

## Serbia

### War-Crime Suspects Key To Serbia's Future

Source: Financial Times, 28 Oct 07

The European Union and Serbia are approaching a moment of truth as EU leaders weigh up whether Belgrade's co-operation in tracking down alleged war criminals is enough to justify putting Serbia on the road to EU membership.

Carla del Ponte, chief prosecutor at the United Nations war crimes tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, discussed the matter with Olli Rehn, the EU's enlargement commissioner, on her return from a two-day trip to Serbia last week. The pair will hold more discussions at the end of the week before a final decision is taken. EU governments have mixed views about how much Serbia's progress towards membership should depend on handing over war-crimes suspects. The central problem concerns Ratko Mladic, the former Bosnian Serb military commander and alleged organiser of the 1995 Srebrenica massacre. Ms del Ponte said Belgrade's co-operation was improving but could not be deemed sufficient without Mr Mladic's arrest. However, some EU officials want to initial a "stabilisation and association agreement" with Serbia - the first step towards EU membership - if Belgrade is doing all it can to find Mr Mladic and three other fugitives. Boris Tadic, Serbia's pro-EU president, said he hoped Ms del Ponte would "prepare a positive report regarding our co-operation . . . even though we are facing some difficulties to find Ratko Mladic and other fugitives."

Serbian officials this month offered a €1m (\$695,000, £487,000) reward for information leading to Mr Mladic's arrest, and rewards of €250,000 for two others. Radovan Karadzic, the former Bosnian Serb political leader, would also be worth €1m, but he does not hold Serbian citizenship, officials said. Western intelligence agencies are uncertain where Mr Karadzic is hiding, but suspect Mr Mladic is in Serbia, according to diplomats in Brussels. Besides opening the door to the EU, Mr Mladic's arrest would, in Serbia's view, boost its goal of retaining sovereignty over the breakaway province of Kosovo. Ms del Ponte has said political pressure, especially from the EU, is the only way ex-Yugoslav suspects have ever come to trial in The Hague. Serbia has delivered nearly 40 war crimes suspects to the tribunal since 2000. However, co-operation with the tribunal was "not fully satisfactory" before Serbia's current government was formed four months ago, Mr Tadic said. The president has insisted on intelligence oversight as a condition for his Social Democrats working in coalition under the nationalist-leaning prime minister, Vojislav Kostunica. Until then, Mr Kostunica had periodically questioned the fairness of the Hague tribunal for Serb suspects. "The first report I get every morning is on full co-operation with the tribunal," he said.

## Somalia

### Heavy Fighting Shakes Somalia

Source: News24, 27 Oct 07

Insurgents and government-allied forces battled with machine guns, mortars and rocket-propelled grenades on Saturday in the heaviest fighting to hit Somalia's capital for months, leaving at least seven people dead and dozens others wounded, witnesses and health officials said.

Islamic fighters briefly occupied a police station in south Mogadishu, before heading back out of the area, chanting "God is great", witnesses said. Witnesses said at least seven people including a woman had died in the heavy fighting, which saw insurgents and government troops and allied Ethiopian forces trading heavy machine-gun fire and mortar rounds. Insurgents could be seen firing rocket-propelled grenades.

At least 35 people were under treatment at Mogadishu's Medina Hospital from injuries suffered during the fighting, including some who were seriously wounded, said Tahir Mohammed Mahmoud, an administrative assistant. He said it was the worst fighting, and heaviest day for hospital admissions, for at least four months in the war-scarred city. Another witness to the fighting, Hassan Hussein, said he saw two dead Ethiopian troops. Ethiopian officials were not immediately available for confirmation. On the political front, Prime Minister Ali Mohamed Gedi was in the Ethiopian capital, Addis Ababa, for consultations. He has been locked in a power struggle for months with President Abdullahi Yusuf, who wants to push through a no-confidence vote this week and form a new government - presumably without Gedi. On Friday, Gedi told local media that he was not planning to resign, contrary to widespread speculation.

Twenty-two ministers and deputy ministers have threatened to resign unless the no-confidence vote is held, exposing deep rifts in the administration. Mogadishu has been plagued by fighting since government troops and their Ethiopian allies chased out the Council of Islamic Courts in December. For six months, the Islamic group controlled much of southern Somalia, and remnants have vowed to fight an Iraq-style insurgency. Thousands of civilians have been killed in the fighting this year. Somalia has not had a functioning government since 1991, when rival warlords overthrew dictator Mohamed Siad Barre and then turned on each other. Some 1.5 million Somalis are now in need of food aid and protection - or 50% more than at the start of the year - due to inadequate rains, continuing internal displacement and a potential cholera epidemic, the UN says.

Spain

Spain To Extradite Syria Arms Dealer Suspect To US

Source: Reuters, 26 Oct 07

Spain's High Court on Friday agreed to a U.S. request to extradite a suspected Syrian weapons dealer accused of planning to supply arms to a Colombian rebel group.

Monzer al-Kassar was arrested in Madrid in June on charges of conspiring to sell millions of dollars worth of weapons to the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). U.S. authorities accuse Kassar of agreeing to provide arms to the FARC to protect a cocaine-trafficking business and attack U.S. interests in the South American country. A long-time Spanish resident known as the "Prince of Marbella" for his outlandish lifestyle, Kassar has sold weapons to the Palestine Liberation Front, Nicaragua, Bosnia, Croatia, Iran, Iraq and Somalia since the 1970s, the U.S. Embassy in Madrid said. In 1995, Kassar was acquitted by Spain's high court of a charge of piracy in connection with the 1985 hijacking of the Italian cruise liner Achille Lauro by Palestinian guerrillas.

Syria

Source: BBC, 26 Oct 07

Newly-released satellite images of the presumed site of an Israeli air raid on Syria last month suggest that a large building has been completely removed.

US research group, the Institute for Science and International Security, obtained and analysed the images. The industrial-style building may have been a nuclear reactor under construction, says the ISIS. A BBC correspondent says the images are not conclusive. Nor is it certain that they show the site hit by Israeli jets. The Israeli strike has been shrouded in mystery and speculation. Originally Israel did not even admit that the 6 September raid had been carried out, and its military censor ordered a complete blackout on information. But Syria said Israeli warplanes violated its airspace in what it called a "hostile act", and Israel eventually acknowledged the mission some four weeks later. Intelligence sources hinted at a possible link with North Korea's nuclear programme.

#### 'Resemblance'

On Wednesday the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS), an independent organisation, released satellite images pre-dating the attack, of a facility in northern Syria that it believes was the target. They showed both a large industrial building and a pumping station near the Euphrates river. The ISIS said the building bore a resemblance to the Yongbyon nuclear facility in North Korea. "The length of the outer walls of the structures are approximately the same," the institute said in its analysis. "From the image, the Syrian building is similar in shape to the North Korean reactor building, but the Syrian building is not far enough along in its construction to make a definitive comparison," it said. The ISIS has now produced a more recent image of the same site taken on 24 October, more than six weeks after the alleged air attack. The image appears to show that the building has been completely removed and the ground scraped clean.

#### 'Provocative'

Syria has consistently denied any plans to build a nuclear reactor, and its ambassador to the UN rejected the ISIS's analysis, saying the building was "only a centre for research for the desert areas, arid and desert areas in Syria". "The main point is that is that the Israeli fighter jet violated the airspace of a member state of the United Nations. This is the only fact that we should focus on," Bashar Jaafari said. "The Israelis have undertaken a provocative action and they should assume the consequences." North Korea has adamantly denied that it was involved in helping Syria build any kind of nuclear facility. The images, says the BBC's diplomatic correspondent Jonathan Marcus, are far from conclusive. But they suggest that, for whatever reason, the Syrian authorities have gone to great lengths to remove any trace of the building apparently targeted in the strike, our correspondent adds.

The ISIS argues that "dismantling and removing the building at such a rapid pace dramatically complicates any inspection of the facilities and suggests that Syria may be trying to hide what was there". The report also raises the question of whether Syria might be in breach of its safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency, our correspondent says. Under that, it would have an obligation to notify the UN's nuclear watchdog of any plans to construct a new nuclear facility. While about the Israeli air strike on Syria is a mystery, it is believed that in the early hours of 6 September a number of Israeli jets appeared to enter Syrian airspace from the Mediterranean Sea. Later, unidentified drop tanks, which may have contained fuel from the planes, were found on Turkish soil near the Syrian border, indicating a possible exit route. Witnesses said the Israeli jets had been engaged by Syrian air defences in Tall al-Abyad, north of Raqqa and near the

border with Turkey.

Turkey

Turkish Troops 'Kill PKK Rebels'

Source: BBC, 28 Oct 07

Turkish troops have killed 15 suspected Kurdish rebels in the east of the country, reports say.

Military sources and Turkish TV reports said operations were taking place near the town of Pulumur, in the eastern province of Tunceli.

The area is thought to be a stronghold of separatists from the Kurdistan workers' Party (PKK). Turkey has stepped up moves against the PKK recently after strikes from across the border with Iraq. The government in Ankara has warned it will not tolerate continued raids by PKK fighters based in northern Iraq, and has massed troops near the border in preparation for a possible ground invasion.

Sunday's raid happened a considerable distance from the border flashpoints. Tunceli is some 550km (340 miles) north-east of the province of Sirnak and 650km (400 miles) north-east of Hakkari, where most of the recent fighting has taken place. The government-run Anatolia news agency said fighting began on Sunday morning, with Turkish troops backed by helicopter gunships. One report said some 8,000 troops were involved. Security forces also shut down a major highway leading to the town of Pulumur, Anatolia reported. There was no official confirmation of casualty figures, but two private TV stations said 15 PKK rebels were killed. The latest raid came a day after Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan criticised European Union nations for not doing enough to rein in the guerrillas...

Kurdish PKK Militants Focused On Own Survival

Source: Reuters, 26 Oct 07

Holed up in the mountains of northern Iraq, Kurdistan workers' Party (PKK) guerrillas have grabbed world attention as rarely before as Turkey mulls whether to launch a cross-border incursion against their bases.

