



SECRET
2001 APR 12 AM 9:04

December 17, 2003

TO: Jim Haynes
CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Philippines

I want to find out what is going on with respect to this fellow from the Philippines who killed one of our soldiers.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
121703-9

.....
Please respond by 1/9/04

383.6

✓
1/16

C 1/16

17 Dec 03

Sir,
Response attached.
vr / CDR Noseny
1/16/03

OSD 05220-04

TAB A

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2004 APR 19 PM 12:00

December 27, 2003

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: PACOM and CENTCOM

Here is a Vern Clark e-mail on the lines between PACOM and CENTCOM that we ought to think through. Please see me on it.

Thanks.

Attach

10/24/03 CNO e-mail re: India/Pakistan Trip Thoughts

DHR:dh
122703-29 (to computer)

.....
Please respond by 1/23/04

322

210ec03

OSD 05625-04

Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD/31536

C

No Classification in Message Body

Craddock, John J, LTG, OSD

From: Clark, Vern (N00) [Clark.Vern@cno.navy.smil.mil]
Sent: Friday, October 24, 2003 6:16 PM
To: 'john.craddock@osd.smil.mil'; 'meyersrb@js.pentagon.smil.mil'
Cc: 'fargotb0@hq.pacom.smil.mil'; 'abizaijp@centcom.smil.mil'
Subject: India/Pakistan trip thoughts

Importance: High
Sensitivity: Personal

(Handwritten: CJCS)

John,

-- Please pass to Secretary Rumsfeld --

Mr. Secretary and Chairman,

You may recall I recently visited India and Pakistan. It was a terrific trip and very fruitful.

Two major issues for me:

- * One: the disconnect in both countries with how the UCP divides sensible relations with these two nations.
- * Our dividing lines are impacting them.
- * India wants to be engaged to the west. They have real national interests in that direction.
- * We are protective to the west because, in CENTCOM, we protect the feelings of Pakistan. (I'm not casting blame; just addressing perceptions)
- * So...India is not as engaged in the Gulf as they would like to be and they told me they sense a lack of connection with CENTCOM. They feel they have no entrance to deal in that AOR, e.g. exercises, liaisons, etc.
- * They don't see themselves as "belonging" to PACOM only.
- * It is less true for Pakistan looking east. As you know, Pak is keeping score of every move we make with India, but in naval stuff, they played in PACOM's submarine rescue event and liked it.

- * Recommendation: We need to figure out how to fuzz the lines between these kinds of boundaries.

- * Two: Recovering from sanctions.
- o Lots of frustration. This is familiar to you I know.
- o We need to figure out how to lock proactive in a post sanctions window. We don't.
- o Example: Pak already has the HARPOON surface-to-surface missile. During the years of sanction their HARPOON missiles became inoperable ...lack of support, parts, test equipment, etc. They are unable to obtain much needed parts and support equipment for legacy systems like this without starting over through our formal, multiagency approval process.
- * Recommendation: When we lift sanctions, we should consider a fundamental change to our interagency approval process and issue, pre-emptively, a list of items already approved. We should not force the nation to go through the approval process again.

All in all a good trip. I told each of them you had given me, and each of the Chiefs, the direction to get engaged. That message was well received.

VR, Vern

11-L-0559/OSD/31537
No Classification in Message Body

October 15, 2003

TO: Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Pakistan Issues

Could you please get me a report on what the Russians the Indians and the
Iranians are doing in Afghanistan? The Pakistanis raised the question with me, and
I am curious.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
101503-65

.....
Please respond by 11/7/03

Pakistan

15 OCT 03

Steve / Taylor = Sardon
Moffet
HOT
— S Advaru

August 1, 2003

TO: LTG Craddock
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Corrected Transcripts

I would like to see the transcript we are correcting on the Pryor issue and the Ted Kennedy issue. I need to see what we are submitting, so please dig it out before it goes up there. I have to get it fixed, and I have to see that it is fixed right. This is very important to me.

Further, I need the retouched text of my letter to Ted Kennedy. The time is passing. I have to get that fixed fast, and if you cannot get it out of Jim Jones, please get it out of somebody else. If you need help from me, ask me, but we have to get it fixed.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
080103-1

.....
Please respond by 8/4/03

LA.

- 1) Do you have the Pryor Letter
- 2) How do we have the transcript amended to include the letter
- 3) Kennedy ~~transcript~~ ^{letter} is coming must be same
- 4) Need copy of the transcript

11-L-0559/OSD/31539

OSD 10628-04

Questions and Inserts for the Record

- Upon completion of each hearing, it takes about seven to ten days before a “transcript” is made available to the committee. They will call OSD/LA, who dispatches a courier to pick up the Department’s copy.
- OSD Comptroller is responsible for transcripts associated with hearings before the Senate and House Appropriations Committees and ASD (C3I) takes responsibility for the Intelligence Committees. OSD/LA handles all other committees.
- Transcripts are logged in, assigned a control number, receipted for and sent to the appropriate DoD organization. The organizations ensure the transcripts are reviewed for accuracy and questions taken for the record by the witness are assigned to the correct organization to answer.
- There are two types of additions made to the record.
 - Question for the Record (QFR) – at the end of the hearing the Chairman will announce how long the transcript will be kept open for Members to provide questions to the witness. The staff will collect any questions Members may have and forward them to OSD/LA. LA logs the QFRs in and assigns them to the appropriate organization to answer with a suspense date.
 - Insert for the Record (IFR) – when the witness tells the Committee he will have to take a question for the record or wishes to correct his testimony, the information is added to the record through an IFR.

Transcript Review

- Transcripts for OSD witnesses (other than Appropriations and Intelligence) are reviewed by the organization in which the witness is associated.
- Transcripts for hearings where the Secretary or Deputy Secretary appeared as a witness are reviewed by the Senate/House Directors in OSD/LA. Additionally, General Craddock is provided with an advance copy of the transcript for review. Any IFRs are answered when identified via correspondence in order to provide a timely response.

Tracking

- Suspense dates for each item is established by the various committees.
- QFRs and IFRs are tracked by OSD/LA (less Appropriations/Intel) for timely submittal.
- As the information is received from the various organizations, it is forwarded via security review to the committee clerks who then insert it into the record.
- Once the information is gathered, the committee will close out the hearing and publish the official transcript.
- The Committee does work with us and tries to get all our information in before closing out the Hearing. If there are questions outstanding when the committee sends the transcript to print, then the phrase "OSD did not respond" is inserted into the record.
- Connie Wachsmuth is the POC in OSD/LA. I will be glad to show you her tracking chart if you are interested.

Weak Points in the Process

- Connie has a pretty good tracking sheet and rapport with the clerks on the Hill. The biggest problem we have is witnesses failing to adhere to the suspense dates assigned by the Committee.



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

JUL 30 2003

IRAQ

The Honorable Mark Pryor
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Senator Pryor,

During the July 9 hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee, you posed some questions regarding the reports that Iraq had sought uranium from Niger and asked when I became aware that the reports might be questionable.

After the hearing, I asked the CIA briefer to provide me the background. He said that shortly after Mr. ElBaradei of the IAEA raised questions publicly in a report to the United Nations Security Council on March 7, I had asked my CIA briefer what the facts were. After checking, he tells me that I was advised on March 11 that the CIA believed ElBaradei could be correct in his suspicions regarding the validity of the documents in question.

A question similar to the one you asked me came up on "Meet the Press" on July 13, and I clarified the situation. Attached is the transcript of the relevant portion of that interview. I will correct the transcript of my hearing before your committee now that I know the facts, but I wanted you to be aware of my correction.

With best wishes,

Enclosure

3000103

U12558 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/31542

RUSSELL: In March.

RUMSFELD: In March, a U.N. IAEA person, and said that he felt that there was a forged document, that the intelligence community then said they agreed with ElBaradei after looking at it, at which time obviously it became clear that that fragmentary evidence may not have been right. Whether it is or not I still don't know. We know that the U.K. still believes it is correct. But -- and I just simply don't know. That's not --

RUSSELL: When Senator Pryor asked you on Wednesday, "When did you know that reports about uranium coming out of Africa coming out of Africa were bogus?" -- you said, "Oh, within recent days."

RUMSFELD: I should have said within recent weeks, when ElBaradei came out.

RUSSELL: Back in March.

RUMSFELD: Right, in March, exactly, because I am told that I was -- that after ElBaradei came out with his statement publicly, I read it, and I am told by the CIA briefer who brief me that I on that next day said, "Who is right on this?" And they said, "We'll check." And it was shortly thereafter that they came out with a piece of paper saying that they thought that ElBaradei was right, and --

RUSSELL: The whole issue of intelligence is so important because --

RUMSFELD: It is.

RUSSELL: There's a theory now put forward that says the administration made the central rationale for the war disarming Saddam Hussein. And then the administration, from the president, yourself on down, said that Saddam Hussein was reconstituting his nuclear program -- and as evidence from that, uranium from Africa, aluminum tubes, which is also questionable, the purchase of those -- and that because of that threat, that potential nuclear threat, the reconstruction of a nuclear program, that we needed a preemptive war, that we could not wait, and that if we wait for a smoking gun, it could be a mushroom cloud. In hindsight -- in hindsight, do you wish that the administration had been more careful in its presentation? And did you massage or hype intelligence data?

RUMSFELD: I think the answer is no to both questions. The question about the intelligence, it seems to me that it has been a very healthy discussion within the administration, where policymakers have looked at the intel and asked questions, and that's good. You need feedback, that process. But has it been politicized? Certainly not. I mean, every one of the intelligence estimates where there was a disagreement, for example on the aluminum tubes or on the cake, yellow cake, it says it right in it. It says, "This agency thought this," "This agency thought that." No one changed their views for any reasons.

Then you go back to the question -- you cast it as though it were nuclear, and as you'll recall, if you think back, the weapons of mass destruction was always chemical, biological and nuclear. And in no instance did anyone in the administration that I know of suggested that they had a nuclear weapon. We did believe, and do believe, that they had reconstituted their program, and

2 of 5

03-60

Stenographic Transcript
Before the

COMMITTEE ON
ARMED SERVICES

Printer's Copy

UNITED STATES SENATE

HEARING TO RECEIVE TESTIMONY ON "LESSONS
LEARNED" DURING OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM
IN AFGHANISTAN AND OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM,
AND TO RECEIVE TESTIMONY ON ONGOING
OPERATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES CENTRAL
COMMAND REGION

Wednesday, July 9, 2003

Washington, D.C.

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WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-5650
(202) 289-2260

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to the U.S. Senate Armed
Services Committee by:

09-15-03
TT-L-0559/OSD/31544

UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

Sir/Madam:

There will be a meeting of the Committee on

ARMED SERVICES

Room SH-216
Hart Senate Office Building

Wednesday, July 9, 2003 – 9:30 a.m.

OPEN/CLOSED*

To receive testimony on “lessons learned” during Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan and Operation Iraqi Freedom, and to receive testimony on ongoing operations in the United States Central Command region.

Witnesses:

Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense

General Tommy R. Franks, USA
Commander
United States Central Command

***There will be a CLOSED session in SH-219, the hearing room of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, following the OPEN session. Staff attendance at the CLOSED session will be restricted.**

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1 HEARING TO RECEIVE TESTIMONY ON "LESSONS LEARNED"
2 DURING OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM IN AFGHANISTAN
3 AND OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM, AND TO RECEIVE
4 TESTIMONY ON ONGOING OPERATIONS IN THE
5 UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND REGION

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Wednesday, July 9, 2003

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U.S. Senate

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Committee on Armed Services

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Washington, D.C.

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The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:31 a.m., in Room SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Hon. John Warner, chairman of the committee, presiding.

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Present: Senators Warner, McCain, Inhofe, Roberts,

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Allard, Sessions, Collins, Talent, Chambliss, Dole, Cornyn,

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Levin, Kennedy, Byrd, Reed, Akaka, Bill Nelson, Ben Nelson,

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Dayton, Bayh, Clinton, and Pryor.

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Committee Staff Members Present: Judith A. Ansley, Staff

21

Director; Cindy Pearson, Assistant Chief Clerk and Security

22

Manager; Kenneth Barbee, Security Clerk; Pendred K. Wilson,

23

Receptionist.

24

Majority Staff Members Present: Charles W. Alsup,

25

Professional Staff Member; L. David Cherington, Counsel; Brian

1 R. Green, Professional Staff Member; Ambrose R. Hock,
2 Professional Staff Member; Gregory T. Kiley, Professional
3 Staff Member; Thomas L. MacKenzie, Professional Staff Member;
4 Lynn F. Rusten, Professional Staff Member.

5 Minority Staff Members Present: Richard D. DeBobes,
6 Democratic Staff Director; Daniel J. Cox, Jr., Professional
7 Staff Member; Kenneth M. Crosswait, Professional Staff Member;
8 Richard W. Fieldhouse, Professional Staff Member; Jeremy L.
9 Hekhuis, Professional Staff Member; Maren R. Leed,
10 Professional Staff Member.

11 Staff Assistants Present: Leah C. Brewer, Andrew Kent,
12 and Sara R. Mareno.

13 Committee Members' Assistants Present: Cord Sterling,
14 Assistant to Senator Warner; Dan Twining, Assistant to Senator
15 McCain; John A. Bonsell, Assistant to Senator Inhofe; James
16 Beauchamp, Assistant to Senator Roberts; Jayson Roehl,
17 Assistant to Senator Allard; Arch Galloway II, Assistant to
18 Senator Sessions; James P. Dohoney, Jr., Assistant to Senator
19 Collins; D'Arcy Grisier, Assistant to Senator Ensign; James W.
20 Irwin, Assistant to Senator Chambliss; Clyde A. Taylor IV,
21 Assistant to Senator Chambliss; Christine O. Hill, Assistant
22 to Senator Dole; Russell J. Thomasson, Assistant to Senator
23 Cornyn; Sharon L. Waxman, Assistant to Senator Kennedy; Mieke
24 Y. Eoyang, Assistant to Senator Kennedy; Jarret A. Wright,
25 Assistant to Senator Kennedy; Erik Raven, Assistant to Senator

1 Byrd; Aaron Scholer, Assistant to Senator Lieberman; Elizabeth
2 King, Assistant to Senator Reed; Richard Kessler, Assistant to
3 Senator Akaka; William K. Sutey, Assistant to Senator Bill
4 Nelson; Eric Pierce, Assistant to Senator Ben Nelson; William
5 Todd Houchins, Assistant to Senator Dayton; Mark Phillip
6 Jones, Assistant to Senator Dayton; Todd Rosenblum, Assistant
7 to Senator Bayh; Andrew Shapiro, Assistant to Senator Clinton;
8 Terri Glaze, Assistant to Senator Pryor.

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1 OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN WARNER, U.S. SENATOR FROM
2 VIRGINIA

3 Chairman Warner: The committee meets this morning to
4 receive the testimony from the Secretary of Defense and
5 General Tommy Franks, who has just stepped down as the
6 Commander-in-Chief of the forces that are now CENTCOM. We
7 also step aside from a very sobering and important hearing to
8 congratulate the Secretary on reaching his 71st year. Today
9 is his birthday.

10 Secretary Rumsfeld: You didn't need to do that.

11 Chairman Warner: I know that. And you're joined, I
12 understand, by members of your family this morning, which is
13 wonderful. And General Franks, we hope the opportunity comes
14 for us to meet your wonderful wife.

15 General Franks: Sir, thank you very much.

16 Chairman Warner: The American public, indeed the world,
17 are awaiting this testimony this morning, and consequently,
18 I'm going to put my full statement into the record and make
19 but a very few brief opening remarks out of deference to my
20 colleagues, who are anxiously awaiting to hear the testimony
21 and participate in the questions and indeed the public that
22 are following the hearing.

23 First we open being mindful of the loss of life, loss of
24 limb, and the families who have suffered the consequences as
25 they have throughout the history of this nation and other

1 nations in times of war. They've paid a great price, and
2 those risks continue, as we well know, each day. They showed
3 courage, the men and women of the coalition forces, they
4 showed commitment. Our delegation of nine Senators witnessed
5 that just days ago when we spent time in Basra, Baghdad,
6 Kirkuk. And we thank you, Mr. Secretary, and your staff,
7 Tommy Korologos, Secretary Cambone, and others who made this
8 trip very successful.

9 So we salute all the men and women of the coalition
10 forces and their families. The leadership that has been shown
11 is remarkable -- our President, Secretaries of State and
12 Defense, our military, General Franks, all those in your
13 command. And our hearing this morning covers not only Iraq,
14 but Afghanistan, and indeed the possible military commitment
15 in Liberia, so I hope each of you, that is you, Mr. Secretary
16 on Liberia, touch on that issue.

17 Civilian control of the military has been a part of our
18 history, but I look upon the relationship that you, Mr.
19 Secretary, had with General Franks as really one of
20 partnership. And I guess that's the way it should be. The
21 buck finally stopped on your desks, but having watched the two
22 of you as partners, conducting the operations in Iraq and in
23 Afghanistan is truly remarkable.

24 When Senator Levin and I, on two occasions, visited
25 Afghanistan, and I think to an extent in the Iraqi campaign,

1 we were impressed by the leadership of the non-commissioned
2 officers, and indeed the junior officers, but the non-
3 commissioned officers, how groups of 15, 20, 25, would go in
4 on a mission at night with one officer, and that officer
5 knowing full well that each man, or woman as the case may be,
6 knew exactly what their missions were. A remarkable chapter
7 in history, and also of jointness, joint operations between
8 the Army, the Navy, the Marines, the Air Force.

9 While the major field maneuvers of our troops, division
10 level, regimental level, have stopped, nevertheless the
11 fighting continues at the company level. When we visited the
12 4th ID, the commander went into great detail -- three
13 operations, General Franks, I think one is still continuing,
14 taking to the remaining enemy the battle, not waiting for the
15 enemy to come, but taking it to them. And to meet that
16 challenge, we would like to have your views this morning on
17 the fourth levels, the adequacy, the rotation policy, and how
18 other coalition nations are joining, Mr. Secretary, I
19 personally felt that tremendous efforts have been made from
20 Washington and the other capitals of the world to bring in
21 other troops, not only to augment our existing force
22 structure, but hopefully to provide and facilitate for the
23 rotation of our forces and those of Great Britain back home.

24 The intelligence is a matter of great interest. Your
25 views on the adequacy of that intelligence from a military

1 standpoint -- troop commanders told us when we asked the
2 question they had a high degree of confidence in the
3 intelligence that they received. Nevertheless, Mr. Secretary,
4 the issue of intelligence is of importance, as you well know,
5 and how the intelligence was utilized in the policy-making
6 levels, at your level, and with your subordinates as you
7 address in the American public in open forums, and as you
8 address the Congress, how you utilize that intelligence in
9 such a manner to -- I certainly feel, to remain accurate at
10 all times.

11 The Task Force 20, which is performing, General Franks,
12 the specialized mission of searching out Saddam Hussein, a
13 bounty quite properly now having put on his head, and how they
14 are operating to not only find him and his two sons, but
15 indeed the others that had significant roles in perpetrating
16 the horror throughout Iraq and the threat to the world with
17 their weapons of mass destruction. And on weapons on mass
18 destruction, Mr. Secretary, you've brought in David Kay, a man
19 with impeccable credentials and a long background and history
20 in this subject, working with General Dayton. And you've
21 given them a charter to go out and use every asset that they
22 need to uncover the mystery of these weapons of mass
23 destruction.

24 Lastly, I want to credit Ambassador Bremer. I'd know him
25 through the years, but I think he's doing an extraordinary

1 job, and he laid down the three objectives that he has at this
2 time to try and lessen the risk to our troops and at the same
3 time bring about the fulfillment of our mission to provide
4 freedom for the Iraqi people. First was to take the battle to
5 the enemy and that's being done, to root out the last pockets
6 of resistance.

7 Secondly, to utilize every effort to find Saddam Hussein
8 and the other principals, and thirdly, to form an interim
9 government, composed initially of two parts: one, a governing
10 council of Iraqis who will elect their own chairman of that
11 council to supervise the several ministries, whether it's the
12 creation of a policy force, whether it's education, whether
13 it's the preservation of artifacts, whether it's sewers,
14 whether it's electricity; and secondly, to formulate a group
15 of individuals that will sit down, Iraqis, and write a
16 constitution, because without a constitution, we can not
17 expect elections to be held nationally. There's just no
18 infrastructure on which an election can be established until
19 that constitution is put in place and candidates can address
20 their views with respect to the fulfillment of the provisions
21 of that constitution.

22 Now, while our delegation was there we met in Kirkuk with
23 Iraqis who are assuming local office as mayors, assistant
24 mayors and so forth, and Bremer's to be congratulated in
25 pockets here and there where possible putting together groups

1 of Iraqis who sort of elect themselves and take over the
2 responsibilities of community matters. But the national
3 elections have to await the constitution.

4 So on the whole, speaking for myself, I feel very
5 positive on my return from this inspection trip, and I once
6 again salute those in uniform, the coalition forces, who night
7 and day are taking the risks, and their families at home who
8 are sharing in those risks.

9 Senator Levin?

10 [The prepared statement of Senator Warner follows:]

11 [COMMITTEE INSERT]

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1 STATEMENT OF HON. CARL LEVIN, U.S. SENATOR FROM MICHIGAN

2 Senator Levin: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I'll also
3 shorten my statement and ask that the entire statement be made
4 part of the record.

5 Chairman Warner: Without objection.

6 Senator Levin: First, General Franks, let me thank you
7 for your life of commitment to this nation. In your public
8 service as a soldier, you've proven yourself time and time
9 again during a unique period in our history. Historians will
10 someday judge the military campaigns that you led in
11 Afghanistan and Iraq that swiftly defeated the Taliban and the
12 forces of Saddam Hussein as brilliantly planned and executed
13 examples of the military art, and as foreshadows of future
14 military tactics. While you would be the first to acknowledge
15 that most of the credit and thanks must go to all who assisted
16 you in that effort, and especially to the fighting men and
17 women of the U.S. Armed Forces, who executed those campaigns,
18 your role as their commander was indispensable.

19 Any inquiry into lessons learned will inevitably tend to
20 emphasize areas of concern, and will tend to spend less time
21 on the innumerable things that were done well. It is
22 essential that that be done, but it must not detract in any
23 way from our appreciation for the superb performance of duty
24 by the men and women of our Armed Forces as they continue to
25 conduct stability operations in Afghanistan and Iraq and

1 prepare to execute other missions in support of our national
2 military strategy.

3 We must succeed in this endeavor, this post-conflict
4 stability effort of ours, and we need to understand the
5 strategy for ensuring that success. Part of that strategy
6 hopefully will be an attempt to internationalize the security
7 and nation-building efforts. To achieve that end, I hope that
8 we will seek NATO and United Nations support and endorsement.
9 That will facilitate the recruitment of their member nations
10 to our effort in terms of providing troops, resources,
11 expertise, and international legitimacy. The whole world has
12 stake in the stability of Iraq.

13 It is a mystery to me why apparently we have not reached
14 out to NATO and to the United Nations as institutions. Their
15 support could bring significant additional forces, such as
16 German and French forces through NATO, and Indian and Egyptian
17 forces through a U.N. endorsement.

18 We're going to be in Iraq a long time. A large number of
19 troops are going to be needed, as the President acknowledged
20 last week. There are a number of advantages to having a
21 significant number of additional forces from other countries
22 join us in the stability operations in Iraq. First, some U.S.
23 forces, including Reserves, have seen extended combat and
24 other exhausting duty. With U.S. forces stretched thin around
25 the world, increasing the number of non-U.S. forces who can

1 substitute for us in Iraq would reduce the numbers of, and the
2 burden on, U.S. forces. As of now, the number of troops of
3 other countries present on the ground will increase from the
4 present number of 12,000 to a total of only 20,000 by the end
5 of the summer, an increase of a mere 8,000 troops out of about
6 165,000. That is difficult to sustain.

7 Second, I would hope that internationalization would
8 serve to reduce the threat to U.S. forces in more ways than
9 reducing the quantity of our forces on the ground. Up until
10 now, we have been the main target of those Ba'athists who
11 stand to lose most when democracy is established in Iraq
12 because we were the ones who brought down Saddam's regime
13 which provided privileged status to the Ba'athist minority.
14 It would be harder for those Saddam loyalists to sustain
15 attacks on forces wearing NATO or U.N. patches on their
16 shoulders, because it would be dramatized to the people in
17 Iraq that this is not a U.S./British occupation, but is an
18 international effort to bring stability to the nation and to
19 the region.

20 Just as reaching out to the world is necessary, so is
21 reaching in to the Iraqi people to help this effort succeed.
22 As our chairman has indicated, that means turning over the
23 civilian government as quickly as possible to the people of
24 Iraq so that they understand that they are deciding their own
25 future. It also means making better use of our TV capability

1 in Iraq, so that Iraqis can be interviewed about, and talk to
2 their fellow countrymen about the thousands of projects that
3 we are engaged in to help rebuild their nation. We are
4 rebuilding schools, we are bringing back water, we are fixing
5 up neighborhoods, we are supplying food, we are moving
6 garbage, and doing many other tasks needed to reconstruct
7 Iraq. But we have done an inadequate job of getting that
8 information to Iraqis.

9 False propaganda that we blew up a mosque must be
10 countered by Iraqis speaking about our rebuilding efforts in
11 their communities, and assuring Iraqis that we are not there
12 for domination, but to help them rebuild. And Mr. Secretary,
13 we talked to Secretary Cambone about speeding up that
14 television presence and projection to Iraq during our trip,
15 and I know that he's probably by now already discussed that
16 with you. The chairman and I and all the members of the
17 delegation had some strong feelings about the importance of
18 speeding up that effort.

19 The United States has taken upon itself the daunting task
20 of nation building in both Iraq and Afghanistan. The
21 administration and Congress must work together to ensure
22 success in those endeavors. It's essential in that regard for
23 our nation to understand the strategy and the milestones for
24 achieving our objectives, and surely we need to know how we
25 will continue over the foreseeable future to maintain a large

1 American military presence in your former region of command,
2 General. It's been now, what, two days or one day?

3 General Franks: Two days.

4 Senator Levin: I know that the relaxation in your face
5 is palpable. Just kidding. You did that with great glory.
6 You handled it absolutely brilliantly, and never even showed
7 the stress. But we have to let the American people know how
8 we're going to be able to execute other missions of our
9 national military strategy as well as maintaining the large
10 presence in the CENTCOM region.

11 Mr. Secretary, we very much look forward to your
12 testimony as well as that of General Franks. We thank you for
13 your service, your commitment, and I know you're grateful for
14 the presence of your family today.

15 [The prepared statement of Senator Levin follows:]

16 [COMMITTEE INSERT]

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1 Chairman Warner: Thank you, Senator Levin. Mr.
2 Secretary?
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1 STATEMENT OF HON. DONALD H. RUMSFELD, SECRETARY OF
2 DEFENSE

3 Secretary Rumsfeld: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of
4 the committee. I would ask that my complete statement be put
5 in the record.

6 Chairman Warner: Without objection. The statements of
7 both witnesses will be included in the record.

8 Secretary Rumsfeld: And I'd like to make a brief
9 statement. I'll begin by saying a few words about the
10 remarkable man seated next to me, General Tom Franks. On
11 Monday, I was in Tampa to attend the change of command
12 ceremony there. It was an occasion to reflect on General Tom
13 Franks and what the CENTCOM leadership that he put together
14 has accomplished during his tenure as combatant commander.

15 Think back to September 11. It was a dark day for our
16 country, to be sure, but how fortunate our country was to have
17 General Franks and his team in command at CENTCOM. In the
18 period since September 11, consider what's been accomplished.
19 In just weeks, they developed and were executing a war plan
20 for Afghanistan, they'd employed a range of capabilities from
21 the most advanced, such as laser-guided weapons, to antique
22 40-year old B-52s that had been updated with modern
23 electronics, to rudimentary cavalry charges, driving the
24 Taliban and al-Qaeda from power in a matter of months.

25 The plan they developed for Operation Iraqi Freedom was

1 even more innovative and transformational, employing an
2 unprecedented combination of speed, precision, surprise, and
3 flexibility. One of the most interesting aspects of the
4 campaign was mentioned in the opening statements about the
5 lessons learned process. It began before the war ever began.
6 There were something in excess of 50 to 70 people that General
7 Franks installed as a team from Joint Forces Command in his
8 command from the very start. And they did a lot more than
9 take notes to improve our performance for the next war. They
10 actually provided immediate feedback, allowing CENTCOM
11 leadership to apply lessons in real time and improve coalition
12 performance in this war. General Franks has said to me that
13 there wasn't a day that went by that there wasn't value added.
14 I'll leave it to General Franks to describe the lessons he
15 believes are most important. I've listed some in my
16 testimony.

17 We're still in the early stages of studying these
18 lessons, and the conclusions that are drawn will most
19 certainly affect how the Armed Forces of the United States and
20 the services organize, train, and equip for many years to
21 come. This will be one of General Franks' truly enduring
22 legacies. He led the coalition forces that liberated two
23 nations, but how he liberated those two people, the tactics,
24 the strategies that he developed and employed will contribute
25 to the freedom of our country and our people for years to

1 come.

2 So while General Franks may be leaving the service, the
3 Army, his service to our country will live on in the impact of
4 Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom that it
5 will have on our budgets, our procedures, our training, our
6 doctrine, and our joint war fighting. And the people he led,
7 those who served with him in Iraq and Afghanistan will now
8 take those transformational experiences to their next
9 important commands and teach them to the next generation of
10 leaders. So General Franks, I salute you and thank you for
11 your truly remarkable service to our country.

12 Today Iraqis do face the enormous challenge of rebuilding
13 from decades of tyranny. Coalition forces are helping the
14 Iraqi people get on the path to stability and democratic self-
15 government by helping Iraqis reestablish security and
16 commerce, restore power and basic services, reopen schools and
17 hospitals, and establish the rule of law. With each passing
18 week, more services come online. Power and water are restored
19 in more of the country, gas lines disappear, and more Iraqi
20 police are on the streets.

21 But we must not underestimate how difficult the task is
22 before us. Yet despite the difficulties they face, most
23 Iraqis are far better off today than they were 4 months ago.
24 Let there be no doubt about that. The residents of Baghdad
25 may not have power 24 hours a day, but they no longer wake up

1 each morning in fear wondering whether this will be the day
2 that a death squad would come to cut out their tongues, chop
3 off their ears, or take their children away, for questioning,
4 quote, unquote, never to be seen again.

5 It's true there are some Iraqis who are not better off
6 today. For the most part, they comprise a small, elite
7 segment of Iraqi society that benefitted from the Saddam
8 Hussein dictatorship, and they are understandably unhappy now
9 that the regime that favored them, at the expense of the
10 population, has been removed from power. Today some of them
11 are in hiding, others are engaging in acts of sabotage and
12 violence.

13 Let me say a word about the security situation in Iraq.
14 There seems to be a widely held impression that the regime
15 loyalists are operating freely throughout the country,
16 attacking coalition forces at will. That's clearly not the
17 case. Large portions of Iraq are stable. If one looks at
18 this map beside me, while there have been isolated incidents
19 in other parts of the country, most of the recent attacks have
20 been concentrated in Baghdad and in the three corridors that
21 reach to the west, the north, and the east out of the Iraqi
22 capital.

23 At this moment, coalition forces are engaged in
24 operations to deal with the threats in these areas. Indeed, a
25 number of recent incidents in those regions are the result of

1 offensive operations by the coalition, cases where the
2 coalition forces have been seeking out and engaging pockets of
3 enemy fighters. Mr. Chairman, the problem is real, but it's
4 being dealt with in an orderly and forceful fashion by
5 coalition forces.

6 In Iraq, coalition forces drove the country's leaders
7 from power, but unlike traditional adversaries in wars passed
8 that sign a surrender document and hand over their weapons,
9 the remnants of the Ba'ath regime, Fedayeen death squads, and
10 the special Republican forces did not surrender. Some were
11 killed or captured, but many others, particularly in Baghdad
12 and to the north faded into the population, and are now
13 forming pockets of resistance against coalition forces. We're
14 now dealing with those remnants of the regime just as we are
15 dealing with the remnants of al-Qaeda and the Taliban that are
16 hiding in the border areas of Afghanistan.

17 In addition to the remnants of the former regime,
18 coalition forces in Iraq are also dealing with tens of
19 thousands of criminals, some estimate up to 100,000 that were
20 let out of the prisons into the streets prior to the beginning
21 of the war. And they're dealing with foreign terrorists who
22 have crossed into Iraq, in many cases from Syria, looking for
23 an opportunity to harm the coalition and to try to shake our
24 resolve in the war on terror. Well, they'll not succeed.

25 So there are a number of sources of instability, but this

1 much is certain: Iraq has been liberated, the Ba'athist
2 regime has been removed from power and will not be permitted
3 to return. But our war with terrorists, the remnants in Iraq,
4 the remnants in Afghanistan and terrorist networks across the
5 globe continues. It will take time, but we will prevail. As
6 President Bush made clear last week, there will be no return
7 to tyranny in Iraq. Those who threaten the order and
8 stability of that country will face ruin just as surely as the
9 regime they once served.

10 One of the challenges facing the coalition is finding
11 Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, as the chairman mentioned.
12 We're still early in that process, so the task before is
13 sizable and complex. Major combat operations ended less than
14 10 weeks ago. The Iraqi regime had 12 years to conceal its
15 programs, to move materials, hide documents, disperse
16 equipment, develop mobile production facilities and sanitize
17 known WMD sites, including 4 years with no U.N. weapons
18 inspectors on the ground. Needless to say, uncovering those
19 programs will take time.

20 The coalition did not act in Iraq because we had
21 discovered dramatic new evidence of Iraq's pursuit of weapons
22 of mass murder. We acted because we saw the existing evidence
23 in a new light through the prism of our experience on
24 September 11. On that day, we saw thousands of innocent men,
25 women, and children killed by terrorists, and that experience

1 changed our appreciation of our vulnerability, and the risks
2 the U.S. faces from terrorist states and terrorist networks
3 armed with powerful weapons.

4 The United States did not choose war, Saddam Hussein did.
5 For 12 years, he violated 17 U.N. resolutions without cost or
6 consequence. His regime had an international obligation to
7 destroy its weapons of mass destruction and to prove to the
8 world that they had done so. He refused to do so. If he had
9 in fact disarmed, why didn't he take that final opportunity to
10 prove that his programs were ended and his weapons were
11 destroyed? Why did he continue to give up tens of billions of
12 dollars in oil revenue under U.N. sanctions when he could have
13 had those sanctions lifted simply by demonstrating that he had
14 disarmed? Why did he file what all agreed was a fraudulent
15 declaration of his weapons with the United Nations? Why
16 didn't he cooperate with the international community as
17 Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and South Africa did?

18 Had he done so, war would have been avoided. If he had
19 in fact disarmed, he had everything to gain and nothing to
20 lose by cooperating with the United Nations, yet he did not
21 cooperate. He continued to lie and obstruct U.N. inspectors.
22 The logical conclusion is that he did so because he wanted to
23 keep his weapons, and he believed that he could continue to
24 outwit the international community for another 12 years, just
25 as he had for the past 12.

1 The objective in the global war on terror is to prevent
2 another attack like September 11 or a biological, nuclear, or
3 chemical attack that would be worse before it happens. We can
4 say with confidence that the world is a better place today
5 because the United States led a coalition of forces into
6 action in Iraq and because of General Tom Franks' skilled
7 execution of the President's orders.

8 Mr. Chairman, that completes my statement.

9 [The prepared statement of Secretary Rumsfeld follows:]

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1 Chairman Warner: Mr. Secretary, before we hear from the
2 General, I think it's important that you interpret in some
3 detail this important map. While we hear daily the stories of
4 attacks, my understanding of that map, based also on my trip,
5 is the green indicates those sections of Iraq which are
6 relatively secure. The dark center brown is where the most
7 intense number of attacks are coming, and the lighter shade of
8 green are between the two in terms of level of threat. Is
9 that correct?

10 Secretary Rumsfeld: That is correct and if you'll
11 recall, when the U.S. and coalition forces moved up from the
12 south, most of the fighting occurred south of Baghdad and in
13 Baghdad, and to a considerable extent, the forces in Baghdad
14 and north, in the Saddam Hussein strongholds, in many cases
15 disappeared into the countryside and still are there. So they
16 still need to be dealt with.

17 Chairman Warner: And those forces did not witness the
18 maneuver of our heavy forces which at one time were
19 anticipated. Had our relations with Turkey been such, we
20 could have inserted heavy forces in the north. Is that not
21 correct?

22 Secretary Rumsfeld: It's true. We did end up, General
23 Franks did, of course, with forces in the north and there was
24 fighting up in that area, but it was not as extensive as it
25 was in the areas to the south.

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Chairman Warner: Thank you. General Franks.

1 STATEMENT OF GENERAL TOMMY R. FRANKS, USA, COMMANDER,
2 UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND

3 General Franks: Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. And
4 Senator Levin, it's an honor to appear again before the
5 committee. I'd ask that my full statement be entered into the
6 record, Mr. Chairman.

7 Chairman Warner: Without objection.

8 General Franks: Since we last sat in this room, much has
9 taken place in the Central Command area of responsibility. A
10 brutal regime has been removed in Iraq to be sure, and efforts
11 are ongoing to help Iraqis build a new future. Forces have
12 continued to help Afghanistan and those people make strides
13 toward independence and have continued to seek out and destroy
14 terrorists and their networks in that country as well as
15 across the central region as part of the global war on
16 terrorism, and I look forward to discussing these important
17 subject today with the committee.

18 Let me begin by bringing a message to this committee from
19 some 280,000-plus members of our coalition, those that I have
20 been privileged to command. And that message for the
21 committee is very simple, it's thank you. These men and women
22 in uniform very much appreciate the support of this body and
23 the support of this committee and all that you have done on
24 their behalf, Mr. Chairman.

25 As you know, earlier in this week, General John Abizaid

1 took the reins of Central Command, and in fact he is a
2 principled leader as this committee knows, and a soldier who
3 brings a great deal to United States Central Command, and I am
4 proud to relinquish command to him, and to consider him a
5 friend. I'd like to begin today by recognizing coalition
6 nations whose contributions of forces, equipment and economic
7 support have signaled worldwide commitment to the eradication
8 of terrorism.

9 Over the past year, the coalition has been steadfast, and
10 today there are 63 nations represented in Tampa at our
11 headquarters, perhaps the largest coalition we have ever seen.
12 A force has been built in the Central Command area of
13 responsibility to continue to move forward to the complete
14 achievement of all of our objectives in Operation Iraqi
15 Freedom as well as in Operation Enduring Freedom, as the
16 Secretary said, to prevent recurrence of the events we saw on
17 9/11/01, to deny terrorists opportunities to use weapons of
18 mass destruction on our people, to bring terrorists to
19 justice, to dismantle their networks.

20 We've also established a visible and viable presence in
21 the horn of Africa, Mr. Chairman, since we last met in order
22 to continue that work. And work in the central region is
23 underway, but as I'll discuss in a moment, the environment
24 within Central Command's region remains challenging and
25 volatile, as the Secretary said. Securing U.S. interests in

1 the future and ensuring regional stability will continue to
2 involve risks in this region and will continue to require the
3 commitment of our resources.

4 This area encompasses 6.4 million square miles and about
5 a half a billion people, as the committee knows, and it runs
6 from the horn of Africa, the Arabian Peninsula to Pakistan and
7 South Asia up to Central Asia, as far north as Kazakhstan,
8 including the waters of the Red Sea, the northern Indian
9 Ocean, the Persian Gulf, key maritime chokepoints of Suez, the
10 Bab el-Mandeb and the Straits of Hormuz. This is an area that
11 represents all of the world's major religions and at least 18
12 major ethnic groups. National economies in this region
13 produce annual per capita incomes which vary from very little,
14 perhaps a few hundred dollars a year, to tens of thousands of
15 dollars. The area includes dictatorships, absolute
16 monarchies, failed states, democracies, and governments in
17 transition toward democracy.

18 Humanitarian crises, resource depletion and overuse,
19 religious and ethnic conflicts, demographic challenges, and
20 military power imbalances create social, economic, and
21 military volatility. These factors are particularly
22 significant given the geographical and economic importance of
23 the region where national resources provide extraordinary
24 opportunities, but they also give rise to a range of
25 socioeconomic problems.

1 In the past 2 years, Central Command has been at the
2 leading edge of the global war on terrorism and the context I
3 just provided makes it perhaps understandable why the initial
4 focus on the war on terrorism would be in this region. The
5 command is engaged with U.S. and coalition forces today in
6 both Afghanistan and Iraq, and the commitment, as the
7 Secretary said, remains strong as our leaders and our troopers
8 continue to work to bring security across the region.

9 On the ground today in Iraq, our troops are conducting
10 ongoing operations. We're combining civil military work with
11 direct offensive military action which will continue to seek
12 out and bring justice to leaders of the fallen regime and
13 other as mentioned, Mr. Chairman, by yourself as well as
14 Secretary Rumsfeld.

15 Priorities will continue to include forming and training
16 police and security forces as well as the creation of a new
17 Iraqi army. We'll continue to work to improve the
18 infrastructure, working with Iraqis to support the
19 establishment of local governance, providing emergency medical
20 care and other humanitarian assistance. Much dangerous work
21 remains to be done, but millions of Iraqis have freedoms today
22 which 4 months ago were only a dream.

23 Our troops continue to work closely with Ambassador Jerry
24 Bremer and the entirety of his civilian team to provide the
25 tools he needs to be successful. Progress is being made and

1 our country is justifiably proud of what's been accomplished.
2 AS I think about lessons learned, as the Secretary mentioned,
3 I'll talk to just a few. The combat work inside Iraq saw a
4 maturing of joint force operations in a number of ways. Some
5 capabilities we saw reached new levels of performance. From a
6 joint integration perspective, our experience in Operations
7 Southern Watch, Northern Watch, and Enduring Freedom in
8 Afghanistan contributed to the jointness and the culture
9 within the headquarters of our area.

10 These operations helped to improve our interoperability,
11 they also helped to improve our command, control,
12 communications, computer and intelligence networking. Our
13 forces were able to achieve operational objectives by the
14 integration of maneuver forces, special operations forces,
15 other government agency assets, precision lethal fires, and
16 non-lethal fires. We saw for the first time integration of
17 forces rather than deconfliction of forces. I believe perhaps
18 most transformational is that particular notion, the business
19 of the integration of forces rather than, as we have seen in
20 the past, simple deconfliction of forces.

21 It seems to me that this integration of the conventional,
22 as you said, Mr. Chairman, air, ground, sea forces to leverage
23 special operations capabilities dealt effectively with
24 asymmetric terrorist-like threats and enabled precision
25 targeting simultaneously in the same battle, in the same

1 battle space. Similarly we have seen in both Afghanistan and
2 Iraq the ability of special operators to use conventional
3 forces in order to set conditions for the success of those
4 forces. Operational fires have been used to spearhead ground
5 maneuver, and our forces have been able to sustain the
6 momentum of the offensive while defeating enemy formations in
7 all kinds of terrain, open desert terrain, complex terrain,
8 and urban terrain.

9 We saw jointness, precision munitions, command and
10 control, the readiness of our equipment, the state of training
11 of our troops, and coalition support as very clear winners
12 during Operation Enduring Freedom. The Secretary said that I
13 would also mention some of the lessons in my remarks and I'll
14 do that briefly now. We also identified a number of areas
15 where we believe we require additional work.

16 Fratricide prevention suffered from a lack of
17 standardized combat identification, so fratricide prevention
18 remains work that we're going to have to focus on in the
19 future. Deployment planning and execution were cumbersome and
20 were much more closely akin to those required during the Cold
21 War than to those required for force projection by our country
22 in the 21st century. And coalition information sharing needs
23 to be improved at all levels. When we operate a coalition, we
24 need the ability to reach back and forth, to and with
25 coalition members. Human intelligence and communications

1 bandwidth also represent areas where we're going to be
2 required, Mr. Chairman, to focus effort in the future.

3 A few comments on Iraq and where we stand today. As the
4 Secretary says, security continues to improve. Portions of
5 Iraq are now and will remain for some time however very
6 dangerous. The term stability operations does not infer that
7 combat operations have ended, indeed they have not. Our
8 forces are engaged in offensive work as member of this
9 committee saw during a recent trip all over Iraq today.

10 As we move forward, the composition and size of the
11 forces that we have in that country will change to match the
12 conditions, and it will ever change to match the requirements
13 recognizing that the enemy we see there also has a vote. And
14 so we will size ourselves, as we have in the past, in order to
15 meet the conditions that we see developed in the future.

16 Factors that will influence our force mix inside Iraq
17 will have to do, as Senator Levin said, with coalition
18 contributions. They will have to do with what we see in the
19 way of the enemy threat. They will have to do with what we
20 see in the success of the Iraqi people themselves as they
21 field their security forces, police forces, infrastructure
22 security forces, single site protection capabilities, and as
23 we assist them in fielding a new Iraqi army.

24 Integration of coalition forces is a major near-term
25 effort. The United Kingdom and Poland are committed at this

1 point to leading divisions in southern Iraq and many partner
2 nations have offered forces to fill those units. Deployment
3 of those forces has already begun, Mr. Chairman. We continue
4 discussions today with India and Pakistan. At this moment, 19
5 coalition partners are on the ground in support of operations
6 in Iraq with deployment of an additional 19 countries pending.
7 An additional 11 nations are conducting military-to-military
8 discussions with the Secretary's staff, the joint staff, and
9 my staff in Tampa today.

10 At this point, we see some 35,000 policeman as having
11 been hired, Iraqi policemen. This represents 55, perhaps 60
12 percent of a total requirement, around 60,000 policemen in
13 that country. Until we see the complete standing up of that
14 number of security forces and policemen, we will continue
15 joint patrolling, we'll continue to train with and work with
16 these Iraqi forces as we bring them on.

17 Creation of a new Iraqi army is also moving forward. The
18 plan envisions three divisions located near Mosul, Baghdad,
19 and Basra. They will provide for territorial defense and they
20 will conduct stability operations. Over the next year, our
21 goal is to field approximately nine battalions in order to do
22 that work, and initially those forces will focus on performing
23 security at fixed sites, assisting in the movement of convoys,
24 and providing border control. As it develops, this force will
25 work with coalition forces to contribute to stability and

1 security throughout Iraq.

2 Underlying all security functions is the need to continue
3 humanitarian assistance and the conduct of civil military
4 operations to improve the quality of life for Iraqi people.
5 It is obvious to all that in order to see Iraq move forward
6 into the future, security must in fact come along at a pace
7 that sees the betterment of the conditions of life for the
8 Iraqi people and the establishment of Iraqi governance, the
9 placing of an Iraqi face on the government there. It is in
10 our interest to move these items forward as quickly and
11 thoughtfully as we can, and we'll continue to do that.

12 I can't overstate the value of coalition contribution to
13 success we have seen up to this point. Hospitals, medical
14 supplies, water, food, transportation, expertise in rebuilding
15 is being provided by coalition members. The fact that there
16 has been no humanitarian disaster in Iraq, no widespread
17 outbreak of disease, no hunger, no refugees, or massive
18 problems with displaced persons, or any other predicted
19 consequence of war, all of that is due in large part to the
20 contribution of our allies.

21 The coalition provisional authority, Ambassador Jerry
22 Bremer, and our forces will continue to work in concert with
23 international and nongovernmental agencies to reverse the
24 result of more than three decades of a brutal regime.

25 Mr. Chairman, let me conclude by saying the global war on

1 terrorism is ongoing. The precision, determination, expertise
2 of our military forces and our coalition partners has brought
3 about the liberation of both Afghanistan and Iraq in lightning
4 speed with minimum bloodshed. However, these two nations have
5 only taken the first steps toward freedom. The United States
6 and our coalition partners must be there to support the whole
7 journey.

8 While we have accomplished a lot, the potential for
9 terrorist acts and other setbacks remains very real.
10 Afghanistan has a new fragile government, a new army, and with
11 coalition support the nation is making strides toward long-
12 term stability. In Iraq, Saddam Hussein's regime was
13 destroyed and regime supporters are being rooted out. Our
14 focus has changed from military destruction of a regime to
15 providing security and humanitarian assistance assisting the
16 Iraqi people to grow a representative form of government.

17 Decisive combat operations have been completed but much
18 work remains to be done. I, as every member of this
19 committee, Mr. Chairman, am very proud of each and every one
20 of the men and women who have continued to serve selflessly
21 and tirelessly in the execution of our mission from Egypt to
22 Kazakhstan, from Suez to Pakistan, regardless of the uniform
23 of service they wear or the nation from which they come.

24 I thank Congress and the American people for the
25 tremendous support you have shown and what you have done for

1 me, Mr. Chairman. I'd be pleased to join the Secretary in
2 answering your questions.

3 [The prepared statement of General Franks follows:]

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1 Chairman Warner: Thank you, General. All of us join the
2 Secretary in his commendation of your distinguished career, 36
3 years I believe, am I not correct? And the contribution of
4 your family.

5 Excellent statement by both witnesses, very balanced,
6 what went right and what we've got to learn to do better in
7 the future, and we'll probe that in these questions. We'll
8 have a 6-minute round, colleagues. We have almost full
9 attendance of the committee and I'll move out quickly.

10 Mr. Secretary, as I departed the one thing that was
11 foremost in my mind is how can we proceed and what steps are
12 being taken to reduce the risk to the individual and groups of
13 our soldiers and civilians, coalition civilians who are in
14 support of this in the face of these repeated daily attacks
15 and losses? The most encouraging information that I received
16 was from Bremer, and that is -- Ambassador Bremer -- that he
17 hopes by this July, within weeks, to have concluded putting in
18 place the initial steps of the interim authority with Iraqis,
19 as I mentioned a council and a constitutional group. Is that
20 on schedule and do you concur in my view that that's perhaps
21 the strongest tool that we have to reduce these attacks, put
22 an Iraqi face, a degree of Iraqi responsibility on this
23 situation as we move towards securing their freedom?

24 Secretary Rumsfeld: Mr. Chairman, I do. I think it's a
25 combination of political progress and, as you suggested,

1 Ambassador Bremer is hopeful that sometime next week or the
2 week thereafter there will be the governing council set up
3 with some 30, 25 to 30-plus members. There are a number of
4 city councils, as you know, that have been stood up in Baghdad
5 and other portions of the country.

6 I think it is, however, a mixture of the political
7 progress, where Iraqis begin to assume responsibility for some
8 of the ministries and some of their activities, economic
9 progress as General Franks said so people see their lives
10 improving, and military security. And I don't think any one
11 can be separated. I think all three are critical and they all
12 have to move forward.

13 Chairman Warner: I agree with that. But as soon as we
14 can begin to hold some Iraqis responsible for these killings
15 and constant attacks all the better, in my judgment. And they
16 can publicly address the need to have them stopped.

