

# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

26 October 2005

To: RAZAQ, ABDULLAH

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF RAZAQ, ABDULLAH

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee stated that during his time on the front lines there was gunfire and he did fire his weapon, although he never saw the enemy that he was shooting at.

2. The detainee traveled to Chechnya to join the jihad and die where his brother had died.

b. Training

1. The detainee and his brother attended the al Farouq training camp. The brothers paid for specialized instruction.

2. The detainee and his brother were identified by a senior al Qaida member as having trained at al Farouq.

3. The detainee explained he was at the al Farouq camp for about two months. During this time he spent the first month learning weapons and the second actually practicing with them.

c. Connections/Associations

1. At the Kandahar safe house, the detainee told the safe house facilitator that he wanted to go to the front lines. There he surrendered his passport and his money for safekeeping.

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2. The detainee and his brothers were identified by a senior al Qaida member as possible al Qaida operatives.

3. The detainee was told by one of Al Latief's friends that it was too cold in Chechnya for combat and Afghanistan would be better. The detainee agreed and arrangements were made instructing the detainee what route to travel.

4. The detainee's name was found on a list that contained the names of suspected al Qaida members.

#### d. Intent

1. The detainee explained that after his brother Al Latief was killed, he was filled with grief. He was very close to this brother and resolved to follow in his footsteps.

2. The detainee was impatient to become a martyr like his brother.

#### e. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee felt that perhaps he was allowed to attend training in Afghanistan because of his young age.

2. During the detainee's stay at the front lines he had a month of advanced weapons training. This involved the same weapons as he was trained on at al Farouq.

3. The detainee identified the weapons he trained on by reviewing the Department of Defense Country Handbook for Afghanistan.

4. The detainee was on the front-line for about 5 months, after which there came an order from the Taliban for everyone to retreat.

5. Once the detainee arrived at Bissawar, he and the others were all put into a prison, where they stayed until turned over to United States forces.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on September 11, 2001.

b. The detainee denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.

c. The detainee maintained that he was never trained in the use of an SA-7, or any shoulder-held missile.

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- d. The detainee was also questioned regarding any knowledge or planning of internal uprisings at the Guantanamo Detention Facility, with negative results.
  - e. The detainee heard of the organization of al Qaida, although he had no first hand knowledge of members or full purpose of al Qaida.
  - f. The detainee said he never swore Bayat to either Usama Bin Laden or al Qaida. The Detainee maintained that doing so would violate the teachings of his Imam in Saudi Arabia.
  - g. The detainee was not a member of al Qaida. The detainee had no loyalty or respect towards neither al Qaida nor the Taliban.
  - h. The detainee never thought about actually fighting the United States.
  - i. The detainee had no first hand knowledge of any items being smuggled in or out of Afghanistan.
  - j. The detainee said he felt good about telling the truth and said he would continue to cooperate.
5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

28 November 2005

TO: AL BAWARDI, KHALID SAUD ABD AL RAHMAN

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL BAWARDI, KHALID SAUD ABD  
AL RAHMAN

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
  - a. Commitment
    1. The detainee used the same route many Saudi jihadists used to go to Afghanistan. The detainee also used similar housing and dining arrangements.
    2. The detainee met a man at the Karachi, Pakistan airport who became his guide and translator. The detainee agreed to go to Afghanistan with this guide.
    3. The detainee stated that his guide and translator while he was in Pakistan and Afghanistan was a Tablighi organization representative.
    4. The detainee was in or near Kabul, Afghanistan for about three to four months beginning in June or July 2001.
    5. The detainee claimed he taught at the Aman Abu Haneefa Mosque in Khowst, Afghanistan for approximately four months.
    6. Sometime in September 2001, the detainee sought to leave Afghanistan.
    7. The detainee left Kabul in mid-October 2001 and traveled toward the Afghanistan/Pakistan border.
    8. In November 2001, the detainee joined a group of male refugees heading toward Pakistan.

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL BAWARDI, KHALID SAUD ABD AL RAHMAN**

9. The detainee was identified as having traveled with a group of 29 men from Khowst, Afghanistan to the Pakistan border. They were arrested as they were crossing the border.

10. The detainee was identified as one who was at Tora Bora digging bunkers and caves.

11. The detainee was identified as one who fought in the Quodous area and was in charge of determining where caves and bunkers would be dug.

## b. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee took about \$4,000 United States Dollars into Afghanistan with him.

2. An immigration document shows a person with the same name as the detainee arrived in Orlando, Florida on 24 July 2000 and departed on 28 August 2000. The document shows the name "Khalid Albawardi" with a date of birth of 21 November 1972.

3. An immigration document shows a person with the same name as the detainee arrived in Orlando, Florida on 4 July 2001 and departed on 1 August 2001. The document shows the name "Khalid Albawardi" and the date of birth is not listed.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee denies any association with al Qaida or the Taliban and claims he did not take part in or see any fighting at all.

b. The detainee stated he was never recruited to fight for the Taliban or al Qaida. He did not hear of anyone who preached about the jihad, and had no knowledge of the training camps throughout Afghanistan.

c. When the detainee was questioned about the Aman Abu Haneefa Mosque, he stated that he did not know anything about the mosque.

d. The detainee said that Usama bin Laden lied to Muslims and that the sheiks in Saudi Arabia should go and tell the truth so that the killing will stop. The detainee defended Muslims and his faith but stated that Usama bin Laden is not a good Muslim if he lies and urges the death of innocent people and fellow Muslims.

e. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001 and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or its interests.

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f. The detainee denied ever traveling to the United States, or Orlando, Florida, specifically. He denied ever losing his passport or giving it to anyone else to use. The detainee maintained he was in Saudi Arabia during July 2000 and took no trips abroad.

g. The detainee said he would not participate or join the Tablighi members in their efforts because they have too many rules and regulations governing their charity efforts.

h. The detainee claimed he was in the United Arab Emirates for a vacation and to do missionary work only. The detainee claimed that if released he will never go on vacation again.

i. The detainee stated he was in Afghanistan to perform missionary work, preach the teachings of Allah, and to help individuals suffering in that country.

j. The detainee turned himself in to members of the Pakistan Military.

k. According to the detainee, if returned to Saudi Arabia, he would go home, find a job, and never leave Saudi Arabia again, even in response to a fatwa.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Numbers not used

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Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

7 October 2005

TO: AL RASHID, MESH ARSAD

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL RASHID, MESH ARSAD

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
  - a. Commitment
    1. The detainee decided to join jihad due to information he had heard on the television and the radio about religious persecution of Muslims in Afghanistan.
    2. The detainee felt that it was his religious duty to heed the fatwa and that a jihad is valid and justified if Muslims are being persecuted and if the King of Saudi Arabia approves.
    3. The detainee identified himself as a soldier of Islam and went to Afghanistan to defend his faith. The defending of Islam was his motivation. The detainee was fighting for the Nation of Islam.
    4. The detainee made travel arrangements at the Mecca Travel Agency in Saudi Arabia. He made all the travel arrangements on his own. Detainee traveled from Riyadh, Saudi Arabia to Islamabad, Pakistan. He then arrived at the Afghanistan/Pakistan border where he stayed in an empty house, close to the border.
    5. The detainee used his own money for the travel.
    6. The Pakistani guide assisted the detainee and another man to cross the border into Afghanistan. The three men used a route through the mountains to cross the border. After arriving in Afghanistan, they traveled to Kandahar, Afghanistan. The Pakistani guide took the detainee and the other man to a Taliban house. The detainee told the individuals at the Taliban house that he wanted to join the Taliban.

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL RASHID, MESH ARSAD**

### b. Training

1. The detainee was sent to the Al Farouq camp, near Kandahar, where he trained for approximately one month. The detainee trained with the Kalashnikov, grenades, and the PK machine gun.

2. The detainee was identified as being in the City Tactics class.

### c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee was identified at the Al-Farouq camp as a person who worked with wireless communication systems. The detainee knew Abd Al Hadi Al Iraqi and he served as Al Iraqi's liaison when he came to the camp.

2. The detainee acknowledged that Usama Bin Laden and other al Qaida leaders visited Al Farouq.

3. The detainee was part of a defensive guard unit. They were guarding the Bilal area of Afghanistan. The detainee's group was from Al Farouq.

4. A document recovered from safe house raids lists 324 Arabic names, aliases, and nationalities. The safe house raids are associated with suspected al Qaida in Karachi, Pakistan. The detainee's alias appears on this list as number 223.

### d. Intent

The detainee would act as a mid-level religious leader by encouraging his group about jihad and being a martyr.

### e. Detainee Actions and Statements

The detainee was a Taliban soldier who fought on the front lines against the Northern Alliance. The detainee believes Americans were fighting with the Northern Alliance.

### f. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee had a great knowledge of the Wohabi sect of Islam. He also implied that he was an active participant in the practice and beliefs of the strict boundaries enforced by the Wohabi.

2. The detainee refused to acknowledge that Usama Bin Laden had declared war on citizens of the United States.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

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- a. The detainee advised he did not kill anyone while fighting with the Taliban.
  - b. The detainee said he is an innocent man and the reason why he went to Afghanistan was to fight the Northern Alliance. The detainee said the Northern Alliance is his enemy and not the United States.
  - c. The detainee denied knowing Abdul Hadi Al-Iraqi.
  - d. The detainee denied knowing about Tarnak Farms.
  - e. The detainee stated that Usama Bin Laden's justification for the events on 09/11/2001 was not proper according to his understanding of Islam.
  - f. The detainee feels that he made a mistake in going to Afghanistan to fight and that he should have researched the situation fully.
  - g. The detainee never intended to fight against Americans. When he found out that Americans were entering the fight, he decided to surrender.
  - h. The detainee was on the secondary line near Kabul, Afghanistan when the 9/11/01 attacks occurred. The detainee advised he had nothing to do with the attacks and was not in Afghanistan to fight against Americans.
  - i. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on September 11th, and he also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.
5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

10 August 2005

TO: LAHASSIHI, NAJEB

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF LAHASSIHI, NAJEB

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee traveled from England, where he had entered illegally, to Pakistan and then to Jalalabad, Afghanistan. He was persuaded to do so by a man he had met at the Baker Street Mosque in London.

2. The detainee was also seen at the Finsbury Park Mosque in the United Kingdom

3. The detainee traveled using a falsified passport that had been obtained for him in London.

b. Training

1. From July through August 2001, the detainee traveled daily to a Taliban training camp where he attended military training.

2. While at the training camp, the detainee learned how to shoot the Kalashnikov and throw hand grenades and he watched many videos about jihad against the "Tyrants" and "Infidels".

c. Connections/Associations

The detainee lived at a guesthouse in Jalalabad, Afghanistan that was located near the Taliban Intelligence Center.

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF LAHASSIHI, NAJEB**

## d. Detainee Actions and Statements

1. A few days after 11 September 2001, the detainee and others left Jalalabad and traveled into the mountains where he was issued a Kalashnikov and assisted some Taliban fighters in digging trenches.

2. After approximately one month in the mountains, the detainee traveled to Konduz, Afghanistan to fight with the Taliban against the Northern Alliance.

3. The detainee was possibly in charge of a group of twenty fighters in Zurmat, Afghanistan after the 11 September attacks.

4. The detainee surrendered to General Dostum's forces near Mazar-e-Sharif.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee stated that the September 11th attacks did not make him happy, as he did not have any problem with the United States and did not consider the killing of women and children to be within the laws of Islam.

b. The detainee advised he did not want to fight the United States Armed Forces in Afghanistan. The detainee stated he does not consider the United States an enemy.

c. The detainee denied any plans to participate in jihad in the future.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

1 September 2005

TO: SHARIPOV, RUKNIDDIN FAYZIDDINOVICH

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SHARIPOV, RUKNIDDIN  
FAYZIDDINOVICH

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee stated that his passport and money were taken when he arrived in Lajeer. The detainee was told his things would be returned once his military job was completed.

2. The detainee was given military clothing, received some weapons training, and stood guard duty.

3. The detainee traveled from Doshamba, Tajikistan to Mazar-e-Sharif via Taleel Dora Lajeer, Konduz, Afghanistan.

4. The detainee, along with a group of men, stayed at a military compound in Mazar-e-Sharif.

5. The detainee did admit to fighting in the mountains.

6. The detainee was at the front lines for seven days in the Khawajahal region of Afghanistan.

b. Training

1. The detainee and other soldiers received military and physical training at the Mazar-e-Sharif, Afghanistan facility.

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SHARIPOV, RUKNIDDIN FAYZIDDINOVICH**

2. The detainee stated that he received three days of weapons training at Mazar-e-Sharif. The detainee further stated that he never shot the weapons and the training lasted only about one half hour each day.

3. The detainee stated that he knew about weapons prior to Camp Lajard. He stated after attending school for ten years, he took the one-week mandatory weapons training in Tajikistan.