But recent attacks on Turkish soldiers look above all like a sign of desperation as a depleted PKK show no sign of being able to force their aims onto the political agenda, analysts say. Their goals, derived from a Marxist-Leninist ideology, have anyway become blurred since they took up arms in 1984 with the aim of establishing an independent Kurdish state in southeast Turkey. More than 30,000 people have died in the conflict. "Their own survival is more important to them now than the issue of Kurdish rights or autonomy," said Gareth Jenkins, an Istanbul-based expert on Turkish security issues. "What they are fighting for is political legitimacy for themselves -- to get Turkey to negotiate with them so they can become a political player." He said the PKK still saw Abdullah Ocalan, their leader captured in 1999, as a potential interlocutor with the state.

After his capture, Ocalan called for a peaceful resolution and the rebels announced a ceasefire. This was ignored by Turkey, which like the United States and the European Union condemns the PKK as a terrorist group. Many of the



group's statements have since shifted their focus more to demanding greater political and cultural rights for Turkey's 12-15 million Kurds. While there is still wide sympathy for the PKK in the southeast, some of the steam may have gone out of Kurds' complaints that their interests and culture are suppressed. In recent years, Turkey has begun to allow limited Kurdish television broadcasts, and Kurdish lessons in private classes. And in last July's parliamentary election, the ruling AKP made strong gains in the region at the expense of the main Kurdish party.

### Stirring Tensions

At the same time, the PKK's attacks have continued and recently intensified, to try to draw attention to their cause. "In order to do this they must create an atmosphere in which there are clashes. They want to stir up tensions between Turks and Kurds by provoking Turks. But I don't think this game will work," said Sadi Cayci, international law consultant at the Eurasian Strategic Studies Centre in Ankara. Cayci said the militants' ultimate aim of creating a Kurdish state remained, and had been reinforced by the growing autonomy of the Kurdish administration in northern Iraq.

The PKK's camps in northern Iraq are now at the heart of their activities, and their armaments are believed to come from poorly controlled Iraqi military stocks. The PKK are still capable of raising money through fund-raising events and protection rackets within Turkey, and through the Kurdish diaspora in Europe, to fuel their insurgency, and this month have mounted two large-scale attacks in which 25 Turkish soldiers have been killed. But their numbers are estimated to be down sharply from a decade ago, to about 3,000 in Iraq and 1,000-2,000 in Turkey.

This explains why more than half the PKK attacks in the last two years have been bomb attacks, the Turkish military says. A military official in southeast Turkey said he did not see the PKK returning wholesale to more direct confrontations, which involve high rebel casualties. "Strategically they are focused on attacks that incur the fewest losses. Hence, they are resorting to remote-controlled bombs and hit-and-run attacks," the official said. Meanwhile, public opposition across Turkey in general to talks with the PKK or Kurdish autonomy is as strong as ever. Ocalan, unable to control the rebels on a tactical level but still a powerful influence in terms of their strategy, has not commented on the latest violence. His lawyers were last able to visit him a month ago, when they issued a statement in which Ocalan stuck to familiar themes of Marxism, democracy and plots against him.

### Turkey Calls For Iraq To Hand Over All PKK Rebels

Source: Reuters, 26 Oct 07

Turkey wants Iraq to hand over all members of the separatist Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) based in northern Iraq, Deputy Prime Minister Cemil Cicek said on Friday.

Cicek, speaking in a televised interview as Iraqi and U.S. officials met Turkish officials in Ankara in a bid to stop Turkey launching an incursion into northern Iraq to tackle the militants, also said Turkish air forces had hit targets in northern Iraq but there had been no full land incursion. "Everyone (PKK members in northern Iraq) there is guilty. They are criminals at least for being a member of a terrorist organisation," Cicek said. "We want all of them to be handed over," he said, adding that Ankara had given Iraq a list of PKK militants. The central government in Iraq has little clout in the mainly Kurdish autonomous north of Iraq, and the interior chief of the autonomous region was blocked from attending the talks by Ankara.

#### Village Guards Arrested in Turkey's Southeast for 'Aiding PKK'

Source: CNN TURK Online WWW-Text in Turkish 1613 GMT 26 Oct 07

Six provisional village guards have been arrested in the Cukurca district of Hakkari on charges of aiding and sheltering the terrorist organization. Acting on a tip, squads from the local gendarmerie command obtained information that some provisional village guards were helping and sheltering the terrorist organization PKK.

Security forces began to monitor the six village guards, and their phones were placed under surveillance.

After it was determined that the said guards were leaking information to terrorists in phone conversations with PKK members, squads affiliated with the Cukurca District Gendarmerie Command raided the homes of the guards in the district center and surrounding villages.

The six provisional village guards detained in the course of these raids were taken to court after they were interrogated at the gendarmerie command. The six men underwent a health check and were sent to the Hakkari Closed Prison after the court ordered them arrested on charges of "aiding and sheltering the terrorist organization."

#### Mine Injures One Person in Siirt

The Office of the Chief of the General Staff reported that one citizen was injured by a mine explosion in Siirt and that there were no casualties in the brief firefights that occurred between terrorists and security forces in Bitlis, Bingol, and Siirt.

According to the counterterrorism bulletin that appeared on the website of the Office of the Chief of the General Staff, one citizen was injured yesterday when an explosive device of unknown type and origin went off in a mountainous area of the Pervari district of Siirt.

Security forces encountered groups of terrorists in the mountainous countryside of Bitlis yesterday, the Karliova district of Bingol two days ago, and the Eruh district of Siirt on 23 October in the course of search and sweep operations.

Brief firefights ensued when the terrorists fired in response to orders to "surrender" by the security forces. There were no casualties in these incidents.

#### Explosive Device Found

An explosive device, crafted out of three kilograms of plastic explosive, was found to have been planted by terrorists near the 2-kilometer marker of the Dargecit-Mardin highway yesterday. The device was subsequently destroyed.

#### Eleven Detained in Sirnak

Eleven persons were detained in the Silopi district of Sirnak on charges of being members of the terrorist organization PKK.

Acting on an intelligence tip, counterterrorism squads of the Security Directorate of Silopi raided a tea garden in the center of the district. In the course of this raid, 11 persons, two of them women, were detained and taken to the Security Directorate of Silopi on charges of being members of the PKK.

#### PKK Changes Battlefield Tactics to Force Turkey into Negotiations

<[http://www.jamestown.org/news\\_details.php?news\\_id=282##](http://www.jamestown.org/news_details.php?news_id=282##)>

Source: Gareth Jenkins, Jamestown Foundation from Terrorism Focus  
<<http://jamestown.org/terrorism/>> , October 24

Recent attacks by the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) suggest that the organization is adopting new battlefield tactics in order to increase the psychological pressure on Turkey in the hope of forcing the Turkish authorities to enter into peace negotiations. Since it resumed its armed struggle in June 2004, the PKK has been pursuing a two-front strategy: an urban bombing campaign in western Turkey and a rural insurgency in the mountainous southeast of the country. During its first armed campaign, which lasted from 1984 to 1999, the PKK initially sought to control large swathes of territory in southeast Turkey, particularly at night. During the early 1990s, it also staged several large-scale attacks on military outposts. However, the practice was abandoned after the Turkish military began to inflict heavy casualties through the use of Cobra attack helicopters in hot pursuit operations. Gradually, through a combination of a scorched earth policy, aggressive search-and-destroy patrols and the development of a cadre of battle-hardened NCOs, the Turkish security forces gained the initiative. By the time that the PKK announced it was abandoning the armed struggle in 1999, it had already effectively been defeated on the battlefield, while political pressure had forced Syria, its main state sponsor, to withdraw its support.

The decision to return to violence in June 2004 was taken despite the opposition of many PKK field commanders, who argued that the organization was too weak militarily, lacked a state sponsor and had only around 4,000 militants under arms, which was down from a peak of around 8,000 in the early 1990s. When it resumed its insurgency, the PKK tacitly acknowledged its relative weakness through its choice of battlefield tactics. It reduced the average size of its active field units to around six to eight militants, compared to 15-20 in the 1990s, and avoided direct confrontations with the Turkish military. Although it staged small ambushes, it concentrated primarily on the use of mines, snipers and long-range strafing of military outposts, after which its units rapidly withdrew before the Turkish military could call up land reinforcements and air support.

The first sign of a change came in the October 7 ambush of a Turkish commando unit in the Gabar mountains in which 13 Turkish soldiers were killed (Eurasia Daily Monitor, October 10). Not only was it the highest Turkish death toll in more than a decade, but the ambush appears to have been laid by 45-50 PKK militants, the largest concentration of PKK forces in a single attack since the resumption of the armed campaign in June 2004.

At 12:20 AM on October 21, an estimated 150-200 militants attacked a 50-strong infantry battalion in a military outpost close to the village of Daglica, approximately five kilometers from Turkey's border with Iraq. The attack appears to have been planned well in advance (Eurasia Daily Monitor, October 22). Local villagers reported that first electricity and telephone lines were cut and then the only bridge to the outpost was blown up (Dogan Haber Ajansi, October 23). A total of 12 soldiers were killed and 17 wounded. One of the wounded later told Sabah daily newspaper that they were able to see the PKK militants taking up positions through night-vision binoculars and thermal imaging devices, while listening to their wireless communications. When the PKK attacked, they overran the outpost before reinforcements could arrive (Sabah, October 23). They then withdrew under fire into northern Iraq, taking with them eight Turkish soldiers as prisoners. On October 23, the PKK released photographs of the soldiers in captivity (Firat News Agency, October 23).

The PKK's decision to incur the operational burden of escorting the prisoners through difficult mountain terrain while under fire appears to indicate that it was part of a preconceived plan. It was the first time that the organization had seized a group of prisoners since the mid-1990s, and at the time they subsequently exploited them for propaganda purposes. It was only after a Turkish parliamentary delegation led by members of the Islamist welfare Party (RP) traveled to northern

Iraq to negotiate with the PKK that the prisoners were finally released. Members of the pro-Kurdish Democratic Society Party (DTP), which is widely believed to be linked to the PKK, have already offered to negotiate the release of the eight soldiers seized on October 21 (NTV, CNNTurk, October 22).

