

# J-006/(TNG Support Packages/Doctrine Revisions)

**(x) RECOMMENDATION/OBSERVATION**

- Particularly for units new to theater, cordon and search operations can have a tendency to replace the careful, deliberate development of intelligence. This is the result of a lack of experience and appropriate intelligence gathering assets at the small unit level. Large, unspecific cordon and search operations more often than not result in a large number of local nationals being temporarily displaced from their homes, but a relatively small number of individuals actually being detained. The general lack of pre-operation intelligence also leads to more persons being detained than is necessary, as some units play it safe and detain an individual rather than release an individual who might be hostile. This can clearly have a negative effect on the local populace. Whenever possible, participation and support of Afghan military or police forces and government officials should be sought. Additional detention training, to include profiling training, is required to maximize the effectiveness of cordon and search operations.

**(x) CURRENT ASSESSMENT:**

D3, T13, T14


OPR: Army  
OCR: J7/CENTCOM

**(x) FIX/ACTION/CHANGE:**

**Fix: Improve doctrinal techniques, intelligence analysis and detainee profiling ISO C/S's.**

**Action: Analyze Lessons Learned (TTPs) & update doctrine for Intel support to C/S operations—specifically intelligence analysis, profiling, and HN coordination. Incorporate doctrine thru specific training requirements.**

**Change: Improve Training Support Packages to enhance TTPs and Soldier/leader knowledge.**





# Jacoby-007

**OPR: Army**

**OCR: JS J-7**

**Presented: 16 Dec 04**

**Status: Amber**



*Issue Title (Interrogation Training):*  
***J-008 JACOBY REPORT Section VI, Item h, pg 15***

**(U) RECOMMENDATION / OBSERVATION:**

Improved interrogation training leading to the certification of all interrogators will improve intelligence gathering and dissemination of actionable intelligence as well as improve the detainee screening process. Interrogators need training on Afghan culture, traditions and history to be able to get the most intelligence from detainees. Additionally, combat commanders at all levels need training on interrogation and detainee chain of custody to ensure that unit actions do not interfere with or negatively affect the interrogation of detainees. Recommend that each commander's right seat ride include case studies on the interrogation process and how the capturing unit can best facilitate and positively impact the process.

**(S) CURRENT ASSESSMENT:**

(b)(5)

**(S) FIX / ACTION / CHANGE:**

**CFC-A:** JIF conducts a certification course for all incoming interrogators and CI personnel. Cultural awareness training is conducted for all soldiers during pre-deployment train-up and periodically while in theater. MTTs conduct mandated commander's training on proper handling of detainees.

**MNF-I: ???**

OPR: CENTCOM

OCR:




*Issue Title (Age Determination Training):  
J-009 JACOBY REPORT Section VI, Item i, pg 15*

**(U) RECOMMENDATION / OBSERVATION:**

Familiarization training in age determination methods would benefit units detaining individuals claiming to be youths and in determining whether individuals detained should be segregated as a youth.

**(U) CURRENT ASSESSMENT:**



Request confirmation that CENTCOM has been officially relieved and Joint Staff has the lead. J-4 Lead?

OPR: CENTCOM  
OCR:

**~~(S)~~ FIX / ACTION / CHANGE:**

**Fix:**

**Action:**

**Change:**



*Issue Title (CCTVs):*

*J-010 JACOBY REPORT Section VI, Item j, pg 15*

**(U) RECOMMENDATION / OBSERVATION:**

All facilities in Afghanistan provide only the most basic security enhancements. INSCOM has offered to add closed circuit television (CCTV) to the current Bagram Holding Facility. CJTF-76 CJ2 is coordinating with INSCOM to see if they will consider funding additional CCTVs for expansion projects for Bagram and Kandahar. Additional CCTVs would be used to monitor and record interrogations, a capability that would facilitate enhanced supervisory oversight and review of interrogations for additional content value.

**~~(S)~~ CURRENT ASSESSMENT:**

(b)(5)

**~~(S)~~ FIX / ACTION / CHANGE:**

(b)(5)

OPR: CENTCOM  
OCR:



*Issue Title (Improve Communications):  
J-011 JACOBY REPORT Section VI, Item k, pg 15*

**(U) RECOMMENDATION / OBSERVATION:**

Communication capabilities must be improved. Secure network capabilities at each site are critical for the timely transfer of information. Existing communication capabilities do not support the secure electronic transfer of documents or successful dissemination of large amounts of data. This hinders the forwarding of timely, actionable intelligence either forward or to the rear. Real time data transfer will improve the SECDEF criteria analysis conducted at points of capture, thus ensuring only individuals who are likely to meet the criteria are further processed.

