

ANNEX T TO
OPLAN SOVEREIGN IRAQ
11 JUNE 2004

ANNEX T – SUPPORT MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT

1. Situation. See attached Support Memorandum of Agreement between Department of State and Department of Defense.
2. Mission. See attached Support Memorandum of Agreement between Department of State and Department of Defense.
3. Execution. See attached Support Memorandum of Agreement between Department of State and Department of Defense.
4. Administration and Logistics: See attached Support Memorandum of Agreement between Department of State and Department of Defense.
5. Command and Control. See attached Support Memorandum of Agreement between Department of State and Department of Defense.

**MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AND
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
FOR SUPPORT SERVICES IN IRAQ**

1. PURPOSE:

This Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) describes services, supplies and other types of support to be provided by the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Department of State (DOS) to the US Mission in Iraq, sets forth procedures and responsibilities concerning the working relationships between the departments and their sub-agencies, pursuant to National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 36 of May 11, 2004 and the Emergency Supplemental (references 2.a and 2.d), and complements the Security MOAs between the Commander, US Central Command (CDR USCENTCOM) and the Chief of Mission (COM), US Mission Iraq (references 2.b and 2.c).

2. REFERENCES:

- a. National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 36, United States Government Operations in Iraq, May 11, 2004
- b. Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) between Commander, US Central Command, and US Chief of Mission Iraq Regarding Security Responsibility (June 2004)
- c. Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) between Commander, US Central Command, and US Chief of Mission Iraq Regarding Physical Security, Equipment and Personal Protective Services (June 2004)
- d. Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense and for the Reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan, Public Law 108-106
- e. Foreign Service Act of 1980, 22 U.S.C. 3901 et seq.
- f. Federal Travel Regulations
- g. Foreign Affairs Manual
- h. DOD 4515.13-R, Air Transportation Eligibility (November 94)
- i. DOD Directive 4500.56, Use of Government Aircraft and Air Travel (April 99)
- j. DOD 4500.36-R, Management, Acquisition, and Use of Motor Vehicles (September 1996)
- k. OPLAN Sovereign Iraq (June 2004)
- l. National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 38 of July 2, 1982
- m. Foreign Service Buildings Act (22 U.S.C. 292-302)
- n. Secure Embassy Construction and Counterterrorism Act of 1999, Title VI, Pub. L. 106-113

3. GENERAL PROVISIONS:

- a. Except as otherwise specified by this MOA, support furnished by DOD pursuant to this agreement will be provided on a non-reimbursable basis in accordance with references

2.a and 2.d, until such time as Congress appropriates funds to DOS for such purposes. Subsequent support will be provided through agreement of the Parties.

- b. This MOA is not intended to be comprehensive or to prejudice the ability of the Secretary of State to make requests for support not specifically stated herein. Except in emergency circumstances, requests for additional support beyond that provided for herein will take the form of a written request, either from the Executive Secretary of the Department of State to the Executive Secretary of the Department of Defense or from the COM to CDR USCENTCOM's in-country designated representative.
- c. The responsibility for COM administrative and logistics services and support not specifically provided for in this agreement shall remain with the COM unless otherwise mutually agreed.
- d. The COM and CDR USCENTCOM may delegate their responsibilities provided for in this MOA.

4. AREAS OF AGREEMENT:

a. Facilities Management and Administrative and Logistic Support:

In accordance with Annexes A and D, DOD will be responsible to facilitate the provision of facility support within the Green Zone (GZ) and for regional offices. DOD will facilitate provision of these services on a priority basis to the US Mission for the Mission's facility support needs within the GZ. US Mission Iraq provides facilities to DOD elements, personnel and contractors (housing, office space, and related equipment and services) as agreed between the COM and the relevant military commander.

b. Contracting Support:

The Department of the Army (DA) will continue to provide a Head of Contracting Activity (HCA) and Principal Assistant Responsible for Contracting (PARC) in Baghdad after June 30, 2004. The HCA in Iraq will provide regional contracting capacity as needed. Support will be provided in accordance with Annex B. This MOA does not address Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund and other foreign assistance contract support.

c. Medical Support:

In accordance with Annex C, DOD will provide Health Service Support (HSS), hospitalization, patient movement, and dental services to all eligible beneficiaries. DOS will establish the US Mission Health Unit to provide Primary Care support services to eligible USG employees under the authority of the COM. At the time the Mission Health Unit is established, DOS will assume responsibility for primary ambulatory care for these employees.

d. Information Technology (IT) Support:

In accordance with Annex E, IT support will be provided by DOD/Communications Support Group (CSG). DOS/Information Resource Management (IRM) will coordinate support for and support the IT requirements of the US Mission, primarily through the direction of the Information Management Office (IMO).

5. SUPPORTED RECIPIENTS:

- a. US Mission Iraq
- b. Others as specifically identified in the Annexes to this MOA

6. ANNEXES:

The following Annexes are included and made part of this MOA:

ANNEX A FACILITIES MANAGEMENT

ANNEX B CONTRACTING

ANNEX C MEDICAL

ANNEX D ADMINISTRATIVE AND LOGISTICS SUPPORT

ANNEX E INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY

6. EFFECTIVE DATE, MODIFICATION AND TERMINATION:

As of the date of signature, the Parties will begin to phase in support and support arrangements as contemplated in this MOA in order to enable this MOA to enter into full force and effect upon dissolution of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). DOD and DOS will review this MOA semi-annually, or more frequently as circumstances indicate, for currency and applicability. This MOA may be amended in writing as mutually agreed by the Parties.

Signed:

Signed:

Deputy Secretary
US Department of State

Deputy Secretary
US Department of Defense

Date: _____

Date: _____

EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE UNDER FOIA'S U.S.C. 552(B)(8)



OPLAN Sovereign Iraq v3.0

Interagency Transition Planning Team

One Team – One Mission

EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE UNDER FOIA'S U.S.C. 552(B)(8)

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11 JUNE 2004

OPLAN SOVEREIGN IRAQ

- References:
- A. Refer to CJTF-7, Operation Iraqi Freedom, Annex B – Intelligence
 - B. Mission Performance Plan FY 2006 U.S. Embassy Iraq
 - C. Security Responsibility and Security Services Memoranda of Agreement between Department of State and Department of Defense
 - D. Support Memorandum of Agreement between Department of State and Department of Defense
 - E. Foreign Service Act of 1980 P.L. 96-465
 - F. National Security Decision Directive Number 38, dated 2 June 1982
 - G. National Security Presidential Directive Number 36, dated May 11, 2004
 - H. Transitional Administrative Law (TAL) and TAL Annex
 - I. UN Security Council Resolution 1483
 - J. UN Security Council Resolution 1511
 - K. UN Security Council Resolution 1546

I.S. situation

- a. General. Operation Plan Sovereign Iraq addresses the simultaneous dissolution of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) in Iraq and the concurrent establishment of a US Mission Iraq that will work in the closest coordination with the Multinational Force, international organization missions, the embassies of coalition countries, and the Iraqi people.
 - (1) Current Situation. The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) has been the government of Iraq since the overthrow of Saddam Hussein and his Ba'ath Regime in April of 2003. The CPA is responsible for the temporary governance of Iraq, consistent with international law and UN Security Council Resolutions 1483 and 1511, with coalition personnel provided immunity from Iraqi law. On Nov 15, 2003, the United States announced that the Iraqi Interim Government (IIG) would assume governance responsibility by 30 June 2004. The USG has initiated a detailed planning effort to timely ensure successful assumption of authority by the Iraqi Interim Government (IIG).
 - (2) In addition to the assumption of authority by the IIG, two significant transfers of authority will occur during May and June 2004:
 - (a) The Coalition Joint Task Force-7 (CJTF-7) transferred authority to a new multinational headquarters, the Multinational Force-Iraq (MNF-I), effective on 15 May 2004. While the transfer of authority has been formalized, this new headquarters and its subordinate organizations, will continue to undergo adjustments before achieving its final organizational structure.
 - (b) Once the Iraqi Interim Government assumes authority, the CPA will no longer have a legal basis for its existence as an occupying authority. At the same time,

the US Government desires to establish formal diplomatic relations with the new Iraqi Interim Government. Accordingly, OPLAN Sovereign Iraq addresses this transition period. As appropriate, some personnel and organizations from the CPA will transition to the new US Mission.

- (3) In performing its mission, the CPA operated according to a strategic plan that established priorities for the US Government, coalition partners and efforts for relief and reconstruction. The Plan outlined five core foundational relief and reconstruction sectors and their end-states and provided a critical starting point for the long term objectives reflected in the Department of State's Mission Performance Plan (MPP) FY 2006 U.S. Embassy Iraq.
- (a) Security End State Objective. A secure environment for the people and property of Iraq that enables citizens to participate fully in political and economic life. The Iraqi government has the means to assume responsibility for external and internal security, including defense and police forces. Good relationships with regional states and with the international community have been established. The roles and accountabilities of organizations providing security are clearly defined within a legal framework. The legal framework also regulates the private possession and use of weapons.
 - (b) Essential Services End State Objective. Essential services and infrastructure, particularly electricity, water, and health care, are provided to acceptable standards. Plans are in place, and where feasible, being implemented to improve the quality and accessibility by all citizens of all public services.
 - (c) Economy End State Objective. Financial market structures and fiscal and regulatory conditions have been established that enable sustainable economic growth, the development of a dynamic private sector, and rising living standards for the Iraqi people. Measures have been taken to develop human resources and to eliminate corruption. Policies have been developed to use Iraq's oil wealth for the benefit of all the Iraqi people.
 - (d) Governance End State Objective. Iraq has a representative form of government that promotes the rule of law, protects individual rights of all, including freedom of expression and religion, and is supported by a vibrant civil society. It is underpinned by a democratically-based constitution and transparent electoral processes agreed to and accepted by the Iraqi people. There is an accountable and responsive system of local governments. The effectiveness of elected local officials has been increased through training.
 - (e) Strategic Communications End State Objective. Unity of effort is achieved among the Iraqi Government, Coalition nations and the international community. Negative Iraqi perceptions of Coalition activities have been mitigated into constructive support. Messaging efforts have created an environment where an aura of legitimacy takes hold among the Iraqi people leading to a sustained, engaged, and active participation in the democratization of the country.

- (4) The US Mission Iraq Mission Performance Plan will succeed the CPA Strategic Plan and guide the activities of the US Mission Iraq. It identifies three mutually reinforcing strategic objectives in Iraq: eliminating terrorism, promoting economic development and supporting democratization and the rule of law. To accomplish these objectives, the US Government must rapidly build a well-resourced interagency U.S. Mission in Baghdad, working in the closest coordination with the Iraqi people, the Multinational Force, international organizations, and the embassies of coalition and other nations.
 - (5) The CPA established the basis of an Iraqi administration that has taken the first steps to implement the three objectives: Iraq's security forces are beginning to develop their capabilities to protect the Iraqi people against terrorists and other criminals. Plans and some key staffing are in place for a proposal for a roadmap toward elections and the organizational infrastructure of central and local governments dedicated to serving the Iraqi people. Iraq's economy and infrastructure are rapidly improving after decades of neglect, corruption, and international sanctions. Much remains to be done, however.
 - (6) The US Mission Iraq will have an exceptional scope and magnitude of responsibilities and resources. In the short term, it will function in one of the world's most unstable and violent environments. These circumstances pose unique management challenges and high human and financial costs, as we build a US Mission and country team with the resources and institutional capacity necessary to accomplish the extraordinary US national objectives in Iraq. While some personnel and structures will carry over from CPA, the Mission necessarily will be a very different organization, reflecting both a different political context and a different mission.
 - (7) The assumption of authority will be formalized in a ceremony on 30 June 2004 when the transfer will be consummated. Following the ceremony, the US Mission Iraq will be established. The Coalition Provisional Authority will cease to function as the governing authority in Iraq, and the Department of State (DOS) Bureau of Near East Affairs, Iraq (NEA/I) and the US Mission to Iraq will be established as the successor organizations to CPA, responsible for representing the interests of the US Government, less the military function which will be discharged by the Commander, Multinational Forces Iraq (MNF-I).
- b. Enemy Forces. See Annex B – Intelligence.
- c. Friendly Forces. See Annex A – Command and Control.
- (1) The Transition Team. The Secretaries of State and Defense established an Interagency Transition Planning Team (ITPT) to develop a joint transition plan to dissolve the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and establish a US Mission within a sovereign Iraq, ensuring a close and mutual partnership between the Chief of Mission (COM) and the Commander, Multinational Force – Iraq (MNF-I). The ITPT, which includes representatives of DOS, DOD, and the CPA (forward and rear), has developed and will continue to develop comprehensive and detailed plans concurrently. Furthermore, the team will continue the spirit of “jointness” as it supports implementation of the plan within the DOS and DOD.

- (2) The US Mission and the Near East Asia-Iraq element (NEA-I) will constitute the successor entity to the CPA under the provisions of Section 2208 of the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act and National Security Presidential Directive 36, dated 11 May 2004. DOS maintains the funds available for establishing the US Embassy in Baghdad, including the balance of uncommitted FY 2004 appropriations for CPA operating expenses and the 1% Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF) transfer.

- (3) Coalition Nations. Iraq relief and reconstruction has been the effort of a multination coalition. Future references to "coalition" are in this context. Coalition contributions have included military forces, donations, civilian reconstruction teams, and planning officers. The US Government provides the most significant leadership and a majority of the coalition forces, but successful prosecution of the war and reconstruction could not have been and will not be achieved without extensive coalition participation. While the US Mission to Iraq will be bilateral, the US Government will continue to encourage coalition participation and will develop appropriate channels for coordination with coalition nations.

- (4) Government of Iraq. As defined in the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL), the Government of Iraq will transition to a permanent, constitutional government in three phases. TAL Phase I will begin with the formation of the fully sovereign Iraqi Interim Government that takes power on 30 June 2004. TAL Phase II begins with the formation of the Iraqi Transitional Government after elections for the National Assembly occur not later than 31 January 2005. TAL Phase III begins with the formation of a permanent Iraqi government, pursuant to a permanent constitution. Elections for the permanent government will occur no later than 15 December 2005 and the new government shall assume office no later than 31 December 2005.




Figure 1. National Transition

- (a) TAL Phase I – Iraqi Interim Government. On 1 June 2004, the Iraqi Governing Council was dissolved and the formation of the Iraqi Interim Government was announced. On 30 June 2004, the Iraqi Interim Government will be vested with governance authority.
- (1) Governance. The Interim Iraqi Government will govern according to the Transitional Administrative Law, administer Iraq's affairs, provide for the welfare and security of the Iraqi people, promote economic development and prepare Iraq for national elections to be held no later than 31 January 2004. These elections will select an Iraqi Transitional National Assembly.
 - (2) Composition. The IIG will consist of a President, two Deputy Presidents, a Prime Minister and 31 Ministers. The President will act as the Head of State. The Prime Minister will preside over the Council of Ministers and oversee the administration of the government.
 - (3) Interim National Council. There will also be an Interim National Council to promote constructive dialogue and create national consensus, to advise the new government, monitor the implementation of laws and approve the 2005 budget. The 100-member Interim National Council will be chosen by a National Conference, to be held in July, involving at least a thousand Iraqis from across Iraq. The Interim National Council will reflect Iraq's diversity.
 - (4) The Transitional Administrative Law. The IIG will operate under the legal framework established by the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL), including the TAL Annex. The TAL will remain the supreme law of Iraq until a new constitution has been ratified, a newly elected government is in place and new laws are enacted to replace provisions of the TAL. Under the provisions of the TAL, the IIG will have the power to conclude international agreements in the areas of diplomatic relations and economic reconstruction, including Iraq's sovereign debt. The IIG will not have the authority to amend the TAL or to form agreements which permanently alter the destiny of Iraq.
- (b) TAL Phase II – Iraq Transitional Government.
- (1) Governance. The Iraq Transitional Government (ITG) will govern according to the laws in force in Iraq on 30 June 2004 unless and until rescinded in accordance with the Transitional Administrative Law. The ITG will have exclusive competence in the areas specified in Article 25 of the TAL.
 - (2) Composition. The ITG will consist of the National Assembly, the Presidency Council, the Council of Ministers, including the Prime Minister, and the Judicial authority.
 - (3) The National Assembly. The National Assembly will be the legislative authority for the State of Iraq. Its mission shall be to legislate and exercise oversight over the work of the executive authority. The National Assembly will consist of 275 members who will be elected through elections to occur by 31 December 2004, if possible, and in any case no later than 31 January 2005. The principal

objective of the Transitional National Assembly will be to prepare a draft permanent national constitution for Iraq and prepare for and conduct a national election under this constitution to elect a permanent Iraqi Government. The new constitution will be presented to the Iraqi people in a national referendum scheduled for the fall of 2005. Under this new constitution, Iraq will elect a permanent government by the end of 2005.

(4) The Transitional Executive Authority. The executive authority during TAL Phase II will consist of the Presidency Council, the Council of Ministers and its presiding Prime Minister.

- (a) The Presidency Council is formed by the President of the State and two Deputies elected by the National Assembly. The Council will oversee the higher affairs of the country.
- (b) The members of the Council of Ministers are named by the Presidency Council upon the recommendation of the Prime Minister.
- (c) The Presidency Council will name the Prime Minister by unanimous vote. The Prime Minister and the Council of Ministers will commence their work as a government only after receiving a vote of confidence by simple majority from the National Assembly. The Prime Minister will have day-to-day responsibility for the management of the government.

(5) The Federal Judicial Authority. A Higher Juridical Council will replace the Council of Judges and will supervise the federal judiciary and administer its budget. The federal judiciary will include a Federal Supreme Court, the Central Criminal Court of Iraq, Courts of Appeal, the Court of Cassation and other courts established by law.

(6) The Transitional Administrative Law. The laws in force in Iraq on 30 June 2004 will remain in effect unless and until rescinded or amended by the ITG. The laws, regulations, orders, and directives issued by the Coalition Provisional Authority pursuant to its authority under international law shall remain in force until rescinded or amended by legislation duly enacted and having the force of law.

(c) TAL Phase III. – Permanent Iraqi Government: The permanent Iraqi Government and National Assembly seated at the end of 2005 will establish laws governing Iraq. Provisions of the TAL, with its Annex, will be rescinded as provisions in the Constitution and/or Iraqi Law direct.

(5) United Nations.

- (a) On 24 March 2004, the U.N. Security Council adopted a statement supporting the new U.N. mission to help Iraq form an interim government and prepare for elections. This U.N. Mission, as well as an electoral assistance team, was dispatched to Iraq to lend assistance and advice to the Iraqi people in the formation

of the IIG, as well as in the preparations for the direct elections to be held before the end of January 2005.

- (b) On 8 June 2004, the U.N. Security Council endorsed the formation of a sovereign Iraqi Government effective 30 June 2004, and the eventual dissolution of the CPA, through UNSCR 1546. It also endorsed the proposed timetable to eventual democratic government including:
 - (1) Holding of direct democratic elections by no later than 31 January 2005 for a Transitional National Assembly to form a Transitional Government responsible for drafting a permanent constitution;
 - (2) Holding of democratic elections by 31 December 2005 for a constitutionally elected Government of Iraq.
- (c) The United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) will play a leading role in convening a national conference in July 2004, to select a Consultative Council; supporting the electoral process and conducting a census; and developing/delivering social services, humanitarian and reconstruction assistance.
- (d) The U.N. mission consists of two separate teams: a political team and an electoral team. The U.N. team is now in Iraq helping to form an Independent Election Commission that will oversee an orderly and accurate national election. The US has assured the United Nations that every possible step will be taken to facilitate the protection of its teams.
- (e) UNSCR 1546 reaffirmed UNSCR 1511 and the continued authority of MNF-I forces to operate under a unified command in accordance with letters of understanding annexed to the resolution by SECSTATE and Prime Minister Allawi, IIG. The letters provided a framework for a future security partnership and included the following:
 - (1) The IIG will form a Ministerial Committee for National Security responsible for establishing Iraqi security policy. The Committee will invite MNF-I to participate and will stand ready to discuss methods of coordination, cooperation, and consultation on fundamental security and policy issues (including those on sensitive military operations).
 - (2) MNF-I and IIG will form national, regional, and local coordinating bodies comprised of Iraqi security force and civilian leaders responsible for ensuring that Iraqi security forces coordinate with MNF-I on all security policy and operations issues. This will facilitate unity of command in military operations in which Iraqi forces are engaged with MNF-I. It will also help foster effective allocation of resources and use of personnel; regular consultation between MNF- I and IIG leaders; and the sharing of intelligence.
 - (3) MNF-I will establish a separate brigade size force under its command dedicated to providing security for UN personnel and facilities in Iraq. Its missions will include static and perimeter security at UN facilities, and convoy escort duties.

(4) Though the MNF-I is in Iraq at the request of the IIG, its mandate could be reviewed or terminated should the Iraqis ask, but will nonetheless expire once a permanent Government of Iraq is constitutionally elected by the end of 2005.

(5) MNF-I will continue to train and equip Iraqi security forces.

(6) Military Forces.

(a) CJTF-7. CJTF-7 was responsible for military operations throughout Iraq, operating in support of the CPA, in order to establish and maintain a secure environment. CJTF-7 transferred authority to the Multinational Force-Iraq (MNF-I) on 15 May 2004.

(b) MNF-I. The MNF-I was established with interim operational capability (IOC) on 15 May 2004 and assumed responsibility for military operations throughout Iraq. Upon transition to a sovereign interim government of Iraq, the MNF-I will continue its mission to establish and maintain a secure environment, allow the continuance of relief and reconstruction efforts, and improve the training and capabilities of Iraqi security forces, including the Iraqi Armed Forces, Border Patrol, Iraqi Police Services, the Facility Protective Service, and the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps. As these Iraqi forces develop appropriate capabilities and the security situation improves, the MNF-I will hand off security responsibilities to them and assume a reduced presence in Iraqi cities and provinces.

d. Assumptions.

- (1) The governing structures in Iraq will be established according to the timelines defined in the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL).
- (2) The concurrent dissolution of the CPA and establishment of the US Mission Iraq will allow for continuity of current relief and reconstruction operations.
- (3) Multinational coalition principles will be preserved in the post-transition environment.
- (4) The US government transition will be managed with currently available funds; there will not be an additional FY 2004 supplemental appropriation beyond the \$25B reserve recently enacted.
- (5) The UN Security Council Resolutions 1511, 1546 and the TAL provide the COM and the MNF-I Commander with necessary legal authorities to carry out their missions.
- (6) Many functions now performed within the CPA will continue until 30 June 2004 and will be assigned on that date to the Chief of Mission (COM).

2. Mission

On 30 June 2004, the Iraqi Interim Government assumes authority and the CPA is dissolved; the US Government establishes a US Mission Iraq to ensure that the responsibilities and interests of

the US Government are preserved and discharged effectively; and in concert with the Multinational Force-Iraq, the Iraqi Government and our Coalition partners and international organizations, continue uninterrupted relief, reconstruction and stabilization efforts.

3. Execution

a. Intent. The Chief of Mission to the new US Mission Iraq will represent the interests of the US Government and will assist the people and government of Iraq as they take full ownership of Iraq during the transition period. Underpinning this goal are three priorities—sovereignty, security, and reconstruction and economic development. In terms of sovereignty, the COM will focus on supporting the Iraqi Interim Government and assisting the IIG in organizing national elections. With respect to security, the principal priority is training Iraqi security forces. The COM will work closely with the Commander, MNF-I to ensure that security forces are trained to take over security responsibilities of their country. Finally, reconstruction and economic development assistance provided or coordinated by the COM will be directed toward giving the Iraqi people a stake in their own future.

(1) Concept of Operations. OPLAN Sovereign Iraq will be executed in five phases (See Figure 1): Phase I (Establishing US Mission Advance Team), Phase II (Transition to US Mission), Phase III (Post-Transition Execution/Fiscal Year Close-out), Phase IV (Constitution /Election Support), Phase V (Post Election Normalization). Through these five phases, the US Government will effectively transition governance responsibilities to the Iraqi Interim Government (IIG) while maintaining ongoing relief, reconstruction, and stabilization efforts throughout Iraq. These actions will occur simultaneously with a shift in primary authority for prioritization of non-security related efforts from DOD to DOS.




Figure 2. Transition Phasing

- (2) Phase I (Establishing US Mission Advance Team). Phase I began 19 March 2004 when the forward planning cell of the Interagency Transition Planning Team (ITPT) arrived in Baghdad and ends when the US Mission Advance Team is fully established by 1 June 2004.
- (a) Purpose. The purpose of this phase was for the ITPT-Baghdad and CPA, with support from the ITPT-Washington and CENTCOM/CJTF-7, to plan and coordinate activities necessary to ensure that the US Mission Advance Team was prepared to function effectively and take over management oversight of select CPA functions. The US Mission Advance Team is a precursor organization to the US Mission, and began the process of standing up the full embassy.
 - (b) Interagency Transition Planning Team. The DOD and DOS ITPT teams planned for the more complex handoff of missions, functions, personnel, logistics, communications, facilities and real property from CPA to the US Mission and finalize plans for other phases.
 - (c) Coalition Provisional Authority. CPA worked to complete all necessary transition tasks to prepare for the US Mission Advance Team no later than (NLT) 1 June 2004. During this period, the US Army assumed responsibility for the Project and Contracting Office (PCO).
 - (d) Department of State. DOS conducted detailed planning and preparations for establishing and staffing the US Mission. During this time, DOS determined those additional capabilities, functions, and personnel currently resident in CPA that would transition to the US Mission Iraq and remain after the 30 June 2004 transition to sovereignty.
 - (e) Department of Defense. Department of Defense (DOD) planned for providing security and other support to US Mission Iraq activities, direct administrative and logistical support to the US Embassy in the Green Zone, and general support to non-DOD US government agencies operating in the Green Zone and at other sites in Iraq.
 - (f) Department of Justice. Department of Justice (DOJ) and DOD provided support to the Iraqi Special Tribunal, and the Commission on Public Integrity. Liaison teams to the Ministries of Justice and the Interior, the Council of Judges and the courts continued their missions.
 - (g) Coalition Joint Task Force-7. CJTF-7 continued to establish and maintain a secure environment, continued to support the training of Iraqi security forces, and prepared for the transfer of authority to Multinational Force-Iraq (MNF-I). MNF-I achieved Initial Operational Capability (IOC) on 15 May and Full Operational Capability (FOC) on 15 July.
 - (h) Phase I ends when the US Mission Advance Team commences operations by 1 June 2004.

- (3) Phase II (Transition to US Mission). Phase II began when the US Mission Advance Team arrived in Iraq and began to gradually assume certain CPA functions by 1 June 2004. Phase II will ends with the dissolution of CPA and the opening of the US Mission Iraq on 30 June 2004.
- (a) Purpose. The purpose of this phase is to establish the US Mission Iraq upon assumption of authority by the IIG. During Phase II, the US Mission Advance Team will assume management oversight of functions from the CPA which are appropriate embassy functions as identified during Phase I.
 - (b) US Mission Advance Team. The US Mission Advance Team will focus on the efficient and supportive transition of appropriate activities, responsibilities, and resources from CPA to the US Mission Iraq and will be in direct support of the CPA until 30 June 2004 for those functions that are transferred.
 - (c) Interagency Transition Planning Team. The ITPT and CPA continue planning for transition of selected functions to the US Mission.
 - (d) Department of State (DOS). DOS and the CPA establish the Iraq Reconstruction Management Office (IRMO) as a "virtual" organization to provide management oversight of those CPA functions and personnel under the authority of the Chief of Mission (COM) deemed mission essential after 30 June 2004, at which time IRMO will be established as a temporary organization under the provisions of Section 3161. IRMO will be comprised primarily of senior and technical liaison personnel and supporting staff, providing expertise and operational assistance to Iraqi ministries.
 - (e) Project and Contracting Office. In preparation for its post-transition organizational structure, the Project and Contracting Office (PCO) will be established within the Army to provide acquisition and program management support to the US Mission for execution of contracts funded under the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF). It will be a temporary organization funded, staffed, and operated by the US Army, with the forward elements under the management oversight of the Chief (DCM designee) of the US Mission Advance Team until 30 June 2004 so that the transition will be seamless.
 - (f) Regional Teams. DOS will establish four interagency Regional Teams at Mosul, Kirkuk, Al Hillah, and Basrah (Annex O) and embedded teams with headquarters of five MNF-I major subordinate commands, and CPA will begin to close sites not selected for an enduring presence. These teams represent one the most critical elements of our continued presence in Iraq as they will have direct contact with the Iraqi people.
 - (g) Coalition Provisional Authority. CPA continues to conduct all activities not transferred to US Mission Advance Team and will continue to be responsible for those activities that transfer to the US Mission Advance Team for management oversight during Phase II. CPA restructures elements of the CPA that will transfer to the US Mission.

- (h) Department of Defense. DOD will establish Area Support Group Central to provide direct administrative and logistical support to the US Mission and general support to other US Government tenants in the Green Zone, as well as Regional Teams. It will achieve initial operational capability on 15 June 2004 and full operational capability of 30 June 2004. It will support operations for the Green Zone and US Mission Advance Team during Phase II.
 - (i) Department of Justice. The Regime Crimes Liaison takes leadership of all US Government efforts in support of the Iraqi Special Tribunal, which will become part of the Regime Crimes Liaison Office. The US Mission Advance Team will convene a Justice and Law Enforcement working group to coordinate the activities
 - (j) Multinational Force-Iraq. MNF-I achieved IOC on 15 May 2004, and continues to establish and maintain a secure environment through 30 June 2004 and beyond. MNF-I will have operational command of the Office of Security Transition (OST) which has responsibility for training and mentoring Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). The Director of Detainee Operations and the Detainee Organization continue to support the Central Criminal Court of Iraq.
 - (k) Phase II ends 30 June 2004 with the dissolution of the CPA and opening of the US Mission Iraq.
- (4) Phase III (Post-Transition Execution/Fiscal Year Close-out). Phase III begins 30 June 2004 with the opening of the US Mission Iraq and will end on 30 September 2004.
- (a) Purpose. The purpose of this phase is to fully establish all programs and procedures pursuant to the new US Mission, support the Iraqi Interim Government, and close-out or readjust all necessary contract work for FY 2004. During this phase, the US Mission Iraq assumes full responsibility for US interests in Iraq and responsibility for relations with the Government of Iraq under the authority of DOS.
 - (b) Department of Defense. DOD will close out all FY04 residual CPA financial transactions. CPA support contracts required by DOS, and coordinated with DOD, will be transferred to the US Mission NLT 30 September 2004. DOS will establish procedures NLT 30 June 2004 to use purchase order instruments when desired to leverage existing DOD contracts such as LOGCAP.
 - (c) Project and Contracting Office. DOD will continue to provide acquisition and program management support to the US Mission for execution of contracts funded under the IRRF through the PCO, with the forward elements under the authority of the COM.
 - (d) US Mission Iraq. The Chief of Mission (COM) will assist the Iraqi Government and UN representatives to prepare for elections, to be held no later than 31 January 2005 and will coordinate closely with Coalition Partners on these matters, as appropriate. The COM will also set requirements and priorities for all non-security-related requirements in his oversight of Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF) programs which will be followed by the PCO.

- (e) Multinational Force-Iraq. Commander, MNF-I will set requirements and priorities for all security-related requirements to be implemented by PCO and will continue to establish and maintain a secure environment.
 - (f) Other Nations. It is expected that respective diplomats in Iraq, together with diplomats from multilateral organizations, will establish inter-Embassy contact groups that would provide fora for discussion and coordination of all subjects of mutual interest, and provide a venue to compare and track progress.
 - (g) Phase III ends with the U.S. fiscal year on 30 September 2004.
- (5) Phase IV (Election Support). Phase IV begins 1 October 2004 and is expected to end when the newly established transitional government is seated.
- (a) Purpose. The purposes of this phase are to finalize organizational changes in MNF-I and the US Mission, and continue to assist in the transformation process of Iraq by supporting the execution of national elections in accordance with fair and internationally recognized standards.
 - (b) Iraqi Interim Government. The new Iraqi Interim Government's primary responsibility will be to administer Iraq's affairs, in particular by providing for the welfare and security of the Iraqi people, promoting economic development and preparing Iraq for national elections to be held no later than 31 January 2005.
 - (c) US Mission Iraq. The US Mission Iraq continues to ensure that the responsibilities and interests of the US Government are preserved and discharged effectively; continues uninterrupted relief, reconstruction and stabilization efforts in concert with the Iraqi Interim Government, our coalition and international partners and the MNF-I; and plans for establishment of the Iraqi Transitional Government after nationwide elections.
 - (d) MNF-I. MNF-I continues to establish and maintain a secure environment, with Iraqi security forces taking an increasingly larger role as they achieve required operational capabilities. MNF-I also continues to establish base support operations throughout Iraq with area support groups, base support battalions, and area support teams to relieve tactical commanders of the base support operations requirements, including support to the US Mission, so they can focus on warfighting. (See Appendix I – BASOPS to Annex A – Command and Control)
 - (e) Phase IV ends on or about 31 Jan 2005 when an internationally recognized elected Iraqi Transitional National Assembly is seated.
- (6) Phase V (Post Election Normalization). Phase V begins on or about 1 February 2005, after elected permanent Iraqi Government is seated.
- (a) Purpose. The purpose of this phase is to monitor and reduce presence of MNF-I and other US Government missions necessary for a state of long-term stability and normalization pursuant to standards and wishes of the Iraqi government. During

this phase, all projects funded by the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund Public Law 108-106 will be or will have been completed.

- (b) Iraqi Transitional Government. The Transitional National Assembly will draft a permanent constitution for the State of Iraq which should be ratified by October 2005. Nationwide elections will be held under this constitution to establish a Permanent Iraqi Government at the end of 2005.
- (c) US Mission Iraq. The US Mission Iraq continues to ensure that the responsibilities and interests of the US Government are preserved and discharged effectively; and continues uninterrupted relief, reconstruction and stabilization efforts in concert with the Iraqi Transitional Government and our coalition and international partners, and the MNF-I. As the situation in Iraq normalizes, the US Mission may reduce its presence in the regions and move toward normal embassy operations.
- (d) MNF-I. As Iraqi security forces become more mission capable, they will assume responsibility for internal and external security from forces belonging to MNF-I. Additionally, as the security situation in Iraq becomes permissive and US Mission operations are normalized, ASG Central gradually hands off administrative and logistical functions to the US Embassy, and Green Zone management functions to appropriate Government of Iraq authorities.
- (e) This phase ends with the normalization of Iraqi local and national governance and a stable environment where the US and other Missions can operate under normal conditions.

b. Tasks by Phase.

(1) Phase I-II.