### c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee was introduced to an individual who was in command of the soldiers at Lajeer, Tajikistan. The individual told the detainee to go into the military to work.

2. The detainee stated that this individual was a leader for the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). The detainee also stated that there were only IMU leaders and followers at Camp Lajard.

3. The Foreign Government Agency established that the detainee was recruited by an Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan Emissary in Tajikistan and was sent to Afghanistan.

4. The detainee denied membership with the Taliban regime but did admit to being a member with the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan.

5. The detainee confirmed that he was a passenger on a truck that contained Taliban soldiers whom had surrendered to Dostum's forces at the Khawajaghal compound.

### d. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee denied ever receiving a military uniform.

2. In Mazar-e-Sharif, Afghanistan, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan gave the detainee new clothing which consisted of two long shirts with pants. They also gave him a black turban. The detainee denied knowing that the Taliban wore these clothing items.

3. The detainee stated he was captured, along with others, at Mazar-e-Sharif, Afghanistan.

4. The detainee believes he could be in trouble upon returning home to Tajikistan because he was with the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan.

5. The detainee stated that he is willing to return to Tajikistan, as long he faces no charges upon his return.

6. The detainee realized he was "tricked" by an individual upon arriving in Afghanistan.

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7. The detainee acknowledged that he has lied to previous investigators regarding training conducted at Camp Lajar, Tajikistan.

8. The detainee was at Mazar-e-Sharif during the uprising at Khawajaghal, Afghanistan.

9. According to the detainee, the leader of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) ordered all IMU soldiers to surrender to the Northern Alliance Forces.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. When asked about weapons training at Camp Lajard, the detainee stated that he does not like to shoot and that he never received any weapons training at Camp Lajard. He collected wood for the fire.

b. The detainee stated that before arriving in Afghanistan he had never heard of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan.

c. The detainee said that he is not an enemy of the United States.

d. The detainee stated that he likes Cuba. The detainee said that he would not fight against America, adding that he did not want to fight against anyone.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

3 November 2005

TO: FAZROLLAH, MEHRABANB

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF FAZROLLAH, MEHRABANB

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
  - a. Commitment
    1. In 2000 the detainee sent his son to a religious school in Karachi, Pakistan. The detainee traveled with his son to the border of Tajikistan and Afghanistan.
    2. In May 2001 the detainee traveled to Karachi, Pakistan to visit his son.
    3. The detainee crossed into Afghanistan illegally.
    4. The detainee went to Konduz, where he was told his son's camp had been moved to Kabul. When he arrived in Kabul, he was told his son was taken to Karachi. The detainee arrived in Karachi in May 2001, found his son and remained there for one month.
    5. After seeing his son, the detainee tried to return to Tajikistan from Afghanistan but was unable to cross the border. The detainee was stuck in Afghanistan for several months because did not have the appropriate papers to re-enter Tajikistan.
    6. The Taliban troops picked up the detainee and brought him to a prison where he was placed in a basement with many other foreign refugees.
    7. The detainee said he had been issued an AK-47 and four magazines loaded with one hundred and twenty live rounds of ammunition.
    8. The detainee was captured with a Kalashnikov and ammunition.

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### b. Training

The detainee was in the Russian military for two or three years. He was in a motorized infantry unit.

### c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee was captured with other Tajik fighters who were known members of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan.

2. The detainee reported that the leader of the Islamic Movement of Tajikistan was the Chief National Director of the Tajikistan Government Dispute Commission.

### d. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee stated that he fought in the Tajikistan civil war and that it was impossible to know which side he fought for because everybody was fighting everybody. The detainee stated that the war ended in 1997 and the citizens reunited.

2. In May 2003, a Republic of Tajikistan delegation interviewed the detainee and requested that he be handed over to the Tajikistan authorities for further investigation and prosecution.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee denied being involved in Jihad and fighting with the Taliban in Afghanistan.

b. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on September 11, 2001. The detainee denied any knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or its interests.

c. The detainee claimed he never heard about Jihad against the United States.

d. The detainee denied knowledge of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan.

e. The detainee denied knowing, working with or seeing an individual identified as a member of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

8 September 2005

TO: BATAYEV, ILKHAM TURDBYAVICH

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF BATAYEV, ILKHAM TURDBYAVICH

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
  - a. Commitment
    1. Men from an Islamic group wanted the detainee to join the group for jihad. The detainee spent eight to ten days with the Islamic group before being flown to Konduz, Afghanistan.
    2. After staying in Konduz, Afghanistan for seven to eight months, the detainee was taken to Mazir-e-Sharif to be surrendered to Dostum's troops.
    3. The detainee was caught smuggling \$600,000 in United States Currency.
  - b. Training
    1. The detainee received training on the Kalishnakov and gas mask during the ninth and tenth grade.
    2. In June 2000, the detainee was part of a group of new recruits that was sent to Tajikistan for training.
    3. A Foreign Government Service reported this group was transporting counterfeit United States Dollars to an unidentified camp run by the Taliban when arrested in Tajikistan.

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF BATAYEV, ILKHAM TURDBYAVICH**

### c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee is a suspected member of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) because some of the information that he provided was nearly identical to information provided by a known member of the IMU.
2. A Foreign Government Service reported the detainee as a member of the IMU.
3. IMU is a coalition of Islamic militants from Uzbekistan and other Central Asian states opposed to Uzbekistani President Islom Karimov's secular regime. Although the IMU's primary goal remains to overthrow Karimov and establish an Islamic state in Uzbekistan, it appears to have widened its targets to include all those perceived as fighting Islam.
4. The detainee was an associate of Abduhalim Pakhrutdinov, a major supporter of Islamic extremist activities in Central Asia and a major financier of the IMU. The detainee worked for Pakhrutdinov at his business Al Baraka.
5. The detainee's position with Al Barakat was that of a "cashier" and he worked on site at the company building. As a "cashier", the detainee was one of several people who received the cash money from those who sell Pakhrutdinov's products elsewhere. He then files the money away in a safe-like room.
6. The detainee was identified as a person observed at Konduz, Afghanistan fighting; Al-Janke; Shabraghan prison; and Kandahar, Afghanistan.

### d. Other Relevant Data

The detainee was at Maser-e-Sharif during the uprising. The detainee was lined up in the courtyard with approximately 15-20 people when the shooting started. The detainee recalled running towards a stairwell and hearing gunfire coming from it. A grenade exploded and he suffered leg and back injuries.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
  - a. While he was with the group of men in Tajikistan and during the several months that would follow in Konduz and Mazar-e-Sharif, he was never threatened with bodily harm, but always feared if he attempted to escape, he would be killed by these men.
  - b. The detainee did not want to join the Islamic group for jihad.
  - c. The detainee has never had any problems with the police anywhere and has never been arrested. The detainee has no knowledge of any counterfeiting to include money, passports and travel documents.

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## UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF BATAYEV, ILKHAM  
TURDBYAVICH**

d. The detainee stated all information regarding him being captured with \$600,000 United States Currency was false.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

14 June 2005

TO: AWAD, WAQAS MOHAMMED ALI

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AWAD, WAQAS MOHAMMED ALI

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee stated he went to Afghanistan to become a fighter.

2. One of the aliases used by the detainee was identified as being a suspected al Qaida member.

3. A senior al Qaida lieutenant identified the detainee as possibly being at the Al-Zubayr guesthouse, and also perhaps at the front line in Kabul.

4. Zubayr Al Haili was responsible for most of al Qaida's guesthouses in Qandahar, Afghanistan.

5. The detainee along with seven other individuals were involved in an automobile accident while attempting to elude U.S. and coalition bombings. Surviving members including the detainee were evacuated to a Kandahar hospital.

6. The detainee, along with seven other Arabs suspected of being al Qaida were reportedly armed with weapons and used a hospital as a safe haven to elude coalition forces.

b. Training

1. One of the detainee's aliases appeared twice on a list of names found among papers retrieved from Tarnak Farms, an al Qaida training facility.

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# UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AWAD, WAQAS MOHAMMED ALI**

2. Tarnak Farms provided the al Qaida with poison and explosive training and it was also an advanced operational training camp. No one was allowed to train at Tarnak without first passing through basic training at al Faruq camp.

3. Students who graduated from Tarnak Farms were assigned missions by Usama Bin Laden based on their willingness to become martyrs.

c. Intent

The detainee has incited four disturbances while at Guantanamo Bay and assaulted personnel on multiple occasions.

d. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee has expertise with the Kalashnikov (AK-47). He advises that the AK-47 was learned at home, as everyone has one in Yemen.

2. The detainee stated he lost his leg during an air raid in Kandahar, Afghanistan.

3. The detainee stated that when he first heard about the events of 9/11, he felt it was wrong. However, the longer he is held captive the more he feels it was justified.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee claimed not to be familiar with fatwas ordering Arabs to attack United States citizens and property.

b. The detainee claimed he never became a fighter and he denies all knowledge of any combat activities in Afghanistan.

c. When asked about his opinion of the terrorist attack on the USS Cole, the detainee did not want to comment on it. The attack was a political incident and he does not like to get involved in politics.

d. The detainee denied any prior knowledge of the September 11th attacks on the United States. He further denied having knowledge of rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.

e. While paging through the 9/11 photograph book, detainee stated that the persons who committed the 9/11 terrorist attacks ruined the reputation of Islam and stated that what happened to the United States was not a good thing.

f. The detainee denied any knowledge of possible revolts or escape plans at the Guantanamo detention facility.

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## **UNCLASSIFIED**

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AWAD, WAQAS MOHAMMED ALI**

g. The detainee is unsure what he will do when he leaves Cuba. He will figure this out when he is home. Once home, he would relax and spend time with his family. The detainee would eventually like to work as a contractor in construction.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

8 September 2005

TO: AL ZAHRANI, YASSER TALAL

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL ZAHRANI, YASSER TALAL

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
  - a. Commitment
    1. The detainee finished the 11th grade and decided on his own, around August of 2001, to go to Afghanistan to fight in the jihad. He heard sheiks say that it was a duty for good Muslim men to fight the jihad alongside the Taliban.
    2. A man identified by the detainee as Ahmed Al Salami told him that he should go to Karachi, Pakistan and meet up with Saria Al Makki to get to Afghanistan. Al Salami traveled to mosques and said that it was the duty of good Muslim men to help establish an Islamic army. The enemy of this Islamic army was the Northern Alliance.
    3. Al-Salami is the deputy Chief of the Political Department for the Yemeni Socialist Party.
    4. Al Salaam is a close associate of al Qaida commander Abd Al Hadi. Al Hadi Al Iraqi is one of Usama Bin Laden's closest commanders and the person in charge of al Qaida fighters in the Afghani Northern Front.
    5. Around August or September of 2001, the detainee flew from Jeddah, Saudi Arabia to Dubai and on to Karachi, Pakistan. He purchased a round trip ticket for about \$300 United States Dollars.
    6. Al Makki picked up the detainee at the airport in Karachi and took him to a rented room where he stayed for two days. Al Makki eventually bought tickets for him and the detainee to fly to Quetta, Pakistan.

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL ZAHRANI, YASSER TALAL**

7. The detainee and Al Makki ultimately made it to Afghanistan, via Spin Boldak, Kandahar, Kabul and then Konduz.
8. The detainee was very important on the Northern line in the Arab group and carried a radio.
9. The detainee was identified as someone who was a money courier.
10. For three months the detainee was assigned as a guard to a second line post between Konduz and Taloqan that was referred to as Issam or Issam Al Bin, which was located about 6 kilometers from the front line. He served there with about 25 other people.
11. The Taliban fighters said that the group of Arabs, including the detainee and Uzbeki's should leave the city and the Taliban would surrender later. However, their plan did not work and the entire group of about 400 were sent to the prison at Mazar e' Sharif.
12. The detainee arrived at Mazar e' Sharif and was taken into an underground room. The following day the prisoners, including the detainee were in the prison yard when fighting broke out.
13. The detainee was immediately shot in the leg and foot when the fighting broke out and fell to the ground. When the prisoners gave up and surrendered, he was one of the first removed.
14. The surviving prisoners were put into trucks and taken to a prison at Sheberghan, Afghanistan where they were kept for one month.

### b. Training

1. The detainee and Al Makki stopped at the Taliban Center in the city of Konduz. Al Makki told the detainee that this is where he would receive his training. The detainee said the center was basically a one room building on a large field with shooting targets.
2. The detainee trained with two Saudi and three Afghani men at the center for one month. They were trained in the use of the Kalashnikov rifle, the Makarov pistol, and hand grenades, plus field training.
3. The detainee purchased weapons for the Taliban and trained at al Farouq camp.
4. Weapons training was conducted on numerous weapons at al Farouq and students learned how to assemble and disassemble each weapon. They received training on the AK-47, AKM and PK machine gun and would fire a total of 30 rounds in the sitting, kneeling and standing positions. They also familiarized themselves with the RPG.