The Turkish military claimed to have killed 32 PKK militants in hot pursuit operations following the attack on Daglica (NTV, CNNTurk, October 21). The claim, however, has been denied by the PKK and the Turkish authorities have yet to produce any corpses of slain PKK militants (Vatan, October 23). Nevertheless, given their experience in the 1990s, the PKK high command would have known that the attack of October 21 carried the risk of high casualties. It appears that they calculated that the cost would be more than offset by the propaganda benefits and the psychological impact on the Turkish public not only of the high death toll but also of the capture of the eight soldiers. The Turkish media has already begun publishing photographs of the prisoners' traumatized relatives (Sabah, NTV, October 23).

The seizure of the eight soldiers also appears to be part of a wider strategy of trying to force the Turkish authorities into negotiations. The staging of the attack on October 21, just days after the Turkish parliament approved a motion authorizing the deployment of Turkish troops in a cross-border operation against the PKK's presence in northern Iraq, seems to have been designed to try to provoke Turkey to threaten an incursion in the hopes that the international community would intervene and argue that a permanent solution to PKK violence could only come through the opening of negotiations (Eurasia Daily Monitor, October 22).  
Gareth Jenkins is a writer and journalist based in Istanbul, who has written on Turkey for the past 20 years.

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(The Turkish information ministry reported the deaths of 15 Kurdish fighters on Sunday in the Southeastern province of Tundjeli. Turkey has deployed a 150,000 man force to the border area with a mandate to cross into Iraq to conduct operations against Kurdish fighters, thought to number approximately 3500.)

Uganda

Confusion Sets Into LRA Peace Process

Source: The Monitor, 28 Oct 07



After a difficult 16 months of going back and forth, the Juba peace process is now faced with yet another storm.

Garamba, where the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) leadership is holed up, is dead silent and the news trickling out is deeply worrying: The two topmost rebel commanders, Joseph Kony and his deputy, Vincent Otti, have disagreed and a major split is feared. Otti's fate remains a mystery. Kony's signaller, Labal Piny, is in possession of Otti's satellite phone set. "Everyday for almost a month now, I have failed to talk to Otti. Kony is not taking my calls, I wonder what is happening, last night I went to Mega FM and personally asked Kony to quickly explain what is going on," Col. Walter Ochora, Gulu's resident district commissioner said. Col. Ochora has been an instrumental channel of communication between the rebels and the government but now finds himself in a vacuum. Kony and Otti, both indictees of the International Criminal Court for war crimes and crimes against humanity, have led the LRA during the best and worst of times for the shadowy organisation. It is now difficult to say what their reported disagreement will mean for the peace process, especially since up to 33 rebels are said to have died in a reported gun battle on October 10 that pitted Kony loyalists against Otti's people. If true, this is unprecedented even in the rebel's long history of dishing out harsh treatment to its members who fail or are suspected of disloyalty. So, attempts by the LRA's delegation to the peace talks to either downplay or vehemently deny that there is anything wrong within the rebel ranks only serves to further complicate the already unclear picture. No substantive or verifiable information as to what may have sparked the disagreement is currently available. Only rumours; first about an alleged dispute over how to spend the \$600,000 ostensibly provided for consultations by the donor community, and then over claims that a power struggle was afoot between the top two rebel leaders.

"Kony was increasingly accusing Otti of doing things behind his back which he considered betrayal," a security source told Sunday Monitor. Otti had also reportedly sanctioned recruitment of 128 former rebels of the Uganda National Rescue Front (UNRF II) "to boost their numbers should things go wrong [with the peace talks]." It is not clear if Kony was aware of this. The UNRF II largely operated in West Nile region before it signed a peace agreement with the government in December 2002. Its leader, Maj. Gen. Ali Bamuze, is currently living in Kampala. The purported recruitment by a former senior member of the UNRF II in mid August, however, reportedly went bad with many of those said to have been recruited deserting upon realising that they had been duped. The men had reportedly been told that they were being hired to go and work on a huge bricklaying project.

Adding to the confusion was the strange decision by Sudanese People's Defence Forces (SPLA) troops to detain members of the LRA's negotiating team for almost one hour when they travelled to Maridi last Saturday (October 20). Mr Martin Ojul and Mr Yusuf Okwonga Adek were held as they travelled to Maridi on their way to Kony's base. "When our negotiators landed at Maridi and got into a convoy to Maridi Hotel they were quickly arrested by SPLA. We still wonder why and we are demanding an explanation," said LRA spokesman Godfrey Ayoo during an interview with Sunday Monitor during the week. Maridi is a small town near the border between south Sudan and the DR Congo through which the Garamba National Park, where the LRA are based, can be accessed. The search for answers continues after Kony snubbed the UN envoy for northern Uganda, Joaquim Chissano, who he was scheduled to meet on October 22.

A week to this appointment Mr Chissano lost contact with Kony. Desperate that the lack of contact was affecting the peace process, Mr Chissano decided to try to meet Kony face to face but he was only able to get as far as Maridi where he met the LRA negotiators, themselves stranded after they failed to meet their leader. Mr Chissano who flew back to Kampala on the same day, later told donors that he had been told that Otti was ill with cholera and could not travel for the meeting. The LRA also promised Mr Chissano that they would come to Uganda by this weekend for consultations. This has not happened either. Though there is speculation over the future of the peace process, Dr Ruhakana Rugunda, the government's chief negotiator and minister for Internal Affairs, is confident that the process is still on course.

Marshall Center PTSS Daily 29 October 2007

"In peace talks we have hitches and corners but we are in touch with the LRA and the peace talks are still on course," Dr Rugunda said on Friday. Meanwhile, the issue of money is becoming a sticking point. The government delegation has expressed concern over what they perceive as indirect funding of the LRA through "exorbitant per diems."

Sunday Monitor obtained information, which we could not independently verify though, that there is an unwritten rule that every LRA delegate in Juba must hand over \$50 of \$120 they receive as allowances everyday to the LRA leadership. There are 15 LRA delegates participating in the Juba negotiations; 13 negotiators and two members who constitute the rebels' membership on the Cessation of Hostilities Team. If this allegation is true then the LRA leadership in Garamba would be receiving \$750 (Shs1.3 million) daily and that translates to \$5,250 (Shs9 million) in one week. "We have information that this is happening and we ask ourselves who is now bankrolling LRA? The donors?" said one government negotiator, who declined to be named in the interests of harmony. The government, according to our sources, has expressed this concern to the donor group, Partners for Development and Governance. The group includes European Union countries, the US, Norway and Canada that are contributing to the Juba Initiative Fund managed by the UN's Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance.

France, the European Union chair, which had earlier expressed concern over LRA's direct handling of large sums of money declined to comment on this development. But the LRA rubbished the claim saying its delegates are free to use their per diems as they wish. "What is it that the Uganda government is worrying about when [they] are stealing millions of dollars from impoverished tax payers?" asked Godfrey Ayoo, LRA's spokesman, in a telephone interview from the Kenyan capital, Nairobi. "No one is going to tell us how to run our affairs," he added. The peace talks are open-ended with no time table, a fact that is increasingly unsettling the government that has now resorted to applying pressure on the Congolese authorities to take action against LRA. But with the uncertainty of what is going inside the Garamba, especially in respect of Otti's fate, and no actual movement by Kinshasa on the rebels despite having made several commitments to do so, a sense of helplessness is beginning to set in.

#### Ex-LRA Chief Held Over Robbery

[One answer to the question, "How do terrorists end?". Legitimate occupations like farming lack luster after the thrill of being a terrorist.]

Source: Daily Monitor, 26 Oct 07

A former director of operations for the Lords Resistance Army and 10 others were on Wednesday arrested over allegations of armed robbery.

Onen Kamudulu, who surrendered to the government forces in 2004, was arrested with a pistol from his hideout in Maruzi farm in Apac District. Police detectives said that Kamudulu and his accomplices, who were armed with pistols and AK-47 rifles, came from Gulu and staged an ambush on Masindi Port Road and robbed cash, mobile phones and other personal belongings from local traders. "Police searched the farm and arrested the suspects with 180 rounds of ammunition, a pistol and four motorcycles which they have been using in the robberies," Police Spokesman Asan Kasingye said yesterday. The waylaid market vendors were returning by taxi from Bweyale Trading Center in Masindi District.

Mr Kasingye identified the other suspects as Joseph Okot, Thomas Opio, George Oola, Denis Okot and Richard Oloya, all residents of Gulu District. Police operatives also apprehended Christopher Ochaya, Justine Odom, Bitek Okot and Agiba

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Anyingi. However, one of the suspects is reportedly at large after fleeing from security officers. By the time of his arrest, Kamudulu had enrolled into an Adult Literacy Education programme and was said to be in Form Five. Maj. Felix Kulayigye, the Defence and Army spokesman, yesterday said the military had armed the ex-insurgent boss over fears that former victims of LRA war would launch revenge attacks on him. "We gave him a pistol for self protection but if he has used it for robbery, the law will take its course and he will be punished," Maj. Kulayigye said. The 10 suspects have now been detained at Apac Police Station from where they will be taken to court.

United States of America

Americans More Confident On War On Terror

Source: Angus Reid Global Monitor, 28 Oct 07

More people in the United States express positive views on the global effort to fight terrorism, according to a poll by Rasmussen Reports.

43 per cent of respondents believe the U.S. and its allies are winning the war on terror, up four points since August. Conversely, 30 per cent of respondents think the terrorists are winning the war, while 22 per cent say neither side is emerging victorious. Afghanistan has been the main battleground in the war on terrorism. The conflict began in October 2001, after the Taliban regime refused to hand over Osama bin Laden, prime suspect in the 9/11 terrorist attacks in New York and Washington. Al-Qaeda operatives hijacked and crashed four airplanes on Sept. 11, 2001, killing nearly 3,000 people. At least 702 soldiers—including 447 Americans—have died in the war on terrorism, either in support of the U.S.-led Operation Enduring Freedom or as part of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) led by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). In addition, 1,708 U.S. military personnel have been wounded in action, according to data provided by the Pentagon.

On Oct. 24, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) said the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan—as well as other war on terror-related activities—are becoming unsustainable. The bipartisan group said such expenses have already amounted to more than \$600 billion U.S. since September 2001, and could ultimately reach the \$2 trillion U.S. mark. Peter Orszag, head of the CBO, declared: "Including both past funding and projected funding under these two illustrative scenarios, total spending for U.S. operations in Iraq, Afghanistan and the rest of the war on terrorism would thus amount to between \$1.2 trillion U.S. and \$1.7 trillion U.S. through 2017. (...) The way I would put it is that we are on an unsustainable fiscal path and something has to give."

