Kalashnikov rifle and the Dashaka 38AA, an anti-aircraft weapon.

e. Other Relevant Data

The detainee surrendered to the Pakistani Army while attempting to cross the border.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
 - a. The detainee claims to not be aware of any threat to U.S. interests.
 - b. The detainee has never been arrested in the past and expressed a willingness to cooperate.
 - c. The detainee claims that his story is true and that other detainees have falsely implicated the detainee to gain special treatment or favors.
 - d. The detainee claims to have never received firearms, terrorist, self-defense training or having fired a gun.
 - e. The detainee denies being involved with Usama Bin Laden, the Taliban or Jamaat Tablighi.
5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

12 October 2005

TO: KARNAZ, MURAT

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF KARNAZ, MURAT

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

On or around 3 October 2001, the detainee traveled from Frankfurt, Germany to Pakistan to learn about Islam.

b. Training

The detainee does not have any military service.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee traveled from Bremen, Germany to various sites in Pakistan to study the Koran. The detainee had decided to travel at this time because his new wife was not yet living with him in Germany. The detainee was sponsored by the Jamaat Tablighi Organization.
2. On 3 October 2001 the detainee and his friend attempted to depart the Frankfurt, Germany airport for Pakistan. However, his friend was stopped, questioned and detained concerning various unpaid legal fees. The detainee was then forced to travel to Pakistan alone and planned on staying there for one and a half to two months.
3. The detainee identified his friend as a possible suicide bomber.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF KARNAZ, MURAT

- a. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001 and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States' interests.
 - b. The detainee was queried regarding any knowledge or planning of internal uprisings at the Guantanamo detention facility with negative results.
 - c. The detainee was aware of the attacks on 11 September 2001. The detainee initially thought that it was an earthquake, but later witnessed the footage of the collapse of the second tower and understood that it was an attack. The detainee referred to the victims as mothers, fathers, sons and daughters.
 - d. The detainee said that no one asked him to fight. The detainee stated that the Jamaat Tablighi did not fight with guns and used words to teach instead. The detainee said that he was not interested in fighting and this was not his war.
 - e. The detainee denied that the Jamaat Tablighi discussed recruitment for fighting while he was at one of their meetings. The detainee denied ever receiving any weapons training when he traveled to Pakistan and also denied having a weapon.
5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

16 August 2005

TO: AL JUHANI, MUHAMAD NAJI SUBHI

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL JUHANI, MUHAMAD NAJI SUBHI

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. *Commitment*

1. The detainee used his own funds to travel from Saudi Arabia to Afghanistan in June 2000 to perform Islamic missionary work after hearing several fatwas issued by Imams in Jeddah.

2. The detainee was seen in Kabul in 1999, visiting for approximately two weeks, between fighting on the front lines under the command of Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi.

3. A senior al Qaida lieutenant stated the detainee might have stayed at the Hamza al-Ghamdi guesthouse in Kabul. He also stated the detainee was seen on the front lines at Kabul.

4. The detainee was seen in a Kandahar guesthouse.

5. An admitted jihadist identified the detainee as a Mujahadin fighter in Afghanistan, a fighter at Tora Bora, and a bodyguard for Usama Bin Laden.

6. The detainee was a Mujahideen at Tora Bora on a jihad mission.

7. The detainee and the other 29 Arabs arrested together were all Mujahideen who were in Tora Bora with Usama Bin Laden (UBL) when the American bombing started. The group of 30 fled Tora Bora together after UBL left the area.

b. *Connections/Associations*

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL JUHANI, MUHAMAD NAJI SUBHI

1. A document recovered by United States forces in Kandahar lists over 150 al Qaida members scheduled for tactics, artillery, security, snipers, and anti-aircraft training dated March 2001 by the Office of Mujahideen Affairs. A variant name of the detainee's is found on the list under Tactics Course Number 2 and Artillery Class Number 2.

2. A name matching the detainee's was found on a chart listing the names of captured Mujahidin. The information was found on a hard drive associated with Khalid Shaykh Muhammad, and was seized on 1 March 2003 in Pakistan.

c. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee and the group of thirty Arabs were arrested in December 2001.

