(U) For the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the principal objective of US NATO policy was to support the strategy of flexible response with a credible conventional deterrent. To achieve this, they advocated not only maintaining at current strength but also improving US forces in Europe. They would have liked to increase the US commitment to NATO but recognized that the continuing demands of the Vietnam War and congressional pressures for reduced defense spending and specifically for troop cuts in Europe made this impossible. Although they believed that the European allies should increase their conventional commitment, the Joint Chiefs of Staff opposed any US reduction in exchange. On NATO policy, their views largely coincided with those of the President. Their battles to have their views accepted were waged instead within DoD, particularly with Systems Analysis.

**Reviewing Strategy and Force Posture**

Since 1962 the United States had reduced its military strength in Europe about 28 percent. Moreover, the demands of the Vietnam War had depleted US-based forces earmarked for Europe in the event of war. In December 1968 the NATO-committed reserve consisted of only one mechanized infantry division and two airborne brigades available by M+30 and one airborne, one infantry, and one mechanized brigade available by M+60. At the beginning of the Nixon administration, there were approximately 320,000 US forces in Europe, comprising 4 1/3 divisions; 2 armored cavalry regiments; 32 air squadrons, of which 21 were tactical; the Sixth Fleet of 25 combatant ships; and support and logistic units. Under the Reduction of Costs in Europe (REDCOSTE) program, a 1968 OSD-initiated proposal for streamlining and consolidating selected headquarters and withdrawing some units from Europe, the additional withdrawal of
approximately 34,000 troops by 1973 was pending. As discussed below, the
Joint Chiefs of Staff opposed these reductions as militarily unsound, while
OSD officials viewed them as a way to respond to congressional pressures
to reduce defense spending. Their debate over force reductions was part
of a larger ongoing JCS-OSD debate over NATO strategy and force posture.\footnote{Poole, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1965-
2450/583-6, JMF 806 (5 Jun 68) sec. 4. DJSM-259-69 to
ASD(ISA), 18 Feb 69, C; Memo, SecDef to Pres, 20 Feb 69, JCS
2450/695, C; JMF 806/301 (18 Feb 69). Memo, SecDef to CJCS et
al., 10 Dec 68, JCS 2458/410-28, JMF 585 (6 Jun 68) sec.
8. Revised Department of State (DoS) Paper, "NATO Policy
Review," JCS 2450/676-4, 7 Apr 69, C; DoS Paper, "NATO Policy
Review," JCS 2450/676-1, 18 Mar 69, C; DASD(ISA) and DepDir, J-5,
Talking Paper for ASD(ISA) and Dir, J-5, "NSC Review Group
Meeting, 24 Mar 69, on Response to NSSM 6," and Tab D, JCS
2450/676-2, 26 Mar 69, C; JMF 806 (21 Jan 69) sec. 1. For a
discussion of REDCOSTE, see p. 211-214.}

\footnote{(b)(1)}
Mr. Laird charged the Joint Chiefs of Staff with conducting the required study for submission to the NSC Review Group. General Wheeler's Special Studies Group, assisted by Joint Staff and Service representatives, produced a reply. However, their draft encountered objections from State and the NSC staff. Under ISA's supervision and guidance and in close coordination with the NSC staff, a "redirected" study, in which State Department representatives also participated, was carried out. On 23 October 1969 the Joint Chiefs of Staff submitted the revised study to Secretary Laird through a memorandum from the Director of the Joint Staff. 4/
The revised study focused on the strategy which the United States should advocate for defense. In addition to the current strategy of defense, it included the options of defense. According to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, since the US lead in deter a SACEUR's Scheduled Program (SSP) was to a full  

Moreover, in a Pact conventional attack,

On 24 January 1970 Deputy Secretary Packard forwarded to Dr. Kissinger the revised NSSM 65 study, together with ISA's comments and his assessment that the JCS study inadequately analyzed the relative

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5/ DJSM-1644-69 to SecDef, 23 Oct 69, JCS 2101/561-1, TS-SP-1-FRD, JMF 806/373 (8 Jul 69) sec. 1A. Memo, DASD(ISA) to DJS, 3 Dec 69, JCS 2101/561-2, 4 Dec 69, TS, same file, sec. 1.
capabilities of the opposing sides’ strategic and nuclear-capable general
purpose forces and the weaknesses of NATO’s conventional forces and cost
of their improvement. On 21 November 1969 President Nixon had auth-
orized a second study of NATO strategy and forces. Through NSSM 84 he
directed preparation of a study of alternative US force deployments in
NATO, their political and budgetary implications, and their consequences
for NATO strategy. Therefore Mr. Packard recommended that work on
NSSM 65 be incorporated in the NSSM 84 study, and Dr. Kissinger accepted
his recommendation. Meanwhile, at the 3 December meeting of the NATO
Defense Planning Committee, Secretary Laird informed the NATO
Ministers that the United States intended to maintain its combat forces in
Europe at essentially the current level through 30 June 1971.6/

(S) The President’s 11 October 1969 decision to adopt a “1 1/2-war”
strategy led to the review of NATO strategy authorized by NSSM 84. In
January 1968, NATO, largely at the instance of the United States, had
formally adopted the strategy of flexible response. MC 14/3 promulgating
this strategy declared that initial defense of Western Europe against

(b)(1)

Should the contraction to a “1 1/2-war” strategy, together with
budgetary constraints, lead to a reduction in US forces in Europe and the
consequent return to the 1950’s strategy of greater reliance on nuclear
weapons? Or, with Western Europe remaining the theater in which the
threat was greatest, should US forces be maintained at current strength?

(S) The Nixon administration’s consideration of NATO strategy and
forces became a forum for rivalry between the Joint Staff and what one

6/ Memo, DASD(ISA) to DJS, 3 Dec 69, JCS 2101/561-2, 4 Dec 69,
TS; Memo, DepSecDef to ATP(NSA), 24 Jan 70, JCS 2101/561-4, S;
Memo, COL Hanson to Mr. Howard, 11 Feb 70, TS-X(X); ExecSecy,
NSC, to Dir, J-5 et al., 11 Feb 70, JCS 2101/561-5, S; JMF
806/373 (8 Jul 69) sec. 1. NSSM 84, 21 Nov 69, JCS 2450/840, S;
JMF 806/520 (21 Nov 69) sec. 1. Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 2 Jan
70, S, JCS 2450/765-8, JMF 806 (27 Jun 69) sec. 4.
officer described as "the bright young people in ASD(SA) and the NSC Staff with no military experience." This rivalry, which had poisoned relations between DOD's military and civilian leaderships during the previous administration, continued to thwart the formulation of a unified Defense position and to complicate adoption of a national policy. While the Joint Chiefs of Staff and OSD's Systems Analysis office agreed that NATO should retain the strategy of flexible response, they disagreed in their assessment of the number of forces needed to support that strategy and in their perception of the threat posed by the Warsaw Pact. Within OSD, too, there was disagreement, with ISA's views coming closer to those of the Joint Staff than to Systems Analysis's assessments.

(U) These disagreements, together with differences in outlook between OSD and State as well as congressional pressures for force reductions, prolonged the administration's debate over NATO forces and strategy. But, in contrast to the outcome of similar policy debates during the Johnson administration, when President Nixon eventually enunciated his policy, it coincided with the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.7/

(3) NSSM 84 directed that a steering committee chaired by a representative of the Secretary of Defense supervise the study of NATO strategy. But because of the study's emphasis on "complex military matters," the Joint Chiefs of Staff attempted to gain principal responsibility for its preparation. Secretary Laird, however, rejected their request, countering that the study was to address political as well as military problems. Instead, ISA received the responsibility. Admiral Vannoy, the Deputy Director of J-5, represented the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the Interagency Steering Committee as he had on the NSSM 3 study.

