


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(U) Discussion in this section of the report will focus on two areas of consideration. First, we will address agreements and guidance that governed the relationships between DoD and OGAs in Guantanamo Bay (GTMO), Afghanistan and Iraq. The second area of discussion will explain exactly how DoD supported OGAs. In some instances, DoD assisted OGA interrogations by holding detainees for OGAs without registering or accounting for them. Our discussion will address, to the extent that our information and interviews can support, the nature and scope of this practice of holding detainees without record, known locally at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq as "ghost detainees." The section will also address DoD's role in supporting OGA logistical requirements to include: facilities for interrogation, interpreters, security, military escort for detainees and, on occasion, personnel shelter and food services. Additionally, while the level and type of support differed in each country, DoD support uniformly involved sharing information on the capture, location and interrogation of detainees as well as the intelligence gained from those interrogations. Finally, this section will address DoD's oversight of other agency interrogations held in DoD facilities.





Interagency Coordination Guidance (U)




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
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ulgated formal guidance-or any implementing Personnel guidance is obvious. Without this guidance, DoD personnel were unsure of exactly what was authorized and expected. The importance of a shared mission to support the Global War on Terror, however, remained the same. In light of that mission, DoD and OGA personnel worked to identify and fulfill their respective requirements. This interagency working relationship was characterized by a CIA official in Baghdad in a November 2003 cable

to CIA Headquarters: "But it also appears that all levels within the military understand CIA's priorities and provide us the necessary support." DoD's support to OGA is addressed below.

DoD Support to OGA (U)

(U) DoD has provided a wide number of services to OGAs in support of interrogation and detention operations since detention operations began in Afghanistan in December 2001. Services provided to OGAs in GTMO, Afghanistan and Iraq differed based on the existing infrastructure and specific mission requirements of the various agencies in those countries. This section will address the four major areas of support that we identified: (1) Transfer and custody of detained personnel to include keeping detainees without formal record or processing, also known as "ghost detainees"; (2) Logistical support; (3) Intelligence sharing; and (4) DoD oversight of OGA interrogations.

(U) In conclusion, the lack of clearly prom- (U) Transfer and Custody of Detained


(U) One area of DoD support for OGAs that we identified involved the transfer of detainees to or from OGAs. Detainee transfers occurred for a variety of reasons. For example, in Iraq, as previously discussed, OGAs relied on DoD to maintain custody and control of detainees with limited exceptions. We are not able to quantify the frequency of this transfer process within the security


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classification of this report; however, we can say that the guidance to combatant commanders that governed the transfer process was very specific. In February 2002, just months after the start of OEF, CENTCOM provided transfer of custody guidance that required advanced Coalition Force Commander (CFC) coordination and SECDEF approval for the transfer of custody to or from other U.S. governmental agencies or to foreign governments. Similarly, an April 2003 CJCS EXORD provided that, 'Upon direction from SECDEF or his designee, other combatant commanders may transfer control of designated detainees ... to a U.S. Federal Agency, or to a DoD agent who will accept. control of detainees. SECDEF notification is required 72 hours prior to all inter-theater movement of detainees and all transfer of control to and from federal agencies."






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


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



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
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
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
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