**~~(S)~~ CURRENT ASSESSMENT:**

(b)(1),(b)(5)

**~~(S)~~ FIX / ACTION / CHANGE:**

(b)(1),(b)(5)

OPR: CENTCOM  
OCR:



*Issue Title (Anti-Intrusion Devices):  
J-012 JACOBY REPORT Section VI, Item 1, pg 15*

**(U) RECOMMENDATION / OBSERVATION:**

In addition to the integration of CCTV at the Bagram and Kandahar detention facilities, anti-intrusion devices or a security alarm system would significantly enhance the security posture of existing facilities. Centrally controlled door locks would also greatly enhance the security of the facility.


**~~(S)~~ FIX / ACTION / CHANGE:**

(b)(1), (b)(5)

**~~(S)~~ CURRENT ASSESSMENT:**

(b)(1), (b)(5)

OPR: CENTCOM  
OCR:



# Jacoby-013

**OPR: OSD**  
**Status: Red**





*Issue Title (Handheld Metal Detectors):*  
***J-014 JACOBY REPORT Section VI, Item n, pg 16***

**(U) RECOMMENDATION / OBSERVATION:**

Handheld metal detectors can discover hidden devices undiscoverable by an external search. Metal detectors can also negate a perceived need for more invasive physical examinations in exceptional cases. All facilities and units that handle detainees should be equipped with these proven devices.

**~~(S)~~ CURRENT ASSESSMENT:**

(b)(1), (b)(5)

OPR: CENTCOM  
 OCR:

**(U) FIX / ACTION / CHANGE:**

**Fix:** Equip personnel with hand held metal detectors.

**Action:** Systems are in place at Bagram and Kandahar and in Iraq. Request submitted for similar equipment to be used at forward collection points.

**Change:** Enhance force protection.



## *Issue Title (System for Recording Detainee Behavior): J-015 JACOBY REPORT*

### **(U) RECOMMENDATION / OBSERVATION:**

A central database for guard personnel to record pertinent observations regarding detainee behavior, for review by authorized personnel responsible for the safeguarding or interrogation of the detainee, is critical to assure the safety of the guard force and assist in the collection of information or actionable intelligence. The task force should consider acquiring the Detainee Information Management System (DIMS) to record observed behavior of the detainees

### **(S) CURRENT ASSESSMENT:**

(b)(1), (b)(5)

OPR: CENTCOM  
OCR:

### **(U) FIX / ACTION / CHANGE:**

**Fix:** Acquisition of a central detainee database that tracks detainee behavior.

**Action:** Currently planning to implement DIMS system in Iraq and a similar system in CFC-A.

**Change:** Guard personnel will have a capability to centrally record observed detainee behavior.



*Issue Title (Non-Lethal Equipment):  
J-016 JACOBY REPORT Section VI, Item p, pg 16*

**(U) RECOMMENDATION / OBSERVATION:**

At Transfer of Authority (TOA), no non lethal equipment was available at the Bagram or Kandahar detention facilities. A full suite of non-lethal capability must, be on hand at both facilities and available to regional commanders.

**~~(S)~~ CURRENT ASSESSMENT:**

- Need to determine the exact requirement?

OPR: CENTCOM  
OCR:

**~~(S)~~ FIX / ACTION / CHANGE:**

(b)(1)




*Issue Title (Facility Upgrade):*  
***J-017 JACOBY REPORT Section VI, Item q pg 16***

**(U) RECOMMENDATION / OBSERVATION:**

The Bagram detention facility is essentially an old Soviet industrial warehouse with the interior gutted and holding cells constructed. While it has seen improvements over the years, much work is still required to make this a more safe and secure facility. A \$4.95 million project to provide upgrades to the facility is pending approval. Once approved, this project will improve plumbing and sanitation, make electrical and roof repairs, install security doors and make other security improvements to the facility. Since it is operating at maximum capacity, engineers have also developed a plan to expand the current facility. The approved plan will provide an additional 18 multi-person cells, shower facility, social activity room and bunkers. The cost of this facility is \$1.3 million, and it will be completed in November 2004. Total detention capability after construction will be 564 detainees.

**~~(S)~~ CURRENT ASSESSMENT:**



(No Change)

Construction not completed until Spring 05.  
Awaiting Council decision on lead agency IRT facility (fixed / deployable) standards.

**~~(S)~~ FIX / ACTION / CHANGE:**

**CFC-A:** \$5 million renovation plan is in place at Kandahar and Bagram for improvements on detention facilities. Expected completion is Dec 04 for Kandahar and Spring 05 for Bagram.