7/ For adoption of the "1 1/2 war" strategy, see Chapter 2. For the US role in NATO's acceptance of the flexible response strategy, see Poole, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1965-1968, pp. 351-362. The quotation is Rear Admiral David H. Bagley's characterization. Admiral Bagley was Deputy Chairman of the Chairman's Special Studies Group. ADM Moorer's Schedule, 29 Aug 70, Moorer Diary, Aug 70, p. 15. For congressional demands for force reductions, see discussion below, p. 223.
with Rear Admiral David H. Bagley of the Chairman's Special Studies Group serving as his alternate. Of the seven interagency working groups set up to prepare the study, JCS representatives served on six. Despite this Joint Staff participation at the working group level, the report itself was chiefly the work of OSD's Systems Analysis office and the NSC staff.\footnote{\textit{NSSM 84}, 21 Nov 69, JCS 2450/840, JCSM-736-69 to SecDef, 29 Nov 69, JCS 2450/840-1; S; Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 11 Dec 69, JCS 2450/840-2; S; DJSM-726-70 to SecDef, 25 May 70, U; J-5P 2513/D, 24 Dec 69, U; JMF 806/520 (21 Nov 69) sec. 1. On 25 May 1970 Major General Richard F. Shaefer, the new Deputy Director, J-5, replaced Admiral Vannoy as the JCS representative on the Interagency Steering Committee. DJSM-726-70 to SecDef, 25 May 70, U, same file. ADM Moorer's Schedule, 29 Aug 70, Moorer Diary, Aug 70. TS.}

The substance of the two drafts of the NSSM 84 report produced in May and August 1970. They he work done on NSSM 84, which, force commitments to NATO.\footnote{JCSM-736-69 to SecDef, 29 Nov 69, JCS 2450/840-1; S; DJSM-726-70 to SecDef, 25 May 70, U, same file. ADM Moorer's Schedule, 29 Aug 70, Moorer Diary, Aug 70. TS.}

In response to the first draft's conclusion that the United States could reduce its forces committed to NATO by as many as 30,000 without adversely affecting deterrent posture or war-fighting capabilities, the Joint Chiefs of Staff argued that US forces currently in Europe provided not only a balanced but also a minimal combat capability. Any reduction from current levels would decrease an already marginal conventional capability and increase the risk of nuclear war. So long as the threat remained undiminished and US national security objectives relating to Europe were to deter both conventional and nuclear war and, failing that, to assure a favorable war outcome, the United States required the NATO force levels recommended in JSOP 72-79. Moreover, to reduce forces without a quid pro quo from the Soviet Union would be unsound policy. If,
despite JCS objections, the President nevertheless decided to reduce forces, then their recommendations should be the basis for those reductions. In response to the contention that inactivation of any forces withdrawn was necessary as a money-saving measure, the Joint Chiefs of Staff insisted that if forces were withdrawn, they must remain active.

One option presented for reducing conventional forces was to plan for a 30- or 60-day rather than a 90-day conventional war and reduce material support and force levels accordingly. The Joint Chiefs of Staff rejected a 30- or 60-day conventional defense as militarily and politically unrealistic and likely to increase resort to a nuclear response. Furthermore, even in the event of a decision to undertake nuclear war, a sustained support capability would be necessary to maintain battlefield forces. Failure to provide this sustaining conventional capability would greatly increase the risk of an unfavorable war outcome. Maintaining the position that they had taken in response to NSDM-27, the Joint Chiefs of Staff also continued to oppose a 90-day limitation as inconsistent with MC 14/3, unduly restrictive, and quite risky.9/

The Chairman presented the JCS views at an SRG meeting on 31 August. When Dr. Kissinger opened the meeting by commenting that the report presented capabilities, strategies, and options in "a most encouraging way," Admiral Moorer replied that it had

(b)(1) He emphasized that

(b)(1) Because of the

(b)(1) Supporting the JCS position, a State Department representative

pointed out that it was the United States which had persuaded the Europeans to accept the doctrine of flexible response and, moreover, that conventional deterrence had worked.

Dr. Kissinger commented that he did not favor US troop cuts, reiterating this in a private discussion with Admiral Moorer afterward. But he raised the question of the best disposition of troops in Europe. Admiral Moorer conceded that redeployment would enhance the US defense posture but argued that it would be extremely expensive. Mr. Packard, however, contended that the United States was not getting the "maximum mileage" from its money through its troop deployments in Europe and that redeployment would provide a strong defense. He argued that the United States currently had an opportunity for persuading the Europeans to assume a greater share of NATO's defense and should take advantage of it to convince them to improve their own forces. This discussion of NSSM 84 ended inconclusively.10/

In response to a request from Dr. Kissinger, on 3 October the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent Secretary Laird their own illustrative force requirements for incorporation in a revised NSSM 84 study, but they dissociated themselves from any endorsement of the study. Basing their recommendations upon the forward defense strategy outlined in MC 14/3, they reaffirmed the force level requirements for the initial defense of NATO which they had provided during the FY 1972 programming and budgeting cycle. The Interagency Steering Committee accepted the

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The study did not consider the worst case of a possible Pact attack without warning: its use of the 90-day war as a

10/ MFR by COL Wickham, "SRG and Verification Panel Mtg, 31 Aug 70, NSSMs 84, 92, 83," 2 Sep 70, NS. Moorer Diary, Sep 70.
In the meanwhile, on 14 October Secretary Laird had written the President suggesting moderate FY 1972 reductions in US forces in Europe, with cuts to come principally in support forces and overhead. He wanted to make a substantial US commitment through 1976 conditional upon equitable burden-sharing by the Europeans and argued that a commitment to maintain NATO's collective defense capability (which he supported) should not necessarily commit the administration to maintain a specific, NATO-committed force level or mix in either Europe or the United States. According to Mr. Laird, the purpose of the proposed cuts would be to show the allies and Congress that the administration intended to shift the NATO defense burden and reduce expenditures over the long term.

Secretary Laird's view but also Secretary Rogers. Unless there was agreement with the Warsaw Pact on mutual force reductions, Mr. Rogers wished to keep US force levels constant through 1972 regardless of whether the allies accepted more burden-sharing. On 26 October Admiral Moorer emphasized to Secretary Laird the importance of stable US force levels in Europe during burden-sharing and mutual and balanced force reductions negotiations. 12/
The United States had for years been attempting to persuade the allies to assume a greater share of NATO's defense. The demands of the Vietnam War and congressional calls for troop reductions in Europe increased administration interest in achieving a burden-sharing arrangement with the allies. In March 1970 in response to President Nixon's call for a strategic review, NATO had undertaken the AD-70 study to determine required force improvements. On 1 October the European allies had adopted a minute recognizing the need for a burden-sharing agreement. Secretary Laird thought that the allies should not only improve their own forces but also provide financial support for US forces in Europe. He recommended development of a NATO plan for a reduced, though still substantial, US presence by 1976.13/

On 30 September, while visiting NATO Southern Command headquarters at Naples, the President had expressed his preference for NATO's European members increasing the strength of their own forces rather than subsidizing US forces in Europe. When the NSC discussed burden-sharing on 14 October, he emphasized that the NATO partners regarded the US presence in Europe as the key to a successful NATO strategy. Despite adoption of MC 14/3, they believed that the US should not only improve its own forces but also provide financial support for US forces in Europe. Admiral Moorer supported the President's view. During his recent visit with the NATO Military Committee, European representatives had challenged the US assertion that in the future NATO would rely more on conventional forces. According to the Chairman, the allies believed that regardless of their contribution to NATO defense, they would rather subsidize US forces than increase their own force commitment.

