

**MILITARY CONSTRUCTION APPROPRIATIONS  
FOR 2004**

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**HEARINGS**

BEFORE A

SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE

COMMITTEE ON

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES  
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FIRST SESSION

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**PART 6**

**FISCAL YEAR 2004**

**SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATIONS REQUEST**



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## MILITARY CONSTRUCTION APPROPRIATIONS FOR 2004

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 2, 2003.

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### DEFENSE DEPARTMENT

#### WITNESSES

RAY DuBOIS, DEPUTY UNDERSECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INSTAL-  
LATIONS AND ENVIRONMENT  
LARRY LANZILLOTTA, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY UNDERSECRETARY OF DE-  
FENSE AND COMPTROLLER

#### STATEMENT OF THE CHAIRMAN

Mr. KNOLLENBERG [presiding]. The meeting will come to order. I appreciate everybody showing up on time. We have a bit of a time constraint with everybody here, so I think we blocked off an hour and a half, and I am hopeful we can get through the questions that are on your mind in that period of time.

And we are going to adhere to the five-minute rule, only because we kind of have to, inasmuch as other members appear, I think they are going to want to also entertain asking questions.

So with that, let me get into the meeting itself.

Good afternoon, everybody, and we thank our witnesses for being here on time and being prepared. We appreciate your coming with the small amount of notice that you have.

Again, this is a hearing that is focusing just on the military construction portion of the fiscal 2004 supplemental appropriations request.

In any event, this opportunity that you have today is an opportunity for all members to specifically learn more about the military construction portion of the supplemental request, which encompasses some \$412 million for urgent projects to support our men and women who are serving in Iraq.

The witnesses here today are those individuals who are exclusively responsible, I should say, for formulating only the military construction portion of the supplemental, based on the support requirements of our troops.

This hearing will be conducted at an unclassified level. We do not plan on going into a closed session. The number of troops or aircraft at certain locations or other classified information may not be discussed during the course of this hearing. And I ask for your cooperation on that matter, as this does relate solely to the military construction portion of the request.

To summarize the request, \$119.9 million is included for the Army to finance various military construction projects in support of

U.S. troops in Iraq. Secondly, the Air Force portion of the request includes \$292.5 million to fund construction projects at various locations in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom.

Finally, a provision is requested which would allow the Secretary of Defense to transfer up to \$500 million from funds appropriated in the Defense title of this bill to the contingency construction account for the purpose of funding unforeseen military construction requirements.

The supplemental budget request raises many valid questions, and I am going to be interested in hearing from today's witnesses.

One area that I am particularly interested in, and would like Generals Lust and Fox to comment on, are the differences between the two requests. I am curious about why the Air Force, for example, their request is so much larger than the Army request, given that the Army has more than 120,000 soldiers on the ground in Iraq. And I would appreciate both generals giving us their observation on that subject.

However, before getting to the substance of the hearing, I would like to digress for just a moment to express my gratitude to all the combat engineers currently serving in Iraq and in the CENTCOM area of responsibility, the AOR.

Americans should be very proud of their Seabees, Corps of Engineers or Red Horse Squadrons. These men and women were integral to preparing for the war and the fighting during the war and their mission continues. And it is an immense one.

Today, American combat engineers are vital to the reconstruction effort in Iraq. And, for example, they assist the U.S. Agency for International Development, another committee I happen to serve on, the Foreign Ops Committee, with increasing the supply of potable water and improving the wastewater facilities.

They have identified and repaired an electrical grid that is 40 years old and has received little, if any maintenance. And they are restoring Iraq's oil infrastructure. They have also rebuilt schools, assessed the structural integrity of buildings and bridges and demolished munitions.

All this effort has proceeded despite continuing harassment by Iraqis loyal to the former regime, daily looting and extreme environmental conditions.

So with that, we will introduce our witnesses. The witnesses today are Mr. Ray DuBois, Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Installations and Environment; Mr. Larry Lanzillotta, Principal Deputy Undersecretary of Defense and Comptroller; Major General Larry Lust, Army Assistant Chief of Staff for Installations and Environment; and then, finally, Major General Dean Fox, the Air Force Civil Engineer.

If you have a prepared statement, that is fine. It will be entered into the record in its entirety. But I would ask you to present your opening statements, and if you can, you can keep those down to a fairly bare minimum, if you will.

And at this time, I would like to turn to Mr. Edwards for any comments and opening statement that he might like to make.

Mr. EDWARDS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think in the name of time I would just like to let the testimony proceed. I am inter-

ested in the issue you raised as to the Army having the vast majority of personnel in the Iraqi theater yet it is only getting 30 percent of the construction funding in this budget. And I hope you can get that answered.

But thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your comments, and I look forward to the testimony.

Mr. KNOLLENBERG. I think we have an itinerary to the process here, which I conveniently put aside.

We will start with Mr. DuBois.

Mr. DuBois, you are recognized.

#### STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE RAY DUBOIS

Mr. DUBOIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Edwards, distinguished members of the committee. On behalf of Secretary Rumsfeld, I want to thank you for allowing myself and Mr. Lanzillotta and Generals Lust and Fox to testify today on the military construction issues that are presented by the President's fiscal year 2004 supplemental appropriation request for the Department of Defense.

Now, to be brief, it seems to me that we ought to focus on three items this afternoon.

The first, of course, are the specifics with respect to the \$412.5 million military construction request, the construction of military facilities and positions for Operation Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom.

Now, these construction projects are driven by operational imperatives. I have been in contact with General Abizaid's office, although he is not here at the moment, and they and I have agreed that obviously the issues of any terrorism force protection, reliable command-and-control capabilities, repair and maintenance of potential logistic hubs, for the continual flow of materiel to the theater and to our deployed forces are critical.

The repairs to host nations' airfields which General Fox is going to address in more detail, are also critical.

Now, constructing key basing facilities in Iraq for our troops that move them from basically bivouac situations to temporary living conditions, with the basic necessities of life, I think we would all agree is an important investment, albeit temporary.

Now, secondly, I think we should address the \$500 million contingency construction authorization which in our view is critical to U.S. CENTCOM operations.

Now, we know that the wars, if you will, in the 21st century are going to be different than the ones in the 20th century. We are dealing with a global war on terrorism; we are dealing with issues that are uncertain. And certainly the combatant commander, in this case, General Abizaid, ought to have some agility, if you will, in being able to respond to the emerging requirements as they arrive.

Now the third issue that I think we need to get some discussion going on is the issue that pertains to the appropriations conference on fiscal year 2004 military construction. And if I might just take a moment, I want to elaborate on one of the important issues raised by Secretary Rumsfeld in his letter, Mr. Chairman, to you

and the Ranking Members of the committees on military construction.

In order to ensure that the department requested only those funds required for mission-critical bases in both Europe and Korea, the Secretary instructed his combatant commanders to reprioritize military construction requirements for 2003 and 2004. They did so.

And the President submitted an amended budget for that military construction in May of this year which canceled or deferred funding for overseas construction projects where our long-term presence was questionable and realigned those funds at installations which will remain key to our global basing posture and fulfill critical operational, logistical, and training mission needs.

In fact, to take Germany just as an example, you may remember that we rescinded the request for 26 different military construction projects that equated to over \$280 million.

An almost identical amount of funds, nearly \$280 million, was added to fund 18 particular projects in the United States.

Now, I think the combatant commanders and the military services have provided to this committee additional information in support of those critical mission requirements. And we believe strongly that without those projects, the Secretary may have to defer some opportunities to consolidate forces and functions efficiently and delay the key elements of our theater strategic transformation plans.

And obviously we will also lose some opportunities to—as many of you who have traveled to our overseas installations—lose opportunities to make small improvements to the quality of life.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. We look forward to working with you. And we do appreciate—the Secretary appreciates your support of all of our men and women in uniform who are at the pointy end of the spear, in adverse conditions, around the world.

Thank you, sir.

Mr. KNOLLENBERG. Thank you, Mr. DuBois.

We now turn to Mr. Larry Lanzillotta. I will get it straight here—

Mr. LANZILLOTTA. Correct.

Mr. KNOLLENBERG [continuing]. Pretty soon, I guess, for his comments. And all of your entire commentary will be entered into the record, but you can confine that, if you can, to something like five minutes, if you would.

#### STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE LARRY LANZILLOTTA

Mr. LANZILLOTTA. Thank you. Okay, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I am pleased to be here today to discuss the military construction component of President Bush's fiscal year 2004 supplemental appropriation request. Prompt and full approval of all components of this supplemental is critical to three historic challenges our nation has undertaken: building an Iraq that will support rather than undermine regional and international stability; successfully completing our mission in Afghanistan; and winning the global war on terrorism.

America and its coalition partners have made great progress in both Iraq and Afghanistan. With commitment and adequate re-

sources, we must sustain and build on our achievements. Accelerating progress now can hold down long-term reconstruction costs and hasten scaling back of U.S. operations and troop levels.

For the Department of Defense, the supplemental passage now facilitates better planning and budget execution. When supplementals aren't approved until late in the fiscal year, maintenance, base ops support, and other essential services get curtailed, hurting readiness and morale.

The President is requesting \$412.5 million for construction in military facilities to support Operation Iraqi Freedom, Operation Enduring Freedom in the military construction account.

The Army account request is \$119.9 million, and it is required to finance a variety of military construction projects.

These projects are critical to sustaining Army operations and improving conditions for our soldiers. They are a vital component to funds for housing of shower and housing facilities which are requested in the Army's O&M accounts and other procurement appropriation accounts in 2004.

