Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

17 November 2005

TO:

AL MARRI, JARALLA SALEH MOHAMMED KAHLA

SUBJECT:

UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL MARRI, JARALLA SALEH

MOHAMMED KAHLA

- 1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
- 1. The detainee went to Mecca and attended a course at the Al Harum Mosque where he met a Saudi individual who described jihad and persuaded him to join.
- 2. The Saudi individual introduced the detainee to another individual who was to be his point of contact regarding the jihad in Afghanistan.
- 3. On 6 September 2001 the detainee flew from Doha, Qatar to Karachi, Pakistan on Qatar Airlines, checked into the Mustafa Hotel, and called his point of contact for jihad. The detainee paid his own way to Afghanistan.
- 4. On 10 September 2001 the detainee departed the Mustafa Hotel and traveled to the al Farouq training camp where he arrived on 11 September 2001.
- 5. The detainee related he resided in the mountains for approximately thirty days while waiting to cross the border, which was closed. The detainee saw this as a barrier to his ability to return home.
- 6. The detainee claimed he needed to return home because he was ill. He reported that he traveled to Kabul, then to the town of Buldak and on to a checkpoint where he boarded a bus that drove to Quetta, Pakistan, where it was stopped by the Pakistani police or military. The detainee was captured and taken to jail, where he remained until he was turned over to U.S. Forces.

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- b. Other Relevant Data
- 1. The detainee reported that upon his arrival at al Farouq he learned that Usama bin Laden owned the camp.
- 2. The detainee reported that while residing in the mountains of Kabul in September 2001 he realized the jihad was a battle of Muslim against Muslim.
- 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a. The detainee denied transferring \$10,000 U.S. Dollars to his brother and claimed the transfer receipt was a forgery.
- b. The detainee claimed he had second thoughts about fighting jihad once he discovered al Farouq was owned by Usama bin Laden.
- 5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

3 June 2005

To:

AL FRIH, MAJED HAMAD

SUBJECT:

UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL FRIH, MAJED HAMAD

- 1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
- 1. The detainee traveled from Jeddah, Saudi Arabia to Karachi, Pakistan in mid to late September 2001 and then on to Boldak, Afghanistan.
- 2. The detainee traveled to Pakistan and then Afghanistan to volunteer for the non-governmental organization Jama'at Al Tablighi.
- 3. Jama'at Al Tablighi, a Pakistan based Islamic missionary organization, is being used as a cover to mask travel and activities of terrorists including members of al-Qaida.
 - b. Connections/Associations
- 1. The detainee is related, by marriage, to the chief of al Wafa in the Kabul, Khost and Kandahar Region.
- 2. The detainee and the detainee's brother entered Afghanistan through Iran after the 11 September 2001 attacks with the help of an al-Wafa employee in Herat, Afghanistan.
- 3. The detainee's brother came to Afghanistan after the 11 September 2001 attacks to fight Jihad against the U.S. The al-Wafa office in Kabul trained the detainee's brother for one week using the AK47 and RPG.
- 4. The al Wafa Humanitarian Organization has been designated as an organization that assists in, sponsors, or provides financial, material, or technological support for, or financial or other services to, or in support of, acts of terrorism.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL FRIH. MAJED HAMAD

- 5. The detainee was a supporter of Usama Bin Ladin and an officer of al Wafa.
- 6. The detainee was identified by a senior al-Qaida Lieutenant as a possible Saudi national who staved at a guesthouse.
 - c. Other Relevant Data
- 1. Detainee refuses to address why he was captured with approximately \$1,200.00 USD after several weeks of travel, when he has previously stated he donated approximately \$1,200.00 USD to Afghan refugees.
- 2. The detainee was arrested at the Pakistani/Afghani border checkpoint when trying to return to Pakistan, at night, after having visited Boldak, Afghanistan.
- 3. The detainee stated he would continue to be uncooperative even if he were interrogated every day until Judgment Day.
- 4. The detainee was designated by a foreign government's Ministry of Interior, General Directorate of Investigations as a priority target. He was placed on a watch list by Ministerial decree because of his travel to Chechnya.
- 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

The detained denied having any knowledge of the attacks on the U.S. prior to their execution on September 11th, and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the U.S. or U.S. interests.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

11 July 2005

TO:

AL-WASM, WASM AWWAD UMAR

SUBJECT:

UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL-WASM WASM AWWAD UMAR

- 1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
 - 1. The detainee arrived in Afghanistan in late 2001.
- 2. The detainee departed Saudi Arabia and drove to Damascus, Syria; flew to Tehran, Iran and Mashhad, Iran; and took a taxi to the Iran-Afghanistan border, Qandahar, Afghanistan and Quetta, Pakistan.
 - b. Connections/Associations
- 1. The detainee volunteered to work with the Al-Haramain charity/non-governmental organization (NGO) from time to time.
- 2. Executive Order 13224, which blocks property and prohibits transactions with persons who commit, threaten to commit, or support terrorism, designates Al-Haramain as a global terrorist entity.
 - 3. The detainee stated he was a colleague of the Al-Haramain Director.
 - 4. The detainee traveled to Iran and Afghanistan with Anwar Al-Nur.
- 5. Anwar Al-Nur's name appeared on a list of al Qaida Mujahidin and the contents of his trust account was found on files recovered on computer media seized during raids against al Qaida associated safehouses in Rawalpindi on 1 March 2003 and Karachi, Pakistan on 11 September 2002.

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- c. Other Relevant Data
- 1. Prior to leaving Saudi Arabia, the detainee withdrew 15,000 Saudi Rials from his personal bank account. He used 5000 Saudi Rials for travel expenses and converted most of the remainder to Iranian and Afghani money and gave it to refugees.
- 2. The detainee was unable to re-enter Iran because of border closures and instead decided to travel through Pakistan. The detainee was detained at a border checkpoint in Pakistan located near Quetta.
- 3. The detainee made more than 20 trips outside Saudi Arabia between April 2000 and September 2001 to both Jordan and Kuwait.
- 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a. The detainee left Saudi Arabia initially for Iran and subsequently Afghanistan to assist Afghan refugees crossing into Iran.
 - b. The detainee did not accept money from anyone to finance his travel.
- c. The detainee stated the money he distributed to needy people in Afghanistan was only for food and medical treatment, not for military purposes.
 - d. The detainee said he did not associate with Taliban and al Qaida members.
- e. The detainee stated he would not have any desire to involve himself in any future activities hostile to the United States.
 - f. The detainee denied ever meeting or traveling with Al-Harbi.
 - g. The detainee denied having ever received military training.
 - h. The detainee advised that if released he would return to his family, farm and job.
- 5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

21 October 2005

TO:

AL DUBAIKEY, BESSAM MUHAMMED SALEH

SUBJECT:

UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE

REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL DUBAIKEY, BESSAM

MUHAMMED SALEH

- 1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
 - 1. The detainee has traveled to Oatar, Dubai and Pakistan for business and pleasure.
- 2. Prior to Ramadan in November 2001 the detainee flew from Jeddah, Saudi Arabia to Karachi, Pakistan. His purpose for travel to Pakistan was to look for rare old books and coins. He could not find coins in Karachi, Pakistan, so he flew to Islamabad, Pakistan.
- 3. The detainee brought \$12,000 United States Dollars with him to Pakistan and funded his own travel.
- 4. The detainee was identified as being present at a guesthouse in Karachi, Pakistan that was run by a known al Qaida member.
 - 5. A senior al Qaida operative recognized a photograph of the detainee.
- 6. The detainee was seen at a guesthouse in Kabul, Afghanistan where he promised to give a senior al Qaida operative money for operations in Israel.
- 7. The detainee admitted he has been using the name of his friend in order to hide his true identity.
 - b. Connections/Associations

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL DUBAIKEY, BESSAM MUHAMMED SALEH

The detainee was arrested with a suspected member of al Wafa.

c. Intent

The detainee was identified as a "religious thinker" in the cellblocks at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. A religious thinker is described as those detainees who use religion as a guide on how to behave, especially while in detention. Religious thinkers direct others to use their religion to withstand the interrogations and not answer any questions.

d. Other Relevant Data

- 1. The detainee admitted another man went to the passport office for the detainee, filled out the necessary paperwork and brought detainee his passport.
- 2. The detainee admitted to having a satellite phone with him at time of capture. This satellite phone was for calling his family.
- 3. A name closely resembling one of the detainee's known aliases, the year and place of his birth and the detainee's parents phone number, was found on a military training camp application discovered in an office in Kandahar, Afghanistan.
- 4. The detainee provided U.S. Forces with his parents' home phone number, which matches the number found on the training camp application.
- 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a. The detainee denied knowing that his traveling companion was the director of the al Wafa office in Herat, Afghanistan or that this man was giving money and supplies to al Qaida.
- b. The detainee denied entering Pakistan illegally through Jordan, Syria and Iran. The detainee claimed that the only other countries he has visited besides Pakistan were Qatar, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates. The detainee denied entering Afghanistan.
- c. The detainee denied his association with al Wafa and the allegation regarding attendance at terrorist training camps.
- d. The detainee stated that the attacks of 11 September 2001 were a tragedy. He believes the actions of Usama Bin Laden and al Qaida are identical to the atrocities committed by Adolph Hitler. He believes the act of killing innocent women and children is always wrong regardless of the cause.
- e. The detainee swore that he had no relations with al Qaida, the Taliban or al Wafa. The detainee reiterated that he had no knowledge of his traveling partner's connection to al Wafa.

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL DUBAIKEY, BESSAM MUHAMMED SALEH

- f. A senior al Qaida operative denied that detainee belonged to al Qaida.
- g. The detainee stated he used to suffer from multiple personalities and that is why he has provided so many different names.
- h. The detained denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001. He also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.
- 5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

24 June 2005

TO:

AL FARHA, SAID ALI

SUBJECT:

UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE

REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL FARHA, SAID ALI

- 1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
- 1. Detainee traveled to Pakistan to teach at the Kubbar Mosque aka Masjid al Quba Mosque operated by the Tablighi Jamaat Organization.
- 2. Jama'at Tablighi is a Pakistan-based Islamic missionary organization used as a cover to mask travel and activities of terrorists, including members of al Qaida.
 - 3. The detainee has recruited at least two individuals for al Oaida.
 - 4. The detainee has facilitated travel for individuals traveling to Afghanistan for al Qaida.
 - 5. The detainee was listed by a foreign government service as a high priority target.
- 6. The detainee was identified by a senior al Qaida member as having been an operative in Qandahar.
 - b. Connections/Associations
- 1. While allegedly teaching for the Jama'at Tablighi, detainee associated with Mullah Mohamed Rassul (Molawiy Mohamed Al Rasool).
- 2. Mullah Mohamed Rassul was a commander in charge of one of six Taliban groups that were scheduled to attack specific targets around Kandahar, Afghanistan.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL FARHA, SAID ALI

c. Intent

- 1. Detainee has been overheard by GTMO MP's speaking about Jihad, Usama Bin Laden and al Qaida.
- 2. Detainee had papers seized from his cell that depicted what appeared to be Camp Delta block broken down with descriptions.
- 3. Detainee had drawings discovered in his cell of what could be the floor layout of Gold or Brown buildings at GTMO.
 - d. Other Relevant Data
- 1. Detainee stated that he left his passport, airline ticket, and money in a little pouch he left on an x-shaped shelf at the al Quba Mosque on the date of his apprehension.
 - 2. The Saudi government stated that the Detainee did not have a valid passport.
 - 3. Detainee was forbidden to travel for seven years as of 17 June 1998.
 - 4. The detainee was apprehended in Pakistan for not having his passport.
 - 5. Detainee has harassed GTMO MP's multiple times.
- 6. GTMO MP's witnessed the detainee performing PT and martial arts moves multiple times.
- 4. The following primary factor favors release or transfer:

Detainee traveled to Pakistan to teach at the Kubbar Mosque aka Masjid al Quba Mosque operated by the Tablighi Jamaat Organization.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

20 May 2005

From:

Presiding Officer

To:

AL QURBI, MOHAMMED MUBAREK // SALAH

Via:

Assisting Military Officer

SUBJECT:

UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE

REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF

AL QURBI, MOHAMMED MUBAREK // SALAH

- 1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state or to a third state; (2) transfer you to your home state, or a third state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state, or the third state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

- 1. The detainee traveled extensively during the period of December 2000 through November 2001. Multiple visits to Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and United Arab Emirates, a one-week stop in Syria, and a five-month stay in Malaysia are recorded in his passport.
- 2. The detainee attended a religious meeting of Jama'at al Tabligh at a mosque in Lahore, Pakistan. During his stay at the mosque, he talked to members of Jama'at Tabligh about the Koran and Al-Da'wa.
- 3. The Jama'at Al Tabligh is a Pakistan-based Islamic missionary organization believed to be used as a cover to mask travel and activities of terrorist, including members of al Qaida.
- 4. The detainee was identified as an al Qaida member by a former guard at Usama Bin Laden's complex at the Kandahar, Afghanistan Airport.
- 5. The detainee was observed on board a Taliban airplane ferrying fighters bound for Northern Afghanistan.

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SUBJECT:

UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE

REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF

AL QURBI, MOHAMMED MUBAREK // SALAH

6. The detainee served as the manager of the al Qaida front-line guesthouse in Kabul, Afghanistan.

b. Training

The detainee's passport contained a forged entry/exit stamp for Malaysia, which was provided to al Qaida members who were trained in the al-Faruq camp.