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### SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL ZAHRANI, YASSER TALAL

#### c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee was recognized as Al-Batar and was known to carry an AK-47 as part of the Marwan Group whose leader was a Yemeni man.
2. Abu Ali Al-Yafi, a.k.a. Marwan, is an educated Yemeni who was known to be a very active Taliban and al Qaida recruiter in Yemen. He had experience fighting in both Chechnya and Afghanistan.
3. The leader of the second line post was Moullah Thaker or Zaker. He was the commander of other posts as well and traveled from post to post with two or three guards.
4. Mullah Zakir was a Taliban Commander for units north of Takharistan and was last seen with Mullah Fazel, the Taliban Minister of Defense.
5. The detainee's instructor was Kahir Allah who was the former governor of Herat Province, former Taliban leader in Iran.

#### d. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee was involved with food services and always on the front line base camps. He was known to have retreated to Konduz, Afghanistan where he was helping in the kitchen at the Arab guesthouse working with the cook.
2. The detainee was identified as a Saudi who fought in Abu Dujanah's group. Abu Dujanah, is a Sudanese who fought on the front lines and carried a Kalashnikov.
3. The detainee's name was found in a document that listed 324 Arabic names, aliases and nationalities. The document was recovered from raids on safe houses associated with suspected al Qaida in Karachi, Pakistan. He was in possession of a Saudi passport.
4. The following primary factor favors release or transfer:  
  
The detainee said he did not engage in any fighting.
5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

31 May 2005

To: AL SEHLI, IBRAHIM DAIF ALLAH NEMAN

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF  
AL SEHLI, IBRAHIM DAIF ALLAH NEMAN

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
  - a. Commitment
    1. The detainee was recruited to go to Afghanistan from his native Saudi Arabia.
    2. Approximately two weeks after 11 September 2001, the detainee traveled voluntarily to Kandahar, Afghanistan from Saudi Arabia via Tehran, Iran and Pakistan.
    3. The detainee was also influenced to travel to Afghanistan by a written fatwa issued by a fellow Saudi.
    4. This fatwa encouraged traveling to Afghanistan to assist the Taliban "in its fight to protect Muslims in Afghanistan."
    5. Upon his arrival in Afghanistan, the detainee sought out Taliban members.
    6. The detainee resided in Taliban safehouses while in Afghanistan.
    7. According to the detainee, the safehouses where he resided were used by Taliban soldiers to rest and recuperate from wounds.
    8. The detainee wished to experience this Islamic society for himself in Afghanistan. He also stressed that he did not go to fight, just to observe.

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL SEHLI, IBRAHIM DAIF ALLAH NEMAN**

9. The detainee served as a Taliban guard at a supply point near Konduz.

b. Training

The detainee was given a Kalishnikov rifle and five (5) rounds of ammunition. However, he insists he was never given any training on how to use this weapon.

c. Intent

The detainee was identified as a possible cell block leader. He is described as a "Religious Thinker", someone who tells the other detainees to be strong and to use their religion to not talk.

d. Other Relevant Data

1. Detainee was captured by Dostum's forces in Mazar-E-Sharif.

2. The detainee was taken by Dostum's forces to Shebargham. He was later taken to Kandahar and turned over to the U.S. military.

3. The detainee's passport was issued by Saudi Arabia in September of 2001, five-year date, applied for in Medina, Saudi Arabia, and contained stamps for Iran and Pakistan.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

Detainee claims if released, he does not intend to cause harm to the US or coalition nations. He never fired a weapon in Afghanistan or anywhere else.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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**Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba**

28 June 2005

**TO: AHMED, ABDUL RAHMAN UTHMAN**

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AHMED, ABDUL RAHMAN UTHMAN**

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
  - a. Commitment
    1. The detainee accepted a fatwa from the Saad Bin Moad Mosque in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia to fight for the Taliban against the Northern Alliance.
    2. The detainee decided to join jihad when he heard the fatwa from Sheikh Hamud Al (Uqla).
    3. Sheikh Hamud Al Uqqla is a Saudi Mufti who issued fatwahs and encouraged people to fight jihad against Christians and Jews. Al Uqqla condoned the 11 September 2001 attacks against the United States. Al Uqqla helped raise money for Usama Bin Laden.
    4. The detainee traveled from Saudi Arabia to Afghanistan via Pakistan during summer 2001.
    5. The detainee was on the battlefield on 11 September 2001.
    6. The detainee carried a Kalishnikov while on the front lines in the Konduz area.
    7. The detainee fought on the Konduz front lines with an Arab unit led by Abu Moazh.
  - b. Training

While in a Kandahar safehouse, the detainee was given instruction in the use, assembly and cleaning of the Kalishnikov rifle (AK47).

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## UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AHMED, ABDUL RAHMAN UTHMAN**

### c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee traveled to Konduz with the goal of being at the front. In Konduz, the detainee served with Abu Mu'ad's unit. Abu Mu'ad led a 16-man unit, a sub section of the 150-man Arab unit headed by Abd Al Salam.

2. Usama Bin Laden could be considered the commander-in-chief of the Arab Brigade, in which Abdul Salam was a general.

3. The detainee's name and passport information was found on a document listing Arabic names, aliases, and nationalities, which was recovered from safehouse raids associated with suspected al Qaida in Pakistan.

4. The detainee stayed at a Taliban guest house that was used by individuals who were traveling to the front line.

5. The detainee's name is on a computer list of al Qaida mujahidin seized during raids of al Qaida safehouses in Pakistan.

### d. Intent

Jihad was important to the detainee because he believed it was necessary to defend a Muslim country.

### e. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee surrendered to General Dostum, along with 450-600 other Taliban fighters.

2. The detainee was sent to the Al-Janki prison in Mazar-e-Sharif, where he was present during the prison uprisings.

3. When asked who was responsible for the attacks on the United States, the detainee opinioned that the United States brought the attack on itself.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on September 11th, and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or its interests.

b. The detainee stated that he does not subscribe to Islamic extremist causes and believes in the proper rule of law, the legitimacy of democratically elected governments and peaceful

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AHMED, ABDUL RAHMAN  
UTHMAN**

resolution to conflict. Detainee hopes to return to Saudi Arabia, where he can share his experiences and the lessons learned with his fellow Muslims, in order to discourage them from making the same mistakes he has made.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

16 August 2005

TO: AL UTAYBI, MUHAMMAD SURUR DAKHILALLAH

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL UTAYBI, MUHAMMAD SURUR  
DAKHILALLAH

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. During the summer of 2000, the detainee decided to travel to Kashmir for military training at the Al Aqsa training camp.

2. The detainee traveled to Pakistan to obtain training that would allow him to fight in the jihad in Afghanistan.

3. The detainee spent approximately three months in Afghanistan, fighting the Northern Alliance, and then returned home to Saudi Arabia.

4. During summer 2001, the detainee decided to travel back to Afghanistan to fight against the Northern Alliance for a second time. The detainee stayed at the Zubair safe house in Kabul and then traveled to the front lines.

5. The detainee was part of an all-Arab unit fighting in north Afghanistan.

6. The detainee stated that he was a guard for his unit.

7. The detainee was identified as being on the back lines at Takhar.

b. Training

1. The detainee spent approximately two months at the Al Aqsa camp in Lahore, Pakistan.

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL UTAYBI, MUHAMMAD SURUR DAKHILALLAH**

2. The Lashkur Ataiba organization ran the Al Aqsa training camp, which included training on the Kalashnikov rifle, Dokteriov rifle, PK machine gun, PPG, and hand grenades. After the training was completed, some of the trainees went to Kashmir to fight in the jihad, while others went to Afghanistan to fight with Taliban or al Qaida forces.

3. The Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LT) is the armed wing of the Pakistan-based religious organization, Markaz-ud-Dawa-wal-irshad (MOI), a Sunni missionary organization with anti-U.S. sentiment, formed in 1989. The Secretary of State has designated LT as a Foreign Terrorist Organization. LT is one of the three largest and best-trained groups fighting in Kashmir against India.

4. The detainee was trained at a camp known as Um Al Qura by a group he knew as Lashkur, which he claimed was the same as Jaish-e-Mohammed. Training consisted of small arms training.

5. The Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM) is an extremist group in Pakistan. The Secretary of State designated JEM as a Foreign Terrorist Organization. Members conduct terrorist activities primarily in Kashmir. The JEM has close ties to Afghan Arabs and the Taliban. Usama bin Laden is suspected of giving funds to the JEM.

## c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee was identified as being associated with Abu Turab Al Nejdi.

2. Abu Turab was a Saudi Arabian in charge of a specific section of the front lines at Khojaghar City. All of the Arabs there were under Abu Turab's command.

3. The detainee related that, after his training with the Lashar-e-Taiba at the Al Aqsa camp in the summer of 2000, he did not go directly back to Saudi Arabia. The detainee spent about 4 more months with the Jamil-e-Tabliq before returning to Saudi Arabia.

4. Tablighi Jamaat, aka Jamat-E-Tabligh, has been supporting Islamic terrorist groups in South and Southeast Asia under the cover of conducting religious activities. The group is closely aligned with other Pakistani terrorist organizations and the al Qaida network.

## d. Other Relevant Data

The detainee surrendered with seven other people at Mazar-e-Sharif and was taken to the Jinki Fortress. Five of the seven died during an incident at the fortress, but the detainee was not injured.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL UTAYBI, MUHAMMAD SURUR DAKHILALLAH**

a. The detainee denied having had any prior knowledge of the attacks on September 11th, 2001 or having any knowledge of future attacks on the U.S. or U.S. interests.

b. The detainee stated that his purpose in going to the training camp was so that he could be a "missionary" and preach to his fellow brothers at the camp.

c. The detainee was asked if he would fight the Americans if he were released and he said that he did not think so. He said that he wants to go home and continue his education.

d. The detainee was identified by a foreign delegation as someone whom they believed to be of low intelligence or law enforcement value to the United States and unlikely to pose a terrorist threat to the United States or its interests.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

30 November 2005

TO: MAHMUD, ARKIN

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MAHMUD, ARKIN

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Connections/Associations

The detainee claimed he was extremely surprised to find out that his brother had gone to a training camp.

b. Detainee Actions and Statements

1. The detainee departed from his village in China on 21 August 2001 after his brother had called home telling his family that the brother was traveling to Pakistan.

2. The detainee traveled from China to Karachi, Pakistan. From Karachi, the detainee made his way to Kabul, Afghanistan.

3. The detainee stayed one and one half months in a guesthouse in Kabul.

4. The detainee was told he had to leave the Kabul guesthouse, and he traveled to a house in Konduz.

5. Shortly after the bombing started the detainee was informed he needed to travel to Kandahar.

6. The detainee boarded a truck he thought was going to Kandahar with about 30 other occupants. However, instead of going to Kandahar, the truck drove to Mazar-e-Sharif, and all the occupants were imprisoned.

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MAHMUD, ARKIN**

**c. Other Relevant Data**

The detainee witnessed the Qual Jangi uprising.

**4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:**

a. The detainee stated he does not have a bad opinion of the United States. He understands why he is here and thinks the United States is justified in conducting the investigation. He understands the process of an investigation takes time and believes he will be found innocent.

b. The detainee thinks he made a mistake by traveling to Afghanistan to find his brother. If he had the opportunity to change anything, he would not have traveled to Afghanistan.

c. When asked if he had plans to attack the United States, the detainee laughed and stated, "No, of course not." The detainee explained that he hoped to have the support of the United States if and when Turkistan separated from China.

d. The detainee laments the deaths of so many innocent people in the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. He hates Usama bin Laden and blames him for his imprisonment in Cuba. The detainee understands why the United States invaded Afghanistan. The detainee believes the United States has been just and fair.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

11 July 2005

TO: ALI, ADNAN MOHAMMED

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ALI, ADNAN MOHAMMED

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
  - a. Commitment
    1. The detainee went to Afghanistan to fight in the jihad with the Taliban.
    2. The detainee stated he answered an Islamic fatwah issued by Hamoud al Aqla to go for the jihad in Afghanistan.
    3. Sheikh Hamud al Uqqla is a Saudi Arabian Mufti who issued fatwahs and encouraged people to fight jihad against Christians and Jews. Al Uqqla called for jihad in Afghanistan, and condoned the 11 September 2001 attacks against the United States.
    4. The detainee is on a foreign government service watch list for working as a recruiter outside of Saudi Arabia.
    5. The detainee served at the front lines near Khanajah Gar, Afghanistan.
  - b. Training

The detainee received training on the Kalashnikov rifle.
  - c. Connections/Associations
    1. The detainee knows Abd al Hadi al Iraqi and al Salaam.

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### SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ALI, ADNAN MOHAMMED

2. Abdul Hadi al Iraqi was trusted by Usama bin Laden. He commanded 200 Arab and Taliban soldiers in Kabul.

3. Abd al Salaam al Hadrami functioned as the second in command to al Hadi. Al Salaam operations included the movement of men and horses.

