

April 29, 2004

Afghanistan

TO: Ambassador Evan Galbraith

CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Afghanistan

Thanks so much for your note on the Allies and Afghanistan. I will work it with Doug Feith. I appreciate it.

Regards,

P.S. If we ever do anything like that, we sure better put a time limit on it, because you can be darn sure they will have time limits on their PRTs!

DHR:dh
042904-9

29 APR 04

OSD 06344-04

April 29, 2004

VIA FACSIMILE

TO: Honorable George Shultz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: E-mail

335 SD

George—

They issue the doctor raised has been run to ground. The people were sincere, and we appreciated the heads up, but it looks like there is nothing there.

Regards,

DHR:dh
042904-13

29 Apr 04

OSD 06369-04

April 30, 2004

TO: Jerry Bremer
Gen. John Abizaid
LTG Rick Sanchez

CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Iraqi Spokesman

Attached is a message I received from a friend.

I think there is a lot of truth to it.

Thanks.

Attach.
Iraq Spokesman

DHR:dh
043004-14

.....
Please respond by _____

OSD 06370-04

11-L-0559/OSD/41257

Subject: Iraqi spokesman in Baghdad is worth two divisions-

having an Iraqi face replace the American face in Baghdad would be worth two divisions

Nagl's Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam makes clear the importance of the political over the military in defeating an insurgency

every time an American spokesman appears in Baghdad we remind Iraqi nationalists they are against us

every time an Iraqi briefs the press and an Iraqi announces new developments we move a step into the background and Iraqi nationalism subsides

can't the white house simply issue an edict that as of tomorrow all briefings will be given in arabic by an Iraqi and translated into English

getting the Americans off television (remember that al jazeera and al arabyia cover American presence with an intensity which has to arouse Iraqi nationalism) would be more helpful than sending two additional divisions

720

EF-8102

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

I-04/000473

January 12, 2004

NATO 322

TO: Doug Feith
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Flag to Post

We are going to have to make sure that the interagency knows that the flag to post thing has to be solved by January 23, when the NAC meets. That means we ought to get it done this coming week and solve it. We need the memo first, however.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
011204-27

.....
Please respond by 1/16/04

Policy ExecSec's Note

January 15, 2004

CDR Nosenzo,

SUBJ: Flag to Post

- The attached memo **was** delivered to you on the evening of January 13.

C. L. O'Connor

Colonel C. L. O'Connor, USMC

FILE
TEN
1/15

OSD 06385-04

12 JAN 04

EF-8218
I-04/000924
January 21, 2004

2/2

IRAN

TO: Doug Feith
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Jim Haynes
FROM:
SUBJECT: Chargé

I notice that a QODs Force general from Iran has been assigned as chargé in Iraq.
As the sovereign, we don't have to accept him, do we?

Any thoughts?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
012104-8

Please respond by

1/26/04

1/26/04

1/31

Sir,
Response attached.
w/CDR Nosenro
1/30

cc: ES
done 1/22

21JAN04

OSD 06386-04

728
TAB A

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

March 8, 2004

728

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: NATO Military Committee

Please get back to me with the lay down of the military committee at NATO and the relationship with SACEUR, the relationship with you, the relationship with me and an analysis as to whether or not you think we ought to propose some changes, given the fact that we are in the 21st century. My guess is that we should.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
030804-8

.....
Please respond by

3/26/04

NATO 334

8 Mar 04

OSD 06395-04

Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD/41261

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

April 30, 2004

TO: Dr. Condoleezza Rice

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Criteria

I would be curious to know what criteria you folks are using for the selection of the people the US would recommend to Brahimi for the key posts. I have not heard any discussion of that, and I am interested.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
043004-17

Iraq

30 Apr 04

19 Apr 04

OSD 06400-04

December 1, 2004
205 APR -5 AM 8:55

TO: Ray DuBois
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Stabilization

Do we need to organize the civilian side of the Department of Defense to include post-war, post-major combat operations stabilization efforts?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
120104-26

.....
Please respond by 12/21/04



ADMINISTRATION AND
MANAGEMENT

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1950 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1950

INFO MEMO

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Agmt 2005 IFR -5 MI 8:52
~~March 31, 2005, 4:20 PM~~

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Raymond F. DuBois, Director, Administration and Management

SUBJECT: Post-Major ~~Combat Operations Stabilization~~ Efforts

- In the attached snowflake you asked if we need to organize the civilian side of the Department to include post-war, post-major combat operations stabilization efforts.
- After many weeks of deliberations in OSD, we are coordinating a draft directive to define and assign DoD responsibilities for stability operations. After the Defense Science Board briefed you on its stabilization study last Fall, you asked that a directive be prepared.
- The directive creates a policy framework for stability operations and reconstruction, and catalyzes the Department to develop a range of stability operations capabilities such as language and cultural expertise, planning, intelligence, and training exercises.
- The directive also calls for the production of metrics to determine progress and inform decisions on how resources should be allocated. It also seeks to integrate DoD efforts with the interagency, NGOs and the private sector in the post-major combat period.
- In the directive, the Secretary of the Army is designated as the Executive Agent for Stability Operations and will lead implementation. He and the USD(P) will co-chair an Executive Committee to oversee implementation and develop a Roadmap of necessary actions. The Secretary of the Army will report to you on progress.
- Marty Hoffmann believes that the directive will be only part of the solution to improving DoD and USG performance in stabilization efforts. DoD needs to develop better operational doctrines for stabilization and reconstruction missions. Key issues include: how to engage in economic reconstruction under combat conditions and how to jumpstart bottom-up, citizen driven economic activity.
- With respect to specific organizational arrangements necessary to enable the Department to execute its responsibilities in stabilization, the Stability Operations Executive Committee will work with the stakeholders and develop recommendations for your approval.

COORDINATION: none

CC: FEITH, HENRY, O'CONNELL, HARVEY, HOFFMANN

Prepared By: Bob Menig, (b)(6)

OSD 06405-05

11-L-0559/OSD/41264

December 1, 2004

TO: Ray DuBois
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Stabilization

Do we need to organize the civilian side of the Department of Defense to include post-war, post-major combat operations stabilization efforts?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
120104-26

.....
Please respond by 12/21/04

720

8:58 AM

TO: Steve Cambone
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
DATE: January 9, 2004
SUBJECT:

Handwritten initials: MR and a large stylized signature.

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

IRAQ

I need to be given what's going on with the ISG. I need to know precisely how many people we reduced out of his operation and what it amounted to in total numbers and as a percentage.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
010904.16

Please respond by: 1/15/04

Handwritten: OB 1/26

OSD 06409-04

970004

Binoler-FILE COPY

EF-8185

In reply refer to EF-8185 and
04/000819

~~SECRET~~

January 20, 2004

TO: Doug Feith
CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
Jim Haynes

SUBJECT: Drug Trafficking Aircraft

I have read the reason we don't shoot down drug trafficking aircraft. There are ways we can do it. Let's go ahead and think about making those recommendations.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
012004-45

.....
Please respond by 2/13/04

COMPLETED

FEB 10 2004

OSD 06413-04
21-01-05 11:32

~~SECRET~~

UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENT(S)
EXEMPT FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

11-L-0559/OSD/41267

0005
20 Jan 04

⁷²⁰
~~SECRET~~ *In reply refer to:* EF-8187
04/000836
C 1/30
January 20, 2004

TO: Doug Feith
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *RM*
SUBJECT: Spain

I want to find ways to strengthen Spain—to include them, give them information, make them knowledgeable, and improve their position in the EU.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
012004-42

.....
Please respond by 2/12/04

Sir, *C 1/30* ✓ *1/30*
Response attached.
vr/CDR Nosenzo
1/30
Spain
20 Jan 04


OSD 06414-04

~~SECRET~~
11-L-0559/OSD/41268

UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENT(S)
THIS DOCUMENT BECOMES UNCLASSIFIED

May 3, 2004

TO: President Gedge W. Bush

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Article

Attached is an article of interest.

Respectfully,

Attach.
Jonas, George. *National Post*, April 17, 2004.

DHR:dh
042004-6

31

3 May 04

OSD 06430-04

canada.com **News**



America must find its national purpose to beat the terrorists
It will need to reconsider decades of ultra-liberalism

George Jonas
National Post

April 17, 2004

There's a demand for Pax Americana and, judging by President George Bush's press conference this week, the United States is ready to supply it. The Bush administration seems anything but wobbly. Even so, one wonders if the President and his advisors fully realize what the task entails. To put the genie of anti-civilizational ruthlessness back into its bottle, to defeat terrorist despotism from the nuclear labs of North Korea to the alleys of Falluja and the caves of al-Qaeda in the Hindu Kush, America will need to reconsider decades of ultra-liberalism and political correctness, and revert to earlier models of national purpose.

SPECIFICALLY, THE UNITED STATES WILL HAVE TO:

1. Regard any hostile power that attempts to acquire or develop weapons of mass destruction, or refuses to sign and abide by a non-proliferation agreement, as a belligerent state. Such countries must be exposed to the traditional consequences of belligerency, from blockades to possible invasion.
2. Acknowledge that, while Islam is a great religion, it contains a strain hostile to Western civilization, and recognize that a state of war exists between that particular strain of Islam and the West. This includes all Arab and/or Muslim countries whose governments nurture or tolerate such a hostile strain.

4/19/2004

11-L-0559/OSD/41270

3. Face the fact that terrorism is the chosen tactic of Islamist militants who can't penetrate the defensive perimeters of Western powers from the outside. Face the fact that terrorism depends for its success on fifth columnists; face the fact that Western residents of Arab/Muslim background, along with Arab/Muslim visitors or students, are susceptible to Islamist recruitment as fifth columnists; and face the fact that the loyalty of such residents and visitors cannot be taken for granted. Consequently, much as it may offend liberal and multicultural sensibilities, face the fact that residents, visitors, and, when warranted, even citizens of such background may have to be subjected to profiling, restrictions, surveillance, isolation and, in some cases, expulsion.

4. Remember that up to, and including, the Second World War, military operations weren't conducted with the view that the enemy was merely "the regime" and not the population. The Allies acted on the assumption that the foe was the Germans and the Japanese, even though far from all Germans or Japanese supported the Nazis or the warmongers of Japan. When the Allies bombed Dresden, they didn't try to separate those who voted for Hitler in 1933 from those who voted against him. The imperiums of Wilhelm II or Franz Joseph before the First World War, though more liberal than modern dictatorships, were hardly Western-style democracies. They were absolute monarchies whose populations might not have endorsed their own rulers in a referendum. Yet it never occurred to the Entente to say that it was only fighting the Kaiser and not his subjects. During the Cold War, even though it was evident that most people inside the Soviet camp hated the regime -- they brought it down in the end -- the West prepared and relied on a nuclear deterrent that by its nature couldn't distinguish between the supporters and opponents of communism.

5. Americans will have to consider that making the avoidance of civilian casualties a rigid priority in war has two predictable consequences. First, there's reduced military effectiveness and increased exposure of one's own troops to danger. Second, a campaign may not be evaluated primarily in terms of its military/strategic achievement, but in how successful it was in avoiding collateral damage. This exposes a victorious campaign to the risk of being judged a political debacle if it falls short of some self-imposed goal of minimizing civilian casualties. In short, it increases the likelihood of winning the war and losing the peace. It's ironic when self-imposed Western standards carry such political burden against a terrorist enemy that, far from trying to avoid collateral damage, deliberately targets non-belligerents. Arab/Islamist military efforts specifically express themselves in the bombings (or suicide bombings) of civilian buses, planes, discos, or office buildings, along with ruses de guerre such as using civilian shields, dressing military units in civilian clothes, placing military targets in civilian quarters, etc. The indignation of Arab and Islamist belligerents -- who, after deliberately targeting civilians, protest when Western or Israeli action results in some collateral civilian damage -- ought not to persuade Americans that they have some moral duty to impose extra conditions on themselves in addition to standard conventions of war.

6. A year ago, I wrote that asking whether Iraqis will look at the coalition as liberators is asking the wrong question. It assumes a unanimity in Iraq we would never expect to find in our own countries. In America, most people share the same liberal-democratic heritage, yet even Americans are divided on the question of whether they're liberators or occupiers. In Iraq, there's at least a six-way division. First, there are those Iraqis for whom individual freedom, political democracy, and economic prosperity are important criteria. These people have predictably greeted the coalition forces as liberators. Next are those who define themselves mainly by their various sectarian or ethnic identities. Shiite or Kurdish Iraqis

may, initially, have considered the forces that removed their Baathist-Sunni oppressors as liberators, but can hardly be relied on to do so forever, given that the coalition stands in the way of, say, Kurdish dreams of an independent Kurdistan or Shiite dreams of a Tehran-style theocracy. A third group identifies itself as Arab nationalists. Some may have hated Saddam, but like Westerners even less. Ditto for the fourth group, who defines itself primarily as Muslims. They're unlikely to cherish being liberated by the infidels, whatever they may have thought of Saddam. The fifth group is the "die-hards" currently burning and mutilating Americans in the streets of Falluja. They actually supported Saddam and benefited from his corrupt and despotic regime. These Iraqis naturally hate the coalition. Finally, there's a sixth group of Iraqis who care about little beyond their daily existence and their families. They understand next to nothing about democracy; they accepted Saddam and his predecessors without either affection or hostility, as one accepts the weather. These Iraqis may not be fanatical nationalists or Muslims, but they certainly regard Westerners as aliens. For them, the coalition appears as neither liberators nor oppressors, but as a force of nature, to be outwitted if possible and endured if necessary. Any estimate about the relative size of these groups would only be a guess, but the first group -- the supporters of democracy and Western values -- is probably the smallest, while the sixth group -- the apolitical Iraqis -- is probably the largest. It's their souls for which Islamists and pan-Arabists are contending with the West.

7. Relying on the possibility, or even probability, that most people within Islam -- or specifically within Iraq -- would prefer to live in a democracy, and that only a minority support despotism and enmity with the West, is a grievous error. It's not an error because it may not be true, but because it's immaterial. Majorities do not necessarily carry the day even in free countries, let alone in theocracies or tyrannies. Militant minorities are far more likely to set the tone in a given country, period, or civilization. Communism was rarely supported by more than 20% of the population in which it held sway. Even a relatively popular totalitarian system, Nazism, was supported only by one out of three voters in Germany's last free election before Hitler assumed power. Western policy-makers cannot take comfort in democracy's enemies having only a minority support among their own people. A minority support is all they need. It was all they needed even before the age of terror and weapons of mass destruction, and can do with even smaller numbers in the age of suicide bombers, anthrax and nuclear devices. It took just 19 Middle East infiltrators to create the havoc of 9/11 in Manhattan, and about the same for the recent mayhem of 3/11 in Madrid.

8. Terrorist despotism, theocratic or secular, must be confronted; it cannot be accommodated or appeased. Defeating the enemy is the best way to change his mind. Anti-civilizational ruthlessness, Marxist or Muslim, is to Western democracy what Hannibal's Carthage was to Rome. Some 2,000 years ago, Marcus Porcius Cato ended his speeches in the Senate with the words *Carthaginem esse delendam* -- Carthage must be destroyed. At his press conference this week, even if somewhat more diffidently, President Bush conveyed the same message.

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7:43 AM

TO: LTG John Craddock
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: January 7, 2004
SUBJECT: **POTUS Briefing**

I do need *to* brief the President on the submarine issue with Vern Clarke and Dick Myers there. Let's get it set.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
010704.10

Please respond by: _____

337 WH

7 Jan 04

217
1400

740

EF-8295
04/001185

January 28, 2004

Durnan → *TO SD*
2/18 cc: *LTG Craddock*

TO: Doug Feith
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
LTG John Craddock

SUBJECT: Poland

The Polish **MoD** wants me to go to Poland for the Ukraine-Poland meeting. He will set the date to fit with me, either in late May or early June, possibly tie it to the Normandy D-day meeting.

Thanks.

DHR:db
012804-3

.....
Please respond by _____

NATO 337

28 Jan 04

29-01-34 11:55

11-L-0559/OSD/41274

OSD 06449-04

January 13, 2004

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
CC: William Winkenwerder
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Wagee Barzani

You are in charge of dealing with this medical problem that Jay Garner wrote about concerning Wagee Barzani.

Thanks.

Attach.
1/9/04 Garner ltr to SecDef

DHR:dh
011304-11

.....
Please respond by 2/6/04

OB
1/20

Iraq

13 Jan 04

✓
1/13

January 9, 2004

Mr. Secretary,

Last night I visited Wagee Barzani, the youngest brother of Masoud Barzani, leader of the KDP, (the largest Kurdish Political Party). As you will remember, Wagee was severely wounded and maimed by friendly fire shortly after the war began. Today, Wagee is missing his left eye, he cannot talk, he cannot walk, and he continually sustains serious internal organ problems. By all rights he should be dead; however, he is a tough soldier from a tough family...and I might add, a family that has, over the decades been extremely pro-American at great personal expense.

After his wounds from friendly fire, we (DOD) committed to oversee and manage his recovery. He received excellent treatment as an in-patient at Walter Reed for several months. However, since that time the oversight by DOD to assist and manage his recovery has been shoddy, unsupportive and embarrassing. If you were to hear the entire story, you would be shocked, enraged and personally embarrassed.

This is the reason for sending this report: After all, the Kurds and especially the Barzanis were our only Iraqi allies during the war. I know you are extremely limited with your time, but I also know you would not condone this lack of performance and support from DOD. I would ask you to call or visit Wagee and Avan (she speaks excellent English) and to also assign a DOD POC which has appropriate authority to assist this family. Wagee is a symbol to all of Kurdistan, and they represent over 20% of the Iraqi population...and again, they were and are our allies. Their address and phone number are (b)(6)

I have been so disturbed by this, as I know you will be. Thank you for allowing me to vent.

Jay

(Garner)

cc: LTG Craddock

11-L-0559/OSD/41276

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

January 14, 2004

TO: Doug Feith
cc: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR.*
SUBJECT: Spanish Detainee

*Advance
copy sent*

383.6

I want to put a full court press on that Spanish detainee. Aznar is coming.
Thanks.

DHR:dh
011404-5

.....
Please respond by NLT 1700, 14 JAN 04

*✓ 1/15
C 1/14*

14 Jan 04

OSD 06452-04

14-01-04 11:14 IN

11-L-0559/OSD/41277

72
EF-8372

FEB 2
January 30, 2004

I-04/001269

TO: Doug Feith
CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: HARM-III

Why did we give the Harm-III to Egypt?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
013004-8

.....
Please respond by

~~2/12/04~~
2/03/04

Egypt

2 Feb 04

20

~~RESTRICTED (UK)~~

EF FILE

Hadley

FILE COPY

27
January 28, 2004

EF-8259
I-04/001054

TO: Doug Feith
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM:
SUBJECT: UK Paper

Here is the UK think piece on the Iraq security agreement. Please take a look at it and see how closely we have conformed.

Thanks.

Attach
1/7/04 UK Paper

DHR:dh
012304-19

.....
Please respond by 2/6/04

1/28/04

→ SD

Policy ExecSec's Note

January 28, 2004

CDR Nosenzo,

- Mr. Feith gave the attached response to SecDef at this morning's Roundtable.

C. L. O'Connor

Colonel C. L. O'Connor, USMC
Director, Policy Executive Secretariat

There's a reasonable degree of overlap in UK and DOD thinking.

I spoke to Hadley on this on Jan 27 and he said that Cond. agrees strongly with your approach, but has some suggestions about revising our tactics, which sounded reasonable to me.

Hadley suggested that we finish getting all USG principals lined up and then engage the UK.

I'll try to get this done today or tomorrow.

Doug Feith.

Iraq

27 Jan 04

COMPLETED

~~RESTRICTED (UK)~~

27-01-04 12:58 IN

~~RESTRICTED (UK)~~

27
January 7, 2004

TO: Doug Feith
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: UK Paper

Here is the UK think piece on the Iraq security agreement. Please take a look at it and see how closely we have conformed.

Thanks.

Attach.
1/7/04 UK Paper

DHR:dh
012304-19

.....
Please respond by 2/6/04

11-L-0559/OSD/41280

~~RESTRICTED (UK)~~

OSD 06463-04

rec'd from
Simon Webb
1/7/04

UK FOOD FOR THOUGHT PAPER: IRAQ SECURITY AGREEMENT

Limited scope

- the Agreement should focus on the key principles of the security relationship ie the functions and responsibilities of the multinational presence during the transition period. Details of rights, immunities etc can come in a later SOFA, based on the NATO standard.

Consent

- multinational forces after transition must be in Iraq at the invitation of the government. This demonstrates a clean break with the "occupying power" period. Principle of consent will also be essential for widening international participation.

Negotiation on behalf of all MNF contributors.

- US should negotiate as commander of the MNF, consulting main contributors. Each contributor should subsequently agree an MOU with US, as is usual procedure.

MNF form

- familiar model may be most easily understood. A UN-authorized MNF, under US unified command, is the simplest option. Bringing host country in as a troop contributor new, but potentially workable. But we should avoid over-elaborate structures that could arouse suspicions that sovereignty was not being respected and complicate UNSC endorsement. Adding in elements of a regional security structure would add further complexities.

Command of Iraqi forces, freedom of action and right to detain

- key red lines. But they will need to be **expressed** clearly in terms of delineation of MNF/Iraqi responsibilities (eg not all Iraqi forces under Iraqi control; purposes for which MNF will need freedom of action and right to detain should be spelt out.) Agreement may need to include provision for what ultimately happens to those the MNF forces detain.

Principle of transition

- principle of a progressive migration of security responsibilities to Iraqi forces as their capacity builds must run through the security agreement. This could be facilitated by focus on tasking, with capability being the key determinant of who does what.

Iraqi responsibility for elements of security

agreement should provide that initially Iraqis take on responsibility for certain security tasks, eg local law enforcement, and take on more as they gain capacity. Shared tasks could include counter-insurgency, with detailed arrangements worked out for joint command structures. The MNF should take on responsibility for external threats. Flexibility to amend arrangements that were not working should be built in.

Iraqi membership of the MNF

- Iraq could assign elements (not all) of its security forces to the MNF. It remains *to* be seen how saleable such **an** approach would be to the Iraqis or the UNSC, although it should be noted (1) that those security forces which would be most visible to the population on a day-to-day basis – ie, the police – would not be so assigned, and would be visibly under Iraqi leadership; and (2) that the MNF and Iraqi leaders would exercise strategic control through a National Security Council (see below).
- The arguments for assigning other Iraqi security force elements to the MNF essentially (1) that indigenous command and control mechanisms will not **be** sufficiently developed in this timeframe for independent Iraqi operations to be realistic option for the more demanding security tasks; (2) that where tasks (eg counter-insurgency operations) are shared between the Iraqis and the MNF the two sets of forces must have a single command chain to ininimise the **risk** of confusion (and, eg,
- Iraqi security forces assigned in this way would need to include the ICDC (which is intended to have a long-term independent existence, but which the Iraqi army will be able to absorb until its command structure is more developed), probably-national/high-end police capabilities, and elements of the armed forces as they are up. Those forces not so assigned (such as the police) would be subject only to command. As Iraqi capacity develops, and subject to the situation on the ground at time, the number of Iraqi force elements assigned to the MNF could be

Iraqi strategic and political input

- Iraqi high level involvement and co-ordination could be delivered through an Iraqi National Security Council of Iraqi government Ministers and military, with a seat for the MNF commander and say, two major contributors. It would provide a forum for discussion of strategic goals, consultation on implementation of the Agreement and clarity over who was responsible for specific tasks - but not operational control. Will need to be squared with Fundamental Law and arrangements for transitional government.

International legitimacy

- the Agreement needs to attract continued involvement of multinational forces. UNSCR 1511 already endorses the multinational force in place in Iraq. Re-authorisation of the force by the UNSC, on the basis of the already negotiated new agreement, would be the simplest way to do this. But **UNSC** will need to see an explicit invitation from the sovereign Iraqi government for continued presence after 1 July as well as IGC agreement, and a further SCR after this may thus be necessary.
- one possible model could be an ISAF/Korean hybrid. UN and US double-hatting would not work without a real blue hatted command structure. Expect UN only to come into the picture to authorise MNF; it would have no operational decision-making power, and the UNSC's role should be limited to receiving regular reports from Commander MNF. But

~~RESTRICTED~~

the element in the Korean model of consultative arrangements at the strategic/political level between the host country and US MNF command (see [redacted]) would help gain Iraqi buy-in.

Cooperation element

- the Agreement needs to demonstrate a balance in what is provided to and by the multinational presence. The agreement should commit MNF partners to delivering a continued package of assistance for build up **the** capacity of Iraqi security forces to a point where they can take over **full** responsibility for Iraq's security.

Provision for withdrawal

- an explicit provision for review on transition should not be included. But genuine sovereignty requires that the Iraqis are able to withdraw. Six months notice is a reasonable period; any longer suggests being "tied in". Continuation of the arrangements should be subject to review after the period of transition is up.

- the Fundamental Law should refer to how Iraq's security will be assured in the transition period, as well as commitments to international obligations including on WMD.

May 3, 2004

TO: President George W. Bush

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Comparison to Vietnam

Mr. President—

Attached for your possible interest is a paper that one of the staff over here did on the comparison between Vietnam and Iraq.

Respectfully,

Attach.

Undated: "Vietnam? No Comparison"

DHR:dh
050304-27

Iraq

3 May 04

OSD 06474-04

11-L-0559/OSD/41284

Vietnam? No Comparison.

- It's difficult to recall of an instance in which guerillas alone have ever won a war. They can:
 - Harass.
 - Ambush.
 - Mine roads.
 - Occasionally shoot down a helicopter.
 - Occasionally mass for an attack (like in Ramadi last week).

- But these things don't win wars, *unless they break the will of the stronger power*. Guerillas stand a better chance of winning when they:
 - Have a coherent political strategy;
 - Can serve as an auxiliary to a conventional force;
 - Enjoy the benefit of an external sanctuary;
 - Have the support of a sympathetic population;
 - Supplied by a major client state.

- Has Iraq become, as some have claimed, "George Bush's Vietnam?" Hardly. Iraq is not like Vietnam:
 - There is no conventional North Vietnamese Army to distract us from organizing to fight a guerilla war.
 - There is no coherent anti-coalition strategy like Hanoi's "armed struggle" and "political struggle."
 - There is no external sanctuary of the scope enjoyed by Hanoi.

- There is no overwhelming sympathy from the population.
- There is no major client state supplying the guerillas.
- With time and perseverance, an army can always defeat guerillas acting alone especially if that army:
 - Organizes for counter-guerilla operations;
 - Develops good intelligence and acts on it quickly;
 - Isolates the guerilla strongholds (prevent them from entering or leaving);
 - Systematically identifies, captures, or kills trapped guerillas;
 - Gains and keeps the support of the local population;
 - Secures the borders.

We are doing these things in Iraq today and we will win. Iraq is not like Vietnam.

720
TAB A

March 15, 2004

TO: Ken Krieg
CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: SLRG on Updating Systems and Processes

Attached is a memo I am sending out on broken systems and processes.

Please put this on an agenda for a SLRG meeting *sometime*.

Thanks.

Attach.
3/15/04 SecDef memo re: Updating Systems and Processes (#031504-23)

DHR:dh
031504-25

.....
Please respond by 4/16/04

Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD/41287

OSD 06893-04

TAB A

March 17, 2004

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Updating Systems and Procedures

We have had a series of difficulties over the past three **years**, where only **after** a period of serious problems with **a DoD** system or process have we realized that **we were** still in the industrial age, rather **than** the **21st** century.

For example:

- DoD Contingency Plans were out of date, **and** the process for preparing **them was** antiquated, excessively long and not suitable for the **21st** century. **Now** we are fixing them.
- The deployment process for the Iraq conflict **was** broken. **Now we** are **fixing** it.
- The balance between the Active component and the Reserve component **was** clearly **out** of whack. **Now** we are rebalancing the **AC/RC**.
- Our **SRO** procedures were sluggish and out of date. Now they have been revamped.
- Today we read that the pay systems for the **Guard** and Reserve are okay if the Guard and Reserve are doing one weekend per **month** and a two-week active duty period per year, but seriously inadequate **when** we are mobilizing to the extent **we** have had to during the Iraq conflict.

TAB A

I am concerned about what we'll discover next that is broken. We've made lots of progress on the operational side, but please review the systems, procedures and business practices that you use and/or are responsible for, and advise me of those that you believe we need to fix now, before we need them and before we discover they are not suited to the 21st century, I'd like to try to get ahead of the curve.

Please coordinate your responses with Ken Krieg in PA&E.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
031504-23

.....
Please respond by 4/16/04

DISTRIBUTION:

CJCS

VCJCS

DJS

DSD

USD(P)

USD(C)

USD(P&R)

USD(AT&L)

USD(I)

GC

ASD(LA)

ASD(PA)

ASD(NII)

SecArmy

SecNav

SecAF

CoS Army

CoS Air Force

CNO

CMC

COCOM: EUCOM, NORTHCOM, TRANSCOM, STRATCOM, PACOM,
SOUTHCOM, JFCOM, CENTCOM

USFK

TAB B



NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND
AND
UNITED STATES NORTHERN COMMAND



APR 16 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
Washington DC 20301-1000

FROM: Commander, NORAD and USNORTHCOM
250 Vandenberg Street, Suite B016
Peterson AF8 CO 80914-3801

SUBJECT: Updating Systems and Procedures (SecDef Memo, 17 March 2004)

1. In response to the SecDefs request for feedback on updating systems and procedures, we have coordinated with OSD (PA&E) and provide the following comments.

a. Several current policies, and in some cases statutes, present significant obstacles to the approval, funding and execution of civil support missions. Prior to the events of 11 September 2001, these precautions provided the appropriate level of oversight for the prudent use of DoD resources. However, now they constitute unnecessary impediments to conducting civil support missions that augment the interagency effort in the Global War on Terrorism. We believe this is the right time to undertake a comprehensive review regarding how DoD will conduct homeland defense and civil support in the future.

b. We are reviewing the roles and responsibilities of NORAD and anticipate recommending the expansion of the bi-national command's mission beyond air sovereignty, including areas such as maritime domain awareness. NORAD must transform to augment its ability to accomplish its legacy strategic mission with the new requirements of the Global War on Terrorism.

c. We propose modification of the Enhanced Planning Process by allowing combatant commands to submit their POMs directly to OSD/PA&E, instead of commands competing within executive agent (Service) POMs. Each command submitting a POM directly to OSD would then be evaluated and resourced on a level playing field with the Services and fellow combatant commands.

2. We appreciate the opportunity to provide feedback on systems and procedures. We believe these proposed adjustments will improve our mission effectiveness. Please pass these to the Secretary per his request.

RALPH E. EBERHART
General, USAF

cc:
OJS
DIRECTOR, OSD (PA&E)

11-L-0559/OSD/41290

Tab B



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

INFO MEMO

CM-1745-04
11 May 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RBM/5/11*

SUBJECT: Updating Systems and Procedures

- In response to your request (TAB A), the Commander, USNORTHCOM (CDRUSNORTHCOM), reply is attached (TAB B). The memorandum proposes that combatant commanders make direct submissions to the Director, Program Analysis and Evaluation (PA&E), as part of the program objective memorandum process.
- CDRUSNORTHCOM proposal has been forwarded to Director, (PA&E), for consolidation with other issues under consideration by the Senior Level Review Group.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachments:
As stated

Prepared by: Lieutenant General James E. Cartwright, USMC; Director, J-8;
(b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/41291

OSD 06893-04

TAB A

March 15, 2004

TO: Ken Krieg
CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: SLRG on Updating Systems and Processes

Attached is a memo I am sending out on broken systems and processes.

Please put this on an agenda for a SLRG meeting sometime.

Thanks.

Attach.

3/15/04 SecDef memo re: Updating Systems and Processes (#031504-23)

DHR:dh
031504-23

.....
Please respond by

4/16/04

Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD/41292

OSD 06893-04

TAB A

March 17, 2004

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Updating Systems and Procedures

We have had a series of difficulties over the past three years, where only **after** a period of serious problems **with** a DoD system or process have **we realized** that **we** were still in the industrial age, rather than **the 21st** century.

For example:

- DoD Contingency Plans were out of date, and the process for **preparing** them was antiquated, excessively long and not suitable for the 21st century. Now we are fixing **them**.
- The deployment process for the Iraq conflict **was** broken. Now we *are* **fixing** it.
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- Our **SRO** procedures were sluggish and out of date. **Now** they have been revamped.
- Today we read that the **pay** systems for the Guard and Reserve are okay if the Guard and Reserve are **doing** one weekend **per month** and **a two-week** active duty period per year, but seriously inadequate when we are mobilizing to the extent we have had to during the Iraq conflict.

11-L-0559/OSD/41293

TAB A

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Please coordinate your responses with Ken Krieg in PA&E.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
031504-23

.....
Please respond by 4/16/04

DISTRIBUTION:

CJCS

VCJCS

DJS

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USD(I)

GC

ASD(LA)

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SecArmy

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SecAF

CoS Army

CoS Air Force

CNO

CMC

COCOM: EUCOM, NORTHCOM, TRANSCOM, STRATCOM, PACOM,
SOUTHCOM, JFCOM, CENTCOM

USFK

TAB B



NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND
AND
UNITED STATES NORTHERN COMMAND



APR 16 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
Washington DC 20301-1000

FROM: **Commander**, NORAD and USNORTHCOM
250 Vandenberg Street, **Suite B016**
Peterson AFB CO 80914-3801

SUBJECT: Updating Systems and Procedures (SecDef Memo, 17 March 2004)

1. In response to the SecDef's request for **feedback** on updating systems and procedures, **we** have coordinated with OSD (PA&E) and provide the following comments.

a. Several current policies, **and** in some **cases** statutes, **present** significant **obstacles** to the **approval**, funding **and** execution of civil support missions. Prior to the events of 11 September **2001**, these precautions provided the appropriate level of oversight for the prudent use of DoD resources. However, now they constitute unnecessary impediments to **conducting** civil support missions **that** augment the interagency effort in the **Global War on Terrorism**. **We** believe this is the right time to undertake a comprehensive **review** regarding **how DoD will** conduct homeland defense and civil **support** in the future.

b. We are reviewing the roles and responsibilities of NORAD **and** anticipate **recommending** the expansion of the **bi-national** command's mission **beyond** air sovereignty, **including** areas such **as** maritime domain awareness. NORAD must transform to augment **its ability** to accomplish its legacy strategic **mission** with the new requirements of the Global War on Terrorism.

c. **We** propose modification of the **Enhanced** Planning Process **by** allowing combatant **commands** to **submit** *their* POMs directly to OSD/PA&E, instead of commands competing within **executive** agent (Service) POMs. **Each command** submitting a POM directly to OSD would then be **evaluated and** resourced **on a level playing field** with the Services **and fellow combatant** commands.

2. **We** appreciate the opportunity to provide feedback on systems and procedures. **We believe** these proposed adjustments will improve our mission effectiveness. **Please pass** these **to the** Secretary **per** his request.

RALPH E. EBERHART
General, USAF

cc:
OJS
DIRECTOR, OSD (PA&E)

11-L-0559/OSD/41295

Tab B



TAB

April 27, 2004

762

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
 CC: Paul Wolfowitz
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
 SUBJECT: Battle Damage Assessment Integration

381

In the SLRG on April 26, it **was** suggested that possibly the Chairman do a battle damage assessment integration process. Do you have plans to do that?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
042704-3

.....
 Please respond by 5/7/04

27 Apr 04
12 May 04

Tab



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

INFO MEMO

CM-1749-04
12 May 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS

RB/MS/11

SUBJECT: Battle Damage Assessment Integration

- **Question.** "In the SLRG on April 26, it was suggested that possibly the Chairman do a battle damage assessment integration process. Do you have plans to do that?" (TAB)
- **Answer.** A battle damage assessment (BDA) integration process is set in joint doctrine, but its implementation is inadequate.
- **Analysis.** The military targeting community is working three initiatives to improve the process: standardizing federation, leveraging information technology (IT) and creating a combat assessment working group (CAWG).
 - **Standardizing Federation:** The intent is to designate specific intelligence organizations as permanent federated partners with specific functional target sets. These organizations will then be able to develop functional expertise and train regularly to support targeting and BDA requirements. Under the current federated BDA process, combatant commands work with the Joint Staff/J-2 to establish a unique federated architecture for each crisis. This is neither efficient nor conducive to effective training because organizations and responsibilities can change for each crisis.
 - **Leveraging IT:** The joint targeting cycle, including BDA integration, is improving through the creation of the Joint Targeting Toolbox (JTT) and a targeting portal. JTT will improve support to all phases of the joint targeting cycle, including BDA deficiencies identified in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF). Creating a single targeting portal will streamline and integrate combat assessment efforts by linking combatant commands and Intelligence Community target analyses.
 - **Creating a CAWG:** The CAWG was formed in December 2003 to resolve OIF combat assessment (and BDA) shortfalls. The CAWG includes combatant commands, Service, national agencies and Allied representatives.

COORDINATION: NONE

Prepared By: Major General Ronald L. Burgess Jr., USA; Director, J-2; (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/41297

OSD 06946-04

May 3, 2004

TO: Gordon England
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Officer Attitudes Toward Innovation

Please take a look at this paper by Mahnken and FitzSimonds and tell me if you think there is anything I ought to be doing with respect to this issue.

Thanks.

Attach.

Undated, Mahnken and FitzSimonds: "Officer Attitudes Toward Innovation"

DHR:dh
050304-30

.....
Please respond by 6/4/04

375 177 12 PM 2: 24

May 12, 2004

To: SECDEF

Fr: SECNAV

Subj: Officer Attitudes Toward Innovation

Mr. Secretary,

In your note of May 3, you asked me to take a look at the survey by Mahnken and FitzSimonds and let you know if there is anything you ought to be doing with respect to this issue. The answer is no.

This survey does highlight a few items the other Service Secretaries and Chiefs may find interesting so therefore I will make sure that the CNO and CMC, as well as the other Service Secretaries and Chiefs, receive a copy with the areas of interest highlighted.

May 3, 2004

TO: Gordon England
c c : Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Officer Attitudes Toward Innovation

Please take a look at this paper by Mahnken and FitzSimonds and tell me if you think there is anything I ought to be doing with respect to this issue.

Thanks.

Attach.

Undated, Mahnken and FitzSimonds: "Officer Attitudes Toward Innovation"

DHR:dh
050304-30

.....
Please respond by 6/4/04

October 18, 2004

TO: [redacted]
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Addition to Awards List and Thank You Note

Please add to the to my awards list the following:

The Precision Strike Association gave me the Special Recognition Award on October 12, 2004 for "Critical Insight, Vision and Commitment to Our Nation in Advancing and Improving Precision Strike Systems in Defense of the United States."

The organization gave me this award via Paul Wolfowitz, as I was out of the country. He has a letter we should get a copy of – so that I can write a note of thanks.

DHR:ss
101804-11

.....
Please respond by _____

001,15D

18 Oct 04

1 Apr 04

October 18, 2004

P.B.
Draft letter
for me to
sign



Sir -

You asked where a letter from SecDef should be addressed regarding his recent award from the Precision Strike Association. The letter should be addressed to:

Mr. Wayne F. Savage
Chairman of the Board
Precision Strike Association
2111 Wilson Boulevard, Suite 400
Arlington, VA 22201-3061

with a courtesy copy to Ms. Virginia Sniegon, the PSA Programs Chair, at the same address. Ginny is apparently the person who nominated the Secretary for the award, which was voted on by the Executive Board of the Association.



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

OCT 29 2004

Mr. Wayne F. Savage
Chairman of the Board
Precision Strike Association
2111 Wilson Boulevard, Suite 400
Arlington, VA 22201-3061

Dear Mr. Savage,

I thank you so much for the Special Recognition Award for "critical insight, vision and commitment to our nation in advancing and improving precision strike systems in defense of the United States."

It was very kind of the Precision Strike Association to select me for this unique honor. I do appreciate it.

With my best wishes for the continued success of your organization,

Sincerely,

OSD 07021-04

11-L-0559/OSD/41303

0011517

29 OCT 04

1 APR 04

Pres for SecDef

Larry Di Rita
1/29

Mr. Wayne F. Savage
Chairman of the Board
Precision Strike Association
2111 Wilson Boulevard, Suite 400
Arlington, VA 22201-3061


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It was very kind of the Precision Strike Association to select me for this unique honor. I do appreciate it.

With my best wishes for the continued success of your organization,

Sincerely,





From the Desk of
Paul Wolfowitz

10/19

Don -

These are the folks who
gave you the Precision
Strike award.

Paul W.

OSD 07021-04

061150

19 OCT 04

1 APR 04

HERE IS WHAT I COULD
FIND
CSC - DSD OFFICE

MIGHT HAVE MORE
CHECK W/ CAPT O'CONNOR
IF YOU NEED INFO M



1 April 2004

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Affiliate, National Defense Industrial Association

Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
1000 Defense Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301-1000

Dear Secretary Rumsfeld:

Members of the Precision Strike Association (PSA) wholeheartedly respect your vision and commitment to the goals/objectives of transforming the Defense Department – especially as you use the urgency of the present global war on terrorism to continue transforming our military.

PSA, founded during the mid-1980s by a small core of Defense experts in support of precision strike systems, is sponsoring its 14th annual Precision Strike Technology Symposium on 12-14 October 2004. This three-day event will be held at the Kossiakoff Conference Center of The Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory, Laurel, MD. It would be our distinct honor to have you open the symposium by delivering the keynote address to the precision strike community on Tuesday, 12 October (unclassified day) at 1300 – or whenever convenient that afternoon to accommodate your demanding schedule. *“Accelerating Joint & Coalition Technology Advances for Precision Strike”* is the theme for this symposium.

At that time, PSA also wishes to present you with a special award in recognition of your keen insight into the need for and the use of precision strike weapons during the past 30 years. This award will recognize your leadership in making precision strike systems a reality – from the time you made the decision to establish the Joint Cruise Missiles Project Office in 1977 until the present time of accelerating the Services’ transformation – to allow critical precision strike systems to become fully interoperable within the joint environment.

PSA is a non-profit organization dedicated to advancing precision strike systems by promoting new concepts, facilitating communication between leaders in government and the commercial sector, and influencing technology investment and infusion. Over 300 representatives from industry, government, and the international arena are expected to participate. Embassy officials and the Press will attend the unclassified sessions on 12 October and the morning of 13 October. Presentations scheduled for the afternoon of 13 October and all day on 14 October will be conducted at the ~~SECRET~~–Releasable to NATO level.

Secretary Rumsfeld, we hope that you will be available to accept our invitation to address this year’s symposium on 12 October and to receive our special recognition. Thank you for your consideration. I will remain in contact with your staff and can be reached at (b)(6)

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "Ginny Sniegou". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style.

Ginny Sniegou

Executive Board & Programs Chair

2111 Wilson Boulevard • Suite 400 • Arlington, VA 22201
Telephone: (703) 247-2590 • Fax: (703) 522-1885 • <http://www.precisionstrike.org>

11-L-0559/OSD/41306

OSD 07021:04

PRECISION STRIKE ASSOCIATION
PRECISION STRIKE TECHNOLOGY SYMPOSIUM
OCTOBER 12-14,2004

KOSSIAKOFF CONFERENCE CENTER * THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY
APPLIED PHYSICS LABORATORY * LAUREL, MD

Accelerating Joint & Coalition Technology Advances for Precision Strike

PSA Programs Chair: Ginny Sniegon * PSA Programs Vice-Chair: CAPT Jim Hart, USN
PSTS-04 Tri-Chairs: Dr. John Walter, Harvey Dahljelm, George McVeigh
PSTS-04 Technical Chairs: CAPT Jim Hart USN, Tim Beard, Manny Garrido, Dean Larson
PSTS-04 Classified Chairs: George McVeigh & Dick Rumpf
Warfighter Representatives: CAPT Deke Philman USN, Col Lance Moore USA, Maj Chad Stevenson USAF

Tuesday, 12 October 2004

—ALL AFTERNOON UNCLASSIFIED—

- 1130 CHECK-IN & LIGHT REFRESHMENTS
- 1230 SYMPOSIUM WELCOME:
Wayne Savage — Chairman of the Board
- 1235 JHU / APL WELCOME:
- 1240 OPENING REMARKS:
- 1300 KEYNOTE ADDRESS:
Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld — Secretary of Defense (*Ginny invited*)
- 1340 SPECIAL AWARD RECOGNITION TO SECRETARY RUMSFELD
- 1345 OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM — MY OBSERVATIONS:
Lt Gen William S. (Scott) Wallace, USA — Commanding General, U.S. Army Combined Arms Center and Fort Leavenworth (Ginny confirmed w/Gen Wallace & his Staff)

1430 AFTERNOON REFRESHMENT BREAK

1450 ACCELERATING PRECISION STRIKE TECHNOLOGIES — WHERE ARE WE SPENDING S&T FUNDS?

Moderator: Harvey *Dahljelm*—Director, Air Force & Space Programs, ITT Industries

- What is happening now: Charles *Holland* —DUSD (Science & Technology) (*Harvey invited 3/17*)
- What is happening mid-term: Industry Representative (*Harvey invite*)
- What is happening long-term: Dr. Spiro *Lekondis* —Director, Weapons Systems, DUSD (S&T) (*Harvey invited 3/17*)

1545 COALITION TECHNOLOGIES

Chair: Paul Hitchcock—MBDA Missiles Systems

- United Kingdom
- France
- Germany

1700 EVENING RECEPTION

Wednesday, 13 October 2004

—MORNING UNCLASSIFIED— AFTERNOON CLASSIFIED ~~SECRET Rel to NATO~~—

0730 CHECK-IN

0800 KEYNOTE ADDRESS—DARPA'S ENABLING TECHNOLOGIES

Dr. Anthony J. Tether—Director, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
(*Harvey/Ginny invited 3/18*)

0845 TARGETING SESSION

Chair: Manny *Garrido*—Battlespace, Inc.

- Invite DARPA speaker to open session to present overview AND TRACKING TARGETS (DAKYA is placing a lot of money into Further, address Investments Today for Future Capabilities— Precision ID, Tracking & Destruction of Elusive
- Unclassified
- Unclassified

1000 MORNING REFRESHMENT BREAK

1015 WEAPONS SESSION

Chair: *Captain Jim Hart, USN*—OUSD(AT&L)/Defense Systems, Air Warfare

- Unclassified Weapons Paper
- Unclassified Weapons Paper
- Unclassified Weapons Paper
- Unclassified Weapons Paper

1145 LUNCHEON—Kossiakoff Center Dining Room

1230 LUNCHEON ADDRESS:

Vice Admiral Thomas R. Wilson, USN (Ret)—President, ATK Missile Systems Co.

* * *

~~—ALL AFTERNOON CLASSIFIED SECRET—REL TO NATO—~~

1315 C4ISR SESSION

Chair: *Tim Beard*—BAE Systems

- Unclassified or Classified C4ISR Paper

1430 AFTERNOON REFRESHMENT BREAK

1445 EFFECTS SESSION

Chair: *Dr. Dean Larson*—The CNA Corporation

- Unclassified or Classified Effects Paper
- Unclassified or Classified Effects Paper
- Unclassified or Classified Effects Paper

1545 WARFIGHTERS' FLAG PANEL

Moderators: *Captain Deke Philman, USN*—Headquarters, U.S. Navy

Major Chad Stevenson, USAF—Headquarters, U.S. Air Force

- Joint Staff Perspective: *(Jim invite)*
- Army Perspective: *(Lance invite)*
- Navy Perspective: *(Deke invite)*
- Marine Corps Perspective: *(Deke invite)*
- Air Force Perspective: *(Chad invite)*

1700 ADJOURN

Thursday, 14 October

~~—ALL DAY CLASSIFIED SECRET—REL TO NATO—~~

0700 CHECK-IN

0745 KEYNOTE ADDRESS:

MG Michael D. Maples, USA—Deputy Director, The Joint Staff (George invited 3/17)

0830 THREAT ASSESSMENT UPDATE:

Christopher Yates: Defense Intelligence Agency (George invite)

0900 CLASSIFIED TARGETING/WEAPONS SESSION

Chair: George McVeigh—SAIC

- Targeting Paper
- Targeting Paper
- Weapons Paper
- Weapons Paper

1015 MORNING REFRESHMENT BREAK

1030 GLOBAL OVERVIEW OF FUTURE JOINT& COALITION ADVANCES FOR PRECISION STRIKE

Moderator: Dick Rumpf—President, Rumpf Associates International

Major General James M. Dubik, USA—Director, Joint Experimentation Directorate (J-9), U.S. Joint Forces Command (Ginny/Lance invite)

Brig Gen Kevin Kennedy, USAF—Director, Strike Warfare, U.S. Strategic Command (Brig Gen Kennedy accepted Ginny's invitation 4/1)

1130 NATIONAL GEOSPATIAL-INTELLIGENCE INITIATIVES:

National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) Representative (Ginny working—discussed with Suzanne Inscoe of NGA 2/4)

1215 OPEN—DICK RUMPF SCHEDULE CLASSIFIED TOPIC & INVITE SPEAKER

1300 CLOSING REMARKS:

Wayne Savage

1305 DEPARTURE SNACKS

CALL FOR PAPERS

Precision Strike Technology Symposium 2004

*The Precision Strike Association will sponsor the
Fourteenth Annual Precision Strike Technology Symposium
12-14 October 2004 – Kossiakoff Conference Center
The Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory, Laurel MD.*

Overview & Purpose

Transformation demands innovative thinking and a process that can identify, examine, and turn technology or concepts into reality. The purpose of PSTS-04 is to continue to provide a forum for exchanging insights, experiences, and ideas regarding the Acceleration of Joint and Coalition Technology Advances for Precision Strike, as well as to introduce new or improved technologies, capabilities, concepts, and processes into Precision Strike planning and operations. PSTS-04 papers should focus on innovations that span near to far time horizons.

Desired Topics

- + Weapons
- + Effects
- + C4ISR
- + Targeting

Abstracts for proposed papers are to be sent to the Precision Strike Association by:

E-mail to: info@precisionstrike.org (preferred)

Fax to: 703-522-1885 (Attn: Dawn Campbell-PSA)

Mail to: Precision Strike Association

2111 Wilson Blvd. - Suite 400

Arlington, VA 22201-3061

Requirements & Schedule

Individuals desiring to present a paper for consideration should ensure that the abstract is pertinent to the symposium theme and/or session topics and that it is no longer than 500 words. Abstracts are due no later than Friday, 11 June 2004. **Presentations may be to the SECRET level, but all abstracts must be UNCLASSIFIED.** Innovative concepts and ideas are particularly welcomed, and multimedia presentations are strongly encouraged.

Papers should be suitable for a no-minute presentation. Abstracts should include the intended classification of the paper and must include the point of contact, complete address, e-mail, telephone and fax number. Specific format requirements will be provided to those individuals whose abstracts are selected.

The Following Schedule Applies:

- + Deadline for Abstracts: 11
- + Acceptance Notification
E-mail: Week of 19
- + Symposium: 12-14

PSTS-04

Virginia (Cinny) A. Sniegon

Adjunct
Cost Analysis and Research Division



INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES

4850 Mark Center Drive / Alexandria, Virginia 22311-1882

(b)(6)

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TAB A

March 8, 2004

721

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith
David Chu

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Calling Back Retired Personnel

Have we made any attempt to get retired civil affairs personnel back on active duty to help out in Afghanistan or Iraq? They may be in the Individual Ready Reserve.

Have we made any effort to get the retired executive international corps going?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
030804-20

.....
Please respond by 3/26/04

0 SD 07131-04
Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD/41313



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

14 MAY 2004 06:00

INFO MEMO

CM-1758-04
14 May 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS

NOM 5/13

SUBJECT: Calling Back Retired and Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) Personnel

- **Question.** "Have we made any attempt to get retired civil affairs personnel back on active duty to help out in Afghanistan or Iraq? They may be in the Individual Ready Reserve. Have we made any effort to get the retired executive international corps going?" (TAB A)
- **Answer.** The Services and the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) have reviewed this concept and do not intend to recall retired or IRR personnel with civil affairs (CA) experience for possible use in Afghanistan or Iraq at this time. As of 19 April, no action has been taken regarding the retired International Executive Service Corps.
- **Analysis.** In February, the Director, Joint Staff (DJS) provided a list of more than 3,000 military retiree volunteers to the CPA; 47 had CA-related military skills. In March, the DJS asked the Services to screen their IRR population for personnel with CA experience and they identified 437. Age, availability, and security clearance issues are primary concerns of the Services. Additionally, CPA has reviewed the possibility of utilizing the IRR population and has decided against such a policy.

COORDINATION: TAB B

Attachments:
As stated

Prepared by: Brig Gen Maria C. Owens, USAF; Director, J-1 (b)(6)

0 SD 07131-04

11-L-0559/OSD/41314

030804-20
030804-20
030804-20

TAB A

March 8, 2004

721

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
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Doug Feith
David Chu

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Calling Back Retired Personnel

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Have we made any effort to get the retired executive international corps going?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
030804-20

.....
Please respond by 3/26/04

OSD 07131-04

Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD/41315

TAB B

COORDINATION

AGENCY	NAME	DATE
USA	COL Wright	16 March 2004
USN	CAPT Thompson	29 March 2004
USAF	COL Ball	16 March 2004
USMC	COL VanDyke	16 March 2004



TAB A

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
121 100 101 12

8:30 AM

709

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: February 25, 2004
SUBJECT: UCP

It seems to me that the linkage between Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey is an important one. If I am not mistaken, at the present time, all those countries except Kazakhstan are in EUCOM. It may be that we want to move Kazakhstan into EUCOM.

The only other country in that area that is a prospect for EUCOM it seems to me is Uzbekistan because of their clear orientation toward NATO and the NATO Partnership for Peace Program. Let's think this through and discuss it.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
022504.11

Please respond by: 3/5

Tab A

OSD 07134-04

72

May 25, 2004

TO: Gordon England

CC: Gen. Dick Myers
 Paul Wolfowitz
 Gen. Pete Pace
 Doug Feith
 LTG John Craddock
 Paul Butler

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: CSIS Recommendations

Your approach on how to organize for the Hamre/CSIS recommendations sounds fine. Press on!

Thanks.

Attach.
 5/14/04 SecNav letter

DHR:dh
 052504-2

.....
 Please respond by _____

020505

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
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May 14, 2004 2004 MAY 14 PM 1:33

AWB
→
→

~~Michael~~
To: SECDEF

Fr: Gordon England



Subj: CSIS/Hamre Recommendation Follow On

Mr. Secretary,

You asked me to think about how we could organize ourselves to properly evaluate the CSIS/Hamre recommendations and to develop a plan for implementation. The attachments outline the approach.

I am asking Doug Feith, Pete Pace and some of the members of your immediate staff to accept taskings in their area of responsibility, including schedules to completion. When responses are received, the output of these separate efforts will be integrated into an overall implementation recommendation for SLRG presentation/decision.

Let me know if you disagree with this approach.

Attachments

TSA SD	5/20
SRMA SD	
MA SD	
EXEC SEC	5/14

OSD 07135-04

April 29, 2004

TO: Gordon England

CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith
LTG John Craddock
Paul Butler

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Hamre's Recommendations

John Hamre came in with a lot of interesting recommendations on the organization of DoD.

Why don't you think about how we could organize ourselves to properly evaluate his recommendations and develop a plan to implement the one we agree with?

You don't seem busy enough!

Thanks.

DHR:dh
042904-2

.....
Please respond by 5/14/04

OSD 07135-04

11-L-0559/OSD/41320

**USD (Policy) lead on following CSIS interagency recommendations
with assistance from Joint Staff**

CSIS Interagency Recommendations
President should establish a new NSC office with the mandate to integrate agency plans.
Establish SOP for the planning of complex interagency operations.
All agencies establish planning offices to lead the development of plans in the interagency process.
Designate one senior official in charge of interagency operations.
Congress establish a new Agency for Stability Operations with a civilian stability operations corps.
Congress create a new Training Center for Interagency Operations and fund international training / exercise programs.
Congress increase funding for programs that support building operational capabilities of allies in complex operations.
Enhance opportunities for civilian planners and operators to work with counterparts.
Congress seek a bipartisan "BRAC" like process in overseeing DoD.

CSIS Interagency Objectives
1. Integrate political, military, economic, humanitarian and other agencies into complex contingency planning.
2. Achieve greater unity of effort in interagency planning for post conflict operations. -Establish procedures for developing integrated strategies and coherent plans.
3. Develop expertise by incorporating dedicated planning staffs and professional training.
4. Achieve a level of jointness at the interagency levels
5. Create stronger roles for key players that have a stake in strategy and planning

**VCJCS lead on following CSIS organizational recommendations
Members: USD (P&R)/(AT&L), and Service Vice Chiefs**

CSIS Organizational Recommendations

Create an integrated civ/mil J1 and OSD (P&R) staff.

Create an integrated civ/mil J4 and OSD (AT&L) staff.

Consolidate J6 and elements of DISA, create a joint C2 task force with SOCOM-like budgetary and acquisition authority.

Disband J7 and transfer responsibilities to the J5 and the Joint Forces Command.

CSIS Organizational Objectives

1. Build an integrated civ/mil staff by consolidating or eliminating duplicative staffs that create excessive wasteful coordination processes. Need to preserve diversity of ideas and perspectives.
2. Staffs should focus on their essential functions.
 - OSD should focus on policy formulation and oversight not program management.
 - Joint Staff should focus on roles in support of CJCS.
3. Create oversight to improve effectiveness in policy formation and strategic thinking.
4. Strengthen joint advocacy to solve joint capability needs.
 - Resolve lack of C2/C3 jointness by strengthening oversight.
5. Strengthen advocacy for joint programs and requirements.
 - Removes processes that are resistive to change.
6. Tie resource allocation decisions to DoD strategy and planning processes.
7. Create stronger roles for key players that have a stake in strategy and planning.
 - Forces the tough trade-off decisions at a higher level.

**VCJCS lead on following CSIS organizational recommendations
Members: COCOMs and Service Vice Chiefs**

CSIS Organizational Recommendation

Build capabilities in the COCOM for a stronger role in the resource allocation process.

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DEPSECDEF lead on following CSIS organizational recommendations

Members: USD (Policy)/Comptroller, PA&E, ASD (Public Affairs)

CSIS Organizational Recommendations

- OSD consolidate housekeeping functions under an Assistant Secretary for Administration.
- Expand the Under Secretary of Intelligence to include C3.
- Build a strong PA&E capable of providing broad strategic choices for DoD.
- Create an Office of Implementation and Execution Review that is tied directly to SECDEF.

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DHR:dh
042904.2

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OSD 07135-04

11-L-0559/OSD/41325

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800
2004 MAY 14 PM 1:33
May 14, 2004

To: SECDEF
Fr: Gordon England 
Subj: CSIS/Hamre Recommendation Follow On

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Attachments

OSD 07135-04

TAB A

SECURITY INFORMATION

APR 10 11 14:36

April 8, 2004

743

TO: Gen. Dick Myers

CJCS HAS SEEN

CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith
Powell Moore

APR 09 2004

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.*

SUBJECT: Private Security Forces

Please come back with an answer for the folks who asked about the disconnect between private security forces and US, Coalition and Iraqi security forces.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
040804-12

.....
Please respond by

4/23/04

Tab A

OSD 07140-04

11-L-0559/OSD/41331

720

May 17, 2004

TO: Dave Gompert
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Note on Fallujah

IRAQ

Thanks so much for your note to John Craddock on Fallujah. I appreciate it.
You're doing a fine job, and we all thank you for it.

DHR:dh
051704-29

.....
Please respond by _____

OSD 07311-04

19MAY04

11-L-0559/OSD/41332

May 17, 2004

TO: President George W. Bush

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT: Economic Issues in Iraq

IRAQ

Attached is a most interesting letter from Art Laffer on the subject of Iraq. I think you will find it interesting.

Respectfully,

Attach.

2/18/04 Laffer ltr to SecDef

DHR:dh
051704-30

19MAY04

OSD 07312-04

11-L-0559/OSD/41333

February 18, 2004

Donald H. Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
1000 Defense Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301-1000

Dear Don,

Last week I was invited by a group of your finest (Marine officers) to a seminar at Camp Pendleton, which is only a few miles north of where I live. These guys are great and have been assigned to a variety of tasks involved in the transition of Iraq from an occupied, economically dependent territory to a self-governing economically independent country. They have their work cut out for them under the best of circumstances. Why I'm writing to you, however, is because I was led to believe both from written material and during the course of our conversations that these tasks are facing additional potentially insurmountable obstacles placed in their way by the Coalition Provisional Authority and other directives coming from the U.S.

Because of my experience with the domestic economy of Vietnam in the 1970-1974 period under George Schultz and my work on a post-Castro transition plan for Cuba with the Cuban American National Foundation, when it was ably led by Jorge Mas Canosa (who passed away five years ago), I thought you might be interested in my two-cents worth (which has been discounted even below two cents). Rather than criticizing what I may not have fully understood of the Bremer and CPA plans, I've limited myself to what I consider essential do's and don'ts for creating an economically viable society out of a war-ravaged former totalitarian state.

- A. Perhaps the most significant obstacle to reestablishing markets is the absence of a viable stable-valued means of payment and store of value (currency). To foster economic interchange, merchants, workers, savers and investors need a currency they can count on both over time and across space. This currency has to be stable in value over time to satisfy the needs of small savers, and to provide a basis for contracts and it has to be readily acceptable everywhere both inside and outside the region to facilitate trade and investment flows.

I can't begin to tell you how depressing it was to the local economy of Mexico in 1976 when the peso started to collapse after having been stable for years and years. Likewise, Argentina's recent abandonment of the currency peg (under de la Rúa) and the subsequent financial collapse is a tragedy of immense proportions. Our own return to dollar credulity in the late 1970s and early 1980s under Paul Volcker and Ronald Reagan was the *sine qua non* of America's renaissance. Time and again countries are forced to relearn the powerful dictum of a sound money.

Iraq does not have the ability nor does it have powerful enough political institutions to pursue, maintain and monitor its own currency *de novo*. Iraq, if it is to have its own currency at all, must have that currency immutably linked to the dollar or euro. My personal suggestion would be to use either euros or dollars as the domestic currency of

11-L-0559/OSD/41334

Iraq and don't even pretend to introduce a new Iraqi currency. Panama is dollarized literally, and lots of other countries are dollarized de facto, and the system works extremely well.

Attempting to set up a new currency puts at risk the entire Iraqi rehabilitation effort and could, if bad enough, force the lower echelons of the Iraqi economy into barter. Barter is inefficient, inconvenient and costly, and will materially impede the type of economic progress we all hope for. The upper levels will always be able to take advantage of foreign currencies.

- B. Also of exceptional importance for a new Iraqi government is the structure of fiscal policy (taxation, spending and the issuance of debt) at the national and provincial levels.

In countries like Iraq where financial markets are years and years away from sophistication, there is a virtual certainty that budget deficits will lead to overuse of the printing press and hyperinflation. Budget deficits also can lead to excessively high tax rates and widespread disregard and flouting of the laws. Therefore, clear and concise tax policy explicitly segregated between federal and provincial prerogatives is of the essence.

Iraq is extraordinarily fortunate to be blessed with oil. As such severance taxes on oil should be a mainstay for government revenues – severance taxes are about as efficient as taxes get. If set up correctly, a good system of oil severance taxes is effectively a tax on foreigners and should do the least damage to the domestic economy of any tax system I know. We have two states that use them extensively, Alaska and Wyoming. It also makes lots of sense to collect revenues on a comprehensive flat rate basis on imports. Any type of sin tax is also a good option because the economic damage the tax does is on the disfavored products. Also property taxes should be used at the provincial level – property and real estate are about the only items that can't escape local taxes by leaving. Any additional revenue supplements should be on a flat rate, broad-based, value added like tax.

Taxes that should be avoided are income taxes (especially progressive) and small taxes where the costs of collection approach or exceed the revenue actually collected. The keys to good tax policy are:

- i.) Tax those items most that can escape the least, and conversely tax those least that can easily escape. It makes no sense to tax something that then flees the jurisdiction, goes underground or stops working. You not only don't get the revenue, but you also lose the benefits of the productive services.
- ii.) Tax those things most that you least like (sin taxes). An additional benefit of sin taxes is that they do reduce the activity being taxed.
- iii.) Tax those things least where the collection costs are highest
- iv.) Broad based low rate taxes provide people with the least incentives to evade, avoid and otherwise not report taxable income and the least number of places where they can escape taxation.
- v.) Tax people fairly. People in like circumstances should have similar tax burdens. The perception of fairness is key to voluntary compliance.
- vi.) Make sure that taxation is not arbitrary or easily subject to discretionary changes. The power to tax in the wrong hands is an ugly weapon for exploitation.

- vii.) Lastly, collect only as much as you really need. Wasteful spending will always rise to the level of revenues.

These rules should help your efforts, if meticulously adhered to. Next to a bad money I know of nothing that will bring an economy to its knees faster than an unjust, inefficient, anti-growth, excessive system of taxation. This principal is universal.

On the spending side, priorities need to be set really quickly. In my view infrastructure is the first among equals such as: security (police), judiciary, water, electricity, telecommunications, roads, airports, hospitals and government itself. In the near term at least, school programs, women's issues, social redistribution and humanitarian projects are further down on the list. Once the economy is back on its feet there will be plenty of time to redress these wrongs. At the outset, government spending should be focused almost exclusively on getting the economy back on its feet as quickly as possible. Without production there's nothing to redistribute. Feigning a big heart is often the quickest path to disaster. Iraq needs endemic production and government can be instrumental in achieving its goal.

- C. Forgiveness of debt owed by Iraq to foreign creditors can be enormously beneficial to Iraq if and only if Iraq has the infrastructure to take advantage of the additional resources financed by additional debt. If Iraq's incentive structure and system of self governance isn't well ranged, new debt to replace old debt is money down a rat hole. You really don't want to replace old bad loans with new bad loans. No one wins. Allowing Iraq to incur additional foreign debt obligations should only occur after Iraq's economy and government have been established. You're going to make lots of mistakes and will learn a lot from those mistakes. The smaller the scale of the initial operations, the less Iraq will have to pay for lessons learned. The less costly the mistakes from which you learn, the better off Iraq will be.
- D. Regulatory policy should be simple, small and fair. Laws should be basic and enforceable with quick and decisive action for violation. Having laws on the books that are not observed or actively disobeyed undermines the moral authority of all government. Keep regulations to a minimum, keep them simple and enforce them.
- E. Trade policy should be as open and as free as possible, restricting only those products which really cause harm (drugs, weapons, etc.). For revenue purposes you may want a low rate, broad-based tax on imports. It's interesting to note that for most of our country's history, tariffs provided the lion's share of our tax revenues. Tariffs plus an oil severance tax could well be the lion's share of future Iraqi tax revenues.
- Trade is often an area where privilege and corruption take root. Here more than anywhere is where Iraq needs transparency, simplicity and fairness.
- F. A lot of attention is being placed on the need to provide an adequate number of jobs for Iraq. And while jobs per se clearly are important, increasing employment and creating jobs is often a catch phrase standing in for increasing output. In truth Iraq needs additional output far more than it needs more jobs. Now in some cases these two phrases are synonymous, but they may not be interchangeable in Iraq. Make work projects and avoiding reform for fear of losing jobs are sure fire losers. At no time and nowhere is it more important to recognize the primacy of efficiency, output and productivity than it is now in Iraq.
- G. Special industries like banking, glass factories, construction companies, etc. should be left to the marketplace. I know they are important, but so does every business person in Iraq. Those businesses will grow on their own if they are profitable.