OPR: CENTCOM

OCR:




*Issue Title (Facility Upgrade):*  
***J-018 JACOBY REPORT Section VI, Item r pg 16***

**(U) RECOMMENDATION / OBSERVATION:**

The Kandahar detention facility is an outdoor holding area in need of repair to accommodate its maximum number of detainees. These improvements are already being made and the facility will soon be able to operate at maximum capacity. Additionally, a 78-person indoor holding area is under construction with a projected completion date of August 04. After a thorough assessment of maximum capacity thresholds; CJTF-76 committed to building another indoor holding facility next to the new indoor 78-person facility. Projected completion date is 1 September 2004. Total detention capability after construction will be 178 detainees.

**(S) CURRENT ASSESSMENT:**



(No Change)

Construction not completed until Spring 05.  
Awaiting Council decision on lead agency IRT facility (fixed / deployable) standards.

OPR: CENTCOM

OCR:

**(S) FIX / ACTION / CHANGE:**

**CFC-A:** \$5 million renovation plan is in place at Kandahar and Bagram for improvements on detention facilities. Expected completion is Dec 04 for Kandahar and Spring 05 for Bagram.



# *Issue Title (Field Holding Site Standards): J-019 JACOBY REPORT Section VI, Item S pg 17*

**(U) RECOMMENDATION / OBSERVATION:**

Minimal standards for field detention sites must be included in a revision to the Detention Operations SOP and distributed throughout the theater.

These standards should include adequate room to lay down and stand up without touching the walls or ceiling, proper ventilation, sufficient lighting, both natural and/or artificial, protection from the elements, cover from attack, and adequate latrine facilities. Each detention site should also have a pre-established plan for segregating women and children from the men.

**~~(S)~~ CURRENT ASSESSMENT:**

(No change). Policy Working Group tasked 11 Jan 05, per matrix.

OPR: CENTCOM  
OCR:

**~~(S)~~ FIX / ACTION / CHANGE:**

(b)(1)




*Issue Title (Management Structure):*  
*J-020 JACOBY REPORT Section VI, Item t, pg 17*

**(U) RECOMMENDATION / OBSERVATION:**

Detainee operations should be a theater-wide focus, not one solely directed towards the detention facilities at Bagram or Kandahar. At the CJTF -76 level, the OIC of detainee operations is resourced on the JMD as a captain, yet a theater wide focus requires the expertise and maturity of a senior field grade officer, preferably an MP LTC. Pending the sourcing of I/R units recommended under the RFF section and approval of changes to the JMD an interim theater level detainee operations chain of command would include an MP LTC responsible for custodial and safeguarding issues and an MI LTC responsible for interrogation issues both reporting to the CJTF -76 PM who in turn reports directly to the CJTF-76 CG. This organization will coordinate detainee operations directly with the Regional Brigade and Component Command Headquarters. Regional Brigade and Component Commanders should appoint commanders in their region responsible for the safeguarding and care of detainees while detained in collection points in their areas of operation. Base commanders should in turn appoint an OIC or NCOIC as the "warden" or single point of contact who is in charge of detainee operations at the local collection point. A clear mandate to operate the facility according to standards established by appropriate authorities and an unequivocal acceptance of command responsibility at these facilities will go a long way in preventing detainee abuse and maintaining standards.

**~~(S)~~ CURRENT ASSESSMENT:**



Request Closure – verify JMD.

OPR: CENTCOM

OCR:

**~~(S)~~ FIX / ACTION / CHANGE:**

**Fix:** Designate a single authority for Detention and Interrogation Operations.

**Action:** (b)(6) is the PM/Detention Operations Commander for CJTF-76.

**Change:** Both theaters have established command responsibility for detention and interrogation operations.



*Issue Title (Develop Rehab Program):  
J-021 JACOBY REPORT Section VI, Item u, pg 17*

**(U) RECOMMENDATION / OBSERVATION:**

As the theater matures, we have an opportunity to create corresponding improvements in our detention facilities and to better provide for the well being of detainees consistent with the principles of the Geneva Conventions. Particularly for Low Level Enemy Combatants (LLECs), many of whom have already been detained in the Bagram Coll Point for extensive periods and who have little chance for release in the foreseeable future, alternative arrangements are worth evaluating. This may be a significant challenge in the short-term given significant detainee population increases, but future construction efforts at Bagram may provide an area separate from other detainees where more space to exercise, take instruction, and even work might be made available in the spirit of Geneva without hindering the intelligence gathering function.

**(S) CURRENT ASSESSMENT:**

(b)(1), (b)(5)

**~~(S)~~ FIX / ACTION / CHANGE:**

(b)(5)

OPR: CENTCOM  
OCR:





*Issue Title (Guidance and Standards):*  
*J-022 JACOBY REPORT Section VII, Item a, pg 18*

**(U) RECOMMENDATION / OBSERVATION:**

Immediate issue of theater interrogation guidance and standards. At the same time, direct an immediate halt of non-CJTF-76 supervised interrogation at CFC-A AO joint use detention facilities.

