SUBJECT: The Defense Warning Network

References: See Enclosure 1

1. PURPOSE. This directive:
   
a. Establishes policy, assigns responsibilities, and provides guidance for the Defense Warning Network (DWN) within the DoD in accordance with the authority in Title 10, United States Code (Reference (a)). Pursuant to DoD Directive (DoDD) 5240.01 (Reference (b)), Defense Intelligence must provide warning of threats, foreign capabilities, and intent in an accurate and timely manner to provide national and defense decision makers with the widest range of options.

   b. Consistent with DoD Instruction (DoDI) 5105.18 (Reference (c)), establishes the Defense Warning Council (DWC) as a forum for reviewing DWN initiatives and issues requiring timely senior-level attention, concurrence, and support (see Enclosure 2).

2. APPLICABILITY. This directive applies to OSD, the Military Departments, the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and the Joint Staff, the Combatant Commands (CCMDs), the Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, the Defense Agencies, the DoD Field Activities, and all other organizational entities within the DoD (referred to collectively in this directive as the “DoD Components”).

3. POLICY. It is DoD policy that:
   
a. DoD has the earliest possible awareness of potential threats, vulnerabilities, and opportunities that may emerge from any circumstance.

   b. DoD has requisite capability to identify and assess relevant events, situations, and environments over broad time horizons to provide the earliest possible alert, to appropriate leadership within the DoD, of potential risks to U.S. interests.
c. DoD warnings are a function of:

(1) Consistent interaction between intelligence consumers and producers to generate the requisite context.

(2) Lead time to reduce risks and increase opportunities for success in actions to address situations and crises involving U.S. interests.

d. DoD warnings include internal risk assessments and will be informed by higher-level risk assessments that capture potential implications, cascading effects, and associated consequences.

e. The DoD warning mission is to:

(1) Identify and warn appropriate leadership within the DoD of potential threats posed by adversaries, political and economic instability, failed or failing states, and any other emerging challenges that could affect the United States or its interests worldwide, to include:

(a) Warning of attack on the United States or its allies or conflict that could require the employment of U.S. or allied forces and capabilities.

(b) Warning of state collapse or failure that could trigger employment of U.S. or allied forces and capabilities.

(c) Warning of terrorist, political, economic, military, technological, energy, environmental, societal, or other developments that could influence the development and implementation of defense policy, operational and contingency plans, and force capabilities.

(2) Identify and convey threats, vulnerabilities, and address potential opportunities associated with U.S. interests, objectives, assets, policies, plans, and ongoing operations or activities.

(3) Inform debates among and decisions by intelligence and operational consumers within DoD about potential implications, cascading effects, and unintended consequences that could affect or be affected by proposed U.S. policies, plans, actions, or responses to emerging foreign events and trends.

f. The DoD:

(1) Integrates relevant intelligence enterprise stakeholders with existing warning capabilities into the DWN.

(2) Promotes the use of collaborative environments and technology to support the full range of warning functions in support of DoD interests.

(3) Promotes the integration of warning capabilities, perspectives, and assessments into OSD and Joint Staff policy and planning processes, from concept to execution.
(4) Provides long-range strategic warning, to appropriate leadership within the DoD, of events that could challenge U.S. military preeminence beyond the Future Years Defense Program.

(5) Provides warning-related intelligence to appropriate leadership within the DoD in support of CCMD and Joint Staff operational plan development.

(6) Capitalizes on the work done by Red Teams, pursuant to CJCS Message DTG 031640ZAPR06 040001Z0CT11 (Reference (d)), across DoD to develop independent assessments of potential outcomes for ambiguous environments.

(7) Develops comprehensive warning doctrine, education, and training programs for intelligence and operational consumers within the DoD, setting requirements to be met by DoD Components.

(8) Complies with Reference (b) and DoD 5240.1-R DoD Manual 5240.01 (Reference (e)) in executing intelligence and intelligence-related activities in support of the DWN.

4. RESPONSIBILITIES. See Enclosure 3.

5. RELASABILITY. Unlimited. This directive is approved for public release and is available on the Internet from the DoD Issuances Website at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives. Cleared for public release. This Directive is available on the Directives Division Website at http://www.esd.whs.mil/DD/.

