

UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

3 March 2006

TO: AL AMRI, MUSA BIN ALI BIN SAID

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL AMRI, MUSA BIN ALI BIN SAID

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee stated that he heard about Afghanistan from newspapers, the internet, and from his friends. The detainee said he saw papers with fatwas issued by sheikhs on bulletin boards around the city and in the mosques. The fatwas called for Saudi citizens to travel to Afghanistan and help the Taliban with money or service. Several famous sheikhs were issuing these fatwas.

2. After two weeks in Kabul, the detainee was moved about five kilometers north to a supply center. Once at the Said Center, the detainee spent about a month and a half loading trucks and supplies. The detainee was upset about having to wait so long to get to the front and complained on numerous occasions. An Egyptian who was in charge of sending fighters to the front told the detainee that they did not need any fighters at the front at the time. After a month and a half, the detainee was issued a Kalashnikov and sent to the front lines.

3. The detainee was positioned about two to three kilometers east of the Bagram airport. The detainee said it was a new position about 700 meters from the front lines. There were eight other individuals with the detainee at this position. While at this position, the group dug trenches and laid barbwire. The detainee said the defenses were well planned out and painstakingly prepared. The detainee was at this position for no longer than two and a half months. During the time the detainee was there he never fired his weapon and never came under attack. The detainee said mortars occasionally shelled the forces to the front of his position.

UNCLASSIFIED

DMO Exhibit 1
Page 1 of 3

000299

ISN 196

UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL AMRI, MUSA BIN ALI BIN SAID

4. The detainee received the order to retreat when the Northern Alliance had broken through the lines at another location due to air bombing. The detainee was told that the Northern Alliance had broken through and set up position behind them. The detainee retreated to the southeast and headed to Kabul.

5. The Taliban fighters headed for Kabul from a road on the east side of the city but met up with many Taliban fighters coming from Kabul who told them the city had already fallen. Upon hearing this, the detainee headed for Jalalabad. Once they arrived in Jalalabad, the detainee stayed at a house for two days. The detainee did not know who owned the house.

6. The detainee and other fighters then decided to try to get out of Afghanistan through Pakistan. They started out on foot, but found out there were roadblocks manned by the Northern Alliance on the road ahead. An Afghan guided them into the mountains.

7. The detainee and other fighters traveled through the mountains for about 20 days and eventually came to the Pakistani border. They turned in their weapons at the border. The detainee thought he was going to be handed over to the Saudi Arabian Embassy in Pakistan, but instead was detained and sent to Kandahar.

b. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee was dropped off at a Taliban house in a small village two hours outside of Kabul. The detainee waited for five to seven days then departed in a different pickup truck. He traveled to a Taliban center located on the outskirts of Kabul.

2. The detainee's name was listed on a computer seized from members of the suspected al Qaida cell involved in the October 2002 attack on United States Marines on Faylaka Island.

3. The detainee's name was found in a file that was recovered from a computer associated with a senior al Qaida leader.

4. The detainee's name was found on a document listing 324 Arabic names, aliases, and nationalities recovered from raids on suspected al Qaida related safe houses.

5. The detainee's name was found on a computer used by suspected al Qaida members. The file contains a list of 78 persons incarcerated. The information was found on a computer recovered by Allied personnel in a suspected al Qaida safe house.

6. The detainee's name was found on a 79-page document that was printed from an internet site. The document contains information regarding the capture of Taliban and al Qaida fighters.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL AMRI, MUSA BIN ALI BIN SAID

7. A source recognized the detainee from rear lines near Bagram (near an artillery section).

8. A source identified the detainee as a Saudi who was fighting on the Bagram front line. The source spent two days with the detainee in Sohail, Afghanistan after Bagram.

c. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee admitted to having fought alongside the Taliban during initial screenings in Kandahar, Afghanistan; however, the detainee now claims he did not fight with any groups.

2. A foreign government designated the detainee as a high priority individual.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee is willing to return to Saudi Arabia and forget about the bad times he had while confined. He would try not to have bad feeling against the United States.

b. The detainee advised that if he were released he would return to Saudi Arabia and attempt to get a job. He also stated he would probably get married.

c. The detainee denied having any involvement or interaction with the Taliban.

d. The detainee advised that he was not telling the truth initially when he provided the story about fighting with the Taliban. The detainee stated that the story he provided the Americans about his missionary work was the truth.

e. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001 and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

19 September 2006

TO: AL WAZAN, AHMAD ABDULLAH

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL WAZAN, AHMAD ABDULLAH

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee said that during 1990 he became active in Jamaat al Tabligh when he decided to travel to Afghanistan to participate in jihad.

2. The detainee said he was a founding member of a group identified as Jamat Mujahedein Maroc. The group was founded during 1999 in Peshawar, Pakistan.

3. The detainee said he was called the Military Commander of al Mujahedin de Maroc, only due to him being bestowed the title by default by virtue of being one of the oldest of the group.

b. Training

1. The detainee said members of his group participated in small arms training with Kalashnikov rifles. The training was conducted at a large complex outside of Kabul, Afghanistan and included live fire training by shooting targets. The training was for fighting against the Northern Alliance when called upon by the Taliban. In exchange, the group was provided a house in Kabul, Afghanistan.

2. The detainee said that during the summer of 2001, approximately eight members of his group wanted to train with weapons. In an effort to keep these members from going to one of the area training camps, the detainee obtained nine Kalashnikov rifles from the Taliban in Kabul,

DMO Exhibit 1
Page 1 of 3

UNCLASSIFIED

000002

ISN 197

UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL WAZAN, AHMAD ABDULLAH

Afghanistan. The detainee had a local official write a letter of reference and then gave a bribe to a Taliban guard at a weapons warehouse.

3. A source stated said that he attended training with the detainee at the Tarik Camp located near Bagram, Afghanistan. The source stated the detainee also fought along side the source's group near the front combat lines in the vicinity of Bagram, Afghanistan.

c. Connections/Associations

1. According to a source, the detainee was part of a small group of Moroccan Islamic leaders who formed the Group Islamique Combatant du Maroc, GICM, during 1995 in Sudan. The purpose of this organization is the overthrow of the Moroccan monarchy and to establish a religious state. The GICM was active inside Morocco, the United Kingdom, Italy, Syria, Turkey and France.

2. According to a source, during the bombings in Afghanistan, the detainee met with Usama bin Laden who supposedly gave Group Islamique Combatant du Maroc financial aid to undertake actions in Morocco.

3. The detainee and another person went to Jalalabad, Afghanistan early 1999 and convinced the leaders of Hizb I Islami Gulbuddin to give them a two-bedroom apartment for a Moroccan guest house.

4. Gulbuddin Hikmatyar founded Hizb I Islami Gulbuddin, HIG, as a faction of the Hizb I Islami party in 1977, and it was one of the major Mujahedin groups in the war against the Soviets. HIG has long-established ties with Usama bin Laden. In the early 1990s, Hikmatyar ran several terrorist training camps in Afghanistan and was a pioneer in sending mercenary fighters to other Islamic conflicts. Hikmatyar offered to shelter Usama bin Laden after the latter fled Sudan in 1996.

5. According to a source, Hizb E Islami Gulbuddin provided Group Islamique Combatant du Maroc paramilitary training and infrastructure support.

6. According to a source, the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group provided Group Islamique Combatant du Maroc recruiting, indoctrination, logistic support, and paramilitary training.

7. The Libyan Islamic Fighting Group emerged in 1995 among Libyans who had fought against Soviet forces in Afghanistan. Declared the government of Libyan leader Muammar Qadhafi un-Islamic and pledged to overthrow it. Some members maintain a strictly anti-Qadhafi focus and organize against Libyan Government interests, but others are aligned with Usama bin Ladin's al Qaeda organization or are active in the international Mujahidin network. The group was designated for asset freeze in September 2001.

UNCLASSIFIED

000003

UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL WAZAN, AHMAD ABDULLAH

8. A source said he saw the detainee at a guest house in Kabul, Afghanistan and heard he was a leader at the al Farouq Training Camp.

9. Another source said that he was told the detainee was very close to Usama Bin Laden, was in charge of the Kandahar camp and was head of the North African group of al Qaida fighters. The source was also told that the detainee had his own weapon, vehicle and guards.

10. An additional source said that the detainee was a military leader on the front lines near Bagram, Afghanistan and also in Tora Bora, Afghanistan.

11. Another source identified the detainee from a photograph and said the detainee was an individual that was experienced with explosives and improvised explosive devices.

d. Other Relevant Data

The detainee said when the bombing started in northern Afghanistan in November 2001 he planned to flee Jalalabad, Afghanistan. The detainee's wife obtained transportation to Peshawar, Pakistan while the detainee and his brother Radwan fled east into the Tora Bora Mountains. After crossing the border the detainee and his brother were turned over to Pakistan authorities.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee said he didn't have any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001. The detainee also didn't have knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.

b. The detainee claims no connection to Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group.

c. The detainee said he had no involvement with al Qaida and would never swear bayaat to Usama bin Laden.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

UNCLASSIFIED

000004

UNCLASSIFIED

**Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba**

21 June 2006

TO: AL UMARI, ABD AL RAHMAN MAADHA DHAFIR AL HILALA

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL UMARI, ABD AL RAHMAN
MAADHA DHAFIR AL HILALA**

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
 1. The detainee quit using drugs and went on the Hajj on his own during the late 1990s, when he learned the life he led was not the correct path and decided to turn his life around.
 2. The detainee was motivated to go on jihad by the death of a Palestinian youth killed by Israeli soldiers. A Saudi Arabian national at a mosque in Tabuk recruited the detainee. The detainee stated he joined jihad for religious reasons, motivation by the media, Allah's promise of 72 virgins and paradise in heaven.
 3. The detainee initially wanted to participate in the Arab-Israeli conflict, but he was not allowed to enter the country. Instead, the detainee went to Afghanistan to fight with the Taliban. The detainee fought with the Taliban for eleven months.
 4. The detainee admits he carried a Kalashnikov rifle while he and many others were heading for Jalalabad, Afghanistan, where he hoped to avoid being captured or killed.
 5. The detainee stated his loyalties while in Afghanistan belonged to his Mujahedin leader at the time. The detainee claimed that presently his loyalties belong exclusively to Allah, God Almighty.

DMO Exhibit 1
Page 1 of 3

UNCLASSIFIED

000305

ISN 199

UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL UMARI, ABD AL RAHMAN MAADHA DHAFIR AL HILALA

b. Training

1. The detainee attended al Mahad al Almi Institute of Science in Saudi Arabia and was expelled during his third year.

2. The detainee was in the Saudi army for nine years and received training from United States military personnel on the Dragon missile system shortly after Operation Desert Storm.

3. The detainee's occupation prior to going on jihad was a soldier with the equivalent United States Army rank of Corporal. The detainee was a crewmember of the Tube-launched, Optically tracked, Wire-guided missile anti-tank artillery.

c. Connections/Associations

1. A senior al Qaida operative said he saw the detainee at the Kabul, Afghanistan guest house in 2000. This senior al Qaida operative saw the detainee again in 2000 in the Kandahar, Afghanistan guest house and claimed that the detainee appeared to be a new Mujahed who was in Afghanistan for training.

2. The detainee had knowledge of the 11 September 2001 attacks in the United States prior to their execution and had limited hearsay information of a future attack on the United States, which was planned to occur on 12 February 2002.

3. The detainee encountered Usama bin Laden on two separate occasions while in the Tora Bora region, approximately during the beginning of December 2001.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. When asked about the events on 11 September 2001 and the devastation that the World Trade Center attacks caused, the detainee was very upset that so many civilians were killed. The detainee believes, as a fighter, it is unfair to kill civilians. If someone came at him with a weapon then the detainee would fight, but he would not kill any civilians or unarmed individuals. The detainee went to fight for jihad because it is every good Muslim's duty.

b. The detainee never gave Bayat to Usama bin Laden explaining that he only wanted to be a fighter. By giving Bayat to Usama bin Laden, the detainee might be pulled off of the front line for other duties.

UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL UMARI, ABD AL RAHMAN MAADHA DHAFIR AL HILALA

c. According to a senior al Qaida detainee the oaths of allegiance, or Bayat, al Qaida members swore to Usama bin Laden are a spiritually binding commitment to obey the leader and his organization and are patterned after the oath of allegiance that early Muslims swore to Muhammad and his successors. The senior al Qaida detainee said al Qaida was the first jihadist group to use this concept as a mechanism for maintaining organizational command and control.

d. The detainee provided the interrogator with whatever information he was asked for. The detainee has been interviewed many times and fears that everyone will think he is helping the Americans. Other detainees constantly ask him what is going on.

e. On 6 April 2002, the detainee advised the interviewers to warn the guards that they should take extra precautions during the move because some of the detainees are feeling that they have nothing to lose and are waiting for a time to cry out. The detainee was aware that some other detainees felt that they would rather die than live the way they were living, and some of the detainees would not care about taking someone else with them when they die.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

UNCLASSIFIED

000007

UNCLASSIFIED

**Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba**

12 August 2006

TO: QAHTANI, SA'D MUHAMMAD HUSAYN

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF QAHTANI, SAID MUHAMMAD
HUSAYN**

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee wanted to go to Chechnya to lend relief support or fight on behalf of his Muslim counterparts.

2. The detainee contacted relief organizations such as the Islamic Relief Organization and Haramin Organization. The detainee's intention was to join a relief organization because those entities would offer him a way to get into Chechnya, whose borders were closed at the time. Once there, the detainee would be free to leave the relief organization and join the fighting.

3. The detainee traveled to Karachi, Pakistan from the United Arab Emirates in the eleventh month of the Islamic Hijri calendar, 1999.

4. In Karachi, Pakistan the detainee met with an individual who arranged for the detainee to travel to Lahore, Pakistan. Once in Lahore, the detainee went to the Raywan Center.

5. The detainee traveled from Lahore, Pakistan and eventually arrived at a training camp named Quba. The detainee spent approximately three months at the camp.

6. In May 2000, the detainee left Camp Quba and returned to his home in Saudi Arabia.

7. The detainee returned to Saudi Arabia because he fulfilled his goal of preparing to fight as every Muslim should. The detainee remained in Saudi Arabia for approximately two months.

DMO Exhibit 1
Page 1 of 5

UNCLASSIFIED

010008

ISN 200

UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF QAHTANI, SAID MUHAMMAD HUSYAN

8. The detainee consulted with religious leaders who issued him a fatwah that instructed him to return to Pakistan and provide aid to the Taliban but not to actually participate in any fighting.

9. The detainee traveled from Saudi Arabia and finally to Kashmir, Pakistan.

10. The detainee returned to Camp Quba and then traveled to Afghanistan where there was fighting.

11. The detainee states that he had a short stay at a safe house with a senior al Qaida operative.

12. The detainee, after a short stay at the safe house in Rawalpindi, Pakistan, departed and traveled to Jalalabad, Afghanistan and stayed at an unidentified safe house. The detainee was then picked up and taken to Camp Khalden.

13. The detainee states that he went to the front lines north of Kabul, Afghanistan.

14. The detainee, while in Kabul, Afghanistan, joined the Taliban forces against the Northern Alliance. The detainee spent much of his time in Kabul, Afghanistan on the front lines.

15. The detainee, while on the front lines, claimed he did not take part in any of the fighting since there still was not a fatwa that would allow him to do so. The detainee performed security work behind the lines.

