

SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th MI Brigade

Allegations of Abuse Incidents, the Nature of Reported Abuse, and Associated Personnel
Note: The chart lists all allegations considered. The specific abuse claimed and entities involved are not confirmed in all cases. The category of abuse are underlined. (See paragraph 5e-h, above)

Date/Time	Incident	Nature of Alleged Abuse					Comments
		Nudity/Humiliation	Assault	Sexual Assault	Use of Dogs	The "Hole" Other	
15 SEP 03/ 2150	Use of Isolation. Incident #42.					MI/MP	MP log entry confirms MI use of isolation and sensory deprivation as an interrogation technique.
16 SEP 03/ 1315-1445	MI Directs Removal of Clothing. Incident #34.	MI/MP					MPs respond to MI tasking. Detainee apparently stripped upon arrival to Hard Site at MI direction.
19-20 SEP 03	Naked Detainee During Interrogation. Incident #35.	MI/MP					
20 SEP 03	Two MI Soldiers Beat and Kicked a Cuffed Detainee. Incident #1.		MI				CID investigated and referred the case back to the command.

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		Nudity/Humiliation	Assault	Sexual Assault	Use of Dogs		The "Hole"
7 OCT 03	Unauthorized Interrogation and Alleged Assault of a Female Detainee. Incident #2.	MI		MI			Unauthorized interrogation. MI personnel received Field Grade Article 15s.
Early OCT 03	Interrogator Directs Partial Removal of Clothing/Failure to Report. Incident #36.	MI					
Early OCT 03	Interrogator Directs Unauthorized Solitary Confinement/Military Police Stripping of Detainee/Failure to Report. Incident #43.	MP	MP			MI/MP	MI directed the MP place the detainee in solitary confinement (apparently the "Hole") for a few hours. The MPs carried out the request, stripped and hooded the detainee.

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		Nudity/Humiliation	Assault	Sexual Assault	Use of Dogs		The "Hole"
17 OCT 03 - 19 Oct 03	Photos Depicting a Naked Hooded Detainee Cuffed to His Cell Door. Detainee Cuffed to His Bed with Underwear on his Head. Incident #37.						Nudity, hooding, and restraint. No indication of association with MI.
20 OCT 03	Detainee Was Stripped and Abused for Making a Shank from a Toothbrush. Incident #8.	MP	MP	MP			No indication of association with MI.
25 OCT 03/2015 (est)	Photos of a Naked Detainee on a Dog Leash. Incident #9.	MP		MP			Humiliation and degradation. No indication of association with MI.

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		Nudity/Humiliation	Assault	Sexual Assault	Use of Dogs		The "Hole"
25 OCT 03/2300 - 2317 (est)	Three Naked Detainees Handcuffed Together and Forced to Simulate Sex While Photographed and Abused. Incident #3.	MI/MP	MI/MP	MI/MP			Incident not associated with interrogation operations. MI personnel observed and participated as individuals.
28 OCT 03	Photographs of Female Detainees. Incident #38.	MP		MP			MPs took many photos of two female detainees. One detainee photographed exposing her breasts.
OCT 03	Abuse and Sodomy of a Detainee (Chem Light Incident). Incident #5.	MP	MP	MP			Detainee on MI Hold. No other indication of association with MI.

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Date/Time	Incident	Nature of Alleged Abuse				Comments	
		Nudity/Humiliation	Assault	Sexual Assault	Use of Dogs		The "Hole"
OCT 03	Detainee's Chin Lacerated. Incident #21.		<u>MP</u>				No indication of association with MI. Assailant unknown.
4 NOV 03/2140 - 2315	Detainee Forced to Stand on a Box With Simulated Electrical Wires Attached to his Fingers and Penis. Incident #10.	<u>MP</u>		<u>MP</u>			No indication of association with MI. Attached wire to penis. Threatened detainee with electrocution
4 NOV 03	CIA Detainee Dies in Custody. Incident #7.		<u>CIA</u>				SEAL Team involved in apprehending detainee. MPs photographed body. Tampered with evidence
5 NOV 03	Detainee Forced to Stand on Boxes, Water is Poured on Him, His Genitals are Hit. Incident #20.	<u>MP</u>	<u>MP</u>	<u>MP</u>			Detainee on MI Hold. No other indication of association with MI.

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7-8 NOV 03/ 2315 - 0024 (est)	Naked "Dog pile and Forced Masturbation of Detainees Following the 6 NOV 03 Riot at Camp Vigilant. Incident #11.	MP	MP	MP				
13 NOV 03	Detainee Claim of MP Abuse Corresponds with Interrogations. Incident #4.	MP	MP					Interrogation reports suggest MI directed abuse. Withholding of bedding
14 NOV 03	MP Log-Detainees Were Ordered "PT'd" By MI. Incident #6.	MP	MP					MPs performed unauthorized medical procedures - stitching detainee wounds

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16 NOV 03	Stripping of Detainee During Interrogation. Incident #39.	<u>MI</u>						MI interrogator counseled and removed as lead interrogator.
18 NOV 03	Photo Depicting Detainee on the Floor with a Banana Inserted into his Anus. Incident #14.				<u>MP</u>			Detainee had an apparent mental disorder. Photos were taken of him on other dates included showing him naked, praying upside down or covered in feces; blood on a door from an apparently self-inflicted wound; and efforts to restrain him. Appropriate psychiatric care and facilities apparently were not available.
24 NOV 03	MP CPT Beat and Kicked a Detainee. Incident #23.				<u>MP</u>			Subsequent investigation determined to be a staged event and not an abusive incident.

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24 NOV 03	Interrogator Threatens Use of Military Working Dog. Incident #25.				<u>MP/MI</u>			
24 NOV 03	The use of dogs and humiliation (clothing removal) was approved by MI. Incident #40.	<u>MI/MP</u>			<u>MI/MP</u>			COL Pappas authorized, and LTC Jordan supervised, the harsh treatment of Iraqi Police during interrogations, to include humiliation (clothing removal) and the use of dogs.
26 or 27 Nov 03	MI/MP Abuse During an Interrogation of Iraqi Policeman. Incident #15.		<u>MI/MP</u>					MP cutoff air supply by covering nose and mouth of detainee and twisted his arm at direction of contract interrogator during interrogation of Iraqi policeman.
29 NOV 04	Photo Depicting a detainee in his underwear standing on a box. Incident #13.	<u>UNK</u>						Photo could not be tied to any specific incident, detainee, or allegation and MI involvement is indeterminate.

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30 NOV 03	MP Log Entry- Detainee Was Found in Cell Covered in Blood. Incident #17.		UNK				Wounds apparently self-inflicted. No indication of association with MI.
Circa Dec 03	Photo Depicting detainee in stress position on chair. Incident #24.		MI				Photo shows detainee kneeling on a chair with Interrogators watching. No associated interrogation summaries to ID detainee
4 DEC 03	MP Log- Determination of Inmate Clothing by MI. Incident #41.	MI/MP					Suggests MI direction to remove selected detainee's clothing, with MP collaboration.

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12-13 DEC 03 (est)	Detainee Involved in Attempted Murder of MPs Claims Retaliatory Acts Upon Return to the Hard Site. Incident #18.		<u>MP</u>		MP	Detainee allegations may have been exaggerated. MP – Forced him to eat pork and forced alcohol in his mouth. MPs may have retaliated in response to the detainee shooting an MP on 24 NOV 03.
4-13 DEC 03 (est)	Withholding of Clothing, Bedding, and Medical Care. Incident #19.	MP	<u>UNK</u>			MI Soldier discovered and attempted to rectify the situation. A U/I COL or LTC medical officer refused to remove a catheter when notified by MI.
12 DEC 03	Dog Bites Iranian Detainee. Incident #27.	MP	MP		<u>MP</u>	Detainee on MI Hold. No other indication of association with MI.
14/15 DEC 03	MI Uses Dog in Interrogation. Incident #29.				<u>MI/MP</u>	Used allegedly in response to COL Pappas' blanket approval for use of harsher techniques against Saddam associates.

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14/15 DEC 03	MI Uses Dog in Interrogation. Incident #31.				<u>MI/MP</u>	Interrogation report indicates dogs used with little effect during an interrogation.
Late DEC 03	Contract Interrogator Possibly Involved in Dog Use on Detainee. Incident #32.				<u>MI/MP</u>	
18 DEC 03 or later	Dog Handler Uses Dog on Detainee. Incident #28.				<u>MP</u>	Photos of incident show only MP personnel; however, it is possible MI directed the dogs to prepare the detainee for interrogation.
27 DEC 03 (est)	Photo Depicting Apparent Shotgun Wounds on Detainee's Buttocks. Incident #12.	<u>UNK</u>	<u>UNK</u>			Detainee apparently shot by MP personnel with shotgun using less-than-lethal rounds. Nudity may have been required to have medics observe and treat wounds. No indication of association with MI.