6. EFFECTIVE DATE. This directive: is effective December 5, 2013.

   a. Is effective December 5, 2013.

   b. Must be reissued, cancelled, or certified current within 5 years of its publication to be considered current in accordance with DoDI 5025.01 (Reference (f)).

   c. Will expire effective December 5, 2023 and be removed from the DoD Issuances Website if it hasn’t been reissued or cancelled in accordance with Reference (f).

Ashton B. Carter
Deputy Secretary of Defense
Enclosures
   1. References
   2. DWN Functions and Coordination
   3. Responsibilities

Glossary
ENCLOSURE 1

REFERENCES

(a) Title 10, United States Code
(b) DoD Directive 5240.01, “DoD Intelligence Activities,” August 27, 2007, as amended
(c) DoD Instruction 5105.18, “DoD Intergovernmental and Intragovernmental Committee Management Program,” July 10, 2009, as amended
(d) Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Message, DTG 031640ZAPR06040001Z0CT11, “Joint Intelligence Operations Center Execute Order Modification 3 (U)”
(f) DoD Manual 5240.01, “Procedures Governing the Conduct of DoD Intelligence Activities,” August 8, 2016
(g) DoD Instruction 5025.01, “DoD Directives Program,” September 26, 2012, as amended
(m) Intelligence Community Directive 204, “Roles and Responsibilities for the National Intelligence Priorities Framework,” September 13, 2007

1 On a need-to-know basis, a copy can be requested from the J-2/Joint Staff. This is a classified document and is not releasable to the public.
ENCLOSURE 2

DWN FUNCTIONS AND COORDINATION

1. FUNCTIONS OF THE DWN

a. The DWN:

   (1) Enables the warning mission among and within the DoD Components.

   (2) Functions as a collaborative enterprise that holistically assesses warnings for key countries, significant events and issues, and supports Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I)) efforts to improve warning.

   (3) Enables:

      (a) The Defense Intelligence Enterprise to contribute to the warning mission and ensure warning concepts are integrated into the overall intelligence analytic endeavor.

      (b) Warning to support the missions and functions of a broad spectrum of DoD Components, reflecting the full scope of U.S. interests.

   (4) Allows monitoring of warning concerns based on individual requirements by DoD Components.

   (5) Provides warning to appropriate leadership in DoD in enough time and with sufficient information to allow DoD leaders to proactively confront emerging challenges, leverage opportunities, avoid or mitigate the impact of surprise, and produce strategic outcomes favorable to the United States.

   (6) Facilitates the ability of DoD Components to contribute to warning at all echelons in support of DoD organizational and Departmental missions and requirements. It enhances collaboration and networked interaction between DoD’s warning intelligence providers and consumers. The end-state of the DWN is the full integration of defense warning-related intelligence into DoD processes and practices.

b. The collaborative nature of the DWN benefits the elevation of minority analytic opinions, which are often discounted in standard analytic processes. The full evaluation of alternative hypotheses will better ensure that the warning considerations conveyed to decision or policy makers encompass the range of valid threat perspectives.

2. DWC

a. Purpose. The DWC:
(1) Is the primary forum for coordinating activities and reaching consensus on issues related to the DWN, such as issuing warning about particular situations, new order of battle information, or recommendations to inform senior DoD leadership.

(2) Reviews DoD DWN initiatives, issues, and enduring and emerging warning concerns that require senior-level concurrence and support.

(3) Updates the Military Intelligence Board and the Senior Military Intelligence Officers Conference on issues related to the DWN.

b. Management and Membership

(1) The membership of the DWC is limited to permanent U.S. Government (USG) officers or employees. The DWC is comprised of voting members, non-voting advisory members, and non-member ad-hoc advisors.

(2) Voting membership consists of representatives who are empowered to provide information from and coordinate on behalf of their DoD organizations. DWC voting membership consists of:

(a) CJCS, who serves as Chair.

(b) USD(I).

(c) Director, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA).

(d) Director, National Security Agency/Chief, Central Security Service (DIRNSA/CHCSS).

(e) Director, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA).

(f) Secretaries of the Military Departments.

(g) Combatant Commanders.

(3) Non-voting advisory membership consists of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)), who is empowered to provide advice and information, as necessary, on issues related to the DWN.