The President rejected Secretary Laird's recommendation to link US troop levels to allied financial support. The United States, he insisted, must not put itself in a position where the European members of NATO

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13/ Memo, SecDef to Pres, "US Troop Levels in Europe and Korea," 14 Oct 70, JMF 806/378 (7 Jul 70).
believed that “if they provide the finances we will provide the forces.” A viable strategy required more adequate European forces. Secretary Laird countered that the problem was getting the allies to implement force improvements. Although he had testified that they were making improvements, his testimony was “just not true.” On 15 October President Nixon issued the first in a series of decision memorandums on burden-sharing. NSDM 88 reaffirmed the US interest in burden-sharing and, while not excluding allied financial support for US troops, expressed the President’s preference for allied force improvements.\(^{14/}\)

Meanwhile, the NSSM 84 review continued. On 17 and 18 November the Joint Chiefs of Staff again discussed their position. Of the strategy alternatives presented in a further reworking of NSSM 84 issues, they preferred the option which assumed that a conventional war in Europe might last longer than 90 days and that the settlement. General Chapman, Commandant of the Marine Corps, supported this option because he believed that the budget would sustain it. If, however, there were budgetary reductions, he thought that the Joint Chiefs of Staff would have to develop a new strategy. In response, Admiral Moorer commented that they would at least have to make the President aware of the problem. Attending for General Westmoreland, General Palmer, the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, supported maintaining current strength because there was “no more fat” in US forces in Europe and it would be destabilizing to reduce the US commitment there. The Joint Chiefs of Staff continued to reject both a 60-day conventional defense and any reductions in US forward deployed forces. They also opposed reverting to \(^{(b)(1)}\)

But the primary objective of US NATO strategy was to give the President another choice besides losing Western Europe or resorting to nuclear escalation. Therefore, all the allies must accept measures that would permit conventional defense to continue beyond a few days. President Nixon emphasized that deterrence depended upon having a credible conventional capability. Secretary Laird did not press his views on reducing forces, although Deputy Secretary Packard commented that current strength could not be maintained without an adequate budget. There was a consensus that the European nations should contribute more to NATO defense, but, according to Admiral Moorer, the only clear decision reached at the NSC meeting was to

16/ Note to Control, SAGA BP, "Issue Paper, NSSM 84 and NSSM 92," 17 Nov 70, SAGA BP-4-70, "NATO Issue Paper (NSSM 84 and 92)," 17 Nov 70, TS, DJS and ASD(ISA), TP for SecDef and CJCS (NSC Mtg, 19 Nov 70), "NATO Issue Paper (NSSMs 84 and 92), JCS 2450/840-20, 20 Nov 70, TS-GP," JMF 806/520 (21 Nov 69) sec. 8. MFR by LTG Knowles, "JCS Mtg with Ambassador Bunker, 1440, 18 Nov," 23 Nov 70, TS, Moorer Diary, Nov 70.

16/ Moorer Diary, 19 Nov 70, TS, CJCS Memo M-211-70, 23 Nov 70, "NSC Mtg, 19 Nov 70," TS, ADM Moorer's Memos M54-M220/70. MFR by COL Wickham, "SRG and Verification Panel Mtg, 31 Aug 70, NSSMs 84, 92, 83," 2 Sep 70, TS, Moorer Diary, Sep 70. Admiral Moorer's MFR reflects the rambling nature of the 19 Nov NSC meeting. Kissinger, White House Years, p. 402.
Through NSDM 95 of 25 November 1970, President Nixon issued policy guidance embodying this NSC consensus. The guiding principles of his administration's NATO strategy were to be:

These general guidelines coincided with JCS views rather than with those of the NSSM 84 study. But it is not clear whether Admiral Moorer and his colleagues on the Joint Chiefs of Staff actually influenced policy or whether their views prevailed simply because they accorded with those of Dr. Kissinger and the President.\(^{17}\)

Secretary Laird informed the December meeting of the NATO Defense Planning Committee of the President's intention to maintain the current US force commitment in Europe and the Mediterranean for the foreseeable future unless the Warsaw Pact reduced its forces in Europe. He emphasized the importance of allied force improvements in winning congressional support for the President's policy, expressing particular concern about the need to increase war reserve stocks. In discussions with his West German counterpart, Admiral Moorer also emphasized the importance of increasing supply levels, pointing out the problem of preventing planners from linking war length to stockage levels. He was told that the Bundeswehr had stocks for 30 days and intended to increase that level to 45 days but would have difficulty going further. Although the Defense Planning Committee approved a five-year burden-sharing and force improvement plan, Admiral Moorer was skeptical about its implementation, noting that "feet will have to be held to the fire."\(^{18}\)

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\(^{17}\) NSDM 95, 25 Nov 70, FS, JMF 001 (CY 1970).
\(^{18}\) CJCS M-212-70, [4 Dec 70], FS, ADM Moorer's Memos M54-M220/70.
Implementing NSDM 95

Through NSDM 95 President Nixon also issued specific guidance on force planning. He directed that the size and structure of NATO-committed forces should be consistent with the strategy of assuming a period of warning and mobilization by both sides. The United States would maintain the end FY 1971 authorized level of 319,000 forces in Western Europe and keep actual strength as close to this level as possible. Reiterating the importance of force improvements, he instructed the Defense Program Review Committee (DPRC) to prepare a program of US measures necessary to implement the conventional defense strategy and a five-year program of US and allied force improvements. He also directed the DPRC to examine alternative doctrines and force structures for the use of tactical nuclear weapons in view of the increased emphasis on conventional defense, but DPRC discussions and the subsequent Presidential decision on its recommendations focused on conventional improvements.19/

The Joint Chiefs of Staff were unsuccessful in their attempt to preempt System Analysis's receiving responsibility for directing preparation of DOD's positions in response to NSDM 95. A basic disagreement between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Systems Analysis over interpretation of the 90-day initial conventional defense strategy soon emerged. Although Mr. Packard had already endorsed the JCS position that the 90-day concept applied only to resource allocation and logistical planning, Systems Analysis believed that it applied to force structure as well. This difference in interpretation led to disagreements over implementing

19/ NSDM 95, 25 Nov 70, 75 JMF 001 (CY 1970). See also Memo, ATP(NSA) to SecDef et al., "A Five-Year NATO Program," 9 Dec 70, JCS 2502/13-1, 75 JMF 806/373 (5 Dec 70) sec. 1.
NSDM 95. The Joint Chiefs of Staff insisted that NATO should also be able to achieve the MC 14/3 objective of preserving or restoring the integrity and security of NATO territory after the initial 90-day period. Therefore, it needed sufficient forward-deployed forces to withstand the initial attack and adequate levels of reinforcements for any subsequent phases of conflict required. In contrast, Systems Analysis focused only on the first 90 days. The Joint Chiefs of Staff offered two arguments against this approach. First, it would require sufficient forward deployed forces to achieve MC 14/3's objectives in 90 days, and clearly NATO would not provide these force levels. Second, it might lead to elimination of those combat and support forces which could not be readied in time to contribute to a 90-day war but which were necessary for reinforcement.20/