16. The detainee left Afghanistan in the eleventh month of the Islamic Hijri calendar to return to Saudi Arabia.

17. The detainee left Saudi Arabia around April 2001. The detainee was influenced to travel by a fatwa from Sheikh Hammoud al-Oqla that gave specific religious approval for fighting on behalf of the Taliban against the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan.

18. Sheikh Hamud al Uqqla was a Saudi Mufti who issued a fatwa calling for jihad in Afghanistan. Al Uqqla condoned the 11 September 2001 attacks against the United States. Al Uqqla helped raise money for Usama bin Laden until his death in Saudi Arabia in 2001.

19. The detainee traveled from Saudi Arabia to Kabul, Afghanistan. The detainee then traveled to Kher Khana, Afghanistan where he got into a Taliban car that brought him to a point called Karagagh. From there, the detainee walked to the front line.

20. The detainee got his weapon, a Kalashnikov, and ammunition from a commander on the front line.

UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF QAHTANI, SAID MUHAMMAD HUSYAN

b. Training

1. At Camp Quba, the detainee was trained on land navigation, celestial navigation and religion. The detainee also received instruction and training with weapons including the Kalashnikov rifles, PK machine guns, hand grenades and rocket-propelled grenades.

2. The detainee trained in small arms weapons, large caliber weapons, mortars and combat tactics at Camp Khalden. The detainee then went to a Taliban armory in Khost, Afghanistan where he received training on Soviet tanks.

3. The detainee states that he trained at Camp Khalden near Khowst, Afghanistan between May and July 2000.

4. The small arms training at Camp Khalden consisted of assembling and disassembling AK-47, RPK machine gun, PK machine gun and range training. On the large caliber weapons the detainee was instructed on how to operate the DSHK-38 12.5mm gun and the ZPU-2 14.5 mm gun. The detainee then received 88 mm mortar training. The last portion of training consisted of simulated attacks, regrouping, patrol, hand signals and ambush training.

5. The detainee, while at Camp Khalden, has stated that he received basic weapons training on the 7.62 mm RPK rifle, the 7.62 mm PK rifle without the tripod, the RPG-7 and the 9mm Makarov pistol. The artillery training the detainee received was on the 38 AGS-17. Training was also conducted on the SPG-9 73 mm gun.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee, in May 2000, received a phone number to a senior al Qaida operative who the detainee believed was someone who could help others receive military training.

2. The detainee's name was part of a list of al Qaida mujahidin on computer media that was recovered during various raids against al Qaida-connected safe houses in Pakistan.

d. Other Relevant Data

1. In September of 2001, when the Americans and Northern Alliance troops began dropping bombs on the detainee's Taliban position, the detainee and the Taliban fighters around him began to retreat. The detainee and some others headed towards the Pakistan border.

2. The detainee was captured by the Northern Alliance forces in late December 2001. A short time after his capture, he was turned over to the American military.

3. The detainee was transferred to United States custody on 31 December 2001 from Kohat, Pakistan.

UNCLASSIFIED

000010

UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF QAHTANI, SAID MUHAMMAD HUSYAN

4. The detainee has been identified as being in Khost, Afghanistan by a senior al Qaida operative. The detainee was acquiring ammunition and arms to take to Kabul, Afghanistan with others. The detainee was also identified as someone who had volunteered to be a suicide bomber and was ready to martyr himself for jihad.

5. The detainee admits to having met two of the hijackers from the 11 September 2001 attacks on the United States.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee did not go to Afghanistan with the intention of joining the Taliban. The detainee's main purpose was to see the accomplishments of the Taliban.

b. The detainee states that if he were released he would like to return to his home in Saudi Arabia and complete his studies.

c. The detainee stated that if he were released he would not return to Afghanistan, Pakistan, or any other country for the purpose of taking up arms against the United States or any of the United States Allies. The detainee simply wants to return to Saudi Arabia and see his family.

d. The detainee stated that he was never a member of al Qaida and adds that he does not know if he ever met or fought with al Qaida forces.

e. The detainee stated that he has never met Usama bin Laden.

f. The detainee has denied swearing bayat to Usama bin Laden or to any terrorist organization.

g. The detainee stated that he would never be involved with an organization, militia, or otherwise, whose purpose was to commit terrorist acts. The detainee also stated that he would not involve himself with a group which would act as the aggressor in a military campaign.

h. The detainee has denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001.

i. The detainee has denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.

j. The detainee has denied any knowledge or planning of internal uprisings at the Guantanamo Bay, Cuba Detention Facility.

UNCLASSIFIED

000011

UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF QAHTANI, SAID MUHAMMAD
HUSYAN**

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

UNCLASSIFIED

Page 5 of 5

000312

UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

22 March 2006

TO: BIN ATEF, MAHMMOUD OMAR MOHAMMED

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF BIN ATEF, MAHMMOUD OMAR
MOHAMMED

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee was recruited at the local mosque called the al Shinqity Mosque in Jeddah. The detainee was also influenced by everyday events, videos about jihad, and people talking. The detainee stated that the thought was in his head.

2. The detainee traveled from Jeddah, Saudi Arabia to Bahrain and from there he traveled to Karachi, Pakistan. Once in Karachi the detainee traveled by bus to Quetta, Pakistan and then to Afghanistan and stayed at a guest house.

3. The detainee funded the trip to Afghanistan with his own funds.

4. After training at al Farouq, the detainee proceeded to the front lines in Khvajeh Ghar, Afghanistan, where he was told he would fight with the Taliban against the Northern Alliance.

5. Even though the detainee is an Arab he considered himself a Taliban because he fought for them and along side them.

6. The detainee stated that his enemies were the Northern Alliance.

7. The detainee fought on the front lines in Konduz, Afghanistan under a senior al Qaida leader until the detainee's capture in December 2001.

b. Training

DMO Exhibit 1

Page 1 of 2
000313

UNCLASSIFIED

ISN 202

UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF BIN ATEF, MAHAMMOUD OMAR MOHAMMED

While at al Farouq training camp the detainee received training in how to use light weapons, Kalashnikov, rocket-propelled grenades, and pistols. The training lasted about three weeks.

c. Other Relevant Data

1. During the detainee's time at al Farouq around July 2001, Usama bin Laden visited and gave a speech about the behavior of Mohammed's followers.

2. The detainee was present at the al Janki uprising at Mazar-e-Sharif.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee stated that he never trained with explosives, chemicals, biological agents or nuclear material.

b. The detainee never got paid. However, one time when the detainee was on the Konduz line money came in. One of the detainee's co-workers passed out two thousand rupees, but the detainee gave it away to charity.

c. The detainee was asked to take an oath to Usama bin Laden but the detainee did not take one since he might have been obligated to do things that he might not want to do.

d. The detainee was never screened for or asked to participate in a martyrdom mission.

e. The detainee stated he never shot at or killed anyone.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

8 June 2006

TO: AL-ZAHRANI, SADI LBRAHIM RAMZI

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL-ZAHRANI, SADI LBRAHIM
RAMZI

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. In early 2001 the detainee and another individual traveled to Manama, Bahrain, where customs officers temporarily detained them.

2. The Bahraini customs officer confiscated a videotape of a speech by Usama bin Laden calling for jihad and an Arabic booklet entitled "An Open Letter to King Fahd on the Occasion of the Ministerial Appointments." This letter criticized the Saudi regime.

3. Around 25 April 2001 the detainee decided on his own to travel to Afghanistan to fight against the Northern Alliance.

4. The detainee left Saudi Arabia with about 4,500 Riyals. The detainee got the address, phone numbers and point of contacts from an individual in Taif, Saudi Arabia.

5. The detainee flew from al Taif, Saudi Arabia through Jeddah, Saudi Arabia to Qatar. The detainee continued on to Karachi, Pakistan. The detainee traveled by bus to Quetta, Pakistan. The detainee said that he resided in a Taliban House named Daftar Taliban while he stayed in Quetta, Pakistan.

6. The detainee said that from Quetta, Pakistan he was taken to Kandahar, Afghanistan in a taxi. The detainee stated that he completed the entire trip alone.

DMO Exhibit 1
Page 1 of 4

UNCLASSIFIED

000315

ISN 204

UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL-ZAHRANI, SADI LBRAHIM RAMZI

7. The detainee spent two days at the Mu'az house in Kabul, Afghanistan and then took a truck to the front lines. The detainee was given a Kalashnikov with four magazines and two hand grenades. The detainee was sent to a bunker facing the Northern Alliance in a position called the Bilal Position.

8. The Bilal unit is part of the 55th Arab Brigade.

9. The al Qaida Force, or 55th Arab Brigade, is Usama bin Laden's primary formation supporting Taliban objectives. Information indicates that the ideology of those in the 55th Arab Brigade includes willingness to give their lives for tactical objectives as declared by Usama bin Laden and the Taliban.

10. The detainee's name appears on a translation of a document listing 324 Arabic names, aliases, and nationalities recovered from safehouse raids associated with suspected al Qaida in Karachi, Pakistan.

11. The detainee's name appears on a list of al Qaida Mujahedin and the contents of their trust that accounts were found on computer media recovered during raids against al Qaida-associated safe houses in Rawalpindi, Pakistan and Karachi, Pakistan.

b. Training

1. The detainee said he went to al Farouq Training Camp for one month then on to Kabul, Afghanistan. The detainee did not finish the training because he just wanted to leave the camp.

2. The detainee said that while at the al Farouq Training Camp he trained for only a short period of time because every time he started to train he would get sick and have to stop. The detainee related that he only trained at the al Farouq Training Camp for a total of two to three weeks.

3. While at al Farouq Training Camp, the detainee says he received an injection for treatment of nerves, shaking and fainting spells. He does not know the name of the illness and cannot recall the type of medication.

4. The detainee said that he received no explosives training. The detainee stated that he was at the camp for three to four weeks. The detainee trained on the Kalashnikov and Rocket Propelled Grenades. The detainee also learned tactical skills and sign language.

5. The al Farouq Training Camp was funded by al Qaida and therefore was more advanced than other training camps in Afghanistan.

UNCLASSIFIED

000316

UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL-ZAHRANI, SADI LBRAHIM RAMZI

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee said that Usama bin Laden spoke at the al Farouq Training Camp mosque while he was there.
2. The detainee claims that he has met Usama bin Laden in Kandahar, Afghanistan at an unknown mosque located at an unidentified training camp.
3. On the front lines, the detainee was placed with an individual, possibly a Saudi, who was responsible for distributing the troops around the area.
4. This individual's name appears on a list of names of al Qaida martyrs and those who are missing from Fort Jangi, near Mazar-e-Sharif, Afghanistan.

d. Other Relevant Data

1. When the United States air strikes started, the detainee and approximately 130 Arabs surrendered to General Dostom's Forces of the Northern Alliance. The Northern Alliance took them into custody and brought them to the castle at Mazar-e-Sharif, Afghanistan.
 2. At Mazar-e Sharif, Afghanistan the detainee was shot in the leg. He could not get away because he was tied up.
4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a. The detainee stated that he has no intentions of ever joining a jihad that is outside of Saudi Arabia.
 - b. The detainee stated that he did not want to fight the United States. The detainee claims to only defend himself. The detainee cited an example such as if a guy was standing in front of him with a gun then of course he would have to fight him.
 - c. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001 and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.
 - d. The detainee denied any knowledge or planning of internal uprisings at the Guantanamo Detention Facility.

UNCLASSIFIED

000317

UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL-ZAHRANI, SADI LBRAHIM
RAMZI**

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

UNCLASSIFIED

Page 4 of 4

000318

UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

3 March 2006

TO: ABDEL AZIZ, ABDULLAH MUHAMMED

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ABDEL AZIZ, ABDULLAH
MUHAMMED

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. While in Medina, the detainee attended El Haram, the largest mosque in the city. A Saudi approached him during a Koran training session.

2. The Saudi first explained to the detainee that certain verses in the Koran stated it was a Muslim's duty to prepare himself to stand against anyone who is against Islam. He told the detainee he could get free training in Afghanistan and that to obtain such training was the detainee's religious duty.

3. The detainee departed Saudi Arabia for Afghanistan sometime between June and August of 2001.

4. The Saudi provided the detainee with the route he should use in his travel to Afghanistan. He then told the detainee that the Arabs there would provide the detainee with the guidance he needed.

5. The detainee left with approximately 4,000 Riyal, of which, 2,000 Riyals the detainee had saved from his job with the telecommunications company; the balance was given to the detainee by his father.

6. The detainee traveled to Medina, Saudi Arabia; Damascus, Syria; Tehran, Mashad and finally Taibad, Iran. The detainee stated he did not meet with anyone during his time in Syria and Iran.

UNCLASSIFIED

DMO Exhibit 1
Page 1 of 4

000319

ISN 206

UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ABDEL AZIZ, ABDULLAH MUHAMMED

7. Upon arriving at the Afghan border, the detainee walked across into Afghanistan.
8. When the detainee got to Kandahar, he told the taxi driver to take him to where the Arabs were. The detainee was taken to a rest house near a mosque and stayed there for four days.
9. While at this rest house, the detainee met a Saudi or Yemeni man, who may have been the person who ran the rest house. The detainee told him that he had come to Afghanistan to receive training. This man said that the detainee should go to Kabul.
10. Al Qaida maintained a safe house in Kandahar which was used as transit housing for individuals fighting with al Qaida or Taliban forces, as well as a residence for Arabs coming to Afghanistan to receive al Qaida training. A Yemeni national managed the house. Usama bin Laden spent a brief period of time at this house in the spring of 2000.
11. The detainee took a taxi to a rest house in Kabul, where an armed guard stood outside the house.
12. The rest house was large enough to hold approximately thirty people, and there were many fighters resting after spending time on the front lines.
13. The detainee stayed at a rest house for free and was fed while there. The detainee met a Saudi at this rest house who was not a fighter, but who had been to the front lines. The Saudi suggested that the detainee receive training.
14. The detainee provided information on a Taliban controlled farm on the outskirts of Kabul where small arms training was conducted. The detainee stayed at this location for a month and a half.
15. The detainee went to the front lines on two occasions to see what it was like. When the group visited the front lines, the detainee stayed in the back, near the kitchen.
16. When the detainee heard United States Forces would bomb Kabul, the detainee joined others from the rest house who were traveling to Konduz.
17. The detainee provide information on a Taliban safe house used for mission planning and rest in the city of Konduz, where the detainee stayed for a month and a half. Up to 110 Taliban fighters were housed or received aid and supplies from this location.
18. The detainee traveled to Konduz and stayed in another rest house.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ABDEL AZIZ, ABDULLAH MUHAMMED

19. The many fighters staying at the rest house decided that all Arabs in Konduz, including the detainee, would surrender to General Dostum's forces at Mazar e Sharif.

20. Prior to departing for Mazar e Sharif, the detainee was issued a Kalashnikov and ammunition. This was the only time the detainee was ever issued a weapon while in Afghanistan.

21. The detainee drove to Mazar e Sharif in a caravan consisting of two trucks and several smaller cars. The vehicles were owned by the Taliban, and most of the people in the caravan were Taliban fighters.

b. Training

The camp was located on a farm and the detainee was trained on the Kalashnikov. The detainee said he shot at targets shaped like people. The detainee was also trained on the PK machine gun. The detainee saw other people being trained on the rocket-propelled grenades and the bazooka at the camp, but he was not trained on these weapons.

c. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee and fighters surrendered their weapons to General Dostum's forces at Mazar e Sharif and were searched, then taken to a castle called Jenki.

2. The detainee surrendered his weapon at Mazar e Sharif without having ever fired it.

3. There were some Uzbek prisoners who began a fight inside the prison. The detainee heard small arms fire, and guards began to shoot from the roof at the prisoners. The unarmed detainee was shot in the leg during the melee.

