

May 17, 2002 3:58 PM

TO: VADM Giambastiani
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Urban "Operations" Center

I agree with you that "operations" is not the right word—let's get that fixed.

Thanks.

Attach.

05/14/02 PDUSD(P) info memo to SecDef re: Joint Urban Operations

DHR:dh
051702-20

.....
Please respond by 06/14/02

353

11 May 02

U17230 02

11-L-0559/OSD/12534

May 17, 2002 9:55 AM

TO: Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: September 11th

Please screw your head into this business about what did people know and when did they know it about September 11, and get back to me.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
051702-15

.....
Please respond by _____

000.5

17 May 02

U17232 02

May 17, 2002 9:54 AM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
Dov Zakheim
Powell Moore
Larry Di Rita
VADM Giambastiani

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Crusader

470

I talked to Congressman Jerry Lewis. He asked that he have a chance to look at a copy of the letter from Aldridge to White that says not to spend funds, except with his approval.

He feels that if we had a "stop order" on expenditures, it would be harmful anytime between now and probably mid-week next week, when the bill is cleared.

We need a tight rein on this building, so nobody does something that inflames people unnecessarily. Therefore, everything should be fed through Larry Di Rita, so we have one control point here on what is going on with respect to the legislation in the House and Senate on the various pieces.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
051702-13

.....
Please respond by 05/20/02

17 May 02

U17234 02

11-L-0559/OSD/12537

May 17, 2002 7:49 AM

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: ICC Signatories

We met with the UAE CHOD yesterday. He said they are not going to sign the ICC.

We ought to keep a record of all the people we talk to and what their views are on it. We ought to get a list country-by-country and know who has signed it, who may, who hasn't and who agrees with us.

6/5

Thanks.

DHR:dh
051702-9

.....

Please respond by 06/07/02

17 May 02

U17235 02

11-L-0559/OSD/12538

TAB

May 17, 2002 7:46 AM

TO: VADM Giambastiani
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Joint Staff

7/16 Larry Di Rita

020705

We got briefed the other day about the Chairman's Joint Warfighters' Analysis Center. I would like to find out what all the things are that the Chairman has as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, so we can look at them and see how they perhaps ought to be regularized.

I am told that one was sent to the Joint Forces Command. But what other things are there like that down in the Joint Staff that I don't know about?

Please give me a complete list of everything they have.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
051702-6

.....
Please respond by 05/31/02

7/16
Gen Myers' Response attached
Di Rita

Larry Di Rita

17 May 02

U17236 02

Tab



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999
INFO MEMO

CM-402-02
15 July 2002

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS

RBM 7/13

SUBJECT: Joint Staff

- The following is provided in response to your request (~~7/13~~) for a list of activities that report to my office. Under current procedures a CJCS-controlled activity must meet the following criteria: (a) is established by the Chairman and reports through a J-directorate, (b) charter approved by the Secretary of Defense/Deputy Secretary of Defense, (c) has a designated Executive Agent, (d) is a multi-Service activity that performs a joint mission, (e) has an approved joint manpower document, and (f) contains approved joint duty positions.
- Three activities report to the Chairman:
 - National Defense University (NDU). NDU charter was approved by the Deputy Secretary of Defense in January 1976. The charter placed operations of NDU under the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
 - Joint Theater Air and Missile Defense Organization (JTAMDO). JTAMDO charter was signed by the Deputy Secretary of Defense in March 1997.
 - US Delegation, Inter-American Defense Board (IADB). The US Delegation, IADB, was placed under the authority of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in November 1990.
- Five activities were transferred from the Chairman to USJFCOM in FY 1998/99 as a result of a Defense Reform Initiative (DRI):
 - Joint Warfighting Center.
 - Joint Communications Support Element.
 - Joint Warfare Analysis Center.
 - Joint Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) Battle Center.
 - Joint Command and Control Warfare Center. Subsequently transferred to US Space Command as a result of UCP 99.
- Additionally, the Joint Spectrum Center was transferred from the Chairman to Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) in December 1998 as a result of DRI.

11-L-0559/OSD/12540

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachment:
As stated

Prepared By: Brig Gen Maria Cribbs, USAF; Director, J-1

(b)(6)

Snowflake

May 17, 2002 7:35 AM

TO: Honorable Colin Powell
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Syria

Syria

Did we vote for Syria to go on the UN Security Council, or did we abstain?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
051702-4

17 May 02

U17237 02

11-L-0559/OSD/12542

May 10, 2002 9:08 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Syria on UN Security Council

(D)

~~7/16~~
NOT
ATTACHED
TO
MEMO

Please find out if the U.S. voted against or abstained on Syria becoming a member of the Security Council.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
051002-9

.....
Please respond by 05/17/02

*SFB
5/14*

*5/13 - 12/5/13
Secret -*

*The interim response
is attached. Short*

*Answer: At least
at the ^{Deputy} Asst + Secretary
level, they aren't saying
or don't know. Still moving
up the chain. Secret*

Syria and UN Security Council Seat

How did US Vote?

- Syria received 160 votes (of the 178 voting nations) of the United Nations General Assembly.
- US did not publicly oppose Syrian ascension to the Security Council Seat.
- General Assembly voting for Security Council (UNSC) seats is anonymous.
- When asked how the US voted, State Department Spokesman Richard Boucher said "As is our longstanding practice and policy, we do not disclose how we voted in any of the elections."

- State Department Syria Desk Officer said that only USUN Negroponte, SECSTATE Powell and POTUS know how we voted.

} According to Luti.



What Were the Circumstances?

- Vote on Security Council 2-year membership occurred in October 2001, about a month after the start of the "Al Aqsa Intifada."
- To block Syria, US would have had to find another Asian/Arab state to contest the seat. (In the 1990s, UK opposed Libyan inclusion, instead supporting Egyptian position on the UNSC.)
- Election took place two years after "election" of Bashar al Asad to power, when many were still optimistic about prospects for new kind of Syrian leadership.

Prepared by: ISA/NESA

snovflake

May 17, 2002 7:33 AM

Arrow
5-20

Done MITG w/VICE
6/21

334

TO: VADM Giambastiani
CC: Gen. Pace
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: JROC

I would like a briefing sometime on what the JROC does, what it is supposed to do and what we might want to have it do.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
051702-3

.....

Please respond by 06/14/02

17 May 02

U17238 02

11-L-0559/OSD/12545

5:00
1523
snowflake

May 17, 2002 7:28 AM

Done 5/21

TO: Larry Di Rita
CC: Powell Moore
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Members of Congress

032

LARRY DRIT
5/20

Please give me a list of all the Members of the House and the Senate. I want to think about who I want to have over for dinner.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
051702-2

.....
Please respond by 05/24/02

17 May 02

U17239 02

11-L-0559/OSD/12546

Senators of the 107th Congress

Akaka, Daniel (D - HI)
Allard, Wayne (R - CO)
Allen, George (R - VA)
Baucus, Max (D - MT)
Bayh, Evan (D - IN)
Bennett, Robert (R - UT)
Biden Jr, Joseph (D - DE)
Bingaman, Jeff (D - NM)
Bond, Christopher (R - MO)
Boxer, Barbara (D - CA)
Breaux, John (D - LA)
Brownback, Sam (R - KS)
Bunning, Jim (R - KY)
Burns, Conrad (R - MT)
Byrd, Robert (D - WV)
Campbell, Ben Nighthorse (R - CO)
Cantwell, Maria (D - WA)
Carnahan, Jean (D - MO)
Carper, Thomas (D - DE)
Chafee, Lincoln (R - RI)
Cleland, Max (D - GA)
Clinton, Hillary (D - NY)
Cochran, Thad (R - MS)
Collins, Susan (R - ME)
Conrad, Kent (D - ND)
Corzine, Jon (D - NJ)
Craig, Larry (R - ID)
Crapo, Mike (R - ID)
Daschle, Thomas (D - SD)
Dayton, Mark (D - MN)
DeWine, Mike (R - OH)
Dodd, Christopher (D - CT)
Domenici, Pete (R - NM)
Dorgan, Byron (D - ND)
Durbin, Richard (D - IL)
Edwards, John (D - NC)
Ensign, John (R - NV)
Enzi, Mike (R - WY)
Feingold, Russell (D - WI)
Feinstein, Dianne (D - CA)
Fitzgerald, Peter (R - IL)
Frist, William (R - TN)
Graham, Bob (D - FL)
Gramm, Phil (R - TX)
Grassley, Chuck (R - IA)
Gregg, Judd (R - NH)
Hagel, Charles (R - NE)
Harkin, Tom (D - IA)
Hatch, Orrin (R - UT)
Helms, Jesse (R - NC)
Hollings, Ernest (D - SC)
Hutchinson, Tim (R - AR)
Hutchison, Kay Bailey (R - TX)
Inhofe, James (R - OK)
Inouye, Daniel (D - HI)
Jeffords, James (I - VT)
Johnson, Tim (D - SD)
Kennedy, Edward (D - MA)
Kerry, John (D - MA)
Kohl, Herb (D - WI)
Kyl, Jon (R - AZ)
Landrieu, Mary (D - LA)
Leahy, Patrick (D - VT)
Levin, Carl (D - MI)
Lieberman, Joseph (D - CT)
Lincoln, Blanche (D - AR)
Lott, Trent (R - MS)
Lugar, Richard (R - IN)
McCain, John (R - AZ)
McConnell, Mitch (R - KY)
Mikulski, Barbara (D - MD)
Miller, Zell (D - GA)
Murkowski, Frank (R - AK)
Murray, Patty (D - WA)
Nelson, Bill (D - FL)
Nelson, Ben (D - NE)
Nickles, Don (R - OK)
Reed, Jack (D - RI)
Reid, Harry (D - NV)
Roberts, Pat (R - KS)
Rockefeller IV, John (D - WV)
Santorum, Rick (R - PA)
Sarbanes, Paul (D - MD)
Schumer, Charles (D - NY)
Sessions, Jeff (R - AL)
Shelby, Richard (R - AL)
Smith, Bob (R - NH)
Smith, Gordon (R - OR)
Snowe, Olympia (R - ME)
Specter, Arlen (R - PA)
Stabenow, Debbie (D - MI)
Stevens, Ted (R - AK)
Thomas, Craig (R - WY)
Thompson, Fred (R - TN)
Thurmond, Strom (R - SC)
Torricelli, Robert (D - NJ)
Voinovich, George (R - OH)
Warner, John (R - VA)
Wellstone, Paul (D - MN)
Wyden, Ron (D - OR)

Representatives of the 107th

Abercrombie, Neil (D-HI, 1st)
Acevedo-Vilá, Aníbal (D-PR)
Ackerman, Gary L. (D-NY, 5th)
Aderholt, Robert B. (R-AL, 4th)
Akin, W. Todd (R-MO, 2rd)
Allen, Thomas H. (D-ME, 1st)
Andrews, Robert E. (R-NJ, 1st)
Armey, Richard K. (R-TX, 26th)
Baca, Joe (D-CA, 42rd)
Bachus, Spencer (R-AL, 6th)
Baird, Brian (D-WA, 3rd)
Baker, Richard H. (R-LA, 6th)
Baldacci, John Elias (D-ME, 2rd)
Baldwin, Tammy (D-WI, 2rd)
Ballenger, Cass (NC, 10th)
Barcia, James A. (D-MI, 5th)
Barr, Bob (R-GA, 7th)
Barrett, Thomas M. (D-WI, 5th)
Bartlett, Roscoe G. (R-MD, 6th)
Barton, Joe (R-TX, 6th)
Bass, Charles F. (R-NH, 2rd)
Becerra, Xavier (D-CA, 30th)
Bentsen, Ken (D-TX, 25th)
Bereuter, Doug (R-NE, 1st)
Berkley, Shelley (D-NV, 1st)
Berman, Howard L. (D-CA, 26th)
Berry, Marion (D-AR, 1st)
Biggert, Judy (R-IL, 13th)
Bilirakis, Michael (R-FL, 9th)
Bishop, Sanford D. Jr. (D-GA, 2rd)
Blagojevich, Rod R. (D-IL, 5th)
Blumenauer, Earl (D-OR, 3rd)
Blunt, Roy (R-MO, 7th)
Boehlert, Sherwood L. (R-NY, 23rd)
Boehner, John A. (R-OH, 8th)
Bonilla, Henry (R-TX, 23rd)
Bonior, David E. (D-MI, 10th)
Bono, Mary (R-CA, 44th)
Boozman, John (R-AR, 3rd)
Borski, Robert A. (D-PA, 3rd)
Boswell, Leonard L. (D-IA, 3rd)
Boucher, Rick (D-VA, 9th)
Boyd, Allen (D-FL, 2nd)
Brady, Kevin (R-TX, 8th)
Brady, Robert A. (D-PA, 1st)
Brown, Corrine (D-FL, 3rd)
Brown, Henry E. Jr. (R-SC, 1st)
Brown, Sherrod (D-OH, 13th)
Bryant, Ed (R-TN, 7th)
Burr, Richard (R-NC, 5th)
Burton, Dan (R-IN, 6th)
Buyer, Steve (R-IN, 5th)
Callahan, Sonny (R-AL, 1st)
Calvert, Ken (R-CA, 43^d)
Camp, Dave (R-MI, 4th)
Cannon, Chris (R-UT, 3rd)
Cantor, Eric (R-VA, 7th)
Capito, Shelley Moore (R-WV, 2nd)
Capps, Lois (D-CA, 22nd)
Capuano, Michael E. (D-MA, 8th)
Cardin, Benjamin L. (D-MD, 3^d)
Carson, Brad (D-OK, 2nd)
Carson, Julia (D-IN, 10th)
Castle, Michael N. (R-DE, At Large)
Chabot, Steve (R-OH, 1st)
Chambliss, Saxby (R-GA, 8th)
Christensen, Donna M. (D-VI, Delegate)
Clay, Wm. Lacy (D-MO, 1st)
Clayton, Eva M. (D-NC, 1st)
Clement, Bob (D-TN, 5th)
Clyburn, James E. (D-SC, 6th)
Coble, Howard (R-NC, 6th)
Collins, Mac (R-GA, 3rd)
Combest, Larry (R-TX, 19th)
Condit, Gary A. (D-CA, 18th)
Conyers, John Jr. (D-MI, 14th)
Cooksey, John (R-LA, 5th)
Costello, Jerry F. (D-IL, 12th)
Cox, Christopher (R-CA, 47th)
Coyne, William J. (D-PA, 14th)
Cramer, Robert E. (Bud) Jr. (D-AL, 5th)
Crane, Philip M. (R-IL, 8th)
Crenshaw, Ander (R-FL, 4th)
Crowley, Joseph (D-NY, 7th)
Cubin, Barbara (R-WY, At Large)
Culberson, John Abney (R-TX, 7th)
Cummings, Elijah E. (D-MD, 7th)
Cunningham, Randy "Duke" (R-CA, 51st)
Davis, Danny K. (D-IL, 7th)
Davis, Jim (D-FL, 11th)
Davis, Jo Ann (R-VA, 1st)
Davis, Susan A. (D-CA, 49th)
Davis, Tom (R-VA, 11th)
Deal, Nathan (R-GA, 9th)
DeFazio, Peter A. (D-OR, 4th)

DeGette, Diana (D-CO, 1st)
 Delahunt, William D. (D-MA, 10th)
 DeLauro, Rosa L. (D-CT, 3rd)
 DeLay, Tom (R-TX, 22nd)
 DeMint, Jim (R-SC, 4th)
 Deutsch, Peter (D-FL, 20th)
 Diaz-Balart, Lincoln (R-FL, 21st)
 Dicks, Norman D. (D-WA, 6th)
 Dingell, John D. (R-MI, 16th)
 Doggett, Lloyd (D-TX, 10th)
 Dooley, Calvin M. (D-CA, 20th)
 Doolittle, John T. (R-CA, 4th)
 Doyle, Michael F. (D-PA, 18th)
 Dreier, David (R-CA, 28th)
 Duncan, John J. Jr. (R-TN, 2nd)
 Dunn, Jennifer (R-WA, 8th)
 Edwards, Chet (D-TX, 11th)
 Ehlers, Vernon J. (R-MI, 3rd)
 Ehrlich, Robert L. Jr. (R-MD, 2nd)
 Emerson, Jo Ann (R-MO, 8th)
 Engel, Eliot L. (D-NY, 17th)
 English, Phil (R-PA, 21st)
 Eshoo, Anna G. (D-CA, 14th)
 Etheridge, Bob (D-NC, 2nd)
 Evans, Lane (D-IL, 17th)
 Everett, Terry (R-AL, 2nd)
 Faleomavaega, Eni F. H. (D-AS, Delegate)
 Farr, Sam (D-CA, 17th)
 Fattah, Chaka (D-PA, 2nd)
 Ferguson, Mike (R-NJ, 7th)
 Filner, Bob (D-CA, 50th)
 Flake, Jeff (R-AZ, 1st)
 Fletcher, Ernie (R-KY, 6th)
 Foley, Mark (R-FL, 16th)
 Forbes, J. Randy (R-VA, 4th)
 Ford, Harold E. Jr. (D-TN, 9th)
 Fossella, Vito (R-NY, 13th)
 Frank, Barney (D-MA, 4th)
 Frelinghuysen, Rodney P. (R-NJ, 11th)
 Frost, Martin (D-TX, 24th)
 Gallegly, Elton (CA, 23rd)
 Ganske, Greg (IA, 4th)
 Gekas, George W. (PA, 17th)
 Gephardt, Richard A. (D-MO, 3rd)
 Gibbons, Jim (R-NV, 2nd)
 Gilchrest, Wayne T. (R-MD, 1st)
 Gillmor, Paul E. (R-OH, 5th)
 Gilman, Benjamin A. (R-NY, 20th)
 Gonzalez, Charles A. (D-TX, 20th)
 Goode, Virgil H. Jr. (I-VA, 5th)
 Goodlatte, Bob (R-VA, 6th)
 Gordon, Bart (D-TN, 6th)
 Goss, Porter J. (R-FL, 14th)
 Graham, Lindsey O. (R-SC, 3rd)
 Granger, Kay (R-TX, 12th)
 Graves, Sam (R-MO, 6th)
 Green, Gene (D-TX, 29th)
 Green, Mark (R-WI, 8th)
 Greenwood, James C. (R-PA, 8th)
 Grucci, Felix J. Jr. (R-NY, 1st)
 Gutierrez, Luis V. (D-IL, 4th)
 Gutknecht, Gil (R-MN, 1st)
 Hall, Ralph M. (D-TX, 4th)
 Hall, Tony P. (D-OH, 3rd)
 Hansen, James V. (R-UT, 1st)
 Harman, Jane (D-CA, 36th)
 Hart, Melissa A. (R-PA, 4th)
 Hastert, J. Dennis (R-IL, 14th)
 Hastings, Alcee L. (D-FL, 23rd)
 Hastings, Doc (R-WA, 4th)
 Hayes, Robin (R-NC, 8th)
 Hayworth, J.D. (R-AZ, 6th)
 Hefley, Joel (R-CO, 5th)
 Herger, Wally (R-CA, 2nd)
 Hill, Baron P. (D-IN, 9th)
 Hilleary, Van (R-TN, 4th)
 Hilliard, Earl F. (D-AL, 7th)
 Hinchey, Maurice D. (D-NY, 26th)
 Hinojosa, Rubén (D-TX, 15th)
 Hobson, David L. (R-OH, 7th)
 Hoeffel, Joseph M. (D-PA, 13th)
 Hoekstra, Peter (R-MI, 2nd)
 Holden, Tim (D-PA, 6th)
 Holt, Rush D. (D-NJ, 12th)
 Honda, Michael M. (D-CA, 15th)
 Hooley, Darlene (D-OR, 5th)
 Horn, Stephen (R-CA, 38th)
 Hostettler, John N. (R-IN, 8th)
 Houghton, Amo (R-NY, 31st)
 Hoyer, Steny H. (D-MD, 5th)
 Hulshof, Kenny C. (R-MO, 9th)
 Hunter, Duncan (R-CA, 52nd)
 Hyde, Henry J. (R-IL, 6th)
 Inslee, Jay (D-WA, 1st)
 Isakson, Johnny (R-GA, 6th)
 Israel, Steve (D-NY, 2nd)
 Issa, Darrell E. (R-CA, 48th)
 Istook, Ernest J. Jr. (R-OK, 5th)
 Jackson, Jesse L. Jr. (D-IL, 2nd)
 Jackson-Lee, Sheila (D-TX, 18th)

Jefferson, William J. (D-LA, 2nd)
Jenkins, William L. (R-TN, 1st)
John, Christopher (D-LA, 7th)
Johnson, Eddie Bernice (D-TX, 30th)
Johnson, Nancy L. (R-CT, 6th)
Johnson, Sam (R-TX, 3rd)
Johnson, Timothy V. (R-IL, 15th)
Jones, Stephanie Tubbs (R-OH, 11th)
Jones, Walter B. (R-NC, 3rd)
Kanjorski, Paul E. (R-D-PA, 11th)
Kaptur, Marcy (R-D-OH, 9th)
Keller, Ric (R-FL, 8th)
Kelly, Sue W. (R-NY, 19th)
Kennedy, Mark R. (R-MN, 2nd)
Kennedy, Patrick J. (R-D-RI, 1st)
Kerns, Brian D. (R-IN, 7th)
Kildee, Dale E. (D-MI, 9th)
Kilpatrick, Carolyn C. (D-MI, 15th)
Kind, Ron (D-WI, 3rd)
King, Peter T. (R-NY, 3rd)
Kingston, Jack (R-GA, 1st)
Kirk, Mark Steven (R-IL, 10th)
Kleczka, Gerald D. (D-WI, 4th)
Knollenberg, Joe (R-MI, 11th)
Kolbe, Jim (R-AZ, 5th)
Kucinich, Dennis J. (D-OH, 10th)
LaFalce, John J. (D-NY, 29th)
LaHood, Ray (R-IL, 18th)
Lampson, Nick (D-TX, 9th)
Langevin, James R. (D-RI, 2nd)
Lantos, Tom (D-CA, 12th)
Larsen, Rick (D-WA, 2nd)
Larson, John B. (D-CT, 1st)
Latham, Tom (R-IA, 5th)
LaTourette, Steven C. (R-OH, 19th)
Leach, James A. (R-IA, 1st)
Lee, Barbara (D-CA, 9th)
Levin, Sander M. (D-MI, 12th)
Lewis, Jerry (R-CA, 40th)
Lewis, John (D-GA, 5th)
Lewis, Ron (R-KY, 2nd)
Linder, John (R-GA, 11th)
Lipinski, William O. (D-IL, 3rd)
LoBiondo, Frank A. (R-NJ, 2nd)
Lofgren, Zoe (D-CA, 16th)
Lowey, Nita M. (D-NY, 18th)
Lucas, Frank D. (R-OK, 6th)
Lucas, Ken (D-KY, 4th)
Luther, Bill (D-MN, 6th)
Lynch, Stephen F. (R-MA, 9th)

McCarthy, Carolyn (D-NY, 4th)
McCarthy, Karen (D-MO, 5th)
McCollum, Betty (D-MN, 4th)
McCrery, Jim (R-LA, 4th)
McDermott, Jim (R-WA, 7th)
McGovern, James P. (D-MA, 3rd)
McHugh, John M. (R-NY, 24th)
McInnis, Scott (R-CO, 3rd)
McIntyre, Mike (D-NC, 7th)
McKeon, Howard P. "Buck" (R-CA, 25th)
McKinney, Cynthia A. (D-GA, 4th)
McNulty, Michael R. (D-NY, 21st)
Maloney, Carolyn B. (R-NY, 14th)
Maloney, James H. (R-CT, 5th)
Manzullo, Donald A. (R-IL, 16th)
Markey, Edward J. (D-MA, 7th)
Mascara, Frank (R-PA, 20th)
Matheson, Jim (D-UT, 2nd)
Matsui, Robert T. (D-CA, 5th)
Meehan, Martin T. (D-MA, 5th)
Meek, Carrie P. (D-FL, 17th)
Meeks, Gregory W. (D-NY, 6th)
Menendez, Robert (R-NJ, 13th)
Mica, John L. (R-FL, 7th)
Millender-McDonald, Juanita (D-CA, 37th)
Miller, Dan (R-FL, 13th)
Miller, Gary G. (R-CA, 41st)
Miller, George (D-CA, 7th)
Miller, Jeff (R-FL, 1st)
Mink, Patsy T. (D-HI, 2nd)
Mollohan, Alan B. (D-WV, 1st)
Moore, Dennis (D-KS, 3rd)
Moran, James P. (D-VA, 8th)
Moran, Jerry (R-KS, 1st)
Morella, Constance A. (R-MD, 8th)
Murtha, John P. (D-PA, 12th)
Myrick, Sue Wilkins (R-NC, 9th)
Nadler, Jerrold (D-NY, 8th)
Napolitano, Grace F. (D-CA, 34th)
Neal, Richard E. (D-MA, 2nd)
Nethercutt, George R. Jr. (R-WA, 5th)
Ney, Robert W. (R-OH, 18th)
Northup, Anne M. (R-KY, 3rd)
Norton, Eleanor Holmes (D-DC Delegate)
Norwood, Charlie (R-GA, 10th)
Nussle, Jim (R-IA, 2nd)
Oberstar, James L. (D-MN, 8th)
Obey, David R. (D-WI, 7th)
Olver, John W. (D-MA, 1st)
Ortiz, Solomon P. (D-TX, 27th)

Osborne, Tom (NE, 3nd)
 Ose, Doug (CA, 3rd)
 Otter, C. L. "Butch" (ID, 1st)
 Owens, Major R. (D-NY, 11th)
 Oxley, Michael G. (OH, 4th)
 Pallone, Frank Jr. (D-NJ, 6th)
 Pascrell, Bill Jr. (D-NJ, 8th)
 Pastor, Ed (D-AZ, 2nd)
 Paul, Ron (R-TX, 14th)
 Payne, Donald M. (D-NJ, 10th)
 Pelosi, Nancy (D-CA, 8th)
 Pence, Mike (R-IN, 2nd)
 Peterson, Collin C. (D-MN, 7th)
 Peterson, John E. (R-PA, 5th)
 Petri, Thomas E. (R-WI, 6th)
 Phelps, David D. (D-IL, 19th)
 Pickering, Charles W. "Chip" (R-MS, 3rd)
 Pitts, Joseph R. (R-PA, 16th)
 Platts, Todd Russell (R-PA, 19th)
 Pombo, Richard W. (R-CA, 11th)
 Pomeroy, Earl (D-ND, At Large)
 Portman, Rob (OH, 2^{dn})
 Price, David E. (D-NC, 4th)
 Pryce, Deborah (R-OH, 15th)
 Putnam, Adam H. (R-FL, 12th)
 Quinn, Jack (R-NY, 30th)
 Radanovich, George (CA, 19th)
 Rahall, Nick J. II (D-WV, 3rd)
 Ramstad, Jim (MN, 3rd)
 Rangel, Charles B. (D-NY, 15th)
 Regula, Ralph (R-OH, 16th)
 Rehberg, Dennis R. (R-MT, At Large)
 Reyes, Silvestre (D-TX, 16th)
 Reynolds, Thomas M. (R-NY, 27th)
 Riley, Bob (R-AL, 3rd)
 Rivers, Lynn N. (D-MI, 13th)
 Rodriguez, Ciro D. (D-TX, 28th)
 Roemer, Tim (D-IN, 3rd)
 Rogers, Harold (R-KY, 5th)
 Rogers, Mike (R-MI, 8th)
 Rohrabacher, Dana (R-CA, 45th)
 Ros-Lehtinen, Ileana (R-FL, 18th)
 Ross, Mike (D-AR, 4th)
 Rothman, Steven R. (D-NJ, 9th)
 Roukema, Marge (R-NJ, 5th)
 Roybal-Allard, Lucille (D-CA, 33nd)
 Royce, Edward R. (R-CA, 39th)
 Rush, Bobby L. (D-IL, 1st)
 Ryan, Paul (R-WI, 1st)
 Ryun, Jim (R-KS, 2nd)
 Sabo, Martin Olav (D-MN, 5th)
 Sanchez, Loretta (D-CA, 46th)
 Sanders, Bernard (I-VT, At Large)
 Sandlin, Max (D-TX, 1st)
 Sawyer, Tom (D-OH, 14th)
 Saxton, Jim (R-NJ, 3rd)
 Schaffer, Bob (R-CO, 4th)
 Schakowsky, Janice D. (D-IL, 9th)
 Schiff, Adam B. (D-CA, 27th)
 Schrock, Edward L. (R-VA, 2nd)
 Scott, Robert C. (D-VA, 3rd)
 Sensenbrenner, F. James Jr. (R-WI, 9th)
 Serrano, José E. (D-NY, 16th)
 Sessions, Pete (R-TX, 5th)
 Shadegg, John B. (R-AZ, 4th)
 Shaw, E. Clay Jr. (R-FL, 22nd)
 Shays, Christopher (R-CT, 4th)
 Sherman, Brad (D-CA, 24th)
 Sherwood, Don (R-PA, 10th)
 Shimkus, John (R-IL, 20th)
 Shows, Ronnie (D-MS, 4th)
 Shuster, Bill (R-PA, 9th)
 Simmons, Rob (R-CT, 2nd)
 Simpson, Michael K. (R-ID, 2^d)
 Skeen, Joe (R-NM, 2^d)
 Skelton, Ike (D-MO, 4th)
 Slaughter, Louise McIntosh (D-NY, 28th)
 Smith, Adam (D-WA, 9th)
 Smith, Christopher H. (R-NJ, 4th)
 Smith, Lamar S. (R-TX, 21st)
 Smith, Nick (R-MI, 7th)
 Snyder, Vic (D-AR, 2nd)
 Solis, Hilda L. (D-CA, 31st)
 Souder, Mark E. (R-IN, 4th)
 Spratt, John M. Jr. (D-SC, 5th)
 Stark, Fortney Pete (D-CA, 13th)
 Stearns, Cliff (R-FL, 6th)
 Stenholm, Charles W. (D-TX, 17th)
 Strickland, Ted (D-OH, 6th)
 Stump, Bob (R-AZ, 3rd)
 Stupak, Bart (D-MI, 1st)
 Sullivan, John (R-OK, 1st)
 Sununu, John E. (R-NH, 1st)
 Sweeney, John E. (R-NY, 22nd)
 Tancredo, Thomas G. (R-CO, 6th)
 Tanner, John S. (D-TN, 8th)
 Tauscher, Ellen O. (D-CA, 10th)
 Tauzin, W. J. (Billy) (R-LA, 3rd)
 Taylor, Charles H. (R-NC, 11th)
 Taylor, Gene (R-MS, 5th)

Terry, Lee (R-NE, 2d)
Thomas, William M. (R-CA, 21st)
Thompson, Bennie G. (D-MS, 2nd)
Thompson, Mike (D-CA, 1st)
Thornberry, Mac (D-TX, 13th)
Thune, John R., SD (R-At Large)
Thurman, Karen L. (D-FL, 5th)
Tiahrt, Todd (R-KS, 4th)
Tiberi, Patrick J. (D-OH, 12th)
Tierney, John F. (D-MA, 6th)
Toomey, Patrick J. (R-PA, 15th)
Towns, Edolphus (D-NY, 10th)
Traficant, James A. Jr. (D-OH, 17th)
Turner, Jim (D-TX, 2nd)
Udall, Mark (D-CO, 2nd)
Udall, Tom (D-NM, 3rd)
Underwood, Robert A. (D-GU, Delegate)
Upton, Fred (R-MI, 6th)
Velázquez, Nydia M. (D-NY, 12th)
Visclosky, Peter J. (D-IN, 1st)
Vitter, David, LA, 1st)
Walden, Greg (R-OR, 2nd)
Walsh, James T. (R-NY, 25th)

Wamp, Zach (R-TN, 3rd)
Waters, Maxine (D-CA, 35th)
Watkins, Wes (R-OK, 3rd)
Watson, Diane E. (D-CA, 32nd)
Watt, Melvin L. (D-NC, 12th)
Watts, J. C. Jr. (R-OK, 4th)
Waxman, Henry A. (D-CA, 29th)
Weiner, Anthony D. (D-NY, 9th)
Weldon, Curt (R-PA, 7th)
Weldon, Dave (R-FL, 15th)
Weller, Jerry, IL (R-11th)
Wexler, Robert (D-FL, 19th)
Whitfield, Ed (R-KY, 1st)
Wicker, Roger F. (R-MS, 1st)
Wilson, Heather (R-NM, 1st)
Wilson, Joe (R-SC, 2nd)
Wolf, Frank R. (R-VA, 10th)
Woolsey, Lynn C. (D-CA, 6th)
Wu, David (D-OR, 1st)
Wynn, Albert Russell (D-MD, 4th)
Young, C. W. Bill (R-FL, 10th)
Young, Don (R-AK, At Large)

Step
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software

May 16, 2002 2:52 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: ICC

015

7/23

Please get me a list of all the countries that signed ICC and those that did not.

4/5/24

Thanks.

DIR dh
051602-21

.....
Please respond by 05/17/02

5/20

→ SecDef-

(Handwritten initials circled)

Attached is
list of signatories, followed
by those signatories that
have ratified I have not
yet found a list of non-signatories,
but will provide when I do.

16 May 02

D. Rita

U17240 02 11-L-0559/OSD/12553

Rome Statute Signature and Ratification Chart

Rome Statute Signatories (139)

in alphabetical order

Albania	18 July 1998
Algeria	28 December 2000
Andorra	18 July 1998
Angola	7 October 1998
Antigua and Barbuda	23 October 1998
Argentina	8 January 1999
Armenia	1 October 1999
Australia	9 December 1998
Austria	7 October 1998
Bahamas	29 December 2000
Bahrain	11 December 2000
Bangladesh	16 September 1999
Barbados	8 September 2000
Belgium	10 September 1998
Belize	5 April 2000
Benin	24 September 1999
Bolivia	17 July 1998
Bosnia and Herzegovina	17 July 2000
Botswana	8 September 2000
Brazil	7 February 2000
Bulgaria	11 February 1999
Burkina Faso	30 November 1998
Burundi	13 January 1999
Cambodia	23 October 2000
Cameroon	17 July 1998
Canada	18 December 1998
Cape Verde	28 December 2000

Central African Republic	7 December 1999
Chad	20 October 1999
Chile	11 September 1998
Colombia	10 December 1998
Comoros	22 September 2000
Congo (Brazzaville)	17 July 1998
Costa Rica	7 October 1998
Cote d'Ivoire	30 November 1998
Croatia	12 October 1998
Cyprus	15 October 1998
Czech Republic	13 April 1999
Democratic Republic of the Congo	8 September 2000
Denmark	25 September 1998
Djibouti	7 October 1998
Dominican Republic	8 September 2000
Ecuador	7 October 1998
Egypt	26 December 2000
Eritrea	7 October 1998
Estonia	27 December 1999
Fiji	29 November 1999
Finland	7 October 1998
France	18 July 1998
Gabon	22 December 1998
Gambia	7 December 1998
Germany	10 December 1998
Georgia	18 July 1998
Ghana	18 July 1998
Greece	18 July 1998
Guinea	8 September 2000
Guinea-Bissau	12 September 2000
Guyana	28 December 2000
Haiti	26 February 1999
Honduras	7 October 1998
Hungary	15 December 1998
Iceland	26 August 1998
Iran	31 December 2000
Ireland	7 October 1998
Israel	31 December 2000

Italy	18 July 1998
Jamaica	8 September 2000
Jordan	7 October 1998
Kenya	11 August 1999
Kuwait	8 September 2000
Kyrgyzstan	8 December 1998
Latvia	22 April 1999
Lesotho	30 November 1998
Liberia	17 July 1998
Lichtenstein	18 July 1998
Lithuania	10 December 1998
Luxembourg	13 October 1998
Macedonia, Former Yugoslav Rep.	7 October 1998
Madagascar	18 July 1998
Malawi	3 March 1999
Mali	17 July 1998
Malta	17 July 1998
Marshall Islands	6 September 2000
Mauritius	11 November 1998
Mexico	7 September 2000
Monaco	18 July 1998
Mongolia	29 December 2000
Morocco	8 September 2000
Mozambique	28 December 2000
Namibia	27 October 1998
Nauru	13 December 2000
Netherlands	18 July 1998
New Zealand	7 October 1998
Niger	17 July 1998
Nigeria	1 June 2000
Norway	28 August 1998
Oman	20 December 2000
Panama	18 July 1998
Paraguay	7 October 1998
Peru	7 December 2000
Philippines	28 December 2000
Portugal	7 October 1998
Poland	9 April 1999

Republic of Korea	8 March 2000
Republic of Moldova	8 September 2000
Romania	7 July 1999
Russian Federation	13 September 2000
Samoa	17 July 1998
San Marino	18 July 1998
Sao Tome and Principe	28 December 2000
Senegal	18 July 1998
Seychelles	28 December 2000
Sierra Leone	17 October 1998
Slovakia	23 December 1998
Slovenia	7 October 1998
Solomon Islands	3 December 1998
South Africa	17 July 1998
Spain	18 July 1998
St. Lucia	27 August 1999
Sudan	8 September 2000
Sweden	7 October 1998
Switzerland	18 July 1998
Syria	29 November 2000
Tajikistan	30 November 1998
Tanzania	29 December 2000
Thailand	2 October 2000
Trinidad and Tobago	23 March 1999
Uganda	17 March 1999
Ukraine	20 January 2000
United Arab Emirates	27 November 2000
United Kingdom	30 November 1998
United States of America	31 December 2000
Uruguay	19 December 2000
Venezuela	14 October 1998
Yemen	28 December 2000
Yugoslavia	19 December 2000
Zambia	17 July 1998
Zimbabwe	17 July 1998

State Parties to the Rome Statute (67)

Senegal	2 February 1999
Trinidad and Tobago	6 April 1999
San Marino	13 May 1999
Italy	26 July 1999
Fiji	29 November 1999
Ghana	20 December 1999
Norway	16 February 2000
Belize	5 April 2000
Tajikistan	5 May 2000
Iceland	25 May 2000
Venezuela	7 June 2000
France	9 June 2000
Belgium	28 June 2000
Canada	7 July 2000
Mali	16 August 2000
Lesotho	6 September 2000
New Zealand	7 September 2000
Botswana	8 September 2000
Luxembourg	8 September 2000
Sierra Leone	15 September 2000
Gabon	20 September 2000
Spain	24 October 2000
South Africa	27 November 2000
Marshall Islands	7 December 2000
Germany	11 December 2000
Austria	28 December 2000
Finland	29 December 2000
Argentina	8 February 2001

Dominica	12 February 2001 a
Andorra	30 April 2001
Paraguay	14 May 2001
Croatia	21 May 2001
Costa Rica	7 June 2001
Antigua & Barbuda	18 June 2001
Denmark	21 June 2001
Sweden	28 June 2001
Netherlands	17 July 2001
Yugoslavia	6 September 2001
Nigeria	27 September 2001
Liechtenstein	2 October 2001
Central African Republic	3 October 2001
United Kingdom	4 October 2001
Switzerland	12 October 2001
Peru	10 November 2001
Nauru	12 November 2001
Poland	12 November 2001
Hungary	30 November 2001
Slovenia	31 December 2001
Benin	22 January 2002
Estonia	30 January 2002
Portugal	5 February 2002
Ecuador	5 February 2002
Mauritius	5 March 2002
Macedonia, FYR	6 March 2002
Cyprus	7 March 2002
Panama	21 March 2002
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Cambodia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ireland, Jordan, Mongolia, Niger, Romania and Slovakia	11 April 2002
Greece	15 May 2002

May 16, 2002 2:40 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Security Clearances

380.01

What is the status of the backlog on security clearances in the Department of Defense?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
051602-14

.....

Please respond by 05/31/02

16 May 02

U17241 02

11-L-0559/OSD/12560

May 16, 2002 10:13 AM

TO: Torie Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Cartoons

ODD.7

Please see if you can get these two cartoons for me.

Thanks.

Attach.
Cartoons

DHR:dh
051602-12




Please respond by 06/28/02

16 May 02


U17242 02

11-L-0559/OSD/12561



11-L-0559/OSD/12562

JENKINS' HILL



11-L-0559/OSD/12563

May 16, 2002 8:16 AM

TO: Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Missile Defense

373.24

Here is a copy of this Missile Defense Program paper. You might want to use some of it as you prepare the short memo for the President.

Thanks.

Attach.
Undated Talking Paper on Missile Defense Program

DHR:dh
051602-10

.....

Please respond by 05/31/02

16 May 02

U17244 02

11-L-0559/OSD/12564

MISSILE DEFENSE PROGRAM

Major Changes in the Missile Defense Program have occurred since January 2001:

- New direction for an aggressive Research, Development, Test & Engineering program to develop a multi-layered evolutionary defense against all ranges of Ballistic Missiles to protect the United States, our allies, deployed forces and friends
- Expanded authorities of the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) with Senior Executive Council (SEC) oversight
- Withdrawal from the ABM Treaty that takes effect 14 June 2002

Congressional criticism of the program comes with two fundamental arguments:

- That the real threat is terrorism and therefore the threat does not justify spending almost \$8B in FY 2003 on Missile Defense
- That MDA has been given too much authority and autonomy that leads to little or no oversight by Department of Defense (DoD) or the Congress

The support for the program comes from ballistic missile threat and the technical progress we have made to date, especially in the last 18 months:

- Ground based – 3 successful tests in a row against long range Ballistic Missile (4 out of 6 so far in total)
- First successful ballistic missile intercept in space from sea-based Aegis program in January 2002
- We have also had failures:
 - Booster for ground based
 - Patriot Advanced Capabilities (PAC)-3 in more aggressive operational tests

As a part of our plan for more realistic, robust testing, building the test bed in the Pacific region, with five interceptors, is progressing rapidly. Our target for test bed activation is September 2004:

- Contracts were let last year for site prep at Ft. Greely, Alaska, and have been completed
- The next major event is ground breaking for silo construction scheduled for 14 June 2002, the day after ABM Treaty withdrawal takes place
- You may recall during site prep an unknown chemical substance was found near the construction site. The chemicals turned out to be benign, and we executed remediation without incident and without negative public reaction

More testing will occur this summer:

- Next PAC-3 operational test is scheduled for 28 May 2002
- Our second sea-based Aegis intercept test is scheduled for 13 June 2002
- Next ground based test scheduled for late July 2002 and will include Aegis radar system tests that were previously denied under the ABM Treaty

Programs have been restructured or terminated as a result of more oversight by the department – not less:

- Terminated Navy Area Defense for poor performance, looking at alternatives
- Restructured Space Based Infrared System – Low (SBIRS-L) to reflect more evolutionary approach

Major changes in Missile Defense since January 2001 have not been fully accepted by the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC), but have been well supported by Senate & House appropriators and the House Armed Services

Committee (HASC). The Missile Defense FY 2003 budget proposal is under attack in the SASC mark:

- These marks cut \$1.1B of requested items and add \$300M for non-requested activities (net \$814M cut). The cut appears to be used for shipbuilding . Furthermore, oversight requirements frustrate streamlining initiatives
- These reductions significantly delay sea-based long and intermediate range defenses, and specifically target key parts of the program:
 - Reduces \$294M or 29% to System Engineering and Battle Management targeting the National Team strategy for the integrated Ballistic Missile Defense Program
 - Reduces \$146M or 79% to Program Operations that would result in termination of about 340 government and 560 support contractors nationwide (approximately 84% of the 1070 program support personnel)
 - Reduces \$250M or 31% for Boost Phase development, delaying Airborne Laser, killing Space Based Laser, and possibly eliminating kinetic boost phase alternatives
 - Eliminates Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) test missiles that could have provided an emergency capability

BOTTOM LINE: We have had major test successes and, despite some developmental test failures that are to be expected, we are confident that we are on the right track with our Missile Defense Program:

- The threat is real, it is undeniable and it is growing
- The proposed SASC language and marks would seriously undermine this program by not funding missile defense system engineering and integration, crippling our new boost development, eliminating contingency capability, cutting 84% of the Government and support personnel, and by stifling our efforts to streamline management.

May 16, 2002 8:13 AM

TO: Pete Aldridge
Michael Wynne

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Crusader

470

Attached is a paper I got from Bill Graham on leveraging the Crusader technology. It sounds like a good idea to me—why don't you take a good look at it.

Thanks.

Attach.
05/15/02 Graham ltr to SecDef

DHR:dh
051602-9

.....
Please respond by 06/14/02

16 May 02

U17245 02

FAX

SECDEF HAS SEEN

MAY 16 2002

TO: THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: BILL GRAHAM

(b)(6)

Bill

*Y
5/15
T/MELI*

DATE: 5/15/02

SUBJECT: LEVERAGING CRUSADER TECHNOLOGY

MESSAGE:

Mr. Secretary:

The Army is facing difficult challenges in developing the Future Combat System (FCS) in a rapid and efficient manner. I have been working with the Crusader design team for the last year, and have come to the conclusion that much of the technology that team has developed could be used to accelerate development of the FCS. I'm sending you the following pages to help by providing information from the perspective of a technologist.

11-L-0559/OSD/12569

MEMORANDUM

LEVERAGING THE NATION'S INVESTMENT IN CRUSADER'S TECHNOLOGY

With the DOD decision to cancel Crusader, the question now is how to leverage the funds already invested in Crusader technologies to accelerate the process of Army transformation. Whatever the problems of Crusader in terms of size, weight and misalignment with Army objective force goals, much of the technology being developed and demonstrated within the program could be useful in achieving early capability and reducing technical risk for a range of Army objective force systems, including the Future Combat System (FCS).

The Crusader technology base, which collectively had achieved Technology Readiness Levels of 6 to 7 in preparation for the April 2003 SD&D decision, includes:

- Development of a software-defined system with nearly 2 million lines of code produced by experienced software developers. This software is based on an object-oriented, distributed and open architecture and includes a Real-Time Common Operating Environment that supports lethality, mobility, command, control, communications, and intelligence, survivability, sustainment/logistics support, and training.
- Digital network node architecture with automated Battle Management capability for real-time sensor-to-shooter operation.
- Automated operation of armament and ammunition functions, including ammunition selection, handling, loading, electronic fuze setting, propellant zoning, gun pointing, active thermal cooling and laser propellant ignition, producing high rates of precision fire.
- Ability to produce simultaneous impact of multiple rounds on one or more targets.
- A survivability suite including lightweight, composite armor, non-ballistic protection, an active defense system, biological and chemical collective protection, and survivability decision aids to further protect the crew against various threats.
- Global C-17 transportability (2 combat loaded howitzers per C-17).
- Ground speed greater than that of modern U.S. tanks.
- Embedded diagnostics and automated fault management.
- Much of the technology required for large unmanned ground combat vehicles, including a fully robotic indirect fire system for FCS.

• Outlined below is a suggested approach for exploiting the Crusader technology to accelerate the development of the Army's Future Combat System:

- Terminate Crusader in the same way that the DDG-21 was canceled with the entire industrial base transitioned into the DD (X), or in this case into the Non-Line of Sight (indirect fire cannon) component of the Future Combat Systems. Balance the cannon, projectile, and propellant characteristics consistent with Army Objective Force deployability requirements and capabilities.
- Preserve the Crusader design and development team, which has met its cost, schedule and technical objectives. Refocus them on developing the elements of the FCS where they have acquired and demonstrated leading expertise.
- Fund this as a directed FCS non-line-of-sight (NLOS) technology development and risk mitigation effort at the level necessary to meet the Army's accelerated FCS deployment schedule of First Unit Equipped in 2008.
- Provide funds within the FY-04-FY-09 POM to procure 150-200 FCS Block I NLOS cannons by 2009 to serve as FCS test beds, demonstrators and advanced precision strike cannon systems for forward based forces, i.e. Korea and other critical theaters. These FCS Block I NLOS would be used to develop new concepts of operations for the Army objective force through joint experimentation and deployment in realistic threat environments such as Korea. They would initially be manned systems, except for a few experimental unmanned vehicles, with the ability to become completely unmanned in the FCS Block II NLOS.
- Accelerate development of various advanced munitions and munition systems such as Excalibur, Guided MLRS, and Net Fires. Restart production of an improved SADARM.

The plan outlined above reflects the "build a little, test a little, deploy a little, learn a lot" philosophy necessary to implement military transformation. In addition, and perhaps of equal importance, it provides a prudent approach for providing U.S. military forces with a critical element of the joint engagement capability they are going to need to handle surprise and unpredictability on future 21st century battlefields, whether urban, mountainous, forested, or desert.



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

Honorable William R. Graham
NSR, Inc.
1523 16th St., NW
Washington, DC 20036


Dear Bill,

Thanks so much for your note on leveraging
Crusader technology.

Mike Wynne and Pete Aldridge are working along
that line already. You might want to give them a call.

Thanks so much, my friend.

Regards,



11-L-0559/OSD/12572

May 16, 2002 7:35 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Singapore

Singapore

Please draft a nice letter to the Senior Minister of Singapore in response to this note, that I valued having him stop by, I look forward to meeting him again and I found his arguments persuasive and will certainly work here along the lines we discussed.

Thanks.

Attach.
05/15/02 Singapore ltr to SecDef

DHR:dh
051602-7

.....
Please respond by 05/24/02

16 May 02

U17246 02

5/15
Ys/15

D

Senior Minister
Singapore

15 May 2002

SECDEF HAS SEEN

Dear Defence Secretary Rumsfeld

MAY 16 2002

May I thank you for giving me so much of your time on problems which were not urgent but could become extremely difficult if they are not dealt with in time.

Since then one of the militants, Jaffar Umar had been detained not because he has wrought terror through his Laskar Jihad killing thousands of Christians in the Moluccas but on a charge that he had threatened in a speech that was tape-recorded, to kill President Sukamo's family (which includes President Megawati).

I left Washington reassured after my meetings with the President, the Vice-President and you. You were all seized with the problem in spite of the urgent and pressing issues between Israelis and Palestinians, weapons of mass destruction in Iraq and the nervousness of the oil states.

With warmest regards.

Yours sincerely

Lee Kuan Yew

The Honourable Donald Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
1000 Defense Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301-1000
United States of America
Fax: (b)(6)

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May 16, 2002 7:23 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Kazakhstan

When did Kazakhstan move its capital from Almaty to some other place, and where did they move it to?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
051602-3

.....
Please respond by _____

- 5/17
- Almaty used to be the capital
- In 1998 (December), the government moved the capital to Astana.
- Astana is where you met with Nazarbaev last month.

Di Rita
Larry Di Rita
5/16

KAZAKHSTAN

16 May 02

U17247 02

Kazakhstan



Introduction Geography People Government Economy Communications Transportation Military Transnational Issues Print This Frame



Kazakhstan Introduction

Top of Page

Background: Native Kazakhs, a mix of Turkic and Mongol nomadic tribes who migrated into the region in the 13th century, were rarely united as a single nation. The area was conquered by Russia in the 18th century and Kazakhstan became a Soviet Republic in 1936. During the 1950s and 1960s agricultural "Virgin Lands" program, Soviet citizens were encouraged to help cultivate Kazakhstan's northern pastures. This influx of immigrants (mostly Russians, but also some other deported nationalities) skewed the ethnic mixture and enabled non-Kazakhs to outnumber natives. Independence has caused many of these newcomers to emigrate. Current issues include: developing a cohesive national identity; expanding the development of the country's vast energy resources and exporting them to world markets; and continuing to strengthen relations with neighboring states and other foreign powers.

Kazakhstan Geography

Top of Page

Location: Central Asia, northwest of China

Geographic coordinates: 48 00 N, 68 00 E

Map references: Commonwealth of Independent States

Area: total: 2,717,300 sq km

land: 2,669,800 sq km

water: 47,500 sq km

Area - comparative: slightly less than four times the size of Texas

local long form: Qazaqstan Respublikasy

local short form: none

former: Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic

Government type: republic

Capital: Astana; note - the government moved from Almaty to Astana in December 1998

Administrative divisions: 14 oblystar (singular - oblysy) and 3 cities (qala, singular - qalasy)*; Almaty, Almaty*, Aqmola (Astana), Aqtobe, Astana*, Atyrau, Batys Qazaqstan (Oral), Bayqongyr*, Mangghystau (Aqtau; formerly Shevchenko), Ongtustik Qazaqstan (Shymkent), Pavlodar, Qaraghandy, Qostanay, Qyzylorda, Shyghys Qazaqstan (Oskemen; formerly Ust'-Kamenogorsk), Soltustik Qazaqstan (Petropavl), Zhambyl (Taraz; formerly Dzhambul)

note: administrative divisions have the same names as their administrative centers (exceptions have the administrative center name following in parentheses); in 1995 the Governments of Kazakhstan and Russia entered into an agreement whereby Russia would lease for a period of 20 years an area of 6,000 sq km enclosing the Baykonur space launch facilities and the city of Bayqongyr (Baykonur, formerly Leninsk)

Independence: 16 December 1991 (from the Soviet Union)

National holiday: Republic Day, 25 October (1990)

Constitution: adopted by national referendum 30 August 1995; first post-independence constitution was adopted 28 January 1993

Legal system: based on civil law system

Suffrage: 18 years of age; universal

Executive branch: *chief of state:* President Nursultan A. NAZARBAYEV (chairman of the Supreme Soviet from 22 February 1990, elected president 1 December 1991)

head of government: Prime Minister Kazymzhomart TOKAYEV (since 2 October 1999)

cabinet: Council of Ministers appointed by the president

elections: president elected by popular vote for a seven-year term; election last held 10 January 1999, a year before it was previously scheduled (next to be held NA 2006); *note* - President NAZARBAYEV's previous term had been extended to 2000 by a nationwide referendum held 30 April 1995; prime minister and first deputy prime minister appointed by the president

election results: Nursultan A. NAZARBAYEV reelected president; percent of vote - Nursultan A. NAZARBAYEV 81.7%, Serikbolsyn ABDILDIN 12.1%, Gani KASYMOV 4.7%, other 1.5%

note: President NAZARBAYEV expanded his presidential powers by decree: only he can initiate constitutional amendments, appoint and dismiss the government, dissolve Parliament, call referenda at his discretion, and appoint administrative heads of regions and cities

Legislative branch: bicameral Parliament consists of the Senate (47 seats; 7 senators are appointed by the president; other members are popularly elected, two from each of the former oblasts and the former capital of Almaty, to serve six-year terms) and the Majilis (67 seats; the

5/17
11:00

Snowflake

May 16, 2002 7:14 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Pillsbury

9/22

There is an article in the *Early Bird* about Pillsbury interpreting for me at the meeting with Vice President Hu, and that we blocked the door from the State Department translator.

China

What the heck is going on?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
051602-2

.....
Please respond by 05/24/02

5/20

U17248 02

SECRET-

- Pillsbury was permitted into the meeting because he has excellent language skills and was the only DoD participant who did. I made that decision, which was then extrapolated by someone to mean we did not need the State Department translator we had requested for the meeting.
- The State Department translator arrived anyway, but was kept out in order to keep the numbers of participants on each side down. The state Department translator remained in the guest waiting area with other DoD and Chinese officials who did not attend the Hu-Rumsfeld meeting.
- The allegation that Pillsbury misinterpreted is not borne out by the Chinese press accounts at the meeting which match truth and D. Rita

16 May 02

11-L-0559/OSD/M 2578

continued support for extremist Islamic groups waging a holy war to drive India from Kashmir, India's only Muslim majority state.

In January, General Musharraf banned several militant Islamic groups, including some that have sent fighters across the border into Indian-ruled Kashmir. Diplomats say that most of these groups continue to function, however, often simply changing their names.

"All that I can at this point say is that it's a situation which calls for punishment," India's defense minister, George Fernandes, said today at a news conference in Jammu. "What that punishment should be is something that will need to be deliberated upon."

But Pakistan's information minister, Nisar Memon, today rejected responsibility for the latest killings. "Pakistan itself is a victim of terrorism," he said. "We will not allow any group or organization to use Pakistani soil against any country."

Reflecting the balancing act at the heart of her mission, Ms. Rocca strongly condemned the Kashmir attack while still in New Delhi, calling it barbaric. "Acts like this are intended to undermine peace in the region," she said. "I think acts that occurred in Jammu are terrorism."

"No matter what the levels are, infiltration must stop," she added, referring to what Indian officials say have been scores of incursions in recent months by Islamic fighters into its side of Kashmir.

But Pakistan is also essential to the United States campaign against Al Qaeda holdouts in Afghanistan and Pakistan itself. Mindful of those priorities, once she arrived in Islamabad this evening, Ms. Rocca expressed "great respect" for General Musharraf's cooperation in fighting terrorism.

The report that Pakistan may have prepared its nuclear weapons during its last confrontation with India offered scant detail, but it provided new reason for caution during the current high tensions.

The report, by Bruce Riedel, who was special assis-

tant to President Bill Clinton, was published by the Center for the Advanced Study of India at the University of Pennsylvania.

In it, Mr. Riedel says that Pakistan's prime minister at the time, Nawaz Sharif, flew to Washington and met with President Clinton on July 4, 1999, desperate to find a way out of a conflict that threatened to turn into a full-scale war.

"Clinton asked Sharif if he knew how advanced the threat of nuclear war was," Mr. Riedel wrote in the paper. "Did Sharif know his military was preparing their nuclear tipped missiles?"

In an interview today, Mr. Clinton's national security adviser, Samuel R. Berger, said that Mr. Sharif "was surprised by the fact, or perhaps surprised that we knew the fact."

The Pakistani prime minister pressed Mr. Clinton to act as a mediator, but the United States rejected that role, Mr. Berger said. Mr. Sharif agreed in any case to withdraw the Pakistani forces unconditionally, and the crisis was defused.

Asked about Mr. Riedel's account, Mr. Berger noted that the United States was worried that neither India nor Pakistan "understood each other's doctrine or capabilities, and therefore misunderstood each other's red lines," the actions that could prompt a nuclear response. Bush administration officials have said in recent months that they share the same fear.

Some experts and Indian military officials said today that they doubted Pakistan actually coupled its missiles with warheads. V. P. Malik, who was India's army chief at the time, said he had no such intelligence, nor did the Americans share what they knew with India.

George Perkovich, a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, said he, too, doubted that the Pakistanis went that far. They may have moved the missiles around, he speculated, as a way to grab American attention in hopes that the United States would intervene on Pakistan's behalf.

But Mr. Riedel's retelling, and Mr. Berger's comments, indicated that President Clinton's success in convincing Mr. Sharif to pull back from the conflict may nonetheless have averted a possible nuclear catastrophe.

"I thought that this was a very dangerous moment," Mr. Berger said.

Far Eastern Economic Review
May 23, 2002

40. Translation Error At The Pentagon?

After a historic May 1 meeting with United States Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld, Chinese Vice-President Hu Jintao emerged with what Pentagon spokesmen later said was a mistaken impression of what Rumsfeld said. A controversial China hawk's role as interpreter suggests a possible reason for the confusion. Rumsfeld's translator was Michael Pillsbury, a Pentagon contractor who works on China policy and has close ties to senior Pentagon leaders. He has ruffled feathers among Pentagon staff because he operates outside the official Asia-policy chain of command. Pillsbury is credited with strong Chinese-language skills, but not those of a professional interpreter.

On the day of the meeting, in what Washington analysts see as a snub to the State Department, guards barred the official State Department interpreter assigned to the meeting from entering the Pentagon. This followed Rumsfeld's unusual decision to bar State Department officials from the meeting. He relented only for U.S. ambassador to China Clark Randt, a close friend of President George W. Bush. Pillsbury filled in as interpreter, and Hu, who does not speak English, emerged believing that Rumsfeld had agreed to resume routine military-to-military relations, ending the policy of case-by-case reviews of military exchanges with China that Rumsfeld put in place early last year.