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8 JAN 04 (Estimat ed)	Dog Used to Scare Juvenile Inmates. Incident #26.				<u>MP</u>		MI Soldier observed the event while in the area during an interrogation. MP motivation unknown. MI Soldier failed to report it.
Unspeci fied	Un-muzzled dog used during an interrogation. Incident #30.				<u>MI/MP</u>		MI approved the use of dogs during an interrogation. The dog was un-muzzled without such approval.
Unspeci fied	Possible Rape of a Detainee by a US Translator. Incident #22.			<u>MI</u>			

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Unspeci fied	Civilian Interrogator Forcibly Pulls Detainee from Truck and Drags Him Across Ground. Incident #16.			<u>MI</u>				The incident was reported by MI, but CID apparently did not pursue the case.
Various Dates	MI Use of Isolation as an Interrogation Technique. Incident #44.						<u>MI/MP</u>	Seven detainees are associated with this line item.
Various Dates	MI Forces Detainee to Wear Women's Underwear on his Head. Incident #33.	<u>MI/MP</u>						MPs may have performed two of the incidents identified in photos, and may have no MI association.

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6. (U) Findings and Recommendations.

a. (U) **Major Finding:** From 25 July 2003 to 6 February 2004, twenty-seven (27) 205 MI BDE personnel allegedly:

- Requested, encouraged, condoned, or solicited MP personnel to abuse detainees or;
- Participated in detainee abuse or;
- Violated established interrogation procedures and applicable laws and regulations as preparation for interrogation operations at Abu Ghraib.

(U) **Explanation:** Some MI personnel encouraged, condoned, participated in, or ignored abuse. In a few instances, MI personnel acted alone in abusing detainees. MI abuse and MI solicitation of MP abuse included the use of isolation with sensory deprivation ("the Hole"), removal of clothing and humiliation, the use of dogs to "fear up" detainees, and on one occasion, the condoned twisting of a detainee's cuffed wrists and the smothering of this detainee with a cupped hand in MI's presence. Some MI personnel violated established interrogation practices, regulations, and conventions which resulted in the abuse of detainees. While Interrogation and Counter-Resistance Policies (ICRP) were poorly defined and changed several times, in most cases of detainee abuse the MI personnel involved knew or should have known what they were doing was outside the bounds of their authority. Ineffective leadership at the JIDC failed to detect violations and discipline those responsible. Likewise, leaders failed to provide adequate training to ensure Soldiers understood the rules and complied.

(U) **Recommendation:** The Army needs to re-emphasize Soldier and leader responsibilities in interrogation and detention operations and retrain them to perform in accordance with law, regulations, and Army values and to live up to the responsibilities of their rank and position. Leaders must also provide adequate training to ensure Soldiers understand their authorities. The Army must ensure that future interrogation policies are simple, direct and include safeguards against abuse. Organizations such as the JIDC must possess a functioning chain of command capable of directing interrogation operations.

b. (U) Other Findings and Recommendations.

(1) (U) **Finding:** There was a lack of clear Command and Control of Detainee Operations at the CJTF-7 level.

(U) **Explanation:** COL Pappas was rated by MG Wojdakowski, DCG, V Corps/CJTF-7. MG Wojdakowski, however, was not directly involved with interrogation operations. Most of COL Pappas' direction was coming from LTG Sanchez directly as well as from MG Fast, the C2.

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BG Karpinski was rated by BG Diamond, Commander, 377th Theater Support Command (377 TSC). However, she testified that she believed her rater was MG Wojdakowski and in fact it was he she received her direction from the entire time she was in Iraq (Reference Annex B, Appendix 1, KARPINSKI). The 800 MP BDE was TACON to CJTF-7. Overall responsibility for detainee operations never came together under one person short of LTG Sanchez himself until the assignment of MG G. Miller in April 2004.

(U) **Recommendation:** There should be a single authority designated for command and control for detention and interrogation operations. (DoD/DA)

(2) (U) **Finding:** FRAGO 1108 appointing COL Pappas as FOB Commander at Abu Ghraib was unclear. This issue did not impact detainee abuse.

(U) **Explanation:** Although FRAGO 1108 appointing COL Pappas as FOB Commander on 19 November 2003 changed the command relationship, it had no specific effect on detainee abuses at Abu Ghraib. The FRAGO giving him TACON of the 320 MP BN did not contain any specified or implied tasks. The TACON did not include responsibility for conducting prison or "Warden" functions. Those functions remained the responsibility of the 320 MP BN. This FRAGO has been cited as a significant contributing factor that allowed the abuses to happen, but the abuses were already underway for two months before CJTF-7 issued this FRAGO. COL Pappas and the Commander of the 320 MP BN interpreted that FRAGO strictly for COL Pappas to exercise the external Force Protection and Security of Detainees. COL Pappas had a Long Range Reconnaissance Company in the 165 MI BN that would augment the external protection of Abu Ghraib. The internal protection of detainees, however, still remained the responsibility of the 320 MP BN. The confusion and disorganization between MI and MPs already existed by the time CJTF-7 published the FRAGO. Had there been no change of FOB Command, it is likely abuse would have continued anyway.

(U) **Recommendation:** Joint Task Forces such as CJTF-7 should clearly specify relationships in FRAGOs so as to preclude confusion. Terms such as Tactical Control (TACON) should be clearly defined to identify specific command relationships and preclude confusion. (DoD/CJTF-7)

(3) (U) **Finding:** The JIDC was manned with personnel from numerous organizations and consequently lacked unit cohesion. There was an absence of an established, effective MI chain of command at the JIDC.

(U) **Explanation:** A decision was made not to run the JIDC as a unit mission. The JIDC was manned, led and managed by staff officers from multiple organizations as opposed to a unit with its functioning chain of command. Responsibilities for balancing the demands of

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managing interrogation operations and establishing good order and discipline in this environment were unclear and lead to lapses in accountability.

(U) **Recommendation:** JIDCs need to be structured, manned, trained and equipped as standard military organizations. These organizations should be certified by TRADOC and/or JFCOM. Appropriate Army and Joint doctrine should be developed defining JIDCs' missions and functions as separate commands. (DoD/DA/CJTF-7)

(4) (U) **Finding:** Selecting Abu Ghraib as a detention facility placed soldiers and detainees at an unnecessary force protection risk.

(U) **Explanation:** Failure adequately to protect and house detainees is a violation of the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions and AR 190-8. Therefore, the selection of Abu Ghraib as a detention facility was inappropriate because of its inherent indefensibility and poor condition. The selection of Abu Ghraib as a detention center was dictated by the Coalition Provisional Authority officials despite concerns that the Iraqi people would look negatively on Americans interning detainees in a facility associated with torture. Abu Ghraib was in poor physical condition with buildings and sections of the perimeter wall having been destroyed, resulting in completely inadequate living conditions. Force protection must be a major consideration in selecting any facility as a detention facility. Abu Ghraib was located in the middle of the Sunni Triangle, an area known to be very hostile to coalition forces. Further, being surrounded by civilian housing and open fields and encircled by a network of roads and highways, its defense presented formidable force protection challenges. Even though the force protection posture at Abu Ghraib was compromised from the start due to its location and poor condition, coalition personnel still had a duty and responsibility to undertake appropriate defensive measures. However, the poor security posture at Abu Ghraib resulted in the deaths and wounding of both coalition forces and detainees.

(U) **Recommendations:**

- Detention centers must be established in accordance with AR 190-8 to ensure safety and compliance with the Geneva Conventions. (DoD/DA/CJTF-7).
- As a matter of policy, force protection concerns must be applicable to any detention facility and all detention operations. (DoD/DA/CJTF-7)
- Protect detainees in accordance with Geneva Convention IV by providing adequate force protection. (DoD/DA/CJTF-7)

(5) (U) **Finding:** Leaders failed to take steps to effectively manage pressure placed upon JIDC personnel.

(U) **Explanation:** During our interviews, leaders within the MI community commented upon the intense pressure they felt from higher headquarters, to include CENTCOM,

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the Pentagon, and DIA for timelier, actionable intelligence (Reference Annex B, Appendix 1, WOOD, PAPPAS, and PRICE). These leaders have stated that this pressure adversely affected their decision making. Requests for information were being sent to Abu Ghraib from a number of headquarters without any prioritization. Based on the statements from the interrogators and analysts, the pressure was allowed to be passed down to the lowest levels.

(U) **Recommendation:** Leaders must balance mission requirements with unit capabilities, soldier morale and effectiveness. Protecting Soldiers from unnecessary pressure to enhance mission effectiveness is a leader's job. Rigorous and challenging training can help prepare units and soldiers for the stress they face in combat. (DoD/DA/CENTCOM/CJTF-7)

(6) (U) **Finding:** Some capturing units failed to follow procedures, training, and directives in the capture, screening, and exploitation of detainees.