For the Air Force military construction account, the \$292.5 million request covers urgent projects in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere. The United States Air Force is operating at an intense pace and often under difficult circumstances. This supplemental is essential for the Air Force to deliver the strongest possible support to ongoing operations worldwide.

All these projects are urgently needed to ensure success in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the global war on terrorism.

These expenditures have now become as important to our armed forces as ammunition, fuel and other war fighting essentials. U.S. Central Command describes the supplemental request as critical to its mission. It needs this funding to support force protection, reliable command and control, continuous flow of materials to the deployed forces, and repair of airfields vital to ongoing operations.

It is impossible to project all the next year's requirements for military operations in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere in the global war on terrorism. To prevent our military construction requirements from degrading these operations, the President has requested a general provision that help us to address these emerging needs. We are thankful that this committee has indicated its intention to provide strong military construction support for our fighting forces. We appreciate your leadership in working out the best way to streamline procedures and to provide for contingency construction needs. Such flexibility is key to sustaining support for our military forces throughout the entire fiscal year.

Central Command tells us that it critically needs the flexibility to meet emerging military construction requirements quickly.

In closing, I urge the approval of President Bush's 2004 supplemental appropriation request. The military construction components of the request are essential to sustaining the success and the morale of our military.

The Department of Defense appreciates this committee's strong support for the needs of our armed forces and looks forward to continuing the close partnership on behalf of America's national security.

And I thank the members of the committee, and am prepared to answer your question.

Mr. KNOLLENBERG. Thank you, Mr. Lanzillotta. I am going to turn to the full Appropriations Chairman, Mr. Young, Bill Young, for any comments he might want to make relative to this hearing.

STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN YOUNG

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. And I just want to, first of all, welcome and thank you all for being willing to join with us.

As you have indicated so far, this subcommittee and our Appropriations Committee intends to provide whatever we need to take care of our troops. Sometimes we do not have as much money as we would like to have to appropriate.

I will have some questions about the specifics on the list. But you can be sure that this subcommittee is prepared to be supportive as we have the money available to provide for not only the mission in Iraq but on our regular 2004 bills and regular bills to provide as much quality of life issues as we can.

And we appreciate those who serve in the military, and we want to show that appreciation by doing the best we can for them.

But I would ask some questions later when you get to the question part.

Mr. KNOLLENBERG. Thank you, Mr. Young.

And now we will turn to Major General Larry Lust for his comments.

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 2, 2003.

U.S. ARMY

WITNESS

MAJOR GENERAL LARRY LUST, ARMY ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR INSTALLATIONS AND ENVIRONMENT

General LUST. Sir, I have no comments.

Mr. KNOLLENBERG. You have no comments. All right, that is good. I guess it is good—

[Laughter.]

Mr. KINGSTON. Mr. Chairman, I move that we move the Army portion of the bill immediately. [Laughter.]

Mr. KNOLLENBERG. I will consider that.

In that case, then, we are going to turn to Major General Dean Fox, the Air Force Civil Engineer.

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 2, 2003.

U.S. AIR FORCE

WITNESS

MAJOR GENERAL DEAN FOX, THE AIR FORCE CIVIL ENGINEER

General FOX. Sir, if we get that kind of support—

[Laughter.]

General FOX [continuing]. Then I am going to defer an oral comment at this time, too.

Just to say that I think what Mr. DuBois and Mr. Lanzillotta have said preparatory, in their comments, we fully support.

Mr. KNOLLENBERG. Very good, thank you. Thank you very much.

Then, again, just to repeat for those that may have come in late, we are going to adhere to a five-minute contribution or input from each member.

I will begin with a question or two, and we will try to adhere to that, because I know there are a lot of questions people have, and there are certainly a lot of questions that are there today to be asked.

So let me start with General Fox, General Lust: If you can, explain to me the process that you used for your respective service to develop the construction requirements for the supplemental request.

And this is an important question: Does the request satisfy all the critical infrastructure requirements for Iraq and for terrorism-related missions? And if they do not, why don't they?

I will start with General Fox.

INFRASTRUCTURE REQUIREMENTS

General FOX. Yes, sir.

First of all, the process that we used was to accept the CENTCOM combatant commander's input, his request. And that process included U.S. Air Forces, U.S. Central Command (CENTAF), the air component to U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM). As we looked at the requirements, we asked for their input on prioritization. And that prioritization was to fully support through-put into the area of operations, to fully support the basing that we need to prosecute the global war on terrorism—

Mr. KNOLLENBERG. So terrorism is definitely a part of—

General FOX. Yes, sir. The global war on terrorism was one of the key elements. The OIF, Operation Iraqi Freedom, was certainly a key element.

And so you will see projects at places like Balad, for example, to complete the OIF aggressively.

And then the global war on terrorism, there is a project at Bagram Air Base in Afghanistan that provides close air support for our Army joint compatriots to make sure that we are taking care of the ground troops.

So we think that CENTCOM and CENTAF have addressed the most critical global war on terrorism and Operation Iraqi Freedom projects.

Mr. KNOLLENBERG. So that was sort of the blueprint that you utilize.

General FOX. Yes, sir.

Mr. KNOLLENBERG. General Lust, would you have a similar comment. You do not have to repeat everything—

General LUST. I would just add we followed the same procedure as what General Fox described. Ours would have come up to the combined forces land-component commander and he has identified his needs.

What is just shown here are the ones that are the most critical ones identified at the time to meet the needs of what he has identified. We support him from a departmental standpoint.

And, again, it is our basic judgment of what the folks, the engineers from the Corps of Engineers have worked up as a requirement.

Mr. KNOLLENBERG. With an emphasis obviously on terrorism—  
General LUST. Affirmative. That has all been bound into the—

Mr. KNOLLENBERG. Well, General Lust, the Army-military construction request includes some \$80.6 million for power plants in Iraq.

I have got a number of questions here, but how will the work for these power plants be contracted? Or are we talking about some kind of mobile apparatus that you just move into the community?

General LUST. The power plants will be modular in nature, and they will be contracted as per their input in the project description, and their placement and the building will be contracted through the Corps of Engineers on a competitive basis—

Mr. KNOLLENBERG. On a competitive basis, okay.

General LUST [continuing]. And designed and built in a process that will be competitive and modular in nature, sir.

Mr. KNOLLENBERG. That is pretty much, I think, what I wanted to know.

Now, here is a question: According to the project justification request for electric plants and wastewater utilities serves approximately 56,000 soldiers and 25,000 soldiers respectively. How are the other approximately 70,000 soldiers to be supplied with basic utility requirements?

General LUST. Those are being handled, sir, either by tactical generators we have for the power, et cetera, or contracting out through either LOGCAP or local contractors, or a use of the Iraqi infrastructure that is available in the local area where the camps are fixed.

That is how that is being met.

What is required here, is on the camps where we can free up and either do not have or get off of the Iraqi infrastructure so we can in fact provide more power to them as far as—

Mr. KNOLLENBERG. So we will use the electrical grid, the Iraqi—

General LUST. Where in fact it does not draw away from the Iraqis.

For example, every million watts of electricity that we consume decreases about 1,000 houses of Iraqis who do not get power. So our work is to get off of the grid as much as we can to free that up.

Mr. KNOLLENBERG. What will happen to these facilities? Will they be left behind when we leave?

General LUST. Sir, the waste-water plant that we are building does not lend itself—it is kind of in the ground; it is kind of fixed, it will have to stay.

The power plants, though, sir, are built on a modular nature. And at the end of this operation, the decision will have to be made, valuation will have to be made: Is there a residual value left in these modules that we want to move somewhere else? Or is, in fact,

the cost of moving greater than the residual value? Then the decision will have to be how would we dispose of them.

But the power plants themselves are not permanent in nature. They may be moved at the end of this operation, should the residual value be determined to be greater than what it would be to move them somewhere else.

Mr. KNOLLENBERG. I think, in fact, at this point I would defer to Chairman Young, who has other things to do, and I would like to have him offer his questions at this point.

#### MILITARY CONSTRUCTION VS. FOREIGN OPERATIONS APPROPRIATIONS

Mr. YOUNG. Well, Mr. Chairman, thank you very much, and I do appreciate that.

I have one general question: A lot of the items here on the two lists will have to do with things that will be left in Iraq, they will become part of Iraq. Why are these included in the military construction section rather than in the foreign operations section, which is the \$20 billion for so-called reconstruction?

Mr. LANZILLOTTA. Let me take the first crack, and then you guys can supplement.

Sir, I believe, because the main purpose of these construction, is not to help the Iraqi people but actually to support our troops. And that was the deciding factor as to whether it went into the \$20 billion or should go in the DOD piece.

As the general has mentioned, there might not be residual value with some of these modules, especially in the power plants, when we leave. So we thought it was inconsistent to probably charge that to the \$20 billion when, in fact, it was only going to be used by U.S. forces and there might not be much left when we left.

Mr. YOUNG. So it was not an attempt to make the \$20 billion look smaller or keep it from getting larger, because if there is any controversy in this bill, it is the \$20 billion figure, it is not the Defense part.

Mr. LANZILLOTTA. I think, sir, it was also the basis of the request we put together.

Ambassador Bremer went to the Department of Finance, or Ministry of Finance, to build the \$20 billion, and they built that based on what the ministries had asked for.

The ministries did not have any—I do not want to say any concern—but it was not within their scope to look after U.S. forces.

This portion of the MILCON request was built by the combatant commanders. They decided what they needed, and they surfaced it up through the DOD channels, and that is how it ended up in the DOD portion versus the \$20 billion for Ambassador Bremer.

#### DOVER AIR FORCE BASE—AIR FREIGHT TERMINAL

Mr. YOUNG. Understand a lot of the questions that we will ask you are because we will be asked those questions, and we need to know what your responses are.