- c. Connections/Associations
- 1. The detainee was a member of al Qaida and a member of Al-Nashiri's security element.
 - 2. Al-Nashiri is a key suspect in the USS COLE bombings.
 - d. Other Relevant Data
 - 1. Pakistani Police in Quetta arrested the detainee on 25 November 2001.
- 2. The detainee had in his possession a notebook which contained the name of Sami 'Ali Muhammad' Umar Al (Damani), a Yemeni jihadist.
- 3. The detainee was polite and easy to get along with during his interviews, but it was apparent that the detainee was withholding information and all of his answers were vague, evasive and unclear.
- 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a. The detainee claims to have no specific knowledge of Taliban, al Qaida or other extremist activities in any of the countries visited. The detainee claims to have not been a combatant in Afghanistan.
- b. The detainee denies having any knowledge of the attacks in the U.S. prior to their execution on September 11th. He also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the U.S. or U.S. interests.
- c. The detainee claimed he moved to Pakistan to teach the Quran and denies any affiliation with the al Qaida.
 - d. The detainee claims he never went to Afghanistan.
- 5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE

REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF

AL QURBI, MOHAMMED MUBAREK // SALAH

Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

24 Jun 2005

TO:

QA ID, RASHID ABD AL MUSLIH QA ID AL

SUBJECT:

UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE

REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF

QA ID, RASHID ABD AL MUSLIH QA ID AL

- 1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
- 1. The detainee indicated that he had heard from a variety of media sources that there was a massive Afghan refugee problem on the Iranian border. He wanted to go to help out.
- 2. On 29 Sep 2001, the detainee traveled from his home in Saudi Arabia via Jordan, Syria, Iraq, and Iran; finally arriving in Afghanistan on 03 Oct 2001.
 - b. Connections/Associations
 - 1. The detainee traveled with two associates from Saudi Arabia.
- 2. The detainee and both of his traveling companions, Al Nur and Wasim, traveled to carry out charity work in conjunction with a Saudi charity, al-ighatha al-khairia.
- 3. Al Ighatha is a large Saudi NGO with field offices worldwide, many of which are staffed by or support terrorists or mujahidin. The NGO is linked to al Qaida and other extremist NGOs.
- 4. Al Nur was on a list of al Qaida mujahidin and their al Qaida trust accounts recovered from various computer media seized during raids against al Qaida associated safehouses.
- 5. The Saudi government designated Al Nur as a priority target and lists him on the "watch and arrest list" for travel to Afghanistan.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF QA ID, RASHID ABD AL MUSLIH QA ID AL

- c. Other Relevant Data
- 1. The detainee can only account for 30 days in Afghanistan, even though his passport says he entered Afghanistan on 03 Oct 2001 and he was captured on 15 Dec 2001.
- 2. The detainee has no idea why his passport is incorrect. The detainee has two brothers-in-law that work at the Skaka passport office.
- 3. The detainee acknowledges that he was arrested in 1994 in the city of Kassin. The detainee says he has never heard of case 117 or that the Saudi government is interested in him.
- 4. The detainee is on a foreign government service's list of Saudi detainees whom they designated as being high priority. The detainee was put on the watch and arrest ministerial order on 29 Oct 2001.
- 5. The detainee was captured by Pakistani forces when he attempted to cross the border from Afghanistan.
- 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a. The detainee advised he conducted his charitable works without the assistance of an organization because he would receive more credit as a Muslim for doing so.
- b. The detainee stated that he does not have negative feelings toward the United States or any European country, and does not consider them an enemy. He continued to state he has never been involved with any terrorist organization, and did not give money to any terrorist organizations.
- 5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

8 July 2005

TO:

AL HAJJ, SAMI MOHY EL DIN MUHAMMED

SUBJECT:

UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE

REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF

AL HAJJ, SAMI MOHY EL DIN MUHAMMED

- 1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
- 1. The detainee worked as an executive secretary for Abdul Al-Latif Al-Imran, general manager for the Union Beverage Company (UBC).
 - 2. The Union Beverage Company has been associated with Bosnian/Chechen mujahid.
- 3. The detainee traveled to Azerbaijan at least eight times to courier money to the Al-Haramayn non-governmental organization (NGO) on behalf of his boss, Abd Al-Latif Omran.
- 4. Al-Haramayn has been designated under Executive Order 13224 as an organization that has provided support to terrorist organizations.
 - 5. During the winter of 1997, the detained delivered \$7,000 USD to Al-Haramayn.
 - 6. During the winter of 1998, the detained delivered \$13,000 USD to Al-Haramayn.
- 7. During the summer of 1999, the detainee visited Al-Haramayn's summer camp, and delivered \$13,000 USD to Al-Haramayn.
- 8. During November 1999, the detainee delivered \$120,000 USD to Munir Al-Barguoni for a new factory in Azerbaijan; he also delivered \$100,000 USD to Jamal, the Director of Al-Haramayn.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL HAJJ, SAMI MOHY EL DIN MUHAMMED

- 9. The detainee was detained in Azerbaijan for the transport of \$220,000 USD. The money was destined for Chechen rebels and not for humanitarian support as the detainee was told.
- 10. After serving as the Al-Haramayn Director in Baku, Azerbaijan from 1997 to January 2000, Jiman Mohammed Alawi Al Muraai, aka Abu Wafa, took a job operating the Wafa offices in Karachi, Pakistan.
- 11. Al-Wafa has been designated under Executive Order 13224 as an organization that has provided support to terrorist organizations.
- 12. While working at the Union Beverage Company, the detainee met Mamdouh Mahmoud Salem.
- 13. Mamduh Mahmud Salim Abu Hajir was arrested in Germany in September 1998 and extradited to the United States. He was a senior al Qaida lieutenant and Bin Ladin's Deputy in Sudan.
- 14. The detainee founded a company on 20 May 1999 in Azerbaijan named "SAMICO Services."
- 15. SAMICO documents were found during a raid of locations occupied by suspected extremists affiliated with Muhammad Rabi'a Abdul Halim Sha'ib (an Egyptian extremist).
- 16. To register a company in Azerbaijan, authorities required that a registree have a registered business in another country.
- 17. Because the detainee did not have a registered company elsewhere, he used falsified documents to register his company. According to the detainee, the falsified documents showed him as a co-owner of Rumat International.
- 18. According to a Foreign Government Service, the detainee and Mamduh Muhammad Salim Ahmad, aka Abu Mu'izz, are both affiliated with Rumat International. Ahmed was subsequently arrested on suspicion of participating in the bombings of the U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania.
- 19. While in Azerbaijan, the detainee came into contact with Ashraf, who ran the juice distribution business for the Union Beverage Company in Azerbaijan.
- 20. Between 1994-1998, Ashraf Abdulrakhim Ayub worked for the Kuwaiti Revival of Islamic Heritage Society (RIHS), a non-governmental organization.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL HAJJ, SAMI MOHY EL DIN MUHAMMED

- 21. The Revival of Islamic Heritage Society (RIHS) has been identified under Executive Order 13224 as a terrorist affiliated organization.
- 22. As of late March 2003, a foreign government was investigating Ashraf for possible ties to terrorism.
- 23. On 4 January 2000, the detainee attempted to reenter Azerbaijan, but was detained and then deported from the country. The deportation was due to his alleged activities supporting Chechen rebels.
 - b. Other Relevant Data
- 1. In March or April 2000, the detainee left the Union Beverage Company and went to work for Al-Jazeera in Doha, Oatar.
 - 2. The detainee was hired to go to Chechnya to do a story.
- 3. Around this time, the detainee met with the former President of Chechnya, who was exiled in Doha, Qatar, on at least 15 occasions to learn about Chechnya and to solicit help in gaining access to Chechnya.
- 4. Following the September 11th attack, the detainee was told by Al-Jazeera to forget Chechnya and go to Afghanistan.
- 5. The detainee interviewed several Taliban officials during his stay in Kandahar, Afghanistan.
- 6. The detainee interviewed a man who identified himself as Abu Hafs Al Moritani, a member of al Qaida.
- 7. Abu Hafs was one of Usama Bin Laden's personal advisors and a religious recruiter. He was also the leader of the Mauritanian al Qaida cell.
- 8. The detainee was stopped in early December 2001 at the border by Pakistani security. According to Pakistan security, the passport the detainee had in his possession did not agree with Pakistani records.
- 9. The detainee was detained at the Afghanistan/Pakistan border because his name appeared on a border authority watch list.
- 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
 - a. The detainee claims never to have traveled to Great Britain.

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL HAJJ, SAMI MOHY EL DIN MUHAMMED

- b. The detainee denies knowing how Chechen fighters obtained their finances.
- c. Detainee has no recorded major discipline acts or violent behavior. Detainee has refused to obey guards on occasion by not following instructions. Detainee has consistently led prayer in the cellblocks and has been seen teaching English and the Koran to other detainees.
- d. The detainee states he wants to return to his family and resume his position as a father and provider. The detainee noted that he would exercise caution in future assignments with Al-Jazeera. The detainee hopes to return to Doha, Qatar, with his family. He stated that he harbors no ill feelings against the U.S.
- e. The detainee denies any knowledge that his former boss at the Union Beverage Company, Al-Latif, was involved with any al Qaida operations.
 - f. The detainee denies any knowledge of al Qaida operations in Chechnya.
- g. The detainee denies any involvement or membership in any Islamic extremist organization, to include the Muslim Brotherhood and the Council of Shura.
- 5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay. Cuba

23 May 05

To:

SHAYBAN, SAID BEZAN ASHEK

SUBJECT:

UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SHAYBAN, SAID BEZAN ASHEK

- 1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
- 1. The detainee traveled to Afghanistan to join the Taliban and fight against the Northern Alliance.
- 2. The detainee used his personal money to purchase his plane ticket. The detainee's route of travel was Saudi Arabia - Qatar - Bahrain - Karachi, Pakistan - Quetta, Pakistan - Kabul, Afghanistan.
- 3. The detainee stayed at the Kubba mosque and the Taliban Mosque in Chaman, Pakistan. The detainee stayed two months at each mosque.
 - b. Training
- 1. The detainee was identified as an individual who was at the Al-Faruq Training Camp in Afghanistan.
- 2. The detainee was a member of a Taliban rifle squad holding defensive positions in the Wadi Bashir area near Kabul.
- 3. The detainee spent six months protecting troop bunkers and stopping the Northern Alliance from advancing or over-running their area.
 - c. Connections/Associations
 - 1. A member of the same Taliban rifle squad has been identified as Abdul Khaliq. UNCLASSIFIED

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SHAYBAN, SAID BEZAN ASHEK

- 2. Abdul Khaliq is a Taliban leader and a Commander of Afghani Military Forces (AMF).
- d. Intent
- 1. The detainee went to Afghanistan at the end of April 2001 with the intention of participating in the fight against the Northern Alliance.
 - e. Other Relevant Data
- 1. The detainee's passport shows a Doha, Qatar, entry and exit on 16 December 2000, a Bahrain entry on 16 December 2000 and an exit on 17 December 2000, as well as an entry to Karachi, Pakistan, on 17 December 2000.
- 2. At the time of his capture, the detainee had 900 USD on him he claimed he earned by renting out his car in Saudi Arabia.
 - 3. The detainee fled because he did not want to fight in the war anymore.
- 4. The detainee stated the following: "If I'm Guilty, I'm Guilty", "After death there is another Life", "God created good and evil and I'm good". The detainee also indicated that he did not care about this life and is preparing for the second life.
- 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a. The detainee denies having any knowledge of the attacks in the U.S. prior to their execution on September 11th. He also denies knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the U.S. or U.S. interests.
 - b. The detainee never fired a round or saw combat.
- c. The detainee did not receive any formal weapons training and did not fire his weapon because they did not have much ammunition.
- 5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

1 June 2005

To:

AL HIZANI, ABD

SUBJECT:

UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE

REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL HIZANI, ABD

- 1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
- 1. The detainee admitted he traveled to Afghanistan in order to fight in the Jihad after reading that the Taliban needed support from Muslims.
 - 2. The detainee spent ten months with the Taliban prior to being captured.
 - b. Training

The detainee received weapons training at the Faruq training camp for six weeks.

- c. Connections/Associations
- 1. In 2001, the detainee served as a security guard under al Qaida associate Gharib Al Yemeni, Taliban commander for Arab fighters in Kabul, Afghanistan.
- 2. Abu Gharib was one of four Yemeni al Qaida cell members selected by Usama Bin Laden to participate in an operation involving the use of ships packed with explosives against oil tankers in the Strait of Hormuz.
 - 3. The detainee knows Abd Al Hadi Al Iraqi.
- 4. Abd Al Hadi Al Iraqi was present at a meeting involving senior members of al Qaida. At the meeting, Al Iraqi proposed a plan to use suicide bombers against United States forces.

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d. Intent

- 1. The detainee was assigned to Bagram, Afghanistan, where he spent more than two months serving with a group of 15-20 other soldiers. The detainee was later transferred to Khvajeh Ghar. The detainee remained on the front for about three months.
- 2. The detainee was present during a retreat from Konduz. The detainee was the only member of his group who had a short wave radio.

e. Other Relevant Data

- 1. The detainee was captured by Northern Alliance forces in mid-November 2001.
- 2. On 3 October 2002, the detainee mentioned he was once in the Saudi Army to guards at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
- 3. A document recovered in Karachi, Pakistan from safehouse raids targeting suspected al Qaida associates listed the detainee's alias as Hussein Al Ghareeb.
- 4. The detainee's alias, Abu Hussein Al Ghareeb, was listed in a document issued by the Office of Mujahideen Affairs that lists 150 al Qaida members scheduled for tactics, artillery, security, sniper and anti-aircraft training.
- 5. The detainee has been cited for numerous incidents of failure to comply, guard harassment and an assault during his detention.
- 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

The detained denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on September 11th, and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or its interests.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

16 June 2005

TO:

SA ID ALI JABIR AL KHATHIM AL SHIHRI

SUBJECT:

UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE

REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF

SA ID ALI JABIR AL KHATHIM AL SHIHRI

- 1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
- 1. According to a foreign government service, the detainee went to Afghanistan in 1421 (2000/2001) for two months.
 - 2. The detainee left Saudi Arabia after September 11, 2001 for Bahrain.
 - 3. The detainee traveled to Afghanistan via Pakistan utilizing his own money.
- 4. The detainee stated that he traveled with 1,900 U.S. dollars to distribute to the Red Crescent charity Organization.
- 5. The detainee is on a watch list for facilitating travel for Saudis' willing to go to Afghanistan through Iran by providing fake passports to those unable to get one.
- 6. The detainee instigated two other individuals to assassinate a writer based on a fatwa issued by Shaykh Hamud ' Shu'aybi.
- 7. Sheikh Hamud Al-Uqqla was a Saudi Arabian Mufti who issued fatwas and encouraged people to fight jihad against Christians and Jews.
- 8. The detainee actually provided financial support in the sum of 7,000 Saudi Riyals (1,867 US Dollars) to other fighters traveling from Bahrain to Afghanistan.

