

UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

23 May 2006

TO: AL SHIHRI, SALIM ABDALLAH SAID AL BAHAYSH

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF
AL SHIHRI, SALIM ABDALLAH SAID AL BAHAYSH

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee says a Saudi named Sheik Hamood Alaqla, the author of the fatwa that was posted throughout the region, recruited him.

2. The detainee ultimately traveled into Afghanistan in August 2001 to join the jihad with the Taliban. He arrived in Kandahar, Afghanistan where he spent ten days and received weapons training. After seeking treatment for a liver problem, the detainee moved onto Konduz, then continued to Hashghar, Afghanistan where he joined the Taliban's front line.

b. Connections/Associations

The detainee traveled to Afghanistan through Jeddah, Saudi Arabia to Qatar, then onto Karachi, Pakistan. From Karachi he flew to Quetta, Pakistan and then proceeded to a Taliban guest house in Kandahar, Afghanistan.

c. Detainee Actions and Statements

1. After approximately a week in Konduz the detainee was told he and his group was going to Mazar-e-Sharif to surrender. He arrived in Mazar-e-Sharif during the night and stayed about a week before the uprising occurred.

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2. Upon arriving at Qala Jangi, the detainee was told to get off the truck and sit in the prison yard in a line of prisoners. They were all sitting there when he heard an explosion near the main entrance of the compound, then the whole group went into the basement of the prison.

d. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee spent approximately one month in Sheborghan before being turned over to the Americans.

2. The detainee's name was found on a translated list of al Qaida Mujahedin and the content of their trust accounts found on files recovered from various computer media seized during raids against al Qaida associated safe houses in Rawalpindi on 1 March 2003 and Karachi on 11 September 2002.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee claims he was never trained on the use of weapons and was given a Kalashnikov rifle for self-defense when the line withdrew to Konduz.

b. The detainee denies having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001. He also denies knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or its interests.

c. The detainee believed that the practice by the Taliban of strictly enforcing Islamic law went too far. The detainee cited the examples of prohibitions against shaving, music, smoking, and dancing. The detainee believed that the leadership should have used its influence to convince the people that these activities were wrong but that they should not have had such vigilant enforcement nor should they have had such harsh sanctions.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

19 June 2006

TO: AL BIHANI, GHALEB NASSAR

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL BIHANI, GHALEB NASSAR

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee heard about a fatwa from a friend that stated it was an obligation to go and fight with the Taliban in Afghanistan. The detainee stated that he would not have gone to Afghanistan if it were not for the fatwa. The detainee intended to go to Afghanistan for nine or ten months and then return home.

2. The fatwa was issued by a sheikh.

3. The detainee left for Afghanistan around June 2001. The detainee and a relative traveled from Tabuk, Saudi Arabia to Pakistan. The detainee and his relative initially traveled from Tabuk, Saudi Arabia to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. Then, the detainee and his relative traveled to Mecca, Saudi Arabia and stayed for one week with the detainee's sister.

4. The detainee's brother joined the detainee in Mecca, Saudi Arabia to be his sponsor. The detainee, his brother and another relative traveled between Jeddah, Saudi Arabia and Mecca, Saudi Arabia trying to get a visa from the Pakistani embassy for the detainee. Eventually, over the course of several days, both the detainee and his relative were able to get visas.

5. The detainee had 1,100 Saudi Riyals that were to be used for his trip to Afghanistan. The detainee's friend had given him an additional 1,500 Saudi Riyals and 3,500 Pakistani Rupees for the detainee's trip to Afghanistan.

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6. A classmate of the detainee's was the facilitator for the detainee. The classmate gave the detainee approximately 1,500 Riyals and arranged for the detainee's travel to the al Farouq Training Camp from Tabuki, Saudi Arabia.

7. The detainee and his relative flew to Karachi, Pakistan where they were told by a friend of the detainee to go to the Faran Hotel and wait for a man to contact them. The man purchased an airline ticket for the detainee to travel from Karachi, Pakistan to Quetta, Pakistan.

8. The man that met the detainee at the Faran Hotel in Karachi, Pakistan was an al Qaida member.

9. The detainee left his relative at the hotel and traveled to the airport in Karachi, Pakistan. The contact from the hotel informed the detainee of another contact that would meet him at the Quetta, Pakistan airport. When the detainee arrived at the airport in Quetta, the contact met him and brought him back to his house.

10. The detainee stayed one day at the contact's house and then traveled with others to Afghanistan. The detainee and the others went to their ultimate destination of Kandahar, Afghanistan. Once in Kandahar, Afghanistan the detainee went to a house he believes belongs to the Taliban. The following day, the detainee and the others went to Kabul, Afghanistan and arrived at another Taliban guest house.

11. The day after the detainee arrived at the Taliban guest house in Kabul, Afghanistan he and others took a bus to an airport, got on a Taliban operated airplane and landed in Konduz, Afghanistan. Once there, the detainee and others boarded trucks and were taken to the front line. At the front line, the detainee received one Kalashnikov, three empty magazines and one full magazine.

12. Once the detainee received his weapon, a senior person on the front line asked for help in the kitchen. The detainee volunteered to work in the kitchen by helping to cook food, wash dishes and serve meals. The detainee worked in the kitchen for several months as an assistant cook until they all retreated.

b. Training

1. The detainee states that he received weapons training in the al Faisali area of Saudi Arabia in a makeshift training camp. The training was provided by a Saudi national. The training included marksmanship and disassembling of the Kalashnikov rifle.

2. The detainee has stated that he attended the al Farouq Training Camp in March 2001 for about three weeks. The weapons that the detainee trained on at the camp were the Kalashnikov, Beaker, rocket-propelled grenade and hand grenades.

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3. The detainee has stated that once he completed training at the al Farouq Training Camp, he traveled to Kabul, Afghanistan and stayed there for two days. The detainee then traveled to his position on the front line in Khawajagar, Afghanistan where he worked as an assistant cook.

4. The detainee received additional training while he was on the northern lines. While there, the detainee received training on the Russian Zubiak anti-aircraft weapon and the Grayinov, a weapon described as being similar to the Beaker.

5. The training that the detainee received on the Zukiak lasted about one month. Additionally, the detainee received training on the 82MM cannon while on the front lines. The weapons training the detainee received on the front line was very basic and consisted of breaking down the weapons, loading and shooting.

6. The detainee identified pictures of a Russian 7.62 MM PKB machine gun and referred to it as the Bika or Beaker.

7. The detainee has stated that he had been trained at the Khalid bin al Walid Camp that was adjacent to the main al Farouq Training Camp.

8. The detainee and one of his brothers were trained in urban warfare, anti-aircraft weapons and improvised explosive devices by another one of his brothers. All three brothers were combat veterans from Afghanistan. Upon completion of training, the detainee and one of his brothers went to the front lines near Kabul, Afghanistan.

9. The detainee and one of his brothers were trained on mortars at the al Farouq Training Camp.

c. Connections/Associations

The detainee has been identified as someone who has trained at the al Farouq Training Camp. Additionally, the detainee has five or six brothers who work for Usama bin Laden.

d. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee did some guard duty while at the front lines. The detainee never had anyone under his direct supervision. The detainee was not a bodyguard for anyone.

2. The detainee heard that the order was given to retreat from the front line. The detainee and some others made their retreat by foot towards Konduz, Afghanistan.

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3. The detainee, once in Konduz, Afghanistan entered a guest house for Arabs. The detainee stayed there for two weeks. The detainee's intent was to travel from Konduz, Afghanistan to Mazar-e-Sharif, Afghanistan to Kandahar, Afghanistan and finally to Saudi Arabia.

4. The head Taliban in charge was negotiating surrender. All of the Taliban, including the detainee, surrendered their weapons and got onto trucks to travel to Kandahar, Afghanistan. Here, the detainee was taken to an underground jail. The detainee spent the night in the jail and the following morning was taken to an outside courtyard.

5. When the detainee and the others were in the courtyard, the detainee heard two explosions and troops began shooting randomly at the prisoners. The detainee was wounded in his upper right arm. Once the detainee was wounded he ran back towards the basement along with others and spent several days down there.

6. On the last day, the detainee and others were told to surrender. After that, General Dostum's troops searched everyone, including the detainee, and then tied them up. The detainee was then taken to the Shabrakhan jail where he stayed for about one month.

7. The detainee claims to have been in Afghanistan from May 2001 to November 2001.

8. The detainee has been identified as being on the northern front lines with a senior al Qaida member.

9. The detainee has been identified as being on the front line and in Konduz, Afghanistan.

10. The detainee was identified as being at the al Farouq Training Camp. The detainee attended the training camp during the months of February and March 2000.

11. The detainee was identified as a low-ranking al Qaida fighter from Yemen.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee has denied any prior knowledge of the 11 September 2001 attacks on the United States.

b. The detainee has denied having knowledge of rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.

c. The detainee has denied any knowledge of possible revolts or escape plans at the Guantanamo Bay Detention Facility.

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- d. The detainee claims to have no knowledge of al Qaida or its members.
 - e. The detainee denies ever fighting against Americans and stated he never discharged his weapon.
 - f. A source has stated that he never saw this detainee on the front lines.
 - g. The detainee has stated that, if released, he would not participate in a jihad. Additionally, the detainee state he would not return to Saudi Arabia but would go to Sanaa, Yemen to look for his family.
5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

17 May 2006

TO: SULTAN, FAHA

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SULTAN, FAHA

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee responded to a fatwa that a sheikh issued in January 2001 from a mosque in Taif, Saudi Arabia. The fatwa directed participants to defend the Taliban in Afghanistan.

2. The sheikh was a Saudi mufti, a specialist in Islamic law authorized to issue a fatwa. The sheikh issued a fatwa calling for jihad in Afghanistan. He also condoned the 11 September 2001 attacks and continued to raise money for Usama bin Laden until the sheikh's death in Saudi Arabia in 2001.

3. The detainee paid for travel to Afghanistan with money received from his father, who was unaware of his plans.

4. The Taliban assigned the detainee to the Muntazara section behind the front line in northern Afghanistan. He did not see any combat at this location.

5. The detainee's commander was in charge of operations in the northern Afghan front. The commander exercised overall control of both Taliban and Arab volunteers in that region.

6. The detainee was identified as someone who worked in a distribution center handing out Kalashnikovs.

7. A Taliban truck driver identified the detainee as someone who spent a long time on the north line and was in charge of supplying the Arab group on the north lines.

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8. The detainee's Taliban group stayed in the Taliban-controlled village of Khvajeh Ghar, Afghanistan for ten months. Their mission was to guard women, children, sheikhs, any other non-combatants, and supplies.

9. The members of the Taliban group were armed with Kalashnikov rifles. When United States air strikes began, the commander ordered a withdrawal toward Konduz and then to Mazar-e-Sharif, Afghanistan.

10. A known Taliban member saw the detainee at the frontline during the retreat to Konduz, Afghanistan and shared the same room with him in a basement at Qala-i-Jenki, Afghanistan. The detainee was wounded during the attack on Qala-i-Jenki. The Taliban member believed the detainee was an administrator, as the detainee was always in the rear purchasing food.

11. The detainee was seen at Konduz fighting; Qala-i-Jenki, Afghanistan; Sheberghan prison; and Kandahar, Afghanistan.

b. Training

The detainee attended two of his commander's centers in Kabul and Konduz, Afghanistan. The commander's group consisted of 300 Arab and Taliban members. The commander often taught the basic use of the Kalashnikov on the premises.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee was identified as a friend of a senior al Qaida leader and had a good relationship with another individual who was a close associate of the senior al Qaida leader.

2. The senior al Qaida leader was one of Usama bin Laden's closest commanders and the person in charge of al Qaida fighters in the Afghan northern front.

3. The detainee's name was found on a document listing 324 Arabic names, aliases, and nationalities recovered from safe house raids associated with suspected al Qaida in Karachi, Pakistan. The detainee was listed as having a Saudi passport.

4. A floppy disc recovered during an 11 September 2002 raid on an alleged al Qaida residence in Karachi, Pakistan contained a list of names and amount of money taken from each individual. The detainee's name was listed with the amount of 1,500 Saudi Riyals.

5. On 8 December 2001 United States and coalition forces raided an Arab office in Kandahar, Afghanistan. They retrieved 160 applications to Afghanistan military training camps. One application was for the detainee, providing his name, alias, home city, year of birth, and contact name.

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6. On 28 November 2003 a Foreign Government Service raided the home of an Islamic extremist and recruiter. The detainee's alias and telephone number were found on a telephone listing seized during this raid.

d. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee was captured sometime before late December 2001 north of Mazar-e-Sharif, Afghanistan while carrying a weapon.

2. The detainee has acted as if in a catatonic state during interviews, and he was overheard after one interview telling another detainee that he had fooled the interrogator into thinking that he was "messed up."

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. In early July 2002 a foreign delegation identified the detainee as one of low law enforcement and low intelligence value.

b. The detainee denied any knowledge of the attacks on the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

15 March 2006

TO: BEN KEND, SALEM AHMED

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF BEN KEND, SALEM AHMED

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee traveled from Yemen to Karachi, Pakistan with \$1,000 in United States currency with the intent of purchasing approximately fifty kilos of honey. The detainee planned on selling the honey from his home in Yemen. In addition to the purchase of honey, the detainee was going to Karachi as a tourist. The detainee ultimately did not buy any honey because while in Karachi he met a Pakistani man who influenced him to go to Afghanistan for jihad. The detainee met the Pakistani at a local mosque near the detainee's hotel in Karachi in 1997.

2. Although influenced by the Pakistani man, the idea of jihad was previously on the detainee's mind. Since the detainee grew up in a small village, the Sheikhs did not visit in person. However, cassette tapes regarding jihad in Afghanistan were available in the mosques. The detainee recalls a tape of a Saudi Arabian Sheikh speaking of jihad in general terms.

3. The detainee traveled to Kabul, Afghanistan. He went to Kabul because Taliban forces, which were at war with Masoud's forces, controlled this area. The detainee stayed in a guest house while in Kabul before eventually being directed to the frontlines.