Let me go to just the list real quickly here.

In the Air Force, the Dover Air Force Base is \$56 million for an air freight terminal. I would expect that this was needed even before Iraq. But Iraq probably enhanced the requirement. Is that a fair statement?

General FOX. Congressman Young, the Dover air freight terminal was nearly destroyed last winter in a catastrophic snow storm. We had as much as four feet of snow drifts on the roof. It is the East Coast superport for getting troops, equipment, materials, food to the area of responsibility and to Europe.

And so it was an issue. We had workarounds that were substandard. We actually took down some aircraft maintenance facilities and did build-up of pallets for equipment and materials to get to the area of responsibility on a temporary basis.

We used some other bases at a much greater expense.

And so you are correct in saying we needed to fix it prior. But it has a direct bearing on the global war on terrorism and full support to the area of responsibility.

Mr. DICKS. Will the chairman yield just for a brief question?

Mr. KNOLLENBERG. Yes, sure.

Mr. DICKS. Was there any consideration given to asking for a budget amendment to the regular bill, the 2004 bill? Or was it just too late in the cycle to get that done?

In other words, if it was done in February, in this big snow storm, you knew you had to fix it, why wasn't a budget amendment set up so it could be done in the 2004 bill?

Mr. LANZILLOTTA. Let me try that and then—sir, this is the first vehicle that we have had. You know, the administration, I guess, has not normally followed a procedure to do a budget amendment on individual projects like that. We could have. I cannot tell you that, no, we could not have done a budget amendment, because certainly it is feasible.

This was the first vehicle after the damage had occurred, we had a temporary fix, that we had to enter this request.

Mr. DICKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

#### CAMP DARBY, ITALY

Mr. YOUNG. One more question on the specific list.

In Camp Darby in Italy—I think most of you all are familiar with Camp Darby and understand its importance. A lot of trains came through Camp Darby up through Aviano and then into the region.

But tell us what you will be doing there in Camp Darby with the \$5 million.

General FOX. Yes, sir.

Camp Darby is the southern hub for munitions and some war-readiness materials into the area of responsibility.

The requirements for that \$5 million include an addition to the munitions maintenance facility, six munitions storage igloos that need to be repaired, and then there is a munitions container, wash facility and storage facility.

The containers that the munitions go in have to be sanitized before loading onto the aircraft because there are Department of Agriculture concerns about diseases and insects from that location.

Mr. YOUNG. Yes, please.

General LUST. Sir, if I might add, the wash rack and stuff, it is also stuff the Army can use. So it is not just specifically the Air Force. By them building it, we in fact do not have to build a sepa-

rate one and can piggyback off their wash rack, sir, because we have got the same requirements to meet that they would.

General FOX. It is a joint facility, joint area. One of the questions that Congressman Knollenberg brought up early on was to talk about the difference in requests, one much more sizable than the other.

I can answer in more detail, but basically, this is probably the most joint engagement in the history of the United States. Everything we do, we do together, whether it is an Air Force in charge of air tasking orders for Navy and Marines, or us in support of Army ground forces.

So when you see large pavement or refueling projects or this munitions project at Camp Darby, each of those very heavily support our ground troops in the Area Of Responsibility (AOR) as well.

Mr. YOUNG. Yes, I think most of us are very familiar with that. I was just looking at the list, looking at things that were not in Iraq. And except for worldwide classified or worldwide various, everything else seems to be in Iraq. Am I correct there?

General FOX. Or in that area of responsibility. Camp Darby, of course, as I mentioned is the southern hub for munitions to that area of responsibility. So when we need to get munitions quickly into Iraq or to prosecute the war on terrorism, they come through Camp Darby.

Mr. YOUNG. General, believe me, I am very much aware of the importance there.

General FOX. Yes, sir.

Mr. YOUNG. You bet.

#### TRANSFER FLEXIBILITY

Just one more question, Mr. Chairman, if I could. The Air Force requests \$292.55 million and the Army request is \$119.9 million. That comes to a total of \$412,450,000. But there is also a request for the ability to transfer up to \$500 million from funds appropriated in the Defense title. That is considerably higher than the specific requests. Where did you arrive at the \$500 million figure? How did that come about? Are you anticipating something that you have not identified on the list that you might need this transfer authority for?

Mr. LANZILLOTTA. I will take the first crack and then Ray may have a few other comments.

Sir, there is no magic, secret formula for the \$500 million. What the department is seeking is the flexibility to address these requirements as they emerge. These requirements often emerge on short notice where there is not time to go through the normal, regular budgeting cycle to seek a normal request.

We have been working with the staff to try to come up with a way to streamline this and come up with some type of flexibility that allow us to address these emerging requirements. I cannot tell you that it absolutely has to be \$500 million because I have no list of projects that add up to \$500 million. I have no list of projects at all that we are planning to use.

The purpose of the general provision is to provide the flexibility. What we are concerned about, if the cap is too low, without a waiver, we often use O&M funding in this type of contingency con-

tructing. But with a cap that was set too low, then that would take that flexibility away from us and we would not be able to use it without some type of waiver authority that we could then do.

So we were seeking that number that would allow us to take care of future emerging requirements, that would not restrict us in what that number is. It is probably a matter for the committee to discuss and debate, but our purpose was to get that flexibility that we needed and not to set the cap too low that would take that flexibility away from us.

Mr. YOUNG. You might suspect, or you might even know that Congress is a little reluctant to give that kind of authority for unjustified programs.

For example, since September 11th, the war on terrorism, which all of us have supported aggressively, you know, Mr. Obey and I moved the first \$40 billion supplemental three days after September 11th and got it to the President that quickly.

But, anyway, since that time we have provided \$42 billion of unjustified basically contingency accounts. So Congress has been pretty lenient when it comes to the issue of the ability to transfer. So we may take a look at this \$500 million. But, you know, it is not easy to say that we are going to. But we probably will at least review it because we do have a lot of members that believe we should have accounting for the monies that are appropriated.

But, anyway, we are here in support of this effort. This mission is totally important to the nation. It is important to the world. The President has done a really great job in leading and our military has performed beautifully. We are here to support whatever needs to be done to accomplish this mission, protect our kids the best we can that are on the battlefield.

And incidentally, I will just give you a quick 30-second report here. We plan to circulate this bill on Monday. I want to expedite it quickly. We have a three-day circulation requirement. We will circulate for three days on Monday, we will go to the full committee and we will mark it up on Thursday.

And then we have another three-day period before we can file the bill. That goes over a weekend. But we hope to have the bill on the floor on the 15th or the 16th and be conferenced before the end of the month and have this behind us and have the money in hand for you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, thank you very much and I apologize for taking so much time.

Mr. KNOLLENBERG. Thank you. Thanks for being here.

Mr. Edwards.

Mr. EDWARDS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Let me thank you first off for what you do, not just in CENTCOM but around the world to support the quality of life for our servicemen and women and their families. You all do a great job, very dedicated.

I would like to ask General Lust a question if I could in terms of the \$119.9 million Army request. I am still concerned that with the overwhelming percentages of soldiers as a percentage of the total number of troops there in that region, the Iraqi region, the Army is only getting 29 percent of this budget request. I know we

do not have formulas based on dollars per service man or woman, but still it at least raises a question.

What I would like to ask you, General Lust, is the \$119.9 million, is that the figure that the combined forces land commander sent in his very first request up the chain of command? Or were some of his requests cut out of the final funding level?

General LUST. I am unaware of a list coming up other than \$119.9 million. I will not say there was not a list, but it did not get into my office for us to look at and work, sir.

Mr. EDWARDS. Was that commander given a cap and said you have to remain within that cap?

General LUST. I am unaware of anyone at the department level or anywhere between here and the seat of the combined forces land commander giving him any kind of ceiling, sir.

Mr. EDWARDS. Okay.

Mr. LANZILLOTTA. Excuse me, sir, could I add to that?

Mr. EDWARDS. Please.

Mr. LANZILLOTTA. The request came up from the combatant commander and it was reviewed, of course, to make sure that it was correct. But no project was deleted or added based upon what the combatant commander wanted.

I think one of the things, though that the Army's request focuses on was bare basing requirements for the soldiers that are in theater, where the Air Force's requirements were more based on operational needs.

There is another \$345 million in procurement in this request and another \$245 million in O&M that would go directly to supporting bare base requirements for our soldiers living spaces.

Part of the thing that is in this request is some of this is being provided through contract services and not just construction. We are not building everything for the Army. Some of it is just being contracted out or being procured as module-type things through procurement. So the total number is \$710 million that we are trying to get for the Army to take care of the quality of life.

Mr. EDWARDS. Going back to the \$119 million—and thank you for that—to the \$119.9 million segment of the request, could either of you please look in good faith and see if there was perhaps a larger number originally requested and clarify that with the committee?

#### SHORTAGE OF WATER

Secondly, to get to the specifics, and this is my last area of questions. I have over 17,000 soldiers from Fort Hood in the Iraqi theater right now. Anecdotally, what I hear as much complaining about as anything is lack of water.

And I owe it to a sergeant I met at Walter Reed two weeks ago who lost an eye and lost a leg in Iraq protecting the Children's Medical Center when somebody dropped a hand grenade in. He lost his heartbeat five times before he was able to be stabilized.

He didn't ask me for anything for himself, an inspiring, incredible citizen. But he did say if there is anything you can do to get more water to my former comrades out in the Iraqi theater, please do that.



I am hearing this more than once. And it makes me believe that, you know, there is a real problem out there.

Now, as I understand in the request, out of 27 Army base camps, you are going to consolidate to nine, if that is not mistaken. You have a request for one water treatment plant at one of those facilities which perhaps might provide water for up to 20 percent of the Army soldiers in that theater.