4. The prisoners were eventually allowed to come out of the basement and surrender.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee stated he just wanted to obtain a little training to fulfill his religious duty.

b. The detainee said it was acceptable to fight and die if you are attacked, but he did not want to participate in the fighting in Afghanistan because it was Muslims fighting other Muslims.

c. The detainee denied any knowledge of future terrorist attacks targeting the United States and denied any knowledge of al Qaida or anyone affiliated with that group.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ABDEL AZIZ, ABDULLAH MUHAMMED

d. The detainee stated if he were allowed to leave United States custody, he would like to return to Medina and would never leave again.

e. The detainee advised he did not agree with Usama bin Laden and did not trust him. The detainee added that he did not feel the United States is an enemy of Islam and did not approve of the terrorist attacks, which he felt were against Islam.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

29 June 2006

To: AL HAMEYDANI, KHALID BIN ABDULLAH MISHAL THAMER

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF
AL HAMEYDANI, KHALID BIN ABDULLAH MISHAL THAMER

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee stated that on 21 or 22 September 2001, he flew alone from Kuwait to Mashad, Iran, took a taxi to Taibat, Iran where he spent one night. The next day the detainee took a taxi to the Iran/Afghanistan border where the detainee showed his Kuwaiti passport. The detainee stated that he met an Afghan man on the Afghanistan side of the border and they took a taxi to Namruz, Afghanistan where they stayed at the Afghan man's house for one day.

2. The detainee stated that he carried 15,000 in United States Dollars to Afghanistan, which he had saved from his employment and his father had given to him.

3. The detainee stated that he gave 9,000 in United States Dollars to an Afghan man to construct a mosque.

4. The detainee stated he visited the al Wafa office in Kabul, Afghanistan twice, and agreed to donate 1,000 in United States Dollars to al Wafa to help build a school.

5. The detainee stated that he gave 2,000 in United States Dollars to a friend of the Afghan man for food and clothing for refugees

6. Al Wafa is on the United States Government's Terrorist Exclusion List, which includes organizations that provide material support to further terrorist activity.

DMO Exhibit 1
Page 1 of 3

UNCLASSIFIED

000323

ISN 213

UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL HAMEYDANI, KHALID BIN ABDULLAH MISHAL THAMER

7. The detainee later stated that he gave 2,000 in United States Dollars as a donation for Lebanese orphans to an Afghan man.

8. The detainee stated that his passport and all but 400 in United States Dollars of the remaining money were stolen before he left Afghanistan.

9. The detainee stated that he traveled to Khowst, Afghanistan where he stayed for a month, then hired a guide, walked through the mountains for three days and was captured in Pakistan.

10. An individual stated that the detainee came to Afghanistan after 11 September for jihad and that the detainee arrived in Afghanistan with a list of all Kuwaitis in Afghanistan for jihad.

11. An individual stated that the detainee was a member of an Arab group fighting against the Northern Alliance.

b. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee's name and phone number are on a list of mujahedin fighters who crossed from Afghanistan into Pakistan on 14 December 2001.

2. The detainee's name is on a list of Arabs incarcerated in Pakistan which was recovered in a suspected al Qaida safe house in Islamabad, Pakistan. The list appears to have been created between March 2001 and January 2002.

3. The detainee's name and safety deposit box number are on a list recovered on 11 September 2002 from an alleged al Qaida residence in Karachi, Pakistan. The list indicates that the detainee's passport was in his safety deposit box.

4. The detainee's name and phone number are on a list of captured mujahedin found on a hard drive associated with a senior al Qaida operative which was seized in March 2003 in Pakistan.

5. The detainee's name and alias are on a list of 324 names recovered from safe house raids associated with suspected al Qaida in Karachi, Pakistan.

6. The detainee's name is on a chart prepared by Kuwaiti State security depicting the relationship between al Qaida and extremist groups in Kuwait.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

UNCLASSIFIED

000324

UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL HAMEYDANI, KHALID BIN ABDULLAH MISHAL THAMER

- a. The detainee stated that he thought al Wafa was a legitimate charity.
 - b. The detainee stated that he did not know the money provided to Al Wafa was used to support the al Qaida network.
 - c. The detainee stated he thinks Al Wafa does some good charity projects, but does not otherwise have any opinion of the organization. The detainee also stated he never saw any weapons at the al Wafa offices and had no concerns about giving them his money.
 - d. The detainee stated that he has never received any military training, carried a weapon or participated in combat.
 - e. The detainee denied any prior knowledge of the September 11 terrorist attacks.
 - f. The detainee stated that he first heard of al Qaida when he was imprisoned and does not know anyone affiliated with the organization.
 - g. The detainee stated that he is not affiliated with any jihadist movement in Kuwait.
 - h. The detainee stated that upon his release he planned to return to Kuwait and secure a job with the Kuwaiti government or become a merchant.
5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

UNCLASSIFIED

000325

UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

26 February 2006

TO: AL KURASH, MUHAMMAD ABD AL RAHMAN

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL KURASH, MUHAMMAD ABD AL
RAHMAN

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. After the detainee's high school graduation in May 2001, the detainee traveled to Afghanistan to fight the "opposition" with the Taliban.

2. The detainee decided to join the Taliban after reading the fatwas issued by Shaykhs Abdallah bin Jibrin and Humud al Uqla.

3. Upon arrival in Karachi, the detainee identified himself as an Arab traveling to join the jihad in Afghanistan.

b. Training

1. The detainee received training at the Moasqr Kari Bilal Camp in Afghanistan.

2. Moasqr Kari Bilal Camp was a Taliban training facility. Trainees learned to use the Kalashnikov rifle, the PK machine gun and rocket-propelled grenades.

3. The detainee was identified as having been at the al Farouq Camp in 2001.

c. Connections/Associations

UNCLASSIFIED

DMO Exhibit _____
Page 1 of 2

000326

ISN 214

UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL KURASH, MUHAMMAD ABD AL RAHMAN

1. The detainee stated that he chose to fight with the Taliban against the Northern Alliance because he wanted to support this cause.

2. The detainee's name was found on an undated letter, along with materials linked to al Qaida, which listed probable al Qaida members incarcerated in Pakistan.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001, and also denied any knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.

b. The detainee was queried regarding any knowledge or planning of internal uprisings at the Guantanamo Detention Facility with negative results.

c. The detainee does not have an opinion on Usama Bin Laden because the detainee's reasons for going to fight had nothing to do with Usama Bin Laden.

d. The detainee believes those who died in the 11 September 2001 attacks were innocent because they were not involved in fighting.

e. The detainee was not aware that Usama Bin Laden and the Taliban were aiding each other and working together. After talking to the interviewers, the detainee believes Usama Bin Laden could be bad, but the detainee is no longer sure of what is the truth.

f. The detainee stated he did not fight any Americans while in Afghanistan and has no reason to fight them now. If a fatwa was issued that told Muslims they should fight Americans, the detainee would have to know the reason behind it.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

3 October 2006

TO: AL SHARIF, FAHD UMR ABD AL MAJID

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL SHARIF, FAHD UMR ABD AL
MAJID

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
 1. The detainee stated he was going to Afghanistan for the purpose of jihad, specifically to fight with the Taliban against the Northern Alliance.
 2. The detainee stated he pledged the oath of bayat to Usama bin Laden and al Qaida at a Kandahar, Afghanistan guest house.
 3. The detainee advised that infantry training was his favorite training evolution because those in infantry would be on the front lines where the possibility of dying was greater and that dying on the battlefield would make him a martyr.
 - b. Training
 1. The detainee worked for two years as a police officer in Mecca, Saudi Arabia, and for one year in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.
 2. The detainee trained at the Khaldan Camp.
 3. The Khaldan Camp's course consisted of light weapons training, heavy weapons training, explosives training, topography, and tactics.
 4. The detainee received training at al Farouq Training Camp.

DMO Exhibit 1
Page 1 of 3

UNCLASSIFIED

000328

ISN 215

UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL SHARIF, FAHD UMR ABD AL MAJID

5. According to a source, the detainee attended basic and advanced training at al Farouq Training Camp. The advanced training at al Farouq was on tactics, operations, escape and evasion, as well as mountain, desert, jungle and urban warfare training.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee met with and received money from Usama bin Laden.
2. The detainee fought on the front lines for approximately nine months and fired his weapon at Northern Alliance Forces.
3. The detainee was present at Tora Bora during the United States air campaign.
4. The detainee said that when United States planes flew overhead, his group did fire at United States helicopters and airplanes with the Kalashnikov rifles; however, the aircraft flew too fast and too high.
5. The detainee's name was found on a computer hard drive that was associated with al Qaida and was seized during joint raids with other foreign agency services.
6. A senior al Qaida operative recognized the detainee as someone who provided administrative assistance at the guest house in Kandahar, Afghanistan.

d. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee stated he and two friends were traveling in Afghanistan, going from village to village teaching Islam, when they were pressed into service by the Taliban. The detainee and his friends believed they had no choice, so they agreed to fight with the Taliban.
2. The detainee was with a large group of Taliban that surrendered to Northern Alliance Forces.
3. The detainee's property included a Casio Watch, Model F-91W. The Casio Watch, Model F-91W, has been used in bombings that have been linked to al Qaida and radical Islamic terrorist improvised explosive devices.
4. The detainee stated that the most important thing is that he fired his weapon at the enemy during jihad and that Allah now looks favorably upon him. The detainee now feels that his duty for fulfilling jihad is complete.
5. The detainee stated that he never pledged an oath or bayat to al Qaida, the Taliban or Usama bin Laden

UNCLASSIFIED

000329

UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL SHARIF, FAHD UMR ABD AL MAJID

6. The detainee admitted that he previously stated he was a member of al Qaida because he thought that was what they wanted to hear.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001, and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

UNCLASSIFIED

000330

UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

31 August, 2006

TO: AL KABI, JAMIL ALI

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL KABI, JAMIL ALI

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. In approximately 2000, the detainee sold his taxi and decided to devote more time to the Dawa, or "the call".

2. The detainee stated that he started the Dawa in Mecca, Saudi Arabia by going out and finding young Muslims who were not following the word of Islam and trying to get them to the mosque.

3. The detainee stated that he left Saudi Arabia to continue the Dawa. The detainee left from Jeddah, Saudi Arabia and transited through Qatar to Lahore, Pakistan. The detainee received a one-year visa for Pakistan and left Saudi Arabia. An individual took the detainee to a house he called the Dawa House. The detainee stated that after six months doing the Dawa and preaching in Lahore, Pakistan, the detainee returned to Mecca, Saudi Arabia for Ramadan and to visit his family.

4. The world headquarters of the Jamaat al Tablighi movement is located in Lahore, Pakistan.

5. Jamaat al Tablighi is a Pakistan based Islamic missionary organization used as a cover to mask travel and activities of terrorists, including members of al Qaida.

DMO Exhibit 1
Page 1 of 4

UNCLASSIFIED

000331

ISN 216

UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL KABI, JAMIL ALI

6. The detainee stated that after being at home in Mecca, Saudi Arabia for about fourteen days, the detainee went to Jakarta, Indonesia. After the detainee arrived in Jakarta, he stayed at a hotel for one night, after which he went to the el Tabligh Mosque.

7. The detainee stated that he went back and forth between Jakarta, Indonesia and the island of Juhandah, Indonesia, which was located off the mainland of Indonesia. The detainee traveled back and forth to Juhandah, Indonesia by air and sea.

8. The Preachers of Islam, or Tablighi Jamaat organization, has been supporting Islamic terrorist groups in south and southeast Asia under the cover of conducting religious activities. The group is closely aligned with other Pakistani terrorist organizations and the al Qaida Network. Tablighi Jamaat recruits from Indonesia were trained at Let's Muridke complex near Lahore, Pakistan.

9. The detainee stated that he was in Indonesia for seven months before he decided to go to Malaysia.

10. The detainee stated that he went to Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia to see the country and do the Dawa. The detainee stated that he knew there were many Arabs that went to Malaysia. When the detainee arrived in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, he went to el Tabligh Mosque where he met Omar, who spoke Arabic and helped the detainee meet many Arabs as well as others who spoke Arabic.

11. The detainee did most of his work in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia in the el Tabligh Mosque and not out in the community.

12. Tablighi Jamaat recruits from Malaysia, and possibly Singapore, were trained at Jaish-e-Mohammad headquarters in the Binori madrassa complex of Karachi, Pakistan.

13. The detainee stated that after approximately one month in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, he left for Karachi, Pakistan to continue the Dawa.

14. The detainee stated that he was in Karachi, Pakistan for one week and he stayed at the el Tabligh Mosque. While the detainee was in Karachi, Pakistan, he met four individuals at the mosque. The detainee and the four individuals left for Afghanistan via bus. The bus went through Quetta, Pakistan where they all stayed for approximately five hours.

15. The detainee stated that from Quetta, Pakistan the four individuals and he took a taxi, which carried them to a village just outside of Kandahar, Afghanistan. In this village they obtained another taxi, which took them to Kandahar, Afghanistan.

UNCLASSIFIED

000332

UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL KABI, JAMIL ALI

16. After arriving in Kandahar, Afghanistan, the detainee and the four individuals went to a mosque and stayed for the night. The next morning they all traveled, via a taxi, to Kabul, Afghanistan. Upon arriving in Kabul, Afghanistan, the detainee went to the Wazir Akbar Khan Mosque. The detainee lived in a room at this mosque during the four months that he was in Kabul, Afghanistan. The detainee continued the Dawa in Kabul, Afghanistan and one of the individuals helped him translate with people who did not speak Arabic.

17. The detainee stated that on the day before Ramadan, word began to spread that the Northern Alliance was entering Kabul, Afghanistan and that they were killing all of the Arabs. The detainee left Kabul, Afghanistan immediately, leaving behind all of his possessions, including his passport. The detainee and the four individuals traveled in a taxi, for five hours, to a village outside of Jalalabad, Afghanistan.

18. The detainee stated that he lived in a village, outside Jalalabad, Afghanistan, for approximately one month. The detainee and the four individuals all walked for two days through the mountains to the border of Afghanistan and Pakistan.

19. The detainee stated that once they arrived in Pakistan, the four individuals went their separate ways but the detainee found his way to the police station. At the police station, which was just outside of Peshawar, Pakistan, the detainee was arrested and jailed for the night.

b. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee stated Usama bin Laden and the rest of the detainees are soldiers. The detainee stated that he does not want to answer whether or not he's a member of al Qaida.

2. The detainee's name was on a list of al Qaida mujahidin and the contents of their trust accounts found on files recovered from various computer media seized during raids against al Qaida associated safe houses in Pakistan on 1 March 2003 and 11 September 2002.

3. On 11 September 2002, Pakistani officers conducted a joint raid on an alleged al Qaida residence in Pakistan. Found among the material were several floppy disks. Analysis of the floppy disks associated with the raids on 10 through 12 September 2002 revealed an Arabic-language document whose title translates to "passports." The document was written on 1 February 2002.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee stated that he never served in the Saudi military and never had any training with weapons.

