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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

2 APR 1979

1-21763/79

Mr. William E. Jackson, Jr.  
Executive Director  
General Advisory Committee  
On Arms Control and  
Disarmament  
Washington, D.C. 20451


Dear Bill:

This is to confirm the information which I phoned to the General Advisory Committee on March 8, 1979. Per your request, the OSD Staff has updated the strategic calculations which we supplied to you in a letter dated June 8, 1978. The results reflect the most recent estimates of Soviet forces which include increased numbers of more accurate ICBM RVs. These Soviet force changes, more than US developments, are responsible for the differences from the earlier results. The assumptions described below are the same as those of the earlier calculations.

We have used a moderate to severe damage criterion for Soviet silos and have further assumed that:

- US and Soviet forces constrained by the numerical limits of SALT TWO;
- All US ICBMs are available for pre-emption against Soviet silos;
- All Minuteman III have improved  (b)(1)

(b)(1)



The table below shows the results in 1985 for alternative US forces, and in 1978 and 1980 for currently planned forces. You should be aware that it is not feasible to have 300 MX deployed by FY 1985.

Classified by Dir, DoD SALT Task Force

Declassify on 31 DEC 1985

Review on 31 DEC 1985

FEDERAL DEPT. DECLASSIFICATION REVIEW

Retain Class'n  Change to \_\_\_\_\_

Declassify in part and excise as shown

EO 12958, 25X( ) ( ) ( ) \_\_\_\_\_

Declassify  After \_\_\_\_\_

With concurrence OSD (not)(obtained)

*J. Sulzer* Date 5/12/03

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US Forces

(b)(1)

Expected  
Percent Soviet  
ICBMs Destroyed

It is important to note that the Soviets could see the situation in much worse light, if,

(b)(1)

We have also calculated, per your subsequent request, the percentage of US survivors if the Soviets pre-empt against Minuteman. In these calculations, we assume a severe damage criterion for US silos and:

- US and Soviet forces constrained by the numerical limits of SALT TWO;
- All Soviet ICBMs are available for pre-emption against US silos;
- The Soviet attack minimizes warheads expended and preferentially attacks Minuteman III to maximize warheads destroyed; and

(b)(1)

The results of the attacks are as follows:

Percentage of US Minuteman ICBMs Destroyed  
in Soviet Pre-Emptive Attack

1978                      1980                      1985

(b)(1)

The table below summarizes surviving ICBM, SLBM and bomber forces after a pre-emptive strike by either side assuming the currently programmed US forces, i.e., MX is not deployed until 1986. The numbers assume that systems not on alert are destroyed. You should also be aware that

(b)(1) attributed to Soviet systems.

\* As of September 1978; all data are given for fiscal years.  
\*\* All damage accomplished by (b)(1) available MX RVs.

	<u>Pre-Attack Inventory</u>			<u>Surviving ICBMs, Bombers and SLBMs After a Pre-Emptive First Strike</u>					
				<u>Generated</u>			<u>Day-to-Day</u>		
	<u>1978</u>	<u>1980</u>	<u>1985</u>	<u>1978</u>	<u>1980</u>	<u>1985</u>	<u>1978</u>	<u>1980</u>	<u>1985</u>
<u>US</u> ICBMs SLBMs* Bombers incl FB-111	(b)(1)								
<u>Soviet</u> ICBMs SLBMs Bombers incl LRA Backfire									

\* Phase out Polaris beginning in 1980 and bring in Trident in 1981.  
 \*\* Higher alert rates after 1982.

You also asked how much we could reasonably increase our ICBM throw weight under SALT TWO.

(b)(1),(b)(3);42 USC §2168(a)(1)(C)-(FRD)

Soviet ICBM throw weight is 8100 K lbs today, and is projected to be 10900 K lbs in 1985, if limited in SALT.

*Walter Slocombe*  
 WALTER SLOCOMBE  
 Director  
 DoD SALT Task Force