Tell me where we are on water, and realistically. I just cannot believe that all these anecdotal stories we are getting back from spouses and then from soldiers at Walter Reed that there is not a serious water problem.

General LUST. Sir, water is currently provided by a couple means. One, by either water sources of a local nature or through bottled water shipped in. The water plant which we have asked for is \$9.8 million and it is at the Anaconda Log Support Element which would produce water there for not only that location—at Anaconda for troops there, but also we are investigating the possibility of bringing in a bottling plant to bottle water there and then be able to ship it out.

I have heard the same stories when I went to Walter Reed and visited troops there, and went back and through the log channels asked them to go back and find out, you know, what it is. Is it a distribution problem? Is it unable to get into country? I know they are working on that. But that is where we stand with water as of today.

We can get it through local sources that have been approved or through bottled water shipped in. And this plant we have here is to supplement those two sources, sir.

Mr. EDWARDS. Well, I pressed the sergeant, and he said twice he got severely dehydrated. He was not complaining about it for himself, he cares about his colleagues. And I hope some attention is paid to that.

General LUST. I will take this back, sir.

Mr. EDWARDS. Thank you again.

Please excuse me, Mr. Chairman. Someone wants to close a VA hospital in my home town of Waco and there is a 9 o'clock hearing on that with the CARES commission tomorrow morning, and I have got to catch the last plane to Waco.

But thank you for holding this hearing.

Thank you, Chairman Young, for underscoring its importance by your presence here.

Mr. KNOLLENBERG. Thank you, Mr. Edwards.

We have lost a person or two so we are going to scoot down here.

I want to recognize now Allen Boyd who is—by the way, we are recognizing people in the order of their appearance so that is why.

Mr. Boyd.

Mr. BOYD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank all of you for your time and service. I have so many questions and I have so many concerns. And I am not very happy. I think we have a military, logistical, and a political nightmare that we are in over there. But I have some very specific questions.

First of all, I want to follow up on the water question that was posed by Mr. Edwards. The 3rd of the 124th Brigade, which is a National Guard unit, is at Baghdad Airport. And I met with their

families and with a couple guys who were on R&R there. The reports that I got from the National Guard are that about 90 percent of our soldiers there in that unit have dysentery. We have had some—the illnesses caused by dysentery are pretty severe.

It is my understanding that if you are using local sources, we cut off chlorine in 1990. There has not been any chlorine in Iraq since 1990. And the water plant that is being built is, I understand, about 70 kilometers north of Baghdad. So we do have a serious water problem.

I know you have answered that, but I just wanted to tell you that the reports that we get, there are very serious water problems over there for our soldiers.

#### BAGRAM, AFGHANISTAN RUNWAY

Secondly, I want to speak to one specific item and to try to get you to illustrate to us about the cost. In the project request, there is an aircraft runway in Bagram, Afghanistan, \$48 million. We just rebuilt a runway at Tyndall Air Force Base in Panama City, Florida, for \$10 million. What is the five times cost factor for building over there compared to building here?

General FOX. Yes, sir, I am familiar with the Tyndall project. We started with a pretty good runway at Tyndall. At Bagram, we have inherited an old Russian runway that was never stressed for the kind of use that we have had on it. The touch down areas for the aircraft are asphalt.

There are severe craters, small craters and it is a severe what we call FOD problem, foreign object damage, a lot of gravel, a lot of asphalt kicked up on the runway. After every landing, we have to sweep the runway and it is deteriorating far faster than we can keep up with the maintenance.

So it is a different baseline from where we started with our bases and what we are used to constructing. What this does, this builds concrete 20 inches in depth for the touch down area for our aircraft and then an asphalt overlay on the remaining runway. It is primarily for close air support aircraft. We can fly A-10s in there sporadically. We cannot fly F-16s in, that we need to support our Army troops on the ground with close air support.

And in addition, what drives the cost is we also have 167,000 square meters of taxiways that in some cases are nearly non-existent and apron parking space for that close air support mission.

Mr. YOUNG. If the gentleman would yield, I would like to confirm what the General has said. That is probably the worst runway that I have ever landed on, including some of the grass strips that I have landed on personally. That really is a bad runway.

Mr. BOYD. Sir, well, I knew there was a good answer. I am sure there is a good answer for the \$50,000-per-bed hospitals that are being built. I don't know what they are. And I don't want to be in the micro-managing job of how you do all this stuff, Mr. Chairman, but at some point in time, you talked about \$42 billion in two-plus years. We have some serious, serious fiscal problems here that we have got to get a better handle on at sometime in the near future.

## DOVER AIR FORCE BASE

I wanted to make other comment too, Mr. Chairman. I thought that the—and I wanted a further explanation. But the question that Mr. Dicks asked about Dover, I was not completely—I think, Mr. Lanzillotta, you answered that question maybe?

Mr. LANZILLOTTA. Yes, sir.

Mr. BOYD. About the answer—that airport, that facility was damaged last winter in a snow storm, January, whenever.

Mr. LANZILLOTTA. February—

Mr. BOYD. February.

Mr. LANZILLOTTA. It was February.

Mr. BOYD. So your answer was that there was not another vehicle prior to that. So even though it had nothing to do with this operation, this is a good place to do it. We do not have accountability in terms of scoring deficits and those kinds of things.

Mr. LANZILLOTTA. No, sir. If I said that, then I stand corrected.

Mr. BOYD. I was trying to read between the lines about what you were saying.

Mr. LANZILLOTTA. No. I will now yield to the General to discuss the importance of the Dover Air Force terminal to our operations.

This storm occurred. It is not unusual for the department to seek repairs in a supplemental for hurricanes, snowstorms, or other natural disasters that occur.

Congressman Dicks asked me if the department could have submitted a budget amendment. Of course, theoretically, yes, the department could have.

Mr. BOYD. But those not to?

Mr. LANZILLOTTA. But due to normal practice, this was handled in the normal practice, the way by precedent that we have always done it.

Mr. BOYD. General Fox does not have to explain any further the importance. I am sure that I would accept the fact that it is very important. And I just do not understand the process that we used, in a budget perspective, of doing it here when the chairman has made very clear that we wanted to limit this to the Iraq and Afghanistan efforts.

Mr. KNOLLENBERG. Well, thank you very much.

Mr. FARR, I erred only because I thought Mr. Kingston left, because he was out in the hallway. So he is back.

Mr. Kingston, all yours.

Mr. KINGSTON. If Mr. Farr is all in a hurry, I certainly would be glad to yield.

General FOX. Yes.

Mr. KINGSTON. General Fox, I wanted to go back to Bagram a little bit. I have landed on that air strip. It is really not an airport at all.

Have you gotten rid of all those land mines that are out there, the toe cappers? Is that what you call them?

General FOX. Yes, sir.

Mr. KINGSTON. Italian-made plastic, two-pound land mines that migrate too, I understand.

General FOX. There is an ongoing cleanup operation for our explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) troops. It is a combination of

Army and Air Force. Both of us have EOD troops in the area. And that is one of the most hazardous jobs in the service.

I would like to think that we have it entirely cleaned up, but my understanding is we still have some areas that are blocked off, that they are actively working.

Mr. KINGSTON. And will a portion of that money go to that, because that really does make it somewhat unsafe and less usable, I would think.

General FOX. Sir, a portion of this money does not go to that, but we are fully funding our EOD efforts in the AOR.

Mr. KINGSTON. Okay. Also, you use Kabul more than Bagram. Correct? Isn't Kabul the bigger airport than Bagram.

General FOX. Yes, sir. It is larger. And we do not use it for Air Force support, like we do Bagram because of the proximity to Bagram to the ground troops.

Mr. KINGSTON. And how is the road from Bagram to Kabul?

General FOX. Sir, I would have to answer that for the record. It is my understanding it is pretty rough.

[The information follows:]

The road between Bagram and Kabul is not in good condition and is currently being repaired as phase one of the Ring Road Project. Road infrastructure throughout Afghanistan urgently needs repair and rehabilitation. The Ring Road Project will rehabilitate and reconstruct 447 kilometers (km) of the primary national road network. Most of the infrastructure in Afghanistan is destroyed or damaged due to two decades of war. Lack of resources and of capacity prevented maintenance, which led to major deterioration and in some cases loss of infrastructure. This is particularly true for major national roads, power and natural gas facilities. The United States Agency for International Development has the lead with the US Army Corps of Engineers with Combined Joint Task Force-180 assisting. Project is underway with a mandatory completion by the end of December 2003.

Mr. KINGSTON. When I was there, which was about two years ago, it was horrible. And you actually had to leave the road at some parts of it. And I would think that part of our reconstruction, if not in this budget then somewhere, it needs to be on the road because spending this kind of money on the airport, if the road is still bad, is probably not a wise investment. We need to do both of them, it would appear.

Also, I wanted to ask you about the Dover Air Force Base, \$56 million and then Camp Darby in Italy, \$5 million. Are those really emergencies related to this war or are they wish-list items?

General FOX. No, sir. They are both directly supporting the global war on terrorism and our ongoing efforts in Iraq.

## CAMP DARBY

The Camp Darby munitions maintenance facility, as I mentioned, is the southern hub for munitions into the AOR. It is used as a joint facility for the Air Force and the Army.

There are severe safety problems there that cause us to restrict the number of containers that we can get into the AOR bearing munitions. We should be able to provide 30 to 40 containers per day. And the workarounds that we have there now restrict us to about 12 containers per day.