4. The detainee spent his first four months stationed on the second line approximately two or three kilometers behind the front lines. The detainee would move forward if there was significant fighting. After four months the detainee was moved to the front line. The detainee would then rotate back and forth between lines.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF BEN KEND, SALEM AHMED

5. After spending approximately three months on the front line, the detainee and his group were sent north near Konduz, Afghanistan. The detainee was told they went there to fight the Northern Alliance. The detainee went there voluntarily to do jihad and was not deceived into going by anyone. The detainee was fighting the Northern Alliance because they were regarded as oppressors, not infidels.

6. After spending one day in Konduz, the detainee's group traveled to the frontlines. However, when they arrived there was no fighting except for some sporadic gunfire. Two or three months went by with no real fighting. The detainee's group simply guarded the area during this period of time.

7. The detainee and the others were captured by Coalition Forces and were taken to the al Jenki castle. The detainee was in the yard for approximately two to three hours when he heard some Kalishnikovs shooting behind him. The detainee was wounded in the chest and still has a bullet lodged in his body. The detainee was losing blood, fainting and not very alert before he was eventually taken to the basement with the help of other prisoners. The detainee spent the next several days in the basement before the surviving prisoners surrendered to Coalition Forces.

8. A source stated that the detainee was his commander. The detainee had been one of two sub-commanders until the original commander was injured in late September 2001. The detainee was the oldest of the group and became the commander.

b. Training

1. The detainee indicated that prior to going the front northern lines, he reported to a distribution center in Kabul, to pick up his weapon. The detainee stated that he was issued a Kalashnikov rifle. The detainee was asked if he received any training in the use of his issued weapon, at which time he stated that he did not. However, the detainee did admit to interviewers that he knew how to fire a PK rifle, as well as rocket propelled grenades.

2. The detainee's name was on a document that lists over 150 al Qaida members scheduled for tactics, artillery, security, snipers, and anti-aircraft training dated March 2001 by the Office of Mujahedin Affairs. The detainee's name was listed under artillery class 2.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee claims that he fought with the Taliban in Kabul and Kandahar, Afghanistan from July to December 2001.

2. A source claims that the detainee was on the northern front lines with a man with ties to Usama bin Laden.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF BEN KEND, SALEM AHMED

3. A source identified the detainee as training at al Farouq and he saw him on the front lines with a Kalashnikov.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee denies assuming a leadership position within the Taliban command structure when a leader was injured on the front lines.

b. A source corroborated the detainee's account indicating he was not the unit commander at Kabul and Kunduz after the detainee's commander was wounded.

c. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001. The detainee also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

25 April 2006

TO: BIN HAMIDA, ADIL MABROUK

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF BIN HAMIDA, ADIL MABROUK

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee first traveled to Italy in 1989 to improve his life and financial situation. He returned to Tunisia because his mother was concerned for his welfare. Sometime later in 1989 he returned to Italy and obtained a residency permit. He then began selling hashish and other narcotics. He was arrested by Italian authorities and imprisoned for approximately four months.

2. In 1992 the detainee was arrested a second time by Italian authorities for narcotics trafficking.

3. As a result of his second arrest, the detainee was jailed for ten days. He subsequently fled back to Tunisia and opened a barber shop in his home.

4. The detainee returned to Italy in mid-1995 where he worked as a farmer. In late 1995 he began to sell hashish. He also started attending a mosque and eventually decided to reform completely and gave up selling drugs.

5. The detainee obtained employment handing out real estate flyers. Later, he bought and sold used telephones and phone cards and also worked as a barber on the street.

6. In 1998, the detainee attempted to renew his Italian residency and discovered that he had been sentenced in absentia to two years in prison for his 1992 narcotics charge. He was imprisoned for approximately one-and-a-half years and was released in 1999.

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7. In early 2001, a facilitator told the detainee how to find the Algerian House in Jalalabad, Afghanistan. The facilitator also took the detainee to a travel agency in Milan to purchase his plane tickets and get his visa for Iran.
8. The Algerian House is a safe house associated with the North African terrorist network.
9. The travel agency in Milan was known to have facilitated trips to Afghanistan for Islamic militants.
10. While staying in the guest house in Jalalabad, the detainee was taught assembly and disassembly of the Kalashnikov rifle.
11. The detainee grew tired of the Jalalabad guest house because he went to Afghanistan to study Islam and live under Islamic law. He decided to return to a guest house in Kabul.
12. The detainee left the Kabul guest house for fear of being captured by the Northern Alliance. He fled to the Pakistan border and was promptly arrested by Pakistani authorities.
13. The detainee was transferred from Pakistani custody to American custody on 31 December 2001.
14. The detainee was captured with a Casio model F-91W watch. This watch was in the property of several detainees and has been used in bombings that have been linked to al Qaida and radical Islamic terrorist improvised explosive devices.
15. The detainee was sentenced in Tunisia to 20 years in prison and five years administrative arrest for being a member of a terrorist organization operating abroad.

b. Connections/Associations

1. A known member of the Salafist Group For Preaching and Combat cell of Bologna, Italy used a phone card owned by the detainee.
2. The Algerian Salafist Group For Preaching and Combat recruited fighters throughout Europe, trained them in Afghanistan, and sent them to fight in Chechnya, Algeria, and Bosnia.
3. An automobile owned by the detainee was driven by the known leader of the Salafist Group For Preaching and Combat cell of Bologna, Italy (this leader was arrested by Italian police in August 2001 and extradited to Tunisia where he is serving a life sentence).
4. In late 2000, approximately five months after the detainee was released from prison stemming from his 1992 narcotics charge, the detainee met a facilitator at his mosque.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF BIN HAMIDA, ADIL MABROUK

5. The facilitator has been imprisoned since December 2001 for terrorism-related activities. He was involved with an al Qaida-affiliated network and recruited and indoctrinated al Qaida candidates who were subsequently transferred to combat zones.

6. The detainee was identified as associated with the suspected Al Takfir Wa Al Hijra cell in Bologna, Italy.

7. Al Takfir Wa Al Hijra is a transnational movement of several loosely networked Islamist sects who believe they are obligated to cleanse Muslim society, through violence if necessary, and replace it with a pure Muslim religious, political, and social structure. The puritanical member's primary goal is to destroy Islamic regimes and to rebuild them with a pure form of Islam.

8. The detainee and his brothers have been identified as members of the Sami Essid terrorist network.

9. The Essid network is active particularly in the falsification of travel documents, the counterfeiting of money, stolen vehicles, and the illicit trafficking of narcotics in coordination with the Mafia to ensure financial support to terrorist groups.

10. As of late 2002, the detainee's brother was suspected by Italian authorities to be planning to commit an unknown type of terrorist attack against an unknown target during Ramadan.

11. In early 2005 the detainee's brother was indicted under charges of international terrorism in Italy. He and nine others were specifically charged with collecting money and recruiting combatants for the group formerly known as Hasm, the Moroccan Fighting Islamic Group, which became Jaamaa Islamica Mujahida Maghribia. They were also accused of planning to bomb subway stations and churches in Italy.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee claims that he never heard any talks about al Qaida at the mosque he attended in Kabul, Afghanistan.

b. The detainee claims that he had no interaction with the Taliban while in Afghanistan. He stated that he never attended any political meetings in Afghanistan.

c. The detainee claims that he was not involved in a logistical cell nor was he a member of a terrorist organization while in Italy.

d. The detainee explained that he was not in Afghanistan for military training but purely there for religious purposes. He denied doing anything wrong in regard to other people.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF BIN HAMIDA, ADIL MABROUK

e. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001 and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.

f. The detainee claims that he never joined nor did he train with al Qaida while in Afghanistan.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

6 September 2006

TO: BOUJAADIA, SAID

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF BOUJAADIA, SAID

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. In July 2001, the detainee traveled with his family to Damascus, Syria, then to Turkey and subsequently to Tehran, Iran. The detainee and his family also traveled to Mashad, Iran, and then to Herat, Afghanistan and finally to Kandahar, Afghanistan.

2. The detainee periodically visited the Omar bin al Khattab Mosque, where the Imam preached support for jihad in Chechnya.

3. The detainee went to Afghanistan with the intention of fighting for jihad. The detainee planned on staying in Afghanistan and becoming a merchant there.

4. An individual facilitated the detainee's travels to Afghanistan. In Kandahar, Afghanistan the detainee located a contact his brother-in-law had given him in the al Wafa organization. This contact took the detainee and his family to the detainee's brother-in-law's house.

5. On 5 December 2001, the Secretary of State placed al Wafa al-Igatha al-Islamia on the Terrorist Exclusion List because the organization has committed or incited to commit a terrorist activity; prepared or planned a terrorist activity; gathered information on potential targets for terrorist activity; or provided material support to further terrorist activity.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF BOUJAADIA, SAID

6. Enroute from the Afghanistan to the Pakistan border, bomb shrapnel struck the detainee's car. The detainee and his wife were hurt and his brother-in-law's wife was killed. After the bombing incident, the detainee's brother-in-law arranged for smugglers to take the detainee's family across the Pakistan border again. The detainee stayed back since it was too dangerous to travel with them. But the detainee's brother-in-law never returned.

7. The detainee returned to Kandahar, Afghanistan and asked a smuggler to help get his family out of Afghanistan and into Pakistan.

8. As two men and the detainee traveled, the detainee heard gunfire. The detainee jumped out of the bus and hid in nearby rocks.

9. On 24 November 2001, about 300 troops loyal to an Afghan opposition figure took control of the village of Takhteh Pol, Afghanistan cutting off the highway between Kandahar City, Afghanistan and the border town of Spin Boldak, Afghanistan. Within two hours of taking the city, the troops traded gunfire with Arabs associated with Usama bin Laden who were passing through the village by car. Three Arabs were killed returning fire at checkpoints. Two additional Arabs were taken prisoner.

10. The Afghan opposition figures troops took possession of two SA-7 missiles and an ICOM hand-held radio from the Arabs killed in the gunfight. The troops listened to the radio's pre-tuned frequency and heard Arabs discussing the capture of their cohorts, mentioning the Afghan leader by name.

11. The two Arabs captured on 24 November 2001 were the detainee and a Yemen citizen.

12. The detainee and the Yemen citizen agreed to tell interrogators a cover story that they worked for the al Wafa organization.

13. The Yemen citizen admitted he was Usama bin Laden's driver in Afghanistan.

b. Training

1. The detainee had no military experience in Morocco. The detainee applied for the Moroccan Gendarmerie Forces, but was rejected because of poor education.

2. A source indicated that the detainee went to al Farouq Training Camp in Afghanistan, but was disappointed with the harsh conditions.

3. The Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group used al Qaida's al Farouq Training Camp in Kandahar, Afghanistan for basic training.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF BOUJAADIA, SAID

4. The detainee went to al Farouq Training Camp in September 2001. The detainee stayed there eleven days. During this time, the detainee trained on the AK-47, RPG, pistol, BK machine gun, formations, hand-to-hand combat and physical fitness.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee first met an al Qaida operative at the Umar bin Khattab Mosque in Casablanca, Morocco sometime in 1998.

2. The al Qaida operative told the detainee that he had lived in Italy, but gave up everything to go to Afghanistan to fight jihad.

3. The same al Qaida operative led a terrorist cell in Kenitra, Morocco with other members of al Qaida and other extremists devoted to jihad to help overthrow the Moroccan government.

4. The detainee believed that the al Qaida operative was a suspected Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group member.

5. The Secretary of State designated the Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group as a foreign terrorist organization. Starting in the late 1990s, the goals of the Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group reportedly included establishing an Islamic state in Morocco and supporting al Qaida's jihad against the West.

6. Sometime in the year 2000, detainee drove a senior al Qaida operative, accompanied by a woman about to be smuggled to Spain, to a private residence.

7. The Secretary of State has designated the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group as a foreign terrorist organization. The Libyan Islamic Fighting Group emerged in 1995 among Libyans who had fought against Soviet forces in Afghanistan and declared the government of Libyan leader Muammar Qadhafi un-Islamic and pledged to overthrow it. Some members are aligned with al Qaida or are active in the international mujahedin network.

8. The detainee's kunya was found on an Arabic document retrieved on 6 March 2002. The document is a list of names of al Qaida martyrs, those missing in action, those imprisoned brothers, and those who escaped to Pakistan, as well as names of individuals assigned to various military positions and units. The detainee was listed as part of a convoy on the Boldak/Kandahar Road around 26 November 2001.

9. At the time of capture, the detainee had a color photograph among his personal affects. A senior al Qaida member identified the person in the photo as a Yemeni who he believed pledged bayat to Usama bin Laden.

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10. We received information from a foreign confidential source stating that the detainee was involved in religious extremism. The source also alleged that the detainee was involved in activities which benefit the terrorist organization of al Qaida or other terrorist groups.

d. Other Relevant Data

1. In January 2002, al Qaida members sent the detainee's brother-in-law to Morocco to identify United States targets for future attacks.

2. Moroccan authorities arrested three Saudis and four Moroccans plotting to use explosive-packed boats to attack American and British ships in the Strait of Gibraltar. The detainee's brother-in-law was one of those arrested.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee stated that he had no knowledge of the attacks against the World Trade Center or any other subversive actions against the American people, before or after they happened.

b. The detainee denied ever hearing about the Moroccan Islamic Fighting Group or the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group prior to his arrival at Guantanamo Bay.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

4 April 2006

TO: AL KHALAQI, ASIM THAHIT ABDULLAH

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL KHALAQI, ASIM THAHIT
ABDULLAH

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee took a trip to Yemen for a month and a half to obtain a Yemeni passport. The detainee's brother, a citizen of Saudi Arabia, refused to sponsor the detainee to travel to Pakistan from Saudi Arabia. Less than a month later, the detainee bribed one of the clerks that worked in the office to obtain a visa for six months.

2. The detainee traveled from Riyadh to Jeddah, then went to Mecca to do Umra. After returning to Jeddah, the detainee went to Kuwait. He then traveled to Karachi, Pakistan.

3. The detainee and a traveling companion decided to go to Afghanistan where they believed there were fewer missionaries. They both went from Karachi, Pakistan to Quetta, Pakistan. Once in Quetta, they both traveled to Kandahar, Afghanistan where they began to conduct missionary work. After approximately two weeks, they traveled to Kabul, Afghanistan. They then traveled to Jalalabad, Afghanistan where they rented another house and stayed for approximately two months conducting missionary work.