UNCLASSIFIED

000333

UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL KABI, JAMIL ALI

b. The detainee stated that he heard about the 11 September 2001 attacks on New York while he was in Kabul, Afghanistan. The detainee also heard that Usama bin Laden was responsible for the attack. The detainee stated that he felt that the attack was an act against God.

c. The detainee stated that he was never recruited to fight with the Taliban or al Qaida and has no ties with either organization.

d. The detainee stated that he has never heard of a fatwa issued in Saudi Arabia or anywhere else against the United States or its citizens.

e. The detainee stated if he was released, he would return to his home.

f. The detainee stated that he had previously denied any affiliation with al Qaida and the Taliban and claimed that he was in Afghanistan for the sole purpose of teaching Islam.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

UNCLASSIFIED

000334

UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

27 February 2006

TO: AL FOUZAN, FAHD MUHAMMED ABDULLAH

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL FOUZAN, FAHD MUHAMMED
ABDULLAH

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee departed Saudi Arabia with approximately 15,000 Riyals. The detainee stated it was to buy laundry equipment.
2. The detainee stopped in Bahrain for two days on his way to Karachi, Pakistan.
3. Once in Karachi, Pakistan, the detainee met with an employee of his company who was also a friend. They stayed in Karachi for about two weeks. The two traveled to Quetta, Pakistan, then on to Kandahar, Afghanistan and stayed in Kandahar for approximately one week. The two then traveled to Kabul, Afghanistan, met with another friend and stayed at his home for about two weeks.
4. The detainee stated he spent one and a half months in Kabul with the friend who was an employee of the detainee's company.
5. The detainee left Kabul and traveled to Khowst, Afghanistan and claims that United States air strikes began during his seven-day stay there. That is when the detainee expressed his desire to leave, stating he wanted to go to the Saudi embassy in Pakistan. The detainee friends warned him that the Pakistani Army would be harsh on Arabs and took him to Jalalabad instead.
6. The group traveled from Khowst to Jalalabad and hid there for approximately two weeks waiting for the bombing to stop. After two weeks, the detainee once again expressed his

UNCLASSIFIED

DMO Exhibit 1
Page 1 of 3

000335

ISN 218

UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL FOUZAN, FAHD MUHAMMED ABDULLAH

desire to leave, insisting on going to Pakistan. The detainee's Afghani friend found a guide to take him to Pakistan.

7. The detainee claims he was advised to let the guide carry his papers, including his passport, on his trip back to Pakistan. The detainee claims that once they reached the border the guide fled with his documents. The detainee was then captured by the police.

b. Training

A foreign government reported that the detainee traveled to Afghanistan for approximately 10 months in 1999. The detainee was identified as having joined the military camp, Abu Nasir, in Afghanistan. The detainee was designated as a high priority target.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee was identified as al Qaida by a foreign government source.
2. The detainee was identified by a senior al Qaida operative.
3. The detainee was identified as having fought in Tora Bora.
4. The detainee was identified as being a fundraiser and recruiter for both al Qaida and the Taliban in Saudi Arabia.
5. The detainee was identified as an employee of the al Haramayn Charitable Institute.
6. Al Haramayn was added on 11 March 2002 to the list of organizations identified under Executive Order 13224 blocking property and prohibiting transactions with persons who commit, threaten to commit, or support terrorism.
7. The detainee was captured in a group of 84 Mujahidin fighters crossing in the Nangahar Province on 14 December 2001. The detainee's name and hometown were listed on an internet site, the Alneda, regarding Taliban and al Qaida fighters captured.
8. The detainee's name was found on a document recovered from a computer associated with a senior al Qaida operative. The document lists the names and addresses of captured Mujahidin fighters.
9. The detainee's name was among the names of 324 al Qaida members listed on a document found in a safe house raided in Karachi, Pakistan.
10. The detainee's name and phone number were found on a document recovered by Allied personnel in a suspected al Qaida member's house in Kandahar, Afghanistan.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL FOUZAN, FAHD MUHAMMED ABDULLAH

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001, and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

6 February 2006

TO: AL KUNDUZI, UMAR ABDULLAH

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL KUNDUZI, UMAR ABDULLAH

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. After Jalalabad fell to the Northern Alliance Forces, the detainee admitted to fleeing to the Tora Bora region with another known al Qaida member. The detainee sought refuge in a cave for approximately one month and was armed with a Kalishnikov rifle.

2. While in Tora Bora, the detainee carried a rocket-propelled grenade and was assigned the responsibility for preparing mortars for use as directed by the cave commander.

3. The detainee and others were led out of the Tora Bora region by the leader of the Khalden Training Camp, who has been linked to Usama Bin Laden and other major al Qaida leaders.

4. While some people left their weapons behind as they were fleeing Tora Bora, the detainee chose to continue to carry his, along with three additional magazines.

b. Training

1. The detainee attended the Khalden Training Camp where he received military training in the late 1990's.

2. The detainee attended urban warfare training at a training camp in the city of Murad Beek.

UNCLASSIFIED

DMO Exhibit ____
Page 1 of 3

000338

ISN 222

UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL KUNDUZI, UMAR ABDULLAH

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee is familiar with al Qaida, two major al Qaida facilitators, and the leader of the Khalden Training Camp.
2. The detainee was identified as a fighter for the Taliban against the Northern Alliance.
3. The detainee was separately identified as fighting along with the Taliban and other Arab fighters aligned with Usama Bin Laden.
4. The detainee was seen at various guesthouses in and around Kabul in the summer of 2001.
5. The detainee admitted to traveling with armed Taliban forces to the Tora Bora region to escape U.S. bombings.
6. The detainee traveled from Saudi Arabia to Afghanistan along a route commonly used by al Qaida recruits: by air from Jeddah, Saudi Arabia to Bahrain to Doha, Qatar to Karachi, Pakistan; by ground from Karachi, Pakistan to Peshawar, Pakistan to Jalalabad, Afghanistan.
7. The detainee admitted to staying at the residence of a known al Qaida facilitator in Jalalabad, Afghanistan. The detainee admitted that some of the people staying at this guesthouse had weapons.
8. The detainee had the names and phone numbers of al Qaida members with him when he was captured.

d. Intent

1. The detainee repeatedly expressed a desire to kill a military guard.
2. The detainee stated that he really wanted to be let free so he could kill "bad" Americans.
3. The detainee stated that while he has never had ill feelings for Americans prior to his detention, he has now developed particular contempt and disgust for America as a result of his detention and treatment while in custody.

e. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee admitted that he had a Kalishnikov while staying in the cave in Tora Bora.
2. The detainee threw water on a guard in protesting the treatment of another detainee.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL KUNDUZI, UMAR ABDULLAH

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

- a. The detainee stated he did not know the people he fled to Tora Bora with were members of al Qaida or the Taliban.
- b. The detainee stated that he went to Afghanistan to visit his family, not to fight.
- c. The detainee stated that he did not fight with al Qaida or the Taliban.
- d. The detainee stated that he was never recruited into the Taliban or al Qaida by anyone.
- e. The detainee stated he has an uncle who is a friend of General Dostum and is a supporter of the Northern Alliance.
- f. The detainee stated that if he were released he would simply return home and would not harm anyone unless they were the aggressor.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

4 August 2006

TO: SULAYMAN, ABD AL RAHMAN ABDU ABU AGHAYTH

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SULAYMAN, ABD AL RAHMAN
ABDU ABU AGHAYTH

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee was recruited to travel to Afghanistan to search for a wife and a job. The detainee was told that if he traveled to Afghanistan, he would be able to find a bride and the Taliban would provide him with a house. The recruiter also mentioned the jihad in Afghanistan.

2. According to the detainee, the recruiter was receiving money from the Taliban.

3. The recruiter arranged for the detainee to travel to Afghanistan by airplane via Karachi, Pakistan. The recruiter also gave the detainee 100 United States Dollars.

4. The detainee acquired a passport one month before departing to Afghanistan. The detainee's reason for acquiring the passport was to travel to Saudi Arabia to look for work.

5. The detainee departed Yemen in March 2001. The detainee traveled from Sanaa, Yemen to Dubai, United Arab Emirates and then went to Karachi, Pakistan. From Karachi, Pakistan, the detainee then proceeded to Quetta, Pakistan where he went to the Daftar Taliban to join the Taliban.

6. The Taliban moved the detainee from Quetta, Pakistan to Kandahar, Afghanistan.

7. Once in Kandahar, Afghanistan, the detainee was directed to travel to Kabul, Afghanistan to find a house. The detainee was told to go to the al Qaeity house.

DMO Exhibit 1
Page 1 of 3

UNCLASSIFIED

000341

ISN 223

UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SULAYMAN, ABD AL RAHMAN ABDUL ABU AGHAYTH

8. The detainee went to the al Qaeity house. The detainee remained there for at least eight months while waiting to get his own house.

9. The detainee has stated that during his stay at the al Gati guesthouse in Kabul, Afghanistan, he made two trips towards the fighting lines north of Kabul.

b. Training

The detainee claimed to have received no formal training at any camp, but was instead trained by a Pakistani in an area in Kabul, Afghanistan. The detainee was trained on the use of the PK machine gun and 82 millimeter mortar.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee was reported to have been seen with Usama bin Laden in the Tora Bora, Afghanistan region.

2. The detainee has been identified as an al Qaida spokesman in Usama bin Laden's entourage.

3. The detainee's name was found on computer equipment that was confiscated during a raid on an alleged al Qaida residence in Pakistan.

4. The detainee's name was found on a chart on computer equipment that was connected to an al Qaida operative. The chart listed the names of captured mujahedin.

d. Other Relevant Data

1. The Hamza Qaiti guest house has been identified as a safe house that was owned and operated by al Qaida.

2. The detainee withdrew from his position at the front line on 12 November 2001, due to a large attack from the Northern Alliance.

3. The detainee decided to leave Kabul, Afghanistan for good around December 2001.

4. The detainee headed north to the front lines when bombs began to fall near Kabul, Afghanistan. The detainee and others traveled to the area of Bagram, Afghanistan.

UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SULAYMAN, ABD AL RAHMAN ABDUL ABU AGHAYTH

5. The detainee left Bagram, Afghanistan when the front lines were attacked. The detainee traveled to Jalalabad, Afghanistan and then towards Peshawar, Pakistan. The detainee traveled to the Pakistan border through a mountainous region where he remained for one month. Finally, after the detainee arrived in Pakistan, villagers turned him in to the Pakistan police.

6. An individual has identified the detainee as the interrogator that tortured him while the Taliban imprisoned him in Afghanistan.

7. The detainee was transferred to United States custody on 2 January 2002, in Kohat, Pakistan.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee claims that he never fought for the Taliban.

b. The detainee has denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001.

c. The detainee has denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or Unites States interests.

d. The detainee denied any knowledge or planning of internal uprisings at the Guantanamo Bay detention facility.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

28 March 2006

TO: MUHAMMAD, ABD AL RAHMAN ABDULLAH ALI

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF
MUHAMMAD, ABD AL RAHMAN ABDULLAH ALI

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
 1. The detainee borrowed 40,000 Yemeni Riyals from a man who owned several businesses in Yemen.
 2. The detainee had also saved 45,000 Yemeni Riyals of his own from the sale of ghat.
 3. The detainee purchased round trip tickets to Karachi, Pakistan for approximately 45,000 Yemeni Riyals.
 4. The detainee spent three months in Karachi looking for work. The detainee stayed with a Yemeni friend whom he had known for two years.
 5. The detainee visited the Taliban Office in Quetta, Pakistan seeking a teaching job in Afghanistan.
 6. The detainee went to Quetta some time in July or August of 2001. Upon his arrival in Quetta, the detainee went to the Taliban center to find work in Afghanistan. The detainee was told that there was no work to be found in Afghanistan. The detainee returned to Karachi two days later and stayed with his friend.
 7. The detainee then returned to the Taliban office in Quetta and paid 1200 Riyals for a guide who took him to Kandahar, Afghanistan to find work.

DMO Exhibit 1
Page 1 of 3

UNCLASSIFIED

000344

ISN 224

UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MUHAMMAD, ABD AL RAHMAN ABDULLAH ALI

8. While in Kandahar, the detainee stayed at a madrassa for ten days. At the end of the ten days, the detainee heard of the New York events and decided to attempt to get out of the country. The people at the madrassa agreed to help him flee, but not before sending him to a known Taliban house 10 to 15 minutes west of Kabul.

9. The detainee was captured in early December 2001.

b. Connections/Associations

1. A variant of the detainee's name was on a list of captured Mujahedin located on a hard drive associated with a senior al Qaida operative.

2. The detainee's name is on a letter listing 68 probable al Qaida members incarcerated in Pakistan. The undated handwritten letter was recovered, along with materials linked to al Qaida, by allied personnel. The letter provided a list of names of incarcerated Arabs, aliases, and countries of origin, and the letter encourages the correspondent to incite the people against the Pakistani government.

3. The detainee's name was found on a document listing 324 Arabic names, aliases, and nationalities recovered during a raid on a suspected al Qaida safe house. According to the document, the detainee was in possession of a Saudi passport, ticket, and ID cards.

4. On 14 December 2001, authorities captured 84 Mujahedin fighters fleeing Afghanistan. The detainee's name, country, and family telephone number were listed on a document published on the internet in July 2002 containing information regarding the capture of suspected Taliban and al Qaida fighters who had crossed the border in Nangarhar Province, Afghanistan.

5. The detainee's name was found on a computer file that lists contact points and telephone numbers for al Qaida Mujahedin. The file was recovered from computer media seized during raids conducted against al Qaida-associated safe houses in Rawalpindi, Pakistan on 1 March 2003. According to the file, these Mujahedin were among a group who had come to Afghanistan in December 2001 but who had not completed their training and therefore were not ready to fight in the war.

6. The detainee's name, aliases, and variants were located on a document listing al Qaida Mujahedin (as well as their trust accounts) found on computer media recovered during raids against al Qaida safe houses.

7. The detainee's name and alias were listed in a document found on a floppy disk recovered from a raid of a suspected al Qaida safe house on 11 September 2002. The document lists the detainee's safety deposit box number and its contents, which includes a passport, ticket, and IDs.

UNCLASSIFIED

000345

UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MUHAMMAD, ABD AL RAHMAN ABDULLAH ALI

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001. The detainee also denied having any knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.

b. The detainee denied receiving any weapons during his one-month stay in Kabul, Afghanistan.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

7 June 2006

TO: AL NUR, ANWAR HAMDAN MUHAMMAD

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL NUR, ANWAR HAMDAN
MUHAMMAD

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee claims he decided to travel to Khowst, Afghanistan with a friend to do humanitarian work. The detainee stated that during the war there were many people killed in Khowst, leaving many orphans.

2. On approximately 15 October 2001, the detainee and others traveled from al Qurayat, Saudi Arabia through Damascus, Syria; Tehran, Iran; Mashhad, Iran; the Afghanistan border; and arrived in Heart, Afghanistan. The detainee continued on to Kabul and then Khowst, Afghanistan, where he stayed for approximately one month.

3. The detainee stated that in November it became too dangerous for him and the others to stay in Khowst, Afghanistan. The detainee decided to flee to Pakistan with eight others. The detainee and eight others were met by the Pakistani Police when they reached the Pakistan border, and were arrested.

4. In late December 2001, several individuals admitted to having been fighters in Afghanistan, but none to being associated with Usama bin Laden. The detainee's name and phone number were found in the notebook of one of the individuals.

DMO Exhibit 1
Page 1 of 3

UNCLASSIFIED

000347

ISN 226

UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL NUR, ANWAR HAMDAN MUHAMMAD

b. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee's name was found on a document listing 324 Arabic names, aliases and nationalities recovered from safe house raids associated with suspected al Qaida.

2. The detainee's name was discovered as part of information that was recovered from hard drives that were seized from the suspected al Qaida cell that attacked the United States Marines on Faylaka Island in October 2002.