- H. Dismantling the former government and former military can be carried too far. Under Saddam Hussein there were no alternatives and therefore there are no substitutes waiting in the wings to take over the general functions of government and security. You do need an Iraqi presence to deal with, to support, and to nurture, in order for us to get out.
- I. Be very careful of U.S. quasi-governmental lobbying groups who see visions of sugarplums with each new contract with Iraq. These people rarely focus on what's good for the Iraqi people (or Americans for that matter) and yet they can wrap their desires in the full clothe of altruistic public interest.
- J. Don't expect Iraq or Iraqis to love us right away. Even though we have done an enormous amount for them, they still feel the intense pain of Saddam's vicious dictatorship and the ensuing war and will lash out at anyone near them. In due course, if we continue to behave honorably, they will come to appreciate all that we have done for them and they will respect us for all that we have sacrificed on their behalf.
- K. Our purpose for being in Iraq has absolutely nothing to do with our desire to develop a free-enterprise, pro-growth, democratic, capitalist nation. Under Saddam Hussein, Iraq was a threat to our way of life and as such we terminated that threat. Anything additional we do for the Iraqi people is truly out of the goodness of our hearts, not out of guilt. No matter what anyone may say, you were 100% correct in the actions you took. You make me very proud to be an American.

Hope these points are of some value. You have done and are doing the best job ever. I dream and hope for you continued success.

Your Buddy,

Arthur B. Laffer

cc: Steven Bucci
Catherine Mainardi
Paul D. Wofowitz

Dr. Arthur B. Laffer
Laffer Associates
5405 Morehouse Drive, Suite 340
San Diego, California 92121
858-458-0811
Fax 858-458-9856

May 17, 2004

TO: Ambassador John Negroponte
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.R.*
SUBJECT: Economic Issues in Iraq

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Regards,

Attach.
2/18/04 Laffer ltr to SecDef

DHR:dh
051704-32

IRAQ

19MAY04

OSD 07314-04

11-L-0559/OSD/41338

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Washington, DC 20301-1000

Dear Don,

Last week I was invited by a group of your finest (Marine officers) to a seminar at Camp Pendleton, which is only a few miles north of where I live. These guys are great and have been assigned to a variety of tasks involved in the transition of Iraq from an occupied, economically dependent territory to a self-governing economically independent country. They have their work cut out for them under the best of circumstances. Why I'm writing to you, however, is because I was led to believe both from written material and during the course of our conversations that these tasks are facing additional potentially insurmountable obstacles placed in their way by the Coalition Provisional Authority and other directives coming from the U.S.

Because of my experience with the domestic economy of Vietnam in the 1970-1974 period under George Schultz and my work on a post-Castro transition plan for Cuba with the Cuban American National Foundation, when it was ably led by Jorge Mas Canosa (who passed away five years ago), I thought you might be interested in my two-cents worth (which has been discounted even below two cents). Rather than criticizing what I may not have fully understood of the Bremer and CPA plans, I've limited myself to what I consider essential do's and don'ts for creating an economically viable society out of a war-ravaged former totalitarian state.

- A. Perhaps the most significant obstacle to reestablishing markets is the absence of a viable stable-valued means of payment and store of value (currency). To foster economic interchange, merchants, workers, savers and investors need a currency they can count on both over time and across space. This currency has to be stable in value over time to satisfy the needs of small savers, and to provide a basis for contracts and it has to be readily acceptable everywhere both inside and outside the region to facilitate trade and investment flows.

I can't begin to tell you how depressing it was to the local economy of Mexico in 1976 when the peso started to collapse after having been stable for years and years. Likewise, Argentina's recent abandonment of the currency peg (under de la Rúa) and the subsequent financial collapse is a tragedy of immense proportions. Our own return to dollar credulity in the late 1970s and early 1980s under Paul Volcker and Ronald Reagan was the *sine qua non* of America's renaissance. Time and again countries are forced to relearn the powerful dictum of a sound money.

Iraq does not have the ability nor does it have powerful enough political institutions to pursue, maintain and monitor its own currency *de novo*. Iraq, if it is to have its own currency at all, must have that currency immutably linked to the dollar or euro. My personal suggestion would be to use either euros or dollars as the domestic currency of

11-L-0559/OSD/41339

Iraq and don't even pretend to introduce a new Iraqi currency. Panama is dollarized literally, and lots of other countries are dollarized *de facto*, and the system works extremely well.

Attempting to set up a new currency puts at risk the entire Iraqi rehabilitation effort and could, if bad enough, force the lower echelons of the Iraqi economy into barter. Barter is inefficient, inconvenient and costly, and will materially impede the type of economic progress we all hope for. The upper levels will always be able to take advantage of foreign currencies.

- B. Also of exceptional importance for a new Iraqi government is the structure of fiscal policy (taxation, spending and the issuance of debt) at the national and provincial levels.

In countries like Iraq where financial markets are years and years away from sophistication, there is a virtual certainty that budget deficits will lead to overuse of the printing press and hyperinflation. Budget deficits also can lead to excessively high tax rates and widespread disregard and flouting of the laws. Therefore, clear and concise tax policy explicitly segregated between federal and provincial prerogatives is of the essence.

Iraq is extraordinarily fortunate to be blessed with oil. As such severance taxes on oil should be a mainstay for government revenues – severance taxes are about as efficient as taxes get. If set up correctly, a good system of oil severance taxes is effectively a tax on foreigners and should do the least damage to the domestic economy of any tax system I know. We have two states that use them extensively, Alaska and Wyoming. It also makes lots of sense to collect revenues on a comprehensive flat rate basis on imports. Any type of sin tax is also a good option because the economic damage the tax does is on the disfavored products. Also property taxes should be used at the provincial level – property and real estate are about the only items that can't escape local taxes by leaving. Any additional revenue supplements should be on a flat rate, broad-based, value added like tax.

Taxes that should be avoided are income taxes (especially progressive) and small taxes where the costs of collection approach or exceed the revenue actually collected. The keys to good tax policy are:

- i.) Tax those items most that can escape the least, and conversely tax those least that can easily escape. It makes no sense to tax something that then flees the jurisdiction, goes underground or stops working. You not only don't get the revenue, but you also lose the benefits of the productive services.
- ii.) Tax those things most that you least like (sin taxes). An additional benefit of sin taxes is that they do reduce the activity being taxed.
- iii.) Tax those things least where the collection costs are highest
- iv.) Broad based low rate taxes provide people with the least incentives to evade, avoid and otherwise not report taxable income and the least number of places where they can escape taxation.
- v.) Tax people fairly. People in like circumstances should have similar tax burdens. The perception of fairness is key to voluntary compliance.
- vi.) Make sure that taxation is not arbitrary or easily subject to discretionary changes. The power to tax in the wrong hands is an ugly weapon for exploitation.

- vii.) Lastly, collect only as much as you really need. Wasteful spending will always rise to the level of revenues.

These rules should help your efforts, if meticulously adhered to. Next to a bad money I know of nothing that will bring an economy to its knees faster than an unjust, inefficient, anti-growth, excessive system of taxation. This principal is universal.

On the spending side, priorities need to be set really quickly. In my view infrastructure is the first among equals such as: security (police), judiciary, water, electricity, telecommunications, roads, airports, hospitals and government itself. In the near term at least, school programs, women's issues, social redistribution and humanitarian projects are further down on the list. Once the economy is back on its feet there will be plenty of time to redress these wrongs. At the outset, government spending should be focused almost exclusively on getting the economy back on its feet as quickly as possible. Without production there's nothing to redistribute. Feigning a big heart is often the quickest path to disaster. Iraq needs endemic production and government can be instrumental in achieving its goal.

- C. Forgiveness of debt owed by Iraq to foreign creditors can be enormously beneficial to Iraq if and only if Iraq has the infrastructure to take advantage of the additional resources financed by additional debt. If Iraq's incentive structure and system of self governance isn't well ranged, new debt to replace old debt is money down a rat hole. You really don't want to replace old bad loans with new bad loans. No one wins. Allowing Iraq to incur additional foreign debt obligations should only occur after Iraq's economy and government have been established. You're going to make lots of mistakes and will learn a lot from those mistakes. The smaller the scale of the initial operations, the less Iraq will have to pay for lessons learned. The less costly the mistakes from which you learn, the better off Iraq will be.
- D. Regulatory policy should be simple, small and fair. Laws should be basic and enforceable with quick and decisive action for violation. Having laws on the books that are not observed or actively disobeyed undermines the moral authority of all government. Keep regulations to a minimum, keep them simple and enforce them.
- E. Trade policy should be as open and as free as possible, restricting only those products which really cause harm (drugs, weapons, etc.). For revenue purposes you may want a low rate, broad-based tax on imports. It's interesting to note that for most of our country's history, tariffs provided the lion's share of our tax revenues. Tariffs plus an oil severance tax could well be the lion's share of future Iraqi tax revenues.
- Trade is often an area where privilege and corruption take root. Here more than anywhere is where Iraq needs transparency, simplicity and fairness.
- F. A lot of attention is being placed on the need to provide an adequate number of jobs for Iraq. And while jobs per se clearly are important, increasing employment and creating jobs is often a catch phrase standing in for increasing output. In truth Iraq needs additional output far more than it needs more jobs. Now in some cases these two phrases are synonymous, but they may not be interchangeable in Iraq. Make work projects and avoiding reform for fear of losing jobs are sure fire losers. At no time and nowhere is it more important to recognize the primacy of efficiency, output and productivity than it is now in Iraq.
- G. Special industries like banking, glass factories, construction companies, etc. should be left to the marketplace. I know they are important, but so does every business person in Iraq. Those businesses will grow on their own if they are profitable.

- H. Dismantling the former government and former military can be carried too far. Under Saddam Hussein there were no alternatives and therefore there are no substitutes waiting in the wings to take over the general functions of government and security. You do need an Iraqi presence to deal with, to support, and to nurture, in order for us to get out.
- I. Be very careful of U.S. quasi-governmental lobbying groups who see visions of sugarplums with each new contract with Iraq. These people rarely focus on what's good for the Iraqi people (or Americans for that matter) and yet they can wrap their desires in the full clothe of altruistic public interest.
- J. Don't expect Iraq or Iraqis to love us right away. Even though we have done an enormous amount for them, they still feel the intense pain of Saddam's vicious dictatorship and the ensuing war and will lash out at anyone near them. In due course, if we continue to behave honorably, they will come to appreciate all that we have done for them and they will respect us for all that we have sacrificed on their behalf.
- K. Our purpose for being in Iraq has absolutely nothing to do with our desire to develop a free-enterprise, pro-growth, democratic, capitalist nation. Under Saddam Hussein, Iraq was a threat to our way of life and as such we terminated that threat. Anything additional we do for the Iraqi people is truly out of the goodness of our hearts, not out of guilt. No matter what anyone may say, you were 100% correct in the actions you took. You make me very proud to be an American.

Hope these points are of some value. You have done and are doing the best job ever. I dream and hope for you continued success.

Your Buddy,

Arthur B. Laffer

cc: Steven Bucci
Catherine Mainardi
Paul D. Wofowitz

Dr. Arthur B. Laffer
Laffer Associates
5405 Morehouse Drive, Suite 340
San Diego, California 92121
858-458-0811
Fax 858-458-9856

* * * TRANSMISSION RESULT REPORT (IMMEDIATE TX) (MAY. 18. 2004 3:22PM) * * *

FAX HEADER:

DATE	TIME	ADDRESS	MODE	TIME	PAGE	RESULT	PERSONAL NAME	FILE
MAY. 18.	3:21PM	(b)(6)	G3ES	0'58"	P.	6 OK		981

: BATCH
M : MEMORY TX
S : STANDARD
* : PC
2- : ASYNC MODE

C : CONFIDENTIAL
L : SEND LATER
D : DETAIL
+ : ROUTING
1- : MIL_STD MODE

\$: TRANSFER
@ : FORWARDING
F : FINE
Q : RECEPT. NOTICE REQ.
3- : RICOH-MG3/COMPATIBLE MODE

P : POLLING
E : ECM
> : REDUCTION
A : RECEPT. NOTICE

Rec'd verbal confirmation from
Ms. BARBARA Johnson (his secretary)

11-L-0559/OSD/41343



THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
2000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2000

ACTION MEMO

EF-9061
I.04/004209-ES

DepSecDef _____

Paul Butler
tab
4/27

Deputy

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Douglas J. Feith *4/28/04*

SUBJECT: LTG (Ret) Garner Suggestion on Equipping Iraqi Armed Forces

- Based on his concern that the U.S. maintain long-term logistical control over the Iraqi Army, General Garner sent you a letter (Tab B) to recommend that
 - contracts for Iraqi Army equipment specify U.S.-built equipment only.
 - excess U.S. equipment be used to equip the Iraqi Army.
 - the equipment be refurbished in U.S. Army depots, thereby creating domestic economic benefits.
- The 2004 Supplemental emphasizes use of full and open competition. This means foreign firms are welcome to bid.
 - An effort to restrict competition likely would further delay the equipping process, thereby delaying the assumption of security responsibilities by the Iraqis, and would cause concern to our Coalition partners.
- It is likely that the Iraqi Armed Forces will be tied to the U.S. by our training program and by a close security relationship between the two countries.

RECOMMENDATION: that you sign the response to General Garner at Tab A.

COORDINATION: Tab C

Attachment(s):
As Stated

DUSD (NESA) *WJA*



TSA SD	<i>5/7/04</i>
SRMA SD	
MA SD	
EXEC SEC	<i>4/28</i>

1240

28 APR 04

20 APR 04



DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1010 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1010

Lieutenant General (Ret.) Jay Garner
L3 Communications
1745 Jefferson Davis Highway
Crystal Square 4, Suite 900
Arlington, VA 22202

Dear General Garner:

The Secretary appreciated getting your suggestions on equipping Iraqi security forces and asked me to respond to you.

We agree with you that a strong U.S. influence on the Iraqi Armed Forces is in our interest. Building that influence began with your work, continues in our training effort, and will grow stronger through all the programs that characterize a close security relationship.

Also important is the speed of equipping the Iraqi Armed Forces, and all Iraqi security forces, so they can assume their responsibilities.

A requirement to use exclusively U.S. equipment is likely to slow the process, given the emphasis that Congress has placed on awarding contracts competitively. We believe we will achieve the goals that you expressed without taking formal action to limit competition.

Sincerely,



11-L-0559/OSD/41345

COORDINATION

LTG (Ret) Gamer Suggestion on Equipping Iraqi Armed Forces

Request Coordination **NLT 12** April 2004

Office of the General Counsel

as revised (back after memo) and Tab A
4/20/04
Principal Deputy GC

Director of the Joint Staff _____

Coalition Provisional Authority _____

Please call Chris Straub OUSD(P) NESAN/G (b)(6) for pick-up

COORDINATION

LTG (Ret) Garner Suggestion on Equipping Iraqi Armed Forces

Request Coordination NLT 12 April 2004

Office of the General Counsel _____

Director of the Joint Staff Frank Hall J-5 (phone, 14 Apr 04)

Coalition Provisional Authority P. V. G. 15 Apr 04.

Please call Chris Straub OUSD(P) NES/NG (b)(6) for pick-up

In reply refer to EF-9061 & 041004209

29
March 28, 2004

TO: Doug Feith
CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz

SUBJECT: Foreign-made Equipment

Please take a look at this note from Jay Garner . I am inclined to agree with him.

What do you folks think?

If you agree, let's get it done.

Thanks.

Attach.
3/25/04 Garner memo to SecDef

DHR:dh
032504-18

.....
Please respond by 4/16/04

IRAO

29 MAR 04

07347-04

29-03-04 10:01 AM

11-L-0559/OSD/41348

4/12
DIA

March 25, 2004

Mr. Secretary,

I know you are incredibly busy and you haven't time to focus on the following, but I think it is important.

The Army's past request to industry to 'bid on equipping the Iraqi Army was cancelled. The Army through Army Material Command is re-initiating this proposal. In the initial proposal, bidders were allowed to bid foreign-made equipment. I recommend that DOD constrain industry to bidding only U.S. built equipment for the following reasons:

- It would logistically tie the Iraqi Army to the United States for the next several decades.
- It also means that we could logistically shut down the Iraqi Army at anytime of our choosing.
- We have excess equipment that can be used for equipping the new Iraqi Army.
- The upside to this is that we would need to refurbish new equipment through the Army Depot system (4-6 depots). This would be an economic advantage to the states concerned; which is a plus to the Administration in an election year.

Bottom line: **I feel it is very important to have a logistical hold over the Iraqi Army.**

thanx

429
000

In reply refer to:
IEF-9061
04/004209

- APR 20 2004

IRAQ

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
Doug Feith

CC: Paul Wolfowitz

SUBJECT: Bids Using US Equipment

Here is a note someone sent concerning the Iraqi **Army**. What do you folks think?

Thanks.

Attach.
3/25/04 Memo to SecDef

DHR:dh
041204-9

.....
Please respond by 4/30/04

ALSO RESPONDS TO SNOWFLAKES
032504-18 from (b)(6) (NEXT UNDER)

20 APR 04

TSA SD	SLJ
SRMA SD	
MA SD	
EXEC SEC	4/28

29 APR 04

20-04-04 12:07 IN

11-L-0559/OSD/41350

07347-04



DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1010 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1010

Lieutenant General Jay Garner, USA (Ret.)
L3 Communications
1745 Jefferson Davis Highway
Crystal Square 4, Suite 900
Arlington, VA 22202

Dear ^{Jay} General Garner:

The Secretary appreciated getting your suggestions on equipping Iraqi security forces and asked me to respond to you.

We agree with you that a strong U.S. influence on the Iraqi Armed Forces is in our interest. Building that influence began with your work, continues in our training effort, and will grow stronger through all the programs that characterize a close security relationship.

Also important is the speed of equipping the Iraqi Armed Forces, and all Iraqi security forces, so they can assume their responsibilities

A requirement to use exclusively U.S. equipment is likely to slow the process, given the emphasis that Congress has placed on awarding contracts competitively. We believe we will achieve the goals that you expressed without taking formal action to limit competition.

With warm regards,

Sincerely,

IRAQ

150004

29 MAR 04



Back original w/ B6 Helmick for DSI

*BACK
1710
28 May 04*

**OFFICE OF
THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT**

May 27, 2004

*Paul,
Answers to your
questions are next
of under. - JH*

FOR: LES BROWNLEE, ACTING SECRETARY OF THE ARMY

FROM: DAVE PATTERSON

Dave
DISTRIBUTION
DATE
TIME

Sir,

Jay Gamer wrote to the Secretary. Policy answered it with a letter back. Could you get me an answer back to the two questions from the Deputy (TAB A). See Gamer letter and Policy cover memo (TAB B). Need quickly. Responses can come directly back to me.

Thanks and VR

Dave

J. David Patterson

2 Attachment

As stated

Suspense

RED TAG - ASAP

*Believe Tina Ballard has
worked this - Thank you.*



26 MAY 2004

Dave

From the Desk of
Paul Wolfowitz

26 May 04

- ① Why can't the equipment requirements specify U.S. equipment -- Then there can be open competition among suppliers?
- ② How are we specifying equipment requirements for Iraq forces?

1710
5/28

INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

May 28, 2004, 3:00 p.m.

FOR: DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Les Brownlee, Acting Secretary of the Army

SUBJECT: Answers to Secretary Wolfowitz' Questions Pertaining to Equipping the Iraqi Armed Forces

Question 1: Why can't the equipment requirements specify U.S. Equipment?

Answer: The Competition In Contracting Act (CICA) requires full and open competition. While the Buy American Act does restrict some procurements to U.S. sources, it does not apply to procurements in Iraq. Furthermore, since our requirements are performance based, full and open competition means that all responsible sources, both U.S. and non-U.S., can compete and offer their products. (Armies in the Middle East commonly use non-U.S. equipment anyway.) The only known applicable exception to full and open competition that would allow restriction to U.S. equipment would be Exception 7, Public Interest. Use of this exception would require the Secretary of Defense to sign a Determination and Findings stating that restriction is in the public interest. Also, to the extent these procurements are funded with the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF), approval by Ambassador Bremer and seven days prior notification to Congress are also required. In some cases, it would be too late to go through these steps, as some procurements have already gone beyond the stage where potential sources are identified.

A determination to procure "U.S. Equipment Only" would require a definition of "U.S. Equipment" because many items manufactured in the U.S. have significant foreign parts.

Also, in some cases a determination to use U.S. Equipment Only would have operational and cost impacts. For example, AK-47s are required because everyone in the Iraqi Armed Forces is already trained on use of the weapon. If we changed the weapon we would have to train the force to use the new weapon. A collateral consequence would be longer training periods and the time-table for deployment of fully trained forces would be extended. Additionally, there would be a cost impact for training and ammo packages.

Question 2: How are we specifying equipment requirements for Iraqi Forces?

Answer: Our requirements are performance based. We do not specify the make/model of a vehicle. For example: A portion from the requirement for Medium Wheeled Vehicle reads:

"The vehicle shall have all wheel drive, be capable of operation on a variety of surfaces and terrains ranging from desert environment to hard surface streets, have a minimum range of 450km on internally carried fuel, shall be equipped with service brakes, be capable of carrying six soldiers - including the driver."

COORDINATION: On HQDA Form 5

Prepared By: LTC Kel Wood (b)(6)

Approved By: Ms. Tina Ballard, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army
(Policy and Procurement)

UNCLASSIFIED
TAB A

26
January 25, 2004

IRAQ

TO: Gen. Pete Pace
CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Lessons Learned

Let's make sure we have a joint CIA-CENTCOM Konar Valley lessons learned effort.

Thanks.

DHR:DA
012304-15




Please respond by 2/6/04

OSD 07371-04

26 Jan 04

May 18, 2004

TO: Honorable Andrew H. Card, Jr.

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Advance Copies of Presidential Remarks

I sometimes receive Presidential remarks for my suggestions after the President has already taped them.

If it is worth my spending time looking at the remarks, it seems to me it ought to be before it is too late to make the changes.

Help!

DHR:dh
051704-41

350.001WH

18MAY04

OSD 07394-04



720
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

INFO MEMO

CM-1774-04
20 May 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RBMY/19*

SUBJECT: KATUSA Model

- **Question.** "I would like you to talk to John Abizaid and see if he has given any thought to using the Katusa Korean model for Iraq or Afghanistan." (TAB A)
- **Answer.** Commander, USCENTCOM, has considered the Korean Augmentees to US Army (KATUSA) model for employment in Iraq and Afghanistan and determined that the exact replication of the KATUSA program is impractical for these areas of operations; however, partnership initiatives similar in concept have evolved and continue to be cultivated as part of USCENTCOM's pursuit of long-term strategic objectives (TAB B).
- **Analysis.** Two primary reasons make the exact duplication of the KATUSA model not viable for implementation in these countries.
 - First, the Iraqi and Afghan Armies are relatively small, all-volunteer forces dependent on volunteers to establish and maintain minimum operational capabilities. The KATUSA force on the other hand depends upon a conscript base from which to recruit.
 - Second, the KATUSA program has thrived under the long-term force presence of US Forces Korea. Over time, selection as a JSATUSA has become desirable among English-speaking Korean Army conscripts. Current US strategy does not envision a similar long-term commitment of forces to Iraq and Afghanistan.
- Partnership initiatives exist in both countries to enhance interoperability, communications, mentorship and cultural awareness. These encompass the embed of US trainers in Iraqi Civil Defense Corps and Afghan National Army units, the development of the Afghan National Army provisional force concept, combined operations with Iraqi and Afghan forces, and assignment of Iraqi liaison officers to US forces down to platoon level.

COORDINATION: TAB C

Attachments:
As stated

Prepared By: LTG Walter L. Sharp, USA; Director, J-5; (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/41358

USD 07515-04

TAB A

APR 27 2004

761

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Katusa Model

I would like you to **talk** to John **Abizaid** and see if he has given any thought to using the Katusa Korean model for Iraq **or** Afghanistan.

Thanks.

DHR:db
042304-9

.....
Please respond by 5/7/04

Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD/41359

TAB B



UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND
7115 SOUTHBOUNDARYBOULEVARD
MACDILL AIR FORCE BASE, FLORIDA 33621-5101

CCJ5-P

1 May 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR Director of Strategic Plans and Policy, the Joint Staff, Washington, DC 20318-1000

SUBJECT: SECDEF Inquiry, Using KATUSA Model in Iraq and Afghanistan

REF: JS Tasker #04-0371, 29 Apr 04, Subject: **SF-761/KATUSA** Model

1. Purpose. To provide the US Central Command position on the use of the Korean Augmentation to United States Army (KATUSA) model for Iraq and/or Afghanistan.

2. Background. KATUSAs are conscripted Republic of Korea (ROK) soldiers assigned to and under the control of United States units for the full duration of their enlistment. The purpose of the KATUSA program is to strengthen ROK combat capabilities and to enhance interoperability with U.S. forces. KATUSAs enhance US force effectiveness by mitigating communication barriers and by providing a source of cultural awareness. KATUSAs are volunteers selected while attending basic training and incur the same 30-month obligation as active duty ROK soldiers. There are approximately 5000 individuals serving as KATUSAs. Selection is competitive and based on the ability to read, write, and comprehend English. Koreans consider KATUSA service as a mark of distinction.

3. Discussion


a. Commander, USCENTCOM has considered the KATUSA model for employment in Iraq and Afghanistan. The exact mirroring of the KATUSA program in Iraq and Afghanistan may be impractical for two reasons. First, the Iraqi and Afghan armies are relatively small, all-volunteer forces and depend on all current volunteers to establish and maintain minimum operational capabilities. Second, the KATUSA program has thrived under the long-term force presence of US Forces Korea. Current US strategy does not envision a similar long-term commitment of forces to Iraq and Afghanistan.

b. The establishment of KATUSA-like programs in Afghanistan and Iraq, however, has enormous potential. Enhanced interoperability, communications, mentorship opportunities, and cultural awareness are critical military objectives in these theaters of operation. Current KATUSA-like initiatives include embedded US trainers in Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (ICDC) and Afghan National Army (ANA) units, combined operations with Iraqi and Afghan forces, and assignment of Iraqi liaison officers to US forces down to platoon level. USCENTCOM continues to explore new KATUSA-like partnerships with Iraqi and Afghan forces.

4. Recommendation. Continue current KATUSA-like initiatives in Iraq and Afghanistan. Pursue additional KATUSA-like programs consistent with long-term strategic objectives.

5. Point of Contact is LtCol Brown, CCJ5-Plans, DSN: (b)(6)

(b)(6)



Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy

Director, Plans and Policy

TAB C

COORDINATION PAGE

USCENTCOM

RADM J. A. Robb

3 May 2004

TAB A

APR 27 2004

76 |

TO: Gen. **Dick** Myers

CC: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Katusa **Model**

I would like you to **talk** to John **Abizaid** and see **if** he has given any thought to using the Katusa Korean model for Iraq **or** Afghanistan.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
042304-9

.....
Please respond by 5/7/04

Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD/41363

OSD 07515-04

7201

May 19, 2004

TO: Tillie Fowler
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Hamre Piece

Thanks so much for giving me the piece by John Hamre. I appreciate it.

Regards,

DHR:dh
051904-7

335 SD

19 May 04

OSD 07532-04

11-L-0559/OSD/41364

f Secretary -
I commend this
article for your reading.
Pages 3 & 4 have some
interesting suggestions.
11.11.

as5 07552-04

11-L-0559/OSD/41365

Law Offices

HOLLAND & KNIGHT LLP

Tillie K. Fowler

Member of Congress 1993-2001

2099 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. Suite 100

Washington, D.C. 20006-6801

202-419-2482 • Fax 202-419-2886

(b)(6)

OS 07552-04

11-L-0559/OSD/41366

May 19, 2004

TO: President George W. Bush
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Hamre Piece

Attached is an *interesting* memorandum by John Hamre, the former Deputy Secretary of Defense under Bill Cohen.

Respectfully,

Attach.

Hamre, John. "Should America Just Walk Away from Iraq?" CSIS Memorandum, May 17, 2004.


DHR:dh
051904-9

IRAQ

19 MAY 04

11-L-0559/OSD/41367 07533-04

CSIS MEMORANDUM

To: CSIS Board of Trustees, Supporters, and Friends
From: John J. Hamre 
Date: May 17, 2004 (Number 137. Three Pages)
Re: **Should America just walk away from Iraq?**

All over Washington I am now hearing this question asked: Is Iraq a lost cause? Should we just find a way to pull out as soon as possible? I honestly believe the answer to both is no. It is clear, however, that we are less in control of the situation every day – which may indeed be our exit strategy.

Washington is still reeling from the terrible pictures from the prisons. They have become a metaphor for all that has plagued us this past year. It seems that Washington (and our Baghdad headquarters, I fear) has been cut off from what is really happening on the ground in Iraq. We have managed Iraq policy through our hopes and aspirations, not through a realistic assessment of the conditions on the ground.

It appears, though, that the Administration is now embracing a new strategic direction that is more realistically grounded on conditions in the field. After the uprising in April, senior leaders in the Administration finally realized the path they were on was not working. They correspondingly made three critical decisions:

First, they abandoned the sweeping “de-Baathification” policy that excluded past managers from participating in the building of a new Iraq.

Second, they decided to reinforce our troop levels in the region, committing to a major deployment for at least the next 18 months. There is no question that the political folks in the White House would have preferred to pull the troops out rather than to move more in, that would have been a far more popular move domestically. Instead, the President decided that his entire presidency now rests on success in Iraq.

Third, they chose to stay with the concept of “indigenization” of Iraqi security, but with a surprising twist. They agreed to let a former Saddam general take charge of the security of Fallujah. It seemed completely incongruous when it first came up. I believe it was more than just a pragmatic solution to avoid a bloody battle, which would have only served to strengthen the uprising elsewhere in Iraq. In fact, it represents a new power-sharing strategy in Iraq. We can see this even more starkly in Najaf, were the radical Shi’ite cleric, Moqtada al-Sadr, has holed up with his small army. Instead of launching an all out assault on them, we have sealed off the region in order to allow the most pragmatic Shia religious and political leadership the time to finally decide that they want to remove al-Sadr and his forces.

Both of these instances—turning Fallujah over to a former Saddam general and letting Shi’ite leaders disarm al-Sadr—are indeed defacto power-sharing decisions. We have

decided to let local political leaders have direct authority on the street, so long as it stays within the boundaries we find acceptable - which is why we are keeping 135,000 troops in the country indefinitely. In effect we are saying "you run things at the local level, and so long as it doesn't threaten national unity, we will leave you alone."

This still begs the question of how we create a viable national government. Here is where the tragedy of the prisoner abuse scandal will haunt us. Some 80% of Iraqi citizens now want America to leave as soon as possible. That, in combination with the fact that Ambassador Paul Bremer has publicly stated that U.S. and coalition forces would withdraw if asked to do so by a future Iraqi government, now presents a significant dilemma. No new Iraqi government will have legitimacy with its citizens unless it confronts America. If America selects the new government, it won't be legitimate. If the Iraqi people pick the government, it is likely to be anti-American. The challenge now is to create a new process to produce a legitimate government, without it being seen as America's product.

Last weekend CSIS sponsored a very high level private conference in a quiet setting outside of London. It was a productive few days that invited very frank and open discussions. The participants agreed that the primary problem we face in Iraq is to prevent it from sliding into factional strife - effectively breaking it up into three constituent parts. Based off of that premise, they outlined a path which I think makes good sense.

1. Immediately seek a new United Nations resolution.
2. Recruit a "national unity" council to replace the Iraqi Governing Council. This national unity council should explicitly include opponents of America's involvement, not just the segment of Iraqi leadership that embraces America's role.
3. Accelerate the use of former Baathists to assume administrative functions within the government. These Baathists should be required, however, to first pledge their support to the Iraqi national unity council.
4. Appoint a U.S. Presidential envoy of unquestioned influence and integrity (Jim Baker was considered a representative candidate) who could undertake a new outreach to Middle East capitals. The purpose of the outreach would be to listen to each of their perspectives, and enlist their support for the remainder of this agenda.
5. Under the umbrella of a UN resolution, establish a Reconstruction Implementation Council patterned after the mechanism developed for Kosovo. This takes the international legitimization effort out of the day-to-day politics of the UN and into the hands of a group that is committed to solving the problems in Iraq. Notionally the Council would include each of Iraq's regional neighbors (including Iran), along with 8-10 other countries willing to

commit a legitimate effort to helping the new government of Iraq get on its feet. This formula allows us to incorporate the regional countries, but in a forum where they can't dominate the deliberations.

6. Seek to involve the Arab League in concrete steps. Let supportive Arab capitals take the lead in developing an agenda that the Arab League could embrace for the reconstruction of Iraq.
7. Re-engage on the Israeli-Palestinian problem. Dr. Condoleezza Rice has been given the lead in this area, and she should *visibly* make it a priority during the next 3 months.

This seems to me a very pragmatic path to answer the opening question of this memo: Is the situation in Iraq lost? No, it is not lost - but the path to success now largely rests in the hands of others.

Sorry, this memo is a bit longer than usual, but I felt the topic merited a more in depth discussion. I am always grateful to hear your thoughts and comments. Please feel free to contact me with your reactions at JHamre@csis.org.

END

May 20,2004

TO: Gen. Jim Jones
c c : Gen. Dick Myers
FROM: Donald Rurnsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: NATO-EUCOM Report

EUCO

Thanks so much for your report on NATO-EUCOM. I will be discussing all these pieces with the folks here.

You sure have a lot going on, my friend!

Regards,

DHR:dh
052004-19



Please *respond* by _____

20 May 04

OSD 07545-04

May 20, 2004

TO: Gen. Jim Jones

CC: Gen. Dick Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: F-15 Basing

Thanks so much for your note on the F-15s. I appreciate it and have asked Dick Myers to see that it gets into the tank, so we can have a good discussion on it, possibly when you are back.

DHR:dh
052004-18

.....
Please respond by _____ 

452 F

20 May 04

OSD 07546-04

May 20, 2004

TO: Gen. John Abizaid

CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Visible Change

Iraq

Please let me know when you develop some plans as to how you are going to show a visible change when sovereignty is passed over.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
052004-13

.....
Please respond by 5/28/04

20 May 04

OSD 07547-04

720
May 19, 2004

TO: Gen. John Abizaid
CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Positioning International Forces

We are seeing growing pressure for various countries to pull their forces out of Iraq – Italy, Poland, Hungary and others, as I recall.

It makes me wonder if, before it is too late, we could get the Coalition forces that are under pressure re-positioned to protect UN missions and/or international sites and to begin working to provide security for the elections later this year. That way, we could help to relieve the political pressure on them. Further, it would give us the opportunity to fill in at their locations with US forces, which are more reliable and have more robust ROEs.

The alternative, if the above fails, is to get them to replace us in Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan.

Any thoughts?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
051904-20

.....
Please respond by 5/28/04

OSD 07548-04

11-L-0559/OSD/41374

Iraq

19M
by DY

May 20, 2004

TO: President George W. Bush
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Remarks to Heritage Foundation

Mr. President—

I spoke to the Heritage Foundation on Monday. I have marked some sections of my remarks on pages 3 and 4 of the attached transcript that I thought might be of interest to you.

Respectfully,

Attach.

5/17/04 Secretary of Defense Remarks to the Heritage Foundation

DHR:dh
052004-36

OSD 07549-04

11-L-0559/OSD/41375

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20MAY04



United States Department of Defense.

News Transcript

On the web: <http://www.defenselink.mil/cgi-bin/dlprint.cgi?>

<http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2004/tr20040517-secdef0782.html>

Media contact: +1 (703) 697-5131

Public contact: <http://www.dod.mil/faq/comment.html> or +1 (703) 428-0711

Presenter: Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld

Monday, May 17, 2004 2:03 p.m. EDT

Remarks by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld to the Heritage Foundation

SEC. RUMSFELD: (Applause.) Thank you. Thank you very much. I appreciate it. (Cheers, applause.) Thank you.

Well, that's amazing. (Applause continuing.) Thank you. Thank you very much. Thank you very much. I appreciate that more than I can say.

Midge, your many contributions to the cause are legendary. You're a friend. You're important to all that's good about this country, and we thank you so much for that.

Ed, you're right, I did tell you not to get a building. (Laughter.) But you didn't take my advice. (Laughter.) I hope the real estate values have gone up. (Laughter.)

You know, it's amazing. I had my family together in February. And I have six grandchildren, and I gave them that poem, "If." And I, this is last February; this is the middle of May, if you can think about it. And I said, "We're going to probably be together over July 4th, and it would be a good idea if y'all memorized it. (Laughter.) I'm prescient, or lucky.

But I then remembered reading that the terrorist organization put a -- I guess it's \$15 million on my head. And then I woke up one morning to CNN about a week ago where they said, about the Senate, "They're after his head!" (Laughter.) And then I remembered "If," and "If you can keep your head -- (laughter) -- when all about you."

And last weekend, before this last, the one before, I got a call from my wife, Joyce. She was in -- at the University of Colorado. And she was there for her 50th college reunion, and she just called up to tell me that it really wasn't necessary for me to give her all this publicity -- (laughter) -- on her return, after 50 years, to Boulder. And she went to the graduation, and the poem they read was "If." So --

AUDIENCE MEMBERS: Aw!

AUDIENCE MEMBERS: Oh!

SEC. RUMSFELD: Well, there is a great deal happening in our world and in Iraq and in Afghanistan. Some is bad. Some's good. Some is truly wonderful. And some of it's uncertain as to what it will mean.

11-L-0559/OSD/41376

I saw a bit of it last week, as I flew into Iraq. First, the bad news: You've all seen some of the pictures and reports about what took place at Abu Ghraib prison. That some of the guards abused those Iraqis who were in our custody and were our responsibility was truly a body blow. As we saw some of those pictures in the Pentagon and looked at each other's faces, you could feel the, the shock that we felt and disappointment that some in our country's uniform could sully it by that behavior.

There are now, I guess, six or seven different investigations going on. Two or three have been completed. We'll know soon how all this came about. And needless to say, those involved will be held accountable.

Last week I saw some of the finest young American men and women working around the clock to provide security for the Iraqi people, to be sure; recognizing that the transition to the Iraqis taking over their country is coming upon us in six or so weeks. The troops are doing their job well. They're doing their jobs with compassion and skill and courage, and we're so fortunate to have them doing what they're doing for our country and defending our freedom. (Applause.) They are truly remarkable and in, in their dedication, their conviction, their recognition that what they're doing is truly noble work.

We've also seen many brave Iraqis risk their lives to protect their country. We saw some reports that some of them did not engage the enemy and left their posts. That's true. There's over -- something like 200,000 of them now. They're getting better equipped every day, but they're not as well equipped as some of the enemies they've faced. And I worry about the impression that was left, because over 300 of these Iraqi security forces have already lost their lives. So it's not like they're not willing to engage; they are, and they're on a path to being able to take over the security responsibilities in that country.

There's a lot of intimidation going on. The former regime elements, the Ba'athists, and the terrorists are trying to intimidate the Iraqi people and to discourage them from cooperating, whether it's on a Governing Council or a judge -- as a judge, or a provincial council, city council, member of the security force, police, the civil defense group. Just hours ago, the head of the Iraqi Governing Council, Izzedine Salim, was assassinated by enemies of freedom. The Governing Council, however, has not been intimidated, it has not been defeated. And we must not allow terrorists or regime remnants to determine the fate of 25 million Iraqis.

In Iraq, the man on the street knows that he has been under a vicious regime for the past 35 years and he's free of that. He knows that Saddam Hussein is in prison, where he belongs, and that he'll be tried by a new Iraqi government in the weeks and months ahead for the crimes he committed against his people and his neighbors. Those crimes, too numerous to list, include the use of chemical weapons on ethnic groups resulting in mass deaths; the use of murder, filling many mass graves, as a tool of state; the torture and abuse of children to instill fear in parents. In Houston right now are seven Iraqi businessmen that are being fitted with prosthesis devices to replace the arms that Saddam Hussein's personal military forces chopped off.

The fact that these actions defined the political culture in Iraq for 35 long years I think goes some way towards explaining why the transition to self-government is so difficult. Over the past year, since the military liberation, Iraqis are slowly settling into a new understanding of what their lives and their futures might be like. They know that among the 138,000 American troops in this country -- their

11-L-0559/OSD/41377

country -- are people who have been not just providing security, but also building roads, fixing schools, fixing hospitals. There today are many times the medical care in terms of delivery of medicine, availability of doctors and clinics than was the case under Saddam Hussein. The oil fields are producing, except when terrorists try to damage them to disrupt them.

Since September 11th, we have known that we have a mission to complete. The global war on terror, like the Cold War before it, will be the work of a generation. Terrorists will strike at will. To defeat them, we not only have to eliminate their leaders, but we also have to wage a war of ideas to win the allegiance of a new generation that needs to see that freedom is a vastly better choice than terrorism and hatred.

We do not know precisely what will happen over the coming weeks because politics and power have too many human variables, but we do have plans and a good sense of what the possibilities are. On or before June 30th, this transition to the Iraqi will occur. It's not a magical date. Our forces don't suddenly head home on June 30th, and a mature state will most certainly not spring forth to be admired and praised by the world. Still, something truly significant should begin.

An interim government of men and women appointed in consultation between the Iraqi Governing Council; the Iraqi people; Mr. Brahimi, the United Nations envoy; will take power on an interim basis. There will likely be a president, a prime minister and a couple of dozen Cabinet ministries. The personalities involved will probably be a mixture of political people, leaders and technocrats. This new interim government will hold power for some -- power for some six months plus, until elections are held for a transitional national assembly. The assembly will be the legislature for a transitioning government that will serve for probably around a year. Its main task will be to write a permanent constitution, an Iraqi constitution, an Iraqi solution to their governing, and that then would be voted on by the Iraqi people.

All of this should be thought of as the infancy of a nation. In our lifetimes, we have watched Germany -- I shouldn't say "our" lifetimes; my lifetime. (Laughter.) It's a little longer than most of the folks here. We've seen Germany and Japan go through a process. We've seen India and Israel. We've seen Eastern European states that emerged from Soviet control. And most recently, we've been able to watch and assist as Afghanistan navigates along that difficult path.

It's always a difficult process. It is not easy. The men and women who undertake to lead Iraq will face a very sharp learning curve, and there will be some real bumps in the road.

Thomas Jefferson said, when our own nation underwent this process, he said, quote, "We are not to expect to be translated from despotism to liberty in a featherbed." Meanwhile, the Iraqis must build the institutions that are the heart of democracy. Coalition countries can consult, they can advise, but the Iraqis will choose what they'll listen to. And that's the way it is.

Is it possible that the country will revert to mayhem? Perhaps. But it's more likely that a set of serious, capable and educated men and women will find ways to make things work. Not our way, not necessarily the way of other coalition countries. Maybe slowly; indeed, very likely slowly.

There will be both successes and failures, and the failures will force people to in some cases give up, I'm sure, and step aside, and in other cases they'll get up off the mat and try again to find a better way of moving forward along that difficult path.

Before turning to questions, let me make a, a brief comment on Abu Ghraib. In the past two weeks, the United States has offered the world a seminar on what happens when things go wrong in a democracy. The world has seen those shameful pictures, but the same world has watched the United States government take responsibility and apologize to those individuals who were wronged. It's watched senior civilian and military leadership come to Congress to testify under oath about what was known and what has been done. It's watched a free media publish stories of all types, from the accurate to the grossly distorted. Iraq and the watching world have seen that in our country, no one is above the law, that we are a nation governed by laws.

They've seen that abuse by a few in the military was revealed and investigated by the military; not by the media, by the military. They're the ones who announced it. They're the ones who went public in early January, within a day or two of a soldier turning in material that raised that alarm, and they went public and told the world that there are abuses, that they are filing charges because of alleged abuses in that prison. The media have piled on, to be sure, but the public announcement was by the U.S. Central Command in Baghdad.

The world will see that Americans will not accept dishonorable behavior. These are important lessons, though we certainly would not have chosen to teach them this way. Terrorists are working to break the will of the United States government and the American people, and to break the growing confidence of Iraqis in their right and their ability to live in freedom. We will be able to claim success in Iraq when we can bring our troops home, leaving behind Iraqi security forces that can provide for the security of those people, leaving behind a nation of free people that is not a threat to its neighbors, leaving behind a nation that's respectful of the various religious and ethnic and minority groups in that country. And the existence of such a country can set a powerful example in that region.

And when the day comes, all who have been a part of such a great stride forward for human freedom will have the right to be proud of what they've done -- and most of all, the remarkable men and women in uniform who remained so steadfast during this testing of our nation's will.

And with your help and the good center of gravity of the American people, we'll see that day in the months and years ahead, but only if we are steadfast and only if we stay the course.

Thank you, and God bless you all. (Extended applause.) Thank you very much. (Applause continues.) I'm told that there are microphones here, and I'd be delighted to respond to some questions. I'll even answer some. (Laughter.)

You know, Midge's introduction was biased. She's -- she left out a chapter. When I was asked to go run the Office of Economic Opportunity, the War on Poverty, and -- Ed Meese remembers this -- I followed -- it's the first war that had ever been run by a Seargent. It was Seargent Shriver. (Laughter.) And the president wanted to try to get it fixed and get it on the right track and stop doing the things that didn't work and get some of the things working.

And I got home one night, and my wife has kind of an unusual sense of humor: there on the refrigerator was a little sign that said, "He tackled a job that couldn't be done." (Laughter.) "With a smile, he went right to it. He tackled a job that couldn't be done and couldn't do it." (Laughter.) You got to be tough to be married for 50 years to someone with that sense of humor. (Laughter.)

11- L-0559/OSD/41379

All right. We have microphones. Why doesn't somebody who wants a question go near a microphone? Then we can do more of them. Here's one right over here if someone has a question. Good, you can pass -- oh, good.

Q Oh. Mr. Secretary, it's the observation of myself and many of my friends that the issue of a free Iraq and the administration of Hussein is a powerful issue. However, I think the more important issue has been sublimated by that issue, and that is the war on terror. We're more concerned about the issue that it's being fought on their grounds by our terms, and the bodies are falling in Iraq and not on New York City streets. So I wonder why we can't heighten that awareness in most of what's issued by the various departments and the press secretaries. I think it's the most important issue, and so do many of my friends, and I don't think it's getting the attention paid to it that it should be. And I'd like to know what you think on that. Thanks.

SEC. RUMSFELD: I agree. I agree completely with what you're saying. There's no question but that the global war on terror is the challenge. If you think of where there have been attacks besides the United States, in Spain, in Madrid, that changed an election undoubtedly; consciously, as a result of terrorist intent, changed the outcome of an election. I just had lunch with President Aznar, who now is out of office, and he is convinced that that's the case. But also in Saudi Arabia, in Indonesia, and country after country we've seen these terrorist attacks, and as well as in Iraq and Afghanistan and elsewhere in the region.

It is -- as I mentioned in my remarks, it's a task not for a battle, but for a generation as the Cold War was a generation. We have a whole host of people who are being trained in these schools to hate the West, to hate progress, to believe that it's in their interest to go out and kill innocent men, women and children. And they have an enormous advantage; they can attack anywhere, anytime, using any technique; and you can't defend everywhere at every moment of the day or night against every conceivable technique. Defense simply doesn't work alone.

You have to defend, to be sure, but the only way to deal with it is to take the battle to the terrorists where they are, and find those networks. And they don't have countries, for the most part. (Applause.)

They have the advantage of using our technology, e-mails and computers and pagers and wire transfers and all kinds of technologies that they never could develop themselves, and use them against us. They have the ability of going to school on us, watching how free societies behave. Practically everything we do is public. And they see that. They, they test it. They watch behavior and then adjust their techniques to accommodate to that behavior.

So it's a tough job. It's going to be a while. It's going to take a while. And it's going to take determination. It's going to take determination by this generation and, very likely, the next generation.

Question. Yes?

Q Mr. Secretary, I'm a little perplexed about Syria. I don't necessarily believe that embargoing will resolve the problem there, particularly when a lot of other countries that we would like to hope would be on our side are against us there. And I don't understand why we are just permitting all of this continuing problem to be handled in such a rather subtle or diplomatic fashion. Is there anything that

11-L-0559/OSD/41380

we can see coming in the future that can deal with the Syrian problem as it's affecting our presence in Iraq better than what we've been hearing in the press and otherwise?

SEC. RUMSFELD: The fact is that Syria and Iran have both been unhelpful to what it is we're trying to do in Iraq. Neither government in any way approximates the kind of a system that we're looking forward to in Iraq, a free system. The dictatorship that exists in Syria is notably different than the model that we're hopeful Iraq will seize. The handful of clerics in Iran that lead that country, to the dismay of, I'm sure, a large fraction of their population, they're not interested in seeing a free Iraq, a system that is representative of the people and that is at peace with its other neighbors.

It's tough, it's tough to answer your question because what the president and the United States has been attempting to do is to go about our business in Iraq and try to get the Iraqis set on a logical, sensible path, and to dissuade, through a variety of different ways, the Syrians from making the kind of mischief that they can make.

I mean, they have -- that border has been porous and people, terrorists, have come across that border. Syria has been recalcitrant with respect to freeing up Iraqi assets that were frozen in their country, and large portions of it have been disappearing.

You say you're not sure the sanctions will work. I don't think anyone is confident that the sanctions alone will change the Syrian government from the direction it's on to some much more acceptable behavior pattern. On the other hand, the Congress has passed sanctions, and they -- it is, in my view, appropriate that Syria not be rewarded. The hope is that through discussion, and debate, and consideration, diplomacy, that Syria will recalibrate its direction. Whether that will happen, I don't know. I wish I did know. But in the meantime, we've got to make sure that they do as little damage to what we're trying to accomplish in Iraq as possible.

Yes?

Q Mr. Secretary, first of all, thank you very much for your service. If there ever was a -- (interrupted by applause).

SEC. RUMSFELD: Thank you. Thank you very much.

Q If there ever was a right person in the right job at the right time, this is it.

AUDIENCE MEMBERS: Hear, hear.

(Applause.)

Q I didn't know I was going to get so much applause! (Laughter.)

SEC. RUMSFELD: Thank you.

Q The second question is a little more difficult. (Laughter.) After you complete the second term with George W. Bush as president in the White House and you finish that four years -- (applause) -- would you consider -- would you consider staying on with a new administration in your present position for the following term? (Laughter.)

SEC. RUMSFELD: (Laughs.) Oh, my! (Laughter.) I'll have to talk to my wife about that. (Laughter.)

Yes?

Q Mr. Secretary, I also want to express my deep appreciation for the job you're doing as secretary of Defense.

And secondly, you spoke to Mr. Aznar, Senor Aznar. And I would be -- I would like to hear if he expressed any thoughts on his defeat, and what his thoughts are about the Spanish people in effect capitulating to the terrorists by electing his successor.

SEC. RUMSFELD: He is a, he's a very interesting man. He served, I think, two terms. He has a great deal of courage personally. He is, as he has said publicly, disappointed in the decision that was made by his successors.

He believes very strongly that what's being done in Iraq is the right thing to do. He plans to write and speak out and, and encourage the countries of Europe and the world to recognize that we simply cannot allow terrorists to determine the outcome of elections. And he believes deeply that that is exactly what happened in Spain and he believes that that is what the terrorists will attempt to do in other countries in the months ahead.

Yes?

Q I'd like to thank you as well, Mr. Secretary.

SEC. RUMSFELD: Thank you.

Q Thank God for you right now.

My question has to do with weapons of mass destruction. There's a question as to whether they existed, and of course we knew they did because he used them. The real question was where the heck are they? And in the news this morning --

SEC. RUMSFELD: Kind of like my wife. (Laughter.) Well, the answer is that the intelligence information in our country and in other countries that have excellent intelligence gathering capabilities was that they existed, that the government of Iraq was systematically deceiving the world about what it was doing. There was a great deal of evidence to that effect. We don't now know what actually happened.

We've got 1,200 people in the Iraqi Survey Group that are there in the country following up on leads, attempting to understand what was done, what took place. As you say, we know they existed because he used them on his own people and his neighbors. And everyone in the United Nations that I know of agreed that his declaration, that was supposed to be accurate, was fraudulent, that it was inaccurate. That was widely accepted.

The debate wasn't about whether or not he had weapons of mass destruction. The debate in the U.N. wasn't about whether or not the declaration was fraudulent. The debate up there was how much longer did one think that inspections should be allowed to continue the way we were going. And

11-L-0559/OSD/41382

finally, after 17 or 18 resolutions, a decision was made that that was enough.

My -- I can't guess how much longer it will take to get what we will finally look and say was ground truth -- certainly months, maybe a year-plus. I just don't know how long it will take. We certainly won't just discover anything. I mean, we did not just discover Saddam Hussein, and he was hiding in a hole that was big enough to put chemical weapons in it that would kill tens of thousands of people.

And how was he found? He was found because intelligence people talked to one person who talked to another person and said this person might know something, and then tracked it down one after another after another, and finally somebody took them out there and said maybe around here. They didn't find him. Finally, they allowed as how that person ought to look harder, and he walked over and said try there. And sure enough, they pull up this thing and he's there in the ground. Our forces had gone back and forth past that farm dozens of times. The only way you'll find it is not by discovery in a country the size of California. The only way you're going to find out what actually happened is if finally people are no longer intimidated, no longer frightened, and come -- are willing to come forward, and the terrorists know that. The former regime elements know that. That's why they systematically killed yesterday the president of the Governing Council, the Iraqi Governing Council, is, is to instill fear and intimidation.

Think of what terrorism is. Terrorism does not mean you blow up a building. Terrorism means you terrorize. The purpose of it is to terrorize. It's to change your behavior. It's to affect what you do. And the fear that exists in that country that that crowd might come back in, that we might leave prematurely and that these -- this vicious regime could take back over is real, it's palpable and it works. And the only thing that will dissuade people from that is time and success.

Q On the news this morning, apparently a mortar shell was found that had sarin gas in it. So we have found some of this material. And then a week or so ago apparently a large quantity was discovered in Jordan. So clearly the terrorists do have access to it. How does that change -- I would hope the media would maybe say some things about -- (chuckles) -- this in a proper way, but how does that change -- (laughter) -- how does that change how we approach things in Iraq?

SEC. RUMSFELD: Well, let me say this about that. The -- I've seen the intelligence on the matter you've raised. My personal view is the way we ought to handle it -- although it's not for me to decide -- is to recognize that what you cited, I believe, was a field test, which is not perfect, and what we ought to do is to get the samples someplace where they can be tested very carefully before coming to a conclusion as to precisely what it was.

Then we have to be careful. We can't say something that's inaccurate. So what we have to then do is to try to track down and figure out how it might be there; what caused that to be there in this improvised explosive device, and what might it mean in terms of the risks to our forces, the risks to other people, and any other implication that one might draw. And that's going to take some time. So. Question?

Q Yes. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Do you think that the United Nations should have a vital role in the rebuilding of Iraq? If so, why? If not, why not?

SEC. RUMSFELD: The president said so. (Laughter, applause.) Those were his precise words,

11-L-0559/OSD/41383

and I agree with him. The more countries that are invested in the success in Iraq, the better it is for the Iraqi people. And the better it is for the Iraqi people, the more rapidly that country will recover and be a positive and constructive force in the neighborhood, which helps Jordan, it helps Turkey, it helps the neighboring countries.

So I do think it's a good thing we attempt to engage the rest of the world, whether it's the United Nations or NATO or other countries individually. We now have something like 32-or-so countries with forces in Iraq, and that's a good thing. And if we can get another U.N. resolution, my guess is they'll be still additional countries that will be doing -- be willing to put forces in there. And that relieves the stress on our force and on our coalition partners, and that, in my view, is a help.

Yes?

Q Mr. Secretary, when the Ba'ath party took over Iraq in 1959, I believe, they murdered the king very brutally, and the prime minister, and many, many other people. Has there been any thought of returning the monarchy to Iraq?

SEC. RUMSFELD: I've seen speculation about that. I've seen people propose that. You may recall that in Afghanistan that was also suggested, and there was a big loyal jirga and a conclave to discuss those types of things. And I'm sure that there will be people who will propose that during the period between now and the time there's a constitution, and it will get sorted out and the Iraqi people will make a judgment about that. Yes?

Q I have a statement or an inquiry. It seems as though much of the world perceives us as being not evenhanded in our treatment of the Israelis vis-a-vis the Palestinians. And I can't help but wonder if that is an encumbrance to our efforts in Iraq and elsewhere.

SEC. RUMSFELD: That's been the case for most of my adult life. And the Palestinian people have not had a good deal over that time. There have been a lot of words spoken, a lot of bullets fired, a lot of people killed, but with the exception of President Sadat and Menachem Begin when the Sinai was returned and various decisions were made, there hasn't been much progress on the Palestinian front.

And the effect of that, of course, is to create a politically volatile situation in the countries of that region. And many of them have Palestinian refugees living there that are not their own nationals, that worry them, and they're concerned. They would like to see the Palestinian problem solved, and solved in the way that there is a Palestinian state and the Palestinians in their countries move back out of their countries and into a Palestinian state.

And that issue about what it might look like has been what's been going on for close to 50 years, 40-some-odd years. And, and it's, it is a complicated one. It's one where there is a great deal of emotion attached to it. There are times when both sides have felt they were quite close, but in the last analysis, the interlocutor on the -- particularly on the Palestinian side, Mr. Arafat, stepped away.

Where it will be in the period ahead, I just don't know. Certainly I think most rational people hope that they can find a way to solve it. Some people look at it from a distance and say, "Well, why doesn't the United States just grab them both by the scruff of the neck and shove them together?" And wouldn't it be nice. And we get that kind of hope expressed from countries in the region.

So there have been occasions when we've heard that hope from Israel.

But it doesn't work that way. You can't just shove people together and think that they're going to stay together. They've got to work this out. They've got to figure out a way that they can live together in peace.

And there's been a great deal of progress made; it just hasn't reached a solution. If you think about it, it wasn't too long ago there wasn't a country that had any relationship with Israel. Today any number of them have a variety of relationships, both formal and informal.

And so I think we have to keep trying. It's the kind of thing that if you're not working on it, it gets worse; and if you are working on it, it may or may not get better. (Scattered laughter.) But God bless all the wonderful people in the world who have worked on it over the years and tried to make it better and tried to see if we can't find ways that -- but if you think about it, there are very few countries today in that region whose position, formal governmental position, is that they want Israel eradicated and shoved into the sea. That was -- I mean, it wasn't too many decades ago that that was the mantra. But you don't hear that today. It's not considered really acceptable, except by terrorists, but not by the countries.

Question?

Q Mr. Secretary, I have a -- wonder if I can get your input on a military policy that's been evolving over the years and has become, I think, very evident in Iraq today. And that's the inclusion of servicewomen in the combat zone, where, even though they aren't in combat MOSs, they are engaged in close combat, being killed and horribly wounded.

I'm wondering if you view that as a contradiction to current social mores against violence in (sic) women. Is the notion of chivalry, the conduct of a gentleman, becoming an anachronism?

And also, are we opening up a Pandora's box of gender-neutral litigation, to include everything from Selective Service, the draft, and military uniform and physical fitness standards? Thank you. (Scattered applause.)

SEC. RUMSFELD: (Sighs.) (Laughter.)

Look, we've got terrific men and women doing a great job for this country. They don't do exactly the same jobs, as you well know. They do somewhat different jobs. There are a lot of things they do as well or better than the other sex. And my impression is that this is not something that needs to be adjusted at the present time.

I think that I'm so darn proud of what they do. And I go out there and I watch them, and I see the determination and the courage that these young men and women show. And to suggest that that isn't right, that they shouldn't be allowed to do that -- everyone's a volunteer.

It's not like you have conscription and we said you have to go do this, and you have to go do this this way. Every one of the people there stuck up their hand and said, "Send me. I want to do this." And that's a wonderful thing.

So I'm -- and I would add, just on the other subject you mentioned, I can't imagine our country going back to a draft. We don't need it. We're able to attract and retain wonderful people the way we're doing it as long as we provide the appropriate incentives. And certainly this is a country that's wealthy enough to do that. (Applause.)

We'll make this the last question, so make it a good one. (Laughter.)

Q Mr. Secretary, going to go back to your first statement. You referred to people -- young people, particularly, being educated to hate us. And I think we know the schools we're talking about. I'm curious, what are we doing domestically and/or internationally to shut down the funding for those kinds of schools, or another way to interdict them?

SEC. RUMSFELD: Well, the president and the team have put together something like an 80- or 85-nation coalition that are trying to use all elements of national power to put pressure on terrorists, financing of terrorism, teaching of terrorism, and to try to share intelligence and to make life difficult for people who would do that.

There is a battle of ideas. There's a struggle within that religion where some people are trying to hijack it -- a relatively small minority of the people in that religion are trying to hijack it. And they are feeding money into these schools that teach people that it's in their interest, religious interest, if you will, to go out and kill people.

We're not -- where we stand in the world on that is not satisfactory, from my standpoint. I'm just one observer, and each of you can make your own assessment. But I have a feeling that it's a tough job. I have a feeling that a great deal of that work is ultimately going to have to be done by people in that religion. They are going to simply -- millions and millions and millions -- hundreds of millions of moderate Muslims are going to have to take back their religion. And we have to try to find ways to help them. (Applause.)

It's amazing, when you think of it. We have such a wonderful country and we're so good at so many things.

We're good at communication. We're good at advertising. We're good at marketing. We are good at inventing things and creating value. And in this area, we're not competing. We're not really -- as a nation focused in a way that would help us engage in this battle of ideas and help those people, those right-thinking people all across the globe, and there are a lot of wonderful right-thinking people all across the globe who recognize -- I mean, think of what we have. Everything we have in this country is based on trust. That is why we are so productive. That is why this country is so creative. Because people are free, and they're free to do what they want and think things that are unorthodox and unusual and to create just an amazing system.

When one compares this system, rooted in trust -- the fact that we can engage in a contract and for the most part expect that it stands up; the fact you can walk out of your door in the morning and not have to look around the corner and see if you're going to be shot; that you can send your kids off to school and you can trust that they're going to come back, that is a special thing and we are, because of the uniqueness of our society, we are the most vulnerable society on earth to terrorism. It strikes right at that trust. It attempts to alter our behavior and for us to be something other than what we are, a free

11-L-0559/OSD/41386

people. And that is really dangerous.

It is something that takes -- is going to take a lot of thought by the best minds in this country, because we cannot afford as a people to find that incrementally we are giving up that which makes this country so special and so distinctive. (Applause.)
Finally, if you see someone in uniform, say "thank you."

(Applause.)

<http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2004/tr20040517-secdef0782.html>

11-L-0559/OSD/41387

<http://www.defenselink.mil/cgi-bin/dlprint.cgi?http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/200...> 5/20/2004

May 20, 2004

EUCO

TO: Gen. Jim Jones

cc: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Response to Periodic NATO-EUCOM Report

1. **ISAF Expansion**. I continue to think we need to push the other countries to step up. The US should not make it a pattern of filling every vacuum. I am reluctant, but I am willing to talk about it.
2. **Bosnia**. Good.
3. **Kosovo**. Sounds right to me. We have to get NATO to work hard on national caveats. You're right - they are killing us everywhere.
4. **NATO Response Force**. What do you propose we do? This should be elevated, and pushed. It is critically important.
5. **Olympics**. We need to keep pushing NATO as a response for Greek Olympic security. We should not fill every vacuum. I agree with you that NATO ought to be able to do it.
6. **NATO Strategic Intelligence**. Good.
7. **Pre-Istanbul Comments**. I agree. What do we do about it?
8. **OIF**. I agree completely that 1st ID and you folks are doing great work to communicate and solve the problems for the families.

20 May 04

OSD 07570-04

9. **EUCOM name.** I will talk to General Myers and think about the renaming, but at the moment I am reluctant until we think through some other things. But thanks for the thought.

10. **Summit.** Thanks.

I look forward to seeing you next week.

Regards,

Attach.

5/18/04 EUCOM memo to SecDef: "Periodic Report from NATO-EUCOM"

DUR:dh
052004-20

.....
Please respond by 6/4/04

rec'd 5/18/04

5/12/04

0115/20

To: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Cc: CJCS, VCJCS
Subject: PERIODIC REPORT FROM NATO/EUCOM
MR. SECRETARY,

BELOW PLEASE FIND A SHORT SUMMARY OF THE CURRENT MAIN ISSUES CURRENTLY ONGOING IN NATO AND EUCOM:

1. NATO:

✓
① -ISAF EXPANSION: "DEAD IN THE WATER. FOR NOW, UNLESS NATIONS CONTRIBUTE TO REMAINDER OF FORCE GENERATION. (NEED 5 C-130S, 1 ROLE TWO MEDICAL STAGING UNIT, SOME INTELL ASSETS, 4 UTILITY HELOS FOR KABUL, AND 36 PEOPLE WITH VARYING SKILLS NECESSARY TO KEEP KABUL AIRPORT OPEN 24/7, BEYOND 1 JUNE). CJCS HAS ALL AMPLIFYING DATA. I KNOW THIS IS A TOUGH TIME FOR US, BUT U.S. CONTRIBUTION TO NATO OPS IS NOW AT 0.2% OF OUR TOTAL CAPABILITY. ONE C-130 FOR NATO, FOR 3 MONTHS WOULD HELP GREATLY..... THEN AGAIN, ANYTHING WOULD HELP GREATLY!

✓ -BOSNIA: ON TRACK FOR HANDOFF TO E-U IN DECEMBER. U.S. DRAWDOWN OF BASES IS UNDERWAY, WILL KEEP SMALL PORTION OF EAGLE BASE FOR U.S. FOLLOW-ON MISSION AS AGREED.

✓ -KOSOVO: RETRAINING THE FORCE, TRYING TO MAKE IT MORE USABLE, NEED MORE SUCCESS ON POLITICAL FRONT. U.N. NOT BEING SUCCESSFUL AT PRESENT. AM RESISTING CALL FOR MORE TROOPS IN FAVOR OF MAKING THE TROOPS WE HAVE MORE USABLE (NATIONAL CAVEATS CONTINUE TO KILL US).

0 -ACTIVE ENDEAVOUR: LIKE ALL OTHER NATO OPS, NOT PROPERLY RESOURCED, BUT DOING WELL NONETHELESS. LIKELY TO CONTINUE IN 05, NATO'S ONLY REAL GWOT MISSION AT PRESENT..... WELL RUN, BUT CRITICALLY SHORT OF MARITIME PATROL AIRCRAFT (75% SHORT OF REQUIREMENT).

✓ -NATO REPOSE FORCE: HITTING SOME SNAGS AFTER GREAT TAKEOFF. NATIONS WANT AN NRF.... BUT THEY DON'T WANT TO USE IT! THIS WILL BE A MAJOR PROBLEM IF NOT FIXED. SOME OF THIS IS CULTURE, SOME OF IT IS WHO PAYS FOR IT WHEN IT IS USED? NONE OF THE ARGUMENTS ARE VALID.

✓ -OLYMPICS: NATO IS RESPONDING TO GREEK REQUEST FOR SUPPORT. STRONGLY RECOMMEND THAT U.S. USE NATO TO ANSWER GREEK BILATERAL REQUESTS FOR ANY HELP. NATO SHOULD BE ABLE TO DO THIS. IF THERE IS A U.S. ONLY CAPABILITY NEEDED (AS YET NOT IDENTIFIED) WILL ADVISE. OPERATIONAL COMMANDER IS ADMIRAL GREG JOHNSON, AND TACTICAL NATO COMMANDER IS VADM HARRY ULRICH. HAVE SENT MESSAGE TO AMBASSADOR MILLER AS TO THIS COA.

- NATO STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE: WILL PROPOSE A PLAN FOR DEVELOPING NATO STRATEGIC INTELL CENTER. PROPOSAL CENTERS ON A "NATO ANALYSIS CENTER VICINITY OF JAC MOLESWORTH. CRITICAL SHORTFALL IN NATO (KOSOVO WAS A TOTAL SURPRISE..... NO INTELL !)