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9. The detainee, an al Qaida travel facilitator, briefed others in Mashad, Iran on entry procedures into Afghanistan utilizing a certain crossing.

b. Training

The detainee trained in urban warfare at the Libyan Camp, north of Kabul in Afghanistan.

- c. Connections/Associations
 - 1. Detainee met Abu Faisal al Ghamdi at the Saudi Consulate in Lahore, Pakistan.
- 2. Abu Faisal was the director of the Herat, Afghanistan Wafa office. He was not a Saudi diplomat.
- 3. Wafa Al-Igatha Al-Islamic (Wafa) claims to serve humanitarian purposes, it has provided logistical support to Usama Bin Laden's al Qaida organization and many of the documents found at the Herat Wafa house pertained to military and terrorist training.
- 4. One of the detainee's aliases and phone number was found in the pocket litter of the Karachi, Pakistan manager of Wafa al-Igatha al Islamia.
- 5. Detainee said he heard no mention on al Qaeda while in Pakistan, but he heard it quite a bit in Afghanistan and even watched Bin Laden on TV.
 - d. Other Relevant Data
 - 1. Detainee claims he traveled to Iran once to purchase carpets for his store in Riyadh.
 - 2. Detainee lost his passport and other documents in Afghanistan.
- 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a. The detainee claims to have been in Afghanistan for 17 hours when he was wounded in an air attack. The detainee was in Afghanistan to assist the needs of the refugee community.
- b. The detainee felt that Usama Bin Laden had no business representing Islam. The detainee believed Usama Bin Laden separated himself from Islam, therefore, Usama Bin Laden separated himself from the people.
- c. Detainee has no knowledge of weapons sales to the Taliban, or any non-governmental organization. Detainee has no knowledge of any terrorist organizations or activities.

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SA ID ALI JABIR AL KHATHIM AL SHIHRI

- d. The detainee denied being in combat in Afghanistan.
- e. The detainee related that if released, he would like to return to Riyadh, Saudi Arabia wherein he would reunite with his family. The detainee stated he would attempt to work at his family's used furniture store if it's still in business.
- f. The detainee denied knowledge of Al Wafa or its objectives. Furthermore, he claimed to have never heard of Al Wafa until he arrived at Camp Delta.
- g. Detainee denied any involvement or knowledge of assistance provided to jihadist traveling from Iran to Afghanistan.
- h. The detainee has also claimed that he never heard of al Qaeda until he arrived at Camp Delta.
- 5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

29 September 2005

TO:

SADKHAN, JAWAD JABBER

SUBJECT:

UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SADKHAN, JAWAD JABBER

- 1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
 - 1. The detainee was a Taliban recruiter.
- 2. In Iraq, the detainee was a member of the Amin emergency response group, a group responsible for tracking down people opposed to Saddam Hussein and torturing and/or killing them.
- 3. The detainee worked as an interrogator for the Taliban police in Mazar-e-Sharif, Afghanistan.
- 4. The detainee was the chief of the Taliban's interrogation office at Mazar-e-Sharif, Afghanistan. Ten to fifteen interrogators worked for the detainee in this office.
- 5. The detainee was the director of intelligence for the Taliban at Mazar-e-Sharif, Afghanistan.
- 6. The detainee admitted that he worked with the Taliban in Afghanistan and stated that he had to carry papers as an Arab to prove the fact.
 - b. Training

The detainee admitted to knowing how to interrogate in Arabic.

c. Connections/Associations

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- 1. The detainee met a Mullah in Kabul by the name of Niham who was a Taliban leader. Niham assisted the detainee's family while living in Kabul for eight months.
- 2. The detainee received financial assistance from the Taliban while living in Mazar-e-Sharif and was given a piece of land.
- 3. The detainee worked for Abdel Hadi al-Iraqi as a recruiter for the Taliban. Abdel Hadi al-Iraqi reported directly to Usama Bin Laden.
- 4. The detainee received funds from Usama Bin Laden funneled through the al-Wafa organization.
- 5. The detainee operated as a conduit between the Taliban Estakbarat in Mazar-e-Sharif and former President of Iraq, Saddam Hussein.
 - 6. The detainee was heavily involved in the heroin trade for the Taliban.
 - 7. The detainee grew heroin in Northern Afghanistan and was a Taliban commander.
 - d. Detainee Actions and Statements
- 1. The detained claimed he had obtained a fake Afghan passport in 1998, then immediately claimed he had only tried to obtain the passport but did not receive the funds to cover the cost.
- 2. The detainee recruited a group of his own fighters. He provided his men weapons, communication equipment and vehicles.
- 3. The detainee intended to sell his fighting group's services to the highest bidding warlord in Afghanistan.
- 4. If a recruit refused to join his fighting group, the detainee turned the recruit over to the Taliban as a spy.
- 5. The detainee and his group of fighters fought against the Northern Alliance on the front lines.
- 6. The detainee threatened the life of an individual and the lives of the family if the individual were to talk to interrogators about the detainee.
- 7. The detainee threatened others for giving information about fellow detainees to interrogators.
 - e. Other Relevant Data

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SADKHAN, JAWAD JABBER

- 1. The detainee provided detailed information about the qualifications for being a Taliban interrogator.
 - 2. The detainee speaks Farsi and translates Arabic to Farsi.
- 3. The detainee was the senior representative in Afghanistan for Bir Halla. The detainee's primary role was to ensure that Mazar-e-Sharif officials at Gumrik would grant titles to the vehicles.
- 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
 - a. The detainee denied association with al-Wafa.
 - b. The detainee claimed to have helped coalition forces.
 - c. The detainee claimed to have worked with the Northern Alliance after 9/11.
- d. The detainee helped the Northern Alliance's Commander Dostom by pointing out Taliban locations.
- e. The detainee denied being part of the former Taliban intelligence organization at Mazar-e-Sharif.
- f. The detainee denied being the intelligence director for the Taliban in Mazar-e-Sharif. He also denied interrogating anyone in Afghanistan.
- g. The detainee stated that the only compensation he received from a non-governmental organization was in the form of charity food and money and never more than the equivalent of 30 or 40 United States dollars.
- h. The detainee stated he knew nothing about the planned attack on the United States before September 11, 2001 and has no current threat information.
- 5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

10 November 2005

TO:

ABDUL SAID, HASSAN

SUBJECT:

UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE

REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ABDUL SAID, HASSAN

- 1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
- 1. In January 1993, in Kurkuk, Iraq, the detainee joined the Iraqi National Congress resistance movement. The detainee stated he worked as a spy for the Iraqi National Congress from 1994 to 1999.
- 2. The detainee was tasked to gather information on the Rashid Camp in Baghdad. The Iraqi National Congress requested that he determine if any chemical weapons training was still being conducted at this facility.
- 3. The detainee went to Kurdistan and was arrested there while working for a Kurdistan resistance movement known as the Iraqi Democratic Party.
- 4. From January to April 2001, the detainee stayed at the Taliban house located in Mazar-e-Sharif.
- 5. The detainee was arrested in Uzbekistan for having false documents. The detainee was in prison in Uzbekistan for two and one half months. After he was released from prison in Uzbekistan, he was turned over to the Taliban and placed in jail for one month.
- 6. The detainee displayed an in depth knowledge of the power structure of tribal leaders serving as Baath party members.
- 7. The detainee demonstrated a detailed knowledge of the identification cards carried by Saddam Hussein's suicide squad and how to differentiate between the suicide squad and most Iraqis.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ABDUL SAID, HASSAN

b. Training

- 1. In March 1994, the detainee joined the Iraqi army, and after basic training in Basra, was assigned to the 2nd Infantry Division, 15th Battalion, 104th Brigade, 3rd Company, 2nd Platoon.
 - 2. While in Basra, Iraq, the detainee learned to make an improvised explosive device.
 - c. Connections/Associations
 - 1. The detainee's cousin works at an Iraqi tactical weapons factory in Basra.
- 2. The detainee has knowledge of Taliban interrogators and identified the Chief of the Taliban's Interrogation Office at Mazar, Afghanistan.
 - d. Other Relevant Data
 - 1. The detainee fled Iraq in search of political asylum after being accused of espionage.
- 2. On 15 June 1995, the detainee was captured by Iraqi Army Officials and imprisoned for one year.
- 3. The detainee was overheard stating he raped an International Committee of the Red Cross Worker in Northern Iraq. He fled from the police and tried to escape by hiring a smuggler to take him across the border into Iran. Once inside Iran, the detainee refused to pay the smuggler so the smuggler turned him over to the Iranian Police who deported the detainee back to Afghanistan.
- 4. The detainee was arrested with five kilos of heroin and several thousand dollars in United States currency.
- 5. On 1 January 2002, the detainee turned himself in to the American Forces at Mazar-e-Sharif, Afghanistan.
- 4. The following primary factor favors release or transfer:

The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

24 October 2005

TO:

AL NASIR, FAIZAL SAHA

SUBJECT:

UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL NASIR, FAIZAL SAHA

- 1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
- 1. The detainee was recruited by Omar Al-Jumhor to go to Afghanistan. He met with Omar 15 to 16 times at the Tayseer Mosque in the months prior to his departure.
- 2. The detainee's purpose for traveling to Afghanistan was to obtain training to fight in Chechnya.
- 3. The detainee joined the Taliban because they were fighting the Northern Alliance. He claims he was not recruited but volunteered for jihad.
- 4. The detainee traveled from Saudi Arabia to Dubai, United Arab Emirates and then flew to Karachi, Pakistan. From Karachi, the detainee flew to Quetta, Pakistan and then traveled to Qandahar, Afghanistan, where he stayed at a guesthouse.
- 5. The detainee watched a jihad video at the Al-Nibra safehouse in Qandahar, Afghanistan, along with other Arab fighters participating in the jihad with the Taliban.
- 6. After training at Al Faruq, the detainee returned to a guesthouse in Qandahar, traveled to Kabul, Afghanistan and then flew to the front lines north of Konduz, Afghanistan.
- 7. The detainee was identified as having trained at the Al-Farouq training camp and was seen on the northern front lines.
 - 8. The detainee remained at the front for two to three months with the Omar Saif group.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL NASIR, FAIZAL SAHA

9. The detainee was assigned to the frontline and guarded against the Northern Alliance invasion.

b. Training

- 1. The detainee attended Al Faruq training camp for two weeks while he completed small arms training.
- 2. At Al-Farouq, the detainee was trained in the assembly, loading and firing of rocket-propelled grenades, the Khalishnikov rifle and the Bika weapon system.

c. Connections/Associations

- 1. The detainee's name was found on a document listing Arabic names, aliases and nationalities recovered from suspected al Qaida safehouses in Karachi, Pakistan.
- 2. A known Taliban member identified the detainee as someone he frequently saw on the back lines and from time to time on the front line.
- 3. The detainee was identified as being on the northern front line with a senior al Qaida member.

d. Intent

- 1. The detainee went to Afghanistan to commit himself to the jihad to fulfill his religious obligation. He stated that he liked the idea of being a martyr for Islam.
- 2. The detainee has been non-compliant in detention. He has repeatedly harassed and attacked guards, failed to comply with instructions, attempted to make weapons and attempted to harm himself.
- 3. The detainee stated he is willing to die for Islam and that jihad was part of his religious education. He stated any unbeliever is an enemy of Islam.
- 4. The detainee stated that when he is released he would join the jihad against non-Muslim believers.
 - 5. The detainee stated he liked Usama Bin Laden and his message.
- 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a. The detainee was identified by a foreign government agency as being of low intelligence or law enforcement value to the United States and unlikely to pose a terrorist threat to the United States or its interests.

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL NASIR, FAIZAL SAHA

- b. The detainee wants to be released to Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, near his family, where he would get a good job.
- 5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

31 October 2005

TO:

BWAZIR, MOHAMMED ALI ABDULLAH

SUBJECT:

UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE

REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF BWAZIR, MOHAMMED ALI

ABDULLAH

- 1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
- 1. The detainee met a man who suggested the detainee go to Afghanistan to receive religious instruction. This man gave the detainee \$150 U.S. dollars and helped him obtain an alias, a visa and airplane tickets.
- 2. The same man provided the detainee with papers from a doctor stating he required medical treatment in Pakistan. The detainee was able to obtain a passport with these papers.
 - b. Training
- 1. The same man provided the detainee with a letter of introduction to the Khalden training camp in Afghanistan. When the detainee learned that camp was closed he attended the al Farouq training camp.
- 2. While at al Farouq, the detainee stated he trained on rocket propelled grenades and the AK-47, M-16, G-3, Beka and Garanov machine guns.
 - c. Intent
 - 1. The detainee stayed at a Taliban house in Quetta, Pakistan on the way to Afghanistan.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF BWAZIR, MOHAMMED ALI ABDULLAH

- 2. The detainee stayed at the Said Center near Kabul where his recruiter provided him with three fatwas. These fatwas convinced the detainee to assist the Taliban and to join the fighting against the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan.
- 3. The detainee was identified as an al Qaida soldier seen at the Ashara guesthouse in Kabul.
- 4. The detainee traveled to the Bilal Center where he was issued an AK-47 and was subsequently wounded. After the detainee recovered he was stationed at Khwaja Ghar for about seven months.
- 5. The detainee served in an Arab Taliban unit in the vicinity of Khwaja Ghar when the 11 September 2001 attacks occurred in the United States.
- 6. The detainee stayed in Afghanistan thinking that fighting would continue. He traveled to Taloqan, Afghanistan to join the fight between the Taliban and the Northern Alliance.
- 7. In Taloqan, the detainee was welcomed to join an Afghani Taliban unit that was engaged in a fight with the Northern Alliance. The detainee and his unit fled to Konduz when Mazar-E-Sharif fell to Northern Alliance Forces.
- 8. The detainee surrendered to General Dostum's forces near Mazar-E-Sharif around 24 November 2001 after hearing radio announcements that any Taliban who surrendered and gave up their weapons would be allowed to return to their homes.

d. Other Relevant Data

- 1. The detainee stated that he knew the Taliban and liked them.
- 2. The detainee attended Usama bin Laden's daughter's wedding in Kandahar.
- 3. Usama bin Laden attended a funeral at al Farouq while the detainee was training there.
- 4. The detainee and about 100 other soldiers from the front lines in Kabul, Afghanistan attended a speech given by Usama bin Laden.
- 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the U.S. prior to their execution on 11 September 2001.
- b. The detainee stated he didn't fight Americans before so he doesn't plan to fight Americans if released.

