Annex 10

INTEGRATED STRATEGIC DEFENSE PROGRAM (U)

10.1 RATIONALE (U)

In this annex we array the recommendations of the panels into a set of programs, attempting to realize a coherent programmatic view of strategic defense. The method employed is that of Mission Area Analysis (MAA). In Mission Area Analysis, the defense mission is defined, our ability to accomplish it over time is assessed, and deficiencies emerge; alternative programs for correcting these deficiencies are developed, and selection of which programs to support is made using cost-effectiveness analyses. This process is imperfect but gives meaningful insights into a very complex structure of military systems and subsystems. The mission area of strategic defense includes warning, space defense, air defense, ballistic missile defense, civil defense, and all the command, control and communications associated with them. The mission of strategic defense is defined as the active and passive defense measures required to enhance strategic deterrence. Evidently strategic defense is only useful insofar as it contributes to deterrence. Deterrence, of course, is a complex entity which has recently been expanded to include endurance. Its subtleties are discussed in the report of the policy panel (Annex 3). For the purpose of synthesizing programs a relatively simple statement suffices.
The underlined portions are new. The sentence in parentheses allows us to measure our ability to carry out the Strategic Defense Mission and identify deficiencies.

10.2 DEFICIENCIES (U)
status of our forces.

10.3 PROGRAM INTEGRATION (U)

All of these deficiencies can be redressed over time with appropriate programs. A set of such programs has been developed from the recommendations of the panels (although in some cases the specific recommendations have been generalized or expanded to subsume two or more ideas). The results of this work are arranged in Tables 1 through 6. (An Addendum provides a glossary of terms for those not familiar with the acronyms, abbreviations and jargon in this part of the defense community.) A priority has been assigned to each program based on the function it supports as shown in Table 7. These priorities are the same as discussed in Sections IV and XII of Volume I. Table 7 also contains the total cost of the programs included in each priority. The philosophy for prioritizing is that the most
important programs are those which assure our capability to utilize present forces, second are those which enhance the survivability of those forces, third are the means for those forces to retain substantive effectiveness for protracted periods (say, several months) after one or more attacks has occurred, and last, to protect our population and industry to a level which mitigates the asymmetry in this capability between ourselves and the Soviets. Table 8 provides a cross reference for each of the major strategic defense missions, the programs listed in Tables 1 through 6 and the priority assigned.

(U) The array of programs provides several insights. We can see immediately that enduring survivability of the essential portions of strategic defense will cost multiple billions of dollars in the next decade. Also obvious is that little can be done in the near-term; we can change procedures, reorganize, reshape our way of viewing strategic defense, but little else. We can discern, too, that there are always alternative ways of accomplishing the same objective (e.g., to be made enduring, C^3 nodes can be proliferated, made mobile or defended). In some of these cases the situation is clear enough so that the DSB recommends a choice. In others, further study is required. As Table 7 shows, the set of programs to preserve the survivability of our strategic forces and programs to give those forces endurance are approximately equal and large in cost, while initiatives to assure the utilization of our present forces are substantially less. Civil defense costs are not chargeable to DoD.
Perhaps the most useful insight emerging from the synthesis is that the "culture of endurance" has not had time to diffuse through the defense community. Many of the problems which arise in protracted nuclear war have not been discussed or analyzed in enough depth to allow confident decisions. For example, the vital importance of reconnaissance to both sides after a nuclear exchange poses requirements for very complex systems to be operable in extremely stressful circumstances. Not enough thought has been given this subject by competent groups of people to permit useful program projections. The process of cultural diffusion should be hastened—an outcome which may be the most important achievement of the 1981 DSB Summer Study.
GLOSSARY (in order that terms appear in the tables) (U)

Table 1 (U)

"HARDENED" DSP SATELLITE is all the activities currently underway to make the DSP satellite function better in a hostile environment. These include radiation hardening (but not to a direct nuclear attack), and jam-resistant communications.

MOBILE GROUND TERMINALS (MGT) are those currently programmed for DSP. They survive by moving aperiodically. They contain all the facilities to gather and use operational data from a single satellite.

MAKE MGT ENDURING means to buy more terminals if required and/or make each terminal able to operate any satellite.

(OTH-B) is over-the-horizon Backscatter radar.