3. The detainee's name was listed on a document associated with the London-based Islamic Observation Center as a Saudi fighting with the Taliban against the Northern Alliance.

4. The detainee's name was on a website that identified a group of al Qaida and Taliban fighters captured in the Nangahar province, Afghanistan on 14 December 2001. A prisoner attacked and disarmed a guard during transport. A struggle ensued leaving six guards and ten prisoners dead.

5. The detainee's name was found on a document containing a list of names, safety-deposit boxes and contents, which was recovered from raids of a suspect al Qaida safe house on 11 September 2002.

6. The detainee's name was found on a document listing suspected al Qaida Mujahedin and the contents of their trust accounts during raids against al Qaida-associated safe houses in Pakistan.

7. The detainee was identified as being involved in relief missions for al Wafa in Afghanistan.

8. Al Wafa al Igatha al Islamia was placed on the Terrorist Exclusion List by the Secretary of State, identifying it as an organization that commits, incites to commit, prepares, plans, or supports terrorist activities.

c. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee blamed the Americans for treating Muslims badly and stated that the attacks on 11 September 2001 were the Americans' responsibility because of their treatment of Muslims. The detainee feels strongly that the United States is in a war against Islam.

2. A foreign government service provided information on thirty-seven detainees being held at Guantanamo Bay, whom they designated as being high priority. The detainee was among those identified.

UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL NUR, ANWAR HAMDAN MUHAMMAD

3. In July 2002, a delegation from a foreign government identified the detainee as one whom they believed to be of low intelligence or law enforcement value to the United States and was unlikely to pose a terrorist threat to the United States or its interests.

4. The following primary factor favors release or transfer:

a. A foreign government delegation indicated that the Saudi government would be willing to take custody of the detainee for possible prosecution as soon as the United States determined it no longer wanted to hold the detainee.

b. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001 and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

UNCLASSIFIED

000345

UNCLASSIFIED

**Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba**

30 January 2006

TO: AL BALUSHI, SALAH ABDUL RASUL ALI ABDUL RAHMAN

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL BALUSHI, SALAH ABDUL RASUL
ALI ABDUL RAHMAN**

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee became interested in traveling to Afghanistan after he heard about the destruction of the Buddha statues in the Bamian Province of Afghanistan. The detainee was further convinced after the return of an unidentified group of sheiks. The sheiks initially went to Afghanistan to persuade the Taliban to quit destroying statues, but ended up changing their minds and endorsing the act.

2. The detainee wanted to go to Afghanistan to ensure that the people were real Muslims, meaning if the people were Salafi Muslims.

3. The detainee traveled to the Balushistan Province in Pakistan via Karachi, Pakistan on 25 July 2001 and stayed with a friend for three weeks. Afterwards, he traveled to Afghanistan around August 2001 via Quetta, Pakistan.

4. The detainee stated he paid for his trip to Afghanistan with 300 Bahraini Dinars and money he saved while attending Jammal Islamia University in Medina, Saudi Arabia. In addition, the detainee received approximately 84 Bahraini Dinars per month as a stipend from the university. The detainee was a student at the university for approximately one year prior to his departure for Afghanistan.

UNCLASSIFIED

DMO Exhibit _____
Page 1 of 3

000350

ISN 227

UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL BALUSHI, SALAH ABDUL RASUL ALI ABDUL RAHMAN

b. Connections/Associations

1. Upon arriving in Kandahar, Afghanistan, the detainee spent two weeks in the house of an acquaintance.

2. At the suggestion of the acquaintance who he lived with in Kandahar, the detainee gave his passport to a scholar at a local institute.

3. The scholar was identified as an initial al Qaida screener. He was particularly known for talking a lot about jihad. The scholar was a helper, a coordinator, and he was the one responsible for travel.

4. The detainee's name was found on a list of captured Mujahidin on a computer, which was associated with an operative and was seized during raids with a foreign governmental agency on 1 March 2003.

5. The detainee's name was found on a document listing 324 Arabic names, aliases, and nationalities recovered from safe house raids associated with suspected al Qaida members.

c. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee claims he became sick in Jalalabad and spent a month in a hospital. After being released from this hospital, the detainee traveled with a man to the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan.

2. The detainee claims to have a learning disability, which makes it very difficult for him to remember details or events.

3. On 18 August 2005, the detainee was not willing to cooperate and refused to discuss his case.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001, and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.

b. The detainee denied having any knowledge of planning of internal uprisings at the Guantanamo Detention Facility.

c. The detainee denied using any type of Taliban communication equipment.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL BALUSHI, SALAH ABDUL RASUL ALI ABDUL RAHMAN

d. An individual asked the detainee to join the Taliban. The detainee stated he did not wish to join the Taliban and told the individual the same.

e. The detainee was confronted concerning an unknown number that he had in his Casio watch. The detainee stated his watch was incapable of number storage and, as a result, did not have any information on the number.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

19 February 2006

TO: KAMEL, ABDULLAH KAMEL ABUDALLAH

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF KAMEL, ABDULLAH KAMEL
ABUDALLAH

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. Sometime after 11 September 2001, the detainee flew from Kuwait to Iran by himself with approximately \$15,000 United States Dollars. The detainee could not remember the name of the city he stayed in, but stated that the city was located near the Iran-Afghanistan border. The detainee planned on staying in Afghanistan for seven days and took vacation from his employer for the time he planned on being in Afghanistan. The detainee did not tell his wife that he was taking their money to give to the poor in Afghanistan. The money that the detainee took to Afghanistan had been kept at his house and not withdrawn from his bank.

2. For information about traveling to Afghanistan, the detainee visited a Kuwaiti mosque and spoke with an Afghani. The Afghani told the detainee to first travel to Iran and then cross the border into Afghanistan. The Afghani also provided the detainee with a letter written in Afghan explaining that he was traveling to Afghanistan to help the poor and included an address in Herat, Afghanistan.

3. After arriving in Iran, the detainee took a taxi to the border with Afghanistan where he walked across the border after getting his passport stamped with an Iranian exit stamp. The detainee then presented the letter he received from the Afghani to the taxi driver. The taxi took him to the address in Herat, Afghanistan that was included in the letter.

4. The detainee arrived in Herat. For the next 10 to 15 days, the detainee distributed food and supplies to refugees located between Herat and the Iranian border. The detainee purchased approximately \$1,000 United States Dollars worth of supplies each day and would also rent

UNCLASSIFIED

DMO Exhibit 1
Page 1 of 3

000353

ISN 228

UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF KAMEL, ABDULLAH KAMEL ABUDALLAH

vehicles (small pickup trucks) to transport the supplies. He would usually have to rent 3-4 vehicles to carry the supplies. The supplies were purchased at a local market in Herat. The drive from Herat to the refugee camp took several hours. The detainee used approximately \$13,000 of the \$15,000 United States Dollars he traveled with to purchase the supplies and vehicles. The detainee called back to his family several times from phone centers to tell them that he was fine.

5. During the beginning of United States air strikes in Afghanistan, the detainee said he was staying at a small, unidentified village in the vicinity of Jalalabad and subsequently decided to leave the country. He paid Afghan smugglers his remaining \$1,800 United States Dollars to guide him into Pakistan. Once inside Pakistan, the detainee stayed in a small village and was then captured by Pakistani authorities.

6. A source claims that the detainee traveled to Afghanistan two times.

7. A source claims that while the detainee was at the Kandahar guesthouse he heard a speech given by Usama bin Laden.

8. A source stated that he did not believe the detainee brought money with him to Afghanistan. The source believes that the detainee went to Afghanistan to fight.

b. Training

A source claims that the detainee first traveled to Afghanistan in 2000 and attended a basic training course at a training camp. The detainee traveled to Karachi where he stayed at a guesthouse.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee's name was found on a 20-gigabyte hard drive associated with al Qaida. The file provides a listing of names of captured Mujahidin.

2. The detainee's name was found on a computer server hard drive recovered by allied personnel in a suspected al Qaida safe house.

3. The detainee's name was found on a document listing 324 Arabic names, aliases, and nationalities recovered from safe house raids associated with suspected al Qaida.

4. The detainee's name was found on a document that was printed from an internet site on 20 July 2002. The internet document contains information regarding the capture of Taliban and al Qaida fighters who had crossed the border after the 11 September 2001 retaliation.

5. A foreign government service reported that the detainee was a member of al Qaida.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF KAMEL, ABDULLAH KAMEL ABUDALLAH

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee denied involvement with the Taliban or al Qaida, and the detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001. The detainee also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.

b. The detainee did not attend any military type training while in Iran or Afghanistan. The detainee did not meet anyone he believes was a member of or associated with al Qaida.

c. The detainee claims he took \$15,000 United States Dollars to give to the poor in Afghanistan.

d. After 11 September 2001 the detainee wanted to help the poor in Afghanistan. He was concerned for the many Afghans who became refugees fleeing Afghanistan, fearing that the United States would bomb their country. The detainee went to a center to donate 100 Kuwaiti Dinars (approximately \$333 United States Dollars). However, the center would not accept the money to assist the people of Afghanistan because the conflict in Afghanistan made assistance to the poor dangerous. The detainee decided that he would go to Afghanistan himself to assist the poor.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

22 September 2006

TO: HAMUD, HAMUD DAKHIL

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF HAMUD, HAMUD DAKHIL

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee acted on fatwas issued by two Sheiks. After learning of the fatwas, the detainee traveled to Chechnya.

2. The detainee stated that he was recruited by his brother to fight jihad in Chechnya circa September 1999.

3. The detainee stated that at the Chechen training camp he purchased an AK-47 for 1,000 United States Dollars and was given a backpack and a Chechen uniform.

4. The detainee stated that if the Muslim people were still fighting in Afghanistan, he would go fight with them, even if it meant fighting against Americans.

5. The detainee stated that he was in the middle of Chechnya when the mafia took him to the border of Chechnya and Dagestan. The detainee stated that he traveled from Dagestan through Azerbaijan, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen to arrive at Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, and then later to Afghanistan.

6. The detainee stated he traveled to Afghanistan on two separate occasions. The first time was immediately after leaving Chechnya approximately in 1999 or 2000. The detainee stated sometime between 2000 and 2001 he returned to Afghanistan in accordance with the fatwas.

DMO Exhibit 1
Page 1 of 4

UNCLASSIFIED

000358

ISN 230

UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF HAMUD, HAMUD DAKHIL

7. The detainee stated that upon completion of training at Camp Malik in Afghanistan he was transferred to the second fighting line near Bagram, Afghanistan. The detainee stated he was given an AK-47 rifle, four magazines of ammunition, and a number of hand grenades.

8. The detainee stated he was an Emir in Tora Bora, Afghanistan.

b. Training

1. The detainee stated that he participated in AK-47, rocket propelled grenade, machine gun, mortar, hand grenade, other small arms and guerrilla operations training at the training camp in Chechnya.

2. The detainee stated that he received approximately six weeks of training at the al Farouq training camp. The detainee received two weeks of training on Kalashnikov rifle, PK machinegun, M-16, RPG, Uzi submachine gun, and Makarov pistol. The detainee received one week of explosives training including grenades, mines, dynamite, C-3 and C-4. The detainee received ten days of camouflage training, movement and tactics. The detainee also received eight or nine days of topography and physical training.

3. The detainee stated that he learned how to extract the explosive element from the landmines in order to make other explosive devices.

4. The detainee stated that at the Malik Camp he received training on anti-aircraft weapons, grenade launchers and how to disassemble and reassemble various weapons.

5. The detainee stated that near Kabul, Afghanistan he was provided training on the ZU-23 and SA-7.

6. A source stated the detainee claimed to be an explosives expert.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee's name and the contents of his trust account were on a list of al Qaida Mujahedin accounts recovered from computer media seized during raids against al Qaida associated safe houses.

2. The detainee stated that while he was at the front lines, Usama bin Laden joined the detainee, along with several other Mujahedin, for dinner at an abandoned house they had occupied.

3. The detainee knows people who swore allegiance to Usama bin Laden and those who killed Americans. The detainee also knows a leader of al Qaida in Saudi Arabia.

UNCLASSIFIED

000357

UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF HAMUD, HAMUD DAKHIL

4. The detainee stated that while waiting for a fraudulent passport he was taken to a house that was an al Qaida meeting place in Sanaa, Yemen. The detainee stated that the men there told him of their affiliation with al Qaida. The detainee stated members in the Yemeni group prepared the explosives for the USS Cole bombing.

d. Intent

1. The detainee stated that he was born a Muslim but did not become a dedicated Muslim until he was in his twenties, which was when he decided to quit his job and follow the calling to join the jihad.

2. The detainee stated that he follows the teaching of Sheik Abdul Aziz bin Baz of Saudi Arabia, whom the detainee said was popular in Saudi Arabia.

3. A source who went to Afghanistan for jihad stated that Sheik Abdel Aziz bin Bazz was a Mufti for all Arab nations and encouraged people to fight jihad against Christians and Jews.

e. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee was in possession of a Casio watch at the time of his capture. This model has been used in bombings that have been linked to al Qaida and radical Islamic terrorist improvised explosive devices.

2. The detainee stated that while at Tora Bora, Afghanistan, he saw an American airplane approaching. The detainee watched as the bombs fell in the area. The detainee stated that one came so close, that even though he hid in a ditch, the impact threw him several feet into the air.

3. The detainee stated that he saw chemical weapons in Afghanistan and Chechnya, Russia. The detainee saw and can describe how chemical weapons were made in Chechnya and saw a training facility for making chemical weapons in Afghanistan. The detainee also saw where improvised explosive devices were manufactured in Afghanistan, and said he will tell everything he knows about the USS Cole bombing.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee stated that the only person he had ever met that had openly admitted to being al Qaida was Usama bin Laden.

b. The detainee stated he feels that al Qaida is against all Muslim beliefs.

c. The detainee stated that he attended a training camp that was funded by Usama bin Laden, but he was not loyal to bin Laden. The detainee stated he did not receive orders from bin Laden or from anyone who said that they were speaking on bin Laden's behalf.

UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF HAMUD, HAMUD DAKHIL

d. The detainee stated that even after hearing Usama bin Laden's speeches he felt no hatred for the United States nor did he ever consider taking up arms or attacking Americans.

e. The detainee stated that he never swore, nor would he ever swear bayat to Usama bin Laden.

f. The detainee went to the training camp specifically to learn how to use weapons to defend and fight for Muslims.

g. The detainee stated that while at Tora Bora, Afghanistan, he was never involved in any kind of firefight, although he could hear gunfire at a distance. The detainee stated that he has never had to engage or shoot at the enemy.

h. The detainee stated radical Muslims are the ones who bomb and kill innocent people and claim that they are doing this in the name of God. The detainee stated that he does not agree with the actions of these radical Muslims.

i. The detainee stated that he did not fight against the Northern Alliance.

j. The detainee stated that he never fought Americans while in Afghanistan.

k. The detainee stated that he only went to join the jihad for the purpose of being a good Muslim, not to be a member of the Taliban or al Qaida networks. The detainee stated that he has no hatred towards the United States and that if he is ever released back to his country he will never take part in another jihad.

l. The detainee stated that he has learned a valuable lesson and has decided to learn the true meaning of Islam by going to the university in Saudi Arabia.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

UNCLASSIFIED

000359

UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

31 August 2006

TO: AL SHARAKH, ABDULHADI ABDALLAH IBRAHIM

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL SHARAKH, ABDULHADI
ABDALLAH IBRAHIM

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
 1. The detainee is one of three living sons in his family involved in fighting with the Arab Mujahedin.
 2. A senior al Qaida operative stated that the detainee's father came to Afghanistan from Saudi Arabia in 2001 for about one month. The senior al Qaida operative stated he met the detainee's father at the al Qaida guesthouse in Kabul, Afghanistan.
 3. The detainee stated that he was engaged in battle while in Kabul.
 4. The detainee admitted that he was a committed member of the Taliban regime, and that he was directed by his Sheik/Imam Hmood al Uqla from a mosque in al Kasim, Saudi Arabia, to travel to Afghanistan and assist the Taliban in jihad against the Northern Alliance.
 5. Sheikh Hamud al Uqqla was a Saudi mufti who issued a fatwa calling for jihad in Afghanistan. Al Uqqla condoned the 11 September 2001, attacks against the United States, and he helped raise money for Usama bin Laden until al Uqqla's death in Saudi Arabia in 2001.
 6. The detainee stated that a Sheik from his hometown of Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, also told him to travel to Afghanistan and assist the Taliban in their efforts. The detainee stated that the Sheik/Iman from the Masjid Abdulla al Jabreen in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia advised him that the jihad was for a good cause and that he should help the Taliban in the name of Allah.