4. The detainee spent a total of 1800 Riyals for his travel and took another 4000 Riyals to Pakistan. The detainee stated that the money was obtained from him saving money from his last job.

b. Connections/Associations

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL KHALAQI, ASIM THAHIT ABDULLAH

1. The detainee stated that his traveling partner was associated with the group Jamat-al-Tabligh and the detainee met some of his friends from the group while they were in Karachi.

2. The detainee stated that he once belonged to the Jamat-al-Tabligh but is no longer a member.

3. The Jamat-al-Tabligh is a Pakistan-based Islamic missionary organization used as a cover to mask travel and activities of terrorists, including members of al Qaida.

4. A senior al Qaida operative identified the detainee as a familiar face that he might have seen in either the Kabul or Kandahar at one of the guest houses.

5. A fighter with the Taliban identified the detainee as a person from Saudi Arabia who was very talkative, liked to recite poetry very loud, and was slightly older than the others. The detainee was identified as arriving at the front lines in Bagram.

6. The detainee's alias was found on a 79-page document printed from an internet site. It contained information regarding the capture of Taliban and al Qaida fighters who had crossed the border.

7. The detainee's alias was found in a letter that lists 68 probable al Qaida members incarcerated in Pakistan.

8. The detainee's name, alias, nationality, passport and a ticket were all found on a document listing 324 Arabic names, aliases and nationalities recovered from safe house raids associated with al Qaida members in Karachi, Pakistan.

9. After a raid in early 2003 a chart in Arabic listing the names of captured Mujahedin was found on a computer. The detainee's alias was found on the chart.

c. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee confirmed he used an alias. The detainee stated he was told by another person to change his name and is not sure if he used the name in Pakistan or Afghanistan. The detainee did not know the purpose of changing his name and stated he just followed the other person's instructions without question.

2. While fleeing Afghanistan, the detainee said he lost his passport somewhere in Jalalabad or in the mountains.

3. The detainee said he surrendered at the Pakistani border to Pakistan authorities sometime during Ramadan 2001. Pakistan authorities interviewed the detainee. The detainee

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL KHALAQL, ASIM THAHIT ABDULLAH

was then taken to another prison where there were a lot of other Arabs. He was then flown from Pakistan to Afghanistan and turned over to the American Forces.

4. The detainee was transferred to United States custody on 30 December 2001 from Kohat, Pakistan.

5. The detainee was found with a 500 Saudi Riyal note and a 10,000 Afghani note at the time of his capture. The detainee said he did not have a 10,000 Afghani note. He claimed he had a 100 United States Dollar bill along with the 500 Saudi Riyal note and other Afghani money.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee was not asked to surrender his passport to anyone while in either Pakistan or Afghanistan.

b. The detainee denies ever participating or being asked to participate in any type of military training in either Pakistan or Afghanistan.

c. The detainee stated that he had never been on the front lines anywhere, nor has he ever fought with any military.

d. The detainee related he never worked for any domestic or foreign government.

e. The detainee stated he had never stayed in any guest houses.

f. The detainee denied any terrorist or Taliban affiliations.

g. The detainee said he was simply part of the Jamat-al-Tabligh organization performing humanitarian assistance to the Afghan people.

h. The detainee stated he would return to Saudi Arabia if released because his family is there. The detainee would get married and find a job.

i. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks on the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001, and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.

j. The detainee said he was disturbed by the images of 11 September 2001. He expressed anger and hopes that Usama bin Laden is found soon before more attacks occur.

k. The detainee seems to bear no ill will toward America or Americans in general.

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL KHALAQI, ASIM THAHIT
ABDULLAH**

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

8 August 2006

TO: SULEIMAN, FAYIZ AHMAD YAHIA

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SULEIMAN, FAYIZ AHMAD YAHIA

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee traveled from Jeddah, Saudi Arabia to Sana, Yemen to Dubai, United Arab Emirates to Karachi, Pakistan to Quetta, Pakistan to Kabul, Afghanistan to Jalalabad, Afghanistan.

2. The detainee identified himself as a trained Imam in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.

3. The detainee stated that some sheiks would frequent his facility to solicit money for other countries and to address jihad. The detainee stated that the majority of the sheiks' talks focused on Chechnya.

4. The detainee was identified as a nurse in Talaquon, Afghanistan while fighting the Northern Alliance and was at Tora Bora, Afghanistan before being arrested trying to cross the Afghanistan border into Pakistan.

b. Training

The detainee was identified as one who trained at the Kandahar Airport in Afghanistan to make poison.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SULEIMAN, FAYIZ AHMAD YAHIA

c. Connections/Associations

1. A possible al Qaida operative provided the detainee with employment at a pharmaceutical company.
2. The detainee's name, alias, nationality and passport information were on a document listing Arabic names, aliases and nationalities recovered from safe house raids associated with suspected al Qaida members in Karachi, Pakistan.

d. Other Relevant Data

1. Fighters heading to the al Farouq Training Camp either chose or were given a kunya, or alias, which they would use from that point forward.
2. The detainee's kunya is Idris.
3. The detainee crossed the border with 10 to 15 other Arabs who were turned in to the Pakistan authorities by the chief of the Pakistani village they entered.
4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
 - a. The detainee stated that he had no military service and he had no desire to serve in such a capacity.
 - b. The detainee denied any connection with al Qaida or the Taliban.
 - c. The detainee claims he was never trained on the use of weapons.
 - d. The detainee claims that he planned to go to Afghanistan and to return as soon as he found his bride.
 - e. The detainee stated that he did not go to the al Farouq Camp in Kandahar, Afghanistan.
 - f. The detainee was aware of the fatwah related to the jihad in Chechnya but denied ever going on a jihad.
 - g. The detainee stated that he has never been in any type of trouble and that he has never been arrested or imprisoned.
 - h. The detainee had no knowledge of persons being ordered or requesting to fight.

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SULEIMAN, FAYIZ AHMAD
YAHIA**

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

02 March 2006

TO: AL AWFI, MAZIN SALIH MUSAIID

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL AWFI, MAZIN SALIH MUSAIID

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee's decision to join the fight with the Taliban was based on a fatwa from a sheikh. The detainee's friend convinced him to listen to the sheikh.

2. The sheikh was a Saudi Mufti who issued a fatwa and encouraged people to fight jihad in Afghanistan. The sheikh condoned the 11 September 2001 attacks against the United States. In addition, the sheikh helped raise money for Usama bin Laden until his death in Saudi Arabia in 2001.

3. The detainee has also indicated that he went to Afghanistan to find his cousin and participate in jihad along side the Taliban. The detainee said he knew his cousin went to Afghanistan to fight in jihad, and, although he wanted to find his cousin, he also wanted to come back with some cool stories for himself about fighting in jihad. The detainee also added that he felt his Muslim brothers would look favorably upon him if they knew he had participated in jihad.

4. The detainee stated he paid the expenses for the trip to go to Afghanistan with his own money. He was able to save enough money to pay for the trip without having to ask for assistance from anyone, and he did not take money from another party.

5. The detainee could not remember exactly when he left Saudi Arabia, but he estimated the date to be around 6 June 2001.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL AWFI, MAZIN SALIH MUSAID

6. The detainee departed Medina, Saudi Arabia with 3000 Saudi Riyals to go to Afghanistan. He traveled from Medina to Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. He then traveled to Damam, Saudi Arabia and Dubai, United Arab Emirates. He then traveled from Dubai to Karachi, Pakistan.

7. The detainee's friend went to Afghanistan about six months before the detainee went. The friend gave the detainee a telephone number to call once the detainee arrived in Pakistan. The detainee called the number from the Karachi airport and spoke to Ahmed, who told him to go to the Hotel Dubai.

8. Ahmed met the detainee and gave the detainee an itinerary, money and plane tickets, and told the detainee to say he was an Afghan. The detainee then traveled from Karachi to Quetta, Pakistan.

9. In Quetta, Pakistan the detainee met two Afghan's at the airport. They were evidently waiting to pick him up. They took him across the border to Kandahar, Afghanistan.

10. In Kandahar, the detainee stayed in a small house for approximately 10 days. In the house, the detainee met a man named Sukhr. Sukhr took him to a house in Kabul, Afghanistan.

11. Another person stayed at a guesthouse in Kandahar called Madafat al Ansar, where Sukhr was in charge. According to the other person, Sukhr had a high position in a Foreign Government Service and may have been a military officer.

b. Training

1. The detainee stated that he was trained by a Foreign Government Service in small arms and unit tactics, thus he did not need further training from the Taliban.

2. The detainee received machine gun and pistol training while making approximately 2700 Saudi Riyals per month.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee's uncle is a terrorist wanted for bombing attacks in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia in May 2003, and has been linked to an al Qaida weapons storage and document forging facility.

2. The detainee's name was found in a translation of an Arabic-language computer file, which lists contact points and telephone numbers for al Qaida Mujahedin in Pakistan.

3. The detainee's name appears in a translation of a document listing 324 Arabic names, aliases, and nationalities recovered from safehouse raids associated with suspected al Qaida in Karachi, Pakistan.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL AWFI, MAZIN SALIH MUSAID

4. The detainee's name was found in an English language translation of a chart in Arabic listing the names of captured Mujahedin. The information was found on a computer associated with a senior al Qaida leader.

5. The detainee's name was found on a computer recovered by allied personnel in a suspected al Qaida safe house in Islamabad, Pakistan.

6. The detainee's name appears in a document printed from an internet site that contains information regarding the capture of Taliban and al Qaida fighters.

7. According to another person, the detainee was at the Nebras guesthouse in Kandahar, the al Farouq Training Center, Kabul, and Tora Bora.

8. The detainee went to the Omar Saif area, near Kabul. A source stated that the detainee's commander was in charge of the Taliban in this area. The commander handed the detainee a Kalashnikov rifle, and the detainee accepted the rifle.

9. The detainee stated that his commander commanded a force of 30 to 35. The detainee served in the unit in Kabul for two weeks to twenty days.

d. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee was captured on the Pakistan border by border guards and processed into United States custody in Kandahar, Afghanistan.

2. The detainee, at capture, had in his possession a Casio F-91W watch, which has been used in bombings that have been linked to al Qaida.

3. The detainee claims to have bought his Casio watch years prior to when he left for Afghanistan. He did not know where he bought it specifically.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee has continuously denied the allegations about eyewitnesses identifying him as being at al Farouq.

b. The detainee stated that if released by the American government, he would return to Saudi Arabia and never leave again.

c. The detainee denied receiving training from anyone or witnessing any ongoing training or training camps.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL AWFI, MAZIN SALIH MUSAID

d. The detainee stated that he never fired upon anyone at any time while in Afghanistan, and although he kept company with people who he believed were Taliban associates, he stated that he could not recall any names, nor did he witness any fire fights.

e. Other than the aforementioned names, the detainee stated that he knew nothing of any terrorist network. The detainee insisted that his main reason for traveling to Afghanistan was to find his cousin, because his aunt was upset that his cousin was gone.

f. The detainee stated that he simply wishes to return home and marry in order to start a family. He expressed no hostility towards the United States and deeply regrets going to Afghanistan to fight with the Taliban.

g. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001, and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.

h. The detainee stated he is fed up with jihad and doesn't ever want to hear the word again.

i. The detainee admits that his attempt to become a Mujahedin is what caused him to be arrested and detained, calling his jihad the mistake that ruined his life.

j. The detainee further stated that he's learned several things from this experience: 1) he will never leave his family again; 2) when he sees trouble, he will turn the other direction; 3) he never again will join any army or pick up arms against other people; and, 4) he will not ever do what someone else tells him without questioning it first.

k. When asked about his plans for the future, the detainee said he had four goals: 1) make up for the disappointment he has caused to his parents; 2) help his (family's) brothers and sisters; 3) get married; and 4) obtain a good job, possibly a government job or some other job of importance.

l. When asked his opinion about America, the detainee said that there were some good and some bad Americans, just as there is everywhere. There are some Americans that he would like to have as friends and some he would not like to have as friends.

m. The detainee stated that all he wants to do is to live in peace and return home. The detainee said that it is impossible that he will ever again take up arms or carry a weapon.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

15 February 2006

TO: ABD AL RAHMAN ABD, ALLAL AB ALJALLIL

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ABD AL RAHMAN ABD, ALLAL AB
ALJALLIL

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee claims he met a man in Yemen who talked about jihad and Afghanistan. The man convinced the detainee to go to Afghanistan.

2. This man is a probable al Qaida member.

3. The detainee flew from Sanaa, Yemen to Karachi, Pakistan. He then traveled to Quetta, Pakistan and then to Kandahar, Afghanistan.

4. This trip was sponsored by the Gameit al Hekma organization.

b. Training

The Taliban gave the detainee weapons training and put him on the front line facing the Northern Alliance north of Kabul.

c. Connections/Associations

1. One of the detainee's names appears on a list of Usama Bin Laden's security detail.

2. The detainee's name appears on a list of al Qaida Mujahidin with the contents of their trust accounts found on files recovered from various computers seized during raids against al Qaida associated safehouses.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ABD AL RAHMAN ABD, ALLAL AB ALJALLIL

d. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee claimed he prefers the name Abdelrahman Abdulla Abdel Galil. The name on his passport is Adnan Farhan Abd al Latif. Latif is his family name.

2. The detainee also stated that his correct full name is Agnahn Purhan Abjillil.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee claimed he did not agree with the attacks on America. He said he would go back to Yemen if released from the detention facility. He claimed he had never been to al Qaida camps and had never seen or heard of Usama Bin Laden. In addition, he claimed he did not know of anyone who worked at al Qaida camps and never heard of any plans to attack the USS Cole.

b. While on the front line facing the Northern Alliance, the detainee claimed he never fired a shot.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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**Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba**

15 August 2006

TO: AL HARBI, MAJID ABDALLAH HUSAYN MUHAMMAD AL SAMLULI

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF
AL HARBI, MAJID ABDALLAH HUSAYN MUHAMMAD AL SAMLULI**

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee flew from Jeddah to Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, took a bus through several locations, and finally arrived in Lahore, Pakistan.

2. In late September and early October 2001, the detainee stated that the Jamaat al Tabligh announced a jihad, and he decided to travel to Afghanistan to support the jihad by teaching the Hadith.

3. Jamaat al Tabligh supports Islamic terrorist groups, tries to hide their activities under the heading of religious activities, and is closely aligned with al Qaida.