(4) Depending on the subject matter under consideration by the DWC, the DWC may solicit advice or information from non-member (non-voting) ad-hoc advisors. Non-member ad-hoc advisors are representatives who provide advice or information, as deemed necessary by the DWC, on behalf of their organizations or governments. Non-member ad-hoc advisors may include:
(a) The Office of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI).

(b) The Central Intelligence Agency.

(c) The Department of State, Intelligence and Research Bureau.

(d) The National Reconnaissance Office.

(e) DIA organizations in addition to the Director, DIA, that can provide intelligence products related to the subject matter under consideration by the DWC.

(f) Foreign government officers or employees, provided that their participation in DWC matters is authorized by DoD and is in accordance with applicable national disclosure policies, export control regulations, and other U.S. laws and regulations. Foreign government non-member ad-hoc advisors must be permanent officers or employees of their respective governments, and their participation must be approved by the DWC on a case-by-case basis.

(g) Such other USG departments or agencies, selected by the CJCS based on DWC requirements and activities.
ENCLOSURE 3

RESPONSIBILITIES

1. **USD(I).** Consistent with DoDD 5143.01 (Reference (g)), the USD(I):
   
   a. Establishes and oversees implementation of DoD policy on warning equities, capabilities, and requirements.
   
   b. Represents DoD warning interests to the DNI and the Intelligence Community.
   
   c. Establishes DoD budget, resource, training, and education requirements to fulfill the DoD intelligence warning mission and implement Defense Intelligence roles and responsibilities in the DWN.
   
   d. Serves as a member of, or provides a representative to, the DWC.

2. **DIRECTOR, DIA.** Under the authority, direction, and control of the USD(I) and consistent with DoDD 5105.21 (Reference (h)), the Director, DIA:
   
   a. Provides regional and functional intelligence subject matter expertise to warning mission tasks in direct support to the DoD Components.
   
   b. Establishes mechanisms to incorporate warning perspectives into current, crisis, and strategic intelligence support.
   
   c. Builds a sustainable warning analytic capability across the Defense Intelligence Enterprise by implementing analytic competencies, professional development pathways, and training and education programs emphasizing the warning intelligence function and tradecraft.
   
   d. Establishes procedures that DoD Component’s will use to verify their compliance with DoD policies governing intelligence support to the DWN.
   
   e. As the Defense Collection Manager:
      
      (1) Ensures collection challenges, capabilities, and limitations are integrated into DWN discussions and assessments.
      
      (2) Provides insight into collection posture and gaps for the DWN.
      
      (3) Responds to DWN and DWC requests for adjustments on collection posture, such as addressing gaps on emerging concerns as they are specifically defined or increase in likelihood or consequence.
(4) Responds to requests from appropriate leadership within the DoD for increased
collection emphasis on warning priorities as appropriate; supports adjudication efforts as
required.

(5) Provides and collaborates on all-source intelligence analysis products with warning
equities or relevance for use by DWN members and the Defense Intelligence Enterprise and to
elevate visibility and concern to consumers.

f. Serves as a member of, or provides a representative to, the DWC and provides
administrative and management support to the DWC.

3. DIRNSA/CHCSS. Under the authority, direction, and control of the USD(I) and consistent
with DoDD 5100.20 (Reference (i)), the DIRNSA/CHCSS:

a. Provides signals intelligence and cybersecurity information on emerging issues to support
the warning mission of the Defense Intelligence Enterprise.

b. Supports the monitoring, review, assessment, and reporting of signals intelligence and
cybersecurity information for DoD enduring warning concerns.

c. Conveys warning of foreign developments, events, or conditions that could threaten or
adversely affect U.S. interests, objectives, policies, or actions in accordance with applicable
policies and procedures.

d. Collaborates with appropriate elements of the U.S. Strategic Command to provide
warning of hostile cyber attacks on DoD, other U.S. Government, or U.S. critical infrastructure
networks.

e. Emphasizes and promotes warning as a priority National Security Agency/Central
Security Service analytic mission.

f. Serves as a member of, or provides a representative to, the DWC.