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF BWAZIR, MOHAMMED ALI ABDULLAH

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

21 November 2005

TO:

AL ZAHRI, ABD AL RAHMAN

SUBJECT:

UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE

REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL ZAHRI, ABD AL RAHMAN

- 1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
- 1. After hearing stories about the fighters in Chechnya, the detainee became inspired and decided to attend training to go fight in Chechnya.
 - 2. The detained purchased and watched a recruitment video about jihad in Chechnya.
- 3. The detainee wanted to join the fight against the Russians in Chechnya and many people instructed him to go to Afghanistan to get training.
- 4. In March or April 2001, the detainee attended the Masjid al Shohada Mosque where he heard that jihad was a good and fun thing to do and that jihad is a duty of all Muslims.
- 5. The detainee heard religious leaders from Saudi Arabia state it would be a great thing to join the war. The religious leaders issued a fatwa.
- 6. The detainee consulted an Afghani fighter who suggested he go to Afghanistan for training.
- 7. The detainee attended the al Khair Mosque in Sanaa, Yemen. While at the mosque, he met a Yemeni with whom he traveled to Afghanistan.
- 8. The detainee stayed at the Al Nibras guesthouse in Kandahar, Afghanistan, before traveling to al Farouq. Al Nibras is known as a place for brothers coming to train for jihad.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL ZAHRI, ABD AL RAHMAN

- 9. The detainee traveled to Belkh, Afghanistan, where he met a Taliban official.
- 10. The detainee took one thousand dollars and his Yemeni passport to Afghanistan.
- 11. The detainee's initial travel route is reported to be from Sanaa, Yemen to the al Farouq training camp via Dubai, United Arab Emirates; to Karachi, Pakistan; to Kandahar, Afghanistan.
- 12. The detainee stayed at the residence of the former Saudi Arabian Ambassador in Kabul, Afghanistan, which has been reported as a Taliban safe house used by al Qaida and personnel from al Farouq.

b. Training

- 1. The detainee never served in the military but knew how to use weapons like the Kalashnikov handgun since he was a child.
 - 2. The detainee spent 57 days at the al Faroug training camp, Afghanistan.
 - 3. The detainee was able to provide details about his training at al Farouq.
- 4. The detainee trained on AK-47's, pistols, M16's, Uzis, G-3's, Kalaco rifles and rocket-propelled grenades.
 - 5. The detainee received specialized weapons training.
- 6. The detainee possessed two training videos that he indicated he made about mines and minefields.

c. Connections/Associations

- 1. During the detainee's training at al Farouq, Usama bin Laden spoke about the need to stay and fight for jihad and not to return to their home country.
 - 2. The detainee sat with Usama bin Laden more than ten times.
- 3. The detainee reportedly identified an individual who was in charge of maintaining an al Qaida computer database containing information indicating which trainee would attend special training courses.
- 4. The detainee confirmed that part of his training allowed him to sit and talk with al Qaida leaders.
- 5. The detainee's name was found on a computer seized during a raid against al Qaida associated safe houses in Rawalpindi and Karachi, Pakistan.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL ZAHRI, ABD AL RAHMAN

d. Intent

- 1. The detainee's mission was to collect information on our techniques and to waste our resources investigating his lies.
- 2. The detainee and others were told they would go to Yemen and set up a base and that base would be "the base of the base".
- 3. The detainee reported he might have been on a mission for Usama bin Laden when he was caught.

e. Other Relevant Data

- 1. The detainee claims he was arrested on a trip with a Taliban official to purchase antique books about Muhammad.
- 2. The detainee was detained and accused of being a thief in Mazar-E-Sharif by the Taliban Intelligence Agency.
- 3. The detainee claims he fabricated a story about his experiences with Usama bin Laden and al Qaida and he did this as a joke to law enforcement authorities.
 - 4. The detainee did well at al Farouq resulting in special treatment.
- 5. The detainee heard about attacks being planned against the United States' interests in Kuwait, Jordan, Qatar and Oman.
- 6. The detainee admitted making fabricated stories such as Usama bin Laden visiting a guest house in which the detainee stayed; that he took trips to Afghanistan to the front lines during training; and that he had knowledge of special training camps in Afghanistan.
- 7. General Dostum's Forces captured the detainee who was in a truck that contained a bag of money and passports.
- 8. The detainee was captured with 24,000 Pakistani rupees of his own money which is approximately \$500 United States dollars and \$500 United States dollars given to him by someone he had met at a hospital.
- 9. The detainee was identified in Konduz, Afghanistan and at the front lines in Afghanistan along with other Arabs from al Farouq.
- 10. The detainee indicated he knew Usama bin Laden was preparing a big strike and several smaller strikes on the United States and that his sources of information were good.

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL ZAHRL ABD AL RAHMAN

- 11. The detainee reported that he would be honored to be an al Qaida member.
- 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a. The detainee claimed everything he had reported to this point was wrong. He denied receiving a fatwa and he left Yemen legally to purchase antiquities.
- b. The detainee denied being at al Farouq and he previously stated he was at al Farouq because this is what he thought others wanted to hear.
 - c. The detainee denied he received specialized training.
 - d. The detainee denied he attended advanced training.
 - e. The detainee was asked to fight for the Taliban but refused.
- f. The detainee didn't train to fight the United States forces, but to fulfill his religious duty to protect himself and his honor with civil and physical defense.
- g. The detainee denied any previous travel to the United States. He denied any knowledge of the World Trade Center attacks; the bombing of the USS Cole, the embassy bombings or any other terrorist attacks.
 - h. The detainee claimed he was not part of al Qaida or the Taliban.
- i. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001 and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States.
- 5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

6 October 2005

TO:

HAMIDULLAH, ALI SHER

SUBJECT:

UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE

REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF HAMIDULLAH, ALI SHER

- 1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
 - 1. The detainee traveled to Afghanistan through Mashhad, Iran.
 - 2. The detainee bribed or paid a Taliban official to enter Afghanistan.
 - 3. The Taliban provided the detainee with room, board, and a job.
 - 4. The detainee fought in Chechnya.
 - b. Training

The detainee received terrorist training in Chechnya.

c. Connections/Associations

The detainee met an Azerbaijani named Elchin while in Russia and the two talked about traveling to Afghanistan.

- d. Detainee Actions and Statements
 - 1. The detainee denied that he had fought in Chechnya.
- 2. The detainee admitted to providing United States military debriefers with a fake name and withholding his true identity.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF HAMIDULLAH, ALI SHER

e. Other Relevant Data

The detainee states that he has no personal opinion of the Taliban but says he never witnessed the Taliban do anything wrong.

- 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a. The detainee states that would like to return to a Turkish speaking country but if he isn't released to Turkey, the detainee would consider returning to Azerbaijan.
- b. If released, the detainee states that he would attempt to find work as a chef or a liquor storeowner, which he has done in the past.
- c. The detainee states he has no animosity to the United States and considers Americans to be good people.
 - d. The detainee has no prior knowledge of the September 11th attacks.
 - e. The detainee claimed he never participated in combat operations.
- f. The detainee claimed that the Taliban never asked him to fight, nor did they offer him training.
- 5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

26 September 2005

TO:

SARAJUDDIN, ABIB

SUBJECT:

UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE

REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SARAJUDDIN, ABIB

- 1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
- 1. The detainee has traveled out of Afghanistan to Saudi Arabia twice and Pakistan one time. His last travel to Saudi Arabia was to complete the Haj around ten or twelve years ago (approximately 1990).
- 2. The detainee was involved with Tablighi Jamaat, a religious group comprised of ten to fifteen people who prayed together. He stated he was in a Jamaat once and he traveled to different villages in his area and preached about Islam and the Koran.
- 3. Some al Qaida members have joined the al Dawa al Tabligh religious organization, identifiable with the Jama'at al Tabligh, which was well known for its support to jihadist causes.

b. Connections/Associations

- 1. The detainee's relatives say that he and his family gave shelter to Jalaluddin Haqqani, the commander of Taliban forces in the southern provinces of Afghanistan who was fleeing from Kabul.
- 2. The detainee was told of a report indicating that his son stated that Haqqani and his bodyguards did come to his house and requested to stay.
- 3. Jalaludin Haqqani was creating a Hezb-e Islami, Gulbuddin base in Waziristan, Pakistan near the border of Afghanistan. Haqqani is with al Qaida.

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c. Other Relevant Data

- 1. The detainee explained that in previous interviews he withheld information or provided false information, specifically saying that his house was not bombed.
- 2. The detainee also said that he went to the Governor of Khowst, Pacha Khan Zadran, to get money to help rebuild his house. In previous interviews he denied that he received money from anyone to rebuild his house.
- 3. The detainee was seized with three others in an open area near a suspected Taliban facility on 20 Jan 2002. The coalition forces were fired upon during the seizure. The detainees were in possession of an Icom very high frequency (VHF) transceiver.
- 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
 - a. The detainee stated that he has never provided shelter (support) to Jalaluddin Haqqani.
- b. The detainee claims that he does not know of any al Qaida members or training camps within his village of Zani Khel.
- c. The detainee said he was still glad the Americans came to Afghanistan. He felt that for the last 20 years the Afghans only knew war, but now that the Americans were there they had a chance for peace. He did not harbor any resentment toward the Americans for bombing his house and killing members of his family.
- d. The detainee stated that he was involved with recruiting people in his village to fight against the Taliban. His recruiting efforts involved going door to door to request volunteers to fight against the Taliban.
- 5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

24 October 2005

TO:

ZAMAN, KHAN

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE

REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ZAMAN, KHAN

- 1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Connections/Associations
- 1. The detainee stated he knew of Pacha Khan Zadran and that Zadran was a good man and the detainee's tribal leader.
- 2. Pacha Khan Zadran, a field commander, initiated field operations against the coalition military forces in the Afghan provinces of Konar, Laghman, Nangarhar, Paktia and Paktika.
 - b. Other Relevant Data
- 1. The detainee reported that the United States bombed his home after receiving some incorrect information about him.
- 2. A modified very high frequency transceiver was seized at the time the detainee and three others were captured.
 - 3. The radio was identified as the same type utilized by Taliban members.
 - 4. Coalition forces were fired upon during the detainee's capture.
- 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a. The detainee said the United States should not imprison him for not doing anything wrong.

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ZAMAN, KHAN

- b. The detainee stated he never heard of Jamaat Tablighi and that he was not a member of that organization.
 - c. The detainee claimed no knowledge of any very high frequency hand held radio.
- d. The detainee denied that his fingerprints would be found on the radio that was seized at the time of his capture.
- e. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on September 11, 2001 and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.
- 5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

24 October 2005

TO:

JANKO, ABD AL RAHIM ABDUL RASSAK

SUBJECT:

UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE

REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF JANKO, ABD AL RAHIM ABDUL RASSAK

- 1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
- 1. The detainee claims that he stayed with an Imam for two to three days. During this time, the Imam gave the detainee money and suggested that the detainee should direct his life toward jihad. The two discussed the jihad in Chechnya.
- 2. In a video that was obtained from a senior member of al Qaida's residence, the detainee claims that he was recruited to join the jihad in Chechnya.
 - 3. The detainee claims that he stayed at an al Qaida guesthouse in Kabul.

b. Training

- 1. The detainee stated that he attended the al Farouq training camp in Kabul, Afghanistan between January and February 2000.
- 2. While at the camp, the detainee claims that he received training in small arms, assault weapons (i.e., AK-47, G-3 and M-16) and various other Russian and Saudi made weapons. The detainee also received training in mountain fighting tactics.
- 3. An associate of the detainee stated the detainee admitted to receiving military training outside of Afghanistan.

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c. Connections/Associations

An associate of the detainee claims that the detainee was possibly an agent for a foreign government.

- d. Other Relevant Data
- 1. The detainee claims that after a dispute with his father over a loan the detainee received from a friend, the detainee attempted to leave the United Arab Emirates.
 - 2. The detainee claims that he sought asylum with numerous countries.
- 3. The detainee claims that he requested to leave the training camp after eighteen days. As a result, the detainee claims that he was suspected of spying.
- 4. The detainee claims that while at the guesthouse, he worked on repairing and servicing heavy weapons. The detainee claims that that he did not have any experience in this field and he learned on the job.
- 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a. An associate of the detainee claims that the Taliban tortured the detainee to the extent that he had little use of his right arm. As a result, the detainee spoke poorly of the Taliban.
 - b. The detainee claims that al Qaida tortured him until he admitted he was a spy.
- 5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

27 August 2005

TO:

BUKHARY, ABDUL HAKIM

SUBJECT:

UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF BUKHARY, ABDUL HAKIM

- 1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
- 1. The detainee has traveled to Afghanistan five times for Jihad training or other activities. The detainee visited Afghanistan once in 1987 or 1988, 1990, 1992, and twice in 2001.
- 2. A Saudi citizen the detainee met at Masjid Mosque first introduced the detainee to the Jama'at Al-Tabligh in 1985 or 1986.
 - 3. The detainee stated that he joined the Jama'at Al-Tabligh to be a good Muslim.
- 4. The detainee stated that the Jama'at Al-Tabligh ultimately led him to the Jihad in Afghanistan.
- 5. Jama'at Al-Tablighi is a Pakistan based Islamic missionary organization used as a cover to mask travel and activities of terrorists, including members of al Qaida.
- 6. The detainee answered the call to Jihad in Afghanistan against the Soviets in 1987 or 1988 by traveling to the Sada Center in Pakistan for military training.
- 7. The detainee stated that he never actually fought against the Soviets in Afghanistan and that his Jihad duties consisted of cooking, digging trenches, and collecting firewood.
- 8. After the completion of his training, the detainee claimed to have stayed at the Sada Center training camp in support of military training being provided for others.