DMO Exhibit 1
Page 1 of 5

UNCLASSIFIED

000360

ISN 231

UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL SHARAKH, ABDULHADI ABDALLAH IBRAHIM

7. The detainee stated that the war in Afghanistan between the Northern Alliance and the Taliban was political and that he knew he had an obligation to participate in jihad.

8. The detainee quoted el Hojerat verse, Sunnah chapters eight, nine, and ten as references for his obligation to participate in jihad and also to justify killing others in the name of Allah.

9. The detainee claimed that it was his duty to assist the Taliban in preserving the correct form of Islam. The detainee stated firmly that the Taliban were correct and the Northern Alliance and its followers were wrong.

10. The detainee stated that he would be rewarded for killing a Northern Alliance holdout. The detainee also stated that, if he were to die during the war, Allah would also reward him for his efforts.

b. Training

1. The detainee stated that he was able to participate in training and the jihad.

2. The detainee stated that while in Kabul he took a one-week urban warfare course run by Libyans. The detainee stated that he received instruction on how to fire, break down, and reassemble AK-47s, PK machine guns and rocket-propelled grenade launchers.

3. The detainee stated that he did attend the Taliban training camp named al Farouq, located outside Kabul and received weapons training on the Kalashnikov, the RPG, and the Russian PK.

4. Al Farouq training camp was located near Kandahar. The training course consisted of marksmanship training and the assembly and disassembly of numerous weapons. Students received training on the AK-47, AKM, and PK machine gun, firing a total of 30 rounds in the sitting, kneeling, and standing positions and they familiarized themselves with the RPG-7.

5. The detainee claimed he only carried and used the Kalashnikov during battle.

6. A senior al Qaida operative stated that he met the detainee for the first time in Kabul during 2000 or 2001 and stated that the detainee attended al Farouq camp.

7. A senior al Qaida operative stated he met the detainee a second time in 2001 when the detainee paid for specialized instruction on conducting attacks from motorcycles and cars, which were tactics not included in their basic al Farouq training, from a former Khaldan instructor.

8. The Khaldan camp was located in Khowst, Afghanistan.

UNCLASSIFIED

000361

UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL SHARAKH, ABDULHADI ABDALLAH IBRAHIM

9. A senior al Qaida operative stated that training courses at Khaldan included, but were not limited to, basic military training, mortars, explosives, and first aid.

10. It has been stated that the detainee had training on the use of manpads, SA-7, in December 2000.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee acknowledged traveling to Afghanistan and his participation in jihad with the Taliban.

2. The detainee claimed he spent a week in Karachi, Pakistan, at the Hotel Dubai, and that he then traveled to the Afghan border and entered a village near Qandahar, Afghanistan.

3. The detainee claimed he surrendered his passport to a Yemeni who resided at the safe house in Pakistan and that after two days the Yemeni returned the detainee's passport. The detainee noted forged stamps had been placed into his passport. The detainee claimed he does not know who actually faked the stamps, only that the Yemeni had the stamps placed into the detainee's passport.

4. The detainee stated that a Yemeni ran the safe house in Kandahar, Afghanistan.

5. The detainee stated that when the United States dropped bombs in Kabul, Afghanistan, he and other Taliban members fled to Jalalabad, Afghanistan. The detainee stated that he fled from Jalalabad to Tora Bora, Afghanistan, with a Kalashnikov and a Bandelaro containing ammunition. The detainee stated that the overall plan was to flee from Afghanistan into Pakistan.

6. The detainee stated that when he fled from Kabul, Afghanistan, he was accompanied by a Taliban leader.

7. The detainee was identified by another detainee as one of the Arabs in the trenches at Bagram, Afghanistan. The other detainee also had the detainee's mobile and house telephone numbers with him.

8. The detainee claimed that at the beginning of the one-week urban warfare course in Kabul, Afghanistan, the Taliban commander in Bagram, Afghanistan took from the detainee a bag containing the detainee's money and his personal possessions.

9. A senior al Qaida operative identified the detainee from a photo as being from Saudi Arabia.

UNCLASSIFIED

000362

UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL SHARAKH, ABDULHADI ABDALLAH IBRAHIM

d. Intent

1. The detainee stated that he would still fight today if the reason was justified and he emphasized that he wanted to attend and participate in jihad in Afghanistan.

e. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee stated that he departed Riyadh, Saudi Arabia in July 2001 with 14,000 United States Dollars that he had received from his father, and flew to Karachi, Pakistan with a two-hour transit stop in Oman.

2. The detainee claimed that after he became ill with jaundice in Afghanistan, he left Afghanistan after only two days, returned to Karachi, Pakistan and departed for Cairo, Egypt. The detainee claimed he was treated for jaundice in Cairo and that he stayed in Cairo for eight or nine months.

3. The detainee claimed that following his treatment for jaundice in Cairo, Egypt he departed for Tehran, Iran with a brief stopover in Oman. The detainee claimed that he was on his way from Oman to Tehran when he heard news of the 11 September 2001 attacks. After spending two days in Tehran, the detainee went by taxi to Herat, Afghanistan. The detainee stated that from Herat, he traveled to Kabul, Afghanistan and spent a total of three months in Afghanistan.

4. The detainee stated that he has never traveled to or resided in Egypt.

5. The detainee identified that the two stamps for Oman, showing that he arrived in June 2001 and later departed Oman on 11 September 2001, were fake (forged), that the two stamps reflecting he traveled to and from Egypt, and the one stamp reflecting he departed Pakistan were also faked (forged).

6. The detainee stated that he, four Yemenis, and five Pakistanis waited in the caves in Tora Bora, Afghanistan for a Pakistani navigator to arrive and guide the group into Pakistan to a safe house or location where they would not be captured.

7. The detainee claimed that after approximately three months in Afghanistan he left Kabul, Afghanistan and went to Jalalabad, Afghanistan and ended up in a village in Pakistan where he was detained by Pakistani authorities.

UNCLASSIFIED

000363

UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL SHARAKH, ABDULHADI ABDALLAH IBRAHIM

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001 and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.

b. The detainee denied undergoing urban warfare training.

c. The detainee stated that he never engaged in fighting while hiding in Tora Bora, Afghanistan.

d. The detainee stated that, once in Pakistan he wanted to surrender to Pakistan authorities and ultimately be turned over to the Saudi Embassy. The detainee stated that he hoped the Embassy would return him to Saudi Arabia so that he could return to his family.

e. The detainee stated that he would still fight today if the reason were justified. The detainee later contradicted this statement and noted that he had no desire to fight and had fulfilled his jihad obligation in Afghanistan.

f. A senior al Qaida operative stated that the detainee was not an al Qaida member.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

UNCLASSIFIED

000364

UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

6 March 2006

TO: AL AWDA, FOUZI KHALID ABDULLAH

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL AWDA, FOUZI KHALID
ABDULLAH

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee left home to travel to Afghanistan for two months. The detainee brought approximately 4,000 United States Dollars, 4,000 Saudi Riyals, and 400 Deutschmarks.

2. The detainee traveled first to Dubai, United Arab Emirates. The detainee then traveled from Dubai to Karachi, Pakistan and then on to Quetta, Pakistan. Once the detainee reached Quetta, he traveled across the Afghanistan border to Buldak.

3. In Buldak, the detainee asked a sheik at the mosque to contact someone from the Taliban to assist him in traveling to places to teach in Afghanistan. The Taliban official drove the detainee to Kandahar, Afghanistan and then to Logar.

4. The detainee traveled to Afghanistan under the auspices of providing monetary relief and to teach the Koran to affected Afghans. The detainee was eventually captured by Pakistani border troops without documents, during his attempt to escape from Afghanistan.

b. Training

1. A Taliban official took the detainee to a small camp located one hour outside of Kandahar, Afghanistan where the detainee fired a Kalashnikov rifle at some targets.

2. The detainee related that he fired a Kalashnikov a few times but never received training in the use of the weapon.

UNCLASSIFIED

DMO Exhibit 1
Page 1 of 3

000365

ISN 232

UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL AWDA, FOUZI KHALID ABDULLAH

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee traveled with a small group of twelve men to the mountains and stated that the group may have had some al Qaida or Taliban members.
2. The detainee's name was found on a computer file that lists contact points and telephone numbers for al Qaida Mujahidin in Pakistan.
3. The detainee's name was found on a computer file used by suspected al Qaida members that contained a list of 78 associates incarcerated in Pakistan. Allied personnel found this information in a suspected al Qaida safehouse in Islamabad, Pakistan.
4. The detainee stated that he knew one Taliban member, an Arab from either Yemen or Saudi Arabia who took him to Arabic schools so that he could teach the Koran.

d. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee stayed in Jalalabad in a house with three Arabs who appear to be fighters who carried Kalashnikovs.
2. After about two weeks in Jalalabad, one of the Arabs who appeared to be a fighter gave the detainee a Kalashnikov and the detainee departed with a large group of others trying to make it through the Tora Bora Mountains to Pakistan.
3. The detainee surrendered and laid down his Kalashnikov to Pakistan border guards.
4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
 - a. The detainee stated that he is not a member of the Taliban or al Qaida.
 - b. The detainee reiterated that he just wanted to go to Afghanistan for three weeks to teach and give money to the poor and get back to his job with the Kuwaiti government.
 - c. The detainee denied going to Afghanistan to fight the jihad and stated that there were muslims on both sides of the fight and he could not kill muslims.
 - d. The detainee stated that he was not a soldier and has had no formal military training.
 - e. The detainee denied attending any training camps and stated that he never fought with or knew anyone belonging to al Qaida.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL AWDA, FOUZI KHALID ABDULLAH

f. The detainee stated that he is not aware of any potential upcoming attacks against the United States or Western interests.

g. The detainee is not aware of potential al Qaida plans to reconstitute past terrorist plots to carry out attacks on specific targets.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

18 April 2006

TO: SALIH, ABDUL AL RAZZAQ MUHAMMAD

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SALIH, ABDUL AL RAZZAQ
MUHAMMAD

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee is a Yemeni citizen who traveled to Afghanistan prior to 11 September 2001 via Dubai, United Arab Emirates and Karachi, Pakistan.

2. The detainee stated he felt compelled to go to Afghanistan to teach the Koran to the Afghans. The detainee stated that he was not formally trained in the Koran, but wanted to go just recite what he could.

3. The detainee traveled to Afghanistan with a falsified passport which was issued in Taiz, Yemen, in 2001.

4. The detainee was identified as a jihadist that worked at the Talut Center in Tora Bora. The detainee carried or operated a Bika weapon.

b. Training

1. The detainee trained at al Farouq.

2. Al Farouq was an Al Qaida training camp that trained all non-Afghans to fight for the Taliban as well as other jihads. The training encompassed eight to ten weeks of intense instruction covering weapons familiarization, commando tactics, topography and explosives.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee was identified as al Qa'Qa al Yemeni.

DMO Exhibit 1
Page 1 of 2

UNCLASSIFIED

000368

ISN 233

UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SALIH, ABDUL AL RAZZAQ MUHAMMAD

2. The name al Qi'Qa al Yemeni was found on a set of al Qaida training camp applications.

3. The detainee's name and other information were found on a document listing over 300 Arabic names, aliases and nationalities. The document was recovered from safe house raids associated with suspected al Qaida in Karachi, Pakistan.

d. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee crossed the Pakistani boarder where he turned himself over to the Pakistani forces.

2. The detainee was transferred into United States custody on 2 January 2002.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee stated that he doesn't like violence and was not fighting in Afghanistan, but was seeking a job teaching in a mosque.

b. The detainee denied any knowledge of the 11 September 2001 attack on the World Trade Center or of perpetrators of the bombing of the U.S.S. Cole. The detainee also stated that the perpetrators in the 11 September 2001 attack are the biggest criminals.

c. The detainee said Sheikh Soulis said it was forbidden to fight for the Taliban so he never had a weapon and never joined in the fighting. The detainee stated he wasn't brave enough to carry a weapon or fight.

d. The detainee denied any al Qaida or Taliban connection and claimed never to have seen Usama bin Laden.

e. The detainee denied having any knowledge relating to the conflict in Afghanistan, the Taliban or any terrorist organizations.

f. The detainee stated that if released, he would like to return to his place of birth, located in Haja, Yemen and would return to his family's farm.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

23 May 2006

TO: AL ZAHRANI, KHALID MOHAMMED

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL ZAHRANI, KHALID MOHAMMED

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee is a Saudi Arabian national who volunteered to travel to Afghanistan to fight against the Northern Alliance in May 2001.

2. The detainee began planning for jihad, which included talking to sheikhs to receive advice on travel routes. While on vacation with his family, the detainee left and met with an individual.

3. The detainee was on the front line in an area called Kut Kalif in Kabul, Afghanistan.

4. The detainee was in a fighting position in the Tora Bora mountain region from 23 November 2001 until 18 December 2001.

b. Training

The detainee traveled to Kut Bakram training camp in Kabul, Afghanistan where he received training on the Kalashnikov rifle and rocket-propelled grenades.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee's name and phone number were found in a computer file which was associated with a senior al Qaida lieutenant. It was seized during joint raids with a foreign government service.

DMO Exhibit 1
Page 1 of 3

UNCLASSIFIED

000370

ISN 234

UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL ZAHRANI, KHALID MOHAMMED

2. According to a foreign government service, the detainee was listed among reported members of al Qaida.

3. The detainee's name was on a document listing 324 Arabic names, aliases, and nationalities recovered from safe house raids associated with suspected al Qaida in Karachi, Pakistan. The list identified the detainee by name, nationality, and noted he had a Saudi passport in his possession.

4. The detainee's name was found on a document containing a list of names, safety-deposit boxes, and contents found on a floppy disk recovered from raids of a suspect al Qaida safe house on 11 September 2002.

5. The detainee's name was found under a chat session on a computer hard drive seized from the suspected al Qaida cell that attacked the U.S. Marines on Faylaka Island in October 2002.

6. The detainee's name was on a list recovered from computer media of al Qaida Mujahedin and the contents of their trust accounts during raids against al Qaida-associated safe houses in Rawalpindi and Karachi between 11 September 2002 and 1 March 2003.

7. The name of the detainee was found on an Arabic-language computer file, which lists contact points and telephone numbers for al Qaida Mujahedin in Pakistan. According to the file, these Mujahedin were among a group who came to Afghanistan in December 2001 but who had not completed their training and were not ready to fight in the war.