"Chinese vice-president, U.S. defence secretary agree to resume military exchanges," was the headline of the official Xinhua news agency's story on

the meeting. Pentagon spokesmen later said all that was agreed was that representatives of both sides would meet to discuss the military relationship. Assistant Secretary of Defence Peter Rodman is expected to travel to Beijing for that discussion later in the year.

Washington Post
May 16, 2002

Pg. 22

41. U.S. Seeks Court Immunity For E. Timor Peacekeepers

By Colum Lynch, Special to The Washington Post

UNITED NATIONS, May 15 -- The United States is seeking assurances from the United Nations that all U.N. personnel serving in a peacekeeping mission in East Timor would be shielded from prosecution by a local court or international tribunal on war crimes charges, according to U.S. and other Western officials.

The move, which is being resisted by leading U.S. allies, is the first concrete effort by the Bush administration to protect American citizens serving in U.N. operations from prosecution by the International Criminal Court, which will convene in July.

The administration renounced its support for the court last week out of concern that the world's first permanent war crimes tribunal might prosecute U.S. soldiers or other Americans serving overseas. It said it will seek agreements around the world barring U.S. citizens from being extradited to the court, which has the support of many of the United States' closest allies, including nearly all NATO members.

But the U.S. initiative at the United Nations would go further, extending broad criminal immunity to all international officials serving in the U.N. mission in East Timor. Responsibility for punishing wrongdoing would be left to the alleged offenders' governments.

The United States has no combat troops serving in U.N. missions. U.S. officials ac-

May 16, 2002 7:12 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
VADM Giambastiani
(b)(6)

CC: Powell Moore

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *[Signature]*

SUBJECT: Calls from Congress

032

I have to get a piece of paper telling me every single member of the House or Senate who ever calls in here for anything—what it is, what they want, do they want a meeting and how it is being handled, so that I can decide if I like the way it is being handled.

Thanks.

DHR.dh
051602-1

.....
Please respond by 05/24/02

[Signature] (b)(6) 5/17

Let's discuss how to organize this.
[Signature] 16 May 02

U17250 02

11-L-0559/OSD/12580

May 15, 2002 9:04 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Testimony

Please make sure the points in Inhofe's remarks here are answered in the testimony, not directly by naming him, but are answered.

Make sure the testimony also says that this is not a decision against the Army or against artillery.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
051502-10

.....
Please respond by _____

Done 5/16
Larry Di Rita

Crusader is vital weapon

Opposing view:
War fighters want it, and they're the ones who know best.

By James M. Inhofe

Those who use inaccurate media statements to argue that Crusader is too big and not transitional are not listening to the soldiers who are responsible for fighting with the system. Army civilian and military leaders have testified that the war fighter needs the Crusader system. Simply put, I support the war fighters.

There has been no credible analysis or testimony against the Crusader. The Defense Department has only presented alternatives that will improve the accuracy, lethality and deployability of our military. The problem is that most of what they propose is based on a false premise.

Army Secretary Benjamin M. Motes at his May 7 press conference said "the requirement for indirect fire systems to support the United States Army across the full spectrum of conflict, 24/7, all-weather, tactical operational ranges, precise and mass targets, complex and difficult terrain is solid and has to be met." Asked whether the alternatives the department proposes met these requirements, he said "I don't know. That's what we're going to have to find out."

Accelerating the production of rockets and missiles will not fix the problem. Rockets and missiles are not as responsive as artillery; their effects are diminished in difficult terrain and most importantly they cannot be used in close proximity to friendly troops. The reality is that our combat forces need a balance of rockets, missiles and cannon artillery to meet a wide range of missions and battlefield situations.

The president included Crusader in his budget request for next fiscal year. The Army made force-structure and funding sacrifices to keep it fully funded. The Army clearly wants Crusader and has testified it needs the system to be part of its transformation. Arguments that experience in Afghanistan caused the Defense Department to re-examine priorities are clearly refuted by testimony by the vice chief of staff when talking about Operation Anacapa. Without proper support, Crusader's combat effectiveness will be significantly reduced. The Department's current proposal represents the best investment in our military.

Our mission is to provide the most effective and accurate fire support systems available. Crusader and other indirect fire systems are the backbone of our combat and are essential to our success.

Sen. James M. Inhofe is a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee. His e-mail address is inhofe@sen.gov.

4770

15 May 02

U17251 02

May 15, 2002 7:11 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D*
SUBJECT: Treaty

Why don't we use something on the treaty for one of my early press briefings sometime between now and the time the President signs it.

Thanks.

Attach.
Talking Points

DHR:dh
051502-5

.....
Please respond by 05/24/01

DUSSDA

15 May 02

U17253 02

11-L-0559/OSD/12582

May 13, 2002

MAY 15 2002

Talking points re: US-Russian strategic arms treaty
For use with Senators Levin and Warner

- **New type of arms accord.** This treaty is a new type of arms agreement, well-suited to the current era and to the new US-Russian relationship.
 - Not a Cold-War-style treaty.
- **No protracted negotiations.** It was produced quickly (Cold War arms treaties often took years).
- **Embodies unilateral pledges.** Essence of the new treaty is to create a framework in which each party takes the reductions that its president unilaterally promised to take.
- **Structure vs. flexibility.** So it strikes a sensible balance between the parties' desire for some structure in their relationship and their strategic need for flexibility.
- **A treaty for non-hostile parties.** The brevity, lack of formality, lack of precise numbers and lack of verification mechanisms reflects the crucial strategic fact that the parties are not hostile to each other.
 - The goal is *not* to try to preserve a balance of nuclear terror.
 - Exact balancing of each side's arms against the other's is not necessary.
- **Openness and predictability.** The treaty's goal is to create a degree of openness and predictability in this area of the US-Russian relationship.
- **Treaty, not executive agreement.** The agreement has taken the form of a treaty because the Administration respects the Senate's constitutional role.

- The President decided that a treaty is the appropriate form given the substance of the agreement – that is, given that the agreement involves limitations on strategic nuclear weapons.
- **A piece of the new framework.** The new treaty should help promote the new, cooperative, open relationship between the US and Russia that President Bush desires.

software

May 15, 2002 6:45 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Science Boards

334

Please get someone to think through how we might have the Army, Navy and Air Force combine their science boards into one and try to start getting more joint.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
051502-1

.....
Please respond by 05/24/02

Done
7/23
Done

15 May 02

U17255 02

11-L-0559/OSD/12585

SHOW/PARe

10/15 1:530

SEC
2002 OCT 12 11:32 AM

October 5, 2002 1:32 PM

10/21

TO: Jim Haynes
CC: Peter Rodman
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Serviceman's Protection Act

292

Whatever happened to the Serviceman's Protection Act?

I am concerned that there is not enough going on to protect people like Henry Kissinger and other officials after they leave office. In my view, if the U.S. is not prosecuting those people, then the U.S. government ought to be willing to pay their legal fees.

Please get together with Peter Rodman and get a good sense of what is going on, and let's see what we do.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
100502-7

.....

Please respond by 10/25/02

*10/20
Haynes response attached*

SOCT02

October 10, 2002 7:08 AM

C/10/21

TO: Larry Di Rita
CC: Powell Moore
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Retiring Members

I want to think about if I want to invite down some other retiring Members of the House and Senate.

Thanks. *Show me the list of retirees*

032

DHR:dh
101002-3

.....
Please respond by 10/18/02

10/21
MOORE RESPONSE ATTACHED

112

10 Oct 02

U17298 / 02

10/18 1300



LEGISLATIVE
AFFAIRS

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1300

SECDEF HAS SEEN

OCT 22 2002

UNCLASSIFIED

INFO MEMO

October 18, 2002 10:10 AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Powell A. Moore

Handwritten signature of Powell A. Moore

SUBJECT: List of retiring Members of Congress reference Snowflake # 101002-3

Handwritten initials and date: PAW 10/19

- You requested a list of all retiring Members of Congress.
- Attached is a list from the *Roll Call* website.

Handwritten number: 032

Attachment:
As stated

UNCLASSIFIED


Prepared By: Claude Chafin, OSD-LA, Special Assistant for Communications

(b)(6)

Handwritten number: 180702

11-L-0559/OSD/12588

U17299 / 02



October 1, 2002

THE ROLL CALL Casualty List

House

Senate

Expelled

Rep. James Traficant (D-Ohio), 61, 9 terms

Appointed to other office

Asa Hutchinson (R-Ark.), 51, 3 terms

Tony Hall (D-Ohio.), 60, 12 terms

Running for Governor

John Baldacci (D-Maine), 47, 4 terms

David Bonior (D-Mich.), 56, 13 terms

Tom Barrett (D-Wis.), 48, 5 terms

Bob Riley (R-Ala.), 57, 3 terms

Frank Murkowski (R-Alaska), 69, 4 terms **

Rod Blagojevich (D-Ill.), 45, 3 terms

Van Hilleary (R-Tenn.), 42, 4 terms

Bob Ehrlich (R-Md.), 44, 4 terms

Running for Senate

Bob Clement (D-Tenn.), 58, 8 terms

Saxby Chambliss (R-Ga.), 58, 4 terms

Greg Ganske (R-Iowa), 53, 4 terms

Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.), 46, 4 terms

John Thune (R-S.D.), 40, 3 terms

John Sununu (R-N.H.), 37, 3 terms

John Cooksey (R-La.), 60, 3 terms

Breaking News

NEWS

OPINION

POLITICS

Policy Briefings

Special Features

Defeated in Primary

Bob Barr (R-Ga.), 53, 4 terms

Sen. Bob Smith (R-N.H.), 61,
2 termsCynthia McKinney (D-Ga.), 42, 5
terms

Lynn Rivers (D-Mich.), 46, 4 terms

Gary Condit (D-Calif.), 54, 10 terms

Tom Sawyer (D-Ohio.), 62, 8 terms

Brian Kerns (R-Ind.), 44, 1 term

Frank Mascara (D-Pa.), 72, 4 terms

Earl Hilliard (D-Ala.), 60, 5 terms

Retiring

William Coyne (D-Pa.), 65, 11 terms

Phil Gramm (R-Texas), 59, 3
terms

Dan Miller (R-Fla.), 59, 5 terms

Jesse Helms (R-N.C.), 80, 5
terms ✓

Tim Roemer (D-Ind.), 44, 6 terms

Strom Thurmond (R-S.C.),
98, 8 terms

Steve Horn (R-Calif.), 70, 5 terms

Fred Thompson (R-Tenn.), 59,
2 terms ✓Marge Roukema (R-N.J.), 72, 11
termsBob Torricelli (D-N.J.), 51, 1
term

Eva Clayton (D-N.C.), 67, 5 terms

Bob Schaffer (R-Colo.), 39, 3 terms

Dick Armey (R-Texas.), 61, 9 terms

Wes Watkins (R-Okla.), 63, 10 terms

Joe Skeen (R-N.M.), 74, 11 terms

James Hansen (R-Utah.), 69, 11
terms

Sonny Callahan (R-Ala.), 69, 9 terms

Robert Borksi (D-Pa.), 53, 10 terms

Bob Stump (R-Ariz.), 75, 13 terms

John LaFalce (D-N.Y.), 62, 14 terms

J.C. Watts (R-Okla.), 44, four terms

Benjamin Gilman (R-N.Y.), 80, 15
terms

Carrie Meek (D-Fla.), 76, 5 terms

Resigned to run for Governor

Steve Largent (R-Okla.), 47, 4 terms

Retiring to run for state Senate

James Barcia (D-Mich.), 50, 5 terms

Resigned

Joe Scarborough (R-Fla.), 39, 4 terms

Bud Shuster (R-Pa.), 70, 15 terms

Defeated for other office

Ken Bentsen (D-Texas), 42, 4 terms

Ed Bryant (R-Tenn.), 53, 4 terms

Died

Patsy Mink (D-Hawaii), 74, 13 terms***

Julian Dixon (D-Calif.), 66, 12 terms

Joe Moakley (D-Mass.), 74, 15 terms

Floyd Spence (R-S.C.), 73, 16 terms

Norman Sisisky (D-Va.), 73, 10 terms

**** Senate term does not expire until 2004**

***** nonconsecutive terms**

Current Politics Index

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[Home](#)

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May 31, 2002 9:12 AM

TO: Doug Feith
CC: STEVE CAMBONE
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Ivanov and Georgia

I have to get ready to talk to Sergei Ivanov about Georgia, on the side at NATO.
My guess is that I ought to listen carefully.

Whoever was in the meeting at the PC yesterday ought to help prepare it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
053102-21

.....
Please respond by 06/03/02

Georgia

31 May 02

U17304 02

May 31, 2002 9:08 AM

TO: Pete Aldridge
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Potential Technology

400.112

Please take a look at this note my son-in-law gave me from a friend of his. Tell me what you think about it, and then I will get back to them.

Thank you very much.

Attach.
05/30/02 (b)(6) to SecDef re: Mobile Mirror Device

DHR:dh
053102-20

.....
Please respond by 06/14/02

31 May 02

U17305 02

11-L-0559/OSD/12593

5.28.02

SECDEF HAS SEEN

MAY 31 2002

Don,

Here is the file from

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

that I mentioned I

had.

It has already been passed along to Peter Aldridge as I mentioned to you.

Paul

(b)(6)
(b)(6)

April 30, 2002

Dear Secretary Rumsfeld:

Enclosed is a letter from Dr. George Geodecke describing the possibility that my mobile mirror device may be used to brake the super symmetry of the Zero Point Field. The amount of energy released in a this type of symmetry braking event would be so significant that it could be a very important national defense issue. The reaction force of such an event would also serve as the ideal space drive. For these and other reasons, I believe that this device should now be considered an item of national security even in the pre-verification stage and treated accordingly.

Sincerely,

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

May 11, 2002

From our most recent calculations of a Moving Mirror Device, it appears that there is a reasonable the likely hood that the device could cause a disruption in the field responsible for holding atoms and molecules together. Should a disruption of this magnitude occur an enormous amount of energy would be released. A Moving Mirror Device one cubic meter in size, accessing only a small fraction of this field, could release the same amount of energy of an atomic bomb.

In researching the available literature on a "gravity like" effect, I have come across references to several devices that operate on principals related to the Moving Mirror Device. These devices are similar in that they use superconductors that are forced into the normal state by electric currents and or magnetic fields. It also appears that these researchers do not yet understand the full implications of the research that they are doing nor do they have a full theoretical understanding of the principles involved.

Marc G. Millis, NASA Glenn Research Center, "The Challenge To Create The Space Drive" In Journal of Propulsion and Power (AIAA), Vol. 13, No. 5, pp. 577-682, (Sept.-Oct.1997).
<http://www.grc.nasa.gov/WWW/bpp/TM-107289.htm>

B. Haisch, A. Rueda, "The Zero-Point Field and the NASA Challenge to Create the Space Drive", presented at NASA Breakthrough Propulsion Physics Workshop, NASA Lewis Res. Ctr., Aug. 12-14, 1997
http://www.calphysics.org/articles/zpf_millis.pdf

E. Podkletnov and R. Nieminen et al, "A possibility of gravitational force shielding by bulk $YBa_2Cu_3O_{7-x}$ Superconductor", Physica C, 203 (1992) 441-444

Carlos Calvet "Gravitation and Inertia as a Consequence of Quantum Vacuum Energy", *Francisco Corbera no. 15, E-08360 Canet de Mar (Barcelona), Spain* <http://www.alien.de/hyperspace/ugc-ce.htm>

Podkletnov Eugene, Modanese Giovanni "Impulse Gravity Generator ? Based on Charged $YBa_2Cu_3O_{7-y}$ Superconductor with Composite Crystal Structure" Courtesy: Los Alamos National Laboratory
<http://superconductors.org/gravity.htm>

Gravitational Repulsion Effect Claimed <http://slasbdot.org/science/01/08/07/1333218.shtml>

Podkletnov Eugene, Modanese Giovanni "Impulse Gravity Generator Based on Charged $Ba_2Cu_3O_{7-y}$ Superconductor with Composite Crystal Structure" <http://ocx.lanl.gov/abs/physics/0108005>

BEYOND $E=mc^2$ A first glimpse of a postmodern physics, in which mass, inertia and gravity arise from underlying electromagnetic processes Bernard Haisch, Alfonso Rueda & H.E. Puthoff published in THE SCIENCES, Vol. 34, No. 6, November / December 1994, pp. 26-31 copyright 1994, New York Academy of Sciences (posted with permission) <http://www.calphysics.org/haisch/sciences.html>

Proprietary

(b)(6)

COLLEGE OF ARTS AND SCIENCES

Department of Physics, MSC 3D
New Mexico State University
P.O. Box 30001
Las Cruces, NM 88003-8001

*1 of 4
(781) 899-1571*



(b)(6)

April 3, 2002

To Whom It May Concern:

I am writing in support of (b)(6) and his project. Below, I have taken the time to introduce myself, discuss my involvement with the project, and outline its practical value.

I completed a BEE in 1954 and a Ph.D. in Physics in 1961 at Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute. I accepted a position on the Physics faculty at New Mexico State University in 1961. From 1988-95, I was the Physics Department Head. I have received several grants and consultancies from the Army Research Laboratory and the Army Research Office.

During 40 years of academic teaching and research, I've taught graduate courses, many times each, in classical mechanics, classical electromagnetism, special and general relativity, scattering theory, quantum mechanics and electrodynamics, statistical mechanics, plasma physics, solid state physics, mathematical methods, and numerical analysis. I've also done theoretical research in most of these areas.

Currently (Spring 2002) I'm teaching our graduate course in mathematical methods of physics. I'm also actively working in three areas: Casimir forces and the zero point field; electromagnetism; and atmospheric turbulence and its effects on sound propagation and scattering. The last effort has been sponsored by the Army Research Office for nine years, with grants continuing and just funded, and involves collaborators at NOAA and the Army Research Laboratory. It has resulted in some significant new developments (see the list of publications below), but they are peripheral to Chris Cooper's project.

My work in electromagnetism has spanned four decades. Much of it is directly or indirectly related to Chris's project, as is my interest and work on Casimir forces and other effects of the zero point field. (See the list of relevant publications below.) My main contribution to the project thus far is a fully relativistic derivation of the reflection of a nearly monochromatic pulse of radiation (pulse of length L , wavelength λ , $L \gg \lambda$) by a moving mirror. The derivation predicts the appropriate Doppler shifting and reflected intensities, pulse lengths, reaction forces, and all momentum and energy transfers. It is not yet published. The derivation shows clearly that, if a mirror can be made to move at any desired speed up to the limiting speed of light, then almost any desired frequency of a reflected laser beam can be obtained, as well as very high reflected intensities. Almost any desired frequency modulation can be attained by using appropriate variations of the mirror velocity.

Clearly one cannot move a solid metal surface at extremely high speeds in the laboratory. (b)(6) idea to use a moving interface between superconducting and normal phases in a superconductor, with motion of the interface caused by moving a magnetic field strong enough to cause the superconducting-normal transition, seems very plausible. Such an interface acts like a mirror. I will be working on the theory and device modeling for this kind of moving interface. Even more promising and exciting is the possibility that a moving mirror device could tap into the huge (infinite) amount of energy in the quantum zero-point (vacuum) field. This is

Proprietary

(b)(6)

2 of 4

(b)(6)

the main theoretical aspect, strongly related to Casimir forces, that I plan to work on in support of the project. So far my thoughts on this possibility include the ideas that i) only if there is a high-frequency cutoff on the zero-point field energy spectrum can a uniformly moving mirror be distinguished from a stationary one, because the field's energy spectrum is otherwise Lorentz invariant, and ii) an accelerating (oscillating) mirror may be able to obtain energy from the photon vacuum, because then Lorentz invariance is not possible, and the instantaneous reflection coefficients and Doppler shifts are nonlinear functions of the instantaneous mirror velocity.

It's clear that there are innumerable applications for continuously variable frequency laser light. Chris Cooper's device should provide this. If his device or any other programmable moving mirror device can also access a significant amount of energy from the zero-point field, that will be a true bonanza.

I think that (b)(6) has had a very, very good idea, and I hope that funding will be made available to pursue it.

Sincerely yours,



George H. Goedecke
Emeritus Professor of Physics

Proprietary

(b)(6)

5 of 9

SELECTED PUBLICATIONS, Dr. George H. Goedecke

(b)(6)

A. Publications relevant to the project.

- G. Goedecke, "On Energy Absorption in Classical Electromagnetism," *Am. J. Phys.* 69, 226-228, (2001).
- G. Goedecke, "On Electromagnetic Conservation Laws," *Am. J. Phys.* 68, 380-384 (2001).
- G. Goedecke and R. Wood, "Casimir-Polder Interaction at Finite Temperatures," *Phys. Rev. A* 60, 2577-2580 (2001).
- G. Goedecke, "Magnetic Dipole Orientation Energetics," *Am. J. Phys.* 67, 45-51 (1999).
- G. Goedecke, "Representation of Arbitrary Charge-Current Densities by Polarization and Magnetization Fields," *Am. J. Phys.* 69, 226-228 (1998).
- G.H. Goedecke and S.G. O'Brien, "Scattering by Irregular Inhomogeneous Particles via the Digitized Green Function Algorithm," *Appl. Opt.* 27, 2431 (1988); and two other papers in the same issue.
- G.H. Goedecke, "Stochastic Electrodynamics I: On the Stochastic Zero-Point Field," *Found. Phys.* 13, 1101 (1983); plus two other papers in v. 13 and another in v. 14, on the same topic.
- G.H. Goedecke, "Radiative Transfer in Closely Packed Media," *J. Opt. Soc. Am.* 67, 1399 (1977).
- G.H. Goedecke, "Classical Dynamics for Charged Particles," *Nuovo Cimento B*, 28, 225 (1975), another paper on this topic in the same journal in 1975, and two in 1984 in *Lettere at Nuovo Cimento*.
- G.H. Goedecke, "On Global Embedding," *J. Math. Phys.* 15, 789-791 (1974).
- G.H. Goedecke, "On Stress-Energy Tensors," *J. Math. Phys.* 15, 792-794 (1974).
- G.H. Goedecke, "Classically Radiationless Motions and Possible Implications for Quantum Theory," *Phys. Rev.* 135B, 282 (1964), and another on this topic with J.B. Arnett in *Phys. Rev.* 168, 1424 (1968).

B. Other recent publications (1997-present) and submissions

- G. Goedecke, V. Ostashev, D.K. Wilson, and H. Auvermann, "Quasi-wavelet model of von Kármán spectrum of turbulent velocity fluctuations," submitted in March 2002 to *Boundary Layer Meteorology*. Also an invited paper to be presented at the 143rd annual meeting of The Acoustical Society of America in Pittsburgh, PA, 2002, and a paper to be presented at the Ninth International Congress on Sound and Vibration, Orlando, FL (2002).
- G. Goedecke, D.K. Wilson, V. Ostashev, and H. Auvermann, "Quasi-wavelet models for atmospheric turbulence," paper to be presented at the 2002 American Meteorological Society Symposium on Boundary Layers and Turbulence, Wageningen, Netherlands.

Proprietor

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

V. Ostashev, D.K. Wilson, and G.H. Goedecke, "Spherical wave propagation through inhomogeneous, anisotropic turbulence: studies of log-amplitude and phase fluctuations," submitted in Feb. 2002 to *J. Acoust. Soc. Am.*

G. Goedecke, R. Wood, H. Auvermann, V. Ostashev, D. Havelock, and C. Ting, "Spectral Broadening of Sound Scattered by Advecting Atmospheric Turbulence," *J. Acoust. Soc. Am.* 109, Pt. 1, 1923-1934 (2001).

V. Ostashev, D. Hohenwarter, K. Attenborough, Ph. Blanc-Benton, D. Juvé, and G. Goedecke, "On the Refraction Law for a Sound Ray in a Moving Medium," *Acustica* 87, 303-306 (2001).

G. Goedecke, S. Moore, H. Auvermann, and V. Ostashev, "Quasi-Wavelet Model of Anisotropic Atmospheric Turbulence," BACIMO 2002, Fort Collins, CO, 10-12 July (to be published in proceedings).

V. Ostashev, D. Wilson, and G. Goedecke, "Sound Propagation and Scattering Through Inhomogeneous, Anisotropic Turbulence," BACIMO 2001, Fort Collins, CO, 10-12 July (to be published).

V. Ostashev, T. Georges, S. Clifford, and G. Goedecke, "Acoustic Sounding of Wind Velocity Profiles in a Stratified Moving Atmosphere," *J. Acoust. Soc. Am.*, 109, 2682-2692 (2001).

V.E. Ostashev, G.H. Goedecke, and R.C. Wood, "Scattering of Sound in a Stratified Moving Atmosphere," Acoustical Society of America Meeting and 2nd Forum Acusticum, Berlin 1999.

V.E. Ostashev and G.H. Goedecke, "Sound Propagation Near the Ground in a Turbulent Atmosphere," Acoustical Society of America Meeting and 2nd Forum Acusticum, Berlin 1999.

V.E. Ostashev, G.H. Goedecke, R.C. Wood, H. Auvermann, and S. Clifford, "Sound Scattering Cross-Section in a Stratified Moving Atmosphere," *J. Acoust. Soc. Am.* 105, 3115-3125 (1999).

V.E. Ostashev and G.H. Goedecke, "Interference of Direct and Ground Reflected Waves in a Turbulent Atmosphere," *Proc. 8th Intern. Symp. on Long Range Sound Propagation*, Penn State University, p. 313-325 (1998).

V.E. Ostashev, G.H. Goedecke, R.C. Wood, H. Auvermann, and S. Clifford, "The Effects of Temperature and Wind Velocity Stratification on Sound Scattering Cross-Section in a Turbulent Atmosphere," *Proc. 8th Intern. Symp. on Long Range Sound Propagation*, Penn State University, p. 363-374 (1998).

V.E. Ostashev and G.H. Goedecke, "Sound Scattering Cross-Section for von Kármán Spectra of Temperature and Wind Velocity Fluctuations," Proceedings 1997 Battlespace Atmospheric Conference, San Diego, 171-180.

V.E. Ostashev and G.H. Goedecke, "Sound Propagation in the Turbulent Atmosphere," BAC 97, San Diego (1997).

G.H. Goedecke and H.J. Auvermann, "Acoustic Scattering by Atmospheric Turbulence," *J. Acoust. Soc. Am.* 109, Pt. 1, 759-771 (1997).

May 31, 2002 11:42 AM

TO: Steve Cambone
CC: Powell Moore
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Brief Congress on SIOP

Handwritten signatures and initials

MITG by 7/15

381 SIOP

Senator Levin raised the issue of whether and to what extent DoD is willing to brief Congress on the SIOP.

We need to get a plan.

Thanks.

DHR.dh
053102-19

.....
Please respond by 06/14/02

6/21/02

Handwritten signature in a circle with date 6/21 and name Larry Di Rita

See attached response.

*SP3 6/21 2/19/02
31 May 02*

U17306 02



ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
2900 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2900

EF1865 CA

822
617

JUN 17 2002

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
POLICY

INFO MEMO

I-02/008609-SFO

June 7, 2002

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: J. D. Crouch II, ASD FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

JUN 17 2002

SUBJECT: Brief Congress on the SIOP

- Senator Levin raised the issue of whether and to what extent DoD is willing to brief Congress on the SIOP.
- Believes current policy is too restrictive.
- Have been actively reviewing this issue with the DepSecDef.
- Have developed number of options, to include retaining current policy.
- Will obtain General Myers' input and coordination prior to providing you the alternatives.

COORDINATION: Tab A

Prepared By: Frank J. Dellermann, (b)(6)

May 31, 2002 11:42 AM

TO: Steve Cambone
CC: Powell Moore
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Brief Congress on SIOP

Handwritten signatures and initials: "DHR", "PM", "CW", "LH", "E"

Handwritten notes: "T M/TG by 7/15"

Vertical handwritten text: "381 SIOP"

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We need to get a plan.

Thanks.

DHR.dh
053102-19

.....
Please respond by 06/14/02

Handwritten date: "6/21/02"

Handwritten text: "See attached response."

Handwritten signature in a circle with "8/21" and "LARRY DI RITA" below it.

Handwritten notes: "SP3 6/21 2/19/02" and vertical "31 May 02"

U17306 02

BEA
6/17



ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
2900 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2900

EF1865
CA

JUN 17 2002

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
POLICY

INFO MEMO

I-02/008609-SFO

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COORDINATION: Tab A

Prepared By: Frank J. Dellermann, (b)(6)

May 31, 2002 9:04 AM

Done 6/3

TO: VADM Giambastiani
CC: Larry Di Rita
Col. Bucci
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *TR*
SUBJECT: Meeting w/Chiefs

337

I ought to have a meeting with the Chiefs sometime in the next 10-20 days to let them talk a bit.

What I want to talk to them about is how to get refocused urgently and put a sense of urgency into this institution.

Thanks.

DHR dh
053102-18

SECRET HAS BEEN

Please respond by 06/21/02

MAY 31 2002

SECRET -

5/31

Meeting scheduled for the week of return from upcoming trip.

Plans are to once again make these meetings recurring about every 3 weeks.

31 May 02

U17308 02

11-L-0559/OSD/12605

TR

Snowflake

May 31, 2002 9:01 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
CC: Col. GALVIN
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Pakistan


Pakistan

I probably ought to visit U.S. troops in Pakistan when I go.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
053102-17

.....
Please respond by 06/01/02



31 May 02

U17309 02

11-L-0559/OSD/12606

May 31, 2002 8:51 AM

TO: Jim Roche
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: End Strength

320.2

I don't think there is any way in the world that we are going to be four percent over authorized end strength. Please take a look at this paper.

I hope you are working on it.

Regards.

Attach.
05/30/02 "Projected Active Component End Strength 30 September 02"

DHR:dh
053102-14



Please respond by 06/28/02

31 May 02

U17310 02

SECDEF HAS SEEN

MAY 31 2002

**PROJECTED ACTIVE COMPONENT END STRENGTH
30 SEPTEMBER 02
(000)**

all

<u>SERVICE</u>	<u>AUTHORIZED</u>	<u>PROJECTED</u>	<u>DIFFERENCE</u> (percent)
----------------	-------------------	------------------	--------------------------------

Army

Army	480	484	.8%
------	-----	-----	-----

Navy	376	382	1.6%
------	-----	-----	------

Marine Corps	173	173	0%
--------------	-----	-----	----

Air Force	359	373	4.0%
-----------	-----	-----	------

2

DoD	1,387	1,412	1.7%
-----	-------	-------	------

May 30, 2002

11-L-0559/OSD/12608

May 14, 2002 4:39 PM

Done 5/20

TO: General Jones
Commandant, Marine Corps

CC: Gordon England

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Safety

729

I just received Gordon England's quarterly safety report. It is clear that there is something going on in the Marine Corps that is worrisome. Are you giving some careful thought to it?

Regards.

Attach.

05/10/02 SecNav memo to SecDef re: Quarterly Safety Report [U08185/02]

DHR:dh
051402-28

.....
Please respond by 06/14/02

14 May 02

U17311 02



17 May 2002

Dear Mr. Secretary,


I am committed to reducing Marine Corps mishaps, both on and off duty. Safety is my number one priority and I am deeply concerned with the number of mishaps the Marine Corps has experienced this year.

In the spring of 2000, the Marine Corps embarked on a number of initiatives to prevent mishaps. I appointed General Williams, my Assistant Commandant, as the Safety Officer of the Marine Corps. To assist him in this pursuit, our Executive Safety Board was formed. Chaired by General Williams, its membership includes my major force and base commanders, and the Sergeant Major of the Marine Corps. Under the guidance of the Executive Safety Board, the Marine Corps Safety Campaign Plan was created. A first among the military services, the Safety Campaign Plan established aggressive mishap reduction goals and strategies for their achievement through fiscal year 2006.

In pursuit of mishap prevention strategies, the Marine Corps reached out to private industry in order to leverage their success. Additionally, we drew on the services of the Naval Postgraduate School and the Navy Safety Center for ideas and assistance. Our efforts achieved success in 2001 and we had every reason to believe that our success would continue.

I was disappointed to see a substantial increase in accidents earlier this year. In response, I ordered a Corps-wide operational pause to increase safety awareness. Since that pause in mid-March, we have seen improvement. Much progress remains to be made, but improving safety is and will remain a top priority. We pride ourselves on taking care of our own. The integration of safety and risk management into all Marine Corps activities is a part of that care. We can and will do better.

Semper Fidelis,


JAMES L. JONES
General, U.S. Marine Corps
Commandant of the Marine Corps

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
1000 Defense Pentagon, Room 3E880
Washington, DC 20301-1000

11-L-0559/OSD/12610

13
1400

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SECDEF HAS SEEN

May 10, 2002

MAY 10 PM 5:15


MAY 14 2002

LARRY DI RITA
5/14

TO: SECDEF

FROM: Gordon England

SUBJECT: Quarterly Safety Report



This is to provide our second Quarterly Safety Report.

This quarter we moved toward developing an on-line mishap tracking and analysis system to replace current safety data collection systems. We initiated a study to determine a best solution given the legacy situation of more than eleven separate mishap reporting systems residing within Department of the Navy. We actively participated in the DIUSD (I&E)/DUUSD(R) "Integrated Process Team for Tracking Lost Time Due to Work Injuries" and are similarly modeling our DON approach. Results will include ability to generate reports similar to the Air Force safety reports you sent me in January.

During this past year, the CNO, CMC, and I used weekly safety updates of Class A mishaps as a mechanism to keep safety at the forefront. The most recent weekly safety update is attached. During my visits across the Navy and Marine Corps, safety was emphasized and safety discussions instigated. A message was sent throughout the Department on safety performance recognition and accountability and announced a Safety Summit to personally recognize top-performing units in safety.

Some of our mishap rates this Quarter were unacceptably high, particularly for the Marine Corps in both aviation and private motor vehicle fatalities. With each mishap investigation completed, we instituted corrective measures. CMC took aggressive leadership action, including requiring an operational pause day for safety. We are in the process of developing a unified Department of Navy plan to reduce mishaps by at least 50%.

5/13
ecDef -
This is a
working group
Ray DuBois
unit to get
as closer to
the O'Neill
approach.

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	5/13
SR MA GIAMBASTIANI	5/14
MA BUCCI	5/14
EXECSEC WHITMORE	5/13

U08185 /02


11-L-0559/OSD/12611

ASN I&E Metrics

07 May 2002

11-L-0559/OSD/12612


*Navy and Marine Corps
Total Class A Operational Mishap Rates
As of 07 May 02*



Monthly rates reflect previous 12 month avg
(May02=Jun01 thru 07 May02)

ASN(I&E)


*Navy and Marine Corps
Class A Flight Mishap Rates
As of 07 May 02*



Monthly rates reflect previous 12 month avg
(May02=Jun01 thru 07 May02)

ASN(I&E)


*Navy Afloat
Class A Mishap Rates
As of 07 May 02*



Monthly rates reflect previous 12 month avg
(May02=Jun01 thru 07 May02)

11-L-0559/OSD/12615


*Navy and Marine Corps
Class A Operational Ashore Mishap Rates
As of 07 May 02*



Monthly rates reflect previous 12 month avg
(May02=Jun01 thru 07 May02)

ASN(I&E)

Navy and Marine Corps PMV Fatality Rates As of 07 May 02



Monthly rates reflect previous 12 month avg
(May02=Jun01 thru 07 May02)

ASN(I&E)

CC:
LARRY DIRCIA
POWER MOORE

May 14, 2002 3:41 PM

TO: Honorable Andrew H. Card, Jr.
CC: Vice President Richard B. Cheney
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Crusader on Agenda

470

I hope that if you have any Congressional meetings down at the White House in the weeks ahead, that Crusader is always one of the agenda items.

We need the help. We are working it hard, but this is an important one for all of us. I would sure appreciate it if you would get it on the agenda for every meeting, and then report back any feedback you get.

Thanks so much.

DHR:dh
051402-25

14 May 02

U17323 02

11-L-0559/OSD/12618

May 14, 2002 1:49 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita
Powell Moore

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Senator Inhofe

476

Please make sure we get an answer to Inhofe's statement that there are four or five countries that have better artillery systems than we do.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
051402-20



Please respond by 05/24/02

15 May 02

U17324 02

11-L-0559/OSD/12619

ALSO SENT TO: GEN MYERS
GEN. PACE
STEVE CAMPBELL

May 14, 2002 8:43 AM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Transformation

Attached is an interesting paper on transformation that Tony Dolan sent me some months back. Please let me know what you think.

Thanks.

Attach.
02/19/02 Dolan memo to SecDef re: Transformation

DHR:dh
051402-15



Please respond by 06/14/02

381

14 May 02

U17326 02

2/22
1545

2/25

SECRET -
A worthy read
when you can Dilute 2/26

Feb. 19, 2002
MEMO
To: Secretary Rumsfeld
Fr: Anthony R. Dolan
Re: Transformation

Larry Di Rita

1. THE ISSUE -- WHAT IS TRANSFORMATIONAL?

- Steve Cambone noted at the Feb 8 meeting the group's need to oscillate between finding a conceptual framework and doing the programmatic work.
- Gen. Keane suggested that "words matter."
- You made the point about "adaptability."
- All this elevated the following issue: Is a definition of transformation possible?
- You raised at a subsequent (Feb. 15) meeting the question of convoys which again went to the issue of what is transformational.

As a start to the discussion, the convoy issue is considered below and then some propositions are listed.

2. THE CONVOY - WAS IT TRANSFORMATIONAL?

The admiralty hotly opposed the concept when first put forward in WWI. The experts said -- and their models showed the same thing -- that it wouldn't work, that it just makes the job easier for the U-boats by assembling targets.

In practice, the experts were proven wrong, their database off and model incorrect. (The initial premise was wrong or, as you would put it, the conclusion to the syllogism -- while logically arrived at -- bore no resemblance to reality.)

So in this sense the convoy is a perfect example of transformation -- it shows the limits of the human mind's ability to abstractly deal with reality and construct a model that reflects it.

And this lesson, that of the limits of human knowledge and the shortcomings of expert prediction (rather like static analysis in the early 80s could not measure supply-side effects and therefore predicted tax cuts could only reduce revenue), is a good starting point for what transformation is about.

3. TRANSFORMATION: SOME PROPOSITIONS FOR DISCUSSION:

Transformation is acknowledgement of the most important insight ever into the reality of war – that the “fog of battle” and confusion as “prince of the battlefield” means one thing can be expected in war-- the unexpected. And that one thing should be unsurprising in war – surprise.

Transformation is about expecting the unexpected in both its forms – the catastrophic or serendipitous.

Transformation is about having a mindset and a strategy expansive enough to handle catastrophe and serendipity -- to absorb the unexpected setbacks and exploit the unexpected opportunities.

Transformation is recognizing that there is no such thing as exact or perfect knowledge of the future – of what will happen, and that this recognition is itself the best kind of conditioning and preparation for the unexpected and for surprise.

Transformation is not a theory, configuration, strategy or plan. Transformation is a state of mind, a psychological readiness, a disposition of the intellect and inclination of the will to think anew and act anew.

Transformation is not a new theory of war, force configuration, strategy or plan but a realization of the inherent limits of all of these and recognition of the likelihood – once war begins – of their inadequacy, failure, even uselessness. (All plans disintegrate at the point of contact –Von Moltke.)

At the heart of transformation is a fundamental paradox -- only by acknowledging the limits of military planning can those limits be overcome. Only by acknowledging the impossibility of human superintendence of a battlefield can there be any hope of achieving it.

In short, transformation is about strategic balance and wider perspective, an expanded state of mind that can handle the bad news and the good news.

Transformation, because it is about flexibility of mind and of will, has a single best word to describe it -- “adaptability.”

Transformation in order to be prepared for both catastrophe and serendipity and calls then for envisioning the worst-case and the best-case scenarios.

Transformation is recognizing that warfare is the story of the failure to envision catastrophe – Braddock’s or Burgoyne’s casualness about the wilderness, Napoleon’s overconfidence about what the Russians would do (he didn’t really underestimate the winter, he just expected to be offered a battle of annihilation) and Yamamoto and Nagumo’s “victory disease” before Midway (the Japanese air groups were too used to victory).

Transformation is recognizing warfare is the story of the failure to envision serendipity (often by dwelling too much on the possibility of disaster and not enough on the possibility of breakthrough).

Transformation is recognition of war’s most constant mistake -- the failure to pursue the opportunity that would have led to annihilation of the enemy e.g. Allied forces in 1792 paused instead of marching on Paris and destroying France’s revolutionary armies (and aborting the Napoleonic era), McClellan at Antietam (Lee had only 25,000 troops), Ewell not taking Seminary Ridge on July 3 at Gettysburg or Meade not following up after Gettysburg (Lee was helpless at the river crossing), the Union missing out on “the crater” at Petersburg and SHAEF not giving Patton the gas and go-sign in September (two thirds of U.S. casualties in the European theater were after September.)

Transformation is realizing that taking advantage of opportunity comes through either (a) inbreeding adaptability -- Nelson solved the insoluble problem of communication in 19th century naval battle (the inadequacy of signal flags) through constant tactical discussions with his captains, or (b) through individual genius -- Napoleon instinctively knew the right moment to commit his cavalry or Old Guard just as Lee knew how to react to real-time intelligence (taking the road by the furnace for his end run at Chancellorsville.)

Transformation is realizing that opportunity for annihilation is sometimes not just battlefield improvisation but a matter of (yes) planning i.e. positioning of forces in such a way that any maneuver by the enemy is fruitless; it is also realizing that frequently the masters of battlefield adaptation are equal masters of strategic positioning. e.g. Napoleon’s ingenious corps system, Grant’s implementation of the Anaconda Plan (And Grant, as Ft. Henry, Ft. Donaldson, Vicksburg and Chattanooga showed, was a master of maneuver warfare; it’s just that in Northern Virginia his opponent, Lee, was another master maneuverer and counter-puncher) or MacArthur’s “Hit’em Where They Ain’t” through the New Guinea –Pacific campaign and, of course, Inchon.

Transformation is realizing that avoiding the classic error of war – failing to follow-up, to pursue – is not just a function of intellect and sound theory but of

will and sound practice. After The Wilderness and silence from the front, Lincoln literally kissed the reporter who delivered this message from Grant: "Tell the president: No matter what happens, there will be no turning back." And Grant's troops cheered him when they realized they were marching south. This is Nimitz going after "that fourth carrier" at Midway. This is MacArthur warning that "In war, there is no substitute for victory" and political leadership failing in the Vietnam era to heed that lesson.

So, if transformation is an openness of mind in the face of the unexpected, it is also about a steadiness of will in the face of the unexpected. If transformation is about the intellectual -- the preparation of the mind, it is also about the psychological -- the preparation of the will.

Transformation is about realizing that war is about resolve, about sending a psychological message of will that eventually causes in the enemy a catastrophic anxiety and psychological collapse. (Col. John Boyd's studies showed the victor in aerial combat demonstrated not only an ability to disrupt the normal reaction time of an opponent by relentlessly thwarting his usual tactics but did something else -- convey an absolute determination to win. And that sending this relentless message of will eventually caused in the enemy a psychological implosion and collapse of will.)

Transformation is recognition of the role of will and psychology -- and the aptness of the apocryphal Napoleonic injunction to one of his generals: "If you mean to take Vienna, take Vienna."

Transformation is recognition of the primacy of will in warfare -- the recognition of Napoleon's saying -- "In war, the material is to the spiritual as three is to one."

Transformation then is about realizing that other great lesson of war -- that in the end it is about one thing -- imposing one's will on the enemy.

Transformation is seeing that in dealing in terms like "state of mind" or "projection of will" transformation is by definition somewhat ambiguous itself. But, because it is made up of ambiguity as well as certainty, transformation is a better model of reality.

Transformation's best working definition may be -- the theory of a constant consciousness of the limits of the human mind in considering conflict and its future, and the putting into practice of that theory through the enculturation of adaptability and the will to victory.

Transformation is not a rejection of certainty -- just an appreciation of ambiguity. And realizing that, far from being contradictory, certainty and ambiguity are complimentary notions. That both are needed -- the enduring and certain principles of war -- will, mass, surprise, shock, mobility etc.— but also the realization that an equally enduring and certain principle of war is that war is by nature filled with the ambiguous and that the application of its principles is situational and improvisational and, therefore, uncertain i.e. not given to codification.

Transformation is seeing it work in Afghanistan. When General Franks spoke of establishing “conditions” on the battlefield the word was not chosen lightly. Rather than attempt to dictate the day-to-day rhythm of battle – to micromanage, the objective here was to allow commanders on the ground to (a) watch for surprise and avert disaster but also (b) see advantage and exploit opportunity through new, unexpected and serendipitous conjunctions of battlefield forces and technology.

Transformation is looking to the lessons of Afghanistan and asking whether precision weapons and desmassification of warfare means demassification of casualties and an era of more humane warfare.

Transformation is about asking the question: Are we entering an era of warfare like that of the sieges of the late 17th and early 18th century (e.g. the Vauban fortresses) when casualties were low and the battle decided not by a pitched, bloody encounter but a series of ritual maneuvers?

Transformation is realizing that in the move from the industrial to the information age – “psychological warfare” has new importance. And consideration of the possibility that information may now be the arm of shock and mobility (what cavalry or armor once were) -- that the decisive element in battle may be the information that plays on the hidden terrors of the enemy and causes overreactions, mistakes and blunders.

Transformation is about asking a fundamental question – is the armor and infantry of the “heavied-up” division an anachronism? Outdated like the cavalry? Or will it be needed more than ever?

Transformation is contrarian and asks when the conventional wisdom concludes a certain kind of war is the wave of the future whether the exact opposite kind of war isn’t sure to happen

Transformation is seeing the ultimate irony that strategy and plans, just like the stopped clock twice a day, might someday be dead-on.

Transformation is a realization of how hard transformation is, that its insights go against strong habits of mind. Transformation is about realizing that human beings want order and reason – relentlessly seek to put the data of real experience into readily understandable categories. That humans think about the future in quite predictable terms, with all the possibilities carefully sorted and compartmentalized.

Transformation is realizing that while humans prefer the tidy, the reality of life is exactly the opposite. The most important or decisive moments in our lives are frequently not the result of rational choice – let alone conscious planning. That happenstance or accident determines to whom we are born, where and how we grow up, with whom we fall in love and critical aspects of our work – not to mention the matter of when and how we will die. That life is a place where the unplanned – the “known unknowns” and the “unknown unknowns” – hold sway.

Transformation is realizing that the lesson of the ever-present unexpected in our lives is one human beings run from – flee from – because it springs from the oldest and most permanent human failing, in fact the one that started all the trouble in world and leads always to disaster. The desire for perfect, all-encompassing human knowledge is what the story of Genesis is about. Adam and Eve, who caused the first catastrophe, sought human sovereignty through human omniscience. They first did wrong through the mind not through the will – they declined to acknowledge the limits of the human knowledge. And they started the tradition of humans choosing confusion first and then wrongdoing..

Transformation realizes that Clausewitz’s insight into war is really an insight into reality – that war only shows it more starkly and dramatically; the insight that life – although we like to think we are in charge – is about the unexpected.

Transformation then is about the human tendency to forget the fact of human non-omniscience.

Transformation is realizing the most important lesson of reality – human non-omniscience and non-sovereignty.

Transformation is also about rejecting the perfectly human tendency to think decisions should be made by the most omniscient i.e. smartest people. The expert paradigm –the notion that panels of experts make better decisions – is invalid. Democracy and elections are about the discovery that over the long run the corporate wisdom of the people exceeds that of elites. (As William F. Buckley Jr. put it: “I would rather be ruled by the first 300 people in the Boston phone

directory than by the Harvard faculty.”) Free markets show that over the long run consumers makes better decisions than central planners.

Transformation means remembering if the bottom line in politics is elections, and the bottom line in business is profits, the bottom line in warfare is battle

Transformation means changing strong habits of mind.

Transformation is remembering that military bureaucracy – like any bureaucracy -- historically has had a problem with innovation. (The bureaucracy was going to arrest Grant for trying to take Vicksburg, drove Billy Mitchell out of the army in part for seeing the possibilities of air power, drummed Rochefort out of the Navy shortly after his code breakers helped win possibly the most decisive naval battle in history at Midway, and did everything to stop Rickover from coming up with a weapons system crucial to preventing nuclear war and winning the Cold War.)

So transformation is not changing this procedure or putting in that commander - - changing process or personnel; it is not about making the old kind of decisions -- adding or cutting back divisions, or building or not building this or that ship type.

Transformation is realizing that “hardware” or “force” decisions could follow only after much larger change had taken place. That transformation was about causing larger conceptual change and setting up a new institutional culture in which the famous “thinking outside the box” can be sanctioned and encouraged.

Transformation means not changing personnel or process – not people and hardware – but changing the culture – not what we think but HOW we think. The conceptual frame within which we operate -- the paradigm.

Transformation means creating a culture where creativity prospers and that requires the very kind of untidiness that it is meant to plan and prepare for -- this means introducing new concepts and therefore a certain amount of disorder or noise into the system. Because such controlled disorder or chaos is at the heart of creativity, the best way to be creative in meeting the inevitable untidiness of the future and chaotic conditions of war is model that untidiness and chaos.

Transformation is about an institutional culture that welcomes change, tolerates failure, seeks innovation and encourages excellence --and sees certainties and ambiguities as compatible. A culture that keeps certain unchanging principles of war in mind but also welcomes the ambiguities that thinking about the future requires.

N. B. – Next subject is how an excellent and most recent example of paradigm shift -- Reagan's rejection of "containment" and "peace through strength" in preference to a new "end of totalitarianism" and a "forward strategy for freedom" -- undid the Soviets and ended the Cold War.

Snowflake

May 14, 2002 8:33 AM

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Prep for NATO

If you think of all the issues we want to bring up at NATO, it might be smart to get our ambassadors to go in and talk to the governments before the NATO meetings. They could talk to the defense ministers and tell them what we are planning to bring up and why. If they have any questions, we can try to help them out beforehand.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
051402-11

.....
Please respond by 05/24/02

NATO 337

14 May 02

U17327 02

11-L-0559/OSD/12629

May 14, 2002 8:20 AM

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Memo on ICC

015

Please get a memo to the NSC that recommends that, at the NATO and summit meetings, Colin Powell bring up the need for the countries to support us on the ICC opt-out clause.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
051402-8

.....
Please respond by 05/24/02

14 May 02

U17328 02

11-L-0559/OSD/12630

May 14, 2002 8:05 AM

TO: Torie Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Cartoons

006.7

Please see if you can get this cartoon from the *Washington Times* and also the cartoon from page 6 of this week's *U.S. News & World Report*.

Thanks.

Attach.

DHR:dh
051402-7

.....
Please respond by 06/14/02

14 May 02

U17329 02

11-L-0559/OSD/12631

Crusader beyond its time

The Crusader is the best mobile artillery system ever designed. Napoleon would have loved to have had one at the Battle of the Bulge. Any NATO ally in the '60s or '70s would leap for joy to add it to West Germany's arsenal. The Crusader deserves to die. Winning the title of "best mobile artillery system ever" is only marginally more impressive than being the best crossbow ever — awfully as a matter of pure design, but terribly relevant to the current strategic environment. The military establishment loves weapons systems, especially ones depicted on fighting the last war, in a more grandiose manner. The Crusader is designed with a War-era land war in Europe in

mind, and it is so big that there's a question about whether it really deserves to be considered a "mobile" artillery system.

Originally designed at 80 tons, the Crusader looks like two tanks hooked together. There's a 155mm howitzer in front and a resupply vehicle in back. The weapon appears as elegant and maneuverable as three or four Chevy Tahoes lashed together with a bunch of ball hitches.

At 80 tons, it would probably not make it into the same hemisphere as one of today's regional conflicts, let alone ever actually be deployed on the battlefield in time for the fighting.

Its advocates, in an attempt to

make it seem more viable, recently slimmed down its design from 80 to 40 tons, in a weight-loss program that would make Richard Simmons envious. But Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld isn't buying it and is asking Congress to cancel the Crusader.

In so doing, Mr. Rumsfeld will engage in a bitter fight with a recalcitrant military bureaucracy and a porked-up Congress: Will the U.S. military adjust to the new strategic environment, or will it waste money, time and energy on buying the best hardware anyone could imagine back in the days when Austin Powers was first making his reputation as an international man of mystery?

During a war, there's an understandable tendency to idealize all aspects of the military. But that doesn't change the fact that at the Pentagon, the bureaucracy rules, and it is bureaucracy on Quaaludes, making the New York City Board of Education look sprightly and trim by comparison.

Especially since the end of the Cold War, the static military bureaucracy has desperately needed a new direction from its civilian leadership.

Mr. Rumsfeld tried to provide it in the months prior to Septem-

ber 11, arguing that the military should prepare for the kind of war we ended up fighting in Afghanistan — one emphasizing mobility, precision weaponry and long-range air power (not overweight artillery pieces).

But Mr. Rumsfeld encountered an astonishing revolt from the Pentagon establishment and its allies in Congress, who operate on a strategic doctrine that is less Karl von Clausewitz and more Tip O'Neill: They favor any weapons system that is manufactured or based in their own district.

The Afghan war should have indicated Mr. Rumsfeld with vengeance, but the Pentagon strategy is so ingrained it is immune to the lessons of even the success of its own armed forces.


No sooner had Mr. Rumsfeld recently floated the idea of killing the \$11 billion Crusader — billions that could be spent on the weapons that won in Afghanistan — than the Army bureaucracy began conspiring with Congress about how to defeat him.

Rep. J.C. Watts, Oklahoma Republican, taking his marching orders like a docile Army private, has called the theory that the military needs to be lighter and more mobile "a fad."

Might this considered judgment — which contradicts actual experience in Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan — have something to do with the fact that the Crusader would be assembled in Oklahoma and based at Fort Sill, Okla.?

But perhaps we should give Mr. Watts credit: If he wants a weapons system at Fort Sill, Okla., why not get one that, at 40 tons, might never even leave Fort Sill, Okla.?

Rich Lowry is a nationally syndicated columnist.



May 14, 2002 8:01 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Testimony

The testimony ought to specifically request that the Senate committee take the money out of Crusader and put it where we want it.

We ought not to go up there and not tell them what we would like them to do.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
051402-5

.....

Please respond by 05/15/02

470

14 May 02

U17330 02



CDR S-

May 14, 2002 7:54 AM

Done 5/14

TO: VADM Giambastiani
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Technology

400.112

Please find out what this "rapid-fire metal storm" technology is about today, so I will know.

Thanks.

Attach.
Arnaud de Borchgrave, "Rapid-Fire Metal Storm Technology Usurps Crusader," *Washington Times*, 05/14/02

DHR:dh
051402-3



Please respond by 05/14/02

5/14

SECDEF-

Aldridge reply is attached

For info, I had looked at this technology while on the Navy Staff. It's a wonderful idea but has very limited ~~applicability~~.

U17332 02

11-L-0559/OSD/12634

19 May 02



ACQUISITION,
TECHNOLOGY
AND LOGISTICS

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3010 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3010

UNCLASSIFIED

INFO MEMO

May 14, 2002

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Mr. E. C. "Pete" Aldridge, Under Secretary of Defense (AT&L)

SUBJECT: Info Memo Rapid Fire Metal Storm

Snowflake at TAB A.

METAL STORM BACKGROUND

- Mike O'Dwyer, an Australian inventor, developed and demonstrated a technology that stacks projectiles and propellant in a gun barrel. The projectiles can be fired electronically with variable timing between rounds. He named the technology and his company Metal Storm.
- Metal Storm technology has been shown to fire 9mm projectiles at ½ tactical muzzle velocities at rates exceeding 1 million rounds per minute. This was accomplished prior to any DARPA investment.

DARPA INVOLVEMENT

- In FY00, DARPA initiated a program to develop a Metal Storm-based weapon system with tactically useful muzzle velocities, dispersion and armor penetration at significant ranges. The program pursued the development of a 0.50 caliber sniper rifle as a meaningful first step towards tactical realization.
- DARPA funded three parallel activities:
 1. A Metal Storm / SAIC team to develop and demonstrate single and multi-barreled 0.50 caliber sniper rifles.
 2. An Australian Government Defence Science and Technology Organisation (DSTO) effort to explore alternative technical approaches to the 0.50 caliber rifle.
 3. A Metal Storm / SAIC effort to study three Metal Storm technology weapon concepts:
 - 40mm grenades stacked in a Gun Pod for use as a ground-based Area Denial System
 - Assess feasibility of using Metal Storm as a replacement for the Phalanx, Close-in Weapon System
 - 20mm Metal Storm Gun Pods on Unmanned Air Vehicle and Unmanned Ground Vehicle platforms



11-L-0559/OSD/12635

CURRENT STATUS

- In February of 2002, DARPA ended the SAIC / Metal Storm team. The team's technical approach was not successful.
- The parallel Australian DSTO technical approach for a 0.50 caliber stacked gun system was successfully demonstrated. DARPA is negotiating an agreement with DSTO to extend the 0.50 caliber technology to a 50mm direct fire weapon system
- The final reports for the Metal Storm / SAIC weapon concepts were reviewed by DARPA and not pursued further.

NEWS ARTICLE

- DARPA did not receive any inquiries from the Washington Times prior to the publication of the article. In our view, we don't see how anyone could have suggested that Metal Storm could be a replacement for Crusader. Also, we are not aware of any research that supports the claim Metal Storm technology will "accelerate out-of-atmosphere ballistic missile interdiction as well as biological and chemical cloud neutralization."


Attachment: Metal Storm Program Power Point Slide at TAB B

Prepared by: Mr. Ron Kurjanowicz, Special Assistant, DARPA, (b)(6)

UNCLASSIFIED

11-L-0559/OSD/12636

Metal Storm Program




0.50 cal Test Barrel

Australian DSTO Approach



0.50 caliber Sniper Rifle Concept

50mm DARPA Concept



ficials say still falls a little short of the target price cut.

"But Boeing is willing to make an additional cut in the price," said a senior Defense Ministry official.

"If it cuts the price by \$200 million, the deal is highly likely," he said on condition of anonymity.

In recent price negotiations, Boeing proposed to lower the price from \$4.46 billion to \$4.29 billion, but the Defense Ministry insisted on a further discount.

The ministry aims to lower the price to between \$4.27 billion and \$4.25 billion, saying that the price cut is essential to mollify critics of the fighter project.

Dassault Aviation SA of France reportedly proposed to build a new fleet of 40 fighters at the cost of \$4.27 billion at the last minute, while Boeing raised the price to \$4.46 billion this year from last year's proposal price of \$4.25 billion without readjusting the proportion of its offset package.

However, last month, South Korea picked Boeing as the contractor for the project in consideration of its longstanding military alliance with the U.S.

Though he did not rule out the possibility that the Defense Ministry will reach an agreement on the price, the official acknowledged that it might push for further price cuts by curtailing the scope of options for the F-15K.

To make the competition fair and transparent for all four foreign bidders, the Defense Ministry called for the same level of fighter jet options, some unnecessary for the F-15K, he explained.

"We are looking at the issue as part of an effort to ease defense budget constraints," he said.

During the negotiations, Boeing also committed to exceeding the 70 percent required offset package, saying that its program will provide further incentives in local work and manufacturing, he said.

In an effort to ease public concern about continued parts supply, the Defense Ministry demanded that the supply of replacement parts be covered by the U.S. government-

guaranteed Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program, the official added.

Washington Times
May 14, 2002

Pg. 3

45. Rapid-Fire Metal Storm

Technology Usurps Crusader
By Arnaud de Borchgrave, The Washington Times

A new type of ballistic technology that can fire more than 1 million rounds per minute from a 36-barrel weapon is one of the reasons Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld has canceled the \$11 billion Crusader artillery system.