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(Michael McConnell, Director of National Intelligence, warned that Al Qaeda is recruiting Europeans specifically to infiltrate into the United States to conduct terrorist attacks. McConnell said that they are being recruited in Europe, trained in Pakistan and will be attempting entry into the United States due to the extra scrutiny U.S. security organs give to Arabs.)

From CIA Jails, Inmates Fade Into Obscurity

Source: Craig Whitlock, Washington Post Foreign Service, Saturday, October 27, 2007; A01

On Sept. 6, 2006, President Bush  
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/George+W.+Bush?tid=informline>  
announced that the CIA  
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/Central+Intelligence+Agency?tid=informline>  
's overseas secret prisons had been temporarily emptied and 14 al-Qaeda  
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/Al+Qaeda?tid=informline> leaders  
taken to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba  
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/world/countries/cuba.html?nav=e1> . But since  
then, there has been no official accounting of what happened to about 30 other  
"ghost prisoners" who spent extended time in the custody of the CIA.

Some have been secretly transferred to their home countries, where they remain in detention and out of public view, according to interviews in Pakistan  
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/Pakistan?tid=informline> and  
Europe <http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/Europe?tid=informline> with  
government officials, human rights groups and lawyers for the detainees. Others have  
disappeared without a trace and may or may not still be under CIA control.

The bulk of the ghost prisoners were captured in Pakistan, where they scattered  
after the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan  
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/world/countries/afghanistan.html?nav=e1> in  
2001.

Among them is Mustafa Setmariam Nasar, a dual citizen of Syria  
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/Syria?tid=informline> and Spain  
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/Spain?tid=informline> and an  
influential al-Qaeda ideologue who was last seen two years ago. On Oct. 31, 2005,  
the red-bearded radical with a \$5 million U.S. bounty on his head arrived in the  
Pakistani border city of Quetta, unaware he was being followed.

Nasar was cornered by police as he and a small group of followers stopped for  
dinner. Soon after, according to Pakistani officials, he was handed over to U.S.  
spies and vanished into the CIA's prison network. Since then, various reports have  
placed him in Syria, Afghanistan and India  
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/world/countries/india.html?nav=e1> , though  
nobody has been able to confirm his whereabouts.

Nearly all the Arab members of al-Qaeda caught in Pakistan were given to the CIA,



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Pakistani security officials said. But the fate of several Pakistani al-Qaeda operatives who were also captured remains murky; the Pakistani government has ignored a number of lawsuits filed by relatives seeking information. "You just don't know -- either these people are in the custody of the Pakistanis or the Americans," said Zafarullah Khan, human rights coordinator for the Pakistan Muslim League, an opposition political party.

Others have been handed over to governments that have kept their presence a secret.

Since 2004, for example, the CIA has handed five Libyan fighters to authorities in Tripoli <<http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/Tripoli?tid=informline>> . Two had been covertly nabbed by the CIA in China <<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/world/countries/china.html?nav=e1>> and Thailand <<http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/Thailand?tid=informline>> , while the others were caught in Pakistan and held in CIA prisons in Afghanistan, Eastern Europe <<http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/Eastern+Europe?tid=informline>> and other locations, according to Libyan sources.

The Libyan government has kept silent about the cases. But Libyan political exiles said the men are kept in isolation with no prospect of an open trial.

Other ghost prisoners are believed to remain in U.S. custody after passing into and out of the CIA's hands, according to human rights groups.

Relatives of a Tunisian al-Qaeda suspect known as Retha al-Tunisi, captured in Karachi <<http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/Karachi?tid=informline>> , Pakistan, in 2002, received notice recently from the International Committee of the Red Cross <<http://www.icrc.org/>> that he is detained at a U.S. military <<http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/U.S.+Armed+Forces?tid=informline>> prison in Afghanistan, said Clara Gutteridge, an investigator for Reprieve <<http://www.reprieve.org.uk/>> , a London <<http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/London?tid=informline>> -based legal rights group that represents many inmates at the U.S. prison at Guantanamo Bay. Other prisoners, since released, had previously reported seeing Tunisi at a secret CIA "black site" in Afghanistan.

At least one former CIA prisoner has been quietly freed. Ahmad Khalil Ibrahim Samir al-Ani, an Iraqi intelligence agent captured after the invasion of Iraq <<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/world/countries/iraq.html?nav=e1>> in 2003, was detained at a secret location until he was released last year.

Ani gained notoriety before the Iraq war when Bush administration officials said he had met in Prague <<http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/Prague?tid=informline>> with Sept. 11, 2001, hijacker Mohamed Atta. Some officials, including Vice President Cheney <<http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/Dick+Cheney?tid=informline>> , cited the rendezvous as evidence of an alliance between al-Qaeda and Saddam Hussein <<http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/Saddam+Hussein?tid=informline>> . The theory was later debunked by U.S. intelligence agencies and the Sept. 11 commission, which revealed in 2004 that Ani was in U.S. custody.

The Iraqi spy resurfaced two months ago when Czech officials revealed that he had filed a multimillion-dollar compensation claim. His complaint: that unfounded Czech intelligence reports had prompted his imprisonment by the CIA.

#### Guantanamo Newcomers

When Bush confirmed the existence of the CIA's prisons in September 2006, he said they had been vacated for the time being. But he said the U.S. government would use them again, if necessary.

The CIA has resumed its detention program. Since March, five new terrorism suspects

have been transferred to Guantanamo. Although the Pentagon  [<http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/The+Pentagon?tid=informline>](http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/The+Pentagon?tid=informline) has not disclosed details about how or precisely when they were captured, officials have said one of the prisoners, Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi, had spent months in CIA custody overseas.

Details of the secret detention program remain classified. U.S. officials have offered only vague descriptions of its reach and scope.

Last month, in a speech in New York  [<http://www.cfr.org/publication/14158/>](http://www.cfr.org/publication/14158/) , CIA Director Michael V. Hayden  [<http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/Michael+Hayden?tid=informline>](http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/Michael+Hayden?tid=informline) said "fewer than 100 people" had been detained in the CIA's overseas prison network since the program's inception in early 2002.

In June, a coalition of human rights groups  [<http://hrw.org/backgrounders/usa/ct0607/>](http://hrw.org/backgrounders/usa/ct0607/) identified 39 people who may have been in CIA custody but are still missing. Many of those on the list, however, were identified by partial names or noms de guerre, such as one man described only as Mohammed the Afghan.

Joanne Mariner, director of terrorism and counterterrorism research for Human Rights Watch  [<http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/Human+Rights+watch?tid=informline>](http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/Human+Rights+watch?tid=informline) , said the CIA has moved many prisoners from country to country and relied on other spy services to take custody of suspects, sometimes temporarily and sometimes for good. "The large majority have gone to their countries of origin," she said. "But that doesn't mean all of them. There could be some that are still in proxy detention."

In a footnote to its 2004 report  [<http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/index.htm>](http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/index.htm) , the Sept. 11 commission named nine al-Qaeda suspects who were in U.S. custody at black sites. Seven were later transferred to Guantanamo.

Still missing is Hassan Ghul, a Pakistani national captured in northern Iraq in January 2004. U.S. officials have described him as a high-level emissary between al-Qaeda's core command in Pakistan and its affiliates in Iraq.

Another prisoner on the commission's list was Ali Abd al-Rahman al-Faqasi al-Ghamdi, a Saudi accused of planning attacks in the Arabian Peninsula  [<http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/Arabian+Peninsula?tid=informline>](http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/Arabian+Peninsula?tid=informline) . He surrendered to Saudi authorities in June 2003.

Although the Sept. 11 commission reported that Ghamdi was in U.S. custody, Saudi officials said that was not the case. They said he remains in prison in Saudi Arabia  [<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/world/countries/saudi-arabia.html?nav=el>](http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/world/countries/saudi-arabia.html?nav=el) and has never left the country. "He was never, under no condition, in U.S. custody," said a Saudi security source who spoke on condition of anonymity.

Officials with the International Committee of the Red Cross said they have failed to find dozens of people once believed to have been in CIA custody, despite repeated queries to the U.S. government and other countries. "The ICRC remains gravely concerned by the fate of the persons previously held in the CIA detention program who remain unaccounted for," said Simon Schorno, a Red Cross spokesman in Washington. "The ICRC is concerned about any type of secret detention."

The CIA declined to comment on whether certain individuals were ever in its custody.

"Apart from detainees transferred to Guantanamo, the CIA does not, as a rule, comment publicly on lists of people alleged to have been in its custody -- even though those lists are often flawed," said Paul Gimigliano, a CIA spokesman.

Out in the Cold

When the Bush administration disclosed last year that 14 senior al-Qaeda leaders had been transferred to Guantanamo -- leaving the CIA prisons temporarily vacant -- some conspicuous names were missing from the list.

One was an al-Qaeda training camp leader known as Ibn al-sheikh al-Libi. He was arrested in the Pakistani border town of Kohat in late 2001 and eventually taken to Cairo <<http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/Cairo?tid=informline>> , where the CIA enlisted Egyptian intelligence agents to help with the interrogation.

Libi began to talk. Among his claims: that the Iraqi regime had provided training in poisons and mustard gas to al-Qaeda operatives.

His statements were cited by the Bush administration as part of the rationale for invading Iraq in 2003. He recanted after the war began, however, and his continued detention became a political liability for the CIA.

Although the CIA has since acknowledged that Libi was one of its prisoners, U.S. officials have not disclosed what happened to him. In interviews, however, political exiles from Libya

<<http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/Libya?tid=informline>> said he was flown by the CIA to Tripoli in early 2006 and imprisoned by the Libyan government.

Libi reported that the CIA had taken him from Egypt <<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/world/countries/egypt.html?nav=el>> to several other covert sites, including in Jordan, Morocco <<http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/Morocco?tid=informline>> and Afghanistan, according to a Libyan security source.

He also claimed that he had been kept someplace very cold and that his CIA captors had told him he was in Alaska <<http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/Alaska?tid=informline>> , the source said. Human rights groups have suggested that Libi was part of a small group of senior al-Qaeda figures held in a CIA prison in northern Poland <<http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/Poland?tid=informline>> .