17 Mr. Secretary, with respect to questions of augmenting
18 the coalition forces, and specifically as my colleague Mr.
19 Levin said, and as I raised with Ambassador Bremer, the
20 inclusion of elements of NATO. Can you address that?

21 Secretary Rumsfeld: I'd be happy to. I keep hearing
22 people say things and people write things to the effect that
23 this is the U.S. and the U.K., and it's not. As General
24 Franks said, we've got 19 countries on the ground. We have
25 commitments from another 19 countries. We are in discussions

1 with another 11 countries. That would bring the total up to
2 49 nations. My understanding is that we currently have on the
3 ground some 19,000 coalition forces with commitments for
4 another 11,000, which would bring the total to 30,000. In
5 addition, the work is going forward to develop an Iraqi army,
6 former Under Secretary of Defense Walt Slocum is working hard
7 to achieve that goal and we expect to have thousands of Iraqis
8 back in uniform, functioning in a responsible way as well as
9 the police evolution that you've discussed.

10 Now, what about the U.N. and NATO? The United Nations
11 passed a resolution, they've assigned an individual, Mr. de
12 Mello, who works closely with Ambassador Bremer. I believe,
13 Senator Levin, you indicated that it was a mystery why we
14 hadn't reached out to NATO. We have reached out to NATO.
15 NATO is assisting Poland, which has agreed to take a sector in
16 force generation. In addition, there are discussions that
17 have been taking place in NATO about the possibility of taking
18 on an additional role. At the current time, as you know,
19 they're planning to take over responsibility in Afghanistan
20 this August.

21 So they have a lot on their platter. But we have reached
22 out to just about everybody I can think of asking for
23 assistance of various types and it is coming in. Is it as
24 much as we'd like, as fast as we'd like? No, it isn't. But
25 are we hopeful it will continue to increase? Yes.

1 Chairman Warner: Mr. Secretary, all of us are very
2 mindful of the need to maintain a rotation base of our forces
3 back. We recognize that probably the OPTEMPO of our military
4 forces of all branches are at a very high point at this time,
5 and yet our nation and other nations are faced with a
6 contingency operation in Africa, most notably Liberia. I
7 think the President quite properly is facing this issue, has
8 sent teams out to make an assessment of what needs to be done,
9 he'll evaluate it and then make a presidential decision.

10 Could you share with us this morning some of the options
11 that are being considered and how those options in terms of
12 our forestructure might impact on our troop redeployments out
13 of Iraq or troop redeployments in other areas? In other
14 words, can our military accept in your professional judgment
15 -- I know they will, but what are the consequences of
16 accepting a presidential decision, should it be made, of a
17 deployment force? And we bear in mind that if you deploy, say
18 1,000 individuals, you've got to have 1,000 in transit, 1,000
19 in training, so it's a multiple of the force that actually
20 goes in the country.

21 Secretary Rumsfeld: You're quite right, of course, Mr.
22 Chairman, that when you have 1,000 troops deployed overseas
23 you do need a rotational base, and it ends up like a multiple
24 of three rather than just the 1,000. First let me say that it
25 is critically important that the department manage the forces

1 in a way that we can continue to attract and retain the people
2 we need, that the Reserve who have just done a superb job are
3 not stressed or called up so frequently or kept there so long
4 that it affects their commitment to serve in the Reserves. We
5 need them badly, and we have to be attentive to that, and we
6 intend to be.

7 The rotation out of Iraq is already starting. I don't
8 know what the number is, but I think it's something like
9 140,000 have already been -- 142,000 have already been
10 redeployed. For the most part, there were large numbers of
11 Air Force and Navy. There also have been some Army and
12 Marine.

13 Chairman Warner: Redeployed back home, put in home?

14 Secretary Rumsfeld: Redeployed back home, back to their
15 bases, wherever they were, mostly in the U.S. The 3rd Brigade
16 of the 3rd Infantry Division is now in Kuwait, it's been taken
17 out of Iraq and it should be back home in July. The 2nd
18 Brigade is -- the plan is that they would return in August,
19 having been there something like 10 months, and the 1st
20 Brigade of the 3rd Infantry Division is scheduled to return in
21 September and they would have -- they've been in there since
22 about January, so that would be a total of about 9 months.

23 And the services and the Joint Staff have been working
24 with Central Command to develop a rotation plan so that we can
25 in fact see that we treat these terrific young men and young

1 women in a way that's respectful of their lives and their
2 circumstances and they wonderful job they did.

3 With respect to Liberia, the President is considering the
4 appropriate U.S. role. He has indicated to world leaders that
5 he intends that the United States assist in some way with
6 respect to Liberia. He has asked the Department of Defense to
7 dispatch assessment teams in two locations, one in Liberia and
8 it's currently there, several dozen people, and in addition he
9 is sending assessment teams to the so-called ECOWAS nations to
10 determine the readiness of the ECOWAS forces and the extent to
11 which they may or not be ready to deploy and over what period
12 of time, with what type of equipment, having had what type of
13 training.

14 The United States, Great Britain, and several other
15 countries have been in the process for many months now
16 training ECOWAS forces, and some have been used in Sierra
17 Leone, some are currently committed. So until the assessment
18 teams come back, it seems to me that we will not have a good
19 grip on what we would propose to the President.

20 Chairman Warner: Thank you. Your staff briefed this
21 committee yesterday and you'll be briefing yourself the Senate
22 tomorrow, so I commend you on keeping us informed on it.

23 General Franks, lastly, the level of conflict that
24 continues, in your planning did you anticipate this level?
25 You've been very candid with us this morning, and had you put

1 in place the preparations to deal with it, and have you
2 considered perhaps while we're standing up an Iraqi army,
3 between now and the stand up of that army, utilizing some
4 Iraqi soldiers that can be trusted to go along on the patrols
5 with our own, so that we have not only the coalition helmet,
6 but something that the citizens can clearly perceive as one of
7 their own helmets?

8 General Franks: Mr. Chairman, the latter point first.
9 Yes, as we begin to work to build with Walt Slocum, whom the
10 Secretary mentioned a minute ago, the Iraqi army, we will as
11 those forces are brought on position them, work with them in a
12 very operational way because as you said that serves to put an
13 Iraqi face on the security assets that are being used
14 throughout the country. And so, yes sir that is part of the
15 plan. With respect to the level of violence, Mr. Chairman I
16 will tell you, I think in a war and in post-conflict, one
17 never knows how to gauge what may be expected in the aftermath
18 of major combat.

19 Was it anticipated, Mr. Chairman? I would say yes sir,
20 it was. And perhaps the way I'll justify that statement is to
21 say that the footprint that we see in Iraq today is not the
22 same footprint that was in Iraq on the day the President
23 announced the cessation of major combat operations. In fact,
24 the deployment orders, which had been approved by the
25 Secretary prior to the time, I believe it was the 1st of May,

1 when our President said that the major combat operations had
2 ended, the deployment orders which had already been signed, in
3 fact adjusted the footprint for Iraq in terms of military
4 policing, in terms of civil affairs people, in terms of
5 humanitarian assistance type forces, in terms of engineers.

6 The plan called for the removal of forces that are much
7 more inclined to be used during major combat operations than
8 during stability operations, for example, armor formations.
9 And so I believe, Mr. Chairman, that we did anticipate a level
10 of violence and I can't tell you whether we anticipated that
11 it would be at the level that we see right now. You know, Mr.
12 Chairman, I think that when a war begins one can always hope
13 for a very quick transition to peace, to see a nation begin to
14 rebuild itself without a great deal of friction and without a
15 great deal of messiness. But on the operational side, on the
16 military side we must always be prepared to handle whatever
17 level of violence may come along, and Mr. Chairman I believe
18 our forces have been and will continue to be able to handle
19 the levels of violence that we see as this nation tries to
20 bring itself together.

21 Chairman Warner: Thank you very much. Senator Levin.

22 Senator Levin. Thank you Mr. Chairman. Secretary
23 Rumsfeld, going back to the NATO issue just for a minute, back
24 in April you were asked about a possible role for NATO, a
25 formal role for NATO in the post-war effort in Iraq and this

1 is what you said, that you suggested to the Secretary General
2 that I thought that would be a good thing. If NATO wanted to
3 do that, obviously France would be opposed I am told. They
4 are opposed to a lot of things so that shouldn't be a problem
5 because you can do it at 18 instead of at 19 countries, since
6 they're not a member of the Defense Planning Committee.

7 Now, we have apparently not asked NATO to formally decide
8 to raise a force for deployment in Iraq similar to what
9 they've done in Bosnia and in Kosovo. Why have we not made
10 that request of NATO as NATO, not just to support Poland for
11 instance as they've done as an individual country, but why
12 have we not asked NATO to formally decide as NATO to raise
13 that force and to give its endorsement to our action? Is it
14 because we're afraid France might not go along, or what? Or
15 we don't want to ask France.

16 Secretary Rumsfeld: No, first of all, it's not clear to
17 me we haven't. I was told this morning that the discussions
18 taking place in NATO include a discussion about a possible
19 NATO role in Iraq. Now to what extent the Department of State
20 or the United States has or has not issued a formal request I
21 don't know, but I know the discussions are going forward and I
22 know that the assistance that NATO is providing, not
23 individual countries in NATO, but NATO as an institution is
24 providing to Poland, is a NATO institutional action. It is
25 something that has been discussed, approved, and under way.

1 I also know as I said that NATO is preparing to take over
2 responsibilities in Afghanistan so how many things like that
3 they're going to be able to do at one time remains to be open.
4 But I have no problem, as I indicated then and I indicate now
5 some months later, in having NATO involved. Indeed, I think
6 it would be a good thing.

7 Senator Levin: NATO involved as NATO, formally being
8 asked and deciding as an organization to raise and to deploy
9 forces in Iraq? You have no problem with that?

10 Secretary Rumsfeld: I have no problem with that.
11 Indeed, I'm very pleased that NATO has been assisting and is
12 currently discussing assisting in additional ways.

13 Senator Levin: But if that request to NATO had been
14 made, wouldn't you know about it?

15 Secretary Rumsfeld: I don't know technically what you're
16 getting at, but whether the Department of State has instructed
17 the U.S. Ambassador to NATO, or Permanent Representative as
18 he's called, to issue some sort of a formal request I don't
19 know. I know NATO has seized the issue, is discussing it, I
20 was told that this morning after Pete Pace, General Pace, had
21 a phone call with the Supreme Allied Commander of Europe,
22 General Jones.

23 Senator Levin: Would you support asking Germany and
24 France to provide forces in Iraq?

25 Secretary Rumsfeld: Our goal is to get large numbers of

1 international forces in from lots of countries, including
2 those two, but we have requests out to a large number of
3 countries.

4 Senator Levin: But you would specifically support
5 requesting Germany and France to provide forces in Iraq?

6 Secretary Rumsfeld: We have made requests to, I don't
7 know what it is, something like the Department of State has
8 issued requests to something like 70 or 80, 90 countries.

9 Senator Levin: Is Germany and France on the list?

10 Secretary Rumsfeld: I'll have to ask. I would suspect
11 they are.

12 Senator Levin: But would you support it?

13 Secretary Rumsfeld: Why certainly.

14 Senator Levin: Good. The troop level, General Franks,
15 you've indicated that that is going to depend upon conditions
16 that exist in the future. General Abizaid at his confirmation
17 hearing recently said that he believes that we would have
18 large number of troops in Iraq for the foreseeable future. Do
19 you agree?

20 General Franks: I do, sir.

21 Senator Levin: And would you -- could you give us just a
22 range of troops, I mean would it be from 100-150,000 for many
23 years, give us some kind of -- I'm not asking for any kind of
24 precise figure, but what's your current best estimate?

25 General Franks: Mr. Chairman, that actually is not as

1 hard to answer as it might seem. We have about 145,000 troops
2 in there right now. As I have talked to commanders at every
3 level inside Iraq one finds that that footprint appears to us
4 on the operational side to be about what that footprint needs
5 to look like. There has been suggestion that perhaps there
6 should be more troops, and in fact I can tell you in the
7 presence of this Secretary that if more troops are necessary,
8 this Secretary is going to say yes. And we have talked about
9 this on a number of occasions and when the tactical commanders
10 on the ground determine that they need to raise force levels,
11 then those forces in fact will be provided. The Secretary may
12 want to comment on that, but what we --

13 Senator Levin: That's reassuring though. In other words
14 the current footprint to your best estimate -- and what that
15 be for the foreseeable future?

16 General Franks: Sir, it is for the foreseeable future.

17 Senator Levin: On the weapons of mass destruction issue,
18 which is back in the press in many ways, in the media this
19 week, Secretary Rumsfeld, as you know, earlier this week the
20 White House acknowledged that, quote, the reference to Iraq's
21 attempt to acquire uranium from Africa should not have been
22 included in the President's State of the Union speech on
23 January 28. On the 29th, you said on CNN something very
24 similar to what the President had said the night before when
25 you said that the Iraqi regime, quote, recently was discovered

1 seeking significant quantities of uranium from Africa.

2 Now Condi Rice just a few weeks ago said the following,
3 that we did not know at the time, no one knew at the time in
4 our circle, maybe someone knew down in the bowels of the
5 agency, but no one in our circles knew that there were doubts
6 and suspicions that this might be a forgery. And I'm just
7 curious as to whether or not you've determined as a policy
8 maker how the facts, the falsity of that claim of uranium sale
9 to Iraq from Africa remained in the bowels of the agency for 9
10 months after you made your statement on the 29th.

11 Did somebody come to you, the intelligence community come
12 to you and say, my gosh, we've got facts that show that that
13 just simply is inaccurate? Have you determined how those
14 accurate facts, in other words, the knowledge in the bowels of
15 the intelligence community that it was wrong that Africa was
16 solicited by Iraq for uranium and that those documents were
17 forged? Have you determined how it happened that that
18 information about the forgery stayed for so long in the,
19 quote, to quote Condi Rice, the bowels of the agency?

20 Secretary Rumsfeld: No, I can't give you a good answer.
21 I can try to get an answer for the record if you'd like. I
22 must say that as someone who reads intelligence every day as
23 you do, I find that corrections are being made fairly
24 continuously, that you review a week's worth of intel, and two
25 months later they come back and say, well we said this on this

1 date, but we have new information that suggests this or that.

2 So the fact that the facts change from time to time with
3 respect to specifics does not surprise me or shock me at all.
4 It's to be expected, it's part of the intelligence world that
5 we live with is uncertainty and less than perfect knowledge.
6 I must say, however, that as we've gone through this period I
7 think the intelligence has been quite good, and I don't think
8 the fact that there is an instance where something was
9 inaccurate ought to in any way paint a broad brush on the
10 intelligence that we get and suggest that that's a pattern or
11 something. It's just not.

12 Senator Levin: Could you find out for this committee for
13 the record? This is a significant piece of intelligence, it
14 was relied on at the highest level, very publicly, very
15 visibly by the President and by you within two days of each,
16 right before the war. A very significant statement about
17 seeking uranium in Africa, it was based on intelligence, at
18 the same time the intelligence community knew in the depths of
19 their agency that this was not true, it seems to me is
20 absolutely startling and I think we would all want to know how
21 it could possibly have stayed there in the basement of the
22 agency while policy makers on the upper floors were making
23 these statements.

24 If you could do that for this committee, I think we'd all
25 appreciate it.

1 Secretary Rumsfeld: I'll try to do that.

2 [The information referred to follows:]

3 [COMMITTEE INSERT]

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1 Senator Levin: Thank you.

2 Chairman Warner: Senator Allard.

3 Senator Allard: Thank you Mr. Chairman. I'm interested,
4 in light of recent attacks and everything, your assessment as
5 to what's happening with the -- are they more organized than
6 say they were 3 or 4 weeks ago, and if they are becoming more
7 organized, is there any evidence of some -- how central is
8 this organization? Is it be region or is it countrywide? I'd
9 like to hear your assessment on that, General Franks.

10 General Franks: Senator, because we see more of the
11 activity, you know, I ask myself are we seeing more of this
12 violent activity in the areas that are shaded on the map that
13 the Secretary turned around a minute ago? Are we seeing more
14 of this violent activity because some of these Jihadist
15 extremists, Ba'athists, Saddam Fedayeen are coming together or
16 are we seeing more violence there because we are more
17 offensive and because we are placing more patrols in there?

18 And so the answer that I give you I will caveat with that
19 because I suspect that we're seeing increased violence in some
20 of these areas because we are more present. We are out
21 looking for it because that's our charter, that's what our
22 force is going to do. Now in terms of networking among these
23 groups or between these groups, Senator, I'm not comfortable
24 right now saying that I believe that there is operational
25 control between factions operating in Tikrit, Ar Ramadi,

1 Masul, Bayji, I'm not sure. I recognize the same thing you
2 recognize which is that we see increased violence, sir, but
3 I'm not ready yet to tell you that I see evidence that these
4 violent acts are being coordinated. I might tell you that
5 next week, Senator, but I do not yet see evidence of it.

6 Senator Allard: Do you see any outside influences coming
7 into the country, for example, Iran? Is there any coalition
8 forces from any of the neighboring countries that you can pick
9 up or any suggestion that there may be?

10 General Franks: Sir, as you know, since the war started
11 we have seen infiltration of elements through Syria, and we
12 have encountered those on a number of occasions. I believe
13 that there continue to be efforts by Iran, by Teheran, to
14 influence activities inside Iraq. We see evidence in there of
15 the intelligence services, Iranian intelligence services. We
16 see evidence in there of political forces. So, yes, I do see
17 attempts by nations in the region, I named those two, to
18 influence activities that are going on inside Iraq.

19 Senator Allard: Mr. Secretary, I'm aware that Ambassador
20 Bremer is trying to get some members on their Iraqi governing
21 council and get this put together rather quickly, at least in
22 the near future. Do you have any idea what we're thinking
23 about in terms of makeup of the council? Are we going to
24 include Islamic clerics, are we going to have former exiles
25 and Kurdish leaders, and when do you anticipate national

1 elections?

2 Secretary Rumsfeld: I saw the pool of names and it's
3 large and diverse, in answer to your question. It includes
4 folks from all across the spectrum, the Iraqis. And elections
5 are something that it seems to me will have to be determined
6 as we go down the road. The goal in life is not to have one
7 election one time as happened when Adolf Hitler was elected
8 for example. The goal is to have a process and to have true
9 representation and true respect for the various elements,
10 diverse elements in that country.

11 And the steps would be something like this, although I
12 can't even be certain of that: that there will be a governing
13 council, there will be some sort of an interim authority,
14 there will be a constitutional convention to develop a
15 constitution. The constitution and the Iraqis who develop the
16 constitution will make a judgment as to when and at what pace
17 they think their country is ready to have elections in a way
18 that would be reasonable and create a representative system
19 for them.

20 And that's out some way. If you think back to
21 Afghanistan, we still have a provisional government in that
22 country and their elections are expected next year sometime,
23 so it takes some time. It's not an easy transition.

24 Senator Allard: The Kurdish problem in the north I think
25 continues to be a problem and the question I have is, from

1 your assessment, Mr. Secretary, do you think the Kurds in the
2 north are more interested in rebuilding Iraq or are they more
3 interested in forming a separate country at this particular
4 point in time?

5 Secretary Rumsfeld: Oh, I think the former. Everything
6 I've heard is that the individuals from the Kurdish section of
7 Iraq are in fact participating in this process, that they've
8 behaved in a reasonably constructive way and that they're
9 relieved that the regime of Saddam Hussein is gone and that
10 they intend to play a political role in the evolution of a new
11 Iraq.

12 Senator Allard: Mr. Chairman, I see my time is expired.
13 Thank you.

14 Chairman Warner: We'll recognize Senator --

15 Secretary Rumsfeld: Mr. Chairman, could I make a
16 response to Senator Levin on this subject that General Franks
17 answered on footprint? He responded, for the foreseeable
18 future about such as it is, as I recall. I would just amend
19 that slightly by saying exactly. We see no reason to think
20 that that footprint isn't the right one for the moment. But
21 the composition of U.S. forces could change and we could end
22 up with different types, as he suggested. And second, the
23 numbers of U.S. forces could change while the footprint stayed
24 the same, in the event that we have greater success in
25 bringing in additional coalition forces, in the event we are

1 able to accelerate the Iraqi army.

2 So the exact number of U.S. forces might change as well
3 as the composition even though the footprint, as General
4 Franks said, would be roughly the same until we see evolution
5 in the political and economic spheres. Thank you.

6 Chairman Warner: Two administrative announcements,
7 colleagues. We have two votes coming circa 11:30. It is the
8 intention of the chair to catch the end of the first vote and
9 remain and do the second, and then return and resume the
10 hearing.

11 Following the open hearing, we will have a closed hearing
12 in 26 -- I mean the Intelligence Committee next door. Thank
13 you very much.

14 Senator Kennedy.

15 Senator Kennedy: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Secretary,
16 General. We're all tremendously proud of the troops'
17 effectiveness in Operation Iraqi Freedom. It's a great credit
18 to you, Mr. Secretary and to General Franks. I'm now
19 concerned that we have the world's best trained soldiers
20 serving as policemen in what seems to be a shooting gallery.

21 The President declared an end to major combat operation,
22 but the war's not over for the men and women who are on the
23 ground in Iraq or their families here at home. And the lack
24 of a coherent plan is hindering our efforts at
25 internationalization and aggravating the strain on our troops.

1 Our troops are tired and want to return to their families who
2 are at home coping with the absence and the loss of income.
3 They've been gone close to a year and this truly is a
4 hardship. They and the American people want to know what the
5 strategy is to stabilize Iraq, bring the promise of democracy
6 to the Iraqi people and alleviate the strain on our troops.

7 Now I've heard in response to Senator Levin's questions
8 about the NATO forces, there are 2 million troops in NATO.
9 Clearly not all of them are qualified to go here, but you have
10 the Italian carabinieri and the French gendarmes and the
11 Spanish guardia civil that are superbly trained troops in riot
12 control and dealing with barriers and fire and explosives.
13 Have we made a specific request to try and get some of the
14 best trained police that exist in the NATO countries to come
15 over and provide some relief to these American troops that are
16 in the process of being attacked almost daily?

17 Secretary Rumsfeld: Yes, in fact, Italy and Spain have
18 both made commitments.

19 Senator Kennedy: And when will they come, can you tell
20 us --

21 Secretary Rumsfeld: I can't tell you --

22 Senator Kennedy: -- what the expectation is and how many
23 are going to be there?

24 Secretary Rumsfeld: I can't tell you precisely. It's up
25 -- I've always believed that it's up to those countries to

1 make their own announcements.

2 Senator Kennedy: I'm asking about what's been requested.

3 Secretary Rumsfeld: We have requested of them exactly
4 the kinds of forces you've described and they have made
5 commitments to do so. The dates generally for these forces
6 are going to be in the latter portion of this summer and into
7 September and certainly by October. So I'm guessing that some
8 will be coming in next month, and then it will be August,
9 September, and October that they will be flowing in, but I
10 don't want to refer specifically to those countries, because
11 I'm speaking to the 19 countries that have made commitments.

12 Senator Kennedy: Well that's true. But these three
13 certainly, among others, have some of the best trained in
14 terms of the police function.

15 I was troubled just by your earlier response about the
16 knowledge of the request of troops from NATO. It would seem
17 that you would be the person that would be on the phone to
18 NATO to ask these troops to be available and we just want to
19 know, are you on the phone talking to NATO, to General
20 Robertson, to request troops, have you done that? You
21 indicated in an earlier response, we want to reach out to
22 everyone. Is it as much as we would like? No, in terms of
23 response to NATO. It's not clear that we have announced to
24 other countries. I have no problem if they want to provide
25 more help and assistance. I think families want to know what

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1 are we doing? If they have 2 million troops over there, what
2 are we doing to bring a major chunk of those troops through
3 NATO into Iraq. Is that part of our plan now in
4 internationalizing the military phase of it?

5 Secretary Rumsfeld: We have made requests of NATO. I
6 don't know quite what you're asking --

7 Senator Kennedy: I'm asking when have you talked --

8 Secretary Rumsfeld: The 2 million troops, Senator --

9 Senator Kennedy: -- have you picked up the phone?

10 Secretary Rumsfeld: The 2 million troops I believe
11 include the United States of America.

12 Senator Kennedy: Well, then you've got, what, 1,700,000
13 over there, out of the 1,700,000 over there?

14 Secretary Rumsfeld: And we have asked, I believe, months
15 ago, the United States through the Department of State made a
16 request to something like 70 or 80 countries for assistance.
17 There have been force generation meetings that have been
18 taking place, one that took place very recently, there's
19 another taking place I believe in New York --

20 Senator Kennedy: But your answer, I gather Secretary, is
21 you're doing everything that you possibly can as a Secretary
22 of Defense --

23 Secretary Rumsfeld: We believe we are.

24 Senator Kennedy -- to make every request of NATO for
25 combat troops as well as for the kind of guard functions, and

1 that you're satisfied you're doing everything you can within
2 NATO and you have made that request yourself, or you're
3 conscious of the administration, or if you don't know that,
4 you're going to find out whether they have made that?

5 Secretary Rumsfeld: We certainly want assistance from
6 NATO and from NATO countries and we have commitments from a
7 good large number of NATO countries already and NATO is
8 already assisting.

9 Senator Kennedy: In the other area of the development of
10 Iraq, as I understand the U.S. Government has talked about the
11 future of Iraq working groups. But I'm told by the people on
12 the ground that there's no formal plan for reconstruction.
13 Can you provide us with the operational plans for
14 reconstruction? Who are the people, the level of resources
15 that are committed, how many Iraqis will be involved in the
16 plan to build, police, justice system, the media, the schools,
17 the other institutions? And are there plans on paper and
18 where are those plans? Or are we shooting from the hip and
19 taking a piecemeal approach when American lives are at stake
20 in terms of the broader security issues?

21 Secretary Rumsfeld: There certainly are plans for the
22 reconstruction of Iraq. I would, however, say that the plans
23 are not for the United States or the coalition to reconstruct
24 Iraq. Iraq's circumstance today is the result of 30 years of
25 repression by the Saddam Hussein regime and a Stalinist type

1 economy and a denial of the people of that country and the
2 infrastructure of that country, the kinds of opportunities and
3 investments that a wealthy country like Iraq is perfectly
4 capable of doing.

5 Today if one goes from the Gulf States, from Kuwait or
6 Qatar or any of those nations into Iraq, it's like going in
7 the old days from Romania into West Germany. It's just stark
8 how damaging that regime has been to that country to say
9 nothing of the mass graves of people that were killed by that
10 regime.

11 The plans do exist, but it will be the Iraqi people that
12 will have to build back their country and reconstruct their
13 country. A reference was made earlier to nation-building. I
14 suppose it's mostly semantics, but I think it's a little heady
15 and arrogant to think that you can build another people's
16 nation. I think the Iraqi people are going to build their own
17 nation back and they're going to build it in a distinctly
18 unique Iraqi way.

19 And our task is to try to create an environment to get
20 rid of that repressive regime and to try to create an
21 environment within which the Iraqi people can put themselves
22 on a political and economic path towards a future and not to
23 think that we're going to go in there and send the American
24 taxpayers' dollars, and billions of them, trying to rebuild a
25 country in a way that fits our image because that's just not

1 going to happen.

2 Senator Kennedy: Well you're not suggesting we're not
3 going to be spending billions of dollars of American taxpayers
4 --

5 Secretary Rumsfeld: Of course we are. Of course we
6 will.

7 Chairman Warner: Senator, the light's on. Thank you
8 very much. I didn't mean to interrupt you Senator, but we
9 have to -- Senator Sessions.

10 Senator Sessions: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and General
11 Franks, I want to express my congratulations along with the
12 others for your leadership, appreciation for your career, and
13 for the great troops that you led, how they performed under
14 extraordinarily difficult circumstances, they performed so
15 well.

16 You know, when we think about what has occurred, a lot
17 has occurred. We could have as a nation stayed right here and
18 tried to build up defenses at home or we could have gone after
19 the bases of terrorism that were plainly out there in the
20 world. The President made a decision, this Congress supported
21 him overwhelmingly to eliminate those bases, we saw those in
22 Afghanistan. You've liberated that country and we've removed
23 al-Qaeda and the Taliban from authority there. We've now
24 liberated the people of Iraq and our prayer is and our hope is
25 that we can help them establish their own nation. It

1 certainly will be, as the Secretary said, ultimately their
2 challenge to do that.

3 I wanted to ask you a couple of things. One of the
4 concerns I have is how quickly we can bring on the Iraqi
5 indigenous army that will be a servant of the Iraqi army and
6 the Iraqi nation. How difficult is that? Do we need more
7 resources? What can we do to speed along the creation of a
8 healthy, well-trained army that serves the people of Iraq?

9 General Franks: Sir, first thank you for your kind
10 remarks. We do want to bring the Afghan -- pardon me, the
11 Iraqi national army online as quickly as we can. I think the
12 vision is for an order of magnitude of 12,000 or so within the
13 initial 12 months, if my memory serves. We want to have as
14 much Iraqi army as we can, but we want a professional Iraqi
15 army when we build it. And what I mean by that is we want the
16 training of the troopers from the bottom up to be done in a
17 very competent way, and we have reinforced for ourselves in
18 Afghanistan that we know how to do that, that we can do it.

19 But what we also learned in Afghanistan is that we do not
20 want to create an army that has no place to go. We want to be
21 sure that the Iraqis themselves bring along the infrastructure
22 for the positioning of those forces as we bring them online
23 and at the same time we want to be sure that we work from the
24 top down to create a Ministry of Defense and the operational
25 level for an army that can manage them. I would like, Senator

1 Sessions, to see this thing, the Iraqi army come along as fast
2 as we can actually control it and put it to work and I am
3 satisfied with the pace that Walt Slocum intends to work on
4 that project right now, sir.

5 Senator Sessions: General Franks, if you would just
6 briefly share with us the status of our commitment to
7 containing Saddam Hussein before this war started, that
8 resources that we've been committing for over a decade to
9 keeping it in a box, including patrolling the Persian Gulf,
10 air flights and Northern Watch and Southern Watch. You know,
11 we think about the cost of the operation and the effort to
12 help Iraq rebuild, but tell us about the costs we were
13 incurring annually?

14 General Franks: Sir, if you think about Operation
15 Northern Watch, Operation Southern Watch, and the maritime
16 intercept operations that were ongoing between 1992 and 2002,
17 I can't give you with precision the math associated with that.
18 The number that I would give you would probably be -- Northern
19 Watch, Southern Watch, \$1- to \$2 billion a year, depending on
20 the year, and that does not factor what it costs coalition
21 members like the state of Kuwait, for example, who paid in
22 assistance in-kind perhaps another \$200- to \$250 million a
23 year during the course of containment.

24 Sir, I attempt to justify nothing with respect to
25 containment and I make no comment about whether that was good

1 or bad. From an operational perspective, our job was to
2 control the skies over Iraq and to ensure as best we could in
3 doing that the sanctity, if you will, of 786, 787, and
4 security council resolutions, some 17 of them that the
5 Secretary mentioned earlier. That was the policy, that's what
6 our forces worked to do for that period of time. I will offer
7 the operational fact, sir, that at this time, those operations
8 are no longer necessary and in fact there are no longer jets
9 and air defense systems shooting at American men and women and
10 then returning to the sanctity of bases belonging to the
11 regime.

12 Senator Sessions: I think that's an important thing for
13 us to consider, and I always felt that in fact the Gulf War
14 never ended, that there was sort of an agreed-upon peace that
15 was not holding, and to me something had to be done, and I
16 think those actions have been taken. Would you just share --

17 General Franks: Sir, if I could insert one thing in
18 response to a comment Senator Kennedy made a minute ago about
19 troops having been committed a year and in many cases being
20 very tired. I believe, having been there, sir, that troops
21 are tired at two levels. One is a tactical level where one
22 becomes tired, and the other is a level where people do not
23 believe in what they're doing. I believe members of this
24 committee who recently visited our troops on the ground in
25 Iraq found none of the latter and it's my job and our job to

1 be sure that we provide the tactical relief, rest, and quality
2 of life for our troops as best we can. But my comment is that
3 I believe that our young men and women who are deployed in
4 Iraq working in a very dangerous circumstance believe in their
5 responsibilities and are doing them remarkably well. I'm
6 sorry, sir, please.

7 Senator Sessions: Thank you.

8 Chairman Warner: Senator Reed.

9 Senator Reed: Well thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
10 First, General Franks, let me add my commendation for an
11 extraordinary career in the Army and service to the Nation,
12 and I think you know that we're all sincerely appreciative,
13 but I think you also know that the appreciation of the
14 soldiers that you've served with, their respect is much more,
15 I think, gratifying to you and it should be. Thank you, sir.

16 Mr. Secretary, I had the privilege to go with Chairman
17 Warner and Senator Levin to Iraq and I had a chance to meet
18 lots of soldiers and I would agree with General Franks, they
19 are proud of what they're doing, they will do it as long as we
20 ask them to do it, but they had one question of me I couldn't
21 answer, particularly the troops in my home State, the 115th
22 military police company, the 119th military police company,
23 the 118th military policy battalion -- when are we coming
24 home?

25 The answer to that question relies upon having troops

1 available to replace these troops, because as you've both
2 indicated our footprint in Iraq will be significant. This
3 burden falls particularly with impact upon the Army. Today
4 the Army has 370,000 troops in 120 countries. In Iraq, the
5 footprint has the 3rd ID, the 4th ID, the 1st Armored
6 Division, 101st Airborne, 173rd Airborne Brigade, the 2nd
7 Brigade of the 82nd, the 2nd Light Cavalry Squadron, the 3rd
8 Army Cavalry Squadron, in addition 5 National Guard enhanced
9 battalions in Iraq and 2 in Kuwait. That's a significant
10 footprint.

11 In Afghanistan, shortly we'll have almost two full
12 brigades with the 10th Mountain Division to take the mission.
13 In the Balkans, we have the 34th National Guard Division from
14 Kansas. In Kosovo, we have the 1st Infantry Division which
15 will be replaced by the 28th National Pennsylvania National
16 Guard Division. We have forces in Korea, the 2nd ID, we have
17 contingency forces in the United States and there are other
18 areas in the world that are dangerous.

19 In addition to that, the normal doctrine years ago when I
20 was serving was for every deployed unit you had to have a 3-
21 to-1 ratio. That I think has changed to 5-to-1 now because we
22 also have preparation, exercise phases, training center
23 missions, reintegration and then the actual mission. We are
24 dangerously stretched thin in the Army and other services
25 also.

1 I know the answer to this will be multinational forces
2 will take the place of these troops in Iraq, but so far we've
3 been unsuccessful in arranging those forces. And it seems to
4 me that we have to be prepared to increase our Army, number of
5 brigades in our Army, or to activate National Guard Divisions,
6 and we have to make that decision soon because of the training
7 these troops will need before they're deployed.

8 So Mr. Secretary, are you planning or prepared to
9 increase the size of the Army to meet these commitments?

10 Secretary Rumsfeld: First I would say that I talked to
11 General Abizaid this morning and he is sensitive to the
12 importance of troops knowing what the rotation plan will be so
13 they have some degree of certainty in their lives. And he's
14 sensitive to the importance of the quality of their lives,
15 whether they get mail and those types of things, and is
16 determined to continue the fine work that General Franks has
17 done and now that we've completed major combat operation in
18 Iraq, begin to get greater clarity as to exactly how that
19 rotation will take place.

20 It would be incorrect to say that we expect that
21 international forces will replace all of U.S. forces. We
22 don't anticipate that. We're going to have to replace U.S.
23 forces with U.S. forces in large measure, and we understand
24 that. And the Joint Staff and the services have been asked to
25 make a presentation to me -- the request went back many, many

1 weeks, and they have been working in the tank with the
2 services and they expect to bring that forward sometime this
3 month, in which case they'll get clarity as to what people can
4 expect in terms of their circumstances.

5 Then the question comes, do you need to increase force
6 levels, particularly in the Army or Marines, the ground
7 forces, I would add. And that answer -- the question to that
8 is if we believe that's the case, obviously we would come to
9 the Congress and make that request. At the moment we are
10 attempting to bring down our force commitments in a number of
11 countries in the world. We have proposals with respect to
12 what's taking place in Bosnia and Kosovo, which are through
13 NATO, in together and out together, as you're familiar. We
14 have been working to try to reduce our force in the Sinai. We
15 have discussions going on with Korea as to how we can have our
16 footprint there arranged. We have discussions taking place in
17 Europe.

18 We also have, I'm told, by Dr. Chu and I don't know if
19 we've ever gotten the exact list, but something in the
20 neighborhood of 300,000 men and women in uniform doing jobs
21 that aren't for men and women in uniform. They're doing
22 civilian functions, and they shouldn't be doing civilian
23 functions. So we've got to continue to try to manage the
24 department in a way that we make the best use of people who
25 serve in the armed services.

1 If, at some point, it looks as though what you suggest
2 might be the case turns out to be the case, clearly we will
3 come to Congress and ask for an increase, but at the moment we
4 do not see that that's the case.

5 Senator Reed: Let me address the question a different
6 way. Since September 11, 42,000 National Guard troops have
7 been on active duty. That's before Operation Iraqi Freedom.
8 Doesn't that suggest to you that there is a need for a
9 increase in active forces?

10 Secretary Rumsfeld: First, I don't have the number at my
11 fingertips and I regret that, but there are a very large
12 number of Guard and Reserve that have been on duty that are
13 volunteers. They are individuals who were not called up,
14 they're not required, but a non-trivial fraction of the total
15 have been individuals who were asked, would you like to come
16 on and serve on an active service for a period and they have
17 said yes.

18 So it is -- you're right, except that within that mix of
19 numbers of Reserve and Guard, a lot of them are there because
20 they want to be, not because they're being forced to be.

21 Senator Reed: Well, you need them Mr. Secretary.

22 Secretary Rumsfeld: You bet we need them.

23 Senator Reed: Then the question goes, if you need that
24 many National Guardsman over an extended period of time,
25 stretching back over a year, doesn't that suggest that the

1 active forces have to be increased?

2 Secretary Rumsfeld: Well, of course, we have increased
3 the active forces. We have a provision the Congress passed
4 and the President has taken advantage of the 2 percent plus,
5 and under an emergency even the 2 percent ceiling is not a
6 requirement for us, and we are in some cases above the 2
7 percent. So the force levels have increased during this
8 period, you're quite right.

9 Senator Reed: Well, Mr. Secretary, my time has expired,
10 but I think this issue of the size of our forces is rapidly
11 approaching a decision point, and from what I've seen from the
12 extended deployment of our Army particularly, and I agree the
13 Marine Corps also, and I would suspect the Navy and the Air
14 Force could make similar cases, is that we're reaching the
15 point where we have to go ahead and bite the bullet and put
16 more forces in our force structure so we can rotate those
17 troops who are doing so well and serving so proudly out of
18 Iraq.

19 Chairman Warner: Thank you Senator. Senator Collins.

20 Senator Collins: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General
21 Franks, let me begin my remarks by joining my colleagues in
22 thanking you for a truly outstanding career. Our country owes
23 you an enormous debt of gratitude and I join my colleagues in
24 saluting you.

25 Mr. Secretary, I was honored to be part of the Armed

1 Services Committee trip to Iraq recently and like my
2 colleagues, I had the opportunity to talk with many of our
3 troops. I want to echo the impressions that Senator Reed
4 received in his conversations. To a person I found that our
5 troops' morale was very high despite the harsh conditions
6 under which they're serving and despite the dangers to which
7 they are exposed.

8 But I also found a weariness among our troops, and over
9 and over I heard, I'm proud of our mission, I helped free the
10 Iraqi people, but when do I get to go home? So I think it is
11 important that we communicate to the men and women who are
12 serving so that they will have some expectations. One soldier
13 from Maine told me, I can deal with another three months, I
14 can deal with another six months, but I just need to know. So
15 I would encourage you, and I know that General Abizaid is
16 working on this, but to share that information with our men
17 and women in uniform as quickly as it is available so there
18 can be some certainty.

19 I would also ask you, Mr. Secretary, to project for us
20 what you see as the percentage mix of American troops versus
21 troops from other countries as part of the coalition forces by
22 the end of the year. Obviously we can rotate troops home more
23 quickly if we can replace them not just with American troops,
24 but with troops from other countries. Could you give us some
25 rough estimate of what you see as the percentages of American

1 troops versus troops from other countries as part of the
2 coalition forces by the end of the year?

3 Secretary Rumsfeld: Well, as General Franks and I have
4 indicated, we now have about 148,000 troops there. We're
5 hoping to get -- have the non-coalition forces up to something
6 like, at the moment we're looking at 30,000 sometime late
7 summer, early fall. We intend to have the Iraqi army grow as
8 rapidly as we can do so, and there's actually a fourth source
9 of forces and that's contract forces for site protection to
10 the extent that that might make sense. That's roughly what it
11 looks like to me going out toward the end of the year.

12 Senator Collins: You mentioned, Mr. Secretary, in your
13 statement that Iraqis no longer wake up every morning and fear
14 wondering whether this will be the day that the death squads
15 come and indeed all of us feel a great pride in freeing the
16 Iraqi people from the breathtaking brutality of Saddam Hussein
17 and his regime. But nevertheless what I found during the trip
18 is that there still is very much a climate of fear in Iraq.
19 There's the fear that the Americans and the coalition forces
20 will go home too soon and that Saddam Hussein will return to
21 power.

22 I was struck by a conversation that we had with an Iraqi
23 who was running an oil refinery in Basra whom, whenever we
24 asked any question that involved Saddam Hussein would not
25 respond. How important is it that we capture or kill Saddam

1 Hussein and how high a priority is it for the coalition
2 forces?

3 Secretary Rumsfeld: The President has said, and we all
4 agree, that the United States and the coalition forces are
5 committed to stay as long as is necessary and not a day
6 longer. So the idea that we would leave too soon and Saddam
7 Hussein come back is not a realistic concern that anyone ought
8 to have. Saddam Hussein's not coming back.

9 How important is it that he be caught or killed and that
10 closure come to that? It would be helpful, there's no
11 question that this individual has created such fear on the
12 part of the Iraqi people because of his brutality and the
13 numbers of tens of thousands of people he's killed, and the
14 willingness to use chemical weapons on his own people and on
15 his neighbors, that there is a fear not just in Iraq but in
16 the region that we have to be certain that he is not going to
17 be around.

18 I think that that will take some time. People don't get
19 over that fear immediately. But he's not coming back. He's
20 through. That regime is over.

21 Senator Collins: You and I know that, you and I know for
22 certain that Saddam Hussein is not coming back, but I am
23 convinced that the fear that Saddam will come back is impeding
24 our progress in reconstructing Iraq. Prior to this trip, I
25 would have said that as long as he's out of power, that's

1 sufficient. I came back with a very different feeling, a
2 determination that unless we capture or kill Saddam that our
3 progress is going to be far slower.

4 Secretary Rumsfeld: I agree with that and I will say,
5 however, that in answer to your question of what's the
6 priority, the priority is very high, as I'm sure you were
7 briefed.

8 Senator Collins: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

9 Chairman Warner: Thank you very much Senator. Senator
10 Akaka.

11 Senator Akaka: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I
12 want to add my pride of the troops as well as the leadership
13 to the record here, General Franks. What you've done out
14 there with our troops is extraordinary and I want to say thank
15 you and I want to praise you for all of that. I also want to
16 commend Secretary Rumsfeld for all he has done with us as well
17 as with you and the troops out there during this period.

18 I want to continue to pursue the question of when are we
19 coming home because although I didn't make the trip to Iraq,
20 I've heard it at home as well. Secretary, you mentioned in
21 response to Senator Warner's questions that CENTCOM is
22 developing a rotational plan for forces in Iraq and it appears
23 at this point that we don't have detailed answers to that. My
24 question to you is when do you expect that plan to be
25 completed and will it include troop rotations in Afghanistan

1 as well? I would appreciate if you could brief me on that
2 plan when completed as well. As ranking member of the
3 Readiness subcommittee, I am deeply interested in this issue.

4 Secretary Rumsfeld: Senator, CENTCOM's responsibility is
5 to communicate the force requirements that they believe they
6 need to do the job that they've been asked to do. The Joint
7 Staff and the services then work with them to determine what
8 kinds of forces and what kinds of rotation schedules make the
9 most sense. That work is currently being done, it's going to
10 be presented to me this week, and I expect to be able to make
11 some decisions.

12 The certainty question is clear to the extent we can get
13 that work done, tell them as we've now told the 3rd Infantry
14 Division what their certainty is, to the extent we can do that
15 with the other forces there. I should add, however, we have
16 redeployed over 140,000 troops already including some Army,
17 including some Marines, some ground forces, as well as Navy
18 and Air Force.

19 Senator Akaka: In regard to this deployment, Mr.
20 Secretary, I recently visited some of our fine marines at Camp
21 Lejeune and our great soldiers at Ft. Bragg. Many of them had
22 just returned from deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan, and we
23 spent a lot of time just talking about what they will need to
24 reconstitute their forces after returning home. In past
25 operations it has sometimes taken units up to a year or more

1 to fully regain high levels of readiness. Do you expect these
2 timelines to be about the same after Iraqi Freedom? If not,
3 how do you expect to accelerate them and how much additional
4 funding will this require?

5 Secretary Rumsfeld: We've asked for some funds already
6 for reconstitution and I don't doubt for a minute that we'll
7 have to ask for additional funds for reconstitution and it's
8 important that that be done. It varies from unit to unit how
9 much time it takes and how much the cost is, but that work is
10 all being done by the Joint Staff. And the other thing that
11 happens, however, is that the combatant commanders around the
12 world look at what took place in CENTCOM, in Afghanistan and
13 Iraq and they begin to change their judgments about the
14 numbers of precision weapons they would use, for example,
15 relative to dumb bombs, and how they might conduct their
16 campaigns, and as they involve their contingency plans they
17 then alter their needs and those kinds of things will be
18 coming in in the budget that's being prepared at the present
19 time for presentation next year.

20 Senator Akaka: Mr. Secretary, I'm quite concerned about
21 the problem, and I'm shifting to dirty bombs. The General
22 Accounting Office recently completed a report for me on the
23 availability worldwide of radioactive material that can be
24 used to construct such a weapon. Because of this the looting
25 of the Iraqi nuclear sites has been a matter of great concern.

1 I thank you for letting an International Atomic Energy survey
2 team into Iraq. I would appreciate it if you could provide me
3 an update, either now or for the record, as to whether all the
4 missing radioactive sealed saucers at the sites have been
5 accounted for.

6 General Franks: Sir, would you repeat the last part of
7 the question, just the last phrase sir, I missed the last
8 part.

9 Secretary Rumsfeld: It's the percentage of -- materials.

10 Senator Akaka: I would appreciate it if you could update
11 either now or for the record as to whether or not all the
12 missing radioactive sealed saucers at the sites have been
13 accounted for.

14 General Franks: We actually are very pleased with the
15 results of that and having brought the IAEA in to check the
16 work of our troops and some people who had been working that
17 very, very hard. And Senator I will provide for the record
18 the exact math, but the amount of yellowcake specifically is
19 what we're talking about from two different sites that was
20 unaccounted for at the end of bringing all this together
21 actually Senator is infinitesimal. Virtually all of the drums
22 and the substances, the substance yellowcake, was recovered,
23 and I will give you with precision the math on it.

24 [The information referred to follows:]

25 [COMMITTEE INSERT]

1 Senator Akaka: Thank you very much.

2 Chairman Warner: Senator Inhofe.

3 Senator Inhofe: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

4 Again let me, General Franks, echo what Senator Akaka and
5 Senator Collins and all the rest of us have said about the
6 great contribution you've made.

7 In the very beginning of this hearing, Senator Levin
8 mentioned that weapons of mass destruction are now back in the
9 press and I feel compelled to share at least my feelings, and
10 I think some others up here, that they've never been out of
11 the press. It's so obvious that this whole notion that
12 weapons of mass destruction they claim that are not found,
13 therefore we should not have gone in and done what we have
14 done is nothing but an absurd media-driven diversionary tactic
15 and I've never seen the likes of it before. And what these
16 people are saying is that if we didn't find these, therefore
17 we should not have gone in.

18 Well, first of all, I think that could have been, if it
19 hadn't been for the media, would have been put to bed way back
20 in the beginning when they found 11 chemical rockets with the
21 capability -- and I'm recalling this from memory now -- of 140
22 liters of some type of chemical, and as Richard Butler said,
23 140 liters of VX could kill a million people. Now to me, we
24 know there are 15,000 more like that out there but we found
25 those. That should have put it to sleep.

1 General Franks, when you said three decades of bloody
2 regime, that's an understatement and we all know that and I
3 know that Secretary Rumsfeld has tried to articulate how bad
4 that really has been. But what you folks have done is end
5 this monstrous bloody regime. When you stop and think and
6 envision if we hadn't gone in, thinking about the -- in one
7 day, 3,000 women and children tortured to death using nerve
8 gas, and I understand that's one of the most painful ways of
9 dying, to envision 317 kids under 12 years old lined up and
10 executed, and I recall right after 1991 when the war was
11 supposed to have been over, I think 2 days before that we had
12 the first freedom flight into Kuwait. Alexander Haig was on
13 it, there were about six of us on this flight. I recall going
14 to the headquarters that Saddam Hussein had used and walking
15 through the torture chambers and seeing the body parts,
16 running into a little boy that had his ear cut off because he
17 had a picture of an American flag that was in his pocket.

18 This fear, and now when I think about how gratifying it
19 must be to the two of you to know, the two of you more than
20 anyone else and the team that you put together has brought
21 this bloodiest regime since Adolf Hitler to a close. It has
22 to be gratifying that people can now have weddings, women can
23 now walk the streets without worrying about being summarily
24 dragged out and raped and tortured to death, parents can send
25 their kids out without fearing that they'll have their tongues

1 cut out. And so I just would say that, General Franks, as you
2 cap off a career, I don't think you ever in your wildest
3 imagination would have thought that you'd be doing such a
4 liberation the way that you have done.

5 There are a lot of things that we'd like to talk about
6 and you've covered quite a few, but I would say this. Before
7 I came in 1994, I was on the House Armed Services Committee and
8 all I heard all those years was jointness, jointness,
9 jointness, we're going to have to get to jointness and get rid
10 of this mentality of each one out there doing his own thing,
11 and we've come so far. I think that the effort in Iraq is the
12 greatest achievement and I might also say Afghanistan in
13 jointness, and I'd like to have your response, either one of
14 you, to your impression as to where we can go, how much
15 further of this effort of jointness we can go and with the
16 successes that we enjoyed.

17 Secretary Rumsfeld: Well, I'll start. You're right.
18 The pattern in the past has been for the services to try to do
19 their own thing and deconflict too in large measure, and what
20 took place in Iraq was the most joint war fighting operation I
21 believe in the history of the world. And I think the team,
22 General McKiernan, General Moseley, Admiral Keating, Dell
23 Daley, and General Franks and his deputies, Mike DeLong and
24 General Abizaid have set a pattern for the future that will
25 dramatically leverage our capabilities for the future.