## DOVER AIR FORCE BASE

At Dover, it directly supports the war effort because it is the superport on the East Coast for getting equipment, personnel, and food stuff. Talking to the former CENTAF commander just yesterday, he used the example of the troops went back on Meals Ready to Eat (MREs) in the theater, meals ready to eat, instead of fresh vegetables when the Dover aerial port went down because we had to restrict the level of support of the East Coast.

We spend as much as \$2-plus million per month doing workarounds. We have over 100 reservists that we have had to activate at Dover to work out of a multitude of facilities there instead of having the superport facilities.

You would almost have to see this to believe the catastrophe. It is more than 40 percent of the large air freight terminal that was destroyed. And the workarounds cannot keep up with what we need to do to support the AOR.

## ELECTRICITY

Mr. KINGSTON. Okay. General Lust, in terms of electricity in Iraq, at this point how much of the country has it? I had heard, a couple of weeks ago, that about 60 percent of the country has electricity and that in Baghdad it is a rolling three-hour, three-hour. But do you know the number off-hand?

General LUST. I cannot answer the question of how much percent of the country has electrical power. I do know that on Monday the chief of the engineers agreed that in November, that is, as they go along, if their plan holds, they will exceed the pre-war production of electricity.

Mr. KINGSTON. And that will be because of this appropriation?

General LUST. No, sir. Because of the reconstruction effort. What we have asked for here is only to support American soldiers on the bases where they live. It does not include any support of the installation to anyone else, sir.

Mr. KINGSTON. So a "no vote" on this would mean denying 25,000 soldiers electricity? Is that—

General LUST. It would not necessarily deny them electricity. But, I would have to continue to use my tactical generators, which were never designed to do the work that they are having to do. I would have to keep two contracts in place at two different locations when less than two years of the contract cost would pay for the building of the plant we are requesting.

So we would continue doing it, but it would not be the best solution, which this request here gives us.

Mr. KINGSTON. I think that is what this committee wants to hear, things like that, because we are thinking about basically being supportive of what our soldiers are doing. And I think more members ought to know about that.

Mr. Chairman, I know I am out of time.

Mr. KNOLLENBERG. Thank you. Thank you very much.

Mr. Farr.

## QUALITY OF LIFE

Mr. FARR. Gentlemen, I want to thank you all for coming and for the tough job that you have, particularly in these controversial times, and about these issues.

I think what I have learned most about this committee is that it has really been focused on the quality of life for men and women in uniform. And most of that quality of life, obviously, has been their bases, which the majority of them are here at home.

And why these supplementals become so controversial is that it is essentially an expenditure abroad that is not being made here. So it is that local versus overseas, because we fight very hard to try to get attention to our local needs. And we have water shortages where I live that are going to be hard to explain when asked why we are building all these water plants in Iraq.

My question is that the Air Force is spending about \$300 million in this request for seven separate countries. How long are we going to be in these countries?

General FOX. Sir, I think, among those countries, in Iraq I would hope that we can complete our job there and get out of there as soon as possible.

Mr. FARR. The request is for the next five years. Have you told the troops that the buildings we are building right now are going to be for the next five years?

General FOX. Sir, the facilities I think that you are reviewing that we are building in deployment areas are all modular. And they are temporary type facilities that we can relocate or reuse at other locations.

Mr. FARR. Now you have this amount that you are requesting, and the headline is that this is for military construction for the Air Force to remain available until September 30, 2008.

So why, if we are not going to be in those countries, or renew, we are not going to build them? And then the question is what happens to them when we leave?

Since those countries do not have a Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) process, where you work with the local reuse authority—

Mr. DUBOIS. If I might—

General FOX. Yes, I am very interested in what happens to these facilities.

Mr. DUBOIS. Sir, Secretary Rumsfeld and General Myers were asked a similar question recently. And if my recollection is correct, General Myers said, as you know, we have moved our air operations center from Prince Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia to Al Udeid in Qatar.

We have also moved surveillance and reconnaissance and intelligence and tanker aircraft operations to Al Dhafra in the United Arab Emirates.

The question, this supplemental, refuel ramp, fuel hydrant systems and so forth, you can quickly see these are operational in nature now. You asked the question how long are we going to be in these places.

Secretary Rumsfeld said, and has said repeatedly, that is a question that there is no answer to at the moment. Having said that,

he has also said if you are looking at Iraq, we want to be there as long as is necessary, but not a day longer.

I think it is also reasonable to assume that places like Al Udeid in Qatar and places like Al Dhafra in the UAE, we are making investments there because we anticipate having operational requirements, mission-critical requirements there, for probably five or 10 years.

Mr. FARR. What surprises me also about this request, Mr. Chairman, is that the men and women—mostly men, I have not met the women yet—that have been injured in Iraq—we have been visiting at Walter Reed, talked a lot about the needs in Iraq, particularly for their own protection.

And yesterday, they were complaining, when they knew about the supplemental, they said, “Well we don’t like the fact that we have to pay for our telephone calls home. And they are building this big telephone system in Iraq.”

It is just little things like that that go back to the quality of life. And I agree with the chairman that here’s the point of the spear, the Army is, but yet this request, two-thirds of the money is going to the Air Force, which is being spent in countries outside Iraq. One-third of the money goes to the Army, which is all being spent inside Iraq.

And I think what I wish we could better explain to the American public is why, since these facilities are going to be jointly shared with allies at a point in time, why aren’t they contributing. And two, why can’t the host country like Iraq itself, because these facilities are permanent, they are not temporary, why can’t we recoup some of those expenses from the oil revenue?

Mr. DUBOIS. I think if I might, the Secretary and Ambassador Bremer both indicated that the notion of a grant, which this is if we are looking at the reconstruction side as opposed to the military operations side. While we are here to talk about military construction, your question is suited to the entire amount. Or it is suited to which part of that entire amount ought to be, or might be, quote, considered a loan and, therefore, debt repayable.

There are a couple of problems politically. There is no government who is sovereign who can accept a debt. The Coalition Provisional Authority headed by Ambassador Bremer is just that, a Coalition Provisional Authority.

The Iraqi Governing Council is a council that is interim, brought together to try to create a system by which a constitution can be written, et cetera.

Mr. FARR. And yet it can sell oil and receive money for that.

Mr. DUBOIS. At the moment, my understanding is that the oil revenues are nowhere near what it would take to just support the pure Government of Iraq needs, much less our military and personnel needs in the country.

When is the crossover? At some point down the road. Would it be then reasonable and justifiable to say that a payback of some kind could be made at that point in the future yet to be determined?

Mr. FARR. Well, here is where I think you get into this—if you are really going to get into it, you have asked for another BRAC round, which Congress has approved.

In those requirements, you have to sell the real estate. You have to sell the real estate to communities that really cannot afford it, and therefore they have to find some developer who is going to—and yet we are giving this real estate and these facilities away in the countries in which we are building them.

I think that the difficulty with this is, is just the fairness process. You know, what is fair for us at home ought to be fair abroad, or vice versa.

Mr. LANZILLOTTA. Excuse me. I have just another a thought on this.

When Ambassador Bremer put together that \$20 billion out of the Ministry of Finance, he was looking not for so much the reconstruction of Iraq, but basically what he needed to ensure the security and the stability of the nation, because the ultimate goal is to get a stable environment, because that will allow us to later bring the troops home sooner. Because that is what is keeping us there.

If you do a loan, I worry that instead of being U.S. priorities, that the priorities will be the Iraqi priorities, which are different. And rightly so that they are different. Because the Iraqis are interested more—and I am not so sure that all of them want us to come home. And I think that they would go more towards the traditional reconstruction.

We are looking toward establishing a stable, secure environment so we can leave. We are not looking toward the reconstruction of Iraq. That is up to the Iraqis.

So I am just worried that a loan, who would have the priority? Who would be able to say how the money would be spent?

I do not think the United States, if we loaned it to them, could tell them how to spend the money. They might not want to put it toward security forces and border guards and building the Iraqi army. They may want to put it all toward infrastructure.

Mr. FARR. Yes, I understand that. That is not what the question is: If we are going to build these facilities in this country—the Federal Government, the military, Department of Defense is, and then we are going to sell them to the local government, why can’t we sell them back to the host country? I mean, that is just a hypothetical question.

But let me just conclude, because my time is running out.

You know, the frustration here for me is that this all moves to the front of the line. It has not gone through the FYDP process, all of these requests. I am sure they are all needed.

So you get this privileged status. And you indicate that we are going to be there for a while. How are the future requests going to come? Will we have the MILCON needs in Iraq and Afghanistan handled by the regular military requests? Or are we going to look for more of these construction supplementals? Is that how we are going to handle it?

Mr. KNOLLENBERG. If you would yield, Mr. Farr.

Mr. FARR. Certainly.

Mr. KNOLLENBERG. One thing I would just say is, it is my understanding—and somebody here can correct me if I am wrong—that all of these, the authority, the MILCON authority, is over a term of five years. So there is something built into this that allows them

to stretch it out without actually making a declaration of specifically how it is going to be spent.

And I know that you are concerned about some of those things. And I am too. But I think that is kind of built into the process.

Mr. FARR. Yes, I understand that. No, it is what are the add-ons, because all these lead to other things. We talked about improving the airports but not the roads getting to the airport, improving the water system, and how about the delivery?

On and on, each of these capital outlay projects is linked to other things. Will we be outside of the MILCON regular appropriations bill next year asking for a supplemental for all of these other incidentals? Or will they be coming through the normal process? When do we get back to doing things—

Mr. DUBOIS. Regular order?

Mr. FARR [continuing]. In the regular order?

Mr. DUBOIS. I think Secretary Rumsfeld has actually discussed this with us, and that was, at what point will the situation in either Afghanistan or Iraq, and the CENTCOM AOR, be predictable, stable enough so that we can move back to not a supplemental request order but rather a regular MILCON order, or a regular appropriations order?