(a) Department of State

- (1) Establish real property facilities in the Green Zone to support a US Mission Iraq capable of performing expanded missions. Prepare to become successor organization to CPA under provisions of Article 5, Section 3161.
- (2) Establish a US Mission Advance Team by 1 June 2004 to begin the process of establishing a US Mission Iraq and assume management oversight of select organizations established as "virtual" organizations with the CPA such as IRMO, PCO forward, STRATCOM (to be redesignated), etc.
- (3) Established four regional team sites with one in Basrah, Al Hillah, Kirkuk, and Mosul to coordinate the on-going relief, reconstruction and governance efforts for the USG.
- (4) Embed teams in the five MND Divisional areas, collocated with the military headquarters to support the military commanders and serve as extensions of the Regional Directors responsible for the Regional Teams noted above.

- (5) Develop and implement US Mission Iraq Mission Program Plan (MPP) FY2006.
 - (6) Establish the Iraq Reconstruction Management Office (IRMO) that works under the management of the Chief, US Mission Advance Team on 1 June - in direct support and under the authority of the Administrator, CPA.
 - (7) Determine post-transition internal organizations and staffing levels for the US Mission activities.
 - (8) Determine staffing levels for all US Government activities in Iraq under COM authority.
 - (9) Deploy DOS and other agency personnel assigned to the US Mission in order to be on station in the US Mission NLT 15 June 2004.
 - (10) Support the development of Iraqi Interim Government capacity to administer the Iraqi Justice System effectively and efficiently, through training, technical assistance, mentoring, certification, and advice.
 - (11) Establish Near East Asia-Iraq office to provide policy and operations support to the US Mission Iraq.
 - (12) Assume authority over selected facilities in the Green Zone and other sites as determined by DOS in coordination with Administrator, CPA and Commander, MNF-I.
 - (13) Establish a public affairs organization under the authority of the US Mission Advance Team and subsequently the COM NLT 1 June 2004, to design and implement a strategic communications plan to achieve the communication objectives of the United States.
- (b) Department of Defense.
- (1) CENTCOM exercise command and control over US and multinational forces.
 - (2) CPA supports transition planning and transfers management oversight of select functions to US Mission Advance Team prior to 30 June 2004. Ensure smooth transition of these functions to US Mission Iraq on 30 June.
 - (3) CPA prepares to transfer unobligated Development Fund in Iraq (DFI) funds to the Iraq Minister of Finance on 1 July 2004.
 - (4) Establish, IAW NSPD 36, the Project and Contracting Office (PCO) as a temporary organization under Army executive agency authority. The PCO forward will be under the management oversight of the Chief (DCM

designee) of the US Mission Advance Team prior to 30 June so that the transition on 30 June will be seamless.

- (5) NLT 30 June 2004, develop and execute base support operations plan to provide administrative and logistics support to USG sites throughout Iraq, including the Green Zone.
- (6) Establish the Office of Security Transition (OST) under the operational command of the Commander, MNF-I until the level of security and stability allows Iraq to assume the lead role in security.
- (7) Establish a Detainee Organization under MNF-I responsible for detainees in Iraq whose director will report to Commander, MNF-I.
- (8) Establish ASG Central OPCON to MNF-I to provide direct support to the US Embassy and general support to other tenants of the Green Zone for specified logistics and administrative functions now supporting the CPA, NLT 30 June, 2004. ASG Central coordinates security with MNF-I and provides management for the Green Zone until security conditions allow it to be transferred to the Government of Iraq or as directed.
- (9) CPA-West transfers select policy and operations functions to NEA-I in DOS and other US Government organizations NLT 30 June 2004 to ensure continuity of effort.
- (10) DOD coordinates all issues associated with US Government contractors under DOD management on the battlefield, including accountability, force protection, privileges and immunities for US personnel, facilities, and contractors not covered under the Vienna Conventions, CPA Orders and other agreements (See Annex N – Contractor Security, Published in Separate Fragmentary Order).
- (11) DOD will designate the Secretary of the Army as the Department of Defense executive agent for the Project and Contracting Office and its functions.

(c) Joint Tasks

- (1) DOD / DOS establishes command and control structures that will ensure a seamless transition upon assumption of authority by the IIG and establishment of the US Mission Iraq in coordination with MNF-I and the regional teams.
- (2) DOD / DOS develops personnel transition plan for CPA personnel.
- (3) CENTCOM / COM ensure that every US Government employee in Iraq is accountable either to the US Mission or the MNF-I.

- (4) DOS / DOD develops USG guidelines for screening standards of private security firms, protocol between CPA/MNF-I and COM contractors, rules for use of force and weapons policies. (See Annexes K and N)
- (5) DOD / DOS establishes a Support MOA NLT 15 June, 2004 that delineates each agency's responsibilities in ensuring adequate support of :
 - (a) The Green Zone and other USG sites and facilities management and responsibilities.
 - (b) ASG Central support of the US Mission Iraq and the Green Zone.
 - (c) Information communication technology support to the US Mission and Regional Team sites.
 - (d) Service support for Regional Team sites.
 - (e) Medical support for the US Mission and Regional Teams.
 - (f) Contracting support for the US Mission.
- (6) DOD / DOS establishes a Security MOA NLT 15 June 2004 that delineates each agency's responsibilities in ensuring the success of :
 - (a) MNF-I security of Regional Team (RT) fixed sites and a consultative process to ensure that Regional Coordinator's requirements are clearly defined and supporting security commanders' plans are clearly understood.
 - (b) MNF-I ability and procedures/processes to provide Quick Reaction Force support.
 - (c) DOS/DOS cooperation and support in protecting COM activities in outside the Green Zone.
 - (d) Transferring Personal Security Details from Criminal Investigation Division (CID) to the Diplomatic Security Service (DSS).
- (7) DOD/DOS inventory and transfer all security related CPA equipment to the US Mission IAW contractual requirements and the Federal Acquisition Regulations to support the establishment of US Mission Advance Team and later, the US Mission Iraq.
- (8) DOD/DOS provide effective Health Support Service (HSS) system for all eligible US personnel in IRAQ to include an effective theater evacuation policy (Annex Q).

- (9) DOD/CPA resolve budget shortfalls to ensure adequate funding is available to support acknowledged requirements of the US Mission Iraq in 4th Quarter FY 2004 (Annex L).
 - (10) DOD/DOS establish financial management support to the COM by closing out CPA financial management actions, and establishing the DOS financial system in the US Mission Iraq on or before 30 June 2004, except for those transactions which, by agreement of both the DOS and the DOD, will be completed by DOD, or transferred to the Project and Contracting Office (PCO).
 - (11) DOD, DOS and CPA coordinate information and communications technology (ICT) infrastructure and services contracts to be transferred to DOS and contractual and technical issues in the transition from DOD to DOS. Identify the residual capabilities of CPA and their disposition in the post 30 June 2004 environment and effect such disposition.
- (d) Other Agencies.
- (1) Other US Government executive branch agencies provide appropriate personnel to staff the US Mission Advance Team during June 2004 and the US Mission Iraq, post 30 June 2004 in accordance and coordination with DOS.
 - (2) On 30 June 2004, CPA-IG becomes the Iraq Reconstruction Inspector General (IR-IG), reporting to DOD. (See Annex C)
- (2) Phase III.
- (a) Chief of Mission.
- (1) Reestablish diplomatic relations with Iraq and open the US Mission Iraq on 30 June 2004.
 - (2) Coordinate, as appropriate, with the embassies of other coalition partners to advance coalition objectives in Iraq.
 - (3) Oversee all activities of the US Mission and US personnel not under US Central Command's (USCENTCOM) authority, except those detailed to the staff of International Organizations.
 - (4) Exercise authority over all assigned personnel to the US Mission through the NSDD 38 process.
 - (5) Provide internal security for sites under his direct authority, and ensure coordination with Commander, MNF-I, for additional security requirements.
 - (6) Support the Iraqi national political process and the work of the UN, as appropriate.

- (7) Support Iraqi civil society efforts and local Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), as appropriate.
 - (8) Support development of Iraqi local media.
 - (9) Support the efforts of the MNF-I.
 - (10) Establish the Iraq Reconstruction and Management Office (IRMO) to initiate and oversee IRRF projects.
 - (11) Coordinate with the international community and NGOs in Iraq.
- (b) Department of Defense.
- (1) Establish and sustain a secure environment in which relief and reconstruction tasks will be accomplished.
 - (2) Provide security and support to the US Mission and other US Government agencies in accordance with the Support MOA and Security MOAs.
 - (3) Coordinate through the Director of the Office of Security Transition (OST) with the COM on matters specific to policies associated with developing the capabilities of Iraq Security Forces and other security assistance.
 - (4) Designate the MNF-I Commander as the principal military advisor to the COM.
- (c) Joint DOD/DOS Tasks
- (1) Establish MOA between COM and combatant commander to ensure every US Government employee in Iraq is accountable either to the US Mission or the Combatant Commander.
 - (2) Provide effective Health Service Support (HSS) system for all US personnel in IRAQ to include a proper theater evacuation policy.
 - (3) Resolve budget shortfalls to ensure adequate funding is available to support acknowledged requirements in 4th Quarter FY 2004.
- (3) Phases IV-V.
- (a) Chief of Mission.
- (1) Coordinate with the embassies of other Coalition Partners to advance coalition objectives in Iraq, as appropriate.

- (2) Oversee all activities of the US Mission and US personnel not under the Combatant Commander's authority, except those detailed to the staff of International Organizations.
- (3) Exercise authority over all assigned personnel to the US Mission through the NSDD 38 process.
- (4) Provide internal security for sites under his direct authority and ensure coordination with Commander, MNF-I for additional security requirements.
- (5) Support the Iraqi national political process and the work of the UN, as appropriate.
- (6) Support Iraqi civil society efforts and local Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) as appropriate.
- (7) Support development of Iraqi local media.
- (8) Support the efforts of the MNF-I.
- (9) Initiate and oversee IRRF projects.

(b) Department of Defense.

- (1) Complete security force transition from US to Iraqi local control, when appropriate.
- (2) Transition selected contracts to the US Mission Iraq.
- (3) Complete security force transition to Iraqi Regional Control, when appropriate.
- (4) Complete security force transition to Strategic Overwatch, when appropriate.
- (5) DOD/DOS transition oversight of OST from CDR MNF-I to COM when security conditions permit. (See Annex A – Command and Control)

c. Coordinating Instructions.

- (1) DOD and other US Government agencies are supporting agencies; DOS is the supported agency.
- (2) Commander, MNF-I coordinates fully with the COM on all matters regarding training and equipping the Iraqi security forces.
- (3) DOD/DOS establish formal procedures to conduct regular coordination meetings with multinational force, coalition partners, Iraqi government agencies, and others, as required, for force protection, financial, stationing, and property issues.

- (4) DOD/DOS establish procedures whereby security provided to COM fixed sites result from a consultative process where COM representatives define security requirements and the supporting security commander coordinates plans with the supported COM representatives and adjudicates concerns and issues through consultation.
- (5) COM, in coordination with MNF-I, establishes a US Mission Operations Center (MOC) in the Embassy Annex to oversee the daily implementation and execution of tasks and resolution of resource issues.

4. Administration and Logistics. (See Annex I- Logistics and Annex T – Support MOA)

a. Support concept. This transition will be supported by DOD, DOS, CPA, and representatives of other US Government agencies as necessary. The primary funding source will be the parent organization operating budgets and operational expenses as defined in (Public Law 108-106). Throughout the transition planning and execution, existing procedures, planning, facilities, materiel, technologies, and data systems will be used as much as possible. New systems, facilities, and technologies will be acquired only when no existing system is sufficient to fulfill the needs of the transition process.

b. Materiel and Services.

(1) Logistics. The US Mission Iraq will require comparable logistics support from the MNF-I that it currently provides to the CPA during and after the assumption of authority by the IIG and the establishment of the US Mission Iraq, in accordance with the Support Memorandum of Agreement between DOS and DOD (Annex T). The transition of support will be completed NLT 30 June 2004. DOS will become a customer of the Army LOGCAP contract and assume use of property formerly utilized by CPA. DOD will establish ASG Central under MNF-I to provide direct support to the US Mission and general support to other US Government tenants in the Green Zone. ASG Central will also provide general administrative and logistical support to the Regional Team sites. (Annex O – Regional Teams). The Project and Contracting Office will coordinate the external logistical requirements in support of Iraq's reconstruction contracts. The end-state objective of this transition mission will be a functioning US Mission with the logistical and administrative support necessary to advance US government objectives in Iraq. Throughout, strict accountability of USG property will be an imperative during this transition period. (See Annexes I – Logistics and T- Support MOA).

(2) Facilities and Real Property. DOS, within available funds and with the support and cooperation of DOD and CPA, established a transition office to phase in the occupancy of the C-135 building by 15 May 2004, and the interim chancery, the embassy annex compound, and the Chief of Mission Residence (CMR) NLT 30 June 2004. DOS will accommodate US personnel under the authority of the COM using existing housing units located on the Annex Compound, augmented by 75 additional housing trailers. DOS will acquire the property known as the lakefront site as the location for a permanent US Embassy compound through agreement with the Iraqi Government in exchange for relinquishment of claims to compensation arising from the 1971 expropriation of the former USG Embassy. The available budget for the interim facilities (approximately \$60 million) will permit only limited renovations and

improvements of the interim embassy facilities and will not meet all new embassy compound standards. The renovations will focus on providing secure, safe and functional facilities, in that order of priority, within funding constraints. Adequate physical security will be provided for the interim embassy facilities to support collocation and setback waivers as necessary under the Secure Embassy Construction and Counterterrorism Act of 1999, Title VI, Pub. L. 106-113. (See Annex F – Facilities and Real Property)

- (3) Contract Support. The Project and Contracting Office (PCO) will provide contracts management and program management authority over the construction and non-construction contracts awarded under the Iraqi Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF). Following the intent to be fully operational on 30 June 2004, the PCO stood up on 1 June 04 as a “virtual” organization but continue to work within the CPA. On 1 June, it will transition to the US Mission Advance Team and be under the management oversight of the Chief (DCM designee) but be responsive to the priorities of the Administrator, CPA, through 30 June 2004. The intent is that the “PCO” would work under the management oversight of the Chief, US Mission Advance Team, during the month of June so that the transition on 30 June is seamless. The Department of the Army will assume responsibility for the PCO for funding, staffing, quality assurance, security, facilities, and life support consistent within this intent. Upon establishment of the US Mission Iraq, responsibility for the non-security project requirements definition and prioritization will be transferred from the CPA to the US Mission, while responsibility for security related project requirements definition and prioritization will remain with the Multinational Force – Iraq. (Annex G – Contracts and Acquisition)
- (4) Medical Services. DOD/MNF-I will continue to provide Health Services Support (HSS) to all eligible US personnel according to the standards already established and in place. DOD / MNF-I will coordinate with DOS to provide HSS beyond the capability of the COM for personnel under the authority of the COM. DOS will establish the US Mission Health Unit to provide Primary Care support services to eligible USG employees under the authority of the COM. As USG-funded contractor personnel deploy to Iraq to assume support functions, contractor organizations sourcing these personnel will provide organic primary care medical support or arrange such care from another contractor organization. (Annex Q – Health Service Support).
- (5) Personnel Support. CPA will remain the core headquarters for personnel management functions related to personnel assigned to CPA in Iraq until the dissolution of CPA on 30 June 2004, after which personnel management responsibilities for USG employees previously assigned to CPA and presently assigned to work in Iraq will be split between a number of organizations, including Department of State and the Department of Army. (Annex E – Organizations, Manpower, and Personnel Administration)
- (6) Reimbursements. Reimbursements by the US Mission Iraq to DOD will not be required subsequent to 30 June 2004. The CPA budget for the 4th Quarter of FY 04 will be transferred from DOD to DOS on 30 June except for those funds withheld to pay for services provided to DOS “in kind”. DOD will continue this practice through the first half of FY 2005 or until DOS has received supplemental funds for the second half of FY 05, at which time DOS and DOD will pay for their support services through appropriate reimbursable agreements.

5. Command and Control. (See Annex A – Command and Control)

a. Command.

- (1) The Chief of Mission is the representative of the President of the United States. He will report to the President through the Secretary of State. All executive branch agencies under COM authority, and every element of the Mission, must keep the COM fully informed at all times of their current and planned activities. (See Annex D – Chief of Mission)
- (2) The chain-of-command for the Commander, MNF-I is through the Combatant Commander, CENTCOM, to the Secretary of Defense, to the President.
- (3) The COM has authority over every executive branch employee in the host country (other than those under the authority of the US area military commander or those detailed to the staff of an international organization).
- (4) The COM / CDR USCENTCOM Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) governs security responsibility for DOD elements and personnel in Iraq (Annex S). The MOA assigns security responsibility for all DOD elements/personnel in country to either the COM or the Commander, USCENTCOM.
- (5) All US Government activities and personnel in Iraq, except those detailed to the staff of an International Organization, will be under the authority of either the Chief of Mission or the Commander of the MNF-I.
- (6) Other executive branch agencies must obtain COM approval before assigning personnel to the Mission or host country. NSDD 38 governs proposals.

b. Signal. See Annex H - Information Technology and Communications.

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ANNEXES TO BASE PLAN, OPLAN SOVEREIGN IRAQ

- ANNEX A Command and Control
 - Appendix 1 Base Support Operations in Support of US Mission
 - Appendix 2 US Mission Operations Center (MOC)
- ANNEX B Intelligence
- ANNEX C Iraq Reconstruction Inspector General
- ANNEX D Chief of Mission
 - Appendix 1 Milestones
 - Appendix 2 Legal
 - Appendix 3 Milestones to Legal Appendix
- ANNEX E Organizations, Manpower and Personnel Administration
 - Appendix 1 Milestones
- ANNEX F Facilities and Real Property
 - Appendix 1 Milestones
 - Appendix 2 Facilities
- ANNEX G Contracts and Acquisitions
 - Appendix 1 Milestones
- ANNEX H Information Technology and Communication
 - Appendix 1 Milestones
 - Appendix 2 Military Postal Support
- ANNEX I Logistics
 - Appendix 1 Milestones
 - Appendix 2 Military Air Support Operation in Support of the US Mission
- ANNEX J Consular
 - Appendix 1 Milestones
- ANNEX K Security
 - Appendix 1 Milestones
- ANNEX L Finance
 - Appendix 1 Milestones
- ANNEX M Not used
- ANNEX N Contractor Security (To Be Issued as a Fragmentary Order)
- ANNEX O Regional Teams
 - Appendix 1 Milestones
- ANNEX P Justice
 - Appendix 1 Milestones
- ANNEX Q Health Service Support
 - Appendix 1 Milestones
- ANNEX R Public Affairs
 - Appendix 1 Milestones
- ANNEX S Security Memoranda of Agreement between DOD and DOS
- ANNEX T Support Memorandum of Agreement between DOD and DOS
- ANNEX U Glossary of Terms

CHANGE 1
ANNEX A TO
OPLAN SOVEREIGN IRAQ
2 JULY 2004

ANNEX A –COMMAND AND CONTROL

- References:
- A. 20 Feb 04 Secretary of Defense Memorandum on Iraqi Security Forces
 - B. State/Defense Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on Security, dated December 16, 1997
 - C. Foreign Service Act of 1980, P.L. 96-465
 - D. National Security Decision Directive Number 38, dated 2 June 1982
 - E. Map of Land Required for DOS Embassy Complex
 - F. National Security Presidential Directive 36, dated May 11, 2004
 - G. Mission Performance Plan, FY 20-06, U.S. Embassy Iraq
 - H. Transitional Administrative Law (TAL) with Annex, multiple dates
 - I. Annex S – Security Services and Security Responsibilities Memoranda of Agreement between Department of State and Department of Defense
 - J. Annex T – Support Memorandum of Agreement between Department of State and Department of Defense
 - K. FRAGO-129 Establishment Of New Provincial Civil/Military Coordination Structure to MNC-I OPORD 04-01

1.S situation

a. Current Situation.

- (1) The US Government has established a date of 30 June 2004 for the transfer of sovereignty of Iraq to an Interim Government. At this time, sovereignty will transfer to the Iraqi Interim Government, and the Coalition Provisional Authority will cease to function as the governing authority in Iraq. The US Ambassador to Iraq will present his credentials and establish a US Mission Iraq, effective 1 July. Department of State (DOS) Bureau of Near East Affairs, Iraq (NEA/I) and the US Mission to Iraq will be established as the successor organizations to CPA and will be responsible for representing the interests of the USG, less the military function which will be discharged by the Commander, Multinational Forces Iraq (MNF-I).
- (2) DOS is implementing an organizational model for the US Mission similar to US missions in other countries throughout the world. However, Iraq presents a unique situation, and US forces and its Coalition Partners in Iraq are engaged in daily security, stabilization and reconstruction missions. Therefore, embassy functions will be performed in a non-permissive environment, and extraordinary security, administrative and logistics support will be required. The US Mission will require significant support from other USG agencies until the environment becomes sufficiently permissive to allow for normal operations.
- (3) The US Mission Iraq will have a number of additional command and control challenges beyond its normal functions: 1) It will assume CPA's responsibility for

providing expertise to develop the capabilities within the Ministries of the Iraqi Government; 2) In addition to its normal public diplomacy functions, it will maintain the current broader, robust Public Affairs strategy in the context of not only the US Mission's functions but also the reality of a coalition military at war; 3) It will determine the requirements and prioritize efforts of the Project and Contracting Office (PCO) in implementing the \$18.4B Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF) for non-security related construction projects; 4) It will coordinate with the Commander, MNF-I, to implement enhanced security measures to protect the embassy and US personnel under the COM authority, and manage a range of other missions unique to the security situation in Iraq, and finally; 5) It will maintain a presence outside of Baghdad through Regional Teams to assist both the military commanders and local Iraqi authorities with the on-going transformation of their institutions and programs.

b. Enemy Forces.

- (1) See Annex B - Intelligence
- (2) Enemy threats and commensurate security requirements differ significantly throughout the cities, provinces, and regions of Iraq. Most significant are internal insurgents seeking to undermine the new sovereign Iraqi government. (Annex B - Intelligence)

c. Friendly Forces. See Base Plan - OPLAN Sovereign Iraq

d. Assumptions.

- (1) The Iraqi Interim Government will ascribe to the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL) as the rule of law until a new government is elected, a constitution is written, and laws replacing them are enacted.
- (2) Coalition Partners will continue to participate in the spirit of the Coalition as represented in the combined operations under the Commander, Multinational Force – Iraq.

2. Mission

The US Government establishes a management structure to exercise command and control of military forces, agencies, and activities required to ensure an orderly transfer of sovereignty to the Iraqi Interim Government; establishment of the US Mission Iraq; and conduct of military operations to establish a secure, stable environment in which a democratic government will be established and relief and reconstruction missions can be completed.

3. Execution

a. Concept of Operations.

- (1) Intent. The USG will ensure a seamless transition of those functions to be assumed by the US Mission Iraq from the Coalition Provisional Authority. It will assure that command and coordination relationships between the US Mission, MNF-I, Coalition / international partners, and Iraqi authorities are clear and effective. Furthermore, the

USG will ensure that the responsibilities and interests of the US Government are clearly defined, preserved, and discharged effectively with the least amount of disruption to on-going security, reconstruction and relief operations. The end-state will provide a sound command and control structure is for the United States to include a fully functioning US Mission Iraq and a Multinational Command which operates effectively in close coordination with each other, Coalition / international partners, and Iraqi leadership.

- (2) Over-arching Concept. To achieve this end-state, the transition between CPA/CJTF-7 and the emerging US Mission and MNF-I must be completed by 30 June 2004. The US Mission Iraq and the Multinational Force must ascribe to the principles embedded in Unity of Effort and Unity of Command—in the context of the US Government’ goals and objectives. In achieving unity of effort, both the Mission and Command must share a common and accurate picture of the changing environments throughout Iraq and the Region. Figure 1 depicts in the broadest sense the overarching concept for the command control relationship amongst the major stakeholders (US Mission, MNF-I, and the Iraq Authorities), and these are described in the following sub paragraphs.




Figure 1. Overarching Command and Control Relationships

- (a) The Chief of Mission (COM) is tasked by the President with full responsibility for the direction, coordination, and supervision of all United States Government Executive Branch employees in Iraq, except those detailed to the staff of an International Organization, and personnel under the command of CENTCOM.
- (b) The Combatant Commander, CENTCOM will exercise command and control over US and multinational forces.

- (c) The Iraq National Command Authority will be established under the civilian control of the Iraqi Interim, Transitional, and Permanent Governments as they are established through the National Election process.
 - (d) The COM and CENTCOM Commander will ensure that every US government employee in Iraq is accountable to and under the authority of either the COM or the CENTCOM Commander, except those detailed to the staff of an International Organization.
- (3) US Mission Command and Control. The US Mission Iraq will ensure that the responsibilities and interests of the US Government are preserved and discharged effectively; and in concert with the Multinational Command, continue uninterrupted relief, reconstruction and stabilization efforts in concert with the Iraqi Government and our Coalition and International Partners.




Figure 2. Regional Team Locations

- (a) Mission Structure. The US Mission will consist of the Embassy in Baghdad, four regional team sites of 100-150 interagency, coalition / international partners, and contractor personnel (Mosul, Kirkuk, Hillah, Basrah), a large provincial team site in Baghdad, and five teams of approximately 5-10 personnel embedded with U.S. military major subordinate commands (MSCs) (currently planned for Tikrit, Ramadi, Baqubah, Najaf, Karbala) as shown above in Figure 2.

(b) Chief of Mission (COM). As noted, the COM has full responsibility for the direction, coordination, and supervision of all United States Government executive branch employees in country, except for those seconded to an international organization and personnel under the command of CENTCOM. He is in charge of all US Mission Iraq activities and operations and their conduct in accordance with the DOS International Affairs Strategic Plan and Mission Performance Plan (MPP). As the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, he will lead the US Embassy which will include not only the normal functions of an Embassy, but also features unique to the Chief of Mission's responsibilities in Iraq. Figure 3 presents the unique organizational structure of the US Embassy in Iraq. Although not a part of the US Mission, the MNF-I Commander has a special relationship with the US Ambassador, and this is noted in the solid double line shown between the two senior personnel.




Figure 3. US Mission Iraq

The legend in the figure can be used to identify typical embassy functions. Other significant additions to a normal embassy staff, including the expanded participation of other USG agencies, are also depicted. Of particular note is the large presence of the Justice Department which will be significantly engaged in the Iraqi court system and training of its police forces. The Iraqi Reconstruction Management Office (IRMO) shown in blue and the Project and Contracting Office (PCO) are discussed below.

(c) Iraq Reconstruction Management Office (IRMO). The IRMO will be established formally as a temporary organization by DOS NLT 30 June 2004. However, the CPA, in coordination with the US Mission Advance Team, will form the IRMO as

a "virtual" organization as of 1 June 2004 within the CPA with a director selected by the DOS. Its primary task is to provide executive agency detailees and temporary employees hired under Title 5 USC, Section 3161 authority as senior liaison officers, technical experts, and staff to support the COM in meeting his objective to develop effective Iraqi Ministries. IRMO will also assist the COM in overseeing the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF) program and coordinate the spending requirements and priorities for the IRRF.

- (d) Project and Contracting Office (PCO). DOD will provide acquisition and program management support to the US Mission to execute contracts funded under the supplemental appropriations. DOD will establish the Project and Contracting Office, a temporary organization funded, staffed, and operated by the Army, with forward elements under the authority of the COM. Following the intent to be fully operational on 30 June 2004, the PMO will be redesignated as PCO on 1 June 04 as a "virtual" organization but continue to work within the CPA. On 1 June, it will transition to the US Mission Advance Team and be under the management oversight of the Chief (COM designee) but in direct support of the Administrator, CPA, through 30 June 2004. The intent is that the "PCO" would work under the management oversight of the Chief, US Mission Advance Team, during the month of June so that the transition on 30 June will be seamless. COM will set requirements and priorities for all non-security-related requirements in his oversight of Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF) programs. Commander, MNF-I will set requirements and priorities for all security-related requirements to be followed by PCO and will continue to establish and maintain a secure environment.

(4) MNF-I Command and Control Concept:

- (a) Multinational Force-Iraq. The MNF-I will maintain one multinational brigade and two multinational division sectors under command of the UK, Poland, and the US. Additionally, the US has two divisional sectors commanded by division commanders. These five commanders will be subordinate to Multinational Corps Iraq (MNC-I) commanded by a three star general. The Corps will be under the operational command of the MNF-I Commander. The Commander, MNF-I will be commanded by the CENTCOM Commander and will serve as the principal military advisor to the COM. The Commander, MNF-I retains command or operational control (OPCON) of all US military forces and other DOD personnel not under the authority of the COM. The Commander and his Deputy Commanding General (DCG) for political-military affairs will work with the COM on a day-to-day basis.
- (b) Office of Security Transition. The MNF-I Commander will exercise command of the Office of Security Transition (OST), a 3-star command. The OST will consist of both the Coalition Military Assistance Training Team (CMATT) designed to assist with the manning, training and development of the New Iraqi Army, and the Coalition Police Advisory Training Team (CPATT) with a similar mission for the Iraqi Police Service and Department of Border Enforcement.

- (1) The MNF-I Commander will exercise OPCON of these forces through CDR, MNC-I while the OST commander will have authority and responsibility for employing available resources effectively and for organizing, training, and equipping the Iraqi Security Forces as directed by Commander, MNF-I.
 - (2) The Commander, OST, will coordinate with the US Mission and the Iraqi Ministries of Defense and the Interior concerning the Iraqi Security Forces.
 - (3) While not a member of the US Mission Iraq, the Commander, OST, will maintain a special relationship with the COM for all policy matters concerning the Iraqi police and armed forces. The COM and Commander MNF-I will consult on policies governing the CMATT and CPATT and in rare instances, may submit matters to the Secretaries of State and Defense for coordination and/or adjudication.
 - (4) Commander, MNF-I will continue to set the priorities for OST training and direction of Iraqi Security Forces until the level of security and stability and the capabilities of Iraqi Security Forces allow Iraq to assume a lead role, at which time it may be appropriate to change directive authority over OST from MNF-I to COM.
 - (5) At that point, the OST will transition to an Office of Defense Cooperation (ODC) and the Ministries of Defense and Interior will resume command and control of all security forces in Iraq. The COM will then resume normal ongoing security assistance support through the US Mission's Office of Defense Cooperation (ODC). Throughout these events, the MNF-I works closely with the US Mission and coalition / international partners to establish a secure environment in which diplomatic, relief and reconstruction activities can take place.
- (5) MNF-I Management of the Green Zone and Support to Regional Sites: MNF-I will establish a provisional Area Support group, called ASG Central, in the Green Zone. It will provide direct administrative and logistics support to the COM and general support to other tenants in the Green zone and will coordinate security within the Green Zone. The Commander, ASG Central, will also provide general base operations support to the Regional Sites in Basrah and Al Hillah. However, in the fixed Regional Team Sites, security requirements and plans will be coordinated by the MNF-I Liaison Cell, provided by the supporting security unit commander, through the on-site Regional Security Coordinator (RSO) (Annex O- Regional Teams). ASG Central will transition its responsibilities to the COM when a sufficiently permissive security environment allows the US Mission Iraq to assume normal operations. Until the Iraqi Government assumes responsibility for the Green Zone, a facilities management office will be established within the ASG Central Command to coordinate space allocation and tenancy for the COM and coordinate support for all tenants within the Green Zone. Because of the sensitive nature of space within the Green Zone and the competition by other nations for prime space, the COM/DCM will approve property allocations within the Green Zone. The Commander, ASG Central will prepare staff recommendations for the COM in such instances. COM will provide office space within the Annex Compound for ASG Central augmentees to the US Mission.

- (6) Coordinating Efforts: The requirement to have all major stakeholders coordinate effectively is a challenge requiring both conceptual and physical interoperability. Interoperability must extend to the execution of all contracted relief and reconstruction tasks as well as normal diplomatic and governance matters in a way that advances US objectives and minimizes security risks. Frequent communication and coordination between coalition / international partner Embassies and donors is critical to building a free, democratic, and stable Iraq. It is expected that respective diplomats in Iraq, together with diplomats from multilateral organizations, will establish multiple inter-Embassy contact groups in Baghdad and probably in the provinces. Such groups would provide fora – and, where and when desired, coordination – to discuss subjects of mutual interest, and provide a venue to compare and track progress. Notwithstanding the establishment of such contact groups on the ground, it is expected that respective diplomats’ reporting channels would accord with usual sending state practice for foreign assistance and all other programs.
- (a) US Mission Operations Center (MOC). To achieve this, the COM, in coordination with MNF-I, establishes a joint/interagency US Mission Operations Center (MOC) in the Annex. This organization will oversee the daily implementation and execution of tasks and resolution of issues. It will serve as an emergency operations center to coordinate security preparations and response and coordinate security requirements in advance of execution. It will provide the COM and the MNF-I with the same common operational picture of unfolding events. US Mission Regional Teams will report directly to the COM / DCM through the communications capabilities found in the MOC. The Regional Teams will also align with the local commanders and establish habitual relationships for coordination of US Mission and MNF-I operations.
- (b) Joint Coordination Centers (JCC). The MNF-I will establish JCCs in the provinces for coordinating Iraqi and MNF-I First Responders to incidents that occur locally. These centers will provide necessary additional platforms for coordinating and controlling events to include administrative movements of personnel under COM authority within Iraq.
- (c) Civil-Military Operations Centers (CMOCs). In each province, MSCs will establish CMOCs to function as security and logistics coordination centers for civil agencies, contractors and subcontractors, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and international organizations (IOs), and UN missions. Establishment of CMOCs will ensure the ability to coordinate local government development, reconstruction, and support for elections. CMOCs will cooperate with Regional Coordinators and IPAOs for provincial activities.
- (d) Provincial Support Liaison Teams (PSLTs). In each province, MSCs will also establish PSLTs. These teams will function, in consonance with policies established by the US Mission through Regional Coordinators and subordinate to the wishes of the sovereign Iraqi government, to support development and growth of the provincial and local governments and to provide liaison between multinational forces, provincial governments, and US mission elements in the provinces.