#### d. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee was responsible for weapons storage under the responsibility of al Salaam and was at the North line for a long time.

2. The detainee was identified as having something to do with issuing or controlling the weapons, and had previously been in Kashmir with Alshkah-d-taiba.

3. Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LT) is the armed wing of a missionary organization having anti-U.S. sentiment. LT has conducted a number of operations against Indian troops and civilian targets in Kashmir since 1993.

4. The detainee stayed in Kabul for four months on the line in the Karabah area.

5. After the four months, the detainee traveled with his unit to Konduz and then to Khwaja Ghar for six months. The detainee said that he, and the others in his unit, worked with horses for that six-month period.

6. A foreign government service has designated the detainee as being a high priority target.

4. The following primary factor favors release or transfer:

The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the U.S. prior to their execution on September 11th.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

16 August 2005

TO: TAYEEA, ALI ABDUL MOTALIB AWAYD HASSAN AL

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF TAYEEA, ALI ABDUL MOTALIB  
AWAYD HASSAN AL

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
  - a. Commitment
    1. The detainee was arrested due to civil unrest. He was jailed in Wusil City in north Iraq for over one year.
    2. While working with the Republican Guard in the al Suera Region, the detainee went absent without leave (AWOL) twice from his unit. The Iraqi military found and arrested him. He was subsequently sent to the al Hara al Umy Prison, which is a prison for Iraqi military intelligence personnel.
    3. When the detainee was released from this prison, he fled Iraq, contacting his sister (Entesar) in Tunisia for assistance.
    4. The detainee traveled through Egypt and Libya on the way to Tunisia.
    5. The detainee flew to Istanbul where he was arrested days after his arrival due to his use of false documents to enter the country. He was transported to a special prison called al Banshee in Istanbul, Turkey.
    6. The Turkish government extradited the detainee to Iraq. He was imprisoned in Baghdad. He spent a year there before escaping.
    7. The detainee joined the Taliban and resided in a Taliban guesthouse in Peshawar, Pakistan while in transit to Afghanistan.

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## UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF TAYEEA, ALI ABDUL MOTALIB AWAYD HASSAN AL**

8. The detainee was a political refugee from Iraq due to the fact he is a Shiite Muslim. He found work as a truck driver for the Taliban.

9. The detainee fought on the frontline. On the front lines, the detainee drove the truck used during the retreat.

### b. Training

1. The detainee was a member of the Iraqi military for approximately three years.

2. The detainee went to basic training in Sinjar Iraq. After basic, he received heavy vehicle mechanic training at al Suera.

3. The detainee was a driver for the Palace Guards for one year. Then, he became the personal driver to General Hakay Shafir Saleh, a secretary of Saddam Hussein.

### c. Connections/Associations

The detainee denied any affiliation with Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) or the Special Republican Guard, even though he admits being the driver for a Special Republican Guard General.

### d. Intent

The detainee has stated he feels that he would be an ideal spy for the U.S.

### e. Other Relevant Data

1. After the fighting in Konduz, the detainee's unit surrendered to the Northern Alliance with the rest of the Taliban forces. They were taken to Mazar-e-Sharif.

2. While the detainee was being held at al Jenki Prison, Mazar-e-Sharif, Afghanistan, he withdrew from a mortar position. During his withdrawal he encountered an American and interpreted for him. He said he was very close to the American when the American was killed.

3. The detainee negotiated the release after the uprising at Qala-I Junghi. He talked other Arabs into surrendering.

4. The detainee stated that he lied to previous interrogators, and his cover story was untrue. The detainee said he lied to all previous interrogators to make himself appear more important.

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# UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF TAYEEA, ALI ABDUL MOTALIB AWAYD HASSAN AL**

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee strenuously denied any ties to the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) and stated that Saddam Hussein's government had executed his uncle and there is no way he would ever be involved with the Saddam Hussein regime.

b. The detainee stated that he is grateful for America and all they have done for the Iraqis.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

14 September 2005

TO: AL KHALDI, ABDUL AZIZ SAAD

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL KHALDI, ABDUL AZIZ SAAD

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee stated that he saw a copy of a fatwa issued by Sheikh Homoud Al-Oqlah from the Al-Kasseeb Mosque for people to defend the Muslims and Islamic nations/lands against the Northern Alliance Commander Massoud and General Abdul Rashid Dostom's Forces. The detainee believed in this fatwa and felt it was his religious duty to fight against people who attacked Muslims

2. The detainee, one exam away from earning his degree, left school early to travel to Afghanistan, after receiving a fatwa from Sheik Hmood Al-Aqla.

3. Sheik Hamud Al-Uqqla is a Saudi Mufti who issued fatwa calling for Jihad in Afghanistan. Al-Uqqla condoned the 11 September 2001 attacks against the United States.

4. The detainee traveled to Afghanistan by taxi from Riyadh, Saudi Arabia to Damascus, Syria in order to participate in the Jihad with the Taliban.

5. The detainee financed his entire trip to Afghanistan. He departed Saudi Arabia with approximately 5,000-6,000 Saudi Riyals, which is equivalent to approximately \$1,333-\$1,600 United States Dollars.

6. The detainee's route to Afghanistan was from Saudi, Arabia to Damascus, Syria to Tehran, Iran to Mashhad, Iran, to Taybad, Iran, to Herat, Afghanistan, to Kabul, Afghanistan and finally to Konduz, Afghanistan.

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## UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL KHALDI, ABDUL AZIZ SAAD**

7. The detainee arranged his own travel from Kabul to Konduz, Afghanistan. The detainee took a taxi with two other men who knew where to go because they had been to the front line before.

8. The detainee and Nassir Al-Yemeni were delayed in their travel to Kabul for approximately seven days due to inclement weather and therefore had to stay at the guesthouse in Herat.

9. The detainee and Nasser stayed at the guesthouse for approximately three or four more days before traveling to the front line.

10. The detainee was given an AK-47 with ammunition and was given a tour of the front line area by Ghareeb, the front line commander.

11. The detainee was in the Northern part of Afghanistan on the line between Taliban and the Northern Alliance.

12. The detainee stated that he was in a bunker and would hear mortar shells and artillery. The detainee was instructed not to shoot his AK-47 unless he was in immediate danger.

13. The detainee was captured and ordered to surrender his weapon by the Northern Alliance forces near Mazar-e Sharif and was transported to prison.

### b. Training

While the detainee was staying at a guesthouse in Konduz, Afghanistan, he was shown how to operate a Kalashnikov AK-47.

### c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee had ties with Sheik Hmood Alaqla who recruited the detainee.

2. Sheik Hamud Al-Uqqla helped raised money for Usama Bin Laden until his death in Saudi Arabia in 2001.

3. The detainee met Gharib Al Sanaani who was the commander of the front line while the detainee was in the Khawajah Ghar region. Gharib showed the detainee around the front line.

4. The detainee's brother Issa Bin Sa D Al Awshan, variant Isa Oshen, is a deceased al Qaida operative who died in July 2004 during a Saudi Arabian security forces raid. He was listed very high on the Saudi most wanted terrorists list.

5. The detainee's younger brother, Salman, was also fighting in Afghanistan.

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL KHALDI, ABDUL AZIZ SAAD**

6. The detainee stated that his brother told him that he was going to the front line.
4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
  - a. The detainee claimed he only went to Afghanistan to find his brother and not because of a fatwa. The detainee claimed that he lied about the fatwa due to pressure he felt in the Dostum prison.
  - b. The detainee stated that he has never been a member of al Qaida and has never been approached by anyone who has attempted to recruit him into al Qaida. The detainee heard on the radio in Saudi Arabia that al Qaida was a terrorist group that conducted activities against different countries.
  - c. The detainee stated that he has never met Usama Bin Laden. The detainee heard on the radio in Saudi Arabia that Usama Bin Laden did bad things and if these things were true, the detainee did not consider Usama Bin Laden a Muslim because Muslims were not supposed to attack innocent people.
  - d. The detainee stated he was still in Saudi Arabia when the attack on the World Trade Center occurred on 9/11/01. The detainee believed the attack was wrong because the Qur'an stated it was wrong to kill innocent people.
  - e. The detainee stated he never heard of a fatwa issued against the United States or Americans.
  - f. The detainee claimed that he was not recruited by anyone for the Jihad in Afghanistan. The detainee decided on his own to go to Afghanistan around November 2001 with his friend Nasser.
  - g. The detainee claimed he did not know of any methods of recruitment and did not know of anyone actively recruiting for Jihad.
  - h. The detainee stated that he never attended any training camp and that the only training he did receive was at this guesthouse.
  - i. The detainee advised he never saw any combat action because there were mountains that acted as a buffer zone between them and the Northern Alliance.
  - j. The detainee claimed that he has never fired a weapon and if he tried to use the Kalashnikov he would probably end up hurting himself.
  - k. The detainee stated that if he were released from Guantanamo Bay, he would return home to Saudi Arabia and not Afghanistan.

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL KHALDI, ABDUL AZIZ SAAD**

1. The detainee stated that if he were released, he would first change out of his prison clothes, enjoy his family, look for a job and find a wife.

m. The detainee also states if he was to be released, he would return to Saudi Arabia and buy a house, a car, become a teacher of Arabic, lead a normal life and not listen to any politics.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

30 August 2005

TO: AL SHIHRI, YUSSEF MOHAMMED MUBARAK

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF  
AL SHIHRI, YUSSEF MOHAMMED MUBARAK

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee stated an individual named Mohammed al Kousi would go to the Mosque and talk about an opportunity to go to Pakistan for The Calling.

2. The detainee stated he decided to go to Pakistan after talking with al Kousi. He traveled to Pakistan by himself.

3. The detainee said he and several friends decided to travel to Afghanistan and fight Jihad on behalf of the Taliban. The detainee left his home and traveled to Damascus, Syria in early May 2001.

4. The detainee took a bus from Medina to Damascus, Syria. From Damascus he took Syrian Airlines to Tehran, Iran. The detainee rode a train to Mashhad on the border of Pakistan.

5. The detainee then took a taxi to the Pakistani border. He said an individual named Abdul Aziz, a Saudi citizen, met him at the border.

6. The detainee and Aziz stayed in Karachi for approximately two and a half months. They were involved in The Calling at the Makki Mosque.

7. Sheik Mustafa Nansur (Mansur) ran the Makki mosque in Pakistan.

8. Sheikh Mansur worked for Jama'at al Tabligh at the al Makki mosque in Pakistan.

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## UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL SHIHRI, YUSSEF MOHAMMED MUBARAK**

9. The detainee said he and Aziz took a taxi to Kabul, and crossed the border into Afghanistan by motorcycle in April 2001. Aziz took care of everything for the trip.

10. According to the detainee, they stayed at a Taliban house for approximately three days.

11. The detainee along with three Arabs and approximately 30 Afghans, were taken by military plane to Konduz, Afghanistan. Once the group arrived at Konduz, they boarded a truck and were taken to another Taliban house.

12. The detainee fought alongside the Taliban in the jihad against Massoud and the Northern Alliance. During this time, he buried the bodies of Arab and Taliban fighters.

13. The detainee served on the second line of the Kunduz battlefield with the Arab Corps of the Taliban Northern Army.

14. The detainee stated he was at the front line just prior to the U.S. attacks and after September 11th; the fighting on the front became intense.

15. A foreign government service provided information on detainees held at Guantanamo bay that they designated as being high priority targets, in order of precedence. The detainee is number four on the list.

### b. Training

The detainee trained at the al Farouq terrorist training camp.

### c. Connections/Associations

The detainee's brother is Abu Abd al Rahman al Najdi, aka Sa'd Muhammad Mubarak al Shihri and is a known al Qaida operative.

### d. Intent

1. The detainee decided he hates all Americans because they attack his religion, Islam. Since Americans are his enemy, he will continue to fight them until he dies.

2. The detainee pointed to the sky and told the interviewing agents that he will have a meeting with them in the next life.

### e. Other Relevant Data

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF  
AL SHIHRI, YUSSEF MOHAMMED MUBARAK**

1. When the detainee has been confronted with his inconsistencies and lies, he has flatly refused to cooperate or has told more lies.

2. The detainee advised that the FBI, the United States, and the interrogators are the enemy.

4. The following primary factor favors release or transfer:

The detainee said he did not receive any training at any camp run by al Qaida.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

11 October 2005

TO: AL KHALDI, SULEYMAN SA D MOHAMED

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL KHALDI, SULEYMAN SA D  
MOHAMED

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee's friend told him about a fatwa that had been issued by Hamud al Uqqla. Based on this fatwa, the detainee went on jihad to Afghanistan to fight with the Taliban.