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- 9. The detainee saw the call to Jihad in the late 1980s in a Saudi Newspaper and then went to Pakistan on his own.
- 10. The detainee stated that in 1992 he moved from the Peshawar guesthouse in Pakistan to Torhum, Afghanistan with approximately 14 to 15 people. The detainee stated that once they arrived in Turhum he was in charge of making up the guard duty roster.
- 11. Also in 1992 the detainee again went to the Towr Kham Center guesthouse to support the Mujahadin combat operations by working in the guesthouse.
- 12. The detainee stated that from hearing how the Taliban declared a Jihad, he knew that he had to go defend his Muslim brothers. The detainee also stated that he went on his own without help.
- 13. The detainee traveled to Kandahar and arrived at the Al-Ansar Guesthouse and was greeted by an Algerian facilitator. The detainee told the facilitator that he was there for a Jihad.
- 14. The detainee was taken to a guesthouse near Kandahar, Afghanistan named Nabras Guest House.
- 15. The Nebras Arab Guest House in Kandahar was used by fighters heading to the al Farouq Training Camp and by Usama Bin Laden. Arabs bound for training at this camp would gather at Nebras until about 25 to 30 people were in the group and then they were transported to al Farouq. Usama Bin Laden would come to Nebras to greet the fighters before they went to training.
- 16. The detainee found an AK-47 with three full magazines inside a foxhole and took possession of it.
- 17. The detainee was present at al Farouq Training Camp when Usama Bin Laden spoke of the Jihad against Americans and all of the enemies of Islam. The detainee defined enemies of Islam as Christians, Jews, Buddhists and Hindus.

b. Training

- 1. In 1987 or 1988 the detainee traveled to the Sada Center in Pakistan for military training.
- 2. The detainee received weapons training for two months at Sada Center's Training Camp.
- 3. During the detainee's month at Sada Training Camp, he participated in physical training that consisted of rope climbing, low crawling, and running three kilometers. The

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF BUKHARY, ABDUL HAKIM

detainee also received training on assembling/disassembling the Kalashikov and pistol, RPG, hand grenades, B-82 canon and mortars.

- 4. The detainee stated in August 2001 he arrived at the al Farouq Training Camp and had to surrender his passport.
- 5. The Military Training at al Farouq consisted of multiple training stations in the camp that provided instruction on physical fitness, hand to hand combat, the Kalashnikov Assault Rifle, medium machine gun, Rocket-Propelled Grenade (RPG), hand grenades, Ganef and Doshka Heavy Machine Guns, Zikyak Light Cannon, and the SA-7 Man Portable Shoulder Fired Air Defense System.
- 6. The detainee stated that he attended the Khalden Camp for three weeks. While at the Khalden Camp, the detainee received training on the 82 mm Mortar, Anti-Aircraft Guns, UZI, M16, pistol, AK-47, and urban training.

c. Connections/Associations

- 1. The detainee is a friend of an individual was involved with modifying passports. This individual trained at a Camp in southern Yemen and at Khaldan and al Farouq Camps in Afghanistan in the early to mid 1990's. The detainee believes that this individual is an al Qaida member.
- 2. An individual processed and gave the detainee a Pakistani Visa, a plane, ticket and 5,000 Saudi Riyals, which is approximately \$1,333 United States Dollars.
 - 3. The detainee stated that while in Peshawar he had a meal with Usama Bin Laden.
- 4. The detainee identified two individuals as Usama Bin Laden's security leaders. Prior to Usama Bin Laden arriving to the Nibras Guesthouse, the security leader personnel did several security checks at the guesthouse.
- 5. The detainee stated that he heard a one-hour briefing from Usama Bin Laden at the Nabras Guest House. The briefing was focused primarily on the occupation of the United States Military in Saudi Arabia.
 - 6. The detainee went to Kandahar, Afghanistan and met Usama Bin Laden.
 - 7. Usama Bin Laden issued a Fatwa to expel the Americans from Arab Land.

d. Intent

1. The detainee stated that if released he would again answer the call to Jihad to fight anywhere for any Muslim cause.

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2. The detainee has shown a commitment to Jihad and has been identified as being an al Qaida member with capability to continue to participate in future hostile acts.

e. Other Relevant Data

- 1. The detainee was identified by a senior al Qaida operative as a member of al Qaida who began training at al Farouq Training Camp but could not finish due to hemorrhoids.
- 2. The detainee is a self-admitted Jihadist, Mujahadin member and member of Jama'at Al-Tabligh, which is a tier one terrorist group.
- 3. The detainee stated that he was the only one in his family who trained and fought for Usama Bin Laden.
- 4. The detainee stated while at Al-Ansar there were people coming in every two to three days and then they would go to the training camp.
- 5. At the Al-Ansar Guesthouse, not only was the detainee's passport taken, but money, tickets and other important documents were taken from each person in the house as well. All the items were put in an individual safe box and a number was written on the box.
- 6. The amount of money the detainee had on him the day he surrendered his passport was \$2,400.00 United States Dollars, 7000 Saudi and 22,000 Rupees.
 - 7. The Taliban arrested the detainee in August 2001 in Spin Boldak, near Ouetta.
- 8. The detainee was put in prison by the Taliban in Kandahar, Afghanistan on accusations of being a spy.
- 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a. The detainee states that he was arrested and placed in an Afghani prison without giving him proof.
- b. The detainee cursed Usama Bin Laden and claimed that answering the call for Jihad issued by Usama Bin Laden was a mistake and that he had reacted based on emotion and not from an informed perspective.
- c. The detainee claimed that he has never been in his country's military service and has not received any type of weapons training.

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF BUKHARY, ABDUL HAKIM

- d. The detainee claims to have no friends or relatives living in the United States and that he heard about the Jihad in Afghanistan on television and newspaper articles. But denied any personal involvement.
- e. The detainee stated that his only trip to the United States was when he went to Williamsport, Pennsylvania for EMT Training for about one month. The trip was sponsored by the hospital and rehabilitation center in Taif when he worked there as an ambulance driver.
- f. The detainee stated that he does not know that Jama'at Al-Tabligh supported al Qaida or Taliban.
- g. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on September 11th and any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.
- 5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

20 July 2005

TO:

RAHMAN, FIZAULLA

SUBJECT:

UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF RAHMAN, FIZAULLA

- 1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
 - 1. The detainee admits to working for the Taliban.
- 2. The detainee was recruited to work for the Taliban and was hired to work in the Office of Intelligence, Division #2, in Mazar-e-Sharif.
- 3. The detainee was identified as having been placed in a position with the Second Administration.
- 4. Administration Office Number Two was the Foreign Affairs/Intelligence Office in charge of foreign personnel, liaison with international charity groups and registering people.
 - 5. The detainee was identified in the position of 2nd Security Office for the Embassy.
 - 6. According to the detainee he was in charge of the front office.
- 7. The detainee provided detailed descriptions on various different departments within the Taliban Intelligence building.
 - b. Other Relevant Data
- 1. The detainee traveled to Pakistan and Iran in search of employment to pay debts. While in Pakistan, the detainee attended a madrassa for approximately 5 to 6 months where he studied the Holy Quran.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF RAHMAN, FIZAULLA

- 2. The detainee was arrested at his house by two of Dostum's soldiers and eventually turned over to American forces.
- 3. The detainee was in possession of \$100 USD and 1000 German Deutsche Marks when he was turned over to American forces.
- 4. The detainee denied having any American or German currency in his possession upon his capture (detention by American Forces).
- 5. The detainee stated that he was not the person in charge of his office as previously reported.
- 6. According to the detainee, his knowledge of Taliban Intelligence operations was based on common knowledge.
- 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a. The detainee reportedly never owned, fired a weapon, or attended military training of any kind.
- b. The detainee stated that although he disliked the Taliban, he needed to support himself by working.
- c. The detainee stated that Americans had rescued Afghanistan and that he would not kill Americans.
 - d. The detainee stated he did not like the Taliban because they killed his uncle and cousin.
- 5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

11 October 2005

TO:

SUBII, NASIR MAZIYAD ABDALLAH AL QURAYSHI AL

SUBJECT:

UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE

REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SUBII, NASIR MAZIYAD ABDALLAH

AL QURAYSHI AL

- 1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment

The detainee went to Afghanistan in response to a Fatwa issued by Sheik Hammond al Uggla.

b. Training

The detainee received three weeks training at the al Farouq camp. The training consisted of physical training and classroom instruction on the AK-47. The detainee stated he never fired the AK-47 during the training.

c. Connections/Associations

The detainee traveled to Kabul and on to Jalalabad with members of the al Farouq training camp.

d. Intent

- 1. The detainee submitted four visa applications to the Saudi Arabian Foreign Ministry on 21 May 2001. All four visas were issued on 8 August 2001.
- 2. After the Taliban were defeated in Kabul, all the Arabs headed for the Tora Bora Mountains. While in Tora Bora, the detainee received a weapon.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SUBII, NASIR MAZIYAD ABDALLAH AL QURAYSHI AL

- e. Detainee Actions and Statements
- 1. The detainee injured his left leg while in Tora Bora. He was not sure if the injury was due to a bullet or shrapnel.
- 2. The detainee is concerned that the attacks against the U.S. on 11 September 2001 gave people a bad image of Islam.
- 3. The detainee stated that you would not find a more peaceful group of people than those who truly follow Islam.
 - 4. After over two years of detention, the detainee now feels that America is his enemy.
- 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a. The detainee affirmed that it was not his intention to fight somewhere after receiving his training. The detainee claims that he never had any intention of fighting the Americans.
- b. The detainee stated that he never planned on joining a group after his training. The detainee did not know al Qaida ran the training camp that he attended until his first interrogation. The detainee said that going to Afghanistan was a mistake that he would not repeat.
- 5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

28 September 2005

To:

SAID, MOHAMMED MOHAMMED AHMEN

SUBJECT:

UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SAID, MOHAMMED MOHAMMED

AHMEN

- 1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
 - 1. The detainee was recruited by Abu Khalood to travel to Afghanistan.
- 2. The detainee stated that he knew his recruiter because they were from the same neighborhood in Taiz, Yemen and belonged to the same soccer club. The detainee talked to Abu Khalood about the training camps in Afghanistan and about how they should travel to Palestine to fight the Jews.
- 3. The detainee went to a mosque near his home named Al Mujima to pray. The detainee would meet other people there and they would sometimes discuss jihad. The detainee stated that his recruiter would lead the jihad discussions and talk about Bosnia, Afghanistan and Palestine.
- 4. The detainee collected money from the local mosque to assist Muslims in other countries.
- 5. The detainee decided to go to Afghanistan and stated that Abu Kholood supplied the funds for his documents and travel.
- 6. The detainee stated that he wanted to go to Afghanistan for military training. The detainee wanted to prepare himself to fight because Jews were killing innocent Palestinians and the same thing was happening in Afghanistan.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SAID, MOHAMMED MOHAMMED AHMEN

- 7. The detainee fought on the front lines with the Taliban against the Northern Alliance.
- 8. The detainee went to Kabul where he was sent to the rear line for four months and then sent to the front lines to guard against the Northern Forces.

b. Training

- 1. The detainee traveled to Afghanistan and trained at the al Farouq Camp, specializing in heavy weapons.
- 2. The detainee had training in mountain fighting, the AK-47, the PK rifle and rocket propelled grenades. The detainee's trainer was Juhaina from Yemen or Saudi Arabia.
- 3. While on the back line, the detainee trained on the M-43 and the SBG-9. While in al Farouq the detainee trained on the AK-47 and the PK.

c. Other Relevant Data

- 1. The detainee was in Tora Bora in a bunker and cave for fifteen days and was injured in a bomb blast when he left the cave.
- 2. The detainee was captured by Northern Forces while leaving Tora Bora. The Northern Forces took the detainee to a prison in Kabul, Afghanistan where the detainee was eventually turned over to the Americans.
- 3. The detainee stated that the Northern Forces were driving the fighters to the mountains and to Jalalabad.
- 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a. The detainee denied having any specific knowledge about mosque activities to raise money to support Mujahideen in other countries.
- b. The detainee stated that he wanted to leave Afghanistan after the training was over and return to Yemen until he could travel to Palestine. He had not decided to join any specific group there but was going to help fight against the Jews.
- c. The detainee stated that he did not agree with the philosophies of Usama Bin Laden and felt that Usama Bin Laden was not correct in his jihad. The detainee stated that Islam did not believe in the killing of woman, children or the elderly like what Usama Bin Laden did in the terror attacks against the United States.