In Tripoli, Libi joined several other Libyans who had spent time in the CIA's penal system. All were members of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, a network that had plotted for years from exile to overthrow Moammar Gaddafi.

After the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, members of the Libyan network who had been staying there dispersed. The CIA helped Libya's spy agencies track down some of the leaders.

One of them, Abdallah al-Sadeq, was apprehended in a covert CIA operation in Thailand in the spring of 2004, according to Noman Benotman, a former member of the Libyan militant network.

Another, Abu Munder al-Saadi, the group's spiritual leader, was caught in the Hong Kong <<http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/Hong+Kong?tid=informline>> airport. In both cases, Benotman said, the Libyans were held briefly by the CIA before U.S. agents flew them to Tripoli. "They realized very quickly that these guys had nothing to do with al-Qaeda," Benotman said in an interview in London. "They kept them for a few weeks, and that's it."

Benotman said he confirmed details of the CIA operations when he was allowed to see the men during a visit to a Tripoli prison this year. The trip was arranged by the Libyan government as part of an effort to persuade the Libyan prisoners to reconcile with the Gaddafi regime.

The CIA has transferred at least two other Libyans to Tripoli, Benotman said. Khaled al-Sharif and another Libyan known only as Rabai were captured in Peshawar <<http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/Peshawar?tid=informline>> ,

Pakistan, in 2003 and spent time in a CIA prison in Afghanistan, he said.

The Libyan Embassy in Washington did not respond to a faxed letter seeking comment.

#### A Missing 'Gold Mine'

In Spain, prosecutors have been searching for Nasar, the redheaded al-Qaeda ideologue, for four years.

In 2003, he was indicted by an investigative magistrate in Madrid <http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/Madrid?tid=informline>, accused of helping to build sleeper cells in Spain. A prolific writer and theoretician in the jihadi movement, Nasar had lived in several European countries as well as Afghanistan <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/05/22/AR2006052201627.htm>

Spain has filed requests for information about Nasar with the Pakistani government, to no avail. Spanish Foreign Minister Miguel Angel Moratinos also raised the issue during a visit to Islamabad

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/Islamabad?tid=informline> last year. "We don't have any indication of where he is," said a source in the Spanish Foreign Ministry, who spoke on condition of anonymity.

Brynjar Lia, a Norwegian terrorism analyst and the author of a new book on Nasar, "Architect of Global Jihad," said the radical would know valuable details about the inner workings of al-Qaeda. "The Americans are probably the ones who want him the most because he was prominently involved in al-Qaeda in the 1990s," said Lia, a senior researcher at the Norwegian Defense Research Establishment [http://www.mil.no/felles/ffi/english/start/research/Analysis\\_Division/\\_TERRA/](http://www.mil.no/felles/ffi/english/start/research/Analysis_Division/_TERRA/). "He must be a gold mine of information."

Some Spanish media have speculated that Nasar is being held in Syria, his place of birth. The CIA has transferred other terrorism suspects to Syria despite tense diplomatic relations between Washington and Damascus <http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/Damascus?tid=informline>.

Other Spanish press reports have claimed that Nasar remains in U.S. custody. Another rumor is that he's being held in a CIA-run prison in India, said Manuel Tuero, a Madrid lawyer who represents Nasar's wife.

Though Nasar would go on trial if he was brought back to Spain, that would be preferable to indefinite detention in a secret prison, Tuero said. "He's in a legal limbo," he said. "The Americans would never give him a fair trial. Spain would."

Special correspondents Munir Ladaa in Berlin and Cristina Mateo-Yanguas in Madrid contributed to this report.

#### General Counterterrorism News:

##### Current Trends in Jihadi Networks in Europe

Source: Lorenzo Vidino, Terrorism Monitor, Volume 5, Issue 20 (October 25, 2007)

The terrorist related events that took place during the summer in Europe—the doctors' plot in Great Britain, the dismantling of various cells in Italy, Austria and Spain, and, finally, the September arrests in Germany and Denmark—have confirmed that Europe is a key staging ground for jihadi activities. Although large differences exist from country to country and within various subgroups in the



ever-evolving underworld of jihadi networks in Europe, it is possible to identify some current trends that, in one way or another, are common to the whole continent.

#### Independent, or Part of a Network

During the last few years, commentators have been fascinated with homegrown networks in Europe and, clearly, small groups of European-born, self-radicalized, violence-prone Islamists have sprung up in most European countries. Yet, the panorama of jihadi networks in Europe is quite complex and, for a more accurate analysis, could be described on a continuum. At one extreme, one can identify quintessential homegrown groups such as the Hofstad Group in the Netherlands: small domestic clusters of radicals that have developed no ties to external groups and act in complete operational independence. At the opposite side of the spectrum are cells that respond to the traditional model used by al-Qaeda-affiliated groups in the 1990s: compartmentalized cells inserted in a well-structured network and subjected to a hierarchy whose heads are often outside Europe. That is the model to which various cells of the Algerian GSPC (today Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb) belong.

In between these two extremes, there is a whole spectrum of realities, positioned according to the level of autonomy of the group. The most recurring model seems to be that of the cell dismantled by Danish authorities on September 4, 2007: a small group of young men, most of them born and/or raised in Europe, who knew each other either from the neighborhood or from the mosque. Their radicalization took place in Europe and only one or two members of the group traveled out of the country (Pakistan, in this case) to link up with foreign-based, well-structured groups ideologically or operationally affiliated with al-Qaeda. The knowledge acquired by the cell after this linkage obviously makes it more dangerous.

#### Traveling for Jihad: Primary and Secondary Fields

In contrast to the situation before the September 11 attacks, today most European jihadis do not travel out of the continent for training or to fight. Nevertheless, a small but significant number of them still opt for short stints in places where they can join training camps or guerrilla units. Pakistan/Afghanistan and Iraq are the two primary destinations. The former seems to attract recruits mostly from Northern Europe (Great Britain, in particular), while militants from Spain, Italy and France seem to travel mostly to the latter (El Periodico, May 6; Le Monde, December 16, 2004).

Noteworthy is the presence of European militants in two lesser known fields of jihad: Somalia and Lebanon. A few dozen European volunteers have been arrested by Ethiopian and Somali governmental forces among the Islamic Courts Union's (ICU) fighters since December 2006. Several of these militants possess Scandinavian passports, and, according to intelligence sources, Sweden is considered the hub for the flow of money from Europe to the ICU (Sveriges Radio, January 30). Italian authorities have also monitored the visits of several ICU-linked preachers who are traveling to various Italian cities in order to fundraise and recruit among the country's Somali population (L'Espresso, February 5). Reportedly, Swedish and British fighters were killed by U.S. missiles and Somali army operations (BBC News, June 3). A smaller number of Western volunteers, mostly from Denmark and Australia, have allegedly fought with Fatah al-Islam in the Nahr al-Barid refugee camp in Lebanon (The Australian, September 13).

#### The Muslim Ghetto Subculture: Jihad and Rap

Europe today is witnessing the growth of a disturbing new subculture that mixes violent urban behaviors, nihilism and Islamic fundamentalism. Many young, often European-born Muslims feel a disturbingly intense sense of detachment from, if not sheer hatred for, their host societies and embrace various antagonistic messages. While some turn to Salafism, others adopt an indefinite blend of counter-cultures, ranging from hip hop to Islamic fundamentalism. Many youngsters from the Muslim-majority ghettos of various European cities adopt several behaviors

typical of western street culture, such as dressing like rappers, smoking marijuana and drinking alcohol, yet watching jihadi videos and having pictures of Osama bin Laden on the display of their cell phones [1]. Any individual who attacks mainstream society becomes a hero to these teens, be it Abu Musab al-Zarqawi or the late American rapper Tupac Shakur.

This hybrid street culture is particularly influenced by African-American gangster culture and music. Bands such as Fun-da-mental and Blakstone in the United Kingdom, Medine in France, and Zanka Flow (Moroccan-based, but hugely popular in the Netherlands) combine radical Islamic concepts with hip hop sounds, jargon and attitudes. An aspiring star in the jihadi rap underworld is Mohammed Kamel Mostafa, the son of former Finsbury Park imam Abu Hamza, who has recently formed a rap duo called Lionz of Da Dezert. Using the stage name of al-Ansary, Mostafa raps about jihad and killing infidels. "I was born to be a soldier," read the lyrics of one of his songs. "Kalashnikov on my shoulder, peace to Hamas and Hezbollah, that's the way of the lord Allah. We're jihad. I defend my religion with the holy sword" (Agence France-Presse, March 1, 2006).

While the phenomenon affects only a minority of European Muslims, its dimensions and repercussions are more than noteworthy. In London, city officials are worried about the growth of an extremely violent gang commonly known as the Muslim Boys. Operating in the southern areas of the British capital, the gang is composed of several hundreds of members and is active in criminal activities ranging from robberies to drug trafficking. The members of the gang are mostly British-born black youth originally from the Caribbean or Africa who converted to Islam in British penitentiaries and bond over their newfound faith (Evening Standard, February 3, 2005). Yet, their interpretation of Islam is perverted. The gang members do not respect the most basic tenets of Islam, and their appearance and slang more closely resemble that of American ghetto culture than that of practicing Muslims. Tellingly, a gang member admitted to a reporter from the Evening Standard: "I pray twice a day: before I do crime and after. I ask Allah for a blessing when I'm out on the streets. Afterwards, I apologize to Allah for what I done [sic]." The gang is also involved in "forced conversions," compelling black youth at gunpoint to convert to Islam and join them; two years ago, they executed a 24-year-old for refusing to convert.

#### The Expansion to the Countryside

Radical Islam in Europe has traditionally been an urban phenomenon. Muslim immigrants have historically settled in large and mid-size cities and, as a consequence, radical mosques and jihadi activities have also been largely confined to urban settings. Yet, during the past few years, there has been a noticeable expansion of radical activities to rural areas. The phenomenon is particularly evident in southern European countries, where large numbers of North African immigrants are employed, seasonally or permanently, in agriculture. Wandering imams, often linked to Tablighi Jamaat and small makeshift mosques run by radicals, have popped up in small country towns and villages in Spain, Italy and France, spreading Salafism among the local Muslim communities. Taking advantage of the absence of other mosques and the limited surveillance of the small local police forces, Salafists have managed to establish a presence in rural areas of Piedmont, Campania, Provence and southern Spain [2].