The technology is known as "Metal Storm," which is also the name of the Australian research and development company that owns it.

The fastest weapons today are mechanical Gatling guns that can fire at a rate of some 6,000 rounds per minute. Infantry rifles average 600 rounds per minute, which is the firing rate for a magazine of 15 to 30 rounds.

The chairman of the board of Metal Storm is retired Adm. Bill Owens, a former deputy chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and author of "Lifting the Fog of War," a book about defense modernization.

With multimillion-dollar contracts, Metal Storm works closely with the U.S. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency and the Australian Defense Science and Technology Organization. The company's new chief corporate officer is Chuck Vehlow, a former general manager of the Boeing Helicopter Division. Mr. Vehlow, who has a master of science degree from Massachusetts Institute of Technology, has negotiated big-ticket procurement contracts and technology-licensing agreements with the Pentagon.

Most of Metal Storm's work is top-secret. Under development are systems that include an unmanned aerial combat vehicle that will carry twelve 40 mm mortar boxes comprising a total of 1,200 tubes, and armed with 7,200 grenades. The system's unprecedented firing capabilities can lay down a continuous 50-

yard-wide carpet of grenades for two miles, firing all its grenades simultaneously with 5-yard separation on impact.

Another gun under development for a small combat aerial vehicle is multibarreled and can fire 270 rounds onto a target in 0.001 seconds without stress on the airframe or any drop in air speed.

The company's Advanced Individual Combat Weapon program, says Chief Executive Officer Mike O'Dwyer, is destined to replace small arms among Western allies. The prototypes under development have a dual-barrel capability to fire both 20 mm and 40 mm bursting munitions and standard 5.56-mm NATO ammunition. The weapon also will fire nonlethal projectiles for riot control. The future infantry weapons hardware replacement program for Australia's small defense forces alone is estimated to be worth \$700 million.

Metal Storm's submachine gun will be capable of firing multiple-barrel, rapid-fire bursts at 45,000 rounds per minute per barrel. The technology is entirely electronic and nonmechanical. Its electronically variable rate of fire has been confirmed to 1 million rounds per minute.

The technology allows barrels to be grouped in any configuration required for a particular application because it has no moving parts, other than bullets or other projectiles. It also has no separate magazine and no ammunition feed or ejection system. Next to Metal Storm's firepower, said a senior Pentagon acquisition official, the lumbering, 45-ton Crusader artillery tube would be obsolete.

At the core of the technology is a projectile design that enables multiple high-pressure ammunition to be stacked in a barrel, and then electronically fired in sequence. In turn, multiple barrels can be grouped to form compact weapons systems of unprecedented conventional firepower.

These new weapons will have all-electronic access control systems to ensure that only authorized personnel use them. The dual function will allow on-board selection at the press

of a button between a nonlethal response capability and the kind of lethality that will deny an area to the enemy without having to use anti-personnel land mines.

V1e is a handgun with a 64-digit electronic keying system that conceals a transponder. An electronic message confirms when the weapon is set to fire and which fire setting is selected. Pentagon specialists have witnessed tests in which the V1e has fired single shots, double-tap shots at 45,000 rpm, triples at 60,000 rpm, and a high-energy double-tap burst at 500,000 rpm.

Sources at the advanced research project agency said the Metal Storm technological breakthrough will produce a new generation of weapons that will "accelerate out-of-atmosphere ballistic missile interdiction as well as biological and chemical cloud neutralization."

Arnaud de Borchgrave is editor at large of The Washington Times, as well as an editor at large of United Press International. His account also appears on the UPI wire.

Dallas Morning News
May 14, 2002

46. Lockheed Flying Solo On JSF Project

Contract winner was urged to share, but Boeing appears to be shut out

By Katie Fairbank, The Dallas Morning News

Even before Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Co. was awarded a winner-take-all contract to build the Joint Strike Fighter, moves were afoot to get the company to share the \$200 billion bounty with rival Boeing Co.

Top brass at the Pentagon said it would be "politically astute" for Lockheed to bring Boeing on board.

A Lockheed Martin executive said the company would have to be prepared to give "noble work" to its competitor.

Even Congress got into the act, pushing in two legislative proposals for some work to go Boeing's way.

TO: Ron Kurjanowicz

Drop Fax

(b)(6)

May 14, 2002 7:54 AM

TO: VADM Giambastiani

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Technology

Please find out what this "rapid-fire metal storm" technology is about today, so I will know.

Thanks.

Attach.

Arnaud de Borchgrave, "Rapid-Fire Metal Storm Technology Usurps Crusader," *Washington Times*, 05/14/02

DHR:dh
051402-3

.....
Please respond by 05/14/02

5/14
1010

Col Schoonover,

We can provide the info on this technology - but can not characterize interface w/DOD to date. VADM G. is looking for any some info today on what "Metal Storm" is doing with DOD or vice versa.

Thank
JLR
Col J. Schoonover

5/14 1700 snowflake

May 14, 2002 7:37 AM



TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Army Congressional Liaison

C23 Army

Please take a look at this Army Congressional relations. I am struck by what they are doing. I can't imagine they have much responsibility for those Army nominations for Senate confirmation.

I can't imagine why we have 200 3- and 4-star officer visits to the Hill every year.

I would think, with respect to the 35,000 written inquiries from Congress—that is an enormous number per member—we should be developing form letters to handle lots of that stuff.

I can't imagine why they have to go on 519 trips with Members and staff.

The thing that really strikes me is the fact there are so few civilians involved and almost all uniformed personnel. I think that is nuts.

Please take a look at this and then see me on it.

7/23 Done

Thanks.

Attach.
Undated Army Congressional Liaison

14 May 02

DHR.dh
051402-1

.....
Please respond by 06/07/02

U17334 02

11-L-0559/OSD/12640

37 officers
 57 civilians
 5 enlisted

Army Congressional Liaison


CAPITOL HILL

	Pentagon		House		Senate		Total
	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ	
Liaison	22/0 <i>OFFICER</i> ↓ <i>ENLISTED</i> ↑	3	4/0	0	2/0	0	31
Support	4/3	45	0/1	3	0/1	3	60
FM(Bu) <i>Support for APPROPRIATORS</i>	5/0	3	---	---	---	---	8
Total	31/3	51	4/1	3	2/1	3	99

85 (under Pentagon total)
11-L-0559/OSD/12641 (under House total)
6 (under Senate total)



Office Chief Legislative Liaison



Persuasive In Peace, Invincible in War



Legislative Liaison Functional Designation

OSD Definitions:

Legislative Liaison: Those individuals that have responsibility for direct and personal external contact and communications with the Congress on all Department of Defense issues. Their primary functional responsibility is to provide advice, information, and assistance to the Legislative Branch on all Department issues. This standard applies to OSD/CJCS, the Services, Combatant Commands, Defense Agencies and DoD Field Activities.

Legislative Support: Those individuals that coordinate legislative issues within each command structure or organization. They are not responsible for external communication on legislative issues; rather, they coordinate internally with and assist those performing direct and personal legislative liaison functions with the Legislative Branch.

Persuasive in Peace, Invincible in War



Recent Actions

Snapshot of Support to 2nd Session, 106th Congress:

- 519 trips with Members and staff
- 170 Congressional Hearings, including 45 high-level hearings which required prepared witnesses
- Over 35,000 written inquiries from Congress, including 700 for senior leader signatures
- 200 Army nominations for Senate confirmation
- 200 3 - and 4 - star General Officer visits to the Hill

*We respond to many Congressional concerns.
Some examples...*

- Corps of Engineers
- Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation
- Transformation

Persuasive In Peace, Invincible in War

5/14 15:15
SHOWTIME

May 13, 2002 6:55 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Rendon

160

Who should we have take a look at this Rendon contract?

Thanks.

Attach.
05/13/02 Early Bird

DHR:dh
051302-55

.....
Please respond by 05/31/02

*Copy BTM
Done - 5/16
ec*

5/13

edef -

- I was thinking of having Dor first do an ~~assessment~~ inventory of the number and sizes of Rendon Group contracts.

- Given the assertions in the Article about a particular contract, ~~I suppose~~ we should ~~not~~ ~~look~~ ~~to~~ ~~you~~ ~~with~~ ~~a~~ ~~proposal~~. A.D.

13 May 02

DR
5/14

U17 3135-02/OSD/12845

vance on Baghdad. Now, at least on paper, it was trying to topple Saddam. "The Agency wanted to clean their hands of the whole mess," says one ex-intelligence official, "so they gave it to Rendon."

From his office in Washington, Rendon became the de facto leader of the Iraqi opposition. He ran radio networks that broadcast into Iraq, creating an entire playlist of anti-Saddam programming. He produced leaflets, comic books, and other material skewering the dictator. And he didn't just produce material for Iraqi consumption. An "atrocities exhibition" of photojournalism traveled across Europe, rebutting sanctions critics like Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari. From Rendon's offices in central London, reporters could instantly receive stock footage of petroleum-covered birds, burning fields, and other Iraqi atrocities against Kuwait.

But the CIA had also assigned Rendon a far more delicate task: to help organize, advise, and stage-manage the Iraqi opposition. After the Gulf war, there weren't many available anti-Saddam vehicles. Under pressure from Congress, the CIA seized on well-connected, smooth-talking London businessman Ahmad Chalabi and tried to help him unite Shia and Sunnis, Kurds and Arabs, exiles and dissidents, into a popular front called the Iraqi National Congress (INC). Rendon wasn't exactly the brains of the operation--Chalabi ran the group--but he was the man whispering in Chalabi's ear. "The INC was clueless. They needed a lot of help and didn't know where to start. That is why Rendon was brought in," says Thomas Twetten, the CIA's former deputy director of operations. Rendon helped Chalabi choose the group's English name, and he organized an INC conference in Vienna. When INC representatives came to Washington in July 1992 to meet with Brent Scowcroft and James Baker, Rendon advised them on what to say and how to say it. He even assigned them one of the field operatives from Walter Mondale's 1984 presidential bid. "The whole mindset is that you're

involved in a campaign," says an ex-Rendon employee. "You've got all the trappings and a similar apparatus."

Rendon's trappings and apparatus cost money. Indeed, throughout his career, he's been dogged by complaints of profligate spending--even charged with being the p.r. equivalent of the Pentagon's \$400 toilet seat. In 1995 CIA accountants demanded an audit of his work. As ABC reported in 1998, Rendon's own records show he spent more than \$23 million in the first year of his contract to work with the INC. Several of his operatives in London earned more than the director of Central Intelligence--about \$19,000 per month. Rendon shot across the Atlantic on the Concorde, while his subordinates flew on open business-class tickets. According to one of those subordinates, "There was no incentive for Rendon to hold down costs." While the Agency's inspector general found no fraud, he was outraged at what he deemed Rendon's exploitation of his opened contract. Take the videotapes that Rendon sent to media around the world: Because Rendon didn't have production capability in his office, he farmed out the work. And under his contract, he collected a 10 percent management fee for each subcontractor he hired. In the course of making the video he also received 10 percent of the cost of buying the tapes, hiring a camera crew, and renting an editing suite. On top of that pure profit, he billed for his own operatives who put the tape together. Finally, he sold the finished tape to the government at a rate of \$5,000 per minute.

And the complaints had as much to do with the quality of Rendon's work as the cost. According to CIA agents who worked with Rendon on the INC, his Langley bosses simply didn't monitor his work. "They were broadcasting into Iraq," says one, "but there was no due diligence. Only the Israelis were listening." If the Americans had paid attention, they would have discovered a distinctly mediocre product. "The scripts were put together by twenty-three-year-olds with

connections to the Democratic National Committee," says the ex-Rendon employee. "They didn't have any experience, let alone in Iraq. And they had every incentive to churn these things out. They were getting paid somewhere between twenty-five and fifty dollars per script. They were rewritten Reuters feeds." Or as the CIA official put it, "Very poor quality. They talked about gassing of the Kurds--but most Iraqis supported that. There were all these ineffectual insults. It was like, 'Saddam has a funny mustache.'" Moreover, according to the ex-Rendon employee, when the scripts were recorded in Arabic in a Boston studio, Rendon's announcers spoke with Egyptian and Jordanian accents that weren't entirely comprehensible to an Iraqi audience.

And Rendon, who doesn't speak Arabic, displayed his cultural naiveté in other ways as well. A CIA operative describes Rendon's work with a "radical Shia group--suicide-bomber types--who wanted to have a conference. The guys are in robes and beards. [Rendon] sent a thirty-one-year-old woman with a dress up to her ass who said 'I'm here to plan.'" A comedy of cross-cultural misunderstandings ensued. "They felt insulted by her sheer ignorance," says the agent. While The Rendon Group planned the conference for a Sheraton hotel in Germany, they hadn't considered the difficulties the radicals would have obtaining visas. In the end, the conference never came off.

Gradually, the complaints took their toll. After the first year of Rendon's contract, the CIA depended on him less and less. By 1995 a new team in charge of the CIA's Iraqi Operations Group had severed the Agency's relationship with Rendon altogether. But Rendon simply refocused on the Pentagon--winning contracts in the mid-'90s to help spin the Balkan wars. He is, after all, nothing if not superbly networked. When Flohr left the CIA, for example, she took a job with The Rendon Group. Now she's back in the National Security Council (NSC), where she's deputy to the head of

counterterrorism. Wayne Downing, Rendon has also grown close to Karl Rove, even briefing the NSC and White House communications office at his behest. "He's developed a niche," says his friend and international political consultant Joel McCleary. "Nobody else does what he does. Nobody else has mastered the complexities of government contracting or knows the people with power. He's all alone."

Rendon won't talk about his work. In an e-mail, he told me, "In order to honor our commitments to our clients, I am not able, at this time, to discuss in any detail the work performed for them by [The Rendon Group]. Suffice it to say, we are a support function to the decision-makers in the Bush Administration and the implementors/warriors at the Department of Defense." He can admit this much because it is public record. The New York Times made Rendon's current Pentagon contract public on February 19. But the article's real scoop was the discovery of what was, briefly, the chief alternative to Rendon's propaganda operation: the Pentagon's Orwellian-sounding Office of Strategic Influence (OSI). According to the Times, OSI was to be the center of a disinformation campaign. A senior official told the paper, "When I get their briefings, it's scary." In the days following the story, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld repeatedly denied that any disinformation operation actually existed. But he couldn't persuade a skeptical press corps. Within a week of the Times article, the bad publicity had become too much for the Defense Department to bear. On February 26 Rumsfeld announced that the "office has clearly been so damaged that it is pretty clear to me that it could not function effectively. So it is being closed down."

The irony is that the OSI really wasn't planning any disinformation campaign. Even before the Times story broke, the Pentagon's general counsel, William Haynes, had begun a standard review of the office's work. And as the controversy

May 13, 2002 6:53 PM

TO: VADM Giambastiani
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Harlan Ullman

092

What do you propose I do with this Harlan Ullman letter?

Thanks.

Attach.
05/13/02 Harlan Ullman ltr to SecDef

DHR:dh
051302-54

.....
Please respond by 05/24/02

13 May 02

U17337 02

11-L-0559/OSD/12647

SECDEF HAS SEEN

MAY 13 2002

THE KILLOWEN GROUP
1245 29TH STREET NORTH WEST
WASHINGTON D.C. 20007

(b)(6)

Harlan Ullman

Chairman

The Hon Donald H. Rumsfeld
The Secretary of Defense
Washington, D.C.

May 13th, 2002

5/13
Thoughts
from
Harlan

Dear Don:

This letter expands on my conversation with Ed Giambastiani today. The most telling point in your recent *Foreign Affairs* piece was, I believe, the need to teach people to think (more) innovatively. But how in the world to do that ain't easy.

My experience is that by the time people become relatively seasoned in their professions, retraining or teaching them to think innovatively is more difficult. The reasons are obvious. New dogs tend to learn new tricks better than old ones. I know this because I am decidedly in the latter category.

The challenge to think innovatively probably best should start when people first come into service through basic and boot camps for enlisted and service academies, ROTC's and OCS for officers. For a number of years, it struck me that one way to begin this process of stressing innovation was through establishing at each service academy, an end of course, annual "battle problem" that lasts about two weeks.

The exercise could be historical (Midway; Barbarossa; Inchon; the battles of Alexander, Caesar or Nelson; Desert Storm; Tet and many others of such varied form and substance to provoke different courses of action), current (Desert Storm II, Enduring Freedom, Allied Force) or scenario/imaginary (from homeland security to the next world war. The point is that by varying the nature and demands of the exercise from year to year, different strategies and solutions as well as ends, means and tools would be needed.

First year cadets/midshipmen would take the roles of enlisted and junior officers, sophomores more senior NCO's and officers; juniors mid-grade officers and seniors would be the commanders and officers in charge. To encourage "joint" thinking, every student would be required to be in a different service for at least two of the annual events. Exchanges between and among the academies would also be worthwhile for further "intellectual

pollinization." Every student would be required to take an academic course each year that provided the operational and academic preparation for such an exercise in keeping with the role and assignment for that student. The exercise would also be graded as further incentive/discipline. And there would be no shortage of retired admirals and generals quite happy to participate throughout the year as mentors, advisors and possibly as senior commanders during the battle exercise. That exercise should be as demanding and realistic as possible with a hint of danger and round the clock events to test endurance as well as intellect.

Similar programs could be constructed for OCS and ROTC. Ed has some excellent ideas about doing the same for enlisted training at boot camps. But the objective is to inculcate (or at least expose) entry-level officers and enlisted with the need for and inherent difficulty in learning to think innovatively. So, with this introduction, perhaps by the time these officers go on to junior and senior war colleges, the foundations for greater innovation will have been put in place.

I leave the rest to you.

Best Wishes,

Harlan —

D 5/14

1545
5/14



May 13, 2002 6:41 PM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D*

SUBJECT: Including Military

337

You do have to include the military in a lot of meetings. Please think carefully if you are excluding them.

Thanks.

D11R dh
051302-50



Please respond by _____

Right.
14 MAY 2002
PW

13 May 02

A 5/15

*SP3
5/15*

U17338 02

11-L-0559/OSD/12650

Done
5/14

May 13, 2002 6:35 PM

TO: VADM Giambastiani

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Paladin

470

I want to know precisely when the Paladin was taken off the web site, by whom and for what purpose.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
051302-48

.....
Please respond by 05/24/02

5/14

SECDEF -

Jaymie Durnon has verified that Paladin was not taken off the 1ST Cavalry Army web site.

DR
ED

13 May 02

U17339 02

May 13, 2002 6:23 PM

TO: VADM Giambastiani

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Capability Piece

Please make sure you get me that capability piece on the Crusader and double-check when it was validated, if it is in fact 27 October 1994, or if there has been something subsequently.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
051302-46

.....

Please respond by 05/17/02

470

13 May 02

U17340 02

Done 5-15

May 13, 2002 6:18 PM

TO: VADM Giambastiani
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR
SUBJECT: JROC Approvals

Let's nail down whether there were any JROC approvals after October 1994. If there weren't, I need to know that so I can use it in the hearing.

334

Thanks.

DHR:dh
051302-45

.....

Please respond by 05/17/02

5/14

SECDEF - Answer to 2 snowflake
① JROC validated CRUSADER
on 27 Oct. 1994 (VERIFIED BY JCS
(J8 and ARMY))
② there have been no JROC
re-validations of CRUSADER
since then
③ the original name for CRUSADER
is highlighted on the ~~last~~ right page
④ Key Parameters

13 May 2002

U17341 02

13-L-055970SD/12653

May 13, 2002 6:23 PM

TO: VADM Giambastiani
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Capability Piece

Please make sure you get me that capability piece on the Crusader and double-check when it was validated, if it is in fact 27 October 1994, or if there has been something subsequently.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
051302-46

.....
Please respond by 05/17/02

5



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ARMY STAFF

14 May 2002 *MS/14*

TO: VADM Giambastiani,

Sir,

LTG Byrnes asked me to forward the below information reference the Crusader.

Response to Question 1: Yes, the Crusader was reviewed and validated by the JROC on 27 Oct 94. There have been no other reviews or validations by JROC; however, there have been two other types of reviews: the Crusader Report to Congress, Feb 99; and a Congressionally Directed Quicklook Analysis of Alternatives in Dec 00.

Response to Question 2: Milestone 1 (now referred to as Milestone A) was completed with the JROC validation in Oct 94. Milestone B is due in Apr 03.

vr

COL Johnson
XO. DAS

11-L-0559/OSD/12654

*I'll obtain copies of both of these.
V/R
Ed*



THE JOINT STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-7000

JOINT REQUIREMENTS
OVERSIGHT COUNCIL

JROCM 076-94
10 November 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (ACQUISITION
AND TECHNOLOGY)

Subject: Advanced Field Artillery System (AFAS)/Future
Armored Resupply Vehicle (FARV).

CRUSADER
← HOWITZER
+
SUPPLY
VEHICLE

1. On 27 October 1994, in preparation for a Defense Acquisition Board Milestone I, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) reviewed and validated the enclosed key performance parameters for the AFAS and FARV programs. The JROC confirmed those key performance parameters will provide the operational capability necessary to satisfy the mission need.
2. The JROC was briefed on the alternatives and cost-performance trades reflected in the Cost and Operational Effectiveness Analysis. The Council concurs with the selection of the AFAS and FARV.
3. The JROC also designated the Chief of Staff of the Army as the Operational Requirements Documents approval authority.

W. A. OWENS
Vice Chairman
of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff
JROC Chairman

Enclosure

11-L-0559/OSD/12655

AFAS KEY PERFORMANCE PARAMETERS

<u>PARAMETER</u>	<u>OBJECTIVE</u>	<u>THRESHOLD</u>
LETHALITY		
Rate of fire (rounds/min)	12	10
Maximum range (KM) Missiles	50	40
MOBILITY		
Cross-country speed (KM/HR)	48	39
Highway speed (KM/HR)	78	67

FARV KEY PERFORMANCE PARAMETERS

<u>PARAMETER</u>	<u>OBJECTIVE</u>	<u>THRESHOLD</u>
Resupply		
Rearm 60 rounds (min)	less than 12	12
MOBILITY		
Cross-country speed (KM/HR)	48	39
Highway speed (KM/HR)	78	67

showfake
1515

May 13, 2002 6:18 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Crusaders

Please find out apples-to-apples on whether or not it is true that it takes 67 C-17s to get 18 Crusader tubes into the area.

Make sure you get those folks to get back to me with the exact timelines, so that when I talk about it, I can be absolutely accurate.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
051302-43

470

.....
Please respond by 02/11/02

Settelo
me
Larry Di Rita

13 May 02

U17342 02

*Summary
14/02
Joe 5/15*

May 13, 2002 5:08 PM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Anecdotes

You keep talking about that Eisenhower anecdote.

You talk about the cruise missile, the GPS, and JDAM anecdotes.

Let's get those in writing for me by tomorrow.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
051302-40

.....

Please respond by 05/14/02

330.001572

*Response in
SPS
5/15*

13 May 02

U17343 02

11-L-0559/OSD/12658

MEMO TO: Secretary of Defense

DATE: May 14, 2002

FROM: Paul Wolfowitz 

SUBJECT: Anecdotes

Don,

In a snowflake dated 13 May, you asked me to provide some anecdotes on capabilities we have introduced in the past despite stiff resistance from the Services.

Attached are five anecdotes you may find useful:

Tab 1 is a story about how Eisenhower's career was almost ended because he wrote articles promoting armored warfare at a time when the Army was dominated by infantrymen.

Tab 2 is my recollection of the Navy's early reluctance to accept the Tomahawk cruise missile program.

Tab 3 is an anecdote from Tony Tether, the director of DARPA, about both Air Force and Army resistance to GPS innovations.

Tab 4 is about the Air Force's reluctance to produce the JDAM.

Tab 5 explains how the Air Force did not acquire precision munitions, especially laser-guided bombs, in great numbers until after Desert Storm, despite the success it had with early models in Vietnam.

TAB

1

Introduction of Armor Warfare

Eisenhower and the Army

This is General Eisenhower's version of how ideas were suppressed and innovative personalities repressed in the old Army (taken from *At Ease: Stories I tell my Friends*). In the early 1920s, Dwight Eisenhower began writing articles on armored warfare's future for the military journals. Then he was called before the Chief of Infantry.

"I was told that my ideas were not only wrong but dangerous and that henceforth I would keep them to myself. Particularly I was not to publish anything incompatible with solid infantry doctrine. If I did, I would be hauled before a court-martial." p.173

In 1924, Eisenhower applied to go to the Infantry School at Fort Benning, which was appropriate for his rank and a stepping stone to Fort Leavenworth and the Command and General Staff School. It was vital for his future advancement, but the Chief of Infantry refused to send him.

"I went to see the Chief of Infantry. I asked whether the orders could be changed, and whether I could be sent to school. I should have known better; he refused even to listen to my arguments...

"A strange telegram arrived. It was from Fox Conner [Pershing's chief of staff in World War I and a senior General who mentored both Marshall and Eisenhower], serving as Deputy Chief of Staff to General Hines. General Conner knew of my disappointment...the telegram was cryptic in the extreme.

"NO MATTER WHAT ORDERS YOU RECIEVE FROM THE WAR DEPARTMENT, MAKE NO PROTEST. ACCEPT THEM WITHOUT QUESTION. SIGNED CONNER [all caps in the original]

"...For several days I was in a quandary until orders arrived. Normally, they would have been so difficult to accept that it was well I had advance warning. The orders detailed me to recruiting duty in the state of Colorado!

"They relieved me from duty with the Infantry. To be assigned to the recruiting service, in those days, unless it was to meet an immediate and temporary personal requirement of an officer, was felt by most of us to be a rebuke a little less devastating than a reprimand.

"...After my gloomy interview with the Chief of Infantry, I had reached the somber conclusion that he and I did not see eye to eye on my place in the military service. ...I learned that the Chief of Infantry had been circumvented, not converted, to enthusiasm.

"A letter arrived from General Conner. He said that because Benning was under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Chief of Infantry, it was impossible for an infantry officer to go there except with the Chief's approval. Instead, General Conner had arranged for my transfer on a temporary basis to the Adjutant General's office--which was in charge of recruiting. I had never thought of so drastic a measure. Had anyone else suggested to me that I desert an arm for a service I would have been outraged. Now it had been done without consultation. But with my solid belief in Fox Conner I kept my temper.

"Under his novel arrangement, a final order came to me which said that I had been selected by the Adjutant General as one of his quota of officers to go to the Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth." pp. 199-200

Eisenhower went on to note that because of this support he entered Leavenworth years before he otherwise would have. Conner changed his career decisively.

TAB

2

Introduction of the Tomahawk Cruise Missile

Tomahawk and the Navy

- The Tomahawk cruise missile was originally pressed on the Navy by Henry Kissinger as a way to get additional nuclear delivery systems. But in the early 1970s, a group of civilians, including Albert Wohlstetter and a number of people from DARPA, begin pointing out that the extraordinary accuracy achievable with Tomahawk would make it possible to use conventional warheads with Tomahawk in many applications.
- However, the Navy took a long time coming around to accepting that idea. During the 1976 arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union, Henry Kissinger was eager to give up the sea-launched cruise missile in order to reach a deal with the Soviets. The Navy was more than willing to oblige since they considered cruise missiles an inconvenient consumer of valuable submarine space, which they preferred to devote to torpedoes.
- It was only through the intervention of the then-Secretary of Defense, someone named Donald Rumsfeld, that Kissinger was prevented from doing a deal with the Soviets that would have made all naval cruise missiles over 600 kilometers illegal. Today, the Navy has adopted the cruise missile and it is an integral part of their whole operational doctrine.
- It is not surprising that military operators view promised precision with a certain skepticism. It's not a matter of wanting belt and suspenders; it's a matter of not wanting to take off your belt when somebody is offering you suspenders that you're not sure will work. Until you can really believe that this kind of accuracy is deliverable, at least it's comforting to have something that can at least fire at a target. However, it's a lot better to have something that can actually hit the target. The difference is truly revolutionary.

TAB

3

Introduction of the Global Positioning System

GPS and the Air Force

- In the late 1970s, there was great difficulty getting the Air Force to keep GPS in its budget. Each year, it would avoid programming for it and OSD would have to add it back in.
- The Air Force did not believe it had any real value for it; rather, it would be of benefit only for the Army to help ground forces navigate. They believed that the Army should fund it.
- Of course the situation today is different. The Air Force has not only come to accept GPS, but has embraced it and recognizes, as do all the Services, the enormous advantages of GPS for conducting precision strikes.

GPS and the Army

- The early GPS-receiver was the Army's "manpack" – literally a man-portable backpack-sized device that only had a single receiving channel for the GPS signal. Having only one channel meant that it took several minutes to establish a signal and determine location, while the enormous size of the system made it difficult to use in tactical environments.
- DARPA sought to reduce the size of the system and make it multi-channel, which meant it could determine location instantaneously. An engineer came to the program manager and said he thought that using gallium arsenide integrated circuits he could reduce the size of a multi-channel receiver to fit in a carton of cigarettes.
- The program manager, doubting his ability to do so, pulled out a pack of Marlboro cigarettes and said "you mean like this?" The engineer frowned and said "no, it's more like a pack of Virginia Slims."
- DARPA succeeded in producing a Virginia Slims-size multi-channel GPS receiver. But the Army didn't want the system because it would interfere with the development of its "manpack." So DARPA went to the Navy, which took over the small GPS receiver program. That program was very successful. It led to the standard GPS receiver that is in all US military systems today.
- The "manpack," thankfully, is in a military museum somewhere.

TAB

4

Introduction of the Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM)

JDAM and the Air Force

- By the early 1990s, the precision revolution was becoming clear. Weapons designers were considering a range of new applications for precision guidance.
- One application they considered involved transforming a “dumb” bomb with a GPS-tail kit that would attach and turn the bomb into a precision-guided weapon.
- These kits would be inexpensive (less than \$25,000 per kit). They would utilize existing munitions. And they could destroy targets with pinpoint accuracy day or night and in all weather conditions.
- But the contractors proposing the JDAM concept made a political mistake. They proposed that the JDAM munitions should be delivered by the B-2, the controversial and expensive stealth bomber.
- The Air Force was concerned that if the JDAM were introduced, it would greatly increase the conventional warfighting potential of the B-2 – a program that was not very popular inside the Pentagon.
- Because the Air Force was reluctant to give the B-2 greater conventional capabilities, it was in no hurry to see the JDAM fielded.
- However, the JDAM program survived – in part thanks to the efforts of many in the Congress – and JDAM, delivered by B-2s in the Kosovo war and by a wider range of aircraft in Operation Enduring Freedom, has been validated as one of the most revolutionary and cost-effective munitions in the US arsenal.

TAB

5

The Introduction of Laser-Guided Bombs

Laser-Guided Bombs and the Air Force

- The Air Force did not rush to embrace precision weapons during the period between Vietnam and the Gulf War, especially laser-guided bombs (LGBs), which were one of the real stars in the Gulf War.
- From the end of the Vietnam War until the Gulf War, there was a reluctance within the tactical fighter community to substitute technology for the manual bombing skills of individual pilots.
- From 1968 to 1972, the Air Force dropped over 28,000 LGBs in Southeast Asia. In the last year of active operations in Vietnam, the laser bombers achieved a reported 50% hit rate, and Air Force strike packages against North Vietnam during Linebacker I were built increasingly around laser bombers.
- Despite this operational improvement, the Air Force largely turned its back on LGBs throughout the 1970s and during most of the 1980s. The tactical fighter community in the Air Force was not receptive to the potential of LGBs. It saw little relevance of LGBs to a conflict in the European theater.
- However, during Desert Storm, the limited number of LGBs in the Air Force's arsenal proved their worth.
- LGBs dropped by F-117s, F-111Fs and F-15Es tracked on and hit the aim-points illuminated with laser designators about 85% of the time (although not all these weapons achieved the desired target damage despite their reliability and accuracy). The U.S. dropped about 9,340 LGBs in 1991, and these weapons accounted for the bulk of the damage inflicted on the Black Hole's "strategic" target categories. Still, precision-guided munitions accounted for only a small fraction of the total munitions expended in the war (<10%).
- After the Gulf War the Air Force abandoned its previous notion of smart jets with dumb bombs. Precision munitions became a priority.
- The F-16's automated bombing system was the poster child for the previous notion. But following Desert Storm, the Air Force moved swiftly to begin buying navigation and targeting pods for most of its F-16 and F-15E aircraft.
- While the Air Force came to embrace precision, rapid procurement of precision munitions was delayed nearly two decades after the early successes of LGBs in Vietnam.

May 13, 2002 4:49 PM

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Korea

When I go to Korea, I have to introduce the plans we have for an alternative, namely to "swiftly defeat," as opposed to a "win decisively," so they know the alternative.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
051302-37

.....
Please respond by 05/31/02

KOLEN

13 May 02

U17345 02



SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

OCT 23 2002

Mr. Jalal Talabani
Secretary General
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan
Sulaimaniya, Iraq

IRAQ

Dear Mr. Secretary General:

Thank you for your letter expressing the views of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan. I appreciate your courage and commitment to a free Iraq.

We are well aware of the threat Saddam's forces pose to the people living in northern Iraq. We plan to continue working with opposition leaders to prepare for the likely contingencies.

We are looking into the matters you raised and will remain in contact through the appropriate United States Government channels.

Sincerely,

23 OCT 02



11-L-0559/OSD/12672

U17347 / 02

SECDEF HAS SEEN

AUG 20 2002

CONTROL OF THE

54/3

8/20

28/20

یە کێشێی پێشمانی کوردستان
سکرێری گشتی

الاتحاد الوطني الكردستاني
الامين العام



Patriotic Union of Kurdistan
Secretary General

The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
The Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301

August 19, 2002

Dear Mr. Secretary:

It was an honor for me to meet with your Excellency in the White House last week. I was heartened to learn of your attention to the intricacies of the Iraq issue, and your commitment to the vision of a democratic Iraq.

The institutions of self-government in the Kurdistan Region, free Iraq, can be a catalyst for wider democratization of the whole of the country. Our model proves that Iraq can be different, and Iraq need not be governed by tyranny. We also understand fully that our interest lies in close partnership with the United States. Furthermore, this is a part of the Islamic Middle East in which U.S. support is widely appreciated and acknowledged. Therefore, it is only logical to predict that Saddam Hussein identifies Iraqi Kurdistan as a priority target in his effort to neutralize plans aimed the removal of his regime.

I am confident that the United States is fully aware of our vulnerabilities in the face of possible onslaught by Saddam's army or WMDs. Given the seriousness of the present situation, it is urgent that the United States Government publicly states a robust commitment to defend the territory and people of Iraqi Kurdistan.

In particular there is need to train our military personnel to assist in supporting possible US Air Force combat missions that will be necessary to repel Iraqi aggression. Mobile Training Teams should be dispatched to our territory to arrange for this as a matter of urgency. This will be seen as a serious deterrence to Baghdad aggressive intentions.

Further, we are seriously concerned about the use of chemical and biological weapons against our people. It is imperative that our friends in the United States make available to us mobile clinics, means of protection and antidotes to deal with this serious possibility.

The PUK is a partner with the United States in this noble endeavor to bring about a democratic Iraq—we look forward to working closely with you and your colleagues for our common interest in democracy and stability in the Middle East.

Sincerely,

Jalal Talabani

11-L-0559/OSD/12673

U1 3787 /02

August 20, 2002 6:16 PM

TO: VADM Giambastiani
Col. Bucci

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Letter from PUK Secretary General

Please make sure someone answers this letter from Talabani, and I want to see the words before it goes out.

Thanks.

Attach.
08/19/02 Jalal Talabani (Secretary General, PUK) ltr to SecDef

DHR:dh
082002-22

..... 8/20
Please respond by 09/06/02

 SWT -
- Draft response
- Coord with Policy
D. R. H.
LETTER DATED
8/21

Snowflake

10:29 AM

TO: Doug Feith
J.D. Crouch

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

DATE: June 8, 2002

SUBJECT:

Make sure you follow up with Geoffrey Hoon of the UK on the subject of the technical issues on Galileo so he and his people understand what the problem is. He can then be helpful.

UK


Thanks.

DHR/azn
060802.17

Please respond by

6/8/02

7/11



Crouch response attached.

7/11 2/13

Response Attached

7/11

8 JUN 02

11-L-0559/OSD/12675

U17348-02

October 1, 2002 7:27 AM

10/23

TO: Gen. Myers

CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Steve Cambone

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*


SUBJECT: Special Operations Command

I am increasingly of the opinion that SOC ought not to be both a resourcer and an operator. I know that is what Congress provided, but I think it possibly is inherently contradictory, and we may want to change it.

SOCOM

Thanks.

DHR:dh
100102-9



10/27
Response attached
Larry Di Rita

10/27

02 OCT 3 2:03 PM

U17360 / 02

Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD/12676

10/23

October 1, 2002 4:07 PM

TO: LTG Craddock
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Problems with Gear

370164

Please find out what this article on problems with soldiers' gear is about.

Thanks.

Attach.
Bloomberg News, "Problems Cited in Soldiers' Gear," *New York Times*, October 1, 2002.

DHR:dh
100102-56

.....

Please respond by 10/11/02


10/22

Response attached

Larry Di Rita

1 Oct 02

October 22, 2002 3:27 PM

TO: Governor Ridge
CC: Honorable Andrew H. Card, Jr.
Honorable Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Public Information

Attached is a thoughtful suggestion from Chris Williams, a member of the Defense Policy Board and a very smart man. It is worth your consideration.

Attach.
10/16/02 Williams letter to SecDef

DHR:dh
102202-9

384

22 OCT 02

U17373 / 02

11-L-0559/OSD/12678

2

10/17
1700

(b)(6)

Done 10/18
[Signature]

Copy to ASD (PA)
Return to me.

October 16, 2002

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY RUMSFELD

FROM: Chris Williams [Signature]

SUBJECT: Public Information

Providing timely and accurate information about threats to public health and safety is an increasingly important aspect of the global war on terrorism. Although the Bush Administration had made noteworthy strides in this area, clearly more can be done.

In this regard, I recommend you consider suggesting to Condi, Karl Rove, Tom Ridge, and other senior White House officials that the Administration initiate a public awareness campaign concerning terrorist threats to the U.S. homeland. Specifically, I propose that a series of 3-5 minute "public service announcements" be produced that could air on national television stations during high profile TV events (e.g., the Super Bowl, World Series, etc.) and in movie theaters prior to the "feature attraction." Each taped segment could be "hosted" by a national figure, such as appropriate White House or Cabinet officials (Ridge, Tommy Thompson, Surgeon General, etc.) or some other prominent individual (governors, mayors, medical figures, Hollywood actors, musicians, sports stars, etc.). Each segment would have a specific theme, such as how to recognize symptoms of a biological weapons attack, how to prepare your family and home for such emergencies, the status of anthrax vaccination program, etc. Such announcements should be sober in tone and factual as opposed to sensationalistic or alarmist. Running at the bottom of the screen throughout the segment could be an easy-to-remember government-sponsored website listing (e.g., www.homelanddefenseinfo.gov or something like that) where they could go for more information.

The potential benefits of such a public awareness campaign are manifold, I believe. First, it would serve to help educate an increasingly frightened but largely ill-informed populace with factual and actionable information. Second, it would underscore the important point that the war on terror is still in its early stages and that Americans can and should expect additional attacks on our citizens and soil. And third, it would help instill in Americans a sense of confidence that their Government is interested in their health and safety and is actively seeking to convey useful information to them.

I am convinced that the American people would respond favorably to this kind of campaign. Furthermore, I am confident that TV networks and movie theater operators would agree to run this type of announcement. And I am certain that many noteworthy public figures would be eager to donate their time to be involved in the production of such segments.

I hope you find this suggestion helpful. I would be pleased to assist in this endeavor in whatever way you deem appropriate. Best regards, sir.

SECDEF CAB
DISTRIBUTE
SECDEF
PLASST
SECSEC
SECDEF
&D
CD
JSDP
CABLE CH
FILE

June 4, 2002 7:59 AM

Done

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: High Commissioner

Afghanistan

Do we need a high commissioner for Afghanistan?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
060402-7

.....
Please respond by

06/28/02

7/15

*Settled -
"One Part of
" Afghan Security
Issue
Ongoing
4 Jun 02
J. R. [Signature]*

*Larry Di Rita
7/4*

U17410 02

11-L-0559/OSD/12680

June 4, 2002 8:05 AM

TO: Newt Gingrich
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Response

I checked on the Harrier question. I am satisfied it was there and usable and not what you suggested.

With respect to the refugee camps as a recruiting area, I thought it was a good idea. I am told that the folks that have tried it haven't had good luck.

Thanks—keep it coming.

Regards.

Attach.
11/09/01 Gingrich e-mail to SecDef

DHR:dh
060402-9

AFJ HANUSMAN

4 June 02

U17411 02

11-L-0559/OSD/12681

(b)(6)

From: Thirdwave2@aol.com
Sent: Friday, November 09, 2001 8:20 AM
To: (b)(6)
Subject: for the sect.

T. Frank

to the Secretary
As the war evolves and grows more complex I need a low cost way to learn
about developments without bothering you and your senior deputies. For
example, the use of the Harriers makes no sense to me from the outside
and
feels like pork barrel planning by the services which would be a very
symptom. example, we ought to have at least five battalions of Pashtuns
recruited from the United States, Europe and the refugee camps and in
training now. I do not want any operational secrets. However if I can't
get
answers to planning and past events my advice can easily become silly or
at a
minimum useless or of disconnected gadfly value.
Is there a person at full colonel level who could be tasked to hand hold
and
keep me within general boundaries of factual relevance?
alternatively I am comfortable if you tell me this is impossible and to
do
the best I can with open source materials.
thanks
Newt

Handwritten notes and circled numbers 1 and 2.

cc: L. D. Rita
Admiral G

*Refugee -
Mole in Army*

June 4, 2002 11:35 AM

TO: Steve Cambone
CC: Powell Moore
Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: DPG and Congress

100-54

Please make sure you keep a darn good record of everything we offer the Congress on the DPG items, so that we track it.

I would like a record of how forthcoming we were and the fact that no one responded and asked to be briefed—on the studies, for example. We should make sure we do it for the House and the Senate.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
060402-17



Please respond by 06/28/02

4 Jun 02

U17412 02

11-L-0559/OSD/12683

TO: Doug Feith
 CC: Gen. Myers
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
 DATE: June 7, 2002
 SUBJECT: National Security

We need to get a memo out to the national security community about the risk of cruise missiles. I am very concerned about it. Let's get a thoughtful piece developed between you and the joint staff and see if we can't get something out in the next 48 hours.

971.92

They are widely spread around the world, they are versatile, and can be launched from land, sea or air. They are versatile in the sense their warheads can be conventional, biological, chemical or nuclear and radiation; they can loiter. There is substantial risk here.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
 06072.03

Please respond by: 6/15/02

7 Jun 02

U17413 02

TO: Larry Di Rita
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *WR*
 DATE: June 8, 2002
 SUBJECT: **Ivanov Visit in September**

Ivanov said that Powell and Sergey Ivanov and Rumsfeld could meet in Washington some time between 9/10 and 9/14 to fulfill the statement in the political declaration.

Russia

Get the statement in the political declaration so I can read it and then let's get the meeting set up so our calendars are set and no one is out of town.

We don't have an agenda. We need to work that out between now and September.

Sergey Ivanov prefers a narrower circle as do I. The topic probably should be the implementation of the treaty.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
 060802.18

Please respond by: 6 | 21 | 02

8 Jun 02

U17414 02

Snowflake

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
DATE: June 8, 2002
SUBJECT: MoD Norway

02/00 10:42 AM

ISA

The Minister of Defense of Norway suggested that NATO be used somewhat for consultation for Homeland Security and Defense issues. I think it is not a bad idea. We might want to think about how we would do that.

Thanks.

Norway

DHR/azn
060802.20

Please respond by: 6/21/02

7/22
RESPONSE ATTACHED

VR

8 JUN 02

U17415 02

06-10-02 17:35 14

11-L-0559/OSD/12686



ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
2600 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2600



INFO MEMO

I-02/010522-NATO
USDP *Ally*

INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY POLICY

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: J.D. CROUCH, II, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

for *OK*
JUL 19 2002

SUBJECT: Homeland Defense Consultations in NATO

- You requested we think about the Norwegian Minister of Defense's suggestion that NATO be used for consultations on Homeland Security and Defense issues (~~ESA~~).
- The NATO Senior Civil Emergency Planning Committee (SCEPC) would be an ideal forum for such consultations.
- We have been working with State and FEMA to reinvigorate the SCEPC and use it to develop Allied capabilities to respond to the consequences of a terrorist attack, including possible weapons of mass destruction (WMD) use.
 - This may include sending an OSD representative to assist the USG representative at SCEPC Civil Protection Committee meetings.
- Under the auspices of the SCEPC, Allies exchange information on civil emergency planning and disaster/incident response capabilities with a view toward future cooperation. This exchange now focuses on WMD consequence management.
- Through the SCEPC, NATO and Russia will conduct a Consequence Management Exercise involving 500 people from 22 Partner countries on September 25-27 in Noginsk, Russia.
 - The exercise scenario involves an attack on a Russian chemical facility that would force Russia to request international emergency response assistance.
 - The US will send a small number of observers, including one from OSD Policy.
- We will continue to seek opportunities to hold Homeland Security Defense consultations in the SCEPC.

Prepared by Anne Galer, ISP/NATO (b)(6)

10:50 AM

TO: Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: June 8, 2002

SUBJECT:

Countries that seem to be leaning forward and friendly to the US on issues that we ought to keep working are Portugal, Norway, UK, Poland, Italy and Denmark.

092

Thanks.

DHR/azn
060802.24

Please respond by: _____

8 JUN 02

U17416 02

11:10 AM

TO: Admiral Giambastiani

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: June 8, 2002

SUBJECT:

The NAC is coming to Washington DC on June 19 - 21. Apparently I am supposed to see ^{them} him briefly. Condi is spending an hour with ^{them} him. Others are spending more time than that. I think I ought to spend more time with ^{them} him and really give them a meal; a breakfast, or a lunch or a reception and give them a lot of chance to ask questions and answer them. Maybe schedule 70 to 90 minutes.

Thanks.

DHR/azm
060802.28

Please respond by: 6/12/02

Done 6/14

NATD 091.112

8 Jun 02

U17417 02

SD HAS SEEN. 4/9

TO: Admiral Giambastiani

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: June 8, 2002

SUBJECT:

① How many cables are we behind in terms of all the bi-laterals and the NATO meetings?

Have we gotten the Ivanov cable out? I am worried about their concerns about Georgia and what they might do. Here's a report that says the Russian military is repositioning their forces.

②

Thanks.

DHR/azn
060802.31

Please respond by:

6/8/02

RUSSTA

6/9

① All cables are done. See attached list. I've also included POTUS letters.

② Ivanov cable is completed. Couch discussed Georgia/Russia issue with you. He has U17418. 02 for action.

Squre

V/Red

**NATO/Middle East Trip
5-13 June '02**

- A. _____ First half of POTUS Letter (RE-WRITE IN PROGRESS)
_____ Second half of POTUS Letter

B. CABLES

LONDON

- _done_ 1. Meeting w/PM Blair
done 2. Luncheon w/MoD Hoon

NATO

- _done_ 1. Secretary General Robertson
done 2. Defense Planning Committee
done 3. Nuclear Planning Group
done 4. NAC-D meeting
done 5. NAC-D Balkans
done 6. NAC-D Luncheon
done 7. Russian Bi-lat
done 8. French Bi-lat
done 9. NATO-Russia Council
done 10. Ukraine Bi-lat
done 11. V-10 multi-lateral meeting
done 12. Kazakhstan Bi-lat
done 13. Euro-Atlantic Partnership Committee
done 14. Canadian Bi-lat

ESTONIA

- _done_ 1. Nordic-Baltic Ministerial
done 2. Danish Bi-lat
done 3. Estonian Bi-lat

KUWAIT

- _____ 1. 1st Deputy Prime Minister & Foreign Minister Bi-lat
_____ 2. MinDef Bi-lat
_____ 3. Amir Bi-lat

- _____ Bahrain
_____ Qatar
_____ Pakistan
_____ India

11:51 AM

TO: Admiral Giambastiani ✓
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld D
DATE: June 10, 2002
SUBJECT:

~~SEC DEF INFO SEEN~~
6/14/02

I need to get briefed on the pay raises. Give me a little piece of paper that shows me that they have gotten one raise at "X" percent, with so much targeted and the President has proposed a second one of it's percent with so much targeted.
Thanks.

240

DHR/azn
06102 07

6/18/02

Please respond by: _____

10 JUN 02

U17419 02

June 10, 2002

INFORMATION PAPER

SUBJECT: Military Pay Raises for 2002 and 2003

2002:

- The January 1, 2002 military pay raise, passed by Congress and signed into law by the President on December 28, 2001, was targeted as per the Department's proposal and the President's Budget.
- All officers got a minimum raise of 5%.
- All enlisted members got a minimum raise of 6%.
- Raises of up to 10% were targeted to mid-grade officers and NCOs (see Tab A).
- The average raise was 6.9%.
- This represented the President's promised additional \$1B.
 - Above the "by law" raise of Employment Cost Index ECI+1/2% or 4.6%.
 - The law calls for military raises of the (ECI)+1/2% through 2006.

2003:

- The January 1, 2003 pay raise is pending passage of the FY2003 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). The Department's Omnibus Bill and the President's Budget again propose a targeted raise.
- All members would get a minimum raise of 4.1% (ECI+1/2%).
- An additional \$300M would be targeted to mid-grade officers and NCOs, with raises of up to 6.5% (see Tab B).
- The average raise would be 4.7%.
- As of June 10, 2002, the House passed its version of the NDAA and the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) marked their version. Both contain the targeted raise as proposed by the Department and included in the President's Budget.

Tab A – Table of 2002 Raises – showing specific targeting

Tab B – Table of 2003 Targeted Raises – proposed percentages above the 4.1% across-the-board raises (e.g. 2.4% above 4.1% is a proposed raise of 6.5%)

MONTHLY BASIC PAY TABLE

PERCENTAGE INCREASES
EFFECTIVE 1 JANUARY 2002 - TARGETED PAY TABLE

YEARS OF SERVICE

PAY GRADE	<2	2	3	4	6	8	10	12	14	16	18	20	22	24	26
COMMISSIONED OFFICERS															
O-10	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	5.0%	5.0%	5.0%	5.0%
O-9	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	5.0%	5.0%	5.0%	5.0%
O-8	5.0%	5.0%	5.0%	5.0%	5.0%	5.0%	5.0%	5.0%	5.0%	5.0%	5.0%	5.0%	5.0%	5.0%	5.0%
O-7	5.0%	5.0%	5.0%	5.0%	5.0%	5.0%	5.0%	5.0%	5.0%	5.0%	5.0%	5.0%	5.0%	5.0%	5.0%
O-6	5.0%	5.0%	5.0%	5.0%	5.0%	5.0%	5.0%	5.0%	5.0%	5.0%	5.0%	5.0%	5.0%	5.0%	5.0%
O-5	5.0%	5.0%	5.0%	5.0%	5.0%	5.0%	5.0%	5.0%	5.0%	5.0%	5.0%	5.0%	5.0%	5.0%	5.0%
O-4	6.5%	6.5%	6.5%	6.5%	6.5%	6.5%	6.5%	6.5%	6.5%	6.5%	6.5%	6.5%	6.5%	6.5%	6.5%
O-3	6.0%	6.0%	6.0%	6.0%	6.0%	6.0%	6.0%	6.0%	6.0%	6.0%	6.0%	6.0%	6.0%	6.0%	6.0%
O-2	5.0%	5.0%	5.0%	5.0%	5.0%	5.0%	5.0%	5.0%	5.0%	5.0%	5.0%	5.0%	5.0%	5.0%	5.0%
O-1	5.0%	5.0%	5.0%	5.0%	5.0%	5.0%	5.0%	5.0%	5.0%	5.0%	5.0%	5.0%	5.0%	5.0%	5.0%
COMMISSIONED OFFICERS WITH OVER 4 YEARS ACTIVE DUTY SERVICE AS AN ENLISTED MEMBER OR WARRANT OFFICER															
O-3E	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	6.0%	6.0%	6.0%	6.0%	6.0%	6.0%	6.0%	6.0%	6.0%	6.0%	6.0%	6.0%
O-2E	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	5.0%	5.0%	5.0%	5.0%	5.0%	5.0%	5.0%	5.0%	5.0%	5.0%	5.0%	5.0%
O-1E	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	5.0%	5.0%	5.0%	5.0%	5.0%	5.0%	5.0%	5.0%	5.0%	5.0%	5.0%	5.0%
WARRANT OFFICERS															
W-5	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	7.0%	7.0%	7.0%	7.0%
W-4	7.5%	7.5%	7.5%	7.5%	7.5%	7.5%	7.5%	7.5%	7.5%	7.5%	7.5%	7.5%	7.5%	7.5%	7.5%
W-3	8.0%	8.0%	8.0%	8.0%	8.0%	8.0%	8.0%	8.0%	8.0%	8.0%	8.0%	8.0%	8.0%	8.0%	8.0%
W-2	8.5%	8.0%	11.0%	11.0%	8.5%	8.5%	8.5%	8.5%	8.5%	8.5%	8.5%	8.5%	8.5%	8.5%	8.5%
W-1	15.0%	8.5%	14.0%	8.5%	8.5%	8.5%	8.5%	8.5%	8.5%	8.5%	8.5%	8.5%	8.5%	8.5%	8.5%
ENLISTED MEMBERS															
E-9	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	9.5%	9.5%	9.5%	9.5%	9.5%	9.5%	9.5%	9.5%	10.0%
E-8	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	9.0%	9.0%	9.0%	9.0%	9.0%	9.0%	9.0%	9.0%	9.0%
E-7	8.5%	8.5%	8.5%	8.5%	8.5%	8.5%	8.5%	8.5%	8.5%	8.5%	8.5%	8.5%	8.5%	8.5%	8.5%
E-6	8.0%	7.5%	7.5%	7.5%	7.5%	7.5%	7.5%	7.5%	7.5%	7.5%	7.5%	7.5%	7.5%	7.5%	7.5%
E-5	13.0%	7.5%	7.5%	7.5%	7.5%	7.5%	7.5%	7.5%	7.5%	7.5%	7.5%	7.5%	7.5%	7.5%	7.5%
E-4	12.0%	6.6%	6.6%	6.6%	6.0%	6.0%	6.0%	6.0%	6.0%	6.0%	6.0%	6.0%	6.0%	6.0%	6.0%
E-3	7.3%	6.0%	6.1%	6.0%	6.0%	6.0%	6.0%	6.0%	6.0%	6.0%	6.0%	6.0%	6.0%	6.0%	6.0%
E-2	6.0%	6.0%	6.0%	6.0%	6.0%	6.0%	6.0%	6.0%	6.0%	6.0%	6.0%	6.0%	6.0%	6.0%	6.0%
E-1 >4	6.0%	6.0%	6.0%	6.0%	6.0%	6.0%	6.0%	6.0%	6.0%	6.0%	6.0%	6.0%	6.0%	6.0%	6.0%
E-1 <4	6.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
	C/S	5.0%	M/S	10.0%											

TAB A

11-L-0559/OSD/12694

PROPOSED
TARGETED PERCENTAGE INCREASES (#300M)
 (ABOVE 4.1 PERCENT) *
 EFFECTIVE 1 JANUARY 2003

YEARS OF SERVICE

PAY GRADE	<2	2	3	4	6	8	10	12	14	16	18	20	22
COMMISSIONED OFFICERS													
O-10	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
O-9	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
O-8	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
O-7	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.9%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
O-6	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	2.4%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
O-5	4.4%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	2.4%	4.4%	2.4%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
O-4	5.4%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	1.4%	1.4%	1.4%	1.4%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
O-3	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.9%	0.9%	0.9%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
O-2	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
O-1	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
COMMISSIONED OFFICERS WITH OVER 4 YEARS ACTIVE DUTY SERVICE AS AN ENLISTED MEMBER OR WARRANT OFFICER													
O-3E	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.9%	0.9%	0.9%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
O-2E	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
O-1E	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
WARRANT OFFICERS													
W-5	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
W-4	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
W-3	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	1.9%	1.9%	1.9%	1.9%	0.0%
W-2	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	1.4%	1.4%	1.4%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
W-1	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	1.9%	1.9%	1.4%	1.4%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
ENLISTED MEMBERS													
E-9	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	1.9%	1.9%
E-8	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	2.4%	1.9%	1.9%
E-7	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	2.4%	1.9%	1.4%	0.0%	0.0%
E-6	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	2.4%	1.9%	1.9%	1.4%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
E-5	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	2.4%	1.9%	1.9%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
E-4	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
E-3	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
E-2	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
E-1 >4	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
E-1 <4	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
C/S		0.0%	M/S	2.4%									

11-L-0559/OSD/12695

software

11:55 AM

TO: Doug Feith
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
 DATE: June 10, 2002
 SUBJECT:

520

I am told that on the maritime interception that the US doesn't get any of the money for any of our costs and expenses for that activity. We don't take the ships and sell them, we don't take the oil and money and instead we are giving it all to the UN. This is goofy! We should be more respectful of the taxpayers' dollars. The UN doesn't deserve that money. It just goes to Iraq anyway. We ought to be getting paid for what we are doing.

Get back to me with a report on what you recommend.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
06102.09

Please respond by: 6/21/02

10 Jun 02

U17420 02

11-L-0559/OSD/12696

showWare

3:48 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: June 13, 2002

SUBJECT:

322

Do we really want to hear the Army Corp of Engineers with respect to the September 11th Memorial? They aren't even part of the Pentagon for all practical purposes. I would want to think we would want to use something else.

What do you think?

Thanks.

DHR/azn
061302.02

Please respond by:

6/19/02

13 Jun 02

U17421 02

11-L-0559/OSD/12697

5:09 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: June 13, 2002
SUBJECT:

I am cool with Tom Franks being bothered by going up and just giving briefings to the House and the Senate. Don't do it.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
061302.15

Please respond by: _____

337

6/21

Lowell Moore - Let's

discuss.

not concure with your proposal that Franks go to House/Senate briefings.

Larry Di Rita

6/21

13 June

5:09 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: June 13, 2002
SUBJECT:

*Done
6/24*

Here's this paper. I have not read it. I am concerned about it, and I notice the calendar doesn't have any time for me to do anything anyway. That's a real problem.

032

Thanks.

DHR:azn
061302 16

Attach: Memorandum from Powell Moore re: June Schedule 5/28/02; Page 2

Please respond by: 6/14/02

13 JUN 02

U17425 02

①



LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1300

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2002 JUN -5 AM 11: 24

May 28, 2002 4:30 PM

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Powell A. Moore, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Legislative Affairs)

SUBJECT: June Schedule

When Congress returns on June 4, there will be a four week period of intense legislative activity leading up to the 4th of July recess. The following are goals that we will support during this period:

- Completion of the FY02 Supplemental Appropriations Bill. The House completed action on this legislation at 3:00 a.m. Friday morning, May 24 and it will be in the pending business in the Senate when the Senate returns on June 4. The Senate is expected to spend most of the week on this bill leading to a conference with the House.
- Final action by the Senate on the FY2003 Defense Authorization Bill and the beginning of the conference on this legislation. The House has completed its action and the Senate Committee has reported its bill. The legislation is currently pending on the legislative calendar waiting to be scheduled by the Majority Leader. It will not be taken up before the Supplemental is completed. We have some work to do on the SASC version of the bill, especially on Missile Defense and the Crusader program.
- House action on the FY2003 Defense Appropriations Bill. The Defense Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee is preparing for markup after a closed hearing with Secretary Aldridge and others on June 5 to consider the Crusader issue. The Subcommittee hopes to get this bill to the floor before the 4th of July recess.
- Continue to maintain support for the global war on terrorism.