DEW IMPROVEMENT is updating the Distant-Early-Warning System across Canada so as to detect low-flying (down to 300 ft) aircraft.

JSS/ROCC is the Joint Surveillance System (46 radars around the periphery of the U.S. which belong to
both the FAA and the Air Force and are used for aircraft surveillance) and Regional Operational Control Centers (of which there are five in the United States and two in Canada) from which the U.S. and Canadian Air Forces control the aircraft in their coverage.

(U) AWACS is Airborne Warning and Control System.

Table 2 (U)

(U) ALCS III is the third-generation Air-Launch Control System for Minuteman.

(U) EC-X is a new command and control aircraft.

(U) EHF COMSAT is Extremely High Frequency (wavelength ~) Communications Satellite.

(U) MORE/BETTER E-4B's is procuring more Airborne Command Posts and upgrading them.

(U) NCA is the National Command Authority.

(U) C³ NODES are those command control communications locations in the United States which contain ganglions of crucial communications lines. These may be major terminal locations or vital relay points.
(U) SSBNs are nuclear submarines capable of launching ballistic missiles.

(U) FORCE STATUS REPORT-BACK is a channel of communication from the missile launch point back to the commander which provides information on force status.

Table 3 (U)

(U) MK-12A is a higher yield MK-12 at approximately the same weight.

(U) MINUTEMAN GUIDANCE IMPROVEMENT is essentially a software upgrade which gives the missile system better accuracy.

(U) M-X is a new strategic ICBM weighing about 200,000 lbs and carrying about 10 MK-12A-size reentry vehicles intercontinental distances.

(U) M-X/MPS is M-X deployed in the Multiple Protective Shelter basing mode wherein a few missiles are deceptively located among a large number of shelters.

(U) BMD is Ballistic Missile defense, sometimes called ABM (Anti-Ballistic Missile Defense).

(U) OVERLAY is an exo-atmospheric BMD system which uses optical components and provides defense leverage for underlying atmospheric systems or acts as a wide area defense on its own.
(U) MAKE AWACS AND FIGHTERS ENDURING means providing facilities, logistics and tactics necessary to make these systems as survivable as practical after a nuclear exchange.

(U) HAWK is a ground-mobile Army air defense system.

(U) PATRIOT is a more advanced mobile, ground-based air defense system.

(U) ENDURING ARMED SURVEILLANCE PLATFORM is a self-contained system, survivable after a nuclear exchange, which can do surveillance and long-range strike.

Table 4 (U)

(U) SR-71s & U-2s are strategic reconnaissance and surveillance aircraft.

(U) F-15/ASAT is the current program for using miniature homing vehicles, Patriot missiles, boosters on F-15s for anti-satellite operations.

(U) JSTPS is the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff.

(U) SPACE CATALOG contains all the orbital elements of about 4500 artificial earth satellites.

(U) LWIR is Long Wavelength Infrared in the region between eight and 24 microns wavelength.
Table 5 (U)

(U) BASE ESCAPE: ENHANCE WITH PASSIVE MEASURES refers to the various steps which can be taken to flush the bombers more effectively, such as making the bombers harder, placing more of them on alert, increasing their readiness, dispersing them to more bases and/or inland bases, etc.

(U) PENETRATION refers to the bomber's ability to penetrate enemy air defenses and reach assigned targets.

Table 6 (U)

(U) CRITICAL SERVICES are medical, food, housing and social services.
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Annex 11

ARMS CONTROL IMPLICATIONS

ABM TREATY AND ITS 1974 PROTOCOL - KEY TERMS (U)

(U) The ABM Treaty is of unlimited duration.

(U) By the terms of the Treaty, the sides will conduct a review of the Treaty every five years after entry into force (3 October 1972). However, amendments may be proposed at any time.

(U) A party may withdraw, with 6 months notice, if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests.

(U) In this connection, it is important to note that the U.S. stated unilaterally on 9 May 1972 that its supreme interests could be so jeopardized if an agreement providing for more complete strategic offensive arms limitations (than those contained in the SALT I Interim Agreement) were not achieved within five years. This is reinforced in the legislative history of the instrument of ratification.