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SAID, MOHAMMED MOHAMMED AHMEN

- d. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001.
- e. The detainee stated that he did not know of any al Qaida members in Yemen and claims to have never heard of them until the USS Cole bombing. The detainee was unaware of the al Qaida's presence until he arrived to Afghanistan.
- f. The detainee did not hear or see plans for attacks against United States interests and said he would not endorse such acts because it is not the Islamic way and would not have any problems reporting such incidents to the authorities.
 - g. The detainee denied receiving explosive device training.
- 5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

24 May 2005

To:

AL MURI, KHALID RASHD ALI

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL MURI, KHALID RASHD ALI

- 1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state or to a third state; (2) transfer you to your home state, or a third state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state, or the third state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
- 1. The detainee expressed his desire to fulfill his religious obligation by going to Afghanistan and fight in the Jihad.
- 2. The detainee traveled from Saudi Arabia to Afghanistan via the United Arab Emirates and Pakistan in August 2001.
- 3. Individual manned a fighting position in the Tora Bora mountain region from mid-November through mid-December 2001.
 - b. Training
- 1. The detainee said he went to Afghanistan to teach the Koran and to simultaneously fulfill his religious obligation to obtain military training.
- 2. The detainee received military training at an al Qaida camp near Kabul, Afghanistan in August and September 2001.
- 3. The camp trained volunteers to fight the Jihad in Chechnya and elsewhere, and provided instruction on basic infantry weapons, crew-served weapons and tactics.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL MURI, KHALID RASHD ALI

- c. Connection/Associations
- 1. The detainee's name was found on a list of "Trust Accounts" found in raids conducted on al Qaida safe houses in Pakistan.
- 2. One of the detainee's known aliases was on a list of captured al Qaida members that was discovered on a computer hard drive associated with a senior al Qaida member.
 - d. Other Relevant Data
 - 1. The detainee surrendered to coalition forces near Jalalabad, Afghanistan.
 - 2. The detainee surrendered with \$2400 in US currency in his possession.
- 3. The detainee traveled to Bosnia and claims to have worked with an unknown charitable organization teaching the Koran in the summer of 1995.
 - 4. The detainee said it is noble to participate in Jihad to protect one's country.
- 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a. The detained denied having any knowledge of the attacks on the U.S. prior to their execution on September 11th, and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.
- b. The detainee agreed to advise interviewing agents if he should learn of planned violence or escape at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
 - c. The detainee claims to know no al Qaida members.
- d. The detainee claims to have never met Usama Bin Laden (UBL) or to have met anyone else who claimed to have met UBL.
 - e. The detainee admitted it was his greatest mistake to travel to Afghanistan.
 - f. The detainee said he did not travel to Afghanistan to participate in Jihad.
- g. The detainee said the United States presence in Saudi Arabia protects his country from Iraq.
- h. The detainee said he intends to find employment as a teacher and marry upon his return to Saudi Arabia.
- 5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL MURI, KHALID RASHD ALI

Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

25 June 2005

TO:

AL DHUBY, KHALID MOHAMMED SALIH

SUBJECT:

UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL DHUBY, KHALID MOHAMMED

SALIH

- 1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
- 1. Ali Al-Yafi convinced the detainee that training and preparation was the duty of every Muslim as taught by the Koran and told him about a camp in Afghanistan where he could receive training.
- 2. Ali Al-Yafi showed the detainee films and pictures of fighting in Chechnya. Ali Al-Yafi is known to have fought in Chechnya and he facilitated travel for the detainee.
- 3. The detainee wanted to go to Afghanistan to receive training and prepare for his duty as a Muslim. The detainee left for Afghanistan after the Hajj in 2001. He made his way to Afghanistan by traveling through Jedda, Saudi Arabia; Dubai, United Arab Emirates; Karachi, Lahore and Quetta, Pakistan; eventually making it to Qandahar, Afghanistan.
- 4. The detainee went to Tora Bora and the caves above this mountainous region and was given a Kalishnakov and 30 rounds of ammunition by his trainers. He was ultimately captured by the Northern Alliance.
 - b. Training
 - 1. The detainee completed training at the Al-Farouq camp.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL DHUBY, KHALID MOHAMMED SALIH

- 2. Al-Farouq is a known al Qaida training camp.
- 3. The detainee received training on how to dig trenches, stay protected from bombing, cover terrain, read maps and use Kalishnakov rifles and RPGs.
 - 4. The detainee stayed at the Al-Farouq training camp for about one and a half months.
 - c. Connections/Associations
- 1. The detainee was given \$500 USD while at the Abu Zubair guesthouse which was run by Abu Khalud. Additionally, he turned over his passport and claims to have never seen it again.
- 2. Al Qaida maintained a safehouse in Kandahar which was used as transit housing for individuals fighting with al Qaida or Taliban forces, as well as a residence for Arabs coming to Afghanistan to receive al Qaida training. This safehouse was near the Haji Habash mosque. It was managed by a man who went by the name Abu Zubayr.
- 3. The detainee saw many people come and go from the guesthouse and he knew that many of the people that came through there were on their way to Al-Farouq.
- 4. The detainee knew that Al-Yafi met with Abu Khalud, who ran the guesthouse at Al-Farouq.
 - d. Other Relevant Data
 - 1. The detainee knew of fighting between Muslims and Russians in Chechnya.
 - 2. The detainee's brother, Saleh al-Dhuby, was at the Abu Zubair guesthouse.
- 3. Saleh Mohammed Al-Dahbi was captured and arrested with "Riyadh the Facilitator" at an al Qaida safe house in Karachi, Pakistan.
- 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a. The detainee did not hear anything about a war in Afghanistan as it was far away. Only when the bombing started did he know there was fighting taking place in Afghanistan. The detainee claims he never saw any U.S. troops fighting in Afghanistan.
- b. The detainee heard Usama Bin Laden was kicked out of Saudi Arabia, but claims he did not know Usama Bin Laden was a terrorist. The detainee never thought about Usama Bin Laden and hardly ever watched the news. Furthermore, the detainee claimed he never heard of al-Qaida

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL DHUBY, KHALID MOHAMMED SALIH

before he went to prison in Jalalabad, Afghanistan. The detainee claims that no one ever told him that the Al-Farouq training camp belonged to Usama Bin Laden.

- c. The detainee said he's not a fighter or a killer, but instead just wanted to train to protect himself and his family as well as defend his country. After training, he wanted to return home to Saudi Arabia.
- 5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

7 July 2005

TO:

KHUSRUF, MOHAMMED NASIR YAHYA

SUBJECT:

UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF KHUSRUF, MOHAMMED NASIR YAHYA

- 1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment

The detainee went to Afghanistan for jihad.

- b. Training
- 1. The detainee did not perform any formal military service. He received small arms training at al Farouq camp in Afghanistan.
- 2. The detainee trained at al Farouq for 18 to 20 days. He shot the Siminoff rifle and Kalashnikov rifle twelve times. He received map and land navigation training.
 - c. Connections/Associations
- 1. The detainee's plane tickets from Yemen to Pakistan were provided by a man named Muad. Another man provided the detainee with 3,000 Saudi Arabian rivals and a passport.
- 2. The detainee stayed at a guesthouse for Arabs in Karachi, Madafat al Ansar, run by Riyadh.
- 3. Riyadh operates a safe house in Karachi, Pakistan, to facilitate movement of recruits into Afghanistan. He coordinates recruit travel to Kandahar, Afghanistan, via Quetta, Pakistan.
 - 4. The detainee stayed in Jalalabad in the safe house of Abu Hatib al Libi.

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- 5. Abu Hatib al Libi, a member of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), was in charge of the guesthouse in Jalalabad, Afghanistan, that belonged to al Qaida. They used it as a residence complex before they moved to Qandahar, Afghanistan. Later it became the guesthouse for the al Qaida leaders when they visited Jalalabad. Usama bin Laden used it during his visits.
- 6. The Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) was designated for asset freeze under Executive Order 13224 and United Nations Security Council Resolution 1333 in September 2001. Some members organize strictly against Libyan Government interests, but others are aligned with Usama bin Laden's al Qaida organization or are active in the international mujahadin network.

d. Other Relevant Data

The detainee was injured during the bombing in Tora Bora. He walked with a group towards Pakistan, but near the border he was stopped. He was taken to prison in Kabul, Afghanistan, and subsequently turned over to United States' forces.

4. The following primary factor favors release or transfer:

The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on September 11th, and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or its interests.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

19 October 2005

TO:

AL NAHDI, SULAIMAN AWATH SULAIMAN BIN AGEEL

SUBJECT:

UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL NAHDI, SULAIMAN AWATH SULAIMAN BIN AGEEL

- 1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
- 1. Approximately June 2001, the detainee traveled to Mecca, Saudi Arabia and Jeddah, Saudi Arabia to visit the "holy places".
- 2. After Saudi Arabia, the detainee traveled to Afghanistan to receive training as outlined in a fatwa he heard issued by Sheik Hammoud al-Oqalah.
- 3. Abu Shakeirly, also preached about the fatwa and sent the detainee to Sanna, Yemen to see Abdal Kalik, who could assist the detainee in getting to Afghanistan.
 - 4. The detainee went to Afghanistan to prepare for Palestine.
 - b. Training
- 1. The detainee trained for approximately one month with the Yemeni Military at Buwesh. During the training, he received instruction on the Kalashnikov and physical training.
 - 2. The detainee arrived at Camp Farouq sometime before Ramadan 2001.
- 3. The al Farouq training camp was funded by al Qaida and therefore was more advanced than the other camps in Afghanistan. The training at al Farouq consists of two-week periods of weapons training, basic commando course, topography and explosives.

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- 4. The detainee knew al Qaida ran the camp, but not everyone at the camp was necessarily a member of al Qaida.
- 5. The detainee's training consisted of small arms training with the Kalashnikov and pistols.
- 6. The detainee stayed for about 20 to 30 days before being told they were moving to another area for training.

c. Connections/Associations

- 1. The detainee stayed at a guesthouse in Karachi, Pakistan, that was led by a man whom the detainee knew only by the name of Riyadh.
- 2. Once in Kandahar, the detainee stayed at a safe house owned by Abu Khaled. He stayed approximately a week. He watched a film about jihad in Bosnia and Chechnya that was narrated by a man named Katib.
 - 3. Abu al Kholud was the emir of the al Qaida guesthouse called Ansar in Kandahar.
 - 4. About one week after the detainee's arrival at al Faroug, he saw Usama bin Laden.
- 5. While in Tora Bora, the detainee saw Usama Bin Laden for the second time. Usama Bin Laden talked about the jihad for approximately one hour and then a senior al Qaida operative made a few comments.
- 6. The detainee's name was found on a chart in Arabic listing the names of captured mujahidin. The information was on a hard drive, which was associated with a senior al Qaida operative.
- 7. The detainee's name was found on a document listing 324 Arabic names, aliases, and nationalities recovered from safehouse raids associated with suspected al Qaida in Karachi, Pakistan.
- 8. The detainee's name was found in files recovered from various computer media seized during raids against al Qaida associated safehouses in Rawalpindi on 1 March 2003 and Karachi on 11 September 2002. The files contained a list of al Qaida Mujahidin and the contents of their "trust" accounts.

d. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee went to Tora Bora and stayed in the mountains for 10 to 14 days.

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL NAHDI, SULAIMAN AWATH SULAIMAN BIN AGEEL

- 2. While in Tora Bora, the detainee took turns with others standing guard in front of a cave.
 - 3. The detainee may have fought in Tora Bora.
- 4. The detainee was part of a group led by Abu Thabbit in the mountains of Pakistan. He carried a Khalishnikov rifle.
- 5. The group remained in the mountains for twenty-five days unsuccessfully searching for a guide, before deciding to exit the mountains and either walk to Pakistan or surrender in Afghanistan.
- 6. The group walked for approximately five hours until they reached a valley where the group was bombed by American planes. Many of the group were injured or killed.
- 7. While in a valley, Afghani forces caught the detainee's group and shrapnel injured the detainee.
- 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
 - a. The detainee is not mad at the United States.
- b. The detainee stated it is every Muslims duty to be military trained, but he was not in Afghanistan to fight and never discharged his weapon.
- c. The detainee was never asked to take an oath to al Qaida. He stated that even if he was asked, he would not have taken the oath.
- d. The detainee knew nothing about al Qaida. He said the only thing he knows about al Qaida was from what he read in a newspaper article.
- e. The detainee denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.
- f. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on September 11th.
- 5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

28 June 2005

TO:

KHOWLAN, ABDUL RAHMAN MOHAMMED HUSSEIN

SUBJECT:

UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF KHOWLAN, ABDUL RAHMAN

MOHAMMED HUSSEIN

- 1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
- 1. The detainee saw and responded to posted announcements in mosques that declared a fatwa supporting training for Jihad as a religious duty.
- 2. The detainee was recruited in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, by Abu Mua'th, who gave the detainee an airline ticket to Karachi, Pakistan, 3000 Saudi Riyals (\$799 USD) and a passport.
- 3. In August 2001, the detainee traveled from Jeddah, Saudi Arabia to Qatar to Karachi, Pakistan to Khandahar, Afghanistan.
 - 4. The detainee stayed at a safehouse in Jalalabad for approximately three to four months.
- 5. The detainee stayed at the Al-Ansar house in Kandahar to await training at Camp al Farouq.
- 6. The detainee was fighting Afghan people and the Northern Alliance while at Camp Farouq.
- 7. The detainee stayed at the Abu Mahajin or "Star of the Jihad" guest house in Jalalabad for approximately four to five weeks while waiting to flee Afghanistan in October and November 2001.
 - b. Training

UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF KHOWLAN, ABDUL RAHMAN MOHAMMED HUSSEIN

- 1. The detainee attended basic training at the al Farouq training camp for approximately two months in late summer of 2001.
- 2. The detainee received training on the AK-47 assault rifle, PK machine gun, automatic grenade launcher, the Rocket-Propelled Grenade (RPG) and an unidentified light anti-tank weapon.

c. Connections/Associations

- 1. The detainee traveled to Quetta, Pakistan, where he met an Afghan man known as Muhammad Rahim, also known as Rakhim Khan. Muhammad Rahim took the detainee to a Quetta safehouse.
- 2. Mohammad Rahim is an al Qaida leader who was attempting to reestablish al Qaida networks in the Tora Bora region of Afghanistan, where he already controlled hidden ammunition depots. He was also trying to recruit individuals to carry out terror attacks against the Jalalabad airport and Spinghar Hotel in Jalalabad.
- 3. The detainee saw Usama Bin Laden at the Al-Ansar safe house and al Farouq Training Camp.

d. Other Relevant Data

- 1. The detainee was present in the Tora Bora region and surrendered there to Afghan Forces.
- 2. The detainee had in his possession, at the time of surrender, \$2,000.00 USD, a Kalashnikov rifle and three full magazines of ammunition.
- 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a. The detainee claims he was responding to a fatwa that requires all Muslims to train and be prepared to defend Islam at any time. He intended to return home after learning of the attacks of September 11, 2001.
- b. The detainee states that he does not have any association with al Qaida and never heard anything about al Qaida at Camp Farouq until after the war started.
- c. The detainee states that his initial report of training at al Farouq was just him telling the interrogators what they wanted to hear, and the truth is he was attempting to retrieve the clothing of the Prophet Mohammed from a shrine in Afghanistan with financial backing from a prominent Saudi Arabian businessman.