The JCS-Systems Analysis disagreement over the 90-day initial defense led to different emphases in the preparation of the force improvement packages mandated by NSDM 95. On 30 January 1971 the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent Secretary Laird their recommendations, which focused on the "clearly critical items" addressed in the NSSM 84 and NATO AD-70 studies: tank/antitank; antisubmarine warfare and surveillance; war reserve stocks; airfield vulnerability; command, control, and communications; reinforcement and mobilization; lines of communication; and "maldeployment." JCS recommendations
(c) Initially, Systems Analysis's recommendations concentrated on armor/antiarmor, aircraft vulnerability, and mobilization. In the JCS view, Systems Analysis overemphasized the critical to Allied Command Europe's operations. Systems Analysis did not meet all of these objections, but a revised paper submitted for DPRC consideration addressed what the Joint Chiefs of Staff considered to be the most important of the AD-70 areas:

On 31 July 1971 the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent Secretary Laird their comments on this paper.

As a result of their disagreement over the 90-day defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Systems Analysis had spent seven months formulating recommendations based on conflicting interpretations of

21/ JCSM-40-71 to SecDef, 30 Jan 71, JCS 2502/13-4, 23 Jan 71, TS, JMF 806/373 (5 Dec 70) sec. 1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff estimated that the annual costs of their recommended improvements for US forces would be $1.2-$6.6 billion; for allied forces $1.2-$3.1 billion. On 10 May they submitted additional recommendations, and on 4 June they submitted their comments on an early Systems Analysis draft. Memo, DASD(SA) to DJS, "NSDM 95-Improvements to US and Allied Conventional Forces in NATO," 11 May 71, JCS 2502/13-8, U, JMF 806/373 (5 Dec 70) sec. 5. Note by COL Wickham, CSG on Cover Sheet to Memo, ATP(NSA) to CJCS et al., "Follow-on Work on NATO (NSDM 95)," 31 May 71, Sec. 9. JCS file 092.2 NATO (Jul 70-Jun 71). J-5 Briefing Sheet for CJCS on a report to be considered at the JCS mtg 4 Jun 71, 3 Jun 71, JCSM-264-71 to SecDef, 4 Jun 71, JCS 2502/13-10, TS; JCSM-374-71 to SecDef, 31 Jul 71, JCS 2502/13-14, TS; J-5 Briefing Sheet for CJCS for mtg with DPRC 5 Aug 71, 29 Jul 71, TS, same file, sec. 9. In August the Joint Chiefs of Staff submitted a detailed analysis, based upon elaborate war-gaming, of how much improvement might result from their recommendations. JCSM-357-71 to SecDef, 12 Aug 71, JCS 2502/13-11, TS, same file, sec. 7.
strategy guidance. Finally, at a 4 August 1971 DPRC meeting, Admiral Moorer asked if the 90-day figure referred to logistic or strategic guidance. Only the Systems Analysis representative thought that it applied to strategic guidance. Dr. Kissinger declared that "there never was any thought about us pulling out in 90 days." But he expressed concern that "we can't get to 40 days, never mind 90" because there were insufficient war reserve stocks. Like the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Dr. Kissinger regarded 90 days as the period necessary to establish a pipeline to Europe. If NATO could continue to fight for 90 days, then the United States could establish the logistic flow to sustain combat beyond that period. But if NATO did not have sufficient war reserves to last for 90 days, "we're in trouble." At its 26 April meeting the DPRC had concluded that NATO forces could support neither NSDM 95 nor NSDM 16. On 4 August it decided to concentrate on efforts. Emphasizing the importance of force improvements, Dr. Kissinger declared that mutual and balanced force reductions, on which discussions were ongoing, would be no substitute for force improvement.22/

(5) On 22 September 1971 President Nixon issued NSDM 133 approving a program of US and allied force improvements. Reaffirming the guidance of NSDM 95, he declared that if the allies also implemented force improvements, the United States would improve its combat forces in Europe and not reduce them except in the context of a mutual and balanced force reduction with the Warsaw Pact. In specific force and resource planning, the first 30 days of conflict would receive priority. To correct the "conspicuous deficiencies in NATO's immediate combat capability" that would remain even with planned allied force improvements, the United States would urge its allies to commit a

minimum of approximately $2 billion over the next five years. In NSDM 134 of 2 October and NSDM 142 of 2 December on mutual and balanced force reductions, the President reiterated the importance of additional allied force improvements. Successful negotiations on mutual reductions would not invalidate the need for force improvements. Moreover, allied improvements were essential to continuing the US commitment to maintain its current force level in Europe. Through these NSDMs the President adopted the JCS view that force improvements were essential to a credible conventional defense of NATO regardless of the outcome of negotiations for mutual and balanced force reductions. However, in linking the maintenance of US force levels to allied improvements, the White House instead to political realities.23/

Changes in Force Commitments

(U) Although, as noted above, only a month after assuming office President Nixon privately committed the United States to maintaining its force level in Europe, his administration agreed to proceed with most of the REDCOSTE reductions approved by the previous administration but deferred for implementation. Acting upon JCS recommendations, presented as the least militarily damaging way to deal with the budgetary constraints imposed by Project 703, the administration also decided to reduce naval forces committed to NATO. At the same time that these forces were reduced, however, the United States enhanced the reinforcing capability of Army combat forces earmarked to NATO.24/

23/ NSDM 133, 22 Sep 71, JMF 001 (CY 71). For NSDMs 134 and 142, see pp. 228-229.
24/ For Project 703, see Chapter IV, pp. 90-92.
of approximately 34,000 troops deferred from the previous administration. They argued that reductions in administration and support personnel would produce an "uneconomical and militarily unsound" imbalance between combat and support forces and that the projected balance-of-payment savings of $79.9 million in FY 1970 and $158.4 million total might be overestimated. They especially

SECRET of the JCS view, a better approach to the balance-of-payments problem, which REDCOSTE was intended to alleviate, would be long-term offset arrangements by which the allies made concessions in exchange for the maintenance of current US troop levels. If, however, "overriding considerations" required implementation of REDCOSTE, they recommended changes in the program which would reduce troop cuts by 7,484 and projected total balance-of-payment savings by $39.7 million. Of these proposed changes, Deputy Secretary Packard accepted a reduction in troop cuts by 2,916. Despite the overall JCS objections, on 28 March he reaffirmed Secretary Clifford's decision to implement the REDCOSTE plan.25/

25/ Nevertheless, during interagency consideration of a study prepared in response to NSSM 6 of 21 January 1969, the Joint Staff continued to advocate a halt to further implementation. Through NSSM 6 President Nixon had ordered a review of NATO policy alternatives, and the resulting study prepared by the IG(Europe) focused primarily on REDCOSTE. The Joint Staff believed that implementation of REDCOSTE would adversely affect US combat capability and trigger allied force reductions. In contrast, ISA thought that implementation was desirable because of

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the projected savings and that the reductions would not significantly affect overall US combat effectiveness or relations with the allies. In formulating the DOD position, the Joint Staff view prevailed. Early in April the Director of the Joint Staff and Assistant Secretary Nutter recommended that in the NSC discussions the Chairman and the Secretary of Defense support proceeding only with those cuts already agreed to or under discussion with the allies and halting implementation of the deferred reductions, pending a Presidential decision.26/