(U) **Explanation:** The role of the capturing unit was to conduct preliminary screening of captured detainees to determine if they posed a security risk or possessed information of intelligence value. Detainees who did not pose a security risk and possessed no intelligence value should have been released. Those that posed a security risk and possessed no intelligence value should have been transferred to Abu Ghraib as a security hold. Those that possessed intelligence information should have been interrogated within 72 hours at the tactical level to gather perishable information of value to the capturing unit. After 72 hours, these personnel should have been transferred to Abu Ghraib for further intelligence exploitation as an MI hold. Since most detainees were not properly screened, large numbers of detainees were transferred to Abu Ghraib, who in some cases should not have been sent there at all, and in almost all cases, were not properly identified or documented in accordance with doctrine and directives. This failure led to the arrival of a significant number of detainees at Abu Ghraib. Without proper detainee capture documentation, JIDC interrogators were diverted from interrogation and intelligence production to screening operations in order to assess the value of the incoming detainees (no value, security hold, or MI Hold). The overall result was that less intelligence was produced at the JIDC than could have been if capturing forces had followed proper procedures.

(U) **Recommendation:** Screening, interrogation and release procedures at the tactical level need to be properly executed. Those detainees who pose no threat and are of no intelligence value should be released by capturing units within 72 hours. Those detainees thought to be a threat but of no further intelligence value should be sent to a long term confinement facility. Those detainees thought to possess further intelligence value should be sent to a Corps/Theater Interrogation Center. (DA/CENTCOM/CJTF-7)

(7) (U) **Finding:** DoD's development of multiple policies on interrogation operations for use in different theaters or operations confused Army and civilian Interrogators at Abu Ghraib.

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(U) **Explanation:** National policy and DoD directives were not completely consistent with Army doctrine concerning detainee treatment or interrogation tactics, resulting in CJTF-7 interrogation and counter-resistance policies and practices that lacked basis in Army interrogation doctrine. As a result, interrogators at Abu Ghraib employed non-doctrinal approaches that conflicted with other DoD and Army regulatory, doctrinal and procedural guidance.

(U) **Recommendation:** Adopt one DoD policy for interrogation, within the framework of existing doctrine, adhering to the standards found in doctrine, and enforce that standard policy across DoD. Interrogation policy must be simple and direct, with reference to existing doctrine, and possess effective safeguards against abuse. It must be totally understandable by the interrogator using it. (DoD/DA/CJTF-7)

(8) (U) **Finding:** There are an inadequate number of MI units to satisfy current and future HUMINT missions. The Army does not possess enough interrogators and linguists to support interrogation operations.

(U) **Explanation:** The demand for interrogators and linguists to support tactical screening operations at the point-of-capture of detainees, tactical HUMINT teams, and personnel to support interrogation operations at organizations like the JIDC cannot be supported with the current force structure. As a result, each of these operations in Iraq was undermanned and suffered accordingly.

(U) **Recommendation:** The Army must increase the number of HUMINT units to overcome downsizing of HUMINT forces over the last 10 years and to address current and future HUMINT requirements.

(9) (U) **Finding:** The JIDC was not provided with adequate personnel resources to effectively operate as an interrogation center.

(U) **Explanation:** The JIDC was established in an ad hoc manner without proper planning, personnel, and logistical support for the missions it was intended to perform. Interrogation and analyst personnel were quickly kluged together from a half dozen units in an effort to meet personnel requirements. Even at its peak strength, interrogation and analyst manpower at the JIDC was too shorthanded to deal with the large number of detainees at hand. Logistical support was also inadequate.

(U) **Recommendation:** The Army and DoD should plan on operating JIDC organizations in future operational environments, establish appropriate manning and equipment authorizations for the same. (DoD/DA)

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(10) (U) **Finding:** There was/is a severe shortage of CAT II and CAT III Arab linguists available in Iraq.

(U) **Explanation:** This shortage negatively affected every level of detainee operations from point-of-capture through detention facility. Tactical units were unable to properly screen detainees at their levels not only because of the lack of interrogators but even more so because of the lack of interpreters. The linguist problem also existed at Abu Ghraib. There were only 20 linguists assigned to Abu Ghraib at the height of operations. Linguists were a critical node and limited the maximum number of interrogations that could be conducted at any time to the number of linguists available.

(U) **Recommendation:** Army and DoD need to address the issue of inadequate linguist resources to conduct detention operations. (DA/DoD)

(11) (U) **Finding:** The cross leveling of a large number of Reserve Component (RC) Soldiers during the Mobilization process contributed to training challenges and lack of unit cohesion of the RC units at Abu Ghraib.

(U) **Recommendation:** If cross leveling of personnel is necessary in order to bring RC units up to required strength levels, then post mobilization training time should be extended. Post mobilization training should include unit level training in addition to Soldier training to ensure cross leveled Soldiers are made part of the team. (DA)

(12) (U) **Finding:** Interrogator training in the Laws of Land Warfare and the Geneva Conventions is ineffective.

(U) **Explanation:** The US Army Intelligence Center and follow on unit training provided interrogators with what appears to be adequate curriculum, practical exercises and man-hours in Law of Land Warfare and Geneva Conventions training. Soldiers at Abu Ghraib, however, remained uncertain about what interrogation procedures were authorized and what proper reporting procedures were required. This indicates that Initial Entry Training for interrogators was not sufficient or was not reinforced properly by additional unit training or leadership.

(U) **Recommendation:** More training emphasis needs to be placed on Soldier and leader responsibilities concerning the identification and reporting of detainee abuse incidents or concerns up through the chain of command, or to other offices such as CID, IG or SJA. This training should not just address the rules, but address case studies from recent and past detainee and interrogation operations to address likely issues interrogators and their supervisors will encounter. Soldiers and leaders need to be taught to integrate Army values and ethical decision-

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making to deal with interrogation issues that are not clearly prohibited or allowed. Furthermore, it should be stressed that methods employed by US Army interrogators will represent US values.

(13) (U) **Finding:** MI, MP, and Medical Corps personnel observed and failed to report instances of Abuse at Abu Ghraib. Likewise, several reports indicated that capturing units did not always treat detainees IAW the Geneva Convention.

(U) **Recommendation:** DoD should improve training provided to all personnel in Geneva Conventions, detainee operations, and the responsibilities of reporting detainee abuse. (DoD)

(14) (U) **Finding:** Combined MI/MP training in the conduct of detainee/interrogation operations is inadequate.

(U) **Explanation:** MI and MP personnel at Abu Ghraib had little knowledge of each other's missions, roles and responsibilities in the conduct of detainee/interrogation operations. As a result, some "lanes in the road" were worked out "on the fly." Other relationships were never fully defined and contributed to the confused operational environment.

(U) **Recommendation:** TRADOC should initiate an effort to develop a cross branch training program in detainee and interrogation operations training. FORSCOM should reinstitute combined MI/MP unit training such as the Gold Sword/Silver Sword Exercises that were conducted annually. (DA)

(15) (U) **Finding:** MI leaders do not receive adequate training in the conduct and management of interrogation operations.

(U) **Explanation:** MI Leaders at the JIDC were unfamiliar with and untrained in interrogation operations (with the exception of CPT Wood) as well as the mission and purposes of a JIDC. Absent any knowledge from training and experience in interrogation operations, JIDC leaders had to rely upon instinct to operate the JIDC. MTTs and Tiger Teams were deployed to the JIDC as a solution to help train interrogators and leaders in the management of HUMINT and detainee/interrogator operations.

(U) **Recommendation:** MI Officer, NCO and Warrant Officer training needs to include interrogation operations to include management procedures, automation support, collection management and JIDC operations. Officer and senior NCO training should also emphasize the potential for abuse involved in detention and interrogation operations. (DA)

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(16) (U) **Finding:** Army doctrine exists for both MI interrogation and MP detainee operations, but it was not comprehensive enough to cover the situation that existed at Abu Ghraib.

(U) **Explanation:** The lines of authority and accountability between MI and MP were unclear and undefined. For example, when MI would order sleep adjustment, MPs would use their judgment on how to apply that technique. The result was MP taking detainees from their cells stripping them and giving them cold showers or throwing cold water on them to keep them awake.

(U) **Recommendation:** DA should conduct a review to determine future Army doctrine for interrogation operations and detention operations. (DA)

(17) (U) **Finding:** Because of a lack of doctrine concerning detainee and interrogation operations, critical records on detainees were not created or maintained properly thereby hampering effective operations.

(U) **Explanation:** This lack of record keeping included the complete life cycle of detainee records to include detainee capture information and documentation, prison records, medical records, interrogation plans and records, and release board records. Lack of record keeping significantly hampered the ability of this investigation to discover critical information concerning detainee abuse.

(U) **Recommendation:** As TRADOC reviews and enhances detainee and interrogation operations doctrine, it should ensure that record keeping and information sharing requirements are addressed. (DA)

(18) (U) **Finding:** Four (4) contract interrogators allegedly abused detainees at Abu Ghraib.

(U) **Explanation:** The contracting system failed to ensure that properly trained and vetted linguist and interrogator personnel were hired to support operations at Abu Ghraib. The system also failed to provide useful contract management functions in support of the facility. Soldiers and leaders at the prison were unprepared for the arrival, employment, and oversight of contract interrogators.