-PRE- ISTANBUL COMMENTS: NATO'S "CANCERS ARE IN FULL BLOOM..... GAP BETWEEN POLITICAL WILL AND WILL TO RESOURCE IS AS WIDE AS EVER. NO NATO OPERATIONAL MISSION IS FULLY RESOURCED, MULTI-NATIONAL LOGISTICS IS A FUTURE MUST. NATIONAL CAVEATS, COMMON FUNDING LIMITATIONS, NATIONAL BUDGETS FOR SECURITY ARE DECLINING (11 NATIONS NOW UNDER 2%), ARE CONTINUING TO LIMIT PROGRESS. PERSONAL OPINION IS THAT CONTINUING ABILITY

✓ OF ANY ONE NATION TO ALTER NATO COA IS A MAJOR LIMITING FACTOR TO NATO'S POTENTIAL TRANSFORMATION.

2. EUCOM.

✓ -OIF: IMPACT OF 2 DIVISIONS IN IRAQ IS FELT, PARTICULARLY IN FAMILIES OF 1ST AD (RECENTLY EXTENDED). USAREUR DOING GREAT WORK TO COMMUNICATE AND SOLVE PROBLEMS FOR FAMILIES.

✓ -FOOTPRINT: REGULAR GERMAN INTEREST/CONCERN ABOUT THIS ISSUE. GENERALLY "BUY" THE TRANSFORMATION THEME WE HAVE TOUTED. THEY ARE NOT IN A STRONG POSITION TO OBJECT....% OF GDP FOR SECURITY GOING TO 1.3% ACCOMPANIED BY FORCE REDUCTION (ARMY CHIEF RESIGNED IN PROTEST)

✓ -NEW "EUCOM" NAME: IN AN EFFORT TO BETTER TITLE THE REGIONS WE OPERATE IN, SUGGEST WE CONSIDER RENAMING PACOM AND EUCOM TO NEW DESIGNATION AS WESTCOM AND EASTCOM, RESPECTIVELY. HENCE WE WOULD HAVE.....NORTHCOM, SOUTHCOM, CENTCOM, EASTCOM, AND WESTCOM..... ALL "GEOCOMS"..... PASSING THOUGHT!

-AFRICA: CONTINUING EXCELLENT WORK IN STIMULATING INTERNATIONAL DISCUSSION THROUGH EUCOM SPONSORED "AFRICA CLEARING HOUSE" SYMPOSIUM 25-26 MAY. IDEA IS TO GET CONCEPT OF HELPING AFRICANS HELP THEMSELVES EMBRACED BY COALITION OF NATIONS.

-GTEP LIKE MISSIONS: WILL SUBMIT LIST OF POTENTIAL NATIONS WHICH COULD BENEFIT FROM GTEP LIKE PROGRAMS

-D-DAY PREP: PROGRESS WITH D-DAY EVENTS IS GOOD. WORKING WITH NAVY TO ENSURE PRESENCE OF U.S. CARRIER OFF COAST. FRENCH INTEND TO HAVE CHARLES DE GAULLE CVN PRESENT ON BACKDROP. MY VIEW IS PRESIDENT BUSH OUGHT TO HAVE HIS THERE AS WELL.

-SUMMIT: WILL FORWARD A PAPER TO ADDRESS BOTH NATO AND EUCOM ISSUE FOR YOUR USE AT ISTANBUL. IT WILL BE A MILESTONE REPORT OF HOW FAR WE HAVE COME SINCE PRAGUE..... THE GOOD AND THE BAD..... AND THE WAY AHEAD.

3. SUMMARY:

-STILL AN ACTIVE TIME WITH TWO TRANSFORMATIONS (EUCOM AND NATO). STRONGLY RECOMMEND U.S. SIGNAL INTENT TO SUPPORT ALLIANCE AT SOME LEVEL OF OPERATIONAL CONTRIBUTION, TO INCLUDE THE NRF. ALSO RECOMMEND THAT WE UNDERScore EUCOM TRANSFORMATION AS BEING AN EFFORT TO MAKE OUR FORCES MORE STRATEGICALLY EFFECTIVE AND USABLE. EMPHASIZE VALUE OF ROTATIONAL FORCES.... WILL NEED SOME ASSURANCES THAT THIS IS A REGULAR PART OF THE PLAN TO AUGMENT THEATER PRESENCE.

-FUTURE IN AOR IS PROMISING DESPITE MAJOR OBSTACLES. YOU HAVE ASSEMBLED A MOST WILLING TEAM, AND WE WILL DO THE JOB!

VERY RESPECTFULLY,



UNCLASSIFIED

TAB A

APR 14 2004

7B

TO: Gen. **Dick** Myers
Steve Cambone

CC: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld **DR**

SUBJECT: Threats

On this Jacoby threat report, I would like to know what we are doing on all **the** relevant potential targets.

Thanks.

Attach.

4/10/04 DIA info **memo** to SecDef re: Threats

DHR:dh
041304-8

.....
Please respond by 4/30/04

OSD 07592-04

UNCLASSIFIED

11-L-0559/OSD/41392

Tab A

720
TAB

APR 27 2004

754

TO: Gen. Dick Myers

CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: PRTs

Please have the Joint Staff start working with John Abizaid to respond to this memo from March 8, so I know what the answer is.

Thanks.

Attach.
3/8/04 SD memo to CENTCOM [#030804-14]

DHR:dh
042304-8

.....
Please respond by 5/7/04


OSD 07594-04

Tab

11-L-0559/OSD/41393

May 21, 2004

337 WH

TO: President George W. Bush
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Briefing on Global War on Terror

Mr. President—

You will recall that you asked us to meet with you to discuss the global war on terror. We were scheduled for an hour and a half, in your upstairs quarters, so it would be less formal.

As you know, we had to cancel the meeting because it was scheduled for the time I had to be on Capitol Hill dealing with the prison problems.

After the discussion we had yesterday with General Abizaid, it strikes me that our briefing on the Global War on Terror might be timely now. We are prepared to come over at any time you feel would be appropriate to make the presentation that we had planned for two weeks ago.

Respectfully,

DHR:dh
052104-7


OSD 07595-04

21 May 04

May 20, 2004

000.5

TO: President George W. Bush

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Gingrich Note

Mr. President—

Here is an e-mail from Newt Gingrich. As you will note, he asked me if I would share it with you, and I am happy to do so. It certainly fits with our discussion on Thursday.

Respectfully,

Attach.

5/20/04 Gingrich e-mail to SecDef re: We are Not Winning the War on Terror

DHR:dh
 052004-40

OSD 07598-04

20 May 04

cc: Craddock
Butter

(b)(6) CIV, OSD

From: Thirdwave2@aol.com
Sent: Thursday, May 20, 2004 7:57 AM
To: (b)(6)@osd.pentagon.mil; Larry.DiRita@osd.pentagon.mil;
 John.Craddock@OSD.Pentagon.mil; (b)(6); jack.patterson@osd.mil
Subject: we are not winning the war on terror-newt

for secdef, despsecdef

I cannot be at the dpb today but I wanted to share this with you

I wish you would share this with the President

it will not make him happy but I think it is profoundly accurate.

as you know I spent a lot of time outside the official system talking with military and intelligence folks. The following is my deepest worries about where we are.

at the Crossroads

someone told me that the President in Georgia was emphatic that we are winning the war on terror and that he was explaining that we were killing terrorists and they were declining in numbers

it is dangerous for him to say this and even more dangerous if he believes it

we are not winning the war on terror and in the absence of profound changes in our strategies and systems of implementation we will not win the war on terror

the Irreconcilable Wing of Islam is larger and more popular than ever

the funding from Saudi Arabia is continuing

Saudi Arabia and Pakistan are far more dangerous than Iraq and Afghanistan

there is a real risk of a catastrophic attack somewhere (a successful version of their effort in Jordan that was stopped) including the United States

there are four groups in American foreign policy today

1. the Howard Dean withdrawal faction
2. the John Kerry stay engaged but only with the UN, the French and The Russians

support faction

3. The partisan loyalists who salute without question

4. those who believe the President is morally right in his positions but the strategies and implementation systems are profoundly too weak

with each passing week people are moving from three to four

the more the Administration protects and defends current accomplishments and the less it demands bold, decisive change the harder it is to keep from speaking out

this transcends politics and is about national security and a lot of American lives

5/14
1730

04-124

APR 23 2004

TO: Les Brownlee
CC: Mike Wynne
Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
Gen. Pete Schoomaker
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *[Signature]*
SUBJECT: Ammunition Shortage

471

I have some questions regarding your response to my memo:

1. If there has been under-funding **of** ammunition procurement since **1988**, as you say, one would have thought that it should **have** been corrected well before **9/11**, and that it would have been the responsibility of the Army to make the case for appropriate funding under its organize, train and equip responsibilities. **Has that** account been used as a "billpayer"?
2. You **say** there were increases directed in small arms training strategy "immediately after **9/11**." What were they, and when?
3. Why wouldn't the Defense Logistics Agency procure common ammunition (like **small arms**)? Mike Wynne, please look into that issue.

Les, seeing your response **makes** me wonder what other situations may exist like this one that the Department may not have been sufficiently attentive to. Please **look into** that question and let me **know**. Thanks.

Attach.
4/8/04 SecArmy memo to SecDef re: Shortage of Ammunition

DHR:dh
042104-3

.....
Please respond by 5/14/04

23 APR 04



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
 WASHINGTON HEADQUARTERS SERVICES
 1 155 DEFENSE PENTAGON
 WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1 155



INFO MEMO

May 14, 2004, 8:00 AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Michael W. Wynne, Acting Under Secretary of Defense, (Acquisition,
 Technology & Logistics)
 R. L. Brownlee, Acting Secretary of the Army

[Handwritten signatures]

SUBJECT: Ammunition Shortage

- This responds to your April 23, 2004, query concerning ammunition shortages. (TAB A)
- We have prepared a joint response to your questions on the Army ammunition shortage. Both before and after September 11th, the Army took prudent and balanced steps to resource capabilities to best meet strategic challenges to win our Nation's wars. Ammunition has historically not been fully funded to the total Army requirement. This is true for other Army programs as well given the numerous demands and constrained resources over time. It does not imply that the Army has been neglectful of providing ammunition resources or used ammunition accounts as a "billpayer." Funding for Army ammunition has increased steadily over the past 10 years. Since 9/11 the Army has further adjusted priorities to support the Global War on Terrorism, to include increases in small arms training requirements and warfighting expenditures. Operational expenditures have exceeded initial projections; we have and plan to use supplemental funding to support replenishing that ammunition.
- On September 28, 2001, the Chief of Staff of the Army directed an immediate increase in small arms weapons training in preparation for combat operations. He specifically directed that all active duty soldiers qualify on their weapons twice yearly versus once, and that they conduct a collective live-fire exercise annually. He also directed a complete review of all training strategies, which resulted in additional training requirements that go into effect starting in FY05.
- Your question regarding the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) raises a good point. Managing the life-cycle of conventional munitions, from research and development to production, storage and demilitarization would require a major

471

19 MAY 04

23 APR 04



SUBJECT: Ammunition Shortage

expansion of DLA's current capabilities. Ammunition acquisition and management more closely resembles the process used for weapon systems than commodities. Ammunition is unique in the complexity of the types and calibers of rounds, and the variety of suppliers and facilities that support ammunition production in the industrial base. Specialized management skills are required due to the constant change in operational demands, weapons platforms, force structure, and training requirements. Due to this complexity and recent actions by the Army to improve ammunition management, we recommend the Army maintain this responsibility.

- The Army has addressed the near term shortage of small caliber ammunition by increasing the annual production rate at the government-owned small caliber facility from 400 million rounds in FY00 to 1.2 billion rounds in FY04; the Army will continue to increase capacity to reach a 1.5 billion round rate in FY05. Additionally, we have initiated procurements from private industry that will provide 350 million rounds annually starting in FY05. This capacity of 1.85 billion rounds a year provides 300 million for other Service requirements, and 1.55 billion rounds a year to meet Army training, operations, and war reserve requirements. These actions give the Army flexibility to more effectively manage production and inventory against requirements and provide surge capacity in times of war (TAB B). To ensure continued improvement, the offices of the Under Secretary of Defense, (Acquisition, Technology & Logistics) and the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics & Technology) will begin a study in June that will closely examine all of our metrics, as well as DLA processes and metrics to improve how we manage ammunition.
- We agree with your concerns about other areas that may need attention. The Army, in conjunction with the Joint Staff, is conducting capability assessments to identify critical gaps that must be closed to retain our warfighting edge. Prior to 9/11, the Army had a different set of priorities. There were areas where we applied fewer resources, and accepted some additional risk. We have identified several areas where the risk has increased based on the global situation, and have taken actions to reduce that risk. Examples of these areas include Rapid Fielding Initiatives, Interceptor Body Armor, Aircraft Survivability Equipment, increased procurements for Up Armored Wheeled Vehicles, and Blue Force Tracking. We are addressing these and similar areas with a combination of program changes in the FY06-11 POM, supplemental funding, and reprogramming funds in the current budget.


Attachments: As Stated

Prepared By: Don Chrans (b)(6)



Small Arms Production History

ROUND: 5X 1 0



11-L-0559/OSD/41401

INFO MEMO

June 14, 2004, 4:30 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Michael W. Wynne, Acting Under Secretary of Defense (AT&L)
R. L. Brownlee, Acting Secretary of the Army *[Signature]*

SUBJECT: Ammunition Shortage

- This responds to your April 23, 2004, query concerning ammunition shortages (TAB A).
- Historically, ammunition has not been funded to the total Army requirement. This is not unique to ammunition; we balance numerous demands with constrained resources based upon a changing environment, but we have not used ammunition as a "billpayer." Since 9/11, ammunition expenditures have increased, and we have adjusted priorities to fund the surge capacity needed in time of war (TAB B).
- On September 28, 2001, the Chief of Staff of the Army directed an immediate increase in small arms weapons training in preparation for combat operations. He also directed a review of Army weapons training strategies. Approved changes take effect Army-wide in October 2004, but we have resourced deploying units at the new levels since 2003.
- Managing the life-cycle of conventional munitions closely resembles the process used for weapons systems; the Defense Logistics Agency's (DLA) core capabilities reside in commodity management and are not readily postured to provide munitions life-cycle management. However, we have initiated a joint study to improve how we manage ammunition and we will look to DLA to advise us on their processes and metrics for commodity management. We recommend the Army, as the DoD Single Manager for Conventional Ammunition, maintain this executive responsibility.
- We agree with your concern about other areas that may need attention. We are taking actions to reduce other areas of risk based on the current global situation. Some examples include: Rapid Fielding Initiatives, Interceptor Body Armor, Aircraft Survivability Equipment, Up Armored Wheeled Vehicles, and Blue Force Tracking. These are being addressed through reprogramming in the current budget, supplemental funding, and the FY06-11 POM.

COORDINATION: TAB C

Attachments: As Stated

Prepared By: Don Chrans, (b)(6)

OSD 07658-04

4/21

4/21/04

23 APR 04

TAB

A

5/14
1730

04-124

APR 23 2004

Les Brownlee

Mike Wynne
Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
Gen. Pete Schoornaker

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D*
SUBJECT: Ammunition Shortage

I have **some** questions regarding your response **to my memo**

1. If there has been under-funding of ammunition procurement since **1988**, as you say, one would have thought that it should have been corrected well before 9/11, and that it would have been the responsibility of the **Army** to make the case for appropriate funding under its organize, **train** and equip responsibilities. Has that account been used as a "billpayer"?
2. You **say there** were increases directed in small **arms** training strategy "immediately after 9/11." What were they, and when?
3. **Why** wouldn't the Defense Logistics Agency procure common ammunition (like small **arms**)? Mike Wynne, please **look** into that issue.

Les, seeing your response **makes** me wonder what other situations may **exist** like this one that the Department **may** not have been sufficiently attentive **to**. Please look **into** that question and let me **know**. **Thanks**.

Attach.

4/8/04 SecArmy memo to SecDef re: Shortage of Ammunition

DHR:dh
042104-3

.....
Please respond by 5/14/04

OSD 07658-04


11-L-0559/OSD/41404

TAB

B



Lake City Army Ammunition Plant Production History



TAB

C

COORDINATION

CONCUR	AGENCY	NAME	PHONE	DATE
Y	OSD, (AT&L)	SES, Melita	(b)(6)	13/06/04
Y	DLA	MG, Mongeon		13/06/04
Y	Army G8	LTG Griffin		14/06/04
Y	Army G4	SES, Plummer		13/06/04
Y	Army G3	BG, Weber		13/06/04
Y	Army, ASA(ALT)	COL, Aultman		13/06/04



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

MAY 25 2004

Ms. Martha Raddatz
Pentagon Correspondent
ABC News
1717 DeSales Street, NW
Washington, DC 20036

3355D

Dear Martha and Tom,

Thanks so much for your hospitality at the White House Correspondents' Dinner. It was a nice evening, and I enjoyed being with you and your associates.

Sincerely,

25 May 04

OSD 07708-04

sent
4/11/04
0630

May 3, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Thank-You for Dinner

Please let me know who I thank off this list of people I had dinner with Saturday night.

Thanks.

Attach.
WHC dinner info sheet

DHR:dh
050304-1

.....
Please respond by 5/4/04

CS/24
Sir,
Response & thank you
note attached.
vr
/CDR Rosenberg

OSD 07708-04 TEN 5/24

DINNER TONIGHT

Host:

Martha Raddatz and her husband, Tom Gjelten, National Public Radio correspondent. He has had lots of time in the Balkans and elsewhere (during Kosovo and Bosnian War)

Others at the table:

- Mr. and Mrs. Karl Rove
- Claire Shipman, ABC correspondent on *Good Morning America* and other programs
- Terry Moran, ABC White House Correspondent
- Tom Brady, quarterback, New England Patriots (was in Mrs. Bush's box w/Joyce at 2004 State of the Union)
- David Westin, ABC President

Note:

1. Larry recommends you go to the ABC reception first and meet Martha Raddatz and Tom Gjelten, before going to any other receptions. They will be flexible; they will be there beginning at 6:00 p.m. and will look for you.
2. Colin Powell will be at another table, also hosted by ABC, but not at your table.

720

May 24, 2004

TO: President George W. Bush
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *[Signature]*
SUBJECT: Qaddafi

Attached is an interesting report quoting Qaddafi as urging Arab governments to retaliate against America's allies in Iraq. Worrisome.

Libya

Respectfully,

Attach.

MacFarquhar, Neil. "Qaddafi, Scorning Agenda, Walks Out of Arab Summit," *The New York Times*, May 23, 2004.

DHR:dh
052404-34

24 May 04

OSD 07711-04

11-L-0559/OSD/41412

The New York Times
nytimes.com

*Qaddafi calling for retaliation
against OIF contributors.* (D)

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May 23, 2004

Qaddafi, Scorning Agenda, Walks Out of Arab Summit

By NEIL MacFARQUHAR

TUNIS, May 22 - The annual summit meeting of Arab leaders opened here Saturday with a few fleeting moments of drama, including the Libyan leader, Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi, stalking out and Yasir Arafat, under Israeli blockade in Ramallah, addressing the gathering with a prerecorded plea for support.

The crucial issues to be addressed by the meeting include a joint Arab position toward ending the American occupation of Iraq, renewing a peace overture toward Israel while condemning recent violence against the Palestinians and, finally, support for reform of both the Arab political system and the Arab League itself.

Colonel Qaddafi, who has repeatedly called for dismantling the 22-member Arab League and had to be coaxed by other leaders to attend, announced he was withdrawing because he believed the entire agenda was flawed.

"There is one agenda laid out by the Arab people and another by the Arab governments," he said at a news conference after he had changed from the brown robe he was wearing when he marched out of the opening session into a white blazer festooned with military ribbons.

Colonel Qaddafi's outbursts, while erratic, often reflect popular sentiment, and those on Saturday mirrored some of the feeling on the street toward the current state of chaos in the Arab world, especially what many see as a lack of greater government support for the Iraqi people who are battling occupation.

While conceding that there was little the Arab governments could do about the American and British occupation forces in Iraq, he said they could collectively threaten smaller countries like Italy, Australia and Bulgaria that have sent troops.

"The Arabs are not doing anything to retaliate against these countries," the Libyan leader said. "The Arab summit should have warned these countries to withdraw their forces from Iraq or else they should consider themselves at a state of war with the Arab countries."

At the same time, he attacked the way the United States-lead coalition is dealing with Iraq. "If Saddam lived for another 10 years, would he be able to kill as many Iraqis and destroy as much of Iraq as the Americans have done in one year?" he asked, although he compared the American revolution favorably with that he carried out in Libya.

He appeared particularly upset because the Arab League has largely ignored a suggestion he made three years ago that the Arabs push for Israel and the Palestinians to form one state called Israteen, to which all Palestinian refugees would be allowed to return. Instead, a 2002 proposal advanced by Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia, who is not attending this year and with whom Colonel Qaddafi sparred last

11-L-0559/OSD/41413

year, is being resurrected. It offered Israel comprehensive peace with all Arab states in exchange for comprehensive withdrawal, but foundered under continuing violence.

Colonel Qaddafi waved a white book he had published outlining his proposal - which Israel has belittled in the past - and said he hoped the Libyan people would decide to withdraw from the Arab League because it failed to carry out its decisions. He walked out of the meeting as Amr Mousa of Egypt, the secretary general, voiced criticism of those trying to dismantle the organization.

The Libyan leader also called it scandalous that the Arab League was saying nothing about the isolation of the Palestinian leader by the Israelis and the imprisonment of Saddam Hussein by the Americans.

"How could they ignore such a serious problem?" he said, rebuking reporters who tried to address him as "Mr. President," saying he was merely the leader of the Libyan revolution. "This means that any member of this summit cannot depend on his brothers to save him when he gets in trouble."

Mr. Arafat addressed the opening session in a statement recorded at his compound in Ramallah. The Palestinian leader, increasingly isolated by Israel with United States backing, referred to the mounting violence in the Gaza Strip as "unprecedented aggression."

He said the Arabs needed to pressure the world to ensure that the proposed Israeli withdrawal from Gaza not be used as a pretext for limiting any withdrawal from the West Bank.

The Palestinians want a state that is a single political and geographic entity, he said, adding, "What applies to the Gaza Strip must apply to the West Bank."

The opening session started with the Tunisian president, Zine el-Abidine ben Ali, asking everyone to stand in a moment of silence for Palestinian victims. But Arab officials conceded that their leaders - only about two-thirds of the kings, princes and presidents attended - could offer little other than criticism of violence in Iraq and the occupied territories. The meeting was delayed two months because of tension over the reform proposals and other issues.

"The reality is that nobody could ask the coalition to withdraw from Iraq immediately," said Mustafa Osman Ismail, the Sudanese foreign minister, who was leading his country's delegation. "But at least the Iraqi people want to know that the coalition forces will withdraw within three years, four years."

The leaders are expected to call for a greater United Nations role in running Iraq and for expanded international efforts to rein in violence in the West Bank and Gaza.

The Bush administration had hoped the meeting would provide an emphasis on reform that would bolster its arguments that overthrowing Mr. Hussein was promoting change throughout the region.



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

ACTION MEMO

CM-1784-04
25 May 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec Action _____

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RBMY/5/24*

SUBJECT: Communicate with Activated Guard and Reserve Families

- **Issue.** "Please come up with a proposal for the Services to develop a better way to stay in touch with the families of Guard and Reserve who are activated. ...I would like to see a proposal."
- **Conclusion.** The Services, with their respective Reserve Components, should expand the current communication program targeting Reserve Component (RC) family members to include the proposed Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) (ASD(PA)) communication initiative (TAB B). New ideas such as internet Webcasts and cable broadcast of the Pentagon Channel, town hall meetings by senior Defense and RC leaders, the DOD Web sites and links to national and local RC, and Active Component community resources should be considered.
- **Discussion.** Since 9-11, there have been substantial increases in the spectrum of tools used to communicate with RC family members. Web sites, armory and Internet-based support groups, E-mails, toll-free numbers, financial advisors and counselors are but a few of the new tools (TABs C and D). More than 1,000 volunteer, full-time or part-time paid family readiness/support coordinators actively reach out to the families. Ideas from the ASD(PA) initiative can be used to expand communications with families.
 - The Services have implemented a program called "One Source" that provides 24/7 toll-free personal assistance, information and referral services to family members. (TAB E)
 - While keeping families informed is a Service responsibility, the Office of Family Policy in DUSD(MC&FP) and ASD(RA) provide policy and a forum supporting these efforts. DUSD(MC&FP) and ASD(RA) host a quarterly Joint Family Readiness Group; the next is scheduled for spring 2005.

326

25 May 04

RECOMMENDATION: Sign proposed memo at TAB F requesting the Services incorporate the ASD(PA) initiative of innovative communication methods into current communication programs.

Approve *[Signature]* Disapprove _____ Other _____

JUN 1 2004

TSA SD	<i>[Signature]</i>
SRMA SD	<i>CS/26</i>
MA SD	<i>5/25 TN</i>
EXEC SEC	<i>5/25</i>

COORDINATION: TAB G

Attachments:
As stated

OSD 07718-04

Prepared by: MG Clyde A. Vaughn, USA; ACJCS (NG); (b)(6)

**Pentagon Channel
Communication to the Men and Women In the Military**

Overview:

The DoD will expand the Pentagon Channel in May to every military camp, base and station in the U.S. DoD will also webcast the Channel and offer the programming to cable providers (C-Span Model).

Purpose for Expansion:

Through our transformation studies, we've learned that the military wants more information and news from their leadership. For instance, Congress passed an updated Soldier, Sailor Relief Act that will provide needed benefits to the military. DoD has the capability to communicate this information overseas via American Forces Radio and Television Service, but no capability to broadcast the information stateside--- where many of the benefits apply. The expanded reach to camps, bases and stations provides the necessary communication vehicle.

1.2 Million members of the military are in the Guard and the Reserves so it is imperative for them to have timely access to military news and information.

Channel Content :

- DoD Briefings
- Military Briefings, speeches from the field
- DoD Interviews
- Military Service Broadcasts
- DoD News and Information pieces (i.e., new military benefits, health requirements...)

Timeline of Events

- In May (Military Appreciation Month), DoD will offer the channel via satellite to every military camp, base and station.
- In June, DoD will begin webcasting the Channel.
- In August, DoD will offer the Pentagon Channel to all cable and satellite providers (C-Span Model).

Justification for Expansion

- Congress funded this expansion in FY04 Budget

Source: OASD/PA(CI), 3/11/04

TAB C

GUARD AND RESERVE UNIT FAMILY READINESS AND SUPPORT PROGRAMS

1. There is a substantial infrastructure facilitating effective communication with RC families. ASD Public Affairs is developing a program to provide the Pentagon Channel via satellite, cable TV providers and Internet Webcast. It has the potential to be a valuable element to add to the substantial outreach infrastructure already in place. Examples of existing infrastructure include the following.

a. There are nearly 400 Family Assistance Centers in the Army National Guard (ARNG) that provide support to the Active Army, Army Reserve and *ARNG* families in addition to the unit family readiness coordinators. Approximately 80 percent of all deployed ARNG units have family readiness groups with full-time staff. So far in FY04, more than 608,000 family members from all components were provided assistance by the Army National Guard Family Support Centers.

b. The Naval Reserve uses a system of volunteer ombudsmen in addition to the 57 unit family support centers to maintain contact with family members. Additionally, the Naval Reserve publishes a monthly magazine, "The Navy Reservist," which provides resources, current news and features, and is directly mailed to all drilling Reservist's homes.


c. The Marine Corp Reserve uses the Key Volunteer Network with unit family coordinators as the primary link between units and families, providing unit spouses with official communication, information and referrals. Additionally, the Lifestyle Insights, Networking, Knowledge and Skills (L.I.N.K.S.) Program is a spouse-to-spouse orientation service offered to new Marine spouses to acquaint them with the military lifestyle and the Marine Corps, including the challenges brought about by deployments. Online and CD-ROM versions of L.I.N.K.S makes this valuable tool more readily accessible to working spouses of Reserve Marines not located near Marine Corps installations.

2. Families are kept informed through a variety of ways. Each Reserve Component headquarters has family readiness offices to oversee and implement command programs.

a. Toll-free family support hotlines, Web sites, newsletters, direct mailings and family support meetings are designed to inform family members about military benefits and entitlements, including medical/dental benefits, commissary and exchange privileges, military pay and allowances, financial assistance, counseling services, parenting and child care, legal issues, reemployment rights, and everyday issues.

b. The implementation of the One Source program provides 24/7 toll-free personal assistance, providing information and referral services to family members at the closest DOD facility.

3. The ASD Reserve Affairs "The National Guard and Reserve Family Readiness Strategic Plan, 2000-2005" calls for a strong, proactive approach to preparing family members for periods of separation due to military service. "The Family Readiness Toolkit" has been developed as a guide for commanders, service members, family readiness group leaders and volunteers to enhance family readiness. "The HELP Guide to Guard and Reserve Family Readiness" promotes a joint approach and includes unit contact information and Internet access to specific programs.



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- Deployment Preparation
- Deployment Locations
- National Guard & Reserves
- Commanders' Health Briefing
- Employment Regulations
- Health Care
- Health Surveillance
- Family Support Programs

- Family Support
- Post-Deployment
- Health Care Providers

Family Support Programs

The following National Guard and Reserves family support programs, servi organizations are available to help families cope **with** the strains associated deployments.

National Guard

Army National Guard Family Readiness Program. The mission of this **prog** help bond **Guard** families together and promote a sense of comradeship; rel information **from** the Director and the Family Readiness Program in order to feeling of isolation and convey the Director's concerns for the well being of families; aid Guard families in better understanding the mission of the ARN Guard families informed about activities sponsored by the Director and /or f Readiness Program; and provide an avenue for Guard families to share som common rewards, or tensions and frustrations of military life.

National Guard Bureau Family Support. In **the** aftermath of the Cold War, n the Guard **and** Reserve are being called to active duty to an unprecedented e recent years we have repeatedly called reservists to duty involuntarily for m Bosnia, **Kosovo** and Southwest Asia. Contingency **operations** like these hav enormous strains on our servicemembers and their families. This site provid information on the steps the **NGB** is taking to enhance family support and r

National Guard Bureau Year of the Family. In **2000** the NGB celebrated the family. **During** this time the National Guard **took steps** to address issues imp Air National Guard **and Army National** Guard Family Readiness Program.

Reserves

Guide to Reserve Family Member Benefits. This guide provides an overview military benefits and **how** to access **them.** It identifies eligibility requiremen associated with some entitlements **and** provides **guidance** for obtaining assis specific questions and problems.

Army Reserve Family Promam. This site provides information on family pr **support offices**, reserve family member benefits, family readiness handbook reserve family **news.**

Navy Reserve Ombudsman Online. The Reserve Ombudsman provide a vol force who is able to offer support and guidance to families.

National Guard & Reserve Family Readiness Strategic Plan. Prepared by the the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs and the Office of **Far** (within the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Personnel Support, F Education) this plan seeks to **ensure** that reservists and their families are pre cope with the strains associated with long or repeated deployments and are served by military family care systems, networks and organizations.

Air Force Reserve Family Readiness. Families of deployed reservists will be and supported by the Family Readiness office. The types of deployment ass services the family can expect include: family support groups, reunion infor volunteer opportunities.

Marine Corps Reserve Community Services, Marine **Corps** Community Ser (MCCS) is the byproduct of merging the Corps old Morale, Welfare, and R and Human Resources programs and tailoring them to better meet today's ne personal and family readiness. **MCCS** is designed around five essential, req capabilities: Marine Corps Family Team Building, Personal Services, Sernp Business Operations, and General Support. Marine Forces Reserve, due to t unique challenges, will focus on the first three.

Coast Guard Reserve Member, Family, and Employer Support. This page h designed to aid the Coast Guard Reservist, their families, and employers to l understand the benefits and nature of reserve service.

Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs. This site is to today's Reserve force. It provides information about the policies, program initiatives that OSD/Reserve Affairs manages for the National Guard and R Components of the United States Armed Forces. This includes family supp issues.

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
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Have you tried one of the popular low-carb diets?

- Yes, I have, and I have had success
- Yes, I have, but I did not have success
- No, but I am interested in trying one
- No, and I am not interested in trying one

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
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
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Navy One Source Online offers monthly email newsletters on a variety of topics.

Events

Moderate
 Helping You Tailor your Elder Relations
 02:00 下午 EDT
 05/20/04

LifeWork

View

Feature

- Financial Calculator
- Child Care Locator
- Elder Care Financial
- Summer Camp

Self-

- Quick Quizzes
- What Help Do You Need?
- Are Life Changes Stressful?
- Are You Depressed?

Bulletin

- Midlife and Retirement
- Older Adults
- Parenting and Family
- Financial Issues

TAB G

COORDINATION PAGE

ASD (PA)	Ms. Allison Barber	19 Apr 04
DUSD (MC&FP)	Ms Meg Falk	20 Apr 04
ASD (RA)	COL James Scott	20 Apr 04
Army	COL John Chappel	8 Apr 04
Navy	CAPT M.S. Simon	8 Apr 04
USMC	Col van Dyke	7 Apr 04
Air Force	Col Ball	13 Apr 04

27
6/6

March 8, 2004

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Communicate w/Activated Guard and Reserve Families

Please come up with a proposal for the Services to develop a better way to stay in touch with the families of Guard and Reserve who are activated.

The active forces seem to have a much better arrangement, since they are generally located together on a base, unlike the Guard and Reserve.

I think some arrangements have to be made. I would like to see a proposal.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
030804-4

.....
Please respond by 4/2/04

SecDef -

DR 6/14

A comprehensive response was sent in to you about 2 weeks ago highlighting communications links to both National Guard & Reserve personnel

6/11

OSD 07718-04

am
6/1

2/16

March 8, 2004

727

TO: Gen. Dick Myers

CC: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Commuicate w/Activated **Guard** and Reserve Families

Please come up with a proposal for the Services to develop a better way to stay in touch with the families of Guard and Reserve who are activated.

The active forces seem to have a much better arrangement, since they are generally located together on a base, unlike the Guard and Reserve.

I think some arrangements have to be made. I would like to see a proposal.

Thanks.

Done
6/1

DHR:dh
030804-4

.....
Please respond by 4/2/04

Sir,
CTCS Response attached.
ur/CDR Nosenzo
5/26

3/20
08 3



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

ACTION MEMO

CM-1784-04
25 May 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec Action _____

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RBM 5/24*

SUBJECT: Communicate with Activated Guard and Reserve Families

- **Issue.** "Please come up with a proposal for the Services to develop a better way to stay in touch with the families of Guard and Reserve who are activated. ...I would like to see a proposal."
- **Conclusion.** The Services, with their respective Reserve Components, should expand the current communication program targeting Reserve Component (RC) family members to include the proposed Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) (ASD(PA)) communication initiative (TAB B). New ideas such as internet Webcasts and cable broadcast of the Pentagon Channel, town hall meetings by senior Defense and RC leaders, the DOD Web sites and links to national and local RC, and Active Component community resources should be considered.
- **Discussion.** Since 9-11, there have been substantial increases in the spectrum of tools used to communicate with RC family members. Web sites, armory and Internet-based support groups, E-mails, toll-free numbers, financial advisors and counselors are but a few of the new tools (TABs C and D). More than 1,000 volunteer, full-time or part-time paid family readiness/support coordinators actively reach out to the families. Ideas from the ASD(PA) initiative can be used to expand communications with families.
 - The Services have implemented a program called "One Source" that provides 24/7 toll-free personal assistance, information and referral services to family members. (TAB E)
 - While keeping families informed is a Service responsibility, the Office of Family Policy in DUSD(MC&FP) and ASD(RA) provide policy and a forum supporting these efforts. DUSD(MC&FP) and ASD(RA) host a quarterly Joint Family Readiness Group; the next is scheduled for spring 2005.

RECOMMENDATION: Sign proposed memo at TAB F requesting the Services incorporate the ASD(PA) initiative of innovative communication methods into current communication programs.

Approve *[Signature]* Disapprove _____ Other _____

COORDINATION: TAB G

Attachments:
As stated

TSA SD	<i>[Signature]</i>
SRMASD	<i>[Signature]</i>
MA SD	<i>[Signature]</i>
EXEC SEC	<i>[Signature]</i>

OSD 07718-04

Prepared by: MG Clyde A. Vaughn, USA; ACJCS (NG); (b)(6)

TAB B

Pentagon Channel Communication to the Men and Women In the Military

Overview:

The DoD will expand the Pentagon Channel in May to every military camp, base and station in the U.S. DoD will also webcast the Channel and offer the programming to cable providers (C-Span Model).

Purpose for Expansion:

Through our transformation studies, we've learned that the military wants more information and news from their leadership. For instance, Congress passed an updated Soldier, Sailor Relief Act that will provide needed benefits to the military. DoD has the capability to communicate this information overseas via American Forces Radio and Television Service, but no capability to broadcast the information stateside --- where many of the benefits apply. The expanded reach to camps, bases and stations provides the necessary communication vehicle.

1.2 Million members of the military are in the Guard and the Reserves so it is imperative for them to have timely access to military news and information.

Channel Content:

- DoD Briefings
- Military Briefings, speeches from the field
- DoD Interviews
- Military Service Broadcasts
- DoD News and Information pieces (i.e., new military benefits, health requirements..)

Timeline of Expansion:

- In May (Military Appreciation Month), DoD will offer the channel via satellite to every military camp, base and station.
- In June, DoD will begin webcasting the Channel.
- In August, DoD will offer the Pentagon Channel to all cable and satellite providers (C-Span Model).

Funding for Expansion:

- Congress funded this expansion in FY04 Budget

Source: OASD/PA(CI), 3/11/04

TAB C

GUARD AND RESERVE UNIT FAMILY READINESS AND SUPPORT PROGRAMS

1. There is a substantial infrastructure facilitating effective communication with RC families. ASD Public Affairs is developing a program to provide the Pentagon Channel via satellite, cable TV providers and Internet Webcast. It has the potential to be a valuable element to add to the substantial outreach infrastructure already in place. Examples of existing infrastructure include the following.

a. There are nearly 400 Family Assistance Centers in the Army National Guard (ARNG) that provide support to the Active Army, Army Reserve and ARNG families in addition to the unit family readiness coordinators. Approximately 80 percent of all deployed ARNG units have family readiness groups with full-time staff. So far in FY04, more than 608,000 family members from all components were provided assistance by the Army National Guard Family Support Centers.

b. The Naval Reserve uses a system of volunteer ombudsmen in addition to the 57 unit family support centers to maintain contact with family members. Additionally, the Naval Reserve publishes a monthly magazine, "The Navy Reservist," which provides resources, current news and features, and is directly mailed to all drilling Reservist's homes.


c. The Marine Corp Reserve uses the Key Volunteer Network with unit family coordinators as the primary link between units and families, providing unit spouses with official communication, information and referrals. Additionally, the Lifestyle Insights, Networking, Knowledge and Skills (L.I.N.K.S.) Program is a spouse-to-spouse orientation service offered to new Marine spouses to acquaint them with the military lifestyle and the Marine Corps, including the challenges brought about by deployments. Online and CD-ROM versions of L.I.N.K.S makes this valuable tool more readily accessible to working spouses of Reserve Marines not located near Marine Corps installations.

2. Families are kept informed through a variety of ways. Each Reserve Component headquarters has family readiness offices to oversee and implement command programs.

a. Toll-free family support hotlines, Web sites, newsletters, direct mailings and family support meetings are designed to inform family members about military benefits and entitlements, including medical/dental benefits, commissary and exchange privileges, military pay and allowances, financial assistance, counseling services, parenting and child care, legal issues, reemployment rights, and everyday issues.

b. The implementation of the One Source program provides 24/7 toll-free personal assistance, providing information and referral services to family members at the closest DOD facility.

3. The ASD Reserve Affairs "The National Guard and Reserve Family Readiness Strategic Plan, 2000-2005" calls for a strong, proactive approach to preparing family members for periods of separation due to military service. "The Family Readiness Toolkit" has been developed as a guide for commanders, service members, family readiness group leaders and volunteers to enhance family readiness. "The HELP Guide to Guard and Reserve Family Readiness" promotes a joint approach and includes unit contact information and Internet access to specific programs.



[Printer Frier](#)

- Deployment Preparation
- Deployment Locations
- National Guard & Reserves
- Commanders' Health Briefing
- Employment Regulations
- Health Care
- Health Surveillance
- Family Support Programs

- Family Support
- Post-Deployment
- Health Care Providers

Family Support Programs

The following National Guard and Reserves family support programs, servi organizations are available to help families cope with the strains associated deployments.

National Guard

Army National Guard Family Readiness Program. The mission of this progr help bond Guard families together and promote a sense of comradeship; rel information from the Director and the Family Readiness Program in order to **feeling of** isolation and convey the Director's concerns for the well being of families; aid Guard families in better understanding the mission of the ARN Guard families informed about activities sponsored by the Director and /or t Readiness Program; and provide **an** avenue for Guard families to share som common rewards, or tensions and frustrations of military life.

National Guard Bureau Family Support. In the aftermath of the Cold War, n the Guard and Reserve are being called to active duty to **an** unprecedented c recent years we have repeatedly called reservists to duty involuntarily for m Bosnia, Kosovo and Southwest Asia. Contingency operations like these hav enormous strains on **our** servicemembers and their families. This site provid information on the steps **the** NGB is taking to enhance family support **and** r

National **Guard** Bureau Year of the Family. In 2000 the NGB celebrated the family. **During** this time the National Guard **took steps** to address issues imp Air National **Guard** and Army National **Guard** Family Readiness Program.

Reserves

Guide to Reserve Family Member Benefits. **This** guide provides **an** overview military benefits and how to access **them**. It identifies eligibility requiremen associated **with** some entitlements **and** provides guidance for obtaining assis specific questions and problems.

Army Reserve Family Program. **This** site provides information on family pr support offices, reserve family member benefits, family readiness handbook reserve family news.

Navy Reserve Ombudsman Online. The Reserve Ombudsman provide a vol force who is able to offer support and guidance to families.

National Guard & Reserve Family Readiness Strategic Plan. Prepared by th the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs and the Office of Far (within the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Personnel Support, F Education) this plan seeks to ensure that reservists and their families are pre cope with the strains associated with long or repeated deployments and are served by military family care systems, networks and organizations.

Air Force Reserve Family Readiness. Families of deployed reservists will b and supported by the Family Readiness office. The types of deployment ass services the family can expect include: family support groups, reunion infor volunteer opportunities.

Marine Corps Reserve Community Services. Marine Corps Community Ser (MCCS) is the byproduct of merging the Corps old Morale, Welfare, and R and Human Resources programs and tailoring them to better meet today's no personal and family readiness. MCCS is designed around five essential, req capabilities: Marine Corps Family Team Building, Personal Services, Semp Business Operations, and General Support. Marine Forces Reserve, due to t unique challenges, will focus on the first three.

Coast Guard Reserve Member, Family, and Employer Support. This page h designed to aid the Coast Guard Reservist, their families, and employers to understand the benefits and nature of reserve service.

Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs. This site is to today's Reserve force. It provides information about the policies, program initiatives that OSD/Reserve Affairs manages for the National Guard and R Components of the United States Armed Forces. This includes family supp issues.

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
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- ▶ Army Reserve Homepage
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 the comprehensive source to help you face
 life's everyday challenges.

▶▶ This Month's Feature

Relocation -- a huge part of the
 military lifestyle...

more ▶

In addition to having access to an Army One Source (AOS) consultant over the phone 24 hours a day, seven days a week, you can also have six PRIVATE in-person counseling sessions* with a counselor for each problem or life issue that you need help with. These sessions are with Masters-prepared counselors in your local community and provided at NO COST TO YOU. This service is available to every Soldier, dependent relative, or guardian of a Soldier's minor child in the US and Puerto Rico. This service is not limited to one set of six sessions. You are encouraged to access these services for as many problems or life issues that you may face now and in the future. Simply call 1-800-464-8107 access these services.

more ▶

Weekly Poll

Have you tried one of the
 popular low-carb diets?

- Yes, I have, and I have had success
- Yes, I have, but I did not have success
- No, but I am interested in trying one
- No, and I am not interested in trying one

Submit ▶

View Results: 1631 votes

Today's Tip

Has your eyeglass prescription changed? Instead of throwing your old glasses in a drawer, donate them. Many vision professionals accept old frames and glasses and then donate them to those who are less fortunate.



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Ideas for Living Within Your Means

Managing Employees Who Work Flexible Schedules

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- ▶ Summer Cam

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- ▶ Quick Quiz: What Help Do Relative Need?
- ▶ Are Life Chan You Stress?
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welcomes you to
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the comprehensive source to help you face
life's everyday challenges.

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Relocation - a huge part of the military lifestyle...

more ▶

US Air Force Family Support Centers offer you access to Air Force One Source Online, where you can find help to cope with life's **little -- and not so little --** issues. Click on a topic of interest on the left, under the How May We Help You? heading, or use the key word search in the top right corner. You can access informative **articles**, helpful **tools**, audio tips on hundreds of specific **topics**, and much more.

more ▶

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Submit ▶

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more

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Submit

View Results: 1644 votes

Life Articles

Mail Order Buying Tips

Co-Dependency in Families with Chemical Dependency

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Bulletin

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- Older Adults
- Parenting and
- Financial Issu



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000


MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE

SUBJECT: Communication with Activated Guard and Reserve Families

Since September 2001, you have done much to improve family support programs for Active and Reserve Components. In the area of communication, we can never do enough for Guard and Reserve members, employers, and families. More information and news are necessary from DOD leadership. As the Department of Defense relies more on the contributions from the National Guard and Reserve, it is increasingly important to improve communication with these members and their families.

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) expanded the Pentagon Channel to reach every military camp and station in the United States via satellite starting May 2004. The Pentagon Channel will also be made available on Internet Webcast in June and to all cable and satellite providers in August.

Please work with your Reserve Components, Family Support, and Public Affairs offices to incorporate this new initiative into your strategic communication plans.



cc:
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)
Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness)



11-L-0559/OSD/41435

TAB G

COORDINATION PAGE

ASD (PA)	Ms. Allison Barber	19 Apr 04
DUSD (MC&FP)	Ms Meg Falk	20 Apr 04
ASD (RA)	COL James Scott	20 Apr 04
Army	COL John Chappel	8 Apr 04
Navy	CAPT M.S. Simon	8 Apr 04
USMC	Col Van Dyke	7 Apr 04
Air Force	Col Ball	13 Apr 04



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

JUN 1 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE

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cc:
Assistant secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)
Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness)

326

1 Jun 04 J S Mory



OSD 07718-04

May 29, 2004

TO: Dr. Condoleezza Rice
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Brahimis List

Condi —

I cannot understand why Bremer, Blackwill and you are unwilling to allow Abizaid and Sanchez to see the names of the people who are being considered by Brahimis.

ITR 09

It seems to me that they may have knowledge of those people, and it would be a shame not to take advantage of it.

I would be curious to know why that decision has been made.

Thank you.

DHR:dh
052504-17

25 May 04

OSD 07771-04

*AM
5/26*

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MAY 26, 2004

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM : CONDOLEEZZA RICE

SUBJECT : BRAHIMI'S LIST

Don,

To my knowledge, there has been no decision made. In any case, Jerry will share the full slate with Abizaid and Sanchez tomorrow morning. He has already briefed Sanchez on the power ministries and has arranged for him to meet some of the key people on the list.

Condi

IRAG


*John De
2/2/04*

07
5/28

May 25, 2004

TO: Dr. Condoleezza Rice

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT: Brahimi's List

Condi —

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Thank you.

DHR:dh
052504-17

Done
5/28


11-L-0559/OSD/41440

07771.04

May 25, 2004

TO: Honorable Andrew H. Card, Jr.

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT: Fact Checking

Andy—

In fact checking several numbers for the President's speech on Iraq, the White House speechwriters called three different points of contact here in the Pentagon – predictably with slightly varying answers.

For similar situations, the best course of action for the speechwriters is to call my office, specifically my Senior Military Assistant, Lieutenant General John Craddock. We want to ensure they get one correct answer with one phone call.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
052504-1

350.001 WH

25 May 04

720

0848
4/30
5/2
2/73



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1950 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1950

ACTION MEMO

ADMINISTRATION AND
MANAGEMENT

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THRU: DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE *SW* 10 MAY 2004

FROM: Raymond F. DuBois, Director, Administration and Management
Ray DuBois 4/29/04

SUBJECT: Information on DoD Advisory Boards for Senator McCain

- In the attached snowflake, you requested that we prepare a letter to Senator McCain transmitting information on DoD Federal Advisory Committees.
- The requested letter is attached for your signature (Tab A).

RECOMMENDATION: That you sign the letter at Tab A

COORDINATION: Tab B

Attachments:
As Stated

Prepared by: Jennifer Spaeth (b)(6)

334

10/11/04

10 Feb 04



5/11
1800

1150

1:00PM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld %
DATE: February 10, 2004
SUBJECT:

Paul Butler
5/24

Please get back to me with that attachment that I will send to McCain explaining what all of our advisory boards are, what the rules are, and defending the rules and defending the people who serve, and that we value and need their advice and counsel. We may end up wanting to put it on the website as well.

334

Thanks.

DHR/azn
021004.21

Please respond by: 2/20

Sim
Response attached.
v/r.
LTC Swope
5/24 TEN

5/24

5/25

Let's do it
Some.

OSD 07775-04

11-L-0559/OSD/41443

10 Feb 04



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1950 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1950

ADMINISTRATION AND
MANAGEMENT

INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Raymond B. DuBois, Director Administration and Management

SUBJECT: Information on DoD Advisory Boards for Senator McCain

- In the attached snowflake, dated February 10, 2004, you requested information on DoD Advisory Boards that would be forwarded to Senator McCain regarding his inquiry.
- Currently, DoD utilizes 60 advisory boards: 34 were established at your discretion or that of your predecessors, 25 were established in statute, and one was established by Executive Order.
- All DoD advisory boards with non-Governmental members are subject to the Federal Advisory Committee Act, 5 U.S.C. App. I. Consistent with longstanding DoD policy, non-Government members are appointed as Special Government Employees. Members may accept travel and per diem, but are rarely compensated for their work. After agreeing to serve, potential members are vetted through the Office of the Special Assistant for White House Liaison and the various OSD Principal Staff Assistants who utilize a board or receive advisory assistance from them. Members are required to execute financial disclosure reports. Advisory board charters, meeting records, reports, and membership listings are open to the public. Meetings are also open to the public unless certain legal exemptions apply.
- The merits of seeking advice and assistance from experts outside the Government are well recognized. They have been very valuable in many areas, including current transformation efforts. They are an important pipeline for informing the DoD leadership of the latest business practices and state-of-the-art science and technology developments. Membership creates professional networks that provide access to information that cannot exclusively be found from internal government sources. In addition, advisory boards provide a timely and cost-effective means of receiving highly expert advice and assistance. The costs would be significant if the Department were to use other contractual arrangements for the same services.
- An information paper is at Tab A and a detailed summary of all DoD Advisory Boards is at Tab B. Both of these may be provided to Senator McCain.

COORDINATION: Tab C

Attachments: As stated

Prepared by: Jenny Spaeth (b)(6)



11-L-0559/OSD/41444

A-611-370

COORDINATION

DA&M Response to SecDef Snowflake on McCain Snowflake

Senior Official

Signature

Date

ASD(LA)

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Dan Stanley", written over a horizontal line.

4/29/04

COORDINATION
DA&M Response to SecDef Snowflake on DoD Advisory Boards

Senior Official

Signature

Date

2/20/04

DoD GC


Principal Deputy *as revised, include the addition of bullet (studs) to the information paper*

ASD(LA)



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

MAY 26 2004

Honorable John McCain
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Senator McCain:

Per our earlier discussion on this matter, attached is an information paper on the Department of Defense Federal Advisory Committees. The first attachment briefly explains the guidelines under which they operate, our policies and procedures on the appointment of members, and their value to me and other senior leaders in the Department. The second attachment is a listing of all DoD advisory committees and describes the purpose of each.

Respectfully,

334
26 May 04



OSD 07775-04

11-L-0559/OSD/41447

10-16604

Information Paper on DoD Advisory Boards

- The Department currently utilizes 60 advisory boards, 34 of which were established at the discretion of the Secretary of Defense. Twenty-five were created in statute by the legislative branch, and one was established by Executive Order. A listing of these boards and their missions is at Tab 1. This listing is also found at the DoD Federal Advisory Committees website: <http://faca.disa.mil> under the Advisory Committees tab.
- DoD advisory boards which have private citizens as members are subject to the Federal Advisory Committee Act, 5 U.S.C. App. I. This statute not only recognizes the merits of seeking advice and assistance from experts outside the government, but it allows the executive branch to receive advice that is relevant, objective, and open to the public.
- Department advisory boards can be established on a long-term basis to address continuing issues, or they can be established on a short-term basis to address a specific issue. Long-term boards can be established for two-year periods and can be renewed for additional two-year periods thereafter.
- Under the law, advisory board meetings must be announced in advance and must be open to the public. All or part of an advisory board meeting may be closed, however, based on one or more of the provisions of the Government in the Sunshine Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552b(c).
 - As an example, advisory board meetings may be closed to the public when the board will discuss classified information.
- The law also requires advisory boards to keep and make available to the public minutes of open and closed meetings, including an accurate description of and the resolution of each matter discussed by the board.
- Department advisory boards are independent entities. While they report their findings to the Department leadership, their recommendations are not subject to direction and control by the Department.
- It has been the Department of Defense's policy for the past 15 years to appoint all private sector board members as Consultants, also known as Special Government Employees. After agreeing to serve, potential members ~~are~~ vetted through the Office of the Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (White House Liaison) and various Principal Staff Assistants who utilize the board

and/or receive their advice. Nominees are also required to fill out financial disclosure reports if the board they serve on makes recommendations that could affect the expenditure of government funds in the future. Board members may accept travel and per diem, but are rarely compensated directly for their work.

- The General Counsel of the Department of Defense notifies advisory committee members by letter to contact the Standards of Conduct Office (SOCO) for advice concerning ethics issues relating to their appointment. SOCO assures that the members' confidential financial disclosure reports are completed before their first meeting. Committee members also complete a Foreign Activities Questionnaire and execute a disqualification from participation in any particular matters involving financial interests listed on the confidential financial disclosure report. SOCO attorneys provide an ethics briefing to the Committee members. A guide for current committee members is distributed at a committee meeting and can be found at [http://www.defenselink.mil/dodgc/defense ethics](http://www.defenselink.mil/dodgc/defense%20ethics) under "ethics resource library" and under "DoD guidance."
- Advice provided to the Department has been critical to current transformation efforts, keeping the Department informed on cutting edge issues from the latest best business practices to state-of-the-art science and technology developments. This advice cannot be drawn exclusively from internal government sources. We simply do not have the expertise or those with professional networks with access to the kind of information needed. This advice often has a direct impact on future military operations and the welfare of the war fighter.
- If the Department were to use survey instruments and contractual arrangements to gather the advice provided by advisory boards, the costs would be significantly higher. Most support provided to these committees is done by federal employees who manage these committees as a collateral duty to their principal duties.



**DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
FEDERAL ADVISORY COMMITTEES**

As of 04/29/2004

Type of Committee: Statutory (Total - 25)

Presidential (Total - 1)

Discretionary/Established by Secretary of Defense (Total - 34)

Committee Name	Type	Description
<u>Advisory Council on Dependents' Education (ACDE)</u>	Statutory	Advises the Secretary of Defense and the Director, Department of Defense Dependents Schools (DoDDS), on improvements to achieve and maintain a high quality public educational program through secondary school for minor dependents in overseas areas as defined in section 1411, Public Law 95-561, as amended.
<u>Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction</u>	Statutory	Assesses the capabilities for responding to terrorist incidents in the U.S. homeland involving weapons of mass destruction. Examines response capabilities at the Federal, State, and local levels.
<u>Air University Board of Visitors</u>	Discretionary	Assists the Air University in sustaining effective programs pertaining to the educational, doctrinal, and research policies and activities of the Air University, and advises the Secretary of the Air Force, through the Commander, AU.
<u>Armament Retooling and Manufacturing Support (ARMS) Executive Advisory Committee</u>	Discretionary	Studies the ARMS Initiative and reviews the Army's plan for its implementation; makes specific findings and recommendations concerning the concept, executability, and overall soundness of the plan; assesses government and industry expectations for the ARMS Initiative; evaluates the incentives being proposed under the ARMS Initiative Implementation Plan (AIIP); reviews and makes specific recommendations on the applicability and adequacy of the loan guaranty program and planning grants; reviews and determines which existing public laws, regulations, and policies are currently available to fulfill the ARMS Initiative; and, reviews and comments on the Army's plans for Plant Reutilization, Emergency Planning, and the Disposal of Excess Plant Equipment.

<u>Armed Forces Epidemiological Board</u>	Discretionary	Serves as a continuing scientific advisory body to the Surgeons General of the military departments and the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs) providing them with timely scientific and professional advice and guidance in matters pertaining to operational programs, policy development and research needs for the prevention of disease and injury and promotion of health.
<u>Army Education Advisory Committee</u>	Discretionary (Auth by Law)	Provides the Secretary of the Army, the Chief of Staff, and the Army's senior leadership with expert and continuous advice on Army educational programs. Advice provided relates to educational policies, school curriculums, educational philosophy and objectives, program effectiveness, facilities, staff and faculty, instructional methods, and other aspects of organization and management.
<u>Army Science Board</u>	Discretionary	Advises the Secretary of the Army, the Chief of Staff, the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Research, Development and Acquisition), the Deputy Chiefs of Staff, and major Army Commanders on scientific, technological, and acquisition matters of interest to the Department of the Army.
<u>Board of Advisors to the President, Naval War College</u>	Discretionary	Advises and assists the President, Naval War College in educational and support areas. Reports or opinions, suggestions and recommendations of the Board will be made to the President, Naval War College. The President, Naval War College shall advise the Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of Naval Operations of opinions and recommendations made by the members of the Board which should receive consideration by a higher authority.
<u>Board of Advisors to the Superintendent, Naval Postgraduate School</u>	Discretionary	Advises the Superintendent and the Secretary of the Navy on naval graduate education programs, assessing the effectiveness of the school in accomplishing its mission and inquires into the curricula, instruction, physical equipment, administration, state of the student body, fiscal affairs, and other matters relating to the operation of school programs.
<u>Board of Regents, Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences</u>	Statutory	Provides advice and guidance to the Secretary of Defense through the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs for the operation of the Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences; to assure that said operation is in the best tradition of academia and in compliance with the appropriate accreditation authorities.

<u>Board of Visitors, Joint Military Intelligence College</u>	Discretionary	Provides the Secretary of Defense, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and the Commandant, Joint Military Intelligence College with independent, informed advice and recommendations on matters related to policy, mission, accreditation, faculty, students, facilities, curricula, educational methods, research, and administration, in connection with the College.
<u>Board of Visitors, Marine Corps University</u>	Statutory	Reviews develops, and provides recommendations on all aspects of the academic and administrative policies of the University; examines all aspects of the University's Professional Military Education operations; and provides such oversight and advice as is necessary to facilitate high educational standards and cost effective operations.
<u>Board of Visitors, National Defense University</u>	Discretionary	Provides advice on matters related to mission, policy, faculty, students, curricula, educational methods, research, facilities, and administration of the National Defense University (NDU). Principal components of NDU are: Armed Forces Staff College, Industrial College of the Armed Forces, national War College, Institute for National Strategic Studies, Institute of Higher Defense Studies, and Department of Defense Computer Institute.
<u>Board of Visitors, Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation (WHINSEC)</u>	Statutory	Provides to DoD expert advice on the operations and management of the Institute. Inquires into the curriculum, instruction, physical equipment, fiscal affairs and academic methods of the Institution and any other matters that it or the Secretary of Defense deems appropriate. Reviews WHINSEC curriculum and determines whether it complies with applicable U.S. laws and regulations consistent with U.S. policy goals toward the Western Hemispheres and adheres to U.S. doctrine appropriately emphasizing human rights, the rule of law, due process, civilian control of the military and the role of the military in a democratic society.

<u>Chief of Engineers Environmental Advisory Board</u>	Discretionary	Serves as advisor to the Chief for developing policy and procedures for Corps Programs; ascertains and advises upon natural, social and cultural resource management issues associated with Corps plans, projects and programs; provides advice aimed at both identifying and resolving existing environmental issues with new or expanded Corps missions; advises on the development of workable methods for quantifying natural, social and cultural resource management costs and benefits of Corps programs and in expressing these in terms of both their tangible and intangible consequences; and, explores and advises on new directions where the Corps, acting as the national engineering agency, can continue to solve not only the engineering and economic aspects of new challenges, problems, and opportunities, but also those environmental features for which it has responsibility.
<u>Chief of Naval Operations Executive Panel Advisory Committee</u>	Discretionary	Provides an avenue of communications by which a distinguished group representing scientific, academic, engineering, and political communities may advise the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) on questions related to national seapower. In pursuing its objectives, the CEP may operate in committees composed of selected Panel members to conduct detailed examinations of matters related to national seapower.
<u>Defense Acquisition University Board of Visitors</u>	Statutory	Advise the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and Technology) and the President of the Defense Acquisition University (DAU) on "organization management, curricula, methods of instruction, facilities and other matters of interest" to the DAU, as directed by 10U.S.C. 1746.
<u>Defense Advisory Board for Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve</u>	Discretionary	Provides advice to the Secretary of Defense about issues concerning Reservists and their civilian employers, to include recommending policies and priorities for employer support actions and programs.
<u>Defense Advisory Committee on Military Personnel Testing</u>	Discretionary	Provides the Secretary of Defense, through the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management and Personnel), with assistance and advice on matters pertaining to military personnel testing; reviews the calibration of personnel selection and classification tests to ensure the accuracy of resulting scores; reviews relevant validation studies to ensure that the tests have utility in predicting success in technical training and on the job; reviews ongoing testing research and development in support of the enlistment program; and, makes recommendations for improvements to make the testing process more responsive to the needs of the Department of Defense and the Military Services.

<u>Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services</u>	Discretionary	Provides the Secretary of Defense, through the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management and Personnel), with assistance and advice on matters and policies relating to women in the Armed Forces.
<u>Defense Business Board</u>	Discretionary	Makes recommendations to the Senior Executive Council (SEC) on effective strategies for implementation of best business practices of interest to the Department of Defense.
<u>Defense Environmental Response Task Force II</u>	Statutory (Lapsed/Inactive)	Studies and provides an annual report to Congress on the findings and recommendations concerning environmental restoration at military installations closed or realigned.
<u>Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) Board of Advisors</u>	Discretionary	Advises and assists the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) and the Director, DFAS, with respect to providing world class finance and accounting services to the Department of Defense.
<u>Defense Intelligence Agency Advisory Board</u>	Discretionary	Provides the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency with scientific and technical expertise and advice on current and long-term operational and intelligence matters covering the total range of the mission of the Defense Intelligence Agency; provides a link between the scientific/technical and military operations communities of the United States and the Defense Intelligence Agency; and, in the military operations area, addresses issues including intelligence support to combat units, joint intelligence doctrine, net assessments, arms control, and integration of intelligence and operational planning.
<u>Defense Policy Board Advisory Committee</u>	Discretionary (Auth by Law)	Provides the Secretary of Defense, Deputy Secretary and Under Secretary for Policy with independent, informed advice and opinion concerning major matters of defense policy; focus upon long-term, enduring issues central to strategic planning for the Department of Defense; and, responsible for research and analysis of topics, long or short range, addressed to it by the Secretary of Defense, Deputy Secretary and Under Secretary for Policy.
<u>Defense Science Board</u>	Discretionary	Advises the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition on scientific and technical matters of interest to the Department of Defense.

<u>DoD Advisory Group on Electron Devices</u>	Discretionary	Provides the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition), the Director, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, and the Military Departments with advice and recommendations on the conduct of economical and effective research and development programs in the field of electron devices.
<u>DoD Domestic Advisory Panel on Early Intervention and Education for Infants, Toddlers, and Preschool Children, and Children with Disabilities</u>	Statutory	Advises the Director, Department of Defense Education Activity (DoDEA) and Director, Domestic Dependent Elementary and Secondary Schools (DDESS) unmet needs within the DDESS for the education of children with disabilities, comments publicly on any proposed DDESS rules or standards regarding the education of children with disabilities; and assists DDESS in matters that have been identified as areas of concern by the Director, DoDEA and Director, DDESS.
<u>DoD Education Benefits Board of Actuaries</u>	Statutory	Advises the Secretary of Defense on the actuarial status of the DoD Education Benefits Fund; furnishes advice and opinion on matters referred to it by the Secretary; reviews valuations of the Fund; and, provides periodic reports to the Secretary and President and Congress on the status of the fund as required.
<u>DoD-Government-Industry Advisory Committee on the Operation and Modernization of the National Defense Stockpile</u>	Statutory (Lapsed/Inactive)	Established pursuant to Section 10(a) of the Strategic and Critical Materials Stock Piling Act (50 U.S.C. 98h-1(a)), and Section 3306 of Public Law 102.484 , the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993, advises the Secretary of Defense concerning significant issues relating to the operations of the National Defense Stockpile (NDS) and recommends ways to effect a modernization of the NDS consistent with NDS material requirements and sound business management practices.
<u>DoD Historical Advisory Committee</u>	Discretionary	Provides advice to the Secretary of Defense, the Secretaries of the Military Departments, and the heads of such other Components as may choose to participate, regarding the professional standards, historical methodology, program priorities, liaison with professional groups and institutions, and adequacy of resources connected with the various historical programs and associated activities of the DoD. These include: historical, archival, museum, library, art , curatorial, and related programs
<u>DoD Medicare-Eligible Retiree Health Care Board of Actuaries</u>	Statutory	Makes all actuarial determinations necessary to sustain the DoD Medicare-Eligible retiree Health Care Fund for the accumulation of funds in order to finance, on an actuarially sound basis, liabilities of the DoD under DoD retiree health care programs for Medicare-eligible beneficiaries.

<u>DoD Retirement Board of Actuaries</u>	Statutory	Makes all actuarial determinations necessary to sustain the Department of Defense Military Retirement Fund for the accumulation of funds in order to finance, on an actuarially sound basis, liabilities of the Department of Defense under military retirement and survivor benefit programs.
<u>DoD Wage Committee</u>	Discretionary (Auth by Law)	Makes recommendations regarding wage surveys and wage schedules for blue-collar employees to the Department of Defense Wage Fixing Authority.
<u>Inland Waterways Users Board</u>	Statutory	Advises the Secretary of the Army on matters relating to construction and rehabilitation priorities on the commercial inland waterways and harbors of the United States.
<u>Joint Advisory Committee on Nuclear Weapons Surety</u>	Discretionary	Advises the Secretary of Defense, Secretary of Energy, and the Joint Nuclear Weapons Council on nuclear weapons systems surety matters that relate to protecting against inadvertent nuclear detonation or plutonium dispersal.
<u>Missouri River -- North Dakota -- Task Force</u>	Statutory	Advise the Secretary of the Army on a plan and projects to reduce siltation of the Missouri River in the State of North Dakota and to meet the objectives of the Pick-Sloan program in accordance with the Missouri River Protection and Improvement Act of 2000.
<u>Missouri River -- South Dakota -- Task Force</u>	Statutory	Advise the Secretary of the Army on a plan and projects to reduce siltation of the Missouri River in the State of South Dakota and to meet the objectives of the Pick-Sloan program in accordance with the Missouri River Protection and Improvement Act of 2000.
<u>National Security Agency Advisory Board</u>	Discretionary	Advises the Director, NSA/Chief, CSS, on matters involving Signals Intelligence production, Information Security, science, technology, business procedures and management related to the mission of the NSA/CSS.
<u>National Security Education Board</u>	statutory	Develop criteria under the National Security Education Act of 1991 for awarding scholarships, fellowships, and grants to U.S. citizens and institutions; provide for wide dissemination of information regarding the activities assisted under the Act; establish qualifications for persons desiring scholarships or fellowships, and for institutions of higher education desiring grants under the Act. The Board will report to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Strategy & Resources), who is the designated representative of the Secretary of Defense.