1 General Franks: Sir, the only thing that I would add to
2 that is I think Afghanistan initially and Iraq later gave us
3 some insight into what joint can be. I think that expansion
4 of that across all our services, all our combatant commands is
5 the future. I think that that would fall under probably what
6 the Secretary would call transformation, I mean, I actually
7 believe that the notion of this level of jointness is
8 tranformational. And I think Joint Forces Command, Admiral Ed
9 Giambastiani, my buddy down at Norfolk, will be and has the
10 support of the Secretary to bring this level of jointness all
11 across our uniformed services in the years ahead.

12 Senator Inhofe: I appreciate that very much. Let me get
13 on record as saying I agree with much of what Senator Reed
14 said concerning a concern on end strength and you've heard me
15 say this before and it's something that I hope you'll keep
16 your minds open. And I know your close communications with
17 the Reserve component will convince you as it's convinced me
18 and many of the members of this panel that there's got to be
19 relief and I hope that will continue to stay open.

20 I had occasion to be in Vicenza the other day and talk to
21 some of those in the 173rd, about half of those who were
22 deployed up to northern Iraq. That was a contingency that we
23 didn't know that would be there. We thought we'd be able to
24 come down through Turkey and it wouldn't be necessary, but
25 they are there. One of the minor things that we have learned,

1 and this hearing is supposed to be about lessons we have
2 learned, and since my time is expired I'm going to ask you to
3 give this response in the record.

4 I know that in Vicenza when the 173rd was to deploy they
5 went to Aviano. Fortunately, we had good weather so that the
6 staging area which is out in the open could accommodate them
7 which it would not have if it had been rainy weather. They're
8 now looking at some MilCon projects that are going to ensure
9 that. That's just one of many, many lessons I'm sure we've
10 learned. I'd like to get as many of these examples so that we
11 and this committee, as we look at MilCon in the future and at
12 our activities in the future will be able to isolate these and
13 get your impression on all of these things that now we realize
14 maybe should have been done before but we should address as a
15 result of our experiences.

16 [The information referred to follows:]

17 [COMMITTEE INSERT]

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1 Chairman Warner: Senator Byrd.

2 Senator Byrd: What is our situation, Mr. Chairman, with
3 respect to the votes on the floor?

4 Chairman Warner: Yes, the vote has commenced and at the
5 conclusion of your questioning, we will adjourn.

6 Senator Byrd: Would you prefer to go now?

7 Chairman Warner: I think we would like to have you
8 complete yours.

9 Senator Byrd: All right. Mr. Secretary, what is the
10 current monthly spend rate to support our ongoing military
11 operations in Iraq?

12 Secretary Rumsfeld: I'll have to get you that for the
13 record. It's a combination of appropriated funds as you, sir,
14 know better than any plus the expenditures of funds that are
15 taking place from Iraqi frozen assets, from Iraqi seized
16 assets, and from U.N./Iraqi assets under the Oil for Food
17 program, and I can certainly have Dr. Zakheim come up and
18 provide a very precise answer as to what's currently being
19 spent.

20 Senator Byrd: Do you have, do you recall a figure? Can
21 you give us an estimate? I've heard a figure of \$1-1/2
22 billion a month.

23 Secretary Rumsfeld: I would not want to venture a guess
24 and be wrong sir.

25 Senator Byrd: Well somebody ought to know.

1 Secretary Rumsfeld: Well they do know and we'd be happy
2 to brief you on it.

3 Senator Byrd: Well, I'd like to know now.

4 [Laughter.]

5 Secretary Rumsfeld: Well, we'd have to adjourn and I'd
6 have to get on the phone with Dov Zakheim.

7 Senator Byrd: Well, we'll be back won't we Mr. Chairman?

8 Chairman Warner: Yes we will, Senator.

9 Senator Byrd: And along with that, what is the -- how
10 much are we spending a month to support U.S. military forces
11 in Iraq?

12 Secretary Rumsfeld: The expenditures for Iraq are in a
13 variety of categories. You might include the salaries of the
14 people that are serving there. Those salaries would be paid
15 whether they're serving there or they're back in Germany or
16 back in the United States. It might include funds as I
17 indicated that are coming from other sources. It might
18 include funds for reconstitution that are currently being
19 spent but for spending on restocks of bombs, for example, and
20 weapons that were used during the conflict.

21 So it is not a question that can be posed and then
22 answered with a single number. I wish I were able to do that,
23 but it falls into a variety of different baskets under our
24 appropriated funds.

25 Senator Byrd: I understand that, Mr. Chairman, but I've

1 been around here going on 51 years and I'm on the
2 Appropriations Committee and we want to fund our military
3 certainly and meet the needs, but there must be some figure,
4 some amount that we can cite as an amount that we're spending
5 monthly in Afghanistan and the same with respect to Iraq.

6 Secretary Rumsfeld: I'm sure there is and we'll get it
7 for your.

8 Senator Byrd: Well, that'll be another figure we'll hope
9 to have after when we return, Mr. Chairman, I would hope.

10 Chairman Warner: Well, in that case --

11 Secretary Rumsfeld: Not likely -- that fast?

12 Senator Byrd: Well, you like to have figures fast when
13 it comes to appropriating money.

14 Secretary Rumsfeld: That's for sure.

15 Senator Byrd: I would like to know on behalf of the
16 Appropriations Committee and the Congress how much we're
17 spending.

18 Secretary Rumsfeld: We'll try and get it for you.

19 Senator Byrd: I hear and I read that it's something like
20 \$3- to \$3-1/2 billion a month to support U.S. military forces
21 in Iraq. Now where are these figures coming from that we read
22 about and that we in the Appropriations Committee are told
23 from time to time? Well, anyhow so much for that for the
24 present.

25 Chairman Warner: Mr. Byrd, the warning for 7 minutes has

1 stopped. We'll recess now and when we come back, you'll be
2 immediately recognized to finish those questions.

3 Senator Byrd: Very well. Thank you.

4 Chairman Warner: We're recessed.

5 [Recess.]

6 Chairman Warner: We will continue the hearing. Senator
7 Byrd will be recognized if here following Senator Roberts.

8 Senator Roberts.

9 Senator Roberts: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General
10 Franks, from a Kansas Aggie to an Oklahoma Aggie, you've done
11 pretty darn well.

12 General Franks: Thank you sir.

13 Senator Roberts: And we truly appreciate your service
14 and I echo all the comments of my colleagues in that regard.

15 Mr. Secretary and General Franks, I want to tell you two
16 accounts from the chairman's CODEL over to Iraq of which I was
17 privileged to be a member, and in which I was trying to
18 determine the intelligence capabilities since I am the
19 chairman of the Intelligence Committee.

20 One is in regards to a massive grave site near Hillah
21 where there is a site about the size of a football field.
22 It's my understanding there are about a hundred of these grave
23 sites around the country and that we have, I think, been
24 involved with this task force justice on the accountability
25 and the forensic job that remains on about 14 and that will go

1 up to about 32, so it's a massive job. And it was with
2 anguish and despair that our delegation stood on a mound of
3 sand and overlooked this pit, half of which has been smoothed
4 over, that contained 15,000 Iraqis. They brought them in by
5 truck, three a day, and in this pit would disgorge these
6 people and they would rape them, they would torture them, they
7 would shoot them. If somebody from the neighboring villages
8 would try to rescue the kids, why they were simply buried
9 alive. Three thousand were excavated when Saddam fell. One
10 thousand were identified and then finally one of the clerics
11 simply declared the whole ground holy ground.

12 I stood there and I wondered about man's inhumanity
13 against man. Saddam Hussein is a Hitler, a Pol Pot, a Stalin,
14 and it gets back to Senator Collins' comment in regards to the
15 palpable fear on the part of Iraqis. I underestimated that.
16 I know that you have made the statement that he is not coming
17 back, we have made the statement he's not coming back, and by
18 damn he's not coming back. But I don't think the Iraqis fully
19 comprehend that or fully grasp it or fully believe it.

20 And that is why I think having been through that and
21 having learned that he basically executed at least 300,000,
22 probably closer to 1,200,000 of his own people and things as
23 graphic as I have described that we must capture or kill him
24 -- must capture or kill him. I know Task Force 20 that you
25 can't really talk about much, if at all, has that duty, has

1 that mission. You say it is a priority. I would urge you sir
2 to say that it is the highest level priority because I don't
3 think that we're going to get the cooperation that we need and
4 the full partnership and have Iraqis enjoy liberty and
5 democracy until we kill or capture Saddam Hussein and his two
6 sons.

7 I'm not asking you to comment on that. You've already
8 responded to it, but I feel very strongly about that. The
9 next account that I'd like to bring to your attention is that
10 there is a Colonel A.J. Kessel who is operating out of the
11 Saddam palace or headquarters there. He is working with the
12 Minister of Culture who is an Italian. And Colonel Kessel got
13 the bright idea that there might be an opportunity to
14 reconstitute the Iraqi symphony of all things, and after 30
15 years there had been no symphony, and was able to do so by
16 relocating and locating people who played in the symphony and
17 obviously some replacements because it's been 30 years. They
18 were in evening dress that was provided. Some of the members
19 of the symphony found their instruments that had been hidden
20 for 30 years, and those that did not have them were provided
21 and they had a symphony. It was a packed house. Tom
22 Korologos was at that performance and Tom did a magnificent
23 job over there in Iraq.

24 The last piece they played, Mr. Secretary, was the Iraqi
25 national anthem, prior to Saddam Hussein. And when they did

1 that, the crowd stood, applauded and cried tears of joy.
2 There is Iraqi nationalism right below the surface that can
3 flourish and there is hope for Iraq. Now I've not asked you a
4 question. Those are just two observations that I would make
5 -- one, anguish and despair on what that man did to brutalize
6 his country and the need to bring him, either killed or
7 captured, and his two sons to justice, so that we can
8 cooperate with Iraqis because they have graffiti, you've heard
9 the tapes, you've heard the pamphlets, anybody that is
10 cooperating lives in fear that he could come back.

11 And then on the other hand, here we have a symphony of
12 all things that is going to be a regular performance, by the
13 way, from now on. And God bless Colonel Kessel, who by the
14 way goes by the name of Buttons. So Buttons did his job, and
15 that is one of the projects -- 1,500 wide that we are
16 conducting in that country that is the untold story because
17 the media doesn't cover it. I wish that symphony had been on
18 CNN, or for that matter any other network. It was very
19 impressive. If you have any comment, I'd be happy to have you
20 comment.

21 Secretary Rumsfeld: Well, Senator Roberts, I agree with
22 you fully on the importance of capturing and bringing to
23 justice Saddam Hussein, his sons, and the senior al-Qaeda --
24 correction the senior Iraqi leadership just as we've been
25 working to try to bring the senior al-Qaeda and Taliban

1 leadership. We will continue to do it. We recognize the
2 problem it poses, and the story you've just recounted on the
3 symphony is an important one and I thank you for doing it.

4 Senator Roberts: One hour and 28 minutes ago, it was
5 announced over Associated Press we have now captured number 23
6 on the U.S. most wanted list and number 29, the high ranking
7 party of the Ba'ath party regional command the former Interior
8 Minister were taken into custody, so the noose draws tighter
9 and that's good news.

10 My time is expired, Mr. Chairman.

11 Chairman Warner: Yes, Mr. Secretary, you wish to
12 respond?

13 Secretary Rumsfeld: Mr. Chairman, I was asked repeatedly
14 by Senator Levin and others, including members of the press,
15 about whether or not the United States has made an explicit,
16 specific detailed request to NATO for NATO's participation. I
17 did not know the answer as to what precisely had been done.
18 It turns out that my deputy Paul Wolfowitz did travel to
19 Brussels in December of '02 and at least in that one instance
20 he made a specific request to the North Atlantic Council to
21 consider contributions that the Alliance could make to post-
22 war stability in Iraq, and that's the answer to the questions.
23 There may have been other requests, which I suspect there have
24 been through the Department of State.

25 General Franks: And Mr. Chairman, if I could just add a

1 Senator Levin: None since the war?

2 Secretary Rumsfeld: I have no idea. I'll be happy to
3 run around and try to find out the answer to that but I do
4 know there was this one specific one. There may have been
5 some before, there may have been some since.

6 Senator Levin: If we could get a complete list if
7 there's more than one, it'd be helpful.

8 [The information referred to follows:]

9 [COMMITTEE INSERT]

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1 Chairman Warner: Senator Byrd.

2 Senator Byrd: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Now if we may
3 continue with my questions concerning the amounts of spend out
4 monies that we're expending in Afghanistan and in Iraq
5 monthly, Mr. Secretary.

6 Secretary Rumsfeld: Senator Byrd, I've been given a
7 number by Dov Zakheim that says that in the fiscal year '03
8 supplemental there is, our funds for the United States
9 Government appropriated funds to spend in connection with Iraq
10 -- that between January of '03 and projected through September
11 of '03 will average something in the neighborhood of \$3.9
12 billion spend rate per month.

13 Senator Byrd: In Iraq?

14 Secretary Rumsfeld: In Iraq.

15 Senator Byrd: 3.9

16 Secretary Rumsfeld: Right.

17 Senator Byrd: Okay. Now what has the spend out rate
18 been for Afghanistan?

19 Secretary Rumsfeld: The estimate that I was given is
20 that it's something in the neighborhood of \$700 million per
21 month.

22 Senator Byrd: \$700 million. That doesn't square with
23 the press reports that I read which as I indicated earlier
24 amounted to about \$1.5 billion.

25 Secretary Rumsfeld: The 1.5 number that I've seen is a

1 number that people used 4 or 5 months ago as the projected
2 figure for Operation Enduring Freedom, the non-Iraq portion of
3 the global war on terror. I don't know what you saw in the
4 press, but I have seen that same number in that connection.

5 Senator Byrd: But you say that the amount that you're
6 stating before this committee today is around \$700 million?

7 Secretary Rumsfeld: For Afghanistan.

8 Senator Byrd: For Afghanistan, per month.

9 Secretary Rumsfeld: Yes, sir. And the numbers that I've
10 been given by Dr. Zakheim of other funds is they anticipate
11 \$1.7 billion from frozen assets to be expended by the end of
12 this fiscal year and \$800 million in seized assets to be
13 expended by the end of this fiscal year. And then there are
14 some additional contributions from various other countries
15 that are going on and the last time I saw that, it was a
16 number of something like \$2.3 billion committed by other
17 nations to assist with the work that's going on in Iraq.

18 Senator Byrd: Well, now it would seem then that we're
19 spending about five times as much per month, a little over
20 five times as much per month in Iraq as we're spending in
21 Afghanistan, \$700 million as against \$3.9 billion, I'd say
22 five-and-a-half times. Yet the numbers there are we have
23 10,000 men, I believe, in Afghanistan, do we not, and
24 something like 150,000 in Iraq, 15 times as many men in Iraq
25 but we're only spending five times as much money.

1 Anyhow, do you believe that the spending rate for Iraq
2 and Afghanistan will continue to remain at the current rate
3 for the next year?

4 Secretary Rumsfeld: I don't know what the administration
5 intends to propose to the Congress by way of funding for that,
6 and that's something that is funded out of a whole host of
7 different portions of your Appropriations Committee, as you
8 know, AID, Department of State, Department of Defense and
9 others. And what OMB and the President will recommend at some
10 point in the future I just don't know, sir.

11 Senator Byrd: All right. I see my time is up but let me
12 ask this follow-up question which my line of questions leads
13 me to. When do you expect to see another supplemental
14 submitted to Congress and how large a supplemental should we
15 expect it to be?

16 Secretary Rumsfeld: I am under the impression that the
17 Office of Management and Budget is looking at a supplemental
18 but I do not know when they would decide to submit it or what
19 the amounts would be either from my department or from other
20 departments because they've not made any recommendations to
21 the President on that to my knowledge.

22 Senator Byrd: But you have some recommendations to make
23 to OMB?

24 Secretary Rumsfeld: At some point we will, yes sir.

25 Senator Byrd: Do you have any idea how much that's going

1 to be.

2 Secretary Rumsfeld: I don't. I'm sure that Dr. Zakheim
3 has some preliminary work that he's done with the services in
4 terms of reconstitution and we can try to provide some of that
5 to you personally if you wish, but I don't have anything at my
6 fingertips.

7 Senator Byrd: Well, I'll be pursuing this as a member of
8 the Appropriations Committee. Mr. Chairman.

9 Chairman Warner: Thank you very much, Senator Byrd.

10 Senator Dayton.

11 Senator Dayton: Thank you, Mr. Chairman and I might say,
12 Mr. Secretary, if you need reinforcements, having been on this
13 trip with the chairman and the ranking members, their ages are
14 classified but they are in extraordinary shape and energy and
15 enthusiasm. It was a privilege to be on the trip with you,
16 both of you.

17 Chairman Warner: Glad to have you with us, Senator.
18 Thank you.

19 Senator Dayton: Secretary, General Franks, I salute both
20 of you for your extraordinary success and military victory in
21 Iraq. Mr. Secretary, you were very complimentary of the
22 General and those who worked with him but from the published
23 reports I've read you were integrally involved as well, and I
24 think you should share in that. The strategy that you
25 developed and the success which -- I remember saying

1 beforehand the optimistic but realistic scenario would be to
2 be 3 weeks, but that was very optimistic and I believe it was
3 3 weeks exactly from the day that you crossed the border to
4 the day that you occupied Baghdad, so I think that's an
5 extraordinary success and I salute both of you for it.

6 I'm not qualified to draw lessons, I'm not experienced in
7 military affairs but it would seem to me that at least a
8 similarity in both Afghanistan and Iraq is that the dispersal
9 of opposing forces rather than a surrender. I don't believe
10 in either case there was a formal surrender and as General
11 Sanchez told us in our meeting in Iraq, he said the Iraqi
12 forces dissolved near the end of the advance because of the
13 extraordinary lethality and precision of our firepower and the
14 overwhelming force which suggests to me that the follow-
15 through and the continuation of that after -- there was a risk
16 of prematurely declaring the victory has been won and the
17 hostilities are over when in fact this continuation of the
18 need to track down people, the principals as well as those who
19 have not really in their own minds surrendered but are just
20 running away to fight another day. That in fact leaves our
21 troops even more exposed often than perhaps in the initial
22 stage of combat and that's sort of what seems is occurring
23 now, which is coming as a surprise to the American public who
24 thought that this matter had been declared over and in fact
25 was.

1 And that leads me again, Mr. Secretary, to my concern
2 about the follow-through in terms of winning the country after
3 winning the war. And the progress that you cite, we witnessed
4 some of that with the economic development of the country, the
5 social rehabilitation, which I totally agree with you sir, is
6 not ultimately the responsibility of the American taxpayer or
7 anyone else in the world but the Iraqi citizens themselves.
8 At this point in time it seems that there's a direct
9 correlation between the progress that's being made in the non-
10 military areas of let's call it social and economic
11 rehabilitation and the feelings of the populus toward the
12 American forces and even the number of attacks on them.

13 So I guess in my view, and I don't think this is
14 necessarily the Department of Defense, but there doesn't seem
15 to be, and we were not briefed and obviously we didn't see
16 everything, but I'm not aware of the same magnitude of non-
17 military projects and initiatives being undertaken that are
18 going to make any kind of difference in the standard of living
19 in that society, and I fear without that kind of parallel
20 effort to the military that our forces are going to be in a
21 holding pattern trying to preserve this military victory but
22 not able to be extricated because this unrest is going to
23 continue.

24 Secretary Rumsfeld: Well, Senator I agree completely
25 that it takes progress on all three fronts, the political, the

1 security, and the economic, and no one is likely to get very
2 far out in front of the other. In the last analysis, either
3 people will be willing to vote with their dollars, and I don't
4 mean U.S. dollars but dinars or whatever and invest in that
5 country and people will come back to that country because they
6 have confidence in it and because it has a well-educated
7 population. It has a population that has energy, it has
8 resources in oil, and it's not a poor country like
9 Afghanistan. It has wealth, and there isn't any reason it
10 can't be as prosperous and as successful as its neighbors in
11 the Gulf States.

12 So I think it's going to take some time, it's going to
13 take some effort and that in the end it will happen, it will
14 improve, and we'll see progress.

15 Senator Dayton: I would assert that that question is
16 about when are our troops going to be able to come home, that
17 the speed with which we show some visible signs of improvement
18 across the country, socially and economically, and obviously
19 we're not going to see those through to completion, those will
20 take decades, but to get things started is going to be a major
21 determinant in how quickly our troops are going to be able to
22 come home, and I don't see, and we were not informed in my
23 recollection of a magnitude of effort and initiative, which I
24 think is going to have be U.S.-started anyway, or it's not
25 going to happen in the near term, to get people to start to

1 have faith in the future and also to look at us more
2 favorably.

3 I would commend the report in the New York Times this
4 morning which talks about a city Abu Ghraib, if I'm
5 pronouncing correctly, and it talks about the absence of power
6 there, and the head of the council there that's been elected
7 said conditions have never been worse, we've never been
8 through such a long bad period. And I'm sure from our
9 experience too there are parts of the country where there is
10 more progress being made, there are parts where progress is
11 not being made, but I would just again say that I don't see,
12 didn't see an organized and well-financed non-military
13 initiatives to parallel and build upon the success that was
14 accomplished militarily.

15 Secretary Rumsfeld: Senator, I believe you said that the
16 war was declared over. No one I know in any position of
17 responsibility declared the war over. What the President said
18 was that major combat operations are completed and now we have
19 to go after the remnants of the regime, and that it will take
20 a good deal of time.

21 Senator Dayton: I stand corrected. That's a better
22 description of what was said.

23 Secretary Rumsfeld: Second, the war started on March 19,
24 major combat was announced as having ended on May 1, and today
25 is July 9. That's less than 4 months. Think what took place

1 in Germany after World War II in 4 years. Think what took
2 place in Japan in years. I mean, I think we have to get some
3 perspective on this and put this in context and think back in
4 history. This is tough stuff. This is hard work. This takes
5 time. As Senator Roberts said, fear is a powerful thing and
6 those people were repressed and fearful. Thirty years of a
7 Stalinist type regime suffocating the creativity and energy
8 and brilliance of so many of those Iraqi people has been a
9 devastating thing on that country. We need to have some
10 patience.

11 Senator Dayton: All right. I would agree with you. And
12 how much patience do the American people whose sons and
13 daughters are over there now -- how much patience do they need
14 to have? Do they need to realistically expect that those
15 forces are going to need to be there for 2 years, 3 years?

16 Chairman Warner: Senator, we have to move on to other
17 Senators. A number are waiting. If you want to make a quick
18 response --

19 Senator Dayton: My time is up, could I have an answer to
20 that question?

21 Chairman Warner: Yes. I was just about to say if you
22 wish to --

23 Secretary Rumsfeld: Well, we responded to that question
24 earlier. The answer is that the people who are over there now
25 will be coming home. They will be rotated home. The ones

1 that are there are not going to stay there for 4 or 5 years.

2 Senator Dayton: The question, sir, was whether American
3 forces have to be there for 2 years of 3 years.

4 Secretary Rumsfeld: And the answer to that question is
5 we don't know. Nobody knows the answer to that question, how
6 long it will take, and it will take some time, and I think we
7 all believe that it's important that it be done, that's it
8 important we get other countries to participate in it, we
9 intend to see it through, and it's going to take some
10 patience. And when it's done, it's going to be darn well
11 worth having done.

12 Senator Dayton: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

13 Chairman Warner: Thank you, Senator. Thank you, Mr.
14 Secretary.

15 Senator McCain.

16 Senator McCain: General Franks, I want to add my
17 appreciation for your dedicated service and sacrifice for this
18 nation and your outstanding leadership. I'll reserve any
19 praise for Secretary Rumsfeld until he retires.

20 [Laughter.]

21 Senator McCain: Please accept the thanks of all America
22 on behalf of your outstanding leadership. Mr. Secretary,
23 here's what you're hearing today from the committee. A survey
24 by the Pew Research Center for the People and the Press show
25 that 23 percent of respondents think the U.S. military effort

1 in Iraq is going, quote, very well, far fewer than the 61 to
2 66 percent that expressed that view during the conflict. And
3 yet at the same time a large percentage of Americans, in my
4 view very appropriately, think that the decision to go to war
5 was the right thing as you state.

6 The problem here is that Americans are unsure about the
7 future of our involvement in Iraq. So what you need to do, in
8 my view, is give not just this committee but the American
9 people, who hold you in the highest regard and esteem, and
10 have the greatest confidence in the President of the United
11 States and his leadership in this conflict, the concrete plan
12 as much as you can. In other words, how much is it going to
13 cost roughly and how long we expect to be there, even if it's
14 a pessimistic scenario, and how many troops are probably going
15 to be required given that there are certain variables? In
16 other words, this whole issue of how long are they going to be
17 there and the uncertainty of seeing the pictures of the
18 wounded or dead American soldiers are leading to this unease,
19 and I emphasize that's the word -- unease, not disaffection,
20 not anger, but unease on the part of the American people.

21 And I am convinced without a doubt that when Americans
22 are told what the plan is for post-war Iraq, then I think you
23 will receive overwhelming support on the part of the American
24 people. I say in all respect and appreciation for your
25 leadership, everywhere I go Americans want to know that. And

1 so I suggest that you have probably been doing that, but
2 probably not in a fashion that the American people either are
3 hearing or understanding what our future is. But again I want
4 to emphasize an overwhelming majority of American people think
5 we did the right thing. Whether weapons of mass destruction
6 are found or not, the overwhelming majority of Americans
7 support this President and your leadership and that of General
8 Franks.

9 But they need to be told. That's all they need and I
10 think by the tenor of the questions that you've gotten today,
11 the other Senators are reflecting what they're hearing from
12 their constituents. I hope you take that as a constructive
13 comment, which it is intended to be.

14 Secretary Rumsfeld: I do. Thank you.

15 Senator McCain: Now I'd just like to move quickly to
16 Iran. There's reports today that there's a newly found
17 nuclear site. There's accumulating evidence about Iran. I'd
18 like to know your assessment of the threat, the situation,
19 whether there's any North Korean involvement -- I guess I'd
20 like to hear a little more information about how you view this
21 situation in this very bad neighborhood.

22 Secretary Rumsfeld: Senator, as the President has
23 indicated, the situation in Iran is roughly as follows, that
24 the U.S. intelligence community has assessed that they do have
25 a nuclear weapon program. The IAEA has had uneven success in

1 dealing with them. The United States, over successive
2 administrations, has had discussions with Russia encouraging
3 them to not participate in a cooperative program with them
4 with respect to anything involving a nuclear power plant.
5 It's estimated that the nuclear facility that they're saying
6 they need for energy would produce less energy than the amount
7 of gas that they burn off on an annual basis.

8 Senator McCain: Have you seen this report this morning?

9 Secretary Rumsfeld: I don't know what report you're
10 referring to.

11 Senator McCain: Iranian exiles describe newly find
12 nuclear site. It was carried in a number of newspapers.

13 Secretary Rumsfeld: I didn't. I have not seen anything
14 in the press this morning, I apologize.

15 Senator McCain: Do you see any other North Korean
16 connection?

17 Secretary Rumsfeld: There has been interaction between
18 North Korea and Iran over a sustained period of time.

19 I would say one other thing. There are recent reports of
20 Iranians moving some of their border posts along about a 25-
21 kilometer stretch several kilometers inside of Iraq, obviously
22 not being respectful of Iraq's sovereignty, and certainly that
23 is behavior that is not acceptable and they should be staying
24 on their own side of the border.

25 Senator McCain: And what action do you think we should

1 be taking, Mr. Secretary?

2 Secretary Rumsfeld: I think that the President and the
3 Department of State have been engaged in a variety of
4 diplomatic efforts to try to persuade countries to not
5 participate with Iran in developing their nuclear
6 capabilities. It takes time to understand the success or lack
7 of success of those efforts.

8 Senator McCain: Well, it seems to me we may have to
9 contemplate significantly more, but I hope not, but it's
10 certainly disturbing news. I thank you, Mr. Secretary. Thank
11 you again, General. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

12 Chairman Warner: Thank you, Senator McCain.

13 Senator Bill Nelson: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General,
14 we're looking forward to having you as a part of our Tampa
15 civilian community and thank you added to all of the accolades
16 here.

17 I would like very briefly to report to both of you what I
18 observed since I just returned from Iraq last night. First of
19 all, I think you have a good appointment in General Sanchez
20 and the Secretary's and your appointment of General Dayton
21 specifically to go after the weapons of mass destruction and
22 trying to find out the fate of Captain Scott Speicher, which
23 was one of the main reasons for my trip there. And I am
24 convinced that in fact he does have him as a priority along
25 with the WMD.

1 I went to the Hakamiyah prison. I can only describe it
2 as a hellhole. I wanted to go there because of the cell that
3 has the initials carved into the wall, MSS, which is the same
4 as Michael Scott Speicher. We have no proof that that was the
5 case. I observed the torture chamber and the refrigerated
6 containers outside where they would put the corpses, and it
7 all the more underscored the brutality of this regime.

8 Happily I noted on the way in this highly protected
9 convoy that went to the prison that economic life was
10 returning on the streets. There were crates of refrigerators
11 and boxes of ovens that you could see along with the fruits
12 and vegetables, the return on the street of economic activity.
13 I was also very heartened to find that new evidence has been
14 produced, which I have just shared at length with Senator
15 Roberts, the two of us have been joined at the hip on this
16 matter of Captain Speicher, new evidence that is classified
17 but that gives me reason to be optimistic for the first time
18 in several weeks that I have been pessimistic.

19 That doesn't say that he's alive, but that says that
20 we're beginning to get evidence that in fact we might be able
21 to find out. So I wanted to give you that report. At the
22 same time, some of the frustration that you have heard here, I
23 don't think that there's any reason for us to shrink from the
24 fact that most of the leadership that briefed me while I was
25 there thinks that we're going to be there for a long time.

1 Clearly I hope we're going to be there for a long time,
2 because we've got to be successful. It is very important in
3 this Senator's opinion that we have economic and political
4 stability, and I think that's going to require us being there
5 with a lot of effort for a lot of time.

6 In addition to Senator Byrd, I had just mentioned to you,
7 maybe we can confirm that in addition to the 150,000 that are
8 there that in the region there are another 80,000 that are
9 basically supporting the 150,000, and I think that we ought to
10 realize that when leadership was telling me that we were
11 likely to be there 5 years, I think it may be longer. Indeed,
12 I can't imagine us being out of Afghanistan just in 5 years,
13 and the experience that we had in Bosnia, now we're in the 8th
14 year.

15 I don't necessarily see that as a negative, but it's, I
16 think, what we ought to get on the table and understand that
17 over the long haul we're committed for that being a successful
18 liberation of those people. Now it gets a lot easier if we
19 find Saddam Hussein, dead or alive, because then a lot of this
20 assassination that's going on right now -- and that's what it
21 is, it's premeditated, it was probably planned before the war,
22 and unfortunately one of the victims was a Florida National
23 Guardsman Sunday night, doing guard duty at the university at
24 which someone slipped up behind him, shot him in the head and
25 then slipped off into the crowd. That has happened five or

1 six times along with what you see, the tactic finding where
2 our convoys are going, putting a mine, having a remote device,
3 detonating it on a Humvee, and that happened and is chronicled
4 in this morning's newspaper again.

5 So I think we just have to screw up our courage, our
6 determination and finally I might say that, Mr. Secretary, you
7 and I have talked about the question of the morale of the
8 troops, the question of the replacement of the troops, I have
9 specifically raised the issue of the National Guard and the
10 reservists and whether or not a policy change ought to be made
11 upping the active duty roster because indeed most every
12 soldier I talk to, and I talk to a lot of them from Florida,
13 both at the noon hour and then later in the evening, they are
14 pretty well under the impression that they've got to stay
15 there for a year. And that's not only the full time Army but
16 that's also the activated National Guard and the reservists.
17 And of course that brings enormous disruption in their lives,
18 in their employers' lives, in their families' lives that they
19 did not necessarily think of that.

20 So I bring this issue up merely as a policy issue that
21 will have to be considered here as well as by you on the
22 question of should we be doing this with these wonderfully
23 trained and specially skilled reservists and National
24 Guardsmen, men and women, or should we not be doing those
25 kinds of tasks that are going to have to be done for the long

1 haul in Iraq as well as Afghanistan with the active duty
2 roster?

3 Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

4 Chairman Warner: Thank you, Senator.

5 Secretary Rumsfeld: Senator, very briefly, as I
6 indicated earlier, we absolutely have to manage the force in a
7 way that's respectful of what the obligations are and what the
8 expectations are. One of the things that the Department has
9 been working on since the beginning of this conflict is how we
10 can rebalance what we have in the Reserve and the Guard
11 relative to what we have on active duty. We ought to have on
12 active duty the kinds of people that are going to be needed
13 for longer term chores or tasks which are going to frequently
14 come up. We can't keep calling the same people up four, five,
15 six times. It's just not right, and the way the force was
16 organized over the past two decades has been the way it is
17 today, and the way it is today is that we don't have the right
18 people in the active force, enough of the right people in the
19 active force to do those kinds of things.

20 We will be coming forward with proposals in a relatively
21 short period of time to see if we can't get the people
22 proportion of this right.

23 Chairman Warner: Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

24 Senator Clinton.

25 Senator Clinton: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and

1 again General Franks, not only do I want to congratulate you
2 on your long and distinguished career but I believe that your
3 leadership in both Afghanistan and Iraq will likely be studied
4 by military historians for years to come and I thank you for
5 your service to our nation.

6 This is a session on lessons learned and I have two areas
7 in particular that I am interested in. The first goes back to
8 Senator Levin's early questions, Mr. Secretary, about the
9 intelligence, and he focused in particular on the forged
10 documents out of Niger that served as the unfortunate
11 reference in both comments by you and the President as well as
12 the Prime Minister in England and other officials. And
13 Senator Levin's question basically came down to how could it
14 not have been known. In response, and I appreciate your
15 willingness to provide specific details to respond to Senator
16 Levin, you made a statement that the intelligence has been
17 quite good.

18 I would hope, Mr. Secretary, that as part of the lessons
19 learned and the after-action review that I'm sure both the
20 civilian and the military leadership are conducting that you
21 will certainly go deeply into the question of intelligence,
22 because it's not just with the incident concerning the alleged
23 efforts by Iraq to obtain enriched uranium from sources in
24 Africa. During his confirmation hearing, General Abizaid said
25 and I quote, we had indications from intelligence that they

1 were getting ready to distribute chemical weapons to forward
2 Republican Guard artillery units. That's what we thought and
3 so we really targeted those artillery units in particular
4 very, very hard.

5 And then he goes on to say, so the answer to the question
6 is, I am perplexed as to what happened and I can't offer a
7 reasonable explanation with regard to what has happened. Now
8 obviously we're all grateful it didn't happen, and I know the
9 chairman and I on several occasions shared our concerns about
10 what would happen if they were deployed, but the fact is that
11 in this new threat environment in which we find ourselves, we
12 are increasingly reliant on intelligence. We just heard
13 Senator McCain refer to a report from Iranian exiles
14 concerning some potential new nuclear site in Iran.
15 Therefore, I think that of the lessons to be learned, that I
16 hope we have learned, the thorough scrubbing and very careful
17 analysis of intelligence has to be at the top of the list.

18 It may very well be that the American people and
19 certainly the majority in this Congress believe we did the
20 right thing given what we found there and given the end of the
21 Saddam Hussein regime. But I don't think that's the answer to
22 the question about the quality, the accuracy, and the use of
23 intelligence. So I would join in the concerns that Senator
24 Levin and others have expressed that not only in closed
25 meetings, but also in public venues insofar as possible that

1 particularly the Department of Defense but also other agencies
2 within our Government really make it clear what our standards
3 for intelligence are and how we can best understand them
4 because in a democracy that's critical, this flow of
5 information.

6 Now turning to another area of lessons, General Franks,
7 in both Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom
8 the military we used was fundamentally different than the
9 military that fought and won the first Gulf War. Indeed, we
10 saw the fruits of a decade's worth of investment in our
11 military. The increased use of special forces, precision
12 guided munitions, unmanned reconnaissance and combat air
13 vehicles benefited from the decade's investment.

14 As we look ahead to transforming our military, it seems
15 clear that UAVs, special forces, precision guided munitions
16 that we invested in during the nineties will continue to play
17 an expanded role, yet I think it's also important to look at
18 the legacy systems like the M1 Abrams tank, the A-10 Warthog
19 ground support plane that also played a critical role in this
20 campaign. Now in this committee we've debated which weapons
21 systems are necessary in the 21st century. As a man with
22 enormous expertise and experience in this area, what lessons
23 have you drawn from both the Afghanistan and Iraqi campaigns
24 about the role of legacy weapons like the M1 tank, the A-10
25 Warthog and others in the transformed military that we are

1 going to be building?

2 General Franks: Yes, ma'am. I think that about any
3 point in the history of our country when we take a look we're
4 going to find the need for legacy systems, in this case, ma'am
5 you mentioned two of them, the A-10 Warthog, the M1A2 Abrams
6 tank and there are a number of others. And we will find
7 ourselves being trained and ready at any point in our history
8 to use those legacy systems and whatever we do tomorrow, we
9 have to be prepared good legacy systems to tomorrow.

10 I think the thing that we're seeing now the expectation
11 that I have for the next 2 years, the next 4 years, the next 6
12 years is a tremendous effort in the area of transformation
13 that will seek to maybe skip some steps in there. I think our
14 young people, men and women in uniform have done, Senator, a
15 remarkable job of using very good systems and in Afghanistan
16 and Iraq we also used some systems that came about, as you
17 said, over the past 10 years, unmanned aerial systems, to be
18 sure, precision munitions, very, very powerful.

19 I think the transformation that our armed services is
20 looking -- this is out of my lane but it's my view, it's my
21 opinion -- the transformation that armed services are looking
22 out now seeks to figure out what are we losing by not putting
23 more money into technologies. What are we losing by perhaps
24 overcapitalizing legacy systems at the expense of what we may
25 want in the future? And I think I'm glad that bright people

1 like some subordinates of Secretary Rumsfeld work such things,
2 but I think it'll be a little bit different in the next 3 to
3 10 years than it perhaps has been for us in the past 10 years,
4 if that makes sense to you. Thank you, ma'am.

5 Chairman Warner: Thank you very much.

6 Secretary Rumsfeld: Senator, could I make a brief
7 comment?

8 Chairman Warner: Yes, yes, of course.

9 Secretary Rumsfeld: Two things. First I want to give a
10 different number than I gave earlier. I'm told now that the
11 \$700 million-a-month burn rate on Afghanistan is low, that
12 it's actually probably 900 to 950. I suppose if we wait
13 another hour we might get a still different number, but that's
14 the trouble with trying to do things in real time.

15 Senator Clinton, I agree completely on the importance of
16 intelligence. I was asked at my confirmation hearing what was
17 the thing that worried me most and I said intelligence
18 information. It's such a big complicated world and there are
19 so many areas that need to be looked at today unlike the Cold
20 War period where you could focus on the Soviet Union and
21 develop a good deal of conviction about it. We're dealing
22 with closed societies, we're dealing with countries that very
23 skillfully used our advanced technologies, where they're
24 trading those technologies, they're indeed trading denial and
25 deception techniques among so-called rogue states.

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1 So it is something that we're focused on, we think is
2 enormously important and I share your concern about it.

3 Chairman Warner: Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

4 Senator Pryor.

5 Senator Pryor: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary
6 Rumsfeld, I only have 6 minutes here, so I'm going to try to
7 keep my questions very short and I'd appreciate it if you
8 could try to keep your answers fairly concise if you could.

9 Let me first start with one of Senator Levin's questions
10 earlier in the day where he talked about the breakdown in
11 communications here, maybe between the intelligence community
12 and the Oval Office and exactly how President Bush was allowed
13 to in the State of the Union talk about the uranium statement.
14 I'd love to get an answer from you on that and I hope you will
15 follow up with Senator Levin with the committee, but my
16 question is slightly different from that, and that is, when
17 did you know, Secretary Rumsfeld, when did you know that the
18 reports about uranium coming out of Africa were bogus?

19 Secretary Rumsfeld: Within recent days, since the
20 information started becoming available.

21 Senator Pryor: So in other words, right after the speech
22 you didn't know that or even before the speech, you had no
23 knowledge of that?

24 Secretary Rumsfeld: I've just answered the question.

25 Senator Pryor: Are you trying to say that in no

1 briefing, in no documents that you had or that you were
2 exposed to, that was never communicated to you in any way?

3 Secretary Rumsfeld: I didn't say that. I see hundreds
4 and hundreds of pieces of paper a day and is it conceivable
5 that something was in a document? It's conceivable. Do I
6 recall hearing anything or reading anything like that? The
7 answer is as I've given it, no.

8 Senator Pryor: The next question is on the lessons
9 learned front, we find ourselves in Iraq right now, post-war
10 Iraq, if we can call it that. Based on your experience there
11 and your wide-ranging experience during your career, is there
12 something that we need to do starting now and into the future
13 to provide our troops with more training or different kinds of
14 equipment for circumstances like Iraq, where they come in
15 there and they're an occupying force, hopefully for not very
16 long, but still at this point an occupying force. Do we need
17 to do things differently? Do we need to do things better?

18 Secretary Rumsfeld: Well, we think of ourselves as a
19 liberating force, not an occupying force. We think of the
20 role there as not permanent and General Franks, maybe you'd be
21 the best one to respond to the question.

22 General Franks: Sir, I think about the national training
23 center at Ft. Irwin, California. I think about 29 Palms, the
24 Marine training center. I think about Red Flag and Green Flag
25 Air Force training centers. And I think about what has been

1 done during the period of time Senator Clinton mentioned a
2 minute ago, perhaps over the last 10 years, in fact in this
3 case perhaps over the last 15 years, the evolution of things
4 rather than sudden discovery.

5 Senator, I'll give you an answer that is precisely to
6 that same point. For the last 10 to 15 years because of our
7 experiences in other places where we were conducting security
8 and stability operations, tremendous energy has gone into the
9 preparation of the United States Marines, the United States
10 Army troopers, airmen and sailors, especially SEALs, for
11 example, and sailors, to be able to work in an environment of
12 security and stability operations.

13 But Senator, the point that I would make is no amount of
14 training and no amount of preparation is going to make it very
15 likely that within a period of 2 months or 4 months or 8
16 months we're going to move our troops into a population of 25
17 million people who have been abused to the extent that the
18 Iraqis have been abused over more than three decades and cause
19 there to be no fractious behavior and cause these groups that
20 we're having all the difficulties with to go away.

21 And so, sir, if I could I would say again I believe our
22 troops are both trained and ready and very capable, and doing,
23 by the way, an excellent job in this very tough environment.
24 Sorry for the long answer.

25 Senator Pryor: I don't disagree with anything you're

1 saying, in fact I agree with everything. I just hope that as
2 we look at Iraq and understand it and understand our mission
3 there that we continue to improve down the road and that's
4 really my main point.

5 One thing on intelligence, and I don't want to dwell on
6 weapons of mass destruction, but there was a number if I
7 recall, a number of news reports and statements made by the
8 administration and others that Iraq was in possession of
9 several dozen, if I remember the numbers right, Scud missiles
10 before we went into Iraq, and the last I've heard, and you
11 correct me if I'm wrong, Secretary Rumsfeld, but the last I've
12 heard to date there have been zero found.

13 Secretary Rumsfeld: My recollection that I'm sure is
14 imperfect but I recall hearing that there were 10 or 12 Scud
15 missiles that were unaccounted for, up to two dozen.

16 Senator Pryor: Two dozen accounted for, and they've not
17 been found yet then, is that what you mean by that?

18 Secretary Rumsfeld: No, there have been none found.

19 Senator Pryor: Another thing, Secretary Rumsfeld, if I
20 may, in March on ABC News you indicated that you felt like you
21 knew where Iraq's weapons of mass destruction were and you
22 gave a specific general area, if that's a correct phrase, that
23 they're generally around Tikrit and Baghdad and some to the
24 east, south, west, and north. Knowing what you know now, do
25 you think that was an accurate statement at the time?

1 Secretary Rumsfeld: Well, of course it was an accurate
2 statement at the time. It's what I believed.

3 Senator Pryor: I understand you believed it at the time,
4 but knowing what you know now, do you think your belief was
5 accurate?

6 Secretary Rumsfeld: I have no reason to believe it's
7 inaccurate. What we said was -- I was asked at a time when
8 our forces were south of Baghdad in the war, in conflict, I
9 was asked why we hadn't found any weapons of mass destruction
10 yet while the war was still going on. And I allowed as how
11 that the area from Baghdad to the north and the west --

12 Senator Pryor: Probably that orange or brown area on
13 that map over there?

14 Secretary Rumsfeld: Probably. Was an area that probably
15 was more likely to have the locations of these so-called
16 suspect WMD sites. How many hundreds were there?

17 General Franks: I think just short of 1,000, Mr.
18 Secretary.

19 Secretary Rumsfeld: And they were all suspect and there
20 was plenty of time for people to know that they were suspect
21 and as I recall a large majority of them are in the area that
22 I've just described, is that right General?

23 General Franks: Sir, that's right, and there's one
24 additional piece to it and that is confirming the negative,
25 whether we're talking about up to two dozen Scuds that the

1 Secretary mentioned a minute ago. If we know that coming out
2 of the 1991 Gulf War, there are up to two dozen of these
3 systems that have not been found and we know that the United
4 Nations' team has spent 11, 12 years looking for them and have
5 not been able to confirm that the Iraqis don't have them then
6 we go look for them just as America would expect us to do, we
7 go look for them. And, sir, that is the case with these
8 nearly 1,000 sites that the Secretary mentioned. We must
9 believe that the problems are there until we confirm the
10 negative that they're not there, and so that's the process
11 that has been ongoing.

12 Senator Pryor: And I understand the difficulty in that,
13 and I'm out of time, but I would like to ask this one last
14 question and that is, there's been some confusion in the press
15 reports, et cetera, about who actually is in charge of
16 searching for the weapons of mass destruction. And Secretary
17 Rumsfeld, I'd like to hear who is in charge of searching for
18 those weapons.

19 Secretary Rumsfeld: There is no confusion about it that
20 I know of. The facts are these. The capabilities on the
21 ground in Iraq essentially are in the Department of Defense,
22 large numbers, helicopters, the ability to move people around
23 and do things. So the Department of Defense was asked to form
24 an Iraqi survey group, which we did. General Dayton is in
25 charge of it.

1 It was pretty clear to me that the Department of Defense
2 did not have the same level of skill that the intelligence
3 community did and the Central Intelligence Agency, so I sat
4 down with George Tenet, the director of CIA and we discussed
5 the importance, not of running around using helicopters and
6 people on the ground to look for weapons of mass destruction,
7 but the importance of gathering intelligence through
8 interrogations, figuring out who might know what, who could we
9 offer amnesty to, who could we offer a reward to, and go
10 through that process that is quite a different thing than
11 looking under every tree for WMD.

12 And so he assigned a man named David Kay to work with
13 General Dayton and the judgment portion of it is being made by
14 David Kay and his cell back in the United States that is a
15 multi-agency cell, and the actual physically doing of things,
16 looking for people, looking for sites is being done under the
17 authority of General Dayton. General Dayton reports to me.
18 George Tenet and I are as close as you can be on this subject.
19 The people on the ground are as close as you can be on this
20 subject and my impression is that the people that have been
21 put in charge are doing a good job and handling it well.

22 Chairman Warner: Thank you, Mr. Secretary. I'm sure my
23 colleague Senator Levin would join me -- we met with Mr. Kay.
24 He was part of the team Ambassador Bremer assembled to brief
25 us and seated right there was General Dayton and we got

1 clearly the understanding that the chain of command was as you
2 described and therefore there is clarity in my judgment as to
3 that reporting chain through Bremer and Kay up to you with
4 parallel to the Central Intelligence Agency. Thank you for
5 that.

6 Senator Ben Nelson.

7 Senator Ben Nelson: Thank you, Mr. Chairman and I know,
8 General, you're never going to get tired of the accolades even
9 though they keep getting heaped on, so I want to certainly add
10 mine to those of my colleagues and to extend my appreciation
11 to the Secretary as well for not only taking our questions
12 today but for sticking with this very important task that's
13 before us, and that is, of course, working with the issue
14 about end strength, with rotation, with deployment, and the
15 obvious questions that we're going to be facing in the future
16 dealing with retention as well as recruitment because that's
17 going to be extremely important to the future of our military.

18 And I think you need to do as you are in the whole area
19 of transformation because obviously the force of tomorrow will
20 only maybe slightly resemble the force of today, so this is
21 all before you and I commend you in advance for your work on
22 this.

23 Regarding the post-war planning, earlier this year I
24 discussed with former Army Secretary White the concerns that I
25 had regarding the number of military police and the number of

1 reservists who had been called up to active duty as a result.
2 And while I recognize that this is a liberating force, there's
3 no question but for a period of time that we'll be looked at
4 and probably serve as an occupying force until stability is
5 established.

6 In Iraq I was told by a group of elected officials in
7 Kirkuk, just recently appointed elected group that they
8 thought that the looting had really undercut the effort toward
9 democracy in certain parts of Iraq and that while folks who
10 had not had any experience with democracy were wondering if
11 this was what democracy was going to be about. They don't
12 have outside experiences, no other experience to call upon and
13 so their first taste of democracy may not have been as sweet
14 as we had hoped, ultimately as sweet as we hope that it will
15 be.

16 What I'm leading up to is, as we look toward other
17 efforts in the world today that we may be called upon to
18 restore peace, to establish democracy, are we thinking about
19 the force that will obviously involve immediately upon the end
20 of combat operations the installation of peacekeeping that
21 consists of law and order military police far more than our
22 own military forces? Are we thinking about that in terms of
23 transformation because it appears that with the lack of
24 staffing that we may have had in that area that it may have
25 gotten away from us in Iraq, but we may be faced with that in

1 the next effort that may be just down the road. Are we
2 building toward that and will that be part of transformation?

3 I guess it's unfair to ask you, General Franks, on the
4 way out, but do you have any thoughts of it, and then of
5 course, Secretary Rumsfeld, I'd love to have your thoughts
6 too.

7 General Franks: Sir, your comment about looting I think
8 is right. Unfortunately, looting actually was a tool used by
9 the regime before we ever undertook this so some of these
10 criminal elements, and I'm not sure what the number is, I
11 think the Secretary mentioned a number earlier in the
12 testimony.

13 Senator Ben Nelson: It's 100,000 I've heard.

14 General Franks: Perhaps 100,000 let out of jail and so
15 the looting by those people as well as other disgruntled
16 people for sure affects the taste that the Iraqis have in
17 their mouths.