4. The detainee and several other Arabs traveled to a guest house in Kandahar, Afghanistan.

b. Training

1. The detainee has no formal military training from his country.

2. The detainee was identified as attending the al Farouq Training Camp.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL HARBI, MAJID ABDALLAH HUSAYN MUHAMMAD AL SAMLULI

3. Al Farouq Training Camp is a basic military training camp that provides eight weeks of instruction in various subjects related to military activities.

4. The detainee admitted that he received AK-47 training from a known Jamaat al Tabligh member who also taught him how to break down, aim, and shoot the weapon.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee met a person associated with Jamaat al Tabligh over a two-month period at the Masjid al Malik Saud mosque in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.

2. A Jamaat al Tabligh representative in Karachi, Pakistan met the detainee and took him to a mosque in Lahore, Pakistan.

d. Intent

The detainee stated that he is at peace and has no interest in being released by the Americans. The detainee said that he does not have hopes of leaving and is happy to stay in Guantanamo Bay.

e. Other Relevant Data

1. While at the guest house, the detainee claims that his two associates purchased Kalashnikov rifles and one associate departed to fight in Tora Bora. The detainee stated that one associate had enough money to buy a weapon.

2. The detainee was informed that he had to leave the guest house. The detainee departed for an unknown village and stayed at a house owned by an unknown Afghan man. The detainee stated that he had lost his passport.

3. The detainee was captured near the Pakistan/Afghanistan border with a group of other Mujahedin fighters that crossed the border.

4. The detainee was identified as a member of al Qaida or the Taliban.

5. The detainee was identified as an Emir for a group of fighters in Tora Bora.

6. A chart seized in a raid listed the detainee's name with a group of other Mujahedin who were captured.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL HARBI, MAJID ABDALLAH HUSAYN MUHAMMAD AL SAMLULI

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee claims that he was teaching the Hadith in Afghanistan and is not involved with the Taliban.

b. The detainee denies carrying a weapon or fighting while in Afghanistan.

c. The detainee decided to leave Afghanistan and return to Saudi Arabia. The detainee stated that he planned to go to the Saudi Arabian Embassy in Pakistan.

d. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001, and denied knowledge of rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or its interests.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

8 February 2006

TO: BEN MOUJAN, MUHAMMAD

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF BEN MOUJAN, MUHAMMAD

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. A source indicated the detainee went to Afghanistan to train for jihad.

2. The detainee admitted he was a foot soldier in the mountains in an unknown location near Jalalabad. He spent about three weeks with Libyan and Yemeni Taliban soldiers.

3. The detainee said he went to al Farouq of his own volition.

b. Training

1. The detainee admitted he trained with the Kalishnikov.

2. At al Farouq the detainee trained on small arms and tactical missions for about one month before the training was suspended and the trainees were instructed to go home.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee attended the weddings of his sisters to two of his brothers-in-law. The marriages were at the request of another brother-in-law of the detainee.

2. These two brothers-in-law were al Qaida martyrdom operatives, and the Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group arranged the marriages.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF BEN MOUJAN, MUHAMMAD

3. One of the detainee's brothers-in-law was captured by Moroccan authorities along with six others who were plotting to use explosive-packed boats to attack American and British ships in the Strait of Gibraltar. Before being captured, this brother-in-law was in the Tora Bora region of Afghanistan until the United States bombing began.

4. Two of the detainee's brothers-in-law are suspected al Qaida members.

5. A third brother-in-law of the detainee went to the al Farouq training camp.

6. One of the detainee's brothers-in-law had arranged for the detainee to attend al Farouq.

d. Other Relevant Data

1. On 20 July 2002 the internet site Alneda contained information regarding the capture of Taliban and al Qaida fighters. The detainee's name was found on this internet site.

2. The detainee verified his phone number was correct on the Alneda website.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001 and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or its interests.

b. The detainee stated that if released he would consider settling down in the United States and seeking a job as a truck driver.

c. The detainee said he never heard of the website Alneda.

d. The detainee advised he had nowhere else to go and associated with Arab fighters in Afghanistan to stay alive.

e. The detainee claimed he had nothing to do while in Afghanistan and had no money to return home to Morocco. The detainee claimed he wanted to go back home but was unable to.

f. The detainee stated he was not opposing Northern Alliance Forces but was just trying to leave Afghanistan for safety reasons due to the bombing.

g. The detainee claimed he was never a member of the Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group or any other group.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
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unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

14 March 2006

TO: AL QADASI, KHALID ABD JAL JABBAR MUHAMMAD JUTHMAN

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL QADASI, KHALID ABD JAL
JABBAR MUHAMMAD JUTHMA

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee is a Yemeni citizen who traveled to Afghanistan via Dubai, United Arab Emirates to Karachi, Pakistan to Quetta, Pakistan and then on to Kandahar, Afghanistan in July 2001.
2. The detainee was identified as a Mujadeen fighter who came to Tora Bora, Afghanistan.
3. The detainee claims that he is willing to spend the rest of his life in prison and has emphatically stated that he would rather die than answer questions.

b. Training

The detainee served for a year from 1988 to 1989 in the Yemeni Army.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee spent time in a Taliban guest house in Quetta, Pakistan and an Arab guest house use in Kabul, Afghanistan, alongside other Arabs traveling to Afghanistan.
2. The detainee spent a day at the Daftar Taliban in Quetta, Pakistan.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL QADASI, KHALID ABD JAL JABBAR MUHAMMAD JUTHMA

3. The detainee's name was found on a document listing 324 Arabic names, aliases and nationalities recovered from safe house raids.
4. The detainee's name was found on a document listing al Qaida Mujahidin and the contents of their trust accounts recovered during raids against al Qaida associated safe houses.

d. Other Relevant Data

The detainee was transported by truck, alongside others from the guest house to Jalalabad and then to Tora Bora, and admits that they had weapons onboard.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
 - a. The detainee alleges that he left Yemen for Pakistan to obtain medical treatment.
 - b. The detainee claims he never possessed any weapons in Afghanistan, as he was unable to fight due to his bad back.
 - c. The detainee stated that he had not participated in any fighting in Afghanistan.
 - d. The detainee stated that he was not a member of the al Qaida organization.
 - e. The detainee said that he never heard or saw anything related to Usama bin Laden while at the safe house.
 - f. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001.
 - g. The detainee denies knowledge of any imminent or future terrorist threats to the United States or elsewhere.
5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

22 September 2006

TO: SHAHIN, MUHAMMAD IBN ARFHAN

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SHAHIN, MUHAMMAD IBN ARFHAN

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
 1. The detainee stated that during the war in Bosnia he worked and slept at a large hospital. The detainee assisted the wounded and performed various other jobs. The detainee stated he spent less than three months in Bosnia and then returned to Bologna, Italy.
 2. An individual claimed he fought with the detainee in Bosnia for eight months starting in June or July 1995, and that they fought together on a major operation labeled Badr Al-Bosna.
 3. The detainee's name was discovered listed under an operation called Brown Lion in Bosnia.
 4. The detainee was one of the main leaders who started the Tunisian Combatant Group at a meeting in his house in Jalalabad, Afghanistan during June 2000. The detainee was assigned the role of contacts, welcome greeter and travels for the Tunisian Combatant Group.
 5. According to the Department of Homeland Security, the Tunisian Combatant Group is identified as a Foreign Terrorist Organization and is reportedly seeking to establish an Islamic regime in Tunisia and targets United States and Western interests.
 6. The detainee stated the detainees in Cuba will never forget the tyranny brought upon them by America. If they are released from Cuba the detainees are going to get revenge for the time they have spent there.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SHAHIN, MUHAMMAD IBN ARFHAN

7. The detainee stated he would kill President Bush if given the chance because President Bush is the cause of all the problems for Muslims.

b. Training

1. The detainee stated he trained at Khalden Training Camp from August 1997 to February 1998. The detainee's training consisted of small arms and spirituality. The detainee also stated he attended light weapons training in Duranta.

2. The detainee was sent to Pakistan to attend a paramilitary training camp as part of the Bologna Group.

c. Connections/Associations

1. A senior al Qaida operative stated the detainee served as the point of contact between himself and the Tunisian group located in Jalalabad, Afghanistan.

2. The same al Qaida operative stated the detainee joined a small group of Tunisians in the Khalden Camp and became the group's deputy emir. The detainee also stated that after the 11 September 2001 attacks, he headed to Tora Bora to fight with al Qaida.

3. The detainee hosted three al Qaida personnel in his house on their way from Kabul, Afghanistan to Tora Bora.

4. The detainee stated he considered himself to be the third or fourth person in the leadership hierarchy of the Tunisians in Afghanistan.

5. The detainee was listed as a member of Islamic Armed Group by the Italian authorities, and wanted for arrest in Italy since 1997.

6. According to the Department of Homeland Security, the Islamic Armed Group is an Islamic extremist group. The Islamic Armed Group aims to overthrow the secular Algerian regime and replace it with an Islamic state.

7. The detainee was also identified on documentation as specializing in negotiating and distributing false banknotes for the Islamic Armed Group.

d. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee admitted he was involved with passport forgery operations and that he trained in passport forgery at the Khalden Camp.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SHAHIN, MUHAMMAD IBN ARFHAN

2. Pakistan authorities arrested the detainee for having an illegal Afghan passport in his possession. The detainee was detained without identification documents.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee denies any role in document forgery or logistical support for any organization, either in Italy or later in Pakistan.

b. The detainee claims he has no knowledge of North Africans in Europe who are or were involved in logistical support for any terrorist organization.

c. The detainee claims his purpose for going to Pakistan and later Afghanistan was to open a restaurant, which he never did. The detainee's reason for not opening a restaurant was that he could not trust the Pakistani's. The detainee bought a house in Afghanistan and got married.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

12 April 2006

TO: MASUD, SHARAF AHMAD MUHAMMAD

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MASUD, SHARAF AHMAD
MUHAMMAD

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee traveled to Afghanistan because he heard that the Afghan leader led by Islamic ways. The detainee knew that the leader of Afghanistan was Taliban and the detainee supported the Taliban. The detainee was not worried about fighting in Afghanistan because it was muslim versus muslim and was occurring in the northern part of the country.

2. The detainee heard about Afghanistan on the radio for a while and after about a week of contemplation, he just decided to go. The detainee did not consider the situation in Afghanistan to be a true jihad because it was muslim versus muslim.

b. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee met Ali Ahmed Muhamed at the al Mutawakil Mosque. Muhamed knew a man named Riyadh from Karachi and made arrangements for the detainee to meet Riyadh. In Karachi, Riyadh took the detainee to a hotel. The detainee gave Riyadh about 50 United States Dollars to purchase a plane ticket for him to fly from Karachi to Quetta, Pakistan.

2. "Riyadh the Facilitator" was in charge of making travel arrangements for al Qaida members going to Afghanistan.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MASUD, SHARAF AHMAD MUHAMMAD

3. The Detainee's name was found in a document listing the names of captured Mujahedin linked to a senior al Qaida person.

4. The detainee's name was found in a document listing 324 Arabic names, aliases, and nationalities recovered from an al Qaida safe house.

5. A senior al Qaida lieutenant noted the detainee looked familiar and that he may be a Tunisian with connections to Italy.

6. The detainee stayed at a place in Kandahar known as the Mujawa al Arab for two months.

7. The detainee spent two weeks at an Arab house in Kabul, and a month and a half at an Arab house in Jalalabad, Afghanistan.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee advised that he did not travel to Afghanistan to fight for the Taliban.

b. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001 and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or its interests.

c. The detainee stated he would not perform jihad against the United States or anyone else.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

28 March 2006

TO: ALAHDAL, ABU BAKR IBN ALI MUHAMMAD

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ALAHDAL, ABU BAKR IBN ALI
MUHAMMAD

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee stated he was a member of the Yemeni political Islah party.

2. The detainee became interested in going to Afghanistan when he heard about how the Taliban had destroyed the idolatrous Buddhist statues in Bamiyam, Afghanistan. The detainee felt the statues were an affront to Islam and needed to be destroyed. He respected the Taliban for what they did.

3. The detainee approached an individual at the Othman mosque in Hudaydah, Yemen to inquire about how to get to Afghanistan.

4. The detainee was recruited by a fellow Yemeni. This individual was a jihadist who was well known in the Hudaydah and Beit al-Ahdel, Yemen areas.

5. The detainee gave the individual who recruited him 1,000 United States Dollars so that the individual could acquire a passport and roundtrip airline tickets for the detainee.

6. The detainee gave the individual who recruited him pictures of himself, a completed passport form, and an unknown sum of Yemeni money. In return, the detainee received a new Yemeni passport, plane tickets to Karachi, Pakistan on Yemeni Airlines and 150 United States Dollars. The recruiter advised him to only use United States Dollars whenever possible, and the

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ALAHDAL, ABU BAKR IBN ALI MUHAMMAD

detainee took 650 United States Dollars with him. The detainee stated that the passport appeared to be genuine.

7. The detainee traveled from Sanaa, Yemen to Karachi, Pakistan via Dubai and the United Arab Emirates.

8. From Karachi, Pakistan the detainee took a taxi to Quetta, Pakistan and was dropped off near the Daftar Taliban office.

9. In Quetta, Pakistan the detainee approached the Taliban office declaring that he wanted to live in a truly Islamic country. He asked to arrange entry and volunteered to fight with the Taliban.

10. The detainee's application to join the Jihad was put on hold, but an Afghan facilitator named Daoud Allah assisted him to Kandahar, Afghanistan where he stayed at the Taliban guest house for four days.

11. After four days in Kandahar, Afghanistan the detainee went to Kabul, Afghanistan, staying in the al-Khat guest house for one week.

12. After one week in Kabul, Afghanistan the detainee then visited Jalalabad, Afghanistan for two weeks, touring the market and mosque, and was assigned a room at the guest house by a North African man.

13. After two weeks in Jalalabad, Afghanistan the detainee proceeded to Bagram, Afghanistan.

14. The detainee served as a fighter for the Taliban Arab forces.

15. The detainee contracted malaria and some other unidentified illness and was sent to the hospital in Kabul, Afghanistan.

16. After the detainee was recuperating for nearly two months, the aerial bombardment started. The explosions were concentrated in areas inhabited by the Arabs so the detainee decided that if he was going to die, he should return to the front and die in the service of Allah in battle.