This schedule is developed with these objectives in mind.

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	6/4
SR MA GIAMBASTIANI	5/6/4
MA BUCCI	5/7/6/4
EXECSEC WHITMORE	6/6/4

6/3
Secret - This is a planning guide only. We will use it as a basic template for scheduling purposes. Does not...
N. B. it

11-L-0559 OSD/12700

11A9349 102

Congressional Hearings:

- Senate Foreign Relations Committee – this Committee has requested a joint appearance by the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense on Afghanistan. This hearing would have extensive television coverage and may provide an opportunity to maintain public support for operations in Afghanistan. ~~(2011)~~
- House Armed Services Committee hearing on the Crusader. The Deputy Secretary may be invited to testify on this issue.
- Arms control agreement with the Russians – A number of committees will have an interest in this issue and may seek appearances by the Secretary or the Deputy Secretary.

*Declined
12/11*

Classified Briefings on the war for the full House and the full Senate:

- Routine briefings by the Secretary and the Chairman or the Deputy Secretary and the Vice Chairman of the full Senate in Room S-407, Capitol and the full House on the House floor will resume during this period. This requires a commitment of 3 ½ hours on afternoons of Tuesday or Wednesday each week. Tentatively, we should propose a briefing by the Deputy Secretary and the Vice Chairman on June 5 and June 19, and an appearance by the Secretary and the Chairman on June 12 and June 26. We plan to encourage General Franks to participate in one of these routine sets of briefings during the four week period.

Group Breakfasts:

- Defense Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee
- Champions for the floor debate on missile defense during Senate consideration of the Defense Authorization Bill including Senators Kyl, Cochran, Warner, Sessions, and Allen with the possible inclusions of Senators Lieberman, Miller, and Ben Nelson.
- A collection of House friends like Congressmen Mac Thornberry, Mark Kirk, Ed Schrock, Chris Cox, Porter Goss and others.

NO

(3)

One on One Breakfasts, Lunches, Coffees hosted by the Secretary:

- o Representative John Dingell
- o Representative Tom DeLay
- o Senator Don Nickles

One on One Breakfasts hosted by the Deputy Secretary:

- o Representative John Spratt, Ranking Democrat on the Budget Committee and Senior Democrat on the House Armed Services Committee
- o Representative Norm Dicks, Senior Member of the Defense Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee
- o Representative Jack Murtha, Ranking Democrat on the Defense Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee

Office Calls proposed for the Secretary:

- o Senator Daniel Inouye, Chairman, Defense Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee
- o Senator Ted Stevens, Ranking Republican of the Defense Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee

Office Calls proposed for the Deputy Secretary:

- o Representative Billy Tauzin, Chairman of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce
- o Senator Joe Biden, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
- o Representative Duncan Hunter, Chairman of the Military Research and Development Subcommittee, House Armed Services Committee
- o Representative Curt Weldon, Chairman of Military Procurement Subcommittee, House Armed Services Committee
- o Senator Trent Lott, Republican Leader

4

- o Senator Tom Daschle, Majority Leader

Special Events:

- Breakfast with the Society of Statesmen and the Chowder and Marching Society on a **Wednesday from 0800 – 0900**
- The New Democratic Coalition, an organization of 74 Democrats with socially moderate and fiscally conservative political views on a **Tuesday afternoon at 1600.**

15

June 14, 2002 11:30 AM

June 1/23

TO: Jim Haynes
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Jose Padilla

Why is the Justice Department announcing who will and who won't do what with respect to Padilla, since he no longer is with the Justice Department?

Notwithstanding this article, if the President made a decision, he could change the executive order and try Padilla by a military tribunal. I don't know why they would be talking anyway.

383.6

Please find out, and see if you can calibrate them.

Thanks.

Attach.
"Military Tribunal Won't Try Padilla, Justice Dept. Says" AP

DHR:dh
061402-4

Please respond by ~~07/19/02~~

SECRETARY HAS

T 6/26

7/17-

SecDef - 7/18

Jim Haynes spoke with appropriate Justice official and calibrated

14 June 02

4174369/83D/12704

Diket

late staff.
forced to leave.
director, former
tor general Eleanor L.
start work until the first L.
members met in closed session.
week.

She is supposed to direct a 30-person staff, which is separate from the staffs of the House and Senate select intelligence committees. But she was not on the job while the

Military Tribunal Won't Try Padilla, Justice Dept. Says

Associated Press

The United States will not bring American terrorist suspect Jose Padilla before a military tribunal, the Justice Department told lawmakers yesterday, according to congressional and Bush administration officials.

The Justice Department, making its case in a closed meeting of the Senate Judiciary Committee, said the United States can hold Padilla until President Bush decides the war against terrorism is over.

"They say it's not punitive, it's just purely prevention to stop him from attacking us," said one congressional official, speaking on the condition of anonymity. "He's going to stay in the can until we're through with al Qaeda."

Government officials had said there were no plans to put Padilla before a tribunal. Officials told the Judiciary Committee that the decision is now final.

Padilla, a Muslim convert and former Chicago gang member, is being held by the military. He is suspected of being part of a plot to detonate a radiological weapon—or "dirty bomb"—in the United States, but he has not been charged.

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Snowflake

June 14, 2002 11:41 AM

TO: Torie Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Retraction

Please dig out what I was supposed to have said that I have since retracted concerning whether or not there are Al Qaeda in Kashmir. I don't recall ever saying they were there. I thought I said there were smatterings of information that suggested it, but that we didn't have evidence.

What is the fact? Please get back to me this morning.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
061402-6

.....
Please respond by 06/17/02

PAKISTAN

14 June

11-L-0559/OSD/12706

U17427 02

TO: SECDEF
FROM: Torie
DATE: June 14, 2002
SUBJECT: Al Qaeda and Kashmir

Here are excerpts from your press briefings in India and Pakistan where you addressed the Al Qaeda-Kashmir issue.

From New Delhi:

Q: Do you now believe that the al Qaeda are operating in Kashmir or influencing events in Kashmir?

Rumsfeld: The question is do I believe that al Qaeda are operating in Kashmir or influencing events in Kashmir.

I have seen evidence, well let me rephrase it -- I have seen indications that there in fact are al Qaeda operating in the area that we're talking about near the Line of Control. I do not have hard evidence of precisely how many or who or where, and needless to say there are an awful lot of people in the world who want to do everything possible to stop al Qaeda from planning and executing additional terrorist acts.

From Islamabad:

Q: Mr. Defense Secretary, this is with reference to your statement in India about the indications of al Qaeda operating along the Line of Control. A similar statement you had made back home in the U.S. as well a couple of weeks ago. We want to know what's the factual basis of your statement, number one, and, related to that, did it play itself out in your meeting with General Pervez Musharraf today?

Rumsfeld: I think what I said in the United States, and on this trip in earlier stops, is what I know to be the facts, and the facts are that I do not have evidence and the United States does not have evidence of al Qaeda in Kashmir. We do have a good deal of scraps of intelligence that come in from people saying that they believe al Qaeda are in Kashmir or in various locations. It tends to be speculative; it is not actionable; it is not verifiable, and I believe I made that clearly, that distinction clear, when I responded to a question in Delhi, I think. In any event, that is, in so far as I know, that is the situation, and I did express that during one or more of my discussions here in Pakistan.

Done
6/24

June 14, 2002 3:18 PM

TO: Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Matrix to Hoon

9/21
LARRY D. ...

U17

I talked to Geoff Hoon of the UK today and told him we would send along that matrix showing all the items we discussed and where they stood on whether they have done them, leaked them, announced them or accomplished them, so that he could have that in his hands in the event he goes there next week.

Please get a draft of the memo plus the matrix and let me look at it before it goes.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
061402-11

.....
Please respond by 06/17/02

Six -

Pete Rodman tells me he handed the matrices over to the UK DATT on Friday, June 14.

I will get copy of what he gave the DATT.

SC
6/17

Dikita

14 JUN 02

U17429 02 91

June 17, 2002 7:45 AM

TO: Torie Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Press Conference on Afghanistan

Afghanistan

I do think we ought to do a press conference on Afghanistan and show the loya jirga process worked and the new transition government is there. Also we should aggregate all the coalition successes, the humanitarian successes and the captives taken.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
061702-6

.....
Please respond by 06/28/02

17 Jun 02

U17430 02

6/17 snowflake
1200

June 17, 2002 11:49 AM

Done 6/20

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: General Hill

095

I have to decide on General Hill and what we are going to do, whether or not we leave him up there for confirmation and I read all the file, or what. Wolfowitz was supposed to have read it over the weekend.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
061702-18

.....
Please respond by 06/21/02

6/17

*sketch -
I'll nudge him on it. There is also an IG review Senator Warrar has requested. I've asked Joe Schmitz to expedite.
Di Rita*

17 Jun 02

Larry Di Rita

6/19

6/25
1339
showfile

June 17, 2002 11:55 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
Torie Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Key Documents

6/23/02 Sir: We regularly send select documents (e.g. noteworthy speeches, interviews) to these

I think we ought to have a policy of sending out key documents to the members of the Science Board and the Policy Board.

people.

T-C.

334

Thanks.

DHR:dh
061702-20

.....
Please respond by _____

Larry Di Rita
6/24

17 Jun 02

U17432 02

11-L-0559/OSD/12711

SNOWflake
1200

June 17, 2002 11:58 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
Col. Bucci
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Former SecDefs



I think we ought to bring back in the former Secretaries of Defense at some point and maybe talk to them about the plan that Larry and I are working on.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
061702-21

.....
Please respond by 07/19/02

020102

6/24 -
Sec Def -
We will schedule in
next couple weeks
D. Rita

Larry Di Rita
6/28

17 June 02

U17433 02

11-L-0559/OSD/12712

June 17, 2002 12:11 PM

Done 6/24

TO: Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Sensors

4/21
LEADY 171 FBIS

India

Are you going to get a meeting set up so someone can take a look and see if this sensor idea makes any sense or not? Give a report back to me, please.

Thanks.

Attach.

06/17/02 FBIS-FMN 02-165, "India-Pakistan: India Sees 'Possibilities' After Rumsfeld Visit, Pakistan Pulls Navy Back"

DHR:dh
061702-24

.....
Please respond by 07/12/02

SIR-

Rich Haver is working on this.

Have to have a memo by week's end.

Also, the "interagency" is looking at vendors. Peter Rodman is the policy lead for this effort.

RC

JUN 19 2002

17 JUN 02

U17434 02

June 17, 2002 1:15 PM

TO: VADM Giambastiani
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Ivanov

Russia

Did I promise Ivanov I would give him a call after I came out of India and Pakistan?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
061702-26

SECRET HAS BEEN

.....
Please respond by 06/19/02

6/18

Yes, you told MOU Ivanov you would call him. We had already requested a call. DATT Moscow is working to arrange it for 9:00 AM Thursday our time.

DK.

V/R
ED

17 JUN 02

June 17, 2002 1:15 PM

TO: VADM Giambastiani
CC: Larry Di Rita
Powell Moore
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Department of Homeland Security

020 HKS

I need someone to brief me on what pieces of Defense are going into the new Department of Homeland Security, so I can be knowledgeable about whether or I agree with it. I am going to be asked on the Hill.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
061702-27

.....
Please respond by 06/29/02

17 Jun 02

U17437 02

11-L-0559/OSD/12716

June 17, 2002 1:58 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Ultra-Wideband

311

Who is the person in the Department who ought to be worrying about what Schlesinger is writing me about here? Is it Stenbit?

Please find out who it is and then send them the attached note from me.

Thanks.

Attach.

06/06/02 Schlesinger ltr to SecDef re: Ultra-Wideband—The Next Phase. BE PREPARED.
SecDef memo #061702-37

DHR:dh
061702-36



Please respond by 06/20/02

6/17
SecDef -
Stenbit is. I
sent him my copy of
the note.
Di Rita

17 JUN 02

U17438 02

11-L-0559/OSD/12717

June 17, 2002 2:02 PM

TO:

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Ultra-Wideband

Attached is a note from Jim Schlesinger. I certainly agree with it. Are you in charge of organizing to see that the worst doesn't happen?

Thanks.

Attach.

06/06/02 Schlesinger ltr to SecDef re: Ultra-Wideband—The Next Phase. BE PREPARED.

DHR:dh
061702-37

.....
Please respond by 07/26/02

6/14/02 - copy given to D. Ritz

MEMORANDUM

SECDEF HAS SEEN

JUN 17 2002

FOR: Donald Rumsfeld
FROM: Jim Schlesinger
DATE: 6 June 2002
SUBJ: Ultra-Wideband—the Next Phase. BE PREPARED.

Don:

The recent approval by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) for Ultra-Wideband (UWB) systems represented a balanced approach to a complex problem. DoD and FAA provided compelling evidence that limits on UWB operation were necessary to prevent interference to critical defense and air traffic control (ATC) systems. The FCC made a decision in the national interest, acknowledging national defense and aviation safety concerns as well as other applications of the UWB technology.

Yet, we need to worry about the future. Here is the background. When they issued the Report and Order that approved UWB operations, some of the Commissioners at the FCC issued statements to the effect that, based on field experience and interference reports (or lack thereof), the strict limits that are now imposed could be relaxed. Only FCC Chairman Michael Powell noted that the change in limits could, in fact, go either way, based on experience. Thus, the majority of the Commissioners feel that reduced restrictions on UWB operations are only a matter of waiting a year or so until the "evidence" shows that the limits are too strict. It is certain that the UWB industry will do everything that it can in the way of measurements and other means to hasten this decision.

Once again, we need be alert to the camel's nose under the tent!

In order to balance the apparent foregone conclusion by many in the FCC that reducing UWB limits will occur, and anticipating the certain agenda of the UWB industry to the same end, it is essential that DoD and FAA be equally energetic in the defense of their position. Belated and ad hoc efforts will not support a strategy that will succeed. The government agencies that have a mission to protect the country and establish safety of life in aviation need a formal plan to measure the effects of UWB on defense and ATC systems, *in actual operational environments*. These tests must be conducted in an unbiased, technically sound manner and the fact that they are being conducted should be widely known.

The industry will spend a great deal of money to show that the UWB limits can be relaxed. It is only with facts that Federal agencies can deal with the still worrisome UWB issue.

11-L-0559/OSD/12719

June 17, 2002 2:13 PM

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: ICC Brief for Amb. Negroponte

015

Ambassador to the UN Negroponte is coming in to see me this week. You ought to get your people ready to brief him on the ICC, so he gets steeped in it either before or after he sees me.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
061702-40

.....
Please respond by _____

17 Jun 02

U17439 02

11-L-0559/OSD/12720

June 17, 2002 3:28 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Leaks

380,015

Please send this memorandum out from me to the senior civilian and military staff.

Thanks.

Attach.
06/14/02 CIA Memo re: Impact of Leaks

DHR:dh
061702-51

.....
Please respond by _____

6/20

~~Exec Sec -~~

Please draft a memo. Simple: I am attaching a CIA assessment on the impact of leaks ~~on the terrorist in our~~ war on terrorism. ~~AT~~ is hunting us. ~~W/Sec~~

17 JUN 02

DL

Larry Di Rita

6/21

June 17, 2002 3:35 PM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
CC: Pete Aldridge
Gen. Pace
Torie Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: De-Mining

471.6

Please see the attached on land mines. Why don't you work up a program with Pete Pace and Pete Aldridge and get ahead of the curve?

Thanks.

Attach.

06/04/02 USD(AT&L) memo to SecDef re: De-Mining [U09336/02]

DHR.dh
061702-52


.....
Please respond by 07/26/02

1750002


U17441 02

11-L-0559/OSD/12723

MINE CLEARING SYSTEMS



Mini-Flail



Abrams Panther with Standardized Robotics System

TO: SECDEF
FROM: Torie Clarke
CC: DEPSECDEF
Doug Feith
Robert Andrews
VADM Giambastiani
Larry DiRita

DATE: May 22, 2002

SUBJECT: De-Mining

It is possible to do what Newt Gingrich suggests regarding de-mining.

As you know, there is considerable money and clout behind the international movement to eliminate landmines altogether. It is likely they would react strongly and negatively to such a program with a massive public relations effort: "Why don't you work as hard at eliminating landmine use at all?"

Recommendation. Consider co-opting the anti-landmine community somewhat by:

a. Committing resources to an effort to develop landmine alternatives. DoD launched a number of efforts to examine alternatives to anti-personnel mines, which are currently under review by the Bush Administration. The following are some of the landmine alternates under review:

- The Man In The Loop (MITL) Non Self Destruct Alternative system
- The Remote Area Denial Artillery Munition (RADAM)
- Self-Healing Minefields

b. Landmine alternatives studies performed by the National Academy of Sciences and Los Alamos National Laboratories (as well as DoD studies) concluded that non-lethal technologies alone are not viable replacements for anti-personnel landmines, but can be useful in certain military operations. The following non-lethal landmine alternatives are now under evaluation:

- The Modular Crowd Control Munition
- A Kevlar capturing net
- A high velocity, air vortex ring munition
- An electrical stun, anti-mobility device

c. Encouraging other countries to join the de-mining campaign. Since 1993, the United States has provided over \$35 million to support humanitarian demining efforts in Afghanistan. In FY 2001, through the State Department's Office of Humanitarian Demining Programs, the U.S. allocated \$2.8 million to sustain such mine action activities in Afghanistan as mine awareness and demining training, and mine detection and clearance operations. We could increase that amount.

June 17, 2002 5:02 PM

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Afghanistan and Section 98

Afghanistan

Should we get Afghanistan to sign the Section 98, so they won't extradite to the ICC?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
061702-58

.....

Please respond by 07/12/02

17 Jun 02

U17442 02

June 18, 2002 7:19 AM

Done 6/20

TO: VADM Giambastiani
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Americans in Pakistan

Pakistan

Please find out what you can about these Americans supposedly seized at the border in Pakistan.

Thanks.

Attach.

Filkins, Dexter. "Americans Seized at Afghan Border, Pakistan Asserts," *New York Times*, 06/18/02

DHR:dh
061802-2

SECRET 19 June 2002

Memorandum for Secretary of Defense

SUBJECT: Americans Seized in Pakistan *(follow up ans.)*

18/19

Sir,

Here
This is an update from the FBI - Counter Terrorism Center

Two American citizens were detained earlier this month by the Pakistani authorities in Peshawar. The Consulate there treated both as routine consular cases, so the Chief of Station and the Legal Attaché were never informed.

The two are (b)(6) is still in custody and will be interviewed today by a Consulate staffer, and the LegAtt. (b)(6) was released, and he returned to New York on 16 Jun.

The Consul General and the Deputy Chief of Mission are working with the COS and the LegAtt to ensure no more problems occur.

18 Jun 02

COL Bucci *S17*

~~11-L-0559/OSD/12729~~

U1 *18 Jun 02*

endorsed, and it would protect government officials from any nation that contributes troops.

The blueprint — one of several U.S. diplomatic efforts in the countdown to the creation of the International Criminal Court — has little support inside the 15-member council, diplomats said.

U.S. officials said they were not sure when a draft of the resolution could be introduced. The court is slated to open July 1.

"We are committed to strengthening peacekeeping," said Richard Grenell, spokesman for the U.S. mission here, confirming the effort to bring a draft resolution to the Security Council.

The draft has been shared informally with council allies France and Britain.

Diplomats from both those nations have indicated that the draft has virtually no chance of approval in the council, where six of the 15 member nations have ratified the treaty setting up the court, and all but China and Singapore have signed it.

"It won't even go to a veto," said one council envoy, who explained that the measure is unlikely to get the nine votes needed to come to a vote.

The Americans have "drafted something terribly carefully that doesn't talk about the ICC, just 'immunity from prosecution.' But they can't trick people into voting for it, we all know what it means," said the envoy, who spoke on the condition of anonymity.

This is the second time in recent weeks the Americans have tried to shape a council resolution to address their fears about the ICC being used against U.S. troops.

U.S. Ambassador John Negroponte last month tried to have similar language added to an East Timor peacekeeping resolution and was swiftly rebuffed by French Ambassador Jean-David Levitte, who said it would go against the laws of France.

So far, 67 nations have ratified the treaty creating the court.

The Hague-based tribunal will prosecute accusations of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity.

The United States, an early if wary supporter of the court, has since turned against it, saying it lacks sufficient safeguards to protect U.S. troops from frivolous and politically motivated prosecutions.

The court's jurisdiction will not be retroactive.

Council members and legal experts say the United Nations already has a "status of mission agreement" with nations contributing troops that guarantees that misbehaving soldiers will be sent home for trial and discipline by their governments.

The ICC statute also defers to a national prosecution, such as a military court-martial hearing for a soldier, before it can take up a case.

But U.S. officials say this is not adequate protection from a third nation that may want to prosecute war crimes or refer an incident to the ICC.

"If it's already established policy, let them put it in writing," said one U.S. official, who described the planned U.S. resolution as "pre-emptive measure."

Deputy U.S. Ambassador James Cunningham briefed British and French officials late last week, and other U.S. officials broached the subject at a Canadian meeting of foreign ministers from the Group of Eight industrial nations.

The United States last month took the unprecedented step of repudiating the ICC treaty that it signed during the Clinton administration. The treaty was never submitted to the Senate for ratification.

The United States had already vowed not to support the court financially, politically or with intelligence.

But one source familiar with the latest conversations at the United Nations said Mr. Cunningham indicated that there could be consequences if additional safeguards were not approved.

"There could be ramifications for future peacekeeping missions, or the U.S. could pull out troops," the source said, adding that Congress could re-examine its 27 percent contribution to the U.N. peacekeeping budget.

Some 47,000 U.N. peacekeepers are deployed worldwide. Just 712 of them — soldiers and civilians — are American.

Washington has been pressuring its allies against the ICC for more than two years, threatening to withhold military sales and training and to renegotiate the bilateral "status of forces agreement" that most nations have with the United States.

In each case, Washington's goal was to pressure nations not to sign or not to ratify the ICC treaty.

New York Times

June 18, 2002

Pg. 1

3. Americans Seized At Afghan Border, Pakistan Asserts

By Dexter Filkins

ISLAMABAD, Pakistan, June 17 — Pakistan said today that it was holding two Americans captured more than a month ago while trying to cross the border from Afghanistan, while Pakistani officials said privately that there might be more Americans among their prisoners.

Aziz Ahmed Khan, spokesman for the Pakistani Foreign Ministry, said during a news conference here that the two Americans had been detained in the country's tribal areas, the remote region near the Afghan border where many Qaeda and Taliban fighters are believed to have taken refuge. He said the two had been captured with others who were also crossing the border from Afghanistan.

"I was told that probably two of them were American passport holders," Mr. Aziz said.

He declined to disclose details of the detentions or the names of those being held.

Later in the day, a senior Pakistani intelligence official who spoke on the condition of anonymity said that the nationality of the two men, who have been in custody since early May, had been "reasonably ascertained" and that the United States was being notified about them, though officials in

Washington said today that they had heard nothing.

Yet there are strong indications that a number of American officials have known about the captives' nationality for some time. The Associated Press said in a report that, according to a senior Pakistani Interior Ministry official, F.B.I. agents had questioned the two men. And Pakistani officials suggested that the process of verifying the prisoners' claims of American nationality was slowed down, with American concurrence, to give the Pakistanis time to interrogate them.

Law enforcement officials in Pakistan are not constrained by American law; nor are they ordinarily constrained by American-style rules that would limit their powers during interrogations.

In Washington, officials at both the State Department and the White House expressed puzzlement at the reports and insisted that they had no knowledge of any Americans taken into custody after entering Pakistan from Afghanistan.

"I have just found nothing to substantiate this," one senior American official said. "I've asked direct, point-blank questions, and I have just heard nothing to substantiate those stories either last week or this week."

Richard Boucher, the State Department spokesman, said: "We've seen these reports, and we're seeking further information from the Pakistani authorities. But like many of these stories that have been circulating for the last week or so, we don't have anything on it."

He added that the United States was "at this point, seeking information from the Pakistani authorities."

The detentions of Americans would raise troubling questions for the Bush administration, which has already drawn criticism for not granting prisoner-of-war status to suspected Qaeda and Taliban fighters captured in Afghanistan.

The administration has also drawn criticism for its handling of Jose Padilla, the Brooklyn-born man suspected of Qaeda ties and declared an "enemy combatant." He has

June 18, 2002 7:26 AM

Afghanistan

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Recruiting Assistance

What do you think about recruiting other countries to help us find Osama bin Laden? Some kind of a "share the effort" approach could perhaps include people, finance, intelligence assets, rewards, etc.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
061802-3

.....
Please respond by

07/12/02

7/22
For/Exec work on it

Dore
8/21

18 June 02

U17445 02

June 18, 2002 8:18 AM

334N50

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: NSC 68

Please get me a copy of NSC 68, written by Paul Nitze. Paul Wolfowitz can tell you how to get it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
061802-6

.....
Please respond by 06/28/02

6/19
Attached
DR

Larry Di Rita
92

18744602

U17446 02

June 18, 2002 9:05 AM

TO: VADM Giambastiani
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld TR
SUBJECT: NSA Program vs. Leaks

Done
Get the file
a set it
Porter

380.015

I want to see some paper on the NSA program against leaks.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
061802-10

6/20
COL NORMAN
WILL PROVIDE
PER PHONCON.
JHR

.....
Please respond by 06/28/02

6/20

SECDEF -

NSA package attached.
Also note the package
you received in early
May.

18 JUN 02

JHR
Ed



*National Security Agency/Central
Security Service Representative, Defense*



20 June 2002

To: VADM Giambastiani

Subject: NSA Program Vs Leaks

Ref: SecDef comment, "I want to see some paper on the NSA program against leaks.

Sir-

Attached are items (desk note, video, and prints of posters) from Gen Hayden on this subject. I am also enclosing a copy of an information sheet that we provided in response to media/public queries. Actual posters were given to President Bush and members of his party during their visit to NSA on 4 June. Posters have not yet been distributed to anyone else. We hope to complete internal coordination and distribute posters to senior DoD leadership (including the combatant commanders) within the next month.

Please let us know if you need any further information.

VR,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Ron".

Col Ron Norman
Deputy, NSA/CSS Representative, Defense

(b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/12734



DIRECTOR

26 April 2002

TO: SECDEF DEPSECDEF

THRU: ASD (C3I)

SUBJECT: (U) NSA/CSS Information Security
Awareness Campaign

(U//FOUO) The National Security Agency recently initiated a campaign to stress the importance of information security during wartime. We hope to convey to military personnel the absolute necessity of using secure communication methods and practicing good computer security in order to protect sensitive information.

(U//FOUO) This campaign, patterned after security awareness efforts used during World War II, has three major components: a celebrity public service announcement broadcast on Armed Forces Television and Radio Network, a series of prints distributed to senior military and civilian DoD officials, and advertisements in the *Military Times* print and online publications. This is NSA's first use of these venues to increase information security awareness.

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

(U//FOUO) Sylvester Stallone donated his time to appear in the public service announcement. American artist Richard Waldrep, who designs stamps for the U.S. Postal Service, created the artwork, one design for each service branch. Copies of the video and prints are enclosed.

(U//FOUO) I believe we must continue efforts to raise the awareness of our personnel to this critical element of our warfighting and defensive strategies. Our vigilance in protecting information is essential to our victory over terrorism and the safe return of our fighting men and women.

VR,
Mike

MICHAEL V. HAYDEN
Lieutenant General, USAF

Encls: a/s

cc: USD (AT&L)
USD (P)
PDASD (C3I)
DASD (Intel)

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

11-L-0559/OSD/12735

June 18, 2002 5:28 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita
VADM Giambastiani

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Missile Defense Briefing

373.24

Please have Cambone or someone give me a missile defense briefing, so I can see it before we get ready to brief the President at some point.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
061802-14

.....
Please respond by 06/28/02

18 Jun 02

U17448 02

11-L-0559/OSD/12736

June 19, 2002 7:17 AM

Issue 6/20

TO: Larry Di Rita
Col. Bucci

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Amb. Negroponte

015

Please cancel me out of this meeting with Ambassador Negroponte, and instead have him see Crouch, Wolfowitz, Haynes, Marshall Billingslea or whoever we have to have talk to him on this ICC matter.

I am concerned about the way the UN is handling these things, but talking to the UN doesn't help—it is talking to the State Department that is going to get it done.

So please get me out of the 3-3:30 p.m. meeting.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
061902-1

.....
Please respond by 06/19/02

6/19
[Signature]
Larry Di Rita

19 JUN 02

U17449 02

11-L-0559/OSD/12737

June 19, 2002 7:21 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Tom White
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Army Corps of Engineers

322

I notice they are proposing an overhaul of the Army Corps of Engineers. I think we ought to overhaul it right out of the Department of Defense.

Let's get a team together to start thinking how we do that.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
061902-2

.....
Please respond by 07/19/02

19 Jun 02

U17450 02

11-L-0559/OSD/12738

~~TOP SECRET~~

July 31, 2002 7:51 AM

Korea (North)

TO: VADM Giambastiani
Col. Bucci
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Brief on North Korea Intel

I need to get briefed on the North Korean intel situation with respect to the agreed framework. It should probably happen sometime in the next week.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
073102-4

.....

Please respond by 08/09/02

ATTACH

7/23/02 attach memo to SecDEF

Brief scheduled for 8/7
WED. @ 0905.

8/6 C 8/6
V/R
Ed

31Jul02

U17452 /03

~~TOP SECRET~~

11-L-0559/OSD/12739

UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENT(S)
DOCUMENT BECOMES UNCLASSIFIED

01/2
1700
showfile

Done
6/21

June 19, 2002 7:59 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: State Department Detailees

040 State

I told Colin Powell you were the person working with State to sort out what kinds of detailees we ought to have going back and forth.

Thanks.

DHR dh
061902-7

.....
Please respond by _____

Done
6/21
Larry Di Rita

19 JUN 02

U17453 02

11-L-0559/OSD/12740

Snowflake

June 19, 2002 8:32 AM

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: NATO

NATO INFRA

Please take a look at this Newt Gingrich memo, get your folks thinking about those things and tell me what you think.

Thanks.

Attach.
06/18/02 Gingrich e-mail to SecDef: NATO Visit Wednesday

DHR:dh
061902-9

.....
Please respond by 07/19/02

T 7/17

*7/15
for morning ISP*

*Jone
8/21*

19 Jun 02

U17454 02

11-L-0559/OSD/12741

Copy given to Wolfowitz

(b)(6)

SECDEF HAS SEEN**From:** Thirdwave2@aol.com**Sent:** Tuesday, June 18, 2002 10:24 PM**To:** (b)(6); Ed.Giambastiani@osd.pentagon.mil;**JUN 19 2002****Subject:** for secdef-nato visit Wednesday

for secdef
 depsecdef
 from newt 6/18/02

NATO visit Wednesday

Kernan allowed me to spend time with the NATO military council on Tuesday at JFCOM and a couple of ideas hit me that might be useful in your meeting.

I start with the premise that NATO is important to us, that extending its standardization and routine interoperability is a building block of our future and that we would like a future with NATO more involved with America better than a future in which NATO declines and the Europeans go off on their own.

The following suggestions are offered in that light:

1. Transformation should be a franchisable commodity in which our NATO allies can tie into our capital investment and get dramatically more reach and effectiveness per dollar.
2. Transforming together will require significant law changes in both Europe and the US to create a more worldwide open architecture system in which common systems can be licensed and built locally. For example, a radio for special forces could be built under license by many local industries but could tie into our world communication net. It would actually be a team building exercise to jointly identify the legal changes needed and be fighting for them in the US and Europe simultaneously. It would also prove mutual good faith.
3. SACLANT/JFCOM should be strengthened and should become the innovation and transformational training center for NATO as well as the US. As a component of this every NATO member should commit 20% of their training dollars to multinational transformational training and SACLANT/JFCOM should be the coordinator and integrator of these innovative efforts. This would require a significantly larger NATO foot print at JFCOM.
4. NATO should succeed the US in the fulfillment strategy phase of Afghanistan and over the next 18 months responsibilities should leave the American-Centcom system and shift to a new NATO Afghan command

6/19/2002

11-L-0559/OSD/12742

5. NATO should succeed the US in the Sinai and a NATO battalion should stand watch between Egypt and Israel (this will take some doing but could be done).

6. NATO needs a permanent office across 17th street from the Old Executive Office Building. The number two person in NATO should be assigned there. If NATO is to retain vitality it has to have a constant understanding of the Washington environment. It was Dill's close working relationship with Marshall which enabled the British-American alliance to work so well. Without the large British presence in Washington and Dill's constant dialogue with Marshall the system could not have been nearly as effective.

7. As part of this closer more systematic relationship the Europeans should shift the \$6billion they are about to waste on a second Global Positioning System into buying transformational capabilities with the understanding the \$6 billion will be spent on European industries licensed to develop and produce 21st century transformational equipment.

June 19, 2002 4:46 PM

TO: David Chu
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Disabled Retirees

292

What percentage of the retirees from the U.S. Armed Forces, by Service, are disabled?

I was talking to Colin Powell the other day, and he tells me he is disabled because of hearing loss. I said, "Everyone at age 60 is disabled because of hearing loss. Why do we all run around saying, 'What?'"

I would like to know what the numbers are. I am told the pattern now is that every person, when they are getting ready to retire, goes and gets a checkout physical. If there is anything different from when they came in at age 17, they are disabled.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
061902-14

.....

Please respond by 07/19/02

19 JUN 02

U17455 02

June 19, 2002 4:49 PM

TO: Doug Feith
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Rewards

000.5

My recollection is that the Deputies Committee was supposed to sort out the rewards system. My impression is that we have not given out any rewards, the rewards are not providing any incentive and we are missing the value of a tool that could be helpful.

What has the Deputies Committee figured out?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
061902-15



Please respond by 07/12/02

19 Jun 02

U17456 02

May 13, 2002 4:47 PM

TO: Steve Cambone
CC: Gen. Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Studies

319.2

My impression is that an awful lot of the studies the DPG calls for are for the Services to do the studies.

I think we ought to make sure the Joint Staff gets involved with those studies, rather than just the Services. I think we will get a better product.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
051302-36

.....
Please respond by _____

13 May 02

U17457 02

11-L-0559/OSD/12746

10:27 AM

TO: John Stenbit

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

DATE: June 8, 2002

SUBJECT: GALILEO

Done 6/24

I need a very simple one-pager explaining to me what the technical problems are with Galileo.

413.77

Thanks.

DHR/am
060802.12

Please respond by:

6/15/02

*TO (As D/C SI)
D, R, K*

6/17

→ John -

- if we have a problem with the House or Senate bills, why not write from SecDef to highlight it?

- Also, take your explanation of the problem down one more notch. (Still assumes knowledge of Def. doesn't have ant. A.W.)

8 Jun 02

U17458 02

11-L-0559/OSD/12747

Larry Di Rita



ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
6000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-6000

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2002 JUN 12 PM 6:10

INFO MEMO

June 12, 2002 9:19 AM

TO: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: *for* JOHN P. STENBIT *Cheryl J. Raby 6/12/02*

SUBJECT: Galileo

- In reply to your question about the technical problems with Galileo, the overriding problem is the potential overlay of our military code. If that happens, and a Galileo receiver falls into the wrong hands, we would have to jam their signal in an area of conflict, and our signal would be jammed as well. We can mitigate this problem, but at increased difficulty.
- We have no problem with the EU's moving forward, provided they meet our four objectives:
 - That the performance of any civil terminal be better in the presence of both GPS and Galileo satellites in the field of view than with one or the other alone.
 - That there be no interference with the frequency used by our military codes.
 - That Galileo does not initiate a regulatory regime that would force the U.S. to have a Galileo receiver in order to fly aircraft in Europe, or on ships to enter European ports.
 - That NATO not be expected to fund the Galileo shortfall through member nations' military funding.
- Perhaps the greatest problem with GPS at the current time is that both the HASC and the SASC reduced the funds we asked for to increase the power of the next several GPS satellites, once again postponing some easily provided anti-jam protection for this most valuable system. We need to make sure we provide the best GPS system before we worry about what the Europeans are doing.

*Please
to read
this down
a little*

*John
- See
my note.
D. R.A*

Prepared by: Ray Swider, C3I, (b)(6)



(b)(6)

3:20 AM

6/14
INFO

TO: Admiral Giambastiani

CC: Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: June 8, 2002

SUBJECT:

337

I do think we ought to keep meeting with the senior military officials everywhere I go.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
060802.04.

Please respond by: _____

*Will Sign
1/12
Ed*

8 JUN 02

3

SHOWTIME

3:26 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: June 8, 2002

SUBJECT:

Should we do anything about this Crusader article?

Thanks.

DHR/azn
060802.04.

attach: *Crusader Boosters Fire Back at Rumsfeld Washington Post, 6/6/02*

Please respond by: _____

6/18/02

470

15

8 Jun 02

U17461 02

11-L-0559/OSD/12750



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Crusader Boosters Fire Back at Rumsfeld

Thu Jun 6, 1:02 PM ET

By Jim Wolf

WASHINGTON (Reuters) - A group of prominent old U.S. warriors accused Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld on Thursday of "madcap" misbranding of the Army's next-generation Crusader artillery gun to keep Congress from reversing his scrubbing of the \$11 billion program.

Photos



Reuters Photo

"The Department of Defense (news - web sites) cancellation of Crusader is a madcap, ill-conceived effort to junk a much-needed weapon system by misbranding it as 'Cold War' and not in vogue with transformation," three Army boosters said in a statement.

Signing were retired four-star Army generals Barry McCaffrey, the White House National Drug Policy director from 1995 to 2001; David Maddox, a former commander in chief of the U.S. Army in Europe; and Joe Reeder, a former undersecretary of the Army.

The statement marked the latest shot in a rear-guard battle to save the Crusader, a self-propelled howitzer designed to fire 155 mm shells more than 25 miles.

About \$2 billion has already been spent on the big gun, designed by United Defense Industries Inc. to be the most technologically advanced ground combat system when it was to have been fielded in 2008. A trade group formed by United Defense was staging a briefing on the weapon in Washington later on Thursday.

The Crusader is the most prominent weapons program to face

Full Coverage

In-depth coverage about U.S. Military

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Drawn Clic

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16

11-L-0559/OSD/12751

cancellation since 1991, when then-Defense Secretary Dick Cheney ([news](#) - [web sites](#)) killed the Navy's A-12 fighter jet program. Litigation challenging that decision is pending.

In asking Congress to kill the program, Rumsfeld said on May 8 his decision involved "a strategy of warfare -- a strategy that drives the choices that we must make about how best to prepare our total forces for the future."

QUESTIONS IN CONGRESS

On Capitol Hill, where the fate of Crusader is in a legislative limbo, House of Representatives Republican Conference Chairman J.C. Watts and three other lawmakers asked Rumsfeld on Wednesday to hand over internal documents on the rationale for killing Crusader.

Watts is a Republican from Oklahoma, where the Crusader was to be assembled. Joining in his request were Republicans Duncan Hunter of California and Curt Weldon of Pennsylvania and democrat Jim Moran of Virginia. The Pentagon ([news](#) - [web sites](#)) did not immediately respond to a query about when and how it would reply to the lawmakers.

Last month, the House passed its version of a spending resolution that would maintain \$475 million in funding for Crusader in fiscal 2003, which starts on Oct. 1. The Senate Armed Services Committee ([news](#) - [web sites](#)) is weighing a similar move despite a White House veto threat.

In blasting Rumsfeld's bid to kill the Crusader, McCaffrey, a former commander in Chief of the U.S. Southern Command now serving as a paid consultant to United Defense, and his co-signers said the gun may be needed to fight North Korean or Iraqi artillery in the coming decade.

Enemy forces may be attacking in the dark and during storms when U.S. air power "cannot effectively provide close air support" for troops on the ground, they said in a statement released during a McCaffrey visit to a United Defense plant in Minnesota.

On May 30, Bush asked Congress to switch funds earmarked for Crusader in his original 2003 spending plan to speed other Army plans, including Lockheed Martin Corp.'s Netfires missile development program and Raytheon Co. Excalibur artillery shell, the first such satellite-guided 155 mm round.

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Next Story: [House Rejects Vote on ABM Treaty Withdrawal](#)

- [Our debt to the US](#) - The Guardian (UK). (Jun 4, 2002)

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- [When duty called, they responded despite personal cost](#) - Newsday (Jun 4, 2002)

Related Web Sites

- [Enduring Freedom](#) - overview of operations in Afghanistan from the U.S. Military Central Command.
- [DefendAMERICA](#) - Defense Department "news on terrorism and the war to defend America against terrorists."
- [Attack on America: Taking Care of Our Own](#) - information on the U.S. armed forces response to the September 11 attacks. Includes photos from briefings. From the American Forces Information Service.

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Guantanamo Bay Naval Station Detainees

- [Joint Task Force 160, U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay](#) - includes a [history](#) of Camp X-Ray, news releases, and photos.
- [U.S. Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay](#) - official site that includes a [history](#) of the base.
- [Geneva Convention: Treatment of Prisoners of War](#) - lists provisions for internment, protection, and discipline of POWs; from Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights.
- [POWs and Unlawful Combatants](#) - provides background on the POW issue including Guantanamo

17

May 31, 2002 9:46 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Meeting in New York

RUSIA

It looks like I am supposed to go to a meeting in New York when the UN General Assembly is meeting.

The President and Putin agreed to a meeting of the two foreign ministers with the two defense ministers. Igor and Colin are going to be in New York for September 11, and they would like me to come up. They are going to see if they can get Sergei Ivanov to come, and we are going to have lunch or something.

Thanks.

Attach.
05/29/02 DepSecDef note to SecDef, "Four-Party Meeting with the Russians"

DHR:dh
053102-26

.....
Please respond by 06/28/02

31 May 02

SECDEF HAS SEEN

MAY 31 2002

LD
for
Rumsfeld
SP3
5/30
y 5/30

MEMO TO: Secretary Rumsfeld

DATE: May 29, 2002

FROM: Paul Wolfowitz *PW*

SUBJECT: Four-Party Meeting with the Russians

Don,

Apparently in the Moscow Declaration there is a commitment to some kind of ministerial-level meeting involving the two Russian ministers and you and Secretary Powell.

Colin is suggesting that the best time to do it would be when they are in New York for the UN General Assembly. ~~Those dates would be somewhere around~~ September 11 (probably the period from September 10-September 14).

In Political Decl. -

[DRICP/SE/II]

→ At U.N. - Sept 10-14 -

May 31, 2002 9:50 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Saudi Arabia and Yemen

Saudi Arabia

Colin Powell wants me to think about going to Saudi Arabia on this trip, just for a short visit to hold hands for those folks, because the President wants us to stay close to Abdullah.

We also ought to think about going to Yemen on the trip.

Please see me about it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
053102-27

.....

Please respond by 05/31/02

31 May 02

U17463 02

6/3
08/20
signature

May 31, 2002 9:54 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *R*
SUBJECT: General Downing

We have to figure out a way to get General Downing to stop boring into DoD. We probably ought to do it in writing. He has gone to J-3 again.

Thanks.

DHR dh
053102-28

.....
Please respond by 06/14/02

210 Army (349)

*7/23
Done*

31 May 02

U17464 02

11-L-0559/OSD/12756

showWare
18
15

May 31, 2002 11:53 AM

TO: Jim Haynes
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Domestic Intelligence

350.09

Please see me about the idea of a domestic intelligence-gathering agency.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
053102-35

.....

Please respond by 06/28/02

7/8
Written Response attached.

*copy of 018
79*

31 May 02

U17465 02

11-L-0559/OSD/12757



GENERAL COUNSEL

GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

July 3, 2002, 10:00 AM

INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: William J. Haynes, II, General Counsel *WJH* 7/3/02

SUBJECT: Your Question About a Domestic Intelligence-Gathering Agency

- You asked about a “domestic intelligence-gathering” agency. An agency modeled after the British Security Service (MI5) may help accomplish President Bush’s twin aims of preventing terrorist attacks and reducing U.S. vulnerability to terrorism.
- The FBI has the primary role in conducting foreign counterintelligence, which includes counter-terrorism. Military departments, the Defense Intelligence Agency and civilian law enforcement agencies also engage in intelligence gathering, generally related to their specific missions. No agency is responsible for oversight of all domestic counterintelligence operations.
- The Homeland Security Department (HSD), in part, has been proposed to close the gap in intelligence coordination and accountability. The White House proposal makes the HSD a “customer” of the CIA and FBI and leaves the FBI and CIA relatively untouched. The proposal requires the FBI and CIA to provide processed intelligence to the HSD, but allows all three agencies to prepare their own competing analyses of threats. The Administration’s proposal has been criticized for potentially promoting greater turf wars and failing to address adequately the lack of communication among the existing agencies.
- Two recent newspaper articles alternatively have suggested modeling the HSD after the MI5. The HSD would take over the FBI’s counterintelligence and counter-terrorism missions and the counterintelligence functions of the various agencies brought within the HSD. It would be responsible for collecting and disseminating counterintelligence, investigating and assessing threats, advising other government departments and offices on protective security measures and providing support for law enforcement agencies. The HSD would have no policing powers. The British model could ensure greater communication and intelligence sharing and more efficient operation. Under this scheme, the HSD would have more control over the process of collecting, reporting and integrating intelligence information. The CIA’s mission would remain unchanged and mirror that of MI6.

COORDINATION: None



11-L-0559/OSD/12758

May 31, 2002 11:55 AM

TO: Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Merger

322

The President is comfortable merging STRATCOM and SPACECOM, so you can proceed as we discussed.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
053102-36



Please respond by _____

31 May 02

U17466 02

11-L-0559/OSD/12759

Done
6-17

May 31, 2002 11:58 AM

TO: Pete Aldridge
CC: VADM Giambastiani
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Joint Strike Fighter

452 F

The President would like a one-pager on the Joint Strike Fighter (one and a half at the most).

Please get it to me in English, so he can understand it and will know what countries are participating and to what extent.

Ed Giambastiani, please be in charge of getting this accomplished for me.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
053102-38

.....

Please respond by 06/28/02

6/4

Aldridge response attached
v/R
Ed

31 May 02

U17467 02

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3010 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3010

02 MAY 31 PM 3: 28



ACQUISITION,
TECHNOLOGY
AND LOGISTICS

OSD
WHITE HOUSE SECTION

ACTION MEMO

May 30, 2002, 9:00 AM

DepSecDef _____

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Mr. E. C. "Pete" Aldridge, Jr., USD (AT&L) *PAE 5/30/02*

SUBJECT: Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) International Participation Update

6/10
LARRY DI RITA

- In response to your recent request (~~TAB B~~), I revised the Memorandum for the President that describes our activities on JSF and provides a 'Fact Sheet' for his use ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~.
- In addition to incorporating your revisions, I have updated the "Fact Sheet" to reflect current status. If this Memorandum generates any additional interest, we would certainly be happy to provide future updates to the White House and/or NSC staff.

COORDINATION: PD(GC), PDUSD(P) (at TAB C)

RECOMMENDATION: Recommend you sign the Memorandum at TAB A

Attachments:
As stated

Prepared by: Frank Kenlon, AT&L/IC/P&A (b)(6) *2-97*

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	<i>6/8</i>
SR MA GIAMBASTIANI	
MA BUCCI	<i>5/31/02</i>
EXECSEC WHITMORE	<i>6/3</i>



W00415-02

11-L-0559/OSD/12761



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Joint Strike Fighter International Participation

Since you speak with foreign leaders regularly it might be helpful to you to have some information on those countries that have entered or are considering entering into cooperative agreements to produce the Joint Strike Fighter.

The United Kingdom and Canada have already joined us as cooperative development partners, and several other countries are nearing completion of their decision process to join.

The enclosed fact sheet summarizes the current status, and provides some points you may wish to use in your discussions with foreign heads of state.

Enclosure:
As stated

cc:
Vice President

11-L-0559/OSD/12762

May 31, 2002 3:58 PM

Done
G/11 Di Rita

TO: Larry Di Rita
CC: Powell Moore
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Congress on Crusader

470

I need a copy of the Senate and the House, where everyone stands on the Crusader, and I need it later today.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
053102-43

.....
Please respond by 05/31/02

31 May 02

U17469 02*

Name	Yes	Leaning Yes	Undecided	Leaning No	No
Allen	<u>Bingaman</u>	<u>Byrd</u>	<u>Akaka</u>	Corzine	<u>Allard</u>
Baucus	Bond	<u>Reed</u>	<u>Kennedy</u>	<u>Hutchinson</u>	<u>Bunning</u>
Bayh	Burns -	Rockefeller	<u>Landrieu</u>	<u>Roberts</u>	<u>Cleland</u>
Bennett	<u>Carnahan</u>	<u>Thurmond</u>	<u>Levin</u>	Schumer	<u>Collins</u>
Biden	Cochran	<u>Warner</u>	4	Specter	<u>Dayton</u>
Boxer	Conrad	5		5	<u>Inhofe</u>
Breaux	Domenici				Nickles
Brownback	Feingold				Wellstone
Campbell	Feinstein				8
Cantwell	Graham				
Carper	Gramm				
Chafee	Hagel				
Clinton	Hollings				
Craig	Inouye				
Crapo	Hutchison				
Daschle	Koht				
DeWine	Kyl				
Dodd	Leahy				
Dorgan	<u>Lieberman</u>				
Durbin	Lott				
Edwards	<u>McCain</u>				
Ensign	<u>Nelson, Ben</u>				
Enzi	<u>Nelson, Bill</u>				
Fitzgerald	<u>Santorum</u>				
Frist	<u>Sessions</u>				
Grassley	Shelby				
Gregg	Stevens				
Harkin	Thomas				
Hatch	Thompson				
Helms	Voinovich				
Jeffords	30				
Johnson					
Kerry					
Lincoln					
Lugar					
McConnell					
Mikulski					
Miller					
Murkowski					
Murray					
Reid					
Sarbanes					
<u>Smith, Bob</u>					
Smith, Gordon					
Snowe					
Stabenow					
Torricelli					
Wyden					
48					

1730 on May 21

June 1, 2002 3:23 PM

VIA FACSIMILE

TO: Marty Hoffmann
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Water in Afghanistan

Afghanistan

Attached is a letter I got back from Tom Franks on the subject of water. Please take a look at it and tell me what you think.

Thanks.

Attach.
05/31/02 CINCCENTCOM ltr to SecDef

DHR:dh
060102-1

1 Jun 02

11-L-0559/OSD/12765

U17470 02⁰²



UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF
7115 SOUTH BOUNDARY BOULEVARD
MACDILL AIR FORCE BASE, FLORIDA 33621-5101

SECDEF HAS SEEN

JUN 01 2002

CCJ4

Mr. Donald Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
2100 Defense Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301-2100

MAY 31 2002

Dear Secretary Rumsfeld:

I have taken a quick look at the water situation in Afghanistan. At our military sites we use Reverse Osmosis Water Purification Units (ROWPU) to purify water from local sources and augment with bottled water shipped in by surface and air. There are no water problems at these installations.

Outside our military sites, Afghanistan is suffering from a five year drought. Currently the United Nations World Health Organization is the lead UN agency to improve the supply of drinking water for the general population. They are coordinating with the Afghanistan Minister of Irrigation and Water Resources on this effort. The lead donors are the United Arab Emirates and Japan. They have pledged support to provide equipment/funds for drilling deep wells. Oxford Committee for Famine Relief (UK) is the lead NGO in Afghanistan for water projects. They are an International NGO with engineers in AFG with projects to design systems to bring clean water from distant mountain springs. USAID/OFDA has provided financial grants for NGOs to support water projects in 14 districts and nationwide assistance to UNICEF. CENTCOM Joint Civil Military Operations Task Force is currently undertaking nine additional projects that will generate/repair wells.

Finally, a water table analysis has been completed through the Corps of Engineers and posted on the Army web site. There are water challenges in Afghanistan outside of our military sites but, the NGOs have a good way ahead and do not require further assistance from the Corps of Engineers.

Very Respectfully,


TOMMY R. FRANKS
General, U.S. Army

11-L-0559/OSD/12766

June 1, 2002 3:34 PM

TO: Torie Clarke
CC: Gen. Myers
Gen. Pace
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: UK Media

DK

In the UK, there have been front-page stories that the Chiefs are "shoulder-to-shoulder" against the President, the civilian leadership and me. We have to put that to bed while we are there.

If other governments believe we are not unified, they sure are not going to follow our leadership.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
060102-4

.....
Please respond by 06/04/02

1 Jun 02.

U17471 02

11-L-0559/OSD/12767

June 1, 2002 3:38 PM

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: India

India

I need someone to brief me before I leave on the political situation in India. The old Congress Party is gone, I guess, or at least not in power, and I need to know the coalition and what the pressures are on Vajpayee.

I also need to know as much as I can personally about Vajpayee and about his senior military people and the senior people we will be seeing.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
060102-5

.....
Please respond by 06/04/02

1 Jun 02

U17473 02

6/ji snowflake
6800

R/4
6/24

June 1, 2002 4:08 PM

Sir: 6/12/02
Scheduling
internal town hall
and AFRTS interview
for early July.
T.E.

TO: Torie Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Message to DoD



4/21
SECURITY DIRECTOR

What do you think about my just going on the internal television network for DoD and talking to them about the need to transform and inject a sense of urgency into what we are doing. Please see me about it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
060102-8

.....
Please respond by 06/21/02

000.7757D

174002

U17474 02

11-L-0559/OSD/12769

OBE
INFO 6/17

June 3, 2002 8:56 AM

TO: VADM Giambastiani
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Time on Trip

333 SD

I need spare time on this trip. I don't want to fill every minute. I need time to get some rest. I need time to maybe exercise. I need time to think about India and Pakistan and get ready for my next meetings.

I am pretty sure I am not going to go to Saudi Arabia or Yemen—it would just be too much.

I want to see the full schedule today, Monday, and if necessary will add a day to allow more time so that I am not just strung out and racing from event to event.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
060302-4

.....
Please respond by 06/03/02

3 Jun 02

U17475 02

Advance

June 3, 2002 9:01 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: India and Pakistan

India

When I go to India, we should try to meet Vajpayee in the morning and not meet him for more than an hour.

I want to go over the calendar and make sure Musharraf and Vajpayee are going to be there when I am there.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
060302-5

.....
Please respond by _____


Larry Di Rita
6/4

3 Jun 02

Snowflake

ADVANCE

June 3, 2002 9:09 AM

TO: J. D. Crouch
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Iceland Meeting in Brussels

Iceland

When we go to Brussels, we ought to have a side visit with the Iceland representative and see if we can't get him straightened out.

Thanks.

DIR:dh
060302-7

.....

Please respond by _____


Larry Di Rita
6/4

3 JUN 02

U17477 02

11-L-0559/OSD/12772

June 3, 2002 9:46 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Absentee Voting

019.35

You may want to get a memo over to Andy Card, telling him what we have done about military absentee voting.

Thanks.

Attach.
05/29/02 GC memo to SecDef re: Absentee Voting

DHR:dh
060302-9

.....
Please respond by 06/21/02

Settle
DR
2/9
DR

7/3
Sharon -
Put Charlie Abell
on my call sheet
for this.

Di Rita

3 JUN 02

U17479 02

11-L-0559/OSD/12773



GENERAL COUNSEL

GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

SECDEF HAS SEEN

JUN 08 2002

INFO MEMO

May 29, 2002, 1:00 P.M.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: William J. Haynes II, General Counsel *WJ Haynes* 5/29/02

SUBJECT: Absentee Voting

- You asked me to work with David Chu and Torie Clark to ensure that our voting assistance program runs smoothly this year and does not repeat any mistakes from election year 2000 (Tab A).

- After the 2000 election, members of the General Accounting Office and the Department of Defense Inspector General's office reviewed the Federal Voting Assistance Program run for many years by Doc Cooke's staff.

- Those reviews made several suggestions for improving the program. In the FY 2002 National Defense Authorization Act, Congress legislated other changes.

- I am told that all suggestions and changes have been implemented, and will get with David and Torie to follow up as necessary.

COORDINATION: NONE

Prepared By: Jim Schwenk; OGC(P&HP) (b)(6)

CC: USD(P&R)
ASD(PA)



11-L-0559/OSD/12774

May 20, 2002 5:52 PM

TO: Torie Clarke
Jim Haynes
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Absentee Voting

People are going to be voting again in November 2002. There was a big flap in the last election about absentee ballots and people not getting their votes counted. Subsequently, Cohen initiated a study on absentee ballots for military people. That study came in; David Chu is working the problem.

It seems to me we ought to get a very effective program going, so we don't end up getting criticized for making the same mistakes that were made last time. If we are going to fall into potholes, we ought to fall into potholes we discover rather than ones people have already fallen into.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
052002-59

.....

Please respond by 06/28/02

5/30

*Initial Haynes response attached
We will get a program going.
Di Rita*

Larry Di Rita
5/21 46/1

June 3, 2002 9:52 AM

TO: Torie Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Cartoon

000.75D

This cartoon was in the *Washington Times*. Please see if you can get a copy of it for me.

Thanks.

Attach.
Washington Times cartoon

DHR:dh
060302-11

.....
Please respond by 07/12/02



3 JUN 02

U17480 02

Action
6-17

June 3, 2002 11:03 AM

TO: VADM Giambastiani

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Traveling w/State

333

Before the Joint Staff assigns people to travel with people from the State Department, I would like to know about it.

I was very surprised to hear that someone traveled with Armitage. I think that is a bit much.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
060302-17

.....

Please respond by 06/14/02

SECRET-448 SEC

JUN 15 2002

7/25

SECDEF - ~~state~~ ^{first} trip
for the new
Asst to CTRCS, VADM

3 JUN 02

Jim Metzger

See attached.

v/r
Ed

24 July 2002

Stamp: 24 JUL 2002

Subject: Absence of the Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

1. Vice Admiral James W. Metzger, USN, Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will be on travel with the Secretary of State as follows:

27 - 28 JUL	New Delhi, India
28 - 29 JUL	Islamabad, Pakistan
29 JUL	Bangkok, Thailand
29 - 30 JUL	Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia
30 JUL	Singapore
30 JUL - 1 AUG	Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei
1 - 2 AUG	Jakarta, Indonesia
2 - 3 AUG	Manilla, Philippines

2. POC is Captain John N. Christenson, USN, Executive Assistant to the ACJCS, Work (b)(6)

(b)(6) (b)(6)

John N. Christenson

JOHN N. CHRISTENSON
Captain USN
Executive Assistant to the ACJCS

Snowflake

Dave 6/24

May 31, 2002 11:56 AM

TO: Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Northern Command

Northern

The President would like a one-pager on the Northern Command—kind of an executive summary of what it is going to look like.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
053102-37

.....
Please respond by *06/14/02*

cc: J-5

*Response Attached
5/22
S/epw*

31 May 02

U17487 02

11-L-0559/OSD/12779

V120
120

KAE C/24
Lobby Di File



06/13/02

MEMO FOR: Secretary Rumsfeld

FROM: Steve Cambone *[Signature]*

JUN 19 2002

SUBJECT: Northern Command

Sir,

The attached paper responds to your request for a one-page executive summary to provide to the President on Northern Command (NORTHCOM).

The paper makes clear that we have made significant progress in being able to stand up the new command on October 1, 2002, but still have a number of unresolved issues to work through.

NORTHERN COMMAND INFORMATION PAPER

An implementation team is conducting detailed planning, preparations, and training to establish U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) on October 1, 2002.