- (e) The US Mission and the MNF-I will achieve unity of effort in administration and logistics support through the Area Support Group concept as well as the IRMO and the PCO.
- b. Command and Control Phases: The establishment of this command and control structure will be conducted in the following phases:
- (1) Phase I. Phase I began when the Transition Team arrived in Baghdad on 19 March 2004 and ended when the US Mission Advance Team was established on 1 June 2004. During this phase, to the extent possible, all elements in CPA that were to transition to the US Mission Iraq will have been configured consistent with their post-transition structure and lines of authority, e.g. the IRMO, Public Affairs Office, ASG Central, and the PCO. ASG Central will be in direct support of the US Embassy and general support of other US tenants. It will manage the Green Zone and provide logistics and administrative support to the MNF-I headquarters located in the Green Zone and general support to Regional Sites in Basrah and Al Hillah.
 - (2) Phase II. Phase II began on 1 June and ends on 30 June 2004. DOS will have begun to establish the offices and activities integral to normal US Embassy designs in mid-May. By 30 June 2004, the embassy will be of sufficient size and staffing to support the Chief of Mission in the performance of his duties. Figure 3 on page A-5 depicts the US Mission command and control relationships that will be in effect on 30 June 2004, the beginning of Phase III. During Phase II, the reconfigured elements assigned to the US Mission Advance Team as "virtual" organizations will be under the management oversight of the DCM designee but will remain responsible to the Director, CPA and under his authority. ASG Central will be OPCON to MNF-I who is the supporting commander; the Director, CPA remains the chief of the supported agency but the DCM designee will have management oversight of the support requirements during this phase.
 - (3) Phase III. Phase III begins on 30 June 2004 with establishment of the US Mission Iraq. Selected functions and personnel of the CPA will have been transferred to the US Mission Advance Team during Phase II as noted above. These functions will either be resident in temporary organizations (IRMO or PCO) or absorbed into the embassy staff on 30 June 2004. Phase III terminates with the end of the fiscal year on 30 September 2004. Since the reorganization of the elements of CPA is accomplished in Phases I and II, there will be minimal changes to the structure of the US Mission during Phase III, other than closing financial activities of the former CPA, adjusting contracts at the request of COM, and managing redeployment, all of which will be completed through the IRMO or PCO. ASG Central will continue to support the US Mission and other US Government tenants in the Green Zone. The US Mission will provide assistance to the Iraqi Interim Government and the UN as it prepares for national elections. Phase III ends on 30 Sep 2004.
 - (4) Phase IV. Phase IV begins 1 October 2004. US Mission continues representing the interests of the US Government, and prioritization of relief and reconstruction efforts. US Mission plans for post-election transition. MNF-I continues to establish and maintain a secure environment. As the US Mission develops the capacity to manage

administrative and logistics support, the embassy will incrementally assume appropriate functions from ASG Central until the US Mission provides all required support functions. Green Zone management functions performed by ASG Central will begin to be transferred to Iraqi government organizations, as appropriate. Phase IV ends with ASG Central drawing down as the US Embassy or Iraqi government assumes some admin/log functions as security environment allows.

- (5) Phase V. Phase V begins on or about 1 Feb 05, after a transitional Iraqi government is seated. During this phase, most of the projects funded by the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund Public Law 108-106 will be completed, and the US Mission will begin to assume normal operations as security environment allows. During this phase, ASG Central will be deactivated as the US Mission assumes responsibility for its own administrative and logistics support and will hand off its Green Zone management functions to the Iraqi government.

c. Tasks by Phase.

(1) Phase I-II.

(a) Department of State

- (1) Determine, in coordination with other agencies, the functions now performed within CPA to be retained in the US Mission, including those duties and responsibilities established by the COM.
- (2) Establish the US Mission Advance Team by 1 June 2004, initially staffed with sufficient personnel to develop the organizational framework and enlarge the embassy staff to an effective operational level by 30 June 2004.
- (3) Establish the Iraq Reconstruction Management Office (IRMO) as a temporary organization with the primary missions to oversee liaison support to the Iraqi ministries and to identify requirements and priorities for IRRF funded projects. The IRMO will have Title 5 USC, Section 3161 hiring authority. The tenure of each element within the IRMO will be determined by the COM.
- (4) Provide management oversight of designated "virtual" organizations during Phase II so that each will transition seamlessly on 30 June to the US Mission (IRMO, PCO, PAO)
- (5) Establish four regional team sites.
- (6) Provide 10 Foreign Service Officers (FSOs) to act as LNOs and Iraq Provincial Action Officers (IPAOs) in support of MSC commanders.

(b) Department of Defense

- (1) Reorganize current organizations supporting the CPA and other US Government agencies into an Area Support Group (ASG Central). ASG Central will be assigned to the MNF-I and continue to provide general

administrative and logistics support to US government tenants in the Green Zone and will be in direct support of the US Mission until the Mission can support itself.

- (2) Begin on 1 June 2004 to establish the ASG Central, manage the Green Zone and coordinate security of the Green Zone with US government and contracted security organizations.
- (3) Provide, through the MNF-I, security for the Convention Center in the Green Zone. Commander, ASG Central will manage the Convention Center.
- (4) Continue to manage the Green Zone during Phases I through III, and transition support/coordination for the Green Zone to the US Mission or other organizations during Phase IV or V.
- (5) Establish the Project and Contracting Office (PCO), a temporary organization funded, staffed, and operated by the Army, with the forward staff under the authority of the COM. Establish the PCO forward as a "virtual" organization under the management oversight of the US Embassy Advance Team. If required, establish an MOA to support non-security related projects and acquisitions for which the COM has responsibility for determining requirements and establishing priorities of construction/acquisition.
- (6) Establish, through the Commander, MNF-I, requirements and priorities for PCO programs related to the training and equipping of Iraqi Security Forces.
- (7) Command through the Commander, ASG Central those military forces providing administrative and logistical support to the US Mission in the Baghdad/Green Zone region, until the US Mission is capable of sustaining itself.
- (8) Coordinate with the COM on facilities management and recommend space allocation within the Green Zone for COM approval.
- (9) Establish the Office of Security Transition (OST), a three-star command, within the MNF-I. OST will consist of the Coalition Military Assistance Training Team (CMATT) and the Civilian Police Advisory Training Team (CPATT).
- (10) Assist DOS in coordinating the transfer of functions, personnel, and support from the CPA to the US Embassy and MNF-I.
- (11) Provide one (1) Foreign Area Officer to each regional site and to each embedded team. Priority of fill to regional sites.
- (12) Provide one (1) PAO to each regional site and to each embedded team. Priority of fill to regional sites.
- (13) Provide Civil Affairs support to embedded State teams.

- (14) Establish CMOCs and PSLTs in each province.
- (15) Establish at least one JCC in each major city.
- (16) Provide a Civil Affairs LNO to regional team sites in Al Hillah and Basrah to coordinate activities between Regional Coordinators and multinational CMOCs and PSLTs.

(2) Phase III.

(a) Department of State.

DOS exercises COM Authority over the US Mission Iraq.

(b) Department of Defense

Develop criteria, in coordination with DOS, to determine when it is appropriate to change directive authority over OST from MNF-I to COM.

(3) Phase IV-V.

(a) Department of State.

DOS exercises COM Authority over the US Mission Iraq

(b) Department of Defense

DOD transitions directive authority over OST from MNF-I to COM.

d. Coordinating Instructions.

- (1) The CPA Inspector General (CPA-IG) is the only USG entity established by Congress with a unique Iraq reconstruction mission currently supporting the Administrator, CPA. The CPA-IG, whose mission is established to not exceed a six (6) month period following the disestablishment of the CPA, is under the general supervision of the SecDef but also reports independently to the US Congress. (Annex C).
- (2) DOD/DOS establish command and control structures that will ensure transfer of sovereignty to the Iraqi Interim Government and establishment of an effective US Mission Iraq. Ensure an orderly, seamless transfer of CPA functions as identified in this plan from the former CPA to the US Mission Iraq in coordination with MNFI.
- (3) DOD/DOS develop personnel transition and redeployment plans for current CPA personnel and implement them by the end of Phase II or Phase III as required.
- (4) CENTCOM/COM ensure that every US government employee in Iraq is accountable either to the US Mission or the Combatant Commander.

- (5) DOS/DOD promulgate USG guidelines for screening standards of private security firms, protocol between MNFI/CPA and COM contractors, Rules of Force (ROF), weapons policies, and licensing of contractors performing non-COM activities.
- (6) In accordance with “State / Defense Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on Security,” dated December 16, 1997, DOS and DOD develop a Security MOA unique to Iraq.
- (7) Identify those functions within the current CPA that will transition as integral to the US Embassy, those functions that would be residual as a part of the US Mission such as IRMO, PAO or APCO, and those functions that should be eliminated.

4. Administration and Logistics

- a. US Mission in the Green Zone will be supported by the ASG Central, under command of MNF-I, until the US Mission is fully capable of self-sustainment.
- b. Regional teams (Annex O) will be supported per the Security and Support MOAs (Annexes S and T).

5. Command and Control

- a. Command. As specified in this Annex.
- b. Signal. See Annex H – Information and Communications Technology.

APPENDIX I TO
ANNEX A TO
OPLAN SOVEREIGN IRAQ
11 JUNE 2004

APPENDIX I – BASE SUPPORT OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF US MISSION -
TO ANNEX A – COMMAND AND CONTROL

- References:
- A. 20 Feb 04 Secretary of Defense Memorandum on Iraqi Security Forces
 - B. Foreign Service Act of 1980 P.L. 96-465
 - C. National Security Decision Directive Number 38, dated 2 June 1982
 - D. Observations and Recommendations for Security of State Department Assets in the Green Zone
 - E. Map of Land Required for DOS Embassy Complex
 - F. Annex A – Command and Control
 - G. Annex K – Security
 - H. Annex S – Security Services and Security Responsibilities Memoranda of Agreement between Department of State and Department of Defense
 - I. Annex T – Support Memorandum of Agreement between Department of State and Department of Defense
 - J. Area Support Group-Central Function Brief to BG West, MNFI-C4, 9 June 2004

1.S ituation

- a. Current Situation. As the CPA transfers authority to the US Mission Iraq, requirements for MNF-I security and support will not be eliminated. Expectations are that security will remain an even greater need during the transition period. The Green Zone was designed to protect both the seats of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and the Iraqi Interim Government. Security of the Green Zone remains critical to the successful operation of the US Mission Iraq, the operations of the Iraqi Interim Government, the missions and embassies of other multinational force partners, and the Multinational Force-Iraq (MNF-I). In this respect, the Green Zone resembles a small city in a combat zone, with requirements for many of the same complex support functions that agencies residing within a municipality require. This set of circumstances creates complexity for organizations which provide security and essential service support to the Chief of Mission (COM), other US Government activities, multinational force partners, the Iraqi Government, and other tenants in the Green Zone. It places a premium on establishing standard operating procedures. Other sites throughout Iraq have been established which provide essential security and support for CPA personnel who are performing various functions. Tactical commanders now perform the base operations / “mayoral” mission for these other sites.
- b. Enemy Forces. See Annex B – Intelligence
- c. Friendly Forces. See Base Plan - OPLAN Sovereign Iraq
- d. Assumptions.

- (1) The security environment will not change in the near future.
- (2) CPA is in transition and will need enhanced base support operations (BASOPS) support.
- (3) The US Mission will require similar, increased support in the near term.
- (4) Base Support Operations units may be staffed with personnel from all services.
- (5) Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) Task order 44 will be extended to Sept 30, 2004 and will add US Mission as customer.
- (6) A new LOGCAP task order will be developed to be effective on or before 1 Oct 2004.
- (7) Funding will be available for US agencies to carry out missions and to fund support.
- (8) The commander of the ASG Central will be responsible for providing direct support to the US Mission Iraq.

2. Mission

Not later than 15 June 2004, the Commander, MNF-I, provides base support operations and facilities management support to the CPA and the US Mission Advance Team within the Green Zone and at designated locations throughout Iraq. On 30 June 2004, MNF-I provides direct support to the US Mission Iraq and general support to other US Government tenants in the Green Zone, and to US Mission Regional Teams in Mosul, Kirkuk, Al Hillah, and Basrah, in accordance with the Support Memorandum of Agreement Between DOD and DOS. Be prepared to support other agencies / organizations as directed.

3. Execution

a. Concept of Operation:

- (1) Intent. The US Mission Iraq lacks the resources to provide essential administrative and logistical support at sites in the Green Zone or the four Regional Team sites in Mosul, Al Hillah, Kirkuk, and Basrah. The Support MOA (Annex T) signed by DOS and DOD outlines specific support requirements and responsibilities. By 15 June 2004, base support operations (BASOPS) support and services will transition from the current CPA Headquarters Support Group to a provisional Area Support Group (ASG Central) established in the Green Zone. ASG-Central provides logistical services and coordinates military support to the U.S. Mission Iraq, including the Regional Team sites. ASG-Central also manages the Green Zone installation and provides logistical support as directed. ASG Central specified tasks include:
 - (a) Provide services to the US Mission Iraq that exceed the Mission's capabilities;
 - (b) Provide support to US Mission regional team sites in Mosul, Kirkuk, al Hillah, and Basrah;

- (c) Coordinate rotary and fixed wing air transportation for the US Mission Iraq;
- (d) Coordinate military support requirements for US Mission Iraq with MNF-I;
- (e) Provide human resource management services to US Military personnel under COM authority and augment the US Mission Human Resource Office as directed; .
- (f) Provide select services to tenant MNF-I units within the Green Zone;
- (g) Coordinate between the commander responsible for security and force protection of the security zone and tenants within the Green Zone;
- (h) Coordinate support to USG facilities within the Green Zone as directed;
- (i) Manage the operation of the Convention Center and al Rasheed Hotel;
- (j) Coordinate law enforcement activities within the Green Zone;
- (k) Coordinate military support for UN Mission Iraq as directed.




Figure 1. ASG Central

(2) The Iraqi Interim Government and embassies of other multinational force and international partners will be located within the Green Zone and will be responsible for their own administrative and logistical support. As relationships normalize between the new Iraqi Government and the embassies of various nations, the Green Zone will gradually come under the management and control of the Iraqis, most likely after

national elections are complete, a new government is formed and a Constitution is adopted.

b. Phasing of base operations support to the US Mission.

- (1) Phases I-II. Phase I ended on 31 May 2004. Phase II involves efforts to restructure, replace, or redeploy CPA organizations and personnel in preparation for establishment of the US Mission. During Phase II, the CPA Headquarters Support Group (HSG) will have transitioned into the ASG Central, with additional capabilities added to ensure no loss of functionality within the Green Zone, with initial operational capability on 15 June 2004, and full operational capability (FOC) not later than 30 June 2004. ASG Central will be subordinate to the Commander, MNF-I, but will have the missions of direct support to US Mission Iraq facilities and general support to other U. S. Government tenants in the Green Zone. In addition to other responsibilities, the ASG Central Commander will manage the Convention Center and al Rasheed Hotel in the Green Zone. ASG Central will also provide general administrative and logistical support to the Regional Teams, using the most appropriate means, including continuation of existing LOGCAP support to these sites. (See Annex O – Regional Teams) Phase II ends on 30 June 2004 at which time the CPA dissolves, the US Mission is established and ASG Central achieves Full Operational Capability (FOC) under the command of MNF-I, but in direct support of the US Mission Iraq and general support of other US tenants in the Green Zone.
- (2) Phase III. Phase III begins with establishment of the US Mission on 30 June 2004. MNF-I will provide logistics and administrative support to US Mission regional sites using current BASOPS organizations and capabilities in accordance with the Support Memorandum of Agreement between Department of State and Department of Defense (Annex T - Support MOA). ASG Central will continue admin/log support to the US Mission and other organizations and agencies within the Green Zone, and regional teams, as stated above. In addition, a facilities management office will be established within the ASG Central to coordinate space allocation and tenancy for the COM and coordinate similar support for all tenants within the Green Zone. Because of the sensitive nature and competition for prime space within the Green Zone, the COM will approve property allocation within the Green Zone and will receive staff analysis and recommendations from the Commander, ASG Central. COM will provide office space within the Annex Compound for ASG Central augmentees to the US Mission. Phase III ends on 30 Sep 2004.
- (3) Phase IV. Phase IV begins on 1 Oct 2004. ASG Central will continue to provide direct support to the US Mission in accordance with the Support MOA and be in general support for other Green Zone tenants and Regional Team (RT) sites. General administrative and logistics support to RT sites in Al Hillah and Basrah will be provided by ASG Central. Admin/log support to US Mission Regional Team sites in Mosul and Kirkuk may be transferred to ASG North and AST Kirkuk when the ASGs are activated. Phase IV ends with transfer of authority between the provisional ASG Central and the OIF 3 ASG that has been sourced for the Green Zone support mission.
- (4) Phase V. Phase V begins with the establishment of the Iraqi Transitional Government o/a 1 Feb 2005 and ends when the US Mission and regional sites are fully operational

and conditions in Iraq allow for normalized embassy operations. As the US Mission develops the capacity to provide necessary administrative and logistics support, ASG Central will gradually hand off functions to US Mission staff and draw down.

- c. Base Operations Support. BASOPS providers will determine the most effective means to satisfy US Mission support requirements, using competitive contracts, as well as military resources or LOGCAP based on the ASG Central Commander's assessment of the best way to meet support requirements.
- (1) Support will be provided to sites hosting the following types of agencies/organizations.
- (a) US Forces (Military and DOD civilian)
 - (b) Multinational forces on US bases other than the Green Zone.
 - (c) US Mission Iraq personnel, including:
 - (1) DOS personnel and other US government employees in the US Mission
 - (2) Agencies under COM not in DOS-controlled facilities (i.e., PCO, Department of Justice Program facilities)
 - (3) Agencies under COM located in regional sites (Mosul, Al Hillah, Basrah, Kirkuk)
 - (4) Personnel under COM embedded in MNF-I units
 - (5) Multinational Force - Iraq personnel collocated with US Mission Iraq
 - (d) Non-DOD contractors and NGOs funded by the US Government, per contractual agreements
 - (e) MNF-I in US Mission facilities (Embassy Annex)
 - (f) Locally Engaged Staff (LES)
 - (g) United Nations agencies as directed on a reimbursable basis, as directed
 - (h) Official International Organizations, Foreign Nations, and US delegations as directed on a reimbursable basis, as directed
 - (i) Government contractors per statements of work that specify the provision of certain government support
 - (j) AAFES per pending MOU being established with MNF-I.
 - (k) American Red Cross

- (2) Anticipated BASOPS functions in accordance with the Support MOA include (For detailed support to the US Mission, see Support MOA at Annex T):
- (a) Water (potable and non-potable)
 - (b) Shower and Latrine Facilities
 - (c) Billeting and Office Space with Power and Environmental Control Units
 - (d) Laundry Services
 - (e) Food Service Operations
 - (f) Communications/Director of Information Management (DOIM) Functions
 - (g) Force Protection Coordination
 - (h) Non – Tactical Vehicle Motor Pool
 - (i) Retail Fuel Support
 - (j) Equipment Maintenance
 - (1) Generators and other infrastructure
 - (2) Vehicle
 - (3) Office Equipment
 - (a) Postal Operations (Appendix 2 – Military Postal Support Operations in Support of US Mission to Annex H – Information and Communications Technology)
 - (b) Power Generation
 - (c) Property Accountability and Supply Operations
 - (d) Vector Control
 - (e) Waste Management
 - (f) Morale and Welfare
 - (g) AAFES
 - (h) Class V support
- (3) All mobile teams will be assigned permanent housing at one base and will require the same type of support provided to the regional teams at their base sites. Mobile teams must billet at existing military facilities when not in Green Zone.

- (4) Mobile teams preparing for travel in Iraq must submit requirements for logistical support prior to leaving base camps.
- (5) Individuals and mobile teams away from base sites may receive a different level of support depending on the capabilities of the supporting base support activity.
- (6) Regional offices not located on a US military base will receive a modified level of support services.
- (7) Individual personnel or teams embedded with MNF-I units will receive the same level of support services as the MNF-I unit.
- (8) Coalition / Multinational Force – Iraq personnel authorized by the COM to collocate with US Mission Iraq will receive the same level of support services as USG personnel on a reimbursable basis. The Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreements (ACSA) will be the vehicle for logistical support and services to coalition / international partners.
- (9) Certain non-DoD contractors and assistance providers funded by the US Government collocated with US Mission Iraq will receive support services on a reimbursable basis as agreed upon by COM and CDR USCENTCOM.
- (10) Support services to Locally Engaged Staff (LES) will be in accordance with US Mission LES compensation plan.
- (11) Support services to official delegations and other categories of visitors will be provided on a reimbursable basis.

d. Tasks.

- (1) Department of State:
 - (a) By 15 May 2004, essential service support required post 30 June 2004 will have been identified.
 - (b) By 15 May 2004, security requirements beyond the capability of DOS necessary for effective security of all personnel under COM authority will have been identified.
 - (c) Identify sites and support requirements for Regional Teams.
- (2) Department of Defense:
 - (a) Not later than 15 June 2004, establish ASG Central and be prepared to provide admin / log support to specified regional team sites in accordance with Support MOA (Annex T – Support MOA).

- (b) MNF-I, in addition to other security requirements provide security for the Convention Center and the Al Rasheed Hotel in the Green Zone. Commander, ASG Central will manage the Convention Center and al Rasheed Hotel.
 - (c) Provide external security to US Mission Iraq beyond that for which the Mission has internal capabilities.
 - (d) MNF-I/ASG-Central will coordinate with COM and non-U.S. embassies to develop an access policy that provides for controlled access of Iraqi nationals into the Green Zone.
- e. Coordinating Instructions.
- (1) DOD and DOS enter into a Memorandum of Agreement on Security no later than 8 June 2004. (Annex S – Security MOAs).
 - (2) DOD and DOS enter into a Memorandum of Agreement on Support no later than 8 June 2004. (Annex T – Support MOA).
 - (3) For both security and support arrangements, COM and Commander, MNF-I establish a mechanism to ensure information sharing regarding movement of personnel under COM authority, movement or activities of US government contractors in Iraq performing work under IRRF and other programs, and other categories of personnel not under COM authority but performing work for which COM has responsibility.
 - (4) DOS will continue to utilize Federal Deployment Centers at Ft. Belvoir and in Kuwait until September 30, 2004 for preparation and deployment of personnel.
 - (5) DOS will use commercial logistical services when available for staff and programs; DOD will provide external logistic support as a contingency. The priority of effort will be determined based on availability and mission.
 - (6) US and UN will develop a separate MOA for support UN missions in Iraq as required when the decisions are made as to the extent of UN participation and presence in Iraq.

4. Administration and Logistics

Per this annex. See Annex I – Logistics, and Annex T – Support MOA.

5. Command and Control

- a. Command. See Annex A – Command and Control. ASG Central is assigned to MNF-I. The ASG Central Commander reports to MNF-I Chief of Staff, and supports the US Mission Iraq in accordance with the Support MOA.
- b. Signal. See Annex H – Information and Communications Technology.

CHANGE 1 TO
APPENDIX 2 TO
ANNEX A TO
OPLAN SOVEREIGN IRAQ
2 JULY 2004

APPENDIX 2 – US EMBASSY BAGHDAD OPERATIONS CENTER - TO ANNEX A –
COMMAND AND CONTROL

References: Annex A – Command and Control-to OPLAN Sovereign Iraq

1.S situation

a. Current Situation.

- (1) The US Government transferred sovereignty in Iraq to the Iraqi Interim Government (IIG) on 28 June 2004, and the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) ceased to function as the governing authority in Iraq. DOS Near East Affairs-Iraq (NEA-I) and the US Mission Iraq were established as the successor organization to CPA and are responsible for representing the interests of the United States, less the military function, which will be discharged by the Commander, Multinational Forces, Iraq (MNF-I).
- (2) The Department of State is implementing an organizational model for the US Mission Iraq similar to US missions in other countries but modified to meet the challenges in Iraq. However, Iraq presents a unique situation for the US Mission in that the United States and other multinational forces are engaged in daily security, stabilization and reconstruction missions.
- (3) The security situation in Iraq severely limits the movement and productivity of personnel. Facilities in Baghdad and particularly those in outlying regions, present particularly difficult security and logistics support challenges for the Chief of Mission (COM). Freedom of movement by land or air is constrained, productivity is reduced, and the speed at which the COM's missions are accomplished is constrained.
- (4) The unique challenges brought on by the security situation require equally unique command and control relationships as well as a capability for synthesizing information flow, monitoring implementation of plans, and responding with appropriate resources in a timely manner across both the military and civilian sectors.
- (5) The Multinational Force-Iraq (MNF-I) operates a joint operations center at its headquarters through which it exercises command and control (C2) over its forces and responded to emergency situations throughout its Area of Operation. This operations center supported the CPA in discharging similar operational responsibilities in what could be viewed as a Joint Operations Center for the MNF-I and the US Embassy.

b. Enemy Forces. See Annex B – Intelligence

c. Friendly Forces. See Base Plan – OPLAN Sovereign Iraq

d. Assumptions.

- (1) The Regional Security Coordination Office came under the management oversight of the US Embassy on 28 June, 2004.
- (2) MNF-I headquarters remained in Camp Victory, Baghdad.
- (3) The US Embassy will have regional teams located in four locations in Iraq and five State embedded teams (SETs) with MSC headquarters. (Annex O-Regional Teams)
- (4) MNF-I will maintain Joint Coordination Centers throughout the country, as required, to manage first responder support to both Iraqi and multinational military and non-military personnel.
- (5) The current joint operations center (JOC)—the MNF-I Commander's Situation Room (CSR)—in the Annex Compound in Baghdad is available for restructuring as the nucleus for a US Mission Operations Center.

2. Mission

The US Embassy Baghdad, supported by the MNF-I, establishes a Baghdad Operations Center (BOC) by 30 June 2004 providing an integrated operations center capability to coordinate and synthesize essential information elements between those under the authority of the COM and MNF-I, and other interagency organizations, and providing common situational awareness to senior leaders to work crises that require their attention and decisions.

3. Execution

- a. Concept of Operations. The COM and the Commander, MNF-I, will establish a US Embassy Baghdad Operations Center (BOC) in the Embassy Annex, collocating representatives of the US Embassy Executive Secretary, Political section, Political-Military section, and Regional Security Office with MNF-I operations representatives. (See Embassy Organization Chart in Annex A – Command and Control) The Regional Operations section will provide the initial staff and be the Embassy lead in the BOC. The BOC will be linked electronically with the MNF-I operations center at Camp Victory, providing continuous communications in an operational culture of rapid planning and response, coupled with continuous situational awareness, decisive execution and continuous tracking of events. The BOC will provide the COM positive command and control of his Regional Teams and other US Embassy activities deployed outside the security areas of the Green Zone, the Regional Sites, and other locations he might establish. The intent of the BOC is to provide the COM and the Commander, MNF-I a common awareness and understanding of threats, operations, and activities throughout Iraq; to ensure an integrated political/military approach to issue resolution and emergency response; and to provide a forum for coordinated resource-management decisions to support COM operations.
- b. Conduct of Operations. The BOC must reach initial operational capability (IOC) NLT 30 June 2004 and full operational capability (FOC) NLT 15 July 2004. Activities during the five phases will include:

- (1) During Phase II, MNF-I and CPA, in coordination with the ITPT Baghdad and CENTCOM, will identify the key functions and responsibilities of and complete the plan for establishment of the BOC. Initial studies recommend the use of the current CSR as the nucleus for the reorganization into the BOC. The MNF-I JOC Forward will retain an adequate staff and command and control suite to perform the mission and will form the nucleus of the US Embassy BOC. The US Embassy Executive Secretary and Regional Security Office will collocate with the MNF-I Operations Staff to complete formation of the BOC and by doing so, will establish immediate and continuous coordination of operations between the COM and the Commander, MNF-I.
- (2) During Phase II, CPA Governorate Teams (GT's) at Basrah, Al Hillah, Kirkuk, and Mosul (See Annex O – Regional Teams), under the management oversight of the Chief, US Mission Advanced Team, will transition to become the US Mission Regional Teams. The RSO will plan for and begin to assume management oversight of select security functions. The CPA will transfer necessary security functions to the BOC as required so that the US Mission Advance Team's oversight will flow seamlessly into continuous operations on 30 June 2004. CENTCOM will assist the MNF-I and the US Mission Advance Team in developing the BOC into an organization capable of meeting the COM's command and control requirements and ensuring that the COM and MNF-I activities are synchronized to the degree required.
- (3) Phase III. Establish the BOC NLT 30 June 2004 in the MNF-I Commander's Situation Room (CSR) in the Embassy Annex. The BOC will be a fusion of POL/Regional Ops, the Exec Sec, RSO, and POL-MIL. Representatives of these sections will comprise an on-call or full-time Embassy staff representation in the CSR depending on the situation/crisis at hand, for a BOC Forward.
 - (a) CSR. The CSR will include the Embassy BOC Forward, MNF-I Force Operations Center Forward functional staff (FOC FWD), the MNF-I CMO National Civil-Military Operations Center (NCMOC FWD), other US Government agencies, and international organization such as the UN. The MNF-I Chief of Operations (CHOPS) is the CSR officer-in-charge (OIC), who is responsible for establishing the common situational picture.
 - (b) BOC. The BOC is responsible to the COM/DCM and the CHOPS and serves as an operations/coordination center. (See Figure 1) The size and scope of BOC is situational dependent, for routine or crisis action coverage. Personnel in the BOC review Embassy cable traffic, Intelligence reports, and operational reports of Regional Offices and State Embedded Teams (SETs). The BOC receives:
 - (1) Coalition and interagency situational awareness from the CSR, FOC FWD, NCMOC and Interagency watch desks;
 - (2) Status of security operations, infrastructure security, essential services, reconstruction efforts and election developments;
- (4) Phases III-V. Continue support to US Embassy operations until the requirement is terminated as conditions in Iraq warrant.




Figure 1. The Integrated US Embassy & MNF-I Operations Center

c. Tasks.

(1) Department of Defense.

- (a) Through the CPA, coordinate with the US Mission Advance Team to develop the BOC, and support the Advance Team in developing its standard operating procedures and concept of operations. Plan for collocation of assets as noted above and establish 30 June as the IOC for the BOC.
- (b) Establish work space for the BOC in CSR.
- (c) Establish hotline connectivity.
- (d) Ensure that clear lines of reporting, command and control are established so that the COM has positive C2 of activities under his authority outside the International Zone.
- (e) Ensure that the BOC is linked electronically to the MNF-I Operations Center and with those multinational force / international partners as required. Ensure that the regional sites have reliable communications with the BOC.

(2) Department of State.

- (a) Initiate efforts to define processes and procedures to include staffing, requirements, products and relationship with the DS Ops Center, Embassy Sections, Regional Offices & SETs and CHOPS.

- (b) Establish 24/7 operations. POL/Regional Ops attend shift-change briefings.
- (c) Ensure that communications capability and procedures are in place to manage requests for security and emergency response to incidents involving assets under the COM authority.
- (d) Ensure that sufficient space is allocated within the Embassy Annex Compound or other facility for collocating the ExecSec, RSO, and MNF-I CSR (or FOC FWD).
- (e) Draft and release cable to key DS and DOD entities outlining the establishment and responsibilities of the BOC.

d. Coordinating Instructions.

- (1) The BOC will be integrated into a broader command and control net for the COM, including the Regional Sites.
- (2) Requirements to support multinational force / international partners through the BOC or the operations centers at the regional sites must be determined in Iraq. It is clear that multinational force / international partners will request participation in COM activities at both the Annex Compound such as being in the liaison groups to Iraqi Ministries and in the regional sites where they may request presence.
- (3) COM will assess, in coordination with the MNF-I commander, requirement for PCO staff in the BOC to ensure integration of their construction activities as they relate to security, convoy control, etc. PCO will have its own operations center outside (¾ mile north) of the Embassy Annex, co-located with the NCMOC Main. Coordination will be through the NCMOC FWD inside the CSR/BOC.

4. Administration and Logistics

US Mission Iraq will be supported by the Area Support Group (ASG Central), until the US Mission is fully capable of self-sustainment. Support requirements for the BOC, as defined in Annex T – Support MOA, will be met by the ASG Central.

5. Command and Control

- a. Command. As specified in Annex A.
- b. Signal. See Annex H – Information Technology and Communications.

ANNEX B TO
OPLAN SOVEREIGN IRAQ
11 JUNE 2004

ANNEX B – INTELLIGENCE

- References:
- A. Refer to USCENCTOM, Annex B to OPORD 11, Dated 27 FEB 04
 - B. Mission Performance Plan FY 2006, U.S. Embassy Iraq

1. Situation

- a. General. For a more detailed or current intelligence assessment of political, military or security conditions related to Iraq, refer to available classified reporting.
 - (1) Current Situation. Attacks directed at Multinational Force-Iraq (MNF-I), Chief of Mission (COM), and other personnel associated with the political and economic reconstruction of Iraq continue to disrupt the overall relief effort and threaten the future political and economic stability of Iraq.
 - (2) Threat Summary. Stability in Iraq continues to depend upon a secure environment supporting reconstruction across all internal institutions and infrastructure. Economic progress is required to create more jobs, establish a middle class, provide opportunities for further growth and investment, and forward movement in the political, social, media, religious, and educational arenas. Since the majority of the country's population is urban, the pace of reconstruction in Iraq's cities is key to establishment of security and stability. Until such time as Iraqis take control of local and regional security and governance, opposition groups will continue attempts to garner support against what they readily call the "occupying forces." High unemployment and a disgruntled urban population create recruiting and information operations targets for Coalition / multinational force / international partner opposition groups, particularly insurgents. Banditry, smuggling and criminal activity continue outside the cities, and violence inside cities undermines stability. This combination presents the highest probability for ethnic, tribal or religious based conflict. The central Iraq area, known as the "Sunni Triangle" and encompassing the area from Baghdad north to Tikrit, and west to Ramadi, Fallujah and Al Qaim, poses multiple problems. Former area leaders reject the loss of their stature. Disenfranchised Sunnis, from tribal groups to former military and security forces, are concentrated in this area, along with many other Sunnis who benefited under the past regime. The disenfranchised and former regime beneficiaries, who see no

future for themselves as Iraq progresses will continue to oppose the Coalition / Multinational Force – Iraq (MNF-I). Former regime loyalists, extremists, terrorists, and criminals abound, and are mixed amongst a population that resents what it perceives of its future. Former Regime Elements (FRE) and extremists will play upon Sunni fears of becoming an oppressed minority. Until such time as a majority of the population in this area perceive and understand the meaning of a fair and representative future in Iraq, and see personal benefits in the new Iraq, they are unlikely to oppose FREs and opposition groups. While passive support continues, the challenge will be in convincing more of this population that they will benefit by turning in those who intend or have committed violence. Notably complicating the situation are the human factors of pride and honor. Many former military personnel (who do not necessarily embrace Saddam) consider themselves professionals and patriots. As Sunnis, they believe they are the rightful rulers and the true protectors of Iraq. These former military, unable to protect Iraq from foreign occupation most likely believe their duty and honor (and their personal future) requires them to fight the Coalition / MNF-I. Additionally, these personnel do not comprehend “democracy.” There is an affinity within this group for the original Ba’ath principles. Key to countering these “groups” participation in insurgency will be the provision of jobs, conveyance of political re-patriotism / democracy through observable actions, some participation in new Iraqi security forces, and engagement through tribal leaders.