17. The detainee and three companions left the Bagram line area for Jalalabad, Afghanistan.

18. After departing the front lines, the detainee went to Kabul, Afghanistan and then to Jalalabad, Afghanistan where he stayed for approximately three days before the fall of Kabul.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ALAHDAL, ABU BAKR IBN ALI MUHAMMAD

He waited to be recalled to the front lines of the Taliban, and then withdrew to a village on the outskirts of Jalalabad.

19. From Jalalabad, Afghanistan the detainee went to the Najim Jihad area, and from there into the mountains toward Pakistan.

20. The detainee then made his way to a village in Pakistan, the occupants of which turned him in to the Pakistani authorities.

b. Training

After re-familiarizing himself with operating a Kalashnikov, the detainee was assigned to a guard position on the front.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee presented himself to the Taliban commander in Bagram, Afghanistan.

2. The detainee's Taliban leader gave him a document. Listed on this document were addresses and meeting locations.

3. An individual wrote a will and gave it to the detainee at the Kart Barwan guest house in Kabul, Afghanistan.

d. Intent

The detainee readily agreed that he was a willing terrorist against the United States for its hostile position against the Palestinian Muslims and other Arab populations.

e. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee had a handheld radio when he was captured and claims that it was used to communicate only with another Taliban fighter.

2. The detainee is familiar with communication equipment and receivers commonly found in Afghanistan or used by the Taliban. He acknowledged that the Motorola GP300 VHF radio and the IC-H16 VHF radio are similar to the radios used by Taliban commanders in Afghanistan. The detainee used a radio on a few occasions. He described basic procedures for using a push-to-talk radio.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ALAHDAL, ABU BAKR IBN ALI MUHAMMAD

a. The detainee claims to have no special interest or expertise in electronics. He explained that he had a band receiver while in Afghanistan so that he could listen to a radio, and he had a calculator so that he could determine exchange rates for the currencies of the various countries he was visiting.

b. The detainee denies having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001, and also denies knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

4 June 2006

TO: SLITI, HISHAM BIN ALI BIN AMOR

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SLITI, HISHAM BIN ALI BIN AMOR

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee stated he left Tunisia in 1995 for Italy. The detainee claimed he became a drug addict after he lost employment and was consequently arrested and sentenced to three years in prison. The detainee claimed he spent 11 months in jail and was then transferred to a drug rehabilitation center. The detainee claims he escaped after two months and went back to drugs.

2. The detainee claims to have met his cousin in Genoa, Italy, and both traveled to Belgium. Then due to detainee's continued use of drugs, troubles started between the detainee and his cousin. The detainee decided to return to Italy with another individual. Upon arriving at the Belgian/French border the detainee was stopped because he had false license plates and was arrested because he had no papers. The detainee claims he assumed the identity of one of his companions living in Italy and was jailed for 62 days in Brussels, Belgium. After being released the detainee claims he returned to drugs.

3. The detainee started going to the Kuba Mosque regularly after being released from the prison. The detainee stated if he had frequented a different mosque, he would not have been drawn to the radical camp and would not have ended up in Afghanistan. The detainee met an individual at the Kuba Mosque in Belgium who provided him with a false passport.

4. The detainee heard from his cousin, who notified the detainee that he was leaving for Afghanistan with his family and that the detainee should do the same.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SLITI, HISHAM BIN ALI BIN AMOR

5. The detainee traveled to London and stayed there two weeks, where a man arranged a visa and airline tickets to Pakistan for him. The detainee arrived in Islamabad, Pakistan on 20 May 2000 and then traveled to Afghanistan. Upon arriving in Jalalabad, Afghanistan he was housed in the Tunisian guest house.

6. The detainee was arrested in Islamabad, Pakistan in October 2000 in possession of a fraudulent passport. He claimed that while the police were checking his passport he escaped from the police station and made his way back to the Tunisian house in Jalalabad, Afghanistan.

7. The detainee was arrested by Pakistani authorities in December 2001 while trying to flee Afghanistan and was turned over to United States authorities on 30 December 2001. He was using a false name.

8. The detainee has arrest warrants in Italy for ties to Islamic extremists in Bologna, Italy.

b. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee's cousin was arrested in Belgium in connection with a case of an assassination of a former Afghan Northern Alliance commander.

2. Upon capture, the detainee had in his possession an address book, which had telephone numbers of several radical Islamists, some of whom had been arrested in Belgium and Europe. Some of these phone numbers were coded, but Belgium authorities broke the code.

3. The detainee stated that after the Tunisian guest house split in January 2001, he received permission from an individual to sleep at the Abdullah Azzam Mosque in Jalalabad, Afghanistan. Persons at the mosque told the detainee to leave and go to the Algerian guest house in Kabul, Afghanistan or go to the front.

4. The above individual was arrested in Brussels, Belgium and confessed in court that he was planning a suicide attack on the American Embassy in Paris, France.

5. The individual also stated during an interview with a Belgium television station that he planned an attempt against Kleine Brogel Air Base in Belgium instead of the American Embassy in Paris, France.

6. The wife of the individual confirmed that as of June 2001, while living in Jalalabad, Afghanistan, her husband had been given the order to carry out a suicide operation in Europe. She further stated that an Algerian, pro-Taliban, al Qaida member provided her husband with training on the handling of explosives.

7. The Algerian had been the deputy at the house of the Algerians in Jalalabad, Afghanistan and was considered the privileged contact of a senior al Qaida operative. He was a

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chemical and electronics specialist who, between late 2000 and September 2001, had been responsible for providing training on the use of electronic components for fabricating explosive devices at the house of the Algerians. In mid-November 2001, he was in Tora Bora fighting against the Northern Alliance.

c. Intent

1. The detainee stated that there were only two reasons to come to Afghanistan, to fight with the Taliban or to learn religion.

2. The detainee has repeatedly assaulted and harassed Guantanamo Bay military police and interrogators. Detainee has incited multiple disturbances within his Guantanamo Bay cellblock.

3. The detainee has fought with guards, threatened to kill a block sergeant, refused instructions and has been caught several times with contraband.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution of 11 September 2001, and also denied knowledge or any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.

b. The detainee was queried regarding any knowledge or planning of internal uprisings at the Guantanamo Detention Facility, with negative results.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

19 March 2006

TO: SAID, HASSAN MUJAMMA RABAI

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SAID, HASSAN MUJAMMA RABAI

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
 1. The detainee departed Algeria on 19 August 2000 and stopped in Damascus, Syria.
 2. After ten months, the detainee left Damascus for Zahedan, Iran via Tehran, Qam, and Mashad, Iran.
 3. The detainee indicates he was helped into Pakistan by a group of smugglers he met through the Jamaat al Tablighi office in Zahedan. The detainee was then taken to Quetta, Pakistan.
 4. The detainee departed Quetta for Jalalabad, Afghanistan, stopping in Kandahar and Kabul, Afghanistan along the way.
 5. The detainee left Jalalabad in November 2001 when the city fell and stayed in the mountains for approximately one month. An Afghan guide led the detainee and about twenty other Arabs to Pakistan where the detainee was captured by Pakistani authorities.
 6. The detainee was identified as a member of a group that moved to Tora Bora on Usama bin Laden's orders. The detainee was in charge of weapons inventory at Tora Bora. The detainee's duties also included handing out ammunition.
 7. The detainee was identified as working in one of the supply caves in Tora Bora, loading and unloading supplies for other Mujahedin.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SAID, HASSAN MUJAMMA RABAI

8. In September 2004 the detainee admitted to using a false name since his arrival to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.

b. Training

The detainee was identified as training at al Farouq.

c. Connections/Associations

1. Jamaat al Tablighi is a Pakistan-based Islamic missionary organization believed to be used as a cover to mask travel and activities of terrorists including members of al Qaida.

2. The detainee's name was on a list of al Qaida members found on a hard drive recovered during the arrest of a senior al Qaida operative.

3. The detainee's name was found on various computers listing suspected al Qaida Mujahedin and the contents of their trust accounts during raids against al Qaida-associated safe houses in Rawalpindi and Karachi.

d. Intent

1. The detainee was identified as having been chosen to be a bodyguard for Usama bin Laden.

2. The detainee told interviewers and linguists that since they were unbelievers, they were his enemy.

3. The detainee claims he did not participate in jihad activities. However, the detainee feels political motivation and a properly declared fatwa are legitimate reasons for participating in jihad.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001 and the detainee denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests. The detainee stated that the attacks were not condoned by Islam and that they were a crime.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

9 July 2006

TO: AL QURAYSHI, MAJID AYDHA MUHAMMAD

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF
AL QURAYSHI, MAJID AYDHA MUHAMMAD

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee stated that approximately one week after 11 September 2001 he left Saudi Arabia to fight in Afghanistan.

2. The detainee stated that he traveled by airplane from Saudi Arabia to Bahrain and then went to Qatar. From there the detainee went to Tehran, Iran then crossed the border into Kandahar, Afghanistan and then to Kabul, Afghanistan. The detainee stated that he was assigned to the second line just north of Kabul.

3. The detainee stated that he was assigned as a guard at a watch center.

4. The detainee stated that after approximately two and one half months on the second line, fighting in Kabul intensified, and he was ordered to retreat. The detainee stated that he was apprehended in December 2001 crossing the Pakistani border.

5. The detainee is on a list of detainees with a Casio model F-91W watch. This model watch has been used in bombings that have been linked to al Qaida and radical Islamic terrorist improvised explosive devices.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL QURAYSHI, MAJID AYDHA MUHAMMAD

b. Training

1. The detainee stated that during the Gulf War he volunteered for the military and received training with pistols, rifles and grenades, but his reserve unit was never activated.

2. The detainee stated that he received training on the Kalashnikov rifle at a watch center in Afghanistan.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee stated that one week prior to the attacks on 11 September 2001 he telephoned a prominent Saudi sheikh to discuss going to jihad in Afghanistan.

2. The detainee's name is on a list of Arab names recovered from safe house raids associated with suspected al Qaida in Pakistan.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee stated that he has never owned a Casio watch.

b. The detainee stated that he has never been in an al Qaida guest house and has no ties to al Qaida at all.

c. The detainee denied an affiliation with Usama bin Laden or al Qaida, and states that he did not have any prior knowledge of the attacks on 11 September 2001.

d. The detainee stated that if he was returned home he would go to his family and get his previous job back.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

22 March 2006

TO: BAADA, TAREQ ALI ABDULLAH AHMED

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF BAADA, TAREQ ALI ABDULLAH
AHMED

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. In a market the detainee noticed videos that were being sold that portrayed the jihad struggle in Chechnya and Bosnia.

2. The detainee watched the videos alone. It was after the detainee watched the videos that he got the idea to go to Afghanistan.

3. After the detainee watched the videos about jihad he asked his parents for their permission to go to Afghanistan but they refused.

4. In the middle of 2001 the detainee decided to go to Afghanistan. The detainee told his parents that he was going to Jordan with the al Dawa group and the detainee's parents gave their consent.

5. The detainee left Jeddah, Saudi Arabia and went to Amman, Jordan.

6. The detainee stayed in Amman and then went to a nearby city named Az Zarqa. In Az Zarqa the detainee met up with the al Dawa group.

7. The detainee then traveled from Amman, Jordan to Karachi, Pakistan.

8. Once the detainee arrived in Karachi, the detainee went to a nearby hotel and stayed for a while.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF BAADA, TAREQ ALI ABDULLAH AHMED

9. The detainee was eventually able to travel from Karachi to Quetta, Pakistan. In Quetta, the detainee met an individual who the detainee traveled with to Spin Buldak, Afghanistan.

10. The detainee and the individual traveled from Spin Buldak to Kandahar, Afghanistan.

11. Once the detainee and the individual arrived in Kandahar they went to a guest house.

12. After about one to two weeks at the guest house the detainee and others traveled to the al Farouq training camp.

b. Training

1. The detainee received training on the Kalashnikov rifle and familiarization training on a pistol while at al Farouq training camp.

2. A source has stated that the detainee has knowledge in the use of anti-aircraft weaponry and 120-millimeter Howitzers.

c. Connections/Associations

1. A source has stated that the detainee was considered an important man and somebody who was loyal to a senior al Qaida member.

2. The detainee has been identified as someone who was close to a high level al Qaida facilitator. The source further states that the detainee received money and supplies from the facilitator in order to travel to Afghanistan.

d. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee has stated that after one month of training everyone at the al Farouq camp was told that the training was being stopped and then they were all sent back to a guest house.

2. The detainee has stated that after he left the al Farouq guest house he traveled to Kabul, Afghanistan.

3. The detainee traveled from Kabul and eventually went to Jalalabad, Afghanistan.

4. After the detainee and others arrived in Jalalabad, they then went to the Tora Bora mountains.

5. When the detainee and others crossed the Afghan/Pakistan border, the Pakistani Army was waiting there to arrest them. The detainee was taken to a prison.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF BAADA, TAREQ ALI ABDULLAH AHMED

6. After several weeks in a Pakistani prison, the detainee was taken to the Kandahar prison run by the Americans before being brought to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.

7. The detainee has been identified as someone who was at Tora Bora and at Bagram.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee stated that the people found guilty of the 11 September 2001 attacks in the United States should be killed.

b. The detainee has denied being a member of al Qaida.

c. The detainee has stated that if he were released he would return to his home, attempt to find a wife, get a job, live with his parents and continue to study Islam.

d. The detainee has denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001.

e. The detainee has denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.

f. The detainee denied having any knowledge or planning of internal uprisings at the Guantanamo Bay, Cuba detention facility.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

1 May 2006

TO: AL-JU'AYD, ABD AL-RAHMAN 'JUWAYIDH

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL-JU'AYD, ABD AL-RAHMAN
'JUWAYIDH

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. During the spring of 2001, the detainee heard a half hour lecture from a sheikh regarding the hardships that Muslims were enduring in Afghanistan and how other Muslims could help them out.

2. Prior to this lecture, the detainee says he had donated money to a charitable organization known as al Haramain in Taif, Saudi Arabia.

3. Foreign government services officials believe that al Haramain might be a cover organization for Usama bin Laden's al Qaida network. Saudi Mujahedin are known to work in al Haramain regional offices around the world.

4. Approximately two or three weeks after the lecture from the sheikh, the detainee decided that he would go to Afghanistan.