<u>Naval Research Advisory Committee</u>	Discretionary	Maintains an understanding of the technological needs confronting the Navy and Marine Corps, keeping abreast of the research and development which is being carried on to address them, and offering a judgment to the Navy and Marine Corps as to whether these efforts are adequate; senior scientific advisory group to the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, and the Chief of Naval Research
<u>Ocean Research Advisory Panel</u>	Statutory	Provides senior scientific advice to the National Oceanographic Research Leadership Council. Advises the Council on policies, procedures, selection of projects and allocations of funds regarding the National Oceanographic Partnership Program and on matters relating to national oceanographic data requirements as well as other responsibilities that the Council considers appropriate.
<u>Overseas Dependents Schools National Advisory Panel on the Education of Dependents with Disabilities</u>	Statutory	Advises the Director, DoDDS, of unmet needs within the system for the education of children with disabilities; comments publicly on any Office of Dependents Schools rules or standards regarding the education of children with disabilities; and assists ODS in matters that have been identified as areas of concern by the Director, DoDDS.
<u>Planning and Steering Committee (Navy)</u>	Discretionary	Provides to the Advanced Technology Panel of the Chief of Naval Operations Executive Board in-depth technical assessments to U.S. and Soviet ASW developments and related technologies, critically review programs which potentially impact SSBN survivability, and evaluate intelligence efforts to identify and define ASW and SSBN survivability threats.
<u>President's Information Technology Advisory Committee</u>	Presidential	Provides the National Science and Technology Council, through the Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy, with advice and information on high-performance computing and communications, information technology, and the Next Generation Internet.
<u>Scientific Advisory Board of the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology</u>	Discretionary	Serves in the public interest as a scientific advisory body to the Director, Armed Forces Institute of Pathology, to provide scientific and professional advice and guidance in matters pertaining to operational programs, policies and procedures of the AFIP central laboratory of pathology for the Department of Defense and other federal agencies with responsibilities for consultation, education and research in pathology.

<u>Semiconductor Technology Council</u>	Statutory (Lapsed/Inactive)	Advises the Secretary of Defense on appropriate technology goals and appropriate level of effort for the research and development activities of Sematech; to link assessment by the semiconductor industry of future market and national security needs to opportunities for technology development through cooperative public and private investment; and, to seek ways to respond to the technology challenges for semiconductors by fostering precompetitive cooperation among industry, the Federal Government, and institutions of higher education.
<u>United States Strategic Command Strategic Advisory Group (SAG)</u>	Discretionary	Provides technical and scientific advice of qualified scientists and representative views of the scientific community to the Director of Strategic Target Planning (DSTP) during the development of the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP). Convening upon request, the SAG will provide scientific and technical advice and representative views to the DSTP in order to enhance JSTPS planning.
<u>strategic Environmental Research and Development Program Scientific Advisory Board</u>	Statutory	Provides recommendations to the Strategic Environmental Research and Development Program Council on environmental research and development activities as prescribed in statute and assume additional advisory responsibilities as directed by the Council.
<u>Technology and Privacy Advisory Committee</u>	Discretionary	Advises the Secretary of Defense concerning the legal and policy considerations implicated by: a) the application of pattern queries/data correlation technology to counter-terrorism and counter-intelligence missions, and b) other DoD activities related to the war on terrorism.
<u>Threat Reduction Advisory Committee (TRAC) Charter</u>	Discretionary	Advises and assists the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and Technology) on reduction of the threat to the United States and its allies from nuclear, biological, chemical, conventional and special weapons, sustainment of the nuclear weapons deterrent, chemical and biological defense, counterproliferation, technology security, weapons effects, and other matters related to the DTRA mission.
<u>Uniform Formulary Beneficiary Advisory Panel</u>	Statutory	Reviews and comments on the development of the uniform formulary by the DoD Pharmacy and Therapeutics Committee.
<u>USAF Academy Board of Visitors</u>	Statutory	Inquires into the morale and discipline, the curriculum, instruction, physical equipment, fiscal affairs, academic methods, and other matters relating to the Academy which the Board decides to consider.

<u>USAF Scientific Advisory Board</u>	Discretionary	Provides a link between the Air Force and the Nation's scientific community by serving as a means of communicating the most recent scientific information as it applies to the Air Force; reviews and evaluates long-range plans for research and development and provides advice on the adequacy of the Air Force program; recommends usually promising scientific developments for selective Air Force emphasis and new scientific discoveries of techniques for practical application to weapon or support systems; makes a variety of studies designed to improve the Air Force Research and Development Program; and, serves as a pool of expert advisers to various Air Force activities.
<u>U.S. Army Coastal Engineering Research Board</u>	Statutory	Provides broad policy guidance and review of plans and fund requirements for the conduct of research and development in the field of coastal engineering and recommends priorities of accomplishment of research projects in consonance with the needs of the coastal engineering field and the objectives of the Chief of Engineers.
<u>U.S. European Command Senior Advisory Group (SAG)</u>	Discretionary	Provides the Commander, U.S. European Command with advice, guidance, and assistance toward fulfilling its mission.
<u>U.S. Joint Forces Command Transformation Advisory Group (TAG)</u>	Discretionary	Provides timely advice on scientific, technical, intelligence, and policy-related issues to the Commander, USJFCOM, during the development of the nation's joint warfighting concepts to provide joint forces and capabilities, improve joint warfighting capabilities, transform the joint force, and improve internal command processes.
<u>US. Military Academy Board of Visitors</u>	Statutory	Inquires into the morale and discipline, the curriculum, instruction, physical equipment, fiscal affairs, academic methods, and other matters relating to the Academy that the Board decides to consider.
<u>US. Naval Academy Board of Visitors</u>	Statutory	Inquires into the state of morale and discipline, the curriculum, instruction, physical equipment, fiscal affairs, academic methods, and other matters relating to the Naval Academy that the Board decides to consider, and, within 60 days of its annual meeting, submits its findings and recommendation to the President of the United States.



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

MAY 26 2004

333

Admiral James O. Ellis, Jr., USN
Commander, USSTRATCOM
901 SAC Boulevard, Suite 2A1
Offutt AFB, NE 68113-6000

Dear Jim,

Let me know the dates you are thinking of Santa Fe and Taos, and I will block them out. As you can see, both places have two bedrooms, so it is all available.

Regards,

26 May 04

OSD 07776-04

May 25, 2004



333

TO: Valerie
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: New Mexico

Valerie—

Admiral Ellis and his wife and another couple, his wife's brother and his wife, would like to use the house in Santa Fe sometime in the third or fourth week of July, I think, and possibly go up and stay in Taos at Valdez for a day or too as well. I will give you a heads up as soon as I know the dates they are thinking of.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
052504-4

25 MAY 04

OSD 07776-04

26 May 04

FAXED
an 5/25

PB
MAY 10 2004

DA
5/25

ACTION MEMO

I-04/004202-ES
USDP 3074/1001
EF-9059 14 5/14

FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Peter W. Rodman, Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) *2004* 10 MAY 2004

SUBJECT: Tunisian Offer to Assist in Iraq

- You asked about exploring Tunisia's offer to help in Iraq.
- ISA-NESA investigated CENTCOM's current requirements and explored the matter more fully with the Country Team. The Country Team met with the Tunisians who said they had several requirements before participating in Iraq:
 - Another UN resolution.
 - An invitation from the UN to send troops.
 - Other Arab nations' involvement.
- They also said Tunisian forces for Iraq would come from their existing mission in the Congo.
- Possible Tunisian contributions would include an MP guard company or medical logistics company.

TUNISIA

10 May 04

RECOMMENDATION: That we explore other Arab contributions and then approach the Tunisians again in the context of a new UNSCR and UN mandate.

SECDEF DECISION

Agree *DA* Disagree _____ Other _____

COORDINATION: Joint Staff (J-5), OSD-Coalition Support, AMEMBASSY Tunisia.

Prepared by LCDR Youssef Aboul-Enein, USN, ISA-NESA (b)(6)

DUSD (NESA) *Y. Abuly 5/10* PDASD (ISA) *H/S*

29 May 04

In reply refer to EF-9059 and 04/004202

29
March 24, 2004

TO: Doug Feith
CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz

LETTER DI FIRM
5/24
Sealy

SUBJECT: Tunisia

The Tunisian MoD said that Tunisia wants to help in the reconstruction of Iraq.
Let's **get** them **engaged**.

Let's ask **them** to help with his neighbors. He **is** a good man.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
032404-29

.....
Please respond by 4/16/04

(Handwritten signature/initials in a circle)

Sir,
@ 5/24
Response attached.
vr/cdr Nosenko
5/24

TUNISIA

29 March

720
SECRET

May 20, 2004

2004 MAY 26 PM 12:37

TO: Ray DuBois
CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith
Pete Geren

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Elevating Issues

Please talk to Jim Roche and find out what the Air Force system is to elevate issues.

Then come up with a proposal as to how we can implement that throughout the entire Department. I would like a first cut at it done within the next four days.

Thanks.

DHR:db
052004-24

.....
Please respond by 5/26/04

OSD 07803-04

11-L-0559/OSD/41464

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT

OSD 07805-04

This is
being
reworked
pursuant to
Secret guidance
at Aven/Marple
meeting

Paul Butler
4/14

080

2 Jun 04

20 May 04

310
1730



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

1950 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1950

ACTION MEMO

June 2, 2004, 10:00 AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec Action _____

FROM: Raymond F. DuBois, Director, Administration and Management

SUBJECT: *RF DuBois*
Handling of Reports from the International Committee of the Red Cross

- In the attached snowflake you asked that we establish a system for receiving, memorializing, and elevating oral and written reports from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). *(snowflake next under)*
- The memo at TAB A establishes a process for receiving and promptly elevating oral or written ICRC reports. To ensure expedited action, we propose the subordinate command immediately notify the appropriate Combatant Commander, who shall be responsible for rendering a preliminary evaluation of the issue and forwarding the report to the USD(P) with an information copy to the Director, Joint Staff.
- ICRC reports received from the interagency, or received directly from the ICRC by OSD or Military Department officials will be promptly delivered to the USD(P) for action. The USD(P) will develop and coordinate a course of action unless a particular issue requires others to lead the action, for example, the DoD General Counsel for a legal matter. *Those ICRC actions with special significance will be forwarded to you.*
- Policy on the DoD Enemy POW Detainee Program is published in a DoD directive under the oversight of the USD(P). Guidance on the reporting of communications from the ICRC exists in a multi-service regulation published by the Secretary of the Army, who is the designated DoD Executive Agent for the DoD Enemy POW Detainee Program. These documents should reflect the new procedures amplifying and expediting, to your attention, reports of communications from the ICRC. Accordingly, we believe that the USD(P) should update DoD Directive 23 10.1 and the Secretary of the Army should update AR 190-8 to incorporate the reporting requirements addressed in the memo at TAB A.

APPROVE _____ DISAPPROVE ✓ OTHER _____

RECOMMENDATION: *Sign the memo at TAB A.*

JUN 14 2004

COORDINATION: TAB B

Attachments
As stated

Prepared By: Bob Menig, (b)(6)

TSA SD	618
SA DSD	
SRMA DSD	
EXEC SEC	6/3/04

USD 07805-04

May 20, 2004

TO: Ray DuBois

CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith
Pete Geren

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: ICRC and Human Rights Reporting

Please fashion a system throughout the Department of Defense whereby any oral input from the International Committee of the Red Cross is memorialized in a memorandum, and any written communication from the ICRC or any human rights group is elevated to at least the next two levels of authority above where the reports are submitted.

We need to get a Department-wide fix on this fast. Please do this in the next four days and make an 80 percent proposal to me.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
052004-26

.....
Please respond by 5/26/04

OSD 07805-04

11-L-0559/OSD/41467

DSD 07805-04



SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
UNDER SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
ADMINISTRATOR OF THE COALITION PROVISIONAL
AUTHORITY
COMMANDERS OF THE COMBATANT COMMANDS
ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE
DIRECTOR, OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION
INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE
ASSISTANTS TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DIRECTOR, ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT
DIRECTOR, PROGRAM ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION
DIRECTOR, NET ASSESSMENT
DIRECTOR, FORCE TRANSFORMATION
DIRECTORS OF THE DEFENSE AGENCIES
DIRECTORS OF THE DOD FIELD ACTIVITIES

SUBJECT: Handling of Reports from the International Committee of the Red Cross

Prompt evaluation and transmission of reports from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to senior DoD leaders is of the utmost importance. Recognizing that information may be reported at various command levels and in oral or written form, Combatant Commanders, OSD Principal Staff Assistants and the Heads of the other DoD Components shall take the following actions:

- Field commanders shall be instructed to forward all reports received at their level to the Combatant Commander without delay. Oral reports shall be transcribed in an appropriate written format.
- Combatant commanders shall conduct a preliminary evaluation to determine (1) the accuracy of the concerns raised, (2) actions and schedule proposed to resolve the concerns, and (3) the potential effects on DoD operations and broader U.S. security objectives. Timeframe: Within five days of receipt.
- Combatant Commanders shall forward this assessment, along with the ICRC report or communications summary, to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)) with an information copy to the Director, Joint Staff. The subject of such actions shall be identified as "ICRC Communication."



11-L-0559/OSD/41468

- The USD(P) in coordination with the DoD Executive Secretary shall ensure ICRC Communication reports are distributed to the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, the DoD General Counsel, and as appropriate, the Secretaries of the Military Departments. Timeframe: Within 24 hours of receipt.
- The USD(P) shall be the DoD lead for such actions unless, upon review by the Deputy Secretary, special circumstances require the DoD lead to be assigned elsewhere. The USD(P) shall develop a course of action and coordinate it with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the DoD General Counsel, and as appropriate, the Secretaries of the Military Departments, the Assistant Secretaries of Defense for Public Affairs and Legislative Affairs, and other OSD officials. The USD(P) shall forward those actions with special significance to the Secretary of Defense. Timeframe: Within five days of receipt.
- ICRC communications received by OSD or Military Department officials from the interagency, or directly from the ICRC shall be immediately forwarded to the DoD Executive Secretary who shall provide the report to the USD(P) for action and shall make distribution as specified above.

All ICRC communications shall be marked with the following statement: "ICRC communications are provided to DoD as confidential restricted use documents. As such, they will be safeguarded the same as CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN information using NODIS channels. Dissemination of ICRC communications outside of DoD is not authorized without the approval of the Secretary of Defense."

These procedures are effective immediately. Pertinent DoD issuances and Army Regulation (AR) **190-8, *Enemy Prisoners of War, Retained Personnel, Civilian Internees and Other Detainees***, the multi-service regulation issued by the Secretary of the Army, who serves as the DoD Executive Agent for the DoD Enemy POW Detainee Program, shall be revised to incorporate these procedures for the reporting of ICRC communications.

Your compliance with the procedures in this memorandum and in regulation is a matter of DoD policy and is essential to enabling the Department to meet its responsibilities and obligations for the humane care and full accountability for all persons captured or detained throughout the range of military operations.

Organization	Official	Date Coordinated
Secretary of the Army	R. L. Brownlee	May 28,2004
CJCS	MG Michael Maples	June 2,2004
USD(P)	Ryan Henry	May 28,2004
USD(I)	Stephen A. Cambone	June 1,2004
General Counsel	William J. Haynes	June 1,2004
ASD(PA)	No response	
ASD(LA)	Powell Moore	May 28,2004
Exec Sec	William P. Marriott	May 28,2004



**Office of the Secretary of Defense
Directorate for
Administration & Management**

2 June 2004

TO: Deputy Secretary of Defense
Acting Secretary of the *Army*
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of **Staff**
USD (Policy)
USD (Intelligence)
ASD (Legislative Affairs)
ASD (Public Affairs)
General Counsel, DoD
Special Assistant to the SecDef (Pete Geren)
Vice Director, Joint Staff
Executive Secretary of the DoD

FROM: Director, Administration & Management

RE: Handling of Reports from the International Committee
of the Red Cross

Gentlemen:

I handed this memo to the Secretary after this morning's

"Detainee" meeting. **He said he would read and let me know.**

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Ray D. Smith".

cc: Director, ES&CD, WHS

11-L-0559/OSD/41471

WASHINGTON HEADQUARTERS SERVICES
CORRESPONDENCE CONTROL DIVISION

2/26/04

MEMORANDUM FOR *ADN*

Your proposed signature item is returned for the following reason(s) indicated below. Please correct and return to the Correspondence Control Division, 3A-948 for processing.

_____ Coordination by: _____

(Note: Coordination must be at the Principal Deputy level or higher.)

_____ Copy requirements. Please furnish the original and one copy, complete with all enclosures, attachments, and tabs.

_____ Envelope(s). Envelopes are required for all addressees outside of the Pentagon.

_____ **An** original message version is required. See Administrative Instruction No. 7, paragraph 5.21. Message will be transmitted by the OSD Cables Division upon signature by the SD/DSD.

Other: *See example attached for correct order of addresses. Coordination sheet is blank.*

ESCD - Pat,

Patrick Gordon
Patrick Gordon
CCD, (b)(6)

See the attached example, I followed!

Bob Mering 😊



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, DC 20301

JAN 28 2004

Administration & Management

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
 UNDER SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
 ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
 GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
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 DIRECTOR, NET ASSESSMENT
 DIRECTOR, FORCE TRANSFORMATION
 DIRECTORS OF THE DEFENSE AGENCIES
 DIRECTORS OF THE DOD FIELD ACTIVITIES

312

SUBJECT: Listing of Addressees and Addressing DoD Memorandums

The addressee section of *this* memorandum shows the correct format for organizational titles and the complete order of listing for multiple-addressee memorandums. Normally, a complete listing will not be necessary, but the titles should be used in the order shown for any memorandum directed to two or more addressees.

28 Jan 04

For multiple-addressee and distribution purposes, the following officials are included within the title indicated above:

(1) Under Secretaries of Defense include: Under **Secretary** of Defense for Acquisition, **Technology** and Logistics; Under Secretary of Defense for Policy; Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer; Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness; and Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence.

(2) Assistant Secretaries of Defense include: Health **Affairs**; Homeland Defense; International Security Affairs; International Security Policy; Legislative Affairs; Networks and Information Integration/DoD CIO; Public Affairs; Reserve **Affairs**; and Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict.

(3) Assistants to the Secretary of Defense include: the **Assistant** to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Chemical and Biological Defense Programs; Special Assistants to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense; the **Executive** Secretary of the Department of Defense; the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Intelligence Oversight); Representative and Executive Director for the Coalition Provisional Authority; the Defense Advisor, U.S. Mission to NATO; and other assistants as may be designated from time to time by the **Secretary** or Deputy Secretary of Defense.

28 Jan 04

OSD 01278-04

11-L-0559/OSD/41473

SECRET
2004 MAY 26 08:10:37

May 20, 2004

TO: Ray DuBois

CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith
Pete Geren

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: ICRC and Human Rights Reporting

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Thanks.

DHR:dh
052004-26

.....
Please respond by 5/26/04

OSD 07805-04

11-L-0559/OSD/41474

28
May 26, 2004

TO: Doug Feith
CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: France

FRANCE

Please see if you can fix this issue that Colin Powell sent me. If you cannot, please let me know today.

Thanks.

Attach.
5/26/04 SecState memo to SecDef

DHR:dh
052604-16

.....
Please respond by _____

Completed
by
Doug Feith

see attached!

28 May 04

26 May 04

cc. Craddock
Butler

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

26/5

To Don Rumsfeld

On the eve of
President Bush's visit
to Normandy and as
I try to get French
support for UN
resolutions, this
seems petty and
counterproductive.

11-L-0559/OSD/41476

07832-04

Kelly, Craig

From: [REDACTED]
Sent: Wednesday, May 26, 2004 8:42 AM
To: [REDACTED]
Subject: [REDACTED]

5

[REDACTED]

Amb. Leach asked that we let the Secretary know of the **latest** incident involving OSD and **the** French. **We** learned today that Gen. Nyland, Assistant Marine Commandant, who **is** coming to France to **preside** at a **Memorial Day** event at one of our cemeteries, has been limited by Doug Feith to a 15 minute, non-substantive meeting **with the French Army/Marine** Chief of Staff.

refused Nyland perm

es: no more

(Nyland's staff is actually clocking the meeting) **and the** only authorized topic of discussion **is** pleasantries about **the** Normandy commemoration.

4526

MAY 26 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Douglas J. Feith, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy *DFD 5/26/04*

SUBJECT: General Nyland's Visit in France

The email that Colin forwarded to you on General Nyland's visit to France reminds me of the famous comment: "every word was wrong, including 'and' and 'the.'" No one imposed "ground rules" or "instructions" on General Nyland's visit. I never suggested (let alone mandated) a time or topic limitation.

France

I have now straightened this out with Colin by telephone. He knows that the email is thoroughly false.

What actually happened:

- General Nyland asked to talk with me about his trip.
- We met on April 21, 2004. I described your views on allied cooperation and US-French relations.
- I noted that you like to extend special privilege (e.g., access to restricted policy discussions) to especially cooperative allies, but DOD wants to have polite and proper relations with the French.
- As his trip is for a commemorative ceremony and General Nyland described his meeting with the French Army Chief as a courtesy call, I told him I saw no problems at all with his visit.

26 May 04

The email transmitted by Colin is full of misunderstandings that must have arisen after General Nyland and I ended our harmonious and relaxed meeting together.

Today, I confirmed with General Nyland that the foregoing is accurate.

26 May 04

Tom - I don't believe 216 C had an opportunity to read this. Thanks C 5/27

May 26, 2004

350.001

TO: President George W. Bush

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT: Paper by George Shultz

Mr. President—

Attached is a very good paper by George Shultz, which he delivered in San Francisco on May 17. He has some excellent thoughts here, which I think might be interesting to you as you prepare for your future leadership speeches.

George Shultz is a good one to talk to from time to time, when you have a moment.

Respectfully,

Attach.

Shultz, George. "The Road Ahead," May 17, 2004.

DHR:dh
052604-7

OSD 07856-04

26 May 04

THE ROAD AHEAD
The Marines' Memorial Club, The Commonwealth Club,
and The World Affairs Council

San Francisco
May 17, 2004

George P. Shultz

The Marines, The Commonwealth Club, and The World Affairs Council. The Marines: a fighting outfit with a clear approach – “No better friend, no worse enemy” – now fighting our country’s battles in Afghanistan and Iraq. The Commonwealth Club and The World Affairs Council: among the great forums in our country, with over 100 years of experience in helping citizens sort through central issues of our times. I am honored to be a member of all three.

I am proud to be a Marine. I am proud of our Marines: their fighting capacity, their will to win, their readiness to be genuinely helpful friends to all those people in Iraq and Afghanistan who seek a peaceful and constructive future. The Marines provide just the kind of strength linked to a helpful attitude that is needed. So, hats off to the Marines.

Now, in the spirit of The Commonwealth Club and The World Affairs Council, and against the background of Marine strength, let me turn to the road ahead. What is going on in the world? Where do we go from here? The answer to the first question is the key to the second, to the formation and carrying out of a comprehensive and effective American strategy.

We Are at War

We have struggled with what we have called terrorism for a long time, without quite realizing the nature of the threat. In the Reagan administration, I was a hawk on the subject. I said terrorism is a big problem, a different problem, and we have to take forceful action against it. Fortunately, Ronald Reagan agreed with me, but not many others did. (Don Rumsfeld was an outspoken exception.)

In those days we focused on how to defend against terrorism. We reinforced our embassies and increased our intelligence effort. We thought we made some progress. We established the legal basis for holding states responsible for using terrorists to attack Americans anywhere. Through intelligence, we did abort many potential terrorist acts. But we didn't really understand what motivated the terrorists or what they were out to do.

In the 1990s, the problem began to appear even more menacing. Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda were well known, but the nature of the threat was not yet comprehended and our efforts to combat it were ineffective. Diplomacy without much force was tried. Terrorism was regarded as a law enforcement problem and terrorists as criminals. Some were arrested and put on trial. Early last year, a judge finally allowed the verdict to stand for one of those convicted in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. Ten years! Terrorism is not a matter that can be left to law enforcement alone, with its deliberative process, built-in delays, and safeguards that may let the prisoner go free on procedural grounds.

Today, looking back on the past quarter century of terrorism, we can see that it is the method of choice of an extensive, internationally connected ideological movement dedicated to the destruction of our international system of cooperation and progress.

The movement is not centrally controlled, but is an effectively coordinated loose global network. We can see that the 1981 assassination of President Sadat, the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center, the 2001 destruction of the Twin Towers, and scores of other terrorist attacks in between and in many countries, were carried out by one part or another of this movement. And the movement is connected to states that develop awesome weaponry, with some of it, or with expertise, for sale.

The intellectual and political leaders of this movement have made their objectives perfectly clear in volumes of materials produced over recent decades. The movement's objectives are in four layers or phases:

- (1) to drive the international community's people and influences out of the Middle East (the core of the Muslim world);
- (2) to overthrow all Arab regimes that are in a working relationship with the international community;
- (3) to gain a more entrenched and threatening foothold on the edges of the Muslim world (Southeast Asia, sub-Saharan Africa, Central Asia) and inside the Western world (Europe); and
- (4) eventually to eliminate all vestiges of the international state system from a unified Islamic theocratic rule.

So we see how deadly opposed the Islamic terrorists are to the international state system. Our commitment to that system may account in part for the apparent lack of comprehension within the international community about the nature or even the existence of this war and a reluctance to acknowledge or discuss the religious dimension of what is now going on in the world.

The basic assumption of the international state system is that all peoples, organized as states, will be in or want to be in, the system. Conflict and war, it is also assumed, will take place between states in the system (e.g., France versus Germany) and not against the system itself. So the foundational attitude of our side is not in accord with the current reality.

So, from a security standpoint, what is going on in the world? The international state system is under determined attack by a religiously motivated movement using terrorist attacks of dramatic lethality as its weapon of choice. The war is against this movement, not just the weapon of terror.

What Should We Do?

First and foremost, shore up the state system.

The world has worked for three centuries with the sovereign state as the basic operating entity, presumably accountable to its citizens and responsible for their well-being. In this system, states also interact with each other – bilaterally or multilaterally – to accomplish ends that transcend their borders. They create international organizations to serve their ends, not govern them.

Increasingly, the state system has been eroding. Terrorists have exploited this weakness by burrowing into the state system in order to attack it. While the state system weakens, no replacement is in sight that can perform the essential functions of establishing an orderly and lawful society, protecting essential freedoms, providing a framework for fruitful economic activity, contributing to effective international cooperation, and providing for the common defense.

Over the last decade we have seen large areas of the world where there is no longer any state authority at all, an ideal environment for terrorists to plan and train. In the early 1990s we came to realize the significance of a "failed state." Earlier, people allowed themselves to think that, for example, an African colony could gain its independence, be admitted to the UN as a member state, and thereafter remain a sovereign state. Then came Somalia. All government disappeared. No more sovereignty, no more state. The same was true in Afghanistan. And who took over? Islamic extremists. They soon made it clear that they regarded the concept of the state as an abomination. To them, the very idea of "the state" is un-Islamic. They talk about reviving traditional forms of pan-Islamic rule with no place for the state. They are fundamentally, and violently, opposed to the way the world works, to the international state system.

The United States launched a military campaign to eliminate the Taliban and al-Qaeda's rule over Afghanistan. Now we and our allies are trying to help Afghanistan become a real state again and a viable member of the international state system. Yet there are many other parts of the world where state authority has collapsed or, within some states, large areas where the state's authority does not run.

That's one area of danger: places where the state has vanished. A second area of danger is found in places where the state has been taken over by criminals, gangsters, or warlords. Saddam Hussein was one example. Kim Jong-Il of North Korea is another.

They seize control of state power and use that power to enhance their wealth, consolidate their rule, and develop their weaponry. As they do this, and as they violate the laws and principles of the international system, they at the same time claim its

privileges and immunities, such as the principle of non-intervention into the internal affairs of a legitimate sovereign state. For decades these thugs have gotten away with it. And the leading nations of the world have let them get away with it.

This is why the case of Saddam Hussein and Iraq is so significant, and why the war against Saddam's Iraq was necessary. Above all, and in the long run, the most important aspect of the Iraq war will be what it means for the integrity of the international system and for the effort to deal effectively with terrorism. The stakes are huge and the terrorists know that as well as we do. That is the reason for their tactic of violence in Iraq. And that is why, for us and for our allies, failure is not an option. The message is that the U.S. and others in the world who recognize the need to sustain our international system will no longer quietly acquiesce in the take-over of states by lawless dictators who then carry on their depredations – including the development of awesome weapons for threats, use, or sale – behind the shield of protection that statehood provides. If you are one of these criminals in charge of a state, you no longer should expect to be allowed to be inside the system at the same time that you are a deadly enemy of it.

North Korea is such a case. The circumstances do not parallel those of Iraq, so our approach is adjusted accordingly. China, Japan, Russia and South Korea must man laboring oars. One way or another, that regime will undergo radical change or will come to an end.

Iran is another very different case, being at one and the same time an outlaw state, an Islamist enemy of the international state system, a destabilizing presence in the Gulf region, and a supporter of terrorism to stop a two-state solution for Israel and Palestine. In some sense, the future of Iran is tied to the issue of our success in Iraq. The Iraqi Shia

inclination to keep its religious hierarchy unsullied by direct involvement in politics and government could be used to draw Iran's theocracy in the same direction. Through deft policy management, the U.S. should stand unambiguously on the side of the Iranian people who want to be rid of their mullah rulers, while pressuring the theocrats to abandon their efforts to dictate every aspect of Iranian society.

But make no mistake. The crucial battle is now joined in Iraq. Were we to falter or fail in Iraq, the entire Middle East would be severely threatened and war on a world scale would have only begun.

The Middle East

The Middle East is an area where governance has failed. In many countries, oil has produced wealth without the effort that connects people to reality, a problem reinforced in some of them by the fact that the hard physical work is often done by imported labor. The submissive role forced on women has led to a huge population explosion. Generations of young people have grown up in these societies with a surplus of time on their hands and a deficit of productive and honorable occupations. Since they are disconnected from reality, they can live in a world of fantasy. Denied opportunity, many have turned to a destructive, terror-using ideology. Islamism is the name most specialists have settled on. Yet these young people can see on their TV screens that a better life is possible in a great many places in the world. Whether or not they like what they see, their frustration is immense. As a result, the Middle East has produced all too many religious radicals who for years have been waging war against the international state system.

Many Muslim regimes in the Middle East have finally realized that the radical variant of Islam is violently opposed to the modern age, to globalization, to secular governance and to those Muslim regimes themselves, their primary target. Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Pakistan top the target list. Years ago these regimes, and others, began a frantic search for ways to deflect the threat. Some tried to co-opt the Islamists into their governments. Some paid extortion money. Some pushed the Islamists into other countries and then subsidized them. Some of them pumped out huge volumes of propaganda to incite the Islamists to turn their attention from the "near enemy," such as Saudi Arabia, to the "far enemy," Israel and the United States. Some of these targeted regimes tried all these defensive tactics in an attempt to buy time.

Since September 11, 2001, some of these Muslim regimes have begun to realize that this approach is a loser; it only strengthens their Islamist enemies, who, in recent months, have begun to turn against them directly.

So increasingly, those regimes in the Arab-Islamic world, however much they may have appeased, bought out, or propagandized the terrorists, have nonetheless now had a reality check. They have recognized that they are members of the international system of states and must find a way to reconcile their Islamic beliefs and practices to it. Saudi Arabia and others in the world of Islam must, in their own interests, recognize their own responsibility to stop the preaching of hate and to reform their societies. Young people must have access to the world of opportunity. Women must be free to play substantial roles in their societies.

Use Less Oil

Our strength and our security are vitally affected by our dependence on oil coming from other countries and by the dependence of the world economy on oil from the most unstable part of the world; the Middle East. Presidents from Eisenhower on have called for energy independence. Ike, no stranger to issues of national security, thought that if foreign oil were more than 20 percent of our consumption, we were headed for trouble. The number is now pushing 60 percent and rising. What would be the impact of terrorist sabotage of key elements of the Saudi pipeline infrastructure? Or of a takeover by Islamic extremists?

I remember proposals for alternatives to oil from the time of the first big oil crisis in 1973. Pie in the sky, I thought. But now the situation is different.

Hybrid technology is on the road and increases gas mileage by at least 50 percent. Increased attention to weight and drag can enhance performance even more. The technology is scaleable. Sequestration of effluent from use of coal may be possible. Maybe coal could be a benign source of hydrogen. Maybe hydrogen could be economically split out of water by electrolysis, perhaps using renewables such as wind power. An economy with a major hydrogen component would do wonders for both our security and our environment. With evident improvements in fuel cells, that combination could amount to a very big deal. Applications include stationary as well as mobile possibilities. And major advances are evident in the effort to turn sunlight into electricity. So all this may take time, but work now on the possibilities. Other ideas are in the air. Scientists, technologists, and commercial organizations in other countries are hard at work on these issues. The administration is coordinating potentially significant

developments. We should not be put off by experts who are forever saying that the possible is improbable. Scientific advance in recent decades is a tribute to and validation of creative possibilities. Bet on them all. Sometimes long odds win.

Now is the time to push hard on research and development with augmented funds directed at identified targets such as sequestration, electrolysis, and fuel cells, and other money going to competent scientists with ideas about energy. You never know what bright people will come up with when resources and enthusiasm combine. We can enhance America's security and simultaneously improve our environment.

Israel and the Palestinians

We must take our long-standing role in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to a new and deeper level, also because of a renewed recognition of the importance of the state.

In 1979 Egypt and Israel recognized each other as legitimate states and signed a treaty of peace. At that time Egypt took on the role of state negotiator with Israel on behalf of the Palestinians, who did not have a state. This was in recognition that states can make peace only with other states within the context of the international state system.

But after Islamists murdered President Sadat, Egypt dropped its role as state negotiator. Jordan took up that role, but dropped it in 1988. Since that time the negotiations have not made serious progress, despite some apparent high points, because there has been no state partner to sit across the table from the State of Israel.

But now the picture has some new possibilities. Yes, optimists should stand aside, but fatalists should, too. You do not work on probabilities in this area, just possibilities. But work we must – and with energy and timing – since the issues involved are vital in this dangerous world.

What are the possibilities? There are far more in evidence than is commonly assumed.

Security for the state of Israel is clearly an essential for fruitful negotiations. So far, nothing has worked. Those who seek to eliminate Israel have regarded efforts at Oslo or Camp David II and elsewhere as proof that terrorism works, and that every Israeli step toward peace is really a sign of weakness.

Now a security barrier is under construction. Israel has stated that its path can be changed in the event of a negotiation. Israel, with all the related turmoil, seems ready to pull back some settlements beyond the new barrier, as in Gaza. If Israel, through these measures, gains security in its land, that will be a major step toward peace. Once again, Israel will have demonstrated that it cannot be beaten militarily, this time by terrorist violence. The confirmation of this fact is essential. And, when Palestinians face the fact that terrorism has become both ineffective and self-destructive, that realization may enable them to take a major step toward peace.

Don't forget that for the first time in the history of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, important Arab states have stated a willingness to promote peace between Israel and Palestine. Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Jordan are the keystones of this structure. And remember the important initiative of Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia. Under his initiative, in the event that a peace agreement is reached between the state of Israel and a state of Palestine, the Arab League states would recognize Israel as a permanent, legitimate state in the Middle East and in the international state system.

And there is a "road map" to work from. This document spells out the general directions for progress toward an Israeli-Palestinian peace. No document since the

founding text of the peace process – the 1967 U.N. Security Council Resolution 242 – has had such wide, even if tentative, international support. Israelis and Palestinians, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and the “quartet” – the United States, the European Union, Russia, and the United Nations – all have indicated willingness to take this road map as a working paper of the parties to the conflict, and of the leading nations and organizations of the international state system itself. Israel's withdrawal from Gaza should be seen as a major step along the road map.

This approach incorporates a way to fix the negotiating problems of the past twenty years. It provides for the establishment of a Palestinian State, not at the end of the negotiations, but in the midst of the effort. Of course, there is much more to making a state than an announcement. But a structure of governance can be established and, if the states of Egypt and Jordan will help, violence can be suppressed and the emerging state can control the use of force. Then there would be a Palestinian state partner for the State of Israel to negotiate with. The Palestinians charged with governance will have more leverage, and the Israelis will have more confidence that their negotiating partner can deliver on the deal that is made – because it will be a state-to-state deal. Put some projects in the mix, about water, for example, to energize those Palestinians who yearn for peace and a chance for a better life. Help them take the play from extremists so that their state has a chance for decent governance. Who knows, just maybe, possibility could become probability and then a new reality.

Additional Steps

I see our great task as restoring the vitality of the state system within the framework of a world of opportunity and with aspirations for a world of states that recognize accountability for human freedom and dignity.

All established states should stand up to their responsibilities in the fight against our common enemy, be a helpful partner in economic and political development, and take care that international organizations work for their member states, not the other way around. When they do, they deserve respect and help to make them work successfully.

International organizations are mechanisms created by the member states – historically with the United States in the lead – to serve the interests of the states as directed by them. Most notable among these institutions is the United Nations. At present, the U.N. has not grasped the fact that it, too, is a target of those making war on the international state system. The U.N. came into Iraq in the summer of 2003 in the belief that its role was to be a neutral facilitator of postwar arrangements to be worked out between the occupying power (the United States) and the defeated Iraqi state. U.N. leaders had not understood the meaning of the revelation at the time of the first terrorist attack on the World Trade Center, in 1993, that the U.N. Secretariat was the terrorists' secondary target. In August 2003, the U.N. headquarters in Baghdad, basically unguarded at the insistence of the U.N., was destroyed. In May 2004, Osama bin Laden offered a reward for the assassination of Secretary General Kofi Annan.

The United States should undertake an intensive effort to bring the U.N. toward a recognition of the new reality and to work with the U.N. in Iraq to bolster its efforts to

create through elections a re-legitimized Iraq that can qualify for full participation in the international state system.

International law is another pillar of the international system and, once again, a product of American leadership through most of the twentieth century. But international law was damaged during the cold war by the Soviet Union's ideological rejection of it, and by its disparagement by American commentators who felt that U.S. adherence to international law only played into Soviet attempts to manipulate it to our disadvantage.

The post-cold war decade of the 1990s did further harm to international law by permitting the production of deeply flawed, politicized negotiated texts such as the Kyoto Accord on climate change and the International Criminal Court. The United States was correct in turning away from these documents as the twenty-first century opened. Now, however, with the international system in jeopardy, the United States should initiate a comprehensive review of the status of international law and begin work to shore up its foundations, curb its excesses, and advance it in responsible, well-grounded ways.

Norms are an essential feature of the international state system and, as enshrined in documents open for signature by states – such as the Universal Declaration on Human Rights and the Genocide Convention – they make up a kind of “standard of civilization” to which members of the system can expect to be held. As with other features of the system, there is the assumption of universal applicability, that everybody either is in, or wants to be in, the international system. The current case of prisoner abuse in Iraq is, in microcosm, an example of the conundrum now facing those responsible for upholding and protecting the international system. The Geneva Conventions are based on the assumption that wars will be waged between two member states of the system, and by

professional armed forces. Prisoners taken in battle may be held until the end of the conflict and then returned to the formerly belligerent state parties. During detention the professional soldier prisoners are required only to give "name, rank, and serial number." But those waging war on the international system today are not professional soldiers of a legitimate sovereign state and, if the system is to have integrity, its privileges and immunities should not be given to those who would destroy it. While the ban on prisoner interrogation under the Geneva Conventions should not automatically be provided to "unlawful combatants" who conduct terrorist attacks against civilians as a matter of policy, they nevertheless are clearly covered by conventions involving torture. The situation, however, cannot be left as it is. The United States should inaugurate a review and study of how to handle fundamental incompatibilities that arise when a system designed to regulate itself encounters an enemy dedicated to its destruction.

Just as membership in the international state system entails professional armed services, so also does it require a professional diplomatic and foreign service. Recent decades have revealed a growing imbalance between the two in the role of the United States in the world. The Foreign Service has been allowed to deteriorate. The terms of service have worsened. The structure of the career has been truncated and distorted. The best young people have been told to put off seeking entrance even as the best veterans have been hurried out of the corps. Political appointees – a necessary and welcome part of the service – have encroached too far into the most professional sectors. Secretary of State Colin Powell has turned these trends around, but there is much more work to do. In the terrorist war being waged today, diplomacy – as is always the case – should be our first line of defense, the forward presence where national interest and security and justice

for, and within, the international system may be advanced without a wider war. So a professional, well-managed American diplomacy must be a top priority. We need more representation around the globe. Just as there is no substitute for boots on the ground, there is no substitute for eyes and ears to help us understand and deal with global developments.

We need to remind ourselves and our partners of an ancient message: the Great Seal of our Republic carries that message, as clear and relevant to these times as to our early days. The central figure is an eagle holding in one talon an olive branch and in the other, thirteen arrows. As President Harry Truman insisted at the end of World War II, the eagle will always face the olive branch to show that the United States will always seek peace. But the eagle will forever hold onto the arrows to show that, to be effective in seeking peace, you must have strength and the willingness to use it.

Strength and diplomacy: they go together. They are not alternatives; they are complements. Both must be developed at the highest professional level and used in a coordinated fashion.

In 1917, a few months after the United States declared that it would enter the First World War, President Woodrow Wilson organized a group of generalists and specialists knowledgeable across the range of international affairs to prepare an approach for the United States to take when peace was restored. This effort became known as "The Inquiry." Now, in the midst of war, something similar may be needed, suitable for the present situation in which a long war must be fought to preserve the international state system, even as that system must shore itself up from within and build or rebuild institutions for peace even as the conflict continues.

A World of Danger and A World of Opportunity

I cannot emphasize too strongly the danger and extent of the challenge we are facing. We are engaged in a war, a long and bitter war. Our enemies will not simply sit back and watch as we make progress toward prosperity and peace in the world.

The civilized world has a common stake in defeating the enemy. We now call this what it is: a war. In war, you act on both offense and defense. The diplomacy of incentives, containment, deterrence, and prevention, are all made more effective by the demonstrated possibility of forceful preemption. You work diplomacy and strength together on a grand and strategic scale and on an operational and tactical level. This means fighting the war on the ground in Iraq. It means diplomacy around the world and at international organizations. And it means, no less, taking serious steps toward energy independence here at home.

September 11 forced us to comprehend the extent and danger of the challenge. We began to act before our enemy was able to extend and consolidate his network. If we put this in terms of World War II, we are now sometime around 1937. In the 1930s, the world failed to do what it needed to do to head off a world war. Appeasement never works. Today we are in action. We must not flinch. With a powerful interplay of strength and diplomacy, we can win this war.

We and our partners throughout the world can then work and live in a time of immense promise. Scientific and technological advances are breathtaking virtually across the board. The impact on the human condition and human possibilities is profound. New technologies are changing the way we live and work, globalizing access

to an extraordinary range of information. People everywhere can see that economic advance has taken place in countries of every size, with great varieties of ethnic, religious, and cultural histories. So we should not be surprised -- as Freedom House, the Heritage Foundation, and *The Wall Street Journal* carefully document -- that open economic and political systems are becoming more common.

So an unprecedented age of opportunity is ahead, especially for low-income countries long in poverty. The United States and our allies can rally people all over the world. Don't let the terrorists take away our opportunities. We have the winning hand. We must play that hand with skill and confidence.

December 31, 2004

TO: The Honorable Andrew H. Card, Jr.
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Positions Important to DoD

If you could give me a hand, I would appreciate it. The following positions are of enormous importance to the Department of Defense.

- Ambassador to NATO
- Ambassador to Afghanistan
- Ambassador to Iraq
- NID
- Deputy NID
- NCTC
- Deputy NCTC
- Deputy CIA

It would be a big help to me if, when people are being discussed and/or announced for these positions, that I be given an opportunity to talk with you or the President about them before final decisions are made.

Thanks so much.

DHR:as
123004-6 (ts)

230.02

31 Dec 04

~~FOUO~~

December 30, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Q&As

333

I think we ought to have a daily session in preparation for Q&As because they come up fast, and we only have a short time to prepare. I think we ought to have two or three people who ask very tough questions and who help me develop excellent answers. We don't have a big margin for error. I also think we ought to work toward shorter answers. Please see me about this.

Thanks.

DHR:gs
123004-7 (ts)

.....
Please respond by 1/4/04

~~FOUO~~

30 Dec 04

OSD 07921-05

7201
FOUO

Advance copy sent 12:30 am

DEC 30 2004

TO: Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Seminar on Iraq Intelligence

IRAQ

I looked at your paper on Seminar on Iraq Intelligence and I don't think the principals ought to be involved. I think it would change it completely. I think it ought to be below that level, and possibly even below the deputy level.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
122904-16 (ts)

.....
Please respond by 1/13/05

FOUO

30 Dec 04

720
~~FOUO~~

.December30,2004

TO: GenPete Pace
CC: Gen Dick Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld)R
SUBJECT: Assessment Team Charter

334

The assessment team charter has got to get people's eyes off their shoe laces, and up at the horizon. It's got to deal with big issues. Therefore we have to have big people on the assessment team. We don't need to have them come back and say they need a six week training program, instead of a seven week training program. We need a macro lock.

Thanks.

DHR:ms
122904-10 (tu)

.....
Please respond by _____

~~FOUO~~

30 Dec 04

11-L-0559/OSD/41501

OSD 07923-05

t

FOUO

December 24, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.R.*
SUBJECT: Mel Laird

You should add Mel Laird to the list of people who want to be helpful. See the attached note.

Thanks.

Attach.
SecDef note to Mel Laird

DHR:sa
122704-9 (TS)

.....
Please respond by 1/10/04

335 SD

29 Dec 04

FOUO



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

The Honorable Melvin R. Laird
Senior Counselor for National and International Affairs
The Reader's Digest Association, Incorporated
1730 Rhode Island Avenue, NW, Suite 212
Washington, DC 20036

Dear Mel,

Thanks so much for your call. You can certainly be of help. We'll suggest television and talk radio give you a call. And if you want to do an op-ed piece, it would sure ~~make~~ sense. I'll have Larry Di Rita get some materials to you.

With my appreciation and very best wishes for the New Year,

Sincerely,

720
~~FOUO~~

DEC 28 2004

TO: **VADM Jim Stavridis**
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Memo from Josh Bolten

I suppose you can send copies of the memo from Bolten to whomever you want, but the first thing we've got to do is to find out what he's **talking** about on the bottom of page one where it says, "We agreed that our supplemental requests will include **\$5 billion annually** for those purposes." I don't remember **any** agreement on what the supplemental would include.

You should get with Paul Wolfowitz and have him **sort** it out, and see if he made an agreement like that.

Thanks.

Attach.
12/21/04 OMB Dir Memo to SecDef

DHR:ss
122704-18

.....
Please respond by 1/3/05

110.01

FOUO

OSD 07926-05

11-L-0559/OSD/41504

28 Dec 04



EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

08/12/27

THE DIRECTOR

December 21, 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: JOSHUA BOLTEN *JB*
DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET

SUBJECT: DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE FY 2006 BUDGET AND SUPPLEMENTALS

Thank you for your letter of December 15 and memorandum of December 20 regarding the Defense Department's 2006 budget and pending and future supplementals. I thought our discussion yesterday was constructive. After follow-on consultations between our teams, I believe we have arrived at good resolutions that are fully consistent with the President's guidance. I am writing to confirm those understandings:

We are agreed that the 2006 Budget will reflect the cancellations and reductions in significant procurement programs on which you briefed the President yesterday. While I know these were tough choices to make, and will be challenging to implement, I believe they will advance the transformational goals you have pursued, while remaining within topline FY 2006 passback guidance of \$4.93 billion (including an increase for classified programs).

With respect to the five specific issues enumerated in your memorandum:

1. We agreed that, to address requirements for Army modularity and recapitalization of equipment, we will increase topline FY 2007-11 passback guidance by \$5 billion each year. Attached is a table reflecting our understanding of the full FY 2006-11 funding path.
2. You sought relief on funding for certain programs, including the Cooperative Threat Reduction program and activities in Iceland. Providing the requested relief in the FY 2006 Budget does not appear to be consistent with the President's current guidance.
3. We agreed that, prior to funding in the regular FY 2007 Budget, addressing the short-term and urgent needs for acceleration of the Army's modularity and associated equipment recapitalization programs, arising from current wartime intensity, will be handled through supplemental funding requests. We agreed that our supplemental requests will include \$5 billion annually for those purposes.

?

4. You requested consideration of supplemental increases in FY 2005 to accelerate the training and equipping of Afghan security forces and provide support to *other* Coalition partners. I understand that our staffs will make a recommendation on an approach that ensures these priorities are met, and they are now finalizing details to match requirements and resources.

5. You requested consideration of supplemental increases in FY 2005 for Improvised Explosive Device (ED) countermeasures. I understand that, while details of the request are still forthcoming, our staffs will work together to ensure that we include absolutely all necessary funding to protect our troops.

Please let me know if your understanding differs in any way from the above.

Thank you for the skillful and cooperative manner in which you and your Department are addressing our shared budget challenges.

Enclosure

FY06 051

(\$ in billions)

	FY06	FY07	FY08	FY09	FY10	FY11
FY05 President's Guidance	422.7	443.9	465.7	487.7	496.3	509.6
FY06 DOD Passback Guidance	417.6	436.4	455.5	475.1	485.1	495.3
SAP Adjustment	-0.053	-0.053	-0.053	-0.053		
OMB Adjustment	1.8	1.8	2.0	1.9	2.0	2.1
Total FY06 Passback Guidance	419.3	438.1	457.5	476.9	487.1	497.4
Modularity Adjustment		<u>+5</u>	<u>+5</u>	<u>+5</u>	<u>+5</u>	<u>+5</u>
SETTLEMENT	419.3	443.1	462.5	481.9	492.1	502.4

720

~~FOUO~~

DEC 28 2004

TO: VADM Jim Stavridis
cc: *PAUL BUTLER*
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Art Cebrowski

Please draft a note to Art Cebrowski, then return this letter to me and let's talk about it at Roundtable some morning, how we ought to move forward.

Thanks.

Attach.
12/22/04 Letter from A.K. Cebrowski to SecDef

DHR:ss
122704-11

.....
Please respond by 1/7/04

D&D FTB

~~FOUO~~

28 DEC 04

OSD 07927-05

11-L-0559/OSD/41508



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

PH 12/27

FORCE TRANSFORMATION
OFFICE

December 22, 2004

Dear Mr. Secretary,

This letter is to request that I be relieved of my duties as Director, Force Transformation as of 31 January, 2005.

Working under your dedicated leadership in pursuing the President's transformation objectives has been rewarding and professionally satisfying. However, I must step aside due to personal commitments and health issues.

The Office of Force Transformation is successful for several important reasons. First, without your personal strong commitment to leadership of transformation the task would be impossible. Second, we report directly to you and the Deputy, and you allow us to work outside the normal course in an organizational arrangement that protects powerful ideas from bureaucratic tyranny. Finally, we have assembled a small, but talented inter-disciplinary team, both uniformed and civilian. And we have built a virtual team of vast dimensions. While there is much to be done, the accomplishments of the office are what we had hoped from the beginning. For example:

- Transformation is now integral to national strategy and DoD corporate strategy.
- Network-Centric Warfare has emerged across the Department as the theory of war for the information-age and well supported by rigorous analysis.
- The culture is changing. Transformational leadership chairs and research projects have been established across the war colleges and service academies


11-L-0559/OSD/41509

- Powerful new concepts are in prototype or experimentation, including a new business model for space, Sense and Respond Logistics, controlling engagement timelines in urban combat, high speed distributed capabilities for naval forces, redirected energy for both lethal and non-lethal applications, and many others.

Our latest assessment of the Transformation Roadmaps is encouraging. I will provide you with **an** overall strategic transformation appraisal **soon**.

My interest **in** advancing national security policy and the President's transformation agenda is enduring. I hope to be able to continue to contribute in some capacity.

Sincerely,



A. K. Cebrowski

Director, Force Transformation

cc:
Deputy Secretary of Defense

DEC 21 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Harold Burson

Here's a memo from Dick McGraw. What do you think about you putting together a group of people, maybe including Tone, to talk with Harold Burson? And if you think I ought to be there, I will, though my schedule is very full. I think it would be a smart thing to do. Let me know what you think.

Thanks.

Attach.
12/15/04 McGraw Memo to SecDef

DHR:ss
122004-50

.....
Please respond by 1/20/05

000.71 SD

21 Dec 04

Wednesday, 15 December 2004

MEMO TO: SECDEF

FROM: Dick McGraw



SUBJECT: Public Image

Generally speaking, “image” is a reflection of reality. The image one has of the Department of Defense is a result of the perception of the decisions made and actions taken by the Department. Therein lies the rub—perception. To the extent we do or do not adequately inform and educate the American people of our decisions and actions, we color their perceptions. Their perceptions also are colored by whether they agree with our decisions and actions and how others portray those decisions and actions.

I don’t know whether we’re doing an adequate job of informing and educating the American public. A good friend of mine who might have some insight into that question is Harold Burson, retired founder and Chairman of Burson-Marsteller, one of the world’s largest public relations firms and a brilliant thinker. I stay in touch with Harold and he frequently offers to be a sounding board for my ideas or to otherwise help where he can.

You should have lunch with Harold and whomever else you think appropriate in the Department. I would be happy to set it up.

_____ Set it up

_____ Don’t set it up



DEC 21 2004

TO: COL Steve Bucci
CC: Cathy Mainardi
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Phone Call with Tillie Fowler

Please arrange a phone call for me with Tillie Fowler in connection with this note.

Thanks.

Attach.
12/17/04 T. Fowler note to SecDef

DHR:ss
122004-45

.....
Please respond by 12/22/04

000.71 SD

21 Dec 04

DEFENSE POLICY
BOARD

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2100



December 17, 2004

To: Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense**From: Tillie K. Fowler**

Thank you for agreeing to continue to serve as the Secretary of Defense. I hope you are ignoring the McCain diatribes and the Lott comments. There is no one who could take your place at this critical time for our military.

I would like to talk with you at some time about some personnel changes that I think would better serve you. I will be in Florida until January 3.

I hope you and Joyce can get away for the holidays.

2476593_v1

11-L-0559/OSD/41514

December 17, 2004

TO: Fran Harvey
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Paul Ignatius

I ran into Paul Ignatius last night. He is a former Secretary of the Army and also held some other positions here in the Pentagon. We got talking about the armor problem. He told me about things they had done during the Vietnam War. There was a special organization that they stood up to deal with scarce items. They also had a special method to get things moved to the battlefield rapidly -- they called it the "Red Ball Express."

Ignatius mentioned the reality that when the Army does things differently than they had done in the past, they learn that, for example, things wear out differently. He pointed out the reality that the more armor we put on these vehicles, the more the breaks and shock absorbers are going to go, and the vehicles wore out at a rate that was notably different than what was planned for.

Ignatius is a very fine person -- sharp as a tack. I would think you might want to have him in for lunch and hear his ideas, probably sooner rather than later (he lives here in Washington). Let me know after you've had him in.

On a related thought -- inviting in former secretaries of the Army is a good idea. I do it with former secretaries of defense and find it very helpful.

Thanks.

Attach.
Paul Ignatius bio

DHR:ss
121704-4

.....
Please respond by _____

451

19 Dec 04

Paul R. Ignatius

February 1964- December 1964

Paul R. Ignatius was born in Los Angeles, California, in 1920; received a B.A. degree with honors from the University of Southern California, 1942; commissioned lieutenant, U.S. Naval Reserve, 1943, serving until 1946 principally as an aviation ordnance officer aboard the aircraft carrier Manila Bay in the Pacific, and in the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts, Washington, D.C.; received an M.B.A. degree from Harvard University, 1947; served as research assistant and instructor in business administration at Harvard, 1947-1950; founded a management consulting and research firm, Harbridge House, Inc., in Boston, 1950, and served as company vice president and director, 1950-1961; was Assistant Secretary of the Army (Installations and Logistics), 22 May 1961-27 February 1964; was Under Secretary of the Army, 28 February 1964-11 December 1964; Assistant Secretary of Defense (Installations and Logistics), 23 December 1964-31 August 1967; was Secretary of the Navy, 1 September 1967-24 January 1969; was president, The Washington Post Newspaper, and executive vice president, The Washington Post Company, 1 March 1969-31 December 1971; chairman, president, and CEO, Air Transport Association, 1972-1986; chairman, board of trustees, Logistics Management Institute, 1986-1993; is trustee of the George C. Marshall Foundation and member of the Federal City Council and the Washington Institute of Foreign Affairs.



BACK TO FORMER USA PAGE

11-L-0559/OSD/41516

December 16, 2004

TO: David Chu
CC: Gen Dick Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: National Guard

325

The response on Guard realignment doesn't sound right to me. What about rebalancing the way we are?

Thanks.

Attach.
11/30/04 SecDef Memo to USD (P&R) re: Changing Force Structure in Guard

DHR:ss
121604-5



Please respond by _____

16 Dec 04

1743
1600

FOUO

November 30, 2004

NOV 30 2004

TO: David Chu
CC: Gen. Dick Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *TR*
SUBJECT: Changing Force Structure in Guard

Paul Butler

12/14

Please report back to me after you have had that December 3 meeting with Blum on how to change force structure in the National Guard.

Thanks.

Attach.

11/17/04 SecDef memo #1 11704-10, USD (P&R) memo to SecDef #OSD 18887-04

DHR:dh
113004-11

.....
Please respond by 12/9/04

TO Sec Def
Paul Butler

*Sic,
Response attached.*

*v/r
Lt Col Bengyel*

DEC 15 2004

FOUO

OSD 19971-04

11-L-0559/OSD/41518

12/10/00



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000



INFO MEMO

PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

December 10, 2004 - 10:00 AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
FROM: DR. DAVID S. C. CHU, USD (PERSONNEL AND READINESS)
SUBJECT: Guard Realignment — SNOWFLAKE (attached)

- Initial meeting with LTG Blum on December 1st; more work is needed before we can provide you with a plan.
- General Blum has already alerted the state adjutants general (in writing) that future force structure will flow to states with sustained recruiting and retention success, at the expense of states that fall short.
- This is an opportunity to rebalance the Guard, building units of the type we now need, shedding those less necessary.
- We will lay out a plan that plots by state how strength should move, and the numbers and types of new units that should be established. I anticipate forwarding this to you by the end of next week.

RECOMMENDATION: Information Only

Attachment:
As stated

cc: General Myers

MA SD	SMA DSD	R/12/13	
TSA SD	SA DSD	D/14	
EXEC SEC	M/12/13		
ESR MA	K/12/13		

OSD 19971-04



11/18/04

November 17, 2004

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2004 NOV 23 PM 6:31

TO: David Chu
CC: Gen Dick Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR.*
SUBJECT: Virginia National Guard

I understand that the Virginia National Guard is not good. Everywhere I turn, someone tells me they are resigning or that they are not recruiting and so forth.

What do we do about fixing it? Should someone talk with the Governor? Does it need new leadership? What do you propose?

Thanks.

DHR:sh
111704-10

.....
Please respond by 12/17/04

DR 11/20

~~FOUO~~

TOTAL P. 01



PERSONNEL AND READINESS

OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-4000

NOV 23 PM 6:31



INFO MEMO

November 22, 2004 - 15:00

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: David S. C. Chu, USD(P&R)

SUBJECT: Virginia National Guard — SNOWFLAKE (attached)

- The Virginia Army National Guard achieved only 65 percent of its FY 2004 recruiting mission, but 94.8 percent of its strength mission.
- The Virginia Air National Guard is performing better, achieving 98.3 percent of its FY 2004 strength mission.
- Virginia Army National Guard is one of nine that have missed their ARNG recruiting missions for the past four years.
 - o They are: CT, DE, HI, IL, LA, MA, MD, VA and VI.
 - o Overall, the Virginia Army National Guard missed its FY 2004 recruiting mission of 56,002 by 7,209 and its authorized strength of 350,000 by 7,081.
- We have engaged the Guard leadership to look at a rebalancing of structure.
 - o We will meet with LTG Blum and his Directors on December 3 to establish the "way ahead".

Attachment: As stated

Prepared by: Mr. Rich Krimmer, OASD/RA(M&P), (b)(6)

TSA SD	11/29
SRMA SD	
MA SD	2 11/29
EXEC SEC	M 11/24
ESR	ESR 11/24



11/29
Paul Buller
11/29

11/29

December 14, 2004

TO: Dan Dell'Orto
CC: Terry Robbins
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Draft Instrument of Gift

Thanks for the draft Instrument of Gift.

I have the following questions and thoughts.

- 1) It says "residing in Washington, D.C." I think my legal residence is still in Illinois. I ought to talk to Terry to see if I want to use Illinois or Maryland, but I'm pretty sure I won't want to use Washington, D.C.
- 2) On line 5, it refers to the type of papers, but it does not mention "business," unless that's what professional means.
- 3) On the next to the last line, on page 1, it says that I may retain any of the originals of my personal papers and furnish a copy. Does that permit me to do it after digitization, when I have had a chance to look at everything and see what I might like the original of? Or do I need to decide before digitization?
- 4) Page 2, paragraph 1: I would like to discuss what "intellectual property" means, and how you solve that.
- 5) Page 3: I'd like to discuss the fact that it does not transfer title to classified information and how that gets handled.
- 6) Page 3, paragraph 2, line 5: I wonder if we ought to make it ten years.
- 7) Page 3, paragraph 2, Line 7 (under Access): I'd like to discuss those policies.
- 8) Page 3, next to last paragraph: When it mentions those that should be restricted from public access, for what length of time is that, and who makes the judgment?

FOUO

11-L-0559/OSD/41522

OSD 07934-05

314.7

14 Dec 04

- 9) Page 3, last line: I'd like to discuss that.
- 10) Page 4, item E: It talks about adversely affecting the security. I also think the reputation of the United States, or there may be something other than security. Let's discuss it.
- 11) Page 5, paragraph 1, line 2: Let's discuss this triple X series.
- 12) Page 5, paragraph 1: Let's discuss the five years.
- 13) Page 5: I wonder about case work and possible embarrassment for the constituents when I was a Member of Congress.
- 14) Page 5: I'd like to talk about press access.
- 15) Page 6, last three lines: Let's discuss.
- 16) Page 7, paragraph 5: I think that I should agree to pay for some or all of the digitization. Let's discuss that.
- 17) Page 7, paragraph 5: We may want to add "except as designated by the donor" and under the add, we may want to include "for all or most."
- 18) Page 8: We should include the George W. Bush Library, if/when it ever exists.
- 19) Page 8, Item 7: Let's discuss.
- 20) Page 9, middle of the first paragraph: Let's discuss a timeframe.

Thanks.

Attach.

11/30/04 Draft Instrument of Gift

DHR:ss
121304-25

.....
Please respond by _____

DRAFT
11/30/04

INSTRUMENT OF GIFT

D.H. Rumsfeld

Borell?

I, Donald H. Rumsfeld, residing in Washington, D.C. (hereinafter referred to as Donor), hereby give, grant, and set over to the United States of America for inclusion in the collections of the Library of Congress (hereinafter Library) and for administration therein by the authorities thereof a collection of my personal and professional papers and associated material documenting my life and career in public service and government (hereinafter referred to as Collection), more particularly described by the attached schedule. Donor warrants that he owns the physical property in the Collection free and clear of any liens. Donor does not represent that the papers and materials donated constitute the entirety of the personal and professional papers and associated material in his possession.

This is a gift of only the physical property contained in the materials constituting the Collection, and Donor reserves to himself all rights, title, and interest he may have in and to all of the intellectual property associated with the Collection including, but not limited to copyright. Further, Donor, in his complete discretion, may retain the original of any of his personal papers and furnish a copy of that original to the Library.

*after the gift of
of disintegration?*

By accepting this gift, however, the Library does so to improve the national collections, and such acceptance of the physical property shall not be construed as a conclusive determination by the Library that the Donor does, in fact, have or possess with regard to these materials such intellectual property as above identified or described.

How Glue?

The Collection shall be subject to the following conditions:

1. Classified Materials. All materials in the Collection that are specifically authorized under criteria established by statute or executive order to be kept classified in the interest of national defense or foreign policy, and are, in fact, properly classified pursuant to such statute or executive order, shall be safeguarded and administered by the Library in accordance with such statutes or executive orders. Access to these materials shall be allowed only in accordance with procedures established by the United States Government to govern the availability of such information. All classified materials shall be reviewed from time to time by the Library (and, at the Library's request, by appropriate security classification authorities), and materials which, because of the passage of time or other

by R

DRAFT

circumstances, no longer require classification restrictions shall, upon declassification, be opened to public access, subject to the access requirements of provision #2 below. This gift does not transfer title to classified information, in whatever form in the collection; and, in accepting the gift, the Library agrees to receive classified information only as a deposit for administration under the terms of this document.

2. Access. With the exception that the entire Collection shall at all times be available to the staff of the Library for administration purposes, access to the Collection is reserved to Donor and to others only with Donor's written permission, or, in the event of the death of Donor, with the permission of Donor's literary executor for a period of 5 years from the later of the date of death of the Donor or the death of Joyce P. Rumsfeld; thereafter the Collection shall be available to researchers according to the policies of the division of the Library responsible for the administration and service of materials of this nature.

Donor recognizes that the Collection may contain some or all of the following classes of material that should be restricted from public access:

(a) Papers and other historical materials the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of the personal privacy of a living

person or persons.

(b) Papers and other historical materials that are specifically authorized under criteria established by statute or executive order to be restricted from public disclosure in the interest of national defense or foreign policy.

(c) Materials relating to the personal, family, and confidential business affairs of Donor or other persons referenced in the Collection.

(d) Materials containing statements made by or to Donor in confidence.

(e) Materials containing statements or information the divulgence of which might prejudice the conduct of foreign relations of the United States or which could affect adversely the security of the United States.

(f) Materials relating to law enforcement investigations of individuals or organizations, to proposed appointments to office, or to other personnel matters directly affecting individual privacy.

[Add: Except for papers that contain national security information as described in (2)(b), all the papers in the Collection shall be made available to researchers after the restriction period described above.]

Those requesting access to the Collection shall provide Donor with their subject of interest and purpose of their research. Those granted access also must

DRAFT

agree in writing to obtain written permission of Donor or his designee prior to quoting for publication any unpublished material in the Collection.

Additionally, access to that section of the collection designated on the attached schedule as the xxx series will be reserved to the Donor and to others only with the Donor's written permission during the Donor's lifetime and the lifetime of President Gerald R. Ford, whichever comes later. In the event of the death of Donor, access to the xxx series will be restricted to those with the permission of the Donor's literary executor for a period of 5 years from the date thereof or during the life of President Gerald R. Ford, whichever is later. Thereafter, the xxx series shall be available to researchers according to the policies of the division of the Library responsible for the administration and service of materials of this nature.

7

2

The Donor will appoint his literary executor. Upon Donor's death, Joyce P. Rumsfeld may appoint a new literary executor, including herself. Upon the death of Joyce P. Rumsfeld, their surviving children may jointly appoint a new literary executor, who may not be any of the surviving children.

The Library will notify the Donor or, upon his death, his literary executor, promptly of any requests, claims, or legal actions relating to the papers or materials of the Collection.

Core 6.2

Prell ?

3. Reproduction. Notwithstanding the above-mentioned reservation of rights and interest in and to the intellectual property as above identified, persons granted access to the Collection may obtain single-copy reproductions of the materials contained therein for research purposes, and, consistent with Library practices and procedures, such additional copies as may be allowed by copyright law (e.g., by the fair use doctrine or expiration of the copyright term). The Library may make preservation copies of the materials in the Collection in any format as determined by the Library.

4. Use. Use of the materials constituting the Collection shall be governed by the Library's policies for the administration and service of materials of this nature. The Library is also permitted to exhibit any or all of the material in the Collection on- and off-site and may display any or all of the materials in the Collection on its website or in any other electronic form or successor technology, provided, however, that the Library first obtains the permission of the Donor or the Donor's literary executor *[Delete: during the period of Donor's life and for 10 years thereafter]* ¹⁰ **[Add: for a period of 5 years from the later of the date of death of the Donor or the death of Joyce P. Rumsfeld]** and subject to the other

DRAFT

conditions expressed in provision 2 of this Instrument. Donor reserves the right to make selected unclassified materials available to the public at any time upon written notification to the Library.