LIMITATIONS (U)

(U) Each side is permitted ABM defenses at one site: either centered on its national capital (the USSR choice), or centered more than 1300 km from the national capital and containing ICBM silo launchers (the U.S. choice). The radii of the deployment areas are each 150 km. Each side is permitted to exchange its deployment site location to the other choice, one time.
(U) The ABM system will consist of no more than 100
ABM launchers and no more than 100 ABM interceptor missiles
at launch sites, and:

- In the case of a national capital defense, ABM
  radars within no more than six complexes having
  a diameter no greater than 3 km each. (But the
  Soviet Try-Add radars don't count.)

- In the case of a silo defense, two large,
  phased-array radars (power-aperture equal to or
  greater than 3 million watt-meters²) and no
  more than 18 smaller ABM radars.

PROHIBITIONS (U)

(U) The following are prohibited.

- Development, testing, and deployment of ABM
  systems or components (present or "future"
  types) which are sea-based, air-based, space-
  based, or mobile land-based.

- Development, testing, and deployment of launch-
  ers for launching more than one ABM interceptor
  missile at a time.

- Development, testing, and deployment of systems
  for rapid reload of ABM launchers.

- Development, testing, and deployment of ABM
  interceptor missiles for the delivery of more
  than one independently guided warhead per
  missile.
The information on this page is Unclassified.

- Giving non-ABM missiles, launchers, or radars capabilities to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory, and testing such components in an ABM mode.

- Deployment of ABM systems based on other physical principals and including components capable of substituting for missiles, launchers, or radars. An Agreed Statement provides that limitations on such systems and their components would be subject to discussion in the SCC and agreement via amendment. Note, however, that the development and testing of such systems or components which are fixed and land-based are permitted.

(U) There are some important definitional issues regarding the foregoing prohibitions. They include:

- When does "development" or "testing" begin? The U.S. interprets this to be the initiation of field testing of the components (as opposed to unverifiable laboratory testing).

- What are "ABM systems or components"? For example, could a component of a space-based laser ASAT weapon be considered an ABM component on the basis of its having potential ABM capability? Such questions must be handled on a case-by-case basis, as a function of the system's actual (or apparent) capability and, perhaps more importantly, how it is tested (i.e., in something which could be considered an ABM mode†?).
SOVIET PROGRAMS AND THE ABM TREATY (U)

The Soviets currently give no indication of wanting to change or to withdraw from the ABM Treaty. On the contrary, they appear to want to keep it as it is.

- They have maintained an active ABM R&D program since the signing of the Treaty, and most elements of that program appear to be compatible with the Treaty.

- They have underway a significant upgrading of the Moscow system, and this appears to be fully consistent with the terms of the Treaty.

- There are no indications that they want to pursue ICBM silo defense, although this is a possible option for preserving the survivability of their fixed ICBMs.

- They have options for preparing for a broader, country-wide ABM defense which do not at this time require actions inconsistent with the ABM Treaty (although in some cases this is a matter of interpretation).

-- They could produce and store (in fact may be producing and storing) rapidly deployable ABM components, such as those they are now developing.

-- They are developing an ATBM system which could have some ABM capability.
-- Their upgraded air defenses could provide some ABM capability.

U.S. PROGRAMS AND THE ABM TREATY (U)

The ABM options under consideration by the U.S. would, at some point, conflict with the ABM Treaty.

LOAD Defense of M-X/MPS (U)

- Prohibition on development, testing, and deployment of mobile land-based ABM systems or components. The "mobile defense unit" would contain both a mobile ABM radar and mobile ABM launchers. (Note that the mobile defense unit might be considered to be a launcher for launching more than one ABM interceptor missile at a time from a single launcher, which is also prohibited.) Field testing, the U.S. definition for start of "development", of the mobile defense unit need not start before 1987-88, or 1985-86 with an accelerated program.

- Limit to a single deployment area near Grand Forks, ND, or Washington, DC, of radius no greater than 150 km (considerably smaller than the Utah-Nevada deployment area). Limit of 100 launchers and 100 interceptor missiles and limit of 18 "small" radars (LOAD defense of 200 M-X/MPS missiles would require up to 600
Interceptor missiles and launchers and 200 radars). Deployment could occur in about 1989-1990, in an accelerated program.