- (3) Theater of Operations. The IRAQI Theater of Operations (ITO) is defined by the total airspace, land area, and boundaries of Iraq, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, United Arab Emirates (UAE), Oman, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt, the Arabian Gulf, the Strait of Hormuz, the Gulf of Oman, those portions of the Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean within the USCENTCOM Area of Responsibility (AOR) (less Seychelles), the Gulf of Aden, the Bab el Mandeb, the Red Sea, the Gulf of Suez, the Gulf of Aqaba, and the Suez Canal system. The ITO also includes (in coordination with Commander, US European Command portions of Turkey and (in coordination with Commander, US Pacific Command Diego Garcia. The ITO also includes Combined/Joint Operating Area (CJOA) Somalia and CJOA Yemen.

- (4) Applicability. Refer to OPLAN Sovereign Iraq.

b. Enemy Forces.

Groups and individuals opposed to successful achievement of objectives by the Multinational Force – Iraq (MNF-I), CPA and Iraqi leaders recognize that stability depends upon security. These groups and individuals will continue efforts to undermine security and prevent stability. FREs, Iraqi extremists and

ihadists, transnational terrorists, foreign fighters (FF), and criminals all seek instability. While these individual's and groups' ideologies are not common or fully synchronized, they do seek a common goal: departure of the US / MNF-I, and they view the war in a long term perspective.

- (a) Adding to the threat from these aforementioned groups are the competing interests and self-serving power struggles by those who desire to attain dominance outside the legitimate processes being instituted in Iraq. These latter individuals consist of corrupt clerics, criminal opportunists, revenge seekers, and disenfranchised Sunni's. The disenfranchised Sunnis view themselves as a "new minority" with little chance for representation in the developing political, economic or social infrastructure. While very few Iraqi's desire the return of Saddam, within these various groups and individuals, such as the disenfranchised Sunnis and radical clerics of both radical Shi'a and Sunni faiths, violence and criminal activity are methods that will be used by some to achieve their own interests.
- (b) The Iraqi security forces—Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS), Special Republican Guard (SRG), Special Security Organization (SSO), military and militia—that blended back into the population as Baghdad fell during major combat operations now comprise an element of the FRE opposition to the US / MNF-I presence. This activity is widespread in Central Iraq with an operational leadership that relies upon former military, tribal, and family clan associations either for safe-havens or direct network support. While Saddam was involved to an extent in the insurgency, since his arrest, Iraqi patriotism / nationalism, fueled by calls for Iraqis to expel the MNF-I and US personnel, have gained appeal. Fear of Zionist, Iranian and Kurdish and Shi'a influence assists in the nationalistic zeal. These elements in many cases believe they are fighting for Iraq, with some believing that the true ideals of the Ba'ath party are the true way ahead for Iraq. The FREs and FFs collude to some degree, particularly in the financing arena and in the use of the FFs by the FRE. There are some indications younger former IIS, SSO, and SRG officers are migrating into the Islamic extremist camps of Salifists and Wahabbists in the North Babil Province. An Al Qaida (AQ) presence is emerging as well, manifesting itself using the existing FF leaders, their networks, and factions within AQ to migrate over to the Zarqawi and Salifist movements in the North, Northwest, and potentially in Baghdad.
- (c) Violence that appears ethnically or religiously motivated can incite sectarian and tribal fault lines, thereby creating additional negative impacts on stability. Smuggling, common crime, revenge attacks, and black-marketeering all create criminal conditions that can result in further violence (in addition to their negative impact on implementation of the rule of law). Violence that leads to fractures in emerging Iraqi political leadership along

sectarian (religious, tribal or ethnic) fault lines presents a danger to achievement of US / MNF-I objectives and the establishment of a free, representative, modern Iraqi state.

c. Friendly Forces. See Base Plan – OPLAN Sovereign Iraq

d. Assumptions.

- (1) If the anti-US / MNF-I propaganda and conspiracy theory rumors are not overcome, and, if the tribal structure and reintegration of former Ba'athists are ignored as part of the solution in reinstating security, FRE will continue to conduct attacks. Vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIED), rockets, and mortars are favored as "standoff" techniques. Complex attacks that combine deliberate targeting and pre-attack surveillance have been noted more frequently in Ar-Ramadi and Fallujah as MNF-I forces seek to eliminate FRE and extremists cells in those cities.
- (2) Insurgents and terrorists will continue to expand their assassination and intimidation campaign against the Iraqi population members of the new government and ministries, and new Iraqi security forces, especially as the date for transition of authority approaches. The size of the insurgency can fluctuate over time, and does not require a large size force to evoke the impression of a well organized and capable resistance. The attackers can choose the time and target based on their perception of the conditions. FRE will continue to exploit anti-Western propaganda, will call upon the populace's loyalty to Islam and Iraq's history as a unifying platform under a nationalistic / Islamist platform. Insurgents echo this sentiment in continued attempts to recruit new active members.
- (3) Terrorists seek to cause US / MNF-I failure in Iraq as a precursor to failure in the overall Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) and the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP). By attempting to prevent the establishment of a free, representative, modern Iraqi state, external terrorist groups view Iraq as a decisive point in the GWOT and the MEPP.

e. Limitations.

Penetration of these insurgency "networks" will require timely and accurate intelligence and cooperation by key national, tribal and local governance representatives. Success will depend upon popular support, with Iraqi's taking control of and securing their areas.

2. Mission

Support the stabilization, relief and reconstruction of Iraq through the provision of timely, coordinated intelligence to key US leadership; the Chief of Mission (COM) Iraq; the Commander, Multinational Force – Iraq (MNF-I); and all subordinate agencies, commands, or organizations, as approved by the appropriate releasing authority.

3. Execution

a. Concept of Operations. During the five phases of OPLAN Sovereign Iraq, support intelligence requirements for US interests in Iraq through a tasking, processing, exploiting and disseminating system that allows for timely reporting; multinational force access, when appropriate; interagency coordination; and continuous intelligence and threat reporting from Iraq uninterrupted by troop rotations, organizational re-alignment, and the overall transition to Iraqi sovereignty.

(1) Phases of Operations: Transition from US / Coalition management to a sovereign Iraq will take place in the five strategic phases identified in OPLAN Sovereign Iraq, and will be supported through these phases by intelligence collection and analysis assets from across the US Government as well as foreign government sources, when available.

(2) Assessed Centers of Gravity (COG) during the five phases of OPLAN Sovereign Iraq include:

(a) Strategic Centers of Gravity. Iraq's strategic centers of gravity in post-regime Iraq are the perceived legitimacy of the Iraqi Interim Government; international public opinion; Iraqi popular support for the development of the new Iraqi government and tolerance of continued multinational force presence; economic development; and the ability of Iraqi institutions to take over responsibility for establishment and control of a stable and secure environment.

Anti-MNF-I Opposition Groups' Perception of MNF-I Strategic COGs. Anti-MNF-I opposition groups perceive MNF-I strategic COGs as the MNF-I public will to maintain presence and operations; the Iraqi population's support of MNF-I presence; and international provision of forces, resources, and funding.

(b) Operational Centers of Gravity. Iraq's operational centers of gravity consist of its hub cities (Mosul, Kirkuk, Baghdad, Fallujah, Najaf, Basrah); developing regional economies; regional governance, and defeat of opposition groups. Other factors in a post-regime environment

include: Tribal leadership; Shi'a Clergy in the south particularly Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani; and a historical emphasis on higher education. Iraq's challenges include: malcontents; the poor state of critical life support infrastructure; poor environmental health and safety conditions; competing interests of tribal groups; and a high percentage of unemployment. As the country rebuilds and faith in the new government increases, many of these challenges will gradually dissipate over time, or become strengths. Other keys to success include isolating the insurgents from their sources of strength (funding, weapons, explosives, command and control, and the population).

Anti-MNF-I Opposition Groups' Perception of MNF-I Operational COGs. Anti-multinational force opposition groups perceive MNF-I operational COGs as Iraqi support and participation in security and stability; stability, credibility of forces, and legitimacy of a new Iraqi government (regional and in Baghdad); and improvement of Iraqi quality of life.

- (c) Anti-MNF-I Insurgent and Opposition Groups' Centers of Gravity (COGs). There are multiple anti-multinational force groups in and outside Iraq, and, because they have different goals, objectives, and interests, it would be incorrect to define them all as one and the same for COGs. Anti-multinational force groups include die-hard FREs, hard core terrorists, foreign fighters coming to Iraq for the specific cause of fighting Westerners, internal Iraqi extremist groups (formed along various lines, such as those under hard-line Shi'a and Sunni clerics), disenfranchised Sunni's who see no hope for their future, revenge seekers and criminals. The common action of these various opponents is to attack troops, police, cooperating Iraqis, key civil servants, facilities and infrastructure, and members of the Iraq Interim Government, the UN and aid agencies. The vast quantities of explosives and weapons in Iraq have offered the means to attack: from small arms, rocket-propelled grenades (RPG), and shoulder fired surface to air missiles (SAM), to explosives for individual suicide bombers, roadside improvised explosive devices (IED) and VBIEDs. The common goal of these groups is to force the MNF-I to leave. However, the groups do not share a common ideology outside Islam, and no positive future end state for Iraq has been espoused to appeal to the population across Iraq. Rather, insurgents use fear as a "motivator" in the population. Terrorists and insurgents want continued instability. However, terrorists seek to ripen Iraq for entry into AQ's regional caliphate while many Sunnis seek government (secular) dominance. Some Iraqi oppositionists believe the West's intentions are to subjugate Iraq and Islam to Western control of the region, and do not trust that

Iraqi's will be given control of the government, resources and country. Other Iraqi's, especially the impressionable, unemployed young males, are lured by the rhetoric and propaganda of hard-line clerics, and desire institution of their leaders in the political scene. Some Iraqi's have a sense of injured pride and pseudo-nationalism that leads them to actively oppose the multinational force, especially if family members were killed in the war, or, if they perceive security efforts as heavy-handed invasive tactics to repress their family, tribe, or area.

b. Tasks. Phase I – V.

Department of State and Department of Defense. Support senior leadership and USG interests through the timely dissemination of intelligence.

c. Coordinating Instructions.

As appropriate, ensure close coordination between all concerned USG entities in the exploitation and dissemination of threat assessments impacting US interests in Iraq.

4. Administration and Logistics

Not Applicable.

5. Command and Control

Intelligence collection and analysis elements attached to standing organizations or commands in Iraq will report through standard channels associated with that element (see Figure 1, "Command and Control Relationships," in Annex A to OPLAN Sovereign Iraq).

CHANGE 1 TO
ANNEX C TO
OPLAN SOVEREIGN IRAQ
2 JULY 2004

ANNEX C – OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE COALITION
PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY

- References:
- A. US Public Law 108-106 (2004)
 - B. Inspectors General Act (1978)
 - C. U.N. Security Council Resolution 1511 (2003)
 - D. Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period, dated March 8, 2004
 - E. CPA-IG Memorandum, dated April 21 2004 on Security and Support
 - F. Memorandum of Agreement between the Inspectors General, dated June 25, 2004

1. Situation.

a. Current Situation.

- (1) As of 1 May 2004, the Office of the Inspector General Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA-IG) consists of 35 professional staff (auditors, inspectors and investigators) in Baghdad and 48 staff in Washington, D.C. The CPA-IG established an active and significant presence in Baghdad. Increasing workloads are anticipated from CPA-IG's expanded coordination with fellow Inspectors General, audit agencies, key stakeholders, and the Congress.
- (2) The Congress established the Office of the Inspector General of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) through Public Law 108-106, Section 3001. Pursuant to that statute, the CPA-IG "reports directly to and operates under the supervision of, the Administrator of the CPA" in order to promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in the administration of CPA programs and operations and prevent and detect fraud and abuse in such programs and operations involving the use of US-appropriated, Iraqi and other funds committed to Iraq relief and reconstruction efforts, by coordinating and engaging in audits, inspections, reviews and investigations.
- (3) Section 3001(i)(1) of Public Law 108-106 requires the CPA-IG to submit to Congress, no later than 30 March 2004 and every calendar quarter thereafter, a report summarizing the activities of the CPA-IG and the CPA. In accordance with that statute, the CPA-IG submitted the first mandated report

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on 30 March 2004. Additionally, in accordance with Sec. 3001(i)(3), CPA-IG is required to submit a semi-annual Report to Congress, under Section 5 of the 1978 Inspector General Act. (Reference B)

- (4) On 28 June 2004, the CPA-IG will begin operating in accordance with terms of Reference F.
- (5) The CPA-IG shall terminate six (6) months after the authorities and duties of the Coalition Provisional Authority cease to exist.
- (6) Chief of Mission Authority: Any US Government personnel not under the military commander in the region will be under the Chief of Mission's (COM) authority.

b. Enemy Forces. See Annex B – Intelligence

c. Friendly Forces. See Annex A – Command and Control

d. Assumptions.

- (1) The CPA-IG will remain a DOD entity under the general supervision of the Secretary of Defense, consistent with Reference A.
- (2) US Mission Iraq constitutes the successor US government entity to the CPA under the provisions of Section 2208 of the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense and for the Reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan, 2004 (Reference A).
- (3) After 28 June 2004, the CPA-IG will be provided with appropriate and adequate office space at the central and field office locations of the CPA-IG, together with such equipment, office supplies, and communications facilities and services as may be necessary for the operation of such offices, and shall provide necessary maintenance services for such offices and the equipment and facilities located therein.
- (4) It is the position of the CPA-IG that Public Law 108-106 (Reference A), UNSCR 1511 (Reference C), Transitional Administrative Law (Reference D), and CPA Regulations and Orders provide sufficient legal authority to allow the CPA-IG to accomplish its mission, as defined in Reference A, after 28 June 2004.

2. Mission

Coalition Provisional Authority Inspector General provides for the independent and objective conduct and supervision of audits and investigations relating to the

C-2 (Change 1)

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programs and operations of the CPA to promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in the administration of such programs and operations; and prevent and detect fraud and abuse in such programs and operations involving the use of US appropriated, Iraqi and other funds committed to Iraq relief and reconstruction efforts. On 28 June 2004, the CPA-IG will cease reporting to the CPA and continue under the general supervision of the Secretary of Defense.

3. Execution.

a. Concept of Operations.

(1) The CPA-IG will continue to pursue an aggressive work plan through 30 June and beyond, making every effort to complete high-priority reviews and audits in FY-04. The CPA-IG established 16 preliminary focus areas which include the following potential areas of risk:

- (a) Security concerns and costs
- (b) CPA transition to Iraqi authority
- (c) Funding controls
- (d) Contracting irregularities
- (e) Logistics management and the safeguarding of assets
- (f) Acquisition planning and management
- (g) Iraqi involvement in reconstruction
- (h) Interagency relationships
- (i) Use of Continental US (CONUS) contracts for intended purposes (only if IRRF or issued by CPA/PMO)
- (j) Use of US Army support contracts (LOGCAP) (only if IRRF or issued by CPA/PMO)
- (k) Other focus areas include these potential areas for process improvement:
 - (1) Corporate governance
 - (2) Contracting processes

C-3 (Change 1)

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- (3) Transition planning
 - (4) Human resource management
 - (5) Program management
- (2) Conduct of Operations: The five phases of OPLAN Sovereign Iraq will not affect the CPA-IG office transition.
- (a) Phases I and II, leading up to the transfer of sovereignty to Iraq on 30 June 2004, will be an intense work period for the CPA-IG staff. During Phase II, the Chief (DCM designee), US Mission Advanced Team, will establish initial operations on 1 June 2004. He will provide management oversight of the CPA-IG but under the authority of the Administrator, CPA until 30 June 2004.
 - (b) Phase III begins on 28 June 2004 with establishment of the US Mission Iraq. The CPA-IG falls under the direction, coordination and supervision of the COM in addition to the general supervision of the Secretary of Defense, consistent with Public Law 108-106.

b. Tasks

(1) Department of Defense

- (a) Department of the Army continues to act as the executive agent for CPA-IG for human capital and financial management.
- (b) Provide CPA-IG-Forward with logistics, support services, including provision and billeting, and funding, through Area Support Group (ASG) Central.
- (c) By 15 May 2004, transition plans will have been completed for the CPA-IG's operations post 30 June 2004. All activities will have been completed by 1 June to ensure continuity of programs and a smooth transition from CPA admin/log support to full support from the US Mission on 30 June 2004.

c. Coordinating Instructions.

CPA-IG will coordinate with DOS OIG and other OIG with Iraq relief and reconstruction oversight missions related to areas of responsibility for audits, inspections and investigations to avoid duplication of effort in accordance with

References A and F. CPA-IG coordination will primarily occur through the Iraq Inspector Generals Council.

4. Administration and Logistics.

- a. Material and Services. CPA will provide computers, desks, Internet support, etc. until the US Mission Iraq is established on 30 June at which time COM will assume that responsibility.
- b. Personnel Support. Hiring and funding of CPA-IG staff will be managed and provided by the CPA-IG. The Department of the Army will continue to be the executive agent for human capital and financial management to the CPA-IG after 30 June 2004. CPA-IG-Forward personnel will be housed by the US Mission Iraq.

5. Command and Control.

Per Reference A, on 30 June 2004 and thereafter, the CPA-IG, will be under the general supervision of the Secretary of Defense. Prior to 30 June, the CPA-IG will report to the Administrator, CPA.

ANNEX D TO
OPLAN SOVEREIGN IRAQ
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ANNEX D – CHIEF OF MISSION

- References:
- A. Foreign Service Act of 1980 (P.L. 96-465)
 - B. National Security Presidential Decision 36, dated 11 May 2004
 - C. President's June 30, 2003 Letter of Instruction to Chiefs of Mission
 - D. Foreign Affairs Handbook, Section 12 FAH-7 H-700
 - E. Diplomatic Security Act (P.L. 99-399)
 - F. Security MOA between DOD and DOS, Annex S.
 - G. Support MOA between DOD and DOS, Annex T.

1. Situation

a. Current Situation.

- (1) The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) presides as the governing authority of Iraq, providing security and administrative functions under the authority of United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) 1483 and 1511. This Annex supports the Operations Plan to transfer sovereignty to the Iraqi Interim Government (IIG) and establish the US Mission. This will be done in five phases. Phase I is the period from 19 March through 30 May at which point the US Mission Advance Team is in place. Phase II is the period of 1-30 June when the US Mission is developed and established on 30 June. Phase III is the period through the end of FY 04, and Phase IV goes through the Iraqi Elections in Jan 05. Phase V encompasses the period from the election until stability returns to Iraq.
 - (a) At the return of sovereignty to Iraq on 30 June 2004, the CPA Baghdad closes and the US Mission Iraq is officially operational as outlined in the OPLAN Sovereign Iraq. During Phases I and II of this plan, CPA will organize the Iraq Reconstruction and Management Organization (IRMO), to include technical and senior liaisons, needed after transition. Similarly, CPA will align and re-designate the current Program Management Office as the Project and Contracting Office (PCO). Both activities will be established as "virtual" organizations under the management oversight of the Chief (DCM designee), US Mission Advance Team.
 - (b) During Phase II (1 June 2004), IRMO and PCO will be transferred as "virtual" organizations to the US Mission Advance Team but will remain in direct support (DS) of the CPA. The Administrator will be

responsible for the performance of missions of both organizations until 30 June 2004. The Chief of Mission (COM) will have full responsibility for the direction, coordination, and supervision of the IRMO and operational control of the PCO, a temporary organization funded, staffed, and operated by the Army, under the authority of the COM after 240030 June 2004.

(2) Applicability. OPLAN Sovereign Iraq.

b. Enemy Forces. Enemy Forces: Terrorist threat to the relief and reconstruction effort remains the primary factor placing the successful completion of the relief and reconstruction effort at risk. (Annex B - Intelligence)

c. Friendly Forces. See Base Plan – OPLAN Sovereign Iraq

d. Assumptions.

(1) Sovereignty of Iraq will be established as of 30 June 2004 and the responsibilities and authorities of the Coalition Provisional Authority will terminate concurrently.

(2) The United States Mission will be accredited to the IIG.

2. Mission

The United States Mission Iraq will open on 30 June 2004 with appropriate staff and organizations to enable the Chief of Mission to implement effective USG policies and to achieve US objectives in a sovereign Iraq. The Chief of Mission, on behalf of the President of the United States and under the guidance of the Secretary of State, shall be responsible for the direction, coordination and supervision of all US government employees, policies and activities in Iraq, except those under the command of the Regional Combatant Commander, or employees seconded to an International Organization. All executive branch agencies under COM authority, and every element of the Mission, must keep the COM fully informed at all times of their current and planned activities.

3. Execution

a. Concept of Operations. Effective, 30 June 2004, the Chief of Mission will serve as the President's personal representative in Iraq. In addition to its other functions, US Mission Iraq will provide mentoring and governmental assistance to the government of Iraq, using resources from the IRMO and the PCO, while coordinating security requirements with the Commander, Multinational Force-Iraq (MNF-1).

- (1) Conduct of Operations. The US Mission will carry out traditional embassy functions, taking into account the unique situations and missions in Iraq. The Mission will be staffed with personnel from those USG agencies whose responsibilities require a presence in country.

b. Tasks.

(1) Phases I and II

(a) Department of Defense

- (1) Determine post transition internal organizations and staffing levels for the Area Support Group (ASG) Mission, including structure, hiring authority, and numbers of authorized personnel, military and civilian.
- (2) Determine post transition internal security organizations and support to the COM and establish command and control procedures to sustain at least the current level of security for COM after 30 June 2004 (See Annex S – Security MOA).
- (3) Determine and coordinate space requirements for DOD personnel within the COM facilities.
- (4) CPA supports the Chief (DCM designee), US Mission Advance Team, in planning and supports transfer of management oversight of functional and operational responsibility of select missions to the US Mission Advance Team prior to 30 June 2004. Functions remain under the command of the Administrator through 30 June 2004.

(b) Department of State

- (1) Determine staffing levels for all US Government activities in Iraq under Chief of Mission authority. Review and make determinations on NSDD 38 staffing requests no later than dates listed below. In coordination with CPA, develop pre-transition flow of DOS personnel into Iraq.
- (2) Determine post-transition internal organizations and staffing levels for the US Mission Iraq, including structure, hiring authority, and numbers of authorized personnel by 30 April 04.

- (3) Determine post transition internal organizations and staffing levels for the IRMO in Baghdad and in Washington, DC, including structure, hiring authority, and numbers of authorized personnel.
 - (4) Establish systems for financial management with particular emphasis on contract management and reimbursements consistent with DOS policies.
 - (5) The COM will establish appropriate communications to support the US Mission throughout Iraq
- (2) Phases III through V. Implement actions to achieve US Mission Iraq cited in paragraph 2. COM serves as the President's personal representative in Iraq. In addition to its other functions, US Mission Iraq will provide mentoring and governmental assistance to the Government of Iraq, using resources from the IRMO and the PCO, while coordinating security requirements with the Commander, MNF-I.

c. Coordinating Instructions.

- (1) IRMO will be established by the President under DOS as a temporary organization authorized by National Security Presidential Directive 36. IRMO will manage those CPA functions and personnel under the authority of the COM deemed mission essential after 30 June 2004. IRMO will be comprised primarily of senior and technical liaison personnel and supporting staff, providing expertise and operational assistance to Iraqi ministries. The IRMO Director will serve in an oversight capacity and report to the COM, through the Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM).
- (2) Funding. Title 5, USC, Section 3161 appointees and detailed Embassy sections / agencies (e.g., ministry liaisons, PAO personnel, etc.) will be funded from the 1% IRRF budget.
- (3) DOD / US Army will establish the PCO as a temporary organization under COM authority to provide acquisition and program management support to the US Mission, for execution of contracts funded under the supplemental appropriations, using Title 22 authority through the US Army's Project and Contracting Office (PCO), a temporary organization funded, staffed, and operated by the Army, with the forward elements under the authority of the COM. Following the intent to be fully operational on 30 June 2004, the PMO will be re-designated as PCO on 1 June 04 as a "virtual" organization but continue to work within the CPA. On 1 June, it will transition to the US Mission Advance Team and be under the management oversight of the Chief (DCM designee) but be responsive to the priorities of the Administrator,

CPA, through 30 June 2004. The intent is that the "PCO" would work under the management oversight of the US Mission Advance Team, during the month of June so that the transition on 30 June is seamless. COM will set requirements and priorities for all non-security-related requirements in his oversight of Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF) programs which will be followed by the PCO. Commander, MNF-I will set requirements and priorities for all security-related requirements to be followed by PCO and will continue to establish and maintain a secure environment.

- (4) Coalition partners. The US Mission will work with the embassies of other coalition partners to advance coalition objectives in Iraq.

4. Administration and Logistics

- a. Security. The Chief of Mission will provide internal security for the sites under his direct control through coordination between the Mission's Regional Security Officer, and the Commander, MNF-I. The COM and MNF-I commander will establish a US Mission Operations Center (MOC) to assist in coordination and management of the USG Regional Teams, MNF-I forces, and US Mission Iraq. This will be done in consultation with coalition, Iraqi and other international forces and organizations in order to ensure an integrated approach to issue resolution throughout Iraq. The COM will also coordinate with the Commander, MNF-I, for other security requirements. (Annex A – Command and Control)
- b. Logistics. Some logistics and administrative support will be provided by the Commander, MNF-I, through the Area Support Group Central (ASG) subordinate to the MNF-I. The ASG will support the COM until the US Mission is fully operational in a stable Iraqi environment. (Annex T – Support MOA)
- c. Finance. During the transition period leading up to 30 June 2004, DOD and DOS will complete analysis and transfer of residual CPA operating budgets to the US Mission, effective 30 June 2004.

5. Command and Control

- a. As of 30 June 2004, the Chief of Mission will have full responsibility for the direction, coordination, and supervision of all United States Government executive branch employees in country, regardless of their employment categories or location, except those under command of the Commander, MNF-I or on the staff of an international organization. He will report to the President through the Secretary of State. All executive branch agencies under COM authority, and every element of the Mission, must keep the COM fully informed at all times of their current and planned activities.

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- b. The Administrator, CPA will retain his full responsibilities and authorities through 30 June 2004.
- c. The COM will establish appropriate communications to support the US Mission throughout Iraq.

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APPENDIX 2 TO
ANNEX D TO
OPLAN SOVEREIGN IRAQ
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APPENDIX 2 – LEGAL TO ANNEX D – CHIEF OF MISSION

- References:
- A. U.N. Security Council Resolution 1483 (2003)
 - B. U.N. Security Council Resolution 1511 (2003)
 - C. U.N. Security Council Resolution 1546 (2004)
 - D. Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period, dated March 8, 2004
 - E. 22 U.S.C. §3927 and President's Letter of Instruction
 - F. CPA Website: http://www.cpa.gov/cpa_documents.html
 - G. NSPD-ZZ, Subject: USG Operations in Iraq
 - H. NSPD-YY, Subject: US Assistance to the Iraqi Special Tribunal

I.S. Situation

a. Current Situation

(1) Legal Authority for CPA Operations.

- (a) United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR). It is the position of the US Government attorneys working group that language in UNSCR 1511 requiring "all necessary measures" is sufficient to allow the Multinational Force to accomplish its mission after 30 Jun 2004.
- (b) The Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC). LOAC will continue to apply after 30 June 2004.
- (c) Transitional Administrative Law (TAL), and CPA Regulations and Orders. Article 26(C) of the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL), signed by the Governing Council on 8 Mar 2004, provides that the laws, regulations, orders and directives issued by the CPA "shall remain in force until rescinded or amended by legislation duly enacted and having the force of law." CPA Order Number 17, *Status of the Coalition, Foreign Liaison Missions, Their Personnel and Contractors*, addressing privileges and immunities for coalition personnel and contractors, and CPA Order Number 16, *Temporary Control of Iraqi Borders, Ports and Airports*, providing exit and entry authority for Coalition personnel and contractors, and CPA Order Number 49, *Tax Strategy 2004*, exempting Coalition personnel and foreign contractors from tax or similar charges in Iraq, *inter alia*, currently protect USG personnel and their contractors operating in Iraq. These orders will remain in effect after June 30, unless or until rescinded or amended by duly enacted legislation.
- (d) MNF-Iraqi Security Arrangements. Article 59 of the TAL provides that the MNF's rights and obligations under UNSCR 1511 shall govern the MNF's activities pending the entry into force of binding international agreements regarding the activities of the MNF with the elected Iraqi Transitional Government.

- (2) Chief of Mission Authority. Any USG personnel not under the command of the military commander in the region or on the staff of an international organization will be under the Chief of Mission's (COM) authority pursuant to Reference D.
- b. Enemy Forces. Terrorist threats to the relief and reconstruction effort remain the primary factor placing the successful completion of the relief and reconstruction effort at risk. (See Annex B - Intelligence).
- c. Friendly Forces. The following USG personnel and assets in Iraq are currently providing legal support to USG operations. Additional USG personnel and assets providing legal and law enforcement advice, training, or support to the Government of Iraq are described in Annex P - Justice.
- (1) CPA Office of General Counsel. Currently there are 24 attorneys working in the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) Office of General Counsel (OGC). The OGC consists of two Section 3161 appointees, seven detailees from other Federal Agencies, ten military attorneys (US, UK and AUS), one contract attorney (Bearing Point) and four Iraqi attorneys. The OGC is supported by teams of attorneys in the Departments of Defense, State, Treasury, Commerce, Justice and the NSC.
- (2) PMO/PCO. Army contract law attorneys within the current PMO provide legal advice on contracting and procurement issues.
- (3) CJTF-7/MNF-I. Judge Advocates within this command provide legal support to the command across all issues. These attorneys are neither under COM authority nor the supervision or coordination of the US Embassy Office of the Legal Adviser.
- d. Assumptions. The CPA will dissolve no later than 30 June 2004, following the transfer of full governance authority to the Iraqi Interim Government.

The legal support required by the US Embassy, Baghdad, can best be provided from Washington agencies through a legal office headed by an attorney from the Department of State, and comprised of lawyers detailed from the Department of Defense and Iraqi national attorneys.

2. Mission

Provide legal advice to the COM and Mission personnel and oversee coordination among legal staff under COM authority as necessary to ensure a common position on issues of common interest.

3. Execution

a. Concept of Operations.

- (1) The COM will establish within the US Embassy an Office of the Legal Adviser (OLA), which will be headed by the Legal Adviser to the COM. The OLA will assume its responsibilities on 1 July 2004. The OLA will provide direct support to the COM and

will be the COM's source of legal advice and assistance. The Legal Adviser will supervise all members of the OLA.

- (2) Although the CPA's legislative function will end when governance authority is transferred to the Iraqi Interim Government, the OLA will support the COM's continuing need for:
 - (a) Counsel to the COM and Mission personnel on all legal issues affecting their responsibilities.
 - (b) Scope of application of applicable Iraqi, U.S. and international law, including relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions, in relation to U.S. Mission activities and U.S. policy objectives in Iraq.
 - (c) Counsel on the application of the Transitional Administrative Law and its Annex (See Reference C).
 - (d) Interpretations of the regulations, orders and directives that CPA promulgated during the occupation (including those applicable to the upcoming election) and the authority by which they were issued.
 - (e) Legal advice regarding the authorities and responsibilities of the various USG agencies and departments operating in Iraq under COM authority.
 - (f) Continuing legal support for the negotiation of agreements with the new Iraqi government that may be necessary or desirable (e.g., agreements regarding diplomatic property, privileges and immunities, and bilateral debt).
 - (g) Traditional embassy legal issues resulting from commencement of operations (e.g., lease and property issues, COM authority).
- (3) The Director, Project and Contracting Office (PCO), will be advised by PCO legal staff. This advice will focus on technical contract law issues and other administrative law advice necessary to complete the mission. Although the PCO will follow the priorities and requirements of the COM, and will be under COM authority, the office will have dedicated legal staff because of the unique technical aspects of contract law. PCO must consult and coordinate with OLA prior to providing any legal advice to the COM or Mission personnel.
- (4) The Senior Department of Justice (DOJ) Representative coordinating all DOJ programs in Iraq on behalf of the COM, will be advised by DOJ legal staff dedicated to Iraq DOJ program teams. DOJ must consult and coordinate with OLA prior to providing any legal advice to the COM or Mission personnel.
- (5) The General Counsel to the CPA (GC-CPA) will continue to provide legal advice to the CPA through 30 June 2004. Some personnel from this office may transition to the OLA or its precursor before or on 30 June 2004.

b. Tasks.

(1) Phases I and II.

(a) CPA.

- (1) Identify which members of the GC-CPA staff are willing / appropriate to transition to the US Mission and obtain approval of these personnel with the Department of State not later than 15 May 2004.
- (2) Determine NLT 15 May 2004 which functions and responsibilities should transition to the US Embassy Advance Team as of 1 June 2004.
- (3) Establish a plan NLT 15 May 2004 to retain or release remaining GC-CPA staff, including a redeployment plan.

(b) Department of Defense.

- (1) Not later than 1 May 2004, identify contract attorney staffing requirements for PCO thru 30 June 2004.
- (2) Not later than 15 May 2004, determine contract attorney staffing needs for PCO post 30 June 2004. Recruit individuals, as required.

(c) Department of State.

- (1) Not later than 1 June 2004, define composition of OLA, and reach agreement with agencies providing detailees.

(d) Departments of Treasury and Commerce.

- (1) Continue to provide detailees as required to GC-CPA.

(2) Phases III, IV, and V.

- (a) Department of Defense. Provide detailees as required to OLA in accordance with interagency agreement with DOS.
- (b) Departments of Treasury and Commerce. Provide detailees and technical assistance as required to OLA in accordance with interagency agreement with DOS.
- (c) Department of State. Establish OLA.

c. Coordinating Instructions.

- (1) Redeployment plans for all personnel must be coordinated with CPA personnel office.
- (2) The Legal Adviser supervises the provision of all legal advice to the COM and other Mission personnel. The Legal Adviser oversees coordination among legal staff under COM authority as necessary to ensure a common position on issues of common interest.

- (3) The Legal Adviser and legal adviser counterparts, including the MNF-I Staff Judge Advocate, will coordinate on a regular basis as necessary to ensure a common position on issues of common interest.

4. Administration and Logistics

- a. This transition will be supported by the CPA, the Departments of Defense and State, and other US Government agencies as necessary.
- b. OLA. Workspace and life support for OLA will be provided by COM.
- c. PCO. Legal staff for PCO will receive logistical support from PCO.