And I think you can readily see that that point will come. Does it come in fiscal year 2005? Is there going to be a fiscal year 2005 supplemental? That is still a question mark.

But Secretary Rumsfeld wants to move as expeditiously as possible back to the regular order, both in terms of military operational appropriations, military construction appropriations, and, quite frankly, with respect to reconstruction.

That is to say, instead of going up through the D committees, moving back to regular order and Foreign Ops Committee.

But that is something that is yet to be decided in terms of timing because of the uncertainties involved.

But your premise is correct.

Mr. KNOLLENBERG. Let me just interrupt here. In order to keep things kind of close, I know the time thing is a problem, Mr. Farr, but I hesitate to go forward with this at this point.

And I defer now to the next individual.

Virgil Goode is recognized.

Mr. GOODE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to say thanks to all with the Air Force and the Secretary's office and Army.

Let me ask Mr. Lanzillotta something now that I understand the process.

Now, I know everything that is asked for here today started at the bottom and came up through the ranks of the Department of Defense. But you mentioned the \$20 billion, that that came through the ministries that are set up in Iraq at this time. Is that correct?

Mr. LANZILLOTTA. Yes, sir.

Mr. GOODE. How many ministries are set up at this time in Iraq?

Mr. DUBOIS. Let me help.

There are senior ministry advisers who report to Ambassador Bremer. We started with—

Mr. GOODE. Now all of these are Iraqi—

Mr. DUBOIS. No. In some cases they—all the senior ministry advisers, as opposed to the ministers who were recently appointed by the Iraqi Governing Council, Iraqis. We have a group of individuals, some from the State Department, some retired State Department, some retired DOD, DOD folks, Justice Department, from almost every agency and department in the Federal Government who work for Jerry Bremer in Baghdad on the Coalition Provisional Authority staff and advise these ministers.

There were 19 to begin with. I think the Iraqi Governing Council actually has created three more new ones.

But the \$20.6 million—I do not remember the precise number—

Mr. GOODE. \$20.3 million.

Mr. DUBOIS [continuing]. \$20.3 million, that total number was an accumulation of requests and requirements that filtered up both from the ministries, filtered through the Coalition Provisional Authority, Ambassador Bremer and his staff, and then vetted in Washington and presented as the President's supplemental request.

It was in some very similar ways, the way we go through it, although at a very truncated time fashion.

Mr. GOODE. Every minister, though, is from Iraq. Correct?

Mr. DUBOIS. Correct.

Mr. GOODE. All right. And they have 22 now. Right?

Mr. DUBOIS. I think that is what it is.

Mr. LANZILLOTTA. Sir, I could provide a line diagram for the record of the ministries and the CPA authority.

Mr. GOODE. Thanks.

Let me ask, we are now repairing and working on pipelines in Iraq. Out of whose budget is that money coming?

Mr. DUBOIS. The oil infrastructure pipelines?

Mr. GOODE. Yes.

Mr. LANZILLOTTA. Right now most of that is being accomplished from a couple of sources. But the majority of it is coming out the \$2.4 billion that the Congress appropriated in the previous supplemental.

There is also—

Mr. GOODE. Is it under Defense? Is it under State? Where is it coming—

Mr. LANZILLOTTA. It is under the President. It was appropriated to the President, and it is administered by OMB, and it goes to whichever federal agency needs the money to execute the program.

The other source of money that is used for their oil infrastructure is the DFI, it is the Developmental Fund for Iraq. That was a fund that was initially set up by the U.N. with a billion dollars out of the food-for-oil program. And any country that makes contributions, it goes into this fund.

Mr. GOODE. Yes, but that is not directly U.S. taxpayer money, in DFI.

Mr. LANZILLOTTA. No. Actually that is Iraqi money.

Mr. GOODE. Okay. In the discretionary money, the \$2.4 billion that the President has, that is where the money would come from now to work on pipelines that you have worked on so far. Is that correct? Is that what you are saying?

Mr. LANZILLOTTA. Most of the money for the Iraqi infrastructure that we have accomplished to date has come out of that fund.

Mr. GOODE. Okay. And I assume working on the utilities, the power plants that are not part of the U.S. Army, U.S. Air Force grid have also come out of the \$2.4 billion?

Mr. LANZILLOTTA. There was another fund created by the Congress, the \$489 million, that was developed for oil. We have also used that piece—

Mr. GOODE. For the pipelines.

Mr. LANZILLOTTA. For infrastructure as well.

Mr. GOODE. And what about—for utilities too?

Mr. LANZILLOTTA. That piece, the \$489 million, was basically for oil wells and oil well infrastructure. The \$2.4 billion, we did the utilities, other infrastructure and some pieces of the oil infrastructure.

Mr. KNOLLENBERG. Mr. Goode, you are pretty close to the five-minute mark.

Mr. GOODE. All right. Let me—

Mr. KNOLLENBERG. You have a 30-second one?

Mr. GOODE. Yes, a 30-second one, to the Assistant Secretary: Do you think if we spent \$200 billion over 10 years, Iraq would be safe, secure, stable and ready to always be on its own with a democratic government?

Mr. KNOLLENBERG. You want short answers? [Laughter.]

Mr. GOODE. That is 30 seconds.

Mr. DUBOIS. Devoutly to be wished that the end result was achieved, but not with the same amount of American dollar investment.

Mr. KNOLLENBERG. Mr. Aderholt.

#### AIR FORCE MILITARY CONSTRUCTION REQUEST

Mr. ADERHOLT. Thank you.

Thank you. It is good to have you here today. Thanks for taking the time.

One of the things that has come to the attention of a lot of people on the committee—and I will direct this to Generals Lust and Fox.

The request for the Air Force MILCON is about \$292 million, which is double the amount requested by the Army. And I guess it is a little bit surprising, in the fact that there are over 130,000 soldiers on the ground in Iraq, that are compared to a lot fewer airmen and women.

I just wanted to get the background on that and the reasoning for more money going to the Air Force as opposed to the—

Mr. KNOLLENBERG. Mr. Aderholt, would you allow me to—

Mr. ADERHOLT. Yes.

Mr. KNOLLENBERG [continuing]. Step in for just a second. That question, by the way, was asked, and I know that you have answered it. But frankly, I did not understand the answer either. And I think it is questionable.

But being repeated as it is might be, again, worthwhile because what is the difference, in 25 words or less if you can do it. Why is this amount as high as it is for the Air Force and not so high for the Army? Just another reiteration, maybe, but that will help, I think.

I was going to ask, because if there was anything we did not cover, I wanted to make sure we covered it.

General LUST. From the Army's standpoint, the \$120 million, \$119.9 million, represents the most critical need that the ground component has right now. I cannot speak for the difference between the Army and the Air Force, why the dollar amount.

But I want to make sure that the committee appreciates the fact that the Dover, the Bagram and the Darby expenditures directly support me. I mean, they are fixing the Bagram Air Base so they can get fast moves in there to support my soldiers on the ground.

The Darby, the washrack there I can use. The Dover aerial port directly supports my soldiers. So while it may be in their account, I am the recipient of what that is going to produce. So if you would balance that, it saves me having to build an aerial port. It saves me having to build a washrack. It saves me having to build my own strip, et cetera.

So while the numbers are different, I am a recipient of a good portion of what they have asked for. My soldiers on the ground are a recipient of that and why it is being included, sir.

Mr. ADERHOLT. So it is dual use, you would say?

General FOX. I would say joint, if I could join in. I mentioned very briefly that, OIF, Operation Iraqi Freedom, perhaps more so than any contingency, any war previous, was a joint effort.

We could come in here with purple uniforms on, instead of green and blue. The combatant commander has endorsed this list. I mean, this is not an Army list and Air Force list. This is a U.S. list. This is the CENTCOM combatant commander. It supports special ops. That supports U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM). And so CENTCOM took an overall view of these requirements and said, just as General Lust just said, there is a blurred line. The number one thing that is necessary to support our troops may not be a billet. It may be close air support to keep them from being injured.

Mr. DUBOIS. There is a bit of apples and oranges here, Mr. Aderholt, I think. And wherein the Air Force's request to MILCON has to do with, in large measure, pieces of iron and pieces square meters of concrete, the Army's request is in point of fact quality of life issues.

And as Mr. Lanzillotta said, it is not just the capital costs that are listed on the MILCON column. It is the other procurement and O&M costs, requests, that total to over \$700 million for our troops' quality of life, basic living necessities in Iraq.

It is a little bit dicey to say, "Well, the Air Force got this and the Army got that." That is totally out of whack, because these are different kinds of investments. The quality of life investments include, just as we do in the United States, not just MILCON. It is base operating services; it is the other issues that are going into Iraq right now.

Mr. ADERHOLT. So one way to look at this is the funding would be earmarked for the Air Force, but the benefit would be to the Army and for your group too.

General LUST. I certainly do benefit from that, sir.

Mr. ADERHOLT. But it is just the way it is being presented, the way the funding comes out, it is to the Air Force?

## BAGRAM PROJECT

General FOX. I could very easily put the Bagram project, for example, on his list. He has the presence there. I do not. But the aircraft that fly in and out of there fly directly in support of our Army troops.

Mr. YOUNG. Will you yield for a quick question?

General LUST, when you made those comparisons of the various areas, you did not mention Diego Garcia. Tell us also the joint—

## DIEGO GARCIA

General LUST. Diego Garcia is also, because remember Diego Garcia is the one that deals with the communications switch. Obviously that is important to get the aircraft safely over there and to have command and control of them, which I am the recipient of it.