2. While in Afghanistan the detainee received and followed a fatwa issued by Sheik Abdullah bin Jibreem. The fatwa stated that the fight in Afghanistan was just and it was every Muslim's duty to fight with the Taliban.

b. Training

The detainee received training in the use of the AK-47.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee stayed in Taliban guesthouses both in Quetta, Pakistan and in Kandahar, Afghanistan.

2. The detainee traveled from Quetta to Spin-Buldak with a group of Taliban.

3. The detainee flew from Kandahar, Afghanistan, to Kabul, Afghanistan with other Taliban members.

4. The detainee stated he was sent to Konduz to join the Arab Brigade.

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## UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL KHALDI, SULEYMAN SA D MOHAMED**

5. The detainee was a member of a Taliban unit that withdrew from Khaj Ghar and moved to Konduz.

6. The detainee served in Afghanistan under Abu Hassan, Mullah Sadr Sayb, Mullah Thaker and Abu Thar. All four of these men were Taliban leaders in Afghanistan.

7. The detainee stated that he was comfortable being listed as an al Qaida member.

d. Intent

The detainee stated he knew he fought with the Taliban against Northern Alliance forces.

e. Detainee Actions and Statements

1. The detainee and his brother discussed travel prior to leaving for Afghanistan and each traveled by a different route to avoid being caught together.

2. The detainee stated that he believes the Taliban was the just and fair government of Afghanistan and that the Northern Alliance, assisted by the United States was the invading force.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee denied having any knowledge of al Qaida before being captured.

b. The detainee stated that al Qaida did not run the Arab Brigade.

c. The detainee denied being part of any political or religious organizations, including the Arab Brigade.

d. The detainee denied receiving any training other than three days learning how to use the AK-47.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

16 September 2005

TO: SAID, SALAM ABDULLAH

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SAID, SALAM ABDULLAH

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee says he was recruited by a Saudi named Sheik Hamood Alaqla, the author of the Fatwa that was posted throughout the region.

2. The detainee ultimately traveled into Afghanistan on August 2001 to join the jihad with the Taliban. He arrived in Kandahar, Afghanistan where he spent ten days and received weapons training. After seeking treatment for a liver problem, the detainee moved onto Konduz, then continued to Hashghar, Afghanistan where he joined the Taliban's front line.

3. After approximately a week in Konduz, the detainee was told he and his group was going to Mazar-e-Sharif to surrender. He arrived in Mazar-e-Sharif during the night and stayed about a week before the uprising occurred.

4. Upon arriving at Qala Jangi, the detainee was told to get off the truck and sit in the prison yard in a line of prisoners. They were all sitting there when he heard an explosion near the main entrance of the compound, then the whole group went into the basement of the prison.

5. The detainee traveled to Afghanistan through Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, then onto Karachi, Pakistan. From Karachi he flew to Quetta, Pakistan where he went to a Taliban guesthouse in Kandahar, Afghanistan.

b. Other Relevant Data

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## UNCLASSIFIED

### **SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SAID, SALAM ABDULLAH**

1. The detainee spent approximately one month in Sheberghan before being turned over to the Americans.

2. The detainee's name was found on a translated list of al Qaida mujahidin and the content of their "trust" accounts found on files recovered from various computer media seized during raids against al Qaida associated safe houses in Rawalpindi on 1 March 2003 and Karachi on 11 September 2002.

3. The detainee claims he was never trained on the use of weapons and was given a Kalashnikov for self-defense when the line withdrew to Konduz.

4. The following primary factor favors release or transfer:

a. The detainee denies having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on September 11th. He also denies knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or its interests.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

18 October 2005

TO: AL BIHANI, GHALEB NASSAR

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL BIHANI, GHALEB NASSAR

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee encountered fatwa flyers about jihad at the al-Menshia mosque in Tabuk, Saudi Arabia.

2. The detainee received a fatwah to fight the jihad in Afghanistan while in Tabuk.

3. The detainee has been identified as a low-ranking al Qaida fighter from Yemen.

4. The detainee has been identified as being at the frontlines near Konduz.

b. Training

1. The detainee was seen training at al Farouq.

2. The detainee received mortar training at al Farouq and urban warfare training in Kandahar.

3. The detainee was taught to use anti-aircraft weapons, specifically the SA-7 and ZSU-23.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee's brothers serve in various capacities in close association with Osama Bin Laden.

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## UNCLASSIFIED

### SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL BIHANI, GHALEB NASSAR

2. One of the detainee's brothers has been identified as one of Usama Bin Laden's bodyguards.
3. One of the detainee's brothers trained fighters in Afghani camps.
4. The detainee's brother traveled to Chechnya for jihad in 1995 or 1996. Upon return from Chechnya, he went to Saudi Arabia for follow up medical treatment for wounds sustained in Chechnya. Once in Saudi Arabia, he was reported to have moved to Afghanistan.
5. One of the detainee's brothers is a detainee at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
6. The detainee is said to have been associated with Khalil Habib. Habib was a trainer on explosives manufacturing, artillery and tactics and maneuvers. In addition, he was also in charge of the Ansar guesthouse in Khandahar.

#### d. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee claimed that while in Afghanistan, he was a cook at the northern front at a canteen that supported Mujahidin who fought the Northern Alliance.
  2. Although the detainee claimed he received no military training in Afghanistan, he received basic familiarization instruction on the AK-47 in Tabuk.
  3. As the Taliban started to flee Afghanistan, the detainee went to Maser e Shariff where he surrendered to the Northern Alliance.
  4. The detainee was shot in the arm during the al-Jinki prison uprising. After being shot, he fled to the prison basement with 60-70 other prisoners. They remained there approximately 8 days. The detainee surrendered after the basement was flooded with water for a second time.
  5. The detainee was kept in prison in Maser e Shariff for one week to nine days before being transferred to Kandahar.
4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a. The detainee stated that he never received any formal military training.
  - b. The detainee claims to have been a cook on the front lines in Khawaja Ghar, Afghanistan, but never participated in combat.
  - c. The detainee claims that he never discharged his weapon.
  - d. The detainee advised that, if he were released, he would not participate in a jihad again, but would defend himself if threatened

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL BIHANI, GHALEB NASSAR**

e. The detainee denied that he was fighting against Americans. The detainee stated that he was in Afghanistan to fight jihad against the Northern Alliance.

f. The detainee denied having any connection to Usama bin Laden or al Qaida. He further denied that his brother was one of Usama bin Laden's bodyguards.

g. The detainee states that he does not believe in the ideals that al Qaida stands for and would not fight for them.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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# UNCLASSIFIED

**Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba**

30 June 2005

**TO: AL-MARWA'I, TOUFIQ SABER MUHAMMAD**

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF  
AL-MARWA'I, TOUFIQ SABER MUHAMMAD**

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

The detainee went to Afghanistan to fight jihad.

b. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee was advised to leave Yemen and migrate to Afghanistan by Sheik Abdul Majid al Zindani.

2. Sheik Abdel al-Majid al-Zindani of Yemen is of interest to the FBI due to his strong al Qaida ties and his association with Usama Bin Laden.

3. The detainee stayed at a Taliban center called Said. He became the cook at the Said center, where he stayed for four months.

4. He went to visit the front lines where the fighting had been taking place and stayed to live at the Omar Saif house. There, the detainee cooked for the front line.

5. The detainee's name was found on a list of al Qaida Mujahidin in the files recovered from computers seized during al Qaida safehouse raids in Rawalpindi and Karachi, Pakistan. The list indicated his trust account contained his passport.

c. Other Relevant Data

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF  
AL-MARWA'I, Toufiq Saber Muhammad**

The detainee surrendered to Dostum's forces at Mazar e Sharif. He did not have any weapons and was taken to Al Jenke in Mazar e Sharif.

4. The following primary factor favors release or transfer:

The detainee stated he regrets going to Afghanistan and would like to return to Yemen. He stated he never fought against coalition forces or U.S. troops. He stated he did not want to fight so he was given the position as cook for the Taliban.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

6 September 2005

TO: SULTAN, FAHA

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SULTAN, FAHA

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee responded to a fatwa that Sheikh Hamun al Uqqla issued in January 2001 from a mosque in Taif, Saudi Arabia. The fatwa directed participants to defend the Taliban in Afghanistan.

2. The detainee's Taliban group stayed in the Taliban controlled village of Khaj Ghar, north of Konduz for ten months. Their mission was to guard women, children, Sheikhs, any other non-combatants and supplies.

3. A Taliban truck driver identified the detainee as someone who spent a long time on the north line and was responsible for supplying the Arab group. He said the detainee was one of al Hadi al Iraqi's friends and had a good relationship with al Salaam and al Tabuki. The detainee spent most of his time with these two men.

b. Training

The detainee attended two Thaker Centers in Kabul and Konduz under the control of Taliban leader Mullah Thaker. Thaker's group consisted of 300 Arab and Taliban members. Thaker often taught the basic use of the AK-47 on the premises.

c. Connections/Associations

1. A known Taliban member saw the detainee on the frontline during the retreat to Konduz and was in the same room in the basement at Qala-I Junghi. The detainee was wounded

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### SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SULTAN, FAHA

during the first grenade attack on Qala-I Junghi. The Taliban member believed the detainee was an administrator, as he was always on the back lines purchasing food. The member was told the detainee had been in Afghanistan in the 1980's and in Bosnia in the 1990's.

2. The detainee was in charge of getting supplies to the north lines.
3. The detainee's name was found on a document listing 324 Arabic names, aliases and nationalities recovered from safe house raids associated with suspected al Qaida in Karachi, Pakistan. The detainee was listed as having a Saudi passport.
4. A floppy disc recovered during a 11 September 2002 raid on an alleged al Qaida residence in Karachi, Pakistan contained a list of names and amount of money taken from each individual. The detainee's name was listed with the amount of 1,500 Saudi Riyals.
5. On 8 December 2001 the United States and coalition forces raided an Arab office in Kandahar, Afghanistan. They retrieved 160 applications to Afghanistan military training camps. One application was for the detainee, providing his name, alias, home address, date of birth, contact name and family telephone number.
6. On 28 November 2003, a Foreign Government Service raided the home of the Islamic extremist and recruiter Ekrem Avdiu. The detainee's alias and telephone number were found on a telephone listing seized during this raid.

#### d. Other Relevant Data

The detainee was captured sometime before late December 2001 north of Mazer-e-Sharif carrying a weapon.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
  - a. In early July 2002, a foreign delegation identified the detainee as one of low law enforcement and low intelligence value.
  - b. The detainee denied any knowledge of the attacks on the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001.
5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

24 May 2005

To: BEN KEND, SALEM AHMED

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF BEN KEND, SALEM AHMED

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee traveled from Yemen to Karachi, Pakistan; Quetta, Pakistan; Kandahar, Afghanistan; and finally Kabul, Afghanistan.

2. The detainee was at guesthouses in Kandahar, Kabul and Konduz. He was directed to the frontlines from the Kabul guesthouse.

3. The detainee was recruited to fight the Jihad by Sheik Mohammad Athdhar.

4. The detainee spent approximately three months on the front line before he and his group were sent north to an area near Konduz, Afghanistan to fight the Northern Alliance.

5. The detainee was fighting the Northern Alliance because they were regarded as oppressors, not infidels.

6. The detainee claims he fought with the Taliban in Kabul and Kandahar, Afghanistan from July to December 2001.

7. The detainee traveled towards Mazar-e Sharif and before entering this area, he and the retreating forces were ordered by the Dostam's forces to surrender their weapons.

8. The detainee stated he had been present during the Taliban prison uprising at Qala-l-Jangi Fortress in Mazar-e-Sharif.

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF BEN KEND, SALEM AHMED**

### b. Training

1. The detainee did not need training from the Taliban because he learned to use small arms simply by growing up in Yemen.
2. The detainee was identified as having trained at the al-Farouq training camp.

### c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee was identified at the Northern frontlines with Abdul Hadi Al-Iraqi.
2. Abdul Hadi Al-Iraqi was a senior al Qaida member and former commander of the Arab Brigade.

### d. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee received his weapon, a Kalishnikov rifle, from a distribution center one day before he was sent to the front line.
2. The detainee traveled to Karachi, Pakistan with the intent of purchasing approximately fifty kilos of honey and selling it back in Yemen.
4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
  - a. The detainee denies assuming a leadership position within the Taliban command structure when a leader was injured on the front lines.
  - b. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on September 11, 2001. The detainee also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or U.S. interests.
  - c. The detainee was queried regarding any knowledge or planning of internal uprisings at the Guantanamo detention facility, with negative results.
  - d. The detainee claims not to know Abd Hadi Al Iraqi.
5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

19 September 2005

TO: AL SHIHRI, ABD AL SALAM GHAYTAN MURAYYIF AL ZAYDANI

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL SHIHRI, ABD AL SALAM  
GHAYTAN MURAYYIF AL ZAYDANI

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. At the end of the summer of 2001, the detainee traveled from Riyadh, Saudi Arabia to Kandahar, Afghanistan via Bahrain; Qatar; Karachi, Pakistan; Quetta, Pakistan and Spin Buldak, Afghanistan.