5. Digitization of Material Currently on Deposit. (Delete: Donor agrees to pay ~~for~~ the cost ~~of~~ digitization ~~of~~ the papers either currently on deposit or to be deposited with the Library, which under this Instrument become the Library's physical property. Upon a mutually agreed-upon schedule, the Library agrees to make these papers available to Donor or his designee ~~for~~ the purpose ~~of~~ their digitization. Donor or his designee agrees to ensure that the original papers are returned to the Library in good order and condition upon completion ~~of~~ their digitization. Donor also will provide the Library a digital copy ~~of~~ these papers).

exec^v
deposited
Ag by Donor

[Add: Donor agrees to donate to the Library funds to be used to pay for the cost of digitization ~~of~~ the papers currently on deposit at the Library and those papers to be placed on deposit at the Library. The Library agrees to use [name of company] to perform the digitization. The Library agrees to provide the Donor or Donor's literary executor, upon either's request, digital copies of all papers the Donor gives to the Library.] Donor reserves the right to provide digitized copies of the collection to other institutions, including but not limited to

FW Books

the Ronald Reagan Library, Gerald R. Ford Library, George H. W. Bush Library, Richard M. Nixon Library, Herbert Hoover Institute [?], and Princeton University, subject to the same conditions as provided for in this instrument.

6. Additions. Such other and related materials as the Donor may from time to time donate to the United States of America for inclusion in the collections of the Library shall be governed by the terms of this Instrument of Gift or such written amendments as may hereafter be agreed upon between the Donor and the Library. At the discretion of the Donor, future additions to the Collection may be transferred to the Library under a separately negotiated Instrument of Gift.

7. *{Delete: Removal. Donor or a representative acting on Donor's behalf pursuant to his written authorization may remove any or all of the Collection at Donor's complete discretion during Donor's lifetime.}* [Add: Original Items.

The Donor may borrow original items from the Library for such periods of time as will be mutually agreed to by the Donor and the Library at the time of the loan of the original items.]

8. Disposal. Should any part of the Collection be found by the Library to

DRAFT

include materials which the Library deems inappropriate for retention with the Collection or for transfer to other collections in the Library, the Library shall offer to return the materials to the Donor and allow the Donor ninety (90) days from the date of such offer to reply. If the Donor does not wish to receive said materials or designate another repository to receive them, or has not responded to the Library's offer by the end of the aforesaid ninety (90) days, the Library may dispose of such materials in accordance with its procedures for disposition of materials not needed for the Library's collections. Should the Library determine, subsequent to acceptance and transfer of the Collection that any part of the Collection includes classified information which the Library deems inappropriate for permanent retention with the Collection, it shall notify the Department of Defense. The Department of Defense shall then notify the Library in writing of the appropriate disposition of these classified materials.

Time
frame?

9. Communications. The Donor will provide the Library with a current address and other contact information in order that the Library can meet its responsibilities as herein described. The Library will send notices and requests to addresses of record as provided and updated by the Donor.

In witness whereof, I have set my hand and seal this _____ day of

_____, 2004 in the City of _____

Donald H. Rumsfeld

Accepted for the United States of America

The Librarian of Congress (seal)

Date

December 8, 2004

TO: Paul Butler
CC: COL Steve Bucci
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Meeting w/Chu on Languages

I need a meeting with David Chu to go over this language memo. I am unhappy about it. Please set it up.

Thanks.

Attach.

11/29/04 USD(P&R) memo to SD re: Macro Layout of Languages [OSD 16491-04]

DHR:dh
120804-2

.....
Please respond by 12/21/04

091.4

8 DEC 04

October 25, 2004

2004 OCT -2 PM 2:49

TO: David Chu
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Memo on Macro Layout of Languages

I just looked over your October 13 memo on the Macro Layout of Languages. It is extremely disappointing. Please come back to me with a set of proposals as to how we can get some intelligent balance into this.

It's clear things in motion remain in motion, and in the past period since September 11, people are not making the kinds of logical corrections that thoughtful people would make.

Please get back to me promptly with some ideas.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
102504-19

.....
Please respond by 11/19/04

DR 12/8



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

OL 12/8

INFO MEMO

2004 150 -2 05 2 47

November 29, 2004, 5:00 PM

PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: David S. C. Chu, USD(P&R)

David S. C. Chu

SUBJECT: Memo on Macro Layout of Languages—SNOWFLAKE (attached)

Paul Buttes
12/3

- The current language pool is driven by an outdated manpower “requirements” process.
- We need to establish a number of people to be trained in languages over and above the needs defined in this traditional manner, “capabilities based.” This is one of the objectives of our Language Transformation Roadmap.
- We can begin by:
 - Identifying a goal for the percent of the force that should possess capability in investment languages (regardless of job), and tasking the Defense Language Institute to set up courses to train these service members over and above their existing capacity. I propose setting the goal at 5% active, 2 1/2% selected reserve (= 70,300 active, 21,522 reserves)
 - Establishing a Joint Service Language Corps that could be used to support all services and operations. We are currently developing the concept for such a Corps.
 - Expediting the full implementation of an Army pilot program to recruit Arabic speaking service members, by expanding the languages we target for recruitment and starting similar programs in other services.
 - Providing incentive for service members to maintain their language proficiency with enhanced Foreign Language Proficiency Pay. An increase was included in this year’s National Defense Authorization Act.

• Subject to your guidance, I will pursue all of the above options and report back to you on our progress.

Attachment: As stated

Prepared by Mrs. Gail McGinn, DUSD(PLANS) (b)(6)

MA SD	SMA DSD		
PSA SD	SA DSD	12/3	
EXEC SEC		11/2/3	
ESR MA		7/12/2	8



December 8, 2004

TO: (b)(6)

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: E-mail to Gingrich

Please send the following e-mail to **Newt** Gingrich in response to his attached e-mail:

Newt—

Thanksfor the copy of your e-mail to Berkson. I am delighted you are pressing forward on it.

You're right. It may very well end up requiring some legislative changes, but for some reason, it's harder than the dickens to get the Department to propose legislative changes, even though they know they are needed. Once they are proposed, it's very hard to get the Department to actually get them accomplished. Let's push it.

Attach,
12/2/04 Gingrich e-mail to SD

DHR:dh
120804-1

.....
Please respond by _____

400

8 Dec 04

(b)(6) **CIV, OSD**

From: Thirdwave2@aol.com
Sent: Thursday, December 02, 2004 11:18 AM
To: brad@berkson.org
Cc: WSanders@aei.org; ken.krieg@osd.pentagon.mil
Subject: more on logistics--newt

thanks for the briefing over dinner last night

the progress you are making in moving toward a single theater level logistics commander is really a big step forward

the work you are doing in bringing lean to bear on analyzing and modernizing logistics inside the **US** is also going to bear some pretty profitable fruit for the department

I would like to get with you and ken krieg to pursue an even bolder and more comprehensive set of reforms in a manner that would both give the secretary of defense an opportunity to move the system even more dramatically into a modern logistics supply chain model (with a goal of at least \$15 billion a year in savings by year five) and also give us the support to go to Congress for any changes that are needed to the law (and to block the depot caucus from blocking reform)

I am working with Bob Luby and Tom Williams at IBM to get a sense of the state of the art in total logistics supply chain management (a combination of Womack's Lean Thinking and Deming's total system approach to quality--the former builds incrementally from the bottom up while the latter starts with a system wide perspective and then works down). I am going to ask them to develop a list of the ten best logistics supply chain practitioners in the country to see if we could get them both to advise you and the secretary and to have them as resources for Congress.

I am also working with General Chuck Boyd at BENS (Business Executives for National Security). As you know Chuck was executive director of the Hart Rudman Commission and we had a long series of proposals in that commission for acquisition and logistics reform. In addition Chuck has members like Fred Smith of Fedex who he believes would be happy to work with you and thre Secretary (Smith had the President as a pledge at Yale and therefore combines technical knowledge and political strength in getting this done).

I also hope you will both get Womack directly involved as an adviser and maybe as a teacher in the system.

I hope you and Chuck will get together in the very near future and work through how BENS can be systematgically helpful. If you could keep Bill Sanders and me in the loop as that develops it would help. You and Chuck should get the head of Delphi involved, when they spun off from General MOtors he was very proud of his role in using lean to really reduce costs and increase productivity at Delphi.

After last night I want to further digest how much you have already accomplished and I do not want to slow down the process of getting service approval of the theater level logistics process.

I would like to focus on three large questions in the next thirty days:

1. can we put together a middleware solution to the system wide legacy computer challenge and the fact that the system does not talk to itself and therefore has not been certified for the Congress. If we could develop a cost comparison of a middleware system versus a replacement of the 1000 plus legacy systems I think Congress would approve a legacy system approach.
2. Can we define a tops down deming style systems analysis that would bring together the various lean initiatives, make sure we are not suboptimizing and enable us to lok at large order changes from parts acquisiotn through lifetime maintenance to immediate logistics. I am told this system wide view is vital to maximizing the scale of change.
3. Can we develop a set of strong proposals for the secretary to consider by mid January so he can see what a complete logistics supply chain approach would look like and what it might save.

thanks
newt

December 6, 2004

TO: (b)(6)
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: E-mail Response

Please send an e-mail response for me to the attached e-mail:

Dear Patt—

Thank you so much for your e-mail about Marty Hoffmann. He is a star and goes about his work on behalf of the people of Afghanistan with no thought of himself. Our country is so fortunate to have people of such dedication and skill.

Thanks so much for the nice thought.

With my best wishes,

Sincerely,

Attach.
12/4/04 Maney e-mail to JR

DHR:dh
120504-20

Please respond by _____

335 SD

6 Dec 04

Joyce Rumsfeld

From: "Maney, Patt" (b)(6)
To: (b)(6)
Sent: Saturday, December 04, 2004 6:51 AM
Subject: Marty Hoffmann

I met and briefed you at the Embassy Kabul. I **am** a deployed reserve officer and serve as part of the **ARG**. I write to seek your advice and assistance regarding recognising the continuing and superlative efforts of Marty Hoffmann. Do you know how one might bring Marty's name to the attention of those who consider folk for the Medal of Freedom? I can't think of anyone who more deserves recognition from the President. His efforts in Afghanistan have been and continue to be in the finest tradition of selfless service in encouraging freedom and prosperity for others. Kaivon Saleh and I will be happy to do anything required to forward this well deserved recognition, if you think it appropriate.

Respectfully,

Patt Maney

Atty - Top DoD.

12/6
1630

FOUO



December 6, 2004

[Handwritten signature]

TO: Paul Butler
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Vehicles and Security

Ray

Let's talk about who gets a car and driver, who gets security, and who doesn't. I think we need to reestablish it for the new team.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
120504-15

.....
Please respond by 12/16/04

*TO SecDef
From Paul Butler*

12/15/04

*out
1/10*

Attached is a memo from Ray Abou S outlining who gets Personal Security Details and cars. Ray, Admiral Stavridis and I will meet next week and give you some suggestions on how to cut this back.

530
6 DEC 04

OSD 07978-05

~~FOUO~~

INFO MEMO

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF THE
DEFENSE

*Call
2/28/05*

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2005 FEB 13 AM 7:41

FROM: Mr. Raymond F. DuBois, Director, Administration and Management

Ray DuBois 12/14/04

SUBJECT: Personal Security Details (PSDs)

In response to your **snowflake** of 6 December, Subject: "Vehicles and Security," I submit the following:

- **Attached listing** of all DoD officials, civilian and military, was forwarded to Peter Sobich, Special Assistant to the President and ~~Deputy Cabinet~~ Secretary, on 17 November 2004. Sobich had requested that each Department provide the White House a list of all officials who are assigned a PSD.
- Six DoD Civilian officials and 21 Military officials are assigned 24/7 PSD here and abroad.
- The following civilian officials, (five ~~Under Secretaries~~ of Defense) have dedicated cars and drivers and are eligible for home to office transportation, but do not have a PSD assigned: Mike Wynne, Doug Feith, Tina Jonas, David Chu and Steve Cambone.

(?)

RECOMMENDATION: None

Attachments:

DoD Inventory of Personal Security Details, November 2004

T 6/1

OSD 07978-05

11-L-0559/OSD/41543

December 6, 2004

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Travel

I notice you and General Hagee are scheduled to **be** in CENTCOM at the same time. I hope you don't overstress the place.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
120504-11

.....
Please respond by 12/9/04

333

6 Dec 04

OSD 07980-05
05

7201

May 28, 2004

TO: Gen. Dick Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

DATE: May 28, 2004

SUBJECT: **Thoughts on Iraq**

D.R.

Iraq

The attached is for your information and review.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
052804.05

Attach: SD Thoughts on Iraq

28 May 04

07982-04

11-L-0559/OSD/41545

December 6, 2004

TO: Mary Claire Murphy
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Pens from the Healthcare Chaplaincy

There has been a mistake. Not a **big** mistake, but a mistake. This hospital chaplaincy is run by a high school classmate of mine. We have been giving him money for **30** years. If you recall, they sent those bookmark pens. We don't have to pay for them.

005

Thanks.

Attach.

Thanksgiving 2004 ltr to SecDef from The Healthcare Chaplaincy

DHR:dh
120504-9

.....
Please respond by 12/10/04

6 Dec 04



Administrative Center

315 East 62nd Street, 4th Floor, New York, NY 10021-7767
Phone 212-644-1111 Ext.101 - Fax 212-758-9959
www.healthcarechaplaincy.org

The Rev. Dr. Walter J. Smith, S.J.
President & CEO

Thanksgiving 2004

Mr. and Mrs. Donald Rumsfeld
2206 Kalorama Road NW
Washington, DC 20008-1621

Dear Joyce and Don,

Winston Churchill once commented that "plans are useless, but planning is invaluable." This makes me muse whether we may also at times confuse life with living, dreams with dreaming, work with working, love with loving? Churchill commented further that many of us live like hungry fishermen: sewing and casting our nets, though we never know for sure what they will yield until the net is hauled onboard. Our Buddhist friends might further counsel us to remain detached from the dream of a specific fish. Whatever is caught or found may be experienced as unexpected treasure.

During the past year, our staff and trustees tried to apply this wisdom as we went about the arduous but exhilarating task of strategic planning. We remained open to much imagining and dreaming. The process required a lot of listening, understanding, and discerning. What has emerged from this planning activity is a wonderfully rich and challenging vision for the future of The Healthcare Chaplaincy, consistent with its 43-year history, but boldly committed to dynamic growth with many new services and programs. However astute the plan may be judged by the passage of time, the planning process itself has been an edifying exercise of multifaith and multicultural dialogue. With Churchill, we would all affirm his conclusion that "planning is invaluable."

At Thanksgiving, we have many reasons for giving thanks. More than ever, our community has embraced the inestimable treasure that we steward in the rich diversity of our faiths and traditions, along with a willingness to speak and work with each other out of those belief systems. In gratitude for your association with us in our mission, we offer this small gift. This unique set of pens — designed to function both as bookmarks and writing instruments — is imprinted with thoughtful words garnered from some of the world's great spiritual traditions, and selected by our staff. They may provide you or a loved one with a needed inspiration, or you may choose to give one or other of these bookmark pens to another person in need of its hopeful message.

In this joyful season which invites us to be mindful of our riches and responsibilities, we want to express to you — out of the very spiritual diversity from which our multifaith identity has been forged — a prayer of gratitude and blessing. None of our achievements or future aspirations would be possible without the loyal support and stewardship of our colleagues, friends, and benefactors like you. May the words inscribed on these gifts remind you of renewed opportunities for living, dreaming, working and loving.

With abundant thanks,

The Healthcare Chaplaincy is a multifaith community of professionals
committed to the advancement of pastoral care, education, and research.
We are dedicated to the spiritual care of all persons who are suffering in body, mind, and spirit.

11-L-0559/OSD/41547

720
FOUO



December 9, 2004

TO: Jim Haynes
CC: David Chu
Jim O'Beirne
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Walter Huffman

231-2

Pete Schoomaker sent along the name of Walter Huffman as a good man to serve on an independent panel of *experts* on DoD legal reforms. His background sheet is attached.

Please tell me the status of that concept and what you think of this individual.

Thanks.

Attach.
11/23/04 CSA note w/ Huffman background sheet

DHR:db
120904-32

.....
Please respond by 12/21/04

~~FOUO~~

OSD 07983-05

9 Dec 04

**RANKED LIST OF CANDIDATES FOR
INDEPENDENT REVIEW PANEL
TO STUDY THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN MILITARY DEPARTMENT GENERAL
COUNSELS AND JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERALS**

3. Stephen W. Preston

Recommended by:

Partner, Wilmer, Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr (2000-present)
General Counsel of the Department of the Navy (1998-2000)
Principal Deputy General Counsel of the Department of Defense (1993-1995)
Deputy Assistant Attorney General (1995-1998)

- *Understands issues from both DoD and Military Department perspectives*
- *Brings perspective of a Military Department General Counsel*
- *Brings expertise regarding Navy legal elements*



4. Walter Burl Huffman, Major General, U.S. Army (Ret.)

Recommended by:

Dean and Professor of Law, Texas Tech University School of Law (2001-present)
The Judge Advocate General of the Army (1997-2001)
25 year Army career

- *Brings perspective of a judge advocate*
- *Brings perspective of being The Judge Advocate General (TJAG)*
- *Brings expertise regarding Army legal elements*



5. Peter M. Murphy

Recommended by:

Partner, Holland and Knight LLP
Counsel to the Commandant of the Marine Corps (1984-2004)
Various assignments in Office of Navy General Counsel (1976-1984)
Infantry Officer, U.S. Army (1966-1969)

- *Brings expertise regarding USMC legal elements*
- *Many years of experience in GC-like position; has seen it all; good and bad*



**RANKED LIST OF CANDIDATES FOR
INDEPENDENT REVIEW PANEL
TO STUDY THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN MILITARY DEPARTMENT GENERAL
COUNSELS AND JUDGE ADVOCATES GENERAL**

6. John O. Marsh, Jr.

Recommended by:

Distinguished Professor, George Mason University School of Law
Secretary of the Army (1981-1989)
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs (1973-1974)
Counsellor to the President (1974-1977)
Member of Congress (1962-1970)
Retired LTC, Virginia National Guard

- *Lengthy experience as Military Department Secretary*
- *Continued involvement with national security issues during past 20 years*



7. Paula Boggs

Recommended by:

Executive Vice President and General Counsel, Starbucks Coffee Co. (2002-present)
Vice President, Legal, Dell Corp. (1997-2002)
Partner, Seattle law firm (1995-1997)
Previously: Assistant U.S. Attorney, Army Officer

- *Brings current corporate law office organizational perspective*
- *Brings junior/mid-level judge advocate perspective*



8. Samuel P. Huntington

Recommended by:

Professor and Chairman of the Harvard University Academy of International and Area Studies (1978-present)
Coordinator of Security Planning, National Security Council (1977-1978)
Author of many defense-related books and articles

- *Brings informed, academic, non-lawyer perspective*
- *Limited practical expertise in military law/military department organization and functioning*



**RANKED LIST OF CANDIDATES FOR
INDEPENDENT REVIEW PANEL
TO STUDY THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN MILITARY DEPARTMENT GENERAL
COUNSELS AND JUDGE ADVOCATES GENERAL**

9. Larry D. Thompson

Recommended by:

Senior Vice President and General Counsel, PepsiCo. (2004-present)

Senior Fellow, Brookings Institute (2003-2004)

Deputy Attorney General (2001-2003)

Partner, King and Spalding (1986-2001)

U.S. Attorney, Northern District of Georgia (1982-1986)

e Brings extensive background of legal organization, public and private

e Limited expertise in military law/military department organization and functioning



10. Edward C. Schmults

Recommended by:

Senior Vice President and General Counsel, GTE Corp. (1984-1994)

Deputy Attorney General (1981-1984)

Partner, White and Case (1977-1981)

Deputy Counsel to the President (1975-1977)

Under Secretary and General Counsel of Treasury Department (1973-1975)

e Brings broad background of legal organization, public and private

● Limited expertise in military law/military department organization and functioning

PERSONNEL SENSITIVE - RESTRICTED DISTRIBUTION

**RANKED LIST OF CANDIDATES FOR
INDEPENDENT REVIEW PANEL
TO STUDY THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN MILITARY DEPARTMENT GENERAL
COUNSELS AND JUDGE ADVOCATES GENERAL**

1. F. Whitten Peters

Recommended by:

Partner, Williams & Connolly LLP (2001-present)
Secretary of the Air Force (1999-2001)
Under Secretary and Acting Secretary of the Air Force (1997-1999)
Principal Deputy General Counsel of the Department of Defense (1995-1997)
Line Officer, U.S. Naval Reserve (1969-1972)
Member, Defense Science Board Task Force on the Future of the
Aircraft Carrier (2001-present)
Vice Chair, Federal Advisory Committee on the Future of the U.S. Aerospace
Industry (2001-present)

- *Understands issues from both DoD and Military Department perspectives*
- *Earned the respect of both uniformed and civilian members of DoD*
- *Brings detailed expertise regarding USAF legal elements*



2. Martin Richard Hoffmann

Recommended by:

Secretary of the Army (1975-1977)
Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (1973-1974)
General Counsel of the Department of Defense (1974-1975)
Served as Assistant U.S. Attorney, Congressional staffer, law firm partner and
as vice president and general counsel of a major corporation

- *Understands issues from both DoD and Military Department perspectives*
- *Experience from the past may help inform panel members*



December 9, 2004

TO: VADM Jim Stavridis

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Agreement w/India

India

In India one of the military people talked about some sort of an arrangement where it has taken two years, they need an agreement, and they paid \$160,000 advance.

I don't know what it is about, but you were in the meeting. Let's sort it out.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
120904-29

.....
Please respond by 12/16/04

Greg

This is Navy submarine rescue vehicle - India wants to "rent" it.
Task ^{Navy} ATIL to give us status. ~~FOUO~~ ASAP.

TR
J

OSD 07984-05

9 Dec 04

December 9, 2004

TO: Mary Claire Murphy
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Memo on Diane Bodman

I received your note about Diane Bodman. Of course, I know her and know what she's been doing. I was there at the luncheon that your memo describes. She walked me all around.

I am surprised at your memo. Was it meant for someone other than me?

Thanks.

Attach.
12/8/04 MCM memo

DIR:dh
120904-28

.....
Please respond by 12/15/04

201.22

9 Dec 04

OSD 07985-05

For Sec Def

12/8

SPB
RM 12/19

I want to bring to your attention the extraordinary volunteer work that Diane Bodman, wife of **Deputy** Treasury Secretary Sam Bodman, is doing at Walter Reed Medical Center.

Last week, I attended a luncheon for wounded soldiers at the Pentagon. Diane organized it, arranging for transportation of some 40 soldiers and their family members to the gathering. She **knew** each soldier's name, family, details of their injuries, **status** of their recovery, **and** their general well being.

Apparently, Diane spends several days a week at Walter Reed, helping to coordinate and facilitate patient recreation activities, including tours of the White House, the Pentagon, the CIA, the Supreme **Court**, etc.

In order to comply with hospital guidelines, Diane joined the Red Cross and completed official **training** and certification. She coordinates with the physicians, nurses, and therapists on appropriate activities for each patient, arranges handicap accessible vans and buses for group outings, and helps keep the families apprised of each patient's care and activities.

I thought you would like to know about **Diane's** wonderful commitment to these fine soldiers.

M/C Murphy

Who is this?

Mary Claire Murphy

156
2

December 9, 2004

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *[Signature]*
SUBJECT: Newt and Negroponte

Did you set **up** Negroponte to see Newt before Negroponte went back?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
120904-22

.....
Please respond by 12/16/04

0000,71

9 Dec 04

~~FOUO~~

OSD 07986-05

December 8, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld PA
SUBJECT: Editorial about Torture

This Washington Post piece (item 41) is just inexcusable. Please tell me what you propose to do about it. I suggest the possibility of Geren and Maples and some others sitting down and spending two hours with them.

Thanks.

Attach.
"The System Endures," *Washington Post*, December 5, 2004

DHR:dh
120804-6

.....
Please respond by 12/16/04

OSD 07988-05

383.6

8 Dec 04

Many of the colleges and law schools that support a ban on military recruiters teach some of the best and brightest students in the country. Their mission is to mold these students into more tolerant, well-rounded citizens who will not discriminate when given the opportunity to influence policy. What purpose, then, does it serve to deprive the military of such candidates?

This year's class of newly commissioned officers and military lawyers will produce the next generation of admirals, generals and military judges. Today's students will later advise the president, Congress and the Pentagon on what is best for the military ranks. What better place to give more tolerant, well-rounded citizens the opportunity to influence policy?

Joshua S. Eisenberg, New York, Nov. 30, 2004

The writer is a lawyer and a captain in the New York Army National Guard.

Editor's Note: The article referred to appeared in the Current News Early Bird, November 30, 2004.

Washington Post
December 5, 2004
Pg. B6

41, The System Endures

SEVEN MONTHS AGO the leak of shocking photographs from the Abu Ghraib prison alerted the country to the fact that U.S. soldiers and interrogators were criminally abusing Iraqi detainees. In the weeks that followed, a still more disturbing story emerged: The torture portrayed in the photographs, while extreme and mostly unauthorized, grew out of a system of abusive treatment of prisoners established by the Bush administration after Sept. 11,

2001. Official investigations have documented the mistreatment of more than 100 detainees in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere and the deaths

of more than 20. In many cases these acts were committed by CIA or Army personnel who were following procedures authorized by such senior officials as Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld, Iraq commander Lt. Gen. Ricardo S. Sanchez and White House counsel Alberto R. Gonzales. This news prompted some noisy congressional hearings; some angry lawmakers, including a few Republicans, called for reforms.

Yet the worst aspect of the Abu Ghraib scandal is this: The system survived its public exposure. The Bush administration is vigorously prosecuting the lowly reservists depicted in the Abu Ghraib photos, while brazenly defending the larger process it established for extracting intelligence from prisoners. No senior officers have acknowledged fault for authorizing harsh interrogation techniques or been held accountable by prosecutors or Congress. An official investigation into how the interrogation policies were drawn up and used, which was completed months ago, has never been released. No alteration has been made in the policies governing the system, including an extremely permissive definition of torture prepared under the direction of Mr. Gonzales, or a set of harsh techniques for interrogating prisoners approved by Mr. Rumsfeld.

Consequently it is no surprise that the International Committee of the Red Cross, which is monitoring the Guantanamo Bay prison and other U.S. detention facilities, continues to find that detainees in American custody suffer "cruel, inhumane and degrading" treatment that is "tantamount to torture." It also is no surprise that the Pentagon would reject those judgments without disputing the substance behind them. According to the New York Times, which obtained a Red Cross report

from July, monitors found that prisoners were subjected to "solitary confinement, temperature extremes, use of forced positions." The Times said that some were forced to strip and then were shackled in uncomfortable positions while being exposed to loud noise or music and prolonged cold. Such abuses are not isolated or the result of rogue behavior by guards. They are part of the standing procedure for interrogating Guantanamo prisoners, approved by Mr. Rumsfeld in April 2003. That is why the administration rejects the Red Cross charges: not because they aren't true but because President Bush and his political appointees -- as opposed to many of the professional lawyers in the military -- don't regard such tactics as improper. To back up their position, they have Mr. Gonzales, who oversaw a 2002 review that concluded that the infliction of pain short of death or organ failure, or psychological stress that did not cause permanent derangement, did not constitute torture under the treaties and federal laws that bind the U.S. government. According to the administration's reasoning, the same methods documented by the Red Cross could be properly used on Americans arrested by foreign governments, or on detainees in federal prisons.

shirked its responsibility. No hearings have been held on the prisoner abuse scandal in three months; no legislation has corrected the administration's twisted interpretation of torture or the Geneva Conventions. Mr. Rumsfeld, Gen. Sanchez and Mr. Gonzales have never been required to answer for their policy decisions. As long as such passivity continues, you can expect more disturbing reviews from the Red Cross.

By now it should be clear that Mr. Bush will perpetuate this systematic violation of human rights, and fundamental American values, unless checked by one of the other branches of government. The federal courts have begun to explore the handling of prisoners at Guantanamo; last week a federal judge in Washington elicited from a Pentagon official the admission that information obtained through torture could be used by the tribunals the administration has established in Guantanamo to judge whether detainees are "enemy combatants." Yet Congress has

shirked its responsibility. No hearings have been held on the prisoner abuse scandal in three months; no legislation has corrected the administration's twisted interpretation of torture or the Geneva Conventions. Mr. Rumsfeld, Gen. Sanchez and Mr. Gonzales have never been required to answer for their policy decisions. As long as such passivity continues, you can expect more disturbing reviews from the Red Cross.

Handwritten scribble with numbers 6, 3, 2, 1 and some illegible text.

7201

28
May 26, 2004

In-acc

TO: Gen. John Abizaid

CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Snail Mail

I just got a memorandum from you on an authorization for granting of immunity dated May 6 that came in on May 26, because it was sent through the mail.

Please don't send things through the mail. This is time sensitive. We won't be able to do this once sovereignty is passed.

We'll try to get our folks working on it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
052604-24

.....
Please respond by _____

28 May 04

OSD 07989-04

December 8, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Joe Klein Piece

This piece by Joe Klein is irresponsible. Have a go at it.

Thanks.

Attach.

Klein, Joe. "Is Bush Serious About a New Spy System?" *Time*, December 6, 2004, p. 29.

DJR:dh
120804-3

.....
Please respond by 12/16/04

350.09

8 Dec 04

Joe Klein

Is Bush Serious About a New Spy System?

HERE IS AN INDISPUTABLE FACT: THE UNITED STATES NEEDS A single, unified computer network that contains—at the very least—all the available information on the world's bad guys. This was the primary recommendation of the 9/11 commission. The FBI needs to know what the CIA knows about, say, the mythical terrorist Mahmoud Shimon O'Hara, and vice versa—and both agencies need to be alerted immediately if O'Hara tries to enter the country or has a phone conversation overheard by the

National Security Agency (NSA). Everyone from the President to the customs cops stamping passports at LAX agrees this is a necessity.

We are probably not going to build that system anytime soon. Congress has tried to do it twice in the past two years, and failed both times. First, it created the Department of Homeland Security, which included a whole new bureaucracy—the office of Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection—to build the system. But IAIIP was almost immediately mugged by the CIA, which backed a new Terrorist Threat Integration Center to do much the same thing. The Pentagon and the FBI ignored both efforts, in the classic passive-aggressive manner of turf-obsessed bureaucrats.

The second attempt, now comatose, was the National Intelligence Reform Act—the brisk congressional response to last summer's findings of the 9/11 commission. The bill would have created a National Intelligence director to ride herd over the CIA, NSA, parts of the FBI and assorted other intel agencies. The czar would have had budgetary authority and also the power to "design" and "implement" the unified computer network. But two House Republican committee chairmen decided to croak the bill on the weekend before Thanksgiving—in large part because the reform was opposed by the Pentagon, which controls 80% of the intelligence budget. An effort is being made to revive it, but don't hold your breath.

And perhaps be grateful: even though the goals of the reform bill were the right ones, I'm not convinced that it would have gotten the job done. It could easily have become a familiar legislative charade—a "re-



Bush says he wants intel reform; Rumsfeld had early doubts

form" is passed, there's a nice bill-signing ceremony in the Rose Garden, various pols (including the President) get to take credit, but nothing really changes ... except for the accretion of another sedimentary layer of semi-powerless bureaucracy. In truth, it is impossible for Congress to reorganize the inner workings of the Executive Branch without the full support of the President, and I'm not so sure George Bush really favored either one of the attempted reforms.

Neither of the two bills emanated from the White House. Homeland Security came from congressional Democrats; Intelligence Reform from the 9/11 commission. Both ideas sprouted during election seasons; both were popular. Bush opposed the creation of a Department of Homeland Security before he favored it—and he has been unwilling to do the head cracking necessary to ensure that his friend, Secretary Tom Ridge, has the authority to do his job. Bush was dragged into supporting intelligence reform by John Kerry's imprudent campaign demand that the 9/11 commission recommendations be enacted

immediately—without any input from, or negotiation with, the entrenched panjandrums of the intelligence community. "You can't do intelligence reform without a clear vision and direct marching orders from the President," 9/11 commission member Bob Kerrey told me last week. "If you create an Intelligence czar, but the President doesn't want to back him fully and give him real authority to build the network, then you might as well deep-six the bill."

it happens, the President does have a clear vision about intelligence reform, and it may not include the bureaucratic reshuffling suggested by the 9/11 commission. Bush, as always, is more interested in action than information. He wants a more aggressive spy service—a good thing. But he also wants a more compliant spy service—not such a good thing. He has hired Porter Goss to achieve both goals at the CIA. He has also issued a series of memos that begin to lay out his vision: one supports a 50% increase in the number of covert operatives—an excellent idea. Another seems to support the transfer of operational control over the use of covert force from the CIA to the

Pentagon. That may not be a bad idea, either, but it feeds a fear among some intelligence professionals that with the CIA in tatters, power may shift, subtly, toward the Secretary of Defense. "The militarization of intelligence is a real worry," an intelligence expert told me—and Donald Rumsfeld's intense and, according to several sources, continuing covert opposition to the 9/11 intel recommendations only reinforces those fears.

The Secretary of Defense has a dreadful track record when it comes to intelligence. In Bush's first term, Rumsfeld set up an Office of Special Plans in the Pentagon to challenge the CIA's cautious analysis of Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction by touting the incendiary garbage provided by Iraqi exiles. That is, I suppose, a version of intelligence reform: a system in which fantasies are produced to support the President's policy preferences. But it is not the version proposed by the 9/11 commission—and it is time for Bush to make clear whether he supports the commission or his Defense Secretary. He cannot support both. ■

DEC 14 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Rob McGuinness

Someone named Rob McGuinness was on television, I think on FOX. He was terrific in answering this armor question. You ought to get a thank you note off to him.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
121304-28

.....
Please respond by 12/22/04

451

OSD 07990-05

14 Dec 04

720

28
May 26, 2004

In a g

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith
Gen. John Abizaid
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: UK and Command and Control

You should be aware of this note from Geoff Hoon.

Thanks.

Attach.
5/26/04 PM's comments in UK

DHR:dh
052604-22

.....
Please respond by _____

28 May 04

OSD 07991-04

11-L-0559/OSD/41563

Handwritten: 5726
C5726



SECRETARY OF STATE

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
ROOM 205, OLD WAR OFFICE BUILDING
WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2EU

Telephone: 020 721 8211/2/3
Fax: 020 721 87140
E-mail: defencesecretary@defence.mod.uk

MO 6/17/15C
MST 4/5/2

26 May 2004

Dear General,

IRAQ

You may be aware that there has been intense media speculation in the UK over the past 24 hours about command and control of forces in Iraq after 30 June. The UK media are perceiving a difference in view between the United States and the United Kingdom based on remarks by the Prime Minister and Secretary of State Powell yesterday.

I attach a summary of what the Prime Minister said in Parliament at lunchtime today on this issue. I should be grateful if you could draw his remarks to the attention of Secretary Rumsfeld.

Handwritten: ||

Yours sincerely
Chris Baker

J C S BAKER
Private Secretary

Lieutenant General John Craddock
Senior Military Assistant to the
Secretary of Defense
United States of America

11-L-0559/OSD/41564



Recycled Paper

PRIME MINISTER'S LINE ON IRAQ – 26 MAY 2004

New Interim Government has to have full sovereignty: ultimate strategic and political decision-making passes to Interim Government.

Our forces will be there with consent of Interim Government.

Once strategic decision made, of course as now, the running of an operation in the hands of the Commander of the Multinational Force.

No question of US or UK troops not being able to protect themselves or US or UK troops being under anything other than US/UK command.

December 13, 2004

TO: VADM Jim Stavridis
Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Plan for Abizaid and Casey

Centcom

What is the plan to get Abizaid and Casey with the President when they are in town?

What is the plan to use them with the media or the Congress?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
121304-23

.....
Please respond by _____

13 Dec 04

OSD 07991-05

DEC 14 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita
Paul Butler
CC: Mary Claire Murphy
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Awards for Afghanistan Personnel

I think we ought to give an award to Zal Khalilzad when he comes in this week.

We also might find that sometime we could give an award to Marty Hoffmann and the Afghanistan team that have been backing up Zal. I don't know if we want to do it at the same time, but we ought to think about it.

The fact that they had the inauguration is a good time to mark it for the Afghanistan group, it seems to me.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
121304-18

.....

Please respond by _____

OSD 07992-05

Afghanistan

14 Dec 04

DEC 14 2004

TO: VADM Jim Stavridis

CC: Larry Di Rita
Matt Latimer

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Comprehensive Article

Please see me about who the person is who we ought to assign the task of taking the initiatives and accomplishments paper and turning it into an article of some kind, where we do a paragraph on each of the initiatives or accomplishments.

It would be pretty long, but we need to begin to compile a record of four years. That staccato, bullet-point paper is useful for me to talk off of, but it is not useful to hand out to people, or to think about a presentation to the Congress or a message to each Member of Congress.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
121304-14

.....
Please respond by 12/22/04

020 DOD

14 Dec 04

December 13, 2004

TO: VADM Jim Stavridis

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Col. Harvey Brief

Please get Scooter Libby to invite Colonel Harvey over to brief him on the intel situation in Iraq.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
121304-10

.....
Please respond by 12/16/04

Iraq

13 Dec 04

DEC 13 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Quotes

Please give me a copy of whatever it is they claim to **be** quoting me from in this editorial on Boeing.

Thanks.

Attach.
"Go Boeing" *Washington Post*

DHR:dh
121004-24

.....
Please *respond* by 12/16/04

0007 SD

13 Dec 04

immense... are and carry outrageous case- loads over which they have little control. The

Warner (D) and Attorney... y W. Kilgore (R) could make a wor- difference. Both should be embarrassed to p- side over a public-defense system that fails its clients so often.

'Go Boeing!'

THE MORE the Boeing tanker deal is scrutinized, the worse it looks. The tanker leasing arrangement, now thankfully dead, was questionable on its face, the result of a back-door legislative maneuver; if it had gone through, the Air Force would have paid too much for planes that it might not need, or that at least might not be the best solution to its aging tanker fleet. Then it turned out that negotiations were rigged in Boeing's favor by an Air Force procurement official as a "parting gift" just before she took a \$250,000-a-year job at the company. The official, Darleen A. Druyun, has pleaded guilty to ethics charges, along with Boeing's former chief financial officer. But as much as the Air Force would like to suggest otherwise, the Boeing mess doesn't stop there. The pile of internal e-mails tenaciously extracted by Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.) show an Air Force leadership more bent on stifling dissenting views from within the military than on determining the best deal for taxpayers; inappropriately cozy with some contractors and personally biased against others; and resolutely uninterested, even now, in determining what went wrong. E-mails to and from Air Force Secretary James G. Roche, who resigned last week, are particularly disturbing. In May 2003, Boeing lobbyist Paul Weaver told Mr. Roche that Marvin R. Sambur, the Air Force's acquisition chief, "was getting beat up" by Michael W. Wynne, a senior Pentagon procurement official, over the tankers' cost. "It's time for the big guns to quash Wynne!" replied Mr. Roche—who then repeatedly denied to the Senate Armed Services Committee that he asked Boeing to put pressure on Mr. Wynne. As chummy as the Air Force was with Boeing, officials were hostile to a possible competitor for the tanker deal, European Aero-nautic Defense and Space Co. (EADS) and its Airbus division. E-mailing a Raytheon Co. executive, Mr. Roche wrote, "Privately between us: Go Boeing! The fools in Paris and Berlin never did their homework." When Mr. Wynne told Mr. Roche that he had invited the

EADS officials to lunch, noting the potential "benefits of competition," he was angrily slapped down. "Mike, you must be out of your mind!!" Mr. Roche wrote. "We won't be happy with your doing this!" Mr. Roche is not the only one whose conduct is troubling. Even as she was negotiat- ing with the Air Force about whether the tanker lease was a good deal, Office of Man- agement and Budget Associate Director Robin Cleveland asked Mr. Roche to inter- ceede with former colleagues at Northrop Grumman to help Ms. Cleveland's brother get a job there. Within half an hour, Mr. Roche had passed the material on to the com- pany, noting Ms. Cleveland's key position and endorsing her brother. Then he wrote back to Ms. Cleveland, "Be well. Smile. Give tankers now (Oops, did I say that? ...)." Ms. Cleveland ended up supporting the leasing deal, but even if she hadn't, her conduct, now under review by the Justice Department, rep- resented an unethical use of her public posi- tion. Mr. Roche's actions weren't much bet- ter. Incredibly, the Air Force withheld this exchange from Mr. McCain on the grounds that the e-mails were simply joking. Indeed, one of the most distressing aspects of this entire episode has been the military's stonewalling response to what Mr. Roche, in an e-mail, termed "the enemies of the lease on the Hill." At a meeting last November, follow- ing the Druyun firing, according to one e- mail, Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld "asked if in light of that should we take a sec- ond look at her involvement in any tanker lease related matters in order to deflect pos- sible criticism from the [Senate Armed Ser- vices Committee] and unfavorable publicity." You would have hoped Mr. Rumsfeld would want to take a "second look" to figure out what went wrong in his operation, not to de- flect criticism or avoid bad press. Mr. McCain put it well in a Senate floor speech: "This ap- pears to be a case of either a system failure in procurement oversight, willful blindness or rank corruption. Either way, full accountabili- ty among Air Force leadership is in order."

I from the over exam But c ning pass t the fl

How. Rather' Nov. 24 pened George hant ba were mi ans bec ping" ir al's pub that inc- nently) him. Mr. R: case for l discredit Bush's Na ords. But

Letto. The 1 and n. er's hc and numb. limita. ters a. ment. able to we car ue the send. Letter to: o lette The ma. Edi. han

Oct 11.

DEC 13 2004

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: JWACC and Iraq

The attached is self-explanatory. Please dig into it and see what you can do.

Thanks.

Attach.
12/10/04 Gingrich e-mail to SecDef

DHR:dh
121004-21

.....
Please respond by 1/6/05

Iraq

OSD 07997-05

13 Dec 04

08/12/10

(b)(6)

CIV, OSD

From NEWT GINGERICH

From: Thirdwave2@aol.com
Sent: Friday, December 10, 2004 12:34 PM
To: giambastiani@jcom.mil
Cc: james.stavridis@osd.mil; peter.pace@js.pentagon.mil; (b)(6)
 paula.thornhill@js.pentagon.mil
Subject: JWACC and Iraq

there are two major areas where JWACC can play a big role in understanding what we need to accomplish in Iraq

1. we need a clear sense of the metrics of a relatively healthy Iraq

the current metrics don't necessarily cover the requirements of a sustainable Iraq but instead reflect the CPA's highly inadequate goals on electricity there was an estimate we needed 9000 megawatts to be economically and socially healthy

CPA arbitrarily reduced that to 6200 megawatts

last month we made 3500 megawatts

there is no plan currently to get to 9000 by the time summer's heat irritates people who have now bought air conditioners

getting a fresh look at the key systems analysis of a sustainable Iraq and the metrics associated with that would be helpful

2. JWACC did a good job a few years ago putting together a financial and economic interest network analysis around the Serbian leadership and identifying ways to bring pressure to bear on Milosevich

we need a similar analysis of the current pro-dictatorship sunni factions. We know they have money in Syria, Jordan Saudi Arabia and probably Switzerland. Col Harvey now has a briefing identifying almost all the key factional leaders.

If JWACC could start with Harvey's list and begin to analyze that would be great.

if you need forensic help from Treasury let me know and I will call Snow

thanks
newt

12/10/2004

11-L-0559/OSD/41573

May 28, 2004

TO: Gen. John Abizaid

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

DATE: May 28, 2004

SUBJECT: **Thoughts on Iraq**

D.R.

IF aq

Please review the attached and get back to me at your earliest convenience with your comments and thoughts.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
052804.06

Attach: SD Thoughts on Iraq

28 May 04

OSD 07998-04

May 28, 2004

SUBJECT: Thoughts on Iraq

When I meet with U.S. military commanders in Iraq and the senior military leadership here in Washington, DC, as I do so often, I invariably hear their confidence and conviction about the progress being made in Iraq and the solid prospect of success. But when one turns on the television or reads the press here, in the United States and in much of the world, the reports are mostly of problems, difficulties, pessimism and despair.

It is fair to ask, which of these perspectives is correct, or more correct, and therefore which should be shaping U.S. policy and conditioning world thinking on this critically important matter?

One reason for the glaring disparity - and it is an enormous difference - may be the standard or expectation that one measures progress against. Those wonderful volunteer soldiers engaged in the struggle against terrorists, who are participating on the front lines of the global war against extremism, who see first hand the relatively small number of radicals trying to hijack a religion from the large majority of moderate Muslims and who are fighting this global terrorist

Iraq

28 May 04

28 May 04

OSD 07998-04

11-L-0559/OSD/41575

insurgency, they have the first hand experience and the perspective to understand not to expect war to be tidy, orderly or predictable.

Quite the contrary, they recognize that conflict, these types of struggles have always been difficult, that people get killed and wounded, that those who step forward with courage can become the targets of assassins and that the purpose of terrorism is to terrorize, to frighten and to cause people to alter their behavior. And terrorism can work. There are those who when frightened, change course, acquiesce, or try to appease the terrorists, the extremists. So those people on the front line of the struggle see the insurgency for what it is, and their expectations tend to be realistic. The perspective is rooted in history and in personal experience.

Conversely, other observers, removed from the battle, and receiving information only through the media see it differently and their perspective is shaded by those who compare what is taking place, with all the difficulties not against history or personal experience, but against the false standard of those countries that have already succeeded in their struggles for freedom and now enjoy tranquility. Not surprisingly, they see that events in Iraq are not tranquil, are not peaceful, and indeed, in many cases, are dangerous and ugly. So they can be vulnerable to the

argument that all is lost, that the terrorists are sure to win, and that what is being done is wrong or imperfect or misguided or, in more extreme cases, even malevolent.

The more correct perspective is to look at history, to look at the struggles that have taken place over the decades, to look at the countries that have navigated the difficult and bumpy path from dictatorships and theocracies to representative civil societies. Only by reflection on those histories, those struggles, then can one appreciate the truth that that path to freedom has always been difficult, always dangerous, and always filled with ugliness. So to test the Coalition's progress against the picture of those that have prevailed is wrong. What is taking place in Iraq is not unusual, let alone wrong. What is taking place should be understandable from history for those who wish to understand. This is a hard road, a tough road, a road filled with potholes and lethal dangers. That is the road we are on – and it is the right road.

It is a road that has been traveled by a number of countries over the decades and successfully so, despite the faint-hearted and those who persuaded themselves it couldn't be done. Even our own country navigated through tough periods, seeing

demonstrations, riots, battles, and we survived it all because the American people were steadfast, courageous and listened to the wiser councils.

Many contended that Japan, Germany and Italy could not successfully move from fascism to a civil society. And while it was not easy to be sure, they did it. It was hard in each case. It took time. And people were killed. And there were difficulties and ugliness. But they succeeded, to the great benefit of the civilized world.

For a country to be great, for a country to be purposeful, for a country to be steadfast, it has to have a concentration span of something greater than a 30 second sound bite, it must be rooted in history and have an understanding that, as Thomas Jefferson of the path to democracy said, "One ought not to expect to be transported on a featherbed."

What is taking place in Iraq is hard and it is not perfect. But it should not be expected to be perfect. It never has been. Is it failing? No. Is there a very good chance it can succeed? You bet. Is it certain? No. But one thing is certain. Our forces cannot be defeated in this struggle on the battlefields of Iraq, They can be

pinpricked to death. They can suffer heartbreaking casualties as they are, but they cannot be defeated on the battlefield. The only way the vital cause can be lost is if the American people are falsely persuaded that it is lost, that it cannot be won, or is not worth the pain.

I can say with absolute conviction that all is not lost. And those who seek the truth should sharply challenge those who are trying to hold this process up against unrealistic expectations. Ask the pundits and the critics where in history it has ever been done smoothly. Ask where in history has a country gone from a repressive, vicious dictatorship to a peaceful, stable, constitutional, civil society without difficulties and challenges or loss of life. And if there are not good answers – and there are not – then ask why should Iraq be tested against that unrealistic template? It should not be. It must not be, or we fail our convictions.

What is taking place is tough. It is hard. It is uncertain. It is dangerous. It's ugly. It is requiring the sacrifice of many wonderful young men and young women - who are all volunteers, and may God bless them all. But the least they deserve is an honest assessment of what it is they are doing. The very least they deserve is an accurate, truthful understanding of the progress that is being achieved both in Afghanistan and Iraq. The least they deserve is some recognition for the progress

they have made - the hospitals that have been built, the clinics that have been opened, the schools that have been staffed and provided new textbooks, the economic progress that has been achieved. The least they deserve is a recognition of the courage demonstrated by the Iraqi security forces they have trained, and the courage of the hundreds of Iraqis who have stepped up to become governors, city council members and police chiefs, at risk to their lives.

This Memorial Day season is a time for reflection to be sure, for thoughtfulness, but also for fairness, balance, and historical perspective. The American people deserve that. They deserve it from those who would lead, as well as those who do lead. And they deserve it from the media that has the full constitutional freedom to be fair, to be honest, to be thorough and constructive.

It is important to ask what are the alternatives for that troubled region and for the 25 million recently liberated Iraqi people, and for the United States, and for our 33 allies in the multinational Coalition?

The Iraqi people know what they want. More than 60 percent of the Iraqi people say they want a single Iraq, with power centralized in Baghdad. Another 20 percent want a single state with power shared between Baghdad and the provincial governments. So more than 80 percent are opposed to breaking up that country. We also know that no nation wants to be occupied. We know that and understand.

We know that the Iraqi people, despite the terrorist attacks, despite the improvised explosive devices, despite the assassinations, despite the disruptions to essential services, despite the fact that the terrorists continue to kill innocent Iraqi citizens by the dozens each week - innocent Iraqi men, women and children - and have already killed close to 400 of the Iraqi security forces, despite all of that, among all Iraqis 70 percent say that getting rid of Saddam Hussein was worth the hardship they face today. Among Iraqi Kurds it is over 90 percent. Among Iraqi Shia, it is 80 percent. Even among the minority Arab Sunnis, those who prospered the country under Saddam Hussein, the figure is only slightly below 50 percent. So the Iraqi people do understand that life is better, despite the critics constant drumbeat to the contrary.

So what then might be the alternatives to the path we are on as disturbing as this path may be? What alternatives do those who criticize and emphasize everything that is dangerous and tumultuous, as opposed to the progress being achieved and the opportunity ahead. What do they suggest? Some say leave. Some say to internationalize the occupation despite the fact that not a week goes by that efforts are not made to decrease the 33 nation coalition and increase the involvement by NATO and the UN.

What if the coalition were to shift direction and leave prematurely? Thoughtful observers speculate that the possibilities would include the following:

- There could be civil war.
- There could be ethnic cleansing of the likes Iraq has seen previously, filling up still more mass graves.
- It could become a failed state and anarchy prevail, with terrorists eventually taking it over and achieving a safe haven to attack the United States and other civil societies.
- One of the neighboring countries would take over and impose their rule – possibly a neighbor would try to put in place still another handful of radical clerics.

- The country could split up into parts with the result being that Iraq would no longer be a nation and their neighbor's aspirations for their land and wealth would be encouraged.
- Or a new Saddam Hussein could take control and reimpose another vicious, theocracy dictatorship.

Which of those options or others equally undesirable might critics argue would be better than the President's goal of Iraq as a single country, at peace with its neighbors, not trafficking with terrorists and respectful of women and all ethnic, religious and minority groups within their borders?

I am convinced that we are on the right course, that the difficulties we face are understandable, given the historical record of many countries that navigated through the difficult seas and faced similar problems. I know of no better alternative for the Iraqi people, for the region, or for the world.

And I repeat, there is no way this struggle can be lost on the ground in Iraq. It can only be defeated by those who insist on not recalling history, and on rushing to conclude it can't be done.

We are waging this struggle during a period of 24 hour news, seven days a week for the first time in our nation's history. And we are doing it during a Presidential election year where incredibly there seems to be a suspension of civil discourse. So we are in for a rough six months. But when we are successful, it will be a fresh 21st Century demonstration of the good center of gravity of the American people and their common sense ability to separate fact from fiction, and paralysis from perserverance.

DHR:dh
052704-8

72

May ²⁸ 26, 2004

Iraq

TO: Steve Herbits
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Your Report

Steve—

Thanks for your report. Ugh!

Keep them coming.

Regards,

DHR:dh
052604-9

28 May 04

OSD 08002-04

cc: Craddock
Butler

(b)(6) CIV, OSD

From: Thirdwave2@aol.com

Sent: Sunday, May 23, 2004 7:33 PM

To: (b)(6)@osd.pentagon.mil; Larry.DiRita@osd.pentagon.mil;
John.Craddock@OSD.Pentagon.mil; (b)(6)@jack.patterson@osd.mil

Cc: peter.pace@js.pentagon.mil

Subject: Fwd: Chalabi - Important

this is in its own way similar to abu ghraib

there was no excuse for this level of action and no excuse for cpa lying about it
newt

(b)(6) CIV, OSD

From: (b)(6)
Sent: Sunday, May 23, 2004 5:27 PM
To: Thirdwave2@aol.com
Subject: Chalabi - Important

From an American Friend Who Witnessed the Humiliating Raid Against Chalabi
(With thanks to Harold Rhode)
Sent: Friday, May 21, 2004 10:26 AM
Subject: Baghdad update

Hi folks,

I wanted to let everyone know that I am safe in Iraq after what was a very eventful day yesterday. As most of you know, I work closely with Dr. Chalabi in Iraq, assisting the INC as a financial advisor. Yesterday, as I was sitting in my nightshirt and shorts, getting ready to face the day, my guard came in and told me that Dr. Chalabi's guards were being arrested. Yelling to my friend and housemate Francis, I raced over to Dr. Chalabi's house to find a confrontation between the Iraqi Police (IP), guarded by the US military and advised by plain clothed "advisors" to the IP. Two Americans demanding to know who was in charge of this operation, startled them. Suddenly some of the American "advisors" disappeared into their cars. The US military were fine—just obeying orders. After a back and forth with the IP and the US military, one unarmed IP was allowed inside to search for the persons for whom they had warrants.

It is helpful to understand that these "warrants" are coming from a special court established by Paul Bremer and reporting directly to him. The judge used to be a translator at the CPA Ministry of Justice and was imposed on the court by the CPA. His first charge was against Aras Kareem, the head of INC intelligence. According to the arrest warrant, he was charged with stealing 11 vehicles that belonged to the Ministry of Finance. Those 11 vehicles had been parked on INC property for protection and the MOF had taken the keys with them. The temporary offices of the MOF (its permanent building was damaged in the war) had no room for the vehicles. The MOF sent a letter to the judge saying there was no basis for the charges. The judge threatened the MOF lawyer with imprisonment if the MOF did not withdraw the letter. He also refused to take the letter from Aras's lawyer. Even yesterday, when they came to arrest several people (none of course were at Dr. Chalabi's house), their investigation was so poor that they did not even know the last names of the people they were trying to arrest. They tried to arrest one of Dr. Chalabi's drivers just because his first name was Kamaran—a common Kurdish name. It would be like going to an office with a warrant to arrest Mike and arresting anyone with that first name.

After the police left (with nothing) I went over to China House—the INC office—where this time there was no pretense of arresting anyone. The plain-clothed American advisor without ID said they were seizing the building. I asked to see the warrant but none was available and no one would admit to being in charge. Under the watchful eye of these advisors, the IP ransacked the office, shooting Dr. Chalabi's picture, overturning furniture, looting what they could carry off and spewing garbage everywhere. Dr. Chalabi had a group picture of his father—about 50 persons in total. The police had smashed the glass and punched a hole through the face of Dr. Chalabi's father. We forget that Iraqis have long histories and long memories. That this police officer would recognize the face of Dr. Chalabi's father in a sea of faces is illustrative of the roots of the invasion of his office.

5/24/2004

11-L-0559/OSD/41587

Paul Bremer's imperious manner has resulted in a tremendous loss of American and Iraqi lives. His subversion of Iraq's nascent judicial system to silence a political opponent not only undermines Iraqi democracy but ours as well. I am okay in Baghdad, but angry.

Peg

Stephen E. Herbits

(b)(6)



December 13, 2004

TO: Jim O'Beirne
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Background Sheet on Harry Kraemer, Jr.

A friend of mine, Joe Jannotta, sent me this background sheet. It is self-explanatory. Please feed it into the process. I don't know the individual, but I know Joe Jannotta very well and he's an outstanding person and a Korean War Naval aviator.

Thanks.

Attach.
Background Sheet on Harry Kraemer, Jr.

DHR:ss
121004-20

.....
Please respond by 1/6/05

230.02

13 Dec 04

(b)(6)

ShieldsMeneley P A R T N E R S

311 South Wacker Drive
Suite 4375
Chicago, IL 60606
312.994.9500
312.994.9550-Fax
www.ShieldsMeneley.com

To: Donald Rumsfeld Fax: (b)(6)

From: Joe Jarmotta (b)(6) Date: 12/9/2004

Re: Harry Kraemer's Resume ^{+ letter} Pages: 8 5

CC:

Urgent For Review Please Comment Please Reply Please Recycle

Comments: Don: This a very talented health care exec. As the attached letter to me indicates Harry would like to work for HHS. could I have 2 minutes to talk about him?

*Best,
Joe*
(b)(6)

Please feel free to contact Harry directly on his cell phone (b)(6)

SHIELDS MENELEY PARTNERS EXECUTIVE GROWTH STRATEGIES™

Subj: Candidate for HHS position
Date: 12/7/2004 4:37:44 PM Eastern Standard Time
From: HKraemerJr
To: Jejannotta
File: harrybio8-04.doc

Dear Joe,

It was great speaking with you. As I mentioned, I spoke with Secretary Tommy Thompson today. He stated that they already have a leading candidate to replace him at HHS. However, he also stated that given my extensive healthcare and management experience, that I would be an excellent candidate.

Given my background of 22 years of global healthcare experience at Baxter Int'l, including the last five as Chairman and CEO, I believe I could make an important contribution. As you know, Baxter is a \$10 billion global healthcare company with more than fifty thousand employees.

Joe, although I am currently looking at other CEO positions within healthcare and lecturing at Northwestern's Kellogg School of Management, I would be honored to have the opportunity to make a true difference in healthcare around the world.

Let me know if this makes sense to you and we can discuss it further at your convenience. I have attached a short bio sketch as well as my contact information.

—
Regards,

Harry

Harry M. Jansen Kraemer, Jr.

office phone:

(b)(6)

office fax:

cell phone:

home phone:

home fax:

HARRY M. JANSEN KRAEMER, JR

Home (b)(6)

(b)(6)

Office (b)(6)

PROFESSIONAL HISTORY**BAXTER INTERNATIONAL****1982 to 2004****CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER / PRESIDENT****1997 to 2004**

Traversed rapid growth, transformation and crisis management during eight-year tenure as President, CEO and Chairman of the Board of a world-leading healthcare business. Outlined and led the execution of progressive strategies to drive market valuation and stock price to all time highs, showcase the company's ability to become a major player in biosciences, and demonstrate a social consciousness that resonated with employees, customers and shareholders.

- Positioned Baxter as one of the healthcare industry's best, most consistent growth companies with revenue and operating profit at double-digit rates over 8 years.
 - Drove a ten-fold increase in market capitalization from \$4 billion in 1993 to \$35 billion by 2002
 - Sustained a 14% average year-over-year increase in stock value to an all time high of \$60/share in 2002 through programs initiated as CFO and continued as President & CEO.
 - Focused the business on profitable growth culminating in revenue growth from \$6.1 billion in 1997 to \$8.9 billion in 2003. Over the same period, net income increased from \$300 million to \$881 million, and net profit margins moved from 4.9% to 9.9%.
 - Led Butler to a solid financial footing, paying down 30% of long-term debt to less than \$2.2 billion in 2002.
 - Instituted aggressive growth through acquisition, completing more than ten transactions valued at more than \$3 billion in ten years to deliver an after-tax return of +20%.
- Led a 2003 corporate restructuring initiative to deliver \$300 million in savings and 25% increases in operating margins over 3-4 years.
 - Reduced global workforce 6%, with 50% of headcount reductions in G&A.
 - Divested slow growth businesses, freeing up more than \$1 billion in capital.
 - Drove manufacturing supply chain improvements, closed ten facilities, and improved overall economies of scale.
- Reinforced a values-based, shared objectives business philosophy initiated as CFO. Demonstrated that corporate investments in people were value-added and the key to success.
 - Hand-picked a talented management team, cultivating self-confidence and holistic decision-making.
 - Named the first Chief Scientific Officer and helped advance careers of many executives who later became CEO/President of other companies.
 - Increased headcount 20% while increasing revenue and profit 30-50% in six years.
 - Maintained simple, open and personal communications with all employees at facilities around the world.
 - Pioneered emerging global standards for environmental and social reporting. Named to *Business Ethics Magazine's* list of 100 Best Corporate Citizens; achieved Top 10% ranking in Dow Jones Sustainability Group Index.
- Diversified the portfolio to create a balanced revenue base. Increased investments in BioScience to 37% of revenue; Medication Delivery to 43% of revenue, offsetting slower growth in Renal Therapy, 20% of revenue, 2003.
- Unveiled an aggressive strategy to build the BioScience business to \$10 billion by 2010. Delivered 20%+ year over year growth in the \$2.5 billion enterprise that is now on par with global biotech firms such as Amgen and Genentech.
 - Drove \$1 billion+ in strategic investments in blood plasma, recombinants and biosurgery products.
 - Positioned Baxter as the "manufacturer of choice" and collaborative partner for small biotech companies.

HARRY KRAEMER

PAGE 2

- Entered the vaccine market with plans to grow a \$100 million business to \$1 billion in ten years. Achieved technology breakthroughs with 10+ vaccines in development Partnered with Acambis PLC to win a \$428 million sole source contract with the federal government for smallpox vaccine.
 - Directed \$1 billion in capital investments in global manufacturing facilities to create high quality, low-cost capacity to produce genetically engineered vaccines and Factor 8 products.
 - Navigated through major market upheaval and 40% price erosion when competitors re-entered the plasma protein market in 2002. Attained market leadership position in blood disorder therapies.
 - Boosted European presence and share of open-heart surgery devices through strategic acquisitions in 1997.
 - Led the rapid growth of a cardiovascular unit spun-off in 2000 as Edwards Lifesciences. Delivered 200% shareholder value and created a new publicly traded company with strong global presence.
- Led strategic repositioning to accelerate the growth of Baxter's flagship \$3+ billion Medication Delivery business. Structured and closed a series of acquisitions to create a robust portfolio of products for physicians and hospitals.
 - Entered the drug delivery business and grew it to \$1 billion in revenue by structuring partnering contracts with major pharmaceutical companies.
 - Expanded anesthesia business lines into a highly profitable market segment.
 - Lunched a five-year strategy to grow a \$200 million oncology business into a \$1 billion enterprise. Acquired oncology business from a major German chemical company that doubled the portfolio of cancer treatments.
 - Positioned the Renal therapy business to capitalize on opportunities in parental and hemo dialysis markets.
 - Partnered with Microsoft and Cisco in 2000 to develop applications for web-enabled kidney dialysis machines to connect the scientific, doctor and patient communities.
- Demonstrated Baxter's social conscientiousness as a 'life saving' company that "did the right thing" regardless of the financial or legal impact
 - Testified before Congress in 2002 as the Chairman of the Healthcare Leadership Council's Executive Task Force on the Uninsured to advocate a combination of solutions to solve a national crisis.
 - Set aside \$150 million in 2001 to compensate victim's families who died using dialysis machines in Europe. Immediately closed plants in acquired company and pulled products from the market. Volunteered a 40% pay cut and 20% reduction in executive bonuses to the Board Compensation Committee.
 - Settled thousands of claims with women suffering side-effects from silicone breast implants in 1997, and hemophiliacs infected with HIV from blood products in 1993.
 - Responded proactively to shareholder concerns of PVC-based hospital supply products, which resulted in a withdrawal of a shareholder resolution and favorable relations with activist groups.
- Championed work-life balance philosophy across the business, attracting and retaining top-notch employees and receiving immeasurable paybacks in employee productivity.
 - Earned recognition as a Fortune "Best Company to Work" in 2001.
 - Introduced back-up elder care, adoption assistance, and alternative work arrangements, e.g., flextime and job sharing.
 - Increased annual giving through the Baxter Foundation to care for uninsured and the elderly, prevent child abuse, promote health education and help local communities.
 - Donated money to charitable causes in which employees participated through "Dollars for Doers" program.

SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT & CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER

1993 to 1997

Promoted to top financial job to introduce discipline and strategic focus in revenue, profit and earnings. Given full latitude to effect a corporate-wide cultural transformation to shared values and objectives. Created and instituted programs that had a widespread impact on the perception of investors, customers, management, employees and the community. Appointed to the Baxter Board of Directors in 1995.

- Transformed Baxter's image as a laggard financial performer by encouraging the spin-off of slow-growth companies to create financial flexibility, and enhance competitive position and shareholder value.
 - Spearheaded financial and operational disciplines that resulted in consistent, solid returns. Grew net income 11% and net profit margins 6.3% from 1993 to 1996.

11-L-0559/OSD/41593

- Self-appointed "Cash Wow Officer" to partner with operating executives in driving profitable business growth despite margin pressures.
 - Led Baxter's spin-off as two separate companies: a \$5 billion biotechnology, renal therapy, and cardiovascular medicine enterprise, and a \$3.8 billion U.S. hospital distribution business.
 - Substantiated the need to divest home care and cardiac device businesses where growth was impeded by Medicare and Medicaid price caps.
 - Designed an exit strategy of the U.S. hospital supply business achieving 650% shareholder return when business was ultimately sold to Cardinal Health in 1998.
- Drove an unprecedented restructuring of the business to capitalize on a 60-year history in blood related health businesses.
 - Targeted international growth to increase Baxter's offshore sales from 25% to 50% of total revenue
 - Extended reach into US cardiovascular perfusion market through the 1995 acquisition of PSICOR and SETA-
 - Led the 1996 \$750 million acquisition of Immuno International to boost European sales.
 - Created a new corporate shared values statement -- *Respect, Responsiveness & Results* -- to promote a clear understanding of corporate objectives and build a values-based corporate culture for 55,000 employees.
 - Broke down "silos" across functional disciplines, business lines and worldwide geographies to improve collaboration and optimize the entire portfolio
 - Ramped-up communication to employees including a fully integrated telecommunications system with weekly voicemails to keep them abreast of progress in every global business unit.
 - Converted an informal "CFO Update" for senior management into a monthly newsletter sent to all employees
 - Created a "Ask Harry" program where employee could communicate directly with the CFO -- a program emulated by all 80 senior managers across the company.
 - Developed a new performance management system that incorporated shared values principles into performance appraisals.
 - Complemented new shared values with the development of four key objectives: *Best Team, Best Partner, Best Results & Best Citizen*.
 - Introduced work/life balance programs that reduced turnover and improved employee satisfaction.
 - Developed new sales/marketing initiatives to position Baxter as a business partner to physicians and hospitals.
 - Implemented focus, discipline, consistency and credibility into all financial planning, budgeting and forecasting processes.
 - Set the example for being responsive to the needs of people, encouraging volunteerism, philanthropy and community outreach.
 - Adopted an annual environmental P&L statement, demonstrating that investments in environmental, health and safety benefited the company and the community.
 - Gained significant media coverage for a unique five-year shared investment program for the top 80 senior managers that focused on creating shareholder value.
 - Introduced voluntary stock purchase plan through personal loans that made senior management vested shareholders in the business.
 - Collaborated with WR to change management objectives and to weight incentive compensation toward profitable growth, cash generation, ROI and overall business results.
 - Led "road show" presentations to share Baxter's vision of delivering a four-fold increase in cash generation that resulted in a 300% increase in stock price over the life of the program.
 - Led the repurchase of more than \$1 billion in Baxter common stock and leveraged strong cash flow performance and divestitures to complete the programs ahead of schedule.