(U) **Recommendations:** The Army should review the use contract interrogators. In the event contract interrogators must be used, the Army must ensure that they are properly qualified from a training and performance perspective, and properly vetted. The Army should establish standards for contract requirements and personnel. Additionally, the Army must

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provide sufficient contract management resources to monitor contracts and contractor performance at the point of performance.

(19) (U) **Observation:** MG Miller's visit did not introduce "harsh techniques" into the Abu Ghraib interrogation operation.

(U) **Explanation:** While there was an increase in intelligence reports after the visit, it appears more likely it was due to the assignment of trained interrogators and an increased number of MI Hold detainees to interrogate. This increase in production does not equate to an increase in quality of the collected intelligence. MG G. Miller's visit did not introduce "harsh techniques" into the Abu Ghraib interrogation operation.

(20) (U) **Finding:** The JTF-GTMO training team had positive impact on the operational management of the JIDC; however, the JTF-GTMO training team inadvertently validated restricted interrogation techniques.

(U) **Explanation:** The JTF-GTMO team stressed the conduct of operations with a strategic objective, while the Abu Ghraib team remained focused on tactical operations. Instead of providing guidance and assistance, the team's impact was limited to one-on-one interaction during interrogations. Clearly a significant problem was the JTF-GTMO's lack of understanding of the approved interrogation techniques, either for GTMO or CJTF-7 or Abu Ghraib. When the training team composed of the experts from a national level operation failed to recognize, object to, or report detainee abuse, such as the use of nudity as an interrogation tactic, they failed as a training team and further validated the use of unacceptable interrogation techniques.

(U) **Recommendation:** TRADOC should initiate an Army-wide effort to ensure all personnel involved in detention and interrogation operations are properly trained with respect to approved doctrine. There should be a MTT to assist ongoing detention operations. This MTT must be of the highest quality and understand the mission they have been sent to support. They must have clearly defined and unmistakable objectives. Team members with varied experience must be careful to avoid providing any training or guidance that contradicts local or national policy. (DA/DoD)

(21) (U) **Finding:** The Fort Huachuca MTT failed to adapt the ISCT training (which was focused upon improving the JTF-GTMO operational environment) to the mission needs of CJTF-7 and JIDC; however, actions of one team member resulted in the inadvertent validation of restricted interrogation techniques.

(U) **Explanation:** Although the Fort Huachuca Team (ISCT) team was successful in arranging a few classes and providing some formal training, to include classes on the Geneva Conventions, both the JIDC leadership and the ISCT team failed to include/require the contract

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personnel to attend the training. Furthermore, the training that was given was ineffective and certainly did nothing to prevent the abuses occurring at Abu Ghraib, e.g., the "Hole," nakedness, withholding of bedding, and the use of dogs to threaten detainees. The ISCT MTT members were assigned to the various Tiger Teams/sections to conduct interrogations. The ISCT team's lack of understanding of approved doctrine was a significant failure. This lack of understanding was evident in SFC Walters' "unofficial" conversation with one of the Abu Ghraib interrogators (CIVILIAN21). SFC Walters related several stories about the use of dogs as an inducement, suggesting the interrogator talk to the MPs about the possibilities. SFC Walters noted that detainees are most susceptible during the first few hours after capture. "The prisoners are captured by Soldiers, taken from their familiar surroundings, blindfolded and put into a truck and brought to this place (Abu Ghraib); and then they are pushed down a hall with guards barking orders and thrown into a cell, naked; and that not knowing what was going to happen or what the guards might do caused them extreme fear." It was also suggested that an interrogator could take some pictures of what seemed to be guards being rough with prisoners so he could use them to scare the prisoners. This conversation certainly contributed to the abusive environment at Abu Ghraib. The team validated the use of unacceptable interrogation techniques. The ISCT team's Geneva Conventions training was not effective in helping to halt abusive techniques, as it failed to train Soldiers on their responsibilities for identifying and reporting those techniques.

(U) **Recommendation:** TRADOC should initiate an Army-wide effort to ensure all personnel involved in detention and interrogation operations are properly trained with respect to approved doctrine. There should be a MTT to assist ongoing detention operations. This MTT must be of the highest quality and understand the mission they have been sent to support. They must have clearly defined and unmistakable objectives. Team members with varied experience must be careful to avoid providing any training or guidance that contradicts local or national policy. (DA/DoD)

(22) (U) **Finding:** Other Government Agency (OGA) interrogation practices led to a loss of accountability at Abu Ghraib.

(U) **Explanation:** While the FBI, JTF-121, Criminal Investigative Task Force, Iraq Survey Group, and the CIA were all present at Abu Ghraib, the acronym "Other Government Agency" referred almost exclusively to the CIA. Lack of military control over OGA interrogator actions or lack of systemic accountability for detainees plagued detainee operations in Abu Ghraib almost from the start. Army allowed CIA to house "Ghost Detainees" who were unidentified and unaccounted for in Abu Ghraib. This procedure created confusion and uncertainty concerning their classification and subsequent DoD reporting requirements under the Geneva Conventions. Additionally, the treatment and interrogation of OGA detainees occurred under different practices and procedures which were absent any DoD visibility, control, or oversight. This separate grouping of OGA detainees added to the confusion over proper treatment of detainees and created a perception that OGA techniques and practices were suitable

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and authorized for DoD operations. No memorandum of understanding on detainee accountability or interrogation practices between the CIA and CJTF-7 was created.

(U) **Recommendation:** DoD must enforce adherence by OGA with established DoD practices and procedures while conducting detainee interrogation operations at DoD facilities.

(23) (U) **Finding:** There was neither a defined procedure nor specific responsibility within CJTF-7 for dealing with ICRC visits. ICRC recommendations were ignored by MI, MP and CJTF-7 personnel.

(U) **Explanation:** Within this investigation's timeframe, 16 September 2003 through 31 January 2004, the ICRC visited Abu Ghraib three times, notifying CJTF-7 twice of their visit results, describing serious violations of international Humanitarian Law and of the Geneva Conventions. In spite of the ICRC's role as independent observers, there seemed to be a consensus among personnel at Abu Ghraib that the allegations were not true. Neither the leadership, nor CJTF-7 made any attempt to verify the allegations.

(U) **Recommendation:** DoD should review current policy concerning ICRC visits and establish procedures whereby findings and recommendations made by the ICRC are investigated. Investigation should not be done by the units responsible for the facility in question. Specific procedures and responsibilities should be developed for ICRC visits, reports, and responses. There also needs to be specific inquiries made into ICRC allegations of abuse or maltreatment by an independent entity to ensure that an unbiased review has occurred. (DoD/CJTF-7)

(24) (U) **Finding:** Two soldiers that the 519 MI BN had reason to suspect were involved in the questionable death of a detainee in Afghanistan were allowed to deploy and continue conducting interrogations in Iraq. While in Iraq, those same soldiers were alleged to have abused detainees.

(U) **Recommendation:** Once soldiers in a unit have been identified as possible participants in abuse related to the performance of their duties, they should be suspended from such duties or flagged.

(25) (U) **Observation:** While some MI Soldiers acted outside the scope of applicable laws and regulations, most Soldiers performed their duties in accordance with the Geneva Conventions and Army Regulations.

(U) **Explanation:** MI Soldiers operating the JIDC at Abu Ghraib screened thousands of Iraqi detainees, conducted over 2500 interrogations, and produced several thousand valuable intelligence products supporting the war fighter and the global war on terrorism. This great effort

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was executed in difficult and dangerous conditions with inadequate physical and personnel resources.

c. (U) Individual Responsibility for Detainee Abuse at Abu Ghraib.

(1) (U) Finding: COL Thomas M. Pappas, Commander, 205 MI BDE. A preponderance of evidence supports that COL Pappas did, or failed to do, the following:

- Failed to insure that the JIDC performed its mission to its full capabilities, within the applicable rules, regulations and appropriate procedures.
- Failed to properly organize the JIDC.
- Failed to put the necessary checks and balances in place to prevent and detect abuses.
- Failed to ensure that his Soldiers and civilians were properly trained for the mission.
- Showed poor judgment by leaving LTC Jordan in charge of the JIDC during the critical early stages of the JIDC.
- Showed poor judgment by leaving LTC Jordan in charge during the aftermath of a shooting incident known as the Iraqi Police Roundup (IP Roundup).
- Improperly authorized the use of dogs during interrogations. Failed to properly supervise the use of dogs to make sure they were muzzled after he improperly permitted their use.
- Failed to take appropriate action regarding the ICRC reports of abuse.
- Failed to take aggressive action against Soldiers who violated the ICRP, the CJTF-7 interrogation and Counter-Resistance Policy and the Geneva Conventions.
- Failed to properly communicate to Higher Headquarters when his Brigade would be unable to accomplish its mission due to lack of manpower and/or resources. Allowed his Soldiers and civilians at the JIDC to be subjected to inordinate pressure from Higher Headquarters.
- Failed to establish appropriate MI and MP coordination at the brigade level which would have alleviated much of the confusion that contributed to the abusive environment at Abu Ghraib.
- The significant number of systemic failures documented in this report does not relieve COL Pappas of his responsibility as the Commander, 205th MI BDE for the abuses that occurred and went undetected for a considerable length of time.