The position which the President adopted on REDCOSTE was in its essentials that advocated by the Defense Department. Through NSDM 12 of 14 April 1969 he directed previously agreed REDCOSTE reductions to proceed and the Under Secretaries Committee to examine on a case-by-case basis deferred cuts and those agreed in principle but subject to negotiation. Its decisions about these should be consistent with the administration’s objectives of both having the allies increase their defense efforts and maintaining US combat capability. Those cuts subsequently approved by the President would be presented individually so as to avoid signaling any general reduction of US forces.27/

On 26 May 1969 the Under Secretaries Committee, with its Joint Staff members’ concurrence, proposed reductions in US personnel and streamlining and consolidation of facilities in Spain, Germany, Turkey, Greece, and Italy, contingent upon those governments’ taking over some facilities and tactical missions. Its recommendations included:

27/ NSDM 12, 14 Apr 69, JCS 2450/676-6, C, JMF 806 (21 Jan 69) sec. 1. Through NSDM 12 he also directed that 1969 offset negotiations should proceed but that the United States should not raise the subject of support costs, seek any substantial increase in the amount of military equipment which West Germany would buy from the United States, or press the procurement issue to the point of risking a confrontation with the German government.
On 5 June 1969 the President approved the Under Secretaries Committee's recommendations. Their full implementation, together with the REDCOSTE proposals already approved, would result in a reduction of 27,000 troops, approximately 20 percent fewer than under the original REDCOSTE plan. Thus, although the Joint Chiefs of Staff had not been able to halt implementation of REDCOSTE, the administration had agreed to reduce the size of the projected cuts.28/

Moreover, by 1972 the United States had enhanced its ability rapidly to reinforce its forces in Europe. As involvement in Southeast Asia wound down, the United States was able to rebuild the Army's NATO-committed reserve. At the end of 1968 this reserve consisted of one mechanized infantry division and two airborne brigades available by M+30 and one airborne, one infantry, and one mechanized brigade available by M+60. The Joint Chiefs of Staff anticipated that, in addition, over the next six months one armored and one airborne division would become available by M+30 and another armored division by M+90. But during 1969 and 1970, the demands of the Vietnam War continued to degrade the readiness of the M-day strategic reserve. By July 1969, for example, the readiness of the mechanized infantry division declined to M+45; by

28/ ASD(ISA) and DJS TP for DepSecDef and CJCS (USecysCmte Mtg of 15 May 69), JCS 2450/676-10, 16 May 69; JCS 2450/676-11, 10 Jun 69; JMF 806 (21 Jan 69) sec. 2. The approved reductions would result in a $128 million balance-of-payments saving. Italy accepted the offer of the Sergeant battalion, but West Germany rejected the Hawk and Nike battalions. Annual Historical Report, HQ, USAREUR and Seventh Army: 1970, pp. 181, 206.
September 1970 it was M+90. The readiness of one of the armored divisions declined from M+45 in July 1969 to M+75 at the end of September 1970, while that of the other division declined from M+75 to M+120.

During 1971, accelerated redeployment of forces from South Vietnam brought a recommitment of Army forces to NATO's strategic reserve and a reversal of this decline. In May 1971 the reserve consisted of one mechanized infantry division available by M+30 and one available by M+45, one armored division available by M+45, and an experimental cavalry division available by M+120. In June 1972 the Joint Chiefs of Staff reported that by the end of the year the reserve would be rebuilt to one mechanized infantry division available within 30 days of warning, one mechanized infantry division and one armored division available at M+30, and the new cavalry division available at M+90. This would approximate the M-day reserve’s prewar strength and availability, a marked improvement over the situation at the beginning of the Nixon administration. 29/

However, naval forces committed to NATO underwent a series of reductions. The Joint Chiefs of Staff submitted their proposals for these reductions in response to the DPQ, the questionnaires for the annual NATO Defense Policy Review, which was designed to establish each ally’s force commitments. Despite their opposition to force reductions, they faced budgetary imperatives which required cuts. Some of the naval forces committed to NATO were obsolete and hence could be cut without significantly affecting combat capability. Other proposals for reductions, however, resulted from the JCS judgment that global strategic needs did not permit cuts in forces committed elsewhere. General Wheeler, who was

29/ Poole, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1965-1968, pp. 380, 395. JCSM-136-69 to SecDef, 12 Mar 69, JCS 2450/583-6, Sec. JMF 806 (5 Jun 68) sec. 4. JCSM-428-69 to SecDef, 10 Jul 69, JCS 2450/765-1, Sec. JMF 806 (27 Jun 69) sec. 1. JCSM-460-70 to SecDef, 19 Sep 70, JCS 2450/977-1, Sec. JMF 806 (21 Aug 71) sec. 1. JCSM-248-71 to SecDef, 25 May 71, JCS 2502/67-2, Sec. JMF 806 (27 Jun 71) sec. 1. JCSM-268-72 to SecDef, 10 Jun 72, JCS 2502/227-1, Sec. JMF 806 (13 Apr 72) sec. 1.
trying to slow the pace of troop withdrawals from South Vietnam, thought that "if necessary, we must go after the sacred cow of NATO."\(^{30/}\)

\(^{30/}\) In July 1969 the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended reducing the naval commitment for 1969 and 1970 by one attack carrier, six antisubmarine carriers, and 48 destroyers. These recommendations resulted not only from budgetary pressures, general force drawdowns, and the decision to phase out obsolete destroyers but also from the belief that the increasing Soviet submarine threat in the Pacific required a redispersion of antisubmarine carriers. Secretary Laird agreed that the current commitment of naval forces to NATO was "unrealistic," and the President approved the JCS recommendations on 20 October.\(^{31/}\)

\(^{31/}\) Project 703 requirements necessitated further reductions for 1970, and the threat posed by Soviet forces in the Pacific led the Joint Chiefs of Staff again to recommend cutting forces allocated to NATO rather than those designated for the Pacific Fleet. On 19 February 1970 Secretary Laird submitted to the President their recommendation for additional cuts in naval force commitments, the major cuts being 15 destroyers and one submarine. When Secretary Laird had presented planned US reductions to NATO in December, he had implied that there would be no further reductions in immediately available forces. Nevertheless, the JCS recommendations for additional cuts included some immediately available forces. The State Department feared that announcing these cuts would erode US credibility within NATO. Secretary Laird, however, believed that budgetary constraints and JCS military arguments overrode these political considerations. On 14 March the President approved consultations with NATO on the DoD recommendations, and on 17 August after

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30/ CNO MFR M-46-70, 3 Mar 70, JS, Moorer Memos M1-M53/70.

In his account Dr. Kissinger does not distinguish between forces in Europe and forces committed to NATO and ignores the JCS role in recommending the cuts. Kissinger, White House Years, pp. 394-396.
completion of these consultations Secretary Laird authorized the Joint Chiefs of Staff to implement the additional reductions.32/

Later in the year the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended additional reductions for 1971. In July the Navy proposed FY 1972 reductions in deployments to the Mediterranean. But the President, on 27 October 1970, prohibited withdrawal of forces stationed in or near Europe. Therefore on 12 November 1970, when the Navy requested "immediate relief" from its NATO commitment in order to meet the most optimistic budget projection for FY 1972, it proposed instead reducing the Atlantic Fleet by 34 combat ships, beginning as soon as possible after 1 January 1971. While total cuts would ultimately be balanced between the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets, Admiral Zumwalt argued that current reductions should come from the Atlantic Fleet. Although the threat was about equal in both oceans, Soviet submarines could sortie more easily in the Pacific than in the Atlantic, where the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom barrier made antisubmarine defense easier.