VICE PRESIDENT, INTERNATIONAL FINANCE & OPERATIONS

1990 to 1993

Responsible for finance and operations in the \$3 billion international business. Developed and implemented a new structure to align core business functions and operations into a global operating environment.

11-L-0559/OSD/41594

HARRY KRAEMER

PAGE 4

- *Designed and implemented a shared services organization for finance, human resources and IT to optimize resources and reduce G&A expense.*
- *Transformed offshore operations and country management structures into a global environment. Appointed six global heads to translate corporate growth initiatives into regional sales and marketing strategies.*
- *Created centers of excellence across manufacturing facilities in 27 countries to leverage high-quality, low cost production and achieve operating efficiencies and economies of scale.*

DIVISION PRESIDENT, HOSPITEX

1989 TO 1990

Promoted into first P&L responsibility for a \$200 million division with 200 employees responsible for specialty hospital products with responsibility for sales, marketing and operations.

- *Drove double-digit growth through new products, market expansion and client relationship management.*
- *Positioned Hospitex as the lead business in the Baxter portfolio, delivering one of the highest ROI's in the company.*
- *Capitalized on emerging technology to expand offerings in higher value, higher margin patient care systems and hospital equipment to offset declining profit margins in commodity-based products and supplies.*

VICE PRESIDENT, FINANCE & OPERATIONS, HOSPITAL GROUP
CONTROLLER, HOSPITAL SUPPLY DIVISION
CONTROLLER, CARDIOLOGY BUSINESS

1988 to 1989

1987 to 1988

1986 to 1987

Transitioned from corporate finance into line management, earning progressive promotions as the top financial executive of business units/divisions ranging in size from \$800 million to \$4 billion.

VICE PRESIDENT, FINANCIAL PLANNING & ANALYSIS
DIRECTOR, CORPORATE DEVELOPMENT

1985 TO 1986

1982 TO 1985

Brought expertise in business development to a \$1.5 billion company under the leadership of a new CEO with a vision to drive ambitious organic and acquisition-based growth. Earned CPA certification.

PLANNING & BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT ANALYST - NORTHWEST INDUSTRIES
Formerly a \$6B diversified holding company with interests in consumer and industrial products

1979 to 1982

DIRECTOR, BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT
BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT ANALYST

1981 TO 1982

1979 TO 1981

EDUCATION

MBA, Finance & Accounting - Kellogg School of Management/Northwestern University, 1979

BS Summa cum Laude, Mathematics & Economics - Lawrence University, 1977
Certified Public Accountant

BOARD & COMMUNITY AFFILIATIONS

Science Application International Corporation (SAIC), Board of Directors
 Northwestern University, Board of Trustees
 Kellogg School of Management, Dean's Advisory Board
 Schaffner Award for Outstanding Leadership & Service - Kellogg School of Management, 1996
 Lawrence University, Board of Trustees
 Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health, Dean's Advisory Board
 Evanston Northwestern Healthcare, Board of Trustees
 Business Counsel, Commercial Club of Chicago
 Economics Club of Chicago
 Past Member, Business Round Table - Healthcare Leadership Counsel

11-L-0559/OSD/41595

DEC 13 2004

TO: (b)(6)
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: E-mail to Gingrich re: JWACC

Iraq

Please send the following e-mail to Newt Gingrich:

Newt—

Thanks for your e-mail on JWACC and Iraq. I have asked Paul Wolfowitz to dig into it fast.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
121004-19

.....
Please respond by _____

EMAILED 12/13 0700

13 Dec 04

OSD 08040-05

FOUO

December 10, 2004

TO: Jim O'Beirne
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Tom Christie

We need to start trying to find a replacement for Tom Christie. He plans to leave in January.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
121004-15

.....
Please respond by 12/16/04

020 OTE

10 Dec 04

OSD 08041-05

720
FOUO

December 10, 2004

TO: Paul Butler
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Status of Letter

452 T

Please find out the status of this letter dated November 19; what has been done, who is doing it, who has the action on it, and when it will be completed.

Thanks.

Attach.
11/19/04 Letter from Levin, Warner and McCain to SecDef

DHR:ss
121004-13

.....
Please **respond** by 12/16/04

10 Dec 04

FOUO

11-L-0559/OSD/41598 OSD 08042-05

Chairman Warner's Office

- JOHN MICHAEL ARIZONA
- JAMES M. WADSWORTH CALIFORNIA
- PAT ROBERTS KANSAS
- WYATT ALLARD COLORADO
- PHIL SHERIDAN ALABAMA
- KEVIN W. CULLEN MAINE
- JOHN ENGLISH NEVADA
- JAMES V. TALENT MISSOURI
- LARRY CRAWFORD MISSOURI
- LYNCH D. GRAHAM SOUTH CAROLINA
- C. JASPER OCEAR NORTH CAROLINA
- JOHN CORNYN TEXAS
- SEN. JEFF MORGAN MASSACHUSETTS
- EDWARD M. SENEZ MASSACHUSETTS
- ROBERT C. BYRD WEST VIRGINIA
- JOHN L. CRAMER CONNECTICUT
- JACK REED RHODE ISLAND
- DANIEL C. AKAKA HAWAII
- BILL NELSON FLORIDA
- E. BENJAMIN NELSON NEBRASKA
- MARK DAYTON MINNESOTA
- TYAN SPOFFORD IOWA
- HILARY RODHAM CLINTON NEW YORK
- MARIE WYDOR ARIZONA

JOYCE A. ANGLY STAFF DIRECTOR
RICHARD C. DANDREA SENIORITY STAFF DIRECTOR

United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-8050

November 19, 2004

R5

Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
1000 Defense Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301-1000

Dear Mr. Secretary:

On December 2, 2003, Chairman Warner wrote to Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz to request that the Department of Defense Inspector General (DOD IG) conduct a thorough investigation of the KC-767A tanker aircraft program. According to Chairman Warner's letter "this inquiry should examine the actions of all members of the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Department of the Air Force, both military and civilian, top to bottom, who participated in structuring and negotiating the proposed tanker lease contract which was submitted to the Congress in July 2003." A copy of that letter is attached.

It was our understanding that the requested DOD IG review would assess not only individual responsibility for any allegations of criminal violations of law; but, equally important, individual accountability for management decisions and executive oversight. In essence, the Senate Committee on Armed Services, in order to conduct its necessary legislative oversight of the Department of Defense, needs to know what happened, who was accountable and what actions must be taken to prevent this situation from happening again.

It is astonishing to us that one individual could have so freely perpetrated, for such an extended period, this unprecedented series of fraudulent decisions and other actions that were not in the best interest of the Department of Defense.

We recently found out that no such managerial accountability review has been undertaken by the DOD IG. Rather, the DOD IG limited his review to determining whether there was evidence to press criminal charges. We are deeply concerned by this development. Given the Chairman's letter, why was a decision made not to do this work?

Congressional oversight of the proposed contract to lease 100 KC-767A tanker aircraft, a contract which is now prohibited by section 133 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, uncovered the most significant defense procurement scandal since the D1 Wind bribery and fraud cases of the 1980s. It is imperative that the Department take actions to hold those responsible accountable. Otherwise, the fallout from this Air Force procurement scandal will have disastrous effects on the integrity of the acquisition system.

18663-04

In our view, an assessment of accountability should include a review of all members of the Department of Defense, and the Department of the Air Force, both military and civilian, who participated in structuring and negotiating the proposed tanker lease contract. Most importantly, this should include Secretary of the Air Force Jim Roche, and Assistant Secretary of the Air Force Marvin Sambur. We reiterate the Committee's request that the DOD IG immediately initiate such an accountability review.

Again, we do not understand how one individual could have amassed so much power that she was able to perpetuate such fraud against the federal government and other actions that were not in the best interest of the Department of Defense. Where was the oversight? Where were the checks and balances? At a minimum, the acquisition chain of the Air Force, and perhaps DOD, was woefully inadequate. The fact that no Departmental review of these questions has been conducted raises significant accountability and oversight questions that go far beyond this one case. We trust you will endeavor to rectify the situation and hold those who are responsible accountable.

Sincerely,

Carl Levin
Ranking Member

John Warner
Chairman

John McCain
U.S. Senator

Attachment

cc: Department of Defense Inspector General

May 28, 2004

TO: Condoleezza Rice
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: **Attached**

DRD CPA

Attached is a memorandum that is time sensitive. We cannot allow him to arrive back in the country without protection.

Ray Du Bois will get back to you some time next week to see what your thinking is.

Thank you.

DHR/azn
052804.03

Attach: Du Bois Snowflake 5/28/04

28 May 04

OSD 08043-04



ADMINISTRATION AND
MANAGEMENT

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1950 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1950

June 2, 2004

FOR: The Honorable Andrew Card, Assistant to the President and Chief of Staff

FROM: Raymond F. DuBois, Director of Administration and Management, Office of the
Secretary of Defense *Ray DuBois*

SUBJECT: Personal Security for Ambassador Jerry Bremer

Dr. Rice's staff told me that she forwarded to you the attached note Secretary Rumsfeld sent us on the subject of Ambassador Bremer's security upon his return to the U.S. at the end of this month.

As a first step, I think we need a Personal Security Vulnerability Assessment (PSVA) to quickly and expertly determine the nature and severity of threats to Ambassador Bremer and his family.

Given Ambassador Bremer's status as Presidential Envoy, I think it would make most sense if your office directed the U.S. Secret Service to analyze the threat situation and to propose an appropriate protection plan.

A concurrent step is the need to address the open issue of who in the Executive branch would have the actual authority and responsibility to provide or contract for any protection measures based on the threat to Ambassador Bremer once he leaves office.

Please let me know what I should do to assist.

cc: Secretary Rumsfeld
Dr. Rice

OSD 08043-04

11-L-0559/OSD/41603

May 28, 2004

TO: Condoleezza Rice
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: **Attached**

Attached is a memorandum that is time sensitive. We cannot allow him to arrive **back** in the country without protection.

Ray Du Bois will get back to you some time next week to see what your thinking is.

Thank you.

DHR/azn
052804.03

Attach: Du Bois Snowflake 5/28/04

OSD 08046-04

11-L-0559/OSD/41604

May 28, 2004

TO: Ray Du Bois
CC: Condoleezza Rice
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Security for Jerry Bremer Upon His Return to the U.S.

A threat assessment should be made as to Bremer's security. Undoubtedly, it will show he needs government paid security after he arrives back in the U.S. for a period.

I do not know what his circumstance is in terms of the government. He is a presidential envoy, he reports to Condi Rice, he is a career ambassador, and the Pentagon has been his back office. The responsibility for his security, I suppose, could come from the secret service, the State Department, the Pentagon or a private contractor to be paid by one of the agencies of the government.

I don't know a lot about this, but I know we better get started right now making sure that the minute he arrives back the security is in place.

I have spoken to Mrs. Bremer and she understandably is aware that there is a price on his head.

Please screw your head into this and let me know what you think. I am sending a copy of this to Condi Rice so she will be aware of the need, and the fact that she and her staff ought to sort through what is the best way to handle this matter.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
052804.02

11-L-0559/OSD/41605



December 10, 2004

TO: Paul Butler
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Jason Read

Please get back to me with a report on whoever Jason Read saw, what they think and what might happen.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
121004-11

.....
Please respond by 12/21/04

000.71 SD

10 Dec 04

FOUO

OSD 08043-05

11-L-0559/OSD/41606

December 10, 2004

TO: Jim MacDougall

CC: Gen Dick Myers
Mira Ricardel
Ryan Henry
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Good Job in Georgia with the Vice Chairman

335 813

Jim,

I've heard from General Pace what a nice job you did in discussions with the Georgian MOD and President. Your high quality work throughout a complex AOR is notable, and is only the latest example.

Thanks for all you are doing.

DHR:ss
121004-7

.....
Please respond by _____

10 Dec 04

OSD 08044-05

May 28, 2004

TO: Ray Du Bois
CC: Condoleezza Rice
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: **Security for Jerry Bremer Upon His Return to the U.S.**

020 CPA

A threat assessment should be made as to Bremer's security. Undoubtedly, it will show he needs government paid security after he arrives back in the U.S. for a period.

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Please screw your head into this and let me know what you think. I am sending a copy of this to Condi Rice so she will be aware of the need, and the fact that she and her staff ought to sort through what is the best way to handle this matter.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
052804.02

28 May 04

OSD 08046-04

11-L-0559/OSD/41608

10301

June 8, 2004

TO: Ray DuBois
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Bremer Security

File

380.01

Please keep your head into the Bremer security situation. It is **possible** he could be coming home somewhat earlier. We want to make sure the security preparations are in **place** and that they know the drill.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
060804-4

.....
Please respond by 6/15/04

RdW

Secret brested orally.

Paul Butler
6/18

8 JUN 04

28MAY04

OSD 08046-04

May 28, 2004

TO: Ray Du Bois
CC: Condoleezza Rice
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: **Security for Jerry Bremer Upon His Return to the U.S.**

A threat assessment should be made as to Bremer's security. Undoubtedly, it will show he needs government paid security after he arrives back in the U.S. for a period.

I do not know what his circumstance is in terms of the government. He is a presidential envoy, he reports to Condi Rice, he is a career ambassador, and the Pentagon has been his back office. The responsibility for his security, **I suppose**, could come from the secret service, the State Department, the Pentagon or a private contractor to be **paid** by one of the agencies of the government.

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Thanks.

DHR/azn
052804.02

OSD 08046-04

11-L-0559/OSD/41610

HUM

May 28, 2004

TO: Condoleezza Rice

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: **Attached**

Attached is a memorandum that is time sensitive. We cannot allow him to arrive back in the country without protection.

Ray Du Bois will get back to you some time next week to see what your thinking is.

Thank you.

DHR/azn
052804.03

Attach: Du Bois Snowflake 5/28/04

OSD 08046-04

11-L-0559/OSD/41611

917
1030



ADMINISTRATION AND
MANAGEMENT

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1950 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1950

INFO MEMO

June 16, 2004, 5:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Raymond F. DuBois

SUBJECT: Security for Ambassador Bremer

Ray DuBois

- In the attached snowflakes you engaged me on the question of Jerry Bremer's security when he returns home.
- Today, I was informed by Mr. Card's office that the Secret Service will be providing personal security protection for Ambassador Bremer for 90 days after his return. After the first 90 days, continuing protection will be based on updated vulnerability assessments by Secret Service.

Attachments

COORDINATION: none

Prepared by: Brett Armstrong, (b)(6)

Bill Brazis, (b)(6)

(b)(6)
(b)(6)

380.01

16 Jun 04

28 May 04

OSD 08046-04

December 9, 2004

TO: Tom Wedige
CC: Paul Butler
Joe Wassel
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Computer and Blackberry

413.51

I would like to get my own computer going. If it cannot be on my credenza, I would like to put it in my small office. Let's talk through how we would do that and what I would want on it.

I also wonder if I ought to get a Blackberry and start using it. Having the cell phone, the computer and the Blackberry may give me a chance to do more things interactively with people faster, without a lot of paper.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
120904-34

.....
Please respond by 12/16/04

9 Dec 04

OSD 08046-05

December 10, 2004

TO: Ray DuBois
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Possible DoD Candidates

Let's put down Asa Hutchinson, who is at Homeland Security, as a person who is a possibility for something here in the Department. For example, he could be General Counsel, Another person is Betty Goldman (I think that is her name), she is Hutchinson's chief of staff. I heard she is excellent. I don't know what she would be able to do, but those are a couple thoughts.

230.02

Thanks.

DHR:ss
121004-6

.....
Please respond by 12/16/04

OSD 08047-05

10 Dec 04

December 10, 2004

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: IG Paper

000.5

The Inspector General was in today and handed me the attached paper.

My understanding, and it is imperfect, is that the IG has the view that something in this packet should be issued. He indicates that David Chu and Jim Roche don't believe it should be issued. I know nothing other than that.

Please dig into it and decide what you think ought to be done and do it, and then let me h o w what you've decided.

Thanks.

Attach.
11/8/04 IG Memos

DHR:ss
121004-3

.....
Please respond by 1/6/05

10 Dec 04



INSPECTOR GENERAL
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
400 ARMY NAVY DRIVE
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22202-4704

08 12/10

NOV 08 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR PERSONNEL
AND READINESS

SUBJECT: Addressing the Sexual Assault Challenges in the Department of Defense

As a follow-on to the DoD Leadership Consultation Summit on Sexual Assault, I want to provide constructive recommendations and pledge the continued support of the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) in assisting your efforts to meet the challenges.

As you know, we have significant recent experience in this area. In February 2003, my office received a request from Senator John Warner asking that we "review the work being done by the Air Force and others" relating to a number of former and current cadets [who] may have allegedly been sexually assaulted and possibly raped while serving at the United States Air Force Academy." During a subsequent meeting with Senator Warner he remarked that the leadership challenges at the Air Force Academy associated with these allegations (and any related challenges at the other services academies) "go to the very heart and soul of our Armed Forces." I could not agree more with Senator Warner's comments and since that time my office has been actively engaged in many of the Department's efforts to ensure an adequate and effective response.

In accordance with my statutory duty under the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended (5 U.S.C. Appendix), we have provided oversight of the Air Force General Counsel's Working Group and the work conducted by the Air Force Inspector General, reviewed criminal investigations, initiated several investigations based on information we independently developed from current and former cadets, and referred other complaints to the military services. Additionally, we provided assistance to the Fowler Panel, the Embrey Panel (Task Force on Care for Victims of Sexual Assault), the leadership summit on the Department of Defense Care for the Victims of Sexual Assault, and the Defense Task Force on Sexual Harassment and Violence at the Military Service Academies. We also have exchanged ideas with the Air Force on its draft confidentiality policy (Tab A).


A major undertaking for my office was to develop and administer a sexual assault and leadership climate survey at the Air Force Academy in May 2003 and another sexual assault and leadership climate survey at the Military, Naval and Air Force Academies in the spring of 2004. As part of our overall assessment of sexual assault-related leadership challenges at the service academies we focused on, among other things, the aspirational standards of leadership established by Congress for officers of all three Services (Tab B).

11-L-0559/OSD/41616

As a proactive measure to curb sexual misconduct within the Services, I urged the Service secretaries in an October 31, 2003, memorandum, Subject: Statutory Tools for Suppressing Sexual Misconduct at Service Academies (Tab C), to consider using these statutory tools both to develop officer character traits and to suppress sexual misconduct. In November 2003, I clarified my expectations for the personnel employed or assigned to the OIG to honor those standards (Tab D). The point being missed by some of our leaders is that our leadership standards must be higher than the society we are pledged to protect, and we cannot be content to simply ensure that criminal misconduct is appropriately punished.

As we continue to analyze the data we collected from both sexual assault and leadership surveys, we recognize that one of the contributing factors to current problems is a failure by leaders to "set the bar" high enough, with aspirational, exemplary leadership standards. Currently, although the Army appears to be proactively engaged in infusing these standards into its ongoing revision of AR 600-100, *Army Leadership*, none of the Services has formally implemented the Title 10 standards, in some cases they say, because they were awaiting specific guidance from you. Therefore, I encourage you to issue such guidance expeditiously in a manner consistent with the service-by-service structure in Title 10, which could be as simple as the draft memorandum at Tab E.

We remain committed to assisting the Department improve the efficiency and effectiveness of all DoD programs and operations. To that end, we will assist you in any way we can to improve the safety and security of our military communities and the confidence our service people, civilian employees and their families have in our military institutions.



Joseph E. Schmitz

Attachments:
As stated



INSPECTOR GENERAL
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
400 ARMY NAVY DRIVE
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22202-4704

FEB 4 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE FOR
MANPOWER AND RESERVE AFFAIRS

SUBJECT :Draft Directive for the USAFA Sexual Assault Response Program

Thank you for the opportunity to review and comment upon the draft Memorandum for USAFA/CC, Subject: **USAFA** Sexual Assault Response Program Directive, dated January 26, 2004.

We feel the directive should challenge cadets and staff to set and attain exemplary leadership standards. As is, the directive appears to focus on superficial remedies in the reporting process while missing an opportunity to address more serious issues. We feel that standards at the Air Force Academy should be at least as high, preferably higher, than the corresponding service standards. Statutory provisions in Title 10 USC §8583 require commanders and others in authority "to be vigilant inspecting the conduct of persons who are placed under their command; to guard against and suppress all dissolute and immoral practices, and to correct... all persons who are guilty of them."¹ As pointed out by Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz in a recent memo to the Service Secretaries*, efforts to combat immoral practices, to include sexual misconduct, "begin with the recognition that all commanding officers and other DoD officers and employees in positions of authority are expected to conduct themselves in a manner that is consistent with statutory requirements for exemplary conduct."

In our opinion, a directive in this critical area ought to go beyond superficial changes in the processes governing sexual assault reporting, investigations, and follow-up. The directive and program ought to ensure visibility of violations to senior leadership; address necessary changes to the Academy culture; and motivate cadets and staff to achieve the requisite exemplary leadership standards of Title 10. The directive should make a strong statement clarifying that criminal misconduct will be prosecuted to the full extent of the law and that lesser forms of misconduct, such as consensual sex between cadets,

¹ c f, Colorado Criminal Code Title 18 Article 6, which proscribes immoral activity, including "offenses involving the family relationships" (Article 6), "promoting sexual immorality" (§18-7-208), and "adultery" (§18-6-501).

² DepSecDef memo dated January 30, 2004, subject: Combating Trafficking in Persons in the Department of Defense.

fraternization, and other violations of rules or regulations, are also prohibited and will be addressed appropriately.

Existing deviations from law and regulations and the failure of leadership to change the academy's culture disguised the depth and extent of chronic problems. Improving that culture or climate could improve the effectiveness of normal reporting processes.

The directive **speaks** to three separate program goals but does not address how the program in the draft directive will accomplish those goals; e.g., the policy does not address how the goal of "eliminating sexual assaults and the climate that fosters it" (Goal A) will be achieved. Since "eliminating" sexual assaults is unlikely, we recommend the achievable goal of "suppressing" sexual assaults, which corresponds to the title 10 charge of "suppressing" immoral conduct. Similarly, the policy does not address how the Academy will "restore victim's health and well-being" (Goal B).

Overall, the document is difficult to understand **and**, therefore, could reduce confidence in the process. We **think** neither cadets nor **staff** will easily and effectively comprehend the policy. For example, in the second subparagraph under 5.A., "The Academy Response Team," the sentence is long and convoluted, with **57** words. The phrases "when feasible" and "before initiation" introduce additional confusion. The same is true for the clarity of the first sentence of paragraph 3, with over 90 words. When revising, consider that cadets are the primary audience.

We continue **to** be concerned about official exclusion of the independent investigative authority, **AFOSI**, from the first responders, the Academy Response Team (ART). **A** multidisciplinary response **to** crime is not new -- child abuse and domestic violence are two topical examples. However, the exclusion of the independent investigative authority **from** multidisciplinary teams responding to allegations of violent crime is not common **and**, therefore, should be challenged. In part, sexual assaults at the **Air** Force Academy stayed hidden because the local command controlled the information. The proposed Tier **1** structure continues that systemic problem. We feel that Tier **1** of the ART should include a representative of the independent investigative authority, with that **person's** performance evaluation written by the independent investigative authority's commander at **USFA**. **On** a related topic, excluding the independent investigative authority could condition these future Air Force leaders to **think** that **AFOSI** services are suspect and do not support Air **Force** commanders.

Paragraph **4.C.** is entitled "**Anonymous Report.**" This should probably be entitled "**Confidential Report**"; it is not anonymous. The counselor knows the complainant, and the Superintendent can order the identity released.

Paragraph 4.J. "Academy Response Team". **The** definition does not set forth the roles of the participants or how they will function **as** a team. While procedures may be well understood by the individuals that currently occupy those positions, it is not clearly stated in the **draft** directive for those who will follow them, or those who will later judge their **effectiveness**. Similarly, paragraph **9.E.** "Academy Response Team" is also vague on how the team will function **and** interact with victim.

In paragraph **5**, the meaning of the expression in the fourth sentence "**this** directive establishes the duty" is not clear, and much **of this** sentence is very similar to the first sentence in the same paragraph.

In the second paragraph under **5.A.** "The Academy Response Team," the following statement appears overly broad "no victim will be compelled to be interviewed or undergo a rape protocol." While **AFOSI does** not have the authority **to** compel **a** victim to interview, others do, **as** evidenced by the "Command Override" at paragraph **7**. Additionally, the structure of the sentence appears to single out **AFOSI**, the independent investigative authority. If that is the intent, we think it is incomplete because the same is true of the **ART**. If you think the quoted statement is necessary, which we don't, the statement should be adjusted to read "neither the ART nor AFOSI have the authority to compel **a** sexual assault victim to be interviewed or undergo a **rape** protocol examination."

In the same paragraph, we **think** it should be made clear that **ART** members and **AFOSI** investigators should coordinate with each other **their** actions **with** respect to victims.

Continuing in the same paragraph, we're not **sure** what is meant by the reference to the Victim **and** Witness Protection Act and "...consideration is given to the victims' views prior to initiation of **an** investigation..." **We** find **no** reference **to** that statement in the Attorney General Guidelines for Victim and Witness Assistance.

Three additional items that caught **our** attention in paragraph **5** are:

- At paragraph 5.A., in the fourth sentence, "agency" should be defined or explained.

- At the second paragraph in 5.A., the “ample time” standard is too open ended.
- It wasn’t clear who had responsibility for providing the victim with the DD **Form 2701**, Initial Information for Victims and Witnesses of Crime, or recording that action and reporting it. (DoDI 1030.2, Victim and Witness Assistance Procedures)

From our reading of the draft directive, only a “Designated Counselor” can write the Anonymous Report (**AR**). That appears to be the renaming of an old idea that failed. **Also**, we assume psychotherapist-patient confidentiality, as described in AFI **44-109**, Mental Health, Confidentiality, and Military Law, does not cover those counselors. What isn’t clear, is why you don’t point out the psychotherapist-patient confidentiality at the mental health clinic as an option available to cadets. Other Air Force members have access to the psychotherapist-patient confidentiality at a mental health clinic. **Our** view is that the **ART**, confidential psychotherapists at the ~~mental~~ health clinic, and chaplains are sufficient options. [If the Air Force decides to continue with the **AR**, the Academy should consider existing report formats, such as **Form 11** used by the Office of Special Counsel] The challenge for the academy leadership is to recapture **the** confidence of cadets in both the investigative process and in protections afforded to complainants/victims. If they can’t do that, this program’s likelihood of success will be limited, regardless of the reporting options added.

The detailed Sexual Assault Reporting options fail to recognize the existence or availability of Inspectors General in the process; the plan should include the Academy IG, the Air Force IG, and DoDIG. Special consideration should be given to the Inspectors’ General role in the Military Whistleblower Protection Act, **and** reprisals addressed in section **7** of the Inspector General Act.

Regarding paragraph **7**, Command Override, reference to DoDI **5503.3** (last line) should read 5505.3.

Direction to “all personnel assigned to the Academy” (paragraph I, page **7**) should incorporate the exemplary conduct guidance ~~from~~ Title **10 § 8583** as well as the **other** guidance listed.

We also noted the draft directive claims nothing in the directive alters the authority to investigate provided to **AFOSI** by law or regulation (~~bottom~~ of page **7**). That is not accurate. DoD guidance specifically prohibits the Military Criminal Investigative Organizations (MCIO), the independent investigative

authorities of the Military Departments, ~~from~~ seeking permission to investigate crime, to wit:

MCIO Commanders are not required to solicit, nor shall they solicit ~~from~~ the commanders outside the MCIO, requests or authorizations to initiate investigations. **This** does not prevent MCIOs from discussing with commanders the initiation of a criminal investigation. In each case, the decision to initiate a criminal investigation remains with the **MCIO**. (Para 6.1, DoDI 5505.3, initiation of Investigations by Military Criminal Investigative Organizations, June 21, 2002.)

The "Designated Counselor" option, like the presently structured **ART**, channels reports of violent crime away from the independent investigative authority. That also appears contrary Air Force Policy Directive 71-1, which at paragraph 7.5.1, directs Air Force Commanders to refer to AFOSI all criminal matters **and** offenses for which AFOSI is responsible. Additionally, **as** indicated above, the first sentence in paragraph 7, is inaccurate, the Superintendent may request **an** investigation, but the decision to initiate a criminal investigation remains with the **MCIO**.

We assume every AR will result in the AFOSI Detachment Commander requesting an override by the Superintendent; there is no other way for the AFOSI commander to protect the equity **of** the independent investigative authority. **On** a related topic, it was not clear when the AR must be provided to the ART, though it is clear that when received **the** ART must immediately distribute the AR to **AFOSI** and others.

The necessity **of** CASIE or SAE Guides is not obvious. **A** more direct **and**, therefore, confidential process would allow the complainant to contact directly the **ART** duty person or duty Designated Counselor (if you decide to continue with that option), or psychotherapist ~~from~~ the mental health clinic. Such direct contact could be facilitated using well-publicized procedures, perhaps a combination Blackberry/cell phone.

Amnesty discussions should address instances in which any cadet provides false testimony **as well as** the other situations listed.

Holding other cadets accountable for acting responsibly in a given situation should not be limited to the "senior **ranking** cadet in attendance". As stated, the policy seems to imply that other **ranking** cadets are not accountable for failing to act responsibly.

If we can be of further assistance with this material, please ask. If you have questions concerning our response, please contact me at (b)(6) or Mr. John Perryman, Director of Oversight, (b)(6)


A. Jerry Hansen
Deputy Inspector General
Inspections and Policy

cc: Air Force Inspector General



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON DC

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY

09 FEB 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR THE INSPECTOR GENERAL OF DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
FROM SAF/MR

SUBJECT: Draft Air Force Confidentiality Policy (Deputy Inspector General, Inspections and Policy Letter, February 4, 2004)

Thank you for your office's comments regarding the draft Air Force confidentiality policy (Deputy Inspector General, Inspections and Policy letter of February 4, 2004). While we share enthusiastically many of the concerns expressed in those comments, our draft represents a sincere effort to implement the Fowler Panel's recommendation that confidential reporting be available to Academy cadets alleging sexual assault. The Senate Armed Services Committee commented favorably on those recommendations, and we believe the Senate expects us to implement them.

The proposed policy you reviewed was an attempt to address a concern raised by many as being absent from the Agenda for Change. It was undertaken in the absence of any direction on this issue from OSD. However, in light of your views, we feel that we are unable to move forward. We need to be of one mind with you on this important matter. Please keep in mind that we did not provide for confidentiality originally, because of our belief in the preeminent responsibility of command for the welfare of assigned personnel, and because we agree with the concerns expressed by AFOSI.

There are, however, several matters that I would like to clarify to assist in our collective efforts to think through this dilemma. Some of these matters are addressed below.

The draft policy your office reviewed represents only one small aspect (confidential reporting) of a much larger set of programs being implemented at the Air Force Academy and the Headquarters in response to our review of the sexual assault deterrence and response process. Our comprehensive approach addresses, at fundamental levels, the culture of the Academy, academics, military training, and the cadet disciplinary system. Our Agenda for Change programs will require detailed implementation through Academy directives and will be integrated with other guidance already in place, and to come. We would be delighted to share with you the extensive materials we are using to direct actions towards the exemplary leadership standards referred to in your memorandum.

While we considered both the possibility of using the existing Air Force psychotherapist privilege as your comments suggest, and the potential application of Military Rule of Evidence 513, as suggested by the Fowler Panel, we concluded that neither avenue could accomplish the task. We would be happy to share our analysis with you. Essentially, we believe that these provisions could not provide a practical measure of confidentiality. Thus, we might raise false expectations among our cadets. In addition, we concluded that attempting to use the existing

11-L-0559/OSD/41624

psychotherapist privilege would considerably aggravate the concerns expressed in your letter about limiting information to the AFOSI and command. It is also significant that, **as** designed, our proposed policy would **be** a careful experiment, limited to the Academy reservation, and would not **require** modifications to existing Air Force-wide programs (**as** would be necessary were we to employ either the psychotherapist privilege or the Military Rule of Evidence **513**). We will not contemplate changes to Air Force-wide regulations **and** policies until and unless this prototype process has been tested and judged suitable for wider application.

Finally, we **do** not believe that the draft policy would alter the AFOSI's authority to investigate, contravene DoD Instruction **5505.3**, or have the necessary result that **AFOSI** would need to request override of confidentiality in every **case**. **AFOSI** would retain the **discretion** to initiate **an** investigation into any matter without seeking permission of any commander. Even in the hopefully **rare** circumstances of a limited confidentiality **report**, **AFOSI** would receive detailed information and its agents could exercise their discretion to investigate. Command override provides **AFOSI** the means of obtaining information withheld in the confidential **report**, notably the names of the victim and alleged perpetrator(s). Consistent with the Instruction, the Secretary would ensure that **AFOSI** understands that its commander could, at any time, turn directly to him **on any** matter believed to be an infringement on AFOSI's independence. Further, we believe that the **AFOSI** liaison on Tier 1 would **be** very helpful to **both** the victim and **AFOSI** to ensure that justice is done while not re-victimizing the victim. However, we do agree that such a confidential reporting process could have the effect of limiting information available to investigators.

In light of your comments and our belief that we **are** in **an** untenable position (obligated to proceed, but unable to do **so** without your endorsement), I request a meeting to **discuss** our **mutual** concerns in detail and to **dispel** the perception that **our** efforts **are** mere "superficial remedies."


MICHAEL L. DOMINGUEZ
Assistant Secretary of the Air Force
(Manpower and Reserve Affairs)

cc:
USD (P&R)
DoD GC
SAF/GC
SAF/IG
AF/JA
USAF/CC

**EXEMPLARY CONDUCT STANDARDS
FOR COMMANDERS AND "OTHERS IN AUTHORITY" IN THE MILITARY SERVICES**

10 USC § Section 3583. Requirement of exemplary conduct [ARMY]

All commanding officers and others in authority in the Army are required-

- (1) to show in themselves a good example of virtue, honor, patriotism, and subordination;
- (2) to be vigilant in inspecting the conduct of all persons who are placed under their command;
- (3) to guard against and suppress all dissolute and immoral practices, and to correct, according to the laws and regulations of the Army, all persons who are guilty of them; and
- (4) to take all necessary and proper measures, under the laws, regulations, and customs of the Army, to promote and safeguard the morale, the physical well-being, and the general welfare of the officers and enlisted persons under their command or charge.

10 USC § 5947. Requirement of exemplary conduct [NAVY]

All commanding officers and others in authority in the naval service are required to show in themselves a good example of virtue, honor, patriotism, and subordination; to be vigilant in inspecting the conduct of all persons who are placed under their command; to guard against and suppress all dissolute and immoral practices, and to correct, according to the laws and regulations of the Navy, all persons who are guilty of them; and to take all necessary and proper measures, under the laws, regulations, and customs of the naval service, to promote and safeguard the morale, the physical well-being, and the general welfare of the officers and enlisted persons under their command or charge.

10 USC § 8583. Requirement of exemplary conduct [AIR FORCE]

All commanding officers and others in authority in the Air Force are required-

- (1) to show in themselves a good example of virtue, honor, patriotism, and subordination;
- (2) to be vigilant in inspecting the conduct of all persons who are placed under their command;
- (3) to guard against and suppress all dissolute and immoral practices, and to correct, according to the laws and regulations of the Air Force, all persons who are guilty of them; and
- (4) to take all necessary and proper measures, under the laws, regulations, and customs of the Air Force, to promote and safeguard the morale, the physical well-being, and the general welfare of the officers and enlisted persons under their command or charge.



INSPECTOR GENERAL
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
400 ARMY NAVY DRIVE
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22202-4704

October 31, 2003

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE

SUBJECT: Statutory Tools for Suppressing Sexual Misconduct at Service Academies

The survey my staff administered at the Air Force Academy in May 2003 was designed in part to provide a baseline for a more refined survey at all three Academies, which we are tentatively planning to administer early next year. During the next weeks and months, I hope to work closely with each of you, and with your respective Inspectors General and Academy leaders, to maximize the value of the upcoming three-Academy survey.

In developing the three-Academy survey, as part of our overall assessment of sexual assault-related leadership challenges at the Service Academies, we will be focusing not only on the minimum standards of conduct for cadets and midshipmen, which criminal activities obviously violate, but also on the other end of the spectrum -- the aspirational standards of leadership established by Congress for officers of all three Services, including legislation enacted over the past decade in response to sexual misconduct and related disciplinary challenges in the Armed Forces. This memorandum: (a) encourages your consideration of these recent statutory tools that might be utilized, directly or indirectly, both to develop officer character traits and to suppress sexual misconduct; and (b) explains how these statutory tools might be worked into our forthcoming survey to address "root causes" and, hopefully, to derive useful recommendations for suppressing sexual misconduct at the three Academies.

A. STATUTORY TOOLS

1. "Exemplary Conduct" Leadership Standard

Statutory Leadership Standard: In 1997, Congress legislated the following "Exemplary Conduct" leadership standard for "commanding officers and others in authority" in each of the Services:

All commanding officers and others in authority in the naval service are required to show in themselves a good example of virtue, honor, patriotism, and subordination; to be vigilant in inspecting the conduct of all persons who are placed under their command; to guard against and suppress all dissolute and immoral practices; and to correct, according to the laws and regulations of the Navy, all persons who are guilty of them; and to take all necessary and proper measures, under the laws, regulations, and customs of the naval service, to promote and safeguard the morale, the physical well-being, and the general welfare of the officers and enlisted persons under their command or charge. [10 U.S.C. §5947; 10 U.S.C. §3583 (Army) and §8583 (Air Force)]

Background: The Senate Armed Services Committee Report accompanying the above legislation "note[d] that these standards have applied to the Naval and Marine Corps officers since they were first drafted by John Adams and approved by the Continental Congress in 1775." (see <http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/liberty.pdf>, p. ii) The Report explained the purpose behind the 1997 legislation: "This provision will not prevent an officer from shunning responsibility or accountability for an action or event. It does, however, establish a very clear standard by which Congress and the nation can measure officers of our military services. The committee

11-L-0559/OSD/41627

TAB C

holds military officers to a higher standard than other members of society. The nation entrusts its greatest resource, our young men and women, to our military officers. In return, the nation deserves complete integrity, moral courage, and the highest moral and ethical conduct." (*Id.*)

Even before our upcoming three-academy survey, you might consider discussing with your Service and Academy leadership: (a) how the following "Exemplary Conduct" leadership standard has been promulgated and/or implemented within your Service and at your Service Academy (*see, e.g.*, <http://www.dodig.osd.mil/IGInformation/IGPolicy/OIGLeadershipStd.pdf>, implementing this Exemplary Conduct standard within the Office of Inspector General); and (b) whether this standard is being as fully utilized as it could be, e.g., as required reading (or even memorization) for all cadets and midshipmen, to inspire within those officer candidates the character traits identified in the Senate Committee Report accompanying the 1997 legislation: "complete integrity, moral courage, and the highest moral and ethical conduct."

2. Physically Separated Housing & Privacy For Basic Training

Recitation of the following statutory standard is not intended to suggest that Congress has already explicitly required you to provide "Physically Separate Housing" and "Privacy" for "male and female" cadets and midshipmen at your Service Academies and respective Prep Schools. Rather, my intent here is to suggest that you might wish to reconsider these statutory standards -- considering their remedial nature and purpose¹ -- as tools for suppressing sexual misconduct.

Statutory Standard for "Recruit basic training: separate housing for male and female recruits":

- (a) Physically Separate Housing. - (1) The Secretary of the Air Force shall provide for housing male recruits and female recruits separately and securely from each other during basic training. (2) To meet the requirements of paragraph (1), the sleeping areas and latrine areas provided for male recruits shall be physically separated from the sleeping areas and latrine areas provided for female recruits by permanent walls, and the areas for male recruits and the areas for female recruits shall have separate entrances. (3) The Secretary shall ensure that, when a recruit is in an area referred to in paragraph (2), the area is supervised by one or more persons who are authorized and trained to supervise the area. . . .
- (d) Basic Training Defined. - In this section, the term "basic training" means the initial entry-training program of the Air Force that constitutes the basic training of new recruits.¹
- [10 U.S.C. §9319; similar provisions at 10 U.S.C. §4319 (Army) and §6931 (Navy)]

Statutory Standard for "Recruit basic training: privacy":

The Secretary of the Air Force shall require that access by military training instructors and other training personnel to a living area in which recruits are housed during basic training shall be limited after the end of the training day, other than in the case of an emergency or other exigent circumstance, to military training instructors and other training personnel who are of the same sex as the recruits housed in that living area or to superiors in the chain of command of those recruits

¹ See *Sutherland on Statutory Construction* at §60:1 ("The policy that a remedial statute should be liberally constructed is well established"), citing, *inter alia*, Northeast Marine Terminal Co. v. Caputo, 432 U.S. 249, 268 (1977).

² Neither the statute nor any DoD implementing regulation/directive restricts the definition of "basic training of new recruits" to enlisted recruits; considering the remedial nature of the statute, an argument could be made that the term "basic training of new recruits" should encompass at least "Cadet Basic Training," aka "Plebe Summer." See discussion of the rule of construction for remedial statutes in the previous footnote.

who, if not of the same sex as the recruits housed in that living area, are accompanied by a member (other than a recruit) who is of the same sex as the recruits housed in that living area. [10 U.S.C. §9320; 10 U.S.C. §4320 (Army) and §6932 (Navy)]

Background: The 1997 Report of the Federal Advisory Committee on Gender-Integrated Training and Related Issues to the Secretary of Defense recommended “that female and male recruits be housed in separate barracks. This would decrease disciplinary problems and reduce distractions from training. The committee has reviewed the layout and surge numbers at the training installations, and believes this change can be accomplished at marginal cost, if any.” (<http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/git/report.html>); see GAO/NSIAD 99-75, “Military Housing: Costs of Separate Housing for Male and Female Recruits in Basic Training,” March 1999 (which “determined that the services would not incur additional construction costs if they housed male and female recruits in separate barracks.”) (<http://www.gao.gov/archive/1999/ns99075.pdf>).

B. HOW THESE STATUTORY TOOLS MIGHT FIT INTO OUR FORTHCOMING SURVEY

I have asked my staff to consider each of the above statutory tools as we develop our more refined sexual assault survey instrument for administration at each of your Service Academies early next year. For instance, we will likely endeavor to measure:

- how well cadets and midshipmen relate to the core values of their Service and with the statutory “exemplary conduct” standard, which the Senate Armed Services Committee Report described as the “very clear standard by which Congress and the nation can measure officers of our military services”;
- how well cadets and midshipmen understand the potential constructive role of inspectors general, whose statutory duties focus on “discipline, efficiency, and economy.” See 10 U.S.C. §§3020 (Army), 5020 (Navy) & 8020 (Air Force); and
- whether cadets and midshipmen consider the Academy chaplains required by law (see 10 U.S.C. §§ 4337, 6031 & 9337) to be part of the solution vis-à-vis guarding against and suppressing sexual misconduct, which is antithetical to the character development missions of each Academy. **Seegenerally** www.usafa.af.mil/hc/ (“The Cadet Chapel is the architectural and spiritual centerpiece of our academy. **As** such, it plays a vital role in developing and nurturing the character of our cadets. It is a reminder that we are a nation under God dedicated to the promotion of peace and goodwill among all nations of the world. The young women and men who come to study here do so in order to prepare themselves to protect freedom - freedom which is God’s **gift** to all people.”).

I look forward to continuing dialogue on these issues of vital importance to our Armed Services and to our Nation.

Joseph E. Schmitz

11-L-0559/OSD/41629



**INSPECTOR GENERAL
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
400 ARMY NAVY DRIVE
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22202-4704**

November 7, 2003

**MEMORANDUM FOR CIVILIAN AND MILITARY OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES
ASSIGNED TO THE OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE**

SUBJECT: Office of Inspector General Leadership Standards (Revision 1)


As civilian and military personnel employed by and assigned to the Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, we have been entrusted with important and special obligations. These include the obligation to understand and adhere to standards established for all those who serve in federal offices of inspector general. The basic premise for these standards, as articulated by the President's Council on Integrity and Efficiency, is that:

"Public office carries with it a responsibility to apply public resources economically, efficiently, and effectively. The offices of Inspector General carry an additional public responsibility. The nature of their activities creates a special need for high standards of professionalism and integrity." [Quality Standards for Federal Offices of Inspector General (2003)]

Because we have a special responsibility for oversight of statutes, directives and policies critical to the national defense and to the welfare of soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and civilian employees of the Department of Defense as we carry out the national defense, we are further obligated to adhere to high standards in our personal conduct. These standards are best articulated in the standards of exemplary conduct Congress has prescribed for the Armed Forces:

"All commanding officers and others in authority in the naval service are required to show in themselves a good example of virtue, honor, patriotism, and subordination; to be vigilant in inspecting the conduct of all persons who are placed under their command; to guard against and suppress all dissolute and immoral practices, and to correct, according to the laws and regulations of the Navy, all persons who are guilty of them; and to take all necessary and proper measures, under the laws, regulations, and customs of the naval service, to promote and safeguard the morale, the physical well-being, and the general welfare of the officers and enlisted persons under their command or charge." [10 United States Code § 5947 -- similar provisions at 10 U.S.C. § 3583 (Army) and 10 U.S.C. § 8583 (Air Force)]

My intent in issuing this memorandum is not to establish new standards for our conduct but rather to clarify existing standards -- leadership standards I expect every individual employed by or assigned to the Office of the Inspector General to make a concerted effort to honor. Meeting these standards is essential to the credibility of our investigations into allegations of misconduct within the Department of Defense, as well as our advisory reports to the Services, the Defense Agencies, the Secretary of Defense, and the Congress. Failing to meet them will disserve both our institutional commitment and our personal obligation to the Secretary of Defense, the Congress, the Constitution, and our fellow Americans.

h

Joseph E. Schmitz

11-L-0559/OSD/41630

TAB D

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
UNDER SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
COMMANDERS OF THE COMBATANT COMMANDS
GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE
INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE
DIRECTORS OF THE DEFENSE AGENCIES

SUBJECT: Statutory Tools for Suppressing Sexual Misconduct

Even as various task forces address issues relating to sexual assault in the Armed Forces, I want to offer my view on this important matter to augment the Inspector General's October 31, 2003, Memorandum to the Service Secretaries on the subject.

Secretary Rumsfeld clarified earlier this year that, "Sexual assault will not be tolerated in the Department of Defense. Commanders at every level have a duty to take appropriate steps to prevent sexual assaults, protect victims, and hold those who commit offenses accountable. . . ."

The statutory "Exemplary Conduct" leadership standard identified by the Inspector General in his Memorandum to the Service Secretaries is codified service-by-service: Title 10, §3583 (Army); §5947 (Navy); and §8583 (Air Force). This leadership standard, although first enacted for the Naval Services in 1775, was re-enacted by Congress in 1997 for all three military departments in response to military sexual scandals of the 1990's. Military Departments need not wait for any guidance from the Department of Defense to implement each department's respective statutory standard.

Commanders throughout the Department of Defense, including the Military Departments, should make full use of all tools available, including the statutory "Exemplary Conduct" leadership standard, DoD and military department Inspectors General, and defense criminal investigative organizations, to suppress sexual assaults, protect victims, and hold those who commit sexual offenses accountable.

In accordance with Secretary Rumsfeld's repeated admonition that "you get what you inspect, not what you expect, or put differently what you measure improves," we will be measuring.

December 10, 2004

TO: VADM Jim Stavridis
cc: COL Steve Bucci
Cathy Mainardi
(b)(6)
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DA
SUBJECT: Phone Call with Brenda Brockett

328

Let's figure out who I can get on the phone with me when I speak to Brenda Brockett, it should be someone who can take notes and know what to do about it.

Thanks.

Attach.
12/8/04 E-Mail from Bill Brockett to SecDef

DHR:ss
121(MM-1)

.....
Please respond by 12/21/04

10 Dec 04

(b)(6)

CIV, OSD

From: (b)(6)
Sent: Thursday, December 09, 2004 9:09 AM
To: (b)(6)
Subject: From DR's email

-----Original Message-----

From: Bill Brockett (b)(6)
Sent: Wednesday, December 08, 2004 11:36 AM
To: Donald Rumsfeld
Subject: Follow up on Kuwait meeting...

Mr. Secretary,

I hope this finds you well and enjoying the holiday season! As someone I know has an interest in the Ford Foundation and Library/Museum I wanted to make you aware that I am beginning a project to re-work the library and museum website with a fresh, new and up-to-date look. I will forward you an address in the near future where you can watch the progress if you like,

Also, I just read the following on the Fox News website from a meeting you had with soldiers in Kuwait:

During the question-and-answer session, another soldier complained that active-duty Army units sometimes get priority over the National Guard and Reserve units for the best equipment in Iraq.

"There's no way I can prove it, but I am told the Army is breaking its neck to see that there is not" discrimination against the National Guard and Reserve in terms of providing equipment, Rumsfeld said.

My wife, Army Captain Brenda Brockett, returned in June from an 18-month deployment in her role as combat support nurse with the 396th CSH. She, and I, are very proud of her contribution to the War on Terror, something we totally support. To be honest with you, her main and really only complaint was the way National Guard and Reservist troops are treated, housed, and equipped when compared to the regular Army. In fact, she detests the terms "One Army" and "Army of One" because of this experience and stories she has heard from other "citizen soldiers" she has spoken with while doing medical case management in Ft. Knox, Kentucky.

I know she would welcome the opportunity to discuss this with you and I hope you would take a few minutes to do this. You can reach her at (b)(6) at our home in Montana most days. I know you would find a conversation with her rewarding in dealing with this very serious issue.

Best wishes for a wonderful Christmas season!

Bill Brockett

(b)(6)
<http://www.foto-nrafics.com/>
 (b)(6)

12/10/2004

11-L-0559/OSD/41633

December 10, 2004

TO: VADM Jim Stavridis
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: New Metrics

Please follow up on this memo to Giambastiani and let me know the status.

Thanks.

Attach.
11/19/04 SD memo to CDR, JFCOM re: New Metrics

DHR:dh
120904-55

.....
Please respond by 12/21/04

NATO 092

10 Dec 04

December 10, 2004

TO: VADM Jim Stavridis

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Metrics for Iraq

Please get the Joint Staff working on these metrics and others, and get back to me

Thanks.

Attach.
11/23/04 List of Metrics

DHR:dh
120904-53

.....
Please respond by 1/6/05

Iraq

OSD 08051-05

10 Dec 04

Holder

November 23, 2004

SUBJECT: Metrics Needed on Iraq

We need metrics to track:

- the number of trials
- the number of punishments of Iraqis who attack the Coalition; who kill Iraqis
- the number of jobs created
- the number of ^{de}awards given
- the number of people dealt with under reconciliation

We need an assessment.

DHR:ss
112304-10

December 10, 2004

TO: Peter Rodman
CC: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Paper on Asia



Asia

That paper on relationships in Asia was excellent.

Thanks so much.

DHR:dh
120904-52

.....
Please respond by _____

10 Dec 04

December 10, 2004

TO: VADM Jim Stavridis
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Memo for POTUS

At some point, I ought to try to think of a memo I could fashion for the President, telling him what his national security agenda legacy will be. We haven't figured out any way so he has any sense of the magnitude of it

381

Thanks.

DHR:dh
120904-51

.....
Please respond by 1/6/05

10 Dec 04

December 10, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Briefing on SOF

Please take a look at this report on SOCOM. Should we do some sort of a statement or briefing sometime on this? This is an amazing amount we've done.

322

Thanks.

Attach.
ASD(SO/LIC) memo to SD re: Special Operations Forces

DHR:dh
120904-50

.....
Please respond by 1/6/05

10 Dec 04

DL 12/9

INFO MEMO

DepSecDef _____

USD(P) *copy provided 2 Nov 04*
I-04/014546

NOV - 2 2004

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Thomas W. O'Connell, Assistant Secretary of Defense (SO/LIC)

2 NOV 04

SUBJECT: Special Operations Forces

You asked for a summary reflecting SOF advances over the past four years addressing capabilities, command relationships, service roles, reduction of nonessential missions, and improved posture for GWOT. The attached paper is the second attempt.

Long

**INFORMATION PAPER
SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES**

OASD(SO/LIC)
2 Nov 04

- The Secretary requested and received Congressional authority to provide SOF support to foreign forces (including groups and individuals) that can assist with GWOT missions. (Greatly increases SOF options and flexibility). (Twenty years overdue).
- SOCOM was designated as the lead (supported) command for GWOT missions with a sweeping change to the UCP. Triggered development of a series of OPLANs orchestrating interagency, combatant command, and allied participation.
 - SOCOM established a Center for Special Operations with joint/interagency collaboration capability. Can respond quickly to the SECDEF's guidance on OPLAN development and adjustment. Monthly reviews with SECDEF. (MG Dell Dailey)
 - SOCOM strengthened Theater Special Operations Commands to better support Geographic Combatant Commanders. More robust and responsive planning and execution capability for SOF missions.
- The Secretary directed increased USMC participation with SOCOM.
 - SOCOM/USMC signed a Memorandum to improve communications and logistics, established an annual SOCOM/USMC wargame focused on interoperability, and established a 100 man USMC SOCOM Detachment for a six month combat deployment to Iraq with SEAL Team One. This team recently returned and is reviewing lessons learned.
 - Marine Expeditionary Units (Special Operations Capable) now provide Liaison Officers to the Theater Special Operations Commands, upon arrival in theater, establishing a much tighter link for all the Geographic Combatant Commander's interoperability issues. USMC participation on the SOCOM staff has increased, with Marines in key leadership positions.
- At the Secretary's direction, worldwide SOF units have been redeployed and reconfigured to support OIF and OEF. Task organization changes provide CENTCOM with a more flexible, responsive and successful force for missions such as HVT operations.

- Worldwide SOF missions have been carefully monitored and adjusted by the SECDEF:
 - All SOF deployments for counternarcoterrorist missions, Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCETs), and allied exercises have been reviewed and realigned to put more SOF into GWOT missions. An example is Georgia train and equip. Another is the 7th and 10th Special Forces Group missions in Iraq and Afghanistan. (The 7th Group traditionally focuses on Latin America, the 10th on Eastern Europe and portions of Africa.).
 - SECDEF guidance has refocused SOF deployments from a 30% rate in GWOT priority countries three years ago to a 90% rate for 2005.
- The Secretary expanded both SOF personnel (12%) and budget lines (77%) providing significant increases in SOF aviation (transport, tanker, and gunship capabilities). This upward ramp for personnel continues through 2009.
 - One benefit to the conventional forces has been increased AC-130 gunship support, (four aircraft) providing precision fires for combat in urban areas and sustained surveillance capability during OIF and OEF.
 - Development of the Advanced SEAL Delivery System merges naval submarine stealth and range with SEAL stealth and lethality for special reconnaissance and direct action missions.
- Because of the rapid development and acquisition process employed by SOCOM, important developments in sensors, communications, night vision systems, and soldier systems have been quickly transferred to conventional forces.
- USSOCOM PSYOP capabilities are now integrated with STRATCOM's IO mission. Theater PSYOP operations executed under the SECDEF's DEPORD process now contribute to the GWOT strategy.
 - PSYOP broadcast capability has been improved with the modification of airborne broadcast platforms. (EC-130s).
- SOF Special Mission Units have been strengthened under the Secretary's direction including transfer of command to SOCOM. They have repeatedly provided actionable intelligence for both SOF and conventional forces, and have been at the center of the most important successes in the GWOT, OEF, and OIF.
- SECDEF's Global Force Posture initiative offers SOF new basing initiatives, allowing more effective task organization and rotation options. This initiative will reduce strain on SOF – from families to mobility platforms.

TAB A

May ²⁸ 26, 2004

384

TO: Gen. Dick Myers

CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith
Paul McHale

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Homeland Security

I feel disconnected from information on Homeland Security. When I came into my office this afternoon, every station on TV had Ashcroft and Mueller announcing a big threat. I had not heard anything about it.

Is there someone on the Joint Staff or in Paul McHale's office who goes to the meetings who knows that I and the folks in OSD need to be told what is going on there?

Eberhart's office is connected to it. McHale's office is connected. The Joint Staff is connected. **But I** feel blind. We should **rewire** this place.

DHR:dh
C52604-23

.....
Please respond by 6/4/04

*Sir,
CJCS response
attached.
vr/
CDR Nosurzo
6/15*

DR 6/16

28 May 04

OSD 08068-04

7201

8/2/04
VM



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
3140 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3140

ACTION MEMO

DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD

June 25, 2004 1250

DepSec Action _____

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: DR. BILL SCHNEIDER, CHAIRMAN, DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD

Publy
↑

THRU: ACTING UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY & LOGISTICS) JUN 25 2004

SUBJECT: Defense Science Board response to Global Artillery

- In response to your snowflake, I have discussed the project with Andy Marshal, Lowell Wood (Livermore Lab, one of the developers of the concept), and Johnnie Foster (DSB). It is a very promising concept with revolutionary implications if it can be successfully developed.
- I have discussed some potentially actionable concepts for promoting the early development of this technology. The aim of this effort will be to:

- (1) Identify the transformational basis for promoting the early development of this technology; and
- (2) Provide you with actionable alternatives for introducing the program and budget for the effort in the FY 06-11 defense program.

RECOMMENDATION That SecDef approve further development of the concept in the form of a more detailed memorandum followed by a meeting at his convenience to discuss the concept.

Approve [Signature] SEP 8 2004 Disapprove _____

COORDINATION: NONE

TSA SD	6/30
SRMA SD	6/30
MA SD	
EXEC SEC	11/9/28

Prepared By: Brian Hughes/DSB/ (b)(6)

OSD 08073-04

470

25 Jun 04

19 Jun 04



DIRECTOR OF
NET ASSESSMENT

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1920 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1920

27 April 2004

TO: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Andy Marshall

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Andy".

SUBJECT: Johnny Foster and Lowell Wood request for a session with you

Several weeks ago Johnny and Lowell came to see me. They want to see you to urge development of a global gun, which they believe is quite feasible. Johnny tells me that, while the idea of a cannon with global reach has been around for some years, the people at Livermore Labs have, in the last couple of years, thought through solutions to most of the technical and engineering problems it presents. Attached are:

- A short memo by Lowell expanding on the proposed project, plus three related graphics.
- A paper by Jonathan Perle that includes a discussion of the geopolitical implications of a global gun (I sent you a copy when it was written during the summer of 2002). See pages 13 to 19, which are marked.

If you decide to go ahead with the first phase of the technical program, I suggest that you also have two studies done. One on the costs of such a program, including the ownership costs of a long-term, fully ready-to-shoot capability. The other to explore likely reactions of other countries to a U.S. program.



11-L-0559/OSD/41645

MEMORANDUM

To:

From:

**Re: Transformation of Geopoliticomilitary Affairs:
Global-Range, High-Rate, Low-Cost Sourcing of All Types of Fires**

Motivation. In order to defend itself and its allies, the US has developed an exemplary world-wide force projection capability. The Nation's combination of logistical capacity and efficiency, superbly trained and proficient personnel, and technically superior weapons and equipment enable it to fight and win conflicts against adversaries throughout the world. Rapid, decisive, world-wide force projection is, however, an exceedingly difficult task. As highly effective as our current force projection capabilities have become, they remain imperfect and expensive.

Many of the costs and limitations of our current system stem from the need to apply force quickly, at the onset and early stages of a rapidly developing conflict. This, of course, is where force is most politically and militarily effective, but also where it is most difficult to apply. Providing really rapid response requires extensive forward-basing of personnel and supplies (with large financial and geopolitical costs), while too-slow response allows adversaries to seize and consolidate gains, driving-up eventual costs to resolve MRCs satisfactorily. Such considerations underlie the SecDef-stated desire to transform U.S. force-projection capabilities.

In addition to fundamentally enhancing American capabilities for really rapid response to MRCs, such transformation should also leverage America's great other-than-human military strengths – creation, production and use of high-potency weaponry – while minimizing the policy impacts of our well-known 'weaknesses': aversion to U.S. casualties, disinclination to harm enemy civilians, properties or territories, and reluctance to engage in prolonged conflicts.

A basic transformation in geopoliticomilitary affairs – not 'merely' a revolution in military affairs – thus may result, and certainly is called for by present circumstances. The key enabling technological means is a revolutionary concept: Global Artillery. Some development is required before this extensively-reviewed concept can be operationally demonstrated, but the required cost, time and risk are comparatively very modest. The basic question today is: *What's possible? or What do you have in mind?*"

Key Requirements. The force levels required to either stall the aggressive advance of a regional superpower in a MRC or to impose outright defeat on it have been extensively studied. Such analyses indicate that about 100 B-2 sorties (~2,000 tons of military payload) per day of high-tech weaponry-delivery capability are required to decisively defeat a North Korean-scale adversary when applied steadily over a 10-day interval (followed by ~20 days of ~40 sorties/day to neutralize national war-making potential), with perhaps 3-6 times that being required to effectively paralyze such an attack in its very earliest phase. [See Figures.]

Since the U.S. doesn't have (and doesn't choose to procure-&-maintain) the forward-based strategic bomber capability corresponding to such force-application levels, we utilize a variety of other, shorter-range ordinance-delivery means to deal with adversaries distant from our shores. The logistical penalties implicit in delivering such forces (involving ~100:1 equipment-to-delivered-ordnance overheads, and multi-month intervals for delivery-to-theater and combat set-up) are responsible for most of the costs and limitations of our current force-projection system.

However, there appears to be realistic technical prospects for the near-term creation of an advanced, near-instantaneous, CONUS-based, weapon/sensor/comm delivery capability, thereby eliminating force projection delays and forward-basing penalties. This new capability would be used at the onset of a MRC, applying sufficient force to impede (if not deter outright) adversarial actions long enough for existing U.S. forces to arrive and definitively deal with the situation. Perhaps most strikingly of all, it appears possible to attain IOC of this capability within the present decade, with the cost to create an operational prototype perhaps being \$10 B.

Global Artillery. This novel weaponry delivery capability is provided by long-range, CONUS-based "artillery": military payloads are launched from high-performance, 21st century guns at sufficiently great speeds that they fly as much as half-way around the Earth before they come down – precisely to where they were programmed. These payloads *each* contain of the order of 1,000 pounds of weaponry – *ad hoc* mixes of munitions, sensors, communications systems, etc. – and are launched at rates of the order of 10,000 every day, so that roughly 10 million pounds – 5,000 tons – of materiel are launched theater-ward (or alternatively, into Earth orbit) each day.

A fundamental purpose of "Global Artillery" is to bring all potential adversaries of the U.S. "under the American gun" – and to do so within the same hour that the President/SecDef gives the order to do so. A secondary objective is to "secure the high ground" for the U.S. in a lasting manner, by conferring a completely unmatched degree of access to the space environment.

First-Level Technology Details. The proposed means for implementing this capability is an electrically-energized launcher – in essence, a mile-length high-tech 'artillery tube' – that's capable of taking electricity from a power transmission line, conditioning it appropriately, and applying it several times each minute so as to 'fire' a payload-packet of the order of 1 ton at a speed of the order of 6 miles per second straight up into the air.

The projectile so 'fired' is an RV-shaped object – a maneuvering transatmospheric vehicle (ManTAV) – that aerodynamically turns towards its target as it climbs through the air. It thereafter flies through space for 20-40 minutes and reenters the atmosphere over its target-area. By means of a combination of its own inertial guidance, GPS signals and target-homing sensors, it 'flies' into the immediate vicinity of its target and – depending on its specified mission – either dives at hypersonic speeds into its target as a unitary weapon (carrying ~10X its own weight of TNT in kinetic-energy form), slows (possibly at high altitude) and distributes sub-munitions, comm gear or sensors – or whatever else may be required of it.

The 10,000 'packets' of mixed fires that each such facility can source daily represent a total of ~200-400 B-2 strike-sorties – even more if sourcing hypersonic blast-engendering munitions – a level sufficient to stall, and quite possibly swiftly defeat, attacks by major regional adversaries.

Programmatic Sketch. Realization of such a revolutionary force-projection capability on transformational time-scales clearly involves some significant acceptance of schedule risk.

The overall-preferred programmatic approach is a three-phase one. The First Phase builds on previous (e.g., the attached) scoping studies, specifies the major risk items and generates a corresponding fast-paced risk-mitigation plan, and also provides skeletal engineering analyses and the outline of a prototype implementation program. Properly executed by a small team of top-quality people, this First Phase would involve somewhat less than a year's effort, so that, if begun promptly, results could be available within a year at a total cost of a few M\$.

The Second Phase would be quadpartite, involving execution of the risk-mitigation program, the corresponding fleshing-out of a more-detailed but still highly-opportunistic program plan, the development and demonstration of key components, and the concurrent commencing of procurement of long-lead-time items and performing the basics of facility preparation. It probably could be completed by end-CY'05 and likely would involve obligation of ~\$50 M (of which ~\$25 M would be costed in FY'05).

The Third Phase would involve high-concurrency execution of the detailed program plan, and could lead to Horizontal Prototype facility IOC at end-'07 and Vertical Prototype facility IOC at end-CY'08, at a total cost of the order of \$5 B. [See Figures.] This program phase would also leverage results from the old ABRES program for support of LRIP of the required maneuvering transatmospheric vehicles (ManTAVs). [In order to minimize cost and overall covert-program risks, the IOC would not involve major electrical transmission-line creation, and thus would sustain the full-scale 10,000ton/day launch-rate for only a fractional-hour with the energy storage capacity of its Power-Conditioning System; an option for very swiftly-executed energizing of the facility to sustain full-launch-rate immediately following IOC would be fully developed during the Third Phase. Plans would also be fully developed for swift post-IOC execution of ever more robust hardening of the National capability embodied by the Vertical Prototype facility.]

Additional Considerations. It's presumably clear that the 'Global Artillery' system represents much more than an ultra-long-range cannon or a super-rate space-launcher. Instead, it's a truly revolutionary capability for long-distance, high-rate transportation of mid-scale payloads to virtually everywhere that's of present or future military interest. It'll likely represent a technological advance of historic scale, one – like powered air-flight – that'll still be 'looking' for leverage-exploiting national security applications a half-century after it's first realized.

Two additional considerations merit explicit attention in this context.


Collateral Space Supremacy. The contemplated capability enables placement of payloads virtually anywhere in near-Earth space at far higher *daily* totals than are currently attained by the entire human race during an entire *year*. These capabilities inevitably confer enduring, utterly-compelling U.S. supremacy-in-space: America would own a veritable railroad-into-space, while all others would still be accessing space via figurative oxcarts.

Asymmetry Maintenance. It's likewise obvious that the most careful attention be given, from the very outset, to maintaining profound asymmetry between the U.S. and all future adversaries with respect to effective ownership of the capabilities conferred by this system.

Recommendations. The historic opportunity proffered by this prospect considered, it is strongly recommended that immediate commitment be made to execution of the First Phase – involving detailed planning and design-for-risk-reduction – of this program, with a commitment-in-principle being made at the outset to seamlessly follow-on into Second Phase, if First Phase results basically bear out results of analyses made to date. This pair of start-up decisions will support a mid-CY'05 review concerned with provisional commitment to commencement of Third Phase work – the 3-year drive to IOC – at start-CY'06.


It's recommended that at least the first two Phases of this 5-year program be DARPA-sponsored, with special top-level management attention being mandated in order to move it along at a technology-limited pace and to maintain its covert characteristics to the greatest extent compatible with a very fast pace and top-quality people being enlisted in adequate quantities for its execution.