2. The detainee and his cousin were recruited by a Taliban fighter.

3. The detainee decided to go to Afghanistan after he listened to the Arab Taliban fighter speak about how great it was to fight for jihad and that the detainee should go fight.

4. The detainee stated that he and his cousin went to Afghanistan to visit the area and ended up at Khaja Ghar, Afghanistan fighting the Northern Alliance.

5. The detainee stayed in the Arab House in Kandahar after a Taliban official suggested that he stay there.

6. The Arab House was a Taliban sponsored safehouse for Arab mujahideen in Kandahar, Afghanistan. A Yemeni National that employed strict screening measures ran the safehouse.

7. The detainee assisted anti-coalition troops while staying at the Taliban Center near Khaja Ghar, Afghanistan.

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL SHIHRI, ABD AL SALAM GHAYTAN MURAYYIF AL ZAYDANI**

8. At the Taliban Center, the detainee was told that he was on the second line in the war with the Northern Alliance.

9. The detainee was captured with an AK-47 near Mazar-e-Sharif by General Dostum's forces.

b. Training

While in Afghanistan, the detainee received training on the Kalashnikov and Bica.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee provided information on the Said Center training camp and the Arab Commander known as Gharib.

2. Gharib was the Commander of Arab Forces operating in the northern area of Khonduz, Afghanistan against General Dostum's army.

3. One of the detainee's known aliases was found on a computer hard drive associated with a senior al Qaida member. The list contained names of captured al Qaida members.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee stated that he had no intentions on going to Afghanistan when he left Saudi Arabia. The detainee stated that his cousin was near sighted and wanted to go to a particular hospital in Pakistan that specialized in laser surgery.

b. The detainee stated that he has never traveled to the United States and has no relatives or contacts in the United States. The detainee also denies having ever met or seen Usama Bin Laden during any of his travels to and through Afghanistan.

c. The detainee claims to have no knowledge of al Qaida personalities in Afghanistan and denied having any knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.

d. The detainee claims that he was forced to train at the Said Center training camp and was conscripted to fight against General Dostum's Army north of Khonduz, Afghanistan.

e. The detainee claims that he was not involved in any fighting while with the Taliban.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL SHIHRI, ABD AL SALAM  
GHAYTAN MURAYYIF AL ZAYDANI**

unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

20 July 2005

TO: BIN HAMIDA, ADIL MABROUK

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF BIN HAMIDA, ADIL MABROUK

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
  - a. Commitment
    1. The Italian police arrested the detainee sometime around November 1989, and he served over four months in prison.
    2. Detainee traveled repeatedly between Tunisia and Italy until 1992, when he was arrested by Italian authorities for narcotics trafficking. Jailed for only ten days, he returned to Tunisia.
    3. The detainee illegally sold used cell phones in Milan to immigrants with no valid residency documents. The detainee would purchase cards, required to start service, and sell them to foreigners.
    4. Detainee became co-owner of the General Services Cooperative with Mohammed Ben Salah Bin Ali which helped detainee obtain residency.
    5. The cooperative operated as a temporary employment agency for companies needing unskilled laborers. Laborers without proper documentation were assisted by the Cooperative.
    6. In February 2001, the detainee went to Afghanistan. Route of travel, and a point of contact in Afghanistan were provided by an Algerian named Fatah.
    7. Detainee was provided with directions on how to find the Algerian House in Jalalabad, Afghanistan.

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF BIN HAMIDA, ADIL MABROUK**

### b. Training

1. The "House of the Algerians" in Jalalabad provides training on the Kalashnikov, the use of electronic components for creating explosive devices and facilitates travel for Mujahidin recruits.

2. The detainee admits he was taught how to operate an AK-47 automatic weapon while in Jalalabad, by an Algerian named Jaffa.

### c. Connections/Associations

1. Tarek Charaabi used a phone card registered to the detainee.

2. Tarak Ben Bechir Ben Amara Chaarabi is a known member of the Milan-based terrorist network of Tunisian Combatant Group member Sami Essid.

3. Sami Essid includes former Tunisian criminals and delinquents who after their integration into Islamic extremist groups advocate jihad. These groups coordinate their activities with terrorist groups around the world.

4. The Essid network is active in falsifying travel documents, counterfeiting money, stolen vehicles and trafficking narcotics.

5. The detainee and his two brothers, Samir and Faical, have been identified as known members of the Essid network.

6. The detainee was accompanied by a Tunisian national, identified as a member of the Sami Essid network, to Afghanistan for military training.

7. The Tunisian Combat Group, led by Essid Sami in Italy, has been linked to the Salafist Group for Call and Combat (GSPC).

8. The Algerian Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) recruited personnel throughout Europe, training them in Afghanistan, and sending them to fight in Chechnya, Algeria and Bosnia.

9. Salafist Group for Call and Combat (GSPC) is a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO), and an outgrowth of the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) in Algeria. GIA is an Islamic extremist group. GSPC members maintain contact with other North African extremists sympathetic to al Qaida.

10. In January 1998, a known member of the GSPC cell in Bologna, Italy, used a phone card registered to the detainee.

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11. Mohamed Ben Brahim Saidani, the leader of the GSPC cell in Bologna, drove a vehicle owned by the detainee. Saidani was arrested by Italian police in August 2001, extradited to Tunisia and is serving a life sentence.

12. Saidani has been identified as the leader of the Islamic militant movement Al-Takfir Wa Al-Hijra in Italy. The detainee has been identified as associated with the Al-Takfir Wa Al-Hijra cell in Bologna, Italy.

13. The puritanical Al-Takfir Wal Hijra's primary goal is to destroy Islamic regimes through violence if necessary and rebuild them with a pure form of Islam.

14. The detainee attended a mosque on via Padua in Milan and the Islamic Cultural Institute (ICI) where Sheik Abdullah, an Algerian, taught. Abdul Fatah was the detainee's mentor.

15. Fatah took the detainee to a travel agency in Milan to purchase his plane tickets and get his visa for Iran. The detainee paid cash for the travel agency's services.

16. Algerian Abd al-Halim Ramadna, aka Abd al-Fatah, an al Qaida network member, recruited North African immigrants in Italy to fight in Afghanistan. He provided false documents, organized routes, collected expense money and ensured religious training.

17. While in Jalalabad, the detainee stayed at the "House of the Algerians" owned by Jaffar.

18. One of the people present when the detainee resided at Jaffar's house was named Abdul Hafith.

19. A known jihadist received electronic circuitry and explosives training at the Algerian House in Jalalabad for six weeks, in early 2001. Jihadist Abu Hafith also received this training.

20. The detainee possessed a Casio F-91W watch, common among detainees and used in bombings linked to al Qaida and radical Islamic terrorist improvised explosive devices.

21. The North African terrorist network associated with Jaffar al Jizzaari in Afghanistan had a network of safe houses. One safe house located just outside of Jalalabad was called "The Algerian House."

22. The Algerian House was used to house North Africans and Europeans of North African descent while in Afghanistan, when transiting to and from training or in and out of the country.

23. The detainee's brother, Samir, resided in Holland, with a known Libyan Islamic extremist and maintained contact with Islamic radicals in Italy. He has sought the assistance of

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF BIN HAMIDA, ADIL MABROUK**

the Tunisian government and International Committee of the Red Cross to gain the detainee's release.

24. Italian officials have investigated the detainee's brother, Faical, for suspicion of planning to commit a terrorist attack during Ramadan.

d. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee left Kabul to escape the Northern Alliance and fled to the Pakistani border where he was promptly arrested by the Pakistan authorities.

2. The detainee anticipates serving a jail term if returned to Tunisia.

3. The detainee has been sentenced by the Tunisian government to 20 years in prison and 5 years administrative arrest for being a member of a terrorist organization operating abroad.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee claims he was not involved in a logistical cell nor was he a member of a terrorist organization while in Italy.

b. The detainee claims that he went to Afghanistan purely for religious purposes, not for military training.

c. The detainee denies receiving military training or ever firing a weapon while in Afghanistan.

d. The detainee claims he had no interaction with the Taliban while in Afghanistan.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

19 August 2005

TO: BOUJAADIA, SAID

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF BOUJAADIA, SAID

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. In July 2001, the detainee traveled with his family via Damascus, Syria; Turkey; Tehran, Iran; Mashhad, Iran; and Herat, Afghanistan, to Kandahar, Afghanistan.

2. The detainee went to Afghanistan with the intention of fighting jihad there. The detainee said that if things went well he planned on staying in Afghanistan as a merchant.

3. On 24 November 2001, about 300 troops loyal to Afghan leader Gul Agha Shirzai took control of the village of Takhteh Pol, cutting off the highway between Qandahar City and the border town of Spin Boldak. Within two hours of taking the city, Shirzai's troops exchanged gunfire with Arabs associated with Usama Bin Laden (UBL) who were passing through the village by car. Three Arabs were killed and two Arabs taken prisoner.

4. The detainee was traveling in one of these cars with three known al Qaida members, including one of UBL's sons-in-law.

5. Shirzai's troops seized from the Arabs two SA-7 missiles and an ICOM hand-held radio. Later that evening, Shirzai's troops listened to the radio's pre-tuned frequency and heard Arabs discussing the capture of their cohorts, mentioning Shirzai by name.

6. The two Arabs captured by Shirzai's forces were the detainee and a Yemeni citizen named Salem Ahmed Salem Hamdan.

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7. The detainee and Hamdan agreed to tell interrogators a cover story that they worked for the Al Wafa organization.

8. Hamdan admitted that he was UBL's driver in Afghanistan.

9. The detainee used a cunya, Hakim al-Maghribi, while in Afghanistan.

10. The detainee's cunya was found on an Arabic document listing "names of al Qaida martyrs, those missing in action, those imprisoned brothers, and those who had escaped to Pakistan, as well as names of individuals assigned to various military positions and units." The detainee was listed as part of a convoy on the Boldok-Khandahar Road around 26 November 2001.

### b. Training

1. The detainee attended al Farouq in September 2001 for eleven days. During this time, he received training on the AK-47, RPG, pistol, BK machine gun, formations, hand-to-hand combat and physical fitness.

2. The Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group is known to have used al Qaida's al Farouq training camp in Khandahar for basic training.

3. The Secretary of State has designated the Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group (GICM) as a Foreign Terrorist Organization. Starting in the late 1990s, the goals of the GICM reportedly include establishing an Islamic state in Morocco and supporting al Qaida's jihad against the West.

### c. Connections/Associations

1. Riyadh facilitated the detainee's travels to Afghanistan. In Kandahar, the detainee located a contact his brother-in-law had given them within the al Wafa organization. This individual took the detainee and his family to his house.

2. On 5 December 2001, the Secretary of State placed al Wafa al-Igatha al-Islamia on the Terrorist Exclusion List because the organization has committed or incited to commit a terrorist activity; prepared or planned a terrorist activity; gathered information on potential targets for terrorist activity; or provided material support to further terrorist activity.

3. Riyadh lived at the home of Bouthar in Morocco and married the detainee's wife's sister.

4. Riyadh is a key al Qaida operative involved in the plot to use explosive-packed boats to attack American and British ships in the Strait of Gibraltar.

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5. The detainee first met Usama Boutahar at the Umar Bin Khattab Mosque in Casablanca sometime in 1998.

6. Boutahar is a suspected Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group member.

7. Sometime in 2000, the detainee traveled to Spain, with Boutahar and others, including the wife of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group's chief of security.

8. The Secretary of State has designated the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) as a Foreign Terrorist Organization. The LIFG emerged in 1995 among Libyans who had fought against Soviet forces in Afghanistan and declared the government of Libyan leader Muammar Qadhafi un-Islamic and pledged to overthrow it. Some members are aligned with al Qaida or are active in the international mujahidin network.

9. The detainee helped Abu Ilyas, a friend of Boutahar, find housing in Morocco. Abu Ilyas is a known GICM member.

10. Boutahar introduced Zuhayer to the detainee after Zuhayer arrived in Morocco from Afghanistan. Zuhayer traveled to Morocco on the recommendation of Abdullah Tabarak.

11. Zuhayr is a senior al Qaida operative and associate of Abu Zubaydah.

12. The detainee identified Abdullah Tabarek as one of UBL's guards. Later, when the detainee's family was living in Afghanistan, Tabarek was the neighbor of the detainee's brother-in-law Mohammed.

13. Tabarak had Zuhair ask on his behalf to marry the detainee's sister. The detainee refused [the request] because Tabarak was already married.

14. In mid- to late-January 2002, al Qaida sent the detainee's brother-in-law, Zuhair, to Morocco to identify United States targets for future attacks.