5. The detainee applied and paid for a Saudi passport in Taif. The detainee also went to the Pakistani Embassy in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia and received a one-year visa for Pakistan. He left Saudi Arabia with 3,000 Saudi Riyals of his own money.

6. The detainee arrived in Kandahar in June or July 2001 by the following route: Taif to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia; to Bahrain; to Karachi and Quetta, Pakistan; to Spin Buldak, Afghanistan; then finally on to Kandahar, Afghanistan.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL-JU'AYD, ABD AL-RAHMAN 'JUWAYIDH

7. On 11 September 2001 the detainee was in Kabul, Afghanistan when he saw the attacks on the United States on television. The detainee said he did not leave Afghanistan when he learned that the United States was bombing the country because he wanted to stay and continue to distribute money to the needy.

8. The detainee stated he left his passport and record of monetary distribution at a house in Kabul, Afghanistan. Kabul had already fallen and the detainee could not get back to Kabul to get his passport or record of monetary distribution.

9. Upon crossing the Pakistani border the detainee surrendered to the Pakistani police hoping that he would be taken to the Saudi Embassy. The Pakistani police sent the detainee to two Pakistani prisons before he was turned over to the American military and sent to Kandahar, Afghanistan.

b. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee was recognized as one of the individuals seen at the Abu Hamza guest house in Kabul, Afghanistan.

2. The detainee's uncle is connected to individuals who are involved in falsifying passports and supporting terrorist organizations such as al Wafa and the Mujahedin.

3. According to a foreign government service the non-governmental organization "Wafa", was believed to have had connections to Usama bin Laden and Afghan Mujahedin.

4. The detainee admits that he likely ran across members of al Qaida during his departure from Afghanistan.

5. In January 2002 a jihadist website published the detainee's name on a list of Mujahedin captured as a result of the United States-led military action in Afghanistan.

6. The detainee's name was found on a computer hard drive recovered by Allied personnel in a suspected al Qaida safe house in Islamabad, Pakistan. The data appears to have been recorded sometime between 31 March 2001 and 22 January 2002.

7. The detainee's name was found on a hard drive belonging to a known al Qaida member.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee stated he has never been involved in any radical Islamic movements in Saudi Arabia.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL-JU'AYD, ABD AL-RAHMAN 'JUWAYIDH

b. The detainee stated he was not in Afghanistan to fight and never trained at any training camp with any weapons in Afghanistan.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

31 January 2006

To: AL JABRI, BANDAR AHMAD MUBARAK

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL JABRI, BANDAR AHMAD
MUBARAK

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee viewed documentary videos describing the war in Chechnya and was influenced to join jihad because of the many role models portrayed in these documentaries. The detainee was also influenced by Saudi television showing those who served jihad during the Afghan war of the 1980's. The detainee was told that before joining the jihad in Chechnya, one must obtain military training and be recommended to attend the training camps in Afghanistan.

2. The detainee did not consider the fighting in Afghanistan to be jihad. The detainee stated that because jihad is considered to be following one's religion and the Afghani fighters were more a rogue and corrupt army and not following their religion. The detainee considered the war in Chechnya to be jihad.

b. Training

1. The detainee attended the Taliban basic military training camp in Afghanistan.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL JABRI, BANDAR AHMAD MUBARAK

2. The detainee received instruction on 82 mm mortars and throwing hand grenades.
3. The detainee attended advanced training at Al Farouq Camp, which included firing weapons while running and in various positions.
4. The detainee believed that training in heavy weapons such as mortars, artillery and anti-aircraft would make him more desirable in Chechnya by fellow Muslims. Going to Chechnya was the original reason the detainee went to Afghanistan for military training. Muslims could not get into Chechnya without proper military training.
5. The detainee attempted to receive training in heavy weapons such as mortars and artillery but was informed there were no camps available for that type of training. The detainee was advised that in order to become familiar with heavy weapons, he would have to receive on the job training.
6. The detainee departed for the second line, which was located about one hour north of Kabul, Afghanistan. The second line is a defensive position containing artillery, behind the first line infantry.
7. The detainee was assigned to the second line of defense in Kabul for eight months.
8. The detainee attended training for several months in the northern part of Afghanistan. This training was for 40mm anti-aircraft guns. The detainee denied ever shooting at any planes and insisted his only targets were on the ground.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee was identified as an al Qaida member who was regularly present in Kandahar, Afghanistan in 2001 and was reported to be close to a top al Qaida member.
2. The detainee's name was found on a file which was recovered from computer media associated with a top member of al Qaida.

d. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee was identified as a commander of a military group.
2. A fighter from the Taliban front lines claims that the detainee had been to a training camp that offered "special training." This same person claims that the detainee had been to the camp a number of times and that he used to go to the camp for a month or two, return home to Saudi Arabia and then return to the camp.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL JABRI, BANDAR AHMAD MUBARAK

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee considered himself affiliated and allied with the Taliban and would have fought with them if needed, but did not consider himself a Taliban soldier. The detainee claims that he never saw any American soldiers and only saw American aircraft.

b. The detainee stated that if he were released he would not repeat the same mistakes. The detainee is hopeful that he will eventually be released back to Saudi Arabia. The detainee said that he would not allow himself to be brainwashed again. He elaborated on his plans to rebuild his life after his release and stated that he was looking forward to starting a family.

c. The detainee stated that despite his detainment, he holds no animosity toward Americans. The detainee acknowledged that he was initially angry about being detained but has since learned to put things into perspective.

d. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001 and denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests. The detainee was queried regarding any knowledge or planning of internal uprisings at the Guantanamo detention facility, with negative results.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

9 May 2006

TO: ALJ-AMRI, TURKI MISH'AWI ZA'ID

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ALJ-AMRI, TURKI MISH'AWI ZA'ID

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee's education included two years at the Imam Muhammad University in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.

2. A professor at the Imam Muhammad University in Riyadh had regular contact with Usama bin Laden and al Qaida.

3. The detainee read a fatwa issued by Sheikh Hamoud al Uqqla. The detainee sold his car for money to be able to travel to Afghanistan and received an additional 3,000 Saudi Riyals from a facilitator.

4. Sheikh Hamoud al Uqqla is a Saudi mufti, a specialist in Islamic law authorized to issue a fatwa. Al Uqqla issued a fatwa calling for jihad in Afghanistan. He also condoned the 11 September 2001 attacks against the United States and helped raise money for Usama bin Laden until al Uqqla's death in Saudi Arabia in 2001.

5. Usama bin Laden had a strong relationship with Sheikh Hamoud al Uqqla.

6. The detainee decided to go to Afghanistan to preach the Koran and to participate in the jihad.

7. The detainee stated that he went to Mecca for the lesser pilgrimage two weeks prior to leaving for Afghanistan. In Mecca, he met an individual who told him about teaching the Koran

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ALJ-AMRI, TURKI MISH'AWI ZA'ID

to the Afghan people. The individual also told the detainee about the guest house in Kandahar, Afghanistan and the al Farouq training camp, where the detainee wanted to receive training.

8. The detainee said he traveled to Afghanistan alone. He stated that he bought his plane ticket for approximately 1,000 Saudi Riyals about two days prior to his departure. The detainee stated that he flew Emirati Airlines from Dubai, United Arab Emirates to Karachi, Pakistan.

9. The detainee traveled from Dubai to Karachi in May 2001.

10. The detainee left Quetta, Pakistan and claims he traveled by vehicle to numerous villages in Pakistan and Afghanistan preaching the Koran along the way for approximately three months. The detainee was unable to remember any mosques or villagers that he visited or met during this time; he was able to name only two villages he recalled visiting.

11. The detainee stated he stayed in Tora Bora from September until late December 2001. The detainee fled to the Pakistan border with other Arabs and surrendered himself to Pakistani authorities.

b. Training

1. The detainee stated that while at the al Farouq camp he trained on the Makarov and the Kalashnikov and also ran, marched, and read the Koran. He stated that after one month of training he got sick (asthma related), forcing him to leave the training early.

2. The al Farouq training camp was located near Kandahar, Afghanistan. Training consisted of physical fitness and weapons training, primarily on the Kalashnikov, AKM, and PK machine gun. All trainees received indoctrination on the importance of joining with Afghanistan to fight the jihad. On several occasions Usama bin Laden visited the camp and spoke to the trainees.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The al-Rajhi Foundation in Saudi Arabia employed the detainee. The detainee passed out Korans and worked in an orphanage.

2. The SAAR network (named for Sulaiman Abdul Aziz Rajhi, the patriarch of the Saudi al-Rajhi family that funded it) gives to charities, invests in companies, and sponsors research to foster the growth of Islam. The SAAR network includes more than 100 Muslim think tanks, charities, and companies. The al-Rajhi family utilized SAAR to fund Islamic extremist organizations and has ties to al Qaida. The SAAR Foundation officially dissolved in December 2000.

3. The detainee stated he came to Afghanistan with Abu Bakr al Jazairi for jihad training.

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4. Abu Bakr al Jazairi is a Jordanian citizen who is an alleged fundraiser for widows and orphans of al Qaida members; al Jazairi served as Usama bin Laden's representative in Jalalabad, Afghanistan.

5. When the detainee arrived in Karachi he met three Arabs from Saudi Arabia also traveling to Kandahar. The three men told the detainee that they were traveling for the Jamat-al-Tabligh and wanted to preach the Koran. The detainee and the three Arabs traveled together to Quetta, stayed together at the Kandahar guest house, trained together at the al Farouq camp, and fled together to Tora Bora from Jalalabad.

6. The Jamat-al-Tabligh is an Islamic missionary organization founded to spread Islam and recruit followers. Islamic extremists had been known to exploit the organization to enhance their ability to fight the perceived enemies of Islam.

7. The detainee was captured with an address book containing names and phone numbers in Arabic.

8. Coalition forces seized a satellite telephone in Khowst Province, Afghanistan on 7 October 2002. One of the phone numbers in the satellite phone's electronic address book matches a number found in the detainee's address book. The satellite phone's entry was listed under the name Hamid Karzai.

9. Coalition forces located a small booklet that contained telephone numbers inside an ammunition crate in Khowst Province, Afghanistan. The crate also contained grenades, mines, fuses, and chemicals used to make explosives. One of the phone numbers in the booklet matches a number found in the detainee's address book. The captured booklet's entry was listed under the name Khan Agha.

10. Documents belonging to an Afghanistan Military Force commander were confiscated in Khowst, Afghanistan on 1 January 2003. Five phone numbers are contained on one scrap of paper in the documents. The commander stated these numbers were for Pacha Khan Zadran and Wazir Khan. One of the phone numbers on this scrap of paper matches a number found in the detainee's address book. The confiscated scrap paper's entry was listed under the name Gardez.

11. Pacha Khan Zadran maintained illegal checkpoints, raided houses to raise money and supplies, recruited soldiers, and made statements on the radio saying that he did not accept the Karzai government.

12. Wazir Khan Zadran is the younger brother of Pacha Khan Zadran.

13. An address book was found in the possession of a suspected al Qaida operative who was detained on 1 July 2002 near Shkin, Afghanistan by United States Forces. One of the phone

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numbers in this captured address book matches a number found in the detainee's address book. The captured address book lists this entry as a mobile number for Amanullah in Zakhel District, Paktika Province, Afghanistan.

14. In January 2003 Pacha Khan Zadran was recruiting personnel to attack Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan (TISA) forces and officials around Khowst, Afghanistan. His commanders included Wazir Khan and Amanullah, who were also involved in recruitment for Pacha Khan Zadran.

15. A document listing 324 Arabic names, aliases, and nationalities was recovered from safe house raids associated with suspected al Qaida in Karachi, Pakistan. This list contains the detainee's name and alias and lists his personal items (passport and automatic teller machine card).

16. The Pakistani government published a list of 84 captured Mujahedin fighters that crossed the border in Nangarhar Province, Afghanistan on 14 December 2001. This list contains the detainee's name, alias, and family contact number.

17. A list of Arabs incarcerated in Pakistan was found on computer media seized by allied personnel at a suspected al Qaida safe house in Islamabad, Pakistan. This list contains the detainee's name, alias, and home country of Saudi Arabia.

18. On 11 September 2002 a foreign government service conducted a raid on an alleged al Qaida residence in Karachi, Pakistan. Found among the material were several floppy disks, one of which contained a file with a list of names, nationalities, safety deposit box numbers, contents, and comments. The list contains the detainee's name, alias, safety deposit box number, and list of contents (passport and bankcard).

19. An Arabic computer file was seized during joint raids conducted with a foreign government service against al Qaida-associated safe houses in Rawalpindi, Pakistan on 1 March 2003. The captured file lists points of contact and telephone numbers for al Qaida Mujahedin in Pakistan. This list contains the detainee's name, alias, and family contact information.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee denies any knowledge of any imminent or future terrorist attacks against the United States or its interests.

b. The detainee denies ownership of the address book allegedly found in his possession when he was captured; the detainee insisted the Foreign Government Service authorities planted it on him.

c. The detainee did not swear an allegiance to Usama bin Laden or al Qaida.

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d. The detainee claimed that he knew nothing of al Qaida plans and intentions, nor did he know who was in charge of his sector in Tora Bora.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

7 August 2006

TO: BALKHAIR, RASHED AWAD KHALAF

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF BALKHAIR, RASHED AWAD
KHALAF

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee stated that in early 2001 he traveled from Saudi Arabia to Pakistan and Afghanistan.

2. The detainee stated that in approximately September 2000, he went to Pakistan with 1,000 Saudi Riyals and his ATM card with approximately 12,000 Saudi Riyals in the bank.

3. The detainee stated that he spent nine months around Karachi, Pakistan and four to six months around Peshawar, Pakistan. The detainee stated that on approximately 15 September 2001 he traveled to Jalalabad, Afghanistan where he stayed for three months, including at a Taliban house for a short period. The detainee stated that at the beginning of Ramadan, he fled Jalalabad due to anti-Arab sentiment and on the last day of Ramadan he arrived in Pakistan and went to the police.

4. The detainee stated that he went to Afghanistan and turned himself in to Pakistani officials near Peshawar, Pakistan when Northern Alliance forces began to overrun the Taliban forces.

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e. The detainee stated that upon his release, he plans to apply for admission to King Khaled University in Saudi Arabia to study religion.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

25 January 2006

To: MAKRAM, MURTADHA AL SAID

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MAKRAM, MURTADHA AL SAID

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

(a) Commitment

1. The detainee left his family when he felt the call to participate in the jihad against the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan.