18 In terms of expectation, sir, I'm not at all sure that I
19 believe that the planning or execution of the post of the
20 initial 60 days or so, and that's how long we've been looking
21 at this, the initial 60 days or so of post-major combat
22 operations -- it can be characterized as well, you weren't
23 quite with it. Actually, what we'll do I suspect, and the
24 Secretary will comment on this, is as the services think
25 through what the structure needs to be for our Armed Forces

1 over the next 10, 20 years, as part of transformation, I
2 believe that sort of study will be undertaken to decide do we
3 have the balance about right. Are we about right in active
4 component, Reserve component? Are we about right in the
5 numbers of armor troopers, in the numbers of military
6 policemen?

7 So, sir, that's the best that I can do.

8 Senator Ben Nelson: Thank you.

9 Secretary Rumsfeld: There's nothing I can add. It
10 clearly is important that as soon as possible at the end of a
11 conflict that you have the ability to assert control over an
12 area. It is also impossible to do. You can not go from a
13 war-fighting circumstance in one minute and have a whole lot
14 of forces decide not to fight you, as they did from Baghdad
15 north and blend into the countryside and think that you have
16 the ability in one hour from a powerful war-fighting force
17 into a stabilization force capable of guarding every hospital,
18 every school, every museum, every suspect weapons site in a
19 country the size of California. You can't do it.

20 Senator Ben Nelson: But is there a period of time that
21 in the planning process you could isolate it down to to say
22 that it's something that you should be aiming for within 2
23 weeks, 7 days, or is there a time frame that you can narrow it
24 down to?

25 Secretary Rumsfeld: Absolutely and they did that.

1 General Franks: Sir, the comment that I would make is
2 that when you plan a war or an operation with a mission that
3 says remove a regime, you recognize that, and in fact the
4 Secretary includes in his statement some half-dozen or so
5 things that can go wrong. Well as a planner what one does is
6 take a look at the things that can go wrong and try to put
7 some scope around how long will this operation take because if
8 we can figure out about how long it's going to take and about
9 what size force in terms of the numbers of tanks and aircraft
10 and so forth we need, then we can figure out how long we have
11 in order to get the sort of force, Senator, that you're
12 mentioning loaded and get it on the ground so that it's
13 Johnny-on-the-spot and ready to do some work.

14 Senator Ben Nelson: That's exactly why I was asking
15 Secretary White if he thought we had the skill sets necessary
16 to be able to -- sufficient staffing and support to move and
17 be able to do that in advance of the occurrence.

18 General Franks: And, sir, actually in this case we
19 couldn't do that. And I make no defensive comment about this.
20 We'll let history reflect whatever it chooses to reflect. But
21 I can tell you that there is a direct trade-off between the
22 size force built and the amount of deception and surprise one
23 achieves. And one more day, one more week, one more hour, one
24 more month to build additional forces which we would all
25 applaud now would have resulted in a totally different war

1 than the one we saw.

2 Senator Ben Nelson: The problem with trying to deal with
3 lessons learned is that there's always an element of criticism
4 that's a part of it. When it's not intentional to be
5 critical, if you're not critical, you don't learn the lesson.

6 General Franks: Sir, I agree with that.

7 Senator Ben Nelson: Thank you very much gentlemen.

8 Chairman Warner: Senator, I indicated to the General
9 that as this committee continues to complete its reports on
10 the operations in both Afghanistan and Iraq, and by no means
11 in my judgment are either operation at that point where we do
12 an after-action report because action is taking place, the
13 General has offered to return in his civilian capacity to take
14 further questions.

15 Yes, Mr. Secretary?

16 Secretary Rumsfeld: I'm going to have to excuse myself.
17 This has gone considerably longer than I had expected.

18 Chairman Warner: I recognize that and what I would like
19 to ask of you if can provide just a brief few minutes in
20 closed session in S-219 next door, we want to have one or two
21 questions on the WMD program, and then you'll be free to go.
22 We thank you. This has almost been a 4-hour public open
23 discussion of all issues relating to these important
24 deployment of our troops.

25 Thank you very much. I'd like to put in today's record

1 at the end a Washington Post article, April 2, '03 by a former
2 Marine Colonel Gary Anderson. I was hoping to address it.
3 Time doesn't permit.

4 [Whereupon, at 1:17 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

5 [The information referred to follows:]

6 [COMMITTEE INSERT]

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Ans 1
July 30, 2003

TO: LTG Craddock
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Arabic Speakers

I need the details on the information Charlie Abell gave me on Arabic speakers, as I have requested, separated out.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
073003-16



Please respond by 8/8/03

According to Charlie Abell,
we have 2800

Active/reserve/retired
arabic speakers. Charlie
+ Fred Smith are working
on seeing how many ~~are~~
are available to go, if
we want to send them.

ACTIVE

11-L-0559/OSD/31707

ARMY

Deployed in CENTCOM AO
Returned within past 6 months

SSN	Name (last first middle)	Serv	Grade	PMOS	Language	DLPT L	DLPT R	DLPT S	DLPT Date	UIC
(b)(6)		ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	2	2+	1+	0104	WGNTA0
		ARMY	E6	31U	ARABIC	3	3	0	0210	WA98AA
		ARMY	E4	97E	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0301	WG4MA0
		ARMY	E4	88M	ARABIC	2+	2+	0	0302	WAC4T0
		ARMY	O3	35E	ARABIC	3	5	0	9812	WGKEAA
		ARMY	E6	63A	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0109	W1L4AY
		ARMY	E5	75H	ARABIC	2	2	0	0209	WDEJ1C
		ARMY	O3	56A	ARABIC	3	2+	0	0106	W2DH1A
		ARMY	E5	35E	ARABIC	3	3	0	0206	WHXJT0
		ARMY	E8	91Q	ARABIC	2	2	0	0007	W1HJAA
		ARMY	E6	63H	ARABIC	3	3	0	0210	WHGBAA
		ARMY	E5	98G	ARABIC	3	2	2	0210	WH6XA1
		ARMY	E3	98G	ARABIC	2+	2+	1+	0303	W1ECZL
		ARMY	E6	51M	ARABIC	2	2	2	0106	W4UJ21
		ARMY	O4	00E	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0206	W30U1N
		ARMY	E5	98G	ARABIC	2	2	2	0304	W1ECZE
		ARMY	E7	25Z	ARABIC	3	3	0	0204	W3E9AA
		ARMY	E4	91W	ARABIC	3	2+	0	0202	WAJKT0
		ARMY	E6	91K	ARABIC	3	3	0	0207	W1HHAA
		ARMY	E6	97B	ARABIC	3	3	4	9709	W1E82B
		ARMY	O4	48G	ARABIC	2	2	0	9808	W00TAA
		ARMY	E6	98G	ARABIC	3	3	2	0210	WDHJDO
		ARMY	E5	98G	ARABIC	3	3	2	0206	WDL1B0
		ARMY	O6	12A	ARABIC	3	2	0	9011	WAT4AA
		ARMY	E4	92Y	ARABIC	3	3	0	0304	WFQMA1
		ARMY	E4	92A	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0302	WBB6AA
		ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	2	2	2	0202	WGNTA0
		ARMY	O3	55A	ARABIC	3	3	0	0006	W3VZ05
		ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	2	2+	1+	0208	WDL1B0
		ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0207	WH6XD0

SSN (b)(6) Name (last first middle)

Serv	Grade	PMOS	Language	DLPT L	DLPT R	DLPT S	DLPT Date	UIC
ARMY	E6	97E	ARABIC	3	3	3	0305	W1E0AW
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	2	2	2	0006	WGNTAO
ARMY	E3	98C	ARABIC	2	2	2	0303	W1E843
ARMY	E4	97E	ARABIC	2	2+	2	0210	WBVDA0
ARMY	E5	98G	ARABIC	2+	2+	2	0302	W00114
ARMY	E7	97E	ARABIC	3	3	1+	0112	W0F802
ARMY	O6	00E	ARABIC	2	2	0	7905	W37W1B
ARMY	E7	97E	ARABIC	2+	2+	2	0206	W3VMAA
ARMY	E2	92A	ARABIC	2+	2+	0	0201	WC0QAA
ARMY	O3	66H	ARABIC	5	5	0	0010	W2DH03
ARMY	E5	98G	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0107	WGNTAO
ARMY	W2	152H	ARABIC	3	3	0	9811	WVJ7HD
ARMY	E5	98G	ARABIC	2	2+	1+	0105	WGNTAO
ARMY	E7	98G	ARABIC	2+	2+	0	0212	W1ECA1
ARMY	E3	98G	ARABIC	2	2+	1+	0303	W1E846

ARMY	E2	97E	ARABIC	2	2+	1+	0303	WBVDA0
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ARMY	E5	98G	ARABIC	2	2+	2	0105	WGNTAO
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ARMY	O4	18A	ARABIC	3	3	0	9802	W30U1E
ARMY	O4	35E	ARABIC	2	2	0	0107	WBU8AA
ARMY	E5	97E	ARABIC	2	2+	1	0105	W1ECZ1

ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	3	3	2	0302	W1E846
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ARMY	O5	00E	ARABIC	2	2	0	0005	W2H602
ARMY	E6	98G	ARABIC	3	2+	1+	0210	WDHUD0
ARMY	O4	48G	ARABIC	3	3	0	9912	W6AK11
ARMY	W4	351E	ARABIC	3	3	0	9605	W4T1AA

ARMY	O3	92F	ARABIC	2+	3	0	0206	W37213
ARMY	E6	98G	ARABIC	2	3	2	0206	W1ECZE

ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	2+	3	1+	0305	W1ECZL
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SSN (b)(6) Name (last, first, middle)

Serv	Grade	PMOS	Language	DLPT L	DLPT R	DLPT S	DLPT Date	UIC
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	2	2+	2	0011	WH6XD0
ARMY	E5	98C	ARABIC	2	2	2	0304	W00112
ARMY	E5	98G	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0210	W1ECZE
ARMY	O4	18A	ARABIC	2	2	0	0003	W04QAA
ARMY	E7	97E	ARABIC	2	2	2+	0301	WHQLAA
ARMY	O2	12A	ARABIC	2	2	0	9801	WAC6B1
ARMY	E6	98G	ARABIC	2	2+	1+	0104	WC8SAA
ARMY	E6	98G	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0211	WBVCT0
ARMY	E7	98G	ARABIC	3	2	0	0210	WGNTA0
ARMY	E6	98C	ARABIC	2	2	1	0003	W00101
ARMY	E5	98G	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0205	W1E862
ARMY	E7	97E	ARABIC	2+	3	1	0206	WDSM05
ARMY	O6	48G	ARABIC	3	3	0	9502	W4B2AA
ARMY	E5	98G	ARABIC	2+	3	2	0010	WH6XD0
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0206	WDLB0
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	2	2	2	0208	WH62D0
ARMY	E4	98C	ARABIC	3	2+	2	0208	WGNTAA
ARMY	E7	98G	ARABIC	2+	2+	2	0303	W1E844
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	2+	2+	1+	0107	WGNTA0
ARMY	E5	98G	ARABIC	3	3	2	0205	WH6XD0
ARMY	E6	98G	ARABIC	3	2+	2	0207	WH62D0
ARMY	E5	98G	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0211	W1ECZF
ARMY	E7	98G	ARABIC	2	2	2+	0109	WGNT99
ARMY	E6	98G	ARABIC	3	3	2+	0207	WH6XD0
ARMY	O4	35G	ARABIC	2+	3	0	0205	W0Z1AA
ARMY	E4	97E	ARABIC	3	3	2	0202	WA77B0
ARMY	E5	98G	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0303	WBVDC0
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	2	2+	1+	0303	W1E846
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0111	WH6XD0
ARMY	O4	91D	ARABIC	2	2	0	9907	W2HX30
ARMY	O4	74C	ARABIC	2	2	0	9404	W475AA
ARMY	E7	98G	ARABIC	3	3	0	0204	WGNTA0
ARMY	E7	97E	ARABIC	3	2+	2	0206	W0F807
ARMY	E6	98G	ARABIC	2+	2	1+	0105	WH6XD0
ARMY	E7	98G	ARABIC	2	2	2	0203	W1ECZE

SSN Name (last first middle)

(b)(6)

Serv	Grade	PMOS	Language	DLPT L	DLPT R	DLPTS	DLPT Date	UIC
ARMY	E5	98G	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0108	WDAMAA
ARMY	E7	97E	ARABIC	2	2	0	9908	WG4KAA
ARMY	W2	351E	ARABIC	3	3	0	0205	W4VN10
ARMY	E4	97E	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0212	WBVFT0
ARMY	E6	98G	ARABIC	2+	2	2	0101	W1ECA1
ARMY	E6	98G	ARABIC	2	2+	2	0207	W1ECZ2
ARMY	E6	98G	ARABIC	2	3	2	0110	WGNTA0
ARMY	E8	98Z	ARABIC	2	2+	2	0011	W1E82B
ARMY	E5	98G	ARABIC	3	3	1+	0105	WGNTA0
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	2+	2+	1+	0210	WDHUHD
ARMY	E4	98C	ARABIC	2+	3	1+	0210	WNDDAA
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	3	3	2	0202	WH72D0
ARMY	E5	98G	ARABIC	3	2+	2	0204	WDLB0
ARMY	W2	352C	ARABIC	5	5	0	0205	WDKEB0
ARMY	E3	98G	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0305	W1E846
ARMY	E7	98G	ARABIC	3	3	2	0204	WDHUHD
ARMY	E7	98G	ARABIC	2	2	2	0103	WH72D0
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	2	2+	1	0109	WGNTA0
ARMY	O4	00E	ARABIC	2+	3	0	9604	W00TAA
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	2	2	2	0105	W1ECZF
ARMY	E6	97E	ARABIC	2+	2+	2	0211	W1ECZE
ARMY	O5	31A	ARABIC	2	3	0	9509	WJHEAA
ARMY	E7	98G	ARABIC	2	2	1	0205	W1E844
ARMY	E5	98G	ARABIC	2+	2	2	0101	WDLB0
ARMY	O4	18A	ARABIC	2	2	0	9510	W4VJAA
ARMY	E3	98G	ARABIC	2	2+	1+	0304	W1E846

SSN Name (last first middle)

(b)(6)

Serv	Grade	PMOS	Language	DLPT L	DLPT R	DLPT S	DLPT Date	UIC
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	2	2+	1+	0208	WA77B0
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	2+	2+	2	0102	WH6XD0
ARMY	E5	97E	ARABIC	2	2	2	0204	WH6XA1
ARMY	E4	97E	ARABIC	2	2	2	0211	WH62D0
ARMY	E6	98G	ARABIC	2	2+	1+	0303	WDGWB0
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	3	2+	2	0102	WSHBU2
ARMY	E6	98G	ARABIC	2	2	1	0102	WGNTA0
ARMY	E4	97E	ARABIC	2	3	1	0305	W1ECZL
ARMY	E7	18D	ARABIC	2+	2+	0	9812	W1E0AW
ARMY	E5	98G	ARABIC	2	2	2	0204	WDLB0
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	2+	2	2	0205	WGNTA0
ARMY	O3	44A	ARABIC	4	4	0	9807	WBGTB0
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	2	2	2	0103	WGNTA0
ARMY	E6	98G	ARABIC	3	2+	1+	0201	WH6XD0
ARMY	O4	35G	ARABIC	2+	3	0	0110	W37213
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	2	2+	1+	0211	WH62D0
ARMY	O5	48G	ARABIC	2	3	0	9806	W1FBAA
ARMY	O4	42B	ARABIC	2	2	0	9812	W3VS24
ARMY	E5	98G	ARABIC	2+	2	2	0202	WGNTA0
ARMY	E5	98G	ARABIC	3	3	2	0208	W1ECZF
ARMY	W3	351E	ARABIC	3+	4+	0	0107	WH6XA1
ARMY	E7	98C	ARABIC	2	2	0	0008	WBVAAA
ARMY	O5	48H	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0206	W45WAA
ARMY	E7	18E	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0206	W1E0FW
ARMY	O2	88A	ARABIC	4	4	0	9906	WB0MAA
ARMY	O4	48G	ARABIC	2	2+	0	9607	W00TAA
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	3	2+	2	0104	WGNT99
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	2	2+	2	0106	WH72D0
ARMY	E5	98G	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0212	W1ECZE
ARMY	E7	98G	ARABIC	2	2	2	0106	W1E844
ARMY	E8	98Z	ARABIC	3	3	2	0208	WDKEA0
ARMY	O4	00E	ARABIC	3	3	0	9903	W30U2L
ARMY	E3	11B	ARABIC	2	2	0	0210	WEZKT0
ARMY	E5	82C	ARABIC	3	3	0	0201	WAM010

(b)(6)

Serv	Grade	PMOS	Language	DLPT L	DLPT R	DLPTS	DLPT Date	UIC
ARMY	E7	98G	ARABIC	2+	3	1+	9811	WH6XD0
ARMY	E5	98G	ARABIC	2	2+	1+	0206	WH6XD0
ARMY	E4	98C	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0208	WGNTAA
ARMY	E5	98G	ARABIC	3	3	2	0206	WDLLB0
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0302	W1E862
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	2+	2+	1+	0007	WH6XD0
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	3	3	2+	0302	WGNTAA
ARMY	E5	98G	ARABIC	3	3	2	0212	W00111
ARMY	E5	98G	ARABIC	2	2+	2	0209	WDGWBO
ARMY	E6	98C	ARABIC	2	2	0	0106	WH62D0
ARMY	E4	98C	ARABIC	2+	3	2	0208	WGNTAA
ARMY	E5	98G	ARABIC	2	3	1+	0206	W00121
ARMY	O6	48G	ARABIC	2	2	0	8708	W4FGAA
ARMY	E7	97E	ARABIC	2+	2	2	0206	W1E801
ARMY	E5	98C	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0206	WH67AA
ARMY	O4	48G	ARABIC	2	2	0	0201	W37223
ARMY	E6	79S	ARABIC	2	2	2	9908	W00130
ARMY	O6	48J	ARABIC	3	3	0	8611	W2H8AA
ARMY	O3	56A	ARABIC	3	3	0	0301	W2MJAA
ARMY	E7	97E	ARABIC	2	2+	1+	0108	W1ECA1
ARMY	E4	98C	ARABIC	3	3	1+	0303	WH6YD0
ARMY	O5	47G	ARABIC	3	3	0	0204	W1FBAA
ARMY	E4	97E	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0212	WH6XA0
ARMY	E6	98G	ARABIC	3	3	2	0206	WDSPAA
ARMY	O3	31A	ARABIC	2+	3+	0	9705	W30F01
ARMY	E5	98C	ARABIC	3	3	2	0103	WGNTA0
ARMY	E7	97E	ARABIC	2+	2+	1+	0304	W0F809
ARMY	E7	97E	ARABIC	2	3	1	0210	WHQLAA
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	2	2+	2	0211	WDGWBO
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	2+	2	1+	0207	WDSPAA

SSN (b)(6)

Serv Grade PMOS Language DLPT L DLPT R DLPT S DLPT Date UIC

ARMY	E5	98G	ARABIC	3	3	1+	0206	WDAMAA
ARMY	O3	66F	ARABIC	2+	2+	0	9011	W2L6AA
ARMY	E5	74B	ARABIC	2	3	0	0210	WATLAA
ARMY	E8	98Z	ARABIC	2	2	0	0208	W00122
ARMY	O3	35D	ARABIC	2	3	0	0201	WALX99
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	2+	2+	2+	0303	W1E828
ARMY	E5	92Y	ARABIC	3	2	0	0202	WDEFD0
ARMY	E8	75H	ARABIC	2+	3	0	9012	W0ZUAA
ARMY	E4	92Y	ARABIC	3	2+	0	0206	WBHUAA
ARMY	E5	98G	ARABIC	2	3	2	0007	WH72D0
ARMY	E5	92Y	ARABIC	2+	2+	0	0209	WACEHD
ARMY	E5	97E	ARABIC	3	3	0	0302	WG4MA0
ARMY	O5	14E	ARABIC	3	3	0	9003	W1FB50
ARMY	O2	25A	ARABIC	3	2+	0	9707	WDWDAA
ARMY	E7	98C	ARABIC	2	2+	1+	0210	W1E841
ARMY	E5	98G	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0208	WH62D0
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	2	2	2	0205	WGNTA0
ARMY	W1	003A	ARABIC	4+	5	0	0305	W3VS1A
ARMY	E7	98G	ARABIC	2	2	0	0210	W4VYAA
ARMY	E6	98G	ARABIC	2+	2	2	0208	WC8SAA
ARMY	E5	98G	ARABIC	3	3	2	0010	WH6XA1
ARMY	E3	98G	ARABIC	3	3	2	0303	W1E846
ARMY	E7	98G	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0303	W00121
ARMY	E5	73C	ARABIC	3	3	0	0110	WENHA0
ARMY	O6	11A	ARABIC	3	2	0	9708	W6AK03
ARMY	E6	98G	ARABIC	2	2	1	0303	W1E862
ARMY	E6	98G	ARABIC	2	3	1+	0209	W3RB35
ARMY	O4	35D	ARABIC	2	3	0	0301	W4T1AA
ARMY	E5	98C	ARABIC	3	3	2	0207	WH62D0
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	2	2	2	0211	WH62D0
ARMY	E7	97E	ARABIC	3	3	0	0206	W1E806
ARMY	E7	98G	ARABIC	2	2+	2	0305	W1ECZ1
ARMY	E6	97E	ARABIC	3	2+	1+	0210	WHQLAA

SSN (b)(6) Name (last first middle)

Serv	Grade	PMOS	Language	DLPT L	DLPT R	DLPT S	DLPT Date	UIC
ARMY	E6	98G	ARABIC	2	2+	2	0206	WDSPAA
ARMY	E6	98G	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0204	W1ECZE
ARMY	O4	11A	ARABIC	2	3	0	0203	W1V036
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0205	WGNTA0
ARMY	E7	98G	ARABIC	2	2	2+	0203	WH62D0
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	2	2+	2	0303	WDAMAA
ARMY	O2	14A	ARABIC	3	3+	0	9908	WAWYE0
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	2+	2+	1+	0204	WDGWB0
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	3	3	0	0106	WH72A0
ARMY	E6	98G	ARABIC	2+	3	1+	0212	W1ECA1
ARMY	O4	00E	ARABIC	4	4+	0	0212	W0VPS1
ARMY	O1	35D	ARABIC	2	2	0	0207	W1E862
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	3	3	2	0302	W1E846
ARMY	E4	97B	ARABIC	2	2+	1+	0303	WH6QAA
ARMY	E4	97E	ARABIC	3	2+	2	0206	WBVFT0
ARMY	E3	92Y	ARABIC	3	3	0	0302	WDFJAA
ARMY	E4	77F	ARABIC	2	2	0	0103	WFAJTO
ARMY	E6	98G	ARABIC	2	2+	2	0209	WDGWB0
ARMY	E3	98G	ARABIC	2	2	2	0303	W1ECZL
ARMY	E6	97E	ARABIC	2+	2+	1+	0207	W1E801
ARMY	E5	98G	ARABIC	3	3	2	0106	WGNTA0
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	3	3	2	0107	WGNTA0
ARMY	E5	97E	ARABIC	2	2	2	0212	WBVDA0
ARMY	E4	71L	ARABIC	2	2+	2	0207	WAZ3T0
ARMY	E4	98C	ARABIC	2	3	2	0205	WDHUD0
ARMY	E6	98G	ARABIC	3	3	2	0209	W1ECA1
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	3	2+	2	0104	WGNT99
ARMY	E5	98G	ARABIC	3	2+	2	0304	W1ECZF
ARMY	E3	98G	ARABIC	2	2	2	0302	W1E846
ARMY	E6	98G	ARABIC	2	2	2	0211	WH62D0
ARMY	E5	98G	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0206	WBVCB0
ARMY	E7	97E	ARABIC	2	2+	1+	0211	W4W6AA
ARMY	E6	98G	ARABIC	2	2	1	0211	WHQLAA
ARMY	E6	98G	ARABIC	3	3	2	0301	WDHUHD

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SSN Name (last first middle)

(b)(6)

Serv	Grade	PMOS	Language	DLPT L	DLPT R	DLPT S	DLPT Date	UIC
ARMY	E4	92R	ARABIC	2	2+	1	0202	WELFAA
ARMY	E5	97E	ARABIC	2	2+	2	0211	WH8QY5
ARMY	W4	180A	ARABIC	3	3	0	9203	W1E0AA
ARMY	E6	98G	ARABIC	2	2+	1+	0210	WDGWBO
ARMY	O5	48G	ARABIC	2	2	0	9503	W1V069
ARMY	O5	35D	ARABIC	2	3	0	9606	WDFKAA
ARMY	E7	98G	ARABIC	2	2+	1+	0109	W1E844
ARMY	O4	48G	ARABIC	2	3	0	0206	W372AA
ARMY	E3	98G	ARABIC	2+	2+	1+	0303	W1E846
ARMY	E2	98G	ARABIC	2	2	2	0305	W1ECZL
ARMY	E4	98C	ARABIC	3	2+	2	0109	W00121
ARMY	O3	13A	ARABIC	2	2	0	0305	W1ECZE
ARMY	O2	35D	ARABIC	2	2	0	9901	WH6XA1
ARMY	E4	68X	ARABIC	2	2	0	0105	WDFJAA
ARMY	E6	98G	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0111	W1ECZE
ARMY	E5	75B	ARABIC	2+	2+	0	0108	W4VN02
ARMY	E4	92Y	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0210	WANVT0
ARMY	E7	97B	ARABIC	3	3	2	0007	W1ECZE
ARMY	E7	98G	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0304	W00112
ARMY	E5	98C	ARABIC	2+	2+	1+	0212	WDKEA0
ARMY	E4	97E	ARABIC	3	2	1+	0305	W1ECZL
ARMY	O5	35D	ARABIC	4	4	0	0104	W1V077
ARMY	E7	92G	ARABIC	2	3	0	0110	WH9QT0
ARMY	E3	98G	ARABIC	2	2	1	0303	W1E846
ARMY	O3	35D	ARABIC	2	2	0	9208	W1ECZE
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	2	2	2	0210	WGNTA0
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	2+	3	2	0303	WGNTA0
ARMY	E7	98G	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0201	WDHUT0
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	2	2+	2	0302	W1E846
ARMY	W4	180A	ARABIC	2	2	0	9711	WH1DW1

SSN Name (last first middle)

Serv Grade PMOS Language DLPT L DLPT R DLPT S DLPT Date UIC

(b)(6)

ARMY	E5	98C	ARABIC	3	3	2+	0106	WGNTA0
ARMY	E5	92R	ARABIC	2	3	0	0301	W1E0C1
ARMY	E6	98G	ARABIC	2	2	2	0304	W1ECA1
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	2	2+	1+	0211	WDLLB0
ARMY	E6	98G	ARABIC	2+	2	2	0304	WDGWT0
ARMY	E4	98C	ARABIC	2+	2	2	0211	W1E843
ARMY	O5	39C	ARABIC	2	2	0	9403	W0VP8F
ARMY	E5	92Y	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0304	WG4KAA
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	2	2+	2	0205	WGNTA0
ARMY	E3	98G	ARABIC	3	2+	2	0305	W1E843
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	2	2	2	0302	WDAMAA
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0303	W1E846
ARMY	E3	98G	ARABIC	3	3	1+	0302	W1E846
ARMY	E6	97E	ARABIC	2	3	2	0212	W1E801
ARMY	E6	98G	ARABIC	2	2	1	0109	W1E862
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	2	2	1	0304	WDAMAA
ARMY	E6	98G	ARABIC	2+	3	1+	0212	W1ECZ2
ARMY	E6	98G	ARABIC	2+	3	2	0212	W00111
ARMY	O3	13A	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0101	W37213
ARMY	E5	98G	ARABIC	3	3	1+	0104	WGNTA0
ARMY	E6	97B	ARABIC	2+	3	1+	0104	WDKVA0
ARMY	W2	351E	ARABIC	2+	2+	0	0112	W0F802
ARMY	E6	98G	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0109	WDSMAA
ARMY	O4	48G	ARABIC	2+	2	0	0012	W40JAA
ARMY	E3	98G	ARABIC	2	2+	1+	0305	W1ECZL
ARMY	E3	88K	ARABIC	2+	2+	0	0205	WCL8AA
ARMY	E4	92G	ARABIC	3	3	0	0208	WAD8T0

SSN Name (last first middle)

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Serv Grade PMOS Language DLPT L DLPT R DLPTS DLPT S DLPT Date UIC

ARMY O2 35D ARABIC 2+ 3 0 0 9908 W4VYAA
 ARMY E5 71L ARABIC 2 3 0 0 0109 WHGHAA
 ARMY E4 98C ARABIC 2 3 1+ 0 0210 WBVBBO
 ARMY O3 91B ARABIC 5 5 0 0 9401 WB29AA
 ARMY O5 48D ARABIC 3 3 0 0 9512 W4B2AA
 ARMY E5 98G ARABIC 2+ 2 1+ 0 0010 WGN99
 ARMY O3 56A ARABIC 5 5 0 0 9904 WAL8T0

ARMY E6 98G ARABIC 3 3 0 0 0303 W00111
 ARMY E5 98G ARABIC 3 3 2 0 0105 W00111
 ARMY E3 98G ARABIC 2+ 2 2 0 0303 W1ECZL

ARMY E6 91E ARABIC 3 3 0 0 0110 W3ZS20

ARMY W3 351E ARABIC 2 2 0 0 9802 WDR5B0

ARMY E5 98G ARABIC 2 2 1+ 0 0206 WDLLB0

ARMY E4 91K ARABIC 3 3 0 0 0210 W03SAA

ARMY E4 92G ARABIC 3 3 0 0 0304 WAM3T0
 ARMY E5 97B ARABIC 2 2 1+ 0 0305 WH8QAA
 ARMY E4 98G ARABIC 3 3 2 0 0107 WGN7A0
 ARMY E6 98C ARABIC 2 2 2 0 0210 W1E841

ARMY E7 97E ARABIC 2 2+ 1+ 0 0108 WH8QHD

ARMY O2 11A ARABIC 3 3 0 0 0104 WH5AC0

ARMY E6 98G ARABIC 2 2 2 0 0101 WA77A0
 ARMY O6 18A ARABIC 3 3 0 0 9403 W37W1A
 ARMY E5 98G ARABIC 3 2+ 1+ 0 0201 WGN7A0

ARMY E4 92R ARABIC 2 2 2 0 0204 WDSPAA
 ARMY E8 18Z ARABIC 2 2 2+ 0 0102 W3QT1A
 ARMY E6 98G ARABIC 3 2+ 2 0 0109 WH72A0
 ARMY O2 12A ARABIC 3 3+ 0 0 0104 WG2CT0
 ARMY E3 98G ARABIC 2 2+ 1+ 0 0305 W1ECZL
 ARMY E5 98G ARABIC 2 3 0 0 0201 WH6XD0
 ARMY E3 98G ARABIC 2 2 2 0 0303 W1E846

ARMY E5 97E ARABIC 2 2+ 1+ 0 0210 WBVFB0
 ARMY E6 98G ARABIC 2 2 1+ 0 0211 W00112

SSN Name (last first middle)

(b)(6)

Serv	Grade	PMOS	Language	DLPT L	DLPT R	DLPTS	DLPT Date	UIC
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	3	3	2	0303	W1E846
ARMY	E7	97E	ARABIC	3	3	3	0111	W0F802
ARMY	O3	35D	ARABIC	3	2+	0	0101	W1E870
ARMY	E4	98C	ARABIC	2	2	0	0303	WBVDC0
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0212	WH6XD0
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	2	2+	2	0209	WDL1B0
ARMY	E6	97E	ARABIC	3	3	0	0210	W1E801
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	2	2+	1	0208	WDL1B0
ARMY	E8	98Z	ARABIC	2	2	2	0005	WH72D0
ARMY	O3	25A	ARABIC	2	2	0	0304	W1ECA1
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	2+	3	1+	0305	WA77A0
ARMY	E4	91Q	ARABIC	3	2+	0	0302	W0Q153
ARMY	E4	13B	ARABIC	2	2	0	0202	WAXMAA
ARMY	O3	25A	ARABIC	2	2	0	9912	WH05T0
ARMY	E3	13B	ARABIC	3	3	0	0207	WAM0C0
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	2+	3	2	0105	WGNTA0
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	2+	2	2	0109	WGNT99
ARMY	O5	48C	ARABIC	3	3	0	8304	W1V023
ARMY	O3	11A	ARABIC	2	2	0	9310	WH3MT0
ARMY	E5	98G	ARABIC	2	2	2	0006	W1E02E
ARMY	E5	98G	ARABIC	2	2+	2	0211	WH62D0
ARMY	O3	18A	ARABIC	2	2	0	9511	W1E02A
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	3	2+	2+	0700	WH62D0
ARMY	E5	97E	ARABIC	3	2+	2	0210	WBVDA0
ARMY	O3	12A	ARABIC	2	2	0	0305	W1ECZE
ARMY	O3	13A	ARABIC	2	2	0	9908	W1DXAB
ARMY	E6	98G	ARABIC	3	3	0	0205	WGNTAA
ARMY	E8	98Z	ARABIC	3	3	3	0204	WH8KA0
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0205	WA77B0
ARMY	E5	98G	ARABIC	3	2+	2	0108	W00112
ARMY	O5	48G	ARABIC	3	3	0	0104	W1V021
ARMY	E4	97E	ARABIC	2+	2+	0	0208	WH62D0

SSN (b)(6) Name (last,first,middle)

Serv	Grade	PMOS	Language	DLPT L	DLPT R	DLPT S	DLPT Date	UIC
ARMY	O4	00E	ARABIC	2	2	0	0006	W30U2L
ARMY	O1	35D	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0211	W1E841
ARMY	O4	00E	ARABIC	2+	3	0	0110	W30U2W
ARMY	O5	48G	ARABIC	3	3	0	0205	W0F8AA
ARMY	E3	98C	ARABIC	3	3	2	0302	W1E843
ARMY	O5	48G	ARABIC	2	3	0	9205	W4FGAA
ARMY	E6	98G	ARABIC	3	2+	2	0211	WDLLB0
ARMY	E5	98G	ARABIC	2	2	2	0212	W1E862
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	3	2+	2	0105	W1ECZF
ARMY	W1	003A	ARABIC	4+	4+	0	0010	WAYCT0
ARMY	O3	14A	ARABIC	2	3	0	0305	W1ECZE
ARMY	O4	48G	ARABIC	2	2	0	0211	W475AA
ARMY	E3	98G	ARABIC	2+	3	2	0303	W1E846
ARMY	E3	97E	ARABIC	2	2+	1+	0305	W1ECZL
ARMY	E6	98G	ARABIC	3	3	2	0303	W1ECA1
ARMY	E6	98C	ARABIC	2	2+	1+	0103	WGNTA0
ARMY	E7	98G	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0210	W1E844
ARMY	E4	98C	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0209	WGNTA0
ARMY	O4	00E	ARABIC	2	2	0	0211	W0VPS1
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	2+	2+	1+	0202	WGNTA0
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	2	2	2	0206	WH62D0
ARMY	E5	98G	ARABIC	3	3	2	0106	WGNTA0
ARMY	O2	11A	ARABIC	2	2	0	9904	WALUB0
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	2+	3	0	0304	W1ECZE
ARMY	E6	98G	ARABIC	3	3	2	0208	W1ECA1
ARMY	E5	97E	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0209	WH62D0
ARMY	W2	351B	ARABIC	3	3	0	0212	WBVHA0
ARMY	E5	97B	ARABIC	2	3	2	0112	WDKEB0
ARMY	O6	21B	ARABIC	3	3	0	8005	WNAG99
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	2	2	1	0206	WDLLB0
ARMY	E5	98C	ARABIC	2+	3	2	0304	WBVDC0
ARMY	E5	98G	ARABIC	2	2	2	0012	WH67D0
ARMY	E6	98C	ARABIC	2	2	1	0110	W1E806
ARMY	W2	351E	ARABIC	2	2	0	0112	W1E801
ARMY	E4	68Y	ARABIC	2+	2+	0	0207	WG2WA0
ARMY	E6	98C	ARABIC	2	3	2	0109	W001AA
ARMY	O4	48G	ARABIC	2	2	0	0210	W37237
ARMY	E4	13B	ARABIC	3	3	0	0108	WGLMT0

SSN (b)(6) Name (last, first, middle)

Serv	Grade	PMOS	Language	DLPT L	DLPT R	DLPTS	DLPT Date	UIC
ARMY	E5	13F	ARABIC	2+	3	0	0110	WAL3AA
ARMY	O6	12A	ARABIC	2	2	0	8005	W09ZAA
ARMY	E4	92A	ARABIC	3	3	0	0304	WAMFB0
ARMY	E6	97E	ARABIC	2+	3	2	0210	WBVDA0
ARMY	E4	82D	ARABIC	2+	3	0	0207	WFBLAA
ARMY	O6	31A	ARABIC	2	2	0	8806	W3KPAA
ARMY	E6	98G	ARABIC	3	3	2	0109	WGNTT0
ARMY	O2	35D	ARABIC	3	3	0	0202	WBU9AA
ARMY	E6	91A	ARABIC	2	2	0	0112	WHLRB0
ARMY	E5	97E	ARABIC	2+	2+	2+	0208	WH62D0
ARMY	O3	88A	ARABIC	2	2	0	0111	W1ECA1
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	2	2	2	0202	WH62D0
ARMY	W2	180A	ARABIC	2	2	0	0205	WH04A0
ARMY	E7	98G	ARABIC	2+	2	1+	0208	W00114
ARMY	E7	98G	ARABIC	3	2+	0	0303	W1EC12
ARMY	O1	35D	ARABIC	3	2+	0	0301	WH9TT0
ARMY	O3	11A	ARABIC	2	2+	0	9504	W2L58B
ARMY	O5	48G	ARABIC	3	2+	0	9508	W6AK14
ARMY	E6	98G	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0301	WDSPAA
ARMY	O4	00E	ARABIC	2	2	0	0212	W372AA
ARMY	E6	97E	ARABIC	2+	3	0	0203	W1ECZE
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0204	WDL1B0
ARMY	E5	97E	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0211	WCAEB0
ARMY	O5	49A	ARABIC	2	3	0	8104	W1E1AA
ARMY	W2	350B	ARABIC	4	2+	0	9812	WAY6AA
ARMY	O1	25A	ARABIC	2+	3	0	9610	WFGNAA
ARMY	E5	97E	ARABIC	3	3	2	0209	WH62D0
ARMY	W2	153D	ARABIC	4+	4	0	9903	WAYPA0
ARMY	E4	91X	ARABIC	3	3	2	0205	W3VZ7Q
ARMY	E5	98G	ARABIC	2	2+	1+	0112	WDAMAA
ARMY	O3	25A	ARABIC	2+	2+	0	9604	W2N3AA
ARMY	E6	18E	ARABIC	2	2+	1+	0301	WH1AC0
ARMY	O6	01A	ARABIC	2	2	0	8907	W49Q1X
ARMY	E5	97E	ARABIC	2	2	2	0011	WBVDA0
ARMY	E5	98G	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0210	WDL1B0
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	2	2+	2	0104	WGNT99
ARMY	E6	98G	ARABIC	3	2+	2+	0006	WH67TD

SSN Name (last first middle)

(b)(6)

Serv	Grade	PMOS	Language	DLPT L	DLPT R	DLPT S	DLPT Date	UIC
ARMY	E6	97E	ARABIC	3	2+	2	0209	W1ECA1
ARMY	E7	98G	ARABIC	2	2	2	0301	W1ECZ3
ARMY	W2	153D	ARABIC	4	4	0	9812	WEAEEA
ARMY	E3	98C	ARABIC	2	2	2	0304	W1ECZL
ARMY	O4	48G	ARABIC	2+	3	0	9508	W6AK03
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	2+	3	1+	0210	WH62D0
ARMY	O3	13A	ARABIC	2	2	0	0305	W1ECZE
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	2+	3	2	0007	WGNT99
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	2	2+	2	0102	WGNTA0
ARMY	E3	98G	ARABIC	3	2+	2	0303	W1E846
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	2	2+	2	0303	W1E846
ARMY	E7	98G	ARABIC	3	3	2	0303	W1E8E0
ARMY	O6	48G	ARABIC	2	2	0	8711	W1V021
ARMY	E5	98G	ARABIC	2	3	1+	0206	WDGW80
ARMY	E3	91E	ARABIC	2	2+	1+	0202	WBHBHD
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	2	2	2	0105	WGNT99
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	3	3	2	0206	WH62D0
ARMY	E8	37F	ARABIC	2+	2	2+	0303	W1E01F
ARMY	E4	97E	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0204	WBVDA0
ARMY	O4	18A	ARABIC	2	2	0	9310	W4T3AA
ARMY	E7	98G	ARABIC	3	3	2+	0303	W1ECZ1
ARMY	E5	98C	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0110	WGNT99
ARMY	O5	18A	ARABIC	2	2	0	9607	W1B6AA
ARMY	E7	98G	ARABIC	3	3	2	0012	WGNT99
ARMY	E9	00Z	ARABIC	3	3	0	9805	WBU4AA
ARMY	E5	97E	ARABIC	2+	3	2	0206	WATGAA
ARMY	O6	48G	ARABIC	3	3	0	8005	W0Z2AA
ARMY	O3	15A	ARABIC	2+	2+	0	0305	W1ECZE
ARMY	E5	98G	ARABIC	3	2+	2	0206	WDSPAA
ARMY	E7	98G	ARABIC	3	3	0	0208	W1ECA1
ARMY	E7	98G	ARABIC	2	2	0	0212	W1E8E0

SSN Name (last first middle)

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Serv	Grade	PMOS	Language	DLPT L	DLPT R	DLPTS	DLPT Date	UIC
ARMY	E4	92A	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0212	WAGKAA
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	3	3	2	0204	W1ECZL
ARMY	E9	98Z	ARABIC	2	2	0	9807	W1D0AA
ARMY	O2	35D	ARABIC	2+	2+	0	0107	W1E874
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	2+	3	1+	0211	WGNTAA
ARMY	E5	98G	ARABIC	2	3	2	0201	WH6XA1
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	2	2	2	0003	WGNT99
ARMY	E6	73C	ARABIC	3	3	0	0112	W2DH1E
ARMY	E8	12Z	ARABIC	3	3	0	0208	WAHCT0
ARMY	W2	352G	ARABIC	5	4+	0	0303	W1E8E0
ARMY	O3	14E	ARABIC	5	5	0	9909	WHQCT0
ARMY	E6	98G	ARABIC	3	2	2	9605	W00111
ARMY	E3	98G	ARABIC	2+	2	2	0302	W1E846
ARMY	O6	18A	ARABIC	3	2	0	8403	W4RAAA
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	3	3	2	0204	WA77B0
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	3	3	2+	0206	WGNTA0
ARMY	E4	73C	ARABIC	3	3	0	0011	WBGJB0
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	2	2	2	0206	WDGWB0
ARMY	E7	98C	ARABIC	2	2	1	9711	W27P26
ARMY	E7	98G	ARABIC	3	3	2	0209	W1ECA1
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	3	2+	1+	0207	WH62D0
ARMY	W4	351E	ARABIC	2+	2+	0	0204	WBU7AA
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	2	2+	2	0206	WDGWB0
ARMY	E5	98G	ARABIC	3	3	2	0105	WGNTA0
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	3	3	1+	0204	WH6XD0
ARMY	E4	31R	ARABIC	3	3	0	0206	WA4RA0
ARMY	E4	92A	ARABIC	3	3	0	0103	WD4PAA
ARMY	E6	68H	ARABIC	2+	3	0	0006	W0U911
ARMY	O4	35D	ARABIC	2	3	0	0206	W48902
ARMY	E7	98G	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0009	W1E844
ARMY	E5	98C	ARABIC	2	2+	1+	9809	W00102

SSN Name (last first middle)

Serv Grade PMOS Language DLPT L DLPTR DLPTS DLPT Date UIC

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Serv	Grade	PMOS	Language	DLPT L	DLPTR	DLPTS	DLPT Date	UIC
ARMY	E7	98G	ARABIC	2+	2	2	0203	W49QBD
ARMY	E4	97E	ARABIC	3	3	2	0207	WH62D0
ARMY	O2	11A	ARABIC	2+	2+	0	0101	W30U2P
ARMY	E3	98G	ARABIC	2	2+	1	0303	W1E846
ARMY	E5	97E	ARABIC	2	2+	1+	0211	WBVDT0
ARMY	E4	97E	ARABIC	3	3	2	0305	W1ECZL
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	3	3	2	0107	WGNTA0
ARMY	E7	98G	ARABIC	3	2+	0	0010	W1E806
ARMY	E5	98G	ARABIC	2	2	2	0012	WGNTA0
ARMY	E5	98G	ARABIC	2+	2+	1+	0202	W1ECZE
ARMY	O4	35D	ARABIC	2	2	0	0105	W4FGAA
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	2	2+	1+	0210	WH62D0
ARMY	E7	97E	ARABIC	2	2+	1+	9710	W0F809
ARMY	E5	98G	ARABIC	2	3	2	0700	WGNTA0
ARMY	E5	97E	ARABIC	2	3	1+	0204	WAY8HD
ARMY	E5	97E	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0301	WHQLAA
ARMY	O4	35D	ARABIC	3	3	0	9903	W1U31B
ARMY	E6	97E	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0208	W1E801
ARMY	E3	98G	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0305	W1ECZL
ARMY	E3	98G	ARABIC	3	3	2	0304	W1ECZL
ARMY	E5	98G	ARABIC	2	2	2+	0111	WDAMAA
ARMY	E6	98C	ARABIC	2	2+	2	0303	WBUZ99
ARMY	O4	00E	ARABIC	3	3	0	0304	W0VPS1
ARMY	O6	47G	ARABIC	2	2	0	0208	W1FBAA
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	3	3	2	0207	WH62D0
ARMY	O6	35D	ARABIC	2	3	0	0000	W6CTAA
ARMY	O4	67B	ARABIC	3	3	0	0110	W4D7AA
ARMY	E7	97E	ARABIC	3	3	3+	0208	W1ECA1
ARMY	O3	00E	ARABIC	2+	2+	0	0210	W1ECZE
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	3	3	2	0210	WH62D0
ARMY	E7	97E	ARABIC	3	2+	2	0011	W00YAA
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	2	2+	2	0104	WGNUG99

SSN Name (last first middle)

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Serv	Grade	PMOS	Language	DLPT L	DLPT R	DLPT S	DLPT Date	UIC
ARMY	E5	98G	ARABIC	2+	2	1+	0204	WH6XD0
ARMY	O5	13A	ARABIC	2	2	0	8104	W2H602
ARMY	E7	18D	ARABIC	2	2+	1	0211	WHQNB0
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	2	2	2	0210	WH62D0
ARMY	O4	48G	ARABIC	2	2	0	9707	W6AK06
ARMY	E7	97E	ARABIC	3	3	0	0206	WDSM05
ARMY	E6	98G	ARABIC	2	2	2+	0003	WC8SAA
ARMY	E6	98C	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0004	W00121
ARMY	O4	48G	ARABIC	2	2	0	0202	W6AK09
ARMY	E3	98G	ARABIC	3	3	1+	0303	W1E846
ARMY	E6	91R	ARABIC	3	3	0	0012	W3U43D
ARMY	E7	98G	ARABIC	2+	2+	0	0012	W4VN05
ARMY	E6	98G	ARABIC	2	2	2	0111	WH72D0
ARMY	E6	98C	ARABIC	2+	3	1+	9704	WH6XA1
ARMY	E6	98C	ARABIC	2+	2	1+	0112	WGNT99
ARMY	E5	97E	ARABIC	2	2+	1+	0305	W1ECZE
ARMY	E6	98G	ARABIC	2+	2+	2	0112	WGNTA0
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0212	WDGWB0
ARMY	O4	11A	ARABIC	2	2+	0	9907	W4VN10
ARMY	W3	351E	ARABIC	2	2+	0	9903	W0F8AA
ARMY	E3	98G	ARABIC	3	3	2	0305	W1E846
ARMY	O4	48G	ARABIC	2+	3	0	9807	W4FGAA
ARMY	E5	98G	ARABIC	2+	2+	2	0204	W00111
ARMY	E5	97E	ARABIC	3	3	0	0207	WBVFT0
ARMY	E6	97E	ARABIC	2+	2+	2	9812	W1ECZ4
ARMY	E7	97E	ARABIC	2	2+	1+	0206	W1E801
ARMY	E7	98G	ARABIC	2	2	2	0207	WH6XD0
ARMY	E6	98G	ARABIC	2+	2	0	0208	W1E806
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	2	2+	2	0107	WGNTA0

SSN (b)(6) Name (last, first, middle)

Serv	Grade	PMOS	Language	DLPT L	DLPT R	DLPT S	DLPT Date	UIC
ARMY	E5	92A	ARABIC	3	3	0	0204	WB30AA
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	2+	3	2	0302	W1E846
ARMY	O2	35D	ARABIC	3	3	0	0109	WG2DT0
ARMY	O7	15A	ARABIC	2	2	0	8606	W1B6AA
ARMY	E5	98C	ARABIC	2	2+	1+	0210	WH6XA1
ARMY	E5	98G	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0202	WGNTA0
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	2	2+	2	0204	WGNTA0
ARMY	E7	98G	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0105	W1E82B
ARMY	E5	97E	ARABIC	2	2+	2	0210	WBVDA0
ARMY	E7	97E	ARABIC	2	2	1	0109	W1E8E0
ARMY	E5	97B	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0301	WHQMD0
ARMY	O5	35D	ARABIC	3	3	0	0302	W1ECZ1
ARMY	E8	98Z	ARABIC	2	2+	2+	0206	WBVCT0
ARMY	O6	48G	ARABIC	2	3	0	9505	W6AK03
ARMY	O5	48G	ARABIC	4	3	0	9509	W475AA
ARMY	O3	12A	ARABIC	2	2	0	9106	W1S505
ARMY	E5	75B	ARABIC	3	3	0	0206	W2L5JA
ARMY	O6	44A	ARABIC	5	5	0	0207	WBF0AA
ARMY	O4	11A	ARABIC	2	3	0	8804	WAKLT0
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	2	2	2	0205	WGNTA0
ARMY	E7	98G	ARABIC	3	2	0	0106	W1E806
ARMY	E5	91S	ARABIC	3	3	0	0210	W2P1AA
ARMY	E5	98G	ARABIC	2	2+	2	9906	WGNT99
ARMY	E4	97E	ARABIC	3	2+	2	0305	W1ECZL
ARMY	E6	98G	ARABIC	2+	2+	2	0205	W00121
ARMY	O6	48G	ARABIC	3	3	0	9403	W1V061
ARMY	O3	35D	ARABIC	2	2	0	0210	W1ECA1
ARMY	E6	75H	ARABIC	2+	3	0	0210	WAZ3T0
ARMY	E5	92Y	ARABIC	2	3	0	0109	WCKSAA
ARMY	E5	98G	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0007	WH72D0
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	3	2+	1+	0209	W00114
ARMY	E5	97E	ARABIC	3	3	2	0205	WH8Q9C
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	2	3	1+	0201	WGNTA0
ARMY	W3	351E	ARABIC	2	2	0	0206	W1E8E0