Mission. NORTHCOM's missions include:

- Conduct operations to deter, prevent, preempt, and defeat threats and aggression aimed at the United States and territories within the assigned area of responsibility; and
- Provide military assistance to civil authorities when directed by the President or Secretary of Defense.

Chain of command. The NORTHCOM commander will report to the Secretary of Defense and the President, the same chain of command as other regional combatant commands. A confirmation hearing for the NORTHCOM commander nominee, Gen. Ed Eberhart, is scheduled for June 20.

- As with other combatant commands, relationships with other agencies will be conducted through the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff.

Phasing. NORTHCOM will achieve initial capability by bringing together the expertise and capabilities resident in existing organizations, such as the U.S. element of the North American Aerospace Defense Command.

- The command's organizational structure will evolve over the next year.
- Transformational concepts such as Standing Joint Task Force Headquarters are being studied as organizational options.

Headquarters. The preferred headquarters location is Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado Springs. The environmental assessment required to finalize this choice has been completed and is available for public comment until June 24.

- NORTHCOM headquarters staff will include personnel from all the Services, Reserve components (including the National Guard), the Coast Guard, and civilians.

Forces. NORTHCOM is unlikely to have a large number of assigned operational forces. Specific military capabilities will be provided, as required, upon Secretary of Defense approval.

- Joint Forces Command, the primary force provider for regional combatant commands, will provide the majority of land, maritime, and air forces.
- The relationship between NORTHCOM and the National Guard and Coast Guard is still under review.

June 3, 2002 11:12 AM

TO: Powell Moore
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Leahy Amendment

Indonesia

Attached is a note from Bill Schneider on the Leahy amendment that is encouraging. Let's press ahead on it.

Thanks.

Attach.
05/31/02 Schneider memo to SecDef re: Addressing the Leahy Amendment Concerning Indonesia


DHR:dh
060302-19



Please respond by 06/21/02

3 June 02

U17488 02



cc given to L.D. Rita

O

William Schneider, Jr.

SECDEF HAS SEEN

MEMORANDUM

May 31, 2002

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

JUN 03 2002

SUBJECT: Addressing the Leahy amendment concerning Indonesia

At the recent quarterly meeting of the Defense Policy Board you expressed interest in suggestions concerning the Leahy amendment. As a result of my interest in the Security Assistance program, I have undertaken some research on the subject. The impact of the Leahy amendment diminishes our ability to collaborate effectively with the Indonesian armed forces in the President's campaign against terrorism. The current effort to make \$18 million available to support "counter-terrorism fellowships," lifting the embargo on C-130 spares, an \$8 million DoD budget request for peacekeeping operations, etc. will have little impact on the willingness of the Indonesian armed forces to work with the US since this effort does little to remove the "stigma" of the Leahy amendment.

What the Leahy amendment does: The amendment bans Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and International Military Training and Education (IMET) funding until the President can certify that:

1. The militias in Timor have been brought under control;
2. Refugees must be permitted and assisted to return home; and
3. Military and civilian officials responsible for the violence and human rights violations in East Timor have been held accountable. I

Items No. 1 and 2 have been effectively met. Only item 3 requires completion to permit presidential certification.

What the administration should do: The administration should seek to meet the requirements of Leahy by encouraging the Indonesians to take action on the accountability issue. Certifying compliance could then be announced simultaneously with a US program of collaboration with Indonesia. Doing so can be accomplished readily by Indonesia taking advantage of its own current *ad hoc* tribunal on human rights violations. On the order of 18 individuals are currently on trial for East Timor human rights violations. The Indonesians should be encouraged by us in low-visibility fashion i.e. a presidential letter delivered by the US Ambassador in Jakarta (Skip Boyce, my former Staff Assistant in the Department of State) to complete these legal proceedings. The Indonesian military establishment can be constructively influenced by discreet US encouragement, but will have difficulty in responding if a high-profile Washington figure delivers such a message.

June 3, 2002 11:22 AM

TO: VADM Giambastiani

CC: Larry Di Rita
Col. Bucci

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Meeting w/Gen. Jones

000.7157

I would like a meeting with General Jones to talk about what he ought to be thinking about in terms of NATO.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
060302-20



Please respond by 06/28/02

3 JUN 02

U17480 02

11-L-0559/OSD/12784

6/4 1530

SHOWWARE

June 3, 2002 12:04 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Weapon System Changes

479

Please take a look at this memo on weapon system changes and see me on what you think we ought to do about it.

Thanks.

Attach.
05/20/02 SecDef MFR re: Weapon System Changes [052002-35]

DHR:dh
060302-25

.....
Please respond by 06/14/02

7/23
Dove

3 Jun 02

U17490 02

11-L-0559/OSD/12785

May 20, 2002 3:53 PM

SUBJECT: Weapon System Changes

I want to establish a new rule—that anytime we are going to change a weapon system, we offer a Congressional hearing or a briefing on the Hill.

And every time we are going to change a weapon system, we make sure we have analysis from PA&E and the Joint Staff, and that it has been discussed with the Chiefs, Chairman, Vice Chairman, senior civilian leadership and Service secretaries.

DHR:dh
052002-35

11-L-0559/OSD/12786

June 3, 2002 1:22 PM

Germany

TO: Torie Clarke
Marc Thiessen
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: FM Fischer Statement

Here is a pretty good statement, that Western societies do face a mix of terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, radical Islam and failed states. We ought to paraphrase that and use it.

Thanks.

Attach.
Undated *Washington Post* op-ed by Ronald D. Asmus, "United We'll Stand"

DHR:dh
060302-26

.....

Please respond by 06/28/02

3 Jun 02

U17491 02

Ronald D. Asmus

United We'll Stand

Recasting NATO to face a perilous world together.

The good news is that for the first time in history, the goal of a Europe that is democratic, peaceful and united is within our grasp. With NATO and the European Union (EU) beginning major rounds of expansion later this year, while also pursuing cooperation with Russia, the zone of stability on the continent will be extended to the Baltics and the Black Sea. Although we still face residual problems in the Balkans, the grand strategic issues of the past in Europe—how to integrate Germany, liberate Central and Eastern Europe and promote democracy in Russia—have been or are being settled.

The bad news is that America and Europe again face an existential challenge. It is what German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer has called a "new totalitarian threat" to Western societies: the toxic mix of terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, radical Islam and failed states. That threat emanates principally from a geographic area that extends from Israel eastward to Central Asia and includes the Greater Middle East and the Persian Gulf.

The challenge of our time is addressing this new threat. Tracking down Osama bin Laden or toppling Saddam Hussein will not be enough. We must dramatically expand our efforts to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction. We must work to lift failed states, from which our enemies draw sanctuary, support and successors.

The problem is more than just terrorism, and the answer must be more than simply a military one. Ultimately, we must support a process by which the greater Middle East is transformed from within—into more equitable and open societies that no longer produce ideologies and people intent upon killing our citizens. Success may require decades of sustained political, economic and military cooperation, much of it between the United States and Europe.

Europeans have been slower to face this threat than Americans, in part because they were not the immediate victims of Sept. 11. But while America is enemy number one, Europe may not be far behind—and Europeans increasingly know it. Plots by al Qaeda to blow up the Eiffel Tower in Paris and a historic

cathedral in Strasbourg and the realization that future attacks might involve weapons of mass destruction are making Europeans insecure. For example, while European elites may oppose a hard line on Iraq, public opinion polls show majority support in key European countries for using force to eliminate Saddam Hussein's ability to produce weapons of mass destruction.

All this raises a simple but important question: What is NATO's purpose? Should it remain focused on managing peace in an increasingly stable and peaceful Europe—and risk being marginalized? Or should it focus on the most immediate and dangerous threats to our common security from beyond the continent?

In the early 1990s, the key strategic challenge the West faced was how to stabilize the new democracies in the eastern half of Europe without producing a train wreck in relations with Russia. Prodded by the Clinton administration, NATO took the lead in halting ethnic cleansing in the Balkans, opening its door to new democracies and reaching out to a democratic Russia.

But Bill Clinton also understood that the threats of a new era required a NATO that Americans and Europeans understood and supported. The paradox today is that whereas several years ago it was the Europeans who were averse to recasting the alliance, today the United States is uncertain. The Bush administration's reluctance to work through multilateral institutions—even those created, led and dominated by Washington—have caused it to downgrade NATO.

Many conservatives argue that Europe is too weak to make a major contribution in the war on terrorism and that the United States is in any case better off going it alone. Europe is too weak militarily. But the way to fix this problem is not by sidelining NATO and ignoring our allies. That simply encourages them to become free riders.

Rather, the answer is to give NATO a new mission and the tools to combat weapons of mass destruction, along with the capacity to move forces far and fast. In spite of American military superiority, we sometimes need our European allies more



BY BARRIE MADRONE

than we admit. Whereas the administration initially resisted using NATO in Afghanistan, it now finds itself asking for allied support, as U.S. forces are stretched thin. Today, more than two-thirds of our NATO allies are in Afghanistan, and there are more Europeans than Americans on the ground. And when it comes to the long-term effort to remake the region, Europe's help is even more badly needed.

Obviously Americans and Europeans do not always see eye to eye when it comes to dealing with issues of war and peace in the greater Middle East. But are American conservatives really afraid to sit down and try to hammer out a common approach with our closest allies on the most pressing strategic issues we face? That was hardly the attitude of Harry Truman and his counterparts when they established NATO to meet the dangers of their day.

History occasionally grants leaders opportunities to turn tragedies into opportunities. Sept. 11 has given President Bush such an opportunity in U.S.-European relations. Just as Clinton set a new strategic course for the alliance in the early 1990s, so must this president now decide whether the United States and Europe will, together, face the strategic challenge of our time by reforming NATO to act beyond Europe. Otherwise the Bush administration runs the risk of presiding over the decline and eventual demise of the greatest alliance in history.

The writer, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, was a deputy assistant secretary of State for European affairs during the Clinton administration.

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June 3, 2002 1:26 PM

TO: Doug Feith
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Islamic Terrorist Phenomena

000.5

Attached is an interesting memo that Lee Kwan Yu gave me. Apparently it is from the Singapore internal security department. Don't pass it around, but read it. It is worth looking at.

Thanks.

Attach.

04/23/02 Singapore Internal Security Department, "The Islamic Terrorist Phenomena in South-Eat Asia: Al Qaeda and Beyond"

DHR:dh
060302-27



Please respond by 06/28/02

3 Jun 02

U17492 02

L Q V *Al-Qaeda*

**THE ISLAMIC TERRORIST PHENOMENA IN SOUTH-EAST ASIA:
AL QAEDA AND BEYOND**

SECDEF HAS SEEN C

JUN 03 2002

Franchising the Cause of God

The key contribution of Osama bin Laden is his success at franchising the cause of Islamic jihad. He has succeeded in twinning or yoking together a broad range of local groups in different parts of the world, each with their own distinct history of struggle and particularised agenda to a common universal crusade of jihad against the enemies of Islam¹. He does this without diminishing or denying the local agenda of these groups or their "revolutionary" histories. In South East Asia, these groups clearly include the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), the Abu Sayaff (ASY), the Kumpulan Mujahideen/Militant Malaysia (KMM) and the Jemaah Islamiyah. This capacity to absorb and co-opt these diverse local groups (even if in different degrees in each case) into a larger common crusade is where the fundamental potency of the current Islamic terrorist threat we are facing is rooted.

Radicalising the Locals

2 The Al-Qaeda connection (be it through participation in the Afghanistan War or in Al-Qaeda training) invariably radicalised the leaders and individuals in these groups. They returned equipped with varying degrees of increased knowledge in the craft of terrorism (eg security measures, organisation, secure communications, operational planning, bomb-making, etc) but almost always with a zeal and a sense of personal empowerment that effectively radicalised their own root organisations. This led to an increased level of terrorist violence and sophistication, eg MILF and ASY. In some cases, this may have even altered their historical and original agenda. For instance, the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) subscribed to an original agenda which was distinctly Indonesian -- the vision of an Islamic Indonesia -- as it was

¹ The number one enemy of Islam for these groups is America. Several of the Jemaah Islamiyah terrorists arrested in Singapore had no personal grievance with Americans. One of them, an engineer, Hashim Abas claimed that personally he was very happy working for his American employer who had treated him well. However, when called upon to do his bid for jihad, he and Khalim Jaffar meticulously cased the American shuttle buses at Yishun MRT station for bombing, a plan conveyed to the Al-Qaeda by Khalim in 1997 when he was in Afghanistan. (For reasons unknown, the plan was eventually not pursued, purportedly stopped by Osama bin Laden.)

historically an Indonesian Islamic nationalist organisation. When the leaders and elements returned from the Afghan conflict and/or training with Al- Qaeda, this vision ambitiously grew to encompass a vision of an Islamic region @ Dauliah Islam Nusantara, consisting of Malaysia, Indonesia, and Southern Philippines (Singapore is expected to be simply swallowed up when this happens and become Islamic too)

3 It was obvious that the Afghanistan experience was valued by the leaders of the Islamic groups in the region. They placed a priority on the sending of as many people as they could to join, witness and experience the jihad in Afghanistan and when that war was over to go for training in preparation for jihad elsewhere, including back in their own home countries.

A Deadly Alumni, A Brotherhood of Trust

4 A significant feature of the returning mujahideens to SE Asia is the links and bonds they establish with each other. In Malaysia, this in fact spawned a new organisation, the KMM. Individual contact and links in this context are more real and enduring than institutional tie-ups or formal links. Although organisational links between Al-Qaeda and local organisations do exist (according to one of the JI members who trained with MILF, he saw a special "Camp Vietnam" within the MILF's Camp Abubakar which was used solely to house and train Arabs believed to be Al-Qaeda members), it is the individual links that in our view are more critical.

5 Our investigation showed that when the JI planned the bombing of American targets in Singapore, the initiative came from the Al-Qaeda. What was alarming was how easily the whole thing was set up. The Al-Qaeda operative made contact with a regional syurah member in KL (Faiz Abu Bakar Bafana). The latter put him in touch with a Singapore JI cell . Although they had never met before, the cell members readily went about doing the leg work (video recce, surveillance, procurement of material) for his terror plan. What the Singaporeans could not do, others from the "talent" pool in the regional network provided. The bomb rigging was to be done by an Indonesian called Fathur Al-Ghozi. He (recently convicted in Manila for possessing 1.2 tonnes of TNT, 2,400 metres of detonator cord and hundreds of detonator caps intended as part of the material for this bombing mission in Singapore) was a student of Indonesian JI leader, Bashir in Java, became a trainer and bomb-maker with the MILF but who remained a JI member married to a Malaysian and resided in Johor.

6 In Malaysia, JI member Yazid Sufaat housed two of the Al-Qaeda terrorists who eventually bombed the Pentagon on Sep 11. He provided the cover for another to obtain a visa to get into the US. This chap, Zaccarias Moussaoui was probably assigned to crash a plane into the White House. (Moussaoui was caught before the incident by the FBI because of suspicious behaviour in a flight school.) According to Faiz, Moussaoui who was received by him and his JI comrades in KL, had told him of his "dream" to crash a plane into the White House and that this was endorsed by Osama bin Laden himself.

7 Whether or not it may be argued that there is a lack of hard evidence to prove formal organisational links between the Al-Qaeda and the JI, it is clear to us that trusted and secure operational links have clearly existed as manifest in these few known cases. And central to the leadership of the JI are the Indonesian personalities of Bashir, Hambali, Jibril (detained in Malaysia) and others (Mukhlas – Indonesian JI leader based in Malaysia, Zulkarnain – a JI military commander who was a trainer with Al-Qaeda, Qadama @ Imam Samudra responsible for Xmas Dec 2000 church bombings in Batam) who are believed to be still in Indonesia².

8 These groups leverage on the relative advantage of individuals, groups and operating terrain in their midst. A few Singaporean JI members were selected for bombing assignments against churches in Indonesia because they could apparently pass off more credibly as Christians since they spoke English and are of fairer skin. While security forces respond essentially as national entities, these groups operate in a porous, borderless manner.

Indigenisation – Autonomous and Self-Generating Bodies

9 The Al-Qaeda and the Afghanistan experience had a deep impact on those individuals and key figures from the region who were exposed to it. These persons returned and radicalised their own organisations but many of these groups existed before Al-Qaeda and have a history of violence and a terrorist capability of their own. The enhanced capability acquired from Afghanistan, even if not augmented in future, is sufficient for their terror agenda in their own operating context. Operationally these organisations and groups are autonomous and self-sustaining.

² Even the Australians are now beginning to realise the likelihood of JI penetration into Australia; Bashir visited Australia eleven times between 1990 and 1998 and was linked to the leader of an extremist Sunni organisation in Australia who subsequently visited Indonesia.

10 The real legacy of Al-Qaeda for these groups is their being conjoined by its common agenda of universal jihad and the valuable trusted collaborative networking it has created. It is natural that they would make efforts to strengthen this networking. An attempt was made by Hambali with Bashir's blessing to create a loose secret regional caucus called the Rabittatul Mujahideen consisting of Islamic terror groups in the region. At the second meeting in KL in 2000, a resolution was passed for joint efforts to attack Filipino assets in Indonesia in support of the MILF. The bombing of the Filipino ambassador at his home later that year was the direct result of this resolution. No one claimed responsibility for the attack.³

11 These groups can carry on without the Arabs or the Al-Qaeda; they have resident resources of their own and they have indigenised what they have learnt from Afghanistan. This is clearly seen in the training capability they have built up over the years. Singapore JI members for instance had undergone training at several locations in Malaysia, including Ulu Tiram, Gunung Pulai, and Kota Tinggi in Johor, and Bahau in Negri Sembilan. They were given religious training and subjected to indoctrination on the JI cause and jihad. In the remote areas, they had lessons on jungle survival techniques, trekking and physical training. JI also conducted training on surveillance techniques and how to carry out assassinations. JI members also underwent military training at MILF Camp Abu Bakar in Mindanao (Philippines) where they learned how to handle weapons, participate in live firing exercises, launch grenades and execute assault and other attack manoeuvres.

12 Now that the Afghanistan theatre is no longer available, the Afghanistan experience of jihad will be sought in new battle arenas. In SE Asia, a new arena of jihad, a new gravitating centre to mobilise groups and individuals across the ummah is Ambon (Malukus). Ambon is the new battle-field touted as a crusade for Muslims to defending Islam against the Christians and to recover a land which they assert was previously Islamic. It seeks to draw volunteers from across Indonesia and from the region; its methods of mobilisation replicates that of seen in the earlier Afghanistan jihad (the proliferation of video-tapes and VCDs on the Ambon crusade, books, tracts, calls through mosques, etc).

³ The greatest beneficiary of the "deadly alumni" from the terror schools of the Al-Qaeda is perhaps the Al-Qaeda itself because it alone has the whole list of all its "trainees". Each one of these persons is in fact a resource which they can approach with trust and with reasonable expectation for help; so far it appears they are seldom refused.

13 Osama bin Laden and the Al-Qaeda have helped set something in motion across the Muslim ummah worldwide. Where the Communists failed, the Islamic terrorist network, if unchecked, is more likely to succeed – the creation of a globalised fraternity bonded by a single religion (ideology). If the stumbling block for world communism was nationalism, especially ethno-nationalism, the Muslim brotherhood will succeed precisely because its bonds are not intellectual but organically rooted in a common ethnicity defined by a common religion -- shared value system, social rituals, a deeply, embedded Islamic sense of self⁴.

Internal Security Department
23 April 2002

⁴ The efficacy of this may be seen in the fact that in many cases of terrorists, it has overcome the primordial instincts of race; in the Spore II case, 5 out of 13 are racially Indians. There have also been cases of Caucasian converts found fighting for the Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan who have been caught by the American forces.

June 3, 2002 1:26 PM

0914

TO: David Chu
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Language Training

Have you taken action with respect to this proposal from Andy Marshall?

Thanks.

Attach.

03/11/02 Marshall memo to SecDef re: Language Training, SecDef memos U04299/02, 031802-37

DHR:dh
060302-28



Please respond by 07/12/02

374002

U17493 02

in
5:30



DIRECTOR OF
NET ASSESSMENT

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1920 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1920

SECDEF HAS SEEN

MAR 18 2002

March 11, 2002

SECDEF HAS SEEN

JUN 03 2002

3/11
LARRY D. RIFE

TO: THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Andy Marshall *ARM*

SUBJECT: Language Training

The Defense Language Institute figures are driven by current defense intelligence requirements since most of the people who go there are enlisted intelligence operators who will listen in on foreign networks. Changing the intelligence requirement is the key to changing the output. The officers may matter most and there the problem is that only the Army has a good Foreign Area Officers (FAO) program, but the Army remains focused on Europe more than Asia and elsewhere.

Perhaps what you should do is to discuss this issue with the Services and then direct all services to have FAO programs modeled after the Army's, plus increased pay incentives for language proficiency, with size of incentive highest for those languages that are of long-term strategic interest and importance, i.e., Chinese, etc.

See attached pages from a recent study for additional information.

Office of the Secretary of Defense

THIS ISSUE IS WORTH
BEING WORKED BY
PEPSECDEF + SEC

8/3/12
SEC
3/12

SECDEF HAS SEEN

MAR 18 2002

5 March 02

MEMORANDUM for the SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: VADM Giambastiani

SUBJECT: **DoD Language Graduates for 2001**

For info, attached is a list of DoD language graduates for calendar year '01 from COL Bucci.

Of note, 461 (25.4%) of the 1817 "basic" language graduates, or 1 out of 4, took **Arabic or Farsi**.

Very respectfully,



11-L-0559/OSD/12797

**Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center (DLIFLC) Graduates
1/31/2001 through 2/1/2002**

- Defense Language Institute is located in Monterey, CA
- The attached document includes all DLIFLC military grads for the past 12 months, broken out by service, language and type of course.
 - The Basic category includes all basic acquisition of a language taught at DLIFLC.
 - The Other category includes all advanced courses and specialized courses.
 - The Contract category includes all courses taught by multiple vendors out of the DLIFLC-Washington Office. This office provides instruction in the low density courses, initial language familiarization for new commanders in Europe, as well as language training to the Defense Attaches.

• USA

Language	Basic	Other	Contracted
ARABIC	198	10	10
ARMENIAN			1
BENGALI			1
BURMESE			1
CAMBODIAN			5
CHINESE-MANDARIN	86	1	4
CZECH	3		1
DUTCH			6
FRENCH	34	6	15
GERMAN	23	7	49
GREEK	1		1
HAITIAN CREOLE			4
HEBREW			1
HINDI			2
HUNGARIAN			6
INDONESIAN			7
ITALIAN	5		2
JAPANESE	8	3	1
KOREAN	175	4	
LAO			3
LITHUANIAN			1
MACEDONIAN			1
MALAY			2
NORWEGIAN			2
PERSIAN AFGAN			2
PERSIAN FARSI	38		
POLISH	2		3
PORTUGUESE	9		
PORTUGUESE AFGHAN			2
PORTUGUESE EUROPEAN			2
ROMANIAN			4
RUSSIAN	153	17	18

Language	Basic	Other	Contracted
SERBIAN CROATIAN	18		
SLOVAK			1
SPANISH	113	7	6
SWAHILI			1
TAGALOG	2		
THAI	8		1
TURKISH	2		3
UKRAINIAN			2
URDU			5
UZBEK			1
VIETNAMESE	4		2
TOTAL	882	55	179

**Number of DLIFLC Graduates Over the Past 12 Months
1/31/2001 through 2/1/2002**

• **USAF**

Language	Basic	Other	Contracted
AFRIKAANS			1
ALBANIAN			1
ARABIC	53	18	5
BULGARIAN			1
CAMBODIAN			2
CHINESE-MANDARIN	40	4	2
CZECH	2		
DANISH			1
DUTCH			4
FINNISH			3
FRENCH	9	1	15
GERMAN	9		4
GREEK			2
HEBREW	7	2	1
HINDI			2
HUNGARIAN			2
INDONESIAN			2
ITALIAN	2		3
JAPANESE	1		
KOREAN	95	11	
PERSIAN AFGAN			5
PERSIAN FARSI	21		
POLISH	1		
PORTUGUESE	2		
PORTUGUESE BRAZILIAN			2
PORTUGUESE EUROPEAN			6
PUSHTU AFGHAN			5
ROMANIAN			4
RUSSIAN	78	18	5
SERBIAN CROATIAN	26	4	11
SPANISH	92	16	14
TAGALOG			1
THAI	1		5
TURKISH	2		4
VIETNAMESE	14		
TOTAL	455	74	113

**Number of DLIFLC Graduates Over the Past 12 Months
1/31/2001 through 2/1/2002**

• **USN**

Language	Basic	Other	Contracted
ALBANIAN			1
ARABIC	57	9	5
CHINESE-MANDARIN	37	4	1
DANISH			2
DUTCH			3
ESTONIAN			4
FRENCH	5	2	7
GERMAN	8		2
GREEK			1
HEBREW	11	3	
INDONESIAN			2
ITALIAN	9		2
JAPANESE	4	1	4
KOREAN	28	1	
NORWEGIAN			4
PERSIAN FARSI	32		
PORTUGUESE	1		
ROMANIAN			2
RUSSIAN	43	7	5
SERBIAN CROATIAN	15	1	
SPANISH	47	9	10
SWEDISH			2
THAI	4		2
TURKISH			1
VIETNAMESE	5		
TOTAL	306	37	60

• **USMC**

Language	Basic	Other	Contracted
ARABIC	54	3	4
CHINESE-MANDARIN	2		
FRENCH	3		1
ITALIAN			1
JAPANESE		1	
KOREAN	21	3	
LATVIAN			2
NORWEGIAN			2
PERSIAN FARSI	8		
PORTUGUESE	1		
RUSSIAN	36	4	3
SERBIAN CROATIAN	8		
SLOVENIAN			1
SPANISH	41		3
TOTAL	174	11	17

TO: Andy Marshall
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
 DATE: March 6, 2002
 SUBJECT: **DoD Language Graduates**

Please take a look at this DoD Language Graduates for 2001 and tell me if you think I ought to send out a memorandum or directive getting it switched out of German and French and that type of thing and into languages that would be more appropriate for the decades ahead.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
 030602.25

Attach: Dod Language Grads for 2001, 3/5/02

Please respond by: _____

3/12

*ANDY MARSHALL RESPONSE
 ATTACHED AT RED TAB.
 V/R
 ED*

U04299 02

March 18, 2002 12:32 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Language Training

Chu

Here is a note from Andy Marshall that I agree with.

Please get a memo drafted for me to do this.

Thanks.

Attach.
03/11/02 Marshall memo to SecDef, "Language Training"

DHR:dh
031802-37



Please respond by 04/12/02

June 3, 2002 2:10 PM

TO: Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Suicide Bombers

000.5

Did this Aldridge suggestion find its way into the DPG?

Thanks.

Attach.
USD(AT&L) memo to SecDef re: Suicide Bombers, U07363/02, U07192/02

DHR:dh
060302-30



Please respond by *Jun/28/02*

3 Jun 02

U17494 02

4/29
2002

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3010 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3010

SECDEF HAS SEEN

INFO MEMO

JUN 03 2002

April 25, 2002, 1:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec Action _____

FROM: E. C. Aldridge, Jr., UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (AT&L)

SUBJECT: Suicide Bombers

- You commented "How to deal with suicide bombers is something that ought to be in the DPG." (TAB A) Here are some thoughts.
- Generally speaking, we need a number of elements to deal with suicide bombers.
 - Intelligence before it happens or attribution to groups afterward.
 - Physical protection which consists of detection and hardening.
- The intelligence portion is being addressed via the various counter-terrorism initiatives. Physical security including detection and hardening is being addressed for similar reasons. What is missing are technology efforts that could provide explosives stand-off detection for uncooperative objects. (We can now detect certain size explosives very well when objects are being scanned, as we do in airports for passenger and baggage checks, and the objects pass through circular scanners.)
- I propose putting something in the DPG that encourages research for explosives stand-off sensors. We already have a good start there in trying to locate and defeat non-metallic mines and new research could serve both purposes.
- I have submitted the following proposed DPG language:
"The Military departments, with Army lead, shall embark on a stand-off explosives detection technology program and present a technology plan to USD(AT&L)/DDR&E by September 2002. The remote sensors will address the terrorist bomber threat."

RECOMMENDATION: For information. No action required.

Prepared By: Dr. Spiros G. Pallas, Acting D,S&TS, (b)(6) 2000-2002

SEL ASSISTANT DI RITA	4/29
SIR MA GIAMBASTIANI	
MA BUKS	8/17/02
EXECSEC WHITMORE	8/1/02

11-L-0559/USD/12805

U07363 0102

4/24
6:30



ACQUISITION,
TECHNOLOGY
AND LOGISTICS

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3010 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3010

SECDEF HAS SEEN

JUN 03 2002

INFO MEMO

April 22, 2002, 10:00 AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec Action _____

FROM: E. C. Aldridge, Jr., UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (AT&L)

Pitt 22 APR 2002

SUBJECT: Asymmetrical Threats

- In an April 1, 2002 memo you wrote, "I hope you have some folks working on how to deal with suicide bombers and asymmetrical threats of that type" ~~(b)(6)~~
- The point paper ^{attached} at ~~(b)(6)~~ provides information regarding your concerns.

RECOMMENDATION: For information. No action required.

*The short answer is that we do, but it is just getting started
Pitt*

Attachments:
As stated

Prepared By: Michael Toscano

(b)(6)

2857-2002RT

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	
SR MA GIAMBASTIANI	
MA BUCCI	
EXECSEC WHITMORE	<i>4/23</i>

Information Paper
on the
Mitigation of Asymmetrical Threats

BACKGROUND: The SECDEF, in an April 1, 2002 memo to the USD(AT&L), wrote "I hope you have some folks working on how to deal with suicide bombers and asymmetrical threats of that type."

- Numerous technologies have been developed for the protection of entry points and buildings from terrorist bombs. Individuals and vehicles passing through portals as they enter installations and buildings can be searched for explosives:
 - Trace explosive detection
 - Advanced X-Ray systems
- The evaluation and performance testing of several commercial products are underway:
 - Three types of commercial Large Vehicle Inspection Systems
 - Two types of Personnel Screening Portal Systems
- USD(AT&L), under the auspices of the DoD Physical Equipment Action Group (PSEAG), has evaluated several commercial hand-held explosive detection devices and is funding an R&D project to detect explosives from a distance.
- ASD SO/LIC, under the auspices of the Combating Terrorism Technical Support (CTTS) Program and the Technical Support Working Group (TSWG) is examining the potential of millimeter wave technology to detect concealed weapons at a distance.
- As a result of the escalation of the violence in the Middle East and the threat to troops outside their installation, the CTTS program has undertaken additional initiatives to combat this threat:
 - Evaluating trace explosive detectors to determine their environmental limitations (adversely impacted by the desert environment within the CENTCOM AOR)
 - Evaluating personnel screening system using x-rays
 - Evaluating the start of a cooperative research effort with Israel in suicide bomber detection and defeat under SOLIC's cooperative R&D agreement with Israel's Ministry of Defense.
 - The Combating Terrorism Technology Support Office will be participating in a Suicide Bomber Detection Workshop in May 2002 in Israel.

April 8, 2002 7:54 AM

TO: Pete Aldridge
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Suicide Bombers

4/30
Larry Di Rita

Please take a look at this memo I sent Steve Cambone.

Would you please get back to me on that subject?

Thanks.

Attach.

04/01/02 SecDef memo to PDUSD(P), "Suicide Bombers" [040102-43] 2800-2002

DHR:dh
040802-12

.....
Please respond by 04/26/02

4/29
Response Attached

Larry Di Rita

4/30

530
4/30
4/30

April 1, 2002 5:19 PM

TO: Steve Cambone

CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Gen. Myers
Gen. Pace

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Suicide Bombers

How to deal with suicide bombers is something that ought to be in the DPG. We need to get people working on that. That is an asymmetrical threat that we are going to have trouble with in the years ahead.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
040102-43

.....

Please respond by 04/19/02

Tim 2/20/02

April 1, 2002 5:21 PM

041601
(LW)

TO: Pete Aldridge
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Gen. Myers
Gen. Pace
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Asymmetrical Threats

4/25 Larry Di Rita

I hope you have some folks working on how to deal with suicide bombers and asymmetrical threats of that type.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
040102-44

.....

Please respond by 04/19/02

4/23

Partial Response attached.

Larry Di Rita
4/25 125/1

June 3, 2002 2:16 PM

TO: Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Intelligence System of 2025

350.09

What is the status of this memo dated June 23? Is there anything I ought to do?

Thanks.

Attach.

06/23/01 SecDef memo to PDUSD(P) re: Intelligence System of 2025

DHR:dh
060302-31



Please respond by 07/12/02

3 JUN 02

U17495 02

11-L-0559/OSD/12811

[Handwritten signature]

June 23, 2001 9:48 AM

TO: Steve Cambone
Rich Haver

[Handwritten signature]

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *[Handwritten initials]*

SECDEF HAS SEEN

SUBJECT: Intelligence System of 2025

JUL 05 2001

I have not heard back from you on the memo I sent you with the attached "Visualizing the Intelligence System of 2025." Please respond.

Thanks.

Attach.
Undated, unsigned memo: "Visualizing the Intelligence System of 2025"

[Handwritten mark]

DHR:dh
062401-3

Sir -

*I concur with all 7 points.
I am skeptical that a Commission is the right answer, right now.
I believe we need to be more specific about DoD needs and interests, internal organization and the products we want to deliver and to be delivered to us.*

Once we know what we want and need, we can commission folks to help us figure out how to succeed.

Haver & I, working with Mr Aldridge & Roach, can do this work - but only after I get into my new position, have the mandate and staff, etc.

[Handwritten signature]

Acfex

11-L-0559/OSD/12812 JUN 26 2001

6/26
1520

Visualizing the Intelligence System of 2025

It is important for the United States to develop a new vision of intelligence gathering, analysis and utilization. The existing system is becoming less than optimal in the face of new conditions and new requirements. As seen from the National Command Authority the United States has a number of new requirements that the Cold War based intelligence system deals with inadequately:

1. There is a world with many centers of activity and importance. The bipolar focus of the past is hopeless. Indeed there may be no coherent focus that is manageable in a world in which Korea, Thailand, Colombia, the Galapagos Islands, Rwanda and terrorist threats against the United States all could simultaneously demand attention while Russia, China, India, Japan, the Middle East and the European Community could also require attention the same day;
2. The nature of the problems which Presidents cannot avoid dealing with have broadened dramatically to include the environment, economics, organized crime, human rights, as well as more traditional military and diplomatic concerns;
3. The reliance on overhead capability is being eroded by increasingly sophisticated strategies of denial and deception;
4. The reliance on code breaking and electronic intercept is being eroded by fiber optic lines and increased encryption capabilities;
5. Some terrorist groups use family and communal relationships that make them extraordinarily difficult to penetrate while their capacity to inflict damage with minimum organization is growing dramatically;
6. There has been a tendency to overemphasize collections and underemphasize analysis so we often know more data than we can translate into usable knowledge. The answer is not less collection but more analysis;
7. More and more information is going to exist in the clear but will need to be gathered, analyzed and distributed within the framework of more traditional intelligence if the two are to be synthesized into one working whole.

These seven changes require a new visualization of the missions, systems architecture, and resource requirements of the intelligence capability America needs for future security requirements.

No one who is managing daily activities and current problems (including PFIAB) can really develop this kind of new visualization. What is needed is a broad based working group or commission to review the collective needs of the National Command Authority and examine the potential real-time and long-term requirements of both American security and American leadership and then propose a system that could meet those needs.

TO: Gen. Myers
Steve Cambone

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Deployable CINCs

We need to have deployable capability for CINCs—they don't exist.

Specifically, in the event a conflict occurs in an AOR, and the CINC is too far away, he doesn't have the ability to get at it. It took Schwarzkopf six months.

What do we do about it?

Thanks.

*Monday 1-30pm in folder
8 Jul*

DHR:dh
060302-37

.....
Please respond by 07/14/02

*meeting set
for Mon.
8 Jul @ 1330.
V/R
Ed*

*6/20
CTCS Response
attached.
V/R
Ed*

02 JUN 6 12:37 PM

Tab A

U17496-02

11-L-0559/OSD/12814

TO: Gen. M
Steve

FROM: Donal

SUBJECT: Deplo

SECDEF HAS SEEN

JUN 24 2002

322

Harry
MTG
1 Ed G-

down this
17R

We need to ha

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT

Specifically, in
away, he does

DeFonnie

What do we do

Thanks.

This is the
read-ahead for
30 pm] in folder

DHR:dh
060302-37

Please respor

a meeting tentatively
scheduled for

8 July, 1:30. Try to

meeting remember to put it in
for a folder this time. Dilite
for 1700.

8 Jul @ 1330.

V/R
Ed

CTCS Response
attached.

V/R
Ed

Tab A

3 Jun 02

June 3, 2002 3:45 PM

PAKISTAN

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Deputy Secretary Armitage

My understanding is that Armitage is going to meet with Musharraf on Thursday, 12:30 p.m., Pakistan time. On Friday, he is going to be in India.

You should double-check that with State, so we know precisely when, using Pakistan and India time, he is going to be meeting there and when he is leaving each country. We want to make sure there is a decent interval between my getting to either of those countries after he is there.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
060302-39

.....

Please respond by 06/04/02

3Jun02

U17497 02

June 3, 2002 4:57 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Oldest SecDef

02050

Someone told me Weinberger was the oldest—are you sure Marshall was?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
060302-41

.....
Please respond by 06/21/02

Done
LARRY DI RITA
7/8

3 JUN 02

U17498 02

11-L-0559/OSD/12817

June 3, 2002 4:59 PM

TO: Powell Moore
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Congressman Schaffer

470

Congressman Schaffer of Colorado is with us on Crusader. I talked to him today.

Thanks.

DHR.dh
060302-42



Please respond by _____

3 JUN 02

U17499 02

June 4, 2002 7:49 AM

TO: VADM Giambastiani
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Camp X-ray

Afghanistan

Do we still call it "Camp X-ray"? It is kind of a lousy name. If we are using it anymore, we ought to think about changing the name.

Please let me know if it is still being used and, if not, what the name of the new place is.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
060402-3

.....
Please respond by 06/14/02

45 Jun 02

U17500 02

1/23
10:00

Negotiation Policy

EF1872

June 17, 2002 5:00 PM

015

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: ICC

7/23

If a country is not in the ICC and we are not in the ICC, do we need them to sign the Section 98 Agreement, so they won't extradite our people to the ICC?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
061702-57

.....
Please respond by 06/26/02

7/22
RESPONSE ATTACHED
AT RED TAB.

JLR

17 Jun 02

JUN 18 02 10:11

ET 7031

02/009888-USDP

July 1, 2002 2:51 PM

015

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: ICC

What is this reference here that I have circled in this article?

Thanks.

Attach.
Ford, Peter. "US Balks at New War Crimes Court," *Christian Science Monitor*, 06/28/02

DHR:dh
070102-38

.....
Please respond by 07/26/02

See Red Tab

1 Jul 02

that the facility will be available "when needed" and that delays in completion "have the potential to impede performance of the stockpile stewardship program."

Christian Science Monitor
June 28, 2002

50. US Balks At New War-Crimes Court

A war-crimes court starts Monday, to the chagrin of Washington, which wants US troops exempt.

By Peter Ford, Staff writer of
The Christian Science Monitor

PARIS - The United States is fighting a fierce last-ditch battle against the world's first permanent war-crimes court, threatening the future of United Nations peacekeeping missions in the Balkans and elsewhere, according to UN diplomats.

With the International Criminal Court (ICC) set to become a reality on Monday, US diplomats are waging a lone campaign to keep US peacekeeping troops beyond its reach.

They have run up against strong opposition from their European allies on the UN Security Council, who say Washington's proposals would weaken the court.

The "collective EU (European Union) position ... is clear not just on the maintenance, but also on the promotion of the court and all it stands for," British ambassador to the UN Jeremy Greenstock said earlier this week.

US deputy ambassador Richard Williamson, however, warned when he introduced a resolution seeking immunity from the court for peacekeepers that "the whole spectrum of United Nations peacekeeping operations will have to be reviewed if we are unsuccessful at getting the protections we demand."

Most immediately at risk is the UN peacekeeping mission in Bosnia, whose Security Council mandate runs out on Sunday. US negotiators are threatening to veto a renewal of the mandate unless their personnel in Bosnia are given immunity from the ICC.

More broadly, according to a source familiar with the backroom discussions currently under way, Washington is threatening to withhold its contributions to the UN peacekeeping budget - 27 percent of the total - unless it is given satisfaction.

The Bush administration has strongly opposed the creation of the ICC, which will try cases of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. Although President Clinton signed the treaty creating the court just before his term ended, Washington "unsigned" it last month, saying the United States would have nothing to do with the new institution.

Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld said last week that the United States should be exempt from the court to avoid "political harassment that can take place unfairly, particularly when ... you are fighting the global war on terror and ... the terrorist training books are encouraging people to make those kinds of charges and allegations."

Under the ICC treaty, US soldiers could be brought before the court even if the United States is not a signatory, if the alleged crime were committed on the territory of an ICC member. Sixty-nine countries have so far ratified the treaty.

Supporters of the court, including all of Washington's European allies, say that US troops serving abroad have no reason to fear the ICC, since it will hear only cases that the accused person's home government has refused to try in a reasonable manner.

"In practical terms, it wouldn't make a huge difference, but it is considerably magnified through a certain political lens," says one European Security Council diplomat. "It is hard to imagine how UN personnel could ever be involved in the sort of crimes that the ICC will try, such as genocide," the diplomat adds. "And because the ICC will hear cases only if national governments refuse to prosecute them," the Americans are 99.9 percent protected anyway," she says. "They are knocking themselves out, using a lot of political capital and

putting a lot of effort into getting that extra 0.1 percent."

Supporters of the ICC, however, see Washington's bid to exempt its soldiers as a further attempt to undermine the court itself. "They are trying to use the Security Council as a battering ram against the integrity of the court," argues Richard Dicker, head of the international justice program at Human Rights Watch, the New York-based human rights group.

"They are looking to punch a hole in the legitimacy of the ICC by getting the Security Council to do what the Americans couldn't do four years ago [when the treaty was negotiated]: give a 100 percent ironclad guarantee that no US citizen would ever be investigated by the court," Mr. Dicker adds.

The waters of the diplomatic battle in New York have been muddied by the revelation that Britain and other European nations providing peacekeeping troops in Afghanistan negotiated a deal last year with the interim Afghan authorities that their nationals would be immune from arrest or surrender to any international tribunal.

That appeared to open European governments to the charge of hypocrisy. European diplomats, however, point out that the ICC treaty allows for bilateral agreements, and that the Afghanistan accord requires that anyone accused of a crime be handed over to his own government. That would also be the first step in any ICC procedure.

The current wrangle at the UN is not the first time the United States has sought to win immunity from the ICC for peacekeepers: It lost a similar fight last month when the mandate of the UN mission in East Timor was extended.

Washington does not contribute many staff to UN peacekeeping operations: A total of 712 American policemen and 35 soldiers are stationed with UN missions around the world, in such places as the Kuwait-Iraqi border and Western Sahara. Nearly 8,000 US troops serve in Kosovo and Bosnia in NATO-led forces

that operate with UN authorization.

The UN discussions have clouded the celebrations that ICC supporters had planned to mark the creation of the court, which they say is one of the most important human rights tools of the past half century.

"But you can't obscure the fact that on Monday the world will be different," says Dicker. "There will be less room for impunity for those responsible for genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. Justice will be strengthened and accountability will be reinforced."

New York Times
June 28, 2002

51. U.S. Links Bosnia Role To Immunity From Court

By Serge Schmemmann

UNITED NATIONS, June 27 — The United States raised the ante today in its opposition to the International Criminal Court, threatening to veto a renewal of the multinational force in Bosnia unless the peacekeepers were granted immunity from the court.

The mandate of the force was extended last week and now expires at midnight Sunday, just when the treaty setting up the International Court comes into force. This time, however, the United States representative said he would not consider another extension.

"A veto is definitely an option if the issue is not resolved in a way that provides the kind of immunity that we believe that non-party states to the I.C.C. that send troops to international peacekeeping missions should receive," said the American envoy, John D. Negroponte, after three hours of consultations behind closed doors.

Diplomats said the meeting would continue Friday morning.

The dispute has pitted the United States against the European Union and many other United Nations members. Though the specific issue is the Bosnia force, the struggle over the court is perceived by many members of the United Nations as a test of wills with an American administration op-

October 24, 2002 4:14 PM

TO: Gen. Franks
CC: Gen. Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Captured Weapons

Afghanistan

I was told today that U.S. Armed Forces in Afghanistan are giving weapons captured from caches to the regional warlords. They said there have been news articles to this effect, and that Special Forces and other people have told them.

I was under the impression that none of that was happening, that in fact the weapons were either being destroyed, if they were unstable, or saved for the Afghan National Army.

Could you please pursue that and let me know?

Thank you.

DHR:dh
102402-9

.....

Please respond by 11/01/02

24 Oct 02

U17550 / 02

Snowflake

~~TOP SECRET~~

June 25, 2002 7:06 AM



TO: Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Papers

Here are four papers—on timing, declaratory policy, the post-war environment and a compendium. Are these papers OBE?

Please take a look at them and tell me what I am supposed to do with these.

Thanks.

Attach.

Four papers: dated 5 May, 7 May 26 Apr, 23 May

DHR:dh
062502-2

.....
Please respond by 07/12/02

IT-09

25 JUN 02

U17552 / 03

~~TOP SECRET~~

UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENT(S)
DOCUMENT BECOMES UNCLASSIFIED



COMPTROLLER

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1100 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1100

INFO MEMO

October 25, 2002, 1:30 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dov S. Zakheim 

SUBJECT: Funding for Joint Experiments/Exercises

- You asked me if we can make sure that Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) receives the necessary funding to conduct joint experiments and exercises, rather than having to scrape up the dollars from other sources.
- I am working with ADM Giambastiani and the Joint Staff to identify the appropriate funding level for joint experiments and exercises. JFCOM has a budget to finance joint experiments and exercises. We will make the appropriate adjustment to reflect current plans and objectives.
- JFCOM's issue is also related to the wider Executive Agent question that we are already reviewing. We have provided JFCOM with three alternatives for comment.
- The Joint Staff and my staff will work with JFCOM to reach agreement on the best solution to improve the executive agent system, and to ensure that Combatant Commanders' funding priorities receive proper attention during the Program and Budget Review.

COORDINATION: None

Prepared By: John M. Evans, (b)(6)

U17559-02

11-L-0559/OSD/12825

October 8, 2002 8:45 AM

TO: Dov Zakheim
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Funding Joint Experiments/Exercises

How do we arrange so that Joint Forces Command is assigned dollars to conduct joint experiments and exercises, rather than having to scrape it up from others?

Thanks.


DHR:dh
100802-9

.....
Please respond by 10/25/02

October 25, 2002 8:16 AM

TO: Honorable Tommy G. Thompson

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT: Project in Kabul

I am determined to help you accomplish the project you have proposed be done in Kabul. We should resolve to get the facility established fast. I would like to see it done in the next two months. There is no need for the US Government to be so inefficient. You have a good idea. It is important that it happens, and I want to help.

I will get whoever I need in DoD to work with you. If at any time, you, or any of your people, feel that DoD is not cooperating fully, please call me personally. I am tired of seeing the US Government incapable of functioning in a reasonable period of time. If the U.S. Government can't figure this out, Joyce and I will provide a boost to make it happen.

We need to do it in a way that it helps Karzai. In addition, once it is established in Kabul, we then need to see that it is replicated in six or seven other Afghan cities in the following five or six months. Once we have the model tested and know what it costs, then we can go out and raise the money, privately if we have to, to get the job done.

DHR:dh
102302-6

Afghanistan

25 Oct 02

May 31, 2002 7:23 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: \$24,000 Sofa

488.13

Please have someone look into this \$24,000 sofa and that type of thing and tell me what kind of controls there are on it.

Thanks.

Attach.

Hoffman, Lisa, "\$24,000 Sofa Among Luxuries bought By Army and Air Force," Scripps Howard News Service, 05/30/02

DHR dh
053102-2



Please respond by 06/28/02

DIRITTA *DR*

6/1

SECDEF -

ZAKHEIM is already into this. He'll provide details.

V/R
Ed

31 May 02

vaccinating all 2.4 million members of the armed forces against the deadly anthrax disease.

Initially the vaccine will be given only to those troops deemed most at risk, he said. He cited as examples those who work in laboratories where anthrax spores are handled, and special forces troops.

Some military personnel believe the vaccine causes health problems, and hundreds have been forced out of the armed forces after refusing orders to take it. The government insists the vaccine is safe.

The Pentagon had been forced to scale back the vaccination program, which started in 1998, after factory violations by the nation's sole manufacturer of anthrax vaccine, BioPort of Lansing, Mich. Those problems have been corrected, and in January the Food and Drug Administration cleared BioPort's manufacturing plant to resume production and to release 500,000 doses it already had made.

The Sept. 11 attacks changed the government's whole approach to the vaccination issue, Chu said.

"The events of last fall were really a wake-up call for the country about the possibility of biological agents being used as a weapon of mass destruction," Chu said, "and therefore this is no longer just a military personnel problem. This is also a national problem."

Thus the vaccine supply will be widely shared.

"While we are still debating the details, what I think you will see in the end is, we will set aside a major part of what vaccine is available to be sure that we can protect the civil population of the United States," Chu said. "I don't want to start any rumors here. We're not going to vaccinate the whole population."

Health officials have said there is no need for civilians to take the vaccine unless there is an attack.

President Bush's Homeland Security Office is trying to figure out how much vaccine might be needed for police, firefighters, rescue squads, and others who would

be first responders to any attack in the United States.

Washington Times
May 31, 2002
Pg. B1

21. Military School Closings Study Hit

By Vaishali Honawar, The Washington Times

A proposed Pentagon study on closing 69 U.S. schools run by the Defense Department — including four on the Marine Corps Base Quantico in Prince William County — is evoking criticism from those likely to be affected.

The study was requested by U.S. Rep. David L. Hobson, Ohio Republican and chairman of the House Appropriations subcommittee on military construction. It will assess the cost-effectiveness of closing schools in Virginia, Alabama, Kentucky, North Carolina, South Carolina and Georgia, and transferring more than 32,000 students to public schools.

The study would not affect 73,500 students in U.S. defense schools abroad.

The study is expected to take about a year to complete, said Elaine B. Hinman, director of the Defense Department's domestic elementary and secondary schools.

"It is really important that we take a look at the way we do business," Miss Hinman said, adding that there is no "predetermined conclusion" to close down these schools.

Among other things, the study will examine the feasibility of transferring the defense schools to the control of local public schools systems and the costs of operating the schools, Miss Hinman said.

The Congressional Budget Office estimates that the Pentagon would save \$1.5 billion by 2010 if all 69 schools were closed. All but \$400 million of that, however, would have to be paid to local communities to support the added students, according to the Federal Education Association, an affiliate of the National Education Association.

Quantico is home to the only local schools among the

69 being studied for closure, and it's where concern about the study is growing.

"My concern is the children," said John Hubert, a teacher at Quantico Middle and High School, and president of the Quantico Education Association, the local teachers union. "These students are uprooted repeatedly and are special children with special needs. Defense schools understand that need."

Quantico has three elementary schools and one school for middle and high school students.

Defense schools worldwide follow a similar curriculum based on national standards. "If a child leaves Germany and transfers to Quantico, he will pick up where he left off," Mr. Hubert said, adding that public schools could not meet the needs of these children.

A study last year by Vanderbilt University gave the defense schools high marks on performance in standardized tests and for maintaining smaller class sizes.

The Federal Education Association, a union of teachers and staff at defense schools, has been asking parents and children to write to their congressional representatives about their concerns about the study.

"The operating cost for these schools is 1/10th of 1 percent of the Defense Department's budget," union spokesman Gary Hritz said. He said the schools are necessary because of the safety and security they provide in addition to their "excellent quality."

Irene Cromer, a spokeswoman for Prince William County public schools, said school officials must look at the financial impact of having the defense schools transferred to them. "We would have to work with it," she said.

This article is based in part on wire service reports.

Seattle Post-Intelligencer
May 30, 2002

22. \$24,000 Sofa Among Luxuries Bought By Army And Air Force

By Lisa Hoffman, Scripps Howard News Service

WASHINGTON -- A \$24,000 sofa and armchair. An \$1,800 pillow. And \$45,800 in silver and china. Such accoutrements would cause little surprise if found in the abodes of the wealthy and well-known.

But government auditors discovered these pricey items -- and many more -- not in a mansion but at Air Force and Army bases in Saudi Arabia, the rest of the Persian Gulf, Europe and the Balkans.

In a just-released report, the General Accounting Office informed Congress that its auditors found a number of "seemingly unneeded expenditures" made by the Air Force and Army in 2000 and 2001.

"As much as \$101 million in contingency operations funds were spent on questionable expenditures" -- a small fraction of the estimated \$2.2 billion examined by the investigators, but troubling nonetheless, the report said.

Among those were \$4,600 worth of "white beach sand" for an air base in the Arabian desert and a \$3,400 Sumo wrestling suit for another.

The Army came in for criticism for duplicating purchases of computers and office equipment at its bases in Bosnia to the tune of \$2.3 million.

Rather than using equipment already there or sharing new items, four successive Army units heading for Bosnia bought their own sets of equipment, the GAO said.

That struck the auditors as particularly wasteful, given that the Army has stocked more than 2,000 computers, 865 printers, 91 copiers and "a multitude of other office equipment" in the area. However, Army officials said that differences in missions and training of the various units serving in Bosnia necessitated some of the equipment purchases.

The auditors blamed Pentagon and Army superiors for failing to provide the clear

October 28, 2002 4:00 PM

TO: Gen. Franks
CC: Gen. Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: WMD Info

470

You are going to have to have a team of people ready to get very hard information on WMD, so that it can be made available promptly to the public. It has to be overwhelming.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
102802-32

.....

Please respond by 11 / 05 / 02

28 OCT 02

U17673 / 02

11-L-0559/OSD/12830

C 10/30

TO: Jim Haynes
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: October 11, 2002
SUBJECT: **United Way**

LARRY DI RITE
10/30

Are we really right in giving blessing to the United Way and raising money in the building if in fact they have a record of not managing their funds properly?

080

An alternative would be to have one year where we give it all to the Army-Navy Relief. Set the same goals and give the money to them and not to United Way.

Why don't you talk to Torie and whoever else you think might have an opinion.

Thanks.

Response attached

Larry Di Rite

10/30

DHR/azn
101102.03

Please respond by: 10/27/02

11 OCT 02



GENERAL COUNSEL

GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600
INFO MEMO

October 16, 2002 (4:00pm)

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: William J. Haynes II, General Counsel *W. Haynes*

SECDEF HAS ST
OCT 30 2002

SUBJECT: Question Concerning United Way

- You asked if the Department was right to allow the United Way to raise money or if money could be raised for the military relief societies.
- OPM regulates the Combined Federal Campaign (CFC). Under the OPM regulations, at 5 CFR 103(d), once a campaign has been established, agency heads are required to seek the prior written approval of the Director, OPM, before discontinuing the solicitation of Federal employees.
- Our DoD CFC campaign was established on September 18th when Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz kicked off the campaign. We are in the 3rd week of fundraising, with over \$2 million raised, 92% of which is by payroll deduction. You would have to seek OPM approval if you want to discontinue the campaign.
- OPM contracted with the United Way to manage the CFC in the National Capital area for this year's campaign. There are other areas in DoD, including overseas, for which the United Way is not the manager.
- The Director of the OPM CFC office and the Local Federal Coordination Committee plan to provide oversight and monitor the receipt of money and fiscal controls used by the United Way during this campaign.
- Under the OPM regulations, at 5 CFR 108, employees may not take actions that restrict, or appear to restrict, the free choice of employees. Restricting fundraising to the military relief societies has the appearance of restricting DoD employees' free choice.
- OPM's regulations do not apply to the military relief societies, so they fundraise regularly in the DoD workplace.

OSD

(*)

16 Oct 02

COORDINATION: None

Prepared by Gail Mason (b)(6)





GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
 1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON
 WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600
 INFO MEMO

October 16, 2002 (4:00pm)

GENERAL COUNSEL

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: William J. Haynes II, General Counsel *WJ Haynes*

SECDEF HAS SE

OCT 30 2002

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OSD



160502

COORDINATION: None

Prepared by Gail Mason (b)(6)



C 10/30

TO: Jim Haynes
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: October 11, 2002
SUBJECT: **United Way**

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10/30

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080

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Thanks.

Response attached

Larry Di Rite

10/30

DHR/azn
101102.03

Please respond by: 10/27/02

11 OCT 02

2.8 : snowflake
129

October 15, 2002 10:59 AM 10/30

TO: Jim Roche
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Wasteful Spending

ATTN: DI [unclear]
10/30

400.13

Please take a look at Dov Zakheim's response to your memo. I think he has a good point.

Thanks.

Attach.
10/07/02 OSD(C) memo to SecDef re: Wasteful Spending - Secretary of Air Force Response [U16159/02]

DHR:dh
101502-17

.....

Please respond by 11/01/02

10/28

SECAF RESPONSE
ATTACHED AT RED TAB.

112

15 OCT 02

11-L-0559/OSD/12835

U17750 /02

10/19
400

2002 OCT -8 PM 2:25



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1100 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1100

~~SECDEF HAS SEEN~~

OCT 15 2002

COMPTROLLER

INFO MEMO

October 7, 2002, 7:00 PM

LARRY DI RITA
10/11

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dov S. Zakheim *DZ* OCT 8 2002

SUBJECT: Wasteful Spending - Secretary of Air Force Response

You asked whether I agreed with Secretary Roche's Info Memo of August 15, 2002, pertaining to the General Accounting Office (GAO) report on contingency fund spending (TAB A).

- I commend Secretary Roche on the corrective actions taken by the Air Force to prevent a future recurrence of the situations highlighted by the GAO. The Air Force's actions will lead to better accountability and control.
- Nevertheless, Secretary Roche missed a central point of the GAO report. The Overseas Contingency Operations Transfer Fund (OCOTF) funds are appropriated solely for the purpose of financing warfighting and operational costs of a contingency operation. The Components are not to use OCOTF resources to finance administrative; general support; or Morale, Welfare, and Recreation programs even when these costs are directly related to a specific operation. The Air Force used OCOTF funds to finance support efforts.
- I sent a memorandum to the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Financial Management & Comptroller) on August 29, 2002, clarifying the Department's financial policy regarding the appropriate use of the OCOTF in financing contingency operations. I attach a copy of that memorandum (TAB B). I believe that this policy clarification will ensure the proper stewardship of the taxpayers' money.

COORDINATION: None required.