2. All thirty Arabs used the same story of going to Afghanistan to teach the Koran.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee claims he did not attend any training camps or swear Bayat to anyone. He claims he never participated in any type of military training or combat.

b. The detainee stated he was not part of the Taliban or al Qaida.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

31 October 2005

TO: AL QAHTANI, MUHAMMAD MANI AHMED AL SHAL LAN

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL QAHTANI, MUHAMMAD MANI
AHMED AL SHAL LAN

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
 1. The detainee said he first traveled to Afghanistan from Saudi Arabia around the beginning of 2001 to participate in jihad, which he deemed a religious obligation. Once in Afghanistan, the detainee attended training at the al Farouq training camp.
 2. The detainee said he completed his training approximately three months after he entered Afghanistan, and he was then compelled to swear bayat to Usama bin Laden. The detainee stated he did this in person with Usama bin Laden, without any witnesses, while at Usama bin Laden's residence in Kandahar.
 3. The detainee stated that sometime in the summer of 2001, after he swore bayat to Usama bin Laden, he was approached and asked to conduct a martyr mission from Usama bin Laden.
 4. At the time the detainee agreed to conduct the mission there was no specific plan in place; however, the detainee knew that per his bayat and obligation he would be called upon at a later time to conduct a martyr mission.
 5. The detainee said his decision to agree to conduct a mission stemmed from three basic fatwas. First was a fatwa in which he felt obligated to participate in jihad in Afghanistan. Second was a fatwa in which he felt obligated to swear bayat to Usama bin Laden. And third was a fatwa in which the detainee felt obligated to do whatever Usama bin Laden asked of him, including conducting a martyr mission, because he had sworn bayat to Usama bin Laden.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL QAHTANI, MUHAMMAD MANI AHMED AL SHAL LAN

6. The detainee was instructed by a senior al Qaida official to obtain British and United States visas. The detainee was then provided airline tickets from Dubai to London to Orlando by his facilitator.

7. The detainee traveled to Orlando, Florida on 4 August 2001. He was unable to answer questions at airport customs and did not have a return ticket. After being denied entry into the United States, he returned to Dubai, United Arab Emirates. He applied for a second United States visa, and after it was denied he traveled to Afghanistan.

8. The detainee answered affirmatively when asked whether he would have completed whatever mission he was assigned when going to the United States.

b. Training

1. The detainee stated that after the completion of his basic training at al Farouq, he attended a city tactics course in Kandahar, Afghanistan, which lasted approximately one and a half months.

2. The detainee attended al Farouq training for a total of five to six months. His initial training lasted approximately two to three months and consisted of indoctrination, small arms (AK-47, handguns, grenades), and physical training. His advanced training also lasted approximately two to three months and consisted of small unit tactics and specialized weapons training.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee identified two senior al Qaida members. He admitted to knowing these two individuals and meeting them in a safehouse in Kandahar, Afghanistan prior to 11 September 2001.

2. The detainee met personally with Usama bin Laden on four different occasions.

3. In February 2001 the detainee traveled from the Arab guesthouse in Kandahar, Afghanistan to Usama bin Laden's house in Kandahar, Afghanistan to give his allegiance to Usama bin Laden.

4. In April 2001, after graduating from advanced training, the detainee visited Usama bin Laden at his house to honor and praise him. The detainee told Usama bin Laden that he would continue to serve him as he would the prophet Mohammed. During this visit, Usama bin Laden instructed the detainee to contact a senior al Qaida official for instructions on how to serve his religion.

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5. In June 2001, on his own initiative, the detainee met with Usama bin Laden again at Usama bin Laden's house in Kandahar, Afghanistan to greet him and to tell him he was ready for his mission to the United States. Usama bin Laden called a senior al Qaida official and advised him that the detainee had returned from the front line and was ready to complete his mission to America.

6. In August 2001 the detainee met Usama bin Laden again at Usama bin Laden's house in Kandahar after the detainee returned from his failed mission to the United States.

7. When the detainee returned to Afghanistan after his failed mission to America, he saw a known suicide bomber at different guesthouses on two separate occasions.

8. The detainee was detained while trying to cross into Pakistan from Afghanistan on 15 December 2001 with 30 suspected al Qaida members.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on September 11th, and he also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or its interests.

b. The detainee insisted that he was a different person now than he was back in the summer of 2001. He then insisted that he would not have done a mission that involved killing women and children. The detainee said he would have refused to participate in that type of operation and would have asked that he be allowed to return to Afghanistan.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