Because of its implications for enduring American supremacy both on the Earth's surface and in all of near-Earth space, it's recommended that this entire program be protected comprehensively, managed optimally and funded appropriately – and that top-level *ad hoc* OSD reviews be convened regularly to ensure all of this.



*From Figure 1 of "Analyses of U.S. Requirements for Conventionally Armed Bombers," by Gen. Jasper Welch (USAF, ret.), July 1994.


MRC Requirements - High Intensity Case





Horizontal Prototype Facility

Vertical Prototype Facility



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Political Policy Implications of the Revolution in Military Affairs

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
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INTRODUCTION

The following paper is intended to examine and illuminate the political consequences of the revolution in military affairs (RMA). The debate over the RMA, while heated within the professional military and those civilian agencies which are responsible for equipping it, has gone unnoticed by many of the civilian leaders who will be most affected by its outcome. The revolution in military affairs has the potential not just to alter the way in which wars are fought, but the nature of the use of force.

It will be the civilians—the President, NSC, Secretary of State, and Secretary of Defense—whose actions will most be transformed by the RMA. New capabilities and weapons systems will alter the realities of warfare: when, where, and how the United States chooses to use force. While the military may become more efficient as a result of the RMA, it will not fundamentally change the nature of their jobs. If ordered to invade Iraq, they might carry out their mission with different methods of operation, but their overall objectives will not be altered. It will be the civilian leadership who will benefit most from the RMA, by gaining new options that will aid in deciding when and how to go to war.

This report examines two aspects of the revolution in military affairs and its effects on policy leaders. One deals with the different overall technologies that make up the RMA, such as stealth and precision. The other examines a specific RMA weapons systems and its individual capabilities that could potentially affect the policy making process. In both cases, the paper will look at the military and policy goals of RMA concepts, and will show where the military and civilian leadership have converging and diverging interests. The objective will be to flesh out exactly which policies, strategies, and technologies will be most useful to policy makers in a post-RMA world.

POLICIES OF THE RMA

The revolution in military affairs promises to change the nature and methods of engaging threats at the tactical level through the emergence of new technologies. Without a corresponding change in strategic thinking at the civilian policy level, however, the true benefits of the RMA will never be realized. The RMA offers the ability to leverage new technologies and operational concepts. While this has repercussions for a tank commander or a fighter pilot, these technologies and concepts have even greater consequences for the President and his national security advisors.

Uncertainty and lack of information have characterized war for all of human history. In the ancient world, policy makers had little to do with war on a daily basis, once it began. Messages took a long time to reach their recipients, and even finding the intended target of the message was an ordeal. As a result, commanders on the battlefield were left to make almost all decisions. But even their measure of control was limited. The best intelligence a commander in the field could get at the time of the Peloponnesian War was to stand on a hill and look out over the battlefield. And even when he was able to see the shape of a battle unfold and make a decision accordingly, he had to rely on a runner to get down to his lieutenants in the field and direct them as to what his wishes were.

Thousands of years later, the situation was little improved. During the Civil War, civilian leaders were still far removed from the day-to-day course of the conflict. Messengers had to be sent using horseback (or telegraph when available), and the armies, for the most part, were completely blind as to what lay just a few miles away. The concept of cavalry reconnaissance extended the range by which a commander could gather intelligence, but even these units were in danger of being captured or getting lost in the unfamiliar terrain and being unable to locate their units. Even assuming the cavalry assets worked as they were supposed to, they were only tactical units, able to provide a commander on-scene with information. The President and others making decisions about the course of the war would have to wait days or weeks to receive intelligence that would often be too old to use.

By the Second World War communications systems had improved significantly, but the "fog of war," both at the tactical and strategic levels, was still prevalent. Today, a mere fifty-five years after the end of World War II, the change in information availability for civilian leaders has been profound. The United States is on the verge of dramatically reducing, for the first time in history, the "fog of war" from the battlefield. Advances in communications, satellites, and radar have combined to completely revolutionize the types and amount of information that is available at both the tactical and strategic levels. The revolutionary capabilities new methods of intelligence gathering and communications will profoundly affect the decision-making capabilities and decisions of those individuals who must exercise the "when" as much as those who decide the "how" to go to war.

U.S. involvement in local, regional, and world conflicts in the coming decades is highly likely, even if the exact nature of future conflicts remains uncertain. The United States has economic, political, and security interests in every region of the globe, as such, it will be forced to deal with a multitude of threats from a host of different countries. Due to our unique and predominant position in world affairs, many countries seek to undermine our regional and global power. The increasing sophistication of guided weapons, even by second-rate powers, forces military commanders to develop counter measures. In the modern age, with advanced mines, anti-ship cruise missiles, "double-digit" surface-to-air missiles (SAM), and other "smart" weapons of the information age, the United States must come up with new, innovative technologies to protect our military personnel.

Civilian policy leaders will also need new tools. In the past, when war was far away and the moral climate less strict, it may have been enough to order the military into the field and await the results. Instant communications, however, have politicized war in the modern era, especially for democracies, to a new level.

At the same time, civilian leaders must overcome the dangers of technology in order to sustain a war effort that may come under fire from civilians who do not understand the ramifications of inaction, and who base their views on an incomplete understanding of the conflict. While for a time the United States' singular advantage in advanced technologies may allow it sharply to reduce the "casualty hypothesis,"¹ potential rivals are developing weapons systems, such as advanced surface-to-air

¹ The casualty hypothesis is the belief that in the modern age of warfare, information about a conflict is near-instantaneously disseminated to the public through television, the Internet, and other forms of communication, either through independent news channels, or by governments themselves. The net effect is to make war more difficult because the public directly sees its visual horrors.

missiles, that promise to reintroduce a large measure of jeopardy for U.S. soldiers. Often times, the weapons used to counter the U.S. technological advantage will be cheaper and easier to manufacture than the weapons the United States must use to counter the increasing threat.

It is the responsibility of the policy makers today to make sure that the weapons systems being built for tomorrow are adequate not just for the military task of war, but for the political task of diplomacy. Furthermore, it will be the civilian policy-makers that bear the ultimate responsibility of the United States' success or failure in adapting to the changing international environment.

It is with that principle in mind—civilian leaders bear the ultimate responsibility in deciding upon the best courses of action to secure U.S. interests abroad—that this paper is written. Many of the technologies that comprise the revolution in military affairs are already in use by our armed forces and provide capabilities that have implications not merely for the war fighters at the tactical level, but also for the policy makers at the strategic level. Future technologies that will be developed over the next two decades will further alter the capabilities that policy makers have at their disposal, and in doing so, will fundamentally alter the nature of the cost-benefits analysis for our leaders. This paper will examine the impact that the RMA will have on policy makers at a macro level, as well as delving into specific weapons, both created and envisioned, and to explain how new weapons systems and classes of weapons will change the nature of warfare.

THE SEPARATION OF POLICY AND MILITARY OBJECTIVES

For civilian policy makers, the revolution in military affairs is not simply about fighting more efficiently; it is about achieving desired *political* effects. Through much of history there was a close relationship between military and political effects: big political effects required big military actions. But today a single car bomb, of no military significance, can give a wildly disproportionate political effect when detonated against a carefully selected target.

The bomb that killed 241 marines in Beirut in 1983 achieved a political effect—the withdrawal of American forces from Lebanon—out of all proportion to the force employed.

Like a terrorist weapon, RMA technologies can have a grossly disproportional political effect. The ability unerringly to strike a building in the middle of a city while leaving its neighbors untouched is as political effects even more important than its military ones. Other RMA technologies can produce similar results, enabling a small but highly sophisticated force to save time, money, and lives by destroying politically and militarily important targets, thus degrading the enemies will to fight. This concept of "Effects-Based Operations" (EBO) is at the heart of the synergy between the increased military capabilities offered by the revolution in military affairs and the political benefits derived from the same.

There are multitudes of reasons for a state to use or threaten to use force to achieve its desired goals. Regardless of the exact circumstances, the decision to go to war is always a political one. It is therefore important to understand whether the RMA will enhance or detract from civilian leaders' political ability to wage war. Will war (or conflict in general) be easier and more frequent as a result of the RMA, or will it be harder? For most of the history of democracies, it has been quite difficult to fuse together political and military objectives. When power is not unified in one individual or like-

minded body, political and military objectives often come into conflict. Such was the case in World War II, when Churchill proposed invading Italy in order to achieve the political objective of cutting off the Soviet Union from Western Europe. The plan was rejected by military planners in the United States, who felt that an invasion of Normandy was safer and more able to meet the immediate objective of military victory, and who saw political victory as a secondary goal.

It is the conclusion of this report that the RMA will enhance the ability of civilian policy makers to use force to achieve their objectives. At the same, the RMA will allow military leaders to carry out operations more effectively. Thus, there is currently the potential for a convergence between political and military objectives. The RMA will allow new military capabilities, which in turn will allow new political capabilities. RMA-enabled forces will conduct operations faster, safer, and more "cleanly" than ever before. Civilian policy makers will in turn be able to threaten the use of force more often, and be able to back up that threat with action.

At the same time, the potential consequences of RMA technologies in enemies' hands must also be acknowledged. Military action becomes politically easier as a result of the RMA for the United States, but becomes significantly harder when opposing forces possess RMA technologies. Even a few "smart" weapons in enemy hands may be used in such a way that their political effects are disproportionate to their military capabilities. Just as a terrorist bomb may have larger implications than its explosive power, so too can highly accurate weapons applied against U.S. troops in the field, or against U.S. citizens in the United States.

Current U.S. doctrine relies on a U.S. presence abroad, through bases on the ground or carrier battle groups at sea. The purpose of a forward presence is two fold. First, it is a political tool that shows America's commitment to its allies overseas. Second, it allows the United States to react more quickly in a crisis, drawing on pre-allocated assets. Forward presence, however, may be nearing the end of its virtual impunity from attack. New and sophisticated weapons can target U.S. assets overseas with increasingly accurate and longer-range weapons. Policy planners will be forced to determine which of the missions (diplomatic reassurance or military pre-planning) is more important. If it is the latter, then it will become increasingly harder to maintain the case for forward presence, given the new vulnerabilities U.S. assets will face. If the diplomatic importance of forward presence is deemed to be the greater of the two benefits, U.S. leaders will still be forced to determine whether forward basing is really the best option for the United States, especially in areas where small conflicts, and not full-scale war are likely to be the situations in which the United States finds itself.²

If adversaries acquire advanced capabilities and even first generation RMA technologies, they will be able to strike at vulnerable American personnel in a way not previously possible. While there may be significant diplomatic benefits to reassuring our allies that we are committed, will they truly be greater than when the first guided set of explosives strikes an airbase killing Americans and destroying aircraft? A risk-averse United States completely shifted its methods of operation in the Middle East after the attack on a single ship, the *USS Cole*.

² U.S. citizens maybe willing to settle for losses in areas perceived as key to U.S. security (i.e. Western Europe and the Gulf region), but will not condone the loss of U.S. lives in regions of the world where no immediately discernable U.S. interest is. While policy planners may recognize the exigency of bases in far-flung regions in order to ensure stability, the majority of the American people are not so present.

5

There is a chance for the United States, for a time, to exercise its political will when, and how, it sees fit. The advances that the RMA offers will allow U.S. leaders to overcome the political obstacles that they face, as well as the military obstacles that the armed forces must confront. Both perception and reality can be altered with the RMA. The United States will gain the ability to strike targets with incredible precision from far distances so that it may protect itself. Simultaneously, by acquiring a capability that makes it politically and militarily easier to go to war, the United States may not have to.

PRECISION STRIKE

If one of the primary aspects of the RMA for civilian policy leaders is to make choices about warfare easier, then the question becomes “what are the technologies civilian policy makers will want to achieve this goal?” The answer begins with one of the earliest RMA technologies, which is just now beginning to enter the mature phase—precision strike. The old axiom “if you can see it, you can hit it; if you can hit it you can kill it,” has never been more true. With advanced information technologies and platforms, such as space-based radar and Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (Joint STARS) the United States can mitigate the “fog of war” and create a more transparent battlefield. When such a capability is combined with advanced precision weapons that can re-target up to the last second before impact, a powerful capability to destroy virtually any tactical or strategic target is realized.

Thus far, there have been three major problems with precision strike, from a political perspective. The United States’ favored method of long-range precision strike, the cruise missile, is expensive at \$1.1 million a piece³, and delivers a relatively small payload. The intelligence needed successfully to use a precision weapon is sometimes wrong or unreliable.⁴ And, there is difficulty correlating the blast size of a weapon to a specific target, so that the intended target, and nothing else, is destroyed. Each of these problems is in some sense a military one, but these problems also have important political consequences. Military commanders must operate within their budgets, but they are not responsible for explaining the use of their funds to all but a handful of theoretically knowledgeable Congressmen. Likewise, the military would prefer to limit collateral damage, but they face relatively little chance of losing career or reputation over collateral damage issues. It is civilian policy makers who attach greatest importance to the avoidance of collateral damage; and it is therefore necessary for *civilian* leadership to press for the development of better precision weapons. Ultimately, while the military generally favors precision munitions, limited budgets may cause military commanders to

³ \$1.1 million reflects the cost of the current Tomahawk Land Attack Cruise Missile (TLAM)

⁴ Improper intelligence in the Kosovo bombing lead to a serious international incident after the Chinese embassy was accidentally targeted, but accurately struck. On a more mundane, but perhaps no less problematic level, targeting error can ruin an otherwise perfect operation. An aircraft can be armed with precision bombs and launch them precisely on target, but if the target’s position is improperly identified by even a few meters, the ability to hit is severely degraded. If the uses of smaller weapons with smaller blast radii are used in order to minimize collateral damage, then a target must be hit dead on. If forced to use larger weapons in order to compensate for Target Location Error (TLE), then collateral damage will increase.

under invest in precision strike since they tend to view the political consequences of imprecision as less important.

The Tomahawk cruise missile has a CEP of somewhere below 8 meters,⁵ making it a fairly accurate weapon. However, its price and relatively small payload make it a non-ideal choice in many circumstances. While the Tomahawk's accuracy will undoubtedly improve, its small payload is not likely to change significantly and its cost will remain high. Coupled with its slow speed of approximately 550 miles per hour⁶, and its high cost per target destroyed, the Tomahawk cannot be the primary weapon in future conflicts.

The ability of a Tomahawk to be fired from beyond the lethal range of the enemy, thus protecting American personnel in the theater, has made it a weapon of choice in many recent conflicts, especially where the prospect of American losses was most troubling. But the effectiveness against hard targets by the Tomahawk is minimal; its slow speed means that it is unable to destroy hardened targets. Furthermore, the small payload means that damage is minimal, which can be a good thing when dealing with small targets, but a real hindrance when striking larger structures. When multiple missiles are needed to destroy a target, the potential for collateral damage is increased, as are the costs.

During the Kosovo campaign, the United States nearly ran out of cruise missiles. In fact, the military had to begin converting nuclear cruise missiles to conventional cruise missiles at an additional cost of about \$500,000 each.⁷ When one considers that a Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) has a CEP of approximately 45 feet (19 feet when used with a B-2), can be manufactured quickly, and has a cost of about \$20,000,⁸ the cruise missile becomes a very expensive option (and the JDAM a remarkably cheap one).

Smart bombs, as of now, are much more effective, both politically and militarily than cruise missiles and are able to achieve a CEP of 19 feet or less.⁹ And, unlike a cruise missile, a JDAM can carry a much larger explosive and conduct "bunker busting" operations. Of course, the cruise missile does not require a pilot to come into range of enemy fire, but this problem can be overcome with stealth. A single B-2, which has a minimal chance of being targeted, especially when combined with radar jamming, can drop sixteen 2000-pound JDAMs at 16 different targets at a cost of approximately \$400,000.¹⁰ The same job with cruise missiles¹¹ would cost of \$17.6 million.

As a political tool, the cruise missile has been very effective thus far and will continue to be. However, its cost is a drawback that must either be cut significantly, or eventually face public scrutiny when a combat scenario arises that makes the cruise missile an unusable weapon.

⁵ Jane's Online

⁶ Jane's Online

⁷ *Congressional Record*, KOSOVO POLICY (Senate - April 19, 1999)

⁸ http://www.safacq.hq.af.mil/acq_ref/stories/jdam_1.html

⁹ If a JDAM were equipped with a laser designator as well as a GPS kit, the accuracy of the system would increase dramatically, enabling in fair weather conditions an almost perfect strike capability. Such a kit would probably double the cost of a JDAM from between \$40,000 to \$50,000, still less than 5% of the cost of a current Tomahawk.

¹⁰ Cost does not include maintenance and flying costs of the B-2

¹¹ Assuming non-hardened targets

There may be ways to lower the cost per target destroyed using new cruise missiles or other precision strike weapons. The re-design of cruise missiles and the employment of new manufacturing techniques may reduce the cost of cruise missiles substantially. While this option should be pursued, as cruise missiles are certain to be a mainstay U.S. weapon for fixed soft targets (and perhaps in the future mobile targets as well), the cost of a cruise missile can only be reduced so much.¹² Another option is to improve stealth, and the accuracy of precision-guided bombs. Bombs are far cheaper than missiles, and can do far more damage. Research into equipping JDAMs and the new small smart bombs (SSB) with both GPS (which itself should be upgraded) and laser designation packages would go a long way towards meeting the needs of cheap, reliable, and effective weapons that can be used to realize the maximum political effect.

Once the United States possesses a cheap and accurate bomb (on the order of one-meter CEP), the weapon adds a new dimension to the political realm. As of now, aircraft flying very low can achieve great accuracy, but by doing so they expose themselves to anti-aircraft fire and Surface-to-Air missiles (SAM).¹³ Politically, U.S. pilots being killed in combat is perhaps the only situation worse than civilian casualties, in a limited conflict. As a result, aircraft are forced to fly at high altitudes, and therefore their accuracy is diminished considerably.¹⁴

¹² The newest Tomahawk, which has yet to be manufactured will cost in the neighborhood of \$500,000.

¹³ *Air Power Studies Centre. APSC Paper Number S3. "Precision Guided Munitions and the New Era of Warfare," Richard P. Hullion, Air Power Studies Centre. RAAF Base, Fairbairn*

¹⁴ Even if a pilot does everything perfectly and a weapon works exactly as it is supposed to, the CEP of a MK 84 general purpose bomb at a slant range of 20,00 feet had a worst-case miss of 160 feet. *Ibid.*

THE CHANGING NATURE OF PRECISION

Historically, warfare has been characterized by a lack of accuracy; munitions — bombs or bullets — have generally missed their mark. During the battle of Gettysburg, the Union expended roughly 240 rounds of ammunition for each Confederate soldier killed.¹⁵ In World War II, it took 648 bombs to achieve a 96% chance of hitting a 400 x 500 foot German power-generation plant.¹⁶

In 1943 the entire U.S. 8th Air Force attacked only 50 targets for the year.¹⁷ In Desert Storm, the allied forces attacked 150 targets in the first day. Now, for the first time in history, a country will be able to field weapons that are effective in a nearly one-to-one ratio. During the Gulf conflict, the F-117A fighter-bomber flew only 2 percent of the U.S. sorties, but damaged over 40% of the strategic targets. While not every bomb hit its target, the F-117s did hit over 80% of their targets — an unprecedented accuracy rate.¹⁸ When compared with conventional aircraft using conventional bombs, the numbers are even more impressive. It took twelve sorties of F-111Es using 168 Mk-82 bombs to destroy two targets during the Gulf War. Twelve sorties of F-117As destroyed twenty-six targets with only twenty-eight precision guided weapons.¹⁹ During Operation Allied Force, more improvements were implemented. In the first eight weeks of the war, six B-2 bombers, all operating from CONUS, combined stealth and precision guided munitions to successfully strike 600 aim points, while 336 other strike aircraft combined to hit 860 aim points.²⁰ The B-2s accuracy was rated somewhere above 90%.²¹

A key strategic doctrine of U.S. military action is destroying command and control (C2) nodes as quickly as possible at the beginning of a conflict. Precision obviously makes it militarily easier for U.S. air power to take out C2 nodes, but it also makes it politically easier. Adversaries witnessed the dominance of U.S. precision weapons against exposed targets in the Gulf War and in Operation Allied Force. In the opening phases of Allied Force, known C2 nodes and lines of communication that were fixed and exposed were easily destroyed. The United States can expect that its adversaries have learned from such mistakes, and will choose one or a combination of three options to combat this vulnerability.

Enemies may seek to make their command and control nodes mobile, forcing intelligence assets to try to locate and track them, a task that can be extremely difficult. In this case, the challenge is military and not civilian. The other two options that opposing forces have are to move their C2 facilities underground and into highly populated civilian centers. Both methods have been tried against the United States, and have met with some success. During the Gulf War, underground bunkers were of particular concern, prompting the United States to develop the GBU-28 "bunker busting" bomb, before which there was no capability to destroy deeply buried targets. Once again,

¹⁵ Conversation with Gettysburg library

¹⁶ *Air Power Studies Centre, APSC Paper Number 53, "Precision Guided Munitions and the New Era of Warfare," Richard P. Hallion, Air Power Studies Centre, RAAF Base, Fairbairn*

¹⁷ *"The Revolution in Military Affairs," Jeffery McKittrick, James Blackwell, Fred Littlepage, George Krause, Richard Blanchfield, and Dale Hill, Strategic Assessment Center-Science Applications International Corporation*

¹⁸ *"The utility of force in a world of scarcity," John Orme, International Security, Winter 1997, 22 n.3*

¹⁹ *Gulf War Air Power Survey, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993*

²⁰ *"Some Weapons Save Money and Lives," Loren B. Thompson, Ph.D., Lexington Institute, August 8, 2000*

²¹ Using a combination of the on board B-2 targeting system and JDAMs.

the problem of buried bunkers is a military one more than a political one. In this case, it is the military that should want advanced precision munitions in order to have the greatest chance of destroying buried targets. The problem becomes a civilian one, however, as soon as enemies seek to put C2 modules underground *and* in highly populated civilian areas.

Making C2 nodes mobile may be the best option for making them survivable, both in terms of making them hard to effectively target and in mobility's ability to make intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) difficult. Mobile units, however, will not be adequate on their own. Adversaries will still undoubtedly need facilities that are larger and better equipped (especially for their civilian leadership and top staff officers), than can be provided for by a mobile platform. C2 centers will be placed further underground, and their construction will be kept more secret in order to avoid detection. Politically moving C2 centers into the middle of cities, underneath residential and civilian areas, will force the United States to recalculate whether and how to strike them.

Even a modest bunker in or underneath a building in a residential section of a crowded city can mean a political nightmare for civilian policy makers. Destroying an underground facility required extremely powerful weapons, which are sure to cause external damage. A weapon that has a CEP of 10 meters, under such circumstances, could mean the end to a limited strike. With a 10 meter CEP a bomb will land somewhere beyond 25 feet of the target half the time. If a command and control center is placed below an apartment building in a crowded area, this could mean the destruction of hundreds of civilian lives. If the C2 facility is of such vital importance to the effort that it *must* be destroyed, regardless of the civilian casualties, a large warhead will have to be used, which means even if the weapon is accurate, it is likely to destroy other buildings in the area. Alternatively, smaller warheads could be employed, but more weapons would have to be used. This is not a viable solution, as each time a weapon is dropped that has a CEP of 25 feet there will be a 50% probability that the weapon falls outside the perimeter.

While there may be no way to eliminate collateral damage in instances where bunkers are placed beneath residential areas, as a matter of moral principle and political understanding, the limiting of collateral damage should be of utmost concern to policy leaders. Improved accuracy not only means that the proper target is selected, but also means that a smaller payload can be used, which in turn will limit the collateral damage caused by the explosion. One can easily imagine a situation where Saddam Hussein places a command center next to a mosque and a school, and then waits for U.S. air strikes to miss their target and kill worshippers or children. Alternatively, the weapon might work perfectly well, but the secondary effects of the blast blow the building outward.

In a world where air power is the primary weapon of choice, precision or payload are the only two options for increasing effectiveness. For the military, increasing payload may work, but for political leaders the negative effects of a large bomb in certain situations will prohibit its use. The perceived lack of morality in using more powerful explosives will offset the benefits of destroying the target in all but the most extreme cases.

Ultimately, the political benefits of precision will manifest themselves in two types of situations: pre-warfare calculations by the enemy and during actual combat. When foreign adversaries calculate their chances of success against the United States,

they are necessarily going to look at the U.S. ability to wage warfare in their region of the globe. If they believe that the United States has the ability to strike any target that they present without suffering negative political effects as a result, then their decision on whether to begin an engagement will be altered. Thus the deterrent factor presented by precision weapons will have strong political influence in policy circles, as diplomatic efforts will partly rest on the knowledge that the United States will be able to destroy any target at any time.

If an adversary is not deterred by the United States' overwhelming military superiority and concludes that there are military or political objectives to be gained by military action, then highly accurate precision weapons will, as discussed above, allow the United States political leaders to more freely engage the enemy. Or, alternatively, the United States may be able to preempt action by an adversary and coerce him by using highly accurate limited strikes to demonstrate U.S. willpower and resolve before hostilities break out in full force.

THE EFFECTS OF PRECISION

Careful examination of precision weapons in the hands of the United States leads towards one conclusion for foreign policy makers. War, or conflict, becomes easier. The question is does it become more frequent? The newfound power the United States policy leaders will acquire with extremely accurate precision weapons will give them an unprecedented ability to use military force anytime, anywhere. Serious political and moral implications arise from this situation.

Politically, making military action an easier option for policy makers may not be a complete benefit all the time. U.S. allies and pseudo-allies are constantly and consistently focused on U.S. power and hegemony, even when used in humanitarian and beneficial ways. While the United States may be willing to engage in military action more frequently due to our enormous precision strike advantage, our allies, both for military reasons (lack of the same capability) and political reasons, may not be willing to support the United States in our endeavors. A second problem, also dealing with allies, is that a clearly superior U.S. capability may cause them to oppose U.S. action, simply by virtue of U.S. power. Countries have a tendency to envy power, and even close friends will oppose U.S. actions some of the time.

A further political consequence will arise from the newfound ability to hit any target that we can find. If weapons with 1 meter CEPs that can be dropped unaided become a reality, then it seems likely that the proclivity to use force in a situation will increase. This can be both a positive and negative situation. On the negative side, civilian leaders may gradually relegate diplomatic and economic coercion to the background if they believe that their military capabilities are such that public support for their actions can be maintained. If this is the case, then it will be likely that military means will supersede diplomatic and other non-lethal methods of implementing policy.

The positive aspect of such a capability is the same as the negative side: politicians may resort to the military option before exhausting diplomatic and economic options. There is a reasonable argument to be made that United States foreign policy has suffered from a cookie cutter formula for the last decade, in which a pattern of diplomatic, economic, and finally military measures are used to achieve political goals, in that order. The reasons for this are twofold: first, a natural reluctance to use force. Second, military action can be politically very costly, as mentioned above. This pattern

has played out time and time again, however, it has not necessarily always been beneficial for U.S. foreign policy. Foreign adversaries, knowing America's proclivity to avoid confrontation for moral and political reasons have been able to take advantage of America's foreign policy formula, and plan accordingly.

Kosovo, which many consider to be a military victory, turned out to be a political failure, for this reason. The United States eventually succeeded in coercing Milosevic by using air power alone. However, by the time that Milosevic surrendered, the ostensible reason for U.S. intervention — stopping the slaughter and displacement of the Kosovars — had failed. Milosevic had already succeeded in displacing hundreds of thousands of people. Thus, America's political objective, which is what prompted the air campaign in the first place, was unsuccessful. Had the United States actually presented the credible threat of force when Milosevic first tried to displace the Kosovars, rather than engage in diplomatic condemnation of the action, perhaps Milosevic would not have sustained his campaign.

STEALTH AND ANTI-ACCESS

Precision represents a revolutionary capability because it transforms the battlefield from one where mass is the dominant factor (i.e. how many bullets you have and how fast you can concentrate them on a single target), to one where accuracy and mobility reign supreme. Similarly, the battlefield will shift away from the primary form of protection for the last half century—armor—to stealth and the ability to hide. In a world where weapons can kill virtually anything that can be seen, the key to survival is to deny weapons the ability to "see" in the first place, or deceive weapons into believing the target is somewhere else.

Stealth, like precision, has the ability to transform the way in which operations are conducted at the military level, as well as the capability to alter how civilian policy leaders make decisions about warfare. Stealth and precision share a dichotomy: precision protects innocent civilians, while stealth protects American servicemen. The ability to protect U.S. personnel is one of the most politically important aspects of the revolution in military affairs. Nothing has a greater potential to hamper a necessary U.S. operation than U.S. casualties. It was U.S. casualties that helped start the anti-Viet Nam War movement, caused the United States to pull out of Lebanon, and leave Mogadishu. While it is possible that the "casualty hypothesis" has been over exaggerated, the potential impact of even a few U.S. casualties on the course of war cannot be pushed aside. In the end, it may turn out that Americans are willing to accept losses in operations, but this cannot be taken for granted, and planning cannot proceed along this assumption without eventually coming to a point where operations, in reality, are no longer feasible.

Stealth is one area of the RMA where the United States' focus should be particularly heavy, given the current environment and planned theater of operations for the next two decades. Stealth is one RMA technology that the United States possesses a lead of perhaps 20 years over any potential adversary.

When examining problems of "anti-access" (A2), stealth becomes all the more important. The proliferation of anti-ship cruise missiles, advanced mines, and advanced surface-to-air missiles is causing the A2 problem to increase dramatically, especially in situations involving the U.S. and Asian powers. In such scenarios, it will be U.S. naval

and air power that shoulders the primary burden in a conflict due to a lack of a significant U.S. presence in mainland Asia.

As of today, U.S. ships are unarmored and rely on their advanced weaponry to destroy the enemy before it can get into range; thus the logic behind the aircraft carrier's use of combat air patrols (CAP). Such a concept works when the enemy is fielding symmetric forces of a lesser quality than the United States, an F-18 E/F vs. a SU 27, for instance. But when the enemy is fielding supersonic, stealthy cruise missiles from great distances that can fly undetected, and even if spotted, give only seconds warning time to ships, then destroying the enemy before he can fire is no longer an option.

Currently, the United States lacks a strong infrastructure and presence in the Far East. With the exception of bases in Japan and Korea, the United States has no major bases in Asia. Without such an infrastructure, the United States will be forced to transport any materiel it needs for combat. Given the aquatic nature of the environment in which the United States will have to operate, stealth will be the key to survival for air and naval forces. Without heavily armored vehicles as the main weapons of U.S. power, it will fall upon sea and air-based forces to provide much of the striking power, especially early on in a conflict while land forces are assembled.

Paramount to conducting a military operation is the protection of troop lives, both for political and moral reasons. Since the United States made the decision not to equip its ships with armor, instead opting for speed and weapons' range as forms of protection, a way must be found to protect troops and assets. As noted above, those two factors are no longer the security blanket that they once were; the United States needs to look at new forms of protection. Stealth, both for ships and aircraft is the only viable solution at this point. Large ships that can be targeted can be killed. Those ships that avoid detection will also avoid destruction, and will have the ability to penetrate enemy defenses more easily. While the navy may have a great love of carriers, being the capital ships that have lead their forces for the past 50 years, the future calls for a different path. The navy was fiercely loyal to battleships 50 years ago, and their inability to protect themselves from the dangers of the air caused their demise in the same manner that the carrier's inability to protect itself from missiles might lead to its own demise.

Given the circumstances and ingrained culture of the Navy, it will be the civilian policy leaders who must take the lead in transforming the naval structure. The political consequences of losing a destroyer or cruiser are horrific, and only the word catastrophe can adequately describe what the loss of a carrier in a non-major regional conflict would be. The Navy, understandably, has a great attachment to the ships, which have been the backbone of their force for half a century. However, when it comes to warfare, sentimental attachment cannot override strategic judgment. Although many in the upper ranks of the Navy will admit that anti-access is a problem, few will acknowledge the carrier's significant vulnerability, due to its large radar signature, that makes it a prime target for the newer generations of anti-ship missiles. Admiral Clark, Chief of Naval Operations, earlier this year stated that carriers may be vulnerable in the future, but that is not true today.²² Such thinking has two fundamental flaws. First, there is growing

²²Remarks by Admiral Vern Clark, Sea, Air, Space Expo, Hosted by the Navy League of the United States, Washington, D.C. April 12, 2001: "Take aircraft carriers, for example. It has been reported in the press that aircraft carriers may be vulnerable, that their survivability might be in question. Some day that may be true. But it's not true today. Maybe in the future we won't have to worry about all that we have to worry about today. But for now and the near term, there is no more powerful, no more capable platform, anywhere in the world, than America's large deck aircraft carrier. I wanted to get that on the record."

evidence that ships with large radar signatures, starting with the Falklands War, are vulnerable to anti-ship cruise missiles or mines. Second, such rationalization causes the Navy to be focused upon the successes of today rather than the problems of tomorrow.

Naval power operating in littoral waters faces a host of threats; many of those threats are as much political problems as they are military problems. Access denial, when planned for, is a purely military problem—how to get into the theater and remain safe. However, when, as so often is the case, a conflict rapidly emerges, plans created in the abstract of the purely military world become subject to the restraints of the political world.

Both Air Force and Navy aircraft have been denied access to targets because of diplomatic concerns. In Operation Earnest Will, the United Arab Emirates and Oman denied overflight permission to Navy jets aboard the carrier.²³ The denial of overflight permission directly lead to a decrease in operational tempo in Operation Earnest Will, and thus paralleled many of the military anti-access threats that our nation's carriers are likely to face in the future.

So what policies can be enacted to counter the anti-access problem? Civilian leaders must strive to create as tight diplomatic alliances as possible with our allies in order to assure effective operations can take place. However, this is only part of the solution. No matter how tight our peacetime diplomatic relations, when war comes, bonds have the ability to weaken suddenly. When bonds do weaken because countries fear repercussions, the United States will need to have back-up plans in place.

Ultimately, the only way that the United States can avoid the political problems of anti-access are to create targets that are unseen and minimally supported. Long-range stealthy aircraft accomplish the goal, as do submarines. The B-2 bomber, the stealthiest of currently operational aircraft, has never been brought down due to enemy fire. Similarly, no modern submarine has been lost due to enemy action. The best systems that policy leaders can use are ones that have the same sorts of stealthy, long-range characteristics.

Global Artillery

Truly revolutionary technologies are rare. While a number of new technologies and novel methods of operation have comprised different revolutions in military affairs over the years (the use of the tank and the aircraft carrier in World War II being prime examples), relatively few military technologies have been nearly an entire revolution in themselves. In the 20th century, nuclear weapons managed to change not just the nature of warfare, but also the entire dynamic of international strategy and politics. Today, the United States has the capability to create a weapon which can destroy a wide range of targets that in the past could only be confidently destroyed by nuclear weapons. The effects of such a weapon have the potential to change not just the way in which warfare is conducted, but also how policy makers decide to implement U.S. grand strategy.

Global artillery combines many of the technologies being developed for the RMA into one weapon, capable of striking anytime and anywhere on the globe, within an hour. The concepts of long-range guns and global artillery are not new, but now the United

²³ Siegel, Adam, *Basing and Other Constraints on Lurid-Based Aviation Contributions to U.S. Contingency Operations*, Center for Naval Analyses, March 1995

States now has both the technological capabilities to build such a weapon, as well as the capital for its construction.

Global artillery, as it is presented in this paper, offers a number of unique or highly upgraded capabilities that the United States would be hard-pressed to find in any other system. In addition to its tremendous globe-spanning range, a global gun is a cost-effective piece of equipment, with multiple roles, that make it a tool with politico-military uses ranging from coercion to bunker busting. Its potential benefits far exceed merely its military effectiveness, and give policy makers a genuinely revolutionary capability that will be unmatched by any country for decades to come.

Long-range operations are one of the hallmarks of modern warfare. The ability to destroy one's enemy before he even has the ability to fire has been a priority across all U.S. weapons platforms. Air Force tactical doctrine, for instance, concentrates on long-range missiles for air-to-air combat, and the ideal situation is to fire the primary weapon at extended ranges, long before the enemy even has a chance to activate his own weapon. Similarly, the Navy's ability to project power relies on its ability to send aircraft over the horizon without putting the carrier battle group in danger. The Army's focus on multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS), tactical missiles (ATACM), and armor equipped with weapons that have the maximum range possible also reflects this thinking.

Global artillery leverages the United States' unique technical and engineering superiority to provide a weapon that operates under the same concept that all U.S. military units currently subscribe to. A long-range artillery piece operating from somewhere in the middle of CONUS takes the natural protection that long-range tactical weapons use and extends them to a new level. Instead of tactical weapons providing stand-off capabilities of 100 miles, global artillery will provide a stand-off capability of 5,000 miles or more; the United States will be able to hit targets without the enemy ever coming within range of U.S. forces. The only options a non-ICBM adversary will have are to run, hide, bury, or surrender. Even those countries that possess an ICBM capability will pose little threat to the United States for one or both of the two reasons that prevents the United States from currently maintaining a fleet of intercontinental ballistic missiles for use as global artillery. For Russia, treaty restrictions prevent it from using its ICBM fleet as global artillery. For the rest of the world, including Russia, the cost of using an ICBM as a conventional weapon is simply too high to be feasible.²⁴

A ballistic missile costs about \$7 million to build.²⁵ Even assuming that the United States was to withdraw from the START treaties and field conventional ballistic missiles, the costs would be enormous. A typical Minuteman III missile is armed with three Mk-12 warheads, which weigh 253 lbs. each. Replacing these warheads with conventional munitions would produce a missile capable of delivering three small, high-speed kinetic energy weapons at a minimum cost of \$2.33 million each. Compared with a cost of less than \$30,000 for a JDAM or even an updated \$500,000 Tomahawk, the ballistic missile option is unrealistic (even when the delivery-system costs for the latter are factored).

Furthermore, the START I and START II treaties prevent policy makers from using a ballistic missile as a conventional weapon. With a cap of 3,500 warheads, and no multiple warheads allowed, the maximum number of weapons the United States could have at its disposal would be 3,500, assuming we no longer were to maintain a nuclear

²⁴ For additional information on the concept of ICBMs as conventional long-range artillery, see *The Ultimate Standoff Weapon*, Lt. Col. John R. London III, USAF, <http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/london.html>

²⁵ Cost for a Minuteman III. Of course the total system cost is many times the manufacturing cost of the missile itself.

missile fleet. Although reductions in the U.S. nuclear force structure are likely to occur, it is highly improbable that the United States will reduce its ballistic missile fleet to fewer than 1,500 warheads. Thus, the maximum number of weapons the United States would have in a conventional ICBM fleet would be around 1,500. At an acquisition cost of \$7,000,000, the use of the entire conventional ICBM fleet would run \$1,050,000,000. Each of these weapons, assuming advanced guidance were installed to give them the same capabilities as GPS guided bombs, could theoretically be used on one target. Thus, 1500 targets could be destroyed, assuming a perfectly accurate weapon, with the entire arsenal. In contrast, during the Gulf War, the United States used a total of 17,201 guided weapons at a cost of \$2,272,000,000. Ignoring munitions which did not possess stand-off capabilities, the United States used a total of 332 Tomahawk and air launched cruise missiles at a price of \$913,800,000.²⁶

Even were cost not an issue for policy makers, and number of weapons not a concern for the military—which they both assuredly are—a conventional ballistic fleet poses an immense political challenge to civilian military leaders. A conventional ballistic missile is indistinguishable from a nuclear one, and countries—such as Russia—will be concerned that each launch carries a nuclear warhead. The association of ICBM's with nuclear weapons is such that the complications of using them for the delivery of conventional weapons, even if cost were not a factor, would rule it out.

If rockets are an unacceptable method the intercontinental delivery of conventional munitions, then very long-range guns remain as an important option to consider. A global gun, capable of hitting any spot in the world within an hour is the solution. Global artillery solves virtually all of the problems that an ICBM fleet cannot overcome, and it can be built now. Once developed, a global gun will be cheaper, faster, and better than any other method of long-range attack against fixed targets in the hands of the United States.

The first question that must naturally be asked when looking at a concept as large as global artillery is: "can it be done?" While at first the challenges of global artillery may seem daunting, in fact, much of the research has already been done. The challenge of a global artillery lies not in the technology, but in the construction. Much of the technological research that would be needed to create a global artillery piece exists, especially for a first generation system. The global gun that would first be built would use existing technologies, simply scaled up. Although the engineering will be new and challenging, the concepts are well understood.

The first global artillery piece will be a scaled-up gun, placed somewhere in CONUS. It will require a (vertically-oriented) barrel measuring approximately a kilometer in length, which is most naturally emplaced underground. The projectile, which will weigh up to 300 kg in the initial reference system, will travel at 9 km/sec. The system will be able to shoot 10,000 projectiles per day continuously for a month, and will do so in a cost-efficient manner. It will also be extremely accurate with respect to (usually, terminally-guided) payload-delivery, as is required for it to be a politically potent tool, rather than simply a militarily effective one.

The global gun will provide a number of unique military capabilities. It will be able to reach any spot on the globe in a matter of a few dozen minutes; its projectiles will be capable, by virtue of their very great kinetic energy, of destroying large armored columns single-handedly; it will be the most capable (non-nuclear) weapon yet invented

²⁶ *Operation Desert Storm. Evaluation of the Air Campaign.* GAO, June, 1997, GAO NSIAD-97-134

to destroy hardened targets and deeply buried bunkers. Finally, it will be a logistically superior weapon, with the entire infrastructure needed to supply it remaining in CONUS.

As important, and perhaps more so, than the military implications of a global gun are the political possibilities it creates. A global gun, once constructed, will be enormously efficient and cost very little to operate, relative to the capabilities it delivers. All military units needed to support the weapon will be based in CONUS, and only a handful of forward observers, if any at all, will be needed to spot and designate targets for the weapon. The weapon's near-instantaneous capabilities will automatically give credibility to U.S. threats of force. No treaties, nor need for cooperative allies, will restrict the weapon's use, and the ability to use it as a coercive tool make it perhaps the one of the greatest such weapons in the history of warfare, comparable to nuclear weaponry.

Global artillery is a single system that combines nearly all of the technologies that comprise the current RMA. Near-instantaneous response, stealth, precision, and long-range are all encompassed by global artillery. Indeed, global artillery may be considered the "aircraft carrier" of the land, able to project power far beyond its platform, emplace its own sensors and reconnaissance assets over targeted areas, remain protected by layers of defenses, respond quickly to a crisis, and reach anywhere on the globe. An aircraft carrier is vulnerable to different weapons systems, is not capable of reaching certain targets, carries limited ordinance, and can take many days to reach its target. A global artillery system has an unlimited ammunition supply, is virtually un-targetable, and can respond within minutes to reach any point in the world.

Just as civilian leaders turn to the aircraft carrier to solve a myriad of political problems, from actual war to merely a show of resolve, so too will political leaders in the future be able to turn to a global gun in the same manner. In fact, global artillery will be far more useful than carriers, for all of the reasons mentioned above.

An examination of the ICBM fleet, as demonstrated above, reveals that an enormous monetary requirement, not to mention treaty restrictions, prohibit the United States from fielding a conventional ICBM force. Similarly, though cruise missiles are less expensive than ICBMs, they have shortcomings in the performance, latency, and cost areas as well. When civilian leaders consider the range of projects to be developed, cost is always crucial. The current administration has made it clear that it does not wish to invest in systems that will not deliver the maximum capability for the minimum dollar amount. Clearly, ICBMs do not deliver such a capability, nor do cruise missiles when used extensively.

Global artillery, on the other hand, is a cost-effective weapon, though at first its price tag may seem high. When it comes to demonstrating U.S. resolve and U.S. capabilities, no system will better be able to form precision strikes, while at the same time maintaining a low operational cost. This makes it an ideal weapon from a policy standpoint, as it is the day-to-day cost of operations, from logistics to maintenance, that usually prove to have the most extensive costs during a conflict.

The projected capital costs²⁷ of a global artillery system are somewhere around the \$4 billion mark. This is a substantial sum, but when compared with a carrier battle group cost of \$10-15 billion; this is not an unreasonable amount. Furthermore, six B-2C

²⁷ All projected cost figures for global artillery are based on briefings and discussions with Dr. Lowell Wood of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, who has done the initial research into global artillery.

bombers are projected to cost approximately the same amount, and the global gun will offer a far more potent capability, exercised at far lower asset-risk, than they do.

Where ordinance is concerned, the cost of a 300 kg projectile is comparable to a JDAM, but there is one fundamental distinction which makes it a very attractive alternative to JDAMs: the global gun rounds can be assembled onsite, thereby drastically reducing logistics costs, and the deployment and operational costs of the associated delivery system are near-zero. The reduction in logistics costs will not only allow money to be spent more efficiently, as this administration has committed itself to doing, but will also free up overseas transport for other vital pieces of equipment.

While the cost issue certainly has an enormous impact on civilian policy makers, as they are the individuals charged with creating and taking responsibility for the budget, it is not the cost-cutting implications of global artillery, but rather the performance implications that make it such a powerful concept.

Politically, the performance that will make global artillery a militarily super-weapon will also revolutionize the way in which diplomacy is conducted. In addition to its unique properties that cannot be mimicked by any other (non-nuclear) system (such as destroying hardened bunkers), global artillery can replace many of the functions of other major platforms, thereby reducing the overall power-projection risk to men and materiel.

The short latency time of global artillery's projectiles and their ability to be re-directed by operators based in CONUS up until a few dozen seconds before impact mimics the capability of carrier battle groups, but allows more and higher lethality ordinance to be placed on a target. With such a capability, U.S. policy makers gain two distinct advantages. First, they need not worry about the political fallout from the damaging or sinking of a carrier. Second, in order for a carrier to respond to a crisis, it must either be pre-positioned, making it vulnerable to a pre-emptive strike, or steam to the location of the conflict, a process which can take many days. Global artillery's ability to strike immediately, within the span of an hour, is its greatest political asset.

United States policy makers will be able to threaten the use of force and actually be able to carry out such threats nearly instantaneously. While the B-2 bomber serves to accomplish this role to a certain degree today, its latency is more than 12 hours, and its invulnerability to enemy countermeasures is far from perfect. Furthermore, while the payload it carries is substantial for an aircraft, it is still limited to what a single global gun could source in less than 15 minutes.

CONCLUSIONS ABOUT GLOBAL ARTILLERY

Global artillery's impact on United States policymaking, as described above, is clearly beneficial. Operations will be conducted more quickly, cleanly, efficiently, with less risk to U.S. soldiers, and at less cost. In short, global artillery is a system that falls clearly on the side of making war easier for the United States. Unlike precision-guided weapons, which may find their way into the possession of a multitude of actors who will be able to utilize them to prevent the United States from achieving its policy goals, the United States will have a global monopoly on global artillery for several decades.

While the benefits of global artillery far exceed any negative aspects of the weapon, there is at least one identifiable problem that the weapon may bring about; global artillery may cause a radical shift in the priorities and operations of potential enemies of the United States. If the weapon works as advertised, the only two factors limiting U.S. action against an enemy are political will and intelligence capabilities.

Since global artillery by its very nature eliminates many of the potential political ramifications of military action, then one can assume that U.S. policy makers will be more willing to employ force, using global artillery as the medium. In such an instance, limited intelligence capacity becomes the only obstacle to U.S. action.

Given such an overwhelming set of capabilities, opposing forces will seek asymmetric methods of attack. Were the United States to have an overwhelming conventional force, the asymmetric means would be achieved through anti-access weaponry, utilizing much of the previously described precision-guided munitions. With global artillery, however, there is no such chance for an opposing force to use conventional munitions in an asymmetric manner.

What then are the alternatives for enemy countries? Two answers immediately come to mind. Nuclear weapons on ballistic missiles are one obvious choice, but very few countries have them and a combination of deterrence and potential future defenses should provide an adequate defense. A more likely approach by an enemy force would be to bring the fight to the continental United States using terrorist tactics.

Proceeding from the assumption that the United States will be able to destroy any weapons system that is not constantly mobile or so deeply buried as to be worthless, states may decide that terrorism is the only effective weapon against the United States. Small, highly mobile forces that can evade U.S. intelligence will be the only guaranteed weapons that cannot be targeted by a global gun.

The threat of terrorism in response to global artillery cannot be taken lightly. However, one can safely assume that any nation that deems it permissible to strike U.S. civilian targets through a campaign of terror in response to the threat of global artillery will probably do so in the absence of global artillery as well. While policy leaders must acknowledge an increase in the possibility that a country may use terrorism during a conflict, ultimately the advantages of global artillery are compelling. Additionally, for the United States to be held hostage to the threat of terrorism and forgo a major weapon of military and political consequence would not serve U.S. interests; sooner or later an attack will be attempted on the U.S. homeland, regardless of what types of weapons the U.S. builds.

POLITICAL ANALYSIS

One area that must be covered in any political analysis of a specific large-scale weapon is its political survivability. Nowhere is this truer than with global artillery. The weapons systems that the revolution in military affairs requires are already coming into conflict with the established military. As Machiavelli noted, "There is nothing more difficult to carry out, nor more doubtful of success, nor more dangerous to handle, than to initiate a new order of things. For the reformer has enemies in all those who profit by the old order, and only lukewarm defenders in all those who would profit by the new order."²⁸ Weapons such as submerged arsenal ships, long-range bombers, and small surface vessels require the armed forces to rethink their methods of operations. In a hierarchical structure such as the military, with deeply embedded tradition, radically new systems are not always readily accepted.²⁹

²⁸ *The Prince*. Niccolò Machiavelli

²⁹ See: *Winning the Next War*, Stephen Rosen, © 1991, Cornell University Press

More conventional weapons have faced fierce challenges from the services, but such challenges may be small in comparison to the potential battle that global artillery will face. A global gun may be seen to threaten the missions of the Navy, Air Force, and Army simultaneously. Global artillery can do the job of an aircraft carrier faster and for much less cost. It can do part of the Air Force's job by being capable of reaching anywhere on the globe. And it can do the job of conventional Army artillery with greater firepower sourced over far greater distances. Consequently, the battle for global artillery must be lead by the civilian policy makers who recognize its great potentialities. Though some visionaries within the Services may recognize the weapon's potential, most will be prone to dismiss it, and will actively work against its creation.

Ironically, the Air Force, who would be the most likely candidate to operate a global artillery system, has officers in it who may be particularly threatened by its creation. One of the applications for a global gun is launching supplies and satellites into space. In fact, a full-scale global artillery system could launch into orbit in a single day 10times the total tonnage of payload that NASA puts in space every year. As such, it is an ideal platform for both the initial launch and then re-supply of satellites, both military and civilian. However, some senior officers in the Air Force may have a vested interest in not re-supplying satellites, or inexpensively launching them, for two reasons. First, the satellite and space launch industrial sector is often a source of jobs for flag officers once they retire. Second, some Air Force officers fear damage to the satellite-creation and space launch industrial base if satellites become cheaply or re-suppliable. Their preference would be to keep launching new satellites at very high costs in order to make sure enough work is provided to maintain the presently structured industry.

In order to gain the support of the Services, it would first seem necessary to enlist the support of the Air Force by emphasizing global artillery's role as being complimentary with current Air Force doctrine. To minimize effective opposition to its development, funding should be provided directly from the Department of Defense, in a program akin to the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, rather than come from the Air Force's (or Army's) budget. Furthermore, studies will need to be conducted that will demonstrate the global gun's usefulness to all the Services, to try and minimize their opposition.

CONCLUSION

This paper provides the groundwork for thinking about the revolution in military affairs from a civilian policy making perspective. In general, the ideas contained within this document are aimed at the broad sweep of the RMA and its consequences. Thus, the examples provided, with the exception of global artillery, are intended to demonstrate how general principles and ideas of the RMA can alter civilian policy makers' thinking about warfare, rather than being directed at calling for or eliminating certain programs.

It is clear that the RMA has the potential to have a major impact on the way in which civilian policy makers prepare for and execute war. At the fiscal level, more efficient weapons will reduce the numbers of weapons needed to execute a war, and thus costs associated with their construction, maintenance, storage, and transportation will correspondingly be reduced. At the policy level, the new technologies that are emerging will give civilian policy makers more leeway in determining when to go to war. And,

once a war has begun, will grant policy makers the ability to go after targets that would have once been politically difficult to destroy.

Though this paper is largely focused on the broad implications of the **RMA**, as opposed to more specific determinations about which weapons and projects should be pursued, global artillery is included because it is perhaps the quintessential weapon system that could revolutionize military operations in the modern era, yet at the same time is of perhaps even more benefit to civilian policy makers.

The time to invest in global artillery or other **RMA** systems is now. **As** the United States continues have a major influence throughout the globe, the chance that we will engage in conflict increases. In order to realize the types of systems that will best enhance policy makers' choices in coming conflicts, research and development must begin sooner rather than later. Precision guided weapons have been in existence since Viet Nam, yet the United States is still a long way from achieving a cheap, reliable, and extremely accurate all-whether munition. Those weapons that have the highest accuracy need clear skies, and those that are all-whether sacrifice some accuracy.

In some cases, both military and civilian policy makers will recognize the importance of an **RMA** technology and that technology will be developed. However, in other cases **RMA** technologies that will be most useful to civilian policy makers may be actively opposed by military leaders, due to entrenched opinions and a genuine preference for different systems. In such cases, civilian policy makers must push for the development of those **RMA** technologies.

The ultimate recommendation of this paper is to call for an investment in RMA technologies as soon as possible, in light of their potential importance to civilian policy makers. Already, numerous papers have been published regarding the significance of RMA technologies for military planners. Given that there is, at least in some areas, a convergence between the technologies that will aid our military and civilian policy makers, now is the time to go forward and explore the possibilities that the RMA offers.

June
May 4, 2004

TO: Bill Schneider
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Global Artillery

Here is an interesting note from Andy Marshall. Is this proposal something the Defense Science Board should look at?

Why don't you get in touch with Andy to discuss it?


Thanks.

Attach.

4/27/04 Director, Net Assessment ltr to SecDef re: Johnny Foster and Lowell Wood request for a session with you

DHR:dh
050404-1

.....
Please respond by 6/25/04



Paul Butler

6/30

Sir,
Response attached. Original attachment included behind.

vr/
CDR Nosenzo
6/30

6/7/1

OSD 08073-04

June
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050404-1

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Please *respond* by 6/25/04

OSD 08073-04

11-L-0559/OSD/41676



DIRECTOR OF
NET ASSESSMENT

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1920 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1920

27 April 2004

TO: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Andy Marshall *Andy*

SUBJECT: Johnny Foster and Lowell Wood request for a session with you

Several weeks ago Johnny and Lowell came to see me. They want to see you to urge development of a global gun, which they believe is quite feasible. Johnny tells me that, while the idea of a cannon with global reach has been around for some years, the people at Livermore Labs have, in the last couple of years, thought through solutions to most of the technical and engineering problems it presents. Attached are:

- A short memo by Lowell expanding on the proposed project, plus three related graphics.
- A paper by Jonathan Perle that includes a discussion of the geopolitical implications of a global gun (I sent you a copy when it was written during the summer of 2002). See pages 13 to 19, which are marked.

If you decide to go ahead with the first phase of the technical program, I suggest that you also have two studies done. One on the costs of such a program, including the ownership costs of a long-term, fully ready-to-shoot capability. The other to explore likely reactions of other countries to a U.S. program.



11-L-0559/OSD/41677

MEMORANDUM

To:

From:

**Re: Transformation of Geopoliticomilitary Affairs:
Global-Range, High-Rate, Low-Cost Sourcing of All Types of Fires**

Motivation. In order to defend itself and its allies, the US has developed an exemplary world-wide force projection capability. The Nation's combination of logistical capacity and efficiency, superbly trained and proficient personnel, and technically superior weapons and equipment enable it to fight and win conflicts against adversaries throughout the world. Rapid, decisive, world-wide force projection is, however, an exceedingly difficult task. As highly effective as our current force projection capabilities have become, they remain imperfect and expensive.

Many of the costs and limitations of our current system stem from the need to apply force quickly, at the onset and early stages of a rapidly developing conflict. This, of course, is where force is most politically and militarily effective, but also where it is most difficult to apply. Providing really rapid response requires extensive forward-basing of personnel and supplies (with large financial and geopolitical costs), while too-slow response allows adversaries to seize and consolidate gains, driving-up eventual costs to resolve MRCs satisfactorily. Such considerations underlie the SecDef-stated desire to transform U.S. force-projection capabilities.

In addition to fundamentally enhancing American capabilities for really rapid response to MRCs, such transformation should also leverage America's great other-than-human military strengths – creation, production and use of high-potency weaponry – while minimizing the policy impacts of our well-known 'weaknesses': aversion to U.S. casualties, disinclination to harm enemy civilians, properties or territories, and reluctance to engage in prolonged conflicts.

A basic transformation in geopoliticomilitary affairs – not 'merely' a revolution in military affairs – thus may result, and certainly is called for by present circumstances. The key enabling technological means is a revolutionary concept: Global Artillery. Some development is required before this extensively-reviewed concept can be operationally demonstrated, but the required cost, time and risk are comparatively very modest. The basic question today is: *What's possible? or What do you have in mind?*

Key Requirements. The force levels required to either stall the aggressive advance of a regional superpower in a MRC or to impose outright defeat on it have been extensively studied. Such analyses indicate that about 100B-2 sorties (~2,000 tons of military payload) per day of high-tech weaponry-delivery capability are required to decisively defeat a North Korean-scale adversary when applied steadily over a 10-day interval (followed by ~20 days of ~40 sorties/day to neutralize national war-making potential), with perhaps 3-6 times that being required to effectively paralyze such an attack in its very earliest phase. [See Figures.]

Since the U.S. doesn't have (and doesn't choose to procure-&-maintain) the forward-based strategic bomber capability corresponding to such force-application levels, we utilize a variety of other, shorter-range ordinance-delivery means to deal with adversaries distant from our shores. The logistical penalties implicit in delivering such forces (involving -100:1 equipment-to-delivered-ordnance overheads, and multi-month intervals for delivery-to-theater and combat set-up) are responsible for most of the costs and limitations of our current force-projection system.

However, there appears to be realistic technical prospects for the near-term creation of an advanced, near-instantaneous, CONUS-based, weapon/sensor/comm delivery capability, thereby eliminating force projection delays and forward-basing penalties. This new capability would be used at the onset of a MRC, applying sufficient force to impede (if not deter outright) adversarial actions long enough for existing U.S. forces to arrive and definitively deal with the situation. Perhaps most strikingly of all, it appears possible to attain IOC of this capability within the present decade, with the cost to create an operational prototype perhaps being \$10 B.

Global Artillery. This novel weaponry delivery capability is provided by long-range, CONUS-based "artillery": military payloads are launched from high-performance, 21st century guns at sufficiently great speeds that they fly as much as half-way around the Earth before they come down - precisely to where they were programmed. These payloads *each* contain of the order of 1,000 pounds of weaponry - *ad hoc* mixes of munitions, sensors, communications systems, etc. - and are launched at rates of the order of 10,000 every day, so that roughly 10 million pounds - 5,000 tons - of materiel are launched theater-ward (or alternatively, into Earth orbit) each day.

A fundamental purpose of "Global Artillery" is to bring all potential adversaries of the U.S. "under the American gun" - and to do so within the same hour that the President/SecDef gives the order to do so. A secondary objective is to "secure the high ground" for the U.S. in a lasting manner, by conferring a completely unmatchable degree of access to the space environment.

First-Level Technology Details. The proposed means for implementing this capability is an electrically-energized launcher - in essence, a mile-length high-tech 'artillery tube' - that's capable of taking electricity from a power transmission line, conditioning it appropriately, and applying it several times each minute so as to 'fire' a payload-packet of the order of 1 ton at a speed of the order of 6 miles per second straight up into the air.

The projectile so 'fired' is an RV-shaped object - a maneuvering transatmospheric vehicle (ManTAV) - that aerodynamically turns towards its target as it climbs through the air. It thereafter flies through space for 20-40 minutes and reenters the atmosphere over its target-area. By means of a combination of its own inertial guidance, GPS signals and target-homing sensors, it 'flies' into the immediate vicinity of its target and - depending on its specified mission - either dives at hypersonic speeds into its target as a unitary weapon (carrying -10X its own weight of TNT in kinetic-energy form), slows (possibly at high altitude) and distributes sub-munitions, comm gear or sensors - or whatever else may be required of it.

The 10,000 'packets' of mixed fires that each such facility can source daily represent a total of -200-400 B-2 strike-sorties - even more if sourcing hypersonic blast-engendering munitions - a level sufficient to stall, and quite possibly swiftly defeat, attacks by major regional adversaries.

Programmatic Sketch. Realization of such a revolutionary force-projection capability on transformational time-scales clearly involves some significant acceptance of schedule risk.

The overall-preferred programmatic approach is a three-phase one. The First Phase builds on previous (e.g., the attached) scoping studies, specifies the major risk items and generates a corresponding fast-paced risk-mitigation plan, and also provides skeletal engineering analyses and the outline of a prototype implementation program. Properly executed by a small team of top-quality people, this First Phase would involve somewhat less than a year's effort, so that, if begun promptly, results could be available within a year at a total cost of a few M\$.

The Second Phase would be quadpartite, involving execution of the risk-mitigation program, the corresponding fleshing-out of a more-detailed but still highly-opportunistic program plan, the development and demonstration of key components, and the concurrent commencing of procurement of long-lead-time items and performing the basics of facility preparation. It probably could be completed by end-CY'05 and likely would involve obligation of ~\$50 M (of which ~\$25 M would be costed in FY'05).

The Third Phase would involve high-concurrency execution of the detailed program plan, and could lead to Horizontal Prototype facility IOC at end-'07 and Vertical Prototype facility IOC at end-CY'08, at a total cost of the order of \$5 B. [See Figures.] This program phase would also leverage results from the old ABRES program for support of LRIP of the required maneuvering transatmospheric vehicles (ManTAVs). [In order to minimize cost and overall covert-program risks, the IOC would not involve major electrical transmission-line creation, and thus would sustain the full-scale 10,000ton/day launch-rate for only a fractional-hour with the energy storage capacity of its Power-Conditioning System; an option for very swiftly-executed energizing of the facility to sustain full-launch-rate immediately following IOC would be fully developed during the Third Phase. Plans would also be fully developed for swift post-IOC execution of ever more robust hardening of the National capability embodied by the Vertical Prototype facility.]

Additional Considerations. It's presumably clear that the 'Global Artillery' system represents much more than an ultra-long-range cannon or a super-rate space-launcher. Instead, it's a truly revolutionary capability for long-distance, high-rate transportation of mid-scale payloads to virtually everywhere that's of present or future military interest. It'll likely represent a technological advance of historic scale, one - like powered air-flight - that'll still be 'looking' for leverage-exploiting national security applications a half-century after it's first realized.

Two additional considerations merit explicit attention in this context.


Collateral Space Supremacy. The contemplated capability enables placement of payloads virtually anywhere in near-Earth space at far higher *daily* totals than are currently attained by the entire human race during an entire *year*. These capabilities inevitably confer enduring, utterly-compelling U.S. supremacy-in-space: America would own a veritable railroad-into-space, while all others would still be accessing space via figurative ox carts.

Asymmetry Maintenance. It's likewise obvious that the most careful attention be given, from the very outset, to maintaining profound asymmetry between the U.S. and all future adversaries with respect to effective ownership of the capabilities conferred by this system.

Recommendations. The historic opportunity proffered by this prospect considered, it is strongly recommended that immediate commitment be made to execution of the First Phase – involving detailed planning and design-for-risk-reduction – of this program, with a commitment-in-principle being made at the outset to seamlessly follow-on into Second Phase, if First Phase results basically bear out results of analyses made to date. This pair of start-up decisions will support a mid-CY'05 review concerned with provisional commitment to commencement of Third Phase work – the 3-year drive to IOC – at start-CY'06.


It's recommended that at least the first two Phases of this 5-year program be DARPA-sponsored, with special top-level management attention being mandated in order to move it along at a technology-limited pace and to maintain its covert characteristics to the greatest extent compatible with a very fast pace and top-quality people being enlisted in adequate quantities for its execution.


Because of its implications for enduring American supremacy both on the Earth's surface and in all of near-Earth space, it's recommended that this entire program be protected comprehensively, managed optimally and funded appropriately – and that top-level *ad hoc* OSD reviews be convened regularly to ensure all of this.




*From Figure 1 of "Analyses of U.S. Requirements for Conventionally Armed Bombers," by Gen. Jasper Welch (USAF, ret.), July 1994.

MRC Requirements - High Intensity Case





Horizontal Prototype Facility



Vertical Prototype Facility

UNCLASSIFIED

Political Policy Implications of the Revolution in Military Affairs

By: Jonathan Perle

Sponsored by:
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IATAC

**Providing IA Support to the
War fighter**



UNCLASSIFIED

11-L-0559/OSD/41686

December 10, 2004

TO: GEN John Abizaid
CC: Gen Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith
GEN George Casey

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Militia Theory

Attached is an e-mail I received on militias. What do you think of it?

Thanks.

Attach.

11/16/04 Pickard e-mail to SD re: Militia Theory

DHR:dh
120904-49

.....
Please respond by 1/6/05

Iraq

10 Dec 04

(b)(6)

CIV, OSD

From: (b)(6)
Sent: Wednesday, November 17, 2004 4:02 PM
To: (b)(6)
Subject: FW: Militia theory

From DR's email

-----Original Message-----

From: Ronn S. Pickard (b)(6)
Sent: Tuesday, November 16, 2004 11:51 PM
To: Donald Rumsfeld
Subject: MILITIA THEORY

Don,

The Department of Defense has no militia theory.

Fundamentally, the term "militia" refers to a citizenry voluntarily mobilized for the common defense.

The strategy of terrorism is ultimately simple. A community is criminally attacked. The folks in the community naturally organize to defend themselves. Terrorist allies within the government block the government from passing proper laws to enable the community to defend itself lawfully and openly. Terrorist allies within the community attacked promote the formation of illegal militias and, thus, control the linkage between illegal militia units. The illegal militia units are then run up against each other and the government. Totalitarianism results. A well regulated militia would make such shenanigans impossible.

Things immediately became unglued in Iraq after Allawi stated that there would be "no militia laws". How could the people of Iraq possibly support a government that seeks to disarm and disorganize them in the face of such violence? Without a lawful self-defense how much easier could it be for terrorists to dominated communities?

The Kurdish militia had repelled Saddam Hussein and his agents when they were in power with a minimum of support from the United States. The Allawi government with U.S. support has sought to stand down the Kurdish militia and replace them with government paid police. The result as with the situation in Mosul was predictable. The militia has to be properly regulated not eliminated.

There is a world of difference between a well regulated militia, a poorly regulated militia, an unregulated militia, and an illegal militia. The Department of Defense has no analysis of the difference.

The principles of a well regulated militia are universal, although unknown to the D.O.D.

1. The basic militia unit must be neighborhood based so that the members are first defending their own families and neighbors. This makes the militia unit naturally conservative and responsible. It would be extremely difficult for a neighborhood based militia unit under proper regulations to sustain illegal activities because everyone in the neighborhood would know what they were doing. It would be too easy for authorities to investigate reports of misbehavior and provide remedial discipline.
2. The members of the basic militia unit elect their own sergeant. This makes the militia unit a bulwork of democracy and assures community support for the unit.
3. The militia sergeants must swear into "the regular uniformed officer corps" -- in municipalities this means the local police station. Sergeants serve, in effect as reserve police officers. They are always subject to the martial laws. No law commands individual militia members to mobilize unless the order comes from a governor or the president. However, the social conditions of the basic militia unit effectively require members to mobilize at the call of their sergeants unless there are exceptional political conditions afoot.

Once mobilized, militia members are under the martial laws.

Our Constitution gives it to the Congress to write the militia code for the nation and leaves it to the states to implement that code. The President becomes commander-in-chief of the militia if he declares a state of emergency.

The Congress never wrote the appropriate militia code. The lack of a national militia code resulted in the militias of the individual states becoming independent only state organs -- which was the necessary precondition if not the ultimate cause of the Civil War.