5. Command and Control

- a. The Legal Adviser shall report to the COM. Technical oversight will be under the Legal Adviser to the Secretary of State.
- b. Technical supervision for the DOJ legal staff will be provided by DOJ. This staff will coordinate any legal opinion on an issue with policy consequences or with implications for other agency equities with the OLA in advance.
- c. Technical supervision for the legal staff of PCO will be provided by DOD (Army). This staff will coordinate any legal opinion on non-technical matters with the OLA in advance.
- d. In the case of differing legal opinions and pending resolution in Washington, the views of OLA will govern in matters under COM authority.

ANNEX E TO
OPLAN SOVEREIGN IRAQ
11 JUNE 2004

ANNEX E – ORGANIZATIONS, MANPOWER AND PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATION

- References:
- A. JCS PUB 1-0, 19 Nov 98, Doctrine for Personnel Support to Joint Operations, Unclassified.
 - B. CJCSI 1301.01C, 1 Jan 04, Individual Augmentation Procedures, Unclassified.
 - C. CJCSM 3150.13, 1 Aug 99, Joint Report Structure – Personnel Manual, Unclassified.
 - D. Title 5, United States Code.
 - E. Title 5, Code of Federal Regulations.
 - F. US Office of Personnel Management, Guide to Processing Personnel Actions, undated but available at www.opm.gov.
 - G. National Security Presidential Directive Number #36, United States Government Operations in Iraq, 11 May 04.
 - H. DOD I 1400.32, DOD Civilian Work Force Contingency and Emergency Planning Guidelines and Procedures, 24 Apr 95

1.S situation

a. General.

- (1) The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) has a personnel management system that maintains accountability for personnel assigned and detailed to CPA in Baghdad or Washington, DC.
- (2) The current CPA workforce is made up of DOD uniformed service members and civilian employees, including personnel appointed under the provisions of title 5, United States Code (U.S.C.), section 3161 (“3161 personnel”), civilian employees detailed from other agencies including the Department of State, and personnel from the Coalition / international partners. Contractor personnel also provide services and support to the CPA. The provisions of 5 U.S.C. 3161 allow the temporary hiring of US personnel as well as non-reimbursable detail of employees from other Federal agencies into CPA since CPA constitutes a “temporary organization” under that statute.
- (3) The current tour of duty for US civilian employees in Iraq, including detailees and 3161 personnel, has generally been from 3-6 months. However, most 3161 personnel have been appointed for a period not to exceed 18-months, which may either be extended or shortened depending on CPA requirements.
- (4) Lack of housing and a stable security environment have been problematic in recruiting the numbers and quality of personnel needed to occupy critical positions within the CPA. These conditions may persist for the foreseeable future.

- b. Enemy Forces. See Annex B – Intelligence
- c. Friendly Forces. See Base Plan – OPLAN Sovereign Iraq
- d. PCO. The Project and Contracting Office (PCO) was established within the DOD by Reference G as a temporary organization to which the provisions of 5 U.S.C. 3161 apply.
- e. IRMO. The Iraq Reconstruction Management Office (IRMO) was established within the DOS by Reference G as a temporary organization to which the provisions of 5 U.S.C. 3161 apply.
- f. CPA / IG. The CPA IG, also a temporary organization to which the provisions of 5 U.S.C. 3161 apply, will become the IR-IG on 30 June 2004 (See Annex C).
- g. Assumptions.
 - (1) The transition to Iraqi sovereignty will take place on 30 June 04.
 - (2) Sufficient funds will be available in each fiscal year to support the personnel strategy recommended in this OPLAN.

2. Mission

United States Government will ensure appropriate staffing of the CPA to support missions through 30 June 2004, including redeployment of those personnel no longer needed in the US Mission Iraq, the MNF-I, and other US Government organizations and establish the US Mission Iraq effective 30 June 2004.

3. Execution

- a. Concept of Operations.
 - (1) Employees, who are a vital strategic resource in Iraq, provide the basis for implementing reconstruction plans, coordinating diplomatic efforts, and providing security, stabilization and reconstruction support. The intent is to size the staff of all organizations commensurate with requirements. Expansion of the staff will depend also upon resources provided by the US, coalition / international or donor nations.
 - (2) CPA, both forward and rear will remain the core headquarters (HQ) for management of personnel assigned to CPA until it is terminated on 30 June 2004. On 1 July 2004, personnel management responsibilities for USG employees previously assigned to CPA will reside with either the Chief of Mission (COM); Commander, Multi-National Force- Iraq (MNF-I); or Secretary of Defense.
 - (3) DOS will determine those CPA functional areas that will continue under COM authority and those that will end. DOS will also identify new functional areas that will commence on or about 30 June 2004. DOS will then identify those CPA functions and personnel for transfer to the US Mission. DOD will make similar determinations for

PCO. CPA will plan and coordinate the redeployment of all staff whose positions are not retained.

- b. Conduct of Operations. Upon the transfer of sovereignty to an Iraqi Interim Government and termination of the CPA, the US Government establishes a US Mission Iraq to ensure that the responsibilities and interests of the US Government are preserved and discharged effectively. This process will be executed in five phases that will discipline the transfer of specified CPA functions to DOS, US Mission Iraq, MNF-I and Department of Defense.

(1) Phase I.

- (a) Phase I began with the arrival of the Interagency Transition Planning Team (ITPT) on 19 March 2004, and ended with the establishment of the US Embassy Advance Team on 1 June 2004. Actions taken during this phase will be significant in that the planning to establish IRMO as a "virtual organization" within the existing CPA structure will be completed.
- (b) On 1 June 2004, IRMO, in its "virtual capacity", will have been placed under the management oversight of the Chief, US Embassy Advance Team, and managed under the authority of the Administrator, CPA. The Project and Contracting Office (PCO) will have been established on 1 June 2004, in a similar "virtual" capacity, to coincide with establishment of the US Embassy Advance Team.
- (c) CPA will have transferred management oversight for the IRMO to the Chief, US Embassy Advance Team, and the Project and Contracting Office (PCO) to the US Army, but retain responsibility for them until 30 June 2004. Both agencies will assume management oversight to include staffing realignments and personnel management functions. With the establishment of IRMO, selected CPA personnel will be appointed to this new organization in accordance with applicable law, regulation and policy [including the *Guide to Processing Personnel Actions*, published by the US Office of Personnel Management]. CPA and DOS will identify by name personnel who will not transition to IRMO, PCO or to other staff sections within the US Mission in Iraq. These personnel will redeploy, and CPA will develop a redeployment plan for them. Prior to developing the redeployment plan for DOD individual augmentees (IA), the CPA will coordinate with USCENCOM J1 to determine if MNF-I has a need for their continued service in Iraq.

(2) Phase II.

- (a) Phase II began when the US Embassy Advance Team opened on 1 June 2004 and ends with establishment of the US Mission Iraq and termination of the CPA on 30 June 2004. During Phase II, US Embassy Advance Team will provide management oversight of select CPA functions, including IRMO and PCO as discussed, but responsibility for execution remains with the Administrator, CPA. The intent is that all management oversight will migrate to the US Embassy Advance Team during June so that all realignments are complete prior to 30 June 2004.

- (b) At the conclusion of this phase, all personnel assignments from the CPA to the U.S. Mission will be complete. Select CPA personnel may be redeployed or reassigned within theater, but those not needed in the US Mission, MNF-I, or PCO will be redeployed from Iraq. The redeployment plan will ensure that personnel are redeployed consistent with workload requirements and “overlap” with replacements when applicable. Therefore, the plan may cause personnel to be redeployed throughout the month of July and even beyond. During that period, such personnel will be assigned in an over-strength status to the Department of Defense for personnel administration, payroll, and associated costs as appropriate. Funds for payment of these personnel and their administration will be retained in DOD and not transferred to DOS on 1 July 2004.
- (c) By the conclusion of this phase, affected personnel will have been appointed to the receiving organizations or redeployed. USG Agencies with personnel assigned to support the above-referenced mission will ensure that all related personnel actions are consistent with the applicable law, regulation and policy including the direction below which address each category of personnel now assigned to the CPA.
- (1) Individual Augmentees (DOD). Uniformed detailees will be transferred to the US Mission, including IRMO and PCO, or MNF-I, or returned to previous / follow-on military command. All costs will be borne by the individual Service. Administrative and medical services for augmentees remaining in Iraq will be provided by the organization to which they are assigned/detailed.
 - (2) DOD Detailees. DOD civilian detailees originally assigned to CPA will be assigned to the extent permitted by law to, US Mission, including IRMO and PCO, MNF-I, or returned to their home organization. All costs, with the exception of travel, will be borne by originating agency. CPA will fund travel costs. Administrative and medical services for detailees remaining in Iraq will be provided by the organization to which they are assigned/detailed (See Annex Q, Medical). For all civilian detailees, the Iraq tour will be treated as a TDY assignment.
 - (3) USG Agency Detailees Other Than DOD. USG civilian detailees originally assigned to CPA and selected for retention by the COM or his designee will be assigned by their agency to the IRMO, US Mission, PCO, other agencies as designated by the COM, or returned to their agency. All costs, with the exception of travel, will be borne by originating agency. Administrative and medical services for detailees remaining in Iraq will be provided by the organization to which they are assigned/detailed (See Annex Q – Health Service Support). For civilian detailees, the Iraq tour will be treated as a TDY assignment.
 - (4) Contractors. Management oversight of select contractors will be assumed by the Chief, US Embassy Advance Team in the same manner as the “virtual” IRMO structure.
 - (5) Section 3161 Personnel. By the conclusion of this phase, those 3161 personnel who have not redeployed will be appointed to IRMO, PCO, and DOS

(including NEA-I). Personnel in an over-strength capacity will be assigned to DOD as discussed above. CPA will continue through 30 June 2004 to provide personnel servicing until such time as the individual is appointed to a subsequent agency/entity or is terminated from employment. After 30 June 2004, the Human Resources Office of the IRMO will manage those 3161 personnel assigned under the authority of the COM as well as those who will redeploy during July and later. The IRMO Human Resource Office will address other employment/redeployment issues for these personnel as they arise.

(6) Area Support Group (ASG). MNF-I's ASG Central will be established by 15 June 2004 and may be staffed by a combination of US military, DOD civilian and/or DOD contractor personnel and assigned to the MNF-I. The ASG will be responsive to the COM and provide support as specified in the DOD/DOS Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) for Support (Annex T). It will provide administrative and logistical support to the US Mission and subordinate organizations. The ASG may have DOD civilian employees who will be managed under existing policies and procedures.

(7) USG advisors/members of boards and commissions will be employed by the USG Department or agency responsible for the board or commission but will be under the authority of the COM. Personnel actions will be processed using the appropriate rules and regulations as specified by the US Office of Personnel Management, agency policy or other applicable procedure.

(3) Phases III.

(a) Phase III begins with the establishment of the US Mission in Iraq on 30 June 2004 and ends with end of USG Fiscal Year (30 September 2004). USG personnel in Iraq come under the authority either of the Chief of Mission or the Commander, MNF-I.

(b) At the beginning of this phase, the CPA and Coalition Joint Task Force-7 (CJTF-7) will cease to exist. The US Mission Iraq and the MNF-I will assume those responsibilities. Personnel will be realigned accordingly.

(c) 3161 Personnel. Any remaining Section 3161 personnel will have been appointed to a follow-on eligible USG agency or terminated from US Government employment. To be a 3161 employee, individuals must be employed by a temporary organization as defined in law. Payment of any residual salaries, benefits and overtime accruing up through June 30 2004 for all CPA 3161 personnel will be the responsibility of DOD.

(d) Contractors. At the conclusion of this phase, administrative support and costs associated with transferring contract personnel will be borne in accordance with the terms of applicable contracts.

(4) Phase IV.

(a) Phase IV begins on 1 October 2004 and ends on the date of the elections for the Iraqi National Assembly now scheduled for no later than 31 January 2005.

(5) Phase V.

(a) Phase V begins on 1 February 2005 or the day after the elections for the Iraqi National Assembly and will continue until the US Mission can function under normal conditions. By the end of Phase V, IRMO and PCO will have been terminated, and the construction tasks will have been completed.

c. Tasks.

(1) Phase I.

(a) Department of Defense/CPA.

- (1) Establish PCO per the authority of the NSPD.
- (2) Develop a redeployment plan for CPA personnel not required in Iraq by the US Mission Iraq, IRMO, PCO or MNF-I.
- (3) Identify CPA organizations and functions that will transfer to the DOS, U.S. Mission, MNF-I or the Department of Defense.

(b) Department of State.

- (1) Establish IRMO per the authority of Reference G.
- (2) Establish the organizational structure for the Regional Support Teams.
- (3) Establish the organizational structure of the IRMO or accept the current one.
- (4) Establish the organizational structure of the new Public Affairs Organization (formerly STRATCOM) or accept the current one.
- (5) Finalize hiring decisions regarding 3161 and other personnel.
- (6) Hire to fill all post 30 June 2004 vacancies in the US Mission Iraq.
- (7) Coordinate CAC Card requirements with DOD and establish procedures to provide names to the FDC on a timely basis.

(2) Phase II.

(a) Department of Defense.

- (1) Establish the "virtual" IRMO within the current CPA structure (Senior and Technical Liaisons and Management staff) as discussed earlier. The intent is

that this organization would function under the management oversight of the Chief, US Mission Advance Team.

- (2) Transfer the organizational elements and functions of STRATCOM to the “virtual” IRMO and establish its new name as Office of Public Affairs to operate in the same model as discussed above.
- (3) Transfer the organizational elements and functions of PMO within CPA to the Department of the Army where it will operate under the management oversight of the Department of the Army until the PCO is formally established on 1 July 2004, in the same model as the “virtual” IRMO.
- (4) Transfer the organizational elements and functions of all remaining “CPA legacy” organizations that will become part of IRMO or the US Mission in the same “virtual” concept to the US Mission Advance Team.
- (5) Implement a redeployment plan for all applicable CPA personnel not required for further utilization by COM or MNF-I.
- (6) Issue CAC cards as a part of the responsibilities of the Federal Deployment Center to US Government employees under COM authority until such time as DOS makes other arrangements or the FDC closes.

(b) Department of State.

- (1) Assume management oversight for IRMO on June 1 and total responsibility for IRMO on 30 June 2004.
- (2) Assume management responsibility for Public Affairs.
- (3) Assume management oversight for all “CPA legacy” organizations accepted by the COM and identified in the US Mission Iraq organization contained in Annex A – Command and Control to OPLAN Sovereign Iraq.
- (4) Continue to hire personnel to fill vacancies.
- (5) Coordinate CAC Card requirements with DOD and establish procedures to provide names to the FDC on a timely basis.

(3) Phases III-V.

Department of Defense.

- (a) Manage redeployment of DOD personnel who transferred from CPA to MNF-I during Phases I and II.
- (b) Issue CAC cards as a part of the responsibilities of the Federal Deployment Center to US Government employees under COM authority until such time as DOS makes other arrangements or the FDC closes.

- d. Coordinating Instructions. The detailed definitions, descriptions of the policy and procedures are presented at Reference A.
- (1) Personnel Policies and Procedures. Personnel appointed to CPA, PCO or IRMO will be temporary employees. Any changes to an individual's employment, including reduction or extension in tour length, must be cleared by the chain of command or the USG agency concerned. During the period of transition between the CPA and Iraqi sovereignty, it is vital that all affected human resources offices are provided with the changes in personnel assignments early enough to gain necessary approvals for the transaction.
 - (2) Pre-deployment and Pre-assignment Training Requirements. Any mandatory national pre-deployment training requirements are the responsibility of individual agencies. Personnel assigned to positions in Iraq will be required to attend pre-deployment training before arrival, subject to the guidelines established by the governing authority within the USG. DOS has established requirements for pre-deployment training after 1 July and those of the DOD will remain in effect.
 - (3) Length and Rotation Policy. Personnel rotation policy is an agency responsibility. Generally tour lengths will be for a period of one year but may be specified by position and based on several factors, including planned duration of the position, the position's criticality and associated continuity requirements. The rotation of personnel must be carefully planned and monitored to ensure that the continuity and efficiency of operations are maintained. The minimum recommended period for staff handovers is five (5) working days; some appointments may require no formal handover, while some key appointments may require a longer period.
 - (4) Identification (ID) Cards. All US Government personnel deploying on the operation must have valid military or civilian ID cards in their possession. DOD has directed implementation of SMART card technology that shall be used as a department-wide Common Access Card (CAC). The CAC shall be the standard ID card for active duty and reserve military personnel, DOD civilian employees and eligible contractor personnel. Contractors will be required to have identification as defined by the hiring agency and in the case of DOD, contractors will be issued a CAC card. All USG employees under the authority of COM will obtain DOS Global Look identification Badge (GLIB). DOD personnel will use the CAC card to transit Kuwait. U.S. Government personnel assigned to the U.S. Mission Baghdad and under Chief of Mission authority will also use the CAC card to transit Kuwait.
 - (5) Security Clearances. All US military and contractor personnel must have the national security clearance appropriate to their position before deploying. Foreign Government personnel and contractors assigned to HQ positions are also required to report with the security clearance appropriate to their position. For USG employees under COM authority, the owning human resources or security office must forward copies of clearances to the DOS Regional Security Office through Diplomatic Security in Washington either in hard copy or electronically. All USG agencies requiring employees to have access to SCI material must identify the positions requiring the access, and such personnel are required to have the clearances passed from the DOS or

DOD in Washington as applicable. Most other support positions in Iraq will not require security clearances; personnel assigned to these positions will not be required to hold security clearances.

- (6) Leave Policy on Operations. Leave accrual is in effect while government members are on active military or civilian duty. Component commands and agencies will develop their own leave policy IAW service policy. Leave accrual and use for USG personnel will be in accordance with applicable law, regulations and policy and reflect both the unique operational requirements of this mission and the security environment in Iraq. Eligible US military and DOD civilians will be afforded the opportunity to participate in the USCENCOM R & R Leave and Pass Programs. Other Government Agencies will be covered by their own regulations and US Mission Policy.
- (7) DOD Civilian Employees. Civilian employees who are serving in emergency-essential (EE) positions, and who have volunteered for assignments must sign an employment agreement, similar to the EE agreement, that specifies conditions of employment, including type and length of appointment and requirement for deployment, chain of command, expected terms of transition from existing to successor organizations, and penalties for refusal or failure to perform assigned functions until relieved by appropriate authority.
- (8) DOD civilian employees deploying to support operations require travel orders prepared IAW Chapter 3, Part D, of the Joint Travel Regulations (JTR), Volume II.
- (9) Other USG employees deploying to support operations will require travel orders prepared IAW their employing agency travel regulations and coordinated with DOD / DOS Travel Offices as applicable.
- (10) For employees in country or in-transit before 30 June 2004, DOS will accept a medical clearance approved by another USG agency. After 30 June 2004, civilian employees must receive DOS medical clearance prior to deployment.
- (11) Civilian employees deploying to Iraq must meet the applicable civilian personnel deployment criteria stipulated by the DOS/DOD regulations. Reference H and DOS policy and regulations.
- (12) Other Civilians. Standard DOS policies to hire Foreign Service Nationals (FSNs) will be followed by agencies under the COM Authority in Iraq.

4. Administration and Logistics

- a. Morale and Welfare Recreation (MWR). Commanders and directors have an executive responsibility for MWR in their areas of responsibility, without jeopardizing the operational integrity of the mission.
- b. Special Allowances. Special allowances for hazardous duty will be determined by applicable law, regulations and policy.

- c. Postal Services. Postal services will be provided consistent with standard DOS policy (See Annex H, Appendix 2) unless changed by the COM. MNFI-I policy may differ but will be consistent with policies established by DOD. The sharing of resources is encouraged.
- d. Discipline for civilian employees. For Section 3161 personnel, discipline is the responsibility of the organization to which the individual is assigned. For detailees, discipline is the responsibility of their home agency. In addition to Mission and/or DOD policies regarding reporting of misconduct or discipline, incidents which are likely to attract unfavorable media attention, should be forwarded promptly via the chain of command to the COM and/or Commander, MNF-I, as appropriate.
- e. Evaluation Reports. First line supervisors will provide performance evaluations consistent with applicable law, regulations and agency policy. If the head or commander of a participating agency requests an evaluation on assigned personnel, the immediate chain of command is responsible for ensuring that a report is submitted.

5. Command and Control

- a. Reports regarding personnel accountability and other personnel metrics will be submitted in accordance with Reference C for military organizations and Department of State Policies for agencies under COM Authority.
- b. Casualty Reporting. Casualty reporting is the responsibility of the owning department/agency and should be processed according to agency policy and procedures. Any requirement to share DOD casualty information between MNF-I / USCENTCOM and the US Mission Iraq for the purposes of creating better situational awareness for the COM will be clearly defined in the Iraqi Security Transition Memorandum of Agreement between DOD and DOS (Annex S).
- c. Serious Incident Reporting. Alleged serious crimes and incidents of national or international media interest require special awareness for both DOD and DOS components in Iraq. Information sharing procedures and channels will be clearly identified in the Iraqi Security Transition Memorandum of Agreement between the DOD and DOS (Annex S).
- d. Application. This plan is applicable to all personnel assigned DOD or DOS organizations operating in Iraq.

ANNEX F TO
OPLAN SOVEREIGN IRAQ
11 JUNE 2004

ANNEX F – FACILITIES AND REAL PROPERTY

- References:
- A. Title 10, Section 2675
 - B. DODI 4270-36
 - C. SECDEF letter of delegation to SECARMY, 14 Jan 04, Re: Assignment of Responsibility for Acquisition and Program Management Support for CPA
 - D. AR 405-10, 405-45, 405-70, 405-90, 415-15, 420-10, 420-18
 - E. General Order #3, dated 9 July 2002, Assignment of Functions and Responsibilities within Headquarters, Department of the Army
 - F. NSPD 36, 11 May 04

1.S situation

- a. Current Situation. Facilities and real property are critical resources for accomplishing the mission of creating and sustaining a sovereign Iraq. Current facilities consist of both real property structures and modular units (personal property). Facilities are supported using both Iraqi infrastructure and DOD equipment (e.g., generators). Some facilities and real property currently used by DOD belonged to the former Iraq government and/or private owners. The Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) Task Order #44 contract provides most facility services. Use, management and security of facilities and real property affect the success and safety of all personnel involved in the mission as well as the success of programs, projects and the transition.
- b. Enemy Forces. The security situation in Iraq will potentially reduce the effectiveness of contractor support by limiting the mobility of contractor personnel and the movement of materiel and supplies. (See Annex B – Intelligence)
- c. Friendly Forces. The Area Support Group (ASG Central) will provide direct support to the US Mission and general support to other US Government agencies and tenants in both the Green Zone, as well as regional sites in Iraq. The Gulf Region Division (GRD), US Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), will support the ASG Central through acquiring, managing, and disposal of real estate needed to support Multinational Force – Iraq (MNF-I) missions. Security for the Green Zone is provided by the MNF-I, except for that provided by the Chief of Mission (COM) for the facilities occupied by the US Mission Iraq.
- d. Assumptions.
 - (1) A procedural framework is established with the Interim, Transitional and Permanent Government of Iraq to authorize the acquisition, management, disposition and operations and maintenance of real property used by the COM and the MNF-I.
 - (2) Documentation will be developed to identify agencies that fall under the COM and those that are responsible to the US Military Commander.

- (3) No additional legislative authority will be required to carry out the real property and facility support to DOD and DOS missions.
- (4) Adequate resources (manpower as well as funds) will be provided to accomplish facility and real property mission requirements for all bases during and after transition.
- (5) DOD and DOS will establish a Support Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) to address mutual roles and responsibilities regarding occupied facilities and facility related costs, including utilities and environmental management, throughout Iraq. (Annex T)
- (6) For the purposes of this plan, all trailers that provide housing are identified as personal property, not real property.
- (7) Legal authority is currently adequate for USACE to perform the real estate mission, both in law and in delegated authority. Should additional delegated authority to execute the mission be needed, USACE Real Estate will assist in the preparation of the delegations and ensure their consideration and approval by the Department of the Army (DA).
- (8) Translators and interpreters are key components of DOD and DOS ability to accomplish the functional mission. The full-time availability and quality of these resources, to translate documents accurately into English, Arabic, or other appropriate language are critical to success.

2. Mission

United States Government establishes facilities and real property to support the US Mission Iraq through deliberate planning and execution, brings facilities to operational standards, and ensures maintenance and management of both facilities and real property during the transfer of sovereignty and the establishment of the US Mission Iraq.

3. Execution

- a. Concept of Operations. DOS will assume authority over four facilities or 'Sites' in the Green Zone, including building C/I-35, the Annex Compound, the Ambassador's residence and the future New Embassy Compound. A fifth site will be designated at a later date. The COM will be responsible for facilities and real property management of these sites. DOD and other agencies / activities will be tenants in the DOS Chancery / Embassy Annex Compounds. (See Appendix 2 to Annex F). MNF-I will establish an Area Support Group (ASG Central) organization to assume responsibility for facilities and real property management for DOD facilities and installations upon disestablishment of the CPA. The MNF-I / Combatant Commander will use a systematic stationing process that includes full consideration of facilities requirements and impacts. LOGCAP and other contracted facility services will continue until they are replaced by other contract services or non-contract services. DOD and DOS will have access to these LOGCAP and non-LOGCAP facility services, as required. DOD will identify an ASG to accomplish the base operations mission, including facilities management and operations. Gulf Regional Division (GRD) support will include acquisition, management and closeout of leases and Host Nation (HN) agreements, environmental management, and assistance to the local Staff Judge Advocate (SJA) in resolving claims arising from the use of real property by US Mission or US Forces. The

GRD Chief of Real Estate will remain as primary source of delegations regarding existing DOD leases, on-going DOD lease negotiations, on-going management of those leases, and monthly lease reporting to Headquarters, USACE as required by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Installation and Housing (I&H) for DOD real property requirements. Prioritization of facilities and real property requirements will be coordinated among COM, MNF-I, and within DOD activities prior to funding and contracting.

b. Conduct of Operations.

- (1) Phase I. Phase I begins when the Interagency Transition Planning Team (ITPT) arrives in Baghdad, and ends on 31 May 2004. Specific policies established in this phase provide a baseline for facility and real property issues that will then inform the respective responsible agencies executing this plan. These include:
 - (a) DOD will be responsible for control, operation and support (to include funding) of real property and facilities used by DOD. DOS may be a tenant in select DOD facilities outside Baghdad.
 - (b) DOD and DOS mission activities will be responsible for programming, budgeting and allocating adequate funding to finance the respective facilities needed to support their missions and in the case of DOD, to finance support of non-reimbursable tasks. The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) control of facilities and real property in the Green Zone not needed for DOS and DOD missions will be transitioned to a combination of the appropriate Iraqi authorities as soon as conditions allow. CPA management and support of Green Zone facilities required for DOS use will transition to DOS.
 - (c) CPA management and support of Green Zone facilities required for DOD use will transition to MNF-I logistics and engineer elements. DOD will appoint a commander of what is now called the Green Zone (Could be the Commander, ASG Central) as the unifying authority for MNF-I security, facilities management, and logistics support within the Green Zone. DOD will establish additional subordinate Area Support Groups under MNF-I that will provide support to non-DOD U.S. government agencies operating at other sites in Iraq. (See Annex A, Appendix 2 – Base Support Operations in Support of US Mission). A facilities management office will be established under the commander of the ASG Central to operate and maintain DOD facilities and manage space allocation and tenancy, and coordinate with Iraq ministry official within the zone. The Gulf Region Division (GRD) will provide support as required.
- (2) Phase II. Phase II begins when the US Office Baghdad opens on / around 1 June 2004 and ends with the disestablishment of the CPA and the re-designation of US Mission Advance Team as US Mission Iraq on 30 June 2004.
 - (a) MNF-I stands up DOD facility and real property management capability via establishment of ASG's with subordinate Base Support Battalions (BSB) when available. Stationing, area master planning, facility space use assignment, and environmental management processes are established for all real property and facilities identified for support of DOD during the Iraqi Interim, Transitional and

Permanent Phases of Government. CPA transitions operation and accountability of facilities in Green Zone to DOS, MNF-I and appropriate Iraqi authorities on 30 June.

- (b) CJTF continues with Global Information System (GIS)-based inventory of facilities and real property used or planned for use by DOD. Personnel, equipment and material needed by MNF-I to accomplish DOD facility and real property mission are transferred to MNF-I. GRD defines facility operation and maintenance requirements for new facilities and infrastructure to be constructed for MNF-I use.
 - (c) GRD will continue to exist with a general officer commanding. Direction and control of GRD will transition from CJTF-7 to MNF-I on 30 June 2004.
 - (d) GRD may provide supplemental support to MNF-I / ASG Central.
- (3) Phase III. Phase III Begins with the redesignation of US Mission Advanced Team as US Mission Iraq on 30 June 2004 and ends 30 September 2004.
- (a) MNF-I assumes full responsibility for facilities and real property support to all DOD base operations activities in Iraq. Between Phase III and the end of Phase IV, DOS will assume full responsibility for all facilities and real property support for the DOS buildings in the Green Zone and the site for the future New Embassy Compound (NEC). Business processes are established and implemented for DOD stationing, facility planning, facility use, and facility work prioritization.
 - (b) The "Convention Center" and the Al Rasheed Hotel will be secured by MNF-I and the Center will be managed by ASG Central.
 - (c) ASG Central provide needed facility and real property support to DOD's facility and real property activities
- (4) Phases IV & V. Phase IV begins 1 October 2004 and ends immediately after Iraqi elections have occurred. Phase V begins immediately after Iraqi elections have occurred and ends when a secure and stable environment allows US Mission in Iraq to function comparably to other US Embassies in the region. Iraq Reconstruction and Management Office (IRMO) and the Project and Contracting Office (PCO) will have phased down and / or been disestablished as their work is completed. Facilities and real property support of DOD activities are adjusted to reflect progress and problems of Iraqi Interim and Transitional Government. MNF-I completes GIS-based inventory of facilities and real property during Phase V.

c. Tasks.

- (1) Phase I and II.
 - (a) Tasks for DOS.

- (1) COM provides facilities, real property, and environmental support requirements, including real estate to ASG Central, for both inside and outside of the Green Zone.
 - (2) COM identifies US Mission activities / facilities requirements outside of Baghdad to DOD activity (where / when DOS is likely to be a tenant on DOD facilities).
- (b) Tasks for DOD.
- (1) Provide facilities, real property, and environmental support (to include real estate) to the COM and MNF-I / Combatant commander.
 - (2) Establish organizational structure (ASG Central) within MNF-I to meet DOD real property and facilities missions. ASG Central shall identify what support is required from organizations such as GRD and verify that ASG Central support organizations are organized and equipped to support ASG missions.
 - (3) Develop area master plans for the allocation and space use of facilities and real property (including ranges) for COM and DOD missions.
 - (4) Integrate Anti-terrorism / Force Protection (AT / FP) plans and requirements with all facility plans.
 - (5) Identify requirements for major repairs and construction for DOD missions.
 - (6) Identify requirements for operations and maintenance (O&M) of facilities and real property for COM and DOD missions.
 - (7) Identify furniture and fixture plans (requirements and funding) for DOD missions during and after transition.
 - (8) Establish process for systematically defining DOD future facility and real property requirements to support DOD missions during and after transition.
 - (9) CPA develops centralized Global Information System-based inventory of facilities and real property used in the Green Zone. Planners for MNF-I define DOD facilities management roles, responsibilities, and organizational concepts for the logistics and engineering elements of MNF-I. CJTF / MNF-I develops inventory of existing facilities operation and support contracts, staffing, and equipment.
- (c) Tasks for DOD and DOS.
- (1) Identify all facilities and real property (including former, current and future requirements) requirements and inventory and evaluate condition on existing assets to establish accountability and to manage and support DOD and DOS Missions. Inventory data should be kept to the minimum required to establish basic accountability and real property management.

- (2) Establish a prioritization process for facilities and real property programming and execution. ASG Central shall establish a joint facilities utilization board representing all DOD elements to coordinate competing requirements.
- (3) Further develop and coordinate DOD and DOS transition plans for facilities. CJTF-7 / MNF-I and DOS define facility and real property requirements to support their missions during and after the transition. DOS establishes an inventory of facilities and real property it will assume in Baghdad. CJTF-7 / MNF-I develops multi-phased plans to create a centralized Global Information System (GIS)-based inventory of formerly used, currently used, and planned facilities and real property to support DOD.
- (4) Establish a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) to address mutual roles and responsibilities regarding facilities and facilities related costs, including utilities, throughout Iraq. (Annex T, Support MOA)
- (5) Develop performance measures.

(2) Phase III.

- (a) DOD and DOS finalize and transition operations and maintenance (O&M) responsibilities for regional sites, plus Baghdad, pursuant to NSPD 36 and Annexes O (Regional Teams) and T (Support MOA) for Regional Team support. DOS assumes responsibility for facility O&M for Interim Chancery Compound, Interim Chancery Annex Compound, and Chief of Mission Residence (CMR).
- (b) DOD and DOS establish a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) (Annex T) to address mutual roles and responsibilities regarding facilities and facilities related costs, including utilities and environmental management, throughout Iraq.
- (c) DOD and DOS establish MOU / MOA for any utilities and related services to be provided by DOD to DOS or by DOS to DOD.

(3) Phase IV through V.

- (a) Jointly continue to provide established mutual support in accordance with MOA as updated to reflect changing conditions. CENTCOM has DOD lead.

(4) Coordinating Instructions.

- (a) Regular coordination meetings between DOD, DOS, Iraqi Governmental organizations, and others, as required, will be established to coordinate force protection, financial management, environmental management, stationing, acquisition and disposal of personal and real property to ensure effective facilities and property management to DOD and DOS missions.
- (b) On request, DOD and DOS coordinate to provide real estate assistance and management support to host nation (HN), US Government agencies, and

international organizations, including emergency repair, restoration or improvements of / to HN infrastructure

- (c) Ensure effective coordination of facility construction schedules and turnover / start-up with facility owners / users. Maximize involvement of construction contractors in initial facility start-up for new facilities constructed for DOD.
- (d) The MNF-I / Combatant Commander's stationing plan (and updates) will include requirements for multinational forces. CENTCOM is DOD lead.
- (e) Systematic processes are essential for identifying and prioritizing facility and real property requirements prior to their execution. Plans, assumptions, and realities regarding DOD and DOS information technology, financial management, personnel, equipment, security, contracting, and human resources will greatly impact the facilities and real property plans and success.
- (f) Appropriate Status of Force Agreement (SOFA) or other Host Nation agreements will be developed as applicable to support use of real property for DOD and DOS missions after establishment of a permanent Iraq Government.