General Westmoreland objected to the cuts, contending that the Navy proposal ran counter to current national strategy, did not give the Atlantic area its customary priority, and reduced SACLANT's ability to control the Atlantic sea lines of communication. Furthermore, if the President kept his promise to maintain US maritime supremacy, he would not cut ships but would take money for the Navy from the Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps. The other Service Chiefs nevertheless concurred in the proposed reductions despite the "severe impact" they would have on the US NATO commitment and NATO's overall maritime capabilities.33/

33/ Memo, ATP(NSA) to SecDef et al., 27 Oct 70, JCS 2101/574, JMF 374 (27 Oct 70). CNOM 222-70, 7 Jul 70, JCS 2450/942, CNOM-311-70, 2 Nov 70 and JCSM-531-70, 18 Nov 70, JCS 2502, CSAM-325-70, 13 Nov 70, JMF 806/378 (7 Jul 70). For the Presidential promise to maintain maritime supremacy, see Chapter IV, p. 105.
Secretary Laird agreed that fiscal constraints provided no alternative, and he warned the President that additional budget cuts might require further reductions. The State Department recommended that the United States not announce the proposed reductions at the upcoming NATO Ministers meeting but instead study them as part of the implementation of NSDM 95. And in his message to the North Atlantic Council on 3 December, the President focused on forces in Europe, not NATO-committed forces, when he promised to maintain US strength if the allies improved their forces and not to reduce it without reciprocal reductions by the Pact. Other reductions proposed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for implementation before the end of 1972 were 26 obsolescent combat ships. Their deactivation, recommended in response to the DPQ for 1971, would free funds for the Navy’s modernization program, and on 17 September 1971 President Nixon approved their withdrawal.34/

Secretary Laird and Secretary Rogers endorsed the JCS recommendation, and through NSDM 132 of 13 September the President

approved it. Although a reduction in the US naval force commitment to NATO, the conversion program, in contrast with the reductions adopted for fiscal reasons, marked a significant increase in combat capability.35/

Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions

(S) Although NSDM 95 emphasized the need for a strong conventional defense of NATO, the Nixon administration was willing to consider force reductions within the context of mutual and balanced reduction negotiations with the Warsaw Pact. Opposed to any US or NATO force reductions, the Joint Chiefs of Staff worked within the framework of the administration's pursuit of mutual and balanced force reductions (MBFR) to attempt to ensure that military, rather than political, considerations would predominate in the adoption of the US position on any MBFR agreement.

(S) After the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in the summer of 1968, NATO had put aside consideration of MBFR. Study resumed in late 1969, and at the close of their spring 1970 meeting the NATO Ministers issued a communiqué stating their willingness to explore further the possibility of such reductions in Central Europe. In late June the Warsaw Pact Ministers expressed their interest in pursuing discussions.36/

35/ JCS 2450/953-2, 12 May 71, TS: Memo, SecDef to Pres, 27 Aug 71, JCS 2450/953-5, TS JMF 806/468 (15 Jul 70). NSDM 132, 13 Sep 71, TS JMF 001 (CY 1971). The Polaris RVs could cover 16 SACEUR targets 100 percent of the time and 32 targets 90 percent of the time.

36/ Poole, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1965-1968, TS, pp. 403-407. "Extract from Memorandum Agreed Upon by Warsaw Foreign Ministers at Budapest, 26 Jun 70," Tab E and "Extracts from Final NATO Ministerial Communique and MBFR Declaration, Rome, 27 May 70," U, Tab F to ASD(ISA) and DJS TP for DepSecDef and CJCS (SRG Mtg, 23 Nov 70, 1515), JCS 2450/908-9, JMF 757 (13 Apr 70) sec. 3. Kissinger, White House Years, p. 400. "Background of Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) within NATO," Tab C to ASD(ISA) and DJS TP for DepSecDef and CJCS (Verification Panel-NSSM 92 (MBFR) Mtg of 31 Aug 70)," JCS 2450/908-3, 28 Aug 70, C JMF 757 (13 Apr 70) sec. 1.
Meanwhile, as part of the renewed interest in MBFR, on 13 April 1970 President Nixon had issued NSSM 92 directing the Verification Panel Working Group, under the direction of the Verification Panel established for SALT, to develop options for a US position on MBFR. Major General Marvin C. Demler, Special Assistant for Arms Control (SAAC), represented the Joint Staff on the Verification Panel Working Group, and JCS representatives served on the interdepartmental teams which prepared a series of preliminary studies. These studies formed the basis for an evaluation report prepared by the NSC staff for the Verification Panel in late August.37/ Raising the question of whether NATO should not first resolve its own problems before initiating MBFR negotiations, the evaluation report also delineated factors which would limit the scope of MBFR proposals and agreements. These included greater European concern with MBFR as a US position on MBFR. The report offered four basic approaches to a

37/ NSSM 92, 13 Apr 70, JCS 2450/908, SAAC 2450/908/D/1, 18 May 70, JMF 757 (13 Apr 70) sec. 1.
On 28 August the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the position which Admiral Moorer should take at the Verification Panel meeting. State and ACDA favored a political approach and could be expected to attempt to sidetrack the military approach. While Admiral Moorer should support thorough analysis of all the options, he should emphasize the need for realistic and expeditious examination of the military approach. He should make clear, moreover, that until Defense was further along in its study of MBFR, it could not adequately assess the relationship of MBFR to the general problem of European security policy. Admiral Moorer himself thought that the United States must settle principles before proposing force reductions. 39/

At the Verification Panel meeting on 31 August, Admiral Moorer advocated waiting for the situation to clarify before taking action on MBFR. Commenting that one could conclude from the evaluation report that the United States should not pursue MBFR, Dr. Kissinger noted, however, the political pressures for negotiations. The meeting agreed that the United States should follow the same procedures used in preparations for SALT, first analyzing the implications of the specific components of MBFR before presenting negotiating options. 40/

The resulting revised evaluation report of 16 October raised questions about whether the United States should actively pursue MBFR. In presenting basic approaches to reductions if the administration should decide to proceed, it changed the alternatives outlined in the initial report to political, arms control, and corrective or asymmetrical. The corrective approach would attempt not only to achieve the objectives of the first two but also to improve NATO's relative military position through disproportionate reductions on the Pact side or "mixed package tradeoffs."

39/ JCS 2450/908-3, 28 Aug 70, JMF 757 (13 Apr 70) sec. 1.
MFR by LTG Knowles, "JCS Mtg, 1430 hrs, 28 Aug 70," 31 Aug 70,
Moorer Diary, Aug 70.
40/ MFR by COL Wickham, "SRG and Verification Panel Mtg, 31 Aug
70, NSSMs 84, 92, 83," 2 Sep 70, Moorer Diary, Sep 70.
such as reductions of Warsaw Pact tanks in exchange for cuts in NATO tactical aircraft. 41/

Both the Joint Chiefs of Staff and ISA considered. They the interrelationship of issues in the alternative approaches, their political and economic implications, and the major arguments for and against each option.