15. Moroccan authorities arrested three Saudis and four Moroccans plotting to use explosive-packed boats to attack American and British ships in the Strait of Gibraltar. Zuhair was one of those arrested.

16. Zuhair was arrested on 12 May 2002 in Morocco and later convicted of planning terrorist acts. In February 2003, he received a 10-year prison sentence.

#### e. Other Relevant Data

1. At the time of capture, the detainee had a color photograph among his personal affects. A senior al Qaida member has identified the person in the photo as a Yemeni who had pledged bayat to UBL.

UNCLASSIFIED

## UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF BOUJAADIA, SAID**

2. The detainee was involved in a riot in Camp Four at Guantanamo Bay.
4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
  - a. The detainee stated that he had no knowledge of the attacks against the World Trade Center or any other subversive actions against the American people, before or after they happened.
  - b. The detainee denies ever hearing about the Moroccan Islamic Fighting Group (GICM) or the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) prior to his arrival at Guantanamo Bay.
5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

UNCLASSIFIED



# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

23 June 2005

TO: HASHEM, MUBARAK HUSSAIN BIN ABUL

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF HASHEM, MUBARAK HUSSAIN BIN  
ABUL

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
  - a. Commitment
    1. The detainee traveled from Karachi, Pakistan to Kabul, Afghanistan via Quetta, Pakistan; Spin Buldak, Afghanistan; and Kandahar, Afghanistan on or about December 2001.
    2. The detainee visited Afghanistan with knowledge that the U.S. was conducting a war in that country.
    3. The detainee provided a false identity to Pakistani authorities.
    4. The detainee maintained his mistaken identity (Al Rauf) from approximately November 2001 until mid-December 2002 when he was visited by a representative from Bangladesh.
  - b. Connections/Associations
    1. A senior al Qaida Lieutenant stated that the detainee looked familiar to him, but he was unable to recall his name, nationality, or other identifying information.
  - c. Other Relevant Data
    1. The detainee was employed as an Imam at the Masjid-e-Madani Mosque in Karachi, Pakistan.

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## UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF HASHEM, MUBARAK HUSSAIN BIN ABUL**

2. The detainee claims to have traveled to Kabul, Afghanistan to visit the Sahaba Karan, also known as the Mazar-e-Sharif Monument.

3. When the detainee was arrested in Peshawar, Pakistan by Pakistani authorities, he did not have any identification on him.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee has no plans after possible release, but has considered returning to Bangladesh to seek the counsel of his parents to determine a future course.

b. When asked if he felt a duty to perform Jihad, the detainee replied that there are many other forms of Jihad besides violence, and that Jihad can mean internal struggle.

c. The detainee did not support the Taliban and to his knowledge never met any Taliban or al Qaida members during his travel to Kabul. He does not support the views of al Qaida.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

UNCLASSIFIED

# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

29 June 2005

To: AL KHALAQI, ASIM THAHIT ABDULLAH

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL KHALAQI, ASIM THAHIT  
ABDULLAH

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee arrived in Afghanistan in late 2001 from Yemen, via Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. He left Saudi Arabia with approximately 200 U.S. Dollars and 2,000 Saudi Riyals. His airline ticket cost about 1,700 Saudi Riyals.

2. Detainee's travel route from Saudi Arabia to Afghanistan was as follows: he flew from Riyadh to Jeddah, then went to Mecca to do Umra, returned to Jeddah and flew to a small city in Kuwait where he stayed for a two-hour layover, then flew on to Karachi, Pakistan. Once he arrived in Karachi, he met up with Abu Ali and stayed in Karachi for a week or two.

3. The detainee was at the front lines in Bagram.

b. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee talked with Abu Ali and decided going for dawa was a good thing to do and he stated that Abu Ali was associated with the group Jama'at Al-Tabligh.

2. The Jama'at Al-Tabligh is known to be a legitimate Islamic missionary organization based in Pakistan and believed to be used as a cover for actions by Islamic extremists.

3. The detainee attended Jama'at Al-Tabligh meetings at local mosques in Karachi with Abu Ali.

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## UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL KHALAQL, ASIM THAHIT ABDULLAH**

4. The detainee had a piece of paper that contained the name of Mohammed Al-Asmari. Asmari's name appeared on a phone list that was recovered in a June 2002 raid of a Karachi facility associated with al Qaida.

5. When the detainee was captured, he was in possession of an address book that included the name of Rashid Al-Qahtani, whose name was obtained in connection with the arrest of an al Qaida terrorist planner.

6. The name of Mohammed Al-Zaharani was found in the detainees address book. Al-Zaharani was mentioned in the handwritten Last Will of one of the 9/11 hijackers.

7. The detainee is a low-level member of the Jaish-e-Mohammed.

8. The Jaish-e Mohammed is an Islamic fundamentalist group known to use mosques to recruit fighters in Karachi, Pakistan, who would then be trained to fight in the jihad in Afghanistan.

9. The detainee was identified by a senior al Qaida lieutenant. According to the lieutenant, the detainee's face seemed familiar and that he may have seen him in Kabul or Kandahar or at one of the guesthouses.

10. The detainees name, alias, nationality, passport and a ticket were all found on a document listing 324 Arabic names, aliases and nationalities recovered from safe house raids associated with al Qaida members in Karachi, Pakistan.

### c. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee surrendered at the Pakistani border to Pakistan authorities sometime during Ramadan 2001.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee stated the people in Karachi were fairly well educated in the Quran and Islamic studies so they decided to go to Afghanistan, a country in need of missionary work.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

UNCLASSIFIED

# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

27 May 2005

To: SULEIMAN, FAYIZ AHMAD YAHIA

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SULEIMAN, FAYIZ AHMAD YAHIA

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. Originally from Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, the detainee traveled to Jalalabad, Afghanistan via Hudaida, Yemen; Sana, Yemen; Dubai, United Arab Emirates; Karachi, Pakistan; Quetta, Pakistan and Kabul, Afghanistan.

2. The detainee identified himself as an Imam in Jiddah, Saudi Arabia.

3. The detainee knew of some Sheiks who would solicit money for other countries and even address Jihad, with the majority of the talk involving Chechnya. However, the detainee had no knowledge of persons being ordered or requesting to fight in combat.

4. The detainee was identified at Toloquan and Tora Bora as a medic.

5. The detainee fought with an Arab fighting group against the Northern Alliance in Talaqoun.

b. Training

1. The detainee trained in Khandahar, Afghanistan to make poisons.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee's names, aliases, nationality and passport information were recovered from safehouse raids associated with suspected al Qaida in Karachi, Pakistan.

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## UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SULEIMAN, FAYIZ AHMAD YAHIA**

2. Abdullah Al Ghamidi, a possible al Qaida operative, provided the detainee with employment at a pharmaceutical company.

d. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee's kunya is Idris.

2. A fighter would pick or would be given a kunya (an alias), which they would use from that point forward.

3. The detainee was arrested in December 2001, by Pakistani authorities attempting to cross the border from Afghanistan with other Arabs.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee believes that the United States was justified in taking military action against the Taliban regime and al Qaida.

b. The detainee believes that the United States is known as a good nation for supplying food and clothing to so many poor nations in the world.

c. The detainee was aware of the fatwas related to the jihad in Chechnya and denied ever going on a jihad.

d. The detainee denied any connection with al Qaida or the Taliban.

e. The detainee denied participating in hostilities in Afghanistan.

f. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on September 11, and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or its interest.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

24 August 2005

TO: AL MALKI, SAED KHATEM

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL MALKI, SAED KHATEM

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
  - a. Commitment
    1. The detainee worked as a security officer for a firm called the Hajj Mawsem where he earned 4,600 Saudi Riyals per month.
    2. The detainee agreed to help distribute aid (food, clothing, etc.) in Afghanistan at the request of Sheik Al-Shaykh. Sheik Al-Shaykh was the senior sheik of the Masjid Al Harem Mosque, which is a large mosque near Kaba, Saudi Arabia.
    3. Sheik Al Shaykh suggested that the detainee work for the Al Birr Foundation. A man named Hasan Al Nashiri, a fellow student with the detainee, asked him to help distribute goods to poor Muslims.
    4. The purpose of the Al Birr organization was to help poor Muslims in Saudi Arabia and other countries.
    5. The detainee left Saudi Arabia sometime around January 2001.
    6. The detainee and Nashiri flew Saudi airlines from Jiddah, Saudi Arabia to Damascus, Syria, then a Syrian airline to Mashhad, Iran where they stayed for two months.
    7. The detainee and Nashiri spent two months in Herat, Afghanistan and in addition to food and clothing they also bought books and tapes regarding Islam. Traveling through Afghanistan, the men stayed in various mosques, but provided no details on the mosques, Sheiks, guides or names of villages.

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## UNCLASSIFIED

### SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL MALKI, SAED KHATEM

8. The detainee and Nashiri also traveled to Spin Buldak, Afghanistan, then to Quetta, Pakistan. They said they traveled to Pakistan to obtain better quality of goods to distribute. Several trips were made between Spin Buldak and Quetta.

9. The detainee claims he traveled for approximately eight months distributing supplies with al Nashiri, whom he referred to as the "money man."

10. The was arrested in Pakistan around December 12-17, 2001 while on his way to re-enter Afghanistan with aid supplies.

#### b. Training

1. The detainee attended a mountain tactics class.

2. The mountain tactics course was a seven-week course held at the Farouk training camp, which covered guerilla warfare in mountainous terrain.

3. The Al Faruq camp provided a general program that consisted of a fundamental or basic course lasting 40 days. The course provided trainees with fundamental military skills in light and heavy weaponry, field guns, warheads, topography and explosives.

#### c. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee was unable to provide any names of individuals who are connected to the Al Birr Foundation. He stated there was no need for him to register with the foundation because he was not going to receive a salary.

2. The detainee has always maintained that he was in possession of a letter from the Al Birr Foundation that explained the purpose of his work in Afghanistan. However, he was unable to explain how he obtained the letter from the foundation if he never registered there.

3. The detainee had his passport and other documents stolen. After hearing about the detainee's loss an unknown guide gave him 1,000 Rupees and took him to a bus headed to Peshawar, Pakistan.

4. The detainee has provided four different versions of his personal history and how he came to be detained. During initial screening, he first stated the Non-Governmental Organization was Yemeni based, then later said it was Saudi based.

5. The detainee told agents he was divorced four or five years ago. However, he could not, or would not, explain how his divorce, five years previous, seemed to contradict the ages of his children.

UNCLASSIFIED



## UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL MALKI, SAED KHATEM**

6. The detainee told agents, after his divorce, he got a job selling cars. He said he sold only one car for his uncle, but he did not know how much it sold for because his uncle set up the deal.

7. A passport from Iraq, with one of the detainee's aliases, Ahmad Muhammad Salih, was recovered from the master bedroom of a suspected al Qaida operative's residence.

8. The detainee may have been involved in a November 1995 bomb attack on the Egyptian embassy in Islamabad. He then escaped to the Shamshad and Deruntah camps in Afghanistan the day of the attack.

9. The Derunta training camp has a poisons course that lasts approximately two weeks and teaches students how to poison food and drinks.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee claims he had no association with Taliban or al-Qaida forces and he denies having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on September 11th. Additionally, he denies any knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or its interests.

b. The detainee had no concern about the doings or whereabouts of al Qaida or the Taliban, and stated that he doesn't feel members of those organizations are Muslim at all due to their actions against others.

c. The detainee stated that although he feels that a great injustice has been done and is being done to him by his detainment here at GTMO, he would still never take up arms against anyone, and would never want to leave Saudi Arabia to try and help others out of his country again.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

30 June 2005

TO: AL HARBI, MAJID ABDALLAH HUSAYN MUHAMMAD AL SAMLULI  
SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF  
AL HARBI, MAJID ABDALLAH HUSAYN MUHAMMAD AL SAMLULI

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. Detainee was recruited by a Jama'at Al-Tabligh associate in Jeddah, who suggested that the detainee travel to Lahore, Pakistan, to teach the Koran and Hadith. The detainee was instructed to contact an associate of the Jama'at Al-Tabligh in Lahore.

2. The Preachers of Islam (or Tablighi Jama'at Organization) has been supporting Islamic terrorist groups in South and Southeast Asia under the cover of conducting religious activities. The group is closely aligned with other Pakistani terrorist organizations and the al Qaida network.

3. Detainee was on a list of 84 Mujahidin fighters captured in Pakistan.

4. Detainee traveled from Jeddah, Saudi Arabia to Riyadh, Saudi Arabia; then on to Dubai, United Arab Emirates; Karachi, Pakistan and finally Lahore, Pakistan. The detainee traveled to Afghanistan during the late September-early October 2001 timeframe to support a Jama'at Al-Tabligh Jihad by teaching the Hadith.

b. Training

1. Detainee was identified as being an Emir for a group of fighters in Tora Bora and as having trained at al Farouq.

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## UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL HARBI, MAJID ABDALLAH HUSAYN MUHAMMAD AL SAMLULI**

2. Detainee admitted that he received training in the use of the AK-47 including how to break the weapon down, aim and shoot.

c. Connections/Associations

1. Detainee's name, alias, nationality and phone numbers were on a list of captured Mujahidin found on a hard drive belonging to a known senior al Qaida operative.