2. The detainee was opposed to the oppression of women and Muslims in Afghanistan, therefore, he saw fit to participate in combat training with the Taliban against the Northern Alliance.

3. The detainee's neighbor consulted with a local sheikh concerning a fatwa about Afghanistan. The neighbor convinced the detainee to travel to Afghanistan.

4. The detainee made a telephonic fatwa with an acquaintance prior to leaving his home in 2000.

5. The detainee paid for his airplane tickets from Saudi Arabia to Pakistan, via Yemen. He departed Saudi Arabia with approximately eight thousand (8,000) Saudi reales (\$3,000 United States dollars).

6. The detainee traveled from Riyadh, Saudi Arabia to Sa'na, Yemen. The detainee then traveled from Sa'na, Yemen to Karachi, Pakistan. From Karachi, the detainee traveled to Quetta, Pakistan, and he then crossed the border into Afghanistan by illegally bypassing the official checkpoints. The detainee then traveled to Kandahar, Afghanistan.

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7. The detainee stayed in a Taliban guesthouse while in Kandahar, Afghanistan. The detainee also stayed in another, unknown guesthouse while in Kandahar, for three weeks and another unknown guesthouse in Kabul, Afghanistan.

8. The detainee left Kabul, Afghanistan, and went to Jabal Saber, Afghanistan, where he spent seven months on a secondary line, which was approximately 30 kilometers from the front line.

9. The detainee was a sentry while at Jabal Saber, Afghanistan.

10. After seven months, the detainee went to Bagram, Afghanistan, where he spent two months on the secondary line of Bagram Hill. The detainee then went to the front line after the Northern Alliance started attacking the front line.

11. On about 26 November 2001, the detainee traveled to the Tora Bora mountains in Afghanistan.

12. The detainee was identified as having fought at Tora Bora.

b. Training

While at Jabal Saber, Afghanistan, the detainee received one day of training on the AK-47, firing one, thirty round magazine of ammunition.

c. Connections/Associations

1. While at the front in Bagram, Afghanistan, the detainee was assigned to the Salman position, which was headed by the Commander of a Taliban unit.

2. When the detainee arrived at Tora Bora, his group came under the authority of an al Qaida commander.

3. A foreign government source reported that two hundred fifteen individuals were applicants for an unspecified terrorist training camp. The detainee's name shows up on this list as number 184.

4. In 2002, raids were conducted on suspected al Qaida safe houses in Karachi, Pakistan. During the raids, a document listing three hundred twenty-four Arabic names, aliases and nationalities was recovered. The detainee's name, alias and nationality were listed on the seized document.

5. During joint raids in 2003 in Pakistan, a chart in Arabic listing the names of captured Mujahadeen was seized from a computer that was associated with a known senior al Qaida operative. The detainee's name, country and telephone number were found on this chart.

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6. A foreign government service listed the detainee as being a member of al Qaida.

7. During joint raids in March 2003 of suspected al Qaida safe houses in Rawalpindi, Pakistan, a seized computer contained a file with the detainee's name, home country and telephone number.

d. Intent

1. The detainee went to Afghanistan to fight the jihad as part of his religious duty. The detainee related it did not matter whether the Taliban won or lost the war, but that he fought for the glory of God. The detainee stated he wanted to be a martyr for the cause.

2. The detainee reported that he went to the jihad to die and that he was captured in Pakistan while traveling to Kashmir in order to join the jihad there, and to die.

e. Other Relevant Data

The detainee advised his fate was in the hands of Allah, and not the Americans. The detainee stated he hates Americans and all non-believers.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee denied ever meeting or knowing the whereabouts of Usama bin Laden while he was in Afghanistan.

b. The detainee denied having any prior knowledge of the 11 September 2001 attacks on the United States or the attack on the USS Cole. The detainee indicated the 11 September attacks were completely bad because many of those killed were non-combatants and the suicides were against the teaching of the Koran.

c. The detainee reported he abandoned his weapon during his retreat to Pakistan because he didn't want to fight anyone anymore.

d. The detainee denied knowing that the Northern Alliance was being supported by the United States at the time of his surrender. The detainee advised he does not and has never been opposed to the Americans or the American military.

e. The detainee reported, if released, he would never again think of participating in any military conflict.

f. The detainee related he never heard of any training camps during his one year and four months in Afghanistan.

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g. The detainee denied any connection to the United States. He claimed to have no information on past or future terrorist operations. He has denied knowing the fate of Usama Bin Laden or any other senior al Qaida members.

h. The detainee advised, from his location, secondary to the front line, he never engaged in any ground combat.

i. The detainee advised that even though he made it to the front line, the Taliban would not let him participate in the actual combat.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

18 February 2006

TO: AL FAYFI, JABIR JUBRAN

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL FAYFI, JABIR JUBRAN

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee was influenced to join jihad by the many verses in the Koran that encourage jihad. The detainee felt that he was not faithful to Islam due to his drug use, smoking and lack of prayer. The detainee saw jihad as an opportunity to make things right between himself and Allah. Additionally, the detainee saw that Muslim women were being beaten in Kashmir and felt he should do something about it.

2. The detainee traveled by taxi and bus from Kashmir, Pakistan to Kabul, Afghanistan and then onto Baghram. In Baghram, the detainee joined approximately 20-25 other men for two or three months waiting for someone to come back from the front lines with weapons they could use. The detainee said a person arrived from the front lines with a weapon, he obtained it and went to the secondary lines for about four months, he was not involved in any action.

3. The detainee's position was on the left, behind the forward line. During the United States bombardment, the detainee's position was struck eleven times over three days. Due to these well prepared trenches, no casualties were sustained. When the Northern Alliance finally made a breakthrough on the left side of the line, the Taliban Commanders feared being encircled and called for a general withdrawal. While the majority of Afghan Taliban and approximately five hundred Arab volunteer jihad extremists withdrew, the detainee and a small number of others were directed to remain on the Baghram Front to provide covering fire against the advancing infantry. They held their position until they were forced to run when confronted by three advancing Northern Alliance tanks. They withdrew to the mountains for a day and heard of the fall of Kabul.

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b. Training

While in Kashmir the detainee was trained on the Kalashnikov rifle.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee's name was found on an electronic document that was recovered during a raid on a suspected al Qaida safe house.

2. The detainee's name was found on a handwritten letter that was recovered along with other materials linked to al Qaida by Allied personnel. This letter contained a list of Arabs incarcerated in Pakistan and encourages its correspondent to incite the people against the Pakistan Government.

3. A foreign government service reported that the detainee was a member of al Qaida.

4. The detainee's name was found on a list of al Qaida Mujahidin recovered during a raid on known al Qaida safe houses.

d. Other Relevant Data

1. After his training, the detainee joined a unit of approximately nine others and participated in three raids. One raid during the day was supposed to be an ambush but the Indians did not come to their exact location. The detainee fought in Kashmir for about four months.

2. The detainee claims that he never trained at camps. The detainee said that he learned how to use weapons such as the Kalashnikov and PK machine gun through other members of the jihad. The detainee stated he went into Afghanistan with the intentions of helping his Muslim brothers who were at war against the Northern Alliance. If not captured, the detainee said he would have stayed on the front lines for a while longer and return to Saudi Arabia. The detainee felt it was his obligation as a Muslim to assist in the defense of Afghanistan.

3. The detainee said that he and other Muslims attacked the security forces that were operating in the Kashmir area.

4. While in the Kashmir area, the detainee was influenced to go fight in Afghanistan by a newspaper article that issued a fatwa calling for Muslims to go to jihad in Afghanistan. The detainee believed that Allah presented him with another opportunity.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL FAYFI, JABIR JUBRAN

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee stated that he did not realize that by fighting with the Taliban that he was indirectly assisting with the protection of al Qaida. The detainee was in Afghanistan to fight against Masood and the Northern Alliance, and had not heard about al Qaida until an interrogator asked him about it.

b. The detainee related that he was a taxi driver before he departed for Afghanistan and would like to resume that job because he made good money.

c. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001 and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.

d. The detainee stated that he now thinks what he did was a mistake. The detainee was not aware that the United States was involved with the Northern Alliance and also related that he will no longer follow a fatwa unless it directly involves Saudi Arabia. The detainee reiterated that he wants to return home and take care of his parents. The detainee also wants to pursue employment as a taxi driver for support of his family.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

11 September 2006

TO: ALJJ SAQQAF, RAFDAT MUHAMMAD FAQI

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ALJJ SAQQAF, RAFDAT MUHAMMAD
FAQI

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. An individual helped the detainee obtain a visa to Pakistan in 1992. The detainee then traveled to Islamabad, Pakistan and then to Peshawar, Pakistan and stayed at the Libyan Guest House.

2. Fearing talks between the Libyan and Pakistan governments to deport all Libyan residents from Pakistan to Libya in 1993, the detainee went to refugee camps in Talokan, Afghanistan and Konduz, Afghanistan.

b. Training

1. The detainee was not in the active duty military but had military training one hour per day for an unspecified amount of time.

2. The detainee attended the Jihad Wahl Camp near Khowst, Afghanistan in 1996.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee was identified as a member of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group by a senior al Qaida member.

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2. A Libyan Islamic Fighting Group member identified the detainee as part of a group who had returned to Pakistan from fighting the Russians in Tajikistan.

3. The same Libyan Islamic Fighting Group member identified the detainee as a member of the Libyan Group.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee denied any knowledge of the 11 September 2001 attacks prior to their occurrence.

b. A senior al Qaida operative stated that the detainee did not go to any training camps in Afghanistan.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

13 September 2006

TO: AL MUSHAD, SHARIF FATHIM

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL MUSHAD, SHARIF FATHIM

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee stated he used his own Egyptian passport and legally obtained a three month Slovakian visa from the Slovakian Consulate in Cairo, Egypt. The detainee applied for an Italian visa at the Italian Consulate in Cairo, but was denied because he was too young.

2. The detainee stated that with approximately 4,000 United States Dollars of his own money in his pocket, he flew from Egypt to Braslava, Slovakia. The detainee stayed in a hotel in Braslava, Slovakia for approximately one month.

3. The detainee stated that in May 1997, he took a train from Braslava, Slovakia to Italy. Allegedly, the detainee boarded the train legally. When the official asked for his Italian paperwork at the Italian border, he told the official he could not find it. The official told the detainee to wait in his seat and the official would return later to check him again. The official never returned and the detainee crossed the Italian border. The detainee traveled to Como, Italy and moved into his uncle's second house.

4. The detainee stated that while in Rome, Italy, he attended the Islamic Center Mosque four times, always at night.

5. The detainee stated that on his second trip to the mosque and his fourth day in Rome, Italy, the detainee met an individual. This individual approached the detainee to help him with his study of Islam. The individual began to talk to the detainee about daawa in general and daawa in Afghanistan.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL MUSHAD, SHARIF FATHIM

6. The detainee stated the individual that he met in the mosque told the detainee to travel to Kabul, Afghanistan.

7. The detainee stated he planned to stay in Afghanistan for only two months, during his summer vacation. With his green card, the detainee was able to obtain an Iranian visa through a local travel agency in Milan, Italy.

8. The detainee stated that on 6 or 7 July 2001, the detainee's flight left Milan, Italy and arrived in Tehran, Iran. The detainee took 4,000 United States Dollars of his own money with him. The detainee stated he stayed for five days at the hotel in Tehran while waiting for a flight to Iran. After learning that his flight would be delayed, the detainee then took a bus to Mashhad, Iran.

9. The detainee stated that after a 20 hour bus ride, he arrived in Mashhad, Iran and stayed about one hour before continuing on to the Afghanistan/Iran border by taxi. The taxi took the detainee to a crossing point near Tayyebat, Iran. The detainee did not go through Tayyebat. At the border, a Taliban government office registered the detainee's passport.

10. The detainee stated that after crossing the border, the detainee took a taxi to Herat, Afghanistan. The detainee went directly from Herat to Kabul, Afghanistan in one taxi for approximately 3,000 Pakistani Rupees.

11. The detainee stated that when he arrived in Kabul, Afghanistan, he stopped and asked some of the many Arabs in the area if they knew the location of the individual he met in Rome, Italy at the mosque. The Arabs directed him to this individual's house.

12. The detainee stated that approximately two months after the attacks, he and the individual he met at the mosque in Rome, Italy and four other residents began planning to leave Afghanistan due to the impending attacks by the United States. The detainee traveled to a small village outside of Jalalabad, Afghanistan.

13. The detainee stated the group hired an Afghani guide for 4,000 Pakistani Rupees and drove for two hours into the mountains until the path required them to walk. The group walked for one and a half days until they reached a small Pakistani village.

14. The detainee stated after arriving in the small Pakistani village, the Pakistani Army detained them. The following day, the Army took them to the prison in Peshawar, Pakistan where they remained for three weeks. United States Forces transferred them to Kandahar on 1 January 2002.

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b. Training

1. A source stated he believed the detainee was a trainee at al Farouq and was Egyptian.

2. An individual stated he met the detainee at a training camp in Bosnia. This individual stated that trainees traveled through Croatia into Bosnia with the aid of Arab nongovernmental organizations, and were trained in an area near the Bosnian Muslim controlled city of Zenica, Bosnia. There he met the detainee at an unidentified three-story building that housed other Arabs. The detainee asked each newly-arrived trainee about his military experiences.

c. Connections/Associations

A senior al Qaida operative identified the detainee. The source stated this individual was new in Afghanistan and had arrived near 11 September 2001. The operative met him when moving from Tora Bora, Afghanistan to Pakistan and they were arrested inside of Afghanistan. The source stated the detainee did not have any affiliation with a group because he was new in Afghanistan and did not receive any training. This operative met the detainee again in jail.

d. Other Relevant Data

1. A source stated when he was taken to Kandahar, Afghanistan to be interrogated by al Qaida, the detainee made the trip specifically to see him and beat him. The source stated the detainee would torture him through beatings and electric shocks. The individual stated the detainee is probably not into religion, but enjoys training and warfare. The individual also stated that the detainee speaks fluent Italian and often tells other detainees he is an Italian citizen.