Defense of ICBM Silo Launchers -- Low-Altitude Portion (U)

- Prohibition on development, testing, and deployment of mobile land-based ABM systems or components (1985 for earliest testing of the radar in a mobile configuration).

Defense of ICBM Silo Launchers -- Overlay (U)

- Prohibition on development, testing, and deployment of interceptors for the delivery by each interceptor of more than one independently guided warhead. The overlay system would utilize interceptors which are each equipped with multiple non-nuclear kill vehicles, each capable of attacking an incoming object. Field testing of the multiple-warhead interceptor could occur in 1989-90, or 1986-87 with an accelerated program.

- Prohibition on deployment of ABM systems or components based on other physical principles.
and capable of substituting for existing ABM systems or components. The forward acquisition system probe would contain an LWIR sensor, together with extensive data processing and communications, and would substitute for a radar in the ABM system. Deployment of such a probe could occur in the mid-1990s, in the early 1990s with an accelerated program.

WHAT POSTURE SHOULD THE U.S. ADOPT REGARDING CHANGING OR WITHDRAWING FROM THE ABM TREATY? (U)

All U.S. ABM options under active consideration are inconsistent with the ABM Treaty. Actual conflict with the Treaty will not be likely to occur before 1985. However, it will be necessary to adopt a strategy for dealing with the Treaty well in advance of that date, especially from the perspective of obtaining Congressional approval of funds for an ABM development program of this magnitude that is likely to lead to deployment. This strategy must take into account our long-term objectives for our strategic offensive and defensive forces. Relevant considerations include the following:

(U) - The Soviets appear to prefer keeping the Treaty as it is. It is unlikely that they would readily agree to modifying it in a manner which permits us to mitigate a problem they have taken some pains to cause (the vulnerability of our ICBMs). On the other hand, they may prefer a modified Treaty to none at all, and so in the end might accept U.S. proposed modifications. Soviet interest in an ABM defense of their ICBMs, say to protect them against attacks by M-X or Trident II, could lead them in this
direction. The Soviets would certainly seek a significant negotiating price (such as broadening the Treaty in ways that meet their defense needs). They will also be likely to stretch out such negotiations in ways which will complicate the U.S. decision process.

-- We should not expect the Soviets simply to stand by while we make apparent preparations to develop and deploy a system which is contrary to the ABM Treaty. At a minimum, we should expect them to argue strongly against our program, both in the Standing Consultative Commission and publicly. They might
themselves use such U.S. programs as a pre-text for threatening to withdraw from the Treaty, attempting to blame the U.S. for this possibility. They would also argue with our allies that this was yet further evidence that the U.S. was not serious about arms control, using such claims to undermine NATO's LRTNF program.

- Relationship of ABM Treaty to an agreement to limit strategic offensive arms.

-- When it signed the ABM Treaty, the U.S. noted the importance of this relationship, linking continued U.S. participation in the ABM Treaty to the achievement (no later than in 1977) of comprehensive limitations on strategic offensive arms. These have not been achieved.

-- It was the intent of the U.S. in SALT I and in SALT II to maintain the survivability of its ICBM force by limits on offensive arms. The SALT I Interim Agreement failed to do this, as did SALT II. It is this failure which is now necessitating consideration of ABM defense of ICBMs.

-- Accordingly, U.S. efforts to seek modification of the Treaty, or U.S. withdrawal from the Treaty, would be fully consistent with its position at the time the Treaty was signed.
Before embarking on an ABM program which will conflict with the Treaty, the U.S. must decide on the approach it intends to take regarding the Treaty. This is necessary first as part of the process of ensuring that this course of action is in the U.S. interest, and second for convincing the Congress and the public that we have thought through the implications of such a program. This is particularly important because of the importance many attach to the ABM Treaty as the foundation (and only firm remaining vestige) of strategic arms control.

The most straightforward approach would be for the Administration to declare that the Soviet buildup in accurate ICBM RV's has made our ICBM force vulnerable to a Soviet strike and that to protect our national security we must take steps to rectify this situation. Doing this requires the development and deployment of an ABM system for defending our ICBMs, and we must proceed with this vital program despite its implications for the ABM Treaty. We will at an appropriate time seek to modify the Treaty to accommodate this program, but failing that will withdraw from the Treaty, in accordance with Article XV of the Treaty.