I mean, they may own the aircraft, but the vast majority of the stuff, sir, is all my stuff.

And so, again, while it may be on their list, the end product is, if they do not have it, then my troopers are the ones that pay the freight.

Mr. YOUNG. I just wanted to give you a chance to open up that issue because you did not mention it.

General FOX. Jumping in just briefly on Diego Garcia, it not only supports his troops through airlift and tanker refueling for that airlift, but it also supports our bomber capability for the entire war effort.

Mr. KNOLLENBERG. Thank you, Mr. Aderholt.

I was wondering if you would not mind my taking a spot now and if you could yield to me for a quick moment so I can get out of here and let somebody else take over, and then we will come right back to you.

If that works out for you.

Mr. BISHOP. Of course I yield, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. KNOLLENBERG. Thank you very much. I appreciate it.

I am going to deviate just a little bit too, because I think this question deserves to be asked. And I want to bring it up. It has to do with the 2004 bill. I know that some of us have been dancing off the page, and I recognize that. But I also think that this is one question that I believe deserves to be asked.

As you know, in our respective marks in the House and the Senate, this subcommittee and the House Armed Services Committee included most of the projects requested by the President in Europe and Korea. Now the other body chose not to include those projects in its mark because of a concern, and I think a legitimate one, that the requested funds would be going to installations that might close as a result of the overseas basing plan.

Frankly, I had the same concern myself until recently.

Last week, I received a letter from Secretary Rumsfeld stating that projects funded in the amended budget are at locations that remain key to the U.S. overseas basing posture.

Subsequently, just after receiving the letter from the Secretary, I met with the Supreme Allied Commander General James Jones who provided me with a list of 10 projects that he says remain es-

sential to our mission regardless of any final decision on overseas basing requirements.

In the hearings last week, the Secretary said that DOD continues to refine proposals for the overseas footprint and that decisions have not been finalized either at the departmental or White House level.

Now my question is, did that statement contradict the Secretary's letter? They were a day apart, I believe, the letter we received last week? And if it does not, if not, why doesn't it?

Mr. DUBOIS. In my view, Mr. Chairman, there is not a contradiction. Let me comment as follows.

The letter was dated the 24th and you received it, I guess on the 25th. The testimony was the 24th.

Mr. KNOLLENBERG. Right.

Mr. DUBOIS. The Secretary, in answer to a question by Senator Feinstein about—and it was her characterization—enduring installations—and what about your global posture, global presence, global basing, study, strategy and the developments thereof?

And she said, "Are not these installations that you are funding in"—she was specifically referring to Iraq and the immediate area around Iraq—"permanent"?

And he answered, "In the latter regard, no," underlined, exclamation point. And with respect to the global posture, global presence, global basing strategy, he said, "You are correct, Senator, we are in the process of finalizing them."

In point of fact, we have had a meeting almost every single week since June on this issue.

Having said that, the Secretary and General Jones have tried to be clear on those bases that are mission critical in Europe, in Germany in particular. And I know that General Jones has provided you with the letters that actually gave you 10 specific—

Mr. KNOLLENBERG. Ten specific.

Mr. DUBOIS. They are the same 10 that are in the amended budget submission. These are the same 10 that the Secretary of Defense has stated on numerous occasions are mission-critical installations.

Now we are undergoing, as Dr. Farr reminded us, a domestic BRAC, which will yield its results in the spring of 2005. That domestic BRAC must be informed by an "overseas BRAC," if you will, in quotes.

The Secretary intends to inform the domestic BRAC with his overseas decision, final overseas decision, sometime in the process of next year, which is when we do these tough analyses, if you will.

Mr. KNOLLENBERG. But let me interrupt. Some of these are now.

Mr. DUBOIS. The now—

Mr. KNOLLENBERG. Some are later.

Mr. DUBOIS. Heidelberg, Hohenfels, Ramstein, Spangdahlen and others, these are installations that we consider to be mission critical.

Mr. KNOLLENBERG. Now?

Mr. DUBOIS. Now, and for the foreseeable future.

Mr. KNOLLENBERG. Right.

Mr. DUBOIS. Now the Secretary avoids, and I think understandably, using the term "enduring," because that can cause a number

of interpretations. Foreseeable future, critical missions, foreseeable future, I view that as being five to 10 years. Does that mean it is enduring and therefore will it be there 20 years from now? No.

Mr. KNOLLENBERG. No. And we do not expect that. But we do expect, with a greater degree of certainty, the fact that it is immediate. It is now. And it is something that should be expected for the near term. In my judgment, that means now, that is in the immediate future.

And so in Korea, we have the same concern there about what is enduring, what is immediate, what is necessary today?

Mr. DUBOIS. Right. And in Korea as General LaPorte I believe has discussed with you, Camp Humphreys is very important, Camp Humphreys is mission critical. Camp Humphreys is going to be around for a long time.

I will say this in front of Chairman Young, that in a conversation with the Secretary within the last 24 hours, he understands that there is this interpretation or misinterpretation, as the case may be. And I did suggest to him that a conversation between himself and both Chairman Stevens, Chairman Young as well as the MILCON subcommittees chairmen might go a long way to dispel that particular interpretation.

Mr. KNOLLENBERG. I think it might be helpful, I do.

Well, I do appreciate your response to that.

Mr. DUBOIS. Not in terms of the responsibilities of the subcommittee.

Mr. KNOLLENBERG. And again, Mr. Bishop, I apologize. I appreciate your courtesy. And I will extend now to you your allotted time.

Thank you.

I am also going to yield the chair to Mr. Aderholt.

Gentlemen, thank you all very much for being here. I appreciate it.

Thank you.

Mr. ADERHOLT [presiding]. Go ahead.

Mr. BISHOP. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Let me take the opportunity to welcome the gentleman and to thank you for the job that you are doing on behalf of our troops.

It is my understanding that thus far some 31 nations have sent some 23,000 personnel to Iraq. And that 60 nations have made pledges of contributions totaling about \$1.5 billion.

I noticed that in the administration's supplemental request, that there is a \$390 million request to pay the cost of supporting the Polish division, another \$390 million to support a potential second multi-national division.

Can you give us some idea of the financial commitment by the 31 nations who sent troops over to Iraq, in support of their own military needs, particularly construction needs. Or is it the administration's intention to fully fund the needs of the international contingent as well as our soldiers?

How much of that \$1.5 billion is targeted to support international troops versus reconstruction activities or support for our troops?

Mr. LANZILLOTTA. Yes, I hope I have this straight. Of the \$1.4 billion that we asked for for coalition support, very little of that

goes toward the support of the troops right there in Afghanistan. The \$390 million that you talked about before, that portion of it is devoted toward some of the transportation and sustainment costs associated with those multinational divisions.

We do not pay for things like salaries, bonuses and most kinds of equipment and things that these divisions bring in. We do pay or help with some of the incremental costs associated when these nations bring forces into theater to help relieve our forces and also provide added security and additional security.

The \$1.4 billion, a lot of that is the reimbursement for nations providing us support, like Pakistan in the Afghanistan theater.

Mr. BISHOP. The answer to my question is that we are assuming all of those costs, as opposed to having them pay the cost of their sustainment and their transportation and the like?

Mr. LANZILLOTTA. We assume a proportion of the cost. The Polish government also has a huge cost that they are paying to have that division in Iraq as well.

Mr. BISHOP. With respect to the military construction requests that you are making—

Mr. LANZILLOTTA. There is no projects in here to support the multi-national divisions. Now if a division, a unit of a multi-national division, happens to be co-located with American divisions or American units, then they will get the benefits. They could get some of the benefits associated with our facilities located at that installation.

Mr. BISHOP. Are any of those countries providing any construction costs from which we can get the benefits?

Mr. LANZILLOTTA. I would have to provide that for the record. I do not know.

[The information follows:]

The nations providing military forces to the Polish-led Multinational Division Central South for stability operations in Iraq are not constructing military facilities or installations in Iraq, or providing funds to build military facilities or installations in Iraq.

Mr. BISHOP. Okay. Let me ask about contracting. There has been a great deal of concern among many members of Congress and the public on the process that was used to solicit the vendors for reconstruction efforts and military contracts.

If you could, would you briefly describe the contracting process, specifically, the competitive bidding process, if there was one, for the projects?

And two, tell me what role the Army Corps of Engineers has played in the contracting process?

And three, tell me whether or not the costs for these projects are higher than they would be in normal circumstances due to circumstances created by the operation or by lack of resources in Iraq?

It is generally believed that the figures for construction and reconstruction in Iraq many times are most costly than construction here in the United States would be or than construction would be by Iraqi standards over there, the utilization of Iraqi labor.

Can you kind of give me some clarification or elucidation on those matters?



Mr. DUBOIS. Well, certainly, construction cost factors are higher in that country for two very simple reasons. Number one, without the appropriate levels of electricity, you are not going to be able to produce some of the ingredients, if you will, aggregates, cement, rebar, that you need for any kind of construction, be it runways or schools or housing. Therefore, it has to be shipped in.

When does that cost factor begin to come down? It begins to come down—

Mr. BISHOP. May I interrupt just for a second?

Mr. DUBOIS. Yes, sir.

Mr. BISHOP. I was given some anecdotal information about a project where they could not get the cement, they were bringing it in, for the exact reason that you said. But then they got the Iraqis to do it, and they were able to do it for a much, much, much smaller cost figure.

Mr. DUBOIS. Well, my understanding is that irrespective of who the contractor is and irrespective of who the contracting agency is, Corps of Engineers or USAID, the principle of hiring as much local labor as possible is there. Because the ingredients, however, at this time, have to be imported, you have a higher cost factor.

