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17



SPECIAL OPERATIONS/
LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-2500

I-03/015831-SO

NOV 18 2003

FILE

FOR: UNDERSECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Iraq History Project

On 11 November 2003 you met with the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy on the Iraq History Project. A memorandum for the record is attached for your comments at Tab A.

I appreciate your support for the Iraq History Project and request your assistance in gaining the support of the Iraq Survey Group. As you know, their cooperation is vital to the success of this project.

Also attached at Tab B is a draft memorandum to the Secretary. Please provide your coordination no later than COB 21 November 2003 to my action officer, (b)(6) at (b)(6)

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Tom O'Connell".

Thomas W. O'Connell

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TAB A

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting on Iraq History Project 11 November 2003

Attendees: Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Stability Operations

- USDP began by referring to the decision memorandum on the Iraq History Project from the DASD for Stability Operations at Tab A.
- The memorandum alerts USDP to the opposition of the Iraq Survey Group (ISG) and recommends narrowing the scope of the project to supporting the Iraq Special Tribunal.
- USDP expressed his desire to move ahead with the project as originally conceived, noting that it was a Presidential priority. He also mentioned Kannan Makiya's plans for a museum in Baghdad.
- USDP asked USDI about the opposition of the ISG. USDI expressed his overall support for the project, with the following comments:
 - The ISG should get "first cut" at the documents.
 - The majority of documents of interest to the Coalition Provisional Authority are in Doha (which means that they have already been screened once).
 - The ISG has had trouble recruiting translators.
- USDP would like to move the project along as quickly as possible. The next step is to award a contract to process documents.
- The main obstacle is funding. There is no funding set aside in the Supplemental for this project.
- Many possible funding sources were mentioned—the National Archives, the Library of Congress, etc. However, most of them have already been asked.

TAB A

Strongly
Agree

ASD SO/LIC *CC*

NOV 6 2003 11/6/03

ACTION MEMO

I-03/014012-SO

EF-7186

FOR: UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY

FROM: Joseph J. Collins, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Stability Operations 5 Nov 03

SUBJECT: Iraq History Project

Do you, WE NEED YOUR GUIDANCE ON THIS JSC

- You and the DASD for Strategy last briefed the Iraq History Project to the Secretary on 21 June.

- The goal of the Iraq History Project is to expose the true nature of Ba'athist rule in Iraq through public access to Iraqi regime records. Specifically, the creation of an Iraq National Archive, a digital archive, and a grant program.

- Without the support of the Iraq Survey Group (ISG), which possesses the majority of Ba'athist regime documents, the scope of this project will be severely limited.

- I recently received a [redacted] outlining his opposition to allowing access to [redacted] project before they have been fully processed and e

11/10/03

Discuss w/ Hoehn + Collins

- He is willing to allow [redacted] which could take yea

has completed its mission,

- The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) for use in an Iraqi Sp

Put on agenda for wkly. Can bone reg. Hoehn + Collins shd

o Iraqi regime documents

- In light of these new

attend. Give this memo to SC in advance, as a draft. DJF

this forward:

- o OPTION 1: direct the ISG to [redacted] Tab A).

end that the Secretary [redacted] ments (sample memo at

AGREE _____ DISAGREE _____ OTHER _____

- o OPTION 2: Focus on the immediate goal of supporting the Iraqi Special Tribunal and recommend the Secretary direct the ISG to allow the CPA access to those documents necessary for the Iraqi Special Tribunal (sample memo attached Tab B).