SSN Name (last first middle)

Serv Grade PMOS Language DLPT L DLPT R DLPT S DLPT Date UIC

(b)(6)

ARMY	E7	98G	ARABIC	2+	3	3	0211	W1EC12
ARMY	E6	98G	ARABIC	3	3	2	0210	W1ECA1
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	3	2	1+	0303	W1E846
ARMY	E5	98G	ARABIC	3	3	2	0206	WDL1B0
ARMY	E3	12B	ARABIC	3	3	0	0208	WAC8C0
ARMY	E6	98G	ARABIC	2	2+	1+	0110	WGNT99
ARMY	E3	98G	ARABIC	2	2	2	0304	W1E846
ARMY	E8	18Z	ARABIC	2+	2+	2	0208	W45VAA
ARMY	E5	98G	ARABIC	2	2	2	0206	WH6XD0
ARMY	E3	98G	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0210	WH62D0
ARMY	O2	35D	ARABIC	3	3	0	0111	W30U3D
ARMY	E5	98G	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0208	WDSLAA
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	2	2+	1+	0303	W1ECZL
ARMY	E5	98G	ARABIC	2	3	2	0206	WDGW80
ARMY	O4	18A	ARABIC	2	2	0	0208	W1FBAA
ARMY	E5	98G	ARABIC	2+	2	2	0003	WGNT99
ARMY	E6	98G	ARABIC	2	2+	2	0212	WDL1B0
ARMY	E6	98G	ARABIC	2	2+	1+	0211	W00111
ARMY	W2	351E	ARABIC	2+	2	0	0201	W0F802
ARMY	E5	71L	ARABIC	3	3	0	0206	W1VCAA
ARMY	E5	98G	ARABIC	3	3	2	0204	WH6XD0
ARMY	E5	98G	ARABIC	3	3	0	0209	W1E862
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	2	3	2	0206	WGNTA0
ARMY	E5	98G	ARABIC	2	2+	1+	0011	WH6XD0
ARMY	E4	97E	ARABIC	2	2+	1+	0208	WBVAFD
ARMY	E5	98G	ARABIC	3	3	2	0304	W00112
ARMY	E4	98C	ARABIC	2+	2+	2	0202	WH6XT0
ARMY	O2	13A	ARABIC	4	3+	0	9605	WHMRB0

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SSN (b)(6) Name (last first middle)

Serv	Grade	PMOS	Language	DLPT L	DLPT R	DLPT S	DLPT Date	UIC
ARMY	E6	98G	ARABIC	2+	3	2+	0208	W00112
ARMY	E3	98G	ARABIC	2+	2+	1+	0303	W1ECZL
ARMY	O1	14A	ARABIC	4	4	0	0208	WAWYCO
ARMY	O5	11A	ARABIC	3	2	0	8504	W0ND24
ARMY	E5	98G	ARABIC	3	3	1+	0209	W1E862
ARMY	E5	98G	ARABIC	2+	2+	2	0208	WDLLB0
ARMY	E5	98G	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0003	WH72A0
ARMY	O3	11A	ARABIC	2+	2+	0	0206	W372AA
ARMY	E6	98G	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0302	WH62T0
ARMY	E4	75H	ARABIC	3	2	2	0103	WFL6A4
ARMY	E6	98G	ARABIC	3	2+	2	0105	W1E844
ARMY	E6	98G	ARABIC	2	2	2	0205	W1ECZ2
ARMY	E7	98C	ARABIC	3	3	2	0211	W00111
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	3	3	2	0302	W0VA3D
ARMY	W2	350L	ARABIC	2	2	0	9703	W1V046
ARMY	E6	97B	ARABIC	2	3	1+	9909	WC9S80
ARMY	W2	352G	ARABIC	3	3	0	0106	WBVDC0
ARMY	E5	98G	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0111	WAY8HD
ARMY	E3	98G	ARABIC	3	3	2	0303	W1E846
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	2+	2+	2	0303	WGNTA0
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0211	WH62D0
ARMY	E4	11B	ARABIC	3	3	0	0301	W1E02C
ARMY	O5	18A	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0301	W1U31B
ARMY	E5	62B	ARABIC	2+	2+	0	0212	WH09D0
ARMY	E3	98G	ARABIC	2	2	2	0303	W1ECZL
ARMY	E5	98G	ARABIC	2	2	2	0303	WBVDC0
ARMY	E5	98G	ARABIC	2	2+	2	0009	W1EC12
ARMY	E6	98G	ARABIC	2	2	2	0109	W1ECA1
ARMY	E2	77F	ARABIC	2+	2+	0	0305	WE8RA0
ARMY	E6	98G	ARABIC	2	2+	2	0111	WGNTA0
ARMY	E4	97E	ARABIC	3	3	0	0302	WH62D0

SSN (b)(6) Name (last first middle)

Serv	Grade	PMOS	Language	DLPT L	DLPT R	DLPT S	DLPT Date	UIC
ARMY	O8	13A	ARABIC	3	3	0	8511	W1VWAA
ARMY	E5	98G	ARABIC	2	2	2	0102	WGNTA0
ARMY	E6	98G	ARABIC	3	3	2	0211	W00111
[REDACTED]								
ARMY	O3	65A	ARABIC	4	4	0	8803	W2NVAA
ARMY	E5	98G	ARABIC	2	2+	2	0302	W00111
[REDACTED]								
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	2	2+	1+	0211	WH677D
[REDACTED]								
ARMY	E5	98C	ARABIC	2	2+	1+	0202	WJHDA0
[REDACTED]								
ARMY	E7	97E	ARABIC	2+	2+	1+	0011	W0F809
ARMY	W2	351E	ARABIC	5	5	0	0205	W1V041
ARMY	E3	98G	ARABIC	3	2+	1+	0305	W1E846
[REDACTED]								
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	3	3	1+	0110	WH67D0
ARMY	E5	98G	ARABIC	2	3	2	0208	WDLLB0
ARMY	E5	98C	ARABIC	2+	2+	1+	0101	WGNTA0
ARMY	O3	13A	ARABIC	2+	2	0	0305	W1ECZE
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0302	W0VA3D
ARMY	E3	98G	ARABIC	2	2+	1+	0305	W1E846
ARMY	W3	351E	ARABIC	2	2	0	0005	WH8QY5
[REDACTED]								
ARMY	E5	98G	ARABIC	2+	3	2	0206	WDLLB0
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	2	2+	2	0208	WH67T0
ARMY	E5	98G	ARABIC	2	2+	2	0211	W1ECZE
ARMY	E4	97E	ARABIC	3	3	2	0305	W1ECZL
ARMY	E3	98G	ARABIC	3	3	2	0303	W1E846
ARMY	E3	98G	ARABIC	2+	3	1+	0303	W1E846
[REDACTED]								
ARMY	E3	98C	ARABIC	3	3	2	0303	W1E843
[REDACTED]								
ARMY	E5	98G	ARABIC	2	2	1	0211	WH62D0
[REDACTED]								
ARMY	E6	98G	ARABIC	2	2	2	0202	WC1TA0
ARMY	O5	11A	ARABIC	2	2	0	9408	WAGNT0
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	3	3	2	0208	WGNTA0

SSN Name (last first middle)
(b)(6)

Serv	Grade	PMOS	Language	DLPT L	DLPT R	DLPTS	DLPT Date	UIC
ARMY	E7	98G	ARABIC	3	2+	2+	0204	WH62T0
ARMY	E8	97E	ARABIC	3	2+	1	0210	W0F802
ARMY	E2	98G	ARABIC	2+	2+	2	0204	WGNTA0
ARMY	O3	65D	ARABIC	2	4	0	9303	WE35C0
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	2	2+	2	0303	W1ECZD
ARMY	E6	98G	ARABIC	2	2	1+	1000	WGNTA0
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	2+	3	2	0109	WGNTA0
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	2	2	2	0012	WGNTA0
ARMY	E4	98C	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0208	WH6XT0
ARMY	E5	98G	ARABIC	2	2	1	0209	W1E871
ARMY	E5	98G	ARABIC	2+	3	2	0211	WAY8HD
ARMY	O4	48G	ARABIC	3	3	0	0110	W37213
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	2	2	2	0303	W1ECZE
ARMY	E5	98G	ARABIC	2+	2+	2+	0203	WH6XD0
ARMY	E6	98G	ARABIC	3	2+	2	0303	W1ECZE
ARMY	E6	98G	ARABIC	2+	2+	2	0212	W1E8E0
ARMY	E6	97E	ARABIC	2	2+	1+	0211	WBVFT0
ARMY	O3	12A	ARABIC	2	2+	0	9501	W1DXAB
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	2+	2+	1+	0202	WDHUID0
ARMY	E7	98G	ARABIC	2+	3	2+	0209	W1E844
ARMY	O5	48G	ARABIC	2	3	0	0012	W1V034
ARMY	E6	98G	ARABIC	2	2+	1+	0303	W00111
ARMY	W2	352C	ARABIC	2	2	0	0110	WGNT99
ARMY	E3	98G	ARABIC	2	3	1+	0305	W1E846
ARMY	E5	97B	ARABIC	3	2	2	0302	WH8QAA
ARMY	O4	48G	ARABIC	2	2+	0	9710	W00TAA
ARMY	O5	18A	ARABIC	3	3	0	9803	W6AK06
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	2	2	2	0211	WH67T0
ARMY	E5	71L	ARABIC	2	2	0	0012	WALXAA
ARMY	E3	98G	ARABIC	2+	3	2	0303	W1ECZL

SSN Name (last first middle)

(b)(6)

Serv	Grade	PMOS	Language	DLPT L	DLPT R	DLPT S	DLPT Date	UIC
ARMY	E6	98C	ARABIC	2	3	2	0302	WBU8A1
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	2+	2	2	0107	WGNTA0
ARMY	E6	97E	ARABIC	2	3	2	0211	W1ECZE
ARMY	E7	98G	ARABIC	3	3	2+	0202	W1E844
ARMY	E5	98G	ARABIC	2	2+	1+	0211	WGNTA0
ARMY	E5	98C	ARABIC	2	2+	1+	0105	WH67D0
ARMY	E4	75H	ARABIC	3	3	0	0204	WHP6AA
ARMY	O4	48G	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0302	W372Z3
ARMY	O4	13A	ARABIC	2	2	0	0006	W0U309
ARMY	E6	97E	ARABIC	2+	2+	1+	0205	W1E801
ARMY	O2	11A	ARABIC	3	2+	0	0304	WAM3T0
ARMY	O3	60S	ARABIC	5	5	0	0103	W2DH02
ARMY	E5	98G	ARABIC	2	2+	2	0201	W00121
ARMY	E4	98G	ARABIC	2+	3	2	0204	WDHJDO
ARMY	O3	67B	ARABIC	3	3	0	0302	W2H8AA
ARMY	E5	74B	ARABIC	3	3	0	0112	WDSTAA
ARMY	O6	13A	ARABIC	4	4	0	8406	W1V006
ARMY	E6	98G	ARABIC	3	3	0	0002	WGNTA0


11-L-0559/OSD/31731

RESERVE

Deployed in CENTCOM AO
Returned within past 6 months

11-L-0559/OSD/31733

SSN	Name (last first middle)	Serv	Grade	PMOS	Language	DLPT L	DLPT R	DLPT S	DLPT Date	UIC
		ARNG	E6	SELRES	97E	ARABIC	2+	2+	1+	9808
		ARNG	O1	SELRES	35D	ARABIC	2	2+	2	9612
		ARNG	E7	SELRES	98G	ARABIC	2	2	1+	9102
		ARNG	E7	SELRES	98G	ARABIC	2+	2+	0	0211
		ARNG	E6	SELRES	97E	ARABIC	2	2+	2	9707
		ARNG	E5	SELRES	98G	ARABIC	2	2	2	9406
		ARNG	E7	SELRES	97E	ARABIC	2+	2+	1+	0008
		ARNG	E4	SELRES	98G	ARABIC	2	2	2	9512
		ARNG	E6	SELRES	98G	ARABIC	3	2+	0	0202
		USAR	O3	SELRES	13A	ARABIC	3	3	0	9609
		USAR	E4	IRR/ING	82C	ARABIC	2	2	0	0010
		USAR	E4	IRR/ING	92Y	ARABIC	2+	2	0	0005
		USAR	E5	SELRES	71L	ARABIC	5	4+	4+	0112
		USAR	E5	SELRES	38A	ARABIC	3	3	0	0109
		USAR	E4	IRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	3	3	2	0011
		USAR	E5	SELRES	97L	ARABIC	3+	3+	3+	0002
		USAR	E1	IRR/ING	31U	ARABIC	2	2+	0	9712
		USAR	E5	SELRES	62J	ARABIC	3	3	0	0303
		USAR	O4	IRR/ING	88A	ARABIC	4	4	0	9305
		USAR	E4	IRR/ING	98X	ARABIC	2	2+	1+	9803
		USAR	E5	IRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	2	2	1+	9903
		USAR	E4	IRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	2	2	1	9807
		USAR	E5	SELRES	98G	ARABIC	3	3	2	0209
		USAR	O5	SELRES	56A	ARABIC	2	2	0	0000
		USAR	E4	IRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	2	2+	2	9808
		USAR	O1	SELRES	ZZZ	ARABIC	3	3	2+	0207
		USAR	O3	IRR/ING	35D	ARABIC	2+	2+	2	9201
		USAR	E5	IRR/ING	97E	ARABIC	3	2+	2	9808
		USAR	E4	IRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	2	2	1+	9903
		USAR	E3	SELRES	97E	ARABIC	2+	3	2	0208
		USAR	E4	IRR/ING	97E	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0012
		USAR	E4	IRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	2	2+	1+	0000
		USAR	E4	STAND-BY	98G	ARABIC	2+	2+	1+	0006



SSN Name (last first middle)

(b)(6)

Serv	Grade	PMOS	Language	DLPT L	DLPT R	DLPT S	DLPT Date	JIC
USAR	E5	IRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	2	2	1+	9803
USAR	O5	SELRES	38A	ARABIC	3	2+	0	9703
USAR	E5	IRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	3	2	1+	0103
USAR	E4	IRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	2+	2+	1+	0009
USAR	O3	IRR/ING	35D	ARABIC	3	3	2	9504
USAR	E4	IRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	3	3	2	9802
USAR	E4	IRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	3	3	2	0111
USAR	E4	SELRES	62E	ARABIC	2	2	1+	9110
USAR	E4	IRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	2	2+	1+	0201
USAR	O5	SELRES	38A	ARABIC	2	3	0	0202
USAR	O1	SELRES	00D	ARABIC	3	2	1+	9703
USAR	O2	IRR/ING	21B	ARABIC	2	2+	0	9901
USAR	E5	IRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	3	3	2	9802
USAR	O3	SELRES	35D	ARABIC	3	3	0	9609
USAR	O3	IRR/ING	18A	ARABIC	2	2	0	9111
USAR	E5	IRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	2	3	2	0006
USAR	E4	IRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	2	2	2	9402
USAR	E5	IRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	2	2+	2	0108
USAR	E4	IRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	2	2	2	9802
USAR	O4	IRR/ING	11A	ARABIC	2	2+	2+	9310
USAR	E4	SELRES	37F	ARABIC	2+	2+	2	9711
USAR	O2	IRR/ING	35D	ARABIC	3	3	0	9706
USAR	E4	IRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	2	2	1+	9903
USAR	O5	SELRES	88D	ARABIC	4+	4+	0	9507
USAR	O3	IRR/ING	25A	ARABIC	2	3	0	9704
USAR	E4	IRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	2	2	2	0009
USAR	E4	SELRES	98G	ARABIC	3	2+	2	0102
USAR	E1	IRR/ING	98X	ARABIC	2+	2+	0	9908
USAR	E4	SELRES	97E	ARABIC	3	2+	2	0107
USAR	E1	IRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	2	2	2	9802
USAR	E4	SELRES	97B	ARABIC	2	2	2	9903
USAR	E4	IRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0003
USAR	E4	IRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	2+	2+	2	0205
USAR	E4	IRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	2	2	1+	9805
USAR	E5	SELRES	98G	ARABIC	2+	2+	2	0108
USAR	O5	SELRES	38A	ARABIC	3	3	0	9901

SSN (b)(6) Name (last first middle)

Serv	Grade	PMOS	Language	DLPT L	DLPT R	DLPT S	DLPT Date	UIC
USAR	E5	STAND-BY	98C	ARABIC	2+	2+	1+	9907
USAR	E5	IRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	2+	2+	2+	9802
USAR	E4	IRR/ING	98X	ARABIC	2	2+	1+	9907
USAR	E4	IRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	2	2+	1	9808
USAR	E6	SELRES	98G	ARABIC	3	3	0	0106
[REDACTED]								
USAR	O1	IRR/ING	35D	ARABIC	2	2+	1	9910
USAR	E6	SELRES	98G	ARABIC	2	2	0	9712
USAR	E4	IRR/ING	98C	ARABIC	2	2	1+	9810
USAR	E5	IRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	2+	2	2	0012
USAR	E6	SELRES	97L	ARABIC	2+	2	1+	0302
USAR	E5	IRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0104
USAR	E5	IRR/ING	98C	ARABIC	2	2	0	0212
USAR	O5	SELRES	13A	ARABIC	2	3	0	9603
[REDACTED]								
USAR	E5	IRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	3	2+	1+	9802
USAR	E5	SELRES	97L	ARABIC	3	3	2+	0211
USAR	E5	IRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0104
[REDACTED]								
USAR	E5	IRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	2	2	0	0303
USAR	O4	SELRES	38A	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0209
[REDACTED]								
USAR	E5	IRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	2	2	0	0303
USAR	E5	IRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0101
USAR	E4	SELRES	38A	ARABIC	2	2+	2	0211
[REDACTED]								
USAR	E4	SELRES	62H	ARABIC	3	2+	2	0205
USAR	E5	IRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	2	2	1	9803
USAR	E6	SELRES	97E	ARABIC	2	2	2	9411
USAR	E4	SELRES	91W	ARABIC	3	3	0	0107
[REDACTED]								
USAR	E5	IRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	2	2+	2+	0006
USAR	E7	SELRES	98G	ARABIC	3	3	2+	9605
USAR	E4	SELRES	97E	ARABIC	2	2	2	9808
USAR	E4	IRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	2	2	1	9906
USAR	W2	SELRES	352C	ARABIC	2+	3	0	0212
USAR	E4	SELRES	37F	ARABIC	2+	2+	2	0302
[REDACTED]								
USAR	E5	IRR/ING	31C	ARABIC	2	3	1+	9707
[REDACTED]								
USAR	O2	SELRES	00D	ARABIC	2	2	0	0108
USAR	O2	IRR/ING	13A	ARABIC	2	2+	2	9305

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SSN (b)(6) Name (last, first, middle)

Serv	Grade	PMOS	Language	DLPT L	DLPT R	DLPT S	DLPT Date	UIC
USAR	E6	SELRES	96B	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0211
USAR	E5	IRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	2	2	0	0303
USAR	E4	SELRES	37F	ARABIC	2	2	2	0111
USAR	E5	IRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	3	3	2	0009
USAR	O3	SELRES	35D	ARABIC	3	3	2+	9904
USAR	E5	SELRES	97B	ARABIC	2	2	1	9805
USAR	E5	IRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	2	2	1+	9802
USAR	E5	IRR/ING	97E	ARABIC	3	3	2	0003
USAR	E6	IRR/ING	11B	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0101
USAR	E5	IRR/ING	97E	ARABIC	3	3	2	0106
USAR	E6	SELRES	98G	ARABIC	2	2+	2	0112
USAR	E5	IRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0303
USAR	O4	SELRES	72B	ARABIC	5	5	0	9407
USAR	E4	IRR/ING	73C	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0004
USAR	O4	IRR/ING	35G	ARABIC	2	3	2	9510
USAR	O4	IRR/ING	13A	ARABIC	2	3	0	9602
USAR	E5	IRR/ING	97E	ARABIC	3	3	0	0106
USAR	E5	IRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	2	2+	2	9803
USAR	E4	IRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	2	2	1+	9807
USAR	E4	IRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	2	2	1+	9805
USAR	E5	IRR/ING	97E	ARABIC	2	2	1	9807
USAR	E7	SELRES	98C	ARABIC	3	2+	2	9105
USAR	O3	IRR/ING	63A	ARABIC	3	3	0	9904
USAR	E6	IRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	2	2+	2+	0107
USAR	E5	SELRES	98G	ARABIC	2+	3	3	0102
USAR	E5	SELRES	98G	ARABIC	2	2+	2	0008
USAR	E5	SELRES	97E	ARABIC	2	2	2	0106
USAR	E4	IRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	2	2+	1	0012
USAR	E4	IRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	2+	2+	2	0007
USAR	O3	SELRES	13A	ARABIC	2+	3	2	0305

SSN Name (last first middle)

Serv Grade PMOS

Language

DLPT L DLPT R DLPT S DLPT Date UIC

USAR	E4	SELRES	98G	ARABIC	2	3	1+	0206
USAR	O2	IRR/ING	13A	ARABIC	3+	2	0	9712
USAR	O3	SELRES	38A	ARABIC	2	2	2	0207
USAR	E3	SELRES	09R	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0108
USAR	E5	IRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	3	2+	2	9908
USAR	E5	IRR/ING	97E	ARABIC	3	3	2	0105
USAR	E4	IRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	2	2	2	9812
USAR	E4	IRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	3	2+	2	9903
USAR	E5	IRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	2	2+	2	0103
USAR	E5	STAND-BY	98G	ARABIC	3	3	2+	9805
USAR	E3	SELRES	97E	ARABIC	3	3	1+	0305
USAR	E4	IRR/ING	88M	ARABIC	3	2+	0	9604
USAR	E5	IRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0111
USAR	E4	IRR/ING	54B	ARABIC	2+	2+	0	0006
USAR	O3	IRR/ING	35D	ARABIC	2	2	1	9811
USAR	E4	STAND-BY	98G	ARABIC	2	2	1	9710
USAR	E5	SELRES	44B	ARABIC	3	2	0	8107
USAR	E4	IRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	2+	2	2	9803
USAR	O3	IRR/ING	35D	ARABIC	3	3	0	9606
USAR	W2	SELRES	881A	ARABIC	3	3	0	9511
USAR	E5	IRR/ING	91K	ARABIC	2	2	2	0009
USAR	E1	IRR/ING	97E	ARABIC	3	3	1+	0003
USAR	O3	SELRES	35D	ARABIC	2	2	0	9503
USAR	E5	STAND-BY	98G	ARABIC	2	3	2	9810
USAR	E4	IRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0303
USAR	E5	SELRES	98G	ARABIC	2+	2	1+	9909
USAR	E6	SELRES	97E	ARABIC	2	2	1+	9807
USAR	E4	IRR/ING	97E	ARABIC	2	2+	1+	0105
USAR	E4	IRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0203
USAR	E5	IRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	2+	2+	2	9805
USAR	E4	SELRES	38A	ARABIC	2	2	4	9910
USAR	E6	SELRES	98G	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0205
USAR	E4	IRR/ING	97E	ARABIC	2	2+	1+	9807
USAR	E4	IRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	2	2	1+	9806
USAR	E5	IRR/ING	98C	ARABIC	3	2+	2	9207
USAR	E4	IRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	2	2+	1	0109
USAR	E4	IRR/ING	12B	ARABIC	2+	2+	0	0108

(b)(6)

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SSN (b)(6) Name (last, first, middle)

Serv	Grade	PMOS	Language	DLPT L	DLPTR	DLPTS	DLPT Date	UIC
USAR	O1	SELRES	35D	ARABIC	3	3	2+	0209
USAR	O3	SELRES	38A	ARABIC	2	2+	2	0305
USAR	E5	IRRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	2	2+	1+	0010
USAR	E6	SELRES	98C	ARABIC	2+	2+	0	0108
USAR	E5	IRRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	2	2	0	0303
USAR	O4	SELRES	67C	ARABIC	2	4	0	9204
USAR	O5	SELRES	55A	ARABIC	2+	2	2+	9507
USAR	E5	IRRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	2+	2	2	0012
USAR	E4	IRRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	3	3	2	0212
USAR	E4	IRRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	2	2+	2	0105
USAR	E4	IRRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	3	3	2	0112
USAR	E5	IRRR/ING	97E	ARABIC	2	2+	2	0112
USAR	E6	SELRES	79V	ARABIC	2	3	0	9305
USAR	E4	IRRR/ING	11B	ARABIC	3	3	2	0105
USAR	E1	IRRR/ING	97E	ARABIC	2+	3	2	9908
USAR	E4	IRRR/ING	98X	ARABIC	2+	3	2	9902
USAR	E6	SELRES	38A	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0103
USAR	E5	IRRR/ING	97E	ARABIC	3	3	0	0105
USAR	E6	SELRES	97L	ARABIC	3	3	0	0110
USAR	E5	IRRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	3	3	2+	9602
USAR	E4	IRRR/ING	97B	ARABIC	2	2	1+	9807
USAR	E6	SELRES	97E	ARABIC	3	3	2	0301
USAR	E4	IRRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	3	3	2	0206
USAR	E6	SELRES	79R	ARABIC	2	2	1+	9710
USAR	E4	SELRES	98X	ARABIC	2	2+	2	0005
USAR	E4	IRRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	2+	3	2	9907
USAR	E4	IRRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0201
USAR	O4	IRRR/ING	12A	ARABIC	2	2	0	9606
USAR	E5	IRRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	3	3	1+	0108
USAR	E5	IRRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	2	2	1	9908
USAR	O1	IRRR/ING	ZZZ	ARABIC	2	2+	2	9907
USAR	E5	SELRES	38A	ARABIC	2+	2+	1+	0012
USAR	W2	SELRES	352G	ARABIC	3	3	2	0205
USAR	E4	IRRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	2+	2	0	9903

USAR	E5	IRR/ING	92A	ARABIC	3	3	0	0008
USAR	E4	IRR/ING	92Y	ARABIC	2	2	0	0006
USAR	E4	IRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	2	2	1+	9811
USAR	E4	IRR/ING	98X	ARABIC	3	3	2+	9805
USAR	E4	SELRES	97L	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0205
USAR	E4	IRR/ING	97E	ARABIC	2	3	1+	9803
USAR	O3	IRR/ING	18A	ARABIC	2+	2+	0	9911
USAR	O1	SELRES	00D	ARABIC	3	3	2	0210
USAR	E4	STAND-BY	98G	ARABIC	2+	2+	2+	9805
USAR	E6	SELRES	97L	ARABIC	3	3	0	0302
USAR	E4	IRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	3	3	1+	0009
USAR	E4	IRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	2	2	1+	9805
USAR	E4	SELRES	37F	ARABIC	2	3	1+	0305
USAR	E4	IRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	2	2+	1+	9812
USAR	E4	IRR/ING	97E	ARABIC	2+	2+	2	9607
USAR	E4	SELRES	38A	ARABIC	2+	2+	2	0211
USAR	E4	IRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	3	3	2	0010
USAR	E5	SELRES	98G	ARABIC	3	3	2	0211
USAR	E4	IRR/ING	98X	ARABIC	3	3	2	9705
USAR	E4	IRR/ING	98C	ARABIC	2	2	1	9806
USAR	E4	IRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	2	2	1+	9807
USAR	E3	IRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	2	2	2	9806
USAR	E5	IRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	2+	2+	2	0104
USAR	E8	SELRES	96B	ARABIC	2	2	2	0005
USAR	E5	IRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	2	2+	1+	0009
USAR	E6	IRR/ING	97E	ARABIC	2	2	2	9904
USAR	E5	IRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	2	2+	2	0010
USAR	E4	IRR/ING	71L	ARABIC	3	3	0	0104
USAR	E4	IRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0102
USAR	E5	SELRES	98X	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0002
USAR	E4	IRR/ING	98C	ARABIC	2	2	2	9711
USAR	E4	SELRES	98G	ARABIC	2+	2+	1+	0211
USAR	E4	IRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	2	2	1+	9708

(b)(6)

SSN (b)(6)

Serv	Grade	PMOS	Language	DLPT L	DLPT R	DLPT S	DLPT Date	UIC
USAR	E4	IRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	2+	2+	2	0103
USAR	E5	IRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	2	2	1+	9809
USAR	E6	SELRES	97L	ARABIC	2+	2	1+	9907
USAR	E4	STAND-BY	98G	ARABIC	2	2+	2	0109
USAR	E5	IRR/ING	97E	ARABIC	3	3	2	0011
USAR	E4	IRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	2	2	2	0110
USAR	E4	IRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0010
USAR	E4	STAND-BY	98G	ARABIC	2	2	1+	9812
USAR	E5	IRR/ING	11B	ARABIC	2	2	0	9406
USAR	E5	IRR/ING	97E	ARABIC	3	2+	2	0012
USAR	E3	IRR/ING	97E	ARABIC	3	2+	2	9810
USAR	E4	IRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	3	2+	1+	9902
USAR	E4	IRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	2+	2+	2	9706
USAR	E5	IRR/ING	97E	ARABIC	3	3	2	9903
USAR	E5	STAND-BY	98G	ARABIC	2+	2+	0	0303
USAR	E4	IRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	2	2	2	0003
USAR	E4	IRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	2	2	1	0103
USAR	E4	SELRES	97E	ARABIC	2+	3	1+	9809
USAR	E7	SELRES	27D	ARABIC	2	2	1+	9404
USAR	E4	IRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	2	2	2	9810
USAR	E4	IRR/ING	98G	ARABIC	2	3	2	9805
USAR	E5	IRR/ING	97E	ARABIC	3	3	0	9812
USAR	O3	SELRES	ZZZ	ARABIC	3	3	0	0202

RETIRED

Deployed in CENTCOM AO
Returned within past 6 months

SSN	Serv	Grade	PMOS	Last name	First name	Middle name	Language	DLPT L	DLPT R	DLPT S	Retirement date
(b)(6)							ARABIC	2+	3	0	20010501
							ARABIC	2	2+	0	20020901
							ARABIC	2	2+	0	20010901
							ARABIC	2+	2	1+	20010901
							ARABIC	2	2	0	20010601
							ARABIC	2	2	2	20021001
							ARABIC	3	3	0	20021001
							ARABIC	2	3	0	20021210
							ARABIC	2	2	0	20010701
							ARABIC	2	2+	0	20020101
							ARABIC	2+	2	1+	20020701
							ARABIC	2	2	1+	20011031
							ARABIC	2	2	1+	20010301
							ARABIC	2	2+	0	20010331
							ARABIC	3	3	0	20010701
							ARABIC	2+	2	0	20010801
							ARABIC	3	2+	0	20010601
							ARABIC	3	2+	1+	20011001
							ARABIC	2	2+	2+	20030101
							ARABIC	2+	2+	0	20020601
							ARABIC	2	2	0	20020401
							ARABIC	3	3	0	20011101
							ARABIC	2	2+	0	20021001
							ARABIC	3	3	2	20010601
							ARABIC	2	2+	2	20030124

TAB

D

ACTIVE

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USAF

Deployed in CENTCOM AO
Returned within past 6 months

SSM Name (last, first, middle)

(b)(6)

Serv	Grade	PMOS	Language	DLPT L	DLPT R	DLPTS	DLPT Date	UIC
USAF	O3	14N3	ARABIC	3	3	0	0210	FFDCT
USAF	E6	T1N375A	ARABIC	2+	3	1+	0206	FF3N2
USAF	E5	2T354	ARABIC	3	3	0	0110	FFDZV
USAF	E4	2T352B	ARABIC	3	2+	0	0209	FFCVD
USAF	O4	44M3	ARABIC	3	3	0	0110	FFNJG
USAF	E6	2R071	ARABIC	3	3	0	0208	FFPHB
USAF	E6	1N375A	ARABIC	3	3	0	0301	FF9TZ
USAF	E5	1N335A	ARABIC	3	3	0	0008	FFNK6
USAF	E5	1A851E	ARABIC	3	3	0	0210	FF2TC
USAF	E4	1N335A	ARABIC	2	2+	2	0211	FFNK6
USAF	E4	2S051	ARABIC	2+	2+	0	0110	FFCS6
USAF	E5	4Y051	ARABIC	3	3	0	0207	FFNJ6
USAF	O2	62E3E	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0212	FF4DS
USAF	E7	2T271	ARABIC	3	3	0	0112	FFJP5
USAF	O2	36P1	ARABIC	3	3	3	0212	FFRM7
USAF	O1	ZZZZZZ	ARABIC	3	2	0	0201	FFGGP
USAF	O2	33S3	ARABIC	3	3	0	0210	FFJ0J
USAF	E5	1N355A	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0208	FFB45
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	2+	2	0	0212	FFH50
USAF	E5	K1A871E	ARABIC	2+	2+	0	0110	FFX1H
USAF	O5	C14N3	ARABIC	2	2+	0	9110	FFFF9
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	2+	2+	0	0210	FFNK6
USAF	O4	43P3	ARABIC	3	3	0	0212	FFB8W
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	2+	3	0	0212	FFH50
USAF	O2	14N1	ARABIC	3	3	0	0210	FF42X
USAF	E6	T1N375A	ARABIC	2	2	0	0209	FF1KR
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	3	3	0	0208	FFH50
USAF	E3	1N335A	ARABIC	2+	2	0	0302	FFB45
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	2	3	0	0212	FFR7T
USAF	E4	1N355A	ARABIC	2	2	2	0211	FFNK6
USAF	E4	1N355A	ARABIC	2	2	0	0208	FFNK6
USAF	E7	8D000	ARABIC	3	3	0	0112	FFB49
USAF	E5	1N355A	ARABIC	2	2	0	0212	FFNK6
USAF	E5	3C051	ARABIC	3	2+	0	0301	FFFQJ
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	2	2	0	0009	FFB45
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	3	3	0	0210	FF3N2

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SSN (b)(6)

Serv	Grade	PMOS	Language	DLPT L	DLPT R	DLPT S	DLPT Date	UIC
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0211	FFNK6
USAF	E7	Q1A871E	ARABIC	2+	2	0	0301	FFK3V
USAF	E4	1N355A	ARABIC	3	3	0	0207	FFNK6
USAF	O1	14N1	ARABIC	3	3	0	0212	FFFFK
USAF	O5	T44D3	ARABIC	3	3	0	0212	FFM8W
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	2	2	0	0107	FLL28
USAF	E5	T1N375A	ARABIC	3	3	2	0206	FFNK6
USAF	E3	1N335A	ARABIC	2+	2	1+	0208	FFH50
USAF	E4	1N355D	ARABIC	2+	3	0	0208	FFNK6
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0207	FFNK6
USAF	E6	1A871E	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0209	FFHGC
USAF	E4	1N355A	ARABIC	2	2	0	0302	FFH50
USAF	O4	14N4	ARABIC	2	2	0	0005	FFNP1
USAF	E3	1N335A	ARABIC	2	3	2	0209	FFNK6
USAF	E4	1N335A	ARABIC	2+	2	0	0206	FFH50
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	3	3	0	0211	FFNK6
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	2	2	0	0211	FFNK6
USAF	E7	1N375A	ARABIC	2	2	0	0211	FFNK6
<hr/>								
USAF	E4	1N335A	ARABIC	2+	2+	0	0204	FFNK6
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	2+	2+	0	0207	FFFGX
USAF	E4	1N335A	ARABIC	3	2+	2	0205	FFNK6
USAF	E5	1N355A	ARABIC	2	2	0	0210	FFNK6
USAF	E4	1N335A	ARABIC	2	2	0	0204	FFNK6
USAF	E5	1N355A	ARABIC	2+	3	0	0208	FFH50
USAF	E5	1A851E	ARABIC	2	2	0	0210	FFX1H
<hr/>								
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	2	2	0	0208	FFNK6
USAF	E4	1N335A	ARABIC	2+	2+	2	0209	FFNK6
USAF	E4	1N335A	ARABIC	2	2	0	0209	FFH50
USAF	E6	1N373L	ARABIC	2	2	0	0208	FF3N2
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	2+	3	0	0209	FFNK6
USAF	E3	1N335A	ARABIC	2	2	0	0208	FFNK6
<hr/>								
USAF	O4	C14N3	ARABIC	2+	3	0	0211	FF4FW
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	3	3	0	0212	FFNK6
USAF	E6	1N375A	ARABIC	3	3	0	0210	FFNK6
<hr/>								
USAF	E4	1A831E	ARABIC	3	3	0	0205	FFX1F
USAF	E3	1N335A	ARABIC	2	2+	1+	0208	FFNK6
USAF	O1	ZZZZZZ	ARABIC	3	3	0	0302	FFHK3
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	2+	3	0	0210	FFNK6
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	2	2	0	0208	FFFJJ
USAF	E5	1N355A	ARABIC	3	3	2	0106	FFX1H
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	3	2+	0	0212	FFNK6

SSN (b)(6) Name (last, first, middle)

Serv	Grade	PMOS	Language	DLPT L	DLPT R	DLPT S	DLPT Date	UIC
USAF	E4	1N335A	ARABIC	3	2+	0	0111	FFNK6
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	2	3	0	0211	FFH50
USAF	E7	1N375A	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0212	FFNK6
USAF	E4	1N335A	ARABIC	2	2+	2	0204	FFNK6
USAF	E7	1N375A	ARABIC	2+	3	0	0212	FFNK6
USAF	E5	1A811E	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0108	FFFJJ
USAF	E5	1N355A	ARABIC	2	3	0	0210	FFNK6
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	3	3	0	0209	FFH50
USAF	E6	1N375A	ARABIC	3	2+	0	0208	FF88G
USAF	E5	1A871E	ARABIC	3	3	0	0207	FFHGC
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	3	2	0	0212	FFLLB
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0212	FFNK6
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0207	FF13K
USAF	E7	1N375A	ARABIC	2	2	0	9912	FFB69
USAF	O1	14N3	ARABIC	2	2	0	0211	FF6VD
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	2	2	0	0205	FFB45
USAF	O3	14N3	ARABIC	2+	2	0	0110	FF8HW
USAF	E5	1N355A	ARABIC	3	3	0	0209	FF13K
USAF	E3	1A831E	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0212	FFB45
USAF	O2	14N1	ARABIC	3	3	0	0211	FFHZP
USAF	E4	1N335A	ARABIC	2	2	0	0304	FFNK6
USAF	E4	1A831E	ARABIC	2	2	0	0211	FFB45
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0203	FFNK6
USAF	E5	Q1A871E	ARABIC	2	2	0	0211	FFX1H
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	2	2	0	0202	FFH50
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	2+	2+	0	0112	FFLLB
USAF	O2	14N1	ARABIC	2	2	0	0007	FFKLJ
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	3	2+	0	0203	FFNK6
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	2+	2	0	0109	FFFJJ
USAF	O3	33S3	ARABIC	2+	3	2	0211	FF5V1
USAF	O1	43E3A	ARABIC	3	3	0	0209	FFNGL
USAF	E4	3P051	ARABIC	2+	2	0	0001	FFBHG
USAF	E1	1N335A	ARABIC	3	2+	0	0008	FFFGX
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	2+	2	0	0012	FF13K
USAF	O4	16F3F	ARABIC	2	2	0	0208	FFLN7
USAF	O5	M44D3	ARABIC	3	3	0	0208	FFF6V
USAF	E6	2T370	ARABIC	2	2	0	0110	FFNJV
USAF	E4	1N335A	ARABIC	2+	3	2	0207	FFNK6
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0212	FFNK6
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	2	2	0	0210	FFNK6

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SSN (b)(6) Name (last first middle)

Serv	Grade	PMOS	Language	DLPT L	DLPT R	DLPT S	DLPT Date	UIC
USAF	O1	ZZZZZZZ	ARABIC	3	3	0	0212	FF5V1
USAF	E5	1N375P	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0209	FF3N2
USAF	E3	1A831E	ARABIC	2+	2+	2	0210	FFX1F
USAF	E7	1A871E	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0209	FFHGC
USAF	E5	1A871E	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0209	FFK3V
USAF	O3	41A4	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0210	FFC7R
USAF	E4	1A811E	ARABIC	2+	2	0	0112	FFFJJ
USAF	E4	1N355A	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0208	FFNK6
USAF	E5	1A871E	ARABIC	2	2	0	0209	FFX1F
USAF	E6	1N375A	ARABIC	2	3	0	0207	FFR7T
USAF	O1	ZZZZZZZ	ARABIC	3	3	0	0211	FFQGB
USAF	E5	1N355A	ARABIC	2	2	0	0112	FFPQH
USAF	E5	7S071	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0212	FFKD5
USAF	E5	1A871E	ARABIC	2	2	0	0208	FFX1F
USAF	E4	1N355D	ARABIC	2	3	0	0208	FFNK6
USAF	E4	1N335A	ARABIC	2	2	0	0202	FFNK6
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	2	2	0	0212	FFNK6
USAF	E6	3M071	ARABIC	2+	3	0	0210	FFRXK
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	2+	2	0	0112	FFNK6
USAF	E5	1N355A	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0303	FFH50
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	2	2	0	0107	FFFJJ
USAF	E4	1N335A	ARABIC	2	2	0	0208	FFNK6
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	3	3	0	6001	FFFJJ
USAF	E6	1A871E	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0207	FFK3V
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	2+	2+	2	0109	FFRM7
USAF	E4	1N335A	ARABIC	2+	2+	1+	0110	FFNK6
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	2	2	0	0205	FFNK6
USAF	E4	1N335A	ARABIC	2	2	0	0207	FFNK6
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0212	FFH50
USAF	E4	1N355A	ARABIC	2+	2+	0	0207	FFNK6
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	3	3	0	0212	FFRM7
USAF	O4	45S3A	ARABIC	3	3	0	0304	FFR56
USAF	E7	1N375A	ARABIC	3	3	0	0301	FFH50
USAF	E7	3M071	ARABIC	3	3	0	0208	FFBSD
USAF	E5	1A871E	ARABIC	2	3	0	0209	FFX1F
USAF	E5	K1A871E	ARABIC	2	2	0	0303	FFX1H
USAF	E6	1A871E	ARABIC	2+	2	0	0203	FF88G
USAF	E6	1N375A	ARABIC	3	2+	0	0212	FFB45
USAF	O3	62E3A	ARABIC	3	3	0	0212	FFB73
USAF	E5	1N355A	ARABIC	2	2	0	0205	FFFJJ

SSN Name (last first middle)

Serv Grade PMOS Language DLPT L DLPT R DLPT S DLPT Date UIC

(b)(6)

USAF	E5	1A831E	ARABIC	2+	2+	1+	0206	FFX1H
USAF	O2	T14N3	ARABIC	2	2	0	0112	FF8M6
USAF	E7	1A871E	ARABIC	2+	2+	0	0211	FFK3V
USAF	E3	1N335A	ARABIC	2	2	2	0212	FFNK6
USAF	E5	1N355A	ARABIC	2	2	0	0304	FFH50
USAF	E3	1N335A	ARABIC	3	3	2	0207	FFNK6
USAF	E3	1N335A	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0207	FFNK6
USAF	E4	1N355A	ARABIC	2+	2+	0	0202	FFNK6
USAF	E5	1A871E	ARABIC	2+	3	0	9904	FFX1F
USAF	E3	3C031	ARABIC	2+	2+	0	0204	FFKG7
USAF	E6	1N375A	ARABIC	2	2	0	0205	FFFJJ
USAF	E7	1A871E	ARABIC	3	3	0	0304	FF88G
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0303	FFH50
USAF	O3	T14N3	ARABIC	3	3	0	0208	FFPP5
USAF	E6	3E571	ARABIC	3	2+	0	0207	FFNSJ
USAF	E3	2S051	ARABIC	2+	3	0	0201	FFP35
USAF	E6	1N375A	ARABIC	3	3	0	0212	FF88G
USAF	E4	1N335A	ARABIC	2+	2+	0	0202	FFNK6
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	2	2	0	0206	FFH50
USAF	E4	1N335A	ARABIC	2	2	1	0205	FFNK6
USAF	E5	1N355A	ARABIC	2	2	0	0209	FFNK6
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	3	3	0	0211	FFH50
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	2	2	0	0303	FFFJJ
USAF	E4	1N335A	ARABIC	2	2	0	0208	FFNK6
USAF	E4	1N335A	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0303	FFH50
USAF	E4	1N335A	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0211	FFH50
USAF	E4	2A353A	ARABIC	3	2	0	0212	FFG5V
USAF	E4	2S051	ARABIC	2	3	0	0304	FFDYK
USAF	E4	1N335A	ARABIC	2	2+	1	0211	FFNK6
USAF	E5	2R031	ARABIC	2	2	0	0011	FFG0G
USAF	O1	ZZZZZZ	ARABIC	2	2	0	0011	FFF7H
USAF	E4	1A831E	ARABIC	3	2+	2	0209	FFB45
USAF	E4	1N355A	ARABIC	2+	2+	0	0207	FFNK6
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	2+	3	0	0207	FFNK6
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	2	2	0	0204	FFR1C
USAF	E6	T1N375A	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0210	FF88G

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SSN (b)(6) Name (last,first,middle)

Serv	Grade	PMOS	Language	DLPT L	DLPT R	DLPT S	DLPT Date	UIC
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	2+	2+	0	0209	FFNK6
USAF	O3	41A4	ARABIC	2	2	0	0108	FFHC3
USAF	E4	1N355A	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0201	FFNK6
USAF	E5	1N375H	ARABIC	2	2	0	0212	FFL31
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	2+	2+	0	0302	FFNK6
USAF	E3	1N335A	ARABIC	3	3	0	0207	FFNK6
USAF	E5	3M051	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0208	FFZL3
USAF	E5	1A871E	ARABIC	2	2	0	0209	FFHGC
USAF	E5	1A871E	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0211	FFX1F
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	3	3	0	0206	FFNK6
USAF	E6	1N375A	ARABIC	2+	2+	0	0210	FF88G
USAF	E4	1N355A	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0204	FFNK6
USAF	E5	1A871E	ARABIC	2+	2	0	0303	FFH0H
USAF	E6	T1N375A	ARABIC	2	2	0	0209	FF88G
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	3	2+	0	0112	FFFJJ
USAF	E4	1N355A	ARABIC	2+	2+	0	0209	FFNK6
USAF	E6	1N375A	ARABIC	3	3	0	0211	FFNK6
USAF	E3	1N335A	ARABIC	2+	2+	1+	0207	FFNK6
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0212	FFNK6
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	3	2+	0	0208	FFX1F
USAF	E3	1N335A	ARABIC	2	2	0	0208	FFNK6
USAF	E3	1N335A	ARABIC	2	2	0	0209	FFNK6
USAF	E5	1N355A	ARABIC	2	2	0	0208	FFH50
USAF	E4	1N355A	ARABIC	2+	2+	0	0011	FFH50
USAF	E5	1N355A	ARABIC	3	3	0	0209	FFNK6
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0205	FFNK6
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	3	2+	0	0204	FFNK6
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0209	FF13K
USAF	E8	1A891	ARABIC	3	3	0	0210	FFK3V
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	2	3	0	0303	FFH50
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	2	2	0	0303	FFH50
USAF	O1	ZZZZZZ	ARABIC	2	2	0	0106	FFBJL
USAF	E7	1N375A	ARABIC	3	3	0	0105	FFNK6
USAF	E6	1N375A	ARABIC	2	2	0	0205	FFC00
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	2	2	0	0210	FFFJJ
USAF	E4	1N335A	ARABIC	2	2	0	0209	FFH50
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	2	2	0	0302	FFH50
USAF	E4	1N335A	ARABIC	2	2+	1+	0205	FF3N2
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	2	2	0	0209	FFZ7G
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0210	FFNK6

SSN Name (last first middle)

(b)(6)

Serv	Grade	PMOS	Language	DLPT L	DLPTR	DLPT S	DLPT Date	UIC
USAF	E5	1N355A	ARABIC	2	2+	1+	0203	FFNK6
USAF	E5	1N375D	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0204	FFNK6
USAF	O2	14N1	ARABIC	2	2	0	0301	FFH0Y
USAF	E3	1N335A	ARABIC	2+	2+	0	0304	FF3N2
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0202	FFNK6
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	3	3	0	0107	FF3N2
USAF	E2	1N335A	ARABIC	3	3	2	0106	FFNK6
USAF	O2	21A1	ARABIC	3	3	0	0209	FFG69
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	2	2	0	0303	FFH50
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	2	2	0	0212	FFFJJ
USAF	E4	1N355A	ARABIC	2	2	0	0206	FFNK6
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0208	FFNK6
USAF	E4	1N355A	ARABIC	3	3	0	0205	FFNK6
USAF	E6	1A871E	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0209	FFR18
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	2	3	0	0103	FFFJJ
USAF	O5	14N4	ARABIC	3	3	2	9205	FFNP1
USAF	E4	1A831E	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0203	FFX1F
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0208	FF13K
USAF	O3	46N3	ARABIC	2+	2+	0	9910	FFNJG
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	3	3	0	0208	FFNK6
USAF	E4	4P051	ARABIC	3	3	0	0212	FFNK5
USAF	E6	1A871E	ARABIC	3	3	0	0211	FFX1F
USAF	E5	1N355A	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0209	FFNK6
USAF	E6	8D000	ARABIC	3	3	0	0211	FFB8J
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	2	2	0	0210	FFB45
USAF	E5	1N355A	ARABIC	2	2	2	0211	FFNK6
USAF	E7	8M000	ARABIC	2	2	0	9005	FF7HB
USAF	E6	1N375A	ARABIC	2	2	0	0304	FFL6N
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	3	3	0	0212	FFLLB
USAF	E6	1A871E	ARABIC	2+	2+	0	0208	FFX1F
USAF	O3	14N3	ARABIC	3	3	0	0301	FFCJT
USAF	O1	43E1A	ARABIC	2	3	0	0301	FFNFC
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	2+	3	0	0205	FFNK6
USAF	E6	1N375A	ARABIC	3	3	0	0208	FFH50
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	3	3	0	0302	FFH50
USAF	E3	1A831E	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0212	FFX1F
USAF	O1	14N1	ARABIC	3	3	0	0301	FFCNF

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SSN (b)(6) Name (last first middle)