But as a matter of tactical application, we might want to take advantage of the fact that actual conflict with the terms
of the Treaty would not occur until 1985. In view of this, we may want to identify milestones in the ABM program at which point we might make such a declaration, based upon the satisfaction of certain criteria regarding the system's feasibility, cost, and/or effectiveness. In this case we would at this time declare only that we were considering such an ABM deployment, and that a deployment decision would depend on a number of factors, including Soviet willingness to undertake meaningful reductions in offensive force. This approach could postpone some of the domestic and foreign furor that proposing changes to the Treaty would cause, as well as aid in holding off Soviet complaints about U.S. activities (or perhaps Soviet actions vis-a-vis the Treaty).

Another consideration is the degree of change to the Treaty the U.S. ABM deployment would require. As is pointed out in the annex to Section 8, options exist, in the case of defense of an MPS ICBM deployment, to deploy a limited ABM system which significantly increases the price to the attacker but only requires one to three hundred interceptors. Modification of the Treaty to accommodate such a system could be defended as being fully consistent with the objectives of the ABM Treaty.
The U.S. posture at the 1982 ABM Treaty review would of course depend on the tactical approach selected. If we choose immediately to declare our intent to modify the Treaty, we would appropriately use the review to initiate discussions with the Soviets on such modifications. If we choose to postpone a declaration of intent to seek modification of the Treaty, we would probably want a relatively low-key review of the Treaty in 1982.
UK, FRENCH FORCES (U)

(U) The British and the French have already expressed concern regarding the effect on their deterrent forces of relaxing the constraints of the ABM Treaty.

OTHER ARMS CONTROL IMPLICATIONS OF STRATEGIC DEFENSE (U)

Defense/Offensive Interaction (U)

(U) The U.S. would probably need more offensive capability, if there were an increased Soviet ABM capability under a relaxed ABM Treaty. (Increased use of penetration aids could compensate for this, but at the cost of reduced useful payload.) This would make the achievement of any offensive constraints, and especially constraints at considerably reduced levels, more difficult to achieve.
Air Defenses (U)

The deterrent effect of the U.S. bomber force would be enhanced if there were limits on Soviet air defenses. However, it is difficult to envision the achievement of significant limitations on strategic air defenses, given the adamant refusal of the Soviets even to discuss such limits in the past, the extent of their air defenses, and the importance of those defenses as a protection from third countries.

Civil Defense Limits (U)

Civil defense limits are also difficult to envision. Civil defense is likely to affect arms control by being an added element in the strategic equation, which must be considered in evaluating possible arms control scenarios.
CONCLUSIONS (U)

(U) The U.S. should proceed with the steps necessary to ensure that it can unilaterally meet its defense needs. It must not rely on arms control to do this. It is exceedingly unlikely that strategic offensive arms control will relieve the stress on our ICBM force, particularly if it is silo-based. Also, the Soviets are unlikely to let the ABM Treaty stand in the way on an expanded Soviet ABM force, if they decide they need such a force.

(S) However, because the potential conflicts with the Treaty would not occur until 1985, we should not unnecessarily take steps which would foreclose future arms control options, including possible retention of the ABM Treaty. The Administration is committed to meaningful arms reductions, and arms control can limit the threat we face. Also it may be in our interest to postpone the political consequences, both domestic and foreign, of moving in a direction counter to the ABM Treaty.

RECOMMENDATIONS (U)

(U) USDP/USDRE should develop a plan for handling the arms control aspects of the M-X basing/ABM decision.

- This plan must be submitted coincident with any new program recommendation involving ABM.
In particular, a forthright public statement of policy should be made at the opening of public consideration of any new ABM program.
Nuclear release procedures are provided for by continuous civil-military interfaces, and the procedures have always included mandatory checks and balances to ensure the authorized employment of nuclear weapons. These checks and balances, which have some unique vulnerabilities, are intended to be flexible enough to retain positive control of a proper military and/or civilian level of command during times of crisis such as nuclear attacks on U.S. and/or death of the President.