2. A source identified a photo of the detainee as an individual who was selling VHS tapes of the USS Cole bombing.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee stated he heard of the attacks in America while listening to the radio. The detainee stated that all who were present with him were sorrowful and none of them were happy.

b. The detainee stated he plans to return to Egypt. The detainee would like to seek employment in the construction business and raise a family.

c. The detainee stated he does not hate Americans. The detainee was asked if he had heard of a jihad against the West, and he replied he had not. The detainee was asked if directed by a cleric would he kill infidels, and he responded he had never heard of anything such as that. The detainee stated he had no desire to fight Americans or even see them again.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL MUSHAD, SHARIF FATHIM

d. The detainee stated he does not agree that women and children should be killed during the war with Israel and Palestine. The detainee believes the war is wrong. In his view, Israel should provide land for the Palestinians and they should then be able to live together.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

20 January 2006

TO: ARBAYSH, IBRAHIM SULAYMAN MUHAMMAD

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ARBAYSH, IBRAHIM SULAYMAN
MUHAMMAD

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
 1. The detainee feels that participation in jihad is a means of providing for the needy and fighting the oppressors of Islam. The detainee also feels that it is the duty of all Muslims to answer the call to jihad.
 2. The detainee discussed a possible jihad to go fight in Chechnya with an individual who attended the same mosque as he did.
 3. The detainee traveled from al Brayma, Saudi Arabia to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia then to Karachi and Quetta, Pakistan. Once in Quetta, the detainee traveled to a guesthouse in Kandahar, Afghanistan.
 4. While at the guesthouse in Quetta a bus arrived and took the detainee to the al Farouq training camp.
 5. After a short time at al Farouq the detainee was told that the camp was being evacuated and he was instructed to leave and go to a guesthouse in Kabul, Afghanistan.
 6. The detainee left Kabul and traveled to another guesthouse in Jalalabad, Afghanistan and returned to Tora Bora because Jalalabad was going to fall.

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7. The detainee was captured by the Pakistanis while fleeing from Afghanistan and was eventually turned over to the United States Forces in Afghanistan.

b. Training

The detainee was trained on the Kalishnikov and instructed in physical training and marksmanship while at al Farouq. The detainee also learned how to field strip and perform maintenance on the Kalishnikov.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee was named in an article concerning Guantanamo Bay detainees by the Islamic extremist web site "almuhayed.com".

2. According to an intelligence source, the detainee is believed to be a member of al Qaida.

3. The detainee's name was found on a computer that listed the names of captured Mujahedin.

d. Other Relevant Data

The detainee blames the United States for his detention.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001. The detainee also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States' interests. The detainee denied any personal knowledge or planning of internal uprisings at the Guantanamo Bay detention facility.

b. The detainee stated that his intentions were to return to Saudi Arabia after his training because he only wanted the training to fulfill his religious obligation to be prepared for jihad. The detainee stated that he did not give bayat or any other oaths while at al Farouq.

c. The detainee denied aiding al Qaida during a 12 May 2004 interview. The detainee also denied going to Afghanistan because of a fatwa. The detainee denied any participation in combat against the United States Forces. The detainee denied ever meeting with any member of al Qaida while in Saudi Arabia.

d. The detainee stated during a 25 October 2004 interview, that he would have applied for a regular job had he not been arrested.

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ARBAYSH, IBRAHIM SULAYMAN
MUHAMMAD**

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

18 April 2006

TO: MUHAMMAD ABD ALLAH MANUR SAFRANI AL FUTRI

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF
MUHAMMAD ABD ALLAH MANUR SAFRANI AL FUTRI

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee based his decision to go to Afghanistan on television and radio news reports as well as a fatwa issued by a Sheikh.

2. The detainee did not tell his parent or friends about his trip. The detainee felt that they would worry that he would get killed conducting jihad in Afghanistan. Despite this fact, the detainee sold his business and took his life savings with him to Mecca, Saudi Arabia.

3. However, the detainee left Yemen and traveled to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia and then on to Mecca. The detainee stayed in Mecca and paid approximately 40,000 Yemen for the ticket.

4. In Mecca, the detainee heard people talking about Afghanistan and jihad. The detainee heard that Afghanistan was the only place where the laws of God are being implemented. The sheikh talked about the necessity of jihad with the Taliban.

5. From Mecca the detainee went from Jeddah to Karachi, Pakistan with a friend. The detainee and his friend paid for their own tickets, costing 3,000 Riyals each. The detainee carried 2,700 United States Dollars and 1,500 Saudi Riyals. The detainee stated that the money came from his business. The detainee did not maintain a bank account.

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6. The detainee did not stay in Karachi very long. The detainee and his friend purchased tickets for 50 United States Dollars and went to Peshawar, Pakistan.

7. An al Qaida and a Libyan Islamic Fighting Group facilitator, was certain the detainee left the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group. The facilitator believed the detainee had a jihadist philosophy and wanted to die a martyr's death.

8. The Libyan Islamic Fighting Group emerged in 1995 among Libyans who had fought against Soviet forces in Afghanistan. The Libyan Islamic Fighting Group declared the government of Libyan leader, Muammar Qadhafi, un-Islamic and pledged to overthrow it. Some members of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group maintain a strictly anti-Qadhafi focus and organize against Libyan Government interests, but others are aligned with Usama bin Laden's al Qaida organization or are active in the international Mujahedin network. The group was designated for asset freeze under E.O.13224 and U.N.S.C.R. 1333 in September 2001.

b. Training

1. Sources say the detainee was in Afghanistan in approximately 1991. The detainee had undergone military training at the al Farouq and Salman al Farisi camps. The detainee participated in several Afghan battles, including Lukar and Qardiz, but mostly in the battle of Jalalabad. In 1991 the detainee joined the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group and might have been supporting the military committee.

2. The detainee was in the possession of a Casio model F-91W watch. This model has been used in bombings that have been linked to al Qaida and radical Islamic terrorist improvised explosive devices.

c. Connections/Associations

1. A senior al Qaida operative identified the detainee as a member of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group.

2. A senior al Qaida operative recognized the detainee. The operative said that the only time he met the detainee was in 2000 at the Kandahar airport camp in Afghanistan. The operative also added that the detainee was not training at the camp, but simply sitting with the brothers. The operative said the detainee walked with a limp from a problem the detainee had when he was a baby, adding that the detainee was a simple person, who could not make explosives, and had bad security.

3. A senior al Qaida operative said the detainee was arrested with him in Tora Bora, Afghanistan in December 2001. The operative said that the detainee was handicapped due to a childhood illness, and as such, he was of no benefit to any of the fighting groups in Afghanistan. As a result of the detainee's condition, he lived off the charity of others. He said the detainee had no relationship with al Qaida or the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group. In late 2001, as the Arabs

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were evacuating Jalalabad, the detainee collected money from several of the Arabs in order to get married. The detainee said that when arrested, many of the brothers had 50-100 United States Dollars in their possession, however the detainee had 1,000 United States Dollars so the U.S. military assumed he was very rich.

4. The detainee lived in Jalalabad, Afghanistan, but traveled frequently to Kabul, Afghanistan and Pakistan as a member of the Jamat-al-Tabligh. The detainee received support from the Jamat-al-Tabligh for two years from 1999 to 2001.

5. The detainee traveled and worked as a paid employee of the Jamat-al-Tabligh with an Islamic missionary group in Libya, Egypt, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Afghanistan.

6. Jamat-al-Tabligh is a Pakistan based Islamic missionary organization used as a cover to mask travel and activities of terrorists, including members of al Qaida.

d. Intent

The detainee stated that he does not want to go back to Libya due to his association to the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group.

e. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee said some brothers, whose identities he refused to reveal, helped him get a visa for Saudi Arabia and Pakistan from their respective consulates in Benghazi.

2. When arrested the detainee had 1,800 United States Dollars, 1,500 Saudi Riyals, and an unknown amount of Afghan and Pakistan money in his possession. The detainee also had medicine, a spoon and a watch he bought in the Jalalabad market.

3. The detainee originally lied about his true name and nationality because he was afraid of being sent back to Libya.

4. The detainee is handicapped with an artificial leg as result of polio.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001 and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.

b. The detainee was queried regarding any knowledge or planning of internal uprisings at the Guantanamo Detention facility with negative results.

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c. The detainee's plans were to go to a Masjid, pray, do the Amra and return to Yemen. The detainee also thought about immigrating to Afghanistan, getting married and settling down.

d. The detainee traveled to Afghanistan to teach the Koran and possible meet a wife.

e. When the detainee was living in Libya he considered himself an Islamist, but stated he did not belong to any religious groups that advocated the overthrow of the government and implementation of an Islamic state.

f. The detainee advises that none of his material spoke of jihad or advocated any type of violence or rebellion.

g. The detainee decided he wanted to get married, so he found an Afghan girl, whom he was supposed to marry after Ramadan.

h. The detainee denied that he had ever fought or received any training on any type of weapons at any training camp.

i. About July 2001, the detainee was introduced to a woman who was 18 to 20 years old, and they were engaged. During his stay in Jalalabad, the source did not work and traveled two or three times a week to the Heart Shari Naw mosque in Kabul via taxi.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

25 September 2006

TO: AL SHUMRANT, MUHAMMAD ABD AL RAHMAN

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL SHUMRANT, MUHAMMAD ABD
AL RAHMAN

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee stated he studied chemicals and the environment after he graduated from high school. The detainee also stated that he decided to teach religion after he read the Koran every day and felt he needed to teach it to young people.

2. The detainee taught Islam for two years at the Al Amir Kaled Ibn Ahmed Asedere Madrassa, located in Najran, Saudi Arabia.

3. The detainee stated he attended two mosques in Saudi Arabia. The first mosque was the Mohamed Ibn Ibrahim Mosque located in Khalidea, Saudi Arabia. The second mosque was the Majid Hadem Al Hareman Al Sherefen Mosque and talked about jihad in Bosnia, Indonesia, and Chechnya.

4. The detainee talked to an individual who told him to go to Afghanistan and by doing so he would be defending his Muslim faith, supporting the Taliban's fight against infidels, and could help stop the killing of young Muslims.

5. The detainee stated he was recruited in Nejram City, Saudi Arabia, by an individual from Medina, Saudi Arabia. The individual traveled throughout Saudi Arabia to recruit men to fight in Bosnia and Chechnya. The detainee also stated he met the individual in April 2000, at the Al Amir Ibn Ahmed Assoudari High School, in Nejram, Saudi Arabia, when the individual was there to recruit.

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6. In May 2001, the detainee stated he spoke again to the recruiter, who told him to stay at the Hotel Dubai. In August 2001, the detainee left Riyadh, Saudi Arabia and traveled alone by bus to Bahrain. The detainee said that he stayed one day in Bahrain then went to Karachi, Pakistan. The detainee said that he arrived in Karachi, Pakistan and went to the Hotel Dubai.

7. The detainee went to Quetta, Pakistan and then to the Center for the Taliban where he told them he wanted to go to Qandahar, Afghanistan.

8. The detainee stated that he begged to fight on the front line and got his wish because he wanted to die in a bunker. The detainee was fighting against Masood and Dostom's people, not Americans. After a month on the front line, the detainee heard of the attack on the United States. The detainee kept fighting until the Pakistanis and Arabs fled from the front line in cars.

b. Training

1. The detainee stated he had one month of military training in the Saudi Arabian Army during the Gulf War. The detainee trained on the G3, 9 mm handguns, and grenades.

2. The detainee stayed in Baghlan, Afghanistan for three months and received weapons training on the Kalashnikov rifle. The detainee noticed fighting going on and the fighters were using Kalashnikov rifles, PKs, Rocket Propelled Grenades and rockets.

3. The detainee trained at Khaldan Camp in Afghanistan, learning basic things like the Kalashnikov rifle, Rocket Propelled Grenades, BK, and Doska. The detainee also trained on mortars and artillery.

4. The detainee stated he went to al Farouq, after Khalden and received training. At al Farouq the detainee studied mines, TNT, how to insert metal fuses into TNT, how to strip wires and use matches to detonate explosives.

c. Connections/Associations

1. A senior al Qaida operative identified the detainee as a Saudi National, and a teacher by profession. This senior al Qaida operative sent the detainee to the Khalden Camp for training in 1998.

2. The detainee's name was noted on a recovered packet of Arabic language documents found in a private residence in Afghanistan. Local residents reported that the home was occupied by Arabs prior to the fall of the Taliban in December 2001. The packet had handwritten Arabic text on its exterior that read al Farouq Camp, Kabul, Operations Course/Cycle Report.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL SHUMRANT, MUHAMMAD ABD AL RAHMAN

3. The detainee said while he was in Afghanistan fighting, he tried to see Usama bin Laden but was denied an audience with Usama bin Laden in the Tora Bora Mountains. The detainee respects Usama bin Laden because he is a jihadist. The detainee would follow Usama bin Laden if it were in the interest of Muslims.

d. Intent

1. The detainee stated he admitted he fought with the Taliban and that he knows he is liable for his actions.

2. The detainee reiterated he is not a member of the Taliban or al Qaida, but was fighting strictly to adhere to the Muslim belief of jihad. The detainee advised if released, he would participate in jihad again if Muslims were threatened. The detainee stated that he would fight against Americans if given the opportunity.

3. The detainee emphasized he was prepared to fight the Americans, in addition to the Northern Alliance. If the Americans had closed in on him, he would have been the first to fight. The detainee explained it's a matter of defending Islam, when fighting Americans in Afghanistan, an Islamic country.

e. Other Relevant Data

The detainee stated he withdrew from Bagram, Afghanistan when fighting intensified (two days before Ramadan), and arrived at Tora Bora the tenth day of Ramadan. After 14-16 days, he withdrew from Tora Bora and left for Pakistan. The detainee was arrested inside the Pakistani border near Khohat and taken to a nearby prison. When the detainee left Tora Bora, he and other fighters gave their weapons to local tribes, and crossed the border.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks on the United States prior to their execution of 11 September 2001, and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.

b. The detainee stated the attacks of 11 September 2001 were not true Islam.

c. The detainee advised that he has not heard of any future attacks on the United States. The detainee does not know anyone who has knowledge, or was involved in past attacks on the United States, to include the American Embassy bombings in Africa and the attack on the USS Cole in Yemen.

d. In the past, the detainee expressed interest in traveling to America. His uncle and cousins, who live in America, always said great things about America.

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL SHUMRANT, MUHAMMAD
ABD AL RAHMAN**

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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