In some cases, Salafist networks have taken advantage of the isolation provided by the countryside to create small fundamentalist communes, as in Artigat, a bucolic village of less than 1,000 residents in the French Pyrenees. When French authorities dismantled a Toulouse-based network that was smuggling volunteers to Iraq, they uncovered links to a 60-year-old Syrian man who was leading an Islamist commune in Artigat (Le Parisien, February 15). Living completely isolated from the outside world, the commune's five families lived under a strict self-imposed Islamic code and preached a radical interpretation of Islam to their children and to the visitors who would come occasionally from the city (mostly Toulouse) to spend time in a "pure Islamic environment."

Eastern Europe?

While not already an established trend, there are indications showing that radical Islam is spreading, albeit at a slow pace and with significant differences from country to country, to Eastern Europe. The presence of radical networks in Bosnia, many of them leftovers from the conflict of the 1990s, is well known. Although less grave, Wahhabi influence, propagated mostly by a wide network of Saudi-sponsored mosques, is on the rise in other areas of the Balkans with significant Muslim populations such as Albania, Kosovo and Serbia's Sandzak region (B92 Radio Serbia, June 6, 2006).

Various Islamist groups have been reported to be actively spreading their propaganda to other Muslim populations throughout Eastern Europe. Hizb-ut-Tahrir, for example, organized a large conference in Ukraine in August, targeting mostly Crimean Tatars (Kommersant-Ukraine, August 13). Yet, even countries with little or no native Muslim population have seen a tiny, yet growing, presence of Islamist activities, particularly among their Arab and Pakistani student population. During the last few years, authorities in Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria have arrested individuals who were either promoting radical Islam through websites and publications or funneling money to terrorist organizations. Additionally, in October 2006, Czech authorities issued a terror alert after uncovering information of an alleged plot to kidnap and kill Jews in Prague (Der Spiegel, October 6, 2006).

The attractiveness of Eastern European countries for jihadis has increased significantly with the inclusion of many of them in the European Union. Some Eastern European countries, with their understaffed and often corrupt intelligence and law enforcement agencies, easy access to black market weapons and forged documents, and possibility of traveling to Western Europe without border controls, can constitute ideal bases of operation. An interesting related phenomenon is the suspicious spike in marriages between Bulgarian and Romanian women and North African men reported in Italy and Spain immediately after the entrance of the two Eastern European countries in the European Union. In all likelihood, the majority of these artificial marriages involve individuals with no connections to terrorism who simply want to acquire a European passport to stay and work in Western Europe. Nevertheless, the possibility that terrorists could use the same scheme should also be considered.

#### Conclusion

Jihadism is a global movement whose characteristics mutate rapidly. While today some of the abovementioned trends are still in a developing phase or can be noticed only in some European countries, it is likely that they will be replicated with greater intensity and in more countries in the near future.

#### Notes

1. The information is based on author's observations throughout Europe.
2. The information is derived from a variety of sources, including: the Indictment of Abdelillah El Kaflaoui, Tribunal of Turin, May 7, 2005; Libero, October 18, 2007; author's private intelligence sources.

<http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2373743>

NIC Associates Report: A Framework For Understanding Radical Islam's Challenge

Source: OSC Feature, 02 May 07

Synopsis. This Paper outlines the challenges facing Europe in integrating its Muslim citizens amidst radicalizing trends within segments of the Muslim community in European cities. The Paper describes the basic challenges facing Europe and five inadequate government responses to radicalization. It then elaborates on the

contrasting French and UK approaches to radicalism followed with some preliminary conclusions and observations.

Introduction: The Demographic Backdrop.

The challenges facing Europe are in large part demographic. A relatively high Muslim birthrate in Europe and an alarmingly low birthrate among indigenous Europeans, combined with the tendency of Muslims to live in urban areas, suggest that many European cities may have Muslim majorities by 2020 or 2025, even with government imposition of tighter immigration restrictions.

To take one city, Bradford, UK, one of the early destinations of Pakistani immigrants after the Second World War, the 1991 census recorded 64,000 Muslims representing 13 percent of the population. By 2001, there were 94,000 Muslims, a 50 percent increase from 1991. In 2001, Muslims represented nearly 20 percent of overall population but over 30 percent of students and 50 percent of toddlers. By 2011, Muslims will represent close to 30 percent of the population in Bradford and over 50 percent of its students. The high growth rates and youth bubble create a burgeoning pool of young Muslim males. The Muslim population surge is most apparent in the British Midlands and in the adjacent corridor across the channel from northern France through Belgium and Holland.

The growth of Muslim population is taking place in countries that until recently had a miniscule Muslim population. In Austria, the Muslim population was 1% in 1981 and only 4% in 2001. Yet, a study of the Vienna Institute for Demography projects that by 2051, the Muslim population in Austria will rise to 14-26%. Assuming current rates of fertility (*italics added*), Islam may be the majority population for those younger than 15 in Austria. If the Muslim population can rise so high from a near zero starting point in Austria, one can imagine the projections in other European countries with substantial Muslim populations. The other finding of the Austrian study is that the Muslim increase takes place simultaneously with a serious decline in membership among Roman Catholics in Austria so that among the religiously observant Austrians, Islam is growing even faster.

The concentration of Muslims in cities and towns is beginning to alarm authorities concerned with integration. Markus Kerber, the director of the new Deutsche Islam Konferenz set up in the German Ministry of Interior by Edmund Stoiber, pointed out that within two kilometers of his office in Berlin, there are separate Turkish (in one direction) and Lebanese (in the other direction) neighborhoods where someone rarely encounters a non-Turk, or non-Lebanese. Trevor Phillips, former chief of the Commission for Racial Equality, warns that Britain may be sleepwalking into segregation.

One can already see separate Muslim districts or millets emerging in cities like Antwerp where Salafist Imams are becoming more influential in the Moroccan neighborhoods that are mushrooming as indigenous Belgians move out to the countryside or to other countries. A worst case scenario could see the inner cities of several European cities eventually becoming no-go zones for non-Muslims beyond the control of the state.

Europe's challenge is thus one of integration. The question one must ask, given these trends and the worrisome manifestations of Islamic radicalism accompanying the rise of a new generation of European-born Muslims, is: what tools can Europe adopt to ensure a successful integration of this growing minority?

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The Triborder Sea Area: Maritime Southeast Asia's Ungoverned Space



Source: Ian Storey, Terrorism Monitor, Volume 5, Issue 19 (October 11, 2007)

Since the al-Qaeda attacks of September 11, maritime security analysts in the Asia-Pacific region have focused their attention on the Strait of Malacca and the potential for a major terrorist strike in this vital artery of world trade. Preoccupation with the Strait of Malacca has meant, however, that another, perhaps equally serious, maritime black spot has been neglected, namely the Sulu and Celebes seas, a porous triborder sea area between the Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia. Decades of poor governance, economic and political marginalization, lack of state capacity, and separatist conflict have turned this area into an "ungoverned space" and hence a haven for transnational criminals, including terrorists. Addressing transnational threats in this area not only requires greater security cooperation among the three countries, but also increased assistance from external powers who have much to offer in terms of capacity building.

The focus on the Strait of Malacca during the past six years is understandable given its importance to the global economy. The 550-mile strait, located between the Indonesian island of Sumatra and peninsular Malaysia, is the shortest route between the Pacific and Indian Oceans, and it is estimated that 25-30% of world trade and 50% of global energy supplies pass through it each year. Post-9/11, security analysts conflated piracy and terrorism, and posited several scenarios in which transnational terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda or its Southeast Asian affiliate Jemaah Islamiya (JI) link up with pirates to perpetrate a major attack in the Strait of Malacca with the goal of disrupting the global economy.

While these concerns were almost certainly overplayed, the international pressure generated galvanized the three littoral states (Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore) into tightening sea lane security. In 2004-2005, the three countries launched the Malacca Straits Patrols (MSP), a cooperative security measure that comprises year-round coordinated naval patrols and combined air patrols. In addition, Indonesia—the locus of maritime crime in Southeast Asia—mustered the political will and resources to increase naval patrols in its territorial waters. As a result of these and other initiatives, cases of reported piratical attacks in Southeast Asia dropped 53% from 2003 to 2006.

#### Security Situation in Triborder Area Deteriorates

While international attention was focused on the Strait of Malacca, however, the security situation in the sea lanes linking the Philippines, Indonesia and Malaysia were allowed to deteriorate. This area—known as the triborder sea area—comprises two main sectors. The first is the Sulu Sea in the southwestern Philippines, a 100,000 square-mile body of water bounded to the northwest by Palawan Island, to the southeast by the Sulu Archipelago, and in the southwest by the eastern Malaysian state of Sabah. The second sector is the Celebes Sea (also known as the Sulawesi Sea), 110,000 square miles of water bordered by the Sulu Archipelago and Mindanao to the north, Sabah and the Indonesian province of Kalimantan to the west, and Indonesia's Sulawesi Island to the south. The Celebes Sea opens southwest through the Makassar Strait, which is increasingly used by large crude oil tankers unable to use the shallower Strait of Malacca.

The Sulu Archipelago (comprising the islands of Basilan, Jolo and Tawi-Tawi), Mindanao and Sulawesi have all been neglected by the central governments in Manila and Jakarta for decades, resulting in poor governance, corruption and high levels of poverty and unemployment. In addition, Mindanao has been wracked by over three decades of insurgency and separatist conflict. As a result, the Sulu and Celebes Seas have become notorious for illegal maritime activities such as smuggling, piracy, and trafficking in illegal narcotics, guns and people; in short, it is an ungoverned space. What most concerns security analysts is the utilization of the maritime domain in this area by terrorist organizations as a base of operations.

The locus of the problem is the southern Philippines, home to the

Marshall Center PTSS Daily 29 October 2007

terrorist organization the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) and the separatist group the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). The ASG has been based on the islands of Basilan and Jolo since its foundation in the early 1990s, and is very familiar with the surrounding maritime area. It was from these islands that the ASG launched raids against tourist resorts in Malaysia and Palawan Island in 2000 and 2001, receiving large ransoms in return. The ASG was also responsible for the world's deadliest act of maritime terrorism to date, the sinking of the MV Superferry 14 in February 2004 in Manila Bay, which killed 116 people and injured 300.