8. The detainee was listed in a computer file recovered from a suspected al Qaida safe house in Islamabad, Pakistan. The file lists 78 associates incarcerated in Pakistan and appears to be an updated/corrected copy of an earlier list.

9. The detainee's name was listed on an undated letter that listed 68 probable al Qaida members incarcerated in Pakistan. The purpose of the document was to incite the people against the Pakistani government.

d. Intent

1. The detainee stated that he followed a fatwa to help the Taliban fight jihad.

2. The detainee went to Afghanistan because of a fatwa issued over the internet.

3. The detainee was a Taliban fighter from August to December 2001, and fought on the Bagram line near Kabul, Afghanistan for two weeks in October 2001.

e. Other Relevant Data

UNCLASSIFIED

000371

UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL ZAHRANI, KHALID MOHAMMED

The detainee was in possession of a Casio watch model that is linked to bombings committed by al Qaida and other radical Islamic terrorists.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

The detainee stated that he did not have prior knowledge of the attacks on 11 September 2001 and he is not affiliated with al Qaida.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

UNCLASSIFIED

000372

UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

20 July 2006

TO: JARABH, SAEED AHMED MOHAMMED ABDULLAH SAREM

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF
JARABH, SAEED AHMED MOHAMMED ABDULLAH SAREM

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee cited the Koran and the possibility of expanding his gold business as motivation for travel to Afghanistan. The detainee made his own travel arrangements.

2. The detainee traveled from Yemen to Dubai then to United Arab Emirates and Tehran, Iran and arrived in Mashhad, Iran.

3. The detainee traveled from Iran to Afghanistan. The detainee stated that he traveled to Afghanistan because he intended to go to the Chechen border to help refugees.

b. Training

1. The detainee attended the Abu Abaida Training Camp. The detainee was trained on the Kalashnikov rifle.

2. The detainee stated that he learned to fire a Kalashnikov rifle because it was the duty of all Muslims to be able to defend themselves.

3. The detainee trained with weapons for one week at the Abu Abaida Training Camp, also known as Tarnak Farms near the Kandahar Airport in Afghanistan.

DMO Exhibit 1
Page 1 of 3

UNCLASSIFIED

000373

ISN 235

UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF JARABH, SAEED AHMED MOHAMMED ABDULLAH SAREM

4. The Tarnak Farms facility in Afghanistan housed an al Qaida poison and explosive training laboratory and an advanced operational training camp. The Tarnak Farms camp was considered the most important al Qaida training camp in Afghanistan since it was where al Qaida operatives received advanced operational training including urban assault and other tactics.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee was directly assisted by six men identified as individuals who facilitated travel, lodging, and training for the Taliban.

2. The detainee has been identified as an al Qaida member.

3. The detainee admitted knowing a Yemen based al Qaida facilitator.

d. Intent

1. The detainee has been identified as the owner of a Casio F-91WK wristwatch. This model has been used in bombings that have been linked to al Qaida and radical Islamic terrorist improvised explosive devices.

2. The detainee was identified as a machine gunner at Tora Bora, Afghanistan.

e. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee traveled to Afghanistan twice.

2. The detainee stated that all of the information he provided when he was initially captured was false.

3. Foreign authorities held the detainee for approximately twenty-three days before the detainee was transferred to United States control.

4. The detainee's name was identified on documents listing al Qaida Mujahedin that were seized during raids against al Qaida associated safe houses.

5. The detainee stated that he could not promise that he would not attack the United States or American citizens.

6. The detainee stated that he believed that America was at war with Islam and that the United States Government had decided the fate of the detainees.

UNCLASSIFIED

000374

UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF JARABH, SAEED AHMED MOHAMMED ABDULLAH SAREM

7. The detainee stated that the United States is incarcerating innocent people. The detainee refused to identify any innocent individuals.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

- a. The detainee claimed that he never had any intention of joining al Qaida.
- b. The detainee stated that if he was released, he would like to return to Sanaa, Yemen and pursue a career in livestock or as a jewelry trader.
- c. The detainee acknowledged he might continue pursuing his religious studies if released, but also stated that it is time to change his life. The detainee said that in his country there are better opportunities for those who possess scientific knowledge and are skilled with computers.
- d. The detainee believes the 11 September 2001 attacks were a tragedy. The detainee said that Usama bin Laden is responsible for the attacks and believes Usama bin Laden is not a true Muslim. The detainee insisted that Usama bin Laden is just another Mujahed and has no authority to declare a fatwah.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

UNCLASSIFIED

000375

UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

7 April 2006

To: HADJARAB, NABIL

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF HADJARAB, NABIL

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. While living in France, the detainee purchased a French passport and traveled from Paris to the United Kingdom at the end of November 2000.

2. In November 2001, the detainee fled Jalalabad. The detainee joined a group of eight others led by Abu Thabit and went up into the mountains where the detainee shared a trench with the group.

3. The detainee's trench was equipped with a Kalashnikov rifle and a few hand grenades.

4. In mid December 2001, the detainee was injured during a helicopter attack as he was heading toward the Pakistan border. The detainee said he surrendered on the outskirts of a village in Afghanistan to armed Afghans, who then turned the detainee over to United States Forces.

5. During another interview, the detainee said he was injured while he was at Tora Bora, and he remained in a foxhole. Abu Thabit gave the detainee a weapon, the detainee claims that he never used it. The detainee remained in the foxhole for about 25 days then he and others began descending the mountain. When helicopters appeared everyone fled in different directions. Despite his injuries the detainee continued his descent. An unidentified Arab arrived and took the detainee's weapon, money and belongings, and carried him to a hospital. After he healed the detainee was taken to Kabul and held by Northern Alliance Troops. A week later the detainee was turned over to American soldiers and stated he was so happy to be released to Americans.

DMO Exhibit 1
Page 1 of 3

UNCLASSIFIED

000376

ISN 238

UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF HADJARAB, NABIL

b. Training

1. The detainee was trained on a Kalashnikov rifle by Zacharia. Zacharia gave the detainee a Kalashnikov rifle for use in self- defense.

2. Thabit commanded Camp Thabit, which was located in the Tora Bora region south of Jalalabad. The camp was one of a series of camps that were set up to support and defend retreating Taliban and al Qaida terrorist forces.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee primarily attended three mosques in London; Finsbury Park, Baker Street and Stamford Hill. Finsbury Park was the mosque the detainee attended most often for both prayers and lectures.

2. The Finsbury Park Mosque has been associated with an Islamic Fundamentalists gathering in which a number of senior muslim leaders gave presentations praising Usama bin Laden and justifying the 11 September 2001 attacks on the United States.

3. Sheik Abu Hamza the spiritual leader of Finsbury Park Mosque, facilitated travel to Afghanistan and access to Usama bin Laden training commanders.

4. The Baker Street Mosque was used for recruitment of young muslims. Baker Street Mosque was the home of the radical imam Abu Qatada al Filistini. The imam, Abu Qatada al Filistini, was al Qaida's spiritual leader in Europe.

5. The detainee has been identified as the London associate of an individual who was implicated in a plot to detonate an improvised radiological device in the United States.

6. Once in Jalalabad the detainee stayed at a house owned by an individual named Zacharia. Three other individuals were staying at the house all of which spoke Arabic with a North African dialect.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001 and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.

b. The detainee said he did not know Afghanistan was a haven for terrorists.

c. The detainee stated that he is truly sorry about what happened on 11 September 2001. The detainee stated that from the beginning he has been sincere with investigators and has told everything.

UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF HADJARAB, NABIL**

d. The detainee stated he had never been at al Farouq or received any military/weapons training. The detainee also denied that he had been a combatant in Afghanistan.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

UNCLASSIFIED

000378

UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

20 October 2006

TO: SAWAD, AL MADANI

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SAWAD, AL MADANI

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee stated he lived in the United States at two locations. The first was Atlanta, Georgia around 1990. The detainee later lived in Gaithersburg, Maryland.

2. The detainee has traveled to Romania where he was introduced to humanitarian organizations including the Islamic Heritage Revival and the Islamic Relief Organization.

3. According to a senior al Qaida operative the detainee first traveled to Afghanistan in 1993.

4. The detainee used an acquaintance to gain entry to Afghanistan.

5. In 1994, the detainee traveled to Bosnia.

6. The detainee taught Arabs how to fight the jihad during the Bosnia-Serb War

7. Around 1995 the detainee traveled to Turkey and Holland and from there to England.

8. The detainee stated he stole a passport and also admitted he bought a forged Belgium passport.

9. In 1998, the detainee visited al Qaida cells in New York City and upstate New York. This trip was financed by the leader of the London, England al Qaida cell.

DMO Exhibit 1
Page 1 of 4

UNCLASSIFIED

000379

ISN 239

UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SAWAD, AL MADANI

10. In 1998, the detainee traveled to Afghanistan, where he stayed in the al Ansar Guest House of a known al Qaida facilitator.

11. The detainee visited the Khaldan Camp.

12. The detainee went to Afghanistan a second time around 1999.

13. A source stated the detainee took another trip to the United States around 2000 and then traveled to London and met with al Qaida cell leaders.

14. The detainee stated he went to Afghanistan in 2000 specifically to be with the Mujahedin on the front lines. The detainee ate, slept and carried a gun with the troops on the front line.

15. A source stated the detainee was a fighter in Tora Bora and Bagram, Afghanistan.

16. A source stated the detainee was in charge of a group of men at Tora Bora, Afghanistan and that the detainee was close to Usama bin Laden because he was able to speak to bin Laden without requesting permission.

17. The detainee was seen armed with a 82mm mortar and an M43 - 120mm mortar which he was taking to the front line.

18. The detainee stated he was armed with a Kalashnikov rifle while hidden in a cave area of Tora Bora.

b. Training

1. A source stated the detainee received training on basic explosives and booby traps.

2. The detainee fought against the Serbs and was trained on the use of the Kalashnikov rifle and rocket propelled grenades.

c. Connections/Associations

1. A source stated the detainee is known to have links to al Qaida as a recruiter.

2. The detainee was identified as a member of the London, England al Qaida cell.

3. The detainee received assistance from nongovernmental organizations known to support al Qaida.

UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SAWAD, AL MADANI

4. The detainee stated he knew the former representative of Usama bin Laden based in the United Kingdom.

5. A source stated that the detainee was an advisor to Usama bin Laden and organizer at Tora Bora, Kandahar and Kabul, Afghanistan.

6. A source stated that the detainee was very close to Usama bin Laden and would ask him for advice on how to deal with certain military situations and where to stage weapons.

7. A source stated that the detainee acted as a special interpreter for Usama bin Laden and was the only person close to Usama bin Laden who spoke fluent English and Arabic.

8. A source stated that the detainee received money from Usama bin Laden.

9. The detainee stated he had never heard of al Qaida until 2000 but knew about Usama bin Laden.

10. The detainee stated he never met Usama bin Laden and did not know of Usama bin Laden receiving contributions from various organizations. The detainee also stated he did not know of anybody preaching about Usama bin Laden in Britain.

d. Intent

1. The detainee referred to himself as a terrorist and stated that the United States would and should fall because it has become an unjust nation.

2. The detainee stated he would be happy to be a martyr for his religion.

e. Other Relevant Data

The detainee was captured in the Jalalabad, Afghanistan area after he and others had fled the Tora Bora area of Afghanistan.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee stated the lifestyle he led while living in Britain would not allow him to have been involved in organizations associated with terrorism. The detainee is a Mujahedin serving his religion but for good reasons.

b. The detainee stated he was never recruited by anyone and he did not play a role with people involved with terrorist acts.

c. The detainee stated he never saw any training taking place at the Khaldan Camp but he did see the caves where the mosque and storage areas were.

UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SAWAD, AL MADANI

d. The detainee admitted he delivered food and aid to the Arab Brigade 3rd Corps in Zenitsa, Bosnia but never served with the brigade.

e. The detainee stated that while he was on the front lines in Afghanistan he never fired a shot and that the fighting was not very bad when he was there.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

UNCLASSIFIED

000382

UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

15 March 2006

TO: AL SHABLI, ABDULLAH YAHIA YOUSF

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL SHABLI, ABDULLAH YAHIA
YOUSF

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee met a Mujahedin fighter who financed the detainee's travels to the al Farouq training camp in Afghanistan.

2. The detainee was given a false Yemeni passport for use in getting to Afghanistan.

3. In August 2001, the detainee traveled to Herat, Afghanistan, through Iran.

4. The detainee went to Kandahar, Afghanistan and stayed in a safe house for one week before departing for the al Farouq training camp.

5. After leaving al Farouq the detainee traveled to Kabul, Afghanistan and alternated staying at two safe houses there. He then went to the Malek Center.

6. When the bombing of Kabul began, the detainee moved closer to the Pakistan border so as to escape from Afghanistan and then return home to Iran.

7. When he arrived in Jalalabad, Afghanistan, he stayed at a safe house outside of the city. He remained there approximately three weeks.

8. When the bombing of Jalalabad began, the detainee traveled towards the Pakistan boarder in a convoy.

DMO Exhibit 1
Page 1 of 2

UNCLASSIFIED

000383

ISN 240

UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL SHABLI, ABDULLAH YAHIA YOUSF

9. The detainee's group came under attack as they exited the mountains. The bombing continued and prevented the detainee from re-entering the mountains.

10. The detainee met people who took a small group to a stable and later into their house. One evening, Afghan authorities arrived at the house and took the fighters into custody.

b. Training

1. The detainee admits he received weapons training at the al Farouq camp. The detainee received training on the Kalashnikov, the rocket-propelled grenade launcher, and the Simonov. The 11 September 2001 attacks on the United States occurred during the detainee's first week in training. The detainee became ill and stopped training.

2. The detainee received approximately one month of anti-aircraft artillery and rocket-propelled grenade training while at the Malek Center.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee's name was among the 324 names listed on a document recovered from a safe house raid associated with suspected al Qaida in Karachi, Pakistan.

2. The detainee claims he had seen Usama bin Ladin in the Tora Bora mountains.

3. The detainee was identified as being in Tora Bora after he received training at al Farouq.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee reports he had no intention to fight the Northern Alliance or the United States. There is no reason for him to fight the United States since Yemen and the United States have good relations. He is willing to tell the authorities if he hears anything about an uprising.

b. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001, and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

UNCLASSIFIED

000384

UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

12 July 2006

TO: AHMAD, KHALED

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AHMAD, KHALED

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee traveled to Afghanistan because he was responding to a fatwa issued by a sheik. The detainee's recruiter told him he should go fight. The detainee wanted to go to Kashmir, Pakistan to fight.

2. The detainee originally wanted to fight in Kashmir, Pakistan because Muslims were being killed there.

3. The detainee traveled to Afghanistan in late 1999 from Aden, Yemen to Sanaa, Yemen. The individual who facilitated his travel met the detainee in Sanaa. The detainee then traveled to Karachi, Pakistan. The detainee then traveled from Karachi to Quetta, Pakistan where he stayed at a Taliban guest house before traveling to Spin Bolduc, Afghanistan.

4. While the detainee was in Spin Bolduc, Afghanistan, he was told to go to Kandahar, Afghanistan. The detainee traveled from Spin Bolduc to Kandahar and stayed at a guest house before traveling to Kabul, Afghanistan.

5. After completing basic training at al Farouq, the detainee went to a guest house in Kabul, Afghanistan. At the guest house, the detainee was given a weapon. The detainee then went to the front lines of the fighting against the Northern Alliance.