4. DIRECTOR, NGA. Under the authority, direction, and control of the USD(I) and consistent
with DoDD 5105.60 (Reference (j)), the Director, NGA:

a. Provides geospatial intelligence (GEOINT) on emerging issues to support the warning
mission of the Defense Intelligence Enterprise.

b. Supports the monitoring, review, assessment, and reporting for DoD enduring warning
concerns.

c. Conveys warning of foreign developments, events, or conditions that could threaten or
adversely affect U.S. interests, objectives, policies, or actions in accordance with applicable
policies and procedures.
d. Collaborates with appropriate elements of the U.S. Strategic Command to provide
warning of hostile nuclear missile attacks on U.S. soil, interests, and global partners.

e. Emphasizes and promotes warning as a priority GEOINT analysis mission within the
NGA and the broader national system for GEOINT.

f. Serves as a member of, or provides a representative to, the DWC.

5. USD(P). Consistent with DoDD 5111.1 (Reference (k)), USD(P) serves as an advisor, or
provides a representative to serve as an advisor, to the DWC.

6. SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS. The Secretaries of the Military
Departments:

a. Provide warning-related information to the DWN on emerging science and technology
developments that will affect current and future U.S. weapons systems.

b. Develop and implement warning doctrine, training, and education of appropriate U.S.
Armed Forces personnel.

c. Ensure that Service Red Team and other alternative analysis products are available to the
DWN.

d. Each serve as a member of, or provide a representative to, the DWC for their respective
Military Department.

7. CJCS. The CJCS:

a. Provides strategic vision, guidance, and leadership to ensure warning capabilities are
integrated into the Joint Staff and the CCMDs.

b. Directs the integration of warning perspectives, concerns, and DWN mission capabilities
and requirements into appropriate Joint Staff processes.

c. Establishes mechanisms to foster formal interaction between warning intelligence and
appropriate CJCS advisory elements, as well as Joint Staff strategy, policy, planning,
operational, and exercise elements.

d. Advocates the inclusion of warning perspectives and risk assessments in CJCS initiatives,
as appropriate.

e. As appropriate, integrates warning analysis and perspectives into the Joint Staff
Capabilities Plan and all planning orders in support of U.S. military plans and operations.
f. Designates Joint Staff leads to support the warning mission.

g. Ensures DoD warning concepts are embedded in National Joint Operations Intelligence Center (NJOIC) operations, at the CCMDs and, as appropriate and in coordination with the Secretaries of the Military Departments, within the Military Departments.

h. Through the Director, Joint Staff Intelligence Directorate:

   (1) Manages the DWN on a day-to-day basis in accordance with DWN guidance by:

      (a) Providing coverage of warning issues requiring the integration of efforts by two or more DWN Defense intelligence components.

      (b) Implementing tools, processes, and procedures for coordination of warning function across the DWN.

      (c) Monitoring the performance of Defense Intelligence Components in the execution of defense warning functions, providing evaluation to the CJCS, USD(I), the Military Departments, DIRNSA/CHCSS, the Director, NGA, and the Director, DIA, as appropriate.

   (2) Serves as the principal advisor to the Joint Staff and OSD for all matters pertaining to warning and the DWN.

   (3) Operates the intelligence element of the NJOIC to provide indications and warning to the Secretary of Defense and CJCS.

   (4) Establishes mechanisms, in coordination with the DIA Deputy Director for Analysis, to incorporate warning perspectives into current, crisis, and strategic intelligence support to the Joint Staff.

   (5) Establishes warning partnerships with OSD, the Joint Staff, and the CCMDs to promote routine interaction and situational awareness on warning concerns in a mutually informative environment.

   (6) Promotes interaction with allies and key partners to advance understanding and cooperation on common warning concerns, policies, procedures, and practices.

   (7) Chairs the DWC and serves as a principal advisor for the Joint Staff and OSD.

   (8) Partners with Defense intelligence analytic experts to identify, assess, and convey relevant assessments for emerging warning concerns to consumers.

   (9) Ensures intelligence subject matter expertise and warning perspectives inform consumer policy, planning, operations, and exercise development from concept to execution, in coordination with the DIA Deputy Director for Analysis.
10. In collaboration with DoD intelligence officers, provides a strategic perspective on the warning implications of existing and emerging events, and elevates visibility of risks to Joint Staff and OSD audiences.