In addition, the Joint Chiefs of Staff argued that the report ignored the security aspects of force reductions, and highlighted instead the political and arms control advantages. Moreover, the report based its assessment of MBFR's effects on the military balance on what they regarded as questionable analysis. In the JCS view, MBFR must be analyzed within the context of current NATO and Warsaw Pact warfighting capabilities. But the inadequacies of the NSSM 84 study made it difficult to determine the likely effects of MBFR on NATO security. The Joint Chiefs of Staff thought that before the administration made policy decisions, it should conduct a study of whether it was in US interests to pursue MBFR. In addition, "competent military authorities" should conduct a risk assessment of post-reduction force capabilities. Admiral Moorer told a 26 October JCS meeting that, of the alternatives presented, they should support asymmetrical reductions. 42/

As Secretary Laird's 14 October memorandum to the President had indicated, in contrast to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, he regarded MBFR as a means for achieving NATO policy objectives for the next five years.

42/ Dec On SAAC TP, "NSSM 92, Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction between NATO and the Warsaw Pact," 21 Oct 70, C; DJJS and ASD(ISA) TP for DepSecDef and CJCS, n.d., JCS 2450/908-6, 1st N/H of JCS 2450/908-6, 4 Nov 70, U; JMF 757 (13 Apr 70) sec. 3. MFR by LTG Knowles, "JCS Mtg 26 Oct 70 (Mtg with LTG Allison and Discussion of NSSMs 84 & 92)," 28 Oct 70, JMF 757 (13 Apr 70) sec. 3.
Both he and ISA argued, however, that MBFR must not prevent the United States from reducing its forces in Europe. While they supported maintaining NATO's overall military capability, they believed that budgetary constraints and congressional pressure would necessitate a reduction in US troops assigned to NATO. Thus, despite agreement that the revised evaluation report was unacceptable, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and ISA were in fundamental disagreement on the question of troop reductions, the basic issue of US policy toward MBFR.43/

Although the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the unilateral reductions being sought by some members of Congress. In a special meeting on 17 November, they agreed that if the NSC discussed approaches to MBFR.

They were particularly concerned about pressure from the State Department for symmetrical reductions, which they emphatically opposed. At the 19 November NSC meeting, however, Secretary Rogers joined in the consensus that reductions should be asymmetrical.44/

The SRG on 23 November agreed that the US position at the December NATO Ministers' meeting should be not to go beyond the spring communique. It also authorized further MBFR studies, to focus on verification, asymmetrical reduction packages, and effects on mobilization. Through NSDM 95 of 25 November, President Nixon confirmed the SRG's

43/ Draft Memo, ASD(ISA) to SecDef, "US Force Levels in NATO-Europe," 10 Nov 70, Att to Tab D to J-5 Briefing Sheet for CJCS on a CNOM to be considered at JCS Mtg on 13 Nov 70, JMF 806/378 (7 Jul 70).
decision to pursue further studies emphasizing asymmetrical force packages and postponed a decision on the US position on the specific elements of MBFR until their completion. In December the NATO Ministers reaffirmed the position adopted at their spring meeting.45/

When the Verification Panel met on 23 April 1971 to consider the resulting further revision of the evaluation report, discussion focused on the projected effects of symmetrical and asymmetrical reductions on NATO/Warsaw Pact force ratios as mobilization progressed, with considerable concern expressed about the imbalance in the Pact’s favor. According to the report, both symmetrical and asymmetrical reductions would ultimately favor the Pact. For example, a ten percent reduction of all ground forces in the “NATO Guidelines Area” of East and West Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Poland, and Czechoslovakia would reduce NATO forces by 75,600 and Pact troops by 80,600. However, after 21 days of mobilization the Pact could return all its forces, but NATO would have 239 fewer tanks than currently. Moreover, an asymmetrical cut of 10 percent for NATO versus 30 percent for the Pact would have the same outcome at M+21.

At the Verification Panel meeting Lieutenant General Richard T. Knowles, Assistant to the Chairman, presented the JCS assessment that, at current ratios, NATO was “just barely holding on.” Contrary to the report’s assessment, the Joint Staff believed that symmetrical reductions would not improve NATO’s position at M-day. Furthermore, its forces were in “tough shape” from M+10 to M+45, when US reinforcements could arrive. In the dynamic context of war, rather than the static situation of the report’s analyses, the lag between NATO and Pact reinforcements at various mobilization dates would have a significant impact on NATO’s ability to resist Warsaw Pact aggression. Dr. Kissinger opined that even if

Warsaw Pact forces were reduced 30 percent and NATO only 10 percent. NATO's situation on both M-Day and M+21 would still be "hopeless." Kissinger directed the preparation of further options to address these problems.46/

Meanwhile, on 30 March General Secretary Brezhnev had indicated Soviet support for reductions in Central Europe. And on 13 May he declared his willingness to begin negotiations. Concurrently, there was a breakthrough on SALT negotiations. At the same time that the Soviets were demonstrating interest in pursuing negotiations, there was renewed pressure in Congress for the unilateral reduction of US forces. On 11 May Senator Mike Mansfield reintroduced in the form of an amendment to the extension of the draft a resolution to halve US troop levels in Europe that he had been sponsoring annually since 1966. Although on 19 May the Senate defeated the Mansfield amendment, the administration feared reintroduction of the force reduction issue in Congress if the United States and NATO appeared not to be making progress on MBFR.47/

In an effort to accelerate the pace of MBFR, President Nixon therefore issued additional guidance on 21 May. Through NSDM 108 he promulgated general policy principles. He also ordered the Verification Panel to prepare a paper that could provide the basis for the US position in allied consultations. As for overall policy, the United States should urge accelerated allied preparation of proposals. While willing to pursue diplomatic explorations with the Soviet Union or the Pact, the


47/ JCS 2502/91, 12 Jun 71, JMF 806/757 (12 Jun 71). Kissinger, White House Years, pp. 938-940, 946-948. For SALT, see Chapter V.
administration would enter formal negotiations only after consultations within NATO had resulted in agreement on both substantive issues and procedures. At their June meeting the NATO Ministers also called for intensified MBFR explorations with the Warsaw Pact.48/

In response to the accelerated US preparations for MBFR, on 17 June the Joint Chiefs of Staff communicated their position to Secretary Laird, and in mid-July the Defense Department forwarded the JCS views to the White House and the State Department. In their view, NATO force reductions must not weaken deterrence by aggravating the current imbalance, degrading the relative capability for both conventional and nuclear defense of Europe, or violating the practice of maintaining balanced military forces. Moreover, as Admiral Moorer had emphasized in the Verification Panel meeting on 11 June, MBFR should not preclude continued allied force improvements.

As for the specifics of an agreement, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believed that any agreement must be consistent with the strategy and objectives of MC 14/3. It should include both a reliable verification system and collateral constraints to restrain Pact mobilization and reinforcement capability while preserving NATO flexibility. All conventional and nuclear forces should be candidates for phased reduction to a common ceiling. At the Verification Panel meeting Admiral Moorer had emphatically rejected including the three western military districts of the Soviet Union in the geographic area to be covered by an agreement, asserting that from a military point of view adding these regions would “greatly complicate” the MBFR problem and waste negotiating time.