DMO Exhibit 1
Page 1 of 3

UNCLASSIFIED

000385

ISN242

UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF QASIM, KHALED

6. Since there was no action on the front lines, the detainee left and went to a guest house located in Kandahar, Afghanistan. The detainee then traveled to another guest house in Kandahar and stayed there for two months. From Kandahar, the detainee went back to al Farouq for additional training.

b. Training

1. The detainee trained twice at al Farouq. The first time he was at al Farouq, the training involved basic training. The second time he attended al Farouq, the training involved advanced training that included mountain warfare and tactical training.

2. At al Farouq, the detainee received basic training which included Kalashnikov rifles, M-16s, PK machine guns, rocket-propelled grenades, hand grenades, and explosives. The detainee received three days of topography training that included how to use a compass and maps. The detainee received tactical training in army fighting, attacking and retreating. A large percentage of the training involved physical exercise, including digging trenches.

3. The detainee has stated that he attended al Farouq training camp in early 2001.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee has been identified as an al Qaida instructor. The detainee trained fighters on the use of Kalashnikov rifles and grenades at an unidentified location near the Bagram, Afghanistan airport. The detainee was constantly preaching about al Qaida and had stated that he received money from al Qaida.

2. The detainee saw Usama bin Laden one time at the Abdul Aziz Center in Tora Bora, Afghanistan. Usama bin Laden spoke to a group of people there.

3. The detainee's brother is on the foreign country's list of al Qaida in Afghanistan.

4. The detainee is listed as an al Qaida Mujahedin on computer hardware that was seized during raids against al Qaida safe houses in Pakistan.

5. The detainee's name was on a document recovered from a safe house raid associated with suspected al Qaida in Pakistan.

6. The detainee's name was discovered on a list of names that were maintained on computer hardware which was recovered from raids of a suspected al Qaida safe house in Pakistan.

7. The detainee's name was contained in a list of captured Mujahedin on a computer that was associated with a senior al Qaida member.

UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF QASIM, KHALED

8. The detainee has been identified as a Yemen al Qaida member.

9. The detainee has been identified as being on the Taliban front lines in Kabul, Afghanistan

d. Other Relevant Data

1. While in Afghanistan, the detainee was in charge of a group at Tora Bora, Afghanistan.

2. The detainee has been identified as somebody who is experienced in explosives and was an instructor at al Farouq. The detainee instructed trainees on all types of artillery.

3. The detainee had withdrawn to the Bagram, Afghanistan area from Kabul, Afghanistan and was instructed to travel to Pakistan. The detainee eventually traveled to Pakistan through the mountains in the Tora Bora, Afghanistan region.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee stated that while at al Farouq, he did not take an oath and also insisted that he is not a member of al Qaida.

b. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001.

c. The detainee denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.

d. The detainee denied any knowledge or planning of internal uprisings at the Guantanamo Bay, Cuba detention facility.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

UNCLASSIFIED

000387

UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

24 August 2006

TO: AL ATAYBI, BENDAR

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL ATAYBI, BENDAR

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. A Foreign Government reported that the detainee left Saudi Arabia destined to Jordan on 18 January 2001.

2. The detainee stated that he departed Saudi Arabia with 30,000 United States Dollars, traveled to Syria where he stayed for two weeks. Then the detainee went to Istanbul, Turkey where he stayed for six to seven months while looking for a wife. The detainee stated that during Ramadan 2001, he decided to travel to Pakistan to offer his assistance and cash to Afghan refugees. The detainee stated that he flew to Pakistan and was captured at a checkpoint in Quetta, Pakistan when his money was discovered.

3. An individual stated that the detainee came directly from Saudi Arabia to work in the al Wafa office in Herat, Afghanistan and the detainee was the director of that office.

4. An individual stated that when the war reached Herat, Afghanistan, the detainee decided not to leave Afghanistan and went to Kabul, Afghanistan to join the head of al Wafa in Afghanistan.

5. A second individual stated that the detainee was in charge of the al Wafa office in Herat, Afghanistan. The individual stated that in addition to digging wells and distributing medical supplies to refugee camps, the Herat al Wafa office arranged vehicle purchases.

DMO Exhibit 1
Page 1 of 3

UNCLASSIFIED

000388

ISN 243

UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL ATAYBI, BENDAR

6. A third individual stated that twelve land cruiser vehicles to be used by the Taliban were purchased in the United Arab Emirates on behalf of al Wafa and were received by the detainee, who was the head of the al Wafa office in Herat, Afghanistan.

7. A fourth individual stated that the detainee came to the Qandahar office after closing the al Wafa office in Herat, Afghanistan following the 11 September 2001 attacks. The individual stated that the detainee took over running the Qandahar al Wafa office until it was ordered closed in anticipation of United States retaliatory air strikes.

8. A foreign government reported that the detainee's name and phone number in Herat, Afghanistan were found in early October 2001 in the residence of the Karachi, Pakistan manager of al Wafa al Igatha al Islamia.

9. Al Wafa is a Terrorist Exclusion List designee. This facilitates the United States Government's ability to exclude aliens associated with al Wafa from entering the United States.

b. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee stated that he had money worth approximately 28,000 United States Dollars in Turkish, Saudi, Pakistani and United States currencies when he was detained.

2. A Foreign Government reported that the detainee was arrested on 12 November 2001 for entering Pakistan and trying to travel to Kuwait, Pakistan.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee stated that all of the money he had with him when he was detained was his own.

b. The detainee stated that he had never been to Afghanistan prior to his detainment.

c. The detainee stated that he did not intend to fight with the Taliban or al Qaida, and that he did not transport cash for either group.

d. The detainee stated that he had no knowledge of Usama bin Laden, his associates, al Qaida or the existence or location of any training camps.

e. The detainee stated that he had no knowledge of the 11 September 2001 attacks against the United States, the bombing of the U.S.S. Cole in Yemen or the bombings against American targets in Africa or Saudi Arabia.

f. The detainee stated that if returned to Saudi Arabia, he would check on his wife, start a new life and would not travel to Pakistan or Afghanistan for any reason.

UNCLASSIFIED

000389

UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL ATAYBI, BENDAR**

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

UNCLASSIFIED

000390

UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

17 October 2006

TO: NASSER, ABDULATIF

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF NASSER, ABDULATIF

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
 1. The detainee stated he was a member of the Islamic fundamentalist group, Jamaat Adl Wa al Ihssan, while he was in Morocco. The detainee stated his activities with the Islamic fundamentalist group were tied in with the Irshad Council being investigated and indicted.
 2. The detainee stated that he worked into a lower leadership position in his neighborhood Jamaat al Adl Wa al Ihssan chapter in Morocco. In the summer of 1990, the detainee was put on house arrest after the leader of Jamaat al Adl Wa al Ihssan and the detainee attended a peaceful sit-in in protest.
 3. At 25-26 years of age, the detainee stated he traveled to Libya to visit his brother and ended up working in Libya, selling goods in various markets for two years. After two years the detainee began selling his goods in Sudan, where he was recruited for jihad.
 4. The detainee stated he watched a training video in Sudan that focused on the glory of fighting jihad, and the reasons why an individual should go to Afghanistan to fight for Islam. The detainee stated the film footage was very moving and reinforced his feelings about going to jihad.
 5. The detainee made the decision to be in charge of the front lines that defended Tora Bora. The detainee stated that he wanted be the first in the line if there was a confrontation. The detainee stated he also took charge of the center, which was part of the front line.

DMO Exhibit 1
Page 1 of 4

000391

UNCLASSIFIED

ISN 244

UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF NASSER, ABDULATIF

6. At the end of 1997, the detainee went to Afghanistan to train on military weapons and tactics. The detainee traveled from Sanaa, Yemen to Peshawar, Pakistan via Karachi, Pakistan. The detainee took a taxi to the Pakistan/Afghanistan border and walked across into Afghanistan. The detainee traveled by taxi to Jalalabad, Afghanistan and stayed at a Libyan guest house in Jalalabad for one day while the Taliban approved his travel papers.

b. Training

1. The detainee clarified that the Libyan guest house was an al Qaida-sponsored guest house in Afghanistan and that he stayed there while transiting to the al Farouq Training Camp.

2. The detainee stated he met an individual in Jalalabad, who convinced him to go to a training camp nearby that many Libyans went to. The detainee went to Derunta to a camp run by a Moroccan national who belonged to the Islamic Party. The detainee stayed there two weeks training on the PK and Kalashnikov rifle.

3. The detainee stated he trained three months at the al Farouq Training Camp. The detainee received basic skills training on the Kalashnikov rifle, map reading, camouflage, artillery, and mountain tactics.

4. The detainee stated he received training on 7.62mm, 7.65mm and 12.7mm firearms, 30mm auto grenade launcher, RPG-7, RGD-5 hand grenades and F-1 anti-personnel grenades.

5. After training at al Farouq, the detainee stated that he traveled to Kabul, Afghanistan to fight on the front lines. The detainee stayed in a Libyan guest house in Kabul and rotated between the front and rear lines. When not fighting, the detainee and his fellow fighters usually stayed in a Libyan encampment at the rear line. In between rotations, the detainee helped train new fighters on the Kalashnikov rifle.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee stated that he joined the Jamaat Tablighi group in Sudan for approximately forty days before splitting with his friends and joining the Kulyah al-Koran al-Karim (University of the Sacred Koran) in Madani, Sudan. Having tried dawa (spreading the message) and hijra (migration), the detainee decided that the only other option for serving Islam was to turn to jihad.

2. While in Sudan the detainee stated that he worked as a production overseer in the Usama bin Laden-owned company, Sharikat Wadi Alakik. The detainee worked there for approximately two years. During this time, the detainee frequently saw Usama bin Laden running the day-to-day operations of his business.

UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF NASSER, ABDULATIF

3. In February 2001, the detainee stated that he attended the wedding of Usama bin Laden's son, in Afghanistan. The detainee stayed at an al Qaida guest house in Kandahar that was hosted by the Libyan organization, Al Jama Al Islami Al Mugatila.

d. Detainee Actions and Statements

1. The detainee admitted that he is the highest-ranking defender of Tora Bora detained at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.

2. The detainee stated that if the Islamic leadership of Afghanistan declared a fatwa, he will be against the United States.

e. Other Relevant Data

1. At the end of Ramadan 2001, several other groups of fighters met up with the detainee and they departed for Pakistan. After an attack by United States helicopters, Northern Alliance forces captured the survivors and took the detainee and the other groups of fighters to a Red Cross/Red Crescent hospital in Afghanistan. The detainee was not injured in the attack.

2. A source stated the detainee was captured in late 2001/early 2002 by Northern Alliance forces and thrown into a Northern Alliance prison in Kabul, Afghanistan.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. When questioned whether the detainee ever had the opportunity to swear bayat to Usama bin Laden, the detainee replied he had the opportunity but chose against it. The detainee stated he still respected Usama bin Laden but disagreed with what bin Laden and al Qaida were doing outside of Afghanistan. The detainee advised he did not think Usama bin Laden was in a position to issue a fatwa because Usama bin Laden was not a religious scholar. The detainee stated this was especially true if the fatwa ordered something that would cause harm to others since this goes against Islamic law.

b. The detainee denied training anyone at Khalden Training Camp. When asked why someone had identified the detainee as a trainer named Taha at the Khalden training camp, the detainee said he would like to see his accuser face-to-face and confront him.

c. The detainee stated if he were released he would go to Morocco and would see his family and go back to work buying and selling merchandise.

UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF NASSER, ABDULATIF

d. The detainee did not agree with the attack on 11 September 2001 on the United States. The detainee further thought the people killed on 11 September 2001 were innocent, and it was wrong to attack them. The detainee further explained it was against Islamic principles to attack innocent people and that Usama bin Laden is wrong to justify attacking Americans because they are "unbelievers", when Islamic law teaches Christians and Jews are not unbelievers. The detainee also stated it is wrong to attack people simply because they are unbelievers and that Muslim and Christians are the same.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

UNCLASSIFIED

000394

UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

23 May 2006

TO: AL SILM HAJI HAJJAJ AWWAD AL HAJJAJI

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF
AL SILM HAJI HAJJAJ AWWAD AL HAJJAJI

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee traveled to Afghanistan to join the jihad and fight with the Taliban.

2. The detainee traveled from Jeddah, Saudi Arabia to Doha, Qatar. The detainee next went to Lahore, Pakistan. After a brief stay at a hotel the detainee ultimately traveled to Quetta, Pakistan.

3. The detainee was supplied plane tickets for travel to Pakistan and was also provided a contact in Lahore, Pakistan.

4. Once the detainee arrived at Quetta, Pakistan, he was picked up and brought to the Afghan border and then finally to a Kandahar, Afghanistan safe house.

b. Training

1. The detainee has stated that he attended training at al Farouq in late 2001.

2. The detainee was trained on weapons, land navigation, maneuvering, and general military skills at the al Farouq training camp.

c. Other Relevant Data

DMO Exhibit 1
Page 1 of 2

UNCLASSIFIED

000395

ISN 245

UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL SILM HAJI HAJJAJ AWWAD AL HAJJAJI

1. The detainee was captured by the Northern Alliance in December 2001 and then handed over to United States custody.
2. The detainee's name was on a document containing a list of names recovered from raids of a suspected al Qaida safe house.
3. The detainee's name was on a chart that listed the names of captured Mujahedin. The information was found on a computer that was associated with a senior al Qaida member.
4. The detainee claimed he was told it was the duty of all Muslims to help the Taliban. The detainee spent approximately nine months in Afghanistan training with the Taliban.
4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
 - a. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001.
 - b. The detainee denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.
 - c. The detainee denied having any knowledge or planning of internal uprisings at the Guantanamo Bay detention facility.
5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

UNCLASSIFIED

000396

UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

16 May 2006

TO: AL HAMIRI, MUHAMMAD ABDALLAH MUHAMMAD AWAD DYAB

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL HAMIRI, MUHAMMAD
ABDALLAH MUHAMMAD AWAD DYAB

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee left Yemen for Pakistan in August 2001. From Pakistan the detainee traveled to Kandahar, Afghanistan and stayed there for one month.

2. The detainee went to Kabul and stayed for about two months in the home of a person the detainee felt may have been associated with the Taliban.

3. The Pakistani Police captured the detainee at the border on or about 16 December 2001. United States Forces took custody of the detainee on 4 January 2002.

b. Training

The detainee was identified as being trained at the al Farouq camp in Afghanistan.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee was identified as being at the Nebras guest house, where he spoke with Usama bin Laden.

2. The detainee found a group of Arab fighters to accompany as he attempted to escape and cross the border into Pakistan.

d. Other Relevant Data

DMO Exhibit 1
Page 1 of 2

UNCLASSIFIED

000397

ISN 249

UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL HAMIRI, MUHAMMAD ABDALLAH MUHAMMAD AWAD DYAB

1. A wealthy British resident from Yemen escorted and fully funded the detainee's trip to Afghanistan and offered to fund his medical treatment in a Pakistan Hospital.

2. The detainee never visited a hospital during his visit to Islamabad, Pakistan and could not provide details on locations visited.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001 and having knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on United States interests.

b. The detainee claims he left Yemen for Pakistan for medical treatment and was tricked by a British resident into going into Afghanistan where he did nothing for six months.

c. The detainee denied knowledge of the British resident's affiliation with any organizations.

d. The detainee denies receiving military training at al Farouq camp in Kandahar, and denies having met Usama bin Laden.

e. The detainee said that he is generally compliant in detention, like honey on butter, and that he gets along with all the guards except the few that are rude. When released, he plans to return to his hometown. The detainee said that all his neighbors and friends love him. The detainee runs errands for them. The detainee hopes to get married.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

UNCLASSIFIED

000398