(U) Recommendation: This information should be forwarded to COL Pappas' chain of command for appropriate action.

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(2) (U) **Finding:** LTC Stephen L. Jordan, Director, Joint Interrogation Debriefing Center. A preponderance of evidence supports that LTC Jordan did, or failed to do, the following:

- Failed to properly train Soldiers and civilians on the ICRP.
- Failed to take full responsibility for his role as the Director, JIDC.
- Failed to establish the necessary checks and balances to prevent and detect abuses.
- Was derelict in his duties by failing to establish order and enforce proper use of ICRP during the night of 24 November 2003 (IP Roundup) which contributed to a chaotic situation in which detainees were abused.
- Failed to prevent the unauthorized use of dogs and the humiliation of detainees who were kept naked for no acceptable purpose while he was the senior officer-in-charge in the Hard Site.
- Failed to accurately and timely relay critical information to COL Pappas, such as:
 - The incident where a detainee had obtained a weapon.
 - ICRC issues.
- Was deceitful during this, as well as the MG Taguba, investigations. His recollection of facts, statements, and incidents were always recounted to avoid blame or responsibility. His version of events frequently diverged from most others.
- Failed to obey a lawful order to refrain from contacting anyone except his attorney regarding this investigation. He conducted an e-mail campaign soliciting support from others involved in the investigation.

(U) **Recommendation:** This information should be forwarded to LTC Jordan's chain of command for appropriate action.

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(3) (U) Finding: MAJ David M. Price, Operations Officer, Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center, 141st MI Battalion. A preponderance of evidence indicates that MAJ Price did, or failed to do, the following:

- Failed to properly train Soldiers and civilians on the ICRP.
- Failed to understand the breadth of his responsibilities as the JIDC Operations Officer. Failed to effectively assess, plan, and seek command guidance and assistance regarding JIDC operations.
- Failed to intervene when the Interrogation Control Element (ICE) received pressure from Higher Headquarters.
- Failed to plan and implement the necessary checks and balances to prevent and detect abuses.
- Failed to properly review interrogation plans which clearly specified the improper use of nudity and isolation as punishment.

(U) Recommendation: This information should be forwarded to MAJ Price's chain of command for appropriate action.

(4) (U) Finding: MAJ Michael D. Thompson, Deputy Operations Officer, Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center, 325 MI BN. A preponderance of evidence supports that MAJ Thompson failed to do the following:

- Failed to properly train Soldiers and civilians on the ICRP.
- Failed to understand the breadth of his responsibilities as the JIDC Deputy Operations Officer. Failed to effectively assess, plan, and seek command guidance and assistance regarding JIDC operations.
- Failed to intervene when the ICE received pressure from Higher Headquarters.
- Failed to plan and implement the necessary checks and balances to prevent and detect abuses.
- Failed to properly review interrogation plans which clearly specified the improper use of nudity and isolation as punishment.

(U) Recommendation: This information should be forwarded to MAJ Thompson's chain of command for appropriate action.

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(5) (U) Finding: CPT Carolyn A. Wood, Officer in Charge, Interrogation Control Element (ICE), Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center, 519 MI BDE. A preponderance of evidence supports that CPT Wood failed to do the following:

- Failed to implement the necessary checks and balances to detect and prevent detainee abuse. Given her knowledge of prior abuse in Afghanistan, as well as the reported sexual assault of a female detainee by three 519 MI BN Soldiers working in the ICE, CPT Wood should have been aware of the potential for detainee abuse at Abu Ghraib. As the Officer-in-Charge (OIC) she was in a position to take steps to prevent further abuse. Her failure to do so allowed the abuse by Soldiers and civilians to go undetected and unchecked.
- Failed to assist in gaining control of a chaotic situation during the IP Roundup, even after SGT Eckroth approached her for help.
- Failed to provide proper supervision. Should have been more alert due to the following incidents:
 - An ongoing investigation on the 519 MI BN in Afghanistan.
 - Prior reports of 519 MI BN interrogators conducting unauthorized interrogations.
 - SOLDIER29's reported use of nudity and humiliation techniques.
 - Quick Reaction Force (QRF) allegations of detainee abuse by 519th MI Soldiers.
- Failed to properly review interrogation plans which clearly specified the improper use of nudity and isolation in interrogations and as punishment.
- Failed to ensure that Soldiers were properly trained on interrogation techniques and operations.
- Failed to adequately train Soldiers and civilians on the ICRP.

(U) Recommendation: This information should be forwarded to CPT Wood's chain of command for appropriate action.

(6) (U) Finding: SOLDIER-28, Guantanamo Base Team Chief, 260th MI Battalion. A preponderance of evidence supports that SOLDIER28 did, or failed to do, the following:

- Failed to report detainee abuse when he was notified by SOLDIER-11 that a detainee was observed in a cell naked, hooded, and whimpering, and when SOLDIER-11 reported an interrogator made a detainee pull his jumpsuit down to his waist.

(U) Recommendation: This information should be forwarded to SOLDIER-28's chain of command for appropriate action.

(7) (U) Finding: SOLDIER-23, Operations Section, ICE, JIDC, 325 MI BN. A preponderance of evidence supports that SOLDIER23 did, or failed to do, the following:

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- Failed to prevent detainee abuse and permitted the unauthorized use of dogs and unauthorized interrogations during the IP Roundup. As the second senior MI officer during the IP Roundup, his lack of leadership contributed to detainee abuse and the chaotic situation during the IP Roundup.
- Failed to properly supervise and ensure Soldiers and civilians followed the ICRP.
- Failed to properly review interrogation plans which clearly specified the improper use of nudity and isolation as interrogation techniques and punishment.

(U) **Recommendation:** This information should be forwarded to SOLDIER23' chain of command for appropriate action.

(8) (U) **Finding:** SOLDIER-14, Night Shift OIC, ICE, JDC, 519 MI BN. A preponderance of evidence supports that SOLDIER-14 did, or failed to do, the following:

- Failed to properly supervise and ensure Soldiers and civilians followed the ICRP.
- Failed to provide proper supervision. SOLDIER-14 should have been aware of the potential for detainee abuse at Abu Ghraib: The following incidents should have increased his diligence in overseeing operations:
 - An ongoing investigation of the 519 MI BN in Afghanistan.
 - Allegations by a female detainee that 519 MI BN interrogators sexually assaulted her. The Soldiers received non-judicial punishment for conducting unauthorized interrogations.
 - SOLDIER-29's reported use of nudity and humiliation techniques.
 - Quick Reaction Force (QRF) allegations of detainee abuse by 519 MI BN Soldiers.
- Failed to properly review interrogation plans which clearly specified the improper use of nudity and isolation as punishment.

(U) **Recommendation:** This information should be forwarded to SOLDIER-14's chain of command for appropriate action.

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(9) (U) **Finding: SOLDIER-15, Interrogator, 66 MI GP.** A preponderance of evidence supports that SOLDIER15 did, or failed to do, the following:

- Failed to report detainee abuse. He witnessed SSG Frederick twisting the handcuffs of a detainee causing pain and covering the detainee's nose and mouth to restrict him from breathing.
 - Witnessed during that same incident, CIVILIAN-11 threaten a detainee by suggesting he would be turned over to SSG Frederick for further abuse if he did not cooperate.

(U) **Recommendation:** This information should be forwarded to SOLDIER-15's chain of command for appropriate action.

(10) (U) **Finding: SOLDIER-22, 302d MI Battalion.** A preponderance of evidence supports that SOLDIER22 did, or failed to do, the following:

- Failed to report detainee abuse.
 - He was made aware by SOLDIER-25 of an incident where three detainees were abused by MPs (Reference Annex I, Appendix I, Photographs M36-37, M39-41).
 - He was made aware by SOLDIER-25 of the use of dogs to scare detainees.
 - He overheard Soldiers stating that MPs were using detainees as "practice dummies;" striking their necks and knocking them unconscious.
 - He was made aware of MPs conducting "PT" (Physical Training) sessions with detainees and MI personnel participating:
- Failed to obey a direct order. He interfered with this investigation by talking about the investigation, giving interviews to the media, and passing the questions being asked by investigators to others via a website.

(U) **Recommendation:** This information should be forwarded to SOLDIER-22's chain of command for appropriate action.

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(11) (U) Finding: SOLDIER-10, Analyst, 325 MI BN (currently attached to HHC, 504 MI BDE). A preponderance of evidence supports that SOLDIER10 did, or failed to do, the following:

- Actively participated in abuse when he threw water on three detainees who were handcuffed together and made to lie on the floor of the detention facility (Reference Annex I, Appendix 1, Photographs M36-37).
- Failed to stop detainee abuse in the above incident and in the incident when SOLDIER-29 stripped a detainee of his clothes and walked the detainee naked from an interrogation booth to Camp Vigilant during a cold winter day.
- Failed to report detainee abuse.