Attachment:
As stated

Prepared By: John M. Evans, (b)(6)

PL ASSISTANT DI RITA	10/10
SP MA CRADDOCK	C 10/11
MA BUCCI	SR3 11/1
EXECSEC WHITMORE	<i>[Signature]</i>



SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON

SECDEF HAS SEEN

OCT 28 2002

INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dr. James G. Roche, Secretary of the Air Force

J. Roche

OCT 28 2002

SUBJECT: Wasteful Spending - Contingency Funds Expenditures

- As you requested, I have reviewed both the Comptroller's response to my 15 August 2002 memo and his 29 August 2002 memo. The latter document appears to stipulate new guidance on the "use of the Overseas Contingency Operations Transfer Fund (OCOTF) in financing contingency operations," and highlights what is clearly a disagreement with respect to the law.
- Based on our review of the law and other existing DOD guidance, the "quality-of-life" expenditures identified in the audit were consistent with fiscal law and DoD policy on the use of funds in contingency operations (FY00-01). Accordingly, the Air Force used OCOTF funds to finance support efforts, as the Comptroller points out. In its audit, the GAO did not take issue with this and also concluded the expenditures complied with applicable fiscal rules and laws; however, it did cite the need for stronger guidance and oversight - a central point of the report with which we agreed.
- Although the Air Force acted within its legal authority in this matter, we recognize questionable judgments were made. Therefore, we are moving ahead with the steps I outlined earlier to you to ensure the Air Force has the right controls, clear standards, and timely training to properly manage future purchases in contingency circumstances. We believe these actions will lead to better accountability and control, as the Comptroller also points out.
- For these reasons, I believe it is unnecessary for the Department to issue new policy (as suggested by the Comptroller's 29 August memo) that completely prohibits the prudent use of contingency funds for administrative, general support, or quality-of-life items during the early phases of troop deployment and base start-up. These incremental costs are not in the service budgets so they are appropriately financed by contingency funds. (But as a base moves into a "steady-state" phase, we can then migrate any contingency funds into the service baseline O&M accounts.) A new policy that prohibits the use of these funds for reasonable quality-of-life items unfairly strains the service budgets and adversely impacts the morale of troops serving in a contingency environment.

400.13

25 Oct 02

- Going forward, we will work closely with the Comptroller to resolve any remaining issues regarding the clarity of the current law and regulations and to propose any necessary and prudent changes to future DoD policy so that:
 - There are sensible boundaries in place for using contingency funds; and
 - Contingency funds are available to pay for very real and legitimate support costs associated with initial deployments or base “start-ups.”

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachments: NONE



SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON

SECDEF HAS SEEN

OCT 28 2002

INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

J. Roche

OCT 28 2002

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 - Contingency funds are available to pay for very real and legitimate support costs associated with initial deployments or base “start-ups.”

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachments: NONE

newWare
129

October 15, 2002 10:59 AM 10/30

TO: Jim Roche
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Wasteful Spending

ATTN: DI
10/30

400.13

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Attach.
10/07/02 OSD(C) memo to SecDef re: Wasteful Spending - Secretary of Air Force Response [U16159/02]

DHR:dh
101502-17

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Please respond by 11/01/02

10/28
SECAF RESPONSE
ATTACHED AT RED TAB.
JLR

15 OCT 02

11-L-0559/OSD/12841

U17750 /02

10/19
400

2002 OCT -8 PM 2:25



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1100 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1100

~~SECDEF HAS SEEN~~

OCT 15 2002

COMPTROLLER

INFO MEMO

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LARRY DI RITA
10/11

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COORDINATION: None required.

Attachment:
As stated

Prepared By: John M. Evans, (b)(6)

PL ASSISTANT DI RITA	10/10
SP MA CRADDOCK	C 10/11
MA BUCCI	SR3 11/1
EXECSEC WHITMORE	<i>[Signature]</i>

4:26 PM
Gid/23
C/1/23

TO: Gen. Pete Pace
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: September 14, 2002
SUBJECT:

I would like to see what the requirements were for Stryker that it was measured against and what the requirements ought to be post-9/11.

451

Thanks.

SECDEF HAS SEFN

DHR/azn
091402.16

10/22 - OCT 31 2002
SecDef -
CTCS response attached.
It includes the
"key performance parameters"
(KPP) that JROC
considered in February
2000.

Dike
145 Sep 02

Tab A



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

SECDEF HAS SEEN

10 OCT 2002

INFO MEMO

CM-555-02
19 October 2002

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS

RBM 10/19

SUBJECT: Stryker

- In response to your inquiry (TABs A, B and C) concerning Stryker vehicles, the following is provided. Specific questions included: what are the requirements against which the system was measured; what should the requirements be post-9/11; does the 105mm cannon use standard ammunition; will the 120mm mortar fit in the vehicle; is it C-130-transportable and is it required to be moved by helicopter.
- The requirements used to measure Stryker's performance are contained in a Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC)-validated Operational Requirements Document, 22 February 2000. The design parameters are valid both pre- and post-9/11. Capabilities of the system enable the Army's Stryker Brigade Combat Teams (SBCTs) to respond to projected future threats in all operational environments. The various platforms provide flexibility to operate in diverse situations including those presented to US forces post-9/11.
- The 105mm cannon and 120mm mortar use the full range of NATO standard ammunition. The first two SBCTs will carry a 120mm mortar that must be ground mounted to fire. A Soltam 120mm Recoil Mortar System (RMS) was successfully fired in July 2002 and is being retro-fitted into the first two SBCTs vehicles to allow them to fire from the vehicle.
- Strykers fit into C-130s and can be quickly readied for combat after airlift with only minor reconfiguration. Strykers are not required to be moved by helicopters. Each variant of the Stryker has its own restoration time. In all cases, there will be some variability depending on crew proficiency, threat, vehicle type and mission. All Stryker variants provide immediate force protection to soldiers with the integral 14.5mm armor. To date, only the Infantry Carrier Variant (ICV) has been transported by C-130. Current restoration estimates range from 15 minutes for four of the variants to 100 minutes for the Mobile Gun System. Evaluation of ICV Stryker's transportability will occur during an operational evaluation and certification exercise next spring.

457

?

19 Oct 02

- (A)
- Recently, the Army hosted a half-day joint conference with the Air Force to review the Stryker program and specifically C-130 deployability. As a result, a joint memorandum of agreement addressing Stryker deployability on the C-130 is being prepared. This memorandum will be signed by the Army VCSA and either by the CG, Air Mobility Command or the VCSAF. The JROC will review the requirements in September 2003 prior to the next acquisition milestone decision.

COORDINATION: None

Attachments:

As stated U17752 U17753 U17754-02

Prepared By: LtGen James E. Cartwright, USMC; DJ-8, (b)(6)

UNCLASSIFIED
(U)

Stryker



- **JROC approved ORD: 22 Feb 00**
 - **Contains Five Key Performance Parameters (KPPs).**

UNCLASSIFIED
(U)

Key Performance Parameters

System	Operational Logic	Demonstration Status	Status/ Trend
<p>KPP #1 Interoperability</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Interoperability. Stryker must be capable of hosting and effectively integrating existing and planned Army C4ISR Systems. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • To be evaluated during IOT&E. 	
<p>KPP #2 C-130 Deployability</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Stryker must be transportable in a C130 aircraft. Stryker must enter and exit the aircraft capable of immediate combat operations (does not require a full basic load). 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The Stryker ICV is C-130 transportable. Each of the other variants will also be C-130 transportable. Four ICVs successfully transported on C-130 during MC02. Preparing to execute Stryker fly in to AAFB on 16 Oct. Evaluation to occur during operational evaluation & certificate exercise (Spring 2003). 	

Legend:	 On Track	 Improved from last review
	 Not on Track but PM/SSO/RSO Solvable	 No change from last review
	 Not on Track. Need help	 Degraded from last review

Key Performance Parameters (Cont.)

System	Operational Logic	Demonstration Status	Status/ Trend
<p>KPP #3 Load Carrying Capability</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> IAV ICV, when configured as an ICV or ESV, must carry a 9 man squad with individual equipment 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Demonstrated in Bid sample. Demonstrated during MC02. 	
<p>KPP #4 Mobile Gun System Lethality</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> MGS primary armament must defeat a standard infantry bunker and create an opening in a double reinforced concrete wall, through which infantry can pass. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> To be demonstrated during PQT for MGS. Army has accepted two MGSs from the contractor that are currently undergoing contractor testing. 	

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UNCLASSIFIED
(U)

Key Performance Parameters (Cont.)



System	Operational Logic	Demonstration Status	Status/ Trend
<p>KPP #5</p> <p>Howitzer Rounds, Range, Rate Of Fire</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The SP Howitzer will integrate a 155mm cannon system with capabilities equal to or greater than the Lightweight 155 (M777) on a common chassis within the IBCT and be capable of firing all currently fielded and developmental US and NATO standard 155mm munitions and propellants. In addition the system must be able to achieve a range of 30 kilometers (assisted) and achieve a maximum rate of fire of not fewer than five rounds per minute for three minutes in low angle (less than 800 mils elevation) indirect fire. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Mar 00 JROC approved baseline ORD that included all five KPPS, including the Howitzer. Also in Mar 00, the Army decided against pursuing the howitzer initially due to technological infeasibility and inadequate funding support in the FY01 PB. The 6 Apr 00 Request for Proposal (RFP) did not include a requirement for an IAV howitzer. In Nov 00 the DAB reviewed the IAV program and the USD (ATL) signed an acquisition decision memorandum that approved the acquisition program baseline for all IAV variants with the exception of the howitzer. <u>The Army has retained the howitzer as a valid requirement in the baseline ORD, but is fielding a surrogate capability, the M198 towed howitzer.</u> 	<p>NA</p>

Legend:	On Track	Improved from last review
	Not on Track but PM/SSO/RSO Solvable	No change from last review
	Not on Track. Need help	Degraded from last review

01

September 16, 2002 9:12 AM

TO: Gen. Pace
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Stryker

What are the requirements listed for the Stryker? Do they require that it be C-130 portable?

451

Do they require that it be movable on the battlefield by a helo?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
091602-18

.....

1658002

#309

3

October 7, 2002 9:01 AM

TO: Gen. Pace
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Stryker

451

Here is a note from Newt on the Stryker, which you received also. When you get an answer to whether or not it uses standard ammunition, please let me know the answers to these questions.

Thanks.

Attach.
10/06/02 Gingrich e-mail to SecDef re: Stryker 105mm Gun

DHR:dh
100702-16

.....

7045 02

From Newt Gingrich

Page 1 of 1

(b)(6)

CIV, OSD

Copies to Gen. Craddock
Dirita
Dr. Wolfowitz

SECDEF HAS SEEN

From: Thirdwave2@aol.com

Sent: Sunday, October 06, 2002 8:33 AM

Oct 7 2002

To: (b)(6)@osd.pentagon.mil; Larry.DIRita@osd.pentagon.mil; John.Craddock@OSD.Pentagon.mil

Cc: stephen.cambone@OSD.mil; damicorj@js.pentagon.mil; jaymie.duman@osd.pentagon.mil;
giambastiani@jcom.mil; john.keane@hqda.army.mil; William.Troy@us.army.mil;
peter.pace@js.pentagon.mil; bernard.champoux@js.pentagon.mil; john.abizaid@js.pentagon.mil

Subject: Stryker 105mm gun

for secdef, depsecdef
from newt 10/6/02

Stryker 105 mm and mortar firing versions

If it is true the Stryker 105 mm gun version cannot use the standard ammunition and will require new ammunition development then it would make more sense to cancel the program, buy an armored gun system off the shelf (or its equivalent) which can use the current tank killing and other 105mm rounds of which we apparently have \$1 billion in stock. This will save the development program on the gun version and the development costs and procurement costs of the new ammunition.

Similarly if the Stryker cannot be engineered to hold the 120mm mortar we would be better off to get a modernized M-113 mortar version. The difference between 81mm and 120 mm mortar is simply too great to allow soldiers to be deprived of the heavier weapon.

10/7/2002

11-L-0559/OSD/12852²

Tab C



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

SECDEF HAS SEEN

19 Oct 2002

INFO MEMO

CM-555-02
19 October 2002

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS

RBM 10/19

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19 Oct 2002

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4

COORDINATION: None

Attachments:

As stated U17752 U17753 U17754-02

Prepared By: LtGen James E. Cartwright, USMC; DJ-8, (b)(6)

UNCLASSIFIED
(U)

Stryker



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UNCLASSIFIED
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UNCLASSIFIED
(U)

4:26 PM
Gid/23
C/1/23

TO: Gen. Pete Pace
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: September 14, 2002
SUBJECT:

I would like to see what the requirements were for Stryker that it was measured against and what the requirements ought to be post-9/11.

451

Thanks.

SECDEF HAS SEFN

DHR/azn
091402.16

10/22 - OCT 31 2002
SecDef -
CTCS response attached.
It includes the
"key performance Parameters"
(KPP) that JROC
considered in February
2000.

Dike
145 Sep 02

Tab A

September 19, 2002 8:33 AM

10/30

TO: Powell Moore
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: CVN-X Question

Larry Di Rite
10/30

334 OSB


Somebody, I think it was Congresswoman Davis of Virginia asked about the Defense Science Board study on CVN-X and asked when it would be released. I would like to know when it will be released and what is going on.

Please get me a report.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
091902-9

.....
Please respond by 10/04/02



Sec Def -
Response attached
Larry Di Rite
10/30
1959102



LEGISLATIVE
AFFAIRS

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1300

INFO MEMO

SECDEF HAS SEEN

30 30 2002

October 21, 2002 5:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Powell Moore, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Legislative Affairs)

SUBJECT: Rep. Davis request for the Defense Science Board study on CVN-X
Reference Snowflake # 091902-9

Power Moore

- The Defense Science Board study was hand delivered by my staff to Rep. Davis' staff, Mr. Chris Caron, at 1300 on 21 October 2002. Action complete on this subject.

560.1

21 Oct 02

Prepared by CDR Chris Aquilino, OSD/LA, 614-9115

11-L-0559/OSD/12861

U17757 /02



LEGISLATIVE
AFFAIRS

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1300

INFO MEMO

SECDEF HAS SEEN

20 OCT 2002

October 21, 2002 5:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Powell Moore, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Legislative Affairs)

SUBJECT: Rep. Davis request for the Defense Science Board study on CVN-X
Reference Snowflake # 091902-9

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560.1

21 Oct 02

Prepared by CDR Chris Aquilino, OSD/LA, 614-9115

11-L-0559/OSD/12862

U17757 /02

September 19, 2002 8:33 AM

10/30

TO: Powell Moore
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: CVN-X Question

Larry Di Rite
10/30

334 OSB


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091902-9

.....
Please respond by 10/04/02



Sec Def -
Response attached
Larry Di Rite
10/30
1959102

10/30

TO: Gen. Dick Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: October 12, 2002

SUBJECT: **Early Bird Article**

LARRY DI RITE
10/30

Could you look into the highlighted portion of this article from Newhouse.com on spending \$51,000 on cappuccino machines for the war on terror and report back.

Thanks.

400.13

DHR/azn
101202.04

Attach: "The US Doesn't Travel Light in going to War", 10/10/02 *Newhouse.com*

Please respond by: _____ *10/28*

Response Attached

Larry Di Rite
12/30

12 OCT 02

02 OCT 18 7:28 AM

Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD/12864

U17758 /02

Newhouse.com
October 10, 2002

The U.S. Doesn't Travel Light In Going To War

By David Wood, Newhouse News Service

BLOUNT ISLAND, Fla. -- Bound for the Persian Gulf and a probable war with Iraq, the piles and bags and crates of stuff cover 17 acres, all waiting to be loaded on ship, all to help sustain U.S. troops in combat:

Tanks, rockets, machine gun ammo, extra boots, spare radios, bomb cradles, trucks, field rations, surgical dressings and body bags.

Jackhammers, tongue depressors, communion wine and wafers, tire chains for trucks driving in snow. Portapotties, of course.

A radio repair shop built into a large steel container, with drawers full of tools and with plug-in electric lights, air conditioning and telephones.

And a 3,800-foot portable airfield for jet fighters and cargo planes that can be set up anywhere, complete with landing lights, arresting gear, a control tower, firetrucks and tow tractors.

Does anyone go to war like the U.S. military?

Not even remotely. Being the world's unmatched military superpower not only means the United States can boast about its combat punch. It means it can take along pretty much whatever it wants.

Like the sumo wrestling suit (\$3,395), cappuccino machines (\$51,200) and white beach sand (\$4,638) the Air Force recently purchased to support its combat operations against Iraq from air bases in the Persian Gulf region.

When young Americans are sent into harm's way, no one, of course, would deny anything that could help them to prevail, to save lives, to ease what is inherently difficult and risky.

As President Bush said earlier this year, "We're asking a lot of our men and women in uniform and we'll be asking more of them in the future. In return, they deserve every resource, every weapon needed to achieve the final and full victory."

But taking along every resource -- and a few frills and baubles -- carries a price. All this stuff has to be purchased, shipped, sorted, repacked, transported, unloaded, counted, guarded and distributed. Discarded packing material leaves a long trail behind units on the move.

"Why do we take all this stuff? Because we can," said James Jay Carafano, a retired Army artillery officer and historian who teaches at the Naval War College.

The furious activity here -- where the Marine Corps is preparing to load one of 13 giant cargo ships crammed with war materiel that float near the world's bad neighborhoods -- is only part of the picture.

At the end of this month the MV Anderson, a 750-foot-long vessel, will sail for the Persian Gulf to join four sister ships that carry enough stuff to keep a 17,000-man Marine Air Ground Task Force in combat for 30 days.

The ships are designed to offload their cargo near the battlefield as Marines fly in to man the equipment.

The Army has seven such ships pre-positioned near the Persian Gulf.

But in wartime the Pentagon can launch an additional 1,400 ships and 360 heavy-lift cargo planes. If that's not enough, it can draft around 650 planes out of the commercial air fleet to load with soldiers and gear. A standard phrase in military travel orders: "Excess baggage is authorized."

Then there are trucks. Nobody knows how many the military has. In 1990 the Army moved 114,000 of them to the Persian Gulf for Desert Storm, but the Air Force and Marines had their own, and there were all those rentals procured in Saudi Arabia to boot.

Military planners figure it takes 2,000 tons of materiel a day to keep a division -- roughly 20,000 people -- supplied in combat. The math looks like this: Four divisions in Iraq equals 16 million pounds a day, carried in five-ton (10,000-pound) trucks, equals a traffic jam of overloaded vehicles growling over the 400 miles of sand between Kuwait and Baghdad.

Military operations chew up an astounding amount of "consumables" like fuel, water, ammunition, grease, filters, gaskets and spare parts.

An M-1A1 Abrams tank eats \$150 worth of consumables an hour -- not including fuel. A CH-47 Chinook helicopter burns up \$2,000 worth of non-fuel consumables an hour, Air Force planes around \$7,000 per flying hour, according to a Congressional Budget Office analysis.

Other consumables being packed at this port run from massive gas turbine engines that propel Abrams tanks to 746 cases of the infamous field rations, "Meals, Ready to Eat." These are stowed in 20-foot refrigerated steel containers -- not because they need to be refrigerated, but because the huge containers double as morgues to preserve bodies of battlefield casualties, said Marty Lussier, Blount Island's container manager.

Other stuff waiting to be shipped is carefully labeled in the military's irritatingly obsessive nomenclature: "can, water, military," and "siren, hand operated, w/ carrying strap."

Lying around somewhere is 776,146 pounds of ammunition ranging from flares, hand grenades and linked machine gun rounds to 105 mm howitzer shells, stinger missiles and 500-pound bombs.

Explosives get packed in the bottom of the ship. Abrams tanks, Humvees and other wheeled and tracked combat vehicles go in above, along with a 116-bed hospital, spare truck transmissions, cartons of boot laces, firefighting suits with suspenders, concertina razor wire, barbells, finger splints and a motorcycle or two.

On this one ship will be 40,000 separate types of stuff. Vehicles are stowed "three fingers tight" to make room, said Marine Corps Maj. Lyle Layher, operations officer at Blount Island.

"Basically, you got just about everything," said Rick Miller, a retired Marine who oversees packing of medical supplies here.

With good reason, some say.

"It sounds excessive, but the rationale is that you can put people into combat and sustain them and recuperate people and put them back in," said Carafano, a historian and author of several books on World War II.

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Investigators for the General Accounting Office found "billions of dollars at risk of fraud, waste and abuse" from shipments the Air Force made to bases in southwest Asia in fiscal year 2000.

And the stuff the GAO did account for opens an interesting window on the American way of war.

According to a GAO report to Congress in May, the Air Force's needs for its combat forces in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia included such items as a \$2,205 designer coffee table, a \$35,000 golf cart, a \$49,500 bingo console, \$4,896 worth of cowboy hats, \$18,980 worth of decorative rock, a \$1,775 "executive pillow" and a \$14,835 "nostalgic juke box" -- as well as the white beach sand, cappuccino machines and sumo wrestling suit mentioned earlier.

In a statement, the Air Force said the white beach sand was needed to build barriers around ammunition bunkers. The other items, it said, were authorized "in support of troop morale, welfare and recreation activities."



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999
INFO MEMO

CH-567-02
24 October 2002

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SECDEF HAS SEEN

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RBM 10/24*

9 OCT 30 2002

SUBJECT: Early Bird Article

- In response to your question (~~VADMA~~) regarding the article from the Web site Newhouse.com, the following information is provided.
 - The article leads one to believe cappuccino machines are routinely shipped with deploying forces. In reality, these 12 industrial, restaurant-quality machines costing a total of \$37,000 were purchased from November 1999 through May 2000 for use in dining facilities for Air Force deployed units.
 - Responding to the 12 May 2002 GAO report, "Need to Strengthen Guidance and Oversight of Contingency Operations Costs," the Secretary of the Air Force defended these purchases as permissible under applicable fiscal rules and laws, and initiated a review of policies for the use of contingency funds at the semi-permanent deployed locations (██████).
 - The Air Force is taking positive steps to strengthen internal controls, make proper use of appropriated funds and promote prudent use of taxpayer dollars.

400.13

COORDINATION: TAB C

Attachments:
As stated

Prepared By: VADM G. S. Holder, USN; Director, J-4; (b)(6)

21 October



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999
INFO MEMO

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12 OCT 02

02 OCT 16 7:20 AM

Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD/12870

U17758 /02

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October 16, 2002 7:53 AM

TO: Gen. Myers

CC: Dov Zakheim
Steve Cambone

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: PAC-3s

471.99

What is the status of PAC-3s, the latest and best? What do we have, where are they, who is going to want them and are we short?

What is in the budget for them?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
101602-8

.....

Please respond by 3:01:52

16 Oct 02

U17732-102

11-L-0559/OSD/12874

02 Oct 11

Tab A

October 31, 2002 6:57 AM

TO: Tom White
CC: Honorable Paul O'Neill
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: M-1 Tank Facility

451.6

Would you please call Secretary O'Neill and get his views on the M-1 tank facility he visited, and let me know what your reaction is.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
103102-5

31 Oct 02

October 30, 2002 5:32 PM

TO: Honorable George Tenet

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT: Finance Briefing

337

The briefing I received on ^vfinances ^uwas world-class. Those folks seem to be doing an excellent job. Congratulations.

I am delighted you insisted I get the briefing.

DJR:dh
103002-15

30 Oct 02

March 20, 2002 7:12 AM

TO: Gen. Myers
 CC: Paul Wolfowitz
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *[Signature]*
 SUBJECT: Colombia Policy

Colombia

I don't know what is going to happen with respect to U.S.-Colombia policy. It is clear there are different views in both the Congress and in the Executive Branch, which is not surprising. It poses some tough issues.

I wonder if it might make sense for SOUTHCOM and SOCOM to be tasked with establishing a joint working group to think through what we might do in Colombia if we are asked. It seems to me we would have to decide what victory would be, and then think through a plan to achieve what we decide to characterize as victory.

The group might be in contact with folks at CIA, DEA, Treasury and State, and also probably coordinate with Wayne Downing at NSC.

There is a lot of history in defeating insurgencies—in the Philippines from 1898-1902, in Nicaragua with the Marines in the 1920s, during the Greek civil war in the 1940s, in Malaysia in the 1950s and even in some pacification efforts in South Vietnam that worked during the 1960s and 1970s.

20 MAR 02

Certainly, if we end up doing something, it would fit into the nation-building category, which the administration has not favored. On the other hand, it could use the principles of entrepreneurial nation-building that Secretary O'Neill and others are beginning to develop.

The working group might want to talk to DARPA to see what programs are being developed for surveillance, intelligence, etc. that might be useful. They might also want to talk to Cebrowski on network-centric warfare as applied to jungles, urban areas and insurgencies.

I suspect this should be a very small cell that would report back to us in 90 days.

My view is that Colombia is a hard case, but, nonetheless, I think we ought to be seeing what, if anything, might be done.

Please let me know what you think.

Thanks.

DJR:ah
031902-25

.....
Please respond by 03/29/02

EF3081

C 10/15

October 7, 2002 11:50 AM

Larry Di Rita
10/15

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Italian Parliament

SWT

just to one who
policy will
longer.

Please take a look at this note on Martino and the Parliament. Isn't that something someone in your shop should draft a letter from me to Martino about?

Thanks.

Attach.

10/03/02 AFP-ui, story e0683: "Italian Parliament Backs Troops for Afghanistan"

DHR:dh
100702-38

Italy

Please respond by 10/11/02

SECDEF HAS SEEN

10/10/02

~~IS 7000~~ SD
We'll send you a note.

This Italian commitment of troops was a key topic of my meeting with Martino in Rome ten days ago. I conveyed your appreciation for his support.

Harry -
Get him to produce a letter
Fast

7 OCT 02

Doug Feith

SECDEF HAS SEEN

OCT 7 2002

AFP-ui Italy-Afghan-Iraq
Story: e0683

Time: 2002 10/03 16:42 GMT

Ref:

Italian parliament backs troops for Afghanistan

ROME, Oct 3 (AFP) - Italy's parliament on Thursday voted to approve deployment of 1,000 combat troops in Afghanistan to help US units hunt down al-Qaeda forces along the border with Pakistan.

The Chamber of Deputies voted by 266 votes to 151 to approve the government's decision to send the elite troops from Italy's Alpine force in March next year, with 65 abstentions.

The move divided the centre-left Olive Tree opposition.

Its leader Francesco Rutelli voted for deployment, saying it was "the right thing for my country."

However, Greens leader Alfonso Pecoraro Scanio said Rutelli had betrayed the centre-left by voting yes.

The vote was also easily carried in the upper-house senate, but seven left-wing senators abstained.

Defense Minister Antonio Martino told parliament that the deployment was not in any way linked to a possible conflict in Iraq, but was about Italy's ability to live up to its international commitments.

"A war against Iraq is not under discussion here today," said Martino. "Military action is neither imminent nor inevitable."

Washington last month sent an official request for mountain troops to help track al-Qaeda fighters in the mountainous border area near Pakistan.

Italy currently supplies 450 troops as part of the international peacekeeping force in Kabul, as well as a naval frigate and fighter aircraft.

csg/db/gk

AFP

August 5, 2002 7:29 AM

file
8/10/30

00007

TO: Torie Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Cartoon

Larry Di Rita
10/30

Please see if you can get this cartoon.

Thanks.

Attach.
Washington Times political cartoon

DHR:dh
080502-2

.....
Please respond by 10/30/02


10/30
Done - Thanks you note attached

Larry Di Rita
10/30

5 AUG 02

© THE WASHINGTON TIMES
TAPNER '02

LOOSE LIPS SINK SHIPS



Letters

Even a poor lab rat is entitled to some happiness

Christopher J. Heyde's column "Activities in the laboratory" (Opinion) deserves serious attention. Heyde's column is a

Finally, Mr. Heyde's reasonable arguments show how grave a mistake we scientists have made in alienating moderate groups such as Mr. Heyde's, which support animal research in the context of biotechnology.

used for the part and extra panels

November 4, 2002 11:01 AM

TO: Honorable Mitchell Daniels
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Funding

We are going to have to figure out how to fund the war. For '03, we decided to put in a plus \$10B. I don't know what to do this year. Let's talk about it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
110402-10

000.5

4 Nov 02

U17940 / 02

11-L-0559/OSD/12883

C 10/30

October 17, 2002 9:15 AM

TO: Jim Haynes

CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Posse Comitatus

Larry Di Rita
10/30

Do you think we ought to get somebody to take a look at Posse Comitatus seriously, and see if we may need some changes or at least know what kind of changes we would want if it happened? It keeps getting raised on the Hill by liberals, even Feinstein.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
101702-7

.....
Please respond by 11/01/02

*Response attached.
(I agree. Revising Posse Comitatus seems like a ~~good~~ solution in search of a problem).*

Di Rita
Larry Di Rita
10/30

U17942-02

11-L-0559/OSD/12884

November 5, 2002 7:25 AM

TO: ADM Giambastiani

CC: Gen. Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Including Allies

092

How do we make sure that you not only do a good job on transformation for the US and NATO, but in addition we hook in our other friends and allies around the world, like Australia?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
110502-5



Please respond by 11/22/02

5 Nov 02

U17990 / 02

11-L-0559/OSD/12885



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-0000

ACTION MEMO

CM-280-02

18 April 2002

326

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS

RBMY 4/18

SUBJECT: Capabilities in the Guard and Reserve

- The following is submitted in response to your 29 March request (TAB) for information regarding capabilities in the Guard and Reserve. In keeping with the spirit of the long-standing Abrams Doctrine (known today as the "Total Force Policy"), today's Army relies extensively on the Reserve Components (RCs) to accomplish its missions. In doing so, the Army benefits from the peacetime economies of a smaller standing force, while reaping the benefits of engaging America through the mobilization of RC soldiers.
- Army force structure requirements are formally reviewed every 2 years to validate, assign, apportion and resource requisite mission capabilities. Force composition decisions are made to leverage the strengths of each component. Certain functional areas and associated skills sets (information technology, medical, civil affairs, psychological operations) can be easily maintained in the RCs through civilian acquired skills. These types of skill sets are frequently in demand as evidenced by operations in Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan. The Army is currently reviewing the existing active-reserve mix to make determinations as to how best to balance its force.
- Force structure reductions have made the Army increasingly dependent on the RCs to accomplish its missions. The issue of the appropriate active/RC mix should be addressed in the DPG.

① RECOMMENDATION: That the Defense Planning Guidance require the Army to conduct a study to determine how it can execute its missions without mobilizing the Reserve Components. *WARTIME + LARGE SCALE CONTINGENCY*

Approve *DR* Disapprove _____ Other _____

(FOR SEC ARMY)

APR 18 2002

② RECOMMENDATION: That the Army, in conjunction with Army National Guard and United States Army Reserve, provide you with an information briefing on its force composition strategy.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____ Other _____

COORDINATION: None

Enclosure:
As stated

Prepared By: MG Gerald A. Rudisill, Jr., USA; Assistant to the Chairman for National Guard Matters and Reserve Matters; (b)(6)

18APR02



SPECIAL OPERATIONS/
LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-2500

INFO MEMO

USD/P *OW* 05 NOV 2002

I#-02/010426-HA&APL
EF-2222

OCT 30 2002

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Marshall Billingslea, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict *Marshall Billingslea* 10/30/02

SUBJECT: Afghan Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)

- Current numbers:
 - Afghan refugees (people in camps outside Afghanistan) number approximately 1.5 million. The bulk of refugees are in Pakistan and Iran. Approximately 2.0 million refugees have returned home.
 - Afghan IDPs number approximately 700,000. Approximately 630,000 IDPs have returned home.
 - UNHCR has assisted the return of 1.6 million refugees and 230,000 IDPs. The others have returned home on their own.
- Winterization:
 - As winter approaches, there is a concern that inadequate winter shelter will cause a migration to the cities. UNHCR is stockpiling tents, stoves, blankets, plastic sheeting and charcoal to meet emergency needs.
 - UN agencies report progress in pre-positioning food and non-food items in for winter. Some concerns remain regarding the pace of these efforts.
- US Assistance:
 - USAID has provided \$138 million in emergency food assistance. State has provided the UN and non-governmental organizations \$124.5 million in refugee assistance funds for repatriation of refugees and IDPs.

COORDINATION: None

Prepared by: COL Mark Zanin, Stability Operations, (b)(6)

10-31-02 14 U18001-02

11-L-0559/OSD/12887

EF2222

02/010426

July 15, 2002 9:51 AM

file

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Internally Displaced Persons

Here is some material on internally displaced persons and refugees. It is garbage. It is not clear, and it does not have any structure in it. It is not something that can be tracked week-to-week or month-to-month. There is nothing in there we can use to prove that things are calmer in the country, if they are, or to learn if they are calmer.

Please have someone put his head into it and put some order into it.

Thanks.

Attach.

Undated CCJ5 Information Paper re: IDP Movement and Trends between 3 June and 3 July 2002

DHR:dh
071502-18



Please respond by 08/09/02

UNCLASSIFIED

CCJS INFORMATION PAPER

47/10
from Gen
Frank

SUBJECT: Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) Movement and Trends between 3 June to 3 July 2002

SECDEF HAS SEEN

1. **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY.** APPROXIMATELY 170,300 IDPs HAVE LEFT CAMPS DURING THE PERIOD 3 JUN TO 3 JUL 02. AN ESTIMATED 377,120 IDPs REMAIN IN CAMPS. APPROXIMATELY 210 IDP CAMPS HAVE BEEN VACATED AS OF THE DATE OF THIS REPORT. JUL 15 2002

2. **DISCUSSION**

a. Returns:

- Estimated 170,300 IDP returns (to areas of origin) took place between 3 Jun to 3 Jul.
 - UNHCR adjusted spontaneous return figures from previous months to show 146,000 additional returns in this past month's data.
 - 24,300 assisted returns reported by International Organization of Migration (IOM).
- Approximately 377,120 IDPs remain in camps in AFG.

b. Significant events over past month:

- IOM temporarily suspended transportation of IDPs for the second time on 27 May due to funding shortfalls, but resumed the week of 17 June 2002 after it received additional funding.

Impact: IOM appealed for a total of \$74.8M for 2002 but only received approximately \$41M. As a result, IOM is now focusing its efforts to provide transportation from IDP camps in western Afghanistan.
- Approximately 10,500 IDPs from the two IDP camps at Mahkaki and Mile-46 located along the Southwest Iran - AFG border near Zaranj relocated 150KM northeast to a new camp near Delaram just southeast of Farah. The Mahkaki and Mile-46 camps are now closed.

Impact: IOM continues to provide support to these IDPs.
- UNHCR is still working to identify long-term sites in Qandahar Province for up to 50K IDPs currently residing in overcrowded camps at Spin Boldak and Chaman along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. Unfortunately, UNHCR reported that a recent mission to survey sites in Qandahar was postponed due to safety concerns. Another UNHCR mission is planned to occur next week.

Impact: IDPs are living in overcrowded and

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11-L-0559/OSD/12889

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unsanitary conditions; movement into longer-term camp sites would be expected to minimize disease and other negative effects from overcrowded conditions.

APPROVED BY: _____

C. A. D'Angelo
COL, USA
Chief, J5-CMO,

PREPARED BY: _____


M. W. MARTIN
MAJ, USA
CCJ5-CMO, 7-2207
03 July 02

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11-L-0559/OSD/12890

As of 3 JUL

IDP Movement Trends



October 28, 2002 8:21 AM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
Dov Zakheim
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Funding for War

000.5

We need to figure out how we are going to fund the war in the next year.

Are the funds for the war specifically in the budget? Are the things we already know we are going to be spending in there? We certainly can't try to do that plus \$10 billion again, because it won't work.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
102802-17

.....

Please respond by 11/08/02

2800T02

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

February 21, 2002 10:53 AM

2002 NOV -7 PM 2:59

Done 2/25

TO: Gen. Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Haiti

HAITI

Do we still have any U.S. troops in Haiti? I was told over the weekend that we do, and I thought we didn't.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
022102-15

.....

Please respond by 02/26/02

21 FEB 02

U18091¹⁰⁰/02

11-L-0559/OSD/12893



INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY
AFFAIRS

UNCLASSIFIED
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
2400 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2400

INFO MEMO

OCT 29 2002
Din

USDP *Amr fn*

06 NOV 2002

EF-3096
I-02/014945

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs
(Peter W. Rodman, (b)(6) *JWR* 06 NOV 2002)

SUBJECT: Guidelines When Considering Committing U.S. Forces

- You requested a paper showing how your guidelines apply to possible military engagement in Iraq (next under).
- The paper at Tab A states your guidelines (updated Oct 02) and how they apply to Iraq.

Attachments: As stated

Prepared by: Col. Kevin Jones, OSD/SP/NESA, (b)(6)

DASD *WJ* 29 OCT 2002

PDRD *anf*

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11-L-0559/OSD/12894

U18101 /02

NESA

EF3096

Office

FOR ACTION 02/014945

September 30, 2002 1:24 PM

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld TR
SUBJECT: Guidelines

Here are my guidelines. Will you or somebody please prepare a paper that shows my guidelines and then answers the question for Iraq—that says, “Here is the answer to each of the guidelines with respect to the possible involvements and military engagement in Iraq.”

Let’s do the same for the global war on terrorism. Needless to say, some of the questions will be the same.

Thanks.

Attach. ~~September 2002~~ ^{MARCH 2001} SecDef “Guidelines To Be Weighed When Considering Committing U.S. Forces”

DHR:dh
093002-56

.....
Please respond by 10/25/02

ISA - Suspense 10/21/02

Guidelines to Be Weighed When Considering Committing U.S. Forces

Is the proposed action truly necessary?

- ***A Good Reason:*** If U.S. lives are going to be put at risk, whatever is to be done must be in the U.S. national interest. If people could be killed, the U.S. must have a darn good reason.
- ***Diplomacy:*** All instruments of national power should be engaged before resorting to force, and they should stay involved once force is employed.
- ***Legal Basis:*** In fashioning a clear statement of the legal underpinning for the action and the political basis for the decision, avoid arguments of convenience. They may be useful at the outset to gain support, but they will be deadly later.

Is the proposed action achievable?

- ***Achievable:*** When the U.S. commits force, the task should be achievable—at acceptable risk. It must be something the U.S. is capable of accomplishing. We need to understand our limitations. The record is clear; there are some things the U.S. simply cannot accomplish.
- ***Clear Goals:*** To the extent possible, there should be clear, well considered and well understood goals as to the purpose of the engagement and what would constitute success, so we can know when we have achieved our goals and can honestly exit or turn the task over to others.
- ***Command Structure:*** The command structure should be clear, not complex and one the U.S. can accept—not a collective command structure where key decisions are made by a committee. If the U.S. needs or prefers a coalition to achieve its goals, which it most often will, we should have a clear understanding with coalition partners that they will do whatever might be needed to achieve the agreed goals. We must avoid trying so hard to persuade others to join a coalition that we compromise on our goals or jeopardize the command structure. The mission should determine the coalition; the coalition should not determine the mission.

Is it worth it?

- ***Lives at Risk:*** If an engagement is worth doing, the U.S. and coalition partners should be willing to put lives at risk.
- ***Resources:*** The military capabilities needed to achieve the agreed goals must be available and not committed or subject to call elsewhere halfway through the engagement. The U.S. cannot do everything everywhere at once.

- **Public Support:** If public support is weak at the outset, U.S. leadership must be willing to invest the political capital to marshal support to sustain the effort for whatever period of time is required. If there is a risk of casualties, that should be acknowledged at the outset rather than allowing the public to believe the engagement can be done antiseptically, on the cheap, with zero casualties.
- **Impact Elsewhere:** Before committing to an engagement, consider the implications of the decision for the U.S. in other parts of the world—if we prevail, if we fail, or if we decide not to act. U.S. actions or inactions in one region are read around the world and contribute favorably or unfavorably to the deterrent and U.S. influence. We need to think through the kind of precedent a proposed action, or inaction, would establish.

If there is to be action--

- **Act Early:** If it is worth doing, U.S. leadership should be willing to make a judgment as to when diplomacy has failed and act forcefully, early, during the pre-crisis period, to alter the behavior of others and to try to prevent the conflict. If that fails, be willing and prepared to act decisively to use whatever force is necessary to prevail.
- **Unrestricted Options:** In working to fashion a coalition or trying to persuade Congress or the public to support an action, the National Command Authorities must not dumb down what is needed by promising not to do things—not to use ground forces, not to bomb below 20,000 feet, not to risk U.S. lives, not to permit collateral damage, not to bomb during Ramadan, etc. That simplifies the task for the enemy and makes the U.S. task more difficult. Political leadership should not set arbitrary deadlines as to when the U.S. will disengage, or the enemy can simply wait us out.

Finally--

- **Honesty:** U.S. leadership must be brutally honest with itself, the Congress, the public and coalition partners, we must not make the task sound even marginally easier or less costly than it could become. Preserving U.S. credibility requires that we promise less, or no more, than we can deliver. It is a fact that it is a great deal easier to get into something than it is to get out of it!

Note:

Guidelines, Not Rules: Finally, while these guidelines are worth considering, they should not be considered rules or a simple formula to inhibit the U.S. from acting in our national interest. Rather, they are offered as a checklist to assure that when the U.S. does engage, it does so with a full appreciation of our responsibilities, the risks, and the opportunities. The future promises to offer a variety of possible engagements. The value of this checklist will depend on the manner in which it is applied.

Decisions on engagement always will be based on less than perfect information, often under extreme pressure of time. These guidelines will be most helpful not in providing answers, but rather in helping to frame and organize available information.

Donald Rumsfeld

Secretary of Defense Guidelines When Considering Committing U.S. Forces in Iraq

Following are Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld's guidelines for assessing whether or not the United States should use military in any given instance. Possible military action in Iraq is assessed in the light of each of the guideline questions.

Is a proposed action truly necessary?

- ***A Good Reason:*** If U.S. lives are going to be put at risk, whatever is proposed to be done must be in the U.S. national interest. If people could be killed, ours or others, the U.S. must have a darn good reason.
- ***Diplomacy:*** All instruments of national power should be engaged before, during and after any possible use of force. The interaction between effective diplomacy and the potential use or use of force can be a powerful influence.
 -
- ***Basis for the Action:*** In fashioning a clear statement of the underpinning for the action, avoid arguments of convenience. They can be useful at the outset to gain support, but they will be deadly later. Just as the risks of taking action must be carefully considered, so too the risk of inaction needs to be weighed.

As applied to Iraq:

- Iraq's pursuit of weapons of mass destruction and its support for terrorism threaten the security of the United States.
- The possibility that Iraq will use WMD against us, either directly or via terrorists, makes it imperative that the USG take action to avert this threat. Iraq may believe that an attack conducted by terrorists would not be attributed to itself – and hence such an attack may not be deterrable.
- Inaction, as the President has stated, is not an option – if Iraq were to acquire nuclear weapons, it would feel emboldened to engage in aggression against its neighbors, confident that regional states would be deterred from cooperating in any international effort to reverse that aggression.
- The USG is using all instruments of national power in relation to Iraq. This is evidenced by the President's address to the United Nations and the attempt to obtain an acceptable UN Security Council resolution on inspections.
- U.S. military action against Iraq would be based on our right of self-defense, as recognized in article 51 of the UN Charter.

Is the proposed action achievable?

- **Achievable:** When the U.S. commits force, the task should be achievable—at acceptable risk. It must be something the U.S. is capable of accomplishing. We need to understand our limitations. The record is clear; there are some things the U.S. simply cannot accomplish.
- **Clear Goals:** To the extent possible, there should be clear, well-considered and well-understood goals as to the purpose of the engagement and what would constitute success, so we can know when we have achieved our goals. To those who would change what is falls the responsibility of helping provide something better. It is important to understand that responsibility and accept it.
- **Command Structure:** The command structure should be clear, not complex—not a collective command structure where a committee makes decisions. If the U.S. needs or prefers a coalition to achieve its goals, which it most often will, have a clear understanding with coalition partners that they will do what might be needed to achieve the agreed goals. Avoid trying so hard to persuade others to join a coalition that it compromises our goals or jeopardizes the command structure. Generally, the mission will determine the coalition.

As applied to Iraq:

- The goals are achievable. The Iraqi military is much weaker than it was during the Gulf War, while the U.S. armed forces have made tremendous technological progress since then. In addition, the current Iraqi regime is a brutal tyranny, whose support base is extremely narrow – under assault, the regime should provide quite fragile.
- Clearly stated goals:
 - Disarm the Iraqi regime.
 - End Iraq's sponsorship of terrorism around the globe.
 - End Iraqi regime's brutalization of their own citizens.
 - End Iraq's threatening of neighbors and violation of treaties.
 - End oppression of Iraq's citizens.
 - Aid the rebuilding of Iraq's economy and create institutions of liberty in a unified Iraq.
- The command structure is forming as the coalition partners come on-board for this operation. U.S. CENTCOM will retain effective command and control of whatever coalition emerges, just as it has done in Afghanistan.

Is it worth it?

- **Lives at Risk:** If an engagement is worth doing, the U.S. and coalition partners should recognize that lives will be put at risk.

- **Resources:** The military capabilities needed to achieve the agreed goals must be available and not committed or subject to call elsewhere halfway through the engagement. Even with a broad coalition, the U.S. cannot do everything everywhere at once.
- **Public Support:** If public support is weak at the outset, U.S. leadership must be willing to invest the political capital to marshal support to sustain the effort for whatever period of time may be required. If there is a risk of casualties, that fact should be acknowledged at the outset, rather than allowing the public to believe an engagement can be executed antiseptically, on the cheap, with few casualties.
- **Impact Elsewhere:** Before committing to an engagement, consider the implications of the decision for the U.S. in other parts of the world—if we prevail, if we fail, or if we decide not to act. U.S. actions or inactions in one region are read around the world and contribute favorably or unfavorably to the U.S. deterrent and influence. Think through the precedent that a proposed action, or inaction, would establish.

As applied to Iraq:

- The Administration has made clear that U.S. and coalition lives will be put at risk. As the President stated, “there is no easy or risk-free course of action.”
- A careful review of overall U.S. force posture has concluded that the U.S. armed forces can conduct an Iraq operation while still meeting other requirements on a global basis.
- The President has taken the case to the American citizens through the Congressional hearings and vote. By passing the resolution, Congress has spoken for the people.
- Regime change in Iraq will eliminate an important source of support for international terrorism. In addition, it will open up the possibility of democratic reform in a key country of the Middle East. These will be very positive implications of success in Iraq.
- On the other hand, failure to act in Iraq will damage U.S. credibility worldwide, given the President’s statements on the necessity of regime change. Inaction will lead to the eventual abandonment of sanctions by the UN, allowing Iraq to accelerate its WMD programs.

If there is to be action—

- **Act Early:** If it is worth doing, U.S. leadership should make a judgment as to when diplomacy has failed and act forcefully, early, during the pre-crisis period, to try to alter the behavior of others and to prevent the conflict. If that fails, be willing and prepared to act decisively to use whatever force is necessary to prevail, plus some.

- ***Unrestricted Options:*** In working to fashion a coalition or trying to persuade Congress, the public, the UN or other countries to support an action, American Leaders should not dumb down what is needed by promising not to do things (i.e., not to use ground troops, not to bomb below 15,000 feet, not to risk lives, not to permit collateral damage, etc.). That may simplify the task for the enemy and make the task more difficult. Leadership should not set arbitrary deadlines as to when the U.S. will disengage, or the enemy can simply wait us out.

As applied to Iraq:

- The current effort at the United Nations to obtain an acceptable resolution on inspections represents a final attempt to use diplomacy to avert the necessity of force. If it fails, we should be willing to use decisive force quickly.
- American Leaders are not setting arbitrary deadlines or restrictions on the use of any military force asset in reference to possible military action in Iraq.

Finally—

- ***Honesty:*** U.S. leadership must be brutally honest with itself, the Congress, the public and coalition partners. Do not make the effort sound even marginally easier or less costly than it could become. Preserving U.S. credibility requires that we promise less, or no more, than we are sure we can deliver. It is a great deal easier to get into something than it is to get out of it!

As applied to Iraq:

- The Bush Administration has publicly stated the policy toward Iraq through Congressional hearings, press release, press conferences, news talk shows, and national speeches. There has been no effort to downplay the magnitude of the task.
- Administration spokesmen have honestly confronted the possibility that Iraq will resort to use of WMD in case of U.S. military action against it.
- The State Department is in communication with potential coalition partners daily.

Note:

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Decisions on military engagements always will be based on less than perfect information, often under extreme pressure of time. These guidelines can be helpful not in providing specific answers, but rather in helping to frame and organize available information.

NESA

EF3096

Office

FOR ACTION 02/014945

September 30, 2002 1:24 PM

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld TR
SUBJECT: Guidelines

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Iraq

Let’s do the same for the global war on terrorism. Needless to say, some of the questions will be the same.

Thanks.

Attach. ~~March 2001~~
~~September 2002~~ SecDef “Guidelines To Be Weighed When Considering Committing U.S. Forces”

DHR:dh
093002-56

.....
Please respond by 10/25/02

ISA - Suspense 10/21/02

30 Sept 02

Guidelines to Be Weighed When Considering Committing U.S. Forces

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- **Unrestricted Options:** In working to fashion a coalition or trying to persuade Congress or the public to support an action, the National Command Authorities must not dumb down what is needed by promising not to do things—not to use ground forces, not to bomb below 20,000 feet, not to risk U.S. lives, not to permit collateral damage, not to bomb during Ramadan, etc. That simplifies the task for the enemy and makes the U.S. task more difficult. Political leadership should not set arbitrary deadlines as to when the U.S. will disengage, or the enemy can simply wait us out.

Finally--

- **Honesty:** U.S. leadership must be brutally honest with itself, the Congress, the public and coalition partners, we must not make the task sound even marginally easier or less costly than it could become. Preserving U.S. credibility requires that we promise less, or no more, than we can deliver. It is a fact that it is a great deal easier to get into something than it is to get out of it!

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Donald Rumsfeld



THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-4000



INFO MEMO

November 7, 2002 – 5:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: DAVID S. C. CHU, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(PERSONNEL AND READINESS) *David S. C. Chu / 11/7/02*

SUBJECT: Ordering the National Guard to Federal Active Duty

- After the first briefing by the Joint Staff on reserve mobilization, Dr. Cambone asked if National Guard mobilization by state governors could preclude federal use. The short answer is, no.
- Involuntary mobilization of National Guard members has precedence over state active duty or any other form of military duty.
- Under the involuntary order provisions (10 USC 12301(a), 12302, and 12304), consent of the governor is not required.
- Voluntary orders to active duty 10 USC 12301(d), or involuntary order to active duty for up to 15 days under 10 USC 12301(b), require the consent of the governor. But these provisions are not at issue in the present circumstances.

COORDINATION: OGC (attached)

Attachment: As stated

Prepared by: (b)(6)

cc: Dr. Cambone



Coordination Page

	<u>Name</u>	<u>Date</u>
Department of Defense General Counsel	Mr. James Schwenk Associate Deputy General Counsel	October 17, 2002

H 260
6/26
ACTION

June 25, 2002 7:51 AM

TO: Gen. Pace
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Siege Operations

Please take a look at this note from Newt Gingrich on mortars and howitzers and let me know what you think about it.

Thanks.

Attach.
03/10/02 Gingrich e-mail to SecDef re: Siege Operations

DHR:dh
062502-13

.....

Please respond by 08/02/02

DLH

25 June 02

U18116 02 of

SECDEF HAS SEEN

(b)(6)

CIV, OSD

JUN 24 2002

From: Thirdwave2@aol.com
Sent: Sunday, March 10, 2002 1:14 PM
To: (b)(6)@osd.pentagon.mil; Ed.Giambastiani@osd.pentagon.mil;
Cc: bluti@mail.policy.osd.mil
Subject: Fwd: Some quick thoughts on recent events

for secdef, depsecdef
from newt

I am attaching a note from MacGregor which makes the case in a siege operation you want 120 mm mortars and 155 howitzers to suppress the 82mm mortars which seem to be doing the most damage.

both are available from europe or campbell and in small quantities would have made a big difference in a siege operation (which is what we are running in the mountains).

If they are not there now you might ask why they have not been shipped in.

As I understand it for accuracy and speed the ground based systems are more reliable in suppressing enemy fire than airpower.

(b)(6)

CIV, OSD

From:

(b)(6)

Sent: Wednesday, March 06, 2002 8:17 AM

To: Thirdwave2@aol.com

Subject: Some quick thoughts on recent

Sir, a picture is slowly emerging from fragmentary reports provided from friends in the field. As suspected, our troops in Afghanistan went in with no counterfire radar, no artillery or mortars. The few AH64s employed (4?) were engaged with RPGs as in Somalia. For reasons that are unclear, our troops were deposited on a hot LZ that intelligence presumably missed. Perhaps, there was an assumption that air force fires would be good enough to suppress/neutralize these fleeting, mobile targets that included numbers of 82mm mortar systems. Sadly, the 82mm mortars seemed to have killed most of our Troops. Mortars also destroyed the brigade tactical operations center. If you can, you should ask the DEPSECDEF for permission to read the CENTCOM sitreps. Only then will you be able to determine the accuracy of any of these reports, but from the looks it seems to fit the pattern of "America's First Battles."

When you read these reports, it is important to keep in mind that this operation is different in character from earlier encounters. In many ways, it is a form of siege warfare or similar to attacking a static target area like a village or city. In siege warfare, time is on the side of the attacker.

In this setting, the enemy numbering 8-900 was static in the mountain side. This means that the first action involves sealing off the area by blocking all the potential escape routes on the ground. Ideally, some number of armored vehicles with heavy fire power should be used at critical points for this purpose, but there do not appear to be any available. Second, at least a battery of 8 guns (in the 101st towed 155mms) should be emplaced at a location from which it can engage the enemy fairly quickly. A firefinder radar designed to quickly identify any enemy indirect fire capability should be nearby to provide coordinates for enemy systems. In addition, high angle mortar fire from 120s or 81mm mortars with white phosphorous and HE need to be on hand to both suppress and mark hard-to-find targets, as well as join the counterbattery fight. Third, AH64Ds (Longbows) can sit some distance from the target area and still launch accurate rockets and hellfires on command. Laser designators for the hellfires can be employed. (If we had TAIFUNS, we would put two in the air over the enemy's positions to instantly attack target groups of enemy as they are identified.) Having positioned these assets in advance, then concentrations of our infantry would be flown to secure areas from which the supported infantry can begin moving to the attack. This is not retrospective analysis. These are standard tactics that are well known and presumably still taught in the Army's school system.

This approach will not guarantee that none of our troops is killed or wounded, but counterbattery radars and pre-positioned guns and mortars are much more responsive in this environment of fleeting targets than an ATO. Remember the slide on the post-Cold War target set in the airborne reorganization briefing? The point of the slide is to show that ground forces, if properly organized, can discover and destroy these types of targets much more efficiently and effectively than air power alone.

I am attending a meeting near Tyson's Corner until 1100, then I will be in the office in Crystal City. V.R. Doug Macgregor

3/11/2002

11-L-0559/OSD/12909

(b)(6) CIV, OSD

From: Thirdwave2@aol.com

Sent: Sunday, March 10, 2002 1:23 PM

To: (b)(6)@osd.pentagon.mil; Ed.Giambastiani@osd.pentagon.mil;

Subject: predator and the current fight

for secdef and depsecdef
from newt

The more I think about the recent fights the more I wonder if predator and similar assets were used to prepare for entry and to monitor fights, for example, was a predator used over the zone the troops were put into and was it used to monitor the fight as it evolved
mountains should not be an asset to our opponents if we can get situational awareness on a realtime basis because with the right assets there are no over the hill places to hide
newt

#249

11:32 AM

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
 DATE: June 8, 2002
 SUBJECT:

Let's find out why CIA is taking those folks out of Ralston's area because we are going to need them for PIFWC and we are giving CIA a lot of people. They can't keep pulling people out.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
060802.30

Please respond by: _____

6/18

FRANCE

8 June

U18117 02 #

March 21, 2002 7:38 AM

TO: Gen. Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Fort Drum Incident

323.3 Army

I do want to know why in the world in New York at Fort Drum if a round falls short, it would strike a mess facility. Why in the world would people be firing over a mess facility?

*Sec. Rumsfeld,
My Army friends say
firing over friendly position
is routine/standard operating
procedure. *VRDich**

Thanks.

Attach.
Incident Note

DHR:dh
032102-1

Please respond by 13/21/02

21 Mar 02

U18118 02

UNCLASSIFIED

20 MAR ARMY ARTILLERY MISHAP AT FT
DRUM, NY (UPDATE #2)

- *Issue*
 - At 0700 EST, 2-15th FA BN, 10th MTN DIV, fired two 105mm rds that impacted 1300 meters short of intended impact area striking the field mess facility of 110th MI BN, 10th MTN DIV at FT Drum, NY
 - Total of 15 soldiers were wounded, 2 have died
 - 4 soldiers remain listed as "seriously ill"
 - 7 soldiers are in stable condition
 - 2 soldiers were treated as outpatients
 - One of the 14 wounded suffered a traumatic amputation of the left thumb
 - Some wounded were evacuated to Good Samaritan Hospital outside of Ft Drum
 - Next of Kin notification in progress
- *Comment* - National Media attention has occurred

583
3/21
Y 3/21
SECDEF HAS SEEN
MAR 21 2002

UPDATE

UNCLASSIFIED

11-L-0559/OSD/12913

213
3/20

March 19, 2002 7:17 AM

Done
4/10

TO: Gen. Pace
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Gen. Myers
Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Requirements System

334

As Chairman of JROC, please think through what we all need to do, individually or collectively, to get the requirements system fixed.

It is pretty clear it is broken, and it is so powerful and inexorable that it invariably continues to require things that ought not to be required, and does not require things that need to be required.

Please screw your head into that, and let's have four or five of us meet and talk about it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
031902-1

.....

Please respond by 04/12/02

19 March 02

U18119 02

#215
3120

March 19, 2002 2:09 PM

TO: Gen. Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Comments by Gen. Kernan

I think you probably ought to talk to Gen. Kernan about saying that the troops are tired. That bothers me.

Please let me know what he says.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
031902-30



Please respond by 03/29/02

322

19 Mar 02

U18120 02

#214

March 19, 2002 2:08 PM

TO: Gen. Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: CENTCOM

Where do we stand on the Franks' headquarters move and all of those proposals he had? It seemed to just dribble away.

I said "yes" on some and "come back to me" on the others, and no one ever came back.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
031902-29



Please respond by 03/29/02

CENTCOM

19 Mar 02

U18121 02

February 28, 2002 8:55 AM

ANSWERED IN
SAP BRIEF - NO
PACKAGE 200005
5/18

TO: Gen. Myers
CC: Doug Feith
Gen. Pace
Gen. Franks
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: MOA

092.2

Who has the action on the MOA?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
022802-2

.....

Please respond by _____

18 FEB 02

U18122 02

4:27 PM

INFO
3/5
1400

TO: Gen. Pete Pace
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR
DATE: March 4, 2002
SUBJECT: Newt Gingrich

You might want to sit down with Newt Gingrich some time. He's worth talking to.

Thanks.

000.71

DHR/azn
030402.16

Please respond by: _____

Ym or 02

U18123 02

11-L-0559/OSD/12918

March 14, 2002 11:49 AM

TO: Gen. Myers
 CC: Larry Di Rita
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
 SUBJECT: Location of Northern Command

*BRIEF
3/22*

NORTH COM

It is becoming increasingly clear that some Members of Congress and political figures in states are maneuvering to get the new Northern Command in their areas.

We need to get going, find out the right place for it and get it announced fast, before the pressure builds.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
031402-20

.....

Please respond by 03/29/02

18 Mar 02

U18124 02

March 18, 2002 12:40 PM

TO: Gen. Myers
Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Pacific Command

Done 3/22
AT Roundtable

PACOM

Please take a look at this memo from Senator Inouye, and let's discuss it at a roundtable.

Thanks.

Attach.
03/07/02 Inouye ltr to CNO re: Pacific Command

DHR:dh
031802-39

.....

Please respond by 03/29/02

18 MAR 02

SECDEF - 3/8

CNO MADE A GOOD
GO ON THE WEST
COAST FORCES ISSUE

IPPI
LVANIA
TEXICO
ISSGURN
UCKY
VA
LAMA
SHRE
ELL, COLORADO
TEXAS

United States Senate
COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6025
www.senate.gov/appropriations

NOO
NOOA
NOOAA
DIST:

3/8

WITH SENATOR
INOUYE, HOWEVER,
IT'S A NO GO.