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF KHOWLAN, ABDUL RAHMAN MOHAMMED HUSSEIN

d. The detainee denies taking the al Qaida oath while at Camp Farouq.

- e. The detainee denies having any knowledge of the attacks in the U.S. prior to their execution on September 11th, 2001. The detainee also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the U.S. or U.S. interests.
- 5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

22 September 2005

TO:

THANI, ABDALLAH FARIS AL UNAZI

SUBJECT:

UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF THANI, ABDALLAH FARIS AL UNAZI

- 1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
- 1. The detainee traveled to Afghanistan by way of Herat, Iran, and Bahrain. He planned to return to the Al-Farouq camp
- 2. The detainee left Saudi Arabia in April or May 2000 and went to Afghanistan for military training. The detainee believes that all Muslims should have military training in preparation for an unspecified future Jihad.
 - 3. The detainee was captured near Tora Bora while trying to flee Afghanistan.
 - b. Training
- 1. The detained for forty-five days at Al-Farouq. Training was conducted every day except Friday. The training consisted of weapons familiarization on hand held weapons.
- 2. The detainee went home and got married. Four months after marrying, he went back to Afghanistan to complete his training.
 - c. Intent
- 1. The detainee stated that he would have fought the Americans, but was unable to because they were dropping bombs and not attacking with ground forces.
 - 2. The detainee inferred that the Jihad would be in response to the situation in Palestine.

UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF THANI, ABDALLAH FARIS AL UNAZI

- d. Detainee Actions and Statements
 - 1. The detainee has the mindset that America is the Great Evil.
- 2. The detainee indicated that his wife is unlikely to take him back since he is now a double amputee, which could make him a likely candidate for a suicide mission.
- 3. The detainee is convinced that the United States invades and bombs countries indiscriminately.
 - e. Other Relevant Data

A doctor in Jalalabad amputated one of detainee's legs below the knee. The heel on his other leg was also cut off. At that point, detainee stated that it would have been better if he had died.

- 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a. The detainee believed that it was the duty of every Muslim to train for Jihad, but he did not anticipate participating in one.
- b. The detainee did not finish training because it was very difficult. He stated that it was very hot and he was always dirty. There was too much running, climbing, and sliding. He missed his family and wanted to take a vacation.
 - c. The detainee stated that he never engaged in combat operations with anyone.
- d. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on September 11th, 2001.
- e. The detainee denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks in the United States or United States' interests.
- f. The detainee denied any knowledge or planning of internal uprisings at the Guantanamo detention facility.
- 5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

NUMBER NOT USED 000472

Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

25 October 2005

TO:

AL HARBI, GHANIM ABDUL RAHMAN

SUBJECT:

UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL HARBL GHANIM ABDUL

RAHMAN

- 1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment

The detainee responded to a fatwa that requires all Muslims to train and be prepared to defend Islam at any time.

- b. Training
- 1. A senior al Qaida facilitator identified the detainee as training at the al Farouq camp in Afghanistan in 2000. The facilitator said he often saw the detainee prior to 11 September 2001 but that he had not heard anything about him since September 2001.
 - 2. The detainee was at al Farouk from July-September 4, 2001.
 - c. Connections/Associations
- 1. The detainee was questioned in 1997 by a foreign government service because they wanted to know why the detainee's phone number was found in the pocket of a man who protested against that foreign government.
- 2. In the summer of 2000, three months prior to leaving for Afghanistan, the detaince began working as a volunteer for the Islamic Relief Organization, based out of Jeddah. He volunteered twice weekly in the finance department.

UNCLASSIFIED

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL HARBI, GHANIM ABDUL RAHMAN

- 3. The detainee stayed at an Arab house in the Haji Habash neighborhood of Kandahar.
- 4. The Haji Habash house is an al Qaida maintained safehouse. The house was typically used for Arabs going to military training.

d. Intent

A person that went to Afghanistan to join the drug trade identified the detainee as issuing a fatwa against the United States and talking about jihad against the United States once the detainee is released.

e. Other Relevant Data

- 1. The detainee was arrested in 1998 for involvement in protests against a foreign government service, and placed on a travel restriction list issued in November 1999.
- 2. In August 2001, the detainee traveled by bus from his hometown of Dammam, Saudi Arabia, to Manama, Bahrain, where he continued his trip by air to Karachi, Pakistan.
- 3. The detainee chose this route because he was not allowed to travel outside of Saudi Arabia and it was common knowledge that Saudi immigration and border officials rarely scrutinized the passports of individuals traveling by bus through this particular checkpoint.
- 4. Usama Bin Laden came to speak at al Farouq camp three weeks after the detainee arrived. Attendance to the speech was encouraged, but the detainee did not attend due to fear of being investigated upon return to Saudi Arabia.
- 5. A guide that the detainee hired to help him leave the country via Jalalabad said it was not safe so he took the detainee to the Tora Bora Mountains and turned him over to a group of approximately 65 Arabs traveling toward the border on November 14th.
 - 6. The group stayed in the Tora Bora Mountains for the entire period of Ramadan.
- 7. On the 29th of Ramadan, two guides were going to take the group to the Pakistani border, when intense bombing started. The detainee was wounded. He stayed three days in a valley with the other wounded before a group of Afghanis picked them up.
- 8. The detainee turned himself in to the Northern Alliance and was taken to a hospital in Jalalabad where he stayed for one and a half months.
- 9. After his hospital stay, the detainee was turned over to the United States and transported to Cuba two weeks later.

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL HARBI, GHANIM ABDUL RAHMAN

- 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a. The detainee had two cousins who took up arms against the Iraqis during the 1990 Gulf War. They were taken prisoner by the Iraqis and have not been seen since.
- b. The detainee's two missing cousins and watching innocent Kuwaitis being killed caused the detainee to think about getting military training to protect his land in case of a similar invasion. The detainee said that based on the teachings of Islam, it was his duty to prepare for the possibility of war.
- c. While at al Farouq, the detainee did not attend Usama Bin Laden's (UBL) speech because he does not agree with UBL's teachings nor does he respect him as a religious leader.
- d. The detainee understands that America is trying to protect herself and has faith that it will be discovered that he was just in the wrong place at the wrong time.
- e. The detainee denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.
- f. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on September 11, 2001.
- 5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

7 September 2005

TO:

AL QUWARI, MAHRAR RAFAT

SUBJECT:

UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL QUWARI, MAHRAR RAFAT

- 1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
- 1. The detainee had a job with the Kuwaiti Joint Relief Committee distributing food and clothing.
- 2. The detainee was at Al Farouq training camp. He was in charge of delivering food to the caves.
- 3. The detainee was in Tora Bora handing out supplies to the mujahedeen fighting there. He was working for Al-Wafa at the time.
- 4. The detainee was the supply person in charge of bookkeeping and distributing food and weapons in Tora Bora. The detainee carried a hand-held radio and often met with Usama Bin Laden.
 - b. Training
- 1. The detainee was identified as someone who was trained in hand weapons at Al Farouq and later fought in Kandahar, Afghanistan.
- 2. Training was conducted on numerous weapons at Al Farouq. Students received training on the AK-47, AKM and PK machine guns. They also familiarized themselves with the RPG.
 - c. Connections/Associations

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL QUWARI, MAHRAR RAFAT

- 1. The detainee sought work from Faoud Al Rabia, leader of a Humanitarian Organization.
- 2. Al Rabia was a major operator for the Al Wafa Non-Governmental Organization who likely transferred large sums of money through a front company called Summit Health Club in Afghanistan.
- 3. Al Rabia met personally with Usama Bin Laden in July 2001 at Bin Laden's house in Kandahar, Afghanistan.
- 4. Abdul Qadoos, the leader of the camp in Tora Bora, Afghanistan, assigned the detainee to work as a supply distributor.
- 5. Al Wafa was headquartered in Saudi Arabia and believed to have had connections to Usama Bin Laden and Afghan Mujahidin.
- 6. The detainee was seen in the Towr Khom Mountains at the same time as Usama Bin Laden.
 - d. Other Relevant Data

During evacuation from Tora Bora to Pakistan, the detainee and Al Rabia were captured by the Northern Alliance.

- 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
 - a. The detainee continues to deny that he was ever in Tora Bora, Afghanistan.
 - b. The detainee claims to have no prior knowledge of past or present terrorist activity.
- 5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

8 July 2005

TO:

ABAHANOV, YAKUB

SUBJECT:

UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ABAHANOV, YAKUB

- 1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

- 1. The detainee claimed that Yusupov Parkhat (name variants: Farhat, Parhat, Farkhat, and possibly Barhat) recruited him in the detainee's garden in Shelek Village of Almaty Oblast.
- 2. Yusupov Parkhat facilitated all the detainee's travel arrangements into Afghanistan and was the decision-maker for the group.
 - 3. The detainee and his family moved into a Taliban provided house in Kabul.
- 4. The detainee was offered a job as an assistant cook at a Taliban camp, where about 45 soldiers were located. The detainee had a Kalashnikov for guard duty and firing team duties but claimed he only fired the weapons three times, while at a range.
- 5. The detainee fought with the Taliban in the Bagram area under the command of Gul Rahman.

b. Training

- 1. The detainee was a member of the Kazakhstan Army from 1995 to 1997. He was trained in the use of a Kalashnikov rifle and his duties included communications and base guard.
- 2. The detainee has admitted to receiving military training at the Taliban's Karabakh Camp. The detainee received training in hand-to-hand combat, the AK-47, and RPGs.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ABAHANOV, YAKUB

c. Connections/Associations

- 1. The detainee was identified as a member of a Uighur criminal organization in Kazakhstan. The organization split with one branch moving to Afghanistan to join the Eastern Turkestan Islamic Party/Movement (ETIP/ETIM) leader Hassan Makhsum (aka Abu Muhammad Al-Turkistani; aka Aysu Maksum) to become terrorists.
- 2. The Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM), a small Islamic extremist group based in China's western Xinjiang Province, is the most militant of the ethnic Uighur separatist groups pursuing an independent "Eastern Turkistan." ETIM is linked to al Qaida and the international mujahidin movement.
- 3. The detainee identified five other detainees as members of the ETIM who he knew from Afghanistan.
- 4. On 24 August 2004, the Uzbek Supreme Court convicted and sentenced Furkat Kasimovich Yusupov to 18 years deprivation of freedom for his involvement in terrorist attacks in Tashkent and Bukhara Provinces, Uzbekistan, during March and April 2004.
- 5. Farhat Yusupov is a senior member of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) who was arrested in Tashkent in 2002.
- 6. The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) is closely affiliated with al Qaida and, under the leadership of Tohir Yoldashev, has embraced Usama Bin Ladin's anti-US, anti-Western agenda.

d. Intent

The detainee has claimed he had a strong desire to wage "jihad" when he went to Afghanistan.

e. Other Relevant Data

- 1. The detainee was arrested at his residence by the United Islamic Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan (UIFSA) in December 2001.
- 2. At the time of his arrest, the detainee was found to be in possession of anti-aircraft missiles. He claims to know nothing at all about anti-aircraft.
- 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a. The detainee stated he was unaware of the September 11th attacks on the U.S. until he was questioned about them in Kandahar. He was saddened to hear so many innocent people were killed and that the perpetrators were not true Muslims.

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ABAHANOV, YAKUB

- b. Early in the interrogation process, the detainee expressed an interest in cooperating with the United States in any manner he could.
- c. The detainee denies ever being a member of the East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) or the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU).
- 5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

14 September 2005

TO:

MAGRUPOV, ABDULLAH TOHTASINOVICH

SUBJECT:

UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MAGRUPOV, ABDULLAH

TOHTASINOVICH

- 1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
- 1. While attending the central mosque in Almaty the detainee met an individual named Nidzhan who suggested he should attend a madrassa in Pakistan. When the detainee decided to go to Pakistan, Nidzhan helped him with the arrangements.
- 2. The detainee stated that in August 2001, he left Almaty for Bishkek and from Bishkek he flew to Islamabad, Pakistan to study.
- 3. The detainee tried to enroll at the Faisal Mesjitt Islamic School but was told the classes were full.
- 4. After spending some time in Islamabad at a madrassa, the detainee traveled to Karachi, Pakistan, and then back to Islamabad. He stayed at various madrassas in Pakistan.
- 5. Many madrassas are popping up all over Pakistan and becoming training grounds for extremists. The detainee belongs to the Eastern Turkestan Islamic Party/Movement (ETIP/ETIM).
- 6. The Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM), a small Islamic extremist group, is one of the most militant of the ethnic Uighur separatist groups pursuing an independent "Eastern Turkistan."