18 July 2005

TO: SEBAII, ABDEL HADI MOHAMMED BADAN AL SEBAII

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SEBAII, ABDEL HADI MOHAMMED
BADAN AL SEBAII

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
 1. The detainee said that Afghanistan had an Islamic government and he wanted to go help build a Mosque.
 2. The detainee traveled to Afghanistan after hearing Saudi Imams say that Afghanistan was in need of support and the people of Saudi Arabia should do all that was possible to assist.
 3. The detainee took leave to go to Afghanistan in late August 2001. He arrived there with 2,700 dollars.
 4. The detainee flew from Riyadh, Saudi Arabia to Karachi, Pakistan via Qatar and Bahrain. He then traveled by bus to Quetta, Pakistan and then by taxi to Kandahar, Afghanistan.
 5. The detainee said that he walked the whole month of Ramadan to the Pakistan border and he and two other men submitted themselves to the Pakistani authorities. The detainee was held by Pakistani authorities and told there was a problem with his papers, meaning his passport and visas.
 6. A foreign government service placed the detainee on a watch list in February 2002. They also designated the detainee as a high priority target.

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b. Training

The detainee trained in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia for his job with the police department. He trained with firearms (revolver), American weapons and a Saudi Arabian rifle called the G-3. He also received training in crime scene investigation.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee's pocket literature included documents containing the name Arsala Khan.
2. Two recovered letters written by Usama Bin Ladin express thanks to Arsala Khan for his financial support and protection.

d. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee stated that in 1997 he was asked by an Al-Haramayn official to travel to Sudan to assist in a major flood.
2. Al Haramain has been connected with violent Islamic groups and possible financial support of militant groups. They're known to support Islamic extremist elements in 17 countries or regions.
3. The detainee states he did not build the mosque because of the war. He had given 900 dollars to Mohammed (last name unknown) in advance to build the mosque.
4. The detainee could not account for 1,500 dollars of the money he took to Afghanistan.
5. The detainee has a past history of aggressive behavior towards military personnel.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

The detainee states, "He never thought America would attack Afghanistan".

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

21 October 2005

TO: AL SULAMI, YAHYA SAMIL AL SUWAYMIL

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL SULAMI, YAHYA SAMIL AL
SUWAYMIL

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. Before the detainee arrived in Afghanistan, he lived in Saudi Arabia where he recruited Mujahideen fighters and collected money and passports. After the detainee was married, he left for Afghanistan and trained at the Khalden training camp in Khowst, Afghanistan.

2. After graduating from a religious institute, the detainee decided to preach the "Word of God" to non-Arabs. The detainee stated that many religious scholars issued a religious decree regarding the importance of teaching the Koran to non-Arabs. Therefore, the detainee decided to travel to Afghanistan to fulfill this duty.

3. The detainee said a friend convinced him to go to Afghanistan because there were people there who needed to learn the Koran. The detainee said he went to Pakistan first for four or five days before going to Afghanistan.

4. The detainee said he traveled to Karachi by himself and paid for the trip with his own money and money his friend gave him. He had about 10,000 Saudi riyals and his friend gave him 5,000 riyals.

5. The detainee said he left Pakistan and traveled to Khowst, Afghanistan. He said he taught Afghan students at the Abi Hanifa Mosque in a village outside Khowst. He said he taught children and adults.

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b. Training

People who were selected for specialized training provided a demonstration of the skills they learned to their trainer before they were sent on a mission. The detainee was identified as probably having this special mission training.

c. Connections/Associations

After the American attack on Afghanistan, the detainee contacted an acquaintance and requested him to arrange for his return to Pakistan. The acquaintance introduced him to two Afghan guides. The guides were to take the detainee along with 30 other Arabs from the Afghan city of Khowst to Pakistan.

d. Detainee Actions and Statements

1. The detainee was seen firing his weapon when his group came under fire from Afghans in the valley between Tora Bora and Jalalabad, Afghanistan.

2. The detainee was identified as the Emir of a group of 10-15 fighters guarding a river crossing leading to the Tora Bora camp.

3. After a helicopter attack killed the leader of a region in Tora Bora, the detainee took over as the military leader since he was the most senior of all the other fighters based on his experience fighting in Afghanistan since 1995. Prior to the helicopter attack, the detainee had been managing logistics and moving supplies to fighters in the mountains.

e. Other Relevant Data

Pakistani forces captured the detainee while he was trying to cross the border from Afghanistan.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on September 11th and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or its interests.

b. The detainee stated he would never go to Afghanistan again and showed no interest in taking up arms for jihad.

c. The detainee stated he wished to be transferred home to live with his family. The detainee stated he would get a job in the market place selling fruits and vegetables.

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL SULAMI, YAHYA SAMIL AL
SUWAYMIL**

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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