4. Administration and Logistics

- a. Security. Provided per requirements of MOA (Annex S) on security.
- b. Logistics. Support will be provided by the MNF-I's Area Support Group Mission within the Green Zone and, when required, other ASG elements outside the Green Zone.
- c. Contract Support. Provided by PCO and GRD, as required and appropriate.

5. Command and Control

- a. Annex A – Command and Control, OPLAN Sovereign Iraq.
- b. The Commander, GRD, will be under the operational control of MNF-I. For Iraqi reconstruction efforts, GRD will take direction and prioritization from the Project and Contracting Office (PCO).

APPENDIX 2 TO
ANNEX F TO
OPLAN SOVEREIGN IRAQ
11 JUNE 2004

APPENDIX 2 - FACILITIES TO ANNEX F – FACILITIES AND REAL PROPERTY

- References:
- A. Foreign Service Buildings Act (22 U.S.C. 292-302)
 - B. Foreign Assistance Act (22 U.S.C. 2396)
 - C. Secure Embassy Construction and Counterterrorism Act of 1999, Title VI, Pub. L. 106-113

1. Situation.

a. Current Situation.

- (1) Department of State is authorized by Foreign Service Buildings Act (22 U.S.C. 292-302) to acquire property for use of USG diplomatic missions and to assign such property to the various agencies of the USG having a presence at such missions. Department of State (DOS) / US Mission will take control of three properties in the Green Zone on or before 30 June 2004. The C-135 compound will become the Interim Chancery. The Annex compound will become the Interim Embassy Annex. The Administrator's residence will become the Chief of Mission residence (CMR). The fourth site in the Green Zone, the New Embassy Compound, will be developed upon approval and appropriation of funds by the US Congress. The C-135 compound is currently occupied by U.S. military units that will have been vacated it in mid-April 2004. An adjacent site is being developed as a residential compound by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). The two properties will be combined into the Interim U.S. Chancery compound which will be the official US Embassy in Iraq, in which the Ambassador will have his office. Pursuant to its Foreign Assistance Act (22 U.S.C. 2396) authorities, USAID will retain control of the residential portion of the compound. The CMR is presently occupied by the Administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). The Annex compound currently houses the CPA, DOD Combatant Commander, Iraqi Reconstruction Management Office (IRMO), and other elements. A fifth site will be designated at a later date.
- (2) Another property, the lakefront site, will be dedicated to the building of a permanent DOS diplomatic complex within two years after congressional authorization and funding. The interim embassy properties will likely be returned to the Government of Iraq once this permanent complex is built and occupied.
- (3) The "convention center" will be secured by the MNF-I and managed by Area Support Group (ASG) Central.

b. Enemy Forces. See Annex B - Intelligence

c. Friendly Forces. See Base Plan – OPLAN Sovereign Iraq

d. Assumptions

- (1) The CMR, Annex, and Chancery buildings will be available for COM use until the future US Embassy compound is constructed.
- (2) Congress will approve and appropriate funds to construct a new US Embassy Compound.
- (3) Custody and control of the three interim properties will be obtained by agreement with the Iraqi Government or by CPA Order extending beyond 30 June 2004 and having the force of Iraqi law under the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL).
- (4) The MNF-I will continue to provide overall security for the Green Zone after 30 June 2004. The DOS will provide internal security for each of the three interim embassy compounds and the fourth and fifth when appropriate. (See Annex K: Security.)
- (5) Support services will be provided by an Area Support Group Mission and by the same service providers, principally LOGCAP, and will have been established by 15 May 2004 for the interim chancery compound and after 1 July 2004 for the remaining interim embassy facilities. Existing support facilities, e.g., generator plants, housing units, dining facilities, and warehouse, will remain available for the duration of the interim embassy facilities. (See Annex I: Logistics.)
- (6) The real estate required for the interim and permanent embassy facilities will be acquired at no cost to the USG, and no funds for real estate acquisition have been included in the allocation of the \$60 million available for the interim facilities.

2. Mission

The Department of State establishes facilities to support a US Mission in Iraq through deliberate planning and execution to identify required facilities, establish construction and renovation standards and programs to upgrade them, and inventory, assess and accept property from existing assets required for the interim embassy.

3. Execution

a. Concept of Operations.

- (1) The DOS, within available funds and with the support and cooperation of DOD and CPA, will have established a transition office in the C-135 building by 15 May 2004 and the balance of the Interim Chancery, the Embassy Annex Compound (Palace), and the Chief of Mission Residence (CMR) NLT 30 June 2004. Using existing housing units located on the palace compound, augmented by 75 additional housing trailers, the DOS will accommodate U.S. personnel under the authority of the COM, at no more than two staff members per trailer. (Each resident shall have a separate sleeping area with a shared bathroom.) The DOS will acquire the property known as the lakefront site as the location for a permanent embassy compound through agreement with the Iraqi Government in exchange for relinquishment of claims to compensation arising from the 1971 expropriation of the former USG Embassy

- (2) The Interagency Transition Planning Team (ITPT) (forward) which arrived in Baghdad on 19 March will perform initial surveys, audits and inventory of furniture and equipment required by the interim embassy, determine space requirements for the COM and other competing tenant demands, and prepare for transition of property and facilities during the Month of April and May (Phase I). Kellogg, Brown and Root (KBR) will retain control of the property book, and the COM will only be a recipient of property managed by the contractor.
- (3) During the month of June, after the US Mission Advance Team is established, the expanded staff will continue coordinating facility transfer with the CPA so as to effect a seamless transition on 30 June 2004. In doing so, the COM / CPA coordinating effort will bring together information, personnel, and resources necessary to perform these tasks and ultimately to design and construct a permanent, diplomatic complex on the lakefront site within two years after congressional authorization and funding.
- (4) The agencies and organizations that will fall under the COM after 30 June 2004 will be located in the two interim office compounds: the chancery and the annex. Any agencies or organizations under the jurisdiction of the COM not located in these facilities will be located in facilities provided by their agency or department, at no cost to the DOS.
- (5) The available budget for the interim facilities (approximately \$60 million) will permit only limited renovations and improvements of the interim embassy facilities and will not meet all new embassy compound standards. The renovations will focus on providing secure, safe and functional facilities, in that order of priority, within funding constraints. Adequate physical security will be provided by COM for the interim embassy facilities to support collocation and setback waivers as necessary under the Secure Embassy Construction and Counterterrorism Act of 1999, Title VI, Pub. L. 106-113.
- (6) Conduct of Operations.
 - (a) Phase I. Provide the physical security improvements and internal renovations to make the interim chancery available for limited operations by DOS transition staff by 15 May 2004.
 - (b) Phase II. Complete limited improvements and renovations to the interim chancery, interim embassy annex and interim CMR by 15 June 2004.
 - (c) Phase III. Complete final improvements and renovations to the interim annex by 12 September 2004.
 - (d) The DOS will control the facilities that have been selected for the interim embassy facilities including all housing and support facilities on the Palace site. This will require transferring ownership of assets from DOD and CPA to the DOS and providing the COM with the authority to assign the housing transferred to the DOS. (DOS will augment the existing housing on the palace site by a total of 75 trailers, which will house 150 occupants at two per unit.) In addition, ownership of the furnishings in the palace and residence occupied by Ambassador Bremer will be transferred from DOD and CPA to the DOS (maintained by KBR property book

officer). None of the \$60 million available for standing up the interim facilities has been allocated for furnishing these buildings. (See Annex I: Logistics.)

b. Tasks. Required tasks are listed in general timeline sequence by Phases I through III

(1) Phases I and II.

(a) DOS.

- (1) DOS shall develop projects to renovate and improve the interim embassy facilities, focusing on security, safety and functionality, in that order of priority, by 24 May 2004.
- (2) Execute projects to renovate and improve the interim embassy facilities to provide initial transition offices in C-135 by 15 May 2004 and the balance of the Interim Chancery, Annex and CMR by 15 June 2004 to permit the interim embassy to be established by 30 June 2004.

(b) DOD (CPA).

- (1) CPA shall coordinate with KBR by 1 May to ensure that an inventory of assets (real property) is available to support DOS.
- (2) CPA will transfer to DOS management and control of the C-135 compound by 15 May 2004.
- (3) CPA shall prepare real and personal property transfer documents and transfer the property in the C-135 compound desired by DOS to it by 15 May 2004, and property in the remaining properties NLT 30 June 2004. The intent of this action is to keep management and control of property under the current contractual agreement with KBR.
- (4) CPA will transfer to DOS management and control of the Palace complex and residence occupied by Ambassador Bremer, including all associated real and personal property assets, after inventory, NLT 30 June 2004.

(c) Joint Tasks.

- (1) Develop a consolidated list of DOS, DOD and other agency and department missions / organizations planned to be accommodated in the interim embassy facilities.
- (2) Develop a master plan for allocation of office space and equipment in the interim embassy annex by 24 May 2004.
- (3) Develop and sign an MOU (done) to provide continuity of services essential to mission operations and maintenance by 1 May 2004.

- (4) Develop plans for moving personnel into the interim embassy by 1 June 2004 (done) and commence movement when conditions permit. The intent is to have a seamless transition on 30 June.
 - (5) Establish reimbursement procedures for unique maintenance and support requirements of tenants, such as IT after receipt of the FY 05 supplemental. (See OPLAN Sovereign Iraq, para 4.)
 - (6) Compile all existing conditions, environmental, etc., assessments and complete on facilities outside the Green Zone but for which there are requirements.
 - (7) Develop requirements and funding process adequately for operations and maintenance (O&M), major repairs and construction (including utilities) for DOS and DOD missions.
 - (8) Develop legal agreements for use of Host Nation facilities
 - (9) By 1 June 2004, tenants will have signed host / tenant agreements with DOS defining space and types of support each will provide / receive. (CPA lead)
- (2) Phases III through V.
- (a) DOS.
 - (1) Remaining work in the Embassy Annex should be completed by 30 September 2004.
 - (2) Complete moving personnel and equipment to accommodate embassy operations by 30 June 2004.
 - (3) Coordinate facility support requirements with Base Support Unit.
 - (b) DOD.
 - (1) Provide facility support through the Base Support Unit.
 - (2) Designate and transition excess Green Zone facilities to appropriate authorities as soon as possible.

4. Administration and Logistics. See Annex F and OPLAN Sovereign Iraq

5. Command and Control. Tenants within the Embassy Annex compound will report operationally to either the Chief of Mission (DOS) or DOD for those DOD elements not under COM authority.

- a. The IRMO will report to the Chief of Mission (DOS). The PCO will be subordinate to the Secretary of the Army as Executive Agent, but will be under the authority of the COM.
- b. See Annex F and OPLAN Sovereign Iraq for additional guidance.

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ANNEX G TO
OPLAN SOVEREIGN IRAQ
11 JUNE 2004

ANNEX G – CONTRACTS AND ACQUISITIONS

- References: A. Section 2207 Report to Congress, JAN04, Unclassified
B. CPA Project List

I.S. ituation

a. Current Situation.

- (1) The Head of Contract Authority (HCA) and the Project Management Office (PMO) or successor organization have been established to support the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). They have been designed to carry out the business of Iraqi Relief and Reconstruction for which the CPA establishes priorities and defines requirements.
- (2) The Department of the Army (DA) and the Department of State (DOS) have completed a joint review of over 2800 contracts that are available to support the CPA, and DOS has expressed specific interest in exercising the authorities of 32 contracts to support future Chief of Mission (COM) requirements. COM will define its requirements in a Statement of Work (SOW) which will be jointly developed with DA to provide required support. Identifying these 32 actions is not intended or does not limit DOS or DA from entering into other contract support relations in the future.
- (3) A DA contracting staff in Baghdad and in CONUS will support the PCO and COM contracts executed through the DA. The DA and PCO will use the “reach back” concept to the greatest extent possible to provide required support.
- (4) DOS and DA will develop a set of contract conditions describing contractor support and responsibilities to include but not limited to: security (Annex S), meals, housing, and medical and place these conditions in all appropriate contracts.
- (5) The DA will continue to inform DOS contracting of all future contracts awarded in support of the CPA as is the current practice.

b. Enemy Forces. See Annex B – Intelligence.

c. Friendly Forces. See Base Plan – OPLAN Sovereign Iraq

Acquisition Support Command (ASC). The ASC will serve as the administrative headquarters for the HCA and PCO upon assignment of the PCO mission to the DA.

d. Assumptions.

- (1) The PMO (the PCO as a “virtual” organization on 1 June 2004) is the single agent and integrator with responsibility and accountability for reconstruction efforts funded directly by the Iraqi Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF).

- (2) The Department of Army (DA) is the executive agent for Department of Defense (DOD).
- (3) The HCA for all contracts under DOD will remain with DA.
- (4) PMO will respond to the US Mission Iraq to assist with the development of IRRF-funded requirements and priorities with Iraqi Ministries.
- (5) Construction contracts awarded will progress according to plan.
- (6) All infrastructure reconstruction sites will be secured along with movement of construction material and equipment. – Cost driver ~25% of Project Cost
- (7) PMO is not responsible for any FY03 Supplemental work.
- (8) All contracts under DOD will use Standard Procurement System (SPS) and the US Army Corps of Engineers Financial Management System (CEFMS) software.
- (9) A program office will be established within DOS to serve as the customer for acquisitions handled by DOS.
- (10) Adequate data will be made available regarding existing contracts and upcoming contract needs.
- (11) US Government (USG) agencies in-country will rely on their own contracting offices to support programmatic acquisitions, following existing International Cooperative Administrative Support Services (ICASS) policy. The ICASS program is a program through which the USG provides and shares the cost of common administrative support at posts overseas.

2. Mission

The Head of Contract Authority (HCA) and the Program Management Office (PMO) continue to execute Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund contracts and projects as outlined in the report to Congress under section 2207 seamlessly through the transition from the Coalition Provisional Authority to an Iraqi Interim Government and the concurrent establishment of a United States Mission Iraq.

3. Execution

- a. Concept of Operations. The PMO, which will officially become the Project and Contracting Office (PCO), will provide contracts management and project management authority over the construction and non-construction contracts awarded under the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF). Following the intent to be fully operational at the time of transfer of sovereignty, the PMO will have been re-designated as the “virtual” PCO on 1 June 2004 but continue to work within the CPA structure. On 1 June, it will have transitioned to the US Mission Advance Team and be under the management oversight of its Chief, the CPM designee, but be responsive to the priorities of the Administrator, CPA,

through 30 June 2004. The Department of the Army will assume responsibility for the PCO for funding, staffing, quality assurance, security (Annex S), facilities, and life support consistent with this intent. With establishment of the US Mission Iraq, responsibility for determining requirements and priority for non-security project requirements will be transferred from the CPA to the US Mission, while responsibility for deciding security related project requirements and priorities will remain with the Multinational Force – Iraq (MNF-I).

- (1) Conduct of Operations. Scheme of Contracts and Project Management Operations is as follows:
 - (a) Phase I. Phase I began when the Interagency Transition Planning Team (ITPT) arrived in Baghdad on 19 March 04. Phase I ends on 31 May and the US Mission Advance Team formally began operating on 1 June 2004. During this phase, HCA and PMO will continue support to the CPA in contracts and projects management while assisting the ITPT to identify critical processes and services needed during and post transition. The CPA, in coordination with the DOS, will have developed plans to establish a temporary organization called the Iraqi Reconstruction and Management Organization (IRMO) on 1 June 2004. Like the PCO, the IRMO will be formally established on 1 July 2004 but will have been established as a “virtual” organization as of 1 June. It will have two major responsibilities during and following the transition: Manage the personnel authorized under Title 5, U.S.C. Section 3161 and support the COM in identifying requirements and priorities for non-security related projects supported by the IRRF funds. It will also develop plans to place the current PMO under the responsibility of the DA and renamed the Project and Contracting Office (PCO), a temporary organization established by National Security Presidential Directive. The intent of these actions is to have provided both “temporary” organizations under the management oversight of the Chief (DCM designee), US Mission Advance Team and the Secretary of the Army as Executive Agent on 1 June 2004 so that operating procedures will be streamlined to support the concept of a seamless transition on 30 June 2004.
 - (b) Phase II. Phase II began on 1 June 2004 when the US Mission Advance Team began operations. Phase II ends with the disestablishment of the CPA and the designation of US Mission Advance Team as the US Mission in Iraq. The IRMO and PCO will be placed under management authority of the Chief (DCM designee), US Mission Advance Team, but with responsibility being retained by the Administrator until 30 June 2004. HCA and PCO will support the US Mission Advance Team as necessary while continuing its support to CPA until 30 June as it divests itself of responsibilities. HCA and PCO will support this transfer of responsibilities without a reduction in capacity or commitment.
 - (c) Phase III. Phase III Begins on 30 June 2004, with the re-designation of US Mission Advance Team as US Mission Iraq. Phase III ends 30 September 2004. With the designation of the US Mission Iraq, HCA and PCO come under the authority of the COM for requirements, prioritization, and execution of non-security related IRRF projects. The HCA will continue under the legal authority of the Secretary of the Army.

- (d) Phase IV. Phase IV begins 1 October 2004 and ends immediately after the Iraqi elections have occurred. By October 2004, PCO contract support for the US Mission may be phased out as the DOS establishes its normal US Mission contracting capabilities---with the exception of those services jointly determined by DOD and DOS as best provided under joint, new or existing agreements.
- (e) Phase V. Phase V begins immediately after the Iraqi elections have occurred. During this phase, all projects funded by the IRRF, Public Law 108-106, will be completed and turned over to the Iraqi Government or designated USG agencies. Phase V ends when a secure and stable environment allows the US Mission Iraq to function comparably to other US Embassies in the region. Both the HCA for the IRRF funds and PCO will be or will have been closed.

b. Tasks.

- (1) Department of State: Phases I and II. Phases III through V support sustainment.
 - (a) Complete Memorandum of Agreement with DOD (DA) to ensure continued contracting support.
 - (b) Review existing contracts managed by the CPA and/or US forces and determine which contracts will be of value for use by DOS. Request that CPA/US forces transfer contracts to DOS or purchase required services through military contacts NLT 30 May 2004.
 - (c) Establish a program office within DOS to manage IRRF requirements and priorities (IRMO).
 - (d) Identify potential contracts to be awarded or administered by DOS.
 - (e) Determine operational contracting personnel needed in Office of Acquisition Management.
 - (f) Codify the finalized scopes of work for Facilities Management and Maintenance contracts completed in mid-April 2004 for execution during all phases.
- (2) Department of Defense. Phases I and II. Phases III through V support sustainment.
 - (a) Establish the PCO with the Secretary of the Army designated as the DOD executive Agent. The PCO forward will be under the authority of the COM after 30 June 2004.
 - (b) Document finalized program management plans among PMO and executing agencies on support and operating budget requirements completed by 1 May 2004.
 - (c) Finalize definitions of construction and non-construction metrics by 1 May 2004.

- (d) Ensure that in-country technical operating agreements among PCO, executing agencies and Iraqi ministry counterparts are developed and in place by 1 June 2004.
- (e) Plan and ensure contract personnel are adequately quartered, rationed, protected and have primary medical care and evacuation procedures for more serious medical conditions prior to country clearance. (Annex N – Contractor Security – TBP)
- (f) Establish procedures for processing contract companies' equipment and personnel to Iraq (country clearance).
- (g) Maintain accountability of contract personnel in Iraq.
- (h) Determine status of Federal Deployment Center task order and extend to September 30 for use by CPA redeployment.
- (i) Develop, in coordination with DOS (See Coordinating Instructions) a set of standard conditions to incorporate into contracts which require forward deployment of personnel and assets.

(3) Tasks to Other Agencies (including USAID).

Execute MOA(s) with DOS and other agencies regarding contracting workload and which agencies will manage or support specific contracts, by 30 April 2004.

c. Coordinating Instructions.

- (1) NLT 30 April 2004, DOS coordinate with DOD to acquire required services using DOD contracts by 30 April 2004.
- (2) DOS and DOD jointly review current LOGCAP contract and operations.
- (3) Ensure DOS has ability to utilize necessary LOGCAP operations by 30 April 2004.
- (4) DOS and DOD jointly will have finalized LOGCAP contract arrangement by 1 June 2004.
- (5) PCO will coordinate provincial relief and reconstruction efforts with the MNF-I and the subordinate military commander in the area where projects are ongoing.
- (6) There are a number of issues related to contractors on the battlefield. The DOS and DOD will develop a set of policies and standard conditions to incorporate in each contract which requires contractors on the battlefield. These conditions (clauses) will address the responsibilities of contractors to secure themselves; the authority of contractors to carry weapons; limitations, if any on the type of weapons; the rules of force; housing and base support requirements; medical responsibilities; identification card requirements, physical condition requirements, and a broad range of other potential standard clauses. In this context, DOD and DOS will develop

communications strategies to inform the contractors and to deal with unintended consequences of policies derivative of this task. (Annex N – Contractor Security – TBP)

- (7) DOS/COM will be informed routinely of the country of origin of contractors employed on IRRF projects.

4. Administration and Logistics

Material and Services. Contract services for the CPA, US Mission Advance Team and the US Mission Iraq will be provided through current contracts and procedures established by the HCA until such time as DOS establishes other support contracts or determines continuation with DOD contracting is more advantageous.

5. Command and Control

The PCO will be directed by the Secretary of the Army who will support contracting and acquisition activity in support of the US Mission Iraq and MNF-I. However, the element of PCO in Iraq will be under the COM Authority. It will be responsive to both the COM and Commander, MNF-I who will establish and prioritize requirements for construction and acquisition in their respective areas of responsibility.

ANNEX H TO
OPLAN SOVEREIGN IRAQ
11 JUNE 2004

ANNEX H – INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY (ICT)

- References:
- A. Foreign Service Buildings Act (22 U.S.C. 292-302)
 - B. Foreign Assistance Act (22 U.S.C. 2396)
 - C. Secure Embassy Construction and Counterterrorism Act of 1999, Title VI, Pub. L. 106-113
 - D. Mission Performance Plan FY 2006 U.S. Embassy Iraq
 - E. State / Defense Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on Security, dated December 16, 1997

I.S. Situation

a. Current Situation.

- (1) US Government (USG) information and communications technology (ICT) currently in Iraq is characterized by four tiers. Tier I represents Department of Defense (DOD) military communications in support of the Commander, Central Command (CENTCOM). Tier II represents the ICT dedicated to the support of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). Tier II consists of ICT assets purchased using both Defense Appropriations and Supplemental Appropriations. Tier II ICT is under the authority of the Communications Support Office (CSO) assigned to CPA, which will become the Communications Support Group (CSG). Tier III is the commercial telecommunications infrastructure of Iraq, and is administered by the Senior Liaison to the Ministry of Communications. Tier IV represents those ICT assets transferred from other tiers to the Department of State (DOS), or brought to Iraq by DOS, supporting USG and Foreign Service Nationals (FSN) currently assigned to CPA.
- (2) The Tier I ICT architecture has evolved from the wartime coalition structure to the developing Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) II structure. This developing architecture is characterized by the replacement of tactical US military communication assets with contractor-supported, commercial communications systems distributed throughout Iraq. The Department of the Army (DA) as Executive Agent (EA) for the ground force component in Iraq, along with the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) have supported both Tier I and Tier II ICT as separate architectures.
- (3) Tier II ICT capacity is characterized by a patchwork of initial communications systems acquired in support of the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) in the immediate aftermath of combat operations. The US military deployed initial communications capabilities in the immediate aftermath of intensive combat operations as it was the only organization capable of generating the magnitude of the capability required under the time constraints existing in April and May 2003. Under the authority of CPA, the Department of the Army (DA), as Executive Agent (EA) built this initial capability into today's current architecture supporting approximately 6,000 people in the Green Zone, three major communications nodes located in the north, south and west, and all regional teams. In addition, CPA provides ICT support

to non-DOD USG organizations and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) within the Green Zone. A critical capability in this Tier II architecture is the GSM-based cellular system purchased from, and operated by the MCI Corporation. Covering metropolitan Baghdad, this system of approximately 10,000 phones and an international gateway remains the primary communications capability for both Iraqis and CPA. In addition, Continental United States (CONUS) dial tone is provided to the Green Zone via the CPA/CSO system using DISA long-haul services. Over the past year, the Intelligence Community and several Departments of the Executive Branch have established ICT infrastructure in Iraq. While not extensive, duplication beyond operational redundancy represents one of the primary areas for improvement in the existing USG architecture.

- (4) The capabilities of the civil telecommunications infrastructure of Iraq, Tier III, are characterized by geographic region. In the north, ten years of infrastructure investment has resulted in a nascent telecommunications capability including fiber, microwave, and cellular systems capable of supporting a significant percentage of Coalition / international partner ICT requirements. In the central and southern region, sanctions and combat operations have resulted in a patchwork of fiber, wire-line and microwave networks suffering from substandard pre-war construction and constant repair during the 1990's. With the exception of disparate ICT improvement projects fostered through the use of CENTCOM's local commander discretionary funding, the major infrastructure repair has been the \$50M USAID effort through Bechtel Corporation repairing Class IV and Class V switches belonging to the Iraq Telegraph and Post Company (ITPC). These repairs were completed in March 2004. While significant, these repairs represent only a beginning in establishing wire-line service to the common Iraqi customer, systematically prevented access to such services by the previous regime. Moreover, authoritarian internal security policy prevented the establishment of cellular infrastructure throughout the regions under Saddam's control. Looting and sabotage following the cessation of combat operations further debilitated Iraq's civil telecommunications system. Post-war reconstruction has made moderate progress on restoring, and in some cases, improving this sector. In the area of cellular technology, there are now 5 cellular telephone companies offering services in Iraq: AsiaCell, Iraqna, and Atheer are providing regional services in the north, central, and south, respectively, but are also licensed to expand beyond their regions when regional standards are met. Korek and Sana Tel, both providing services in the north, have been given regional licenses only. Recent instability has resulted in system build-out delays for all cellular carriers.
- (5) An initial Tier IV ICT infrastructure was established in March 2004 as DOS established an initial communications capability at the Palace in the Green Zone. The expansion of DOS ICT support to the future Chief of Mission (COM) and those assigned to COM authority under National Security Decision Directive (NSDD)-38 has been the primary focus of the ongoing transition effort. Critical Mission staffing and space allocation decisions have yet to be made, delaying DOS efforts to expand initial installations of OpenNet Plus (similar but not identical to DOD's NIPRNet) and ClassNet (similar but not identical to DOD's SIPRNet) systems into the Green Zone. Simultaneously, DOS has been conducting extensive liaison with DOD facilitating the use of common ICT infrastructure. The lack of a Chief Information Officer for CPA, the pace of the US and multinational deployments into Iraq, and the relative difficulty

of conducting direct liaison in the current security environment in Baghdad have resulted in unnecessary duplication of ICT assets in Iraq. With the establishment of a Senior Steering Group in Baghdad comprised of the senior ICT representatives from CSO, DOS, CJTF-7, CENTCOM, the Intelligence Community, and the Senior Liaison to the Ministry of Communications, this duplication is being removed and efficiencies achieved.

- (6) This annex jointly developed by DOD, DOS, CENTCOM, and CPA, clarifies which ICT infrastructure and services contracts will be transferred to DOS, addresses contractual and technical issues in the transition from DOD to DOS, as well as identifying the residual capabilities of CPA and their disposition in the post 30 June 2004 environment. The goal of this Annex is to create a plan for obtaining an initial operating capability for the proposed US Mission population by 15 May 2004 so that it is fully operational when the US Mission Advance Team is established, while satisfying the residual ICT service requirements without interruption.
- b. Enemy Forces. The terrorist threat to the relief and reconstruction effort remains the primary risk factor for the successful completion of the mission. The ICT infrastructure is at risk from indirect fire from rockets and mortars and from direct action by saboteurs. The CSO/CSG must take actions to ensure alternate means of communications are available if a major telecommunications node is damaged or destroyed by hostile action. Continuity of Operations Plans (COOPs) must include the installation of redundant telecommunications systems. (See Annex B - Intelligence)
- c. Friendly Forces. US military forces falling under the operational control of the Multi-National Force Iraq (MNF-I) will be required to provide physical protection of the Green Zone. Military forces will also be required to perform convoy escort duties to protect telecommunications equipment and personnel in transit in the Iraqi Area of Responsibility (AOR). (See Annex A – Command and Control Organizational Structure, and Annex K-- Security)
- d. Assumptions.
- (1) After transition, the Department of the Army will remain the Executive Agent for providing Communications Support to those areas of the CENTCOM AOR for which it is now responsible.
 - (2) Department of the Army will acquire funding to support existing communications contracts beyond 30 June 2004.
 - (3) The US Mission and the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, Office of Iraqi Affairs (NEA/I), Department of State, will constitute the successor entity to the CPA under the provisions of Section 2208 of the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act. CPA property not transferring to DOS will be transferred to MNF-I before 30 June 2004. DOS and DOD will agree on the equipment to be transferred.
 - (4) The official transfer of authority from CPA to US Mission Iraq, will occur on 30 June 2004.

- (5) DOS Information Resource Management office (IRM) will eventually provide all ICT support to organizations falling under COM.
- (6) DOS will eventually provide all ICT support to Regional Team sites belonging to DOS.
- (7) The Iraqi Government will provide ICT support for all Iraqi Government organizations operating in the Green Zone as soon as possible after 1 July 2004.
- (8) The Iraqi Communications and Media Commission (ICMC) will be established and retained to allocate frequency spectrum for Iraq after sovereignty is established, and the US Government will continue to receive priority on and dedication to the frequencies required on a no-cost basis to support the US Mission and prosecute military operations.

2. Mission

The CSO/CSG mission is to install, operate, and maintain reliable seamless information and communications technology (ICT) for the United States Department of Defense organizations residing in the Green Zone of Baghdad, Iraq, as well as those DOD assets that are part of the regional teams deployed throughout Iraq. The CSO will also support other USG agencies and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) as agreed upon.

3. Execution

a. Concept of Operations.

- (1) Commanders Intent. Upon transition or when designated by the Secretary of Defense, the CPA CSO/CSG will be transferred to be a subordinate organization to MNF-I, as specified by CENTCOM.. The CSO/CSG provides communications support as directed by MNF-I and will provide communications support to DOD and non-DOD USG organizations and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) within the Green Zone as directed by MNF-I. DOS will establish an Information Resource Management (IRM) function in Baghdad to provide communications support for the COM. There will be a period of time where organizations that fall under the Chief of Mission (such as the IRMO) will maintain communications support from the CSO/CSG while DOS IRM capabilities are being installed. CSO/CSG support will continue until the security environment becomes sufficiently permissive to allow for normal operations of the Mission ICT functions. Eventually, all communications support to organizations reporting to the Chief of Mission will be provided by the DOS IRM office. After transition, the Iraqi Government will assume responsibility for providing communication support to Iraqi Government offices operating in the Green Zone. Iraqi government offices and other non-DOD organizations that currently receive IT support from the CSO/CSG will transition to commercial telecommunications as soon as possible after 30 June 2004.
- (2) The US Government, through the Department of State and the Department of Defense, will continue to refine the existing tiered ICT architecture in Iraq. The first tier, supporting US and Multinational military forces, will continue under the authority of

CENTCOM. Those Tier II assets transitioning from CPA that support US military assets both under MNF-I and COM authority will transfer to CENTCOM authority, under the MNF-I. This transfer would include the CSO/CSG organization. The third tier represents the build-out of the commercial/government networks of Iraq. Tier IV, DOS IRM support of the US Diplomatic mission, will be developed by the Department of State.

- (3) An executive-level Senior Steering Group (SSG) will be formed in Baghdad to facilitate awareness of various ICT initiatives and to recommend prioritization of projects, equipment, training, and sustainment of Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence (C4I) operations for USG. It will be comprised of senior ICT stakeholders from the DOS, DOD, CPA, CENTCOM, MNF-I, the Intelligence Community, and the Senior Liaison for the Ministry of Communications. The SSG will be co-chaired by the Department of State Information Management Officer (IMO) and the MNF-I Communication and Information Services (CIS) officer.
- (4) The SSG will coordinate the sharing of USG ICT resources and contractual vehicles as practical in an attempt to find cost efficiencies, while capitalizing on technological synergies. The SSG will make recommendations concerning the implementation of the transitional architecture identified in this annex during transition and in the following phases of operations in Iraq. For those decisions beyond the control of the senior ICT representatives themselves, each member of the SSG will have the responsibility to staff the recommendations of the SSG through their respective chains of command, resolving these issues at the lowest level possible, e.g. MNF-I Chief of Staff and the Deputy Chief of Mission. An Executive Level Transition Panel (ELTP) has been established in Washington,, D.C. comprised of the Chief Information Officers (CIOs) of the Department of the Army, DOD, DOS, the Intelligence Community, and the Joint Staff J-6 to seek resolutions not obtainable in theater. The SSG will continue to coordinate the installation of large-bandwidth satellite downlinks in the Green Zone to prevent unnecessary duplication. The SSG will also work with the Ministry of Communications civil reconstruction effort to ensure that Iraq reconstruction priorities are synchronized, creating opportunities to shift some ICT services onto the Iraq civil telecommunications infrastructure. The USG will have achieved success if the USG has developed an integrated communications architecture that meets mission requirements, minimizes costs, eliminates duplication of assets, leverages the latest technology through technology insertion growth paths, and shapes a sustainable, flexible system which can adapt quickly to changing environments and missions in Iraq.
- (5) Conduct of Operations.
 - (a) Current ICT infrastructure in Iraq includes equipment purchased with either US appropriated funds or assets belonging to the people of Iraq. To achieve the goal of minimizing the impact to the existing USG user base, while maximizing the sharing of ICT infrastructure assets in Iraq across the USG, an architecture is required that permits flexibility in the pre-30 June 2004 environment. This architecture also will require the specificity to successfully distribute all USG assets between MNF-I and the Chief of Mission (COM) in the time period leading

up to 30 June 2004. This transition ICT architecture currently encompasses the existing CPA ICT infrastructure including wiring, computers, peripherals, and transport into and within the Palace compound. This infrastructure also includes the ongoing expansion of ICT services to other buildings in the Green Zone currently or soon to be occupied by ministries or liaison staffs, other DOD agencies, as well as other Executive Branch organizations. On 30 June 2004, several buildings within the Green Zone (such as the Government of Iraq Complex, GOIC) will no longer be associated with the USG, thus falling outside the transition ICT architecture. CSO/CSG, working with the CPA General Council, the COM incoming staff, and the Senior Liaisons to the Iraqi ministries, will determine which equipment will transfer to the future Government of Iraq, and effect that transfer on 30 June 2004. For that equipment remaining USG property, the CSO/DSG will ensure that this equipment is accounted for, recovered, and processed using the procedures identified as part of the overall ICT inventory reconciliation between DOD and DOS.