Both the ASG and MILF have been accused of conducting piratical attacks in the Sulu and Celebes Seas as a means of generating income for their causes. The full extent of this problem, however, remains unclear as accurate statistics are not available. Piracy in the southern Philippines has been a perennial problem—indeed a way of life—for many centuries. Ships' masters are often unwilling or unable to report attacks to the International Maritime Bureau's (IMB) Piracy Reporting Center in Kuala Lumpur because it only receives reports in English via high frequency radio or fax, and language skills and equipment are often lacking in the rich fishing grounds of the triborder sea area. As a result, the vast majority of maritime depredations in this area go unreported to the IMB. For instance, in early January 2007, the Philippine authorities rescued dozens of fishermen who had been held for ransom off Tawi-Tawi, and in March suspected MILF operatives held 20 fishermen hostage off Mindanao—neither incident was reported to the IMB. The IMB received just six reports of maritime crime in Philippine waters in 2006, a grossly inaccurate figure.

Both the ASG and MILF have established linkages with JI, and a recent RAND study noted that the Sulawesi-Mindanao arc provides the terrorist organization with a "key logistical corridor" and "theater for jihadist operations" [1]. JI members Umar Patek and Dulmatin, both suspected of planning the 2002 Bali bombings, are believed to be in the Sulu Archipelago after escaping from Indonesian authorities. JI operatives are known to undertake training in camps in the southern Philippines, and travel from Sulawesi to Mindanao via Sabah which is just a short boat ride from the Sulu Archipelago. Sulawesi itself constitutes an important base of operations for JI as the organization has grafted itself on to sectarian and communal violence in Poso over the past few years. Sabah is also important to JI and the ASG for another reason: it provides a place of sanctuary. Sabah is home to more than half a million illegal immigrants from the Philippines and Indonesia, allowing operatives from both groups to blend in and lie low.

#### States Lack Capacity to Handle Threat

Tackling transnational security threats in the triborder sea area is hindered by the lack of state capacity, especially in the Philippines and Indonesia.

Starved of funding for years, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) is one of the weakest military forces in Southeast Asia. As the country's primary security threats are land-based—separatist, communist insurgent and terrorist groups—the army has received priority funding. The operational effectiveness of the Philippine Navy (PN) and Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) has suffered accordingly, leaving the country's sea lanes largely unprotected. In October 2006, Philippine National Security Adviser Norberto Gonzales summed up the situation: "we cannot check every boat that travels between Indonesia and Mindanao. Over 26,000 trips are made by these boats [every year] and it is impossible to monitor each of them given the government's meager resources" (The Philippine Star, October 16, 2006). The PN's inability to effectively monitor the sea lanes in the Sulu Sea enabled ASG and JI operatives to flee from Jolo and Basilan in the wake of a major U.S.-backed AFP offensive earlier this year. In early September, for instance, Philippine authorities arrested six alleged ASG members on Palawan Island, who were believed to have escaped the dragnet around Jolo.

The Indonesian Navy faces similar problems. In the wake of the 1997 Asian financial crisis, Indonesia's defense budget was slashed, and by 2003 it was estimated that less than 30% of the Navy's 113 vessels were operational. Since 2004,

improved economic conditions have enabled the navy to purchase new corvettes and patrol boats, but it is still significantly below strength and incapable of monitoring the country's 34,000 miles of coastline and 4.9 million square miles of territorial waters and exclusive economic zones. The navy estimates it needs another 262 warships to adequately patrol the country's vast maritime domain (Antara, September 18). Moreover, due to international pressure, the navy has been required to concentrate its limited resources on the Strait of Malacca. Indonesia's participation in the MSP, and increased naval patrols in its territorial waters adjoining the strait, have put severe pressure on the navy's aging and fuel-thirsty vessels.

Malaysia is in a better position to deal with the problem. The Royal Malaysian Navy (RMN) is more professional and better equipped than its Philippine or Indonesian counterparts, and after the 2001 raid on Sipidan its presence on Sabah was beefed up. In 2005, Malaysia launched its national coast guard, the Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency (MMEA), which is responsible for enforcing maritime law in both east and west Malaysia. However, both the RMN and MMEA have focused their efforts on the Strait of Malacca for the past several years to the detriment of security in the waters around Sabah.

Security cooperation among the three countries is very limited. The naval forces of Indonesia, the Philippines and Malaysia conduct coordinated patrols but their effectiveness is limited by infrequency and lack of available assets. Indonesia and the Philippines conduct CORPAT PHILINDO four times a year, but each patrol involves only one vessel from each country and lasts for only 10 days. Nevertheless, Manila and Jakarta have agreed to strengthen the patrols in an effort to stem arms trafficking into Poso, but resources are very limited. Malaysia and the Philippines conduct just two coordinated patrols (OPS PHIMAL) each year. In 2006, the Philippines proposed year-round coordinated naval patrols like the MSP, as well as designated sea lanes for all maritime traffic to facilitate easier monitoring and inspection by the three navies, but so far no agreement has been reached (Associated Press, March 13, 2006). The Philippines has, however, recently announced a program designed to enhance the PN's ability to conduct surveillance and interdiction of security threats in the country's "southern backdoor" called Coast Watch South. The concept, developed with help from Australia, envisages the establishment of 17 Coast Watch Stations from Palawan to Davao provinces, equipped with fast patrol boats and helicopters. Funding the \$380 million program, however, will be a challenge.

#### Conclusion

If maritime security threats in the triborder sea area are to be effectively addressed, Indonesia, the Philippines and Malaysia will require sustained assistance from external powers in the form of capacity building. Capacity building efforts need to focus on improving the communication, surveillance, and interdiction capabilities of regional maritime law enforcement agencies such as the navy, coast guard and marine police. So far, the focus has been on the Strait of Malacca, but this is gradually changing. The United States has agreed to supply Indonesia with 12 radar stations, some of which will be situated in North Sulawesi, as well as 30 patrol boats for the Marine Police. Australia, meanwhile, has agreed to supply the Philippines with 28 high-speed boats for Coast Watch South. This is a good start, but much more needs to be done in the coming years to undo decades of neglect and rein in this ungoverned space.

#### Notes

1. Angel Rabasa, "Case Study: The Sulawesi-Mindanao Arc," in Angel Rabasa et al, *Ungoverned Territories: Understanding and Reducing Terrorism Risks* (Santa Monica: RAND, 2007), p. 116.

<http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2373708>

Terrorism: Forum Debates Bin Ladin's Remarks, Criticizes Al-Jazirah

Source: OSC Feature - Iraq -- OSC Report 26 Oct 07

#### Capture of Bin Ladin's Statement

In the wake of the 22 October release by the Qatari Government-financed Al-Jazirah satellite channel of excerpts from Usama Bin Ladin's statement on Iraq, some jihadist forum participants claimed the statement singled out the Al-Qa'ida-affiliated Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) for criticism. However, after Al-Sahab, the media arm of Al-Qa'ida, released the full statement on 23 October, forum participants argued his comments applied to other insurgent groups in Iraq and not just ISI. By 25 October, many postings suggesting Bin Ladin criticized ISI had disappeared. Al-Sahab and many website participants sharply accused Al-Jazirah of intentionally distorting Bin Ladin's message.

After Al-Jazirah aired short segments of the statement on 22 October, some forum participants asserted that Usama Bin Ladin's references to "mistakes" were directed specifically at ISI. Some also speculated Bin Ladin may be preparing to replace ISI's alleged leader, Abu-Umar al-Baghdadi.

\* On 22 October, "Al-Nafir," a participant of the Ana al-Muslim forum, argued Bin Ladin did not "recognize" ISA and that Al-Baghdadi needed to "relinquish his rule" to preserve unity.

\* On 23 October, "Sami al-Hataq" argued Bin Ladin's statement was in "preparation" for al-Baghdadi's removal, which would be "to the advantage of everyone" (Ana al-Muslim).

After Al-Sahab released the entire statement on 23 October, forum participants generally agreed Bin Ladin's references to "mistakes" applied to the Mujahidin in general and not specifically to ISI.

\* On 24 October, "Jami'-al-Shaml" said on the Al-Boraq forum that Bin Ladin "addressed his speech to all jihadist groups," calling on them to "unite under one banner."

\* On Al-Fallujah Net, "Mawsu'at al-Jihad" argued Bin Ladin's comments were "a set of general instructions" to remind all Muslims of the "fundamental objectives of Al-Qa'ida" (23 October).

By 25 October, many of the postings suggesting Usama Bin Ladin had been critical of ISI had been removed from prominent forums. Participants in the Ana al-Muslim forum argued that member "Al-Nafir" should be suspended from the forum for supporting this view.

After the full statement was released on 23 October, both Al-Sahab and a number of forum participants attacked Al-Jazirah, which jihadists have historically accused of hostility to the jihadist movement. A minority of participants defended the satellite news network.

\* Upon releasing the full video, Al-Sahab issued a statement accusing Al-Jazirah of "counterfeiting" facts, altering "the purposes and objectives of the speech," and ignoring "all the pillars of honor" for professional media.

\* On the Al-Boraq forum, "Al-Mu'min-bel-Nasr" said that prior to this incident his belief in the truthfulness Al-Jazirah's was "forty percent" and that now it is "zero-percent" (24 October).

\* "Jami'-al-Shaml," on the other hand, noted on the Al-Boraq forum that many were talking as if "Al-Jazirah had broadcasted a speech" by someone other than Bin Ladin, when in fact it had summarized the content of his speech accurately (24 October).



Pakistan: Writer Calls for Differentiation Between 'Martyr and Terrorist'

Source: Rafia Zakria, Daily Times (Internet Version-www) in English 27 Oct 07

It is important ideologically to refine our definitions of who constitutes an enemy to Pakistan. In the past, for a variety of reasons, such definitions have pivoted on our identity as Muslims and the identity of our enemies as non-Muslims. We are a nation bred on war. Not simply because we have been ruled by the military for much of our sixty-year existence, but also in terms of the national myths that sustain our national identity.

Every Pakistani child learns early to venerate the army and to idolise the martyrs that have sacrificed their lives for the country. We name streets after them and commemorate their birthdays. Even those of us who were born decades after the wars fought against India in the sixties and seventies, learn of heroic acts by our soldiers.