March 7, 2002

TO OFF HAS SEEN

MAR 8 2002

DIRTA
Chief of Naval Operations
2000 Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20350-2000

Dear Admiral Clark:

I want to thank you for taking the time to explain your vision for the Navy and your reasons for wanting to make certain changes as we discussed. I have used the last 24 hours to reflect upon your views and wanted to let you know that while I support your intent, I cannot agree with your recommendation to shift control of naval forces and activities on the West Coast from the Pacific Fleet to another entity.

It is my view that the Pacific Command has been the cornerstone on which our foreign policy with Asia has rested. For the past thirty years, our nation has been at peace in the Pacific. I believe most of the credit for this goes to Pacom, and, in great measure, to our maritime forces which have been the underpinning of the Pacific Command. Our peacetime engagement activities and our unwavering commitment to strong military presence in the region has deterred all adversaries and allowed us to strengthen our relations with old and new allies.


When word of the proposed changes in the Unified Command Plan and the Navy's actions began to be made public, I was immediately visited by key representatives of one of our closest allies in the region. They were quite concerned that these changes would be seen as a pulling back from our commitment to the region. They argued that it would be extremely destabilizing in Asia. I share that view, and believe that any change in the forces assigned to the Pacific Command would be viewed as a lessening of our resolve. I do not think we can afford for this to happen.

Last year, you and I discussed your desire to create super type commanders for the Navy warfare communities. You made a strong case that this would allow you to get more consistent training standards and improve readiness across the Navy's fleets. With your assurance that this would not involve a diminishing of the role that the Pacific Fleet commander played in either resource allocation or fleet readiness, I agreed to support your recommendation.

Let me be clear that I remain committed to your goal of ensuring consistent training and readiness standards for the Navy. You have my assurance that I will support your efforts to achieve these goals. However, I believe this can be accomplished without shifting the control of forces from the Pacific Fleet to another entity.

I sincerely appreciate your willingness to discuss this matter with me and to accede to my recommendation. I have every confidence that you have the best interest of the Navy and the nation in mind, and I hope you understand that I do as well. If there is anything I can do to support your goal of ensuring that the Navy is trained and equipped in a fair and consistent manner please do not hesitate to ask.

Sincerely,



Daniel K. Inouye
Chairman
Committee on Appropriations
Subcommittee on Defense

cc The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld

3/8

SECDEF -

Y 3/8

Here is a potential response that may allow us to just get on with it

D. Ritz

Dear Senator:

Thank you for your recent letter regarding our proposed changes to the Unified Command Plan.

As you know, we share a goal of protecting our important security interests in the Pacific region. Our proposed changes to the Unified Command Plan seek both to support that commitment and strengthen our organizational approach to defense in light of our new strategy and the dangerous challenges we face.

With regard to your specific concerns, let me assure you of our intention to continue to assign Alaska-based forces to U.S. Pacific Command as well as to associate the Alaska NORAD region to any successor to NORAD.

As you know from our discussions, the assignment of West Coast forces is not specifically addressed in the Unified Command Plan. We will ~~reevaluate our position in light of~~ continue to work with you to address your concerns ~~and will continue to consult with you~~ on this matter as we move ahead with the Unified Command Plan.

Again, let me thank you for your support on these important changes to the Unified Command Plan.

#196

February 27, 2002 1:53 PM

TO: Gen. Pace

CC: Doug Feith
Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Georgia

Done 3/1

Georgia

Please pull together some talking points for me on what we are doing in Georgia. I have agreed to call MoD Ivanov and walk him through it.

Larry, please set up a phone appointment for me to talk to Ivanov sometime this week.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
022702-17

.....

Please respond by 03/01/02

27 Feb 02

U18126 02



THE VICE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

INFO MEMO

MAR 2 2011

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Peter Pace, VCJCS *J.P.P. 11/16*

SUBJECT: Talking Points for Georgia Train and Equip Program

- For your information (TAB A), attached talking points (TAB B) are provided should you call Russian Minister of Defense Ivanov to discuss Train and Equip Program in Georgia.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared By: LTG George Casey, USA; Director, J-5 (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/12925

28 February 2002

TALKING PAPER

Subject: SECDEF Phone Call with Russian Minister of Defense (MoD) Ivanov on Georgia Train and Equip Program

Purpose: Provide talking points for planned SECDEF phone call to Russian MoD Ivanov

Talking Points:

- (U) I'm calling to inform you of where we stand on working with the Georgian Ministry of Defense to increase their ability to conduct effective counterterrorism operations.
- (U) As we have discussed with members of your government, the United States is committed to Georgia's sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity.
- (U) We understand your concern regarding terrorists in the Pankisi Gorge and believe combating terrorism and organized crime on Georgian territory is in both our interests.
- (U) We are committed to assisting the Georgians to develop a credible capability to address internal security problems themselves resulting from terrorist activity and organized crime.
- (U) Our proposed Train & Equip will not be a new program; rather, it will be a continuation of our military-to-military cooperation with Georgia. Train & Equip will involve short-term training conducted by a limited number of U.S. personnel.
- (U) Although the plans are not finalized, We are discussing with the Georgian government a proposal to train and equip several select units of the Georgian MOD forces to better control their territory and borders.
- (U) We want to avoid any misunderstandings on this issue. We are prepared to discuss the issue further during our upcoming meeting in March after the Georgians and we have reached agreement on a final plan.
- (U) We do not intend to establish a long term military presence in Georgia.

*NATO
12-01-02
Pec*

TAB B

11-L-0559/OSD/12926

~~SECRET~~
INFO
2/28
/200

February 25, 2002 10:49 AM

TO: Gen. Pace
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: GTMO Cells

I am certainly cool to the idea of doubling up two to a cell in GTMO.

Thanks.

DHR.dh
022502-21

.....

Please respond by 03/01/02

U18127 02

11-L-0559/OSD/12927

February 25, 2002 12:38 PM

Dave 3/8

TO: Gen. Pace
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Ceramic Plates

This article talks about some ceramic plates that seem to be in short supply. Do you know anything about that? Please let me know.

420

Thanks.

Attach.
03/04/02 Naylor, "Not So Bulletproof" *Army Times*

DHR:dh
022502-31

.....
Please respond by 03/15/02

25 Feb 02

U18128 02



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-0999

INFO MEMO

CM-216-02
7 March 2002

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RBM 3/7*

SUBJECT: Ceramic Plates

- For your information (TAB) concerning the Army Times article, "Not So Bulletproof," which highlights the apparent short supply of ceramic body armor plates.
- Requirements
 - Two ceramic plates (1 set) are required for each outer tactical vest (OTV). The OTV alone provides protection from fragmentation and 9-mm rounds. The addition of ceramic plates increases protection up to 7.62-mm machine gun rounds.
 - The Army fielding plan requires 75,914 ceramic plate sets by the 4th quarter FY03.
 - Army fielding issues one set per every three vests based on Army analysis of likely threats. Units may request additional sets as operational needs dictate. The ground commander ultimately determines which soldiers will wear the vest with the ceramic plates inserted.
 - Fielding to the 101st Airborne Division requires 5,609 sets and will be completed in the 3rd quarter FY02. They currently have 802 sets on hand and require an additional 1,600 sets to completely equip all soldiers in Afghanistan. The Army authorized release of the 1600 additional sets from contingency stocks on 5 March. These sets should arrive in Kandahar within 7 to 12 days.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachment:
As stated

Prepared By: VADM G. S. Holder, USN; Director, J-4; (b)(6)

Ali said. Most of the strikes were "bang, on target. Nobody could imagine it could be so good."

On Nov. 9, the Northern Alliance captured Mazar-i-Sharif. Less than a week later, the Taliban abandoned Kabul.

Karzai, aided by the U.S., gathered a few hundred fighters and moved south toward Kandahar. On Nov. 15, Shirzai, also with the help of Americans, crossed into Afghanistan from Pakistan with about 1,000 fighters.

Over the next few weeks, according to commanders from both armies, each received dozens of calls from operatives in Kandahar and other southern cities, who provided notification when a Taliban regiment departed to confront them or rearranged its defenses.

"Our guys were informing us every hour, at times," said Khalid Pushtoon, one of Shirzai's commanders and now a top aide. "Our guys would call and say, 'A hundred more troops are coming.' We were always ready for them."

If the Taliban forces had been receiving the same quality of intelligence, they could have attacked and probably devastated their adversaries, anti-Taliban commanders acknowledge.

The Taliban hierarchy in Kandahar had limited knowledge of its enemies without but realized quickly that it was also fighting enemies within. Omar began interrupting radio broadcasts of Koran recitations to threaten anyone working for anti-Taliban forces and to encourage Kandahar residents to report anyone with a satellite phone.

Around Nov. 14, Shirzai phoned Khyal—rather than the other way around—just before the appointed hour, Nazak says. Shirzai briskly told Khyal that he should gather his family and leave immediately for Pakistan.

"OK, we will see you soon, God willing," Khyal said. "Don't worry."

"See you soon, God willing," Shirzai replied. "Be careful."

Without telling any relatives, Nazak and Khyal packed all the family's documents, cur-

rency, jewelry and other valuables into a ragged leather briefcase. The next morning, Khyal sent Nazak to pick up the Toyota from a relative's house. Khyal then went out, perhaps to pass on instructions or warnings to other operatives.

As he walked along Shikar Pur Darwaza street, dodging rickshaws and mule carts, a pickup truck roared up and slammed on its brakes. Several Taliban policemen leaped from the back, aiming their rifles at Khyal and declaring him under arrest for spying.

When Nazak returned with the car and walked through the wooden gate into the courtyard of his home, police were waiting for him too.

They already had gone through the briefcase. Among the valuables he and Khyal had packed were papers containing handwritten GPS coordinates, sketches of Taliban buildings and the phone number with the telltale 873 prefix indicating a satellite phone.

The beatings began almost as soon as they got to the jail.

Working two at a time with mannequins or cables, Nazak says, police beat the bottoms of his feet until the skin was gone. They ordered him to confess to treason and to reveal where the satellite phone was. When he refused, they poured salt on his feet.

The next night, guards moved to his back; the night after, to his head, using the cable to avoid crushing his skull.

From his lightless cell, Nazak listened to the bombing and tried to guess what was being hit—the ammunition depot on the eastern edge of the city, the airport eight miles past that, the barracks for Taliban Regiment No. 2. Beatings usually followed bombings, with the proximity of the explosions dictating the severity of the blows.

"They told me, 'You and your uncle are spies for America,'" Nazak said. "You are bringing this bombing."

"We are Taliban," Nazak would say.

Around Dec. 1, after more than two weeks of daily beatings, Khyal, a husband and father of three, died of the torture. He never talked.

The Taliban hung his body in Martyrs' Square in Kandahar, leaving it dangling for three days to teach the citizenry a lesson. Part of the time, his body was wrapped in a banner that read: "Abdullah, son of Habibullah, inhabitant of Salehan, who had a satellite telephone and was giving information to the Americans, and was killing Muslims through the Americans."

Nazak's beatings continued. He knew nothing about the death of his uncle. He was growing weak, but so was the Taliban. He could tell.

Several of the spies fled the city after learning of Khyal's death. Ali took his satellite phone and headed north, linking up with Karzai. So did another member of his cell, named Hamdullah.

Faiz Mohammed and Aimal, who worked for Khyal, made their way east and joined the troops of their tribal leader, Shirzai.

The number of phone calls then dropped precipitously, both camps say. But the spies had already done their job. The Taliban was collapsing.

"They kept saying, 'We won't leave you alive when we go,'" Nazak recalled.

The Taliban forces fled Dec. 7 without carrying out their threat, after a fierce battle between Shirzai's troops and mostly Al Qaeda fighters at the Kandahar airport.

Two days later, soldiers and family members carried Nazak from his cell. He asked about his uncle. They told him that Abdullah Khyal was all right, that he should sleep. The next day the family took Nazak to his uncle's grave.

"He never told them a thing," Nazak said proudly. "The satellite phone was still at my uncle's house. We buried the GPS in the dirt. The video camera was still underneath the hood of our car. My uncle didn't tell them anything."

Nazak still walks gingerly, his feet perhaps permanently damaged. His eyesight, which deteriorated badly from the beatings, has largely returned, though his hearing has not.

The break in his aquiline nose is still visible. He seems to forget the names of friends.

Shirzai rewarded Nazak with the command of 15 soldiers. Most are several years his senior. He takes them to the family home and shows them pictures of his uncle: the ones before the Taliban, when Khyal sported only a mustache; the ones with him in the middle of a flock of doves in Herat; the one, snapped by a cousin and printed in Pakistan, of a crowd watching Khyal's body hanging in the square and twisting in the dusty wind.

"The Taliban are gone," Nazak said. "My uncle is very happy."

Few details of the war in Afghanistan emerged as it was being fought. This is one in an occasional series chronicling untold stories from the conflict. Times staff writer Esther Schrader in Washington contributed to this report.

Army Times
March 4, 2002
Pg. 8

18. Not So Bulletproof
Troops on the front lines lack vital piece of body armor
By Sean D. Naylor, Times staff writer

KANDAHAR
INTERNATIONAL
AIRPORT, Afghanistan — As the Kalashnikov rounds rained in on his machine-gun position Feb. 13, Spc. Timothy Bates sheltered himself behind the sandbags, then poked his head up and returned fire with his M-4.

"You could hear the rounds popping overhead, you could hear them smacking the sandbags," he said.

Had one of the 7.62 mm rounds hit Bates in the chest, his brand-new "Interceptor" body armor was designed to stop it cold.

But it's unlikely that Bates' vest would have stopped the 7.62 mm rounds because it was missing critical, potentially life-saving components.

The vests the troops wear are designed to have two, high-tech ceramic plates inserted front and back. Each plate can stop three 7.62 mm rounds, according to Bates' battalion

commander, Lt. Col. Charles "Chip" Preysler.

Bates and many others in his platoon did not have the ceramic plates during the firefight.

It turns out that the \$500 plates are in short supply throughout the Army, even among the men and women thrust onto the front lines in the war against terrorism.

By the time the 101st started shipping troops to Afghanistan, for example, it had received plenty of the \$450 vests but only 800 sets of the plates, according to David Nelson, acting product manager-soldier equipment at Fort Belvoir, Va.

According to Maj. Paul Fitzpatrick, spokesman for the 101st, all 800 pairs of plates are in Kandahar. There are 1,700 soldiers of the 101st's 3rd Brigade in Afghanistan, meaning there are plates for less than half the troops.

Even without the plates, the vests alone still offer roughly the same protection against shrapnel and 9 mm ammunition as the slack vests they replace, Preysler said. All of his troops have the vests.

"I'd rather have this [vest] now and have some form of protection against fragmentation," he said.

The problem is simply one of supply, according to 3rd Brigade commander Col. Frank Wiercinski. "We are getting them as they are being produced, and as they are being shipped," he said.

Nelson said, "All of the present production [of plates] is for the 101st." The three companies that make the plates are turning out about 2,500 to 5,000 sets per month, which is all the Army budget allows for, he said.

There is some finger pointing about the apparent shortage. An official at the Pentagon involved in supplying the plates said the 101st had gotten all of the plates it asked for. It requested and got 385 pairs in November, and another request in 417 in December, said the official, who asked not to be quoted by name.

Fitzpatrick said that when the 101st made its initial requests, the number of plates

ordered would have been sufficient for the planned number of troops. But, Fitzpatrick said, the mission kept changing and the number of troops got ahead of the supply of bulletproof inserts. Fitzpatrick said that by the end of March, each soldier in Afghanistan would have a full set of ceramic plates.

Even when the 101st and other Army divisions receive all the ceramic plates the Army plans to buy, it will still be enough to equip only one in every three soldiers.

"That ratio allows for people likely to go into harm's way to get plates," Nelson said. "One hundred percent of that battalion is not in harm's way at any given time."

Wiercinski pulled out his vest to show that it contained no plates, and added that soldiers in units like his Headquarters and Headquarters Company and the 626th Forward Support Battalion, who are unlikely to face direct enemy fire, do not have plates either.

Preysler said his aim was to ensure that as many of his troops on the line as possible had at least a front plate. But, he acknowledged, "There may be a few soldiers that still do not have plates."

Bates, on the front line without the plates, was lucky. The only round to hit him missed what the military likes to euphemistically refer to as "center body mass" and nicked the pinkie on his right hand.

In the meantime, soldiers going without the added protection will have to display the same fortitude as those who faced withering fire Feb. 13.

Pfc. Will Davis, who was firing the M-240 machine gun next to Bates, said he "didn't even think about" the fact that his vest was missing the plates.

Bates echoed his buddy. "After the fact, I thought about it, and it made me feel a little bit uncomfortable," he said. "But it wasn't an issue at the time."

New York Times
February 25, 2002
**19. Speak Clearly, Soldier.
And Carry A Spare Battery**
By Andrew Zipern

Peacekeeping noops in Afghanistan will soon be relying on the sort of technology more often associated with wealthy American tourists than with the military.

In early March, a handheld language translator developed by a former Navy Seal will be issued to more than 500 American soldiers in Afghanistan. The device, called the Phraselator, is encased in rugged weatherproof rubber, powered by a rechargeable lithium-polymer battery (or four AA alkaline batteries) and can translate more than 1,000 spoken English phrases with the press of a button.

Designed by John Sarich, a 20-year armed forces veteran who served as a Navy Seal in the Vietnam War, the device can instantly translate phrases like "I am here to help you" and "show me your identification" into Pashto, Urdu, Arabic or Dari. Users can also choose from a text menu of common phrases.

For example, Mr. Sarich said, "If you're a doctor, you can say, 'stand up' or 'where does it hurt?' and the device will speak the appropriate translated phrase" by playing a sound file of a native speaker.

Like the electronic translation devices that have been available to consumers the last few years, the Phraselator is not foolproof. It is a "one-way" system: it can understand spoken English, but it is of little use in translating other languages into English. So if an Afghan offers important information, American soldiers still need to figure out how to make sense of it.

The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, or Darpa, which devoted more than \$1 million to the Phraselator's technology, is working toward a two-way system. "It's where we want to go," said Mr. Sarich, but "real two-way is probably 10 years in the future."

John E. Pike, a military analyst and director of Global-Security.org, a military policy Web site, said that despite its drawbacks, the device was likely to be a big improvement over the usual routine of soldiers' fumbling through phrase books. "It's obviously less ef-

fective than having an interpreter with you." Mr. Pike said, "but linguistic skills have never been a strong suit of the American military."

Its developers say that in most everyday encounters the Phraselator should work quite well. Unlike some consumer translation devices, the Phraselator translates words very quickly. Fast enough, Mr. Sarich said, to blurt out, "Stop, or I'll shoot" in time for it to make a difference.

Washington Post
February 25, 2002
Pg. 17

20. Detainees Case to Be Taken To OAS Rights Commission
By John Mintz, Washington Post Staff Writer

Human rights lawyers will take their legal argument that the U.S. government is violating the rights of the 300 prisoners at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, to a new forum: an obscure seven-member panel of the Organization of American States (OAS).

The attorneys are expected to file a petition today with the OAS's Inter-American Commission on Human Rights asking that the al Qaeda and Taliban detainees be declared prisoners of war, and that they be given immediate access to lawyers and consular officials of their home countries.

The documents also contend that all interrogations of the captives should end, and that they should not be tried before military tribunals planned by the United States.

Attorneys filing the proceeding, led by the New York-based Center for Constitutional Rights, acknowledge privately that their goal is as much to put public pressure on the Bush administration as it is to wage a legal attack. Even if the panel grants all their requests, the U.S. government is certain to reject the ruling because it historically has insisted it is not legally bound by the commission's actions, the lawyers said.

"The U.S. has been singularly disdainful of the commission's findings," said Richard J. Wilson, an international law professor at American Univer-

Snowflake

6:13 PM

190

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: February 14, 2002
SUBJECT: Duke Cunningham (R-CA)

Done 2/25

Duke Cunningham mentioned that he knows a lot of people in the Philippines and speaks some of the language. You might want to tell Dennis Blair that so he is aware of it.

Philippines

2/22/02

Thank you.

Sir, Dennis said he would call Cunningham.

Dick Myers

DHR/azn
021402.02

2/25

Please respond by: _____

CHAIRMAN RESPONSE

*14 Feb 02
VLR J*

U18129 02

11-L-0559/OSD/12932

February 15, 2002 7:51 AM

TO: Gen. Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Brief for Gov. Ridge

Done 1/21/02

322

Someone ought to brief Tom Ridge on the UCP.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
021502-2

.....
Please respond by 02/22/02

15 Feb 02



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-0999

INFO MEMO

#185

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Peter Pace, Acting CJCS

VRP 2/20/02

SUBJECT: Brief for Governor Ridge

- Reference your memorandum (TAB) directing Governor Ridge be briefed on the UCP.
- On 5 February, we briefed Governor Ridge using the UCP brief that we gave to the President.

COORDINATION: None

Attachment

As stated

Prepared By: LTG John P. Abizaid, USA; Director, Joint Staff

(b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/12934

February 21, 2002 10:33 AM

TO: Gen. Pace
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Red Flag

Done 2/8

Please find out what the Red Flag people use as their gauge for deciding which countries they will allow to participate. Apparently the requests greatly exceed the slots.

353

I would be curious to know how they make their decisions. For example, I notice they did not include the Turks, which I would have thought would be a higher priority than some of the people they had.

Thanks.

DHR:db
022102-9

.....
Please respond by 02/08/02

21 Feb 02



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999
INFORMATION MEMO

187

CM-217-02
7 March 2002

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RM 3/7*

SUBJECT: Participants in the USAF Red Flag Training Program

- For your Information, per your question on how participants are decided in the USAF Red Flag Training Program (Tab A).
- Of seven red flag training periods in FY02, three have been designated "US only" to fully integrate special access program training. For the four periods open to foreign participation, USAF Air Combat Command requests Deputy Under Secretary Air Force, International Affairs (SAF-IA) identify foreign participants. SAF-IA then solicits foreign participation for available periods.
- Germany and the United Kingdom are given the highest priority, and may participate in multiple exercises each year. Other allies are limited to one exercise per year and are selected based on their capability and how their participation contributes to both USAF training and Allied combined operations.
- Turkey did not request to participate in FY02.
- The attached USAF memo provides more detail, if needed (Tab B).

Prepared by: John P. Abizaid, LTG; USA; (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/12936



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON, DC

5 Mar 02

AFODM 04-02

MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTOR, JOINT STAFF

SUBJECT: RED FLAG INVITEE CRITERIA (DJSM-0182-02)

HQ Air Combat Command (ACC) uses USAF training requirements to determine how many and which Red Flag periods are available for allied participation. "US Only" Red Flag periods are reserved to fully integrate Special Access Programs / Special Access Required elements of the DoD. In FY02 there were three Red Flag periods designated "US Only" and three periods open to allied participation. For FY 03, there are three "US Only" periods and four periods open to allied participation.

In November of each year, HQ ACC forwards to the Deputy Under Secretary of the Air Force, International Affairs (SAF/IA), the Red Flag periods available for foreign air forces' participation. SAF/IA solicits foreign participation through their respective country desk officers. Allied participation is then established by SAF/IA and coordinated with representatives from ACC and Pacific Air Force HQ at an annual SAF/IA hosted scheduling meeting. The United Kingdom and Germany are given the highest participation priority. Both countries may participate in multiple Red Flag exercises annually. All other allies are limited to a maximum of one Red Flag period per year. In general, allied selection is based on consideration of allies' operational capability to perform the requested mission type, how allied participation enhances USAF AEF combat capability, and how participation enhances ability of allies to support combined operations. SAF/IA has final determination authority when a conflict exists between two allies competing for the same exercise mission type or on whether a country other than the UK or Germany participate in multiple Red Flag exercises.

For those Red Flag periods open to international participants in FY02, the following foreign air forces participated: UK, Canada, Australia, Germany, Netherlands, Spain, France, Italy, NATO (AWACS), Singapore, and Israel. For FY 02, Turkey did not submit a request to participate in any international Red Flag periods and Norway cancelled, at their request.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Charles F. Wald".

CHARLES F. WALD, Lt Gen, USAF
Deputy Chief of Staff
Air and Space Operations

11-L-0559/OSD/12937

Snowflake

Ref 800
1338
C 10/30

October 7, 2002 10:19 AM

TO: Jim Haynes
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Geneva Conventions

Larry Di Rita
10/30

Switzerland

In Sunday's *New York Times*, page 13, there was an article saying the Swiss are calling a meeting to reexamine the Geneva Conventions. You might want to make sure that DoD gets involved in that.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
100702-27

.....
Please respond by 10/25/02

Response attached

Larry Di Rita
10/30

7 Oct 02

5:3
6:30
snowflake

May 6, 2002 9:15 AM

TO: Torie Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Former Military TV Commentators

Sir:
Please see attached Press Ops
4/5/14

good on this job
T.C
000.77

Please give me a list of all of the retired military people doing television who are doing a good job.

I would like to see their names and something about them, so that at some point I can write them a note.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
050602-8

.....
Please respond by _____

done
LAMY DE P...
11/7

6 May 02

U18243# / 02

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CNN

General Wesley K. Clark (USA, Ret.)

Maj. Gen. David Grange (USA, Ret.)

Maj. Gen. Don Shepperd (USAF, Ret.)

ABC

Anthony H. Cordesman (CSIS)

NBC/MSNBC

General Barry McCaffrey (USA, Ret.)

Lt. Gen. Bernard Trainor (USMC, Ret.)

Col. Ken Allard (USA, Ret.)

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Brig. Gen. Tim McInerney (USAF, Ret.)

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Gen. Wesley Clark: U.S. military retaliation options

September 18, 2001 Posted: 1:21 PM EDT (1721 GMT)



CNN

General Wesley K. Clark was the Supreme Allied Commander Europe from 1997 to 2000, and was also the Commander-in-Chief, United States European Command. General Clark is an Armor Officer who has commanded at every level from Company to Division. He joined the CNN.com chat room from Washington D.C.

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CNN: General Clark, some say that military retaliation could come at any moment, others believe it may not start for weeks. What are your thoughts?

CLARK: Well, I wouldn't speculate because it really depends on the decision of President Bush. He has to weigh three considerations. First, he has to consider the significance of whatever targets might be struck in view of advancing our long-term interests. Second, he has to consider the impact on his diplomatic efforts to form a coalition. Many around the world are fearful that an American attack that kills innocent people will fuel more terrorism. And the third consideration is the expectations of the American people.

CHAT PARTICIPANT: Thank you for your honorable service. In this chat room, there are people from all over the world and many of them express a concern that the U.S. will act irresponsibly. Can you give them some reassurance that we will not be wanton in our response?

CLARK: Well, the response will be determined by the president of the United States, but he will consult with allies around the world. The president has said that this is a different kind of war and he wants to build a coalition. I think there's every reason to believe he will consider when to strike. However, the overriding concern will be the safety of Americans and others around the world. And if he determines the strike is necessary now in order to disrupt

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preparations for an ongoing terrorist attack against us, he might well decide that it is necessary to strike.

CHAT PARTICIPANT: What will happen to the Afghan people who are opposed to the Taliban if the U.S. decides to attack? I read yesterday that the Afghan people will support the U.S. with 15,000 men and a few helicopters, as their resources are limited. Should the war be fought on their grounds?

CLARK: The answer is that the U.S. will probably encourage others to increase their support to the Afghan forces opposed to the Taliban.

CHAT PARTICIPANT: Will Saudi Arabia permit coalition troops to be based there?

CLARK: We will ask the Saudis for whatever support is necessary. Right now it is not required to move troops to Saudi Arabia.

CHAT PARTICIPANT: Are there any plans to support Pakistan long term if they continue to assist us?

CLARK: Yes, the U.S. government will undoubtedly increase its support for the government of Pakistan.

CHAT PARTICIPANT: Given the terrain of Afghanistan, wouldn't sending ground troops there be like sending them into a firing squad?

CLARK: Our soldiers can take care of themselves in any terrain. But, we also know that there is no inherent advantage in occupying Afghanistan. Our objective is to end international terrorism, not to conquer countries.

CHAT PARTICIPANT: What kind of lessons can we learn from the Russian conflict with Afghanistan?

CLARK: The Russians attempted to occupy the major cities, mistakenly believing that control of the cities would give them control of the countryside. It became clear that they could control neither the cities nor the countryside.

CHAT PARTICIPANT: Judging from the recent mobilization of 35,000 reservists, how much farther do you think the commitment of U.S. forces, particularly conventional forces, could go?

CLARK: This is unknowable at this time. But this war will be largely be fought by diplomatic personnel and intelligence forces.

CHAT PARTICIPANT: What other countries are housing terrorist organizations?

CLARK: Terrorist cells have roots in perhaps as many as 60 countries including the U.S., most countries in Europe, many in Africa and, of course, the Middle East and Asia. The question is the degree of government complicity in support for these acts of terrorism. That remains a major intelligence issue.

CHAT PARTICIPANT: Why isn't covert activity the major thrust of our retaliation?

CLARK: Covert activity probably will be a major part of U.S. action. But because it is covert, it won't be discussed.

CNN: Who is the actual enemy here? Will this be all over when Osama bin Laden is either captured or killed? What happens if we attack and he still isn't handed over?

CLARK: Well, our objective is to dismantle the terrorist network. But, we will quickly find that the network that directed this tragic attack is connected to many other networks.

CHAT PARTICIPANT: Hello, and greetings from the United Kingdom. What do you think will be the long-term implications of this, say 20 years down the line, for relations with the Middle East and the surrounding area?

CLARK: We don't know that yet. It depends on the nature of this campaign. The possibilities range from a resolution of the Middle East dispute and tranquility, to the most nightmarish visions of regional conflict. We're engaged in an action/reaction cycle with terrorists in Middle Eastern countries, and both sides, or all sides, will have an impact on the outcome.

CHAT PARTICIPANT: Do you think that the followers of bin Laden have already infiltrated into the four corners of the world, and that in the event of a strike against bin Laden, his followers will be able to strike into the hearts of many cities in the world?

CLARK: Yes. There is great concern about follow on terrorist attacks.

CNN: Do you have any final thoughts for us today, General Clark?

CLARK: I hope that people will understand that this is a threat to Western civilization, not to the U.S. And it is a threat that cannot be appeased by apologies or changing policies toward Israel. It is derived from fundamental conflicts within Islam itself, and the impoverishment and tragedy that has befallen Afghanistan.

CNN: Thank you for joining us today.

CLARK: Thank you very much. I've enjoyed being with you today.

Gen. Wesley Clark joined the CNN.com chat room by telephone, and CNN provided a typist. This is an edited transcript of the interview which took place on Tuesday, September 18, 2001.

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Maj. Gen. David Grange: Keeping the momentum

November 16, 2001 Posted: 8:05 PM EST (0105 GMT)



David Grange is a retired U.S. Army major general and a military analyst for CNN.

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Update: The next couple of weeks are key. Most of the key cities in Afghanistan have fallen to anti-Taliban forces. And the United States, I'm guessing, will be putting more troops in. We're getting closer to the areas where we think these bad leaders are. It's a transition phase, so if we back off we'll lose that momentum.

The informational warfare is also important, especially with Ramadan starting today. We have to get people to understand that we're this war isn't against Islam, but it's a war against terrorists. And by the way, Muslims have fought during Ramadan throughout history when they thought they had to, and we think we have to right now.

We really have to watch the border with Pakistan, because that country may end up being a more safe haven for some of these leaders than Afghanistan. In fact, a report out of Iran this morning says bin Laden is already there. We're not really searching anywhere in Pakistan, although I'm sure we have agents, because of the delicate political situation in Pakistan and the number of pro-Taliban Pashtun living there. The more pro-Taliban (forces) get into Pakistan, (it) turns the tide against Musharraf, so it's in Islamabad's best interest to keep it stabilized. The problem is that the border is so porous, and a lot of the pro-Taliban folks are already in Pakistan.

Impact: You're going to add more ground forces and continue with the air means to find bin Laden and his cronies. The flow of information will pick up, as we get more people spilling their guts and start paying off people. Plus, people will start readily giving information, because there are a lot of people who were on the fence before that have changed sides. You really need to have people to sort the info out, analyze and report it. Special

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ops will also look for documents and such and send them onto intelligence guys. A little piece here, a little piece there puts together this puzzle.

We have totally mobilized all our assets so that we have better awareness of what's going on. We've changed some of our laws. We've declared a state of emergency to give President Bush powers to act immediately and react to intelligence.

So we're on alert, watching. Everybody has to keep their guard up on the rear areas as well as the front lines. There are no front lines in this fight. The area of operations is the world.

Tactics: It's very important that we get American assessments of the situation, and not just rely on this local commander said this or that. The other issue is that we can't get hung up on bin Laden being in a cave somewhere. He could have had a series of tapes made, and all the while be in a villa in Pakistan or Yemen or someplace like that. These guys spend years setting up safe houses.

Most of his communication is very rudimentary, as in Somalia and Vietnam. They know we can intercept messages, so the info is sent in very short, say, 10-second bursts, or via human messengers and non-technical communication -- messages that are open source but hidden in some sort of code. We just have expect the unexpected, because we're dealing with people who are very nasty, very innovative. You've got to think, if I was a bad guy, what would I do? And then, how would I prevent it?

Saying all that, we still have got to keep the pressure on in Afghanistan because they're starting to crack. We've got to keep being on the offensive.

Strategy: There are a couple of scenarios with bin Laden. One, he's not in Afghanistan -- maybe he's in Pakistan, probably the only country bordering there where he can get away with staying right now. The other scenario is, he says, "Hey, I'm going to die as a hero with my Arab legions around me." He wants to suck in Americans, setting up not only mines but rigging the place with demolitions or a chemical weapon. In other words, he's a terrorist, so he wants psychological impact -- he wants media, he wants recognition because of his ego. He'll go out in a bang.

The other possibility is he's completely out of the region and, as we're hunting for him in these caves, he plans to hit us in the rear. He'd do something in the United States or Europe or somewhere else -- if not himself, then some of his people will. And he's planned that very well ahead of time, assuming he's been out of the country for a while. Is it far-fetched? Maybe. But some of the stuff he's done has been pretty far-fetched.

U.S. Army Gen. Wesley Clark (ret.), a former NATO supreme commander, U.S. Army Maj. Gen. David Grange (ret.) and Air Force Maj. Gen. Don Shepperd (ret.) are serving as CNN military analysts during the war against terror. Their briefings will appear daily on CNN.com.

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Maj. Gen. Don Shepperd: Taking care of Kandahar

December 2, 2001 Posted: 9:08 p.m. EST (0208 GMT)



Don Shepperd is a former U.S. Air Force major general and now a military analyst for CNN.

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UPDATE: In Kandahar, Pashtun forces under Hamid Karzai are moving in from the north, the Marines are down to the southwest, and another Pashtun tribesman, Gul Aga, is moving his fighters from the south. With the exception of the Marines, all of these forces are slowly encircling the city, while intense bombing is hitting remaining Taliban and al Qaeda positions.

Many southern Pashtun tribes are now realizing they made a marriage with the devil when the Taliban came in. They became disaffected with the government, and only now do they have the means to do something about it -- with U.S. air power and the antiterrorism coalition on their side.

It also looks as if the Afghan leaders are nearing a political solution for a future government in Bonn. There appears to be some agreement among all four factions. They would set up an interim government to last six months until a loya jirga [or traditional Afghan council] can be held, at which time a solution for a final government will be explored and pursued.

IMPACT: The bombing and troop movements will continue until the remaining Taliban are in the same situation that they were in Konduz -- encircled with no supplies, no communications and no way to get out other than to surrender or fight to the death. The remaining Afghan Taliban will most likely surrender or switch sides. As to foreign al Qaeda fighters there, the incident in Mazar-e Sharif seems to indicate many of them won't surrender. So there may be some hard, pitched battles to come.

A few days ago, we were predicting Kandahar would fall the first of this week. Now it seems the pro-Taliban pockets in Kandahar won't be cleaned up until next week or the week after.

The political developments are very encouraging, but now the real challenge comes. That includes implementing an interim government in Kabul, getting airfields around the country repaired so humanitarian aid can be brought in, getting the country safe under a rule of law so you can distribute aid on the ground -- all as you pursue a final political solution while pursuing al Qaeda and Taliban holdouts loyal to Mullah Omar.

TACTICS: You want to avoid house-to-house fighting. As pockets of resistance are identified in Kandahar, you may see precision U.S. strikes so that you don't have to take it building by building. Still, it will be tough to take Kandahar. It is a reasonably sized city and there are desperate people inside.

The Marines are there to set up a forward operating base so more forces can come in if we need them to take Kandahar, mop up southern Afghanistan, or pursue bin Laden and al Qaeda. They also have significant air support with them in the way of helicopters, so they can also be a quick reaction force. They're very flexible.

But with these troop movements and strikes, you'll see reports like those coming out of towns being bombed near Jalalabad. I can tell you U.S. forces did not intentionally bomb towns just because al Qaeda may have been in the area.

They may be errant weapons or maybe there was mistaken intelligence. Or the buildings may have been intentionally hit because they had been identified as holding al Qaeda cells and supporters, because we've said all along we'd target those supporting, housing, feeding or financing al Qaeda.

STRATEGY: If and when anti-Taliban forces take Kandahar, we turn to mopping up and routing any remaining and defecting Taliban around the country. When they have defected, you want to make sure they've laid down their arms, so they won't shoot you in the back or regroup and re-attack. That takes some time, and could get messy. It's going to be the responsibility of Pashtun tribal leaders in the south and the Northern Alliance in the north.

There's many reasons why Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld has said this is a dangerous and difficult time. You've got Kandahar, hunting down the remaining al Qaeda and bin Laden, ironing out a political solution, dispensing humanitarian aid and stabilizing the country. All five things will be going on at once, whereas before all you had to do was fight.

U.S. Army Gen. Wesley Clark (ret.), a former NATO supreme commander, U.S. Army Maj. Gen. David Grange (ret.) and Air Force Maj. Gen. Don Shepperd (ret.) are serving as CNN military

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From the desk of Peter Jennings



Anthony Cordesman, of the Center for Strategic International Studies, has provided extensive advice and analysis for ABCNEWS. (ABCNEWS.com)

Illusions and Realities Among the Lessons of Gardez: On Intelligence, Technology and Proxies

Analysis
By Anthony H. Cordesman
abcNEWS.com

March 18 — It takes time, sometimes months, to actually analyze and characterize a battle. Military historians, particularly detailed tactical analysts, can take years to separate fact from fiction and determine which accounts and impressions are credible.

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The fighting in the Gardez and the Shah-e-Kot mountain area of Afghanistan will probably prove to be no exception. Any rush to judgment produces errors, and this is particularly true when there are no reliable estimates of the forces engaged, casualty estimates are largely guesses, and there are few historical parallels.

That said, some preliminary judgments and guesses may be in order, if only to try to put the battle in perspective and provide some cautions about rushing to the wrong kinds of judgments.

The Human Dimension, Surprise, and Intelligence 'Failures'

Since the Gulf War, Americans have increasingly accepted the illusion of perfect wars in which the United States is never surprised, there are few or no casualties, U.S. forces act on the basis of perfect knowledge, and

anything that goes wrong is a mistake or failure. The reality is very different, particularly in a case like Shah-e-Kot.

U.S. forces have major intelligence and reconnaissance problems in tracking the movement of individuals and infantry. For all of the advances in UAVs (unmanned aerial vehicles), satellites, and sensors on our aircraft, U.S. forces cannot hope to accurately count the number of people infiltrating a given area, how scattered troops position themselves, the nature of their shelters, and how many and what kinds of man- and crew-portable weapons they have. This may someday be possible, with more UAVs, better sensors, and the ability to provide nearly constant coverage, but the Pentagon doesn't have anything like the numbers, night vision capability, and poor weather capability to do this today.

Human intelligence rarely helps. Barring access to the opposition leadership, impressions from locals, allies, defectors, and prisoners of war can produce as much confusion as additional data. In this case, the United States had some local allies reporting 400 opposition fighters and some reporting 4,000 — an order of magnitude difference. The United States also chose to let the al Qaeda and Taliban forces move

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into the area in numbers and dig in. This made tracking their positions almost impossible, although it also made them a key target and made the battle worth fighting.

By the time the fighting started, U.S. forces faced the tactical reality that they were entering a highly distributed battlefield with many ambush points and possible areas of engagement. This is typical of at least the first set of engagements in mountain warfare, as well as urban warfare and jungle-forest warfare. There simply is no current technology to avoid limited tactical surprise, and it is not a failure on the part of the planner or intelligence analyst. War is based on intelligent risk-taking, and risk-taking means surprise, failures, and casualties.

For the same reasons, U.S. forces have no way to develop an accurate picture of how large the forces engaged were unless they capture a high level POW, and they have no way to estimate enemy casualties and how many of the enemy escaped. The media can force the Department of Defense to issue guesstimates, and winners tend to exaggerate their success. A guesstimate, however, is a guesstimate.

What can be said is that U.S. and Afghan casualties were very small for the forces engaged, and given the enemy's tactical position and ability to achieve surprise. They were very small in terms of weather and visibility, and the fact the enemy have many tunnels and dug in positions. In comparative fighting at Monte Casino, in the Pacific campaign of World War II, and Korea, the United States would have taken at least 10 times more casualties. Even in Vietnam, the U.S. military would have had higher casualties in many roughly similar tactical situations.

No one can predict how much of this is the result of more advanced reconnaissance systems, better tactical equipment, training, air mobility, a new air-land ability to work in close partnership, or help from our allies. It is clear, however, that U.S. forces dealt quickly with initial surprise, reacted faster than the enemy, and were able to counter many of the advantages terrain and position have given similar enemies in past wars.

The Problem of Distributed Warfare

Even before this battle began, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld had approved planning guidance that the war could easily last to 2008 and beyond. U.S. military planners and counter-terrorism experts had warned that the struggle in Afghanistan would teach U.S., British, and friendly forces as well as the enemy.

The planners were speculating that one key lesson for future terrorist and asymmetric opponents will be to create far looser and more broadly distributed networks and groups of cells that have a high degree of individual independence and survivability and which do not have a rigid hierarchy and headquarters and physical facilities that can be located and attacked.

They argue that a key lesson of Afghanistan to such enemies will be the need for more anonymity, more emphasis on a cover organization and proxies, and on creating a campaign plan of sequential or multiple attacks from isolated cells and elements so that no victory in any one area can halt the overall campaign.

The battle of Shah-e-Kot showed these warnings apply to more than terrorist organizations. Like other movements defeated in conventional battles, the many al Qaeda and other forces that escaped were able to regroup and choose a more favorable area to fight. In the process, they also developed superior initial situational understanding and dug-in positions and were able to force U.S. forces to change their tactics and fighting on terms more favorable to them.

Fortunately for Washington, the Taliban and al Qaeda forces seem to have been too rigid in holding their positions, counted too much on the advantages of similar positions and strong points in past wars, and to have concentrated too much in a single area. They also fought too determinedly once superior forces engaged them.

The next time around, enemies are likely to be more dispersed, to try to fight in several different places at once, and retreat more quickly. They also may not operate under conditions where much of the local population is hostile.

If so, they can fight in towns and cities where U.S. forces will face much sharper constraints on using artillery and airpower, and where it will be far more difficult to know who the enemy really is.

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It also may be possible to combine such asymmetric warfare with terrorism to create a series of asymmetric attacks, phased over time, that would not depend on the existence or survival of some central or easily locatable command structure. It can be organized to focus on the most lethal, costly, or disruptive means of attack, and to avoid repeating past forms of attack.

In fact, it is still possible that al Qaeda will reorganize and go on with its attacks in the future. Alternatively, elements of al Qaeda may go underground, reconstitute themselves and emerge with new names and possibly new leaders, changes in goals and ideology, and changes in method of attack.

It has become a cliché to say that death and defeat cannot deter a suicide bomber. It may be equally true that any given defeat of a terrorist or asymmetric opponent simply forces the opponent to adapt.

A Presence on the Ground and a Willingness to Take Casualties

This lesson should be obvious. Air power is incapable of holding territory, dealing with political issues, gathering human intelligence, and destroying dug-in enemy positions. It cannot seal off territory or deal with highly dispersed forces. In fact, the success of U.S. air power earlier in the war was heavily dependent on both Afghan ground troops and Afghan political bargainers on the ground, who arranged for most potential battles to end in defections and retreats, rather than large-scale fighting.

The current fighting also reveals something that tended to be lost during coverage of the previous fighting. Reporting focused on the lack of U.S. and British casualties, and paid little attention to the casualties of the Afghan forces opposing the Taliban and al Qaeda. Putting U.S. forces on the ground has shown that war still means casualties — this time U.S. casualties. This does not mean that such casualties are not low by the standard of past wars, but the "Teflon-like" image of casualty free war was never real and the current fighting brings this fact home.

Yet, a sub-lesson is that every time U.S. forces do take minimal losses, the American media almost panics and starts talking about the unwillingness of Americans to take casualties. Americans may have a media that is unwilling to take them, or which has trouble understanding military realities.

Virtually every serious study I have seen, however, indicates that ordinary Americans, and most politicians, expect such casualties and are willing to accept them if (a) they believe in the conflict, and (b) believe U.S. troops are properly led and equipped and the engagement they are fighting in is justified.

The Limits of Super Toys and New Weapons

The media seems to be fascinated with super toys: Daisy Cutters, "thermobaric" weapons and other things that produce a large bang. So far, the U.S. military has not issued one word on successful hard target kills or caves destroyed by airpower. If there is a case where such attacks produced large casualties except by chance, it has not been reported.

This is not an argument against advances in airpower and weapons, but the most that exists to quantify how much airpower has improved in terms of actual physical battle damage are anecdotes. This is partly the result of a deliberate Department of Defense refusal to provide any of the BDA (bomb damage assessment) provided in past wars.

At the same time, it is a little striking that the first uses of any new weapon get so much coverage but no one has gone back to try to determine the result.

Moreover, it is unclear how much of the impact of airpower is the cumulative result of psychological effects, barriers to movement, and sheer shock and how much is the impact of actual killing and physical destruction. This is particularly true in the case of Taliban and al Qaeda forces hiding in caves.

Most of those troops seem to have survived the most glamorous weapons and required ground troops to illuminate or find them or even to get clean air hits on the entrances of the caves.

Similarly, it is far from clear how effective any ordnance was against well dug-in infantry. U.S. forces have much more ability to target, and therefore kill, vehicles, buildings, etc.

Allied Forces Are Only a Limited Substitute for U.S. Military Power

Shah-e-Kot again shows that allied proxies are an uncertain answer to many tactical situations in this war and may well be of even more limited value in conflicts like Iraq. Those who have argued that Afghanistan provides broad lessons about the value of mixing U.S. air power with friendly ground forces and forcing the rapid collapse of weak opposition forces should rethink their judgments.

The Afghan factions supporting us have different goals, and a different willingness to take casualties and persist in combat. They are not fighting a war on terrorism. They want to serve their own factional interests, and having the Taliban largely disperse and al Qaeda leave Afghanistan is perfectly acceptable.

At the same time, it simply is not reasonable to condemn allied forces for being unreliable or lacking courage. The Afghan troops lack air mobility and modern equipment, and they need to be cautious and slow moving to win and survive. (They do not have U.S. medical services, or technologies like body armor.)

They also generally have limited training and little relevant experience. The factional fighting in Afghanistan rarely involved sustained pitched battles, particularly against well-equipped troops and it has been a long time since the Afghans fought the Soviets.

While Afghanistan is not Iraq, this battle is an important lesson regarding the risks inherent in trying to use air power to create sanctuaries and allow weak infantry forces like the Iraqi National Congress takes over a modern state with heavy divisions and 2,200 main battle tanks.

Anthony H. Cordesman is a military analyst for ABCNEWS.

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Anthony Cordesman joined CSIS from Senator John McCain's office, where he served as assistant for national security. He is also an adjunct professor of national security studies at Georgetown University and a military analyst for ABC-TV. He has held senior positions in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the State Department, the Department of Energy, and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency. His overseas posts included Iran and other Middle Eastern states, Great Britain, the U.S. delegation to NATO, and as a director in the NATO International Staff. Cordesman has written and lectured extensively on NATO, the Middle East, the U.S. and Soviet military balance, U.S. forces and defense budgets, and the lessons of war. Of his many books, the most recent include *The Arab-Israeli Military Balance and the Middle East Peace Process* (Westview, 1996), *Iran's Military Forces in Transition* (Praeger, 1999), *Iraq and the War of Sanctions* (Praeger, 1999), and as author/coauthor of the series *CSIS Middle East Dynamic Net Assessment* (Westview, 1997). He was formerly the international editor of the *Armed Forces Journal* and U.S. editor of *Armed Forces* (UK).

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General: Action will come 'without warning'

October 4, 2001 Posted: 3:50 PM EDT (1950 GMT)

By Frank Sesno
CNN Washington Bureau

WASHINGTON (CNN) -- Retired Army Gen. Barry McCaffrey, who was drug czar during President Clinton's second term, said in an online exchange last month that those against the United States in its war on terrorism would "be killed suddenly, in significant numbers and without warning."

McCaffrey, who commanded the 24th Mechanized Infantry Division in the Persian Gulf War, offered his blunt assessment on the mission and the strategy confronting the United States and its allies in an e-mail exchange with a cadet at West Point, where McCaffrey teaches.

The exchange took place September 19 -- a little more than a week after the deadliest terror attacks on U.S. soil. McCaffrey and others have since distributed the e-mail widely to friends and associates in the national security community.

McCaffrey told CNN he is not displeased the exchange became public, because he is eager to articulate the likely multi-faceted course of action.

McCaffrey identified multiple objectives -- to increase domestic security, build a strong coalition and finally "take the gloves off and use integrated military power to find, fix and destroy" terrorist organizations.

He told the cadet, "We are going to disrupt these people through preemptive attack ... we will deceive them, we will run psyops on them, at selected points and times they will be killed suddenly, in significant numbers, and without warning."

"Tomahawk missiles, 2000 pound laser guided

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weapons dropped from B2's or F22's at very high altitude, remote control, booby traps, blackmail and at places, small groups of soldiers or SEALs will appear in total darkness, blow down the doors and kill them at close range with automatic weapons and hand grenades," the e-mail message read.

McCaffrey went on to say: "We will find their money and freeze it. We will arrest their front agents. We will operate against their recruiting and transportation functions. We will locate their training areas and surveil or mine them. We will isolate them from their families.

"We will try to dominate their communication function and alternately listen, jam or spoof it. We will make their couriers disappear. If we can find out how they eat, or play or receive rewards, or where they sleep -- we will go there and kill them by surprise."

McCaffrey said the military component would be "a supporting but lesser aspect of a strategy that will be based fundamentally on diplomatic and economic leverage to compel cooperation with international law."

The retired general said there would need to be substantial and costly efforts to reduce the "environmental factors" that feed "extremist madness."

That would include "dramatically increased" international aid to address the poverty of Palestinians, Afghans, Sudanese and others, he said.

A U.S. military official who was shown McCaffrey's comments said they were "The insights of a very smart guy."

Another official said they do not contain any national secrets, but they do accurately reflect the strategy the United States has adopted.

In the words of this official: "It's the plan."

TAB

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The Korea Society Quarterly - Portfolio - Summer 2000

An Excerpt from "On Going to War"

By Lt. Gen. Bernard E. Trainor, USMC (Ret)



From the classrooms of The Basic School to the frozen hills of the Korean War, the author tells his story of how a 'student officer' (or was it officer student?) is transformed into a combat leader. This series is aimed at Basic School graduates going to their first duty, plagued with the uncertainties experienced by legions of officers preceding them.

It was deadly silent and light snow fell as I made my way to the forward slope and into the fighting trenches. There was nary a soul above ground. I stood in the trench line looking north across the Soyang Gang at the hills opposite hosting the North Koreans. Little could be seen; no sign of trenches or bunkers. I had yet to learn that our enemies dug deep and were masters of camouflage. The only signs of war were the dirty scars on the snow-covered slopes to my front caused by our artillery and air strikes. Off in the distance, a pair of Corsairs were dropping bombs on a rear area position. I could not see the explosions, but I could hear them well in arrears of the pullout of the aircraft. I tried to remember how to gauge distance by the flashbang method, but for the moment the formula eluded me. Looking down our zig-zag trench line, I could see fighting positions with flimsy overhead cover. Periodically, a head would emerge from one of them to sniff the air and glance at me before returning to obscurity. My Marines, I thought. I would get to know them in the coming weeks, mostly by eccentricities of their attire, because their dirty faces made them indistinguishable. Weeks later, when we came off the line and they showered up and were issued clean clothing, it was as though I had never seen one of them before. Before returning to the platoon CP, I gazed northward beyond the Korean main line of resistance. It was a panorama of ever higher snow-covered mountains etched against a leaden sky and stretching to eternity. Jesus, Mary, and Joseph, I thought, if we go on the offensive this spring, we'll all die out there somewhere. With that happy thought, I retreated back down the communication trench. The snow was getting heavier. The hospitality within the platoon bunker was only a few degrees warmer than the outside temperature. I was being studiously ignored. I had never thought about what sort of reception I would get upon taking over my first platoon, but unconsciously I assumed it would be a bit more cordial than the reality that faced me.

It was about 2300 that first night when I visited the piss tube just down from the CP. As I stood there, I saw a flash from the forward slope reflected in the falling snow. An explosion immediately followed. Other explosions followed along with a sound that was to become all too familiar, the zapping of a Chinese burp gun. I could hear M-1 and automatic weapons fire responding. Ricocheting tracers wiggled off into the night. A parachute flare exploded overhead, followed by others in succession, casting an eerie light over the hillside and reflecting off the snow flakes like so many tiny strobe lights. The heavy flash and crump of mortar rounds added greater substance to the cacophony of a fire fight. I stood mesmerized. As a light and sound show, it was beautiful to witness. I came out of my reverie with the shocking realization that we were under attack. Hastening back to the CP, I fumbled through the folds of the shelter half entrance to find a scene of amazing calm and orderliness. The corpsmen were layering out their kits, and the radio men were making comm checks. The platoon guide was taking hand grenades out of their tubes and putting them into sandbags. My platoon sergeant, who was a gunnery sergeant, sat on an upended case of C-rations. Around his neck was a dirty strip of cloth with either end tied to a sound-powered phone. One phone was connected to the company mortars, the other to the automatic weapons positions out on the line. When I entered, he was arguing with the mortar NCO who, well removed from the fire fight outside our door, wanted to check fire in order to find out why some of the rounds we were firing were duds. The Gunny demanded continuous fire, even duds "could hit them on the head," he argued. Alternately, he would speak into the other phone admonishing the BAR (Browning Automatic Rifle) men not to fire unless they had a target. He reminded them, "They're trying to find out where our automatic weapons are at, you know."

I just stood there. With that, a dirty face appeared through the canvas asking the guide for a resupply of hand grenades. The response was explosive: "More grenades? What are you doing, wasting them or eating them. I just gave you some yesterday." There ensued a debate between the two to them over the justification for more grenades. I couldn't believe it. Here was the fiercest battle since Iwo Jima taking place just yards away and they were bean counting grenades. Under my breath I took up the mantra, "Give him the grenades, give him the grenades, for God's sake give him the grenades." My silent importation apparently worked. At any rate, the guide reluctantly handed over a sandbag with about a dozen grenades clacking inside, accompanied by a warning not to waste them. Up to this point, nobody had glanced my way. Wait a minute, I thought, I'm the platoon commander and my platoon is under attack. I remembered the golden rule from TBS: "Even if you don't know what to do, do something." It didn't work that night on Hill 749. In my best command voice, I said something to the Gunny that to this day escapes me. But I will never forget the response. He took the phones from his ears and let them hang from his neck by their cloth umbilical. The silence was suffocating. I had the sense that the war was caught in a state of suspension, with grenades, mortars, and tracers halted in mid-flight. Time stood still. Then fixing me with a stare I can still see, the Gunny said, "Lieutenant, why don't you make yourself a cup of coffee?" The war immediately resumed in all its fury while I slinked to my corner of the dugout in shock. Within twenty minutes, the North Korean probe was history and life returned to normal in CP. I remained numb the rest of the night, not knowing who to hate more, me or the Gunny.

Lt. Gen. Bernard E. Trainor became military correspondent for *The New York Times* after his retirement from the Marine Corps in 1985. He is now an associate at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government and an *NBC News* military consultant.

The account from which this segment was excerpted appeared initially in the April 1996 issue of the *Marine Corps Gazette*.



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Transcript for Thurs., March 7, 2002

... I been on are ABC news, NBC News, and CBS News. And ... now, involving those two parties? LT. GEN. BERNARD TRAINOR (RET), US MARINE CORPS: Alan ... www.msnbc.com/news/721266.asp - 83k - [Cached](#) - [Similar pages](#)

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... Bernard E. Trainor, Adjunct Senior Fellow. ... Bg F. Brown Lt Col W. Clark ... Mg J. Welch Gen J. Wickham. ... Sloan Sch., MIT Bernard Harleston, City College ... NBC/RCA Jane ... www.alamo-girl.com/04562A3.htm - 48k - [Cached](#) - [Similar pages](#)

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
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... of Lt Gen Bernard E. "Mick" Trainor ... technology. Yet, General Trainor and Mr. Johnson

also ... base is credible. **Lt Gen James F ...** and chemical (**NBC**) attacks. Instead ...
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Theater Missile Defense

... component commander (JFACC), **Lt Gen Charles ...** with Iraq's **NBC** program, were to ... immortalized
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Lt. Gen. Bernard Trainor AND NBC

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TAB

7



If you think you know how to play the game...

December 14, 2001 19:26:57

The Early Show CBS Evening News 48 Hours 60 Minutes 60 Minutes II All Br

WAR ON TERROR

Section Front

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The Next Step

Dec 14, 2001



Some hawks see Iraq as the next terror target. (AP)

(CBS) To President Bush, the end of the Taliban does not end the war. What comes next he says, is a hunt for al-Qaida terrorists hiding in dozens of countries.

"And that is the reason this great nation with our friends and allies will not rest until we bring them all to justice," he said earlier this week.

CBS News Correspondent Wyatt Andrews reports the CIA and Pentagon have already focused on five countries: the Philippines, Yemen, Somalia, Sudan and Bosnia that harbor al-Qaida or its allies. A U.S. intelligence team has just visited Somalia gathering information on the al-Qaida presence there.

QUOTE

"They have been warned, they are being watched. They will be held to account."

President Bush on rogue nations with weapons of mass destruction

"The possibility of terror cells being in Somalia is real," visiting Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Walter Kansteiner told reporters in Pretoria this week.

A Somali faction leader opposed to that country's transitional government acknowledged Wednesday that he met this week with a U.S. military delegation to Somalia.

"We have been continuously consulting since the September terrorist attacks on the United States with representatives of the U.S., the Ethiopian and Kenyan governments on the terrorist networks run by Al-Itihaad and al-Qaida," Hussein Mohamed Aidid told reporters. "The visit by the American delegation is a continuation of that consultation."

Aidid is a member of the Ethiopian-backed Somali Reconciliation and Restoration Council, a group of faction leaders who oppose the transitional government of President Abdiqasim Salat Hassan and accuse it of having ties to Al-Itihaad Al-Islamiya, a Muslim fundamentalist organization that appeared on a Bush administration list of 22 terrorist organizations issued Dec. 6.

Kansteiner said Washington believes there are links between Osama bin Laden's al-Qaida, blamed for the Sept. 11 attacks, and Al-Itihaad, a militant Somali group, and that Washington wanted those links severed.