(U) Recommendation: This information should be forwarded to SOLDIER-10's chain of command for appropriate action.

(12) (U) Finding: SOLDIER-17, Interrogator, 2d MI Battalion. A preponderance of evidence supports that SOLDIER17 did, or failed to do, the following:

- Failed to report the improper use of dogs. He saw an un-muzzled black dog go into a cell and scare two juvenile detainees. The dog handler allowed the dogs to "go nuts" on the juveniles (Reference Annex I, Appendix 1, Photograph D-48).
- Failed to report inappropriate actions of dog handlers. He overheard Dog Handlers state they had a competition to scare detainees to the point they would defecate. They claimed to have already made several detainees urinate when threatened by their dogs.

(U) Recommendation: This information should be forwarded to SOLDIER-17's chain of command for appropriate action.

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(13) (U) Finding: SOLDIER-19, Interrogator, 325 MI BN. A preponderance of evidence supports that SOLDIER-19 did, or failed to do, the following:

- Abused detainees:
 - Actively participated in the abuse of three detainees depicted in photographs (Reference Annex I, Appendix 1, Photographs M36-37, M39-41). He threw a Foam-ball at their genitals and poured water on the detainees while they were bound, nude, and abused by others.
 - Turned over a detainee to the MPs with apparent instructions for his abuse. He returned to find the detainee naked and hooded on the floor whimpering.
 - Used improper interrogation techniques. He made a detainee roll down his jumpsuit and threatened the detainee with complete nudity if he did not cooperate.
- Failed to stop detainee abuse in the above incidents.
- Failed to report detainee abuse for above incidents.

(U) Recommendation: This information should be forwarded to SOLDIER-19's chain of command for appropriate action.

(14) (U) Findings: SOLDIER-24, Analyst, 325 MI BN (currently attached to HHC, 504 MI BDE). A preponderance of evidence supports that SOLDIER24 did, or failed to do, the following:

- Failed to report detainee abuse. He was present during the abuse of detainees depicted in photographs (Reference Annex I, Appendix 1, Photographs M36-37, M39, M41).
- Failed to stop detainee abuse.

(U) Recommendation: This information should be forwarded to SOLDIER-24's chain of command for appropriate action.

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(15) (U) Findings: SOLDIER-25, Interrogator, 321st MI BN. A preponderance of evidence supports that SOLDIER25 did, or failed to do, the following:

- Failed to report detainee abuse.
 - She saw Dog Handlers use dogs to scare detainees. She "thought it was funny" as the detainees would run into their cells from the dogs.
 - She was told by SOLDIER-24 that the detainees who allegedly had raped another detainee were handcuffed together, naked, in contorted positions, making it look like they were having sex with each other.
 - She was told that MPs made the detainees wear women's underwear.
- Failed to stop detainee abuse.

(U) Recommendation: This information should be forwarded to SOLDIER-25's chain of command for appropriate action.

(16) (U) Finding: SOLDIER-29, Interrogator, 66 MI GP. A preponderance of evidence supports that SOLDIER29 did, or failed to do, the following:

- Failed to report detainee abuse.
 - She saw CPL Graner slap a detainee.
 - She saw a computer screen saver depicting naked detainees in a "human pyramid."
 - She was aware MPs were taking photos of detainees.
 - She knew MPs had given a detainee a cold shower, made him roll in the dirt, and stand outside in the cold until he was dry. The detainee was then given another cold shower.
- Detainee abuse (Humiliation). She violated interrogation rules of engagement by stripping a detainee of his clothes and walking him naked from an interrogation booth to Camp Vigilant on a cold winter night.
- Gave MPs instruction to mistreat/abuse detainees.
 - SOLDIER2-9's telling MPs (SSG Frederick) when detainees had not cooperated in an interrogation appeared to result in subsequent abuse.
 - One of the detainees she interrogated was placed in isolation for several days and allegedly abused by the MPs. She annotated in an interrogation report (IN-AG00992-DETAINEE-08-04) that a "direct approach" was used with "the reminder of the unpleasantness that occurred the last time he lied to us."

(U) Recommendation: This information should be forwarded to SOLDIER-29's chain of command for appropriate action.

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(17) (U) Findings: SOLDIER-08, Dog Handler, Abu Ghraib, 42 MP Detachment, 16 MP BDE (ABN). A preponderance of evidence supports that SOLDIER08 did, or failed to do, the following:

- Inappropriate use of dogs. Photographs (Reference Annex I, Appendix 1, D46, D52, M149-151) depict SOLDIER-08 inappropriately using his dog to terrorize detainees.
- Abused detainees. SOLDIER-08 had an on-going contest with SOLDIER-27, another dog handler, to scare detainees with their dogs in order to see who could make the detainees urinate and defecate first.

(U) **Recommendation:** This information should be forwarded to SOLDIER-08's chain of command for appropriate action.

(18) (U) Findings: SOLDIER34, 372 MP CO. A preponderance of evidence supports that SOLDIER34 did, or failed to do, the following:

- Failed to report detainee abuse. He was present during the abuse of detainees depicted in photographs (Reference Annex I, Appendix 1, Photographs M36-37, M39-41).
- Failed to stop detainee abuse.

(U) **Recommendation:** This information should be forwarded to SOLDIER34's chain of command for appropriate action.

(19) (U) Findings: SOLDIER-27, 372 MP CO. A preponderance of evidence supports that SOLDIER27 did, or failed to do, the following:

- Actively participated in detainee abuse.
 - During the medical treatment (stitching) of a detainee, he stepped on the chest of the detainee (Reference Annex I, Appendix 1, Photograph M163).
 - He participated in the abuse of naked detainees depicted in photographs (Reference Annex I, Appendix 1, Photographs M36-37, M39-41).
- Failed to stop detainee abuse.

(U) **Recommendation:** This information should be forwarded to SOLDIER27's chain of command for appropriate action.

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(20) (U) Findings: SOLDIER-27, Dog Handler, Abu Ghraib, 523 MP Detachment. A preponderance of evidence supports that SOLDIER27 did, or failed to do, the following:

- Inappropriate use of dogs. Photographs (Reference Annex I, Appendix 1, Photographs D46, D48, M148, M150, M151, M153, Z1, Z3-6) depict SOLDIER-27 inappropriately using his dog terrorizing detainees.
- Detainee abuse. SOLDIER-27 had an on-going contest with SOLDIER-08, another dog handler, to scare detainees with their dogs and cause the detainees to urinate and defecate.
- Led his dog into a cell with two juvenile detainees and let his dog go "nuts." The two juveniles were yelling and screaming with the youngest one hiding behind the oldest.

(U) Recommendation: This information should be forwarded to SOLDIER-27's chain of command for appropriate action.

(21) (U) Finding: SOLDIER-20, Medic, 372 MP CO. A preponderance of evidence supports that SOLDIER20 did, or failed to do, the following:

- Failed to report detainee abuse.
 - When called to assist a detainee who had been shot in the leg, he witnessed CPL Graner hit the detainee in his injured leg with a stick.
 - He saw the same detainee handcuffed to a bed over several days, causing great pain to the detainee as he was forced to stand.
 - He saw the same detainee handcuffed to a bed which resulted in a dislocated shoulder.
 - He saw pictures of detainees being abused (stacked naked in a "human pyramid").

(U) Recommendation: This information should be forwarded to SOLDIER-20's chain of command for appropriate action.

(22) (U) Finding: SOLDIER-01, Medic, Abu Ghraib. A preponderance of evidence supports that SOLDIER01 did, or failed to do, the following:

- Failed to report detainee abuse. She saw a "human pyramid" of naked Iraqi prisoners, all with sandbags on their heads when called to the Hard Site to provide medical treatment.

(U) Recommendation: This information should be forwarded to SOLDIER-01's chain of command for appropriate action.

(23) (U) Finding: CIVILIAN-05, CACI employee. A preponderance of evidence supports that CIVILIAN-05 did, or failed to do, the following:

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- He grabbed a detainee (who was handcuffed) off a vehicle and dropped him to the ground. He then dragged him into an interrogation booth and as the detainee tried to get up, CIVILIAN-05 would yank the detainee very hard and make him fall again.
- Disobeyed General Order Number One; drinking alcohol while at Abu Ghraib.
- Refused to take instructions from a Tiger Team leader and refused to take instructions from military trainers.
 - When confronted by SSG Neal, his Tiger Team leader, about his inadequate interrogation techniques, he replied, "I have been doing this for 20 years and I do not need a 20 year old telling me how to do my job."
 - When placed in a remedial report writing class because of his poor writing, he did not pay attention to the trainer and sat in the back of the room facing away from the trainer.

(U) **Recommendation:** This information should be forwarded to the Army General Counsel for determination of whether CIVILIAN-05 should be referred to the Department of Justice for prosecution. This information should be forwarded to the Contracting Officer (KO) for appropriate contractual action.