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MAGRUPOV, ABDULLAH TOHTASINOVICH

7. The U.S. has acknowledged that some Uighurs have been found fighting with al Qaida in Afghanistan.

b. Connections/Associations

- 1. The detainee clarified that he lived in Kazil Shariq village, Kazakh region, Imbekchi, Altma Province, and admitted that Farkat Yuspov lived there and he knew him.
- 2. The detainee said he did not know if Yuspov was affiliated with the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU).
- 3. Reporting indicates Yuspov was a senior member of the IMU who was responsible for recruiting and arranging travel for the detainee into Afghanistan.

c. Other Relevant Data

- 1. The detainee was told to give fake information in case people in Afghanistan planned to threaten their families in Kazakhstan to ensure cooperation.
- 2. The detainee claimed his sole tie with the Taliban was having stayed in a house in Kabul owned by the Taliban.
- 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a. The detainee denied any involvement with the Taliban or al Qaida. He also denied that he was somehow recruited as part of the jihad.
- b. The detainee stated that while in Afghanistan, he did not partake in any military activities, and he never committed any crime.
- 5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

14 July 2005

TO:

SHARIF, MOHAMMED

SUBJECT:

UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE

REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SHARIF, MOHAMMED

- 1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
 - 1. The detainee stated that he was conscripted into the Taliban by Nasser Khan.
- 2. The detainee identified Abdul Naser Khan as an intelligence officer for the Taliban with offices located in Mazar-e-Sharif.
- 3. The detainee stated that he was a Taliban security guard, cleaner, recruiter and soldier. He was last based in Konduz but also worked in Mazar-e-Sharif, Sheberghan, Sar-e-Pol and Imam Saheb.
- 4. The detainee stated that he had provided the Taliban with information regarding other village members.
- 5. The detainee has been identified as Sharif Uddin Sharif, the Taliban Intelligence Officer.
 - 6. The detainee has been identified as the intelligence chief at Mazar-e-Sharif.
- 7. The intelligence chief at the Taliban Office of Intelligence in Mazar-e-Sharif reported to the secretary of intelligence in Kabul and was in charge of subordinate intel services in seven cities. He was also in charge of at least 10 to 12 intelligence directorates, including the interrogation and espionage directorates.
 - 8. The detainee claimed that he was simply an intelligence officer, not the chief.

UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SHARIF, MOHAMMED

b. Training

As a soldier, the detainee was issued a Kalashnikov rifle and received training on the weapon.

- 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a. The detainee claimed that he did not understand the meaning of jihad and added that his Imam never explained the meaning of jihad.
- b. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the U.S. prior to their execution on September 11th, and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the U.S. or U.S. interests.
 - c. The detainee claimed no allegiance to the Taliban.
 - d. The detained to have no knowledge regarding Usama Bin Laden or Al Oaida.
- e. The detainee claimed that he was not "issued" a Kalashnikov, per se, but was shown where 2-3 were kept in case they were needed.
- f. The detainee stated that he was never provided training/instruction for the weapons, nor was he provided with the opportunity to fire the weapons.
- g. The detainee denied all previous information that involved his duties as someone who gathered intelligence in Konduz, Sherbaghan, and/or Mazar-e-Sharif.
- h. The detainee stated that he had no intention of returning home to fight against the U.S. and that his only concerns were for his family.
- 5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

31 October 2005

TO:

ZUMIRI, HASSAN

SUBJECT:

UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE

REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ZUMIRI, HASSAN

- 1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
- 1. The Islamic Salvation Front vice president lived very close to the detainee's home in Algiers.
- 2. An Islamic extremist group, the Armed Islamic Group aims to overthrow the secular Algerian regime and replace it with an Islamic state. The Armed Islamic Group began its violent activity in 1992 after Algiers voided the victory of the Islamic Salvation Front in the first round of legislative elections in December 1991.
- 3. The detainee stated that he traveled to Spain several times in the early 1990's. At this time, the detainee was assisting his brother in the acquisition and sale of electronics.
 - 4. The detainee traveled from Afghanistan to France via Italy.
- 5. The detainee traveled to Italy in the summer of 1991 and stayed for 6 months in Verona, Italy and then he traveled to Paris, Bordeaux, and Marseilles in France.
- 6. The detainee left France with a forged passport, which cost 3,000 francs (approximately \$550 U.S. dollars) and went to Canada.
 - 7. The detainee entered Canada in October 1994 and left Canada in June.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ZUMIRI, HASSAN

- 8. The detainee was known to be an active member of a network supporting subversion in Algeria. The detainee held the status of political refugee in Canada since 1994.
- 9. The detainee's name was placed in appropriate U.S. Government agency watch lists at the unclassified/for official use only level on a non-attributable basis.
- 10. The detainee attended six Mosques while living in Canada. One of the Mosques was the al Sunnah Mosque, an extremist Mosque that shows videos to members portraying the jihad in Algeria.
- 11. The detainee traveled to Vancouver, Canada in 1996 in order to file his immigration papers. The detainee's reasoning was that the Vancouver immigration department expedited immigration papers faster than any other Canadian province.
- 12. In the summer of 1998 the Canadian Police arrested the detainee with two friends in Niagara Falls.
- 13. The detainee claims he went to Afghanistan because of the mounted pressure put on him by the Canadian Secret Service. The detainee wanted to live in peace and be left alone.
- 14. The detainee traveled between 15 and 25 June 2001 from Montreal, Canada to Afghanistan via Zurich, Dubai, Karachi, Quetta, Kandahar, Kabul and Jalalabad.
- 15. The detainee said he was in a group of approximately 60 persons in the Tora Bora Mountains and that American bombers spotted his group. The detainee's group was bombed and the majority died.
- 16. The detainee said that all the Arabs in his group, including himself, were armed. The detainee said that his pistol was only for his protection.
- 17. The detainee said his purpose for going to Afghanistan was to immigrate and for jihad. The detainee said that he simply wanted to immigrate, live and retire peacefully in Afghanistan.

b. Training

- 1. While he stayed at the Toran camp, the detainer received instruction in the use of small firearms. The detainer claims that he learned how to use these firearms for fun.
- 2. Small arms training occurred near Toran camp to prepare for impending attack by Northern Alliance Forces. A cave system used for billeting was located above the Toran camp.

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c. Connections/Associations

- 1. The detainee admitted that he left Canada with a false Canadian passport that he stole from a friend of his named Najib. When questioned about the present whereabouts of this passport, The detainee said that it is now in the hands of the Afghans.
- 2. In 2001, a Canadian passport was in the possession of al Qaida facilitator in Afghanistan used by the detainee. The last recorded use of this passport in Canada was by the detainee on 14 June 2001 when he left Canada with his wife.
- 3. A Canadian Algerian involved with document forgery networks and terrorists says the detainee may have prepared a passport for him.
- 4. A suspected al Qaida attack planner said the detainee was planning on doing jihad in Algeria and wanted to fight with the Jama'ah in Algeria.
- 5. A suspected al Qaida attack planner confirmed that he received a \$3,500 Canadian dollar loan from the detainee just before he left for Vancouver. The detainee also gave him a video camera. The suspected al Qaida attack planner said that the detainee was a personal friend and that the detainee trusted him.
 - 6. The detainee knows an Islamist extremist who is in Sudanese custody.
 - 7. The detainee is a friend of a suspected Algerian operative.

d. Other Relevant Data

- 1. The detainee confirmed that when he left Canada, he brought his portable cellular telephone with him, but it was never used:
- 2. The detainee was in the Tora Bora region of Afghanistan when he was captured in December 2001 by the Northern Alliance Forces
- 3. The detainee had three \$100 U.S. dollar bills and two 1000 Rupee notes on him when he was captured.
- 4. The detainee claims to have no knowledge why his wife was arrested with \$13,000 U.S. dollars. The detainee claims he left Canada with \$7,000 or \$8,000 U.S. dollars with him. The detainee does not know where his wife got the money.
- 5. The detainee was once arrested in Canada for attempting to steal a computer from a tourist. The detainee would steal and shoplift by himself and with others.

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- 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a. The detainee expressed that in the future he will no longer have friends like the ones he had before. The detainee has learned his lesson.
- 5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

8 November 2005

TO:

AL HARBI, MOHAMMED ABDULLAH

SUBJECT:

UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL HARBI, MOHAMMED ABDULLAH

- 1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
- 1. Mosque elders informed the detainee it was his Islamic duty to go to Afghanistan and receive training. The detainee believed this Islamic duty included both physical fitness and weapons training.
- 2. The detainee advised that four men at a mosque were recruiting volunteers to go to Afghanistan to train for jihad. The recruiters read to recruits from the Koran and recited Hadiths supporting the concept of jihad.
 - 3. The detainee was provided a facilitator to assist in crossing the Afghanistan border.
- 4. The detainee's route of travel was: Riyadh to Dammam, Saudi Arabia, to Bahrain, to Mashhad, Iran, to Herat, Afghanistan, and ending in Kabul, Afghanistan.
 - 5. The detainee paid for his own travel.
- 6. The detainee went to an Arab guesthouse in Kabul, Afghanistan intending to receive training.
- 7. The detainee spent approximately one month in Kabul, Afghanistan waiting for training when he learned training was not available.

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- b. Other Relevant Data
- 1. An anti-Taliban Commander identified the detainee as being an al Qaida member who reportedly raised money for the Taliban. The detainee informed his captors that he could do the same for the anti-Taliban forces.
- 2. The detainee told his captors in Kabul, Afghanistan he was a charity worker and was there to help them. He told them this to gain their sympathy, as they threatened to cut his throat.
- 3. The detainee spent approximately eleven weeks in Afghani custody and claims to have been beaten.
- 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a. The detainee traveled to Afghanistan to fulfill his Muslim duty of training and helping the poor.
- b. The detainee denied any military service, military or weapons training, owning a computer or having any contact with foreign businesses regarding pilot training.
- c. The detained having any knowledge of the attacks on the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001 and denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or its interests.
 - d. The detainee denied meeting or seeing Usama bin Laden in Afghanistan.
- 5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

6 October 2005

TO:

AL ALI, MAHMUD SALEM HORAN MOHAMMED MUTLAK

SUBJECT:

UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE

REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF

AL ALI, MAHMUD SALEM HORAN MOHAMMED MUTLAK

- 1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

- 1. It was recommended to the detainee that prospective jihadists travel through Iran to Afghanistan because the Pakistan border with Afghanistan was closed. Travelers used border crossings near Taybat and Zabol, Iran.
- 2. The detainee stated that if he had received training, that he would have desired to fight the opposition on the front lines in support and defense of the Taliban.
- 3. On or about October 17, 2001, the detainee traveled from Kuwait, Damascus, Syria, Tehran, Iran, Mashhad and finally to Teybad, Iran in an attempt to cross the border into Afghanistan. Upon discovering the border was closed, the detainee received an escort to Zabol where he entered Afghanistan.

b. Training

- 1. The detainee advised that on or about 25 October 2001 an unidentified Taliban official in Tamrouz cited that people who wanted to fight in the jihad should go to Kandahar, Afghanistan to receive military training.
- 2. On or about 26 October 2001, the detainee was told that a military training site in Kandahar was damaged, and prospective jihadists should go to Kabul, Afghanistan for military training.

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- 3. The detainee traveled to Afghanistan specifically to attend training at the Al-Farouq camp.
 - c. Connections/Associations
- 1. The detainee admitted to lying about his affiliation with the Islamic Charitable Organization.
- 2. The detainee was visually identified as a Taliban fighter caught in Kabul, Afghanistan. At the time of his capture, the detainee was seen carrying his issued Kalashnikov rifle, and was heard telling that he was in Afghanistan to fight the Northern Alliance.

d. Other Relevant Data

- 1. The detained developed an interest in receiving jihad training as the result of his ownership of several commercially available videos, which he purchased in a shop located in the Al Waq Souq, Fahahil, Kuwait.
 - 2. The videos caused the detainee to desire to join in jihad activities.
- 3. The detainee knew that the training camp was run by Usama Bin Laden's al Qaida organization prior to leaving Kuwait.
- 4. The detainee was familiar with Usama Bin Laden's connection to both the U.S.S. Cole attack and the attacks of 11 September 2001, through his viewing of Al-Jazeera Network programming while residing in Kuwait and Syria.
- 5. The detainee was also familiar with the Taliban's role in assisting and abetting al Qaida's activities prior to making his decision to attend training.
- 6. The detainee funded his own travel to Afghanistan, by working at a fruit and vegetable market located in Al-Soulabia, Kuwait.
- 7. Prior to traveling, the detainee attempted to obtain a visa. Later, there was an attempt to reach the detainee by the Kuwaiti police and question him about his intended travels.
- 8. A Foreign Government Agency attempted to contact the detainee pertaining to a purported traffic citation. The detainee decided to leave earlier than planned for his travel.
- 9. The detainee advised that the house he stayed at in Kabul, Afghanistan, was used to store weapons that were later sold to various people. Examples of the weapons there included RPG-7s, SA-7s, PK Machine guns, and AK-47 Rifles.

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL ALI, MAHMUD SALEM HORAN MOHAMMED MUTLAK

- 10. After his stay at the guesthouse, the detainee fell ill and received medical attention at a clinic in Kabul.
- 11. While making his recovery in Kabul, the detained that he was informed that Kabul had fallen and that they should go home.
- 12. The detainee tried to escape in a taxi, but was stopped, beaten, robbed, then jailed at Tufan prison before being transferred to Bagram, then to Qandahar, and then on to Camp Delta.
- 13. The detainee was asked if he wanted to fight against United States Forces. He replied that it was his desire to fight non-Muslims categorically.
- 14. The detainee admired the interrogators' Casio watch, and stated he had one just like it. He got the watch in Kuwait.
- 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
 - a. The detainee stated that he received no training at the guesthouse.
 - b. The detainee denied that he was acting on the resistance training.
- c. The detainee denies going to fight against United States Forces, saying he went to fight the enemies of Islam, the Northern Alliance.
- d. The detainee stated that he was perfectly comfortable in Cuba, that prison life has changed him, and he is a new man that is comfortable with a simple solitary lifestyle. He is putting his fate in Allah's hands. The detainee has no desire to go to Camp 4.
- e. When the detainee was asked what life would be like if he ever did leave Cuba, he mentioned taking another wife and starting a business.
- f. The detainee spoke positively about the modernization and western influence of the Middle East. He said it is a beautiful thing and it makes life easier for everyone.
- g. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on September 11th.
- h. The detainee denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.
- i. The detainee was queried regarding any knowledge or planning of internal uprisings at the Guantanamo detention facility, with negative results.

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL ALI, MAHMUD SALEM HORAN MOHAMMED MUTLAK

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.