However, Somalia's prime minister denied that followers of Osama bin Laden had sought refuge in his shattered African country following their defeat by U.S. forces in Afghanistan.

"No absolutely. That is not true. No people fighting in Afghanistan are coming to Somalia. We would never accept that," Hassan Abshir Farah said.

"I think clearly there's going to be a phase two," said retired general and CBS News consultant Ron Fogelman.

He says the first U.S. tactic will be to demand that local governments shut down al-Qaida themselves. U.S. forces would be kept to a minimum and countries like Sudan and Yemen, after seeing what happened in Afghanistan, won't see a choice.

"For countries to see that this nation, this coalition has got the wherewithal and the will to go in and change a regime has got to have a big impact," he said.



By land, sea and air, the United States and allies employ their military might to engage terrorist networks in combat. Discover the new battlefields and follow America's war on terrorism.



The terror attacks in the U.S. and air strikes on Afghanistan have forced the nation to toughen its national security. Find out what actions are being taken to protect our nation in the air, water and on land.

MULTIMEDIA

Video Wyatt Andrews reports on the future fronts in the war on terrorism.

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But the president is not just focused on al-Qaida. His speeches also mention rogue states that hold weapons of mass destruction.

"They have been warned, they are being watched. They will be held to account," cautioned the president.

Where exactly dos the president mean? In Washington there is a drumbeat to target Iraq.

The war on terrorism will not be over until we take down Saddam Hussein because so long as he's in power in Iraq. He's not just a thorn in our side he's a threat to American lives," said Sen. Joseph Lieberman, D-Conn.

The Iraq question is being hotly debated with the hawks arguing it's now or never and the more cautious pointing out there is no international support to attack Saddam Hussein — these are discussions. Right now, officials insist no formal decisions on phase two of the war have been made.

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- Could It Have Been Stopped?
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March 4, 2002

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NEWS ANALYSIS

U.S. Took Time for This Afghan Raid

By JOHN HENDREN, Times Staff Writer

WASHINGTON -- In planning the current air and ground assault in the eastern Afghan mountains near Gardez, U.S. military strategists drew on the lessons of last year's disappointing campaign in Tora Bora, a mountainous region near the Khyber Pass.

That battle began in November and ended after weeks of relentless airstrikes had killed hundreds of suspected Al Qaeda and Taliban fighters. But hundreds--if not thousands--escaped, possibly including Osama bin Laden.

This time, defense officials and military analysts say, the Pentagon is doing it differently.

Before the air assault that began Saturday morning, U.S. soldiers were deployed to block the roads, making sure that no one left the region. U.S. diplomats quietly worked with Pakistani officials to ensure that Afghanistan's border with Pakistan was sealed more thoroughly. Instead of relying on Afghan forces with sometimes competing interests, war planners put hundreds more American boots on the ground, taking weeks to train U.S. and Afghan forces.

The difference, military strategists say, is time. The region had been under increasingly intense surveillance since early January after reports of a growing mass of pro-Taliban forces surfaced, an Afghan Interior Ministry official said.

"This has been in the planning for a few weeks, quite a few weeks," a senior U.S. defense official said. In Tora Bora, "we didn't know the terrain very well, and we didn't have quite enough help from the locals. . . . But here, you had time to set it up, you had time to surveil, you had time to think about it."

A week before hundreds of American soldiers descended on what Pentagon officials now describe as the last major redoubt of Al Qaeda fighters, U.S. officers attending a party in the southern Afghan city of Kandahar for warlord Gul Agha Shirzai murmured about "the big push up north."

As they walked back to their base, a line of Humvees and equipment used by special operations soldiers and the Army's 101st

Photos



Afghan soldiers mountain pass (Reuters)

Special Rep

A CHANGE

An occasional serk- impact of the Sep- American society.

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La Opinión

Airborne Division was quietly rolling out to be loaded onto C-17 and C-130 cargo planes in the dead of night. Thermobaric bombs, devastating cave-penetrating explosive devices never before tested in battle, were being shipped from the United States.

Over the last two months, in fact, special operations soldiers have been arriving in the villages and mountains of Paktia province and the city of Khowst, to the southeast. Local Afghan commanders and defense officials said U.S. Special Forces soldiers trained at least one group of 500 Afghans for a search in the rugged, isolated mountains several hours' drive south of Afghanistan's capital, Kabul.

The campaign required coordination with special operations and support soldiers from Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany and Norway, the U.S. Central Command, which is running the war, disclosed Sunday. To achieve that coordination, U.S. commanders took a stronger hand in managing the campaign still dominated by the 1,500 soldiers of three Afghan warlords--Kamal Khan Zadran, Zakim Khan and Gen. Zia.

The ensuing battle has emerged as the fiercest since December, when a combination of U.S. air power, Afghan ground forces and U.S. special operations soldiers defeated the Taliban at its last major stronghold in Kandahar. A senior defense official described the target region as a haven for several hundred fighters--discounting estimates of up to 5,000--who have regrouped to form the last major pocket of Al Qaeda and Taliban holdouts in the country.

"These guys were either going to dig in and fight and finish it or they were going and run. So we had to prepare the size of force--the weaponeering, the tactics--to either," the defense official said.

"Now we've been down in the area," he added. "We've established some relations locals. We've learned the terrain very well. We have a better picture of how they're about."

Defense officials have declined to describe the Tora Bora campaign as rife with mistakes. They have acknowledged that U.S. forces did not understand the porous terrain. The Afghan soldiers who dominated the anti-Taliban forces in the campaign often led cave-by-cave searches reluctantly, appearing more interested in looting than finding Bin Laden, a defense analyst said. Although the Gardez-area campaign reverted largely to an air campaign Sunday--the result, Afghan commanders said, of intense opposition from well-armed pro-Taliban fighters--there are hundreds more Americans on the battleground, including Special Forces and, for the first time, regular Army soldiers from the 101st Airborne in Kandahar.

"The Defense Department has done a remarkably good job of learning on the fly," Ralph Peters, a retired Army intelligence officer, said Sunday. "In Tora Bora, they hope that the Afghans would in fact do more for us than they actually did, which you're now seeing more U.S. forces on the ground."

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The Pentagon has also dug deeper into its arsenal to ship 2,000-pound thermobaric explosives to Afghanistan. The bombs, used at least twice over the weekend, sent explosive pressure of the bomb deep into cave and tunnel complexes.

Another failing in Tora Bora came in coordinating with Pakistan, analysts said. The States relied almost exclusively on Pakistani soldiers to seal the border, by some : allowing thousands of Taliban and Al Qaeda fighters to cross to safety in Pakistan doing little more than removing their trademark black turbans. Some reports suggest Pakistani intelligence officials loyal to the Taliban aided the fugitives. This time, soldiers have reportedly blocked all roads out of the region and coordinated much closely with Pakistan to guard the border.

"We relied on the Pakistanis to do that at Tora Bora, and that was a mistake. They did it," said Col. Timothy Eads, a retired Army special operations officer. "From what we understand, U.S. forces sealed the border this time."

Notably, the suspected pro-Taliban forces are believed not to have fled before the attack, suggesting that Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf may have purged from intelligence service the pro-Taliban elements who might have tipped off the opposition.

"We clearly hit them before they could move all their key people and supplies out of the area," Peters said.

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TAB

9

Media Beat

Oct. 8, 2001

TV News: A Militarized Zone

By Norman Solomon

When the bombing of Afghanistan resumed Monday night [Oct. 8], retired generals showed no fatigue at their posts under hot lights at network studios. On CNN, former NATO supreme commander Wesley Clark teamed up with Maj. Gen. Don Shepperd to explain military strategies; they were sharing their insights as employees of AOL Time Warner.

Far away, missiles are flying and bombs are exploding -- but in televisionland, a sense of equilibrium prevails. The tones are calm; the correspondents are self-composed. News bulletins crawl across the bottom of the screen, along with invitations to learn more. "Take a 3-D look at U.S. military aircraft at CNN.com."

At Pentagon briefings, carried live, the secretary of defense bears a chilling resemblance to a predecessor named McNamara. But the language of Donald Rumsfeld is thoroughly modern, foreshadowing a war without end: "In this battle against terrorism, there is no silver bullet." But there will be many bullets, missiles and bombs. We hear the customary assurances that air strikes will be surgical, and Rumsfeld echoes the metaphor: "Terrorism is a cancer on the human condition."

The reports about the bombing are laced with references to airborne food drops. Details have been sketchy. But self-congratulation has been profuse on television, now a free-fire zone for war propaganda.

Sunday night [Oct. 7], on "Larry King Live," a bipartisan panel of senators affirmed their loyalty to the president. The ranking GOP member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, a former secretary of the navy, illuminated our goodness. Sen. John Warner said: "This, I think, is the first time in contemporary military history where a military operation is being conducted against the government of a country, and simultaneously, with the troops carrying out their mission, other troops are trying to take care of the innocent victims who all too often are caught in harm's way."

Hours after Warner's explanation of American saintliness, the UN's World Food Program halted its convoys of emergency aid to Afghanistan because of the bombing campaign. Meanwhile, private relief workers voiced escalating alarm. A news release, put out by my colleagues at the Institute for Public Accuracy (www.accuracy.org), quoted the president of the humanitarian aid organization Conscience International, Jim Jennings: "Food drops from high altitudes alone absolutely cannot provide sufficient and effective relief that is urgently necessary to prevent mass starvation."

The U.S. government sent two C-17 planes to drop rations. Jennings, who has been involved in humanitarian work around the world for two decades, was not impressed. At a single camp inside Afghanistan, in Herat, "there are 600,000 people on the verge of starvation," he said. "If you provide one pound of food per day, the minimum for bare survival, it would take 500 planeloads a month to supply the one camp in Herat alone, and Afghanistan is the size of Texas. The administration has stated that two aircraft are being used for food relief so far -- for all of Afghanistan."

Avowedly, the main targets of the bombing are the people in the Bin Laden network. But the rhetorical salvoes will be understood, all too appropriately, in wider contexts. "We will root them out and starve them out," Rumsfeld said, just before closing a news conference with a ringing declaration: "We are determined not to be terrorized."

"That last quote says it all," MSNBC anchor Brian Williams interjected a moment later, before going to "NBC military analyst" Bernard Trainor, a former Marine Corps general. Like the other ex-generals on network payrolls, Trainor consistently uses the word "we" to describe U.S. military actions. ("We now have the capability...") High-tech maps and video graphics are profuse during the explications of war-game scenarios.

Former diplomats can play too. On NBC, Richard Holbrooke -- a media favorite who engineered the diplomatic runup to the bombing of Yugoslavia in spring 1999 -- chatted with Tom Brokaw while using a pointer and a bright-lit map to elucidate geopolitical dynamics.

Constantly crawling across TV screens, snippets of quotes blur together... Bin Laden saying that believers will triumph, Bush declaring "may God continue to bless America," the Taliban accusing the U.S. of "terrorist" attacks... As time goes on, the adversaries increasingly seem to be talking each other's language.

The on-screen logos, spangled in red-white-and-blue, exude pride in a nation resurgent. CBS has opted for "America Fights Back." NBC and MSNBC are using "America Strikes Back." At times, MSNBC switches to an alternate buzz phrase: "Homeland Defense."

Supposedly, bombing Afghanistan is going to make us safer back here in the USA. Yet hours after the attacks began on Oct. 7, the FBI called for heightened alerts across the United States -- because the risk of another deadly attack in this country had just increased. If war can be peace, why can't greater danger bring us greater security?

By Monday afternoon, networks were showing bombers taking off from aircraft carriers, en route to Afghanistan. MSNBC's viewers saw footage of warheads with "NYPD" scrawled on them; in the background, an American Flag fluttered on deck.

And so, a bait-and-switch process of patriotic imagery is near completion. For weeks, in the aftermath of the horrendous events of Sept. 11, the public embraced Old Glory as a symbol of grief, human solidarity and love of country. Now the ubiquitous American Flag is being affixed to military means of destruction.

"This will be a long war," George W. Bush promised on Monday. From all indications, the TV networks are ready to do their part for the military operation that has been named Enduring Freedom. But far from the comforts of televisionland, many people will be enduring our freedom to kill.

Norman Solomon's latest book is "The Habits of Highly Deceptive Media."

*** Note to readers of "Media Beat": If you'd like to see Norman Solomon's syndicated column appear in a local daily newspaper, you can help-- by contacting the opinion-page editors of papers in your area and urging that they give the column a try. Editors can make arrangements by phoning Creators Syndicate in Los Angeles or by sending an email note to mediabeat@igc.org.

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SECRETARY OF THE ARMY 13 NOV 07
WASHINGTON



INFO MEMO

November 12, 2002; 2:00 p.m.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
FROM: Thomas E. White, Secretary of the Army
Tom White
SUBJECT: M-1 Tank Facility

I talked to Secretary O'Neill about his visit. He says the facility is being run very poorly (2 on his scale of 10); I am not happy and will attack the issue. The plant itself is mainly shut down, contractor-operated (General Dynamics), and overseen by a team from the Defense Contract Management Agency.

I'll give you an update as we fix things.

COORDINATION: NONE

U18253 /02

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11-L-0559/OSD/12980

October 31, 2002 6:57 AM

TO: Tom White
CC: Honorable Paul O'Neill
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: M-1 Tank Facility

Would you please call Secretary O'Neill and get his views on the M-1 tank facility he visited, and let me know what your reaction is.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
103102-5

11-L-0559/OSD/12981

U17807-02

show/ake

10/2/02

October 1, 2002 8:44 AM

TO: David Chu

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Foreign Language Speakers/Training

I don't really want to get into too much of a dialogue on this issue and take weeks and months—I want to get a template as to what we think the most important languages are going to be, set some targets and then tell the Services to get about it.

091.4

The brains I want you to get on this are Andy Marshall, the Chairman or Vice Chairman and Director of the Joint Staff, Doug Feith and Paul Wolfowitz. Then I think we ought to get some advice from others, like the CIA.

Thanks.

Attach.

09/23/02 USD(P&R) Memo to SecDef re: Arabic, Chinese and Spanish Language Speakers
[U15403/02]

DHR:dh
100102-18

1 OCT 02

November 12, 2002 10:54 AM

TO: ADM Giambastiani
CC: Gen. Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: JFCOM Update

US JFCOM

Thanks for your 7 November Joint Forces Command Update. It was excellent.

Do we have the right amounts in the budget for what you need to do in '04 and thereafter? If not, get on the horn with Steve Cambone and let's get it fixed.

Regards.

DHR:dh
111202-29



Please respond by 12/6/02

12 Nov 02

November 12, 2002 7:18 AM

TO: Combatant Commanders
Commanders

CC: Gen. Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT: Quarterly Reports

In the past, the pattern has been for Commanders to send in a quarterly report. On reflection, I haven't found them very useful. They seem to come off as somewhat forced. Therefore, I recommend they be discontinued.

Instead, I would suggest that if and when you have something you feel I should know, please put a single subject on a single piece of paper and send it to me.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
110802-12

.....
Please respond by _____


Snowflake

November 13, 2002 7:07 AM

VIA FACSIMILE
49-228-379981

TO: Franz Krapf

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT: Visit

I met with Minister of Defense Struck. I am confident he was not in any way embarrassed. I was hospitable.

Do express my appreciation to Minister Leber for his interest.

With my appreciation and best wishes,

Sincerely,

DHR:dh
111202-41

Germany

13 Nov 02

11-L-0559/OSD/12985

U18355 /02



Ambassador Franz Krapp
FAX: (b)(6)

Oct. 26, 2002-

Hon. Donald H. Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
Room SE 880
1000 Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301

Dear Don,

This is to repeat the essence of what I told (b)(6) yesterday over the telephone:

Former Secretary of Defense Georg Leber who - as I - is very much concerned over the present state of the relations between our two countries, asked me to tell you that he would like to see you very urgently and well before the Prague summit. He would like, as a friend of your country, to discuss the situation informally with you to seek your advice about what could be done on our side to improve this situation. He informed Sec. Struck of his plan and at the same time advised him strongly against trying himself at this time to talk to you directly.

Struck welcomed Leber's idea very much. A Luftwaffe plane is at our disposal at very short notice at any time. I would accompany George.

Of course we realize the tremendous burden of work you have to cope with. But we feel that we should spare no effort to help.

Your opinion, Don, at this moment would be particularly valuable and I do hope that you can arrange a very informal meeting.

Sincerely

Franz

10/31/02

Sir,

You may recall that Amb. Franz Krapf called a few days ago to make an appointment with you (copy attached). You requested that Dr. Wolfowitz or Doug Feith see him.

Unfortunately, Dr. Wolfowitz does not have the time available, and Mr. Feith will be TDY for the next week.

Do you want to pass this down to Dr. Crouch, who will be available?

Amb. Krapf has called me daily asking about an appointment. He is a very sweet man. He feels strongly the appointment should be complete before MoD of Germany's visit here, on November 11th.

Please advise.

Thank you,

V/r,

Arlene

10/31

Sec Def - I will talk w. the
Amb Krapf and attempt to
dissuade him from coming.
J. Ritter

_____ Yes, Dr. Crouch should see Amb. Krapf

_____ Other

SECDEF HAS SEEN

10/25/02
7:30am

OCT 25 2002

Ambassador Franz Krapf called from Germany. He would like an appointment to come to DC and have dinner or a long meeting with you. He intends to bring with him former Secretary of Defense George Lieber (Germany). He said you are a life-long friend of Lieber's.

Discussion would be on how to improve current German/American Relations. Secretary Lieber has already discussed his intentions to meet you with the current German Secretary of Defense Schtrock (sp?) who has unofficially approved of the meeting.

LD has been advised, and requested I give you this note.

Arlene

_____ Set Meeting

_____ Regret

Ash P.W.
D.F.

11-L-0559/OSD/12988

showfile

November 14, 2002 8:10 AM

TO: Honorable Mitchell E. Daniels, Jr.

CC: Honorable Paul Wolfowitz
Gen. Richard Myers
Honorable Dov Zakheim

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Pending Business

110.01

We have several items pending. They are:

1. Getting a Presidential decision on the inflation plus-\$10 billion issue for DoD for FY '08 and '09. (See attached memo.)
2. Sorting through with you any remaining issue on incremental funding for R&D on some major shipbuilding.
3. Coming to an early understanding about a supplemental appropriation to go to Congress in early February 2003 for the global war on terrorism, which is clearly going to be needed. We are already moving through November and are moving funds out of some accounts to cover the global war on terrorism, which, as you know, wasn't funded for '03 because of actions by the Congress.
4. Last, there is the question of our putting out a "call" in DoD to ask what it would cost in the event of a conflict in Iraq. There are some pluses to asking the question—we will have some answers, and it would reinforce the diplomacy and could help to persuade Saddam Hussein that force is behind the UN inspections. Another plus might be that when the figures come in, the numbers could be high, and that could put pressure on Congressional efforts to raise non-defense spending.

Why don't you think about these issues, and then let's get them decided.

Thanks.

Attach.
11/14/02 SecDef memo to the President re: \$10 Billion for FY 08 and 09

DHR:dh
110602-12

14 NOV 02



COMPTROLLER

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1100 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON DC 20301-1100

SEC 1100-1100-001
NOV 15 11 3 03



INFO MEMO

November 14, 2002, 5:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dov S. Zakheim NOV 15 2002

SUBJECT: Tasks – Reserve vs. Active Duty

- You noted that some distinctive tasks are found only in the reserves and not in the active duty force. You asked what these tasks are, what the Services are doing to put these skills on active duty, and how this is reflected in the budget (Tab A).
- Tab B lists capabilities in each Military Service that are found nearly exclusively (~80 – 100 percent) in the Reserve Components. It notes which capabilities will be reallocated during the ongoing FY 2004 – FY 2009 program/budget review to bring more of them into the active force.
- The Services will bring some capabilities into the active force because demand for these skills has increased. For example, the Army plans to increase its active Civil Affairs units because all recent mobilizations have required this capability.
- The Services are keeping many of the capabilities shown in Tab B in the Reserve Forces because they are never used except during war. Examples include Navy cargo handling units and Army water supply units. Other capabilities are kept in Reserve Forces because they exist in small, specialized communities and are needed on an intermittent basis. Large numbers are not needed for mobilization. Examples include Air Force polar ski aircraft, Army Alaska scout battalions, and Navy and Marine Corps adversary squadrons. The Services judge that it is far less costly to keep units used intermittently in the Reserve Forces than on full-time active duty.
- Other capabilities are simply in short supply, requiring reserves to be mobilized when these are needed. For example, the reserves contain only 35 percent of the Air Force's security forces, but demands since 9-11 have caused the Air Force to mobilize 90 percent of its reserves in this career field. Moving more of these capabilities to the active side would not be sufficient to solve the problem.
- The Services plan to increase capabilities in the active force for shortage skills in the FY 2004 - 2009 program. Only modest changes are planned for FY 2004.



11-L-0559/OSD/12991

U18398 /02

More significant adjustments are planned by all of the Services beginning in FY 2005.

- Within constant end strength levels, adding capabilities to the active force would require offsets. The Quadrennial Defense Review-directed "Review of Reserve Component Contributions to National Defense," performed by the USD (P&R), suggests options for making these offsets: convert lower-demand structure inside the active force and reallocate capabilities from the active force to the Reserve Forces. The review also identifies options for maximizing key capabilities held in Reserve Forces but needed intermittently: convert lower demand structure inside the Reserve Forces, and change reserve personnel management to enhance volunteerism and diminish involuntary mobilization.
- The next Defense Planning Guidance can add additional direction to ensure such force changes are made.

COORDINATION: Tab C.

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared By:

(b)(6)

TAB

A

November 1, 2002 2:47 PM

TO: Dov Zakheim
Steve Cambone

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Tasks—Reserve v. Active Duty

Today we had a briefing on Reserves and active duty personnel. It is very clear that there are some distinctive tasks only found in the Reserves that are not found on active duty, which means if you want to do those things you have to activate Reservists. That seems to me to be unwise.

I would like a list of what those things are, and then an indication of what the various Services are doing to put those critical skills back on active duty, rather than in the Reserves. This has to be reflected in the budget in some way.

Please advise.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
110102-19

.....
Please respond by 11/15/02

TAB

B

Mission Area	RC Personnel	RC Units	% of Total Force	Description	FY 04-09 Budget Changes
Marine Corps					
Civil Affairs	242	2	100%	Intermittent surge requirements, using civilian-based skills.	None
Adversary Squadrons	28	1	100%	Steady-state, predictable requirement, using aircraft not assigned to war plans.	None
Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Companies	494	2	100%	Active component capability will provide MAGTF Commanders enhanced capability for fire support liaison and coordination with allies.	Reorganization of existing MEF assets to establish new AC capability. RC assets stay the same.
Air Force					
Weather Reconnaissance	203	1	100%	Steady-state requirements well suited to the Reserves.	None
Air Defense Interceptor	2,674	4	100%	Vacillating threat levels since 9/11 may require intermittent AC support.	None
Aerial Spraying	409	4 aircraft	100%	Steady-state peacetime requirement managed by RC in AEF construct.	None
Polar Ski Aircraft	218	10 aircraft	100%	Reimbursable program funded by National Science Foundation.	None

Mission Area	RC Personnel	RC Units	% of Total Force	Description	FY 04-09 Budget Changes
Army					
Civil Affairs	6,064	40	95%	Civilian acquired skills needed to rebuild infrastructure. Increased requirements in later phases of small scale contingencies.	Added AC structure to support ongoing increased demand.
Public Affairs	1,412	64	92%	Limited peacetime requirement; RC provides wartime surge.	Increased RC capability
Division Institutional Training	23,883	5	100%	Supports CONUS training base expansion during mobilization. Runs peacetime training for active & reserve units.	None
Training Support Divisions	11,480	7	79%	Multi-component units to provide training evaluation for RC units; improve readiness. Validates units for deployment.	None
Water Supply	3,610	49	92%	Limited peacetime requirement.	None
Alaska Scouts	945	3	100%	World War II, Cold War derived capability; now Congressionally supported.	None
Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams	692	32	100%	By law, National Guard support of on-site situational assessments to civil authorities for WMD incidents within CONUS.	None
Navy					
Mobil Inshore Undersea Warfare	2,898	45	100%	Additional AC structure required. After USS Cole, 24/7 demand increased.	\$99M RC Equipment; no force changes
Naval Embarked Advisory Teams	87	3	100%	Low peacetime demand	None
Harbor Defense	413	14	100%	Low peacetime demand	None
Port Cargo Handling Support	3,087	14	100%	Low peacetime demand	None
Logistics Support Airlift	3,800	15	88%	Steady state, predictable requirements manageable with non-mobilized Reserves.	None

TAB

C

COORDINATION PAGE

Subject: Tasks – Reserve v. Active Duty

OUSD(P&R)

Jennifer Buck *
DASD(Reserve Affairs)

November 14, 2002

* Dr. Chu has seen and approved; package is in for his formal coordination as of 11/14/02 4:45 PM

11-L-0559/OSD/12999

November 1, 2002 2:47 PM

TO: ~~Dov Zakheim~~
Steve Cambone

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Tasks—Reserve v. Active Duty

Today we had a briefing on Reserves and active duty personnel. It is very clear that there are some distinctive tasks only found in the Reserves that are not found on active duty, which means if you want to do those things you have to activate Reservists. That seems to me to be unwise.

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Please advise.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
110102-19

.....

Please respond by 11/15/02

326

1 Nov 02



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
 1100 DEFENSE PENTAGON
 WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1100



INFO MEMO 222 NOV 16 AM 9:53

COMPTROLLER

November 18, 2002, 9:00 AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dov S. Zakheim *DZ*

SUBJECT: Support for the Afghan National Army (ANA)

- You asked for a summary of the support provided to the Afghan National Army (ANA) to date by the U.S. and international community.
- To date, the United States and the international community have delivered \$93.965 million in support to the ANA.
- The United States has contributed \$84.08 million in support for the ANA. The U.S. contribution accounts for 89.4 percent of all support delivered to the ANA to date. Tab A provides the details of U.S. support.
- The international community has provided \$1.56 million in cash donations to the ANA. Tab B provides the details of this support.
- The international community has provided \$8.325 million in In-Kind assistance to the ANA. Tab C provides the details of this support.
- The international community has pledged an additional \$98.35 million in cash/In-Kind assistance to the ANA, but has not yet delivered the cash/items. Once this support is delivered, the ANA will have received approximately \$192.315 million in support. Tab D provides a summary of these pledges.
- Taking into account donations and pledges, there is a \$350 million shortfall in FY03 funding for the ANA. State, Policy, and my office are working together to close this gap.

*all
 We need
 to do better*

!

*to do - focusing on
 U.S. (\$50M) and data...*

COORDINATION: Tab E.

Attachments:
 As stated

Prepared By: (b)(6)

TAB

A

TAB A – U.S. Government Funding (\$84.08 million)

- \$50.00 million of FY 2002 supplemental Foreign Military Financing (FMF) funds.
- \$20.00 million of FY 2002 supplemental Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) funds.
- \$7.00 million of FY 2002 reprogrammed FMF funds.
- \$1.78 million of FY 2002 reprogrammed PKO funds.
- \$3.80 million to “Quick Start” ANA training. This includes:
 - \$2.00 million of Presidential Drawdown authority.
 - \$0.85 million of CINC Initiative Funds.
 - \$0.95 million of Emergency and Extraordinary Expense (EEE) authority funds
- \$1.50 million of EEE authority for a Ministry of Defense contractor assessment study.

TAB

B

TAB B - International Cash Donations (\$1.56 million)

COUNTRY	AMOUNT (\$)	TYPE OF SUPPORT
France	\$0.56 million	ANA salaries
Qatar	\$0.05 million	ANA salaries
Luxembourg	\$0.90 million	ANA Trust Fund Deposit
Finland	\$0.05 million	ANA Trust Fund Deposit

TAB

C

TAB C - In-Kind Contributions Delivered (valued at \$8.325 million)

COUNTRY	AMOUNT (\$)	TYPE OF SUPPORT
France	\$3.0 million	ANA Training
Slovenia	\$1.68 million	Weapons/Equipment
Ukraine	\$1.13 million	Weapons/Ammunition
Bulgaria	\$0.65 million	Weapons/Ammunition
Romania	\$0.485 million	Weapons/Ammunition
Greece	\$0.60 million	Air Lift/Equipment
Korea	\$0.30 million	Medical Support
Denmark	\$0.30 million	Air Lift
Italy	\$0.15 million	Equipment
Switzerland	\$0.03 million	Equipment

TAB

D

TAB D - Assistance In Kind Pledged but not Delivered (\$98.315 million)

COUNTRY	AMOUNT (\$)	TYPE OF SUPPORT
United Arab Emirates	\$50.00 million	Vehicles/Communications Gear
United Kingdom	\$17.50 million	Salaries/Communications Gear/ Afghan MoD Support
India	\$10.50 million	Vehicles/Driver Training
Hungary	\$7.33 million	Weapons/Ammunition
Lithuania	\$5.12 million	Weapons/Ammunition
Croatia	\$3.18 million	Ammunition
Korea	\$2.00 million	Communications Gear
The Netherlands	\$2.00 million	ANA Salaries
Albania	\$0.53 million	Weapons/Ammunition
Germany	\$0.19 million	Vehicles

TAB

E

COORDINATION

USDP/SOLIC	Dr. Joseph Collins	November 14, 2002
USCENTCOM (J-5)	COL (P) Joseph Orr	November 13, 2002
JCS (J-5)	LTC Pat Antonietti	November 13, 2002

Snowflake

October 25, 2002 8:17 AM

TO: Dov Zakheim
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DA
SUBJECT: Money to ANA

Let's get a list of all the money like this \$50 million referred to here that is going to go into the Afghan National Army, whether it is in dollars or in kind. We need to keep a tally.

Thanks.

Attach.

Cable 02 2759093, TOR 231411Z OCT 02, ABU DHAB 05771

DHR:dh
102502-5

.....
Please respond by 11/08/02 11/15/02 per Col. Belt

UNCLASSIFIED WHEN SEPARATED
FROM CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE

11-L-0559/OSD/13012



October 25, 2002 8:17 AM

TO: Doy Zakheim
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DA
SUBJECT: Money to ANA

Let's get a list of all the money like this \$50 million referred to here that is going to go into the Afghan National Army, whether it is in dollars or in kind. We need to keep a tally.

Thanks.

Attach.
Cable 02 2759093, TOR 231411Z OCT 02, ABU DHAB 05771

DHR:dh
102502-5

.....
Please respond by 11/08/02 11/15/02 per Col. Bett

AFGHANISTAN

85 Oct 02

UNCLASSIFIED WHEN SEPARATED FROM CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE

11-L-0559/OSD/13013

U18433 / 02

NOV 19 2002 11:30 AM



COMPTROLLER

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1100 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1100
INFO MEMO

November 19, 2002, 11:30 AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dov S. Zakheim 

SUBJECT: Mitch Daniels Response

- The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) staff is well aware of our need for a supplemental appropriation in FY 2003. We worked with OMB to develop the "fixed costs" proposal for \$10.055 billion (including \$700 million for the Nuclear Posture Review Program) that was included in the President's Budget submission. These "fixed costs" were for research, procurement and, more generally, non-O&M accounts. We will continue to work with OMB on a daily basis. In my view, there is no failure of communications with OMB.
- The OMB leadership is averse to submitting a supplemental appropriation at this time because it opens the door to other issues such as the funding level for non-defense spending, deficit spending, and the uncertainty of future war-related plans.
- We have asked the Components to prepare their cost estimates for the current Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Noble Eagle. We have also prepared for your approval a data request for the next phase. My staff will receive this data in late November and we should have a handle on these cost estimates by mid December. Once you approve these cost estimates, we will share all our data and analysis with the OMB staff. They are aware that we are collecting this information.

- Executing FY 2003 presents a wide-range of funding challenges. The attachment provides a snapshot of the FY 2003 funding shortfalls as we know them today. This list will evolve as the year unfolds.
- The suggestion from Mr. Daniels that we use the \$10.055 billion from the budgeted “fixed costs” to finance current war-related requirements would require substantial reprogramming actions. It would take money (which was cut to \$7.1 billion in the Appropriations Act) from budgeted efforts such as procurement of additional precision munitions (especially JDAM), acquisition of additional Predators, Guantanamo Bay detention center operations, NORTHCOM headquarters functions, investment in improved intelligence capabilities, CONUS combat air patrols and others.
- I will continue to carry our message to OMB. We will likely need you and the Deputy to continue to carry our message to Mr. Daniels and others in the White House as well.

COORDINATION: None

Attachment:
As stated

cc: Deputy Secretary of Defense
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Director, Program Analysis and Evaluation

Prepared By:

(b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/13015

FY 2003 Budget Execution Problems

	<u>\$ Million</u>
Global War on Terrorism Continuation of current Operation Enduring Freedom/Noble Eagle at current monthly expenditure rates*	10,000-13,000
Preparation Tasks	2,500
Undistributed Reductions Congressional reductions related to reduced inflation rates, improved business practices, information technology development, foreign currency fluctuation adjustments, travel, purchase card reform, reduced FFRDC usage	3,192
Fuel Price Increase Budget assumed \$18/barrel; current prices fluctuating between \$25-30/barrel; prices could rise higher	1,400
Working Capital fund Purchases of Supplies/Spare parts Additional purchases to support preparation tasks	2,000
Increased Civilian Pay Raise Budget assumed 2.6 percent raise; Congress will authorize 4.1 percent	490
Guantanamo Base Operations Increased cost of detention center operations	125
PAC-3 Missile Production Acceleration Buy an additional 12 missiles this fiscal year	104
MH-47 Helicopter Procurement Offer from United Kingdom for 8 aircraft for SOCOM missions	368
White House Communications Agency Additional requirements identified in Andrew Card memo	103
Armed Forces Radiological Research Institute Medical research, FY 2003 budget transferred funding responsibility to NIH Absence of a HHS appropriation requires DoD to continue funding	10

* Some portion could be covered by O&M accounts, but net bill is expected to approximate \$10 billion.

	<u>\$ Million</u>
Free Iraq Force	150-400
Afghan National Army	350-400**
Various operation and maintenance requirements	50
Additional continuity of government requirements, GSA rent increase, etc.	
FIA (NFIP)	900

These costs are subject to change and will have to be paid from either a supplemental request or reprogramming actions.

** State responsibility, but not budgeted by State.

(b)(6)

November 17, 2002 3:26 PM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz

CC: Gen. Myers ADM Clark
Doy Zakheim Steve Cambone

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: OMB Issues

Attached is a response I got from Mitch Daniels on the memo I sent him, which is also attached. We simply have to get the Department organized to start working at the staff level over there and get their heads screwed into this. This idea that we don't need a supplemental fast is amazing. How could we be that much out of touch with them that they would think that. We need to get the data, the facts, what the Services are doing, get it sorted out and inform me and then OMB.

The good news, of course, is that we are getting the inflation plus \$10 billion in the out years 08 and 09, and that he does think we should go ahead with the data call on Iraq.

The other issue that needs to be addressed is incremental R&D funding. I was surprised when I found out the extent to which the Navy is apparently thinking of split funding. I was under the impression it was just the aircraft carrier. I must have misunderstood. They have always done it with the aircraft carrier, so that shouldn't be a problem. It is the other things that are bothering him. I need a briefing showing me what we are trying to do, so that maybe I can provide some input before we start finally racking the numbers up.

Thanks.

Attnch.
11/15/02 Daniels Ltr to SecDef

DMR:dh
111702.6

.....

Please respond by 12/6/02

November 15, 2002

TO: HONORABLE DONALD RUMSFELD
FROM: MITCH DANIELS *MDJ*
SUBJECT: STATUS REPORT

A status report on your items of concern, on each of which our staffs have been working actively together:

- 1.) I support continuing annual \$10 billion increases (beyond inflation) in FY 08 and FY 09, as you suggested. I still believe that any further extension of these increases should be linked to Presidential reviews of long-term needs, and of the progress of transformation. I have encouraged Condi Rice to take the initiative in organizing such reviews. I know your planning process needs to proceed, and it seems to me that we know enough about both subjects to move ahead this year without waiting.
- 2.) On incremental funding, I think caution is in order. First, the hazards of incremental funding are real, especially the risk that future Congresses will violate the compact and drive up projected costs through schedule stretchouts or other deviations from the original plan. Up to this point, the Department's proposals look unduly risky, especially given the large resources currently available to support the conventional approach.

Moreover, this is not the only departure from conservative budget practices that the Department is asking us to sanction. Simultaneously, we have received requests to lease rather than purchase new equipment, and to reduce sharply reserves for termination liability on a variety of projects. Taken together, this would compound to a lot of new taxpayer exposure. We want to be cooperative in accelerating recapitalization, but up to this point we are not comfortable that these mechanisms are responsible.
3. I think it is premature to plan on a supplemental for the current anti-terror operations. The President requested, and Congress provided \$10.055B for the so-called "fixed costs" of the war on terrorism, and the Department's own current estimates indicate that costs are not exceeding this level. Obviously, we are monitoring this on a regular basis.
- 4.) I support your proceeding with a data call on Iraq.

Available anytime to discuss these things further.

*Copies have gone to - Dep Sec. Def
- Comptroller*

cc: CFD

11-L-0559/OSD/13019

TOTAL P.02

118449-02

(b)(6)

November 14, 2002 8:10 AM

TO: Honorable Mitchell E. Daniels, Jr.

CC: Honorable Paul Wolfowitz
Gen. Richard Myers
Honorable Dov Zakheim

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Pending Business

We have several items pending. They are:

1. Getting a Presidential decision on the inflation plus-\$10 billion issue for DoD for FY '08 and '09. (See attached memo.)
2. Sorting through with you any remaining issue on incremental funding for R&D on some major shipbuilding.
3. Coming to an early understanding about a supplemental appropriation to go to Congress in early February 2003 for the global war on terrorism, which is clearly going to be needed. We are already moving through November and are moving funds out of some accounts to cover the global war on terrorism, which, as you know, wasn't funded for '03 because of actions by the Congress.
4. Last, there is the question of our putting out a "call" in DoD to ask what it would cost in the event of a conflict in Iraq. There are some pluses to asking the question—we will have some answers, and it would reinforce the diplomacy and could help to persuade Saddam Hussein that force is behind the UN inspections. Another plus might be that when the figures come in, the numbers could be high, and that could put pressure on Congressional efforts to raise non-defense spending.

Why don't you think about these issues, and then let's get them decided.

Thanks.

Attach.

11/14/02 SecDef memo to the President re: \$10 Billion for FY 08 and 09

DHR:dh
110602-12

(b)(6)

November 17, 2002 3:26 PM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz

CC: Gen. Myers ADM Clark
Doy Zakheim Steve Cambone

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: OMB Issues

110.01

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Thanks.

Attach.
11/15/02 Daniels Ltr to SecDef

DHR:dh
11/17/02.6

.....
Please respond by 12/6/02

17NOV02

November 15, 2002

TO: HONORABLE DONALD RUMSFELD
FROM: MITCH DANIELS *MDJ*
SUBJECT: STATUS REPORT

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4.) I support your proceeding with a data call on Iraq.

Available anytime to discuss these things further.

*Copies have gone to - Dep Sec. Def
- Comptroller*

cc: CFD

8:18 AM

TO: Torie Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
DATE: November 9, 2002
SUBJECT: Anaheim Angels

337 JCOC

Please tell me when I met with this group. I don't remember this fellow at all.
Somebody also ought to make sure we get a nice thank you letter to him.

Thanks.

Brent
D. & SecDef
ever do (65)
the drop by
for the JCOC.

DHR/azn
110902.06

Attach: Letter dated 11/1/02 from Tim

Please respond by: _____

Yes
#65
(2001)

Chris —

See attached letter for

your review. TX.
Brent

9 Nov 02



Anaheim Angels Baseball Club, Inc.

November 1, 2002

Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Dear Mr. Rumsfeld:

First of all please accept my apologies for this very long overdue correspondence. After returning from my JCOC experience, I wanted to find something "special" to acknowledge each of you who made the adventure possible and. Little did I know as I was trying to figure out the gesture that I could share part of a World Championship with you.

I can't express in reflection how much the JCOC meant to me. As I've stated many times since our trip, it wasn't always what we saw that made the trip so special, rather it was often whom we talked to along the way and what they had to say.

At the outset of the tour I already had the utmost respect for any man or woman who chooses to serve in the armed forces. What the JCOC experience reinforced to me is the pride in which they fulfill their responsibilities. From start to finish it was the people who made the lasting impression on me. The ability to reach inside the soul of a young person and shape and guide them into a disciplined, respectful and dedicated individual is a tremendous craft. The military not only implements that ability, but excels as well. Amazing.

Your efforts during the trip left a lasting impression. You met with 60 strangers and made each and everyone one of us feel extremely comfortable. I can't express how memorable you made this.

Obviously on a smaller scale I've just finished a season that resulted in the ultimate effort of teamwork on a professional sports level. It has been a satisfying season after a 42-year wait. You are part of a BIG team as well, one that is unselfish, intelligent and fiercely loyal. I commend you as well as thank you for that commitment.

Again, if I can ever be of any assistance to you at any time for anything, please let me know.

Respectfully,

Tim Mead
VP, Communications
Anaheim Angels

#316

TAB A

October 15, 2002 12:41 PM

TO: Gen. Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: NORTHCOM Standing Requirements

I need to get a good look at what standing requirements NORTHCOM thinks they have.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
101502-29

.....

Please respond by 11/01/02

Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD/13025

02 OCT 2002

U18553-02

TAB

October 15, 2002 4:14 PM

TO: Gen. Myers
 CC: Paul Wolfowitz
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
 SUBJECT: Connections

Do you have a high degree of confidence that the connection between Eberhart, the DoD and Homeland Security is sufficiently tight for the period we may be going into?

If not, I would like to set a meeting. Please give me a recommendation as to who you think ought to attend.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
 101502-53

.....
 Please respond by 11 OCT 2002

Tab

U18554-02

11-L-0559/OSD/13026
 02 OCT 2002

snowflake

#32

TAB A

November 1, 2002 2:55 PM

TO: Gen. Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Joint Directives

300.8

In the Reserve briefing in the tank today, people talked about the list of requirements that flow from Joint Directives and allocation documents. I would like to see what those things look like.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
110102-21



Please respond by 11/08/02

1 Nov 02

11-L-0559/OSD/13027
02 NOV 5 2002

Tab A
U18555 /02



SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON
INFO MEMO

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE



2002 NOV 20 AM 8:54

November 19, 2002, 10:00 am

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: *Tom White* ~~Thomas E. White~~, Secretary of the Army

NOV 19 2002

SUBJECT: Status Report on Turbulence within the Army

- Turbulence is the disruption to unit cohesion and effectiveness caused by frequent movement of personnel through duty positions, individual replacement system, and an unpredictable training schedule.
- The Army is committed to reducing turbulence and its adverse effects on soldier and combat readiness. The sole purpose of the Army Personnel Transformation initiative is to enhance unit cohesion and effectiveness by reducing turbulence.
- A more detailed list of initiatives to reduce turbulence within the Army is at TAB A.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachment:
As stated

Prepared By: Lieutenant Colonel Barry Price (b)(6)

U18571-02

INFORMATION PAPER

19 November 2002

SUBJECT: Reduction of Turbulence in the Army

1. **PURPOSE.** To describe initiatives to reduce turbulence in the Army.

2. **Initiatives.**

- **Actions taken include:**
 - Stabilized the Reserve Component (RC) Force Structure
 - Authorized Home Station Mobilization for RC soldiers
 - Published a five-year Bosnia and Kosovo deployment schedule
 - Implemented a Personnel Tempo (PERSTEMPO) tracking system
 - Prorated the enlisted bonus throughout the initial term of enlistment
 - Increased resources for full-time manning of RC positions
 - Expanded a Korean tour extension bonus
 - Increased Targeted Selection Reenlistment Bonus (TSRB) locations
 - Modified up/out policies to retain soldiers with critical skills
 - Increased time on station for NCOs
 - Increased key leaders and field grade branch qualifying tour length targets
 - Stabilized soldiers with seniors in high school

- **Ongoing initiatives include:**
 - Focusing leaders on maintaining predictability in training schedules
 - Maximizing distance learning
 - Moving changes of command to the summer months
 - Providing soldiers 12 month PCS notifications
 - Relocating soldiers with school-age children during the summer months
 - Reducing Borrowed Military Manpower to put soldiers back in units
 - Increasing efforts to leave soldiers at duty locations longer
 - Minimizing force structure changes to decrease personnel moves

- **Future initiatives include:**
 - Two task forces are actively pursuing unit manning and unit rotation solutions, which we expect to test within the next nine months.

 - We are developing and staffing new metrics that will force us to measure efficiency in terms of cohesion and stability as well as personnel fill, our traditional solitary measure.

COL(P)Byrne (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/13029

August 12, 2002 1:09 PM

600

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Pentagon Floor Plan

Please have someone give me a piece of paper that shows the Pentagon floor by floor and what is located where. I don't want a lot of detail. It could almost be a sketch.

It should show me where all of the following elements are: OSD, Joint Staff and the Services. If something is already prepared, that would be best. I need something so I can look things up and don't have to ask all the time.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
081202-32

.....
Please respond by 08/20/02

11/16
→ Ray Dubois -
Please re-produce
Di Rita

12AUG02

U18574 02

11-L-0559/OSD/13030



S: 22 OCT 02
Cull

October 16, 2002 8:05 AM

SECDEF HAS SEEN

NOV 20 2002

210 ARMY (3&4)

TO: Sec. Tom White
Gen. Shinseki
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: MG Clark

11/1 Larry Di Rita

You gentlemen recommended MG Clark for a promotion and a major assignment. In the letter recommending his nomination, you said, there is no "alleged adverse information on the part of this officer."

After the matter had gone to the Senate, I discovered that there had been a much-publicized murder case at his command. I would think that you would have given me a heads up on something like that. In the future, I would appreciate your letting me know any information I may need to have to make a decision and to respond to questions.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
101102-6

.....
Please respond by 10/25/02

Army Suspense: 10/22/02

10/30 -

SECDEF -

- Response from White and Chu

- Note: The New York Times Article is attached, too. It highlights that this was a very complicated matter

16 OCT 02

U18576^{1W}/02
11-L-0559/OSD/130311

Larry Di Rita

Di Rita



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

DATE: 10/23/02
TIME: 11:23 AM

INFO MEMO

PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

October 23, 2002

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
FROM: DAVID S. C. CHU, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(PERSONNEL AND READINESS) *David S. C. Chu*
SUBJECT: Alert on Clark Nomination—SNOWFLAKE

- You wrote Secretary White and General Shinseki about the importance of alerting you to controversial issues associated with candidates for senior positions (~~your snowflake at Tab A, Army response at Tab B~~). Mr. DiRita asked for my comments on the package.
- The Army response is accurate. To the extent that insufficient warning was provided, I take responsibility, and have pledged to Mr. DiRita that we will be more pointed in our warnings: simply referring to the controversy, assuming you would fill in the rest from background knowledge, is not enough.
- I did, at the time, check with Admiral Holcomb, to ensure this information was being brought to your attention, and he confirmed it was—that he had done so.
- There is a strong flavor of Rashomon in this situation. The Army IG report on Fort Campbell presents a completely different picture from the SLDN portrayal.
- For what it's worth, I've also attached the contemporary New York Times Magazine account. It suggests that some of the critics were seeking a focal point for a larger argument when the tragedy occurred (Tab C).

*10/30
Secret -
Discussed with Staser.
This is true, but he recalls that he did not discuss Clark with you until after the nomination.
D. Chu*

Attachments:
As Stated

Prepared by: Captain Stephen M. Wellock (b)(6)

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	
SR MA CRADDOCK	
MA BUCCI	
EXECSEC WHITMORE	<i>[Signature]</i>

U17346-02
U17336 / 02





DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

WASHINGTON DC 20310

OCT 21 2002



MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Nomination of Major General Robert T. Clark

This memorandum is in response to your October 16, 2002 note regarding the information provided to you concerning Major General Bob Clark's nomination for appointment to Lieutenant General and as Commanding General, Fifth United States Army.

You misunderstood what we stated in our April 15, 2002, nomination of Major General Clark. What we stated in that memorandum was "...there is no planned or ongoing investigation or inquiry into matters that constitute alleged adverse information on the part of this officer." The allegations previously ascribed to Major General Clark had been unsubstantiated by the Department of the Army Inspector General. Nonetheless, we did provide this information to the Department of Defense Office of General Counsel and to the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness).

General Jack Keane had discussions with Paul Wolfowitz and Staser Holcomb regarding Major General Clark and the problems he encountered with the Servicemembers' Legal Defense Network during his command at Fort Campbell. Staser made it clear to Jack that he would apprise you of this information prior to you making your decision on Bob Clark's nomination.

Further, in David Chu's August 13, 2002 memorandum to you that accompanied Major General Clark's nomination, he included information about the Department of the Army Inspector General Investigation conducted at Fort Campbell and about the death of Private First Class Barry Winchell.

There was absolutely no intent to withhold any information from you or your staff regarding Major General Clark's nomination.

Eric K. Shinseki
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff

Thomas E. White
Secretary of the Army

11/5/1330
Snowflake

October 7, 2002 5:43 PM

e 11/15

TO: Peter Rodman
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: PRC Requirements

Larry Di Rita
11/14

China

Attached are the requirements on the PRC in the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2000.

I wonder if you ought to get that over to the National Security Council. They keep wondering about what we're doing, and perhaps they ought to be aware of it.

Thanks.

Attach.
Public Law 106-65, October 5, 1999.

DHR:dh
100702-73

.....
Please respond by 10/25/02

RESPONSE ATTACHED

11/15

11/12

NOCT02

OUT 902 09102

11-L-0559/OSD/13034

U18606 /02

UNCLASSIFIED

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000
Public Law 106-65
(Became Law on October 5, 1999)

?

Subtitle A--Matters Relating to the People's Republic of China

SEC. 1201. LIMITATION ON MILITARY-TO-MILITARY EXCHANGES AND CONTACTS WITH CHINESE PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY.

- (a) **Limitation.**--The Secretary of Defense may not authorize any military-to-military exchange or contact described in subsection (b) to be conducted by the armed forces with representatives of the People's Liberation Army of the People's Republic of China if that exchange or contact would create a national security risk due to an inappropriate exposure specified in subsection (b).
- (b) **Covered Exchanges and Contacts.**--Subsection (a) applies to any military-to-military exchange or contact that includes inappropriate exposure to any of the following:
- (1) Force projection operations.
 - (2) Nuclear operations.
 - (3) Advanced combined-arms and joint combat operations.
 - (4) Advanced logistical operations.
 - (5) Chemical and biological defense and other capabilities related to weapons of mass destruction.
 - (6) Surveillance and reconnaissance operations.
 - (7) Joint warfighting experiments and other activities related to a transformation in warfare.
 - (8) Military space operations.
 - (9) Other advanced capabilities of the Armed Forces.
 - (10) Arms sales or military-related technology transfers.
 - (11) Release of classified or restricted information.
 - (12) Access to a Department of Defense laboratory.
- (c) **Exceptions.**--Subsection (a) does not apply to any search-and-rescue or humanitarian operation or exercise.
- (d) **Annual Certification by Secretary.**--The Secretary of Defense shall submit to the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives, not later than December 31 each year, a certification in writing as to whether or not any military-to-military exchange or contact during that calendar year was conducted in violation of subsection (a).
- (e) **Annual Report.**--Not later than March 31 each year beginning in 2001, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives a report providing the

UNCLASSIFIED

11-L-0559/OSD/13035

UNCLASSIFIED

Secretary's assessment of the current state of military-to-military exchanges and contacts with the People's Liberation Army. The report shall include the following:

- (1) A summary of all such military-to-military contacts during the period since the last such report, including a summary of topics discussed and questions asked by the Chinese participants in those contacts.
 - (2) A description of the military-to-military exchanges and contacts scheduled for the next 12-month period and a plan for future contacts and exchanges.
 - (3) The Secretary's assessment of the benefits the Chinese expect to gain from those military-to-military exchanges and contacts.
 - (4) The Secretary's assessment of the benefits the Department of Defense expects to gain from those military-to-military exchanges and contacts.
 - (5) The Secretary's assessment of how military-to-military exchanges and contacts with the People's Liberation Army fit into the larger security relationship between the United States and the People's Republic of China.
- (f) Report of Past Military-to-Military Exchanges and Contacts With the PRC.--Not later than March 31, 2000, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives a report on past military-to-military exchanges and contacts between the United States and the People's Republic of China. The report shall be unclassified, but may contain a classified annex, and shall include the following:
- (1) A list of the general and flag grade officers of the People's Liberation Army who have visited United States military installations since January 1, 1993.
 - (2) The itinerary of the visits referred to in paragraph (2), including the installations visited, the duration of the visits, and the activities conducted during the visits.
 - (3) The involvement, if any, of the general and flag officers referred to in paragraph (1) in the Tiananmen Square massacre of June 1989.
 - (4) A list of the facilities in the People's Republic of China that United States military officers have visited as a result of any military-to-military exchange or contact program between the United States and the People's Republic of China since January 1, 1993.
 - (5) A list of facilities in the People's Republic of China that have been the subject of a requested visit by the Department of Defense that has been denied by People's Republic of China authorities.
 - (6) A list of facilities in the United States that have been the subject of a requested visit by the People's Liberation Army that has been denied by the United States.
 - (7) Any official documentation (such as memoranda for the record, after-action reports, and final itineraries) and all receipts for expenses over \$1,000, concerning military-to-military exchanges or contacts between the United States and the People's Republic of China in 1999.
 - (8) A description of military-to-military exchanges or contacts between the United States and the People's Republic of China scheduled for 2000.
 - (9) An assessment regarding whether or not any People's Republic of China military officials have been shown classified material as a result of military-to-military exchanges or contacts between the United States and the People's Republic of China.

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11-L-0559/OSD/13036

snowflake

#326
011112

TAB

October 21, 2002 6:01 PM

350.09

TO: Gen. Myers
CC: LTG Craddock
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Streamlining

1.5/21/02
11/8

At one of the early CINC conferences, what do you think about showing how we used to handle SRO and how we are handling it now—what it has done to shorten the time frame, make it easy to read in terms of the amount of time people have to mess with it, make it more creative, ping the system, and find ways to develop metrics so we can evaluate how well we are doing.

I think then we ought to do the same thing with deployment orders.

The point is that maybe they will have an incentive to see a process or two that they are engaged in that needs that same kind of cleanout.

We should probably also do it for the senior staff.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
102102-20

.....
Please respond by 11/18/02

Response attached

2102102

02 OCT 25 7:58 AM

11-L-0559/OSD/13037

Tab
U18611 /02

2/15

TAB A

October 8, 2002 7:32 AM

350.09

TO: Doug Feith
 CC: Gen. Myers
 Torie Clarke
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
 SUBJECT: Board on IO

Larry Di Rita
11/15

We have a "collection board" that meets weekly or monthly to keep on top of what we ought to be collecting.

It strikes me that IO, declaratory policy, strategic influence, and all those pieces, will move so fast and require so many people to do things that we may need a board to meet weekly.

Please come back to me with a proposal—what level it ought to be and who it ought to report to, etc.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
100802-3

.....
Please respond by 10/18/02 *11/10*

Response attached

*cc: USD(P) Feith
ASD(PA) Clarke*

8 OCT 02

Tab A

02 OCT 11

SECRET
202 NOV 21 11:13 13



COMPTROLLER

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1100 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1100

INFO MEMO

November 21, 2002, 3:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dov S. Zakheim) **NOV 22 2002**

SUBJECT: Blue Force Tracking

- As you requested (Tab A), I assessed John Stenbit's proposal (Tab B) for Blue Force Tracking (BFT). I recommend that we not provide funding until we see the results of two Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations (ACTDs) on BFT that are now underway.
- The AT&L and C3I staffs are working on John's proposal, which builds on an ACTD called Personnel Recovery Extraction Survivability Aided by Smart Sensors (PRESS), but have not reached any programmatic consensus on how to proceed. They are asking for additional time to define this new effort.
- In addition to the Stenbit proposal, the OUSD(AT&L) is pursuing a second, new ACTD -- Joint Blue Forces Situation Awareness -- that will fuse existing BFT systems into a common plot. This ACTD will result in web-enabled Common Operating Picture capabilities for BFT that will be interoperable with the Services' systems.
- A Joint Requirements Board for BFT has been rescheduled for December 13, 2002, to designate the Army as the Executive Agent for BFT. As Executive Agent, the Army is expected to address BFT interoperability across the Services, not giving preference to any specific technical solution for BFT such as GPRS.
- The Army is independently delivering a different form of BFT in Afghanistan and for other potential operational contingencies in FY 2003. The Army's BFT solution involves both the Force XXI Battle Command, Brigade and Below (FBCB2) systems using L-Band satellite, Grenadier Brat, and the Mini-Transmitter, which employs the same technology as Grenadier Brat. The FBCB2 systems were accelerated to elements of the 1st Cavalry Division to support Global War on Terrorism contingency planning.

COORDINATION: Tab C

Prepared By: Irene Ng, (b)(6)

TAB

A

October 18, 2002 3:13 PM

TO: Dov Zakheim
CC: Pete Aldridge
John Stenbit
Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Blue Force Tracking

Here is a proposal from John Stenbit for blue forces tracking.

I have no way of evaluating its merits in isolation. I do think we should make a priority of such systems, but this should be considered together with other priorities for the FY04 budget build.

All you smart folks should tell me whether it makes sense to do what John is proposing.

Thanks.

Attach.
06/11/02 ASD(C3I) memo to SecDef re: Blue Force Tracking [U09856-02]

DHR:dh
101802-6

.....

Please respond by 11/08/02 *extended per CFI letter 11/14 to allow C3I / ATL controls.*

OFFICE OF THE
2002 JUN 08
SECRET HAS BEEN
JUN 17 2002



ACQUISITION,
TECHNOLOGY
AND LOGISTICS

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
3010 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3010
INFO MEMO

June 4, 2002, 08:30 AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec _____

FROM: UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (AT&L) *Pete 6/4/02*

SUBJECT: De-Mining

4/10 LARRY DI RITA

- You provided USD (AT&L) Tori Clarke's comments on Mr. Gingrich's November 12, 2001, email, which proposed a campaign to eliminate landmines in Afghanistan and a robotics de-mining competition. You asked if it is possible to do that (~~to do~~). *(Attached at back.)*
- Currently, we have unmanned systems - Miniflaits and Standardized Robotics Systems (~~to do~~) - operating in Kosovo, Bosnia and Afghanistan. Our systems in Afghanistan are used to clear anti-personnel and anti-tank mines to protect our operational forces.
- The Department has a solid de-mining research and development program. AT&L is developing robotic technologies that make mine clearing more efficient and safer for our personnel. There are two ongoing ACTDs and one potential FY04 candidate focused on countermine technologies that could have de-mining applications. Additionally, DARPA is pursuing a range of de-mining initiatives as well as robotic technologies that could potentially be adapted for use in de-mining. We welcome good ideas that compete favorably in the program reviews.
- Mr. Robert Andrews, PD, SO/LIC, previously responded to Mr. Gingrich's email and sent you a follow-up Information Memorandum on May 3, 2002. I concur with Mr. Andrews' points and do not feel it is necessary to respond to Mr. Gingrich again.

I plan to meet with Dick Harwin who has some ideas in this area. Pete

COORDINATION: None

Attachments:
As stated

Prepared By: Michael Toscano, S&TS/LW, (b)(6)

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	
SR MA GIAMBASTIANI	<i>5/6/14</i>
MA BUCCI	<i>5/15/11</i>
EXECSEC WHITMORE	<i>5/6/14</i>

11-L-0599 OSD/12724

U09336 102