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(S) [REDACTED]

sought based on intelligence information. Detainees are also captured in the immediate aftermath of attacks against U.S. or Afghan forces, if there is reason to suspect that the person has information pertaining to the attack, or which could help prevent future attacks. In addition, "cordon and sweep" operations have been conducted in areas known to harbor Taliban or al Qaeda elements in order to capture or kill those elements, or to gain intelligence about their location and activities.

(b)(1) [REDACTED]

**Detainee Flow From Point of Capture  
Through Detention (U)**

(U) Persons come into U.S. custody in Afghanistan through several means. First, there are a small number who were captured during traditional force-on-force fighting against Taliban or al Qaeda groups, or following the seizure of an enemy facility. Many of these detainees have since been transferred to GTMO. There are also detainees who were captured by opposition groups, such as the Northern Alliance, and transferred to U.S. control after being screened using the criteria described above. Finally, there are those who are picked up by U.S. forces in the course of ongoing operations, as described below. The majority of captured persons in Afghanistan now fall in the last category.

(U) Ongoing operations by U.S. forces include raids in which specific personnel are

(S/NF) [REDACTED]

(b)(1) [REDACTED]

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(b)(1)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S/NF)

[REDACTED]

(S/NF)

[REDACTED]

(S)

[REDACTED]

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


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## Field Holding Site at Salerno (U)



(b)(1)

ited aircraft availability, which may result in ground transportation by convoy. Poor road conditions throughout the country, coupled with the danger of enemy attacks or roadside bombs, land mines or improvised explosive devices (IEDs), can create extremely long travel times. For example, surface travel from Kandahar to the FOB at Gereshk, a distance of less than 60 miles, can take more than six hours.

(U) Transfer from field holding sites to the facilities at Kandahar and Bagram can be challenging and time-consuming. The preferred method of transfer is by helicopter, but competing operational requirements frequently result in lim-

(U)

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
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
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


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
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


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(b)(1) + (b)(2)

~~(S/NF)~~~~(S/NF)~~~~(S/NF)~~**MI-MP Relationship (U)**

(U) In Afghanistan, the working relationship between MI and MP personnel was dictated by doctrine, albeit with all of the uncertainties regarding implementation of interrogation techniques described in our report's section on MI-MP Doctrine. Interviewees repeatedly stated, "MPs do not interrogate." However, the decision as to whether MPs participated in the implementation

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## Classification of Captured Persons in Afghanistan (U)

(S/NF)

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of techniques such as Sleep Adjustment or MRE-Only Diet, or were present in interrogation rooms, devolved to the unit level for reasons we have discussed previously in our discussion of doctrine. For instance, we received some reports that at times, MPs had enforced detainee compliance with Safety Positions.

(U) In general, though, we found that in practice the MI-MP relationship in Afghanistan was well-defined, particularly at the BCP, and that

MI and MP units maintained separate chains of command and remained focused on their independent missions. After the BCP's establishment, for example, the CJTF-180 Provost Marshal (the senior officer responsible for detention operations) designated a principal assistant to oversee detention operations there, while the CJTF-180 CJ2 was responsible for interrogation operations in the facility. The two work together to coordinate execution of their respective missions. A dedicated judge advocate has been assigned full time to the

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


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### Afghanistan Counter-Resistance Policy Development (U)



facility, and the CJTF-76 Inspector General provides independent oversight.

(U) Our MP interviews also suggested that media coverage of the Abu Ghraib abuses has resulted in a feeling among some guards that any misconduct on the part of the interrogators will also reflect upon them. The Kandahar facility's provost marshal provided an example of a resultant precautionary measure: at Kandahar, Plexiglas has been installed between interrogation

rooms and adjacent observation rooms so that guards may observe interrogations. Guards are directed to ensure the safety of detainees as well as of interrogators.

#### Evolution of Approved Techniques (U)

(U) As with GTMO, the interrogation techniques approved for use in Afghanistan have evolved significantly over time. The highlights of this evolution are depicted in the above figure and

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are described briefly below, followed by a detailed, chronological examination of the major events and that have shaped the development of approved interrogation techniques in Afghanistan.

(U) From the beginning of OEF on October 27, 2001 until January 23, 2003, the only official interrogation guidance in Afghanistan was the doctrine contained in FM 34-52. In response to a January 21, 2003 message from the Director of the Joint Staff (DJS), on January 24, 2003 the CJTF-180 Acting Staff Judge Advocate (SJA) forwarded a memorandum describing techniques then being employed in Afghanistan, citing FM 34-52 as the only reference and noting that the techniques described were "based on interrogators' experiences during Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) from Dec 01 - Jan 03," and strongly recommending that the techniques listed be approved as official policy.

(U) Our interviews indicated that, in the absence of any response, CJTF-180 adopted the January 24 memo as policy under an assumption that "silence is consent," and it remained in effect until March 16, 2004, when it was superseded by a new CJTF-180 interrogation policy, as described below. (In the interim, CJTF-180 commander LTG Dan K. McNeill had prohibited certain techniques as a precaution following detainee deaths at Bagram; however, these techniques were revived without explanation in the March 16 policy.) Finally, by direction of CENTCOM, in June 2004 CFC-A ordered the adoption of CJTF-7's (the coalition command in Iraq) interrogation policy.

(U) October 2001 - February 2004

(U) As described previously, no dedicated U.S. interrogation personnel entered the Afghanistan Combined-Joint Operating Area (CJOA) until late November 2001. Having no other specific guidance, these HUMINT teams relied on FM 34-52, which would remain a basic source of approved interrogation techniques throughout OEF.

(U) Evidence suggests that in developing techniques, interrogators in Afghanistan took so literally FM 34-52's suggestion to be creative that they strayed significantly from a plain-language reading of FM 34-52. In particular, Alpha Company, 519th MI Battalion (A/519), [REDACTED] developed a variety of techniques that went well beyond those authorized in FM 34-52. Some of these techniques, including sleep adjustment and stress positions, were similar to those included in the counter-resistance techniques requested by SOUTHCOM and approved by the Secretary of Defense in December 2002 for employment at Guantanamo. (How these techniques appeared in Afghanistan is described later in this section during our discussion of technique "migration.") However, rather than considering these techniques to be distinct, as in the GTMO policy development process, interrogators in Afghanistan appear to have broadly interpreted FM 34-52 so as to consider the techniques included within existing doctrine. For example, in a memorandum written shortly after A/519 moved from Afghanistan to Iraq, [REDACTED] related each of the techniques the A/519 had devel-

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

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(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

oped to FM 34-52 (as will be discussed further in our section covering Iraq); and in an interview with our team on September 15, 2004, [REDACTED] indicated that she used the same rationale in Afghanistan. (Of the techniques she identified, [REDACTED] has indicated that sleep adjustment and stress positions were the only ones used by her unit in Afghanistan.)

(U) Of note, [REDACTED] references to FM 34-52 cite its Appendix H, a summary of interrogation techniques that appears in the outdated 1987 edition but not in the current 1992 edition of FM 34-52. As the Independent Panel has noted, the 1987 edition also calls for the interrogator to appear to control all aspects of interrogation, "to include lighting and heating, as well as food, clothing and shelter given to detainees." Notwithstanding the qualifier "appear to control," this language may have been perceived by interrogators as conveying a broad span of control which, when coupled with an expansive interpretation of the techniques themselves, made it possible to cite doctrinal origins for many of the most controversial counter-resistance techniques.

Battlefield Interrogation Techniques In Use by CJTF-180 as of January 24, 2003 (U)

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