- (b) DOS intends to utilize the current CPA Headquarters as the Interim Embassy Annex, designating the North Wing as a Controlled Access Area (CAA). DOS will utilize a villa within the Green Zone (previously occupied by C Company 1-35) as the interim Embassy (aka Chancery). DOS will also utilize a residence currently occupied by the CPA administrator as the Chief of Mission's Residence (CMR). All of these areas either now or soon will contain wiring, computers, peripherals, and transport purchased by DOD. The transitional architecture described in this annex calls for the maximum use of this installed infrastructure. As DOS establishes an OpenNet and ClassNet presence in some of these three locations, maximum use of existing CPA-installed infrastructure will be used. The establishment of this presence will require additional equipment installations; however, to the maximum extent possible, DOS will avail itself of existing DOD contracts to complete this work.
- (c) As of May 2004, the Iraqi civil telecommunications infrastructure is insufficient to support the U.S. Mission and MNF-I.
- (d) Senior Acquisition Officials from DOD and DOS will work to ensure that the communications requirements of all commercial contracts are appropriately accounted for. In addition, each contract must specify the requirement that contractors provide their employees access to COM Emergency Response Networks without cost to the USG.

b. Tasks.

(1) Department of State and DOD.

- (a) CPA will identify by number and location the non-CENTCOM USG consumers of ICT assets within and outside the Green Zone.
- (b) CPA will notify the SSG, and in its absence the CSO/CSG and the senior DOS IRM representative in Baghdad, of any requirement to use additional office space in buildings within the Green Zone for CPA purposes.

- (c) CPA and COM will determine the structure, reporting relationship, and membership of the governorate teams to be deployed outside of Baghdad, to provide for COG/CSG planning.
- (d) Coordinate with Iraqi Ministries to accomplish the following:
 - (1) Obtain information from the Ministry of Communications to facilitate the connection of the planned Green Zone fiber ring to the commercial Iraqi fiber network infrastructure.
 - (2) Transition all ministries from USG ICT providers and support to non-USG ICT providers as soon as possible.
 - (3) Transition ICT services for the Government of Iraq Center (GOIC) and the Convention Center / Forum to non-USG ICT providers as soon as possible.
 - (4) Ensure that the Chief Information Officer within the Ministry of Science assumes responsibility for the provision of Iraqi Government domain presence and connectivity for the Government of Iraq.
- (2) DOS IRM.
 - (a) Assume Co-Chairmanship of the ICT SSG.
 - (b) Determine the ICT requirements for business units that will fall under the Chief of Mission on 30 June 2004.
 - (c) Develop a plan to satisfy the ICT requirements for business units that will fall under the Chief of Mission on 30 June 2004. This plan will execute a deployment of OpenNet and ClassNet systems to satisfy these requirements as quickly as possible. It should include a transition plan to eventually move these offices off DOD-provided ICT services.
 - (d) In the period leading up to 30 June 2004, DOS IRM will provide OpenNet and ClassNet services to those in the Green Zone requiring them. These services will be provided initially in common-use terminals; however, IRM will deploy these services to the desktop as rapidly as possible. DOS IRM will eventually provide all ICT support to organizations falling under COM. On 30 June 2004, DOS will assume responsibility for the provision of all Internet presence for organizations under COM authority.
 - (e) DOS will develop the ICT capability to fully support regional teams deployed outside of Baghdad. Until these services can be provided by DOS, DOD will provide these services.
 - (f) Working with CSO/CSG, develop an inventory of ICT equipment required by IRM to satisfy its requirements to support the COM.

- (g) In coordination with the CSO/CSG, identify for retention on Task Order 44 the ICT equipment required by IRM to satisfy its requirements to support the COM.
- (h) Working with CSO/CSG, determine an ICT requirement satisfaction plan that provides for a smooth transition of ICT services from CSO/CSG to IRM for those offices and organizations subject to COM authority with minimal impact on services provided, while maximizing the sharing of ICT infrastructure assets.
- (i) Determine method to share Global Address List information between DOD and DOS domains.

(3) CSO/CSG.

- (a) Assume Co-Chairmanship of the ICT SSG in preparation to transfer this responsibility to MNF-I once established.
- (b) In the period leading up to Total Operating Authority (TOA), CSO/CSG shall provide all ICT support to USG consumers in the Green Zone and to the government support teams located in the regions.
- (c) On 1 July 2004, CSO/CSG will provide NIPRNet, SIPRNet, CENTRIXS, commercial dialing, and long-distance wire-line telephone access to all non-DOD, USG personnel requiring these capabilities. In addition, CSO/CSG will provide NIPRNet, SIPRNet, CENTRIXS, commercial dialing and long-distance wire-line telephone access to all CENTCOM-subordinated consumers located in the Green Zone. The regional teams will be provided ICT services by CSO as required until which time DOS can assume full responsibility for the provision of these services.
- (d) Working with DOS IRM and the transition team, determine what ICT support will be required by new business units to be established in the support of the Chief of Mission.
- (e) Working with Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA), develop an inventory of ICT equipment required by CSO/CSG to satisfy its requirements to support DOD personnel and those personnel subject to COM authority throughout the transition process.
- (f) In coordination with DOS, transfer all ICT equipment required by CSO/CSG to satisfy support to DOD and COM to the property book of Area Support Group Central (or designated DOD element) prior to 30 June 2004.
- (g) Working with IRM, determine an ICT requirement satisfaction plan that provides for a smooth transition of ICT services from CSO/CSG to IRM for those offices and organizations under COM authority with minimal impact on services provided, while maximizing the sharing of ICT infrastructure assets.
- (h) Determine method to share Global Address List information between DOD and DOS domains.

- (i) Complete permanent wiring in North, Middle and South Embassy Annex.
 - (j) Working with the Ministry Senior Liaison Officers and the US Mission Public Affairs Office, determine and implement a transition strategy that ends DOD ICT involvement in Intranet and Internet web sites supporting non-USG organizations.
 - (k) Working with DOS, determine and implement a transition strategy that ends DOD ICT involvement in Intranet and Internet web sites supporting organizations subject to COM authority.
 - (l) Develop and implement a management plan for USG GSM System cell phones that identifies the user, his or her organization, and validates the need for long-distance access.
 - (m) Develop physical security procedures for DOS/DOD shared spaces in the Embassy Annex.
 - (n) Develop and implement a data network migration plan.
 - (o) Develop and provide network architecture to the MNF-I to facilitate Network status monitoring (NETOPS).
- (4) Multi-National Force – Iraq.
- (a) Be prepared to accept Co-Chairmanship of the ICT SSG, and assume these responsibilities once MNF-I is established.
 - (b) Co-Chair the ICT SSG facilitating development of a common ICT architecture that minimizes duplicative efforts.
 - (c) MNF-I will accept OPCON of CSO/CSG on 30 June 2004 or when designated by the Secretary of Defense.
 - (d) MNF-I will establish a property account in order to receive accountability for that CPA ICT equipment transferring to MNF-I.

c. Coordinating Instructions.

- (1) Tier 1 (CJTF-7) Memorandum of Understanding on frequency assignments. CPA has enacted Order No. 65, which provides for Iraqi spectrum management responsibilities to be assumed by a newly created Iraqi Communications and Media Commission (ICMC). The Order stipulates the ICMC must coordinate its spectrum management activities with multinational forces (CJTF-7 and its successor entity, MNF-I), CPA (and its successor entity, COM), and DOS in order not to interfere with the operations of military forces protecting Iraq's national security.
- (2) In order to implement this mandate and ensure it is unimpaired by the transition to Iraqi sovereignty, a written document is required to codify current arrangements, rights and privileges of MNF-I (and future commands) with regard to current and future

spectrum assignments, as well as the Iraqi table of allocations for spectrum, which has been updated to reflect the role of multinational forces in Iraq. This document, to be signed by MNF-I and Iraqi civilian spectrum managers, will ensure the smooth transition of Iraqi spectrum management authority to ICMC and compliance with Order No. 65's mandate on an operational level. This will help cement ties and remove regulatory uncertainties that might otherwise raise ambiguity for Multinational spectrum managers and / or their Iraqi counterparts.

- (3) MNF-I and the COM will identify resource requirements and determine personnel and equipment requirements to be provided by CSO/CSG.

4. Administration and Logistics

The COM will oversee and direct the communications staffs and requirements of the US Mission. The Iraq Base Operations Command, reporting to MNF-I, will provide augmentation support until such time as the security environment becomes sufficiently permissive to allow for normal mission operations. The Commander, MNF-I, will support the military architecture to include Tier I and those ICT assets transferred to MNF-I authority from CPA.

5. Command and Control

Upon transition, the CSO/CSG will be transferred CDR, US CENTCOM

- a. The requirements validation and resourcing of the CSO/CSG then becomes the responsibility of CENTCOM and the Title 10 authority.
- b. DOS Information Resource Management (IRM) has appointed an Information Management Officer responsible to the current CPA executive staff. On 30 June 2004, this individual will report under Chief of Mission authority as specified by DOS.
- c. On 30 June 2004, the Senior Liaison for the Iraq Ministry of Communications (MOC) will be assigned to the Iraq Reconstruction and Management Office under COM authority.

APPENDIX 2 TO
ANNEX H TO
OPLAN SOVEREIGN IRAQ
11 JUNE 2004

APPENDIX 2 – MILITARY POSTAL SUPPORT OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF
US MISSION - TO ANNEX H – INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND
COMMUNICATION

- References:
- A. NSPD 36, Dated 11 May 2004 and Public Law 108-106
 - B. DOD 4525.6-M, DOD Postal Manual, dated 15 Aug 02
 - C. Appendix 2 to Annex A – Base Support Operations in Support of US Mission
 - D. Annex E – Organizations, Manpower and Personnel Administration
 - E. 39 U.S. Code, Section 3401

1. Situation

- a. Current Situation. The US Government (USG) has established a date of 30 June 2004 for the transfer of sovereignty of Iraq to an Interim Government. At that time, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) will cease to exist, and the US Mission Iraq will be established. The Chief of Mission (COM) will be responsible for the direction, coordination and supervision of all USG employees, policies, and activities in country, except those under the command of the Commander, MNF-I, and employees seconded to International Organizations. The President has stated in NSPD 36 that the effort to build a strong, bilateral relationship with the Government of Iraq and to support Iraq as it makes the transition to democracy must have the full commitment of all agencies and directs the heads of US Departments and Agencies to provide assistance, services and other support. This appendix outlines the plan for continued military postal support to the US Mission Iraq by establishing a fully functioning APO in the US Mission Iraq to be used by authorized personnel assigned to the Mission. This APO will be referred to hereafter as the US Mission Iraq APO.
- b. Enemy Forces. See Annex B – Intelligence
- c. Friendly Forces. See Base Plan – OPLAN Sovereign Iraq
- d. Assumptions.
 - (1) The US Mission will require military postal services.
 - (2) The US Mission diplomatic pouch system, if available, will not be capable of providing adequate postal services.
 - (3) The US Mission will not be able to provide all necessary manning for the US Mission Iraq APO until the situation on the ground in Iraq has substantially normalized and the US military presence has been substantially drawn down.

- (4) The Department of Defense (DOD) under NSPD 36 will maintain the contract for APO services provided by the USG-servicing contractor (presently, Kellogg, Brown and Root (KBR)) or provide sufficient manpower to replace the KBR contractors. Properly cleared non-citizens can be hired as postal clerks, although they cannot handle official registered mail.
- (5) To the maximum extent possible, the Secretary of State will identify for the Department of Defense the expected requirements for non-reimbursable APO support for DOD's use in preparing future budget requests.
- (6) Area Support Group (ASG) Central, outlined in Reference C, will provide sufficient postal services to authorized US Mission customers in the Green Zone who work both inside and outside of the US Mission Iraq compound.
- (7) Anyone authorized APO privileges is also authorized free mail privileges (personal correspondence) as long as that entitlement is in effect for Iraq.
- (8) US Mission Iraq will endeavor to fully protect all US Mail entering Iraq, both on the ground as currently managed and in future SOFA negotiations.

2. Mission

The USCENTCOM Single Manager for Postal Operations will provide reliable mail dispatch and receipt services to USG personnel, other authorized United States citizens in Iraq, and their authorized dependents on a non-reimbursable basis.

3. Execution

a. Concept of the Operation.

- (1) This Mail Address Only (MAO) is currently operational. It only provides mail receipt services (i.e. customers can receive, but not send mail). Plans are underway to transition this mailroom to a fully functional APO by 9 June 2004.
- (2) Since the current servicing contractor KBR has denied a request to allow their personnel at the US Mission Iraq APO to handle postal finance, DOD has agreed to provide sufficient military postal finance clerks for this operation until civilianized, contracted out, or DOS assumes normal support in the future. There is no Military Postal Service Agency (MPSA) objection to contractors providing postal finance support if the contract calls for it and bidders concur. The servicing contractor would be responsible for financial losses.
- (3) The US Mission Iraq APO will provide services similar as other APOs in the area according to USCENTCOM and DOD regulations. These services will include, but may not be limited to, a full unit mail room with the exception of Official Mail service, and a finance operation to include numbered and unnumbered insurance, certified mail and return receipt for merchandise. The US Mission Iraq APO will not provide express military mail service. The finance portion of the APO will accept cash only, as

it does not have the capability to accept checks or charge cards. Requests to add additional services shall be made to the USCENTCOM Single Manager for postal services.

- (4) The Postal Officer at US Mission Iraq will determine the days and hours of operation of the US Mission Iraq APO.
- (5) The US Mission Iraq APO shall operate in accordance with all applicable instructions outlined in References A and B and USCENTCOM postal regulations.
- (6) The USCENTCOM Single Manager for postal services shall appoint a Postal Finance Officer to provide initial stamp stock and future replenishment to the US Mission Iraq APO.
- (7) The US Mission Iraq APO will collect and provide all required mail metrics as directed by the USCENTCOM Single Manager for postal services. These reports may include, but are not limited to, mail transit time data, mail volume data and commerce data reports.
- (8) The authorized contractor shall pick up inbound mail from and deliver outbound mail to the Joint Military Mail Terminal Iraq (JMMT-I). The contractor shall also perform other APO operations at the US Mission Iraq APO that do not involve the handling of postal monies or stamp stock as detailed in the firm's contract with the USG.
- (9) Access to US Mission Iraq APO services shall be limited to personnel outlined in Reference B, Appendix 1. Normally, this includes only USG personnel and USG contractors in direct support of US Mission Iraq; however, all organizations providing direct support to US Mission Iraq at the time of CPA transition are hereby granted full APO access for their USG employees. Any group, not normally authorized APO access, and not covered by this exception at the time of CPA transition, must have a request made in writing from the Chief of Mission to the combatant commander, as outlined in Task 1b below, within 60-days. The expectation is that such requests will be supported to the maximum extent practicable.

b. Tasks.

- (1) Department of State.
 - (a) Appoint a postal officer to oversee US Mission Iraq APO operations. This position may be an additional duty allocated to a permanently assigned DOS member.
 - (b) Where such individuals may not be automatically authorized postal services by Reference. B, Appendix 1, they or their organization may submit a request for exception to user policy through the combatant commander to allow those individuals working in Iraq access to the US Mission Iraq APO. The combatant commander shall request services through the Military Postal Service Agency to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). Requests shall be made in

accordance with Reference B and should clearly outline which currently unauthorized personnel are requesting postal support.

- (2) Department of Defense.

Provide qualified postal finance clerks for the US Mission Iraq APO as needed to effectively accomplish the mission.

c. Coordinating Instructions.

- (1) The USCENTCOM single manager for postal services will act on behalf of USCENTCOM.
- (2) Mail for the US Mission will be manifested (in and out) in such a way that US Mission mail may be accounted for separately from military mail. This action will allow MPSA and United States Postal Service (USPS) accounting offices to calculate the additional DOD funding required to provide non-reimbursable support and provide a basis for calculating required DOS budgets, once NSPD 36 is superceded.
- (3) Any contracts for postal services must be jointly reviewed by US Mission Iraq and the USCENTCOM Single Manager for Postal Services prior to implementation.

4. Administration and Logistics

The US Mission Iraq will provide the same level of administrative and logistical support to the US Mission Iraq APO as to other operations within the compound. This will include access to computers, phones, office furniture, office supplies, etc.

5. Command and Control

- a. A Postal Officer, appointed by the US Mission Iraq, shall oversee and direct the US Mission Iraq APO operations. His/Her duties shall include performing monthly audits on the finance clerk accounts and quarterly audits on the Custodian of Postal Effects (COPE) account.
- b. The USCENTCOM Single Manager for Postal Services (presently, Air Combat Command Postal Services) shall provide policy guidance to the US Mission Iraq APO and assist in resolving any mail flow problems affecting this operation. In addition, the USCENTCOM Single Manager for Postal Services shall perform annual postal assessment of the US Mission Iraq APO in accordance with Reference B.
- c. The CENTCOM Single Manager for Postal Services shall maintain operational control of the US Mission Iraq APO until and if it transitions to a DOS Post Office.

CHANGE 1 TO
ANNEX I TO
OPLAN SOVEREIGN IRAQ
2 JULY 2004

ANNEX I – LOGISTICS

- References: A. Task Order 44
 B. Army Regulation 710-2

1. Situation.

- a. Current Situation. The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) Headquarters provides logistical support to the CPA personnel and governance representatives. Primary life support is provided under Task Order 44 of the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) contract. The Defense Contract Management Agency assists the Contracting Officer's Representative to ensure the LOGCAP contractor meets the expected performance under the contract. Contracts with local firms provide supplemental support in addition to that provided by CJTF-7. The CPA C-4 is the office of primary responsibility to coordinate logistics requirements and support. After transition on 30 June 2004, the US Mission Iraq will receive support from the same sources; contracts and MNF-I as established in this plan, particularly in its annexes where the details of functional execution are outlined.
- b. Enemy Forces. The current security situation in Iraq is problematic for logistics support. It increases costs and time for security, movement and supplies, and this condition will likely exist throughout the early phases of the transition period and beyond. (Annex B – Intelligence)
- c. Friendly Forces: The CPA is supported by a number of contractors with the majority of the support coming from LOGCAP Task Order 44. DOD now manages the contract which provides logistical manpower, material, transportation, and other support functions. The US Mission will become a customer of LOGCAP and be entitled to use all T.O. 44 property formerly used by CPA.
- d. Assumptions.

LOGCAP will be the primary means of life support for the US Mission Iraq until a permissive security environment enables the US Mission to utilize more economic sources.

2. Mission.

Not later than 30 June 2004, Department of Defense will transition specified logistics and administrative functions now supporting the CPA to the US Mission Iraq. This transfer of responsibility will be completed without disrupting ongoing operations, ensuring full accountability and protection of US Government property.

3. Execution.

a. Concept of Operations. The Chief of Mission will assume primary responsibility for its logistics support, supported by DOD, no later than 30 June 2004. During this transition by DOD from its supporting the CPA to supporting the US Mission Iraq, it will ensure continuity of operations in its support. DOS will become a customer of the Army LOGCAP Contract and assume use of property formerly utilized by CPA. DOD will establish an Area Support Group (ASG Central) under MNF-I that will provide direct support to the US Mission and MNF-I personnel in the Green Zone, and general support to other US Government agencies operating in the Green Zone and at other sites in Iraq. (Annex A, Appendix 1 – Base Support Operations in Support of US Mission). It will provide specified support as established in an MOA between the COM and Commander, MNF-I, and will do so until a permissive security environment allows normal embassy operations. The Project and Contracting Office (PCO), with its forward element under the authority of the Chief of Mission (COM), will coordinate the external logistical requirements in support of Iraq's reconstruction contracts. The end-state objective of this transition mission will be a functioning US Mission with the logistical and administrative support necessary to advance US government objectives in Iraq. Throughout, strict accountability of USG property will be an imperative during this transition period.

(1) Conduct of Operations. The transition of logistics support from the CPA to the US Mission Iraq will occur during Phases I and II of the OPLAN phasing. Phase I from March through the 31 May 2004 culminated in establishment of the US Embassy Advance Team on 1 June 2004. Phase II culminates with establishment of the US Mission Iraq on 30 June 2004 and disestablishment of the CPA. Phase III terminates on 30 September as all financial and contract transactions / modifications are completed. Phase IV terminates with the elections of a Iraqi Transitional Government NLT 31 Jan 2005, and Phase V terminates when stability and normal operations of the US Mission are restored.

(2) Mortuary Services. DOD will provide Mortuary Services support to US Mission Iraq until adequate host nation mortuary resources are available and safe for the US Mission to use. In the event of a fatality of a US Government employee (who is a US national) under Chief of Mission authority, all efforts should be exercised to return remains in an expedient manner. The US Mission and MNF-I will coordinate in such cases. United States Central

Command (US CENTCOM) is the military's lead agent having the responsibility of evacuating remains. Mortuary services for other eligible US citizens are covered in Annex J – Consular Affairs.

b. Tasks.

(1) Phases I and II.

(a) Department of State.

- (1) Establish commercial air and surface lines of transportation to support US Mission Iraq's internal operations. (Appendix 1 – Military Air- to this Annex) In the absence of adequate DOS capabilities, identify requirements for US military assets.
- (2) Establish support relationships between US Mission and new and / or existing DOS support offices outside of Iraq.
- (3) Request US Army Head of Contracting Authority (HCA) to add US Mission Iraq as a customer of the current LOGCAP contract.
- (4) Identify capabilities of the current CPA Headquarters Support Group that will be required by the US Mission Iraq for specified logistics and administrative support.

(b) Department of Defense. Ensure that all property used in CPA activities to be carried on by the US Mission Iraq will be available to the US Mission no later than 30 June 2004. To that end:

- (1) Upon receipt of request from DOS, US Army adds US Mission Iraq as a customer of the current LOGCAP contract.
- (2) Upon receipt of request from CPA property accountability officials (KBR), DCMA grants waiver of physical inventory since KBR will remain accountable for property after customer changes to US Mission Iraq.
- (3) CPA property accountability officials (KBR) modify property accountability records reflecting US Mission use of property formerly used by CPA.
- (4) Establish an Area Support Group (ASG Central) concept under MNF-I, for support in Baghdad / Green Zone and other areas of Iraq (Appendix 1 – Base Support Operations in Support of the US Mission

to Annex A - Command and Control) with specified support requirements and commitments contained in the Support MOA (Annex T - Support MOA). Required logistics and administrative support to the US Mission Iraq will be supported through the ASG Central which has been designated within the ASG concept to support the US Mission in the Green Zone until a permissive security environment allows normal US Mission operations.

- (5) CENTCOM coordinate with DOS, CPA, the Joint Staff and DOD to define the roles and missions, size and organization of the Area Support Group Mission providing direct admin/log support to COM and general support to other tenants in the Green Zone.
- (6) After Army adds US Mission Iraq as a LOGCAP customer, DOD will audit Kellogg, Brown, and Root (KBR) property accountability records on an ongoing basis.

(c) Department of State and Department of Defense.

- (1) Establish a joint in-country synchronization cell to track all issues relating to the logistics transition. A smooth transition requires the accomplishment of some key tasks immediately.
- (2) Establish a joint DOD / DOS key events timeline which is critical to the logistics transition. Identify responsible parties to ensure that all USG entities as well as key contractors participate in transition planning and execution. Turnover will require careful consideration to ensure qualified individuals are available to perform necessary transition tasks.
- (3) Ensure that the CPA C-4 and the DOS Representative (US Mission Management Counselor) coordinate all logistics support during the transition to the US Mission. All ongoing support will continue during transition. Additional support required by the overlap of DOD and DOS personnel and functions must be identified immediately for resolution.
- (4) Establish within the Support MOA (Annex T- Support MOA) requirements for the ASG Mission to be direct support of the US Mission Iraq and general support to other tenants in the Green Zone until a permissive security environment allows normal US Mission operations.

- (2) Phases III through V. Continue Logistics support operations.

c. Coordinating Instructions.

- (1) Cost of LOGCAP services will not be reimbursed until such time as Congress appropriates funds to DOS or other USG agencies for such purposes.
 - (a) At the appropriate time and as the situation permits, reliance on LOGCAP support will be terminated or reduced and replaced by other more cost effective means of support.
 - (b) The Federal Deployment Centers in Virginia and Kuwait will be used by DOS through at least 30 Sep 2004.
 - (c) All USG entities in the US Mission will be responsible for funding their own life support costs.
 - (d) Any property refused by DOS transition team will be the responsibility of the LOGCAP Contractor and DCMA for disposition. These items should have been identified by 1 June 2004 to ensure proper disposition.

(2) Autopsy Responsibilities.

The Armed Forces Medical Examiner (AFME) is the lead agent for conducting death investigations of US personnel. The AFME or his designated representative, in coordination with the Regional Medical Officer of the US Mission, will determine the cause and manner of death for any US Mission death investigation. The AFME also makes the determination whether or not an autopsy will be performed or forensic pathology investigation will be conducted. The AFME is also the lead agent for working in cooperation with the Federal Bureau of Investigation and other investigative agencies in determining the cause of death.

- (3) The Commander, ASG Central, will develop procedures for reimbursement of costs, such as LOGCAP, for personnel who use services in the Green Zone but who do not fall under the authority of the COM nor command of the MNF-I. A similar procedure will be established by the Regional Coordinator, Regional Teams.

4. Administration and Logistics

As stated in this plan and Annex A, Command and Control

5. Command and Control

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- a. The Administrator, CPA, will remain the final decision authority on all relevant issues until transfer of sovereignty on 30 June 2004. Effective with transfer of sovereignty on 30 June 2004, decision authority as appropriate will shift to the Chief of Mission Iraq and to the Commander, MNF-I, as appropriate.
- b. Command of the ASG Mission will be assigned to the MNF-I and responsive to the COM for direct support identified in the Support MOA (Annex T-Support MOA) and in Appendix 2 –Base Support Operations in Support of US Mission to Annex A – Command and Control.

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APPENDIX 2 TO
ANNEX I TO
OPLAN SOVEREIGN IRAQ
11 JUNE 2004

APPENDIX 2 – MILITARY AIR SUPPORT OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF US
MISSION - TO ANNEX I – LOGISTICS

- References:
- A. OPLAN Sovereign Iraq
 - B. Annex I - Logistics
 - C. Support Memorandum of Agreement between Department of State and Department of Defense

1. Situation.

- a. Current Situation. DOD currently provides scheduled and special mission Military Airlift (MILAIR) support to CPA. Requirements are coordinated by the Headquarters Support Group within the Annex Compound.
- b. Enemy Forces. See Annex B – Intelligence
- c. Friendly Forces. See Base Plan – OPLAN Sovereign Iraq
- d. Assumptions.
 - (1) The security environment will not change in the near future.
 - (2) The US Mission Iraq will require similar support in the near term.
 - (3) The US Mission Iraq will use commercial air assets as the security situation permits.

2. Mission. Not later than 15 June 2004, DOD makes available Military Air assets to support US Mission Advance Team operations in Iraq and, subsequently, the US Mission Iraq after of 30 June 2004.

3. Execution.

- a. Concept of the Operation. DOD through the MNF-I will provide military air support for the COM on an as required basis for fixed wing aircraft and on an allocated basis for rotary wing support. The US Mission Iraq will seek to minimize utilization of aircraft for administrative purposes unless all other means of transportation have been analyzed and rejected. US Mission intends to use commercial surface and air carriers to move freight and diplomatic pouches into Iraq in support of Mission requirements provided it is safe and available. However, if commercial service is unavailable, DOD will provide Military Air support to move needed materiel. Until such time as commercial air transportation has been deemed safe, and remains so for a reasonable period of time, DOD will support DOS air transportation needs according to the following:

- (1) Fixed Wing. MILAIR Travel is provided by USCENTCOM Air Mobility Division (AMD) through Joint Movement Center (JMC) requests according to schedules and routes as requested. The initial Embassy request will be for a daily shuttle: Kuwait/Baghdad/Amman/Baghdad/Kuwait. CENTCOM will coordinate with AMD to ensure that COM has appropriate air routes, at appropriate periodicities, to support COM business in-country and out-of-country.
- (2) Rotary Wing. Each day, USCENTCOM will allocate two UH-60 Blackhawk helicopters to be available on a priority basis, at the same level of priority assigned to Commander MNF-I. Daily (by 0900 if possible), COM will release these aircraft, if not needed for COM use. Even if the dedicated craft have been released back into the pool for the day, aircraft from the pool will be available for COM use upon request, at the same priority level as Commander MNF-I.
- (3) If additional helicopters are needed to meet mission requirements, requests will be submitted per the normal SOP, with as much advance notice as possible, in accordance with priorities based on principal passengers.

b. Tasks.

Department of Defense:

- (1) DOD provides Military Air support for official transportation of US Mission Personnel, including all official USG travellers in support of the Mission, between locations within Iraq until alternative transportation is determined to be safe and available.
- (2) DOD will provide Military Air support for official transportation of US Mission Personnel, including all official USG travellers in support of the Mission, into and out of Iraq until alternative transportation is determined to be safe and available.
- (3) DOD will coordinate Military airlift support requirements for personnel, goods and programs under COM.

4. Administration and Logistics

See Annex I - Logistics

5. Command and Control

See Annex I - Logistics

ANNEX J TO
OPLAN SOVEREIGN IRAQ
11 JUNE 2004

ANNEX J – CONSULAR

- References:
- A. 7 Foreign Affairs Manual, Section 240 – Disposition of Remains
 - B. 7 Foreign Affairs Manual, Section 300 – Emergency Financial and Medical Assistance for US Citizens Abroad
 - C. 22 C.F.R., Section 72.12 – Proper Preparation of Remains

1. Situation

a. Current Situation.

Iraq is a war zone where some regions are permissive and others are not. American citizens, including people such as reporters and missionaries, who are not affiliated with the Coalition / international partners or with the US Government (USG), have been killed or injured. The medical system in Iraq is not currently capable of providing an adequate level of care for American citizens who become injured or ill. There is no commercial transportation system or company, other than the US military, capable of providing emergency medical evacuation for American citizens in Iraq. There are no mortuary service providers capable of meeting US standards for certifying deaths or preparing and shipping remains back to the US. The US consular officer's ability to perform his/her duties and assist private American citizens with emergencies outside of the "Green Zone" is very limited. These limits are a function of the security environment in Iraq and the absence or inadequacy of Iraq's local police, rescue teams, trauma facilities, disaster assistance agencies, transportation providers, and its mortuary/funeral industry. In the absence of local abilities to provide these services, the US military has been providing them. These arrangements have been informal to date. DOS receives no specific funding to provide for private citizens' medical care, medical evacuation, mortuary services, or transport of remains if the citizen is injured or killed in Iraq, and DOS receives very limited funding to grant loans in such cases. Moreover, those funds are available to support private U.S. citizens worldwide and are wholly inadequate to the ongoing situation in Iraq.

- b. Enemy Forces. See Annex B - Intelligence
- c. Friendly Forces. See Base Plan – OPLAN Sovereign Iraq
- d. Assumptions. None provided.

2. Mission

The United States Government (USG) continues current consular capability and establishes a Consular Section in the US Mission Iraq on 30 June 2004, upon establishment of diplomatic relations with Iraq, to perform routine consular services relying upon resources available within Iraq.

3. Execution

a. Concept of Operations.

- (1) The Consular Section within US Mission Iraq will consist initially of three consular officers and six locally employed staff members who will all be posted in Baghdad. Once fully operational in Phase V noted below, the section will perform the following functions, as appropriate: assist American citizens who are injured, hospitalized, become destitute, are arrested or go missing in the host country; assist with the repatriation of remains of deceased US citizens not under the authority of MNF-I; adjudicate citizenship claims; provide judicial assistance and notarial services; handle or facilitate extradition and prisoner transfer cases where applicable in the consular district; provide routine immigrant and non-immigrant visa services; assist American citizens with any property claims; and assist American citizens with any custody or child abduction cases.
- (2) In addition, the Consular Section will perform the following functions as appropriate in Phase V without any direct host country support: provide voting services; issue fee and no-fee passports; register American citizens residing in the consular district; issue Consular Reports of Birth (comparable to US birth certificates); process passport waiver requests; process loss-of-nationality cases; establish a panel of physicians to conduct medical examinations of visa applicants as necessary; process immigrant visa applications, including adoption cases and diversity visa lottery cases; and process non-immigrant visa applications including diplomatic, official and US sponsored cases.
- (3) Continued support for Consular operations will be required from DOD with regard to medical care, emergency medical evacuations, mortuary services, certification of death and the transportation of remains. This support will be required until such time as Iraqi companies or agencies are able to perform those services in line with normal host-country practices elsewhere around the world. DOS will not incur any obligation for reimbursement for the provision of these services by DOD, including that DOS will not provide DOS funds or fund cites to DOD in connection with the provision of these services. Rather, the private US citizen will be obligated to reimburse DOD for any reasonable expenses incurred by DOD in the provision of these services. It is the intent of the Consular Section to establish a flexible organization that can expand with the mission. Iraq is sufficiently unique that casualty evacuation, for example, may require expanded capabilities in that area. Flexibility and capability will be an inherent part of the capabilities designed into the Consular Section.
- (4) Conduct of Operations. Transition from US / Coalition management to a sovereign Iraq will take place in the following potentially overlapping strategic phases supported by Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and USG agencies as follows:
 - (a) Phase I. Phase I began when the Interagency Transition Planning Team arrives in Baghdad on 19 March 2004 and ends on 31 May 04 when the US Mission Advance Team is in place. The Consular Section will have established two consular officers in Baghdad by 31 May 2004. Annex Q, Health Service Support, and Annex T, Support MOA, outlines the provision of the medical, mortuary, and transportation services by the US military as described in the paragraph above.

- (b) Phase II. Phase II begins when the US Mission Advance Team is established and ends with the dissolution of the CPA and establishment of the US Mission Iraq. DOS will have identified three American Consular Officers and hired six Iraqi Locally Employed Staff (LES) in time to complete all necessary background checks and stand-up the Consular Section no later than the establishment of the US Mission on 30 June 2004.
- (c) Phase III. Phase III Begins with the opening of US Mission Iraq. During this phase, US Mission Iraq assumes responsibility for relations with the Government of Iraq under the authority of Department of State. The Consular Section will provide full services to the extent practicable and adjust to missions as demand dictates.
- (d) Phase IV and V. Phase IV begins on 1 October 2004 and ends with the elections in January 2005. During Phase IV, four additional consular officers, including the Consul General, will be assigned to US Mission Iraq. Eight additional LES will also be hired to complete consular staffing. The Consular Section will continue to perform its duties as discussed above and will adjust its operations as circumstances within Iraq change. During Phase V, the Consular Section will become fully operational, including immigrant and nonimmigrant visa services as well as the other duties discussed above.

b. Tasks.