AGREE _____ DISAGREE _____ OTHER _____

07-11-03 11:24 IN

Strongly Agree
ASD SO/LIC *OK*
NOV 6 2003 *11/6/03*

ACTION MEMO

I-03/014012-SO
EF-7186

FOR: UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY

FROM: Joseph J. Collins, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Stability Operations *5 Nov 03*

SUBJECT: Iraq History Project

- Joseph Collins*
Doug, WE NEED YOUR UP-FRONT GUIDANCE ON THIS SSC
- You and the DASD for Strategy last briefed the Iraq History Project to the Secretary on 21 June.
 - The goal of the Iraq History Project is to expose the true nature of Ba'athist rule in Iraq through public access to Iraqi regime records. Specifically, the creation of an Iraq National Archive, a digital archive, and a grant program.
 - Without the support of the Iraq Survey Group (ISG), which possesses the majority of Ba'athist regime documents, the scope of this project will be severely limited.
 - I recently received a position paper from MG Dayton's office outlining his opposition to allowing access to documents in support of the Iraq History Project before they have been fully processed and exploited (Tab C)
 - He is willing to allow access to documents only after the ISG has completed its mission, which could take years.
 - The Coalition Provisional Authority wants immediate access to Iraqi regime documents for use in an Iraqi Special Tribunal.
 - In light of these new developments, there are three possible paths forward:
 - OPTION 1: Stick with the original plan and recommend that the Secretary direct the ISG to allow the CPA access to Iraqi documents (sample memo at Tab A).

AGREE _____ DISAGREE _____ OTHER _____

- OPTION 2: Focus on the immediate goal of supporting the Iraqi Special Tribunal and recommend the Secretary direct the ISG to allow the CPA access to those documents necessary for the Iraqi Special Tribunal (sample memo attached Tab B).

AGREE _____ DISAGREE _____ OTHER _____

- OPTION 3: Support the ISG's position that documents should not be released until they have been fully processed and exploited.

AGREE _____ DISAGREE _____ OTHER _____

- The ISG will oppose Options 1 and 2. The CPA will oppose Option 3. I tend toward recommending Option 2.
- The success of the Iraqi Special Tribunal is imperative to the long term stability of Iraq. It is important that the ISG support it even if doing so impinges on its other missions.
- Please give us your guidance on this matter.

COORDINATION: None

Attachment:
As stated

cc: Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence
Deputy General Counsel for International Affairs
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy
Director, Joint Staff
President, National Defense University

Prepared by: (b)(6) SO/LIC Stability Operations, (b)(6)

TAB A



DRAFT
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

COMBATANT COMMANDER, CENTRAL COMMAND

SUBJECT: Iraq National Archive Project

(b)(5)

cc: Administrator, Coalition Provisional Authority
Director Central Intelligence Agency
Commander, Defense Intelligence Agency
Director, Iraq Survey Group



DRAFT

TAB B



DRAFT
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

COMBATANT COMMANDER, CENTRAL COMMAND

SUBJECT: Iraq National Archive Project

(b)(5)

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cc: Administrator, Coalition Provisional Authority
Director, Central Intelligence Agency
Commander, Defense Intelligence Agency
Director, Iraq Survey Group



DRAFT

TAB B

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USD/P_____

ACTION MEMO

I-03/015830

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec Action_____

FROM: Thomas W. O'Connell, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
and Low-Intensity Conflict

SUBJECT: Iraq History Project

BACKGROUND

(b)(5)



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DASD Stability Operations

Prepared by:

(b)(6)



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(b)(5)



RECOMMENDATION: Sign memo at Tab A.

AGREE _____ DISAGREE _____ OTHER _____

COORDINATION: Tab C

Attachments:
As stated

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TAB A



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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

COMBATANT COMMANDER, CENTRAL COMMAND

SUBJECT: Iraq National Archive Project

(b)(1)

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cc: Director of Central Intelligence
Administrator, Coalition Provisional Authority
Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence
General Counsel
Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Near East and South Asia
Director, Joint Staff
President, National Defense University

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TAB B

IRAQ SURVEY GROUP POSITION

ON

ALLOWING COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY ACCESS TO CAPTURED IRAQI DOCUMENTS

The Iraq Survey Group (ISG) strongly disagrees with the proposal to allow the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) access to ISG documents for its Iraq History Project prior to the documents being fully processed and exploited. The ISG believes allowing CPA this access will be severely detrimental to three distinct but equally critical areas:

- A. The National Security of the United States
- B. The internationally-vital ISG WMD mission
- C. The DoD's and CPA's Iraq History Project itself

A. The National Security of the United States

- **Intelligence documents will be lost.** ISG is continually discovering documents of high intelligence value from captured Iraq documents. Most of these documents are found in the initial review, or 'triage' of the documents. Many are also found later in the exploitation process, to include during the latter ISG analyst and subject matter expert review process. Access and review of documents during any stage of this exploitation outside ISG will negatively impact the ability to properly identify and classify these highly sensitive documents.
- **Intelligence documents will be compromised.** Building on the reasoning above, access and review of documents during any stage of ISG exploitation outside ISG will raise the risk of documents being inadvertently released to the public or others without a need to know. This will severely damage U.S. national security. Nothing outweighs taking all measures to ensure this does not occur.
- **Counter Intelligence (CI) documents will be compromised.** Any release of CI documents, which the ISG also continually discovers throughout its exploitation process, would be extremely detrimental to the security of the United States. (b)(7)(A), (b)(7)(E)

(b)(7)(A), (b)(7)(E)

(b)(7)(A), (b)(7)(E)

Once a CI document is publicly released, at best it can completely lose its intelligence value; at worse it could compromise the investigative process.

B. The ISG mission

- **An already stressed DOCEX mission will be overwhelmed.** Document access for the Iraq History Project will considerably disrupt the already taxed ISG DOCEX mission. ISG DOCEX physical space and expertise are limited. ISG uses specific priority intelligence requirements (PIRs) to guide the DOCEX mission. Additional Iraq History Project search requirements, regardless if more people are added to the process, will slow down the ISG DOCEX operational process. A parallel review of already exploited documents will also be required for the Iraq History Project, further upsetting the current ISG DOCEX mission.
- **Original documents needed for follow-on exploitation will be lost.** Although ISG has digital copies of documents, this does not mean exploitation is complete.

ISG often must use original captured documents for interviews with high value targets and other detainees. For effective operations, it needs immediate access to these documents; losing possession of them and retrieving them from CPA is not a viable alternative to current operations. Original documents are also sent for forensic analysis in the US and are used to confront High Value Detainees and other Iraqis suspected of involvement in Iraq's WMD programs.

- **CPA document review will be taken out of context.** ISG experts, and ISG experts alone need to focus on Iraqi DOCEX during its WMD mission execution. CPA review and reporting of documents will result in efforts to assist the ISG in this mission. Although well intentioned, this will result in incorrect, incomplete, and/or inadvertently inaccurate conclusions.

C. The Iraq History Project

- **A CPA review as new documents arrive degrades the Iraq History Project.** ISG receives a constant flow of new captured documents every day. These are reviewed and appropriately prioritized relative to other documents. The rush to review and obtain ISG documents for the Iraq History Project does not outweigh the increase in efficiency the CPA will have if it waits until after the ISG has completed its mission. Without waiting, the Iraq History Project will continually be reviewing, re-reviewing, and correlating new information with existing information until ISG document capture mission is complete.
- **A concurrent ISG WMD DOCEX and CPA Iraq History Project review dilutes ISG capability to fully assist in the Iraq History Project.** ISG resources for its WMD mission are already at a premium. Sharing these with the Iraq History Project will be inefficient and cause undue competition among the two missions; ISG will be unable to assist CPA with the full capabilities it has to bear. On the other hand, if the Iraq History Project waits until after ISG mission completion, CPA will potentially have available more dedicated, expert resources to execute its mission.

Based upon these basic reasons, the ISG highly recommends the CPA wait until after it completes its document exploitation mission before reviewing the documents

TAB C

COORDINATION

Administrator, Coalition Provisional Authority

Under Secretary of Defense Comptroller

Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence

General Counsel

Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Near East and South Asia

Director, Joint Staff

President, National Defense University

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