Two significant orders exist for the employment of U.S. nuclear weapons: the launch order and nuclear release authority. Currently, CINCSAC is authorized to launch nuclear loaded bombers under positive control, and CINCNORAD is authorized to launch nuclear loaded U.S., Canadian, and Federalized ANG interceptors under positive control. ("Positive control" is the phrase used to denote that nuclear release is still pending.) This permission emanates from the NCA and is verified by use of proper authentication procedures. These procedures provide for a fail-safe system for the control of nuclear weapons employment with a civilian-military interface.

If another country should attack the U.S. there is a chance the President and/or the NCA could be "decapitated" from military commanders. There are three methods for dealing with these vulnerabilities. All three methods have been used conjointly and presumably all will continue to be used.
Survival Mechanics. Dedicated means for fast evacuation of the President and/or the remaining members of the NCA and staff.

Successor Procedures: Two functions exist to ensure a proper successor to the presidential position. One is the statutory law which provides for the successor list, and two, is technical procedures (e.g., communication) available to establish contact with the successor.

Devolution of Authority: This provides for authorized assumption of specified authorities (e.g., nuclear weapons releases) under specified conditions. The legitimacy of the assumption derives from the appropriate offices, i.e., the path of devolution, the authority so devolved, and the conditions of authorized devolution. Clearly, the degree of provision for devolution is itself a major presidential decision and idle speculation as to his judgement on such matters is of no value. In fact, a successor has clear authority to make and to change the devolution rules. Nonetheless, for purposes of providing the C³I equipment as may be desired, the following logic is inescapable.

- Authorized conditions for assuming specified authorities through devolution
- Ability to recognize conditions requiring devolution
Ability to convey to others that devolution has taken place.

Means to execute specified authority through devolution.

Legacy plans approved by the NCA for implementation should devolution occur.

Scope of Authority assumed by devolution.

Specified conditions for relinquishment of any authority assumed by devolution.

(U) For the 1980's, it is technically possible to destroy the National Capital Region (NCR), or all other likely locations of the NCA, with a precursor attack just prior to tactical warning. Therefore, plans providing for a presidential successor or devolution of authority should acknowledge the successor's very short time available to recognize and determine current conditions, convey to others the establishment of the assumptive NCA, choose the next course of action, and begin to direct action.

(U) A function closely linked to the NCA and nuclear release procedures is the ability to launch U.S. nuclear weapons while under nuclear attack. Public U.S. policy on Launch Under Attack (LUA) has been as follows for a long time:

- We have the capability.

- We will maintain and improve this capability.
We will decide at the appropriate time whether to use our capability to LUA.
As always, a well conceived and integrated plan is best. In particular, a well-conceived plan would include all forces that are useful to mount an attack aimed at thwarting the attacker's war aims -- not just those U.S. forces most threatened (by the attack being launched from under).

For the 1980's, U.S. ICBM's have, warhead for warhead, best effectiveness against Soviet silos; penetrativity, lethality, and timeliness. Without a U.S. ICBM LUA plan, counterforce outcomes are U.S. unfavorable, at least until 1990. (To be sure, outcomes could improve gradually before 1990 if currently proposed programs come to fruition). With a U.S. ICBM LUA plan, the best case outcomes (Soviets ride out U.S. LUA attack) are markedly improved -- but clearly this best case is not enforceable. However, even the worst case military outcomes (Soviets LUA under U.S. ICBM) are noticeably improved, since a well-conceived U.S. LUA would take under attack many important, timely targets other than silos such as mobile forces and command and control facilities.

NUCLEAR RELEASE FOR BMD - A SPECIAL NEED

In order for active BMD to provide the high payoff performance described in this report, three ingredients are needed: 1) deception for offensive and defensive components (in particular, deception within a set of hardened shelters); 2) preferential defense of only a portion of the offensive components; and 3) evaluation of performance using offense reasonable rules.

It is possible for the enemy to undercut this high payoff from BMD by multiple shoot-look-shoot attacks, especially light, probing initial attacks. However, these
tactics are unreasonable if offensive forces can be launched before the attacker's second wave. That is, if the attacker's cannot be certain he has time to look, then it is unreasonable for him to evaluate his performance using shoot-look-shoot. This U.S. threat to launch before the second "shoot" needs an effective offensive punch, in particular a significant counterforce punch to threaten the attacker's second "shoot" forces.