(24) (U) **Finding:** CIVILIAN-10, Translator, Titan employee. After a thorough investigation, we found no direct involvement in detainee abuse by CIVILIAN-10. Our investigation revealed CIVILIAN-10 had a valid security clearance until it was suspended.

(U) **Recommendation:** This information should be forwarded to Titan via the KO. CIVILIAN-10 is cleared of any wrong doing and should retain his security clearance.

Neal

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(25) (U) **Finding:** CIVILIAN-11, Interrogator, CACI employee. A preponderance of evidence supports that CIVILIAN11 did, or failed to do, the following:

- Detainee abuse.
 - He encouraged SSG Frederick to abuse Iraqi Police detained following a shooting incident (IP Roundup). SSG Frederick twisted the handcuffs of a detainee being interrogated; causing pain.
 - He failed to prevent SSG Frederick from covering the detainee's mouth and nose restricting the detainee from breathing:
- Threatened the Iraqi Police "with SSG Frederick." He told the Iraqi Police to answer his questions or he would bring SSG Frederick back into the cell.
- Used dogs during the IP Roundup in an unauthorized manner. He told a detainee, "You see that dog there, if you do not tell me what I want to know, I'm going to get that dog on you."
- Placed a detainee in an unauthorized stress position (Reference Annex I, Appendix 2, Photograph "Stress Positions"). CIVILIAN-11 is photographed facing a detainee who is in a stress position on a chair with his back exposed. The detainee is in a dangerous position where he might fall back and injure himself.
- Failed to prevent a detainee from being photographed.

(U) **Recommendation:** This information should be forwarded to the Army General Counsel for determination of whether CIVILIAN-11 should be referred to the Department of Justice for prosecution. This information should be forwarded to the KO for appropriate contractual action.

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(26) (U) Finding: CIVILIAN-16, Translator, Titan employee. A preponderance of evidence supports that CIVILIAN-16 did, or failed to do, the following:

- Failed to report detainee abuse.
 - She participated in an interrogation during the IP Roundup, where a dog was brought into a cell in violation of approved ICRP.
 - She participated in the interrogation of an Iraqi Policeman who was placed in a stress position; squatting backwards on a plastic lawn chair. Any sudden movement by the IP could have resulted in injury (Reference Annex I, Appendix 2, Photograph "Stress Positions").
 - She was present during an interrogation when SSG Frederick twisted the handcuffs of a detainee, causing the detainee pain.
 - She was present when SSG Frederick covered an IP's mouth and nose, restricting the detainee from breathing.
- Failed to report threats against detainees.
 - She was present when CIVILIAN-11 told a detainee, "You see that dog there, if you do not tell me what I want to know, I'm going to get that dog on you."
 - She was present when CIVILIAN-11 threatened a detainee "with SSG Frederick."

(U) Recommendation: This information should be forwarded to the Army General Counsel for determination of whether CIVILIAN-16 should be referred to the Department of Justice for prosecution. This information should be forwarded to the KO for appropriate contractual action.

(27) (U) Finding: CIVILIAN-17, Interpreter, Titan employee. A preponderance of evidence supports that CIVILIAN-17 did, or failed to do, the following:

- Actively participated in detainee abuse.
 - He was present during the abuse of detainees depicted in photographs (Reference Annex I, Appendix 1, Photographs M36-37, M39, M41).
 - A detainee claimed that CIVILIAN-17 (sic), an interpreter, hit him and cut his ear which required stitches.
 - Another detainee claimed that someone fitting CIVILIAN-17's description raped a young detainee.
- Failure to report detainee abuse.
- Failure to stop detainee abuse.

(U) Recommendation: This information should be forwarded to the Army General Counsel for determination of whether CIVILIAN-17 should be referred to the Department of Justice for prosecution. This information should be forwarded to the KO for appropriate contractual action.

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(28) (U) **Finding:** CIVILIAN-21, Interrogator, CACI employee. A preponderance of evidence supports that CIVILIAN-21 did, or failed to do, the following:

- Inappropriate use of dogs. SOLDIER-26 stated that CIVILIAN-21 used a dog during an interrogation and the dog was unmuzzled. SOLDIER-25 stated she once saw CIVILIAN21 standing on the second floor of the Hard Site, looking down to where a dog was being used against a detainee, and yelling to the MPs "Take him home." The dog had torn the detainee's mattress. He also used a dog during an interrogation with SSG Aston but stated he never used dogs.
- Detainee abuse. CPT Reese stated he saw "NAME" (his description of "NAME" matched CIVILIAN-21) push (kick) a detainee into a cell with his foot.
- Making false statements. During questioning about the use of dogs in interrogations, CIVILIAN21 stated he never used them.
- Failed to report detainee abuse. During an interrogation, a detainee told SOLDIER-25 and CIVILIAN-21 that CIVILIAN-17, an interpreter, hit him and cut his ear which required stitches. SOLDIER-25 stated she told CIVILIAN-21 to annotate this on the interrogation report. He did not report it to appropriate authorities.
- Detainee Humiliation.
 - CIVILIAN-15 stated he heard CIVILIAN-21 tell several people that he had shaved the hair and beard of a detainee and put him in red women's underwear. CIVILIAN-21 was allegedly bragging about it.
 - CIVILIAN-19 stated he heard OTHER AGENCY EMPLOYEE02 laughing about red panties on detainees.

(U) **Recommendation:** This information should be forwarded to the Army General Counsel for determination of whether CIVILIAN-21 should be referred to the Department of Justice for prosecution. This information should be forwarded to the KO for appropriate contractual action.

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(29) (U) **Finding:** There were several personnel who used clothing removal, improper isolation, or dogs as techniques for interrogations in violation of the Geneva Conventions. Several interrogators documented these techniques in their interrogation plans and stated they received approval from the JIDC, Interrogation Control Element. The investigative team found several entries in interrogation reports which clearly specified clothing removal; however, all personnel having the authority to approve interrogation plans claim they never approved or were aware of clothing removal being used in interrogations. Also found were interrogation reports specifying use of isolation, "the Hole." While the Commander, CJTF-7 approved "segregation" on 25 occasions, this use of isolation sometimes trended toward abuse based on sensory deprivation and inhumane conditions. Dogs were never approved, however on several occasions personnel thought they were. Personnel who committed abuse based on confusion regarding approvals or policies are in need of additional training.

(U) **Recommendation:** This information should be forwarded to the Soldiers' chain of command for appropriate action.

CIVILIAN-14 (formally with 368 Military Intelligence Battalion)
SOLDIER-04, 500 Military Intelligence Group
SOLDIER-05, 500 Military Intelligence Group
SOLDIER-03, GTMO Team, 184 Military Intelligence Company
SOLDIER-13, 66 Military Intelligence Group
SOLDIER-18, 66 Military Intelligence Group
SOLDIER-02, 66 Military Intelligence Group
SOLDIER-11 6 Battalion 98 Division (IT)
SOLDIER-16, 325 Military Intelligence Battalion
SOLDIER-30, 325 Military Intelligence Battalion
SOLDIER-26, 320 Military Police Battalion
SOLDIER-06, 302 Military Intelligence Battalion
SOLDIER-07, 325 Military Intelligence Battalion
SOLDIER-21, 325 Military Intelligence Battalion
SOLDIER-09, 302 Military Intelligence Battalion
SOLDIER-12, 302 Military Intelligence Battalion
CIVILIAN-20, CACI Employee

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(30) (U) **Finding:** In addition to SOLDIER-20 and SOLDIER01, medical personnel may have been aware of detainee abuse at Abu Ghraib and failed to report it. The scope of this investigation was MI personnel involvement. SOLDIER-20 and SOLDIER-01 were cited because sufficient evidence existed within the scope of this investigation to establish that they were aware of detainee abuse and failed to report it. Medical records were requested, but not obtained, by this investigation. The location of the records at the time this request was made was unknown.

(U) **Recommendation:** An inquiry should be conducted into 1) whether appropriate medical records were maintained, and if so, were they properly stored and collected and 2) whether medical personnel were aware of detainee abuse and failed to properly document and report the abuse.

(31) (U) **Finding:** A preponderance of the evidence supports that SOLDIER-31, SOLDIER-32, and SOLDIER-33 participated in the alleged sexual assault of a female detainee by forcibly kissing her and removing her shirt (Reference CID Case-0216-03-CID259-6121). The individuals received non-judicial punishment for conducting an unauthorized interrogation, but were not punished for the alleged sexual assault.

(U) **Recommendation:** CID should review case # 0216-03-CID259-61211 to determine if further investigation is appropriate. The case should then be forwarded to the Soldiers' chain of command for appropriate action.

(32) (U) **Finding:** An unidentified person, believed to be a contractor interpreter, was depicted in six photographs taken on 25 October 2003 showing the abuse of three detainees. The detainees were nude and handcuffed together on the floor. This investigation could not confirm the identity of this person; however, potential leads have been passed to and are currently being pursued by CID.

(U) **Recommendation:** CID should continue to aggressively pursue all available leads to identify this person and determine the degree of his involvement in detainee abuse.