Mr. Nutter, however, thought that their inclusion would give the United States its strongest negotiating position on geographic areas. And in their 17 June memorandum to Secretary Laird, the Joint Chiefs of Staff advocated as an initial US position applying MBFR to both stationed (i.e., nonindigenous) and indigenous forces in the three western military districts of the Soviet Union as well as the "NATO Guidelines Area". This reversal of the Chairman's position apparently resulted from the Army's insistence that if MBFR negotiations were to include consideration of nuclear-capable forces, then inclusion of the western military districts was essential to increase the likelihood of early warning of Soviet offensive intentions.49/

The 17 June NSC meeting reviewed the basic MBFR issues, and on 28 June President Nixon issued NSDM 116 outlining the objectives of US MBFR policy. Within the Alliance, the US goal was to achieve a consensus. In MBFR negotiations themselves, the objectives were to maximize the reduction of Soviet forces and establish constraints on their reintroduction into areas from which they were to be withdrawn. Therefore, NATO should emphasize proportionately large reductions of stationed Soviet and US forces, and the area of reductions should include Czechoslovakia and Poland as well as East and West Germany. The President directed the Verification Panel to prepare a range of specific MBFR options to advance these objectives.50/

The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Office of the Secretary of Defense were unable to reach agreement on the question of the area of reductions. Despite Mr. Nutter's earlier support for including the western military districts of the Soviet Union, at the 21 September Verification

49/ JCSM-283-71 to SecDef, 17 Jun 71, JCS 2502/91, 12 Jun 71, TS-

GP- Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 17 Jul 71, JCS 2502/91-1, U; JMF

806/757 (12 Jun 71). CM-974-71 to CSA et al., 12 Jun 71, JCS

2482/119-4, TS; ASD(ISA) MFR, "MBFR Verification Panel Mtg," 14

Jun 71, JCS 2482/119-7, TS; JMF 757 (30 Nov 70) sec. 2. J-5 TP

for CJCS for Mtg with SecDef 25 Sep 71, "Preparation for Deputy

Foreign Ministers Mtg on MBFR," 24 Sep 71, TS; JMF 806/757 (13

Sep 71).

50/ CJCS M-47-71, 18 Jun 71, Att to Moorer Diary, 17 Jun 71, TS-

NSDM 116, 28 Jun 71, TS; JMF 001 (CY 1971).
Panel meeting when Admiral Moorer proposed their inclusion, Mr. Packard demurred. Secretary Laird's subsequent recommendations to Dr. Kissinger did not include these areas among the options for the proposed zone of reductions. Nevertheless, the Joint Chiefs of Staff continued to press for their inclusion. At the 30 September Verification Panel meeting General Westmoreland, attending as Acting Chairman, asserted that consideration of nuclear forces as part of MBFR required the districts' inclusion. The Verification Panel, however, rejected the JCS position. And when President Nixon issued his guidance for consultations with the NATO allies, he endorsed the position of the Office of the Secretary of Defense. NSDM 134 of 2 October 1971 did not include the western military districts of the Soviet Union among the US options for the area of reductions. Rather, the US order of preference for the zone of reductions was (1) East and West Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Poland; (2) the "NATO Guidelines Area" plus Hungary; (3) the "NATO Guidelines Area".51/

On the question of whether to emphasize stationed or indigenous forces, the Joint Chiefs of Staff reluctantly agreed—albeit with some reservations—to the preference of the Office of the Secretary of Defense for proportionately larger stationed force reductions. Both the Verification Panel and the President endorsed this position. While the administration rejected the JCS common ceiling approach, on other MBFR issues on which the President issued specific guidance, he expressed views similar to those of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Like them, he insisted that further improvements in NATO's conventional forces were essential to successful MBFR negotiations. He also supported considering all types of forces as candidates for reduction. And on the question of verification, he endorsed at least a temporary need for inspection.52/

51/ For description of NATO Guidelines Area, see p. 224.
Differences between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Office of the Secretary of Defense persisted. In response to NSDM 134’s call for preparation of a full range of specific MBFR options plus an assessment of their military implications, the Office of the Secretary of Defense produced a study which included the option of symmetrical ground force reductions. Believing that such reductions would enhance the Pact’s offensive advantages against NATO, the Joint Chiefs of Staff continued to endorse instead significant asymmetrical reductions under a common ceiling as the only approach both compatible with NATO’s vital security interests and militarily disadvantageous to neither side. In an 11 November 1971 memorandum to Secretary Laird, they stressed, moreover, that without inactivation of affected Pact forces and effective verification, even asymmetrical reductions could work to NATO’s disadvantage. They also objected to OSD proposals on forward-based systems and nuclear weapons because they were reluctant to include consideration of nuclear forces in NATO discussions of MBFR.53/

In the summer and autumn of 1971 Soviet interest in negotiations waned, and US consideration of MBFR resumed a more leisurely pace. After a 1 December NSC meeting, President Nixon issued further guidance for consultations with the allies. In NSDM 142 of 2 December 1971, he declared that the United States was not ready to adopt a definite position but would proceed slowly to develop a NATO consensus on options that would maintain Western military security.54/

As preparations for exploratory talks with the Warsaw Pact proceeded through 1972, basic disagreements between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and OSD remained. While the Joint Chiefs of Staff continued to advocate asymmetrical reductions and preferred these reductions to include a balance of stationed and indigenous forces, the Office of the

53/ Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 23 Oct 71, JCS 2502/146, 6; JCSM-501-71 to SecDef, 11 Nov 71; JCS 2502/146-2, 8 Nov 71, 8; JMF 806/757 (23 Oct 71).
54/ Kissinger, White House Years, pp. 948-949. NSDM 142, 2 Dec 71, JMF 001 (CY 1971).
Secretary of Defense wished to propose initially a symmetrical ten percent reduction of stationed forces. The Office of the Secretary of Defense was, however, alone among the agencies involved in MBFR preparations in endorsing this position. There was also JCS-OSD disagreement about force elements to include in MBFR, the JCS view being that there should be a balance of ground and air forces and the Office of the Secretary of Defense wishing to emphasize ground forces. By the end of the first Nixon administration there was no agreed US or even DOD position on the specific elements of MBFR. Although the Joint Chiefs of Staff had not been successful in persuading either Secretary Laird or the President to adopt many of their views, the slow progress on MBFR meant that their basic objective of postponing—if not preventing—further US and NATO force reductions had been achieved.55/

Conclusion

In October 1972 Secretary Laird told the Nuclear Planning Group that the Soviet Union’s having achieved strategic balance with the United States made conventional forces more important than ever in the defense of NATO. Thus, in principle, the JCS position on the need for increased emphasis on conventional defense of NATO had prevailed over the views of those within DOD who wished to reduce the US conventional commitment. In reality, however, although JCS views also coincided with those of President Nixon and Dr. Kissinger, budgetary constraints not only made their full implementation impossible but motivated the Joint Chiefs of Staff themselves to recommend reductions in NATO-committed forces.56/

55/ JCSM-419-72 to SecDef, 15 Sep 72, JCS 2482/161-1, 14 Sep 72, U, JMF 757 (21 Aug 72). Note, COL Nutting, CSG to CJCS, 15 Sep 72, Cover Sheet to SecDef Memo to CJCS, "MBFR," 13 Sep 72; Note, COL Nutting, CSG to CJCS, 14 Oct 72, U; Cover Sheet to SecDef Memo to CJCS, "Views on MBFR," 14 Oct 72; CJCS file 092.2 NATO (MBFR thru Dec 72) BP.
56/ "NATO Nuclear Planning Gp, 12th Mtg, Lancaster House, London," Encl to Moorer Diary, TS, 26 Oct 72; Moorer Diary, 30 Oct 72, TS.