(U) Thus active BMD, for high payoff, also needs the ability to launch offensive forces before the attacker's "look" and attack with a second wave. It is crucial to note that this must be accomplished with C3I assets that may be damaged, and with the NCR destroyed -- since attacks on the C3I and the NCR would reasonably accompany the attacker's initial, probing attack.

SPECIFIC CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (U)

(U) Specific conclusions and recommendations for nuclear release procedures, Launch Under Attack (LUA), and BMD can be found in Figures 12.1, 12.2, and 12.3 of this section.
CONCLUSION

GIVEN THE INHERENT VULNERABILITY OF THE NAT'L CAPITAL REGION, AND OTHER LIKELY AND KNOWABLE LOCATIONS OF THE NCA, TO NEAR-ZERO - WARNING-TIME ATTACKS; MEANS FOR NUCLEAR RELEASE BY SUCCESSORS AND THROUGH AUTHORIZED DEVOLUTION OF AUTHORITY SHOULD BE PROVIDED.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- SUCCESSOR COMPETENCE BE PROVIDED THROUGH MECHANICS AND INSTITUTIONS THAT PROVIDE FOR NCA COMPETENCE

- DEVOLUTION BE FACILITATED THROUGH
  -- MEANS TO ASCERTAIN CONDITIONS FOR DEVOLUTION E.G., NCR STATUS AVAILABLE TO CINC'S.
  -- MEANS TO CONVEY DEVOLUTION E.G., PRE-POSITIONED AUTHENTICATION CODES
  -- BASIS FOR INFORMED CHOICE OF ACTION E.G., INTEGRATED FORCE EXECUTION PLANS DEVELOPED AND APPROVED.

Figure 12.1: (U) NUCLEAR RELEASE - NCR VULNERABILITY
CONCLUSION

GIVEN VULNERABLE FORCES FOR 1980'S, AN EVIDENT CAPABILITY FOR LAUNCH UNDER ATTACK COULD PROVIDE SOME ADDITIONAL DISINCENTIVE FOR A SOVIET FIRST STRIKE. BUT, SUCH A CAPABILITY IN NO WAY SUBSTITUTES FOR OUR FUNDAMENTAL NEED FOR SURVIVING AND ENDURING FORCES. MOREOVER, SUCH A CAPABILITY REQUIRES, BEYOND CREDIBLE TM/AA,

1) MEANS TO DEAL WITH NCR VULNERABILITY

2) AN INTEGRATED AND APPROVED FORCE EXECUTION PLAN THAT NOT ONLY SEeks TO SURVIVE VULNERABLE FORCES BUT ALSO WOULD ATTACK A COMPREHENSIVE SET OF SOVIET MILITARY FORCES.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- DO NOT SUBSTITUTE LUA FOR SURVIVING, ENDURING FORCES

- IMPROVE AND MAINTAIN LUA CAPABILITY

-- SEE NCR VULNERABILITY R/C
-- SEE BMD NUCLEAR RELEASE R/C
-- SEC DEF DIRECT JCS TO REVIEW LUA PLANS

Figure 12.2: (U) NUCLEAR RELEASE - LAUNCH UNDER ATTACK

12-8

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CONCLUSION

- NON-NUCLEAR BMD REMAINS A FAR-TERM PROSPECT

- NUCLEAR BMD HAS TWO NUCLEAR RELEASE NEED:
  1) RELEASE OF BMD ITSELF TO COPE WITH INITIAL ATTACK WAVE
  2) RELEASE OF OFFENSIVE FORCES AFTER INITIAL WAVE BUT UNDER THREAT OF SECOND WAVE

  BOTH ARE REQUIRED

RECOMMENDATIONS

- CONSIDER BOTH NUCLEAR RELEASE NEEDS AS INTEGRAL REQUIREMENTS FOR A BMD SYSTEM

  -- USD P UT IN DEFENSE GUIDANCE (JAN '82)
  -- US DRE DIRECT APPROPRIATE C^I WITH BMD PROGRAMS (AUG '81)
  -- JCS ESTABLISH PROCEDURES AND C^I REQUIREMENTS (JAN '82)
  -- SERVICES & DEFENSE AGENCIES PUT IN POM (MAY '82)

Figure 12.3: (U) NUCLEAR RELEASE - BMD