It would be easy to implement a good Standard Militia Code in Iraq. Provide the form for neighborhoods to form units and elect sergeants. Assign local police officers to the units and ex-military personnel to drill them. This would put an immediate end to the insurgency because it would give the citizenry the mechanism to lawfully root it out and also prevent the only course to power the insurgency depends upon.

If even the weak PLA issued a Standard Militia Code, the Palestinian people would immediately and openly establish neighborhood militia units. These units would put a prompt end to the petty crime in the neighborhoods that is the necessary precursor to the gangs and larger illegal militia organizations. Once the Palestinian neighborhood militias were up and properly regulated, they would quickly put an end to any intimidation by the existing illegal militias such as that of Hamas and the al Aqsa Martyr's Brigade. What seems so difficult from a centralized political perspective is essentially simple on the neighborhood level.

The political opposition to well regulated militias is simply motivated. If folks in a neighborhood had a well regulated militia unit, they would use different but similar neighborhood based organization to address other political concerns. The well regulated militia entrenches the principles of freedom, democracy, and good government.

This is evident in urban American. Good neighborhood watches use the natural principles of a well regulated militia. Where the good neighborhood watch exists, the community is safe. Governing urban Democratic Parties actively and systematically oppose those who independently select their neighborhood leadership for any purpose. We have the common phenomenon of Democratic politicians pulling back their opposition to a neighborhood's self-organizing when crime surges and then pouncing back in after the the crime is reduced. The meetings are flooded out with public employees, etc., when the crisis is solved. In minority areas where the Democrats' hold is especially strong, gangs can simply take over. Although the American neighborhood watch rarely displays arms, they are present in the background.

The well regulated militia simply formalizes the rights and procedures that are natural and appropriate. The well regulated militia, of course, also instructs and disciplines the use of arms.

The problems with militias around the world are predictable when we look at how the individual principles of the well regulated militia are manifest or absent. In Iraq, even urban militias are tied to family and tribes rather than being neighborhood based. Local unit leaders are appointed not elected. The regular uniformed officer corps plays no role. It would be easy to replace these structures with a well regulated militia structure.

The well regulated militia requires that the regular uniformed officer corps is under local civil authority except for states of emergency.

It should be expected that members of a well regulated militia in their individual capacity as citizens would form civic associations and have political impacts. It would be best for such associations to follow the principles of American non-profit organizations.

It is also proper that militias have communications and joint operational infrastructures by which they can operate if their regular uniformed officers are absent. Those communications and joint operational infrastructures should develop under the law and the supervision of the regular uniformed officer corps. For instance, in case of strife, a police department headquarters could be compromised or officers might need to be sent to particular hotspots. The neighborhood militia should still be able to mobilize and communicate. When regular officers return, their authority should be immediately recognized.

It is common in America for citizens to take action to apprehend a suspect, and for those citizens to immediately follow the orders of police officers when they arrive on the scene. The principles involved are natural.

Under our Constitution, our Congress should enact legislation that gives our citizens the specific right and regulations to form neighborhood militia units, elect sergeants, and be assigned officers. If we had a Standard Militia Code, the neighborhoods across the America would form militia units virtually overnight. Street crime and neighborhood gangs would vanish in a few short weeks. This is not a pipe dream. It is based on practical experience. I served as chair of an ad hoc community neighborhood watch in a high crime minority area in Los Angeles. At one point we dissolved what had become the heaviest drug trafficking intersection in Los Angeles in two weeks without arrests -- then the politicians swept in.

My concern is with applying the natural principles of a well regulated militia without written regulations and formal structures. Although this immediately pacifies neighborhoods, the corruption of these structures looms.

We should take advantage of the crises in this country and abroad to enact the full regulatory structures that would govern appropriately long after the crises are past. Parties will always seek to dominate and exploit any neighborhood structures (let alone militia) for other political purposes. Only by good regulations can militia be properly governed and sustained.

Presently, the D.O.D. position is against any militia because it has no theory of regulation let alone the regulations themselves.

Citizens have the natural right to mobilize for the common defense. It is essential that this be properly regulated. The alternative is untenable.

At the time our Constitution was written the wisdom of the following words of the Second Article of the Bill of Rights was self-evident:

"A well regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free state, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed."

Your D.O.D. has analysts who would be willing to work on the development of militia theory and a Standard Militia Code. Would you care for names?

It would be easy to have the assistance in doing this from police departments across America. The people would support, the Congress would pass, and the President would sign such a code.

Sincerely yours,
Ronn S. Pickard

(b)(6)

December 10, 2004

TO: (b)(6)
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: E-mail Response to Ronn Pickard

Iraq

Please send the following e-mail response to Ronn Pickard:

Dear Mr. Pickard—

I received your e-mail, I thank you and I will see that it is put in the hands of a number of people.

Thank you so much.

Attach.
11/16/04 Pickard e-mail to SD re: Militia Theory

DHR:dh
120904-48

.....
Please respond by _____

OK

10 DEC 04

(b)(6) CIV, OSD

From: (b)(6)
Sent: Wednesday, November 17, 2004 4:02 PM
To: (b)(6)
Subject: FW: Militia theory

From DR's email

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Our Constitution gives it to the Congress to write the militia code for the nation and leaves it to the states to implement that code. The President becomes commander-in-chief of the militia if he declares a state of emergency.

The Congress never wrote the appropriate militia code. The lack of a national militia code resulted in the militias of the individual states becoming independent only state organs -- which was the necessary precondition if not the ultimate cause of the Civil War.

It would be easy to implement a good Standard Militia Code in Iraq. Provide the form for neighborhoods to form units and elect sergeants. Assign local police officers to the units and ex-military personnel to drill them. This would put an immediate end to the insurgency because it would give the citizenry the mechanism to lawfully root it out and also prevent the only course to power the insurgency depends upon.

If even the weak PLA issued a Standard Militia Code, the Palestinian people would immediately and openly establish neighborhood militia units. These units would put a prompt end to the petty crime in the neighborhoods that is the necessary precursor to the gangs and larger illegal militia organizations. Once the Palestinian neighborhood militias were up and properly regulated, they would quickly put an end to any intimidation by the existing illegal militias such as that of Hamas and the al Aqsa Martyr's Brigade. What seems so difficult from a centralized political perspective is essentially simple on the neighborhood level.

The political opposition to well regulated militias is simply motivated. If folks in a neighborhood had a well regulated militia unit, they would use different but similar neighborhood based organization to address other political concerns. The well regulated militia entrenches the principles of freedom, democracy, and good government.

This is evident in urban American. Good neighborhood watches use the natural principles of a well regulated militia. Where the good neighborhood watch exists, the community is safe. Governing urban Democratic Parties actively and systematically oppose those who independently select their neighborhood leadership for any purpose. We have the common phenomenon of Democratic politicians pulling back their opposition to a neighborhood's self-organizing when crime surges and then pouncing back in after the crime is reduced. The meetings are flooded out with public employees, etc., when the crisis is solved. In minority areas where the Democrats' hold is especially strong, gangs can simply take over. Although the American neighborhood watch rarely displays arms, they are present in the background.

The well regulated militia simply formalizes the rights and procedures that are natural and appropriate. The well regulated militia, of course, also instructs and disciplines the use of arms.

The problems with militias around the world are predictable when we look at how the individual principles of the well regulated militia are manifest or absent. In Iraq, even urban militias are tied to family and tribes rather than being neighborhood based. Local unit leaders are appointed not elected. The regular uniformed officer corps plays no role. It would be easy to replace these structures with a well regulated militia structure.

The well regulated militia requires that the regular uniformed officer corps is under local civil authority except for states of emergency.

It should be expected that members of a well regulated militia in their individual capacity as citizens would form civic associations and have political impacts. It would be best for such associations to follow the principles of American non-profit organizations.

It is also proper that militias have communications and joint operational infrastructures by which they can operate if their regular uniformed officers are absent. Those communications and joint operational infrastructures should develop under the law and the supervision of the regular uniformed officer corps. For instance, in case of strife, a police department headquarters could be compromised or officers might need to be sent to particular hotspots. The neighborhood militia should still be able to mobilize and communicate. When regular officers return, their authority should be immediately recognized.

It is common in America for citizens to take action to apprehend a suspect, and for those citizens to immediately follow the orders of police officers when they arrive on the scene. The principles involved are natural.

Under our Constitution, our Congress should enact legislation that gives our citizens the specific right and regulations to form neighborhood militia units, elect sergeants, and be assigned officers. If we had a Standard Militia Code, the neighborhoods across the America would form militia units virtually overnight. Street crime and neighborhood gangs would vanish in a few short weeks. This is not a pipe dream. It is based on practical experience. I served as chair of an ad hoc community neighborhood watch in a high crime minority area in Los Angeles. At one point we dissolved what had become the heaviest drug trafficking intersection in Los Angeles in two weeks without arrests -- then the politicians swept in.

My concern is with applying the natural principles of a well regulated militia without written regulations and formal structures. Although this immediately pacifies neighborhoods, the corruption of these structures looms.

We should take advantage of the crises in this country and abroad to enact the full regulatory structures that would govern appropriately long after the crises are past. Parties will always seek to dominate and exploit any neighborhood structures (let alone militia) for other political purposes. Only by good regulations can militia be properly governed and sustained.

Presently, the D.O.D. position is against any militia because it has no theory of regulation let alone the regulations themselves.

Citizens have the natural right to mobilize for the common defense. It is essential that this be properly regulated. The alternative is untenable.

At the time our Constitution was written the wisdom of the following words of the Second Article of the Bill of Rights was self-evident:

"A well regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free state, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed."

Your D.O.D. has analysts who would be willing to work on the development of militia theory and a Standard Militia Code. Would you care for names?

It would be easy to have the assistance in doing this from police departments across America. The people would support, the Congress would pass, and the President would sign such a code.

Sincerely yours,
Ronn S. Pickard

(b)(6)

December 9, 2004

TO: VADM Jim Stavridis
Paul Butler
Larry Di Rita

CC: COL Steve Bucci

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Future Travel

In terms of travel, I think when I go over to Asia, I ought to go to Thailand, Malaysia, probably Indonesia, Cambodia and Mongolia.

Let's talk about that trip.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
120904-43

.....

Please respond by 12/21/04

333 SD

9 Dec 04

December 9, 2004

TO: Paul Butler
Larry Di Rita
VADM Jim Stavridis

CC: COL Steve Bucci

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Plans for DoD

Attached is a memo we ought to start thinking about fast.

Thanks.

Attach.
12/9/04 SecDef memo re: Plans for DoD - 2005

DIR:dh
120904-39

.....
Please respond by 12/21/04

020 100

9 Dec 04

December 9, 2004

SUBJECT: Plans for DoD – 2005

We need to set our plans for DoD for the coming year:

- Outreach – Get a schedule that is more creative. For DR plus other DoD folks.
- Members of Congress – Get a schedule and master plan for DR, plus others.
- Ministers of Defense – schedule regular calls to key MoDs and key coalition partners.
- Travel – Lay out 2005 now. Must be creative – domestic and international.
- Press plan – do's and don'ts, off the record sessions, social, ways to help key press people who cover us thoughtfully and carefully (Mikelczewski, Raddatz, key folks from *Defense News*), contact with some of the key press people from DoS and WH, etc.
- Consider a new rhythm for staff meetings.
- Set plans to keep Service Secretaries in tight.
- Plan creative events by DoD for those who help – USO, entertainers, heroes, etc.

DHR:dh
120904-31

December 3, 2004

TO: Mary Claire Murphy

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Letter to POTUS

Please draft a letter from me to the President, telling him how much Diane Bodman is doing for the troops.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
120304-22

.....
Please respond by 12/9/04

201.22

3 Dec 04

December 3, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita
CC: Matt Latimer
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: National Security Personnel System

230

Whenever we talk about transformation, we ought to mention the National Security Personnel System.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
120304-12



Please respond by _____

3 Dec 04

December 3, 2004

TO: Paul Butler
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Thank You Note for Bill Timmons

If we have not prepared a thank you to Bill Timmons for his heads up on the calling cards for the military, please draft one.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
120304-10

.....
Please respond by 12/9/04

311.3

3 Dec 04

file

December 3, 2004

TO: Paul Butler
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Note to Chefs

9

Someone ought to draft a nice note from me to the chefs of each of the restaurants listed on the attached invitation, thanking them for helping out the troops.

Thanks.

Attach.
12/13/04 Invitation to USO Holiday for the Troops Dinner

DHR:ss
120304-7

.....
Please respond by 12/9/04

12/15 ~~OK~~ 12/16

TO Secret
from Paul Butler

These have been Done

335 SD

3 Dec 04

We would like to cordially invite you and a guest to join the service members from Walter Reed Army Medical Center and the National Naval Medical Center at Bethesda for the

"HOLIDAY FOR THE TROOPS" DINNER

Chefs from:

Ceiba
Citronelle
Equinox
Fat Punk's
Kinkead's

Marcel's
Melrose
Poste Brasserie
Rocklands BBQ
Tosca



Will be cooking a very special dinner on
MONDAY DECEMBER 13TH
6:00-9:00 PM

Mologne House Dining Room
Walter Reed Army Medical Center

Please RSVP to Lisa Marie at



of Metropolitan Washington



Fax

To: Honorable Donald Rumsfeld and guest

Fax Number:

(b)(6)

From: Elaine Rogers President, USO & Metropolitan Washington

Number of Pages including Cover Page: 2

Message: We are pleased to invite you to celebrate the holiday season with our wounded service members. Please RSVP no later than December 8, 2004. Thank you!

HAPPY HOLIDAYS

11-L-0559/OSD/41703

December 3, 2004

TO: The Honorable Andrew H. Card
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Prepaid Calling Cards for Military

Attached is a note from my friend, Bill Timmons, raising a matter of importance and concern on telephone credit cards for the military. It is self-explanatory.

The solution lies totally outside the Department of Defense, as I read it. I would very much appreciate your interest in this.

Thank you, sir.

Attach.
12/1/04 Memo to SecDef from Bill Timmons

DHR:ss
120304-3

311.3

3 Dec 04

1 Dec 04

~~FOUO~~

OSD 08084-05

VIA FAX

Memorandum for the Honorable Donald Rumsfeld

From: Bill Timmons *BT*

Date: 1 December 2004

Subject: Prepaid Telephone Calling Cards for Military

Request your personal assistance on an issue of importance to our servicemen and women and their families. In the next few weeks the FCC intends to issue an order concerning prepaid calling cards that threatens to increase rates on the military and other users of this low-cost telephone service by as much as 20%.

Ten years ago calling card service that contained promotional advertisements (called enhanced cards) was placed in service. Telephone calls using these enhanced cards are informational and outside regulated service and therefore not subject to intrastate access or universal service fees. After all these years the FCC intends to make these cards fall in a revenue category that will cause troops and other card users to contribute more so others may contribute less.

Consistent with the goals of universal service, the cards today provide low-cost calling for those who need it most - military, senior, rural, minority, and low-income users. The USO provides free pre-paid cards to service personnel as part of "Operation Phone Home program." Wal-Mart, Sam's Club, drug stores, military exchanges, and other retail outlets sell the inexpensive calling cards. Members of Congress have communicated with FCC Chairman Powell not to take money out of soldiers' pockets while they defend our country. In fact, in the closing days of this Congress through report language for the final budget legislation Congress directed the FCC 'not to take any action that would directly or indirectly have the effect of raising the rates charged to military personnel or their families for telephone calls placed using prepaid phone cards.' On 23 July of this year the Pentagon weighed in when Charles Abell wrote the FCC pointing out the increased costs to service personnel and families if this order were implemented. The FCC chairman put off official action until after the election but now intends to go forward.

Don, about the only avenue open seems to be White House involvement to protect the low-cost prepaid calling cards for the military. May I suggest you call Andy Card and ask him to help?

Thanks a bunch.

311.3

1 Dec 04

OSD 08084-05

11-L-0559/OSD/41705

December 1, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Fundraising

005

Please call Lynda Webster and tell her I cannot write a letter like this, according to the General Counsel.

Thanks.

Attach.
11/15/04 Webster fax re: Request from Ambassador Michael Thawley

DHR:dh
120104-4

.....
Please respond by 12/9/04

1 Dec 04

Pentagon Memorial Fund**Fax**

To: Sec. and (b)(6) From: Lynda Webster

Fax: (b)(6) Fax: (b)(6)

Phone: (b)(6) Phone: (b)(6)

Date: 11/15/2004 Pages: 2

Subject: **Request** from Ambassador Michael Thawley

Hello~!

I received a call from Ambassador Michael Thawley of Australia. As you may recall, he was seated at your table, Secretary Rumsfeld, the day we held the Pentagon Memorial 'friendraiser' a few weeks ago. He was seated there because we have been talking with him at length about an Australian gift to the Memorial. Australia lost a citizen in the attack.

In order to secure the largest commitment possible, the ambassador is confident a letter from you to their Minister of Defense would be helpful. He took the liberty of drafting one he thought would be effective - it's attached for your review and consideration. Naturally it can certainly be re-worded to satisfy your legal team.

I told Ambassador Thawley that while you have both been extremely supportive of our Memorial effort, you are being very careful not to engage in anything that might be perceived as "fundraising." Whether or not this proposed letter falls into that category will be something I'll leave for you to determine.

Should you or an aide wish to contact Ambassador Thawley directly, his number is (b)(6) his fax is (b)(6). Or, you may simply give me direction on how to respond to his request.

We have just passed the \$4.5 million mark today...! We continue to be grateful to you both for your continued interest and support.

Warmly, Lynda

FROM :

11/15/2004 17:59

(b)(6)

FAX NO.

(b)(6)

Nov. 29 2003 07:08PM P2

AMBASSADORS OFFICE

PAGE 01/01

(b)(6)

DRAFT

→ Lynda Webster

Senator ~~the~~ Hon. Robert Hill
Minister for Defence
Parliament House
CANBERRA ACT 2600

Dear Minister

The profound loss of September 11,2001 has moved a great many people to support the building of a permanent memorial at the site of the terrorist attack on the Pentagon. All those affected by the attack hope for a fitting place to remember the events of that day.

We remember that Australia grieved with us then. An Australian, Yvonne E. Kennedy, was aboard the flight that hit the Pentagon. And we will always be grateful for the fellowship expressed by your Prime Minister, John Howard, during his visit to Washington at the time of the attacks-- and for Australia's support in the war on terror.

A Pentagon Memorial Fund has been established by a group of leading private citizens and corporations which aim to raise \$17.5 million to build and maintain the memorial.

The Fund would like to include Australia in its endeavour and has invited Australia to participate in the building of the memorial. I would like to endorse their approach to you and encourage you to contribute. I understand that the Fund has had some discussion with your Ambassador about an appropriate contribution.

I enclose some additional information about the memorial and the fund. We would be privileged to have one of our principal allies involved in an enduring memorial to an event so close to our hearts.

Lynda Webster
→ could send information under separate cover.

DRAFT

11-L-0559/OSD/41708

December 1, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita
Paul Butler

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Admiral Ellis

Let's put Admiral Ellis on the Defense Science Board.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
120104-6

.....
Please respond by 12/21/04

334 DSB

1 Dec 04

December 1, 2004

TO: Paul Butler
CC: COL Steve Bucci
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Meet with Commandant, Marine Corps

I would like a meeting with General Hagee sometime to talk to him about transformation.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
120104-7

.....
Please respond by 12/17/04

000.71 SD

1 Dec 04

December 1, 2004

TO: Paul Butler
CC: COL Steve Bucci
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Meet with Service Secretaries

I need to see the three Service Secretaries and David Chu to talk to them about precepts for selection boards and the importance of diversity and innovation.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
120104-8

.....
Please respond by 12/21/04

000.71 SD

1 Dec 04

7201
~~FOUO~~

December 1, 2004

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Projects

I would like to see a list of the projects you're working on.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
120104-12

.....
Please respond by 12/9/04

020 DSD

1 Dec 04

~~FOUO~~

72
~~FOUO~~

Adv.
copy sent

December 1, 2004

TO: COL Steve Bucci
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Meeting w/VP

The President suggested that I have a meeting with Vice President Cheney.

Please see if you can work with Cheney's office and get it set up for shortly after I get back from India - the first day or the next day.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
120104-14



Please respond by 12/10/04

00011 SD

1 Dec 04

~~FOUO~~

December 1, 2004

TO: Pete Geren
cc: Larry Di Rita
Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D*
SUBJECT: Early Report of Abuse

38346

What is this *Early Bird* article about from the *Washington Post*? I have never heard of it.

Thanks.

Attach.
White, Josh. "U.S. Generals in Iraq Were Told of Abuse Early, Inquiry Finds," *Washington Post*, December 1, 2004, p. 1.

DHR:dh
120104-16

.....
Please respond by 12/9/04

1 Dec 04

Washington Post
December 1, 2004
Pg. 1

U.S. Generals In Iraq Were Told Of Abuse Early, Inquiry Finds

By Josh White, Washington Post Staff Writer

A confidential report to Army generals in Iraq in December 2003 warned that members of an elite military and CIA task force were abusing detainees, a finding delivered more than a month before Army investigators received the photographs from Abu Ghraib prison that touched off investigations into prisoner mistreatment.

The report, which was not released publicly and was recently obtained by The Washington Post, concluded that some U.S. arrest and detention practices at the time could "technically" be illegal. It also said coalition fighters could be feeding the Iraqi insurgency by "making gratuitous enemies" as they conducted sweeps netting hundreds of detainees who probably did not belong in prison and holding them for months at a time.

The investigation, by retired Col. Stuart A. Herrington, also found that members of Task Force 121 -- a joint Special Operations and CIA mission searching for weapons of mass destruction and high-value targets including Saddam Hussein -- had been abusing detainees throughout Iraq and had been using a secret interrogation facility to hide their activities.

Herrington's findings are the latest in a series of confidential reports to come to light about detainee abuse in Iraq. Until now, U.S. military officials have characterized the problem as one largely confined to the military prison at Abu Ghraib -- a situation they first learned about in January 2004. But Herrington's report shows that U.S. military leaders in Iraq were told of such allegations even before then, and that problems were not restricted to Abu Ghraib. Herrington, a veteran of the U.S. counterinsurgency effort in Vietnam, warned that such harsh tactics could imperil U.S. efforts to quell the Iraqi insurgency -- a prediction echoed months later by a military report and other reviews of the war effort.

U.S. treatment of detainees remains under challenge. Representatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross recently told U.S. military officials that the treatment of inmates held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, was "cruel, inhumane and degrading" (story, Page A10). Herrington's report, which was commissioned by Maj. Gen. Barbara Fast, the top intelligence officer in Iraq, said some detainees dropped off at central U.S. detention facilities other than Abu Ghraib had clearly been beaten by their captors.

"Detainees captured by TF 121 have shown injuries that caused examining medical personnel to note that 'detainee shows signs of having been beaten,' " according to the report, which later concluded: "It seems clear that TF 121 needs to be reined in with respect to its treatment of detainees."

A group of Navy SEALs who worked as part of the task force has been charged with abuse in connection with the deaths of two detainees they arrested in the field. One died in a shower room at Abu Ghraib on Nov. 4, 2003, a month before Herrington arrived for his review.

A military source who participated in Task Force 20, the predecessor to TF 121, said the task forces comprised several 12-man units that had targeted missions, such as searching for Hussein loyalists and

11-L-0559/OSD/41715

terrorists. TF 20, which had about 1,000 soldiers, incorporated Army Rangers, members of Delta Force and Special Forces units working with CIA agents. They planned their missions nearly autonomously and answered either directly to the theater commander or to officials in Washington, the source said, speaking on the condition of anonymity because the missions were classified.

Task Force 121 added Navy SEAL units but was slightly smaller overall. Herrington wrote that an officer in charge of interrogations at a high-value target detention facility in Baghdad told him that prisoners taken by TF 121 showed signs of having been beaten.

Herrington asked the officer whether he had alerted his superiors to the problem, and the officer replied: "Everyone knows about it."

While several investigations have been completed into the Abu Ghraib scandal and U.S. interrogation practices in Iraq, an official military inquiry into the detention activities of Special Operations forces has not been released. That probe, headed by Brig. Gen. Richard P. Formica, was expected to be presented to Congress earlier this year, but a Pentagon spokesman said it is ongoing.

Of the Herrington report, a Pentagon official said top generals in Iraq, including Lt. Gen. Ricardo S. Sanchez, who at the time directed U.S. forces there, reported the alleged abuses to officials at U.S. Central Command, which oversees military activities in the Middle East. The official said TF 121 was investigated, but he could not provide results.

"The Herrington report was taken very seriously," said the official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because the report has not been released.

The report also provided an early account of the practice of holding some detainees -- sometimes called "ghost detainees" -- in secret and keeping them from international humanitarian organizations. Herrington also wrote that agents from other government agencies, which commonly refers to the CIA, regularly kept ghost detainees by not logging their arrests.

Nearly six months later, Defense Department officials were forced to acknowledge the practice because of the Abu Ghraib scandal. Soldiers who worked at the prison said several detainees were hidden, and a prison logbook showed a consistent stream of them from October 2003 to January 2004.

Herrington, who is considered an expert in human intelligence operations, ran programs during Operation Desert Storm and in Panama and was part of the controversial Phoenix Program, which targeted the roots of the Viet Cong insurgency in Vietnam. He compiled his report after a week-long trip to Iraq beginning Dec. 2, 2003, joined by a military intelligence officer and an Army intelligence official from the Pentagon.

His ultimate conclusion was that much needed to be done to increase intelligence capabilities, which he called below average, though he praised Fast's determination.

"Given the fact that the United States and its coalition partners paid and continue to pay a steep price in losses and national treasure to lay our hands on these detainees, it is disappointing that the opportunity to thoroughly and professionally exploit this source pool has not been maximized, in spite of your best efforts and those of several hundred MI [military intelligence] soldiers," Herrington wrote to Fast in the Dec. 12 report. "Even one year ago, we would have salivated at the prospect of being able to talk to people like the hundreds who are now in our custody. Now that we have them, we have failed to devote the planning and resources to optimize this mission."

Herrington, contacted by telephone, declined to discuss the report. A Pentagon official said Fast personally requested Herrington's visit, and the report indicates Fast was interested in improving U.S. intelligence and detention operations, saying that "in spite of efforts to upgrade this effort, [she] remained concerned about its state of health."

In the 13-page report, Herrington wrote that overcrowding and a lack of resources caused the Army to use "primitive prison accommodations" for even the most important targets. He said that led to the loss of considerable significant intelligence and might have fueled the Iraqi insurgency.

He added that some detainees were arrested because targets were not at home when homes were raided. A family member was instead captured and then released when the target turned himself in -- a practice that, Herrington wrote, "has a 'hostage' feel to it."

A separate report by the Center for Army Lessons Learned, issued this past May and intended for internal use, gave the sense that some Army tactics served to "alienate common Iraqis who initially supported the coalition."

The 134-page CALL report singled out the practice of detaining female family members to force wanted Iraqi males to turn themselves in, similar to Herrington's findings.


"It is a practice in some U.S. units to detain family members of anti-coalition suspects in an effort to induce the suspects to turn themselves in, in exchange for the release of their family members," the report stated. The CALL report also was critical of the delays in notifying family members about the status of detainees held in U.S. custody, reminding family members of Hussein's tactics.

Herrington's report also noted that sweeps pulled in hundreds and even thousands of detainees who had no connection to the war. Abu Ghraib, for example, swelled to several thousand more detainees than it could handle. Herrington wrote that aggressive and indiscriminate tactics by the 4th Infantry Division, rounding up random scores of detainees and "dumping them at the door," was a glaring example.

As the United States recently has picked up its counterinsurgency efforts, the number of new detainees has again surged.

"Between the losers and dead end elements from the former regime and foreign fighters, there are enough people in Iraq who already don't like us," Herrington wrote. "Adding to these numbers by conducting sweep operations . . . is counterproductive to the Coalition's efforts to win the cooperation of the Iraqi citizenry. Similarly, mistreatment of captives as has been reported to me and our team is unacceptable, and bound to be known by the population."

Staff writer Thomas E. Ricks contributed to this report.



December 1, 2004

TO: Tina Jonas
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: GAO Report

120-1

What is this item about in today's *Early Bird* referencing a GAO report that says DoD is not providing proper oversight to ensure that military personnel appropriations are directed to cover pay, benefits and expenses?

Thanks.

Attach.
McGlinchey, David. "Defense Department Not Tracking Personnel Spending, Report Says," *GovExec.com*, November 30, 2004.

DHR:dh
120104-17

.....
Please respond by 12/9/04

1 Dec 04



GovExec.com
November 30, 2004

Defense Department Not Tracking Personnel Spending, Report Says

By David McGlinchey

The Defense Department is not providing sufficient oversight to ensure that military personnel appropriations actually are directed to cover pay, benefits and expenses, according to a new Government Accountability Office report.

As a result of the report, the Office of the Secretary of Defense has ordered a study on the cost and time needed to modify the relevant financial systems to comply with regulations.

GAO released similar findings to lawmakers in 2003, and the fiscal 2004 conference report on defense appropriations called on the Pentagon to "strengthen the annual review process" and "provide transparency of disbursements at the same level as the budget submission."

In the report released this week, however, GAO announced that the Pentagon is not following congressional direction on oversight.

"The military services are not matching obligations to disbursements at the individual disbursement transaction level in all the years that disbursements can occur as required by the Financial Management Regulation," the report (GAO-05-87R) said. "Additionally, the services are not reporting the obligation balances at the budget submission level as directed by congressional conferees."

In their report, GAO noted that military personnel appropriations, also known as MILPERS, make up a significant amount of the Defense Department's budget. In fiscal 2003, MILPERS accounted for more than \$109 billion. That figure also includes allowances, housing, travel and reserve training. GAO investigators said the insufficient budget review is stopping lawmakers from making informed decisions on funding.

"This has made it difficult, if not impossible, for decision-makers to oversee how the services actually use MILPERS funds," the GAO report said.

The investigator took the Office of the Secretary of Defense to task for failing to implement the reforms from the top.

"OSD has not provided the services with explicit instructions in the Financial Management Regulation requiring them to review MILPERS obligations," the report said. "Moreover, OSD has not effectively monitored the services' compliance with the Financial Management Regulation's requirement to review obligation balances. Unless the services strengthen their year-end reviews and certification processes, the actual use of MILPERS funds will continue to be masked, and the baseline for future budget requests may be inaccurate."

GAO did note that the Army has made some progress in developing prior year financial reports with great detail. In a Nov. 23 directive, top Defense officials ordered the Air Force, Navy and the Defense Finance and Accounting Service to complete a feasibility study on recording and reporting detailed

11-L-0559/OSD/41719

- disbursements for prior years' spending. That study is scheduled to be completed by Jan. 31, 2005.

11-L-0559/OSD/41720

720
~~FOUO~~

file

December 14, 2004

TO: COL Steve Bucci
cc: Cathy Mainardi
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Breakfast with POTUS

I think the President wants to have breakfast in the residence on Thursday morning at 7:00 am with Casey, Abizaid and probably Myers or Pace (but not both) and me. Let's confirm that with the White House.

Thanks.

DIIR:ss
121404-22

.....
Please respond by _____

DB 12/14

SIR,

It is confirmed and on the schedule:

Thursday 16 December 7:00am-8:00 w/POTUS, SecDef, Abizaid, Casey, VCJCS, VP, Card, Rice @ Small Dining Room next to Oval Office.

Cathy.

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/41721

OSD 08112-05

337 WJH

14 Dec 04

December 14, 2004

TO: (b)(6)

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Cabinet Acknowledgements

I need to know who I have called and who I have written to in connection with Cabinet people coming and going.

Please give me a list.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
121404-20

.....
Please respond by 12/22/04

230,02

14 Dec 04

~~FOUO~~

file

December 14, 2004

TO: COL Steve Bucci
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Tony Dolan

*He is on tomorrow's
schedule for 8:40am.*

I would like to see Tony Dolan for about 10 or 15 minutes sometime this week.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
121404-16

.....
Please respond by _____

000.71 SD

14 Dec 04

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/41723

OSD 08114-05

December 14, 2004

TO: VADM Jim Stavridis
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Travel Schedules

I would like to see the travel schedules between now and March 1 for General Myers, General Pace, Paul Wolfowitz, Jim Haynes, Steve Cambone, and Larry Di Rita.

333

Thanks.

DHR:dh
121404-15

.....
Please respond by 12/16/04

14 Dec 04

December 14, 2004

TO: Calendar
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Location of Events

In the future, it would be helpful if it is listed on the calendar where in the White House a meeting is going to be.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
121404-14

.....
Please respond by _____

337 WH

14 Dec 04

December 14, 2004

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Debrief Doug Feith

Please debrief Doug Feith on the NSC meeting and make sure he comes up with a list we can use with the NSC of possible things we can do with respect to Syria.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
121404-13

.....
Please *respond* by 12/16/04

334 NSC

14 Dec 04

1211
1600

120

~~FOUO~~

ES-1692
04/016917-ES

December 14, 2004

TO: Doug Feith

SUBJECT: Wehrkunde Conference

I've forgotten the name of the guy who runs the Wehrkunde Security Conference in Munich. But given the lawsuit that has been filed against so many people in Germany, I think he ought to be aware that there may be a reluctance to attend Wehrkunde on the part of people who are subject to those frivolous lawsuits.

092.3

Thanks.

Attach.
12/14/04 Washington Times Article

Paul Butler

DHR:ss
121404-5

12/20

.....
Please respond by 12/22/04

12/17/04

MR. SECRETARY:

DD 12/21

- I CALLED MR. HORST TELTSCHIK TODAY AND PASSED ON THAT THE LAWSUIT IS PROBLEMATIC AND THERE MAY BE A RELUCTANCE TO ATTEND ON THE PART OF THOSE NAMED, BUT NO DECISION HAD BEEN MADE.

- TELTSCHIK SAID HE APPRECIATED THE CALL, UNDERSTOOD OUR CONCERNS, AND WOULD LET US KNOW IF HE LEARNED ANYTHING RELATED TO THE LAWSUIT. HE ADDED IT WOULD BE A PITY IF YOU DID NOT ATTEND.

DEC 04

Y/R Mila

15-12-04 11:56 IN

OSD 08118-05

Washington Post
December 14, 2004
Pg. 2

Tell Weckel

1. Corrections

Two Dec. 13 articles incorrectly identified Gen. Paul J. Kern as the commander of the Army Materiel Command. Kern relinquished that post in November.

Editor's Note: The articles referred to appeared in the Current News Early Bird, December 13, 2004.

Washington Times
December 14, 2004
Pg. 1

2 'Frivolous Lawsuit' Irks Pentagon

Leftists target Rumsfeld
By Rowan Scarborough, The Washington Times

The Pentagon expressed concern yesterday about a "frivolous" complaint filed against Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld by a leftist group that is using a new German law that claims the right to investigate war crimes anywhere in the world.

The reaction was in response to a Nov. 30 lawsuit filed in Berlin by the Center for Constitutional Rights, whose founders include liberal activist William Kunstler.

The New York-based center filed the German complaint against Mr. Rumsfeld and other U.S. officials on behalf of four Iraqis who, the complaint says, were abused by U.S. guards at the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq.

"Generally speaking, these cases are of concern, these frivolous lawsuits filed by activist groups on behalf of people making very unsubstantiated charges and probably not able to be substantiated charge," Larry Di Rita, chief Pentagon spokesman, said in an interview yesterday. "These kind of frivolous lawsuits are troubling."

Mr. Di Rita said the Pentagon has raised the issue with the State Department.

"State is engaged in this," he said. "Obviously, it's something that we're focused on and very concerned with and are going to pursue with purpose to make sure this does not become part of a pattern."

German-U.S. relations have been strained over the Iraq war, which the Berlin government adamantly opposed.

The Pentagon's concerns resemble a dispute last year between Mr. Rumsfeld and another NATO country, Belgium. Mr. Rumsfeld traveled to Brussels for a NATO meeting and used the visit to bluntly chastise Belgium for a law that has made the nation a favored venue for accusations of war crimes against American leaders.

Lawyers cited Belgium's law to file a number of lawsuits, including one against retired Gen. Tommy Franks, who commanded the invasion of Iraq in March 2003 to oust Saddam Hussein. Previously, a complaint was filed against former President George Bush, Vice President Dick Cheney and Gen. H. Norman Schwarzkopf.

Activists also filed cases against former Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat, Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and Cuban dictator Fidel Castro.

Mr. Rumsfeld said the law could force U.S. officials to shun NATO headquarters in Brussels. He also threatened to block funding for a new NATO building.

"We will have to seriously consider whether we can allow our civilian and military officials to come to Belgium," Mr. Rumsfeld said at a news conference last year.

As the lawsuits and complaints piled up, Belgium gutted the law.

Republicans in Washington take a dim view of U.S. service members being subjected to international courts, fearing that anti-U.S. groups will use such courts as a

vehicle to carry out a vendetta against American forces throughout the world.

On a global scale, President Bush has refused to submit a treaty to the Senate that would make Washington a party to a new International Criminal Court.

There are parallels to the situation in Germany, where the United States stations about 70,000 troops. In 2002, Germany enacted the Code of Crimes Against International Law. It grants German courts "universal jurisdiction," or the power to hear war-crimes complaints regardless of where the war crimes are supposed to have taken place.

This law is the basis for the Center for Constitutional Rights' picking Germany to file its complaint against Mr. Rumsfeld. Also named in the complaint are former CIA Director George J. Tenet; Stephen Cambone, undersecretary of defense for intelligence; Lt. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez, the former top commander in Iraq when abuses at Abu Ghraib occurred; and Brig. Gen. Janis Karpinski, who ran the prison.

Under the German code, the country's general prosecutor, who is akin to the U.S. attorney general, now must decide whether the case has merit and should be forwarded to the courts for a criminal investigation.

Asked to respond to Pentagon complaints, a spokeswoman at the German Embassy said, "German courts are independent of the government and this is an important part of a democratic system."

"Secondly, the international code of crimes deals with crimes against humanity and crimes punishable following international conventions," she said on the condition of anonymity.

The spokeswoman also said that after the law took effect in 2002, a "handful" of complaints were filed and the

page 2
general prosecutor rejected them all.

Center for Constitutional Rights President Michael Ramer personally filed the Rumsfeld complaint in Berlin.

"From Donald Rumsfeld on down, the political and military leaders in charge of Iraq policy must be investigated and held accountable," Mr. Ratner said. "It is shameful that the United States of America, a nation that purports to set moral and legal standards for the world, refuses to seriously investigate the role of those at the top of the chain of command in these horrible crimes."

The Pentagon has started a number of administrative and criminal investigations that have resulted in criminal charges against personnel who abused Iraqi detainees.

The center's mission statement reads, "CCR uses litigation proactively to advance the law in a positive direction, to empower poor communities and communities of color, to guarantee the rights of those with the fewest protections and least access to legal resources, to train the next generation of constitutional and human rights attorneys, and to strengthen the broader movement for constitutional and human rights."

Wall Street Journal
December 14, 2004
Pg. 4

3 Pentagon To Seek \$80 Billion More

Request to Help Finance Iraq, Afghanistan Presence Is Bigger Than Expected

By Greg Jaffe and Jackie Calmes, Staff Reporters Of The Wall Street Journal
WASHINGTON

Pentagon officials said they will ask the Bush administration for an additional \$80 billion in emergency funding to help pay costs of the military presence in Iraq and Afghanistan, slightly higher than the \$70 billion to \$75

DEC 14 2004

385.6

TO: Pete Geren
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Brits and Detainees

Colin Powell tells me the Brits are going to come back and try to get four more detainees. We better be ready.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
121304-38



Please respond by _____

14 Dec 04

DEC 14 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Article by Douglas MacKinnon

Here's an interesting article by Douglas MacKinnon. You might want to thank him.

Thanks.

Atach.
12/11/04 *New York Post* article by Douglas MacKinnon

DHR:ss
121304-34



Please respond by _____

000.7

14 Dec 04

insurgency.

On the other hand, the United Iraqi Alliance, a coalition of mostly Shiite parties organized under the auspices of Grand Ayatollah Ali Hussein al-Sistani, is expected to win a large majority in the 275-seat assembly, enabling it to write up Iraq's constitution. A Shiite domination of Iraqi politics will further polarize the ethnic divide already aggravated by the war and push the door wide open toward a civil war.

Although Shiite and Sunni affiliations have been an integral part of Iraq's history, two U.S.-led wars and occupation have galvanized these far-from-homogenous communities into tribe-like ethnicities with hardening sectarian loyalties. During the Iraq-Iran war in the 1980s, Iraqi Shiites were seen as great patriots who fought bravely against the (Shiite) Iranian Army. With the exception of the 1990 uprising incited by the Americans and the Iranians, contrary to conventional wisdom, Iraqi Shiites were no more oppressed than the Sunnis, whom Saddam considered more threatening to his regime.

Today, the Bush administration is peddling the ethnic factor as a precondition for Iraq's (numeric) democracy. It argues that since the Shiites make up a majority 60 percent of the population, their vote will guarantee the legitimacy of the elections and pave the way toward democracy, with Sistani's indispensable encouragement. Wrong.

Referred to as a "moderate" for not advocating resistance against the American occupation, the fundamentalist cleric is also seen as a "democrat" for being adamant on holding elections when parts of the country burn. Beyond that, little is known about how he thinks or what he is planning.

What is certain, however, is that the ayatollah is a spiritual leader with no

political experience or interest, whose only connection to the rest of Iraq, indeed the world, is a network of politically minded functionaries and clerics with sectarian agendas and ambiguous liaisons within and outside Iraq. They feed him information and implement his general directives as they see fit. Today, they are dividing the assembly seats among their close allies in the Shiite parties. That is hardly a cause for optimism.

In fact, members of Sistani's entourage are thought to be concealing their true intentions in accordance with the Shiite religious code of Taqiyah, or concealment in the face of danger, which was adopted through centuries of discrimination against them as a small minority within the Muslim world. Sistani's men are exploiting America's need for elections (when all other justifications for the war have been discredited), to prepare for Iranian-style clerical control over a predominantly secular Iraq. In recent days Arab leaders, including Yasser, have warned against blatant Iranian interference in Iraq and a "dramatic geopolitical shift" in the region resulting from the elections.

Why then does Washington insist on a policy that strengthens the fundamentalists and inflames ethnic strife, instead of empowering secular or Arab majorities in a federal democratic Iraq? Simply put, the Bush administration is trapped between two alternatives and no real choice.

If it alienates Shiite leaders, they would organize their own insurgency parallel to the one in the Sunni Triangle, leading to an immediate Vietnamization of Iraq's war. Otherwise, it must appease them and risk the consequences of their takeover. The latter scenario will probably not last long as the conflict escalates into an open ethnic war inflamed by

extremists on both sides.

In light of an aggravating strategic impasse, the Bush administration is opting for appeasement in the imperial tradition: Divide and rule. Better split the Iraqis through elections than having them unite through resistance to the occupation.

Such a shortsighted and morally bankrupt policy will backfire with cataclysmic domestic and regional consequences. Only in the context of a healing process of national reconciliation, reconstruction and the promise of full American withdrawal do elections play a pluralistic rather than a divisive role. Otherwise, Iraq would have suffered a costly war only to replace an oppressive regime with fundamentalist sectarian rule.

Marwan Bishara is a visiting lecturer at the American University of Paris and the author of "Palestine/Israel: Peace or Apartheid."

New York Post
December 11, 2004

42. Press Pile-On

By Douglas MacKinnon

WITH each passing day, the role of the media in Iraq becomes more confusing and much more controversial.

The latest example: the "question" asked of Secretary Donald Rumsfeld during his "town hall" meeting this week with U.S. soldiers in Kuwait.

One soldier asked, "Why do we soldiers have to dig through local landfills for pieces of scrap metal ... to up-armor our vehicles, and why don't we have those resources readily available to us?"

That question and the video of that question led almost every newscast or front page in this country. What does the question have to do with the media and its ever growing controversial role in Iraq? A reporter for the Chattanooga Times Free Press fed the

question to the soldier so he could set up Donald Rumsfeld.

While there is no doubt our soldiers need more armor and protection, the question remains: Is it right or ethical for a member of the media to spoon-feed a question to a soldier and manufacture a news story that he and others would then cover?

Which begs a larger question: At what point does irresponsible and sensationalist reporting become dangerous, or even acts of betrayal? All involved in prosecuting and covering this war need to ask themselves that.

Political correctness dictates that we do not speak about this, but I have yet to talk with a member of our military who does not strongly believe that the Abu Ghraib prison scandal wasn't blown out of all proportion. Worse, they feel that the ensuing media feeding frenzy had a direct result in fueling the insurgents attacking our troops and innocent civilians in Iraq.

Do they feel the mistreatment of the Iraqi and insurgent prisoners was wrong and disgusting? To a person, b o they think some in the media have used the inappropriate behavior of seven ignorant soldiers to tar and feather the other 140,000 on the ground? To a person. Just as they feel that many in the press are purposely twisting the definition of "torture" to play "gotcha" journalism with a military they not so secretly look down upon.

As recently as this week, in a lead editorial, The Washington Post referred to the Abu Ghraib situation as "torture" and "extreme." If the Post thinks that the reprehensible, but juvenile humiliation we saw in the Abu Ghraib photos rises to the level of "torture," then I would ask them to define what innocent Iraqi police endured before being shot in the head, or the brutal beatings endured by U.S. military POWs during the first Gulf War.

December 14, 2004

TO: Paul Butler
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Ballot for Marty Hoffmann

014.35

Please **put** this ballot with the materials for Marty Hoffmann that we are going to give him.

Thanks.

Attach.
Ballot

DHR:dh
121404-25

.....
Please respond by _____

14 Dec 04

December 15, 2004

TO: Paul Butler
CC: Jim O'Beirne
COL Steve Bucci
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Tony Principi

000,115D

I ought to try to have lunch with Tony Principi sometime to talk about the VA-DoD relationship.

Jim O'Beirne, please get me a copy of his background sheet.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
121504-12

.....
Please respond by 1/13/05

15 Dec 04

December 15, 2004

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: MoD Letter

I should get a letter off to the new Minister of Defense of Afghanistan, if in fact it has been decided.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
121504-10

.....
Please respond by 12/22/04

Afghanistan

15 Dec 04

December 15, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita
CC: Gen Dick Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Kurt Schilling

335

I saw Kurt Schilling last night, and he volunteered to help and do anything. I talked to him a bit about the possibility of going to Walter Reed or Bethesda. He said he has just had an operation on a leg, so he is not able to do much right now, but at some point in the future.

He also said he would be willing to go overseas, if that would be helpful.

Why don't we check in two months and see how his health is.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
121504-8

.....
Please respond by 2/10/05

15 Dec 04

December 15, 2004

311.3

TO: Paul Butler
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Prepaid Calling Cards

Please look into this memo I sent Andy Card.

Thanks.

Attach.
12/3/04 SD memo to Card

DHR:dh
121504-6

.....
Please respond by 12/22/04

15 Dec 04

December 3, 2004

TO: The Honorable Andrew H. Card
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Prepaid Calling Cards for Military

Attached is a note from my friend, Bill Timmons, raising a matter of importance and concern on telephone credit cards for the military. It is self-explanatory.

The solution lies totally outside the Department of Defense, as I read it. I would very much appreciate your interest in this.

Thank you, sir.

Attach.
12/1/04 Memo to SecDef from Bill Timmons

DHR:ss
120304-3

A large, hand-drawn oval containing a handwritten signature and the date '12/15'. The signature is written in a cursive style and is partially obscured by a vertical line. The date '12/15' is written in a simple, blocky font.

OK 12/3

VIA FAX

Memorandum for the Honorable Donald Rumsfeld

From: Bill Timmons *bill*

Date: 1 December 2004

Subject: Prepaid Telephone **Calling Cards** for Military

Request **your personal assistance on an issue of importance to our servicemen and women and their families.** In the next few weeks the FCC intends to **issue an order concerning prepaid calling cards that threatens to increase rates on the military and other users of this low-cost telephone service by as much as 20%.**

Ten years **ago calling card service that contained promotional advertisements (called enhanced cards) was placed in service.** Telephone **calls using these enhanced cards are informational and outside regulated service and therefore not subject to intrastate access or universal service fees.** After all these years the FCC intends to make these **cards fall in a revenue category that will cause troops and other card users to contribute more so others may contribute less.**

Consistent with the **goals of universal service, the cards today provide low-cost calling for those who need it most - military, senior, rural, minority, and low-income users.** The USO provides **free pre-paid cards to service personnel as part of "Operation Phone Home program."** Wal-Mart, **Sam's Club, drug stores, military exchanges, and other retail outlets sell the inexpensive calling cards.** **Members of Congress have communicated with FCC Chairman Powell not to take money out of soldiers' pockets while they defend our country.** In fact, in the closing days of this Congress through report language for the final budget legislation **Congress directed the FCC 'not to take any action that would directly or indirectly have the effect of raising the rates charged to military personnel or their families for telephone calls placed using prepaid phone cards.'** **On 23 July of this year the Pentagon weighed in when Charles Abell wrote the FCC pointing out the increased costs to service personnel and families if this order were implemented.** The FCC chairman put off official action **until after the election, but now intends to go forward.**

Dan, about the only avenue open seems to be White House involvement to protect the low-cost prepaid calling cards for the military. May I suggest you call Andy Card and ask him to help?

Thanks a bunch.

December 15, 2004

TO: GEN Leon LaPorte

CC: Gen Dick Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Progress

The progress in South Korea is impressive. Congratulations!

DHR:dh
121504-2



Please respond by _____

Korea

15 Dec 04

December 15, 2004



TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Operation Hometown

Someone with the Vice President's party last night talked to me about "Operation Hometown." Do you know anything about it?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
121504-1

.....
Please respond by 1/6/05

1/21/05 *1/11*

SecDef -

See the attached

Note. It may be what

The individual was referring to. It is a good and very interesting program at the National Endowment for the Arts. Could not find "Operation Hometown" per se.

OSD 08127-05

FOUO
11-L-0559/OSD/41740

D. Rumsfeld

1
292

15 Dec 04

MEMORANDUM

To: Allison Barber
Dallas Lawrence

From: Babs Chase

Date: December 17, 2004

Re: Operation Hometown/ Operation Homecoming

I have reviewed our *America Supports You* database and researched online, but I was unable to locate a program entitled *Operation Hometown*. There is a program entitled *Operation Homecoming* that may be the one to which he is referring.

- *Operation Homecoming: Writing the Wartime Experience*, is a program for U.S. military personnel and their families aimed at preserving the stories and reflections of American troops who have served our nation in Afghanistan and Iraq—and stateside defending the homeland.
- In coordination with all four branches of the Armed Forces and the Department of Defense, the National Endowment for the Arts is sponsoring writing workshops for returning troops and their families at military installations across the country and overseas.
- The workshops will be taught by some of America's most distinguished novelists, poets, historians, and journalists, these workshops will provide service men and women with the opportunity to write about their wartime experiences in a variety of forms—from fiction, verse, and letters to essay, memoir, and personal journal. The visiting writers, many of whom are war veterans themselves, will help the troops share their stories with current and future generations.
- The *Arts* Endowment has produced an accompanying audio CD for this program. Moving from a heart-rending letter from the Civil War to poems and memoirs about World War II to Vietnam War fiction, the CD explores the variety of literary responses by those who have come through similar experiences.
- In addition to these multi-day workshops and CD, the Arts Endowment will provide an online writing tutorial at www.operationhomecoming.org to help the troops develop their writing skills and access writing resources. The Web site also will be used to collect submissions of writing by active personnel and their families.
- The best writing that emerges from this program will be published in a nationally promoted anthology of wartime writing that will be sold in bookstores and will be distributed free by the *Arts* Endowment to military installations, schools, and libraries.

December 15, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Ike Skelton Story

451.6

Please get back to me with the answer on the Ike Skelton story on the armored personnel carriers, and why we are not using them until we get enough up-armored humvees. It sounds reasonable to me.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
121504-21

.....
Please respond by 1/6/05

15 Dec 04

December 15, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Ike Skelton Story

MR

Please get back to me with the answer on the Ike Skelton story on the armored personnel carriers, and why we are not using them until we get enough up-armored humvees. It sounds reasonable to me.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
121504-21

.....
Please respond by 1/6/05

4516

1/12/05 -
SecDef -

12 Jan 05

General Myers will be responding to Ike Skelton, but there seems to be a divergence of views in the matter between the Army and CentCom in the matter. There is an indecipherable Joint Staff info memo attached, but Myers will apparently respond.

15 Dec 04

11-L-0559/OSD/41743

OSD 08128-05

ci

JOINT STAFF ACTION PROCESSING FORM

UNCLASSIFIED

CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED

ACTION NUMBER SJS 04-08131

TO CJCS

THRU DJS

ORIG SUSPENSE 6 Jan 2005

SUBJECT /5C/ LETTER TO CJCS FROM REPRESENTATIVE IKE SKELTON REGARDING RECENT MEDIA REPORTS ABOUT THE LACK OF ARMOR IN **IRAQ**

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. Purpose. To clarify Army and CENTCOM positions regarding the feasibility of using M113s to augment HMMWV armored vehicles prior to the CJCS's response to Congressman Skelton.¹

2. Discussion.

a. Recently Army² and CENTCOM³ provided responses to JSAP 04-08131 for the Joint Staff to prepare a coordinated response to Congressman Skelton's request for information on the feasibility of using the M113 in Iraq to augment armored HMMWVs. CENTCOM and Army indicated in their responses that the M113 was neither practical, nor readily available to augment armored HMMWVs for operations in Iraq.

b. In a 4 Jan 2005 Miami Herald article, written by Joe Galloway, the paper cites an anonymous Army source who states that the Army is preparing M113s with add on armor for deployment to Iraq at the request of LTG Metz and approved by GEN Casey.⁴

3. Recommendation. HQDA and USCENTCOM provide feedback reference the validity of the Galloway article prior to the CJCS response to Congressman Skelton.

COORDINATION

NAME	AGENCY	DATE	NAME	AGENCY	DATE
	Army				
	CENTCOM				

CLASSIFICATION

UNCLASSIFIED

CLASSIFICATION/DECLASSIFICATION INSTRUCTIONS

(b)(6)

DUNDAS MUNTER, CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN
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 TRENT FRANKS, ARIZONA

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

U.S. House of Representatives

Washington, DC 20515-6035

ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS

December 13, 2004

ICE SKELTON, MISSISSIPPI
 JOHN SPRATT, SOUTH CAROLINA
 SCHEIDTKE, TEXAS
 LARRY EVANS, KANSAS
 DEAN TAYLOR, MISSISSIPPI
 NICK ABENGO, VIRGINIA
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 KENNETH E. BREE, FLORIDA
 MARLITHE E. BORDALLO, GUAM
 BRUCE ALEXANDER, LOUISIANA
 THE STAFF, DND

ROBERTY M. GRIFFIN, STAFF DIRECTOR


General Richard B. Myers
 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
 The Pentagon
 Washington DC 20310

Dear General Myers:

I am concerned that the recent discussions in the press regarding the lack of armor in Iraq are a symptom of a larger problem with U.S. forces in Iraq. This problem has links to the Vietnam War. As I am sure you are aware, in the early days of that war the Army sent only infantry forces based on a mistaken belief that armor forces were inappropriate. It was only after several years that the Army leadership recognized that armor forces could make a significant contribution. One of the most successful units in Vietnam was the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, which was equipped with M-113 Armored Cavalry Assault Vehicles (ACAVs) and M-48 tanks. Armed with multiple machine guns behind gun shields, the M-113 proved itself an especially effective vehicle for close combat in jungles against enemy forces armed with RPGs and AK-47 rifles.

I understand that the M-113 may not provide the same level of protection as some other armored vehicles currently in use, but they certainly provide better protection than soft-skinned vehicles. Moreover, I believe that the M-113 chassis is robust enough to easily accommodate the additional weight of supplemental armor kits, whereas the HMMWV struggles under the burden, and it is causing significant maintenance issues. As you know, broken-down up-armored HMMWVs provide no protection at all.

I have read reports where earlier this year, the deputy director of Army Material Command said he had seven hundred M-113 series vehicles prepositioned in Kuwait. Are they still there? I know you share my concern that we provide our fighting men and women with the very best equipment available. While we await delivery of additional up-armored HMMWVs, I would like you to revisit the possibility of using the M-113s the Army already has on hand as a means to provide them additional mobile protection. Could they point toward a solution to the Army's challenge in supplying armored transportation to protect our soldiers?

Sincerely,

 Ike Skelton
 Ranking Member

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
ASSISTANT DEPUTY TO THE ARMY OPERATIONS DEPUTY
(JOINT AFFAIRS)
OFFICE OF JOINT AND DEFENSE AFFAIRS

20 DEC 2004

ARMY PLANNER DACS-ZD-JDA
Memorandum Number: 785-04

MEMORANDUM FOR J4/SAIL, ATTN: LTC Ware, (b)(6)

SUBJECT: (U) Response to Representative Ike Skelton's letter regarding recent media reports about the lack of armor in Iraq,

■ (U) Purpose. To provide feedback to Representative Skelton regarding the feasibility of using M113s to augment HMMWV armored vehicles.

2. (U) Discussion.

a. The Multinational Force-Iraq Commander identifies requirements in theater and has determined that the Up-Armored High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (UAH) and Add-on Armor kit program best fit the need for daily operations in theater instead of the M113A3. Nonetheless, there are still over 800 M113A3s in use in the theater of operations.

b. Tracked vehicles, such as the armored personnel carrier, are not well suited for operations in an urban environment. The heavy tracked vehicle tends to be more difficult to maneuver on the paved streets than wheeled vehicles. The tracks of the heavy vehicles are also known to inflict heavy damage to the infrastructure. Operational commanders prefer the Up-Armored HMMWV to the armored personnel carrier.

c. The chart below depicts the availability of M113s in or near the area of operation. Of the 62 M113A3s on hand, 48 require some level of maintenance before they could be issued to units. Of the 332 M113A2s on hand, 242 require some level of maintenance.

MODEL	Kuwait	Qatar	DRMO SWA	APS 2	TOTAL
M113A3	2 (1)	45 (45)	0 (0)	15 (2)	62 (48)
M113A2	3 (3)	0 (0)	149 (149)	180 (90)	332 (242)

* Total Vehicles on hand (vehicles requiring maintenance) - AMC G3 data

d. Additionally, the M113A2 is not well suited for add on armor kits. The added weight puts a severe strain on the engine and transmission and causes the vehicle to move much slower. This is important to note since speed has become a critical survivability measure in the Iraqi area of operations.

3. (U) POC for this action is MAJ Steven J. Adams, DAMO-SSW, (b)(6)


ROY L. MCWICK
Colonel GS
Army Planner

UNCLASSIFIED

CCJ3 Information Paper

Subject: Letter to CJCS from Representative IKE Skelton Regarding Recent Media Reports About the Lack of Armor in Iraq

1. Purpose. To provide feedback to Representative Skelton regarding the feasibility of using M113s to augment HMMWV armored vehicles.

2. Background. Senator Skelton would like to revisit the possibility of using M-113 Armored Personnel Carriers (APC) that the US Army already has on hand as a means to provide soldiers in Iraq with more armor protection. The following information in response to Representative Skelton's query was provided by LTC Clark LeMasters, CCJ4-O-LRC DSN (b)(6)

- (U) Question: *Senator Skelton specifically asked about the status of several hundred M-113s that Army Material Command previously reported were in Kuwait.*

- (U) Based on a phone call from BG Leonard, CFLCC C-4/AMC SWA Commander, there are 45 M113s in Kuwait. All are Non-Mission Capable.

- (U) Based on a review of reports from MNC-I, there are 609 M113, APCs with MNC-I in Iraq. The table below shows the break out by unit. I MEF does not have M113s.

Table Extracted from 4th CMMC Maintenance Report.

M113	Required	O/H	FMC	NMC	FMC
1 CD	238	238	223	15	
2/2 ID	87	85	71	14	84%
1 ID	209	209	197	12	
MNB-N			0		N/A
III CARTY	8	8	5	3	63%
1ST COSCOM			0		N/A
44 MED			0		N/A
185 AVN			0		N/A
420 EN BDE	28	32	28	4	88%
16 MP BDE			0		N/A
42 MP BDE	0	0	0	0	N/A
504 MI BDE			0		N/A
81 ESB	37	37	35	2	
HQ, III CORPS			0		N/A
3 SIG BDE			0		N/A
TOTAL	607	609	559	50	

O/H - On Hand; FMC - Fully Mission Capable; NMC - Not Mission Capable

UNCLASSIFIED

CCJ3

Subject: Letter to CJCS from Representative IKE Skelton
 Regarding Recent Media Reports About the Lack of Armor in Iraq

- (U) From the Army G-4, LOC Brief from 15 DEC 04, the Depot Maintenance Workload slide shows there are 750 M113s scheduled for repair at Anniston, AL, Army Depot (ANAD). 303 are currently on hand at ANAD.

SYSTEM	SOURCE OF REPAIR	FY05 REQUIREMENT	FY05 FUNDED WORKLOAD*	ON-HAND		FY05 PROG (EOM)	FY05 COMP (TO DATE)
				UNSERV WAITING INDUCTION	WORK IN PROGRESS		
M113 ARMORED PERSONNEL CARRIER FOV	ANAD	763	750	243	60	41	28

- (U) From the same Army G-4 LOC brief, Retrograde Processing Status slide for APS Rolling Stock shows that there are 626 M113 APCs that have been shipped from APS stocks in Kuwait to source of repair. 445 are in transit and 181 are at the source of repair.

SYSTEM	BALANCE (AS OF 24NOV04)	SHIPPED TO DATE		REMAINING TO BE SHIPPED	IN TRANSIT	REC'D AT SOURCE OF REPAIR	REMARKS
		NUMBER SHIPPED	PERCENT SHIPPED				
M113 ARMORED— PERSONNEL CARRIER FOV	626	626	100%	0	445	181	363 ON CHARLTON

3. Recommendation: None. Provided for information only.

APPROVED BY: //PJK//21 Dec 04// PREPARED BY://EAA//20 Dec 04
 PATRICK J. KANEWSKE EDUARDO A. ABISELLAN
 Colonel, USMC Major, USMC
 Chief, Current Ops Division Ground Operations

Miami Herald
January 4, 2005

U.S. Army Adding Armor To 'War Horse' Troop Carriers

To answer complaints about inadequately armored vehicles, the Army confirmed that it will armor two types of veteran war horse carriers and send them to Iraq.

By Joseph L. Galloway

WASHINGTON - The Army, beset with complaints that its troops are going into combat in inadequately armored Humvees, will send an older and less used class of armored personnel carriers to Iraq after spending \$84 million to add armor to them.

These vehicles, both veteran war horses, are the M-113/A3 armored personnel carrier and the M-577 command post carrier. Both will be tougher and safer than newly armored Humvees.

Army officials who pushed hard over the past two years for getting the M-113 into duty in Iraq said it was more useful, cheaper and easier to transport than the Army's new wheeled Stryker armored vehicle, also in use in Iraq.

The Army and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld found themselves at the center of a firestorm last month over the pace of adding armor to the Humvee, a small transport vehicle that's been pressed into service in Iraq as a combat vehicle. Critics have charged that even with armor the Humvee is too easily destroyed by rocket-propelled grenades and improvised explosive devices.

An Army representative, who requested anonymity, said Monday that \$84 million was being spent to add armor to 734 M-113/A3s and M-577s.

For the M-113s, that includes hardened steel side armor, a "slat armor" cage that bolts to the side armor and protects against rocket-propelled grenades, anti-mine armor on the bottom and a new transparent, bulletproof gun shield on the top that improves gunners' vision.

SLAT ARMOR

The M-577, nicknamed the "high-top shoe" for its tall, ungainly silhouette, will get only slat armor and anti-mine armor. Its high sides can't take the steel armor without making the vehicle unstable and even more liable to roll over.

The slat-type armor essentially is a metal cage designed to detonate RPGs before they breach the steel armor and the light aluminum wall. Similar slat armor has been added to the Stryker vehicle.

The armor kits will be produced in the United States, the Army representative said, and installed in Kuwait.

The representative said the M-113 upgrade was requested by Lt. Gen. Thomas Metz, the ground commander in Iraq, and approved by Gen. George Casey, the commander of multinational forces in Iraq.

11-L-0559/OSD/41749

The **M-113** typically carries a driver, a commander and 11 infantry soldiers. It can be fitted with a .50-caliber machine gun or a **MK-19 40mm** grenade launcher.

NEWER, IMPROVED

The **M-113/A3** version, introduced in **1987**, has a bigger turbo-charged diesel engine, an improved transmission, steering and braking package, and inside liners to suppress spall, the superheated molten metal produced by **RPG** and tank-round hits. It has a range of 300 miles and a road speed of more than 40 mph. It also is amphibious.

More than **80,000M-113s** in **28** configurations have been manufactured since **1960**.

At 13 tons, the M-113 is much easier to transport than the behemoth **M1A2 Abrams** tank or **Bradley Fighting Vehicle**.

11-L-0559/OSD/41750

December 15, 2004

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Taiwan

Do take over the Taiwan weapon issue, and keep me posted on what you think.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
121504-20

.....
Please respond by 1/6/05

China(Chats)

15 Dec 04

December 15, 2004

TO: Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Turkey

TURKEY

Do get back to me after you have talked to the Intel community about the situation with Turkey, and why the drift.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
121504-19

.....
Please respond by 1/6/05

IS DREADY

DEC 16 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita
CC: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D*
SUBJECT: "Rumsfeld Plan"

0205D

What in the world is this group talking about – the "Rumsfeld Plan"?

It seems to me that this is this fellow out in Hawaii who we had questions about. I don't know what is going on, but I have never heard of the "Rumsfeld Plan."

Thanks.

Attach.
Halloran, Richard. "Rumsfeld Plan Called Ambitious, Flawed," *Honolulu Advertiser*, December 12, 2004.

DHR:dh
121504-14

.....
Please respond by 1/6/05

16Dec04

Honolulu Advertiser
December 12, 2004

The Rising East

Rumsfeld Plan Called Ambitious, Flawed

By Richard Halloran

The plans of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld to transform the nation's armed forces ran into a spirited dose of skepticism at a recent gathering in Hawai'i of strategic thinkers from America, Asia and the Pacific.

An Australian strategist on land warfare, Michael Evans, set the tone by pointing to both the strengths and weaknesses of the Rumsfeld plan, which seeks to propel American military power so far ahead of that of any other nation that none would dare challenge it.

"American strengths in transformation are seen as being in the realm of ideas, innovation and technology," Evans told his colleagues. Weaknesses included "a tendency toward faddism," a love of technology for the sake of technology, and "a perceived inability to transform the vast organization of the Pentagon, whose mindset was formed in the crucible of the Cold War."

The conference on transforming U.S. armed forces was organized by the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, where military officers, defense officials, diplomats and law-enforcement officers from America, Asia and the Pacific meet to examine security issues.

To encourage candor, speakers usually cannot be identified. Evans, however, agreed to be quoted.

The main cause of the Asian doubts, which were as much cultural as military, was their difficulty in discerning what "transform" means. American defenders of the plan acknowledged that it was an "elusive concept," but asserted that the objective was to assemble a force that could dominate the spectrum of conflict from nuclear war to terrorism.

This transformed force, which would include political, economic, diplomatic and cultural elements, would provide depth in homeland defense and would rely on a revitalized intelligence corps, innovative uses of space, streamlined logistics, and new weapons.

The deadline was set as 2012.

In Asia and the Pacific, the United States has already begun to redraw the map of its bases and to realign forces so that expeditions could be launched to points elsewhere in the region. War plans are being updated and speed of command will be emphasized.

Alliances with Japan, and to a lesser extent with South Korea, will become even more vital than they are today.

Even so, Japanese misgivings included concern that the plan relied too much on advanced technology that Japan's Self-Defense Forces could not match. There was concern that efforts to win hearts and minds through public affairs, psychological operations, and the Internet would be neglected.

11-L-0559/OSD/41754