Serv	Grade	PMOS	Language	DLPT L	DLPT R	DLPT S	DLPT Date	UIC
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	3	3	0	0209	FFH5J
USAF	E4	1N332A	ARABIC	2	2+	1+	0202	FFH50
USAF	E5	1A851E	ARABIC	2	2	0	0110	FFK4K
USAF	E4	4T051	ARABIC	2+	3	0	0301	FFNLC
USAF	E6	1A871E	ARABIC	3	2+	0	0305	FFG40
USAF	E4	1N355A	ARABIC	3	3	0	0208	FFNK6
USAF	E1	1N315A	ARABIC	2	2+	2	0110	FFC99
USAF	E6	1N375A	ARABIC	2+	2+	0	0212	FFLLB
[REDACTED]								
USAF	E5	1N355A	ARABIC	2+	2+	0	0208	FFNK6
USAF	E3	1N335A	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0212	FFH50
USAF	E5	1N355A	ARABIC	3	3	0	0206	FFSQD
USAF	O2	14N3	ARABIC	2	2	0	0212	FFQF1
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	3	3	0	0208	FFFGX
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	3	3	0	0212	FFNK6
USAF	E4	1N335A	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0202	FFNK6
USAF	E4	1N355A	ARABIC	2+	2+	0	0203	FFNK6
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	2	2+	2	0212	FFH50
[REDACTED]								
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	2+	2+	0	0209	FFH50
USAF	E5	1N355A	ARABIC	2	2	0	0108	FF13K
USAF	E5	1N355A	ARABIC	2+	2+	0	0110	FFFJJ
USAF	E3	1N335A	ARABIC	2+	2+	2	0210	FFNK6
USAF	E4	1N355A	ARABIC	2+	2+	0	0211	FFNK6
USAF	E4	1N355A	ARABIC	3	3	0	0208	FFNK6
USAF	E7	1A831E	ARABIC	2	2	0	0012	FFX1H
USAF	E6	T1N375A	ARABIC	2	2	0	0208	FF88G
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	3	3	0	0112	FFNK6
USAF	E5	1N355A	ARABIC	2+	2+	0	0209	FFLLB
USAF	E7	T1N375A	ARABIC	2+	2	0	0210	FFNK6
USAF	E7	1N375A	ARABIC	2	3	0	0209	FFH50
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	3	3	2+	0206	FFRM7
[REDACTED]								
USAF	E4	1N355A	ARABIC	2	2	0	0301	FFNK6
USAF	O3	11S3G	ARABIC	2	2	1	0206	FFG1T
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	3	3	0	0212	FFNK6
USAF	E8	1A871E	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0206	FFHGC
USAF	E6	1N375A	ARABIC	2	2	0	0205	FF3N2
[REDACTED]								
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	3	3	0	0112	FFNK6
USAF	O3	14N3	ARABIC	2+	3	0	0212	FFBCM
USAF	O4	C71S3	ARABIC	2	2	2	9411	FFX9J
USAF	E5	1N355A	ARABIC	3	3	0	0211	FFH50
[REDACTED]								
USAF	O1	ZZZZZZ	ARABIC	2+	2+	0	0304	FFQGQ

SSN Name (last first middle)

(b)(6)

Serv	Grade	PMOS	Language	DLPT L	DLPT R	DLPT S	DLPT Date	UIC
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	2	2	0	0208	FF88G
USAF	E6	T1N375A	ARABIC	3	3	0	0206	FFNK6
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	3	2+	0	0207	FFNK6
USAF	E7	1N375A	ARABIC	2	2	0	0112	FF3N2
USAF	O2	14N1	ARABIC	3	3	0	0302	FFF27
USAF	E6	1A871E	ARABIC	2	2	0	0210	FFX1F
USAF	E4	1N335A	ARABIC	2	2	2	0211	FFNK6
USAF	E7	1N373A	ARABIC	3	3	0	0212	FFRM7
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	3	3	0	0211	FFNK6
USAF	E7	Q1A871	ARABIC	2	2	0	0303	FFGZ6
USAF	E7	7S071	ARABIC	3	3	0	0209	FFJ6J
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	2	2	0	0210	FFNK6
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	3	3	0	0209	FFRM7
USAF	E6	1N373M	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0208	FF3N2
USAF	E5	1N375A	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0210	FFNK6
USAF	E4	1N335A	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0202	FFNK6
USAF	E5	1A871E	ARABIC	2+	2	0	0304	FFX1F
USAF	E5	1N355A	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0206	FFNK6

RESERVE

Deployed in CENTCOM AO
Returned within past 6 months

SSN	Name (last first middle)	Grade	PMOS	Language	DLPT L	DLPTR	DLPT S	DLPT Date	UK
ANG		E5	SELRES	2S031	ARABIC	5	5	5	0106
ANG		E4	SELRES	3S051	ARABIC	2	2	2	0208
ANG		E6	SELRES	3M071	ARABIC	2	3	0	9608
ANG		E5	SELRES	2W151	ARABIC	3	3	0	0110
ANG		O4	SELRES	T11F3H	ARABIC	3	3	3	0305
ANG		O1	SELRES	ZZZZZZZZ	ARABIC	5	5	5	9612
ANG		E4	SELRES	2A654	ARABIC	4	4	4	9709
ANG		E8	SELRES	2T291	ARABIC	2	2	2	9611
ANG		E9	SELRES	2A300	ARABIC	3	3	3	9610
ANG		O5	SELRES	44G3	ARABIC	3	2+	0	0112
ANG		E6	SELRES	1A871E	ARABIC	3	3	0	0212
ANG		E6	SELRES	2T370	ARABIC	4	4	4	9701
ANG		E6	SELRES	1N071	ARABIC	2	2	1	8702
ANG		E6	SELRES	1A871E	ARABIC	2	2	0	9611
ANG		E6	SELRES	4R071	ARABIC	2	2	2	9710
ANG		O3	SELRES	33S1	ARABIC	2	2	2	9612
ANG		O4	SELRES	52R1	ARABIC	3	3	3	9610
ANG		E8	SELRES	1A891	ARABIC	2+	2	0	8903
ANG		O4	SELRES	W11F3F	ARABIC	4	4	4	9610
ANG		O3	SELRES	C36P3	ARABIC	2	2	2	9606
ANG		E6	SELRES	1A871E	ARABIC	2	2+	0	9312
ANG		E7	SELRES	4A071	ARABIC	3	3	3	9611
ANG		E5	SELRES	2E051	ARABIC	5	5	5	0001
ANG		E5	SELRES	1A851E	ARABIC	2	2	0	0202
USAFR		E7	STAND-BY	2A553B	ARABIC	3	3	0	9711
USAFR		E5	SELRES	4P051	ARABIC	4	4	4	0302
USAFR		O4	SELRES	32E3G	ARABIC	3	3	0	0108
USAFR		O6	SELRES	43E3A	ARABIC	2	2	2	9610
USAFR		E4	IRR/ING	2R051	ARABIC	3	3	3	9712
USAFR		E4	SELRES	3P051	ARABIC	4	4	4	9610
USAFR		E4	IRR/ING	3M051	ARABIC	5	5	5	9610
USAFR		E6	SELRES	3C171	ARABIC	2	2	2	0305

A

SSN (b)(5) _____ Name/last first middle/initial

Serv	Grade	PMOS	Language	DLPT L	DLPT R	DLPT S	DLPT Date	UIC
USAFR	E9	SELRES	1N200	ARABIC	2+	3	0	9711
USAFR	E4	IRR/ING	1N355A	ARABIC	2	2	0	0007
USAFR	E4	IRR/ING	1N335A	ARABIC	2	2	0	0107
USAFR	E4	IRR/ING	4P051	ARABIC	4	4	4	9708
USAFR	O3	STAND-BY	52R3	ARABIC	3	3	0	9411
USAFR	O4	SELRES	14N3	ARABIC	2	2	2	9610
USAFR	E4	IRR/ING	2A754	ARABIC	2	2	2	0106
USAFR	E5	IRR/ING	K1A851E	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0205
USAFR	E4	IRR/ING	3C331	ARABIC	4	4	4	0209
USAFR	E3	IRR/ING	2S051	ARABIC	3	3	3	9711
USAFR	E5	IRR/ING	1N355A	ARABIC	2+	3	0	0112
USAFR	E4	IRR/ING	1N355A	ARABIC	3	3	0	0206
USAFR	E5	IRR/ING	1N375A	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0208
USAFR	O3	IRR/ING	14N3	ARABIC	4	4	4	9610
USAFR	E7	SELRES	2A571	ARABIC	2	2	2	9612
USAFR	E4	IRR/ING	1N355A	ARABIC	2	2	0	0008
USAFR	E6	SELRES	1A871E	ARABIC	2+	2	2+	9108
USAFR	O1	SELRES	12A3C	ARABIC	5	5	5	0104
USAFR	O2	SELRES	51J3	ARABIC	3	3	3	9611
USAFR	O3	IRR/ING	95A0	ARABIC	4	4	4	9610
USAFR	E6	SELRES	2A671A	ARABIC	2	2	2	9611
USAFR	E5	IRR/ING	1N375A	ARABIC	2+	2+	0	0112
USAFR	O4	STAND-BY	M44F3	ARABIC	5	5	5	9610
USAFR	E7	IRR/ING	7S071	ARABIC	2	2	2	9610
USAFR	E6	SELRES	3P071	ARABIC	2	2	2	9611
USAFR	E5	IRR/ING	1N355A	ARABIC	3	2+	0	0210
USAFR	E7	SELRES	3S091	ARABIC	2+	2+	0	9203
USAFR	E4	IRR/ING	1N355A	ARABIC	3	2+	0	0112
USAFR	E4	IRR/ING	1N355A	ARABIC	2	2	0	9911
USAFR	E6	SELRES	2T271	ARABIC	3	3	3	9610
USAFR	E4	IRR/ING	2S051	ARABIC	2+	2+	0	9812
USAFR	E4	SELRES	1N355A	ARABIC	2	2	0	0009
USAFR	E4	IRR/ING	1N355A	ARABIC	2	2	0	0102
USAFR	E4	SELRES	X4N051	ARABIC	5	5	5	9610
USAFR	O3	IRR/ING	62E3H	ARABIC	3	3	0	0108
USAFR	E5	SELRES	1N355A	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0012
USAFR	O4	SELRES	35P4	ARABIC	3	3	3	0210
USAFR	O3	IRR/ING	43E3A	ARABIC	3	2+	0	0010
USAFR	O6	SELRES	16F4	ARABIC	5	5	5	9612
USAFR	E5	IRR/ING	K1A851E	ARABIC	2	2	0	0112
USAFR	E5	SELRES	2T271	ARABIC	3	3	3	9610
USAFR	E4	IRR/ING	1N355A	ARABIC	2	2	0	0111
USAFR	O3	IRR/ING	63A1	ARABIC	4	4	4	9611
USAFR	E4	IRR/ING	4E051	ARABIC	5	5	5	9705

SSN (b)(6) Name (last, first, middle)

Serv	Grade	PMOS	Language	DLPT L	DLPT R	DLPT S	DLPT Date	UIC
USAFR	O3	IRR/ING	14N1	ARABIC	2	2	0	0204
USAFR	O5	SELRES	11G4	ARABIC	2	2	2	9611
USAFR	E5	IRR/ING	K1A871E	ARABIC	2	2	0	0211
USAFR	E5	IRR/ING	2W051	ARABIC	2	2	0	9910
USAFR	E5	IRR/ING	1N355A	ARABIC	2	3	0	0205
USAFR	E5	SELRES	1N375A	ARABIC	2	2	0	0110
USAFR	O3	STAND-BY	47G3	ARABIC	3	3	0	0108
USAFR	O3	STAND-BY	T11K3C	ARABIC	2	2	2	9611
USAFR	E6	SELRES	3P071	ARABIC	3	3	3	9610
USAFR	E9	SELRES	1A891	ARABIC	2	2	2	9610
USAFR	E5	IRR/ING	1N355A	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0112
USAFR	O2	SELRES	14N1	ARABIC	2	3	0	9508
USAFR	O4	SELRES	20C0	ARABIC	5	5	5	9611
USAFR	E4	IRR/ING	3E551	ARABIC	5	5	5	0202
USAFR	E7	SELRES	1N375A	ARABIC	2	2	0	0209
USAFR	E5	SELRES	1N355A	ARABIC	3	2+	0	9908
USAFR	E4	IRR/ING	3E031	ARABIC	3	3	3	0001
USAFR	E5	SELRES	3P071	ARABIC	2	2	2	9610
USAFR	E8	SELRES	1N091	ARABIC	4	4	4	9611
USAFR	E4	IRR/ING	1N355A	ARABIC	2	2	0	0211
USAFR	E6	SELRES	1A271	ARABIC	5	5	5	9612
USAFR	O6	SELRES	32E4	ARABIC	2	2	2	9611
USAFR	E5	IRR/ING	1N375A	ARABIC	3	3	0	0207
USAFR	E4	IRR/ING	1N355A	ARABIC	2	2	0	0202
USAFR	O3	SELRES	44M3	ARABIC	5	5	5	0010
USAFR	E5	IRR/ING	1N355A	ARABIC	2	2+	0	9511
USAFR	E4	IRR/ING	1N335A	ARABIC	2+	2	0	9910
USAFR	E5	IRR/ING	1N375A	ARABIC	2+	2+	0	0110
USAFR	O4	STAND-BY	14N3	ARABIC	2	2+	0	9308
USAFR	E4	IRR/ING	1N355A	ARABIC	3	3	0	9809
USAFR	E5	IRR/ING	1N375A	ARABIC	2+	2+	0	0212
USAFR	E7	SELRES	4N071	ARABIC	2	2	2	9610
USAFR	O5	SELRES	64P3	ARABIC	2	2	2	9612
USAFR	E5	IRR/ING	1N375A	ARABIC	2	2	0	0109
USAFR	E4	IRR/ING	1N355A	ARABIC	3	2+	0	9901
USAFR	O1	SELRES	43T3A	ARABIC	3	3	0	9307
USAFR	E4	IRR/ING	2F051	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0009
USAFR	O4	SELRES	E14N3	ARABIC	2	2	0	8003
USAFR	E4	IRR/ING	1N355A	ARABIC	2	2	0	0110
USAFR	E4	IRR/ING	4T051	ARABIC	4	4	4	9802
USAFR	O6	SELRES	M45B3	ARABIC	5	5	5	9612
USAFR	E5	SELRES	2A513A	ARABIC	5	5	5	9705
USAFR	E4	IRR/ING	1N355A	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0205

SSN _____ Name (last first middle)

(b)(6)

Serv	Grade	PMOS	Language	DLPT L	DLPT R	DLPT S	DLPT Date	UIC
USAFR	O4	SELRES	21R4	ARABIC	3	3	0010	0010
USAFR	E4	SELRES	3E052	ARABIC	4	4	9709	9709
USAFR	O3	STAND-BY	T64P3	ARABIC	2	2	0	9005
USAFR	E5	IRR/ING	1N375A	ARABIC	2	2	0	0112
USAFR	E5	IRR/ING	1N375A	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0205
USAFR	O3	STAND-BY	21A3	ARABIC	2	2	0	9708
USAFR	E3	SELRES	4A011	ARABIC	2	2	2	0303
USAFR	E7	SELRES	2A671A	ARABIC	5	5	5	9611
USAFR	E5	IRR/ING	1A851E	ARABIC	3	3	0	0304
USAFR	E7	SELRES	2A571	ARABIC	5	5	5	9707
USAFR	E4	IRR/ING	1N355A	ARABIC	2	2	0	0012
USAFR	E5	IRR/ING	9A000	ARABIC	3	3	0	0209
USAFR	E4	IRR/ING	1N355A	ARABIC	2	2	0	0010
USAFR	E4	IRR/ING	1N355A	ARABIC	3	3	0	0207
USAFR	E6	SELRES	7S071	ARABIC	3	3	3	9611
USAFR	O3	SELRES	14N3	ARABIC	2+	2	0	9412
USAFR	E5	IRR/ING	1N355A	ARABIC	3	3	0	0207
USAFR	E7	SELRES	J1W071A	ARABIC	5	5	5	0208
USAFR	O6	SELRES	33S4	ARABIC	3	3	3	9611
USAFR	O3	IRR/ING	48G3	ARABIC	3	3	0	9712
USAFR	O4	SELRES	71S3	ARABIC	2+	2+	2+	9504
USAFR	E8	SELRES	1N011	ARABIC	4	4	4	9611
USAFR	E3	IRR/ING	1N315A	ARABIC	2	2	1+	9909
USAFR	E5	SELRES	2S071	ARABIC	2+	3	0	0111
USAFR	O3	STAND-BY	62E3A	ARABIC	3	3	0	9205
USAFR	E5	SELRES	1N151	ARABIC	5	5	5	9610
USAFR	E5	IRR/ING	1N375A	ARABIC	3	2	0	0109
USAFR	E9	SELRES	2A600	ARABIC	5	5	5	9610
USAFR	E5	IRR/ING	1N355A	ARABIC	2	2+	1+	0203
USAFR	O3	SELRES	14N4	ARABIC	4	4	4	0204
USAFR	E4	IRR/ING	2A353A	ARABIC	5	5	5	9610
USAFR	E4	IRR/ING	1N335A	ARABIC	2	2	0	9908
USAFR	E4	IRR/ING	1N335A	ARABIC	3	3	2	0211
USAFR	E5	IRR/ING	1N375A	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0110
USAFR	E5	IRR/ING	K1A871E	ARABIC	3	2+	0	0208
USAFR	O3	IRR/ING	14N3	ARABIC	3	3	3	9610
USAFR	E6	SELRES	1N375A	ARABIC	2	2	0	9912
USAFR	O4	SELRES	46S3	ARABIC	2	2	2	9610
USAFR	O4	SELRES	T14N3	ARABIC	2	2	2	9611
USAFR	E4	IRR/ING	2A553A	ARABIC	3	2+	0	0008
USAFR	E5	IRR/ING	1N375A	ARABIC	2	2	0	0209
USAFR	E5	IRR/ING	1T151	ARABIC	3	3	0	0108
USAFR	E4	IRR/ING	1N355A	ARABIC	2	2	0	0007
USAFR	E4	IRR/ING	1A831E	ARABIC	3	2+	0	0109

SSM (b)(6) Name (last first middle)

Serv	Grade	PMOS	Language	DLPT L	DLPT R	DLPT S	DLPT Date	UIC
USAFR	E5	IRRR/ING	2E071	ARABIC	3	3	3	9610
USAFR	E5	IRRR/ING	1N375A	ARABIC	2+	2	0	0110
USAFR	E4	IRRR/ING	1N355A	ARABIC	2	2	0	9909
USAFR	E4	IRRR/ING	1A851E	ARABIC	2+	3	0	0111
USAFR	O4	SELRES	14N3	ARABIC	3	3	3	0303
USAFR	E5	STAND-BY	1N355A	ARABIC	2+	2+	0	0106
USAFR	E7	SELRES	ZZZZZZZ	ARABIC	3	3	3	9611
USAFR	O6	SELRES	11A3M	ARABIC	5	5	5	0304
USAFR	E4	IRRR/ING	4E051	ARABIC	2	2	2	9705

RETIRED

Deployed in CENTCOM AO
Returned within past 6 months

SSN	Serv	Grade	PMOS	Last name	First name	Middle name	Language	DLPT L	DLPT R	DLPT S	Retirement date
(b)(6)						E	ARABIC	2	2	0	20020601
						A	ARABIC	2	2	0	20011001
						R	ARABIC	2	2	0	20021101
						R	ARABIC	3	3	0	20030301
						P	ARABIC	3	3	0	20011201
						A	ARABIC	2	2	0	20010601
						A	ARABIC	2	2+	0	20010501
						A	ARABIC	2	2	0	20010901
						H	ARABIC	3	3	0	20010601
							ARABIC	3	3	0	20010401
						Y	ARABIC	3	3	0	20030201
						L	ARABIC	2	2	0	20030318
						J	ARABIC	2	2	0	20010901
						W	ARABIC	3	3	0	20020401

TAB

E

ACTIVE

11-L-0559/OSD/31764

USN

Deployed in CENTCOM AO
Returned within past 6 months

SSN	Name (last first middle)	Serv	Grade	PMOS	Language	DLPT L	DLPT R	DLPT S	DLPT Date	UIC
		NAVY	E3	AN	ARABIC	5	5	5	0009	N20550
		NAVY	E2	GSM	ARABIC	5	5	5	0203	N21949
		NAVY	E5	YN	ARABIC	3	3	3	9712	N46865
		NAVY	E3	IS	ARABIC	5	5	5	0210	N43494
		NAVY	O4	2300	ARABIC	3	2+	0	0304	N00029
		NAVY	E4	CTI9216	ARABIC	2+	3	2	0103	N41247
		NAVY	E4	CTI9216	ARABIC	3	3	0	0210	N41247
		NAVY	E5	EM 4671	ARABIC	3	3	0	0203	N20635
		NAVY	E5	CTI8296	ARABIC	2	2	1	0202	N31188
		NAVY	E3	AN	ARABIC	5	5	5	0009	N09943
		NAVY	E5	AM 8805	ARABIC	5	5	5	9708	N09303
		NAVY	E4	DK 2905	ARABIC	5	5	5	0004	N21979
		NAVY	O3	1115	ARABIC	5	5	5	0000	N22178
		NAVY	E4	EM	ARABIC	4	4	4	0112	N05832
		NAVY	E4	AM	ARABIC	5	5	5	0006	N09122
		NAVY	E4	CTI	ARABIC	3	3	2+	0302	N65804
		NAVY	E4	CTI9216	ARABIC	3	2+	1+	0109	N39901
		NAVY	E5	CTI9216	ARABIC	2	2	2	9907	N30570
		NAVY	E4	CTI9216	ARABIC	2	2	2	0106	N41247
		NAVY	E7	CTI9216	ARABIC	2	2	0	0204	N41247
		NAVY	E4	CTI	ARABIC	2	2+	2	0303	N31050
		NAVY	E5	CTI9216	ARABIC	3	3	0	0211	N63987
		NAVY	E7	CTI9216	ARABIC	3	2+	0	0212	N47002
		NAVY	E2	AD 8201	ARABIC	3	3	3	0110	N65554
		NAVY	E1	CTI9216	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0212	N39901
		NAVY	E5	EM 4671	ARABIC	2	3	0	0201	N46130
		NAVY	E5	CTI9216	ARABIC	2	2	0	0203	N63987
		NAVY	E4	AD 6419	ARABIC	3	2	0	0105	N44326
		NAVY	E6	SK 8012	ARABIC	4	4	0	9904	N09718
		NAVY	E5	GSM	ARABIC	5	5	5	9812	N21450
		NAVY	E4	CTI9216	ARABIC	2	2	1	0209	N39901
		NAVY	E5	CTI9216	ARABIC	3	3	0	0207	N63987

(b)(6)

Grade	PMOS	Language	DLPT L	DLPTR	DLPT S	DLPT Date	UIC
NAVY	E4 CTI9216	ARABIC	2	2	2	0211	N30500
NAVY	E5 CTI9216	ARABIC	2	2+	1+	9707	N30921
NAVY	O3 1615	ARABIC	2	3	0	9604	N31405
NAVY	E5 CTI9204	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0202	N31050
NAVY	E4 CTI	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0304	N31050
NAVY	E4 CTI9216	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0109	N32842
NAVY	E4 CTI9216	ARABIC	2	2	0	0110	N31050
NAVY	E2 SA	ARABIC	3	3	3	0206	N21560
NAVY	E5 MA	ARABIC	5	5	5	9602	N46262
NAVY	E3 HN 8404	ARABIC	4+	4+	5	0201	N30496
NAVY	E3 SN 9750	ARABIC	5	5	5	0304	N30646
NAVY	E4 CTI9216	ARABIC	2	2	0	0106	N63987
NAVY	O2 1135	ARABIC	2	2	2	0112	N08973
NAVY	E4 CTI9216	ARABIC	2	2+	2	0212	N30500
NAVY	E4 CTI9216	ARABIC	2	2+	1+	0202	N41247
NAVY	E6 CTI8296	ARABIC	2+	2+	0	0105	N48035
NAVY	E7 CTI9204	ARABIC	3	2+	0	9408	N64355
NAVY	E4 CTI	ARABIC	3	3	2	0303	N31050
NAVY	E4 CTI9216	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0205	N41247
NAVY	E4 CTI	ARABIC	2	2+	1	0305	N31050
NAVY	O5 1630	ARABIC	2	2+	2	9511	N65792
NAVY	E4 CTI9216	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0106	N41247
NAVY	E5 YN	ARABIC	2	2	2	0110	N63217
NAVY	O1 1645	ARABIC	2	2	0	0208	N32842
NAVY	O3 1635	ARABIC	2	2+	2	9504	N47855
NAVY	E5 CTI9204	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0211	N63987
NAVY	E4 CTI9216	ARABIC	2	2+	1+	0206	N41247
NAVY	E4 CTI9216	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0302	N32842
NAVY	E4 CTI9216	ARABIC	2	2	2	0111	N32842
NAVY	E4 CTI	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0212	N65804
NAVY	E5 CTI8295	ARABIC	2	2	0	0208	N41247
NAVY	E5 CTI9216	ARABIC	3	3	0	0208	N63987
NAVY	E5 CTI9216	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0004	N32842
NAVY	E4 CTI	ARABIC	3	3	2	0208	N65804
NAVY	E4 CTI9216	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0303	N41247
NAVY	E5 CTI8296	ARABIC	2+	2+	1+	9909	N41276
NAVY	E6 CTI8296	ARABIC	2+	2+	0	0201	N62443

(b)(6)

NAVY	E5	CTI9216	ARABIC	3	2+	0	0302	N32842
NAVY	E4	CTI	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0207	N3480B
NAVY	O5	1310	ARABIC	3	3	0	8104	N00011
NAVY	E6	CTI9216	ARABIC	2	2	0	0208	N32842
NAVY	O6	1630	ARABIC	2	2	2	0000	N49554
NAVY	E4	CTI	ARABIC	3	3	2+	0105	N65804
NAVY	E3	HN 8404	ARABIC	3	3	0	0107	N40211
NAVY	E4	CTI9216	ARABIC	2	2+	1+	0207	N41247
NAVY	E4	CTI	ARABIC	2	2	2	0205	N41247
NAVY	E4	CTI9216	ARABIC	2	2	0	0211	N41247
NAVY	E5	CTI9216	ARABIC	2	3	0	0202	N41247
NAVY	E4	CTI9216	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0111	N41247
NAVY	E5	CTI9216	ARABIC	2	3	0	0103	N46462
NAVY	E4	CTI9216	ARABIC	2	2	0	0212	N63987
NAVY	E6	CTI9216	ARABIC	2	2	0	0210	N41247
NAVY	E6	CTI9216	ARABIC	3	3	0	0210	N41246
NAVY	E5	CTI8296	ARABIC	2	2+	1	0206	N32842
NAVY	E5	CTI9216	ARABIC	2	2+	2	9810	N30922
NAVY	O4	1610	ARABIC	2+	2+	1+	9702	N47784
NAVY	E5	AD 6418	ARABIC	5	5	5	9612	N09623
NAVY	E4	SK	ARABIC	3	3	3	0110	N21949
NAVY	O2	2305	ARABIC	3	3	0	0304	N00183
NAVY	E2	AA	ARABIC	3	3	3	0209	N07195
NAVY	O2	1635	ARABIC	2	2+	2	9612	N39906
NAVY	E4	EN	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0303	N65918
NAVY	E6	SK 8012	ARABIC	3	3	0	0204	N30929
NAVY	E3	FN	ARABIC	3	3	3	0211	N21660
NAVY	E3	HN	ARABIC	5	5	5	0002	N30639
NAVY	E3	FN	ARABIC	2	3	0	0302	N21946
NAVY	E3	FT 1327	ARABIC	4+	4+	4+	9908	N45235
NAVY	E4	AE	ARABIC	5	5	5	0104	N09527
NAVY	E4	CTI9216	ARABIC	3	3	1+	0210	N39901
NAVY	E3	FN 9760	ARABIC	5	5	5	0204	N21297
NAVY	E6	CTI8296	ARABIC	2+	2+	0	9410	N63987
NAVY	E4	CTI9216	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0202	N41247
NAVY	E6	CTI9216	ARABIC	3	3	0	0207	N48002
NAVY	E5	DC	ARABIC	3	3	0	0212	N05848
NAVY	E3	DN	ARABIC	5	5	5	0210	N68326

(b)(6)

NAVY	E5	AE 7137	ARABIC	2	2	0	0202	N31050
NAVY	O3	1630	ARABIC	4	4	0	0107	N49325
NAVY	E4	CTI	ARABIC	3	3	2	0302	N65804
NAVY	E5	SK	ARABIC	5	5	5	9909	N21639
NAVY	E5	CTI9216	ARABIC	3	3	0	0210	N31186
NAVY	O3	1635	ARABIC	2+	2+	2	9503	N31405
NAVY	E6	CTI8296	ARABIC	3	3	0	0204	N32842
NAVY	O2	3105	ARABIC	2	2	2	9210	N30449
NAVY	E4	CTI9216	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0110	N41247
NAVY	E4	CTI9216	ARABIC	2	2	0	0203	N32842
NAVY	E6	CTI9216	ARABIC	2+	2+	2	9702	N63987
NAVY	E3	SN 9730	ARABIC	5	5	5	0208	N01024
NAVY	E4	CTI9216	ARABIC	2	2+	1+	0202	N41247
NAVY	E5	AE 8303	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0211	N52959
NAVY	E4	CTI9216	ARABIC	3	3	2	0212	N41247
NAVY	E7	CTI8295	ARABIC	2	2	0	0002	N32842
NAVY	E6	CTI9216	ARABIC	3	3	0	0006	N45492
NAVY	W2	7441	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0205	N44599
NAVY	E3	SK	ARABIC	5	5	5	0204	N53827
NAVY	E5	CTI9216	ARABIC	2+	2+	0	0209	N39900
NAVY	E4	CTI9216	ARABIC	2	2	0	0203	N41247
NAVY	E5	CTI9216	ARABIC	2	2	2	9509	N31188
NAVY	E2	MM	ARABIC	3	3	3	0209	N20120
NAVY	W3	7151	ARABIC	2	2	2	0112	N39966
NAVY	E6	MS 3538	ARABIC	5	5	5	8811	N07172
NAVY	E5	CTI9216	ARABIC	2	2+	2	0304	N31050
NAVY	E6	CTI9216	ARABIC	2	2	0	0203	N63987
NAVY	E4	CTI9216	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0212	N41247
NAVY	E4	CTI	ARABIC	2	3	1+	0302	N65804
NAVY	E5	CTI8296	ARABIC	2	2	0	0208	N63987
NAVY	E6	CTI9216	ARABIC	3	2+	0	0108	N41725
NAVY	O1	1645	ARABIC	3	3	0	0202	N41246
NAVY	E4	CTI9216	ARABIC	2	2	0	0211	N63987

SSN (b)(6) Name (last first middle)

Serv	Grade	PMOS	Language	DLPT L	DLPT R	DLPT S	DLPT Date	UIC
NAVY	E4	CTI	ARABIC	2	3	1+	0303	N65804
NAVY	E5	CTI9216	ARABIC	2	2+	2	9907	N39899
NAVY	E5	CTI9216	ARABIC	2+	2	0	0212	N41247
NAVY	E3	DN	ARABIC	3	3	3	9905	N68326
NAVY	O5	1110	ARABIC	2+	3	0	9202	N00011
NAVY	E4	AD	ARABIC	5	5	0	0212	N55600
NAVY	E4	CTI	ARABIC	3	2	1+	0302	N65804
NAVY	O3	1135	ARABIC	2+	2	2	9606	N39592
NAVY	E7	CTI9216	ARABIC	2	2+	2	0003	N64355
NAVY	E3	CTI9216	ARABIC	2	2	0	0211	N39900
NAVY	E4	HM 8404	ARABIC	3+	3+	3+	9907	N68096
NAVY	E3	AE	ARABIC	3	3	0	0005	N21853
NAVY	E3	EA	ARABIC	5	5	5	9908	N55101
NAVY	E4	SK	ARABIC	3	3	0	0204	N00062
NAVY	E3	SN	ARABIC	2	3	0	0209	N33014
NAVY	E4	CTI9216	ARABIC	2+	2+	2	0203	N41247
NAVY	E4	CTI	ARABIC	3	3	2	0304	N31050
NAVY	E6	EM	ARABIC	5	5	5	9401	N44884
NAVY	E4	CTI	ARABIC	2+	2+	2	0203	N41247
NAVY	E4	CTI	ARABIC	2+	2+	0	0212	N31050
NAVY	E4	MS	ARABIC	5	5	5	0008	N09604
NAVY	E3	EM	ARABIC	2+	2	0	0304	N42043
NAVY	E4	AD 8806	ARABIC	5	5	4	0001	N09467
NAVY	E4	CTI9216	ARABIC	2	2	0	0202	N41247
NAVY	E5	CTI9216	ARABIC	2	2	0	0212	N63987
NAVY	O4	2300	ARABIC	3	3	3	0000	N48462
NAVY	O3	1110	ARABIC	3	2	0	8910	N21346
NAVY	E4	GSM	ARABIC	5	5	5	9908	N20836
NAVY	E4	EN	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0205	N20603
NAVY	E6	CTI9216	ARABIC	2+	2+	0	0209	N63987
NAVY	E4	CTI9216	ARABIC	2	2+	2	0205	N41247
NAVY	E6	HT 7353	ARABIC	3	2+	2	0004	N47898
NAVY	E9	CMD9216	ARABIC	2	2	0	7606	N09372
NAVY	E6	CTI8296	ARABIC	3	2+	0	0205	N32842

NAVY	E4	CTI	ARABIC	3	3	2	0212	N65804
NAVY	E4	CTI9216	ARABIC	3	3	2	0201	N41247
NAVY	E6	CTI9216	ARABIC	2	2	1+	9406	N31932
NAVY	E6	CTI9216	ARABIC	2+	2+	0	0105	N39901
NAVY	O3	1615	ARABIC	2+	3	2	9212	N48035
NAVY	E4	CTI9216	ARABIC	2	2+	1+	0207	N41247
NAVY	E5	CTI9216	ARABIC	2+	2	0	0110	N63987
NAVY	E5	PN	ARABIC	3	3	3	9906	N09353
NAVY	O5	1310	ARABIC	2	2+	2+	9505	N00161
NAVY	O5	1440	ARABIC	5	5	5	0000	N35366
NAVY	O4	5100	ARABIC	5	5	5	0000	N60169
NAVY	E3	GSE	ARABIC	3	3	0	0302	N22996
NAVY	E4	AE 8819	ARABIC	3	2+	0	0204	N09630
NAVY	E3	FN	ARABIC	5	5	5	0109	N21879
NAVY	E1	AR	ARABIC	3	3	3	0305	N30646
NAVY	E4	CTI	ARABIC	2	2+	2	0302	N65804
NAVY	E3	HN 8506	ARABIC	5	5	5	9812	N00183
NAVY	E5	CTI9216	ARABIC	2+	3	2	9902	N41247
NAVY	O3	2100	ARABIC	3	2+	2	9410	N48456
NAVY	E4	CTI	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0212	N31050
NAVY	E4	CTI9216	ARABIC	2	2	2	0206	N41247
NAVY	E4	CTI8296	ARABIC	3	3	0	0107	N32842
NAVY	E4	CTI9216	ARABIC	2	2	2	0208	N41247
NAVY	O6	1610	ARABIC	3	3	2	0000	N65487
NAVY	E4	MM	ARABIC	2	2	0	0105	N39088
NAVY	E5	CTI8201	ARABIC	2+	2+	0	0209	N32842
NAVY	E6	CTI9216	ARABIC	2	2	0	0107	N41247
NAVY	E3	FN 9760	ARABIC	3+	3	0+	0211	N03367
NAVY	E4	CTI9216	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0111	N39901
NAVY	E5	CTI9216	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0107	N39900
NAVY	E4	HM 8404	ARABIC	2+	3	2	0205	N31050

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NAVY	E6	CTI9216	ARABIC	2	2	0	0108	N41247
NAVY	E4	GSE	ARABIC	5	5	5	9808	N22996
NAVY	E4	CTI9216	ARABIC	2	2	0	0110	N47757
NAVY	E4	CTI9216	ARABIC	2	2	2	0207	N32842
NAVY	E5	CTI9216	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0110	N41247
NAVY	E4	CTI	ARABIC	2	2	2	0305	N65804
NAVY	E5	CTI9216	ARABIC	2	2	0	0207	N39900
NAVY	E4	CTI9216	ARABIC	3	2	1+	0212	N65804
NAVY	E3	FN	ARABIC	5	5	5	0305	N30646
NAVY	O3	1135	ARABIC	2	2	0	0202	N08943
NAVY	E4	CTI	ARABIC	2+	2+	2	0303	N31050
NAVY	E7	CTI8296	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0303	N41247
NAVY	E5	CTI9216	ARABIC	2	2	0	0108	N63415
NAVY	E6	CTI8296	ARABIC	2	3	0	0108	N41247
NAVY	O5	1610	ARABIC	2+	2+	0	0000	N41725
NAVY	E5	CTI9216	ARABIC	3	2+	0	0108	N63987
NAVY	E5	CTI8296	ARABIC	2	2	0	9908	N41247
NAVY	E6	CTI9216	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0207	N41247
NAVY	E4	CTI9216	ARABIC	2	2	0	0209	N41247
NAVY	E5	CTI9216	ARABIC	2	2	0	0203	N41247
NAVY	E5	EN 4382	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0111	N31050
NAVY	E6	CTI9204	ARABIC	2+	3	0	0207	N32842
NAVY	E4	MM	ARABIC	3	3	3	0112	N30896
NAVY	E6	CTI9216	ARABIC	2	2	0	0303	N41247
NAVY	E6	CTI9216	ARABIC	2	2	1	9705	N41247
NAVY	E4	SK	ARABIC	4	4	4	9910	N09223
NAVY	E2	FA	ARABIC	5	5	5	0203	N22999
NAVY	E4	MS 3527	ARABIC	5	5	5	0007	N21533
NAVY	E3	SN	ARABIC	5	5	5	0011	N21979
NAVY	E3	SK	ARABIC	4+	4+	4+	0301	N30128
NAVY	E5	CTO9302	ARABIC	3	3	2+	9509	N3028A
NAVY	E6	CTI8296	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0204	N32842
NAVY	E5	CTI9216	ARABIC	2	2	0	0204	N41247
NAVY	E4	EN 4313	ARABIC	5	5	5	9610	N62813

(b)(6)

Serv	Grade	PMOS	Language	DLPT L	DLPT R	DLPT S	DLPT Date	UIC
NAVY	O4	1610	ARABIC	5	5	0	0110	N46828
NAVY	E6	CT19204	ARABIC	3	3	0	0102	N63987
NAVY	E6	DT 8732	ARABIC	3	3	0	9807	N62753
NAVY	E3	MS	ARABIC	5	5	5	0102	N21451
NAVY	E6	CT18296	ARABIC	2+	3	2+	9409	N48002
NAVY	E1	AR	ARABIC	3	3	3	0000	N30646
NAVY	E4	CT19216	ARABIC	2	3	1+	0206	N41247
NAVY	E4	CT19216	ARABIC	3	2+	2+	0203	N41247
NAVY	E5	CT19216	ARABIC	3	3	0	0303	N32842
NAVY	E4	CT19216	ARABIC	2	2+	1+	0208	N3480B
NAVY	E5	CT19216	ARABIC	2	3	1+	9810	N41247
NAVY	E4	YN	ARABIC	5	5	5	9806	N46875
NAVY	E4	CT19216	ARABIC	2	2+	1+	0111	N41247
NAVY	O5	1320	ARABIC	2	2	1	0000	N69235
NAVY	E4	CT19216	ARABIC	2+	2+	0	0009	N31050
NAVY	E6	CT18296	ARABIC	2	2	0	9903	N48002
NAVY	E4	CT19216	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0106	N41247
NAVY	E5	CT19216	ARABIC	2	2+	2	0112	N63987
NAVY	E5	CT19216	ARABIC	2	2	0	0108	N41247
NAVY	E5	HM 8448	ARABIC	5	5	5	9201	N00259
NAVY	E6	CT19216	ARABIC	2+	3	2+	9409	N39900
NAVY	E6	CT19216	ARABIC	3	2+	2	9608	N63987
NAVY	E8	CT18296	ARABIC	3	2	2	9703	N41246
NAVY	O5	1630	ARABIC	3	3	2+	9409	N4171A
NAVY	O2	1175	ARABIC	3+	3+	4	9611	N30896
NAVY	E4	CT19216	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0209	N41247
NAVY	E8	IS 3912	ARABIC	2+	2+	2	9205	N31086
NAVY	E6	CT19216	ARABIC	4	4	2	9511	N41247
NAVY	O5	1630	ARABIC	2	2	1	9702	N44860
NAVY	E4	CT19216	ARABIC	2+	2+	2	0211	N30669
NAVY	E4	CTI	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0303	N31050
NAVY	E5	CT19216	ARABIC	3	2+	0	0208	N63987
NAVY	E3	AN	ARABIC	5	5	5	0109	N63922
NAVY	E4	HM 8404	ARABIC	5	5	5	9703	N31948
NAVY	O3	3105	ARABIC	3	3	0	9809	N57007
NAVY	E5	EN	ARABIC	5	5	5	9804	N30811
NAVY	E4	MM	ARABIC	2	2	2	0111	N62995

SSN [redacted] Name (last first middle)

(b)(6)

Serv	Grade	PMOS	Language	DLPT L	DLPT R	DLPT S	DLPT Date	UIC
NAVY	E5	HM 8479	ARABIC	5	5	5	9012	N46897
NAVY	E3	SN 9700	ARABIC	3	3	3	0210	N20574
NAVY	E7	CT18296	ARABIC	3	3	1+	0212	N64355
NAVY	E5	CT19216	ARABIC	2	3	0	0212	N39901
NAVY	E4	CT19216	ARABIC	2	2	2	0207	N3480B
NAVY	E5	EN	ARABIC	5	5	5	9710	N66588
NAVY	E5	CT19216	ARABIC	2+	3	0	0106	N63987
NAVY	O1	1645	ARABIC	2+	2	0	9909	N46828
NAVY	E5	CT19216	ARABIC	2	2	0	0210	N63987
NAVY	E1	SR	ARABIC	5	5	5	0000	N30646
NAVY	E5	CT19208	ARABIC	3	3	2	0212	N66756
NAVY	E4	CT19216	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0202	N41247
NAVY	E6	CT18296	ARABIC	2	2	0	9705	N31743
NAVY	E4	CTI	ARABIC	2	2	2	0303	N31050
NAVY	E4	CTI	ARABIC	2	2+	2	0305	N31050
NAVY	W3	7151	ARABIC	2	2	1+	9807	N68869
NAVY	O3	1320	ARABIC	5	5	5	0000	N09865
NAVY	E5	CT19216	ARABIC	3	2+	0	9905	N31186
NAVY	E4	CT19216	ARABIC	2	2	2	0202	N41247
NAVY	E5	CT19204	ARABIC	2+	2+	2	0206	N46462
NAVY	E6	CT19216	ARABIC	3	2	0	0209	N63987
NAVY	E5	CT18296	ARABIC	2	2	2	9803	N32842
NAVY	E5	CT19216	ARABIC	3	2	0	0209	N41247
NAVY	E5	CT19216	ARABIC	2	2	2	0304	N31050
NAVY	E4	CT19216	ARABIC	2+	2+	1+	0208	N41247
NAVY	E1	SR	ARABIC	5	5	5	0304	N30646
NAVY	E4	CT19216	ARABIC	3	2+	2	0206	N39900
NAVY	O3	2300	ARABIC	5	5	5	0000	N35977
NAVY	E5	AM 8347	ARABIC	5	5	5	9712	N09226
NAVY	E6	EN 4324	ARABIC	3	3	3	0110	N0580A
NAVY	E6	CT18295	ARABIC	2	2	2	9406	N63908
NAVY	E4	EM	ARABIC	2+	2	0	0202	N21351
NAVY	E4	SK	ARABIC	2	4	2	0110	N62995

RESERVE

Deployed in CENTCOM AO
Returned within past 6 months

SSN	Name (last first middle)	Serv	Grade	PMOS	Language	DLPT L	DLPT R	DLPT S	DLPT Date
(b)(6)		USNR	E4	HM 8416	ARABIC	4	4	4	9602
		USNR	E5	CTI 9216	ARABIC	2	2	0	0212
		USNR	E5	AME 8319	ARABIC	5	5	5	9703
		USNR	E4	SH	ARABIC	3	3	3	0206
		USNR	E3	SN 9700	ARABIC	5	5	5	0103
		USNR	E5	CTI 9216	ARABIC	3	2	0	0000
		USNR	E6	CTI 9216	ARABIC	2	2	2+	9511
		USNR	E2	SA	ARABIC	4	4	4	0106
		USNR	E4	CTI 9216	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0003
		USNR	O3	1105	ARABIC	5	5	0	9501
		USNR	E4	EN	ARABIC	2	2	1	0303
		USNR	E4	BM	ARABIC	2	2	1	0304
		USNR	E4	CTI 9216	ARABIC	3	2+	0	0010
		USNR	O6	2105	ARABIC	5	5	5	9712
		USNR	E4	GSE	ARABIC	4	4	4	9805
		USNR	O5	1635	ARABIC	3	3	3	0104
		USNR	O3	1635	ARABIC	3	3	2	0301
		USNR	E4	BM	ARABIC	5	5	5	9707
		USNR	E4	MM	ARABIC	3	3	3	0000
		USNR	E4	CTI 9216	ARABIC	2	3	2	9904
		USNR	E5	SK	ARABIC	5	5	5	0210
		USNR	E5	PN	ARABIC	2	2+	2	9906
		USNR	E3	FN 9760	ARABIC	5	5	5	0110
		USNR	O4	5105	ARABIC	2	2	2	0101
		USNR	E4	CTI 9216	ARABIC	3	2	2	0000
		USNR	E5	AD 6418	ARABIC	5	5	5	0211
		USNR	E4	AT	ARABIC	3	4	2	0105
		USNR	E4	EN	ARABIC	5	5	5	9704
		USNR	E5	GSE	ARABIC	5	5	5	9703
		USNR	E4	BM	ARABIC	4	4	4	0304
		USNR	E4	GSE	ARABIC	5	5	5	0205
		USNR	E4	SH	ARABIC	3	3	2	0304
		USNR	E4	CTI 9216	ARABIC	2	2	0	0205
		USNR	E5	CTI 9216	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0207
		USNR	E4	CTI 9216	ARABIC	3	3	3	0000
		USNR	E5	CTI 9216	ARABIC	2	2	2	0000
		USNR	O3	1615	ARABIC	2	3	2	9901
		USNR	E4	MM	ARABIC	5	5	5	9706
		USNR	E4	CTI 9216	ARABIC	4	4+	0	0212

SSM - Name /last first middle/



Serv	Grade	PMOS	Language	DLPT L	DLPT R	DLPT S	DLPT Date
USNR	O5	1125	ARABIC	4	4	3	9710
USNR	O3	2305	ARABIC	5	5	5	0204
USNR	E3	MS	ARABIC	4	4	4	0109
USNR	E5	CTI	ARABIC	2+	2+	2+	9609
USNR	O6	2105	ARABIC	2	2	2	9706
USNR	E5	SK	ARABIC	3+	3+	5	9109
USNR	O2	1635	ARABIC	2	2	2	0210
USNR	E4	CTI9216	ARABIC	2	2	0	0003

RETIRED

Deployed in CENTCOM AO
Returned within past 6 months

SSN	Serv	Grade	PMOS	Last name	First name	Middle name	Language	DLPT L	DLPT R	DLPT S	Retirement date
(b)(6)							ARABIC	2	3	0	20010801
							ARABIC	2	2	0	20020331
							ARABIC	3	2	0	20020731
							ARABIC	2	3	2	20020401
							ARABIC	3	3	2	20010901
							ARABIC	2	2	2	20021130
							ARABIC	3	3	0	20030401
							ARABIC	2+	3	0	20030331

TAB

F

ACTIVE

██████████
Deployed in CENTCOM AO
Returned within past 6 months

11-L-0559/OSD/31781

USMC

SSN	Name (last first middle)	Serv	Grade	PMOS	Language	DLPT L	DLPT R	DLPT S	DLPT Date
(b)(6)		USMC	E4	0121	ARABIC	3	3	0	0303
		USMC	E4	3531	ARABIC	3	3	0	0111
		USMC	E4	2671	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0211
		USMC	E3	0121	ARABIC	3	3	0	0207
		USMC	E3	2600	ARABIC	2	2	0	0202
		USMC	E4	2671	ARABIC	2+	2+	0	0209
		USMC	E4	6042	ARABIC	3	3	0	0211
		USMC	E3	2671	ARABIC	2	2+	2	0205
		USMC	E5	2671	ARABIC	2	2	0	0303
		USMC	E5	2671	ARABIC	2	2	0	0207
		USMC	E5	2671	ARABIC	2	2	0	0302
		USMC	E5	0656	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0103
		USMC	E6	2671	ARABIC	2+	3	0	0205
		USMC	E5	2671	ARABIC	2	3	0	0305
		USMC	E7	2671	ARABIC	3	3	0	0302
		USMC	O4	0302	ARABIC	3	3	0	0212
		USMC	E3	2600	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0303

SSN Name (last first middle)

Serv Grade PMOS Language DLPT L DLPT R DLPT S DLPT Date

(b)(6)

USMC	E4	2671	ARABIC	2+	2+	0	0304
USMC	E4	2671	ARABIC	2	2	0	0206
USMC	E3	2671	ARABIC	2	2+	2	0212
USMC	O5	0302	ARABIC	2+	2	0	0112
USMC	E2	2671	ARABIC	2	2	0	0109
USMC	E3	2671	ARABIC	2+	3	1+	0206
USMC	O4	7202	ARABIC	2+	2+	1+	9812
USMC	E1	0300	ARABIC	2	2	0	0301
USMC	E2	2600	ARABIC	2	2+	1+	0212
USMC	E6	2671	ARABIC	2	2	0	0304
USMC	E3	2671	ARABIC	2	2	2	0207
USMC	E7	2671	ARABIC	3	3	0	0301
USMC	E4	2671	ARABIC	3	2+	0	0209
USMC	E4	2671	ARABIC	3	3	0	0303
USMC	E1	0100	ARABIC	2	2	0	0304
USMC	E7	2671	ARABIC	3	3	0	0302
USMC	E5	2671	ARABIC	2+	3	0	0212
USMC	E5	2671	ARABIC	3	3	0	0304
USMC	O1	9901	ARABIC	3	3	0	0303
USMC	O3	0302	ARABIC	3	3	0	0204
USMC	E3	2600	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0303
USMC	O3	7562	ARABIC	2	2	2	9408
USMC	E3	2671	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0304
USMC	E5	0231	ARABIC	2+	2+	0	0203
USMC	E4	2671	ARABIC	3	3	0	0208
USMC	E5	2671	ARABIC	3	2	0	0203
USMC	E4	2671	ARABIC	2+	2+	0	0202
USMC	E5	2671	ARABIC	2	2	0	0207

(b)(6) SSN Name (last, first, middle)