As many of you know, I was involved with the building of the detention facility at Guantanamo. Several of us went down there. You have a higher cost factor in Guantanamo, again because, because of U.S. government policy, we do not buy from the Castro construction company, we have to import on barges, cement, rebar, concrete et cetera.

Mr. BISHOP. But you could buy from the Iraqi—

Mr. DUBOIS. If it were available. And we hope that with security, electricity, water and the oil infrastructure improvements that at some point at the end of this year, early into next year, 12 to 18 months from now, we will no longer have to import, and therefore the cost factors will go down.

You also have addressed a very important issue about competition and contracting.

Mr. BISHOP. Right.

Mr. DUBOIS. Ambassador Bremer and Secretary Rumsfeld were I think quite clear last week in some 30 or 35 hours of testimony in front of seven different committees that the principle of competitive contracting is being executed. But one has to go back to the war and up to the point in May when we were in major combat operations, there were urgent and compelling needs that the Corps of Engineers and the Army Materiel Command who had standing already competed contracts used to do the immediate and the necessary.

At this time, those contracts, be they the Brown & Root contract that the Corps of Engineers used for oil field reconstruction and repair, be it the Bechtel contract that USAID used for civil infrastructure rebuild and repair, are being, even though they do not have to be technically, are being re-competed. We also are about to announce a telecommunications contract competitively bid.

So there are two chapters here. And I think one has to go back and understand the first chapter which was replete with urgent and compelling needs and the chapter that is unfolding now which

Ambassador Bremer and Secretary Rumsfeld have said will be driven by, wherever possible, competitive contracting.

Mr. LANZILLOTTA. And could I add to that, Ambassador Bremer now has developed, with the Army as the executive agency, a contracting cell right there in Iraq, consisting of 15 people by the end of this month. He has named David Nash, a retired admiral, to head this program office. It is the goal to ensure that this money is executed and openly competed. We have 19 auditors in Iraq and Kuwait from DCAA that go through the contracts just to make sure that everything is best dollar value.

And I have heard Ambassador Bremer testify last week when he was here to the same question about some of the Iraqis say that they can do it cheaper. And his answer, and I guess this is kind of hearsay, I was listening to his testimony. But his answer is he is not opposed to doing it cheaper. But he feels charged by the American people to do it the best and as cheap as possible. And if somebody can come to him and show him the way of doing it cheaper, then he said he is willing to sit down and talk to them.

Mr. BISHOP. Would it not also help, in terms of the tremendous Iraqi unemployment, help to empower them by eliminating some of their unemployment problems, which I understand is a significant part. My grandmother used to say an idle mind is the devil's workshop. And it seems to me that if somebody is working and earning some money on some of those contracts that they would be less troublesome for the people that we have over there wearing our uniforms.

Mr. LANZILLOTTA. Ambassador Bremer recognizes that. And I do not want to speak for Ambassador Bremer, but in testimony he has said that he has given unofficial targets to the primes—American primes—about how much that he wants them to have Iraqis employed off that contract.

And that he is trying to get as much Iraqi employment up to do that very thing, because he recognizes the fact that for security, if these guys are working, then they are not going to be out causing trouble in other parts of the country. So he has given the major primes goals, per se, to go ahead and hire Iraqis to do that type of labor and do that type of jobs right there in country.

Mr. BISHOP. Mr. Fox seems to want some of my time. Do I have any left?

Mr. ADERHOLT. No, you do not have any time left. [Laughter.]

Do you want—

Mr. YOUNG. No, Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. I think we have explored this very thoroughly and I appreciate all the responses we have had. And I thank you very much.

Mr. ADERHOLT. Mr. Farr.

Mr. FARR. Thank you very much. I just want to follow up on this. I have been trying to watch how we build capacity in these countries. And I have been particularly interested in Colombia. What really struck me in Colombia is that a lot of that Plan Colombia money is just going to American companies to do essentially what Colombians can do. For example, the aerial spraying, American planes, American pilots or Latin American pilots hired by American companies.

President Uribe told us that one of the problems they are having is that their best qualified people are leaving the military and leaving the government service in the country to come work for the American contractors because their salaries are so much better.

We closed a base in Fort Ord and had to do cleanup, which was pretty basic work. The unexploded ordinance obviously needs special training, but just the cleanup of the buildings, the environmental cleanup. In order to get a contract under American law, Federal law, you have to be credibly bonded, and so the local contractors could not even stand in line to be qualified to be bidders.

How do we, using the very sophisticated requirements that we have in Federal law really use—and I think you are on the right track to build that capacity. And what we need to do is hire all those idle people to do this work. But indeed, if the bidders can only be sort of American companies and do it by American standards overseas, we are not going to gain a lot of confidence by the host country natives who are not getting in on it, who are not benefiting from it.

So is there a way to figure out how much of this \$420 million is going to end up back in the pockets of the U.S. versus the pockets of the host country, because you do have some issues with contractors in Iraq. I am not sure that you have that same problem in the United Arab Emirates or Qatar or Diego Garcia. I mean, we are not under attack and being sniped at in those countries.

Can we really use this effort to build a much better capacity by letting more and more of the work be done by host country nationals? I think if we do that, it will be a win-win.

If you are spending the money in Iraq, the American public thinks the Iraqis are going to benefit from it, not K Street, but we know here in Washington that K Street comes over here and lobbies for a lot of these contracts.

Mr. DuBOIS. I think that we are dealing with one of those marvelous situations where the American people (a) want American prime contractors to win, and they do, and (b) hire as many Iraqis as possible to execute the labor contracts in country. And I think that is what is going to be done.

Now your question about can we report back to you six months from now as to, let's just take the Army's \$119.9 million for these capital construction. How much is going to be labor? How much is going to be equipment? How much is going to be management and overhead and expertise? Let's say that labor is a third of the cost, how much of that has gone to local labor? I commit to you to try to monitor that.

Mr. LANZILLOTTA. Ambassador Bremer on an earlier testimony said to Bechtel that he wanted to get it up to 70 percent. In testimony he said he had not gotten it quite there, but he is making progress. But he has set these unofficial goals for these companies to use local labor to try to do the reconstruction effort there. So they recognize it.

I guess the difficulty here, and it is hard, just like it is for Ambassador Bremer, to really get a defined number on it, because there is no way because of the way the laws are written that you can actually force them to do this. They have a certain set of laws

that they have to comply with and we have to comply with. And we cannot force them outside the realm of those.

Mr. FARR. My only point is, and I will just end here, it is something to think about. I think we really need to reexamine our laws that prevent us from building capacity. Building capacity is what I think saves us from all of these disasters that these countries have. I mean, poor countries always remain poor and something is wrong. Something is broken. And we ought to be able to do a better job and fix it.

Mr. LANZILLOTTA. I agree, sir. I believe when we had these laws and we were following these laws, we are coming into a new security situation and finding out different challenges that we are now facing that we have never faced before. And I think it is probably incumbent on all of us to go back and identify these situations and look at it and say, you know, at the time we did this, it seemed like a good idea, but now maybe we ought to do something different.

Mr. FARR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

#### HURRICANE ISABEL

Mr. ADERHOLT. General Lust and General Fox, let me address this to you, an issue that has really just surfaced in the last couple of weeks, but Hurricane Isabel and the damage that it inflicted to your installations. Do you have any primary estimations about the damages and the cost it would—

#### LANGLEY AIR FORCE BASE

General FOX. Langley Air Force Base sustained major damage; 231 facilities that had flood damage; 800 trees and most of these trees are 40-, 50-year-old trees. And the water was a tidal surge that came in and caused water heights as high as three and a half to four feet. They have recovered very nicely with their own people and equipment there. But we are still working complete estimates on what it is going to take to restore Langley. We do not have that number completely refined yet, but we have some preliminary numbers.

General LUST. Sir, obviously the installations we had in the path of the storm ran from Fort Bragg up to Fort Meade. And like General Fox, we have some preliminary numbers. The severest damage we had was to Fort Monroe due to the same thing, the tidal surge. And it had flooding. Any building that had a basement got flooded, and the like.

So we are working through that. But we have some preliminary numbers but not anything I would want to put out in public, because we still have to get some final workup by the engineers.

Mr. ADERHOLT. Mr. DuBois and Lanzillotta, let me address this to you. Has the administration decided whether to send another supplemental request to pay for storm damage that occurred during the recent hurricane?

Mr. LANZILLOTTA. Right now, I know of no plans to do an additional supplemental for this year. But then again, I do not even know what the number is. So I think it is way premature—

Mr. DuBOIS. We are waiting to hear from the services. I brought all three Assistant Service Secretaries for Installations and Envi-

ronment in on Tuesday and I said I want you to scrub those numbers.

I know that some have percolated, you know, to the Pentagon, the preliminary. It is the issue of rebuild versus repair.

I will say in one of my other hats, as Mayor of the Pentagon, one of the only two military installations that are not owned by a Service Secretary, in this case owned by the Secretary of Defense, we had some minor roof damage and I lost six trees, which we care about because there is an awful lot of concrete and tarmac and limestone there, and trees are precious. But besides that, we came out pretty well in Isabel.

But we have not seen well-scrubbed numbers from the services yet. And I suspect we probably will not for another several weeks. At which time we will sit down, take a look at it, probably come over here and talk to you all and see what you think.

But it could have been a lot worse, as we all know, notwithstanding the fact that many of our neighbors went for a long time here without electricity.

Mr. ADERHOLT. Mr. Young, do you have anything else?

Mr. Farr.

Mr. FARR. No, thank you.

Mr. ADERHOLT. Okay. Thank you for coming in this afternoon, for your time and we appreciate your testimony. We look forward to working with you.

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