These images and practices of nationhood that sustain and create our identity through textbooks, the celebration of Defence Days and the commemoration of martyrs are all pivoted against fighting the non-Muslim and usually Indian enemy. In this war, Pakistani forces fight against enemies of Islam that are threatening our national integrity. Parallels are often drawn between those fighting and dying for Pakistan and the early Muslim fighters who were martyred in the name of Islam in the Battles of Badr, Uhud and Karbala. Undeniably, the "shaheed" who put the sanctity of his faith, and hence the interests of his nation, above his own life is the ultimate Pakistani hero.

But now Pakistan faces a new battle, and a new enemy. The national myth of a valiant Muslim army fighting against the enemies of Islam that has sustained us in interminable wars and hostilities against India can no longer serve us. This is because the new enemy, which has claimed over two hundred innocent Pakistani lives and left more than 600 injured and maimed since September, is not an "other" defined by religious and national difference; he is situated within our own territorial boundaries, connected to us by culture, ethnicity and language, and making claims to the same concept of martyrdom in the name of Islam as our own army.

More worryingly, today's enemy was the vanguard in our battles against the infidels and while the state might have chosen to redefine some parameters of Pakistani nationalism, he holds the ideals aloft and considers the state and its functionaries treacherous -- not only because the state that sacralised itself by making the narrative religion-heavy is now reneging on those parameters but because by doing so it is also undermining the bigger ideal of pan-Islamism.

It is this final fact that poses the biggest challenge to Pakistanis in facing down and defeating the new extremism that has led to us to be entitled by Newsweek magazine as "the most dangerous nation in the world".

The increasing death toll from suicide bombings, the burning down of music and video shops, the overt threats of more violence by the likes of rebel cleric Maulana Fazlullah and Taliban commander Baitullah Mehsud are all desperate signs of the urgent need to reassess how we will redefine our ideologies and our sense of national identity to truly understand that those who commit acts of aggression against innocent civilians are our greatest enemies.

Most crucially, it requires us to define clearly the difference between a "shaheed" and a "terrorist", such that the confusion that currently pervades our understanding of this distinction does not drag us deeper into the morass of senseless violence.

In other words, how do we turn into the "other" what belonged to us, indeed defined us?

The first task in delineating this crucial distinction is to recognise the battle being fought against extremism as our own distinctly Pakistani struggle. Much rhetoric has been expended on how the battles being fought in the tribal areas are being fought at the behest of the United States and have little to do with Pakistani national interests. This ignores the blatant and glaring reality that the 222 dead in the past two months have been innocent Pakistani citizens who had no stake in the US or its strategic interests.

While the imperialist influence of the United States is certainly worth denouncing and resisting, it should not dull us into supporting the scourge that is condemning our nation to a grisly reality. If we fall into the illogical and self-sabotaging trap of denouncing the war against extremism and suicide terror simply because of our opposition to the imperialist actions of the US, we would be doing our nation a great disservice.

Secondly, it is important ideologically to refine our definitions of who constitutes an enemy to Pakistan. In the past, for a variety of reasons, such definitions have pivoted on our identity as Muslims and the identity of our enemies as non-Muslims. Since this is no longer the case, we must create the ideological iterations that see the misuse of Islam and the use of its doctrines to justify violence as something unequivocally intolerable and reprehensible.

This is a complicated task. How indeed must an army and a nation raised on sixty years of fighting a non-Muslim enemy now re-conceptualise the meanings of "enemy" to fit a foe that claims to still practice the ideals the state has abandoned? Recognising this perversion of Islam that our new enemy represents is a goal that will require much work and soul-searching by a Pakistani population used to looking at religion as a panacea.

I began by arguing that every Pakistani child is taught to venerate and respect the shaheeds who gave their lives for their nation. This fact bears important clues regarding how the future of Pakistan must be shaped. The new enemy, the Al Qaeda and Taliban leaders that have unleashed a spate of bombings on innocent civilians across the country, are adept at using our own identity and our national veneration of death and martyrdom as a weapon against us.

Unless we, as a nation, can define clearly the difference between a shaheed that dies for his nation as part of armed combat, and a terrorist who misuses religion to justify an act of aggression against innocent civilians, our future generations will fall into the deceptive trap of believing that the distinction between a shaheed and a terrorist is perhaps just a matter of opinion.

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#### A Mountain Meeting With The PKK

Source: BBC, Crispin Thorold, 27 Oct 07

The soldiers at the final Iraqi border patrol checkpoint were reluctant to let us through.

"If you want to continue, you do so at your own risk," one warned. The writ of the local authorities ended at this point and after the checkpoint we would enter Kurdistan Worker's Party (PKK) territory. For the next 10 miles or so the road was

paved. As it hugged the rugged mountains, it wound deeper into the territories bordering Turkey. Abruptly we turned off onto a dirt track which local people had told us would lead us to the PKK. The dusty track was bumpy and was only accessible on foot or in a four-wheel-drive car.

The path descended into a valley and as we drove next to a stream, we were often in full view of the surrounding hills. An invading army travelling on the same route could face an ambush at any turn. The mountains in this part of northern Iraq are a rebel's paradise. The steep, jagged peaks are covered in trees and caves dot the hillsides. The rivers that flow through the valleys are hidden by woods. When we reached the PKK we nearly missed them. They were in a little copse across a stream and it was only the light of their campfire that caught our attention. Two men dressed in military fatigues with Kalashnikovs slung across their shoulders immediately jumped up. They said that they would talk but first the elder man had a question for us. "Why does everyone call us terrorists?" he asked. The rebel, who said that his name was Yezdin Sher, was puzzled. "The British government call us terrorists. The BBC call us terrorists."

He said: "They only call us terrorists because there are good relations between them and the Turkish government. That's why they call us terrorists." The PKK is considered a terrorist organisation by Turkey, the United States and the European Union. It is believed to have been responsible for the deaths of thousands of civilians - Turks and Kurds - in south-eastern Turkey. Yezdin Sher was adamant. "We have a right to defend our nationality," he said. "The Turkish government has for many years stood against the Kurds. [In Turkey] There are no schools, no Kurdish language and no rights for the Kurds. We have a right to be free like the Kurds of Iraq who for 50 years stood against Saddam's regime and the previous regimes. We also want freedom and we don't target any civilians," he added.

That claim would be ridiculed by the Turkish government, as well as by much of the international community. Last Sunday the PKK was blamed by the Turkish military for a bomb explosion which injured 17 people who were part of a wedding party. Human rights groups say that during the course of the conflict between the PKK and the Turkish military, some 35,000 people have been killed - the vast majority of them civilians. They [the Turkish government] have special units who dress in our uniforms and kill civilians. PKK fighter Yilmaz Sardar However, the PKK men refused to acknowledge that they were responsible for the deaths of civilians, instead blaming the government. At this stage the younger and quieter of the two men spoke up. "They [the Turkish government] have special units who dress in our uniforms and kill civilians," Yilmaz Sardar said. "Then they blame us."

The fighters claimed that they had no support in the mountains from the Kurdish authorities in northern Iraq. Instead, they said that they relied on the help of local people and smugglers. The elder man, Yezdin Sher, said that he had been living in the mountains for 19 years and neither of the rebels had any intention of leaving before they had won rights for the Kurds in south-eastern Turkey. "If the Turks cross the border we will fight them," said Yezdin Sher. "We are guerrillas. They can't do anything against guerrillas." The afternoon was drawing to a close and the light was beginning to fall. Before we left the elder man wanted to make it clear that in his view war did not have to be inevitable. "It is better to resolve the Kurdish problem peacefully," said Yezdin Sher. "We are ready to make a ceasefire with the Turkish government if the Turkish government accepts that. We are ready."

Arab Public Support for Hizballah, Iran, Syria Wanes

Source: OSC Feature - State INR 10 Oct 07

Last year, Hizballah's strong showing against Israeli forces, Iran's defiance in halting uranium enrichment, and its overt hostility toward Israel were met with high levels of public support in the Arab world. But recent Office of Research nationwide polls indicate that these gains have been largely overturned. Favorable ratings

toward Hizballah and its leader, Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah, among publics in Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia have fallen significantly since last winter.

### To Fight Insurgents, Armies Need More Brains, and Money

Source: The Economist, 29 Oct 07 Issue

The Economist says western militaries must be able to fight both traditional and insurgent threats.

#### Summary:

The Economist has some tough news for the U.S. government and its western allies: If they want their militaries to be able to grapple with dangerous insurgencies around the world, it is going to cost them. That is one of several messages that the British newsweekly seeks to convey in a cover story on how best to reshape the armed forces to deal with modern threats. To successfully wage a fight against terrorists and insurgents, western armies will need more "boots on the ground," but also different types of soldiers wearing them. And since more traditional threats from big powers like Russia and China can't be entirely discounted, the U.S. military in particular will have to continue funding its investment in hardware -- aircraft, ships and advanced weapons. Addressing both sets of challenges will require more contributions from taxpayers.

But that burden needs to be put in perspective, the Economist says. At 4% of gross domestic product, U.S. defense spending is low by historical standards (it hovered around 9% during the Vietnam War). Europeans are even less committed -- some U.S. allies spend less on defense than the 2% minimum target set by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. More money certainly will be needed to be spent to fight "protracted, enervating counterinsurgency wars" like the ones the U.S. and its allies are waging in Iraq and Afghanistan that offer no clear-cut victories and risk the prospect of humiliation. But to cope with new threats, armies need more brains than bullets, says the newsweekly. That means more linguists, civil-affairs officers, engineers and other skilled advisers who can help western militaries do as good a job at building things as they do in destroying them.

Source: Reuters, 28 Oct 07



U.S.-led coalition and Afghan troops killed about 80 Taliban fighters in a six-hour battle following an ambush in southern Afghanistan, the U.S. military said on Sunday.

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(Head of the Russian National Anti-terrorism Center, Nikolai Sintsov, said that terrorists more than ever are using the internet to spread their extremist ideas due to the practically unrestricted possibilities of spreading their propaganda around the world. He said that today, practically all extremists, terrorists, insurgents and various other groups have their own web sites. In 1998 there were 12 such websites, according to Sintsov, while today there are over 5000.)

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