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7. (U) Personnel Listing. Deleted in accordance with the Privacy Act and 10 USC §130b

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8. (U) Task Force Members.

LTG Anthony R. CIVILIAN08 Command	Investigating Officer	HQs, Training and Doctrine
MG George R. Fay	Investigating Officer	HQs, Dept of the Army, G2
Mr. Thomas A. Gandy	Deputy	HQs, Dept of the Army, G2
LTC Phillip H. Bender	Chief Investigator	HQs, Dept of the Army, G2
LTC Michael Benjamin	Legal Advisor	TJAG
MAJ(P) Maricela Alvarado	Executive Officer	HQs, Dept of the Army, G2
CPT Roseanne M. Bleam	Staff Judge Advocate, CJTF-7	CJTF-7 (MNF-I) SJA
CW5 Donald Marquis	SME – Training & Doctrine	HQs, US Army Intelligence Center
CW3 Brent Pack	CID Liaison	US Army CID Command
CW2 Mark Engan	Investigator – Baghdad Team	HQs, 308th MI Bn, 902nd MI Group
SGT Patrick D. Devine	All Source Analyst	ACIC, 310th MI Bn, 902nd MI Group
CPL Ryan Hausterman	Investigator – Baghdad Team	HQs, 310th MI Bn, 902nd MI Group
Mr. Maurice J. Sheley	Investigator	HQs, US Army INSCOM
Mr. Michael P. Scanland	Investigator	HQs, 902nd MI Group
Mr. Claude B. Benner	Investigative Review	ACIC, 902nd MI Group
Mr. Michael Wright	Investigator	HQs, 308th MI Bn, 902nd MI Group
Mr. Scott Robertson	Investigator	HQs, Dept of the Army, G2
Mr. Paul Stark	Chief of Analysis	ACIC, 310th MI Bn, 902nd MI Group
Mr. Kevin Brucie	Investigator – Baghdad Team	Det 13, FCA, 902nd MI Group
Ms. Linda Flanigan	Analyst	ACIC, 310th MI Bn, 902nd MI Group
Mr. Albert Scott	Cyber-Forensic Analyst	HQs, 310th MI Bn, 902nd MI Group
Ms. Saoirse Spain	Analyst	ACIC, 310th MI Bn, 902nd MI group
Mr. Albert J. McCarn Jr.	Chief of Logistics	HQs, Dept of the Army, G2
Ms. Cheryl Clowser	Administrator	HQs, Dept of the Army, G2
Mr. Alfred Moreau	SME – Contract Law	HQs, Dept of the Army, OTJAG
Mr. Rudolph Garcia	Senior Editor	HQs, Dept of the Army, G2

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9. (U) Acronyms.

2 MI BN	2d Military Intelligence Battalion
B/321 MI BN	B Company, 321st Military Intelligence Battalion
B/325 MI BN	B Company, 325th Military Intelligence Battalion
A/205 MI BN	A Company, 205th Military Intelligence Battalion
115 MP BN	115th Military Police Battalion
165 MI BN	165th Military Intelligence Battalion
205 MI BDE	205th Military Intelligence Brigade
229 MP CO	229th Military Police Battalion
320 MP BN	320th Military Police Battalion
320 MP CO	320th Military Police Company
323 MI BN	323d Military Intelligence Battalion
325 MI BN	325th Military Intelligence Battalion
372 MP CO	372d Military Police Company
377 TSC	377th Theater Support Command
400 MP BN	400th Military Police Battalion
470 MI GP	470th Military Intelligence Group
447 MP CO	447th Military Police Company
500 MI GP	500th Military Intelligence Group
504 MI BDE	504th Military Intelligence Battalion
519 MI BN	519th Military Intelligence Battalion
66 MI GP	66th Military Intelligence Group
670 MP CO	670th Military Police Company
72 MP CO	72d Military Police Company
800 MP BDE	800th Military Police Brigade
870 MP CO	870th Military Police Company
1SG	First Sergeant
A/519 MI BN	A Company, 519th Military Intelligence Battalion
AAR	After Action Report
AFJI	Air Force Joint Instructor
AG	Abu Ghraib
ANCOC	Advanced Non-Commission Officer's Course
AR	Army Regulation
ATSD (IO)	Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Oversight
BDE	Brigade
BG	Brigadier General
BIAP	Baghdad International Airport
BN	Battalion
BNCOC	Basic Non-Commission Officer's Course
BPA	Blanket Purchase Agreement
C2X	Command and Control Exercise

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CALL	Center for Army Lessons Learned
CENTCOM	US Central Command
CG	Commanding General
CHA	Corps Holding Area
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CID	Criminal Investigation Command
CJCS-I	Chairman, Joint Chief of Staff Instruction
CJTF-7	Combined Joint Task Force 7
CM&D	Collection Management and Dissemination
COL	Colonel
COR	Contracting Officers Representative
CP	Collection Point
CPA	Coalition Provisional Authority
CPL	Corporal
CPT	Captain
CSH	Combat Support Hospital
DA	Department of the Army
DAIG	Department of the Army Inspector General
DCI	Director of Central Intelligence
DCG	Deputy Commanding General
DIAM	Defense Intelligence Agency Manual
DoD	Department of Defense
1LT	First Lieutenant
CASH	Combat Army Surgical Hospital
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
KO	Contracting Officer
DOJ	Department of Justice
DRA	Detention Review Authority
DRB	Detainee Release Branch
EPW	Enemy Prisoner of War
FM	Field Manual
FOB	Forward Operating Base
FRAGO	Fragmentary Order
G-3	Army Training Division
GCIV	Geneva Conventions IV
GP	Group
GSA	General Services Administration
GTMO	Guantanamo Naval Base, Cuba
GWOT	Global War On Terrorism
HQ	Headquarters
HUMINT	Human Intelligence
IAW	In Accordance With
ICE	Interrogation and Control Element
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross

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ICRP	Interrogation and Counter-Resistance Policies
IET	Initial Entry Training
ID	Infantry Division
IG	Inspector General
IMINT	Imagery Intelligence
INSCOM	Intelligence and Security Command
IP	Iraqi Police
IR	Interment/Resettlement
IROE	Interrogation Rules Of Engagement
ISCT	Interrogation Support to Counterterrorism
ISG	Iraqi Survey Group
JA	Judge Advocate
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JIDC	Joint Interrogation and Detention Center
JTF-GTMO	Joint Task Force Guantanamo
MAJ	Major
MCO	Marine Corps Order
LTC	Lieutenant Colonel
LTG	Lieutenant General
MFR	Memorandum For Record
MG	Major General
MI	Military Intelligence
MIT	Mobile Interrogation Team
MOS	Military Occupational Specialty
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MP	Military Police
MRE	Meals Ready to Eat
MSC	Major Subordinate Command
MSG	Master Sergeant
MTT	Mobile Training Team
NCO	Non-Commissioned Officer
NCOIC	Non-Commissioned Officer In Charge
OER	Officer Evaluation Report
OGA	Other Government Agency
OGC	Office Of General Counsel
OIC	Officer In Charge
OIF	Operation Iraqi Freedom
OPORD	Operations Order
OPNAVINST	Office of the Chief of Naval Operations Instructions
OSJA	Office Of the Staff Judge Advocate
OVB	Operation Victory Bounty
RP	Retained Personnel
SASO	Stability And Support Operations
SECARMY	Secretary of the Army

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SECDEF	Secretary of Defense
SFC	Sergeant First Class
SGT	Sergeant
SIGINT	Signals Intelligence
SITREP	Situation Report
HMMWV	High-Mobility, Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle
PFC	Private First Class
MA1	Master at Arms 1
MA2	Master at Arms 2
PVT	Private
QRF	Quick Reaction Force
SJA	Staff Judge Advocate
SOF	Special Operations Forces
SOP	Standard Operating Procedure
SOUTHCOM	US Southern Command
SOW	Statement of Work
SSG	Staff Sergeant
TACON	Tactical Control
THT	Tactical HUMINT Team
TRADOC	Training and Doctrine Command
TTP	Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
UCMJ	Uniform Code Of Military Justice
USAIC	US Army Intelligence Center
USAR	US Army Reserve
VFR	Visual Flight Rules
E-6	Enlisted Grade 6 (Staff Sergeant)
E-7	Enlisted Grade 7 (Sergeant First Class)
E-5	Enlisted Grade 5 (Sergeant)
96B	Intelligence Analyst
NBC	National Business Center
FSS	Federal Supply Schedule
POC	Point of Contact
DAIG	Department of the Army Inspector General
97E	Human Intelligence Collector
351E	Interrogation Warrant Officer
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
ISN	Internee Serial Number
JTF-21	Joint Task Force - 21
TF-121	Task Force - 121
SEAL	Sea, Air, Land
SPC	Specialist
RFF	Request for Forces
TF-20	Task Force - 20
97B	Counterintelligence Agent

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CM&D
JIG
351B
PT
IRF

Collection, Management and Dissemination
Joint Intelligence Group
Counterintelligence Warrant Officer
Physical Training
Internal Reaction Force

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