2. One of the detainee's aliases was found in a phone book belonging to an al Qaida terrorism planner.

d. Other Relevant Data

1. Detainee's name was on a list of 68 probable al Qaida members incarcerated in Pakistan. The handwritten letter was recovered along with materials linked to al Qaida.

2. Detainee had 400 USD on him when captured. He claimed he had exchanged 3850 Saudi Riyals in Dubai and received USD 850 of which he used 450 USD to pay for travel and incidental expenses prior to arriving in Afghanistan.

3. Detainee stated that prior to his trip to Afghanistan he had never traveled outside Saudi Arabia and has never been to Croatia, Bosnia or the U.S.

4. The detainee's name was found on a watch list for Chechnya.

5. A subject named Majid Abdakka Husay Al-Harbi, with a Saudi Arabian citizenship and a birth date of 06 April 1979 was admitted for entry into the United States as a non-immigrant from 29 April 1999 until 28 October 1999. Port of entry was New York, NY and the intended destination, Holiday Inn, Denver, CO.

6. When entering Afghanistan, the detainee traveled by car to the Afghan border, then crossed the border by motorcycle away from the official crossing site.

7. Detainee has been witnessed multiple times by Guantanamo Bay Military Police performing physical training in his cell and leading prayer.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. Detainee stated that in his opinion Usama Bin Ladin's call for Jihad has created confusion among Muslims and is wrong.

b. Detainee claims to have gone to Pakistan to teach the Koran and Hadith.

UNCLASSIFIED

## **UNCLASSIFIED**

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF  
AL HARBI, MAJID ABDALLAH HUSAYN MUHAMMAD AL SAMLULI**

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

1 July 2005

TO: AL NOAIMI, ABDULLAH

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL NOAIMI, ABDULLAH

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
  - a. Commitment
    1. Around July 2001 the detainee went to the Mosque near the Abdullah Center. He met a male named Jenahay (ph) who told him he could have a new life by dying in a jihad.
    2. The detainee decided to die as a martyr by fighting the enemies of Islam, which included the Northern Alliance and the United States.
    3. The detainee took a flight from Bahrain to Meshad, Iran, then a taxi to the Afghanistan border. He crossed into Afghanistan on foot and went to a Taliban office/guesthouse in Kabul, Afghanistan. He took a taxi to the airport in Herat, Afghanistan, then a flight to Kabul.
    4. He converted about \$50.00 of his money to Afghani currency. He brought the equivalent of approximately \$1,000.00 United States dollars to Afghanistan. Once in Kabul, he took a taxi to the Taliban office.
    5. At the Taliban office, the detainee told a Taliban representative that he was here to fight. He said that he had not been trained in weapons or fighting.
    6. In the village he joined a group of four Arabs and two Afghans who were following a guide to the Pakistan border. The guide was paid \$50.00 in United States currency.
    7. He states he did not hate the United States before his incarceration; however, he expressed a dislike for the U.S. because of his incarceration in Kandahar, Afghanistan and Camp Delta.

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## UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL NOAIMI, ABDULLAH**

### b. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee is associated with Al-Janahi who is believed to be identical with Sunni extremist Mohammed Jaffer Abdulla Abdul Rahim Janahi.

2. An al Qaida operative said that Jahani sent him a message mentioning that he was involved in planning an operation in the straits of Hormuz.

### c. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee was identified by a senior al Qaida member who said that the detainee was originally from Saudi Arabia and had come to Afghanistan in 2000. He thinks he saw the detainee either in Kandahar, Kabul or Tora Bora in 2001.

2. The detainee's name and telephone number were included on the list of captured Mujahidin found on a hard drive associated with Khalid Shaykh Muhammad, seized during joint raids on 1 March 2003 in Pakistan.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. While looking at photographs of September 11, 2001, the detainee was visibly upset and saddened by them. He said he was not part of the terrorist acts committed against America.

b. Detainee reiterated that he never fought in Afghanistan and does not want to hurt anyone today. Looking back on his decision to go to Afghanistan, he realizes he made a mistake.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

UNCLASSIFIED

Numbers not used

# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

26 October 2005

TO: SHAHEEN, MUHAMMED IBN ARFAN

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SHAHEEN, MUHAMMED IBN ARFAN

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
  - a. Commitment
    1. The detainee stated that during the war in Bosnia he worked and slept at a large hospital. He helped with the wounded and performed any other jobs they needed. He stated he spent less than three months in Bosnia, and then returned to Bologna, Italy.
    2. Another individual claimed that he fought with the detainee in Bosnia for eight months starting in June or July 1995, and they fought together on a major operation labeled Badr al Bosna.
    3. The detainee's name was discovered listed under Operation Brown Lion in Bosnia.
    4. While in Jalalabad, Afghanistan in June 2000, the detainee was one of the main leaders who agreed to create the Tunisian Combatant Group. The detainee was assigned the role of contacts, welcome greetings and travels for the Tunisian Combatant Group.
    5. The detainee said "the detainees in Cuba will never forget the tyranny brought unto them by America. If they are released from Cuba the detainees are going to get revenge from the time they have spent over here."
    6. The detainee said he would kill President Bush if given the chance because President Bush is the cause of all these problems for Muslims.

UNCLASSIFIED

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## UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SHAHEEN, MUHAMMED IBN ARFAN**

### b. Training

1. The detainee stated he trained at Khaldan training camp from August 1997 to February 1998. His training consisted of small arms training and spiritual training. The detainee also stated he attended light weapons training in Duranta.

2. The detainee was sent to Pakistan to attend a paramilitary training camp as part of the Bologna Group of the Islamic Armed Group.

### c. Connections/Associations

1. A senior al Qaida operative said the detainee served as the point of contact between himself and the Tunisian group located in Jalalabad.

2. The same al Qaida operative said the detainee joined a small group of Tunisians in the Khaldan camp and became the group's Deputy Emir. He also stated that after the 11 September 2001 attacks, the detainee went to Tora Bora to fight with al Qaida.

3. The detainee hosted three al Qaida personnel in his house on their way from Kabul to Tora Bora.

4. The detainee stated he considered himself to be the third or fourth person in the leadership hierarchy of the Tunisians in Afghanistan.

5. The detainee also had ties to al Qaida by providing forged passports while living in Jalalabad.

6. The detainee was listed as a member of the Islamic Armed Group by the Italian authorities and was wanted for arrest in Italy as of 1997.

7. The detainee was also identified as specializing in negotiating and distributing false banknotes for the Islamic Armed Group.

### d. Detainee Actions and Statements

The detainee admitted that he was involved with passport forgery operations and that he trained at the Khaldan camp.

### e. Other Relevant Data

1. Pakistani authorities arrested the detainee for having an illegal Afghani passport. He was detained without identification documents.

UNCLASSIFIED

## UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SHAHEEN, MUHAMMED IBN ARFAN**

2. The detainee identified himself as a violent person in Tunisia, which was before he chose to fully pursue Islam. The detainee revealed he had killed a man who had cheated him.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee denies any role in document forgery or logistical support for any organization either in Italy or later in Pakistan.

b. The detainee claims he has no knowledge of North Africans in Europe who are, or were, involved in logistical support for any terrorist organization.

c. The detainee claims his purpose for going to Pakistan, and later to Afghanistan, was to open a restaurant, which he never did. His reason for not opening a restaurant was that he could not trust the Pakistanis. He bought a house in Afghanistan and married.

d. The detainee denied pledging bayat to Usama Bin Laden.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

1 July 2005

TO: MASUD, SHARAF AHMAD MUHAMMAD

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MASUD, SHARAF AHMAD  
MUHAMMAD

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

The detainee stated he went to Afghanistan because it was governed according to Shari'a. He wanted to take the opportunity to visit a true Islamic state.

b. Training

The detainee claims to have no military training.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee met Ali Ahmed Muhamed at the Al Mutawakil Mosque. Muhamed knew a man named Riyadh from Karachi and made arrangements for the detainee to meet Riyadh. In Karachi, Riyadh took the detainee to a hotel. The detainee gave Riyadh about \$50 USD to purchase a plane ticket for him to fly from Karachi, Pakistan to Quetta, Pakistan.

2. Riyadh the Facilitator was in charge of making travel arrangements for al Qaida members going to Afghanistan.

3. A senior al Qaida lieutenant noted the detainee's picture looked familiar and that he may be a Tunisian with connections to Italy.

4. The detainee stayed at a place in Kandahar known as the Mujawa Al Arab for two months.

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MASUD, SHARAF AHMAD MUHAMMAD**

5. The detainee spent two weeks at an Arab house in Kabul, Afghanistan, and a month and a half at an Arab house in Jalalabad, Afghanistan.

d. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee has been unable to provide any specific details related to his travel to Afghanistan or any of the Arab houses he stayed.

2. The detainee fled from Jalalabad, Afghanistan, to Pakistan with 50 other Arabs. He surrendered to the Pakistani Army in December 2001.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

The detainee stated he would not perform jihad against the United States or anyone else.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

15 June 2005

TO: ALAHDAL, ABU BAKR IBN ALI MUHAMMAD

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF  
ALAHDAL, ABU BAKR IBN ALI MUHAMMAD

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee became interested in going to Afghanistan when he heard about how the Taliban had destroyed the Buddhist statues in Bamiyan, Afghanistan.

2. The detainee was recruited by Abu Jaffr. Abu Jaffr was a well known Jihadist.

3. The detainee traveled to Afghanistan to teach Islam and Arabic in May of 2001.

4. The detainee knew he would be issued a weapon by the Taliban and that he would be expected to fight with the Taliban.

5. The detainee insisted he wanted to go to the front line.

6. The detainee served as a fighter for Taliban Arab forces, mostly in a guard duty capacity.

7. The detainee was issued an AK-47 with three magazines as well as a vest with two grenades.

8. The detainee was a member of a 12 man Taliban unit located in the vicinity of Bagram, Afghanistan.

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## UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ALAHDAL, ABU BAKR IBN ALI MUHAMMAD**

9. The detainee spent three weeks at the front line.

### b. Connections/Associations

1. According to a senior al Qaida operative, the detainee arrived in Afghanistan in 1999 and participated in the battles north of Kabul in the Khalid Center.

2. The detainee was provided information from his leader Abdullah Al-Iraqi, of a safe house in Islamabad, Pakistan, and information of an associated Islamic Jihad office in Faisalabad, Pakistan.

3. Abd al Hadi al Iraqi is an al Qaida lieutenant who was busy after 11 September 2001 fighting U.S. forces in the eastern region of Afghanistan, especially Jalalabad.

4. The detainee claims to know Muhammad Abu Ghayth, who had previously been at the Al-Nur Institute. Abu Ghayth is an al Qaida member in Al-Hudaydah, Yemen.

### c. Intent

The detainee was proud to have been a Mujahidin fighting for the Islamic cause under the banner of the Taliban. Now that it is no more, he will bide his time until a new Islamic nation arises and will join it to fight against the enemies of Islam. Asked if he were a terrorist, the detainee required a definition and readily agreed that he was a willing terrorist against the United States for its hostile position against Palestinian Muslims and other Arab populations.

### d. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee stated that he was a member of the Yemeni political party Islah, but added that his membership in the party had nothing to do with his participation in Jihad.

2. The Yemeni political party Islah (Al-Islah Reform Party in Yemen) is a radical fundamentalist group closely associated with and supportive of al Qaida activities in Yemen.

3. The detainee stayed at the Daftar Taliban guesthouse.

4. Daftar Taliban is a Taliban office in Quetta, Pakistan, helping Arabs cross the border into Afghanistan by coordinating travel and lodging for a fee. The office advises Arabs to stay at houses in Kabul and Kandahar, Afghanistan, during travel.

5. Detainee's pocket litter included U.S. \$100, 500 Saudi Riyals (approximately U.S. \$133), 6,000 Pakistani Rupees (approximately U.S. \$100), a transistor radio and a watch.

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ALAHDAL, ABU BAKR IBN ALI MUHAMMAD**

6. The detainee contradicted much of the information pertaining to his use of radios and radio procedures he had given in previous interrogations.

7. The detainee knew that a war was taking place in Afghanistan and that the combatants were Afghans against Afghans.

8. The detainee stated that he was sad for the civilians who died in the attack on 11 Sep 2001, but he feels that the Pentagon was a legitimate military target.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee and others did not fire their weapons at the American airplanes. He was aware that the United States was bombing Afghanistan but still considered the Northern Alliance his enemy.

b. The detainee stated that he did not intend to fight when he went to Afghanistan.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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