**~~(S)~~ CURRENT ASSESSMENT:**

● Request Closure. Retasked to Policy Working Group, per matrix 11 Jan 05.

OPR: CENTCOM

OCR:

**~~(S)~~ FIX / ACTION / CHANGE:**

**Fix:** Provide overarching guidance IRT interrogation standards.

**Action:** Guidance put out by CDR, USCENTCOM May 04 to use only techniques found in FM 34-52.

**Change:** All interrogators follow the same theater-wide standard for interrogations.




*Issue Title (Develop SOPs):*  
***J-023 JACOBY REPORT Section VII, Item b, pg 18***

**(U) RECOMMENDATION / OBSERVATION:**

CJTF-76 finalize revisions and issue, consistent with CFC-A guidance, appropriate theater detainee standard operation procedures including: i. CJTF-76 Detainee Operations SOP; ii. CJTF-76 Interrogation Techniques SOP; iii. CJTF-76 Bagram detention facility Provost Marshal Operations SOP; and iv. CJTF-76 ICRC Visit and Liaison SOP.

**(S) CURRENT ASSESSMENT:**



Closed 16 Dec 04.

OPR: CENTCOM  
OCR:

**(S) FIX / ACTION / CHANGE:**

**Fix:** Develop theater specific detainee SOP's.

**Action:** Both MNF-I and CFC-A have developed SOP's for their respective theaters.

**Change:** Standardized and up to date guidance published for detainee operations.



*Issue Title (MP 06 PM):*

*J-024 JACOBY REPORT Section VII, Item c, pg 18*

**(U) RECOMMENDATION / OBSERVATION:**

Approval of a JMD position for an MP 06 as Provost Marshal of CJTF-76 reporting directly to the Commanding General, CJTF 76. Immediate appointment of an MP 05 as Commander of Detainee Operations reporting directly to the Provost Marshal of CJTF-76.

**~~(S)~~ CURRENT ASSESSMENT:**

Request Closure.

OPR: CENTCOM  
OCR:

**~~(S)~~ FIX / ACTION / CHANGE:**

**CFC-A:** JMD has been approved, individual has arrived in theater.



# Jacoby-025

**OPR: Army**  
**Presented: 16 Dec 04**  
**Status: Amber**



# Jacoby-026

**OPR: Army**

**Presented: 16 Dec 04**

**Status: Amber**



*Issue Title (C2):*

*J-027 JACOBY REPORT Section VII, Item f, pg 19*

**(U) RECOMMENDATION / OBSERVATION:**

Formal assignment of each detention facility in the AO to an appropriate Regional or Component Commander who will exercise C2 oversight over assigned detention facilities.

**~~(S)~~ CURRENT ASSESSMENT:**

Closed 16 Dec 04.

OPR: CENTCOM  
OCR:

**~~(S)~~ FIX / ACTION / CHANGE:**

(b)(1),(b)(5)



*Issue Title (Appointment of OIC/NCOIC):  
J-028 JACOBY REPORT Section VII, Item g, pg 19*


**(U) RECOMMENDATION / OBSERVATION:**

Formal appointment of a commissioned or non-commissioned officer in charge over each detention facility.

**~~(S)~~ FIX / ACTION / CHANGE:**

(b)(1), (b)(5)

**~~(S)~~ CURRENT ASSESSMENT:**



Request Closure.

OPR: CENTCOM

OCR:



*Issue Title (ICRC Access to Detainees):  
J-029 JACOBY REPORT Section VII, Item h, pg 19*

**(U) RECOMMENDATION /  
OBSERVATION:**

That all individuals detained by US forces be made available for interviews by the ICRC within 30 days after original detention unless approved by CFC-A and CENTCOM.

**(S) CURRENT ASSESSMENT:**

No status change. Pending OSD guidance.

OPR: CENTCOM  
OCR:

**~~(S)~~ FIX / ACTION / CHANGE:**

(b)(1),(b)(5)





*Issue Title (Detainee Handling Procedures):  
J-030 JACOBY REPORT Section VII, Item i, pg 19*

**(U) RECOMMENDATION / OBSERVATION:**

That the following detainee handling procedures to the extent they are still used, be formally discontinued by forces throughout the CFC-AO: i. Mandatory removal of all clothing during medical exams; ii. Rectal or hernia exams unless medically required; iii. Sensory deprivation for the purposes of disorientation except during movement; iv. Use of flex cuffs for extended periods of time; and v. Photographing detainees and detention facilities unless for identification or documentation purposes.

**~~(S)~~ CURRENT ASSESSMENT:**

(b)(5)

OPR: CENTCOM  
OCR:

**~~(S)~~ FIX / ACTION / CHANGE:**

(b)(1)