Serv	Grade	PMOS	Language	DLPT L	DLPT R	DLPTS	DLPT S	DLPT Date
USMC	E4	2671	ARABIC	2	2	0	0	0211
USMC	E4	2671	ARABIC	2	2	0	0	0304
USMC	W2	2602	ARABIC	2	2	0	0	0107
USMC	O6	9906	ARABIC	2	2	1+	1+	9411
USMC	E6	2671	ARABIC	3	3	0	0	0209
USMC	E5	2671	ARABIC	2+	2	0	0	0207
USMC	E4	2671	ARABIC	2+	2+	0	0	0302
USMC	E3	2600	ARABIC	2+	2+	1+	1+	0303
USMC	E5	2671	ARABIC	2	2	0	0	0208
USMC	E4	2671	ARABIC	2+	3	0	0	0302
USMC	E4	2671	ARABIC	2	2	0	0	0301
USMC	E6	2671	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0	0208
USMC	E5	0200	ARABIC	2	2	2	2	0305
USMC	E6	2671	ARABIC	2	2	0	0	0202
USMC	E5	2671	ARABIC	2+	3	0	0	0202
USMC	E8	3051	ARABIC	3	3	0	0	0205
USMC	E3	0311	ARABIC	2	2+	1	1	0206
USMC	E4	2600	ARABIC	2	2	1+	1+	0110
USMC	E2	2671	ARABIC	2	2+	1+	1+	0205
USMC	E6	2671	ARABIC	2	2	0	0	0110
USMC	E4	2600	ARABIC	2+	2+	1+	1+	0206
USMC	E5	2671	ARABIC	2	2	0	0	0211
USMC	E3	3381	ARABIC	2	2	0	0	0212
USMC	E3	2671	ARABIC	3	3	0	0	0304
USMC	E4	2671	ARABIC	2+	3	0	0	0107
USMC	E3	2671	ARABIC	2	2	0	0	0305
USMC	E3	2671	ARABIC	2+	3	2	2	0212

SSN (b)(6)

Serv	Grade	PMOS	Language	DLPT L	DLPTR	DLPT S	DLPT Date
USMC	E3	2600	ARABIC	2	2+	1	0305
USMC	E7	2671	ARABIC	2	2	0	0107
USMC	E4	0151	ARABIC	3	3	0	0303
USMC	E3	2671	ARABIC	2+	2+	1+	0211
USMC	E6	2671	ARABIC	2	2	0	0009
USMC	E4	2671	ARABIC	2+	2+	0	0207
USMC	E5	2671	ARABIC	2	2	0	0302
USMC	E4	2600	ARABIC	2	2	0	0301
USMC	E4	2671	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0205
USMC	O4	4402	ARABIC	2+	3	0	0211
USMC	E5	2671	ARABIC	3	3	0	0302
USMC	E5	2671	ARABIC	2	2	0	0208
USMC	E8	2691	ARABIC	2	2	0	9709
USMC	O3	7208	ARABIC	3	3	0	0212
USMC	O2	7210	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0108
USMC	O1	9901	ARABIC	2+	3	2	0001
USMC	E6	2671	ARABIC	3	3	0	0303
USMC	E5	1142	ARABIC	3	3	0	0209
USMC	E5	0151	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0205
USMC	E6	2671	ARABIC	3	3	0	0012
USMC	E7	2671	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0211
USMC	E6	2671	ARABIC	3	3	1+	0206
USMC	E4	2671	ARABIC	2+	2+	0	0303
USMC	E7	2671	ARABIC	2+	3	0	0211
USMC	E5	2671	ARABIC	2	2	0	0207
USMC	O1	9901	ARABIC	3	2+	0	0001
USMC	E3	3051	ARABIC	3	3	0	0209
USMC	E7	2141	ARABIC	2+	3	0	0211
USMC	E3	2671	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0303

SSN Name (last first middle)

(b)(6)

SerV	Grade	PMOS	Language	DLPT L	DLPT R	DLPT S	DLPT Date
USMC	E3	2600	ARABIC	2+	2+	2	0302
USMC	E5	7372	ARABIC	2+	3	0	0207
USMC	E4	2671	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0302
USMC	E3	2600	ARABIC	2+	2+	2	0302
USMC	E4	2671	ARABIC	3	3	2+	0107
USMC	E5	2671	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0302
USMC	E6	2671	ARABIC	2	2	0	0210
USMC	E5	2671	ARABIC	2	2	0	0205
USMC	E3	2600	ARABIC	3	3	2	0303
USMC	E4	2671	ARABIC	2	2	1+	0202
USMC	E4	2671	ARABIC	3	3	0	0204
USMC	E3	2600	ARABIC	3	3	2+	0105
USMC	E5	2671	ARABIC	3	2+	0	0202
USMC	E4	2671	ARABIC	2	2	0	0303
USMC	E5	2671	ARABIC	2	2	0	0302
USMC	E6	2671	ARABIC	3	3	0	0302
USMC	O3	4402	ARABIC	2+	3	0	0302
USMC	E3	2671	ARABIC	2+	2+	1+	0206
USMC	E4	2600	ARABIC	2	2+	2	0303
USMC	O3	0402	ARABIC	3	3	0	9503
USMC	E4	2671	ARABIC	2	2	0	0209
USMC	E4	2671	ARABIC	2	2	2	0107
USMC	W1	1310	ARABIC	3	3	0	0204
USMC	E5	2671	ARABIC	2	2	0	0204
USMC	E3	2600	ARABIC	2	2	2	0305

(b)(6)

Serv	Grade	PMOS	Language	DLPT L	DLPT R	DLPT S	DLF
USMC	E3	2600	ARABIC	2	2+	2	C
USMC	E6	2671	ARABIC	2	2	0	C
USMC	O5	0402	ARABIC	3	3	0	C
USMC	E3	2600	ARABIC	2	2+	1+	C
USMC	E3	2671	ARABIC	2	2	1+	C
USMC	E6	2671	ARABIC	2	2	0	C
USMC	E5	2671	ARABIC	2	3	0	C
USMC	O6	9904	ARABIC	3	2+	0	C

RESERVE

Deployed in CENTCOM AO
Returned within past 6 months

11-L-0559/OSD/31788

SSN	Name (last first middle)	Serv	Grade	PMOS	Language	DLPT L	DLPT R	DLPT S	DLPT Date	UIC
(b)(6)		USMCR	E2	SELRES	9900	ARABIC	2+	2+	0	0305
		USMCR	O3	IRR/ING	0602	ARABIC	3	3	0	0012
		USMCR	E4	IRR/ING	0121	ARABIC	3	3	0	0204
		USMCR	E4	IRR/ING	2671	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0104
		USMCR	E4	STAND-BY	2671	ARABIC	2	2	0	0106
		USMCR	E5	IRR/ING	2671	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0102
		USMCR	E5	STAND-BY	2671	ARABIC	3	3	0	0205
		USMCR	E4	IRR/ING	2671	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0108
		USMCR	E5	IRR/ING	2671	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0102
		USMCR	E5	IRR/ING	2671	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0210
		USMCR	E5	IRR/ING	2671	ARABIC	2+	2+	0	0205
		USMCR	E4	IRR/ING	2671	ARABIC	2	2	0	0105
		USMCR	O4	IRR/ING	1302	ARABIC	3	3	0	0304
		USMCR	E5	IRR/ING	2671	ARABIC	3	3	0	0005
		USMCR	E5	STAND-BY	2671	ARABIC	2+	2+	0	0112
		USMCR	E4	IRR/ING	0311	ARABIC	3	3	0	0201

Serv	Grade	PMOS	Language	DLPT L	DLPT R	DLPT S	DLPT Date	UIC
USMCR	E5	SELRES	3531	ARABIC	2+	2+	0	0209
USMCR	E4	STAND-BY	0231	ARABIC	2+	2+	0	0111
USMCR	E5	IRR/ING	2671	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0108
USMCR	E4	IRR/ING	2671	ARABIC	3	2+	0	0110
USMCR	E3	IRR/ING	2111	ARABIC	2+	3	0	9910
USMCR	E5	STAND-BY	2671	ARABIC	3	3	0	0204
USMCR	O3	IRR/ING	0203	ARABIC	2	2	0	0008
USMCR	E5	IRR/ING	2671	ARABIC	2+	3	0	0208
USMCR	E5	IRR/ING	2671	ARABIC	2	3	0	0106
USMCR	E5	IRR/ING	2671	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0108
USMCR	O5	IRR/ING	0802	ARABIC	2+	3	0	0109
USMCR	E4	IRR/ING	1141	ARABIC	3	2+	0	9809
USMCR	O3	IRR/ING	4302	ARABIC	2+	3	1+	9606
USMCR	E4	IRR/ING	0231	ARABIC	3	3	0	0004
USMCR	E5	STAND-BY	2671	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0105
USMCR	E4	IRR/ING	2671	ARABIC	2+	2+	0	0011
USMCR	E5	STAND-BY	2671	ARABIC	2	2	0	0106
USMCR	E4	IRR/ING	2671	ARABIC	2+	3	0	0103
USMCR	O3	SELRES	0302	ARABIC	2	2	0	9805
USMCR	E3	SELRES	3381	ARABIC	2+	2+	0	0112
USMCR	E6	SELRES	3381	ARABIC	2+	2	0	9703
USMCR	E5	IRR/ING	2671	ARABIC	2	2+	0	0210
USMCR	E5	IRR/ING	2671	ARABIC	2	3	0	0107
USMCR	E5	IRR/ING	2671	ARABIC	3	3	0	0201

SSN	Name (last first middle)	Serv	Grade	PMOS	Language	DLPT L	DLPT R	DLPT S	DLI
(b)(6)		USMCR	E6	IRR/ING	2671	ARABIC	3	3	

11-L-0559/OSD/31790

RETIRED

Deployed in CENTCOM AO
Returned within past 6 months

SSN	Serv	Grade	PMOS	Last name	First name	Middle name	Language	DLPT L	DLPT R	DLPT
(b)(6)							ARABIC	2+	3	0
							ARABIC	2	2	1+
							ARABIC	3	3	0

11-L-0559/OSD/31792

TAB

G



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

MAR 10 2003

PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS

SUBJECT: Defense Language Capability


As we continue to prosecute the Global War on Terrorism, the availability of individuals capable of speaking the necessary languages is of increasing concern. Our Defense-wide database of Arabic language speakers, for example, reveals that there are 4500 members of the armed forces (active and selected reserve) identified as Arabic speakers, with almost 2,500 considered proficient at level 2 or higher on the Defense Language Proficiency Test.

To meet our current and emerging language needs it is imperative that we maximize use of all available language speakers. In so doing, we must go beyond a traditional approach of assigning only those with linguist specialties to positions requiring language skills.

Therefore, I ask that you take action to screen all those identified as Arabic, Dari and Pashto speakers, regardless of specialty, to create a base of individuals capable of meeting language requirements. These individuals should be considered eligible for reassignment in support of those language requirements unless the loss of the service member will critically affect the mission capability of the unit to which they are currently assigned. Services shall take positive action to ensure that undertaking these assignments does not adversely effect these individual's advancements and careers. These critical language assignments must be viewed positively in all promotion and selection board processes.

Due to the importance of this skill, it may be necessary to source command requirements without regard to the Service of the individual. We will work with the Joint Staff in reviewing the implementation of this approach.

Please forward a summary of the results of your screening efforts to Mrs. Susan Kelly (Susan.Kelly@osd.mil) (b)(6) of this office by March 21, 2003.


David S. C. Chu

cc: Director, Joint Staff

dispatched 3/10/03



11-L-0559/OSD/31794



GENERAL COUNSEL

GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

INFO MEMO

September 22, 2003, 5:00 p.m.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
FROM: William J. Haynes II *WJ Haynes*
SUBJECT: Legislation on Treatment of Detainees

- In light of the August 13, 2003 Daily Telegraph article entitled "The Guantanamo Solution" you asked whether we have thought about seeking legislation regarding how we should treat the detainees. Tab A.
- The disadvantages of seeking such legislation far outweigh the advantages of seeking such legislation. Nevertheless, more interaction with Congress and the public on this issue could help us and could be achieved through means other than seeking legislation.
- *Reasons to Seek Legislation.*
 - Seeking legislation offers the prospect of additional legitimacy for the continued detention and treatment of the individuals held at Guantanamo Bay (GTMO).
 - The President acts at the height of his power when he acts with congressional authorization.
 - Legislation could reduce arbitrariness and the appearance of arbitrariness in the detention and treatment of detainees.
- *Reasons Not to Seek Legislation.*
 - The President has the legal authority to detain those individuals currently being held at GTMO and to determine the course of their treatment without congressional authorization.
 - Determinations about the detention and treatment of enemies detained during an armed conflict are tactical determinations made in prosecuting a war. The Constitution vests in the President *alone* the ability to make such determinations.
 - Executive branch practice is an important factor in judicial determinations regarding the scope of presidential power. If the President seeks legislation



OSD 19909-04

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when he does not need to do so, he may limit his legal authority as well as the legal authority of future Presidents to act in a similar manner absent congressional authorization.

- Moreover, the President is already acting at the height of his authority in the current context.
 - Congress has authorized the President to detain individuals held at GTMO through its authorization of the use of force, permitting him “to use all necessary and appropriate force” against those responsible for the September 11 attacks and to prevent future such attacks against the United States. 50 U.S.C.A. § 1541 Note (2001).
 - Even if Congress had not expressly authorized the President to detain such individuals, it has done so tacitly through similar authorizations and permitting unbroken executive practice of such detention. As a result, the President would still be acting at the height of his authority.
 - Through the Alien Enemies Act of 1789, 10 U.S.C. § 21, which remains in force today, Congress has authorized the detention and removal of enemy aliens.
 - There is an unbroken history of the President’s authority as Commander in Chief to detain enemy combatants.
- As a matter of policy, seeking legislation would also bear substantial risks.
 - There is no way to predict the rules that Congress would impose.
 - The legislation potentially could limit the President’s ability to react to new intelligence and his ability to gather intelligence from those detained at GTMO.
 - Seeking legislation from Congress regarding the detention of those at GTMO may also expose the military commission process to legislative efforts to dictate the rules and procedures to be used by the commissions.
- *Alternative to Seeking Legislation.* The reduction of arbitrariness and the appearance of arbitrariness can be accomplished through actions undertaken by the Department.
 - The Department could adopt a plan for the periodic review of the need for continued detention of those individuals detained at GTMO, which could reduce any arbitrariness present in the current system.
 - The appearance of arbitrariness could be reduced through making that plan public, to the maximum practicable.
 - As you may recall, I briefed you a few weeks ago on a concept for such a process. Tab B. We are currently seeking views within the

Department on that concept, which we revised based on comments received in the briefing. Tab C.

- Reaching out to Congress in ways other than seeking legislation may be helpful to us.
 - We need not seek legislation in order to reach out to Congress.
 - There is value in going to the Hill and inviting their informal participation, such as in seeking their comment on any long-term detention plan that we might wish to adopt.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachment:
As stated

Prepared by: Jennifer L. Koester, DoD OGC,

(b)(6)

August 14, 2003

TO: Jim Haynes
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Detainees

I just read this piece from the *London Daily Telegraph* on Guantanamo. I wonder if we have given any thought to going up and asking for legislation as to how we should treat the detainees, so we get off the hook legally.

Thanks.

Attach.

"The Guantanamo Solution," *London Daily Telegraph*, August 13, 2003

DHR:db
081403-12

.....
Please respond by 9/5/03

U 21682-03

London Daily Telegraph
August 13, 2003

The Guantanamo Solution

President Bush and Donald Rumsfeld, the US Defence Secretary, have been unfairly maligned in this country for their decision to put terrorist suspects on trial in Guantanamo Bay.

Paradoxically, their difficulties stem not so much from their alleged illiberalism as from a desire to maintain some measure of due process in a time of a new and horrific kind of asymmetric warfare.

The Bush Administration has been wrestling with the problem - not dissimilar to that faced by Whitehall during the early years of the Troubles in Northern Ireland - about whether to treat suspects as prisoners of war or common criminals. His dilemma was understandable. Had he called them PoWs, he would have been obliged by the Geneva Conventions to release them at the end of hostilities.

But when can a war against global terrorism be said to be at an end? With the fall of the Taliban? With the deposition of Saddam? Mr Bush had every reason to believe - he still has - that, if he were to release the prisoners in Camp Delta, a great many of them would return immediately to the war against the West, and plot a new atrocity like the destruction of the Twin Towers. That was something that no responsible leader could countenance.

But if he could not call his captives PoWs, nor could he treat them quite like common criminals. Under the US Constitution, criminal suspects have to be put on trial, and judged according to the rules of evidence. Any competent defence lawyer would make short work of testimony gathered from secret sources or from prisoners held for many months, in harsh conditions, without access to lawyers.

Mr Bush's liberal instincts told him that it was wrong to hold possibly innocent men for long periods without trial. But, equally, he knew that no ordinarily conducted criminal trial could be expected to result in a conviction, no matter how guilty the defendant might be.

So it was that the President hit upon the idea of treating them neither as PoWs nor as criminals, but as something in between. He decided to put them on trial by military tribunal, and instructed his Defence Secretary, Donald Rumsfeld, to draft special rules of evidence and procedure that would make convictions more likely than in a civilian court. In so doing, he landed himself in the worst of all possible worlds.

Mr Rumsfeld's rules, drafted on March 21, 2002, are not nearly as illiberal as his critics maintain. They include many safeguards of the rights of the defendant. But the fact is that they fall well short of the standards of justice required by civilian courts in both Britain and America.

By being as liberal and fair-minded as he dared, Mr Bush succeeded only in making himself look more authoritarian than he appeared before he suggested trials of any sort. The British Government, which has never wanted responsibility for British prisoners held in Camp Delta, has been forced into the hypocritical position of defending the rights of its citizens against Mr Bush.

Only a fool would dispute that Mr Bush was right to hold and interrogate prisoners while they might still have useful information about planned terrorist atrocities. But the longer their detention goes on, in this limbo between PoW and criminal status, the less justified it seems to many in this country.

The answer, surely, lies not in subjecting the prisoners to military tribunals, but in regularising their status under the law. During the Second World War, many Germans and Italians were humanely interned in Britain, under a form of administrative detention that made no comment on their guilt or innocence of Nazi sympathies. The prisoners in Guantánamo Bay should be treated like that.

December 30, 2002 6:55 PM

TO: Tom White
Gen. Shinseki

CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Gen. Myers
POWELL MOORE

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Stryker

Attached is a letter I received from Congressman Saxton from the Armed Services Committee on the Stryker. Chairman Duncan Hunter raised it with me. I would be curious to know how you respond to this.

Thanks.

Attach.
11/19/02 Cong. Saxton ltr to SecDef re: Stryker

DHR:dh
123001-18 (ts computer) doc

.....
Please respond by 01/10/03

U00219-03



1/6/03 11:13 AM

CLASSIFIED
SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

203 JUN -6 PM 5:47

FROM: Steve Cambone *sc*

SUBJECT: Transformation

You asked for a short list of things we might do if we had the funds:

1. Accelerate next generation intelligence capabilities.

- The heart of new capabilities: "universal situational awareness"

- Treat intell databases as if they were databases accessed today through the internet.

- Those internet databases are refreshed without specific demand from the user; the existence of the database, and the rate of refreshment are a function of user interest; but once the level of interest is established, the database is refreshed at a rate sufficient to satisfy the interest.

- How would it work?

- Example Database: Iraq

- All entries from all intell sources converted to digital formats, tagged and entered in database

- Database indexed, with all entries cross referenced

- Each new datum entered as collected

- User demand for a particular datum would go from database to collector which would automatically collect on next available opportunity

- Deconfliction schemes sort priority activity for a given collector

- New datum posted as collected

- Result: User drives collection, not as today, the collector giving the user what the collector can gather and thinks the user should have.

381

6 Jan 03

- Think of the PDB everyday. Except for what is specifically asked for, it is filled with what the collector has make available to the analyst.
 - If it were a web-based product, you could enter your preferences and search engines would find what you want.
 - As the system became smart about your choices, it would adapt, providing more of what you want.
- The effect on operations could be profound:
 - Planner would have a readily available, time-phased history of his target in all “INTS.”
 - He could adjust his target folders in real time
 - He could the latest data even as his operation unfolds.
- Assumptions:
 - Persistent surveillance with which to build the baseline
 - Internet-based database and database access system
 - Requires complete overhaul of our current system.

2. Improved Computer Network Capabilities

- We added considerable money in FY 04 for computer network defense.
- We created Strategic Command and gave it the global IO—e.g., computer network attack, defense and exploitation—mission.
- However, the DOD is not “manned, trained and equipped” to conduct operations in this emerging mission area.
- It may be that we need to create something for Computer/Information Operations akin to the reforms on space that we implemented last year.
- At a minimum we are looking at investing billions per year.

3. At least 2-3 more UCAV demonstration programs

- The F/A-22, JSF has no real competitor—manned or unmanned
- We understand the limits of manned aircraft; need to learn whether and how UCAVs can make a difference

- On current plans, we do not have enough variety; need to get to situation like the 1960s when multiple airframes were in development.
- Result: more competition, potentially lower cost and increased effectiveness for known missions, might develop new mission capabilities

4. New forms of access to space

- Single stage to orbit still languishes
- New fuels, materials, engines, etc. needed
- New applications need concept development

5. New ship designs

- We continue to build mono-hulled, steel/aluminum ships
- Composite materials, with two or more hulls, with different propulsion designs are possible
- Result: speed, stealth, new ways to do minesweeping, ASW, etc.

6. New weapon designs

- We have few programs that aren't driven either by high explosive (bombs, bullets, artillery) or nuclear energy.
- Alternative energy sources could revolutionize warfare, e.g.,
 - Directed energy
 - Electro-magnetic rail guns
 - Non-lethal weapons
- Would require a joint program office, incorporating DARPA, Service, National Laboratory activity.
- Investment would be needed at a level to permit extensive experimentation and testing.
- Key is to avoid creating the White Elephant or Silver Bullet; what we need are weapons applicable to a wide variety of circumstances.

7. Undersea Operations

- A great deal of investment has gone into beating surface to air missile systems, e.g., F-22, JSF, etc.
- Little has been devoted to undersea activity, to include anti-submarine warfare (ASW), unwarmed attack (underwater, surface, land, air), etc.
- The advent of quieter diesel subs, capable of air independent operations, advanced torpedoes, computing to support adversary listening devices, etc., all point to the possibility of “sub-surface anti-access” operations by potential adversaries.
- Current submarine designs—the Virginia class—may not meet our needs in the coming decades. We have nearly abandoned the underwater arrays by which we mapped activity below the surface.
- New investment is needed to characterize the emerging threat and design responses.

8. Bio-mechanical devices

- Should give more support to robotics—even the big robots of today
- Future is in micro systems, including those that are self-constructing and healing; industry has started down this path; not obvious we are exploiting that effort

9. High speed computing

- This is related to Computer operations, above, but goes beyond the operational domain. Moore’s law continues to hold. But we are making progress in sometimes inelegant ways—massive parallel processing, for example.
- Moreover, much of our problem with advanced systems is related to software/hardware integration.
- More attention to what it takes to do high speed computing and integrating hardware and software is key to continued progress in the development of advanced systems.

10. New materials, e.g.,

- Ambient temperature, conducting materials for advanced computer applications;
- Other materials are needed to enable concepts like “adaptive wings”—e.g., aircraft wings that can be reshaped in flight to affect drag, radar signature, etc.
- Armor protection is another area for work. Materials capable of withstanding the impact of projectiles—bullets, tank rounds, shrapnel, etc.—are still desired.
- Lightweight, high strength materials for applications in space, underwater, etc., are of interest.

12:28 PM

TO: Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: December 21, 2002
SUBJECT: **Transformation**

Please give me a list of the things we are not doing that would be transformational that we would be doing if we had a larger budget. Not one hundred things, but 10, 15-20.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
122102.13

Please respond by: _____

1/15/03

U00220-03

11-L-0559/OSD/31808



HEALTH AFFAIRS

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1200

SECRET

2003 JAN -7 AM 7:54

INFO MEMO

JAN 3 2003

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: *William Winkenwerder, Jr.*
William Winkenwerder, Jr., MD, ASD (Health Affairs)

SUBJECT: Update on Maternal and Child Health Care Project in Afghanistan

- On December 16, 2002, you asked the question, "How are we doing on the midwifery program?" (TAB A)
- The Department of Defense (Stability Operations) facilitated a December 6-16, 2002 joint Department of Defense/Health and Human Services trip to Afghanistan to select a site and develop an implementation plan to provide post-graduate Obstetrics/Gynecology teaching clinic for Afghan physicians and mid-level health care providers (e.g. midwives).
- The Afghani Minister of Public Health requested the Rabia Balkhi Hospital in Kabul be selected as the teaching clinic site.
- Health and Human Services and Health Affairs physicians agreed this is an optimal location for the clinic. The hospital is a large women's general hospital, but emphasizes maternal/child health care. The hospital already has a large physician training program to serve as a training base and a potential training staff for the clinic.
- Civil Affairs soldiers have already begun renovation of the hospital. Renovation completion is expected within 90 days. Work is proceeding in two shifts per day.
- The Health and Human Services Team Chief, Dr. Peter Van Dyck, briefed a plan for the clinic to the Health and Human Services Secretary on December 23, 2002, but has not yet filed his written report. Health and Human Services is working to identify funding of this program other than the Department of Defense-funded reconstruction. Health and Human Services expects initial phases of the program to begin within 90 days and has formed three committees to work on details of the proposal.
- Representatives of the Department of Defense and Health and Human Services will meet on January 7th at the Pentagon to discuss the next steps for the project.

COORDINATIONS: TAB B

Prepared by: CAPT Jack Smith, C&PP, (b)(6) PCDOCS # 44051, 44403

Winkenwerder, William, Assistant Secretary of Defense, ASD(HA)

From: Ritchie, Elspeth, LtCol, OASD(HA)/TMA
Sent: Friday, December 13, 2002 5:46 PM
To: Coates, Marianne, CIV, OASD/HA; Winkenwerder, William, Assistant Secretary of Defense, ASD(HA); Tornberg, David, DASD/C&PP, OASD(HA); Smith, Jack, CAPT, OASD(HA)
Subject: FW: A Country in Need: U.S. Forces Help Restore Afghan Health Care

-----Original Message-----

From: Press Service [mailto:afisnews_sender@DTIC.MIL]
Sent: Friday, December 13, 2002 3:31 PM
To: DEFENSE-PRESS-SERVICE-L@DTIC.MIL
Subject: A Country in Need: U.S. Forces Help Restore Afghan Health Care

By Linda D. Kozaryn
American Forces Press Service

WASHINGTON, Dec. 13, 2002 -- Pictures coming out of Afghanistan show a land seemingly forgotten by time -- and modern medicine. After 20 years of war, medical clinics and hospitals are in ruins and in dire need of basic medical supplies and equipment.

With U.S. and coalition aid, the situation is on the mend.

The United States has been "indispensable" in helping to restore health care in Afghanistan, according to Dr. Abdullah Sherzai, director of planning at the Afghan Health Ministry in Kabul.

"Just the presence of the American military creates the security background within which you can work -- from nutritional work, to health care, to reconstruction," he said. "The Afghan people understand this and we appreciate it."

Sherzai, a neurologist and a U.S. citizen, gave up his research work at the National Institutes of Health in May to go to Afghanistan. This week, he accompanied Health Ministry officials to Washington to meet with U.S. government leaders.

During a Dec. 10 interview at the Pentagon, Sherzai served as spokesman for Afghan Deputy Health Minister Ferozudin Feroz. Expressing the minister's appreciation for America's help, Sherzai said the Afghan people hope the United States intends to create a long-term partnership with Afghanistan.

"The purpose of our visit is to make sure that the world attention, specifically America's attention, is still kept on Afghanistan," Sherzai said. "We are very thankful for all the help, but there is a lot more needed. We're not even close to resolving our problems."

Afghanistan needs help rebuilding, equipping and supplying its medical facilities, according to Sherzai. The first step toward security is health care. It should be everyone's No. 1 priority, he stressed.

"There's nothing more primary and immediate than health care," he said. "Without health, women aren't able to secure the household and, therefore, society is not secure. Without health, men are not able to work and the household situation falls apart and, again, society is insecure."

The people suffering most in Afghanistan are women and children, he reported. Of every 100,000 pregnancies, an estimated 1,600 women die. In one province alone, 7,000 of every

11-L-0559/OSD/31810

100,000 pregnancies result in the mother's death.

"We would like your help to change these statistics and help us reverse the calamity that is the health care system for women in Afghanistan," Sherzai said.

The U.S. Defense Department, he pointed out, is helping to rebuild Rabia Balkhi, one of the major women's hospitals in Afghanistan. During the Taliban regime, it was the only women's hospital in operation. The hospital was completely destroyed after the Taliban fell, he said, and now "Americans are the main component reconstructing it."

According to Feroz, about 174 hospitals in Afghanistan need some reconstruction and refurbishing.

Afghanistan's overall health care system right now is "pretty basic," Sherzai said. "We are way below 'zero' at this point. We need a lot of help just to come to an even playing ground.

"There's plenty to be done," he affirmed. "We need a little bit of coordination, and if all our coalition partners and all our friends take one section, we'll be in good shape."

The U.S. military, in particular, Sherzai said, "has been of great help so far -- indispensable help."

U.S. medics are providing basic medical care to Afghan men, women and children. Military veterinarians are treating Afghan farm animals. U.S. forces have helped rehabilitate clinics around Bagram and completely refurbished and reconstructed one hospital. Troops have also dug several hundred wells.

"The American military has multiple campaigns of immunization, treatment and reconstruction going on right now," Sherzai said. Spanish and Jordanian medical officials have set up hospitals. Other coalition partners have focused assistance in different areas.

The Afghan people greatly appreciate these efforts, Sherzai said, and would welcome more U.S. and coalition medical care beyond Bagram and Kabul.

The DoD, Department of Health and Human Services and U.S. Agency for International Development are "an incredible force in Afghanistan," Sherzai concluded. "We appreciate the collaborative nature of their help, and (hope) they'll take a part in the reconstruction of a lot of the clinics in Afghanistan.

"We hope the Defense Department and the rest of the team will help in refurbishing those as well, because no matter how many clinics we have, when there are obstructive emergencies, the clinics can't take care of that, so there has to be a referral system that takes these patients from the clinics into the hospitals."

U.S. military officials are now seeking guidance from the Health Ministry on what they can do next. "They want to participate in a collaborative, organized fashion in rehabilitating and reconstructing the health care system," Sherzai said. "That's of utmost importance to us."

Helping the ministry gives legitimacy to the government, which is directly related to security, he said. At present, the Health Ministry is "semi-organized."

The ministry has the capacity to receive help and disperse it. "We don't need to have a middle man, or go through multiple levels," Sherzai said. "Hopefully, within a few months, we will have the financial structure to take the money, have accountability and transparency to show that what you gave was directly transferred into a clinic, directly linked to the health care of this woman and this woman and this woman."

Along with U.S. and coalition military forces, he noted, nongovernment organizations also have been an indispensable help.

As the Afghan government restores health care, Sherzai said, the NGOs and others can help in the interim. "They have to come with the realization that they have to work themselves out of business. They have to give capacity to the Afghan government itself and also to the private sector. But even in the next few years, they'll be indispensable. We need to use their help and their capacity building."

American church groups and private U.S. citizens are also doing what they can to help, according to Sherzai.

"The Memphis-Afghanistan Friendship Council has a relationship with us on a continuing basis. They came to educate people. Other Americans are coming to Afghanistan. There are a lot of American church groups that have come to Afghanistan and helped financially.

"Loma Linda University is directly helping our medical school. Tufts University is directly helping our nutrition department. Georgetown University has relations with Afghanistan. Johns Hopkins University is also helping us directly. National Institutes of Health has sent us equipment through Health and Human Services. Nebraska University is helping us with capacity-building and education."

Sherzai said people who want to help could communicate directly with the Ministry of Health by writing to neurondr@hotmail.com.

200212133a.jpg U.S. Army Capt. David Gann of the 82nd Forward Support Battalion examines an Afghan girl from the village of Qadzi Kariz during a humanitarian medical aid visit. The 82nd FSB is an element of the 82nd Airborne Division at Kandahar Army Airfield, Afghanistan. Photo by Spc. Preston Cheeks, USA.

200212133a_hr.jpg High-resolution image available.

200212133b.jpg Afghan women wait in line for U.S. medical care in the village of Deh Baba Ali, Afghanistan. Soldiers of the 339th Combat Support Hospital were on hand to provide medical assistance to Afghan locals as part of a medical assistance mission. Providing aid such as this is part of Operation Enduring Freedom. Photo by Spc. Jeremy Colvin, USA.

200212133b_hr.jpg High-resolution image available.


200212133c.jpg Three girls of the Afghanistan village of Qadzi Kariz, sit outside the perimeter of a U.S. medical aid station waiting to receive care from medics of the 102nd Forward Surgical Team, which is attached to the 82nd Airborne Division at Kandahar Army Airfield. U.S. Army photo by Spc. Preston Cheeks, USA.

200212133c_hr.jpg High-resolution image available.

NOTE: This is a plain text version of a web page. If your e-mail program did not properly format this information, you may view the story at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Dec2002/n12132002_200212133.html Any photos, graphics or other imagery included in the article may also be viewed at this web page.

=====
Visit the Defense Department's Web site for the latest news and information about America's response to the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and the war against terrorism: "Defend America" at <http://www.DefendAmerica.mil>.

December 16, 2002 6:01 PM

TO: Bill Winkenwerder
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Midwifery Program

How are we doing on the midwifery program?

Thanks.

DHR dh
121602-41

.....
Please respond by 01/03/03

11-L-0559/OSD/31813

LL19784-02

MIDWIFERY SNOWFLAKE

COORDINATION

CoS, HA

Ms. Diana Tabler


1/3/03

PDASD, HA

Mr. Wyatt

USD, P&R

Dr. David S. C. Chu


6 Jan 03



January 3, 2003 8:29 AM

TO: LTG Mike Hayden
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR
SUBJECT: Breakthrough

Thanks for your note on the breakthrough. It sounds terrific.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
010303-12



Please respond by _____

ADD. 1

3 Jan 03



COMPTROLLER

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1100 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1100


SECRET

203 JAN -7 PM 5:12

INFO MEMO

January 7, 2003, 3:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dov S. Zakheim 

SUBJECT: Supplemental

- Newt is right, it would be advantageous to align our supplemental request with the congressional schedule to enact the FY 2003 funding for the domestic agencies.
- We have finalized the initial supplemental request for ongoing operations. If the Office of Management and Budget approves the supplemental request in an expeditious manner, Congress will have our request by late January.
- I would add that given the urgency of finding funds for allies such as Turkey, the case for an early supplemental becomes even stronger.
- The supplement request totals \$19.9 billion. This includes \$13 billion for deployment-related costs, \$4 billion for reserve component mobilization, \$1.5 billion for preparatory tasks and \$1.5 billion for other costs, such as reimbursement for host nation support.
- A second supplemental request will address future operations. It is premature to submit this request now because it will raise questions about operational plans that cannot be discussed at this time. The Services have just finalized their cost estimates. As with the first supplemental, my staff will work with the Joint Staff to review the requirements. We should be ready to submit this supplemental request in February.

110.01


7 Jan 03

COORDINATION: None required.

Prepared By: John M. Evans, (b)(6)

U00251 / 03

December 23, 2002 10:50 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Dov Zakheim
Powell Moore
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Supplemental

We need to get our supplemental on a bill in January. What do we do to do that?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
122302-21

.....
Please respond by 01/03/03

December 23, 2002 5:35 PM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
Dov Zakheim
Steve Cambone

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Supplemental

Attached is a useful e-mail from Newt on the supplemental. I agree with his assessment. Let me know what you folks think, and let's get moving.

I talked to the President on Friday about an early supplemental, and he agrees with us. The Vice President and Andy Card were in the room.

Thanks.

Attach.

12/07/02 Gingrich e-mail to SecDef re: Supplemental

DHR:dh
122302-62

.....
Please respond by 01/10/03



117

January 2, 2003 9:07 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: John Walters

Handwritten scribble

Please check and find out how well we are cooperating with John Walters. Read his Christmas note.

Thanks.

Attach.
12/02 Walters card to SecDef

DHR:dh
010203-12

.....

Please respond by 01/24/03

200404

1/7 SECDEF HAS SEEN
2003

SecDef -

We are cooperating in that we scaled back but did not gut his military detainee roster. Otherwise, we have the ongoing counter-drug activities that have a mixed record of support/interest in DoD. I have asked DR Chu and Marshall Billingslea for their own views as they work the programs of interest. Di Rita

2/4/03

U00256 / 03

11-L-0559/OSD/31819



December 20, 2002

Dear Don,

At the end of my first year as director of the Drug Office, I want to thank you for your continued support at this time of war. I know this has been difficult in the face of other demands. Thanks for listening to our proposals and allowing us to maintain a smaller number of outstanding professionals from the review. I would ask that you consider adding only the current

Senior Military Advisor position to the new list of detailees because I have found such an officer to be of tremendous value.

We have just seen survey results showing we have drug use by young people heading down again for the first time ~~to~~ in 10 years. Thanks for DOD's help in the national effort.

Happy holidays to you and Joyce and your entire family. Regards, Ben



2003 JAN -8 AM 11: 11

January 3, 2003 9:20 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: List of Documents

Please pull together a list of all of those documents we talked about yesterday that the Joint Staff, the Chairman and the Vice Chairman seemed to think they have to put out on vision, strategies and all that stuff.

381

We ought to get our arms around them, compare them with what we put out overall and get a single DoD document rather than a Joint Staff document. It is just a lot of people spinning their wheels doing things we probably have to edit and improve.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
010303-19

.....

Please respond by 01/24/03

3 Jan 03

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE CORRESPONDENCE ACTION REPORT

This form must be completed and forwarded to the Correspondence Control Division (CCD), WHS Room 3A948 Suspense Desk, (b)(6) FAX Number: (b)(6)

(b)(6)

Action Agency **JCS**

Suspense Date **01/15/2003**

1. ACTION TAKEN (Check one)

- a. ACTION HAS BEEN COMPLETED (Copy attached)
- b. REQUEST EXTENSION OF SUSPENSE DATE TO _____ (Justify below)
- c. INTERIM REPLY HAS BEEN SENT (Copy attached) EXTEND SUSPENSE TO _____ (Justify below)
- d. REQUEST CANCELLATION (Justify below)
- e. REQUEST TRANSFER TO _____ (Justify below /include POC Name & Phone Number)
- f. REQUEST DOWNGRADE TO _____ (Justify below)

2. JUSTIFICATION

After review by the Joint Staff (DJ-5 and DJS level) and previous discussions with the appropriate offices within OSD, believe this has been answered by other means and this action should be closed out.

381

3. REPORTING AGENCY

a. ACTION AGENCY Joint Staff	e. APPROVING AUTHORITY (Service Secretary/Under Secretary/ASD/Military/Executive Assistant Level) Signature: <i>Francis W. Diehard</i> Date Signed: 6/26/2003
b. NAME OF ACTION OFFICER _____	

c. TELEPHONE NO. (b)(6)	5. ACTION TAKEN (For EXSEC/ Correspondence Control Division Use Only)																					
d. DATE 06/26/2003	<table border="1" style="width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse;"> <tr> <td style="width: 33%;">a. EXT</td> <td style="width: 33%;"><input type="checkbox"/> Approved</td> <td style="width: 33%;"><input type="checkbox"/> Disapproved</td> </tr> <tr> <td>b. CANX</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/> Approved</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/> Disapproved</td> </tr> <tr> <td>c. DWNGRD</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/> Approved</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/> Disapproved</td> </tr> <tr> <td>d. TRANSFER</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/> Approved</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/> Disapproved</td> </tr> <tr> <td colspan="3">e. OTHER (Specify) _____</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Signature</td> <td colspan="2">Date Signed</td> </tr> <tr> <td> </td> <td colspan="2"> </td> </tr> </table>	a. EXT	<input type="checkbox"/> Approved	<input type="checkbox"/> Disapproved	b. CANX	<input type="checkbox"/> Approved	<input type="checkbox"/> Disapproved	c. DWNGRD	<input type="checkbox"/> Approved	<input type="checkbox"/> Disapproved	d. TRANSFER	<input type="checkbox"/> Approved	<input type="checkbox"/> Disapproved	e. OTHER (Specify) _____			Signature	Date Signed				
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4. CCD CONTROL # U00271-03																						

(3 Jan 03)

SD FORM 391, DEC 2000

R 400271-03



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

INFO MEMO

CM-700-03
8 January 2003

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RBM 1/6*

SUBJECT: Report on the Suitability of the Eritrea Range

- In response to your request (TAB A), the following information is provided.
- The Eritrea range offered for US use can replace some aspects of Vieques. It provides a useful training alternative for carrier battle groups (CVBGs) while conducting operations in the vicinity of the Red Sea. Transiting units or deployed units can use Eritrea to their advantage in two primary areas:
 - Naval gunfire proficiency training
 - Amphibious training
- While valuable, the Eritrea range lacks the following key elements inherent in the Vieques range that the Navy considers necessary for training prior to deployment:
 - not close enough to US east coast ports for use in predeployment CVBG certification.
 - location in the Red Sea offers limited air operations maneuver space for the CVBG.
 - no suitable alternate airfields in close proximity to accommodate aircraft that cannot land on the carrier with live ordnance malfunctions. This is vital to carrier safety.
 - existing range infrastructure will not support day and night aircraft operations.

COORDINATION: TAB B

Prepared By: Lt Gen N. A. Schwartz, USAF, Director for Operations (b)(6)

TAB B

COORDINATION PAGE

USN

CAPT D. D. Thompson


20 December 2002



January 8, 2003 7:23 AM

TO: Bill Steiger
Director, International Affairs,
Office of the Chief of Staff,
Office of the Secretary of Health and Human Services

CC: Bill Winkenwerder

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Midwife Program

I hope the midwife program doesn't migrate up into a major women's hospital. I think the midwife idea was solid and important, and there is always a tendency for things to be elevated up.

What is happening?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
010803-8

AFghanis

8 Jan 03



January 6, 2003 8:15 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Reserve Call-Ups

Let's get me some more headroom for Reserve call-ups. We need to keep track of where I am and of where they are. It looks like we are close to the limit that I set, and it looks like we could go as high as the limit the President set.

(A) 3/2/03

Let's get a projection.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
010603-5

.....

Please respond by 01/17/03

1/7
To: Dr Chu -
Would you proposal
to DepSec help with this?
Please advise in either event
J. Di Rita

Larry Di Rita

1/7



January 8, 2003 3:16 PM

TO: ADM Giambastiani
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: House

Is this the house of the ex-Senior Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense?

If so, where is the Secretary of Defense's house?

Happy New Year!

Attach.
Card

DHR:dh
010803-25

33550



SECDEF CABLES DISTRIBUTION	
SECDEF	
SPLASST	
EXECSEC	
DEPSECDEF	
C&D	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
CCD	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
USDP	
CABLECH	
FILE	

8 Jan 03

7128 Snowflake
L-0000



August 20, 2002 5:59 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita

~~FROM: Donald Rumsfeld~~ DR

SUBJECT: Briefing Senator Hagel

Please get on top of this. I am concerned about it.

Thanks.

Attach.
08/20/02 SecDef memo to ASD(LA) 082002-17

DHR:dh
082002-18



Please respond by 09/05/02

Done

9/9

337

20 Aug 02

U00587 / 03

August 20, 2002 5:57 PM

TO: Powell Moore
CC: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Briefing Senator Hagel

I don't feel like I am being kept up to date on how we are briefing Hagel—who is doing it, where it is being done, whether or not I am aware of it before it happens, what the topics are, and who is sitting in.

I need to be on top of that. It is important, and I do not feel like anyone is getting back to me.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
082002-17

.....
Please respond by 09/04/02



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000
INFO MEMO

2003 JAN 14 AM 8:00

January 13, 2003 – 1:30 PM

PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: DR. DAVID S. C. CHU, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(PERSONNEL AND READINESS) *David S. C. Chu*

SUBJECT: Reducing Turbulence—SNOWFLAKE

- Tab A identifies a central contributor to today's turbulence: the 1990s drawdown reduced long-tour structure (e.g., Europe) at a pace three times faster than short-tours (e.g., Korea). This hiked turbulence.
- As you see at Tab B, most rotations (59%) are caused by people entering or quitting service, followed by postings overseas or returning from overseas (22%), by intra-theater (including CONUS) "developmental" assignments (13%), and by professional education or training (5%).
- I believe that reductions in forward stationed forces – particularly in Europe – should be a priority, as I argued in our recent meeting. Per your direction, I will work with PA&E to develop a preliminary proposal within 30 days. Meanwhile, there are a number of other steps that can generate quick results:
 - Stabilize Where it Counts Most. This includes the generals or admirals, as well as commanders of all grades – those are key.
 - Managing General and Flag Officers. We are scheduled to brief you on January 28 on new approaches to improve stability. Currently, average time in each job is 23 months.
 - Command Stability. We should establish 24 months as a required minimum now. Most services are meeting or exceeding that on average (Tab C). You (or I) should discuss this with the Service Secretaries and Chiefs. A further goal could be extending the average by six months or possibly longer. The downside, of course, is that fewer officers will have had this experience.
 - Other Tour Lengths: We are looking at other positions and locations where longer minimum tours are appropriate. We will be ready to brief you on this initiative within 30 days.



- Voluntary Incentives: We can make it in the individual's interest to want a longer tour (Tab D).

- New Educational Paradigms. School seats at Staff and War Colleges did not shrink in proportion to the force; thus, opportunity for resident attendance went up. Should we bring that opportunity back to preceding levels? Can we accomplish educational goals in ways that reduce turbulence?
 - Opportunity. The present opportunity is richer than the past by a few percentage points. Had the opportunity held constant, about 600 fewer officers, grade O4-O6, would be moving each year to meet professional education demands.

 - Length of Residency. I have tasked the Services to evaluate their PME curriculum and recommend modules for distance learning, as a means of reducing PCS moves and associated turbulence in jobs. Their first reports are due March 5th.

- There are other steps specific to the circumstances of the individual Services. I will begin developing these for action. A first important one involves the Army: The separation of its schoolhouse system (e.g., the Armor School at Fort Knox) from its maneuver units (e.g., Fort Hood) induces geographic turbulence as individuals move from troop positions to instructor positions and back. I will include this issue in Ray DuBois' BRAC effort.

RECOMMENDATION: Info only

Attachments: As stated

Prepared by: Captain Stephen M. Wellock, (b)(6)

A

Changes in OCONUS Strengths and Rotational Moves (All figures in thousands)			
	FY 87	FY 97	% Change
Long-Tour structure	247.7	89.4	-64
Short-Tour structure	42.2	33.4	-21
Total OCONUS Structure	289.9	122.8	-58
Rotational Moves	151.7	73.0	-52

PCS Moves per 1,000 End Strength, FY97		
	Officer	Enlisted
Accession and separation	162	436
Rotational	97	158
Other (training, operational, unit)	150	52
Total	409	646

PCS Environment

Types of PCS Travel

ACCESSION—A move to a new station or assignment.

SEPARATION—A move to a new station or assignment.


Rotational—Between CONUS and overseas (if transoceanic travel is involved)

Operational—Within CONUS and between stations overseas

Training—CONUS moves to or from training of 20 weeks or more (excludes accessions)

Unit—In connection with relocation /establishment /disestablishment of an organized unit

Number of Moves (FY01)



* MustMoves

c

Average Time in Command	
Army	MONTHS
GO (Line Cmd)	23
Field Grade	24
Navy	
FO (Line Cmd)	30
Senior Grade	28
USMC	
GO (Line Cmd)	24
Field Grade	24
Air Force	
GO (Line Cmd)	25
Field Grade	24
Average Time in Command: 25	

D

Stabilization Incentives

The following authorities support the goal of reducing personnel turbulence by increasing retention and stability. Special and incentive pays work in concert with robust compensation and enhanced quality of life factors to affect an individual's retention decision. A decision to stay means one less person needs to be replaced, trained and relocated to a new duty station--the retention of a trained and ready individual ultimately impacts job tenure. Other authorities specifically target "voluntary" overseas tours. Together these authorities work to increase personnel stability.

FY 2003 NDAA –Issues

- **Pay Raises** – The January 1, 2003 pay raise was targeted as per the Department's proposal and the President's budget. All members received a minimum raise of 4.1% (ECI+1/2%), with additional raises targeted to mid-grade officers and NCOs. The average raise was 4.7%.
- **BAH – Reduction in Out-of-Pocket Expenses** – The President's budget continued the Secretary of Defense plan to lower out-of-pocket housing costs from 11.3 percent in 2002 to 7.5 percent in 2003 and to eliminate average out-of-pocket costs altogether by 2005.
- **Assignment Incentive Pay** – Provided authority for monthly incentive pay to a member while in a 'hard-to-fill' assignment designated by the Service Secretary. Payable up to \$1,500 per month in addition to any other pay and allowance to which entitled.
- **Increased Maximum Amounts Payable for Medical Officers** – Increased maximum multiyear retention bonus from \$14,000 to \$50,000 and special pay from \$36,000 to \$50,000.
- **Increased Maximum Amounts Payable for Other Health Care Professionals** – Increased maximum rates per year for dental officers, nurses, optometrists and pharmacy officers.
- **Retention Incentives for Health Care Providers Qualified in a Critical Skill** – Provided exceptions to 'maximum bonus amount' and 'years of service limitation.'
- **Extension of Leave Travel Deferral Period for Members on Consecutive Overseas Tours of Duty** – Allowed leave travel anytime before consecutive tour and up to 1 additional year if travel precluded by duty in conjunction with a Contingency Operation.

- **Expansion of Vehicle Storage Authority** – Authorized storage of privately owned vehicles in CONUS when assigned to Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, N. Mariana's, or any US Possession.
- **Overseas Tour Extension Incentive Program** - Modified leave incentive to allow members flexibility in where they take the additional leave.

FY 2002 NDAA – Issues

- **Pay Raises** – The January 1, 2002 pay raise was targeted as per the President's budget. Officers received a minimum of 5%; enlisted received a minimum of 6%. Raises of up to 10% were targeted to mid-grade officers and NCOs. The average raise was 6.9%. This represented the President's promised additional \$1B (above the by law raise of ECI + ½% (4.6%).
- **Basic Allowance for Housing (BAH) – Reduction in Out-of-Pocket Expenses** – The President's budget continued the Department's plan to lower out-of-pocket housing costs from 15% in 2001 to 11.3% in 2002 and to eliminate out-of-pocket costs altogether by 2005.
- **Extension of BAH During PCS for All E-4s and Below** – Eliminated the requirement to be "E-4 (4 or more years of service) and above" for receipt of BAH during PCS.
- **Certain Career Continuation Bonuses for Early Commitment to Remain on Active Duty** – Authorized aviation officers and surface warfare officers the eligibility for career continuation bonuses to remain on active duty by initiating a continuation agreement during the last year of completing current service commitment.

Others

- **Critical Skills Retention Bonus**- authorized in FY 2001 NDAA for FY 2002 implementation. Provisions are flexible enough to implement a policy that would allow for payment of CSRB for individuals in certain skills at certain locations to be eligible for the bonus provided they remain in the job for a designated period of time.
- **Non-Monetary Incentives Review** – currently contracted study which examines non-monetary incentives that can not only enhance retention, but also encourage personnel to extend in their current tour.