11. Consults with OSD, the Joint Staff, CCMDs, intelligence combat support agencies, and the DNI, as appropriate, to ensure warning policies and procedures optimize DoD warning capabilities and processes, in coordination with the DIA Deputy Director for Analysis.

12. Serves as DoD liaison to North Atlantic Treaty Organization Warning Secretariat and other allies and partners concerning warning policy, doctrine, processes, and procedures.

13. Identifies, validates, accepts, and adjudicates responsibilities to the Joint Staff, CCMDs, and Military Departments for addressing key foreign intelligence warning matters, consistent with the National Intelligence Priorities Framework, described in Intelligence Community Directive 204 (Reference (l)).

14. Maintains a defense warning executive staff to provide warning mission management leadership, and warning analysis.

15. Manages a defense warning virtual presence and knowledge management capability for DoD.

8. COMBATANT COMMANDERS. The Combatant Commanders:

a. Provide guidance to the CCMD intelligence, operational, and planning elements on roles and responsibilities in the DWN.

b. Execute intelligence functions of the warning mission, including acting on assignments for national and DoD enduring warning concerns as directed by the CJCS or Director, DIA.

c. Integrate appropriate subject matter intelligence expertise and warning perspectives into operations, plans, and exercises from concept through execution.

d. Maximize Red Team capabilities in support of the warning mission and forward Red Team products to the Director, DIA, for database integration, as appropriate.

e. Establish, as appropriate for CCMD missions, measures or processes to identify, assess, and convey CCMD-specific warning of regional developments, events, or conditions that could:

   (1) Threaten or adversely affect U.S. interests;

   (2) Put U.S., DoD, or CCMD objectives, policies, actions, or activities at risk; or

   (3) Present opportunities to further U.S. objectives.
f. Present CCMD warning policy and program issues and requirements to the DWC as appropriate.

g. Support and integrate the development and implementation of warning doctrine, training, experimentation, and exercises.

h. Each serve as a member of, or provide a representative to, the DWC for their respective Combatant Command.
GLOSSARY

PART I. ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

CCMD  Combatant Command
CJCS  Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

DIA  Defense Intelligence Agency
DIRNSA/CHCSS  Director, National Security Agency/Chief, Central Security Service
DNI  Director of National Intelligence
DoDD  DoD Directive
DoDI  DoD Instruction
DWC  Defense Warning Council
DWN  Defense Warning Network

GEOINT  geospatial intelligence

NGA  National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency
NJOIC  National Joint Operations Intelligence Center

USG  United States Government
USD(I)  Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence
USD(P)  Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

PART II. DEFINITIONS

Unless otherwise noted, these terms and their definitions are for the purpose of this directive.

consumer. Defined in Joint Publication 1–02 the DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Reference (m/l)).

Defense Intelligence. Defined in Reference (gf).

Defense Intelligence Components. Defined in Reference (gf).

Defense Intelligence Enterprise. For the purpose of this directive, the Defense Intelligence Enterprise includes the intelligence combat support agencies, the intelligence components of the Military Services and Combatant Commands, and DoD intelligence, counterintelligence, and security organizations (e.g., Defense Security Service).
DWN. A collaborative and integrated network made up of DoD organizations, that provides senior decision makers warning on emerging and enduring warning threats to U.S. and allied interests.

enduring warning issue. A significant national security issue, usually linked to an operation plan or concept plan, that is well defined and are longstanding potential threats to the interests of the U.S. and its allies.

emerging warning concerns. Newly identified issues relevant to national security of sufficient significance to warrant temporary attention by the Defense Intelligence Enterprise. An emerging warning issue may be redefined as an enduring warning issue based on national security priorities and operational plans.

National System for GEOINT. Defined in Reference (j).

operational warning. A warning to theater level or equivalent decision makers of developing situations or ongoing event which may initiate operational planning or trigger the execution or change in status of standing operations or contingency plans.

Red Team. Defined in Reference (m).

strategic warning. Defined in Reference (m).

tactical warning. Defined in Reference (m).

warning. A communication and acknowledgment of dangers implicit in a wide spectrum of activities by potential opponents ranging from routine defense measures to substantive increases in readiness and force preparedness and to acts of terrorism or political, economic, or military provocation.