1/7/03

January 6, 2003 12:26 PM

TO: David Chu
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Turbulence

I am at the end of my string. We have a global war on terrorism going on, and we are business as usual in terms of people moving from assignment to assignment to assignment every 15 or 18 months. It is irrational.

Please screw your head into it, and get back to me within 5 working days and tell me precisely what you think I can do to create greater stability and less turbulence. There is no question, absolutely no question, but that by reducing turbulence, unless it is conscious and intentional to get rid of somebody, that we will increase military capability and warfighting capability.

Please respond with a program that is short, simple and will be effective.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
010603-26

.....
Please respond by 01/13/03



PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

SECRET

2003 JAN 17 10 07 AM '03

INFO MEMO

January 16, 2003 – 1:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: DR. DAVID S. C. CHU, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(PERSONNEL AND READINESS)

David S. C. Chu 16 Jan 03

SUBJECT: Coordination with the Department of Veterans Affairs—
SNOWFLAKE (TAB A)

- I believe we've established an excellent relationship with the VA:
 - Together we've helped shape a very constructive interim report by the Presidential Task Force to Improve Health Care Delivery for our Nation's Veterans. Its final report is due in March, and we expect it to call for institutionalizing the rejuvenated DoD-VA relationship.
 - Central to that relationship is the Joint Executive Council that we established with the VA Deputy Secretary, to oversee the existing Health Executive Council, and a newly established Benefits Executive Council. Together these have:
 - Concluded an agreement establishing a single discounted rate for the provision of medical services by VA to DoD and vice versa. We believe it will encourage the efficient sharing of resources.
 - Initiated a system for the transfer of protected electronic health information (so we can send veterans' service health records to the VA electronically)
 - Facilitated procurement sharing arrangements under which we either buy together, or one uses the preferential procurement arrangements of the other (for example, we will be using the VA's access to better drug prices)



11-L-0559/OSD/31844

U00861 /03

- Provided a forum for deciding the administration of “Purple Heart Plus,” the program Congress enacted in lieu of concurrent receipt. We hope this forum can be used to revamp the overall disability program in a way that focuses funds on those injured by military service. (Congress’ recent direction focused on conditions associated with the aging process, including a bill this year that will make hearing loss presumptively a service connected disability for many)
- DoD and VA are collaborating on future facilities planning, through a Strategic Planning Executive Steering Committee we have created, and through a coordinated approach to our BRAC process and the VA’s analogous process “Capital Asset Realignment for Enhancement of Services (CARES).
- We are also collaborating on deployment health issues—i.e., anticipating the concerns raised after the last Persian Gulf War that became known as “Gulf War Illness.”

Attachment: As stated

Prepared by: Dr. William Winkenwerder, Jr., MD, ASD (Health Affairs)

TAB

A

December 23, 2002 4:10 PM

TO: David Chu
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Coordination with VA

The President wants a progress report on how we are doing with the Veterans Administration and Toni Principi on coordinating and cooperating our activities. Please give me a report by January 8.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
122302-49

.....
Please respond by 01/08/03



January 7, 2003 12:16 PM

TO: Dr. Winkenwerder

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Amphetamines

Have you looked into the issue of giving amphetamines to pilots? What are your thoughts?

Thanks.

DHR db
010703-13

.....
Please respond by 1/24/03

440

7 Jan 03

U00887-03



THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

1200 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1200

HEALTH AFFAIRS

INFO MEMO

OCT 16 2002

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM. *William Winkenwerder*
William Winkenwerder, Jr., MD, ASD (Health Affairs)

SUBJECT. Operational Use of Dextroamphetamine in Pilots

- You asked, "Why don't you get some folks to think about it a little bit?" in reference to operational use of dextroamphetamine by pilots. (TAB A) My staff called a meeting of Army, Navy, and Air Force medical specialists to review this practice
- Fatigue is linked to an average of ten Air Force class A aviation mishaps and several fatalities each year
- The remedy for fatigue is adequate sleep. However, sleep is not always possible. For example, two-man B-2 bomber missions from Whiteman AFB to Central Asia require in excess of 48 hours of continuous flight
- When fatigue countermeasures, such as adjusting sleep patterns, in-flight naps and exercise, fail, pharmaceuticals can aid the pilot in completing the critical mission. Dextroamphetamine is the most effective of the drugs available and is safe when properly used. The use of these medications is closely supervised by medics and the line, and supported by experience, research and mission requirements. No aviation mishaps have been attributed to use of fatigue management medications.
- The Army, Navy and Air Force have strict policies on use of stimulant medications to maintain performance during long or frequent operational flights. Each allows use of stimulants only as a last resort.
- Pilots also undergo extensive ground-testing to preclude inadvertent complications before they are "cleared" to use controlled stimulant medications. Unused doses are returned and accounted for to preclude non-operational diversion of the medications
- Based on this review, my medical opinion is that the practice is limited, acceptable in support of certain military missions, and is well controlled.

COORDINATION: TAB B

Attachments.
As stated

Prepared by COL James M. Bengt, C&PP, (b)(6) PCDOCS# 41751,
41518

11-L-0559/OSD/31849

September 30, 2002 9:32 AM

TO: Bill Winkenwerder
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Dextroamphetamine

I just can't believe using these pills is a good idea. Why don't you get some folks to think about it a little bit? I admit I've got kind of a bias against putting things into your body unless you absolutely have to, but please take a look at it.

Thanks.

Attach.

09/06/02 ASD (Health Affairs) memo to SecDef re: Operational Use of Dextroamphetamine in Aviators [U14912-02]

DHR:dh
093002-4

.....
Please respond by 10/20/02

Dr. T -

10/2

Thoughts? Any possibility we could (should?) develop Policy with tighter guidelines for use of these pills? I tend to agree w/ Sec Def
Pls. respond w/in 5 business days.

BW



HEALTH AFFAIRS

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D C 20301-1200

INFO MEMO

SEP 6 2002

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: *William Winkenwerder, Jr.*
William Winkenwerder, Jr. MD, ASD (Health Affairs)

SUBJECT: Operational Use of Dextroamphetamine in Aviators

- You directed that we "look into this business about pilots using amphetamines." (TAB A)
- Dextroamphetamine, known as "go pills," has been used by military aviators since World War II to counter the effects of fatigue during combat operations. It is only used if alternatives such as adjusting sleep patterns, in-flight naps or exercise are either unsuccessful or not an option. There have been no reported safety incidents involving aircrew members' use of "go pills."
- The wing commander, or deployed commander equivalent, in consultation with the senior flight surgeon, determines if the use of Dextroamphetamine is medically warranted. The authorization for its use is time and/or mission specific.
- Countering pilot fatigue is an "off label" use of Dextroamphetamine; informed consent is necessary from the crew member. Commanders may not order its use. There is no penalty, punishment, loss of benefits, or adverse action of any kind for those who decline the use of stimulants. Ground testing prior to combat use and rigorous accountability measures must also be in place.
- Military medical research laboratories are currently studying alternative drugs to effectively combat pilot fatigue, including Modafinil, a Food and Drug Administration approved medication used to treat narcolepsy.

COORDINATION: TAB B

Prepared by: COL John Powers, C&PP, (b)(6) PCDOCS# 40336, 40197

11-L-0559/OSD/31851

Snowflake

8:29 AM

Kevin
Aug 8

David Chu

Donald Rumsfeld

August 8, 2002

SUBJECT:

Please look into this business about pilots using amphetamines. I don't think that is a good idea. What's going on?

Thanks.

DHR/asa
080902.02

Please respond by:

8/25/02

U14910-02

11-L-0559/OSD/31852



DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20340-



ACTION MEMO

U-2791/DO-5

January 16, 2003, 6:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec Action _____

FROM: *L. E. Jacoby* L. E. Jacoby, Vice Admiral, USN, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

SUBJECT: Defense Attaché Paris

France

- The U.S. Air Force (USAF) plans to move the defense attaché (DATT) Paris, Brigadier General Felix Dupre, USAF, in February, prior to his promotion to Major General.
- The options for replacing General Dupre are to send another O-7 to Paris or to designate one of the O-6 service attaches assigned in Paris as acting DATT.
- The USAF does not have a language-qualified O-7 available to complete the remainder of General Dupre's assignment as DATT.
- If a flag officer entered attaché training in early January 2003, he/she would graduate in late April 2003 and would require an additional 6 months of language training.
- The proposed legislative change as drafted by the OSD General Counsel to remove the Title 10 requirement that the DATT Paris be an O-7 is attached at TAB A.
- The DATT Paris was an Army general officer from 1965 to 1989 and an Army O-6 from 1992 to 2000.

RECOMMEND THAT YOU APPROVE:

AGREE
DISAGREE
PLEASE
1/13

- Naming the Army attaché, Colonel Ralph Steinke, as acting DATT upon General Dupre's departure, until legislative resolution of the Title 10 O-7 requirement.
- As a contingency, pending a change in the Title 10 requirement, Army identify an O-7 to assume the DATT position no earlier than summer 2004.
- Revert the DATT Paris position to an O-6 billet filled by Army foreign area officers, if the Title 10 O-7 requirement is lifted.

Approved

JL
JAN 16 2003

JL
JAN 18 2003

JL
JAN 18 2003

Attachments: As stated
Prepared by: Ms. Beth Wald, Office of Plans, Programs, and Policy,

(b)(6)

16 Jan 03

1) Draft Legislative Language:

SEC. ____ . REPEAL OF REQUIRED GRADE FOR DEFENSE ATTACHE IN FRANCE.

(a) **IN GENERAL.**—Section 714 of title 10, United States Code, is repealed.

(b) **CONFORMING AMENDMENT.**—The table of sections at the beginning of chapter 41 of that title is amended by striking the item relating to section 714.

Section-by-Section Analysis

Repeal of this provision will eliminate the requirement that only one-star military officers or those selected for promotion to that grade may be selected as defense attache to the United States embassy in France. Following this repeal, the Secretary of Defense may assign an officer to the position of defense attache to the United States embassy in France in the grade that the Secretary determines to be most appropriate. This repeal will permit the Secretary to dedicate scarce general/flag officer assets in ways that he determines are most beneficial to the Department of Defense.

01117

August 20, 2002 7:17 AM

VCJES chop on this
action on marginal notes,
left side of the paper

TO: General Myers
CC: RADM Jacoby
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Flag Defense Attachés

I would like to stop the assignment of Dupré to Paris. I don't think a two-star is appropriate.

I think we ought to assign an O-6 so we don't end up with a two-star there if he gets promoted.

I will ask the General Counsel to prepare a proposal to change the law, so we can go back to an O-6, as in other countries.

Thanks.

Attach.
08/19/02 DIA memo to SecDef re: Flag Defense Attachés

DHR:dh
081902-45

.....
Please respond by 09/06/02

- Response Attached

(Refer to memo on rear of packet)

013717 /02

August 15, 2002 4:15 PM

Snowflake

TO: RADM Jacoby
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Defense Attachés

I understand we have a two-star defense attaché in Paris. What is normal in a country like France—an O-6? Do we have two-stars anywhere else, or are there one-stars in China and Russia?

Please advise. I want to talk to Senator Warner about this soon.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
081502-23

.....
Please respond by 08/20/02

#286



THE VICE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

ACTION MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec Action _____

FROM: General Peter Pace, VCJCS *RP 8/22*

August 22, 2002
GFO 289/74-02

SUBJECT: Defense Attaché - France

• You asked Gen Myers to stop the assignment of Brig Gen Felix Dupre, USAF, as the Defense Attache (DATT) - France (TAB) in order to avoid having a two star fill this position. Brig Gen Dupre is projected to be promoted to Major General in June 2003.

• I certainly agree that the DATT-France position should be downgraded to a Colonel and fully support your legislative proposal to change the law that currently requires the grade to be an O-7. However, in the interim, recommend Brig Gen Dupre continue with his scheduled assignment based on the timing of your request.

• Brig Gen Dupre is already in France. He has relocated his family and received his household goods. He is currently scheduled to assume the position on 4 September. In addition, Brig Gen and Mrs. Dupre both just completed four months of extensive preparation and training at the Defense Intelligence Agency. The incumbent, RADM Larry Poe, has also shipped his household goods and is preparing to retire.

• In light of these circumstances, recommend Brig Gen Dupre be allowed to serve as DATT-France until his promotion to Major General. This solution avoids a two-star in the position and alleviates undue personal hardship for General Dupre and his family, while affording the department sufficient time to amend the legislation and adequately prepare his replacement.

• The Air Force concurs with curtailing his assignment.

RECOMMENDATION: SecDef approve the assignment of Brig Gen Dupre to be Defense Attaché - France until the month prior to his effective promotion date to Major General (currently projected as May 2003).

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachments:
As stated

Prepared By: Colonel Julia K. Sennewald, USA, Spec Asst for G/FO Matters, (b)(6)

SECDEF DECISION SEP 3 2002

U13869 02

 JP Approve _____ Disapprove _____ Other

11-L-0559/OSD/31857

11/3869.02



THE VICE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

ACTION MEMO

2002 AUG 23 PM 12:10

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec Action _____

FROM: General Peter Pace, VCJCS *HP 8/22*

August 22, 2002
GFO 289/74-02

SUBJECT: Defense Attaché - France

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COORDINATION: NONE

Attachments:
As stated

Prepared By: Colonel Julia K. Sennewald, USA, Spec Asst for G/FO Matters, (b)(6)

SECDEF DECISION

_____ Approve _____ Disapprove _____ Other

522
8/19
48/19
SECDEF HAS SEEN

INFO MEMO

AUG 19 2002

U-090/DR

August 19, 2002

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Acting Director, Defense Intelligence Agency 

SUBJECT: Flag Defense Attachés

Sir, you noted that we have a two-star defense attaché (DATT) in Paris and asked what rank DATT would normally be assigned to a country like France, whether two-stars are assigned to any other country, and if one-stars are assigned in China and Russia.

- (Large Law)*
- Public Law 105-85 of Nov 1997 specified the DATT in France hold (or be on the promotion list for promotion to) the grade of one-star. The law was the result of Sen Warner's promise to Amb Harriman in France to enact this change.
 - Sen Warner pressed the Department to fill with a one-star. Eventually RADM Larry Poe, a Reserve two-star assigned to ASD(C31) as a civilian, was activated and assigned as DATT. He arrived in Jul 2000 and is scheduled to depart in Sep 2002.
 - The previous DATT was an Army O-6. At various times in the past there were Flag/General officers assigned to France.
 - Brig Gen Felix Dupre, USAF, is scheduled to replace RADM Poe. Brig Gen Dupre is a two-star select. He was assigned as Military Assistant to SACEUR, GEN Ralston, from Apr 2000 to Mar 2002. Dupre is fluent in French.
 - The other one-star DATT positions are in Russia and China. Both are filled with one-stars. France is the only country with a two-star.
 - DATT assignments equivalent to France (U.K., Germany, Italy, Australia, Japan for example) are O-6's.

COORDINATION: NONE.

Prepared By: RADM L.E. Jacoby, Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy

11-L-0559/OSD/31859

U13868 / 02



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20316-9999

INFO MEMO

CM-728-03
22 January 2003

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RBMyers/21*

SUBJECT: Staff Reductions

- In response to your request (TAB) for opinions on initiating an outside review of the OSD and Joint Staff, concur in the idea for an independent study to gain efficiencies, reduce duplication and potentially free assets to meet future challenges. In addition, Larry Welch is, without a doubt, the right person to take a look at this issue.
- It would be beneficial to have full Joint Staff participation in this effort to include the development of the terms of reference, the selection of team members, and the review and implementation of any study recommendations. Regardless of our challenges while prosecuting the Global War on Terrorism, please be assured of our support for this study initiative.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachment:
As stated

Prepared By: Brig Gen Maria I. Cribbs, USAF; Director, J-1; (b)(6)

January 2, 2003 1:05 PM

TO: Gen. Myers
Gen. Pace
CC: PAUL WOLKOWITZ
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Staff Reductions

I am inclined to get someone outside to take a look at OSD and Joint Staff reductions. We have now have Ken Krieg's and Arnold Punaro's ideas. My instinct is to get Larry Welch to put together a small group of folks who have worked on the Joint Staff and in OSD and help us figure out a way how we can cut down the size of this place and stop duplicating everything.

Please let me know what you think. I would like to get on with it fast.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
010203-31

.....
Please respond by

03 JAN 3



January 22, 2003 9:38 AM

TO: Honorable Anthony J. Principi
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Statement

I am sure you have seen the flap. Here is the statement I issued. I hope you can give me a hand by calling some of your friends in the veterans' organizations.

The most active ones on this issue apparently are the Vietnam Veterans of America and the national office of the American Legion.

Thanks so much for any help you can provide.

Regards,

Attach.
01/21/03 SecDef statement, DoD Press Release No. 029-03

DHR:dh
012203-5

327

125anos



United States Department of Defense

News Release

On the web: <http://www.defenselink.mil>Media contact: media@defenselink.mil or +1 (703) 697-5131Public contact: public@defenselink.mil or +1 (703) 428-0711

No. 029-0.

January 21, 2003

IMMEDIATE RELEASE

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE STATEMENT ON THE DRAFT

During a recent press briefing at the Pentagon, a reporter asked my views on the old military draft system. Although not eloquently stated, I responded to the question in part as follows:

"If you think back to when we had the draft, people were brought in, they were paid some fraction of what they could make in the civilian manpower market, because they were without choices. Big categories [of people] were exempted-people that were in college, people that were teaching, people that were married. . . . And what was left [those who were not exempted] were sucked into the intake, trained for a period of months and then went out, adding no value, no advantage really, to the United States Armed Services over any sustained period of time, because (of) the churning that took place - it took an enormous amount of effort in terms of training and then they were gone."

Again, my statement was not eloquent. A few columnists and others, though, have suggested that those words were intended to mean that draftees added no value to the military. That is not true. I did not say they added no value while they were serving. They added great value. I was commenting on the loss of that value when they left the service. I certainly had no intention of saying what has been reported, or of leaving that impression. Hundreds of thousands of military draftees served over years with great distinction and valor - many being wounded and still others killed.

The last thing I would want to do would be to disparage the service of those draftees. I always have had the highest respect for their service, and I offer my full apology to any veteran who misinterpreted my remarks when I said them, or who may have read any of the articles or columns that have attempted to take my words and suggest they were disparaging.

The intent of my comments was to reflect a view I have held for some time: that we should lengthen tours of duty and careers for our all-volunteer forces, so that these highly trained men and women in uniform can serve in specific assignments longer, and also not be forced to leave the service when they are at the peak of their skills and knowledge.

It is painful for anyone, and certainly a public servant whose words are carried far and wide, to have a comment so unfortunately misinterpreted.

11-L-0559/OSD/31863

It is particularly troubling for me that there are truly outstanding men and women in uniform or their families -- past and present -- who may believe that the Secretary of Defense would say or mean what some have written. I did not. I would not.

I hope this deeply felt statement reaches those who have served those who are serving, and their families.

http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jan2003/b01212003_bt029-03.html

11-L-0559/OSD/31864

<http://www.defenselink.mil/cgi-bin/dlprint.cgi?http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jan...> 1/22/2003



January 24, 2003 11:27 AM

TO: John McLaughlin
CC: Honorable George Tenet *JA*
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

It was enormously helpful having you at that Senate presentation yesterday with Colin and me. Thanks for doing it.

DHR:dh
012403-13

335 50

24 Jan 03



January 22, 2003 10:38 AM

TO: LTG Hayden
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Update

Thanks for the update on the Giesler project. I appreciate it.

DIR:dh
012203-12

.....
Please respond by _____

33550

DR Jan 23



January 22, 2003 10:25 AM

TO: Honorable Colin Powell
Honorable Condoleezza Rice

CC: Vice President Richard B. Cheney

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Funds

Iraq

We need to think about "tin cupping" the world for the situation if we do end up using force in Iraq. Someone ought to be putting together a plan as to how we do it, so we can implement it near immediately.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
012203-11

22 Jan 03



January 21, 2003 7:08 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Invitation and Response

Please see me on that invitation to speak to the McDonald's board. I am inclined not to do it, but I have to answer.

Also, I have to answer Penn James, who wrote me about J.J. Quinn.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
012103-2



Please respond by 01/24/03

001.150

21 Jan 03



THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1200

INFO MEMO

JAN 24 2003

HEALTH AFFAIRS

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: *William Winkenwerder, Jr.*
William Winkenwerder, Jr., MD, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs)

SUBJECT: Response to Secretary of Defense about an Alignment between Armed Forces Institute of Pathology and the Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences

- In the enclosed letter from Dr. Bernie Wagner, he suggests that “an alignment between the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology and the Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences would reinforce the major strengths of both institutions and also result in significant cost savings for the Department of Defense.” (TAB A)
- We agree with Dr. Wagner that there are potential educational advantages and economies to be gained from closer links between the two Department of Defense organizations. Indeed, in our recent response to the Program Analysis and Evaluation’s study on the Program Decision Memorandum on the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology, we recommended that the Institute should increase formalized collaborations with or realign to become part of the Uniformed Services University of Health Sciences.
- We are taking steps to explore opportunities for improved collaboration this year with the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology Board of Governors and the Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences Board of Regents.

COORDINATION: TAB B

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared by: LTC E.C. Ritchie, C&PP, HA, (b)(6) PCDOCS
#44679,44556

U01258-03

11-L-0559/OSD/31869

December 20, 2002 8:04 AM

TO: David Chu
CC: Larry Di Rita
Ray DuBois
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: AFIP and USUHS

Please take a look at this letter from my friend, Dr. Bernie Wagner, and get back to me with an indication of what you think.

Thanks.

Attach.
11/21/02 Wagner ltr to SecDef

DHR:dh
122002-4

.....
Please respond by 01/17/03

*Stacy,
check w/ Dgt. Haddock and see if Winkler needs
has the action and please keep me informed.
See also my noted questions,
270 12.23.02*

U01256-03

11/20/2002 09:10 AM

Bernard M. Wagner, M.D.
Emeritus Research Professor of Pathology
New York University Medical Center

(b)(6)

SECDEF HAS SEEN

DEC 20 2002

November 21, 2002

Mr. Donald Rumsfeld
Suite 405
400 North Michigan Avenue
Chicago, Illinois 60611

Dear Don:

The Armed Forces Institute of Pathology (AFIP), plays a vital role in our country's military preparedness. Virtually all of its programs are directly related to military readiness. Furthermore, many of these programs are unique in their specificity to the needs of DoD. For example, many cities, counties and states have forensic pathology programs. However, the Armed Forces Medical Examiner System is specifically designed to address the unique circumstances attendant to deaths among the military. As we have discussed in the past, the AFIP has the strongest group of pathologists in the world. Their expertise is focused not only upon the appropriate diagnosis and treatment of disease among military personnel but also the support of DoD in research of specific importance to the Armed Forces and the education of health professionals throughout the military health care system.

This education component of the AFIP's mission has prompted the recommendation that it be united with the Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences (USUHS). Careful examination of these two organizations reveals an amazing degree of possible synergy should they be combined. Such a combination would not only provide benefits to DoD and our country but could result in major cost savings.

In summary, the AFIP is vital to the mission of DoD in terms of military readiness, Force Health Protection and homeland security. The value of USUHS to DoD is well known and respected. An alignment between the AFIP and USUHS would reinforce the major strengths of both institutions and also result in significant cost savings for DoD. I served for 15 years as a member of the Committee on Toxicology, National Academy of Sciences. During this time, the DoD was our major sponsor of studies. Repeatedly, we used the AFIP as a consultant to our committee.

Here's wishing you and your family a happy Holiday Season and I hope to see you soon. With very best personal regards,

Bernie

who + what's behind this?

11-L-0559/OSD/31871

JAMES M. DENNY

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

November 25, 2002


(b)(6)

Office of Secretary of Defense
Department of Defense
1000 Defense-Pentagon
Room 3E-880
Washington, DC 20301-1000

(b)(6)

Attached is a letter that Bernie Wagner asked me to pass on to Don. Bernie was a member of the Scientific Advisory Board at Searle when Don was CEO and has been a member of the Scientific Advisory Board at Gilead for some time

kindest regards,



James M. Denny
JMD/dm

D:\Kali\2002\james\112502.html

cc: Larry D. Rita - ~~LD~~

11-L-0559/OSD/31872



Colonel Stacey K. Hirata

*Military Deputy
Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense
Installations and Environment*

23 Dec 2002

CAPT Steve Wellock
P&R

Steve,

Can you tell me who within P&R will be responding to the attached SecDef snowflake?

Request they keep us informed of the reply to the SecDef.

Further request they attempt to answer Mr DuBois' handwritten questions (on the snowflake).

Thanks.

11-L-0559/OSD/31873

RESPONSE TO SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ABOUT AN ALIGNMENT BETWEEN AFIP
AND USUHS

COORDINATION

DASD, HB&FP

1/17/03

CoS, HA

PDASD, HA

USD, P&R

David L. Chm 1/17/03



OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1200

ACTION MEMO

HEALTH AFFAIRS

January 10, 2003; 6:00 PM

FOR: ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (HEALTH AFFAIRS)

FROM: David Tornberg, DASD, C&PP, Health Affairs *per 1/17/03*

SUBJECT: Response to Secretary of Defense about an Alignment between Armed Forces Institute of Pathology (AFIP) and the Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences (USUHS)

- The enclosed memorandum is in response to a letter from Dr. Bernie Wagner to Secretary Rumsfeld.
- Dr. Wagner suggests that "an alignment between the AFIP and USUHS would reinforce the major strengths of both institutions and also result in significant cost savings for DoD."(TAB B)
- We agree with Dr. Wagner that there are potential educational advantages and economies to be gained from closer links between the two DoD organizations. Indeed, in our recent response to the Program Analysis and Evaluation's study on the Program Decision Memorandum on the AFIP, we recommended that the Institute should increase formalized collaborations with or realign to become part of the Uniformed Services University of Health Sciences.

RECOMMENDATION: That the ASD (HA) forward INFO Memo (TAB A) to SECDEF.

COORDINATION: TAB C

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared by: LTC E.C Ritchie, C&PP, HA,

(b)(6)

PCDOCS #44679



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9000
INFO MEMO

CH-736-03
28 January 2003

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS

RBMY 1/28

SUBJECT: Activating the Guard and Reserve

- In response to your request (TAB A) the following information is provided.
- The Joint Staff will form a General and Flag Officer Steering Committee (GOSC) representing the combatant commands and Services, with a mandate to offer specific recommendations and provide a framework for operation by 28 February 2003.
- GOSC will evaluate three alternatives to consolidate responsibility for activating Reserve Components (RCs) into one location:
 - Establish a manpower allocation task force similar in doctrine and procedures to the Office of the Secretary of Defense Priority Allocation of Industrial Resources Task Force whenever the activation of RC personnel is contemplated.
 - Create a Joint Manpower Priorities and Allocation Board analogous to the Joint Material Priorities and Allocation Board to administer the activation program.
 - Charge US Joint Forces Command, in its force provider role, to make force allocation decisions for both Active and Reserve Components.
- Each of these alternatives offers considerable change to organization, doctrine and business processes for the Services, combatant commanders and Joint Staff. GOSC will complete its report by the above stated due date.

COORDINATION: TAB B

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared By: VADM G.S. Holder, USN; Director, J-4; (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/31876

U01270 / 03

TAB A

36

9:06 AM

TO: Gen. Dick Myers

CC: Admiral Giambastiani
David Chu

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: December 21, 2002

SUBJECT:

I think we are going to have to find a way to take all of the responsibility for activating the guard and the reserve from the services, the joint forces command and the combatant commanders and put them in one place so that the flow of forces, whether it is active duty or reserves, is all in one location. We can't do anything skillfully the way it is currently ~~dispersed~~. *dispersed Arrayed*

Please come back to me with a recommendation.

Thanks.

DHR:azn
122102 GS

Please respond by: _____ 1/3/03

Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD/31877

420034-02

TAB B

COORDINATION PAGE

USJFCOM	CAPT Burdon	17 January 2003
USA	COL Chappell	16 January 2003
USN	CAPT Thompson	16 January 2003
USAF	Col Estep	16 January 2003
USMC	Col Bultemeier	16 January 2003



January 22, 2003 11:40 AM

Received 1/27
10:00am

TO: Dev Zakheim

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: Djibouti

Could we pay Djibouti for the use of that bombing range?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
012203-24

.....
Please respond by 01/31/03

Djibouti

Done / Tosh

Suzanne 1/29

22 Jan 03



COMPTROLLER

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1100 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1100


OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2003 JAN 28 PM 4:14

INFO MEMO

January 28, 2003, 1:57 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dov S. Zakheim 

SUBJECT: Payment for bombing range in Djibouti

- You asked whether we could pay Djibouti for the use of a bombing range. The answer is "yes."
- The United States has a current lease with Djibouti for the use of Camp LeMonier for \$4.75 million per year. The Office of the General Counsel has determined that we can renegotiate the current leasing agreement to include additional facilities, space, and other land, the cost of which reflects the special use of the land (e.g. using bombing ranges to train for the global war on terrorism).
- USCENTCOM currently has an assessment team in Djibouti to evaluate the facilities, space and ranges, and will report back next week.
- USCENTCOM advises that the United States currently does not pay for the use of bombing ranges in the USCENTCOM area of responsibility. Any such agreement that provides payment for the use of bombing ranges would be precedent setting.
- My office and Policy are also pressing U.S. Embassy, Djibouti to provide an itemized list of the costs that Djibouti has incurred supporting U.S. military operations in connection with the global war on terrorism. Once we obtain the itemized list, we can proceed with making a payment using FY 2002 Emergency Supplemental funds. My staff believes that the payment should be approximately \$3 million.

COORDINATION: Attached

Attachment:
As stated

Prepared by: Josh Boehm (b)(6)

Djibouti

28 JAN 03

U01288 / 03

**U.S. Government Support to Djibouti
FY03**

*Humanitarian
Civil Work*

DOD: 6.05M

- Humanitarian Assistance -- \$1M → OK - ODAHCA
- Airport Landing/Parking Fees -- \$300K (\$25K per month)
- Renewal of Lease of Camp Lemonier -- \$4.75M

\$ for demine & human assistance

(Camp will have to renew by Sept for 9/03-9/04)

Center pay monthly \$ 2.5 M.

D.S.

SECURITY ASSISTANCE: \$2.185K

- Foreign Military Financing -- \$2M
- International Military Education and Training (IMET) -- \$185K

STATE DEPARTMENT: \$10.25M

- Economic Support Funds (ESF) -- \$5M
- USAID Development Assistance -- \$2M
- Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism Demining and Relating Programs (NADR)- Humanitarian Demining -- \$250K
- USAID Food for Peace -- \$3M

GRAND TOTAL \$18.5M

IN PROCESS:

- Reimbursement for Djibouti services provided in support of OEF --(Djibouti has submitted \$4,000,939 in expenses which are under review) ± 3 mil.
- Additional FMF for military to military support (including coastal security support)
- Additional ESF and USAID funding for economic/education/medical support
- Continued IMET (FY04 and beyond)

COORDINATION

OGC (Fiscal)	Scott Castle	January 28, 2003
USD(P)/ISA/Africa	Theresa Whelen	January 28, 2003



COMPTROLLER

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1100 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1100

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2003 JAN 28 PM 4:14

INFO MEMO

January 28, 2003, 1:57 PM

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COORDINATION: Attached

Attachment:
As stated

Prepared by: Josh Boehm (b)(6)

DJIBOUTI

28 JAN 03

U01288 / 03

U.S. Government Support to Djibouti
FY03

Humanitarian
Work

DOD: 6.05M

- Humanitarian Assistance -- \$1M → OK - ODAHCA
- Airport Landing/Parking Fees -- \$300K (\$25K per month)
- Renewal of Lease of Camp Lemonier -- \$4.75M

\$ for demining & humanitarian assistance -

(Custom will have to renew by Sept for 9/03-9/04)

Center to pay money \$ 2.5 M.

D.S.

SECURITY ASSISTANCE: \$2.185K

- Foreign Military Financing -- \$2M
- International Military Education and Training (IMET) -- \$185K

STATE DEPARTMENT: \$10.25M

- Economic Support Funds (ESF) -- \$5M
- USAID Development Assistance -- \$2M
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- Continued IMET (FY04 and beyond)

COORDINATION

OGC (Fiscal)

Scott Castle

January 28, 2003

USD(P)/ISA/Africa

Theresa Whelen

January 28, 2003

January 22, 2003 11:40 AM

Received 1/27
10:50am

TO: Dov Zakheim

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: Djibouti

Could we pay Djibouti for the use of that bombing range?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
012203-24

.....
Please respond by 01/31/03

Dave / Josh
Suzanne 1/29



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

INFO MEMO

CM-742-03

29 January 2003

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RBMyers/29*

SUBJECT: Alerts and Mobilization

- In response to your question (TAB A), the following is provided. All Services have similar processes for alerting and mobilizing forces.
- An Alert memorandum is generated from you to the respective Secretary of the Military Department, who then notifies the command structure via standard message traffic. An automated retransmission is then sent to the affected units. Individual notification of Service members is by the unit commanding officers via telephone (phone tree is activated).
- The process for alerting forces and the process for mobilizing forces are the same, except mobilization requires that orders be generated for the individual.
- Service inputs indicate that the period between a signed SecDef memorandum and notification of the individual varies from 24 to 96 hours.

COORDINATION: TAB B

Attachment:

As stated


Prepared By: Gordon S. Holder, VADM, USN; Director, J-4; (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/31887

U01379-103

January 21, 2003 7:17 AM

TO: Gen. Pace

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Alerts and Mobilization

Please tell me how we alert people and how we notify them that they are being mobilized. Is it done by phone, mail or e-mail? Is it uniform among the Services? How long does it take?

The reason I ask is that it is my recollection that in World War II when Norway decided to mobilize their reserves they did it by mail, and the letters went out and arrived after they had already surrendered.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
012103-3

.....

Tab A

TAB B

COORDINATION

USN	Captain Thompson	23 January 2003
USA	Colonel Wright	23 January 2003
USAF	Colonel Murphy	23 January 2003
USMC	Colonel(S) McCarron	23 January 2003

Tab B



May 15, 2003 8:34 AM

TO: Gen. Franks
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *TR*
SUBJECT: Military Critics

Someone sent me this Roman general's opinion, thinking you might like to read it.

Thanks.

Attach.
"A Roman General's Opinion of 'Military Critics'"


DHR:dh
051503-15

.....
Please respond by _____

33550

15 May 03

U07389 /03



A ROMAN GENERAL'S OPINION OF "MILITARY CRITICS"

LUCIUS AEMILIUS PAULUS, a Roman Consul, who had been selected to conduct the war with the Macedonians, B. C. 168, went out from the Senate-house into the assembly of the people and addressed them as follows:

IN EVERY circle, and, truly, at every table, there are people who lead armies into Macedonia; who know where the camp ought to be placed, what posts ought to be occupied by troops; when and through what pass that territory should be entered, where magazines should be formed; how provisions should be conveyed by land and sea, and when it is proper to engage the enemy, when to be quiet. And they not only determine what is best to be done, but if anything is done in any other manner than what they have pointed out, they arraign the consul, as if he were on trial before them. These are great impediments to those who have the management of affairs; for every one cannot encounter injurious reports with the same constancy and firmness of mind as Fabius did, who chose to let his own ability be questioned through the folly of the people, rather than to mismanage the public business with a high reputation. I am not one of those who think that commanders ought at no time to receive advice; on the contrary, I should deem that man more proud than wise, who regulated every proceeding by the standard of his own single judgment. What then is my opinion? That commanders should be counselled, chiefly, by persons of known talent, by those who have made the art of war their particular study, and whose knowledge is derived from experience; from those who are present at the scene of action, who see the country, who see the enemy; who see the advantages that occasions offer, and who, like people embarked in the same ship, are sharers of the danger. If, therefore, any one thinks himself qualified to give advice respecting the war which I am to conduct, which may prove advantageous to the public, let him not refuse his assistance to the state; but let him come with me into Macedonia. He shall be furnished with a ship, a horse, a tent; even his travelling charges shall be defrayed. But if he thinks this too much trouble, and prefers the repose of a city life to the toils of war, let him not, on land, assume the office of a pilot. The city, in itself, furnishes abundance of topics for conversation; let it confine its passion for talking within its own precincts, and rest assured that we shall pay no attention to any councils but such as shall be framed within our camp."

LIVY (TITUS LIVIUS) HISTORY OF ROME
Vol. 7, Book XLIV, Chapter 22

U07389 /03



THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20350-1000

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
370 MCGUIRE BLVD
WASHINGTON, DC 20350-1000
203 705 4300

INFO MEMO

Date prepared: August 6, 2003, 3:00 PM

FOR: THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE DepSecDefAction_____

FROM: Hansford T. Johnson, Secretary of the Navy *H T Johnson 8/7/03*

SUBJECT: EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS

- This is in response to your July 28, 2003 memorandum, asking me to review the situation at the U.S. Naval Academy (USNA) in relation to concerns about sexual misconduct of the type currently being addressed by the U.S. Air Force Academy.
- The attached memorandum details how the Department of the Navy is responding to these issues.
- In summary, sexual misconduct is a violation of good order and discipline, which cannot be tolerated in a military environment.
 - My staff have verified that the USNA takes prompt and effective action when problems of this nature arise.
 - Further, standards of conduct have been established, rules and procedures are in place and well known by the Midshipmen, and enforcement is effective.
 - Continual attention to the task of guiding young people toward maturity is firmly embedded in the USNA's systems.
 - Both the USNA and its overseers regularly review and seek to improve the USNA's policies, processes and programs in light of the experiences of the USNA and other institutions.
- Please let me know if you would like more information or if you would like to discuss these issues.

COORDINATION: TAB C AND ATTACHMENTS

Attachments:
As stated

Prepared By: Ms. Anita K. Blair

(b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/31892

U13526 /03

TAB

A

**Report to the Secretary of Defense
U.S. Naval Academy – Lessons Learned Concerning Sexual Misconduct**

The Department of the Navy has viewed the recent difficulties of the U.S. Air Force Academy with sympathy, for the Department of the Navy and its constituents have endured and emerged from similar problems in the past. We have learned, and continue to learn, from our own experience and that of others.

Background

On October 8, 1975, President Gerald Ford signed Public Law 94-106, which directed that women would be eligible for appointment and admission to the U.S. service academies beginning in calendar year 1976. The law provided that “the academic and other relevant standards required for appointment, (admission) training, graduation and commissioning of female individuals shall be the same as those required for male individuals, except for those minimum essential adjustments in such standards required because of physiological differences between male and female individuals.”

Within a few months, 119 women entered West Point, 81 entered the U.S. Naval Academy, and 157 enrolled at the U.S. Air Force Academy. Little more than “minimum essential adjustments” had occurred in preparation for their arrival. Over the ensuing twenty-five years, the service academies and other similar institutions have learned from (sometimes difficult) experience how to address not only physiological differences, but also issues of privacy and sexual conduct associated with mixing young men and women in a close, intense military and educational environment.

From the late 1970s to the early 1990s, the Navy suffered many setbacks in the path to assimilating women in the force, including highly publicized incidents of sexual harassment and assault, culminating in the September 1991 Tailhook scandal. During the early 1990s, the Naval Academy experienced a number of problems, including cases of sexual assault and sexual harassment, as well as cheating, hazing, and occasional incidents of criminal behavior among a few midshipmen.

In the same period, it became obvious that young people today, including those entering the military and the academies, are indeed different. They have grown up under many negative influences, including an increased incidence of broken families and pervasive media glamorizing sex and violence. No longer can the military expect society to furnish young men and women already endowed

with honor, character and virtue; we must be able to produce these qualities out of the human raw material that we receive.

Actions Taken

During the past ten years, the Department of the Navy and the Naval Academy have developed and refined several sets of rules, policies, and programs designed to address problems related to destructive personal behavior, including sexual misconduct. These include –

- Ethical Training Continuum / Character and Leadership Education (Tab 1)
- Honor Concept (Tab 2)
- Sexual Assault Victim Intervention (SAVI) (Tab 3)
- “Right Spirit” campaign (Tab 4)
- Dignity and Respect Task Force (Tab 5)

As described in an August 2000 internal assessment, both the leadership and midshipmen of the Naval Academy are engaged in “an unending journey of relentless self-examination and improvement.” We do not expect midshipmen to behave perfectly, and we acknowledge that, despite best efforts, a few may fail disastrously. But we expect our leadership to provide a good example and a secure and healthy environment, where midshipmen may learn and practice habits of good character and leadership.

Response to Current Issues

At my request, shortly after learning about the situation at the U.S. Air Force Academy, the General Counsel of the Navy and the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Manpower and Reserve Affairs personally visited the Naval Academy in March 2003. They had frank discussions with the Superintendent, informing him of my concerns. In April, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Military Personnel Policy and the Special Assistant for Military Law (both of whom are women lawyers with considerable experience in these matters) spent a day at the Naval Academy with the Superintendent, Commandant, brigade leaders and Academy staff reviewing Naval Academy policies and practices in cases of sexual assault and related misconduct.

These officials have closely followed published reports, and they have established communications with officials from the Department of the Air Force and the Department of Defense Inspector General (DODIG) involved in investigations of incidents at the Air Force Academy. The Air Force Academy Working Group published a preliminary report in June 2003, and the DODIG investigation is ongoing. The Panel to Review Sexual Misconduct Allegations at

the U.S. Air Force Academy, chaired by Hon. Tillie Fowler, is due to submit its report and recommendations in late September.

Even at this early stage we can discern some “lessons learned” from the Air Force Academy situation. Following are comments based on our preliminary impressions.

- Rules and Procedures. At some point in recent years, the Air Force Academy established several rules and processes for addressing sexual misconduct, separate from those of the Air Force generally. Of note, the Air Force Academy operated under a different definition of “sexual assault,” which (among other things) equated rape with sexual harassment. The Naval Academy operates as part of the larger Navy command and uses the same rules, definitions, and procedures as the rest of the Navy (see generally OPNAVINST 1752). This enhances common understanding and also gives the Naval Academy the benefit of experience gained by the Navy and Marine Corps.
- Victim Confidentiality. Reportedly some female cadets were reluctant to report that they had been assaulted because they feared the reaction of others at the Air Force Academy if the charges became publicly known. At the Naval Academy, the Commandant may order the parties to an investigation to keep confidential both the facts and circumstances relating to the investigation and the fact that an investigation is taking place. Anyone violating such an order would be subject to discipline. This policy protects the interests of both accuser and accused, while officials sort out what actually happened.
- Amnesty for Infractions. Air Force Academy cadets also reportedly feared that they would be punished for their own misconduct (*e.g.*, drinking, fraternizing) in connection with the assault. Naval Academy policy is to defer any action against a complainant until after a full investigation of the facts. The Commandant has discretion to waive formal punishment of a victim (in effect, deciding that she or he “has suffered enough”).
- Other Factors. The Air Force Working Group identified a number of factors that we find to be common issues, including alcohol abuse, loyalty to peers, dormitory environment, and support and role models for female cadets. Further, it is difficult to obtain accurate and useful data on the gender climate and incidence of assault, harassment and other misconduct. Naval Academy authorities (including myself) continually review and revise our policies and practices as appropriate.

As you know, the U.S. Senate last week confirmed the nomination of a new Superintendent at the Naval Academy, VADM Rodney P. Rempt, USN. As his first action on his first day on the job, Vice Admiral Rempt requested me to facilitate the appointment of a special assistant to be his “eyes and ears” in staying ahead of any concerns relating to the Air Force Academy situation. Vice Admiral Rempt is working closely with my staff and DODIG officials as well.

Finally, I assure you that I retain a keen personal interest in ensuring the safety and welfare of all young people who enter the Navy or Marine Corps. In this I am guided by Title 10, section 5947, originally adopted in 1775, which states:

Requirement of exemplary conduct. All commanding officers and others in authority in the naval service are required to show in themselves a good example of virtue, honor, patriotism, and subordination; to be vigilant in inspecting the conduct of all persons who are placed under their command; to guard against and suppress all dissolute and immoral practices, and to correct, according to the laws and regulations of the Navy, all persons who are guilty of them; and to take all necessary and proper measures, under the laws, regulations, and customs of the naval service, to promote and safeguard the morale, the physical well-being, and the general welfare of the officers and enlisted persons under their command or charge.

TAB B

TO: Secretary of the Army
Secretary of the Navy
Secretary of the Air Force

CC: David Chu

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



DATE: July 28, 2003

SUBJECT: **Educational Institutions**

I continue to be concerned about the situation that occurred at the Air Force Academy. I know that Jim Roche and John Jumper have been working hard on that problem. I am concerned, however, that similar problems conceivably could exist at other educational institutions in the military.

I would like each of you to review your Service's circumstance and get back to me with your personal account. Certainly there are lessons learned with respect to the Air Force situation that can be helpful to the other services.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
072803.22

8/8/03

Please respond by: _____

TAB C

TAB

1

TAB 1
Ethical training Continuum/Character and Leadership Education

USNA has established a series of required courses over 4 years, each with seminars that culminate in the 1/C Year's Capstone Junior Officer Practicum. Further, each course has guest speakers to enhance the instruction and seminar approach. For example, Senator McCain, General Zinni, and Mr. Tim Russert were guest speakers on Ethics. The following table is a summary.

Ethical Training Continuum

Year	Concept	Course Name	Seminar
4/C	The Good Follower	Leadership and Human Behavior (NL112)	Leaders of Character Seminars - Honor
3/C	The Ethical Leader	Moral Reasoning for Naval Leaders (NE203)	Leaders of Character Seminars - Moral Courage
2/C	Motivator & Standard Setter	Leadership: Theory and Application (NL302)	Leader of Character Seminars - Commitment
1/C	Applied Leadership	Leadership: Theory and Application (NL302)	Capstone Character Excellence Seminar

TAB

2

TAB 2
Honor Concept

USNA has an intensive Honor Education and Training program that encompasses immediate inculcation beginning with Plebe Summer and continuing throughout a Midshipman's plebe year and upper class years. The educational focus stresses honor as a component of combat leadership, as well as in the broader sense, apart from the consequentialist view of "Don't lie, cheat, or steal."

The Honor Concept Execution involves a multi-step system, with a series of checks and balances. These include formal counseling, an investigative process, and a Brigade honor Board. If a violation is found, the individual will receive Commandant's Review and Hearing, face-to-face mentoring by an O-5/O-6 and a plan of remediation. Honor sanctions can include loss of leave and/or privileges for up to one year, Honor Probation for up to one year which can involve restrictions to the Yard not to exceed six months, and delayed graduation. Further, during Honor Probation, the Commandant can automatically recommend separation should the Midshipman commit another honor violation.

TAB 3

TAB 3
USNA Process for Handling of Sexual Assault Allegations

The Naval Academy's Processing Policy for handling sexual assault is stated as "Comprehensive assistance to victims, prompt and thorough investigation and assessment, and zero tolerance for offenders."

Per OPNAVINST 1752, sexual assault is defined as rape, forcible sodomy, and assault with the intent to commit rape, sodomy, or to gratify desires. The Naval Academy's primary consideration is to protect and support the victim. A Sexual Assault Victim Intervention (SAVI) advocate is assigned, and if needed, the parties to the alleged assault are moved in the Hall. The investigation process includes NCIS, which coordinates with civil authorities.

Midshipmen reporting avenues include the chain of command, civilian authorities, Brigade Medical, Midshipman Development Center, the Chaplains, and the SAVI Guide.

Should the facts support the sexual assault allegation, the disciplinary process is Courts-Martial. If the facts do not support sexual assault, then there will be other administrative action or no disciplinary action, contingent upon the findings. The Naval Academy has no NJP or administrative separation options as disenrollment can occur only through ASN (M&RA) for "Unsatisfactory Conduct".

According to COMDMIDNINST 1752, victims shall generally not be disciplined, but rather counseled in cases where behavior by the victim may also be considered an offense (such as underage drinking or prior consensual sex in the Hall.) Such disciplinary determinations are made on a case-by-case basis, weighing the severity of the misconduct and the likelihood that the offense might not have been otherwise reported.

TAB

4

TAB 4
"Right Spirit" Campaign

The "Right Spirit" Campaign is designed to deglamorize alcohol use and encourage moderation for those who choose to drink.

The "Right Spirit" Campaign's motto, "It's about choice," conveys its educational aspect, which seeks to inform Sailors of the possible consequences of their actions so that they are able to make the right decisions for themselves and their peers. The program is not about prohibition, but seeks to reaffirm that each individual can choose whether or not to drink without any peer pressure. It also encourages commands to provide opportunities for Sailors to enjoy themselves without drinking to excess.

Further information can be found in the Commanding Officer's Guide, "Alcohol and Drug Abuse Prevention and Control, NAVPERS 53500A (10-02).

TAB 5

TAB 5*
Dignity and Respect Task Force

In May 2000, VADM John Ryan, Superintendent of the United States Naval Academy, directed that a Dignity and Respect Task Force (DRTF) be formed to conduct a one-time, internal, "self-orienting" study. The mission assigned to the DRTF was to analyze the culture of the Brigade of Midshipmen with respect to improving the dignity and respect accorded to each midshipman.

The DRTF used two months of interviews, focus groups, and assessments. It focused on five major areas for continued growth: human relations, mission focus and integration, risk management, empowerment and training, and leveraging institutional heritage.

Human relations: DRTF recommended the development of a midshipman-owned HR program along with various academic requirements. Some male midshipmen were still unsettled by women as "warriors," so several recommendations centered on teaching midshipmen that a true "warrior" is bound by the highest standards of professional behavior and mutual respect, as well as a full awareness of what is needed to win in war in the 21st Century.

Mission Focus and Integration: Since the ethics and leadership education programs and the honor, human relations and "officership," training programs were not coordinated fully enough, recommendations included having instructors, faculty and coaches brought together to develop standardized evaluation methods, standards and metrics, both qualitative and quantitative.

Risk Management: As in many civilian colleges and universities, the combination of sexual tension and alcohol abuse in the college-age population contributes to incidents of sexual assault at USNA. As a result, the DRTF's recommendations centered on increased awareness of this issue through education, even strongly stating that midshipmen should take the lead in the development and execution of sexual assault awareness and crisis response program under the guidance of a cadre of professionals.

Empowerment and Training: Recommendations centered on ensuring that constructive feedback was provided to midshipmen after focus groups and interviews were conducted on a variety of topics. Further, MWR programs were emphasized as a method to further support midshipman quality of life.

Leveraging Institutional Heritage: To make the best use of the heritage of the USNA and its alumni as a source of inspiration naval service, DRTF recommended that the Brigade of Midshipmen should be asked for their thoughts, recommendations, and participation on how to celebrate certain aspects of naval history/heritage. Further, DRTF recommended the use of an inclusive term such as "the larger Brigade" to describe alumni and Midshipmen.