(1) Phases I and II.

(a) Department of State.

- (1) Establish, equip and staff a Consular Section to be operational by 30 June 2004.
- (2) Ship Consular systems equipment to Iraq no later than 15 June 2004.
- (3) Sustain operations in Phases III – V.

(2) Phases I – V.

(a) Department of Defense.

Coordinate and support Chief of Mission (COM) requirements as defined

c. Coordinating Instructions.

Coordinating Instructions are defined in Annex Q – Health Service Support and Annex T – Support MOA, in OPLAN Sovereign Iraq..

4. Administration and Logistics

The Consular Section will receive administrative and logistics support from US Mission resources except for those identified in OPLAN Annex Q –Health Service Support and Annex T - Support MOA.

5. Command and Control

Effective upon the establishment of diplomatic and consular relations with Iraq on 30 June 2004, the Chief of the Consular Section reports to the Deputy Chief of Mission. Consular functions remain under the command of the Administrator, CPA, until that date.

ANNEX K TO
OPLAN SOVEREIGN IRAQ
11 JUNE 2004

ANNEX K – SECURITY

- References:
- A. 20 Feb 2004 SecDef Memorandum on Iraqi Security Forces (ISF)
 - B. 12 Mar 2004 DOS ExecSec Memorandum on Requested Assistance for Security at the future United States Embassy in Baghdad, Iraq
 - C. Eikenberry Security Assessment Report dated 24 Mar 2004
 - D. CPA Operating Orders
 - E. CJTF-7/MNF-I Operating Orders
 - F. CDR USCENTCOM Operating Orders
 - G. CPA RFF for MEVA Security
 - H. Green Zone Map with CJTF-7/MNF-I MEVAs and ECPs
 - I. Observations and Recommendations for Security of State Department Assets in the Green Zone, dated 18 Feb 2004
 - J. Map of Land Required for DOS Embassy Complex
 - K. CJTF Guidance for Non-tactical Vehicle Movement dated 6 Dec 2003
 - L. DOS-DOD "Universal" MOU on Security and Force Protection dated 16 Dec 1997
 - M. National Security Presidential Directive 36, dated 11 May 2004
 - N. Memorandum of Agreement between DOS and DOD for Support Services in Iraq
 - O. Memorandum of Agreement between COM and Commander, US CENTCOM for Security Responsibility
 - P. Memorandum of Agreement between DOS and DOD for Physical Security, Equipment and Personal Protective Services

1.S ituation

- a. Current Situation. See OPLAN Sovereign Iraq
- b. Enemy Forces. See Annex B – Intelligence
- c. Friendly Forces. See Base Plan – OPLAN Sovereign Iraq
- d. Assumptions.
 - (1) Iraq will remain a non-permissive (hostile) environment for the foreseeable future.
 - (2) Multinational force (Coalition) partners will retain a role in Iraqi security (external / internal) through at least Jan 05 as elements of the Multinational Force, Iraq.
 - (3) MNF-I Commander will exercise:
 - (a) Operational control over elements of the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (ICDC) / Iraqi Armed Forces (IAF).

- (b) Tactical control over Iraqi Police Services (IPS) / Department of Border Enforcement (DBE) / Facility Protection Services (FPS) for specific operations following authorization by the Iraqi Minister of the Interior.
- (4) US end-state objectives will continue to be supported by:
 - (a) Iraqi Security Forces (ISF).
 - (b) Iraqi Interim, Transitional and Permanent Governments.

2. Mission

The United States will provide capability to secure US Mission Iraq at a level commensurate with the threat environment. Establish a secure and stable environment in Iraq with integrated security forces of multinational and Iraqi security forces operating within a security plan encompassing protection of Iraqi sovereignty, internal civil affairs, a US Mission Iraq, and outlying US interests country-wide.

3. Execution

a. Concept of Operations: The security posture maintained by Multinational and Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), in conjunction with incoming DOS Diplomatic Security Services, will combine resources to ensure a secure and stable transition to Iraqi sovereignty and provide a safe and secure environment for the US Mission Iraq. Some USG elements may contract for security services. MNF-I and ISF may coordinate with such contractor personnel, but contractor personnel will not participate in any military or other government security operations, nor protect military convoys, supply routes, facilities or personnel.

(1) Conduct of Operations:

- (a) Provide continued security operations and expanded capabilities that facilitate transition from CPA to Iraqi sovereignty and establishment of the US Mission Iraq.
- (b) Transition security responsibilities to Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) as capabilities allow (coordinating with DOS DSS for those assets in direct support of DOS).
- (c) Provide an adequate level of security for Green Zone, US Mission Iraq, and COM activities. (Annex S – Security MOA).

b. Tasks:

(1) Phases I and II.

(a) Department of State.

- (1) Will have promulgated by 1 June 2004 the number, size, and location of all Governorate or Regional Teams including:

- (a) Those RTs that have DOS personnel.
 - (b) Those Regional Teams (RT) with non-DOD, USG personnel conducting activities under the authority of COM and require some level of DOD protection.
- (2) Determine the number, size, and locations of PCO teams country-wide
- (3) Diplomatic Security Services. Conduct a security threat assessment, in coordination with Commander, MNF-I, and other USG entities, to determine what new security requirements exist due to the emerging standup of the US Mission and transition to Iraqi sovereignty.
- (4) Determine security requirements for liaisons to Iraqi ministries that will work outside of the Green Zone. (Done by 1 June 2004) These senior liaisons will be under the force protection responsibility of the COM. They will be provided security support equivalent to that of other Embassy employees.
- (5) Complete contracting of transition security contracts; will have been done by 1 June 2004.
- (a) Extend contracts as necessary.
 - (b) Contract new security as required, to include PSD.
- (b) Department of Defense.
- (1) Issue memorandum designating Secretary of the Army as the Executive Agent (EA) for administrative support to the US Mission Advance Team, and US Mission Iraq.
 - (2) Define specific security responsibilities requiring planning apart from local / regional MNF-I footprints.
 - (a) Green Zone will have been completed by 1 June 2004.
 - (b) Multinational forces will have been completed by 1 June 2004.
 - (c) Non-Governmental Organizations (As NGOs signup for participation).
 - (3) Resolve/identify ISF equipment shortfalls; to have been completed 1 June 2004.
 - (4) Standup of MNF-I to full operational capability; completed before 1 June 2004.
 - (5) Develop security transition concept of operations (NLT 1 June 2004)
- (c) Department of State and Department of Defense.

- (1) Define specific security responsibilities, requiring planning apart from local / regional MNF-I footprints.
 - (a) US Embassy will have been completed by 1 June 2004.
 - (1) Including Embassy Signal Annex.
 - (b) Contracted security (to include Personal Security Detail).
 - (c) Regional Teams (NLT 15 June 2004).
 - (d) UN Mission (Upon determination of UN Mission role).
- (2) Embassy Security Preparation will have been completed by 1 June 2004; CPA, DOS, and CJTF-7 / MNF-I commence compound preparation. Include land management, perimeter fencing, berm construction and other facility security construction issues.
- (3) Identify life support requirements for security force personnel—will have been completed by 1 June 2004.
- (4) Complete security contract review; will have been completed by 1 June 2004.
 - (a) Identification of contracts needing extension.
 - (b) Identification of new security contracts required, to include Personal Security Details (PSD).
- (5) Promulgate USG guidelines for the following; to have been completed before 30 June 2004: (Annex N- Contractor Security will be published as a Fragmentary Order)
 - (a) Screening standards of private security firms.
 - (b) Protocol for coordination between contractors and CDR MNF-I / CPA / COM.
 - (1) Force protection arrangements.
 - (2) Medical policies.
- (6) Establish Support MOA (NLT 8 June 2004) that delineate responsibilities between departments for non-security support of USG efforts to establish a safe, secure, and democratic Iraq.
- (7) Inventory CPA-controlled security related equipment, establish source, method of acquisition, and ownership of equipment, and distribute CPA resources to support the US Mission IAW contractual requirements and Federal Acquisitions Regulations (FAR) to support:

- (a) DOS. Standup of US Mission Advance Team was to be completed by 1 June 2004
- (b) DOS. Standup US Mission (NLT 30 June 2004)
- (d) CDR USCENTCOM and Chief of Mission.
 - (1) Establish Security MOAs (NLT 8 June 2004), that specify physical security, equipment, and personal protective services between CDR, USCENTCOM and COM, delineating each agency's responsibilities for:
 - (a) Coordination requirements, including Green Zone security.
 - (b) The combatant commander's protection of Regional Teams (RT).
 - (c) The combatant commander's ability to provide Quick Reaction Force capabilities.
 - (d) DOD / DOS cooperation in protecting COM activities outside of the Green Zone.
 - (e) Coordinating Command and Control intelligence sharing.
 - (f) Transferring PSD from Criminal Investigation Division (CID) to Diplomatic Security Service (DSS).
 - (2) Review and update the Security MOA at least semi-annually.
- (e) CDR USCENTCOM
 - (1) Assess the requirements requested by the DOS in ref (b) and provide assessed needed capabilities prior to the conclusion of phase II.
 - (2) Coordinate security ROE and ensure all Multinational Force (Coalition) and private security firms are familiar with CENTCOM security policies and procedures.
 - (3) The Security Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) is included as Annex S in this OPLAN.
- (f) CDR Multinational Force - Iraq
 - (1) Concurrent with transition (during Phase II), conduct a security threat assessment, in coordination with DOS DSS and other USG entities, to determine what, if any, new security requirements exist due to the emerging standup of the US Mission and transition to Iraqi sovereignty.

- (2) Establish the Office of Security Transition (OST). Exercise direct authority over OST and operational control of the Multinational Force (Coalition) Military Advisory Training Team (CMATT) and Civil Police Advisory Training Team (CPATT).
- (3) Establish the following organizations to be filled with in-theater assets:
 - (a) Area Support Group Central in the Green Zone: To coordinate security of the Green Zone except that within the COM facilities.
 - (b) Project and Contracting Office (PCO).
- (4) Ensure that appropriate security measures are taken to implement recommendations from ref (c).
- (g) DOD / DOS Interagency Transition Planning Team. Facilitate interagency resolution of transition issues.
- (h) Coalition Provisional Authority.
 - (1) Provide Interagency Transition Planning Team the current CPA Transition Plan.
 - (2) Embassy Security Preparation will have been completed by 1 June 2004. CPA, DOS, and MNF-I commence compound preparation. Include land management, perimeter fencing, berm construction and other facility security construction issues.
 - (i) Other Agencies. Keep DOD informed of operations in order that requested security assistance may be provided subject to the availability of assets.
- (2) Phases I – V.
 - (a) Department of State Diplomatic Security Services.
 - (1) Secure DOS facilities.
 - (2) Control access / egress.
 - (3) Protect DOS personnel and those under force protection responsibility of COM.
 - (4) Conduct a security threat assessment, in coordination with CDR MNF-I and other USG entities, to determine all, if any, new security requirements exist due to the emerging standup of the US Mission and transition to Iraqi sovereignty.
 - (b) Department of Defense.
 - (1) Ensure CDR USCENTCOM is adequately supported.
 - (2) Provide strategic operating guidance and direction.

- (3) Train Iraqi Security Forces (Phase I-IV).
 - (4) Conduct OIF 2/3 US force rotation (Phase I-IV).
 - (5) Standup and advise Ministry of Defense (MOD) (Phase I-V).
- (c) Department of State and Department of Defense.
- (1) Conduct periodic security inspections / JSIVA (Phase I-V).
 - (2) Conduct periodic security threat assessments (Phase I-V)
- (d) CDR USCENTCOM
- (1) Continue to provide security capabilities to the MNF-I retaining current security capabilities afforded to CPA and ensure capabilities are not downgraded for the incoming COM until security requirements ease.
 - (a) Organize, train, equip, mentor, and certify Iraqi Police Service (IPS) / Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (ICDC) / Department of Border Enforcement (DBE) / Iraqi Armed Forces (IAF).
 - (b) Advise, assist, and certify Facility Protection Services (FPS).
 - (c) Direct and prioritize the allocation of DOD resources.
- (e) CDR Multinational Force -- Iraq
- (1) Will give highest priority to standing up capable ISF and transitioning responsibilities to them as soon as possible. Transitioning of security responsibilities fulfilled by DOD in direct support of DOS DSS (such as PSD's, fixed facility security, Quick Reaction Force) will be coordinated with COM.
 - (2) Retain current security arrangements and mechanisms provided to CPA and ensure capabilities are not reduced or limited for the incoming COM until security requirements ease.
 - (3) Perform periodic security threat assessments to facilitate transitioning from multinational forces Maximum Control to Iraqi Local Control, Iraqi Regional Control, and Strategic Overwatch.
 - (4) Counter internal and external threats to achieve a secure and stable Iraq.
 - (5) Serve as senior military advisor to CPA and COM.
- (3) Phases III -- V.

(a) Department of State and Department of Defense.

Transition oversight of OST to COM.

(b) Department of Defense.

- (1) Complete transition to Iraqi Local Control (Phase IV).
- (2) Complete transition to Iraqi Regional Control (Phase V).
- (3) Complete transition to Strategic Overwatch (Phase V).

c. Coordinating Instructions. (Phase in parentheses)

- (1) USG. Support Force Generation for international troop contributions to MNF-I (Phase I-IV).
- (2) USG. Establish US Mission in Iraq (Phase III-V).
- (3) USG. Obtain final UNSCR and/or SOFA codifying Multinational Force (Coalition) presence and/or MNF-I organization (Phase V).
- (4) USG. MNF-I / ASG-Central will coordinate with COM and non-U.S. embassies to develop an access policy that provides for controlled access of Iraqi nationals into the Green Zone.

4. Administration and Logistics

The transition will be supported by DOD and DOS. DOS will assess its needed security requirements and provide them to DOD, which will determine the capabilities DOD can provide and make recommendations on DOS contracted security.

5. Command and Control

a. Command.

- (1) All military forces in Iraq will be under the operational command of the Commander, MNF-I, with the exception of the US Marine Security Guard detachment. Those forces assigned direct support of COM pursuant to an approved MOA will be jointly agreed upon by CDR USCENCOM and COM.
- (2) The Commander MNF-I will be the senior military advisor to the COM and will be responsible to, and receive strategic direction from, Commander USCENCOM.
- (3) Iraqi Security Forces.
 - (a) OST, exercising operational control of the CMATT and CPATT, will be under the direct authority of the Commander MNF-I until the level of security and stability in Iraq allows the ISF to assume a lead role in provincial security, at which time (Phase

V) OST will transition to the Office of Defense Cooperation (ODC), under the authority of the COM.

- (b) The IAF will be a principal partner in the MNF-I operating under unified command pursuant to provisions of UN Security Council Resolution 1511 (2003). CDR MNF-I will also have operational control of the IAF/ICDC, and tactical control (following authorization by the Iraqi Minister of the Interior) of the DBE/IPS/FPS for specific operations.

b. Signal. See Annex H.

ANNEX L TO
OPLAN SOVEREIGN IRAQ
11 JUNE 2004

ANNEX L – FINANCE

- References:
- A. Public Law 108-106, Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense and for the Reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan, 2004
 - B. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1483, 2003
 - C. National Security Presidential Directive
 - D. Financial Management Assessment Team Findings, dated March 5, 2004
 - E. CPA Operating Budget, Monthly Financial Report

1.S. ituation

a. Current Situation.

- (1) Coalition Provision Authority (CPA) is funded from a separate appropriation approved by Congress in Public Law 108-106, Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense and for the Reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan, 2004. The FY04 CPA Operating Funds consists of \$858 million for personnel costs, transportation, supply, equipment, facilities, communications, logistics requirements, studies, physical security, media support, promulgation and enforcement of regulations, and other activities needed to oversee and manage the relief and reconstruction of Iraq and the transition to democracy. There is also \$50 million appropriated to fulfill reporting and monitoring requirements. CPA manages these funds and will do so through 30 June 2004.
- (2) CPA also manages those funds appropriated in the supplemental appropriation until 30 June 2004 at which time the Chief of Mission (COM) assumes this responsibility. The Department of the Army's Project and Contracting Office will continue to manage and integrate execution for all agencies apportioned Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Funds.
- (3) In executing the transition from the CPA to a sovereign Iraq with a US presence comprised of a US Mission Iraq and a Multinational Force-Iraq, the CPA operating budget must be transitioned to appropriate successor organizations. The US Mission Iraq and the Near East Affairs – Iraq (NEA-I) in the Department of State in Washington, DC, will be the successor organization and assume responsibility for the CPA operating budget and program executive responsibilities for the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Funds.
- (4) In execution of the transition, CPA will transfer account balances of the Development Fund for Iraq (DFI) in accordance with procedures provided by the Iraqi Ministry of Finance and terms of the International Audit Management Board (IAMB) as set forth in United Nations Security Council Resolution 1483 (2003). Legal review of existing authorities must be completed prior to use of available balances.
- (5) Vested and Seized Assets, generally cash assets, must be expended prior to 30 June 2004. In the event vested assets are recovered or found to be unexpended, the monies

will be deposited in the appropriate Treasury account (2131096) for disposition by the US Treasury. Recovered or unexpended seized assets will be provided to US Mission Disbursing Officer (DO) for disposition.

- (6) This plan covers the transition period only. USG agencies must realize that there is no guidance indicating a long term presence, not an established basing plan, or a status of forces agreement. Accordingly, agencies must fund requirements within available resources and seek reimbursement through a supplemental if the administration approves a supplemental financing strategy. Defense activities will include appropriate requirements in their Program Objective Memorandum (POM) in accordance with the Defense Planning Guidance.

b. Enemy Forces. See Annex B – Intelligence, page B2

c. Friendly Forces. See Base Plan – OPLAN Sovereign Iraq

d. Assumptions.

- (1) DOD and DOS Chief Financial Officers will approve all support agreements.
- (2) Transition will be managed within funds that are currently available. There will not be an additional FY 04 supplemental. Agencies will have adequate resources to fund Iraqi operations within Iraq until receiving an FY 05 supplemental in spring 2005.
- (3) DOS will have resources to establish an embassy in the amount of about \$97 million and will have access to the 1% Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF) transfer authority (\$184 million). The military mission must be funded from within available DOD mission funding in FY04 and in FY05 before supplemental funding is appropriated.
- (4) DOD and DOS will split the 4th quarter apportionment (\$195 million) based on the mission assignment and services pre-funded in advance of July 1st. Generally, the funding will follow the mission assignment. For example, salary and life support funding for personnel reassigned to the US Mission (IRMO) will be transferred to DOS.
- (5) Funds, resulting from the decision to partially ‘chargeback’ life-support costs from 1 May 2004 through end of year FY 04, will be used to balance the CPA budget and transfer the maximum amount to DOS. Policy review is required before enacting such procedures for FY 2005.

2. Mission

Department of Defense transfers financial management functions from the CPA to the US Mission Iraq, Department of State, and the Multinational Forces-Iraq on or before 30 June 2004, except for those which, by agreement of both the DOS and DOD, will be completed by DOD, transferred to the Iraq Reconstruction Management Office (IRMO), or transferred to the Project and Contracting Office (PCO).

3. Execution

a. Concept of Operations. The financial functions of the CPA will transition over the period from 1 March to 30 September 2004. The functional transitions occurring after 30 June will be completed under the auspices of the US Mission Iraq and / or the Commander, MNF-I. The financial managers within the DOS, DOD and CPA will work closely together to analyze and establish transitions on a function-by-function, line-by-line basis for all business activities that involve the stewardship and accountability of US appropriated funds.

b. Conduct of Operations.

(1) During this transition period, all management actions will require and include close coordination among Office of Management and Budget (OMB), DOS Resource Management (including NEA-I), DOD, CPA CFO, CPA Comptroller, CPA OMB, CPA-West Deputy CFO, and the Army CPA Support Team. The tactical approach is to review each functional element of the CPA Operating Budget, with both functional and resource management personnel from both DOD and DOS working together, to review detailed elements of each functional area, including contracts, service agreements, funding strategies, and future requirements. The goal of these frequent meetings is to share information, discuss challenges, and develop the way ahead. A product of these meetings is information that can be shared among other sector leads in the Iraq Transition Planning Team (ITPT) or requests for decisions that can be elevated within the ITPT process.

(2) The DFI transitions to Iraqi control and is executed and monitored through execution of the approved Iraq budget. Liaisons to the Ministry of Finance will encourage the Iraqi government to continue the practice of prioritizing and vetting requirements through a Program Review Board akin to that established by the CPA.

(3) The Project and Contracting Office (PCO) will be established as a temporary organization under Army executive agent authority. This move will enable the PCO to access up to 10% of IRRF for overhead expenses. Office of Management and Budget (OMB) will approve the PCO budget, and that of other agencies, to ensure that only proper administrative expenses are chargeable to IRRF.

(4) The Iraq Reconstruction Management Organization (IRMO) will be established under DOS control. Funds to support personnel and operations of the IRMO are in the CPA Operating Funds that will be transferred to DOS on 30 June 2004.

(5) An Area Support Group (ASG Central) will be established under DOD responsibility and control. DOD funds will support this mission.

c. Tasks.

(1) Phase I (Current – 1 June 2004):

(a) Department of State and Department of Defense.

By 1 March, both departments will have established a Resource Management Working Group (RMWG) comprised of the tactical plan for administration, funding

and oversight of every active contract, points of contact from the interagency working group to review every functional area of the CPA Operating Budget. The RMWG will have prepared a detailed budget transition plan that resolves budget shortfalls and identifies funding available to DOS upon transition. The RMWG will have worked with other sector leads to develop the tactical plan for administration, funding and oversight of every active contract open by the end of Phase I, on 1 June 2004.

(b) Department of State.

- (1) By 1 June 2004, DOS will have integrated budget personnel into the CPA Comptroller organization in Baghdad.
- (2) The CPA Comptroller integrates DOS personnel into the Requirements Review Board (RRB) Process. The Chief (DCM designee), US Mission Advance Team reviews and endorses requirements and priorities for approval by the Administrator, CPA, throughout the month of June 2004.

(c) Department of Defense.

- (1) The CPA Comptroller prepares for a UN International Audit Management Board (IAMB) audit of the DFI, which will occur prior to transfer to Iraqi control, at a date to be announced. DOS representative participates in the preparations for and execution of the audit.
- (2) Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) conducts an audit of vested and seized funds accounts to be completed NLT 15 June 2004. The CPA Comptroller develops a plan to transition control and accountability of unspent vested and seized funds to DOS to be completed NLT 15 June 2004.
- (3) CPA initiates and coordinates the decision and legal action to assign the PCO to the US Army, and subsequently establish reimbursable funding authority from the IRRF for PCO administrative expenses within the allowable 10% margin.
- (4) The CPA Office of Management and Budget prepares and staffs the Section 2207 Report of 3rd quarter IRRF funding, which defines priorities and requirements for reconstruction and non-construction security projects. Staffing includes coordination with PMO/PCO, CJTF-7/MNF-I, CPA-W, DOD, DOS, USAID, OMB, and National Security Council (NSC). This report will be reviewed and endorsed by the Chief, US Baghdad Office and approved by the Administrator, CPA. The 2207 report will be prepared in the future by IRMO, forwarded by the COM for Interagency review, and submitted to Congress by OMB.

(2) Phase II: (1 June – 30 June 2004).

- (a) Department of State and Department of Defense. IAW the plan agreed upon in Phase I, DOS establishes embassy budget operations using funds provides for embassy establishment. DOD continues to execute finance and contracting actions in coordination with DOS and begins to implement drawdown activities that close

out funding actions, as appropriate. DOD / CPA prepares monthly and quarterly financial reports in coordination with DOS.

- (b) Department of State. DOS establishes the IRMO and coordinates with DOD / CPA to transfer personnel, supporting contracts, and develops a strategy and procedures for transferring associated funds.
- (c) Department of Defense.
 - (1) The CPA Comptroller prepares for the transfer of the DFI funds to the Iraq Minister of Finance on 1 July 2004. The CPA CFO, Comptroller, and CPA's OMB conduct a mid-year budget review of the Iraq budget NLT 15 June.
 - (2) CPA determines the cash balances and disposition of vested and seized funds, merging remaining funds into the US Treasury or DFI, if determined legally appropriate. Balances should be deposited prior to 1 July 2004 or in accordance with other appropriate guidance.
 - (3) Establish the PCO on 1 June 2004 as a temporary organization within DA. CPA-W coordinates with PCO and assigns current PMO employees in all categories to the new organization. The Army Budget Office (SAFM-BU) coordinates financial management strategies and mechanisms to support initial PCO requirements.
 - (4) IRMO, in conjunction with PCO and DOS, prepares and staffs the Section 2207 Report of 4th quarter IRRF funding, which defines priorities and requirements for reconstruction and non-construction security projects. Staffing includes coordination with MNF-I, CPA-W, DA, DOD, DOS, USAD, OMB, and NSC.
 - (5) The DOD establishes a Military Support Group comprised of elements supporting the CPA and US Office, Baghdad, and after 30 June 2004, the US Mission. This support element will be resourced from Department of Defense. CJTF-7 will have, working with CPA, DOS, CPA-W, and the Army CPA Support Team, developed concept of operation by 1 June 2004 to transition functions, personnel and contracts, as appropriate for management other than those belonging the COM.
- (3) Phase III (1 July – 30 September 2004).
 - (a) Department of State and Department of Defense. DOS and DOD prepare requirements for the FY 05 Supplemental. Guidance on submission will be provided by OMB.
 - (b) Department of State.
 - (1) DOS executes embassy budget operations. If not previously transferred, DOD will transfer IRMO funding, administration and oversight of all contracts, except for logistical support, to DOS. Completion of this phase occurs at the end of the fiscal year. DOD / IRMO continue to provide monthly and quarterly financial

reports, including close out of vested and seized funding. CPA / IRMO CFO closes-out FY 04 financials.

(2) IRMO in coordination IRRF Requirements Management Committee, the US Mission's interagency advisory body, prepares and staffs the Section 2207 Report of 1st quarter, FY 05 IRRF funding. The report defines priorities and requirements for reconstruction and non-construction projects by sectors specified in the Supplemental. Staffing includes coordination with MNF-I, and US Mission stakeholders. The PCO serves as an advisor to the management committee. DOS is responsible for interagency coordination in Washington DC.

(3) The US Mission Iraq monitors the DFI in its capacity to provide expertise through liaison to the Ministry of Planning and Development and the Ministry of Finance, and promotes the development / refinement of the 2005 budget. Coordination with the IRMO CFO, Comptroller and OMB is desired.

(c) Department of Defense. None.

(4) Phase IV (1 October 2004 – Iraqi elections o/a January 2005).

(a) Department of State and Department of Defense. DOS and DOD provide financial reports to OMB.

(b) Department of State.

(1) DOS assumes responsibility for funding, administration, and oversight of all administrative and logistical support.

(2) IRMO and OMB support monitoring the DFI to the extent that US liaisons are in place within the Ministry of Planning and Development and the Ministry of Finance. Transparency in reporting continues to receive emphasis as year-end reports are developed and announced, and preparations for elections are conducted.

(3) COM, in coordination with PCO, IRMO, and DOD, prepares and staffs the Section 2207 Report of 2d quarter, FY 05 IRRF funding, which defines priorities and requirements for reconstruction and non-construction security projects. Staffing includes coordination with MNF-I, IRMO, DA, DOD, DOS, USAID, OMB, and NSC.

(5) Phase V (1 February 2004 or post election until Iraq is stable).

(a) Department of State and Department of Defense. DOD / DOS develop plans to phase down support external to the US Mission Iraq or the MNF-I if conditions permit. Support required in theater and provided by support units to the US Mission during this phase may be merged into one of the existing US elements and ultimately discontinued at that time when stability and security permits normal COM functions.

- (b) Department of State. COM, in coordination with PCO, IRMO, and DOD, prepares and staffs the Section 2207 Report of 3rd quarter, FY 05 IRRF funding, which defines priorities and requirements for reconstruction and non-construction security projects, and outlines steps to completion. Staffing includes coordination with MNF-I, IRMO, DA, DOD, DOS, USAID, OMB, and NSC.

d. Coordinating Instructions.

- (1) Beginning 1 March 2004, DOD and DOS will coordinate on every funding action requested and approved from the CPA.
- (2) DOD / CPA will resolve budget shortfalls to ensure adequate funding is available to support acknowledged requirements in FY 04. Actions include:
 - (a) Establish procedures to contain personnel strength within available funding parameters; implement an overtime policy that enables stability in budget forecasts of overtime costs; and contain personnel augmentation contracts within budget parameters. Coordinate with the human resources staffs on the transition plans for personnel, including Title 5 USC, Section 3161 employees, detailees, and contractors.
 - (b) Confirm revised Rough Order of Magnitude (ROM) estimates for Logistic Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) contract task orders, both Task Order (TO) 44 (\$447 million) and TO 63 (\$7 million). Validate external agencies receiving support from these task orders and develop a one-time chargeback mechanism that allocates cost among agencies with personnel serviced by CPA-funded contracts. This mechanism will have been in place by 1 June 2004, and shall be coordinated with any similar mechanism proposed by DOS for the FY 04 4th Quarter and FY 05.
- (3) DOD coordinates the future pre-deployment and redeployment process for DOS and IRMO, so that a plan for the Federal Deployment Center may be devised.
- (4) DOD and DOS coordinate the security-related decisions on CPA facility and personnel to determine scope of future requirements for the US Mission Iraq and IRMO.
- (5) Coordinate with the IT / Communications sector leads for decisions on the IT / Communications architecture during transition. These decisions will drive funding requirements and decisions between DOS and DOD and will have been completed NLT 1 June 2004.
- (6) Coordinate with CPA Contracting to modify the Iraq Media Network contract to change the fund source from appropriated funds to Development Fund of Iraq (DFI). DOD will then de-obligate the appropriated funds to make them available for other CPA priorities. This coordination and decision has been completed.
- (7) DOD and DOS specify post-transition funding requirements for IRMO and PCO, and align requirements versus available funding resources. Program budgets for the remainder of FY04 will have been finalized NLT 1 June 2004.

- (8) Jointly review every contract with funding transactions to determine disposition at transition; either termination or continuation by DOS or DOD. Priority will be given to reviews affecting logistics, security, personnel, and communications, with transition plans completed NLT 15 June 2004.
- (9) DOS and DOD will have jointly reviewed U.S.C. 5 Section 3161 employees for determination of employment tenure by 1 June 2004. Jointly develop the payroll transition plan that ensures all employees receive continuity in pay and entitlements. DOD continue to resolve outstanding pay and benefits for CPA personnel resigning prior to 30 June 2004.
- (10) Coordinate with the CPA (and IRMO after 1 July 2004) CFOs on financial reporting requirements.

4. Administration and Logistics

Logistics support will be provided to the US Mission Iraq by an Area Support Group (ASG Central) assigned to the MNF-I, until such time that the COM can develop other logistical support vehicles. The Information Technology Office within the US Mission will provide automation support to the US Mission Iraq. The Information Technology Office within ASG Central will provide all other CPA Information and Communications Technology (ICT) support to the COM and other Green Zone entities. Both support costs shall be incorporated into cost allocation methodologies.

5. Command and Control

The IRMO CFO will report to the Director of IRMO and the Deputy Chief of Mission on the management and execution of US Mission operating funds and the IRRF. The COM may assign additional financial oversight responsibilities as necessary.

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ANNEX M – NOT USED

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ANNEX N – CONTRACTOR SECURITY

To Be
Prepared

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ANNEX O TO
OPLAN SOVEREIGN IRAQ
2 JULY 2004

ANNEX O – REGIONAL TEAMS

References:

- A. OPLAN Sovereign Iraq
- B. Annex A – Command and Control
- C. Annex K – Security
- D. Security Responsibility and Security Services Memoranda of Agreement between Department of State and Department of Defense
- E. Support Memorandum of Agreement between Department of State and Department of Defense
- F. FRAGO_129 Establishment Of New Provincial Civil/Military Coordination Structure to MNC-I OPORD 04-01

1.S situation

a. Current Situation.

- (1) The CPA and Multinational Force-Iraq (MNF-I) currently have Governorate Teams (GT) in all 18 governorates, varying in size from 10 to 120 personnel. GTs are multi-disciplinary interagency groups deployed at the Provincial level. GTs include US government officials from DOS and UK foreign service officers (FSOs), Department of Justice (DOJ) and other federal agencies, US military civil affairs teams and other military support personnel, and Iraqi Reconstruction and Development Council (IRDC) staff. GTs were created to bridge the gap between the national level governing authority and the multitude of local governments within Iraq. Functions of the current GTs include:
 - (a) Establishing and overseeing local government (Governors, Councils, Senior Ministry Positions).
 - (b) Overseeing and directing local government.
 - (c) Implementing (and explaining) national political processes and policies.
 - (d) Building civil society – centers for human rights, women's rights, democracy.
 - (e) Political and economic reporting.
 - (f) Developing and supporting local media.
 - (g) Supporting MNF-I and local government, including the Governor and Chief of Police, in efforts to keep the peace.
 - (h) Initiating and overseeing Development Fund for Iraq (DFI) project implementation.

- (i) Initiating and overseeing coalition / international partner-funded projects, as required.
 - (2) Locations are secured currently by military forces of the Multinational Force-Iraq (MNF-I) and supported through contracts, including Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP).
 - (3) Local military commanders from the Multinational Force-Iraq (MNF-I) established Governorate Support Teams (GST), using Civil Affairs and other functional specialties, to bridge the gap between government at the national level and the multitude of local governments within Iraq.
- b. Enemy Forces. See Annex B - Intelligence
- c. Friendly Forces. See Base Plan – OPLAN Sovereign Iraq
- d. Assumptions.
- (1) US Mission Regional Teams will have operational responsibility for every governorate after 30 June 2004. However, it is not the intent of the COM to establish a physical presence in each region.
 - (2) Other multinational or US Government agencies may wish to collocate staff with US Regional Teams.
 - (3) Collocation with military forces of MNF-I would enhance security of the RTs, help coordination, and enable efficiencies.
 - (4) Support staff, including security, will comprise a large portion of the total numbers of personnel at each site. Current numbers will vary considerably with each team and will vary as well because of requested participation and collocation from Coalition / international partners (See coordinating instructions, pg. 15).
 - (5) The Project and Contracting Office (PCO), successor to the Program Management Office (PMO), will retain a presence in up to seven sites to manage implementation of the IRRF construction projects.

2. Mission

Not later than 30 June 2004, Departments of State and Defense establish two types of interagency teams at specified locations to expand the situational awareness and outreach capabilities of the US Mission Iraq and MNF-I to all 18 provinces in Iraq, supporting political and economic development in the provinces, conducting media outreach, assisting with election support, and implementing assistance and training programs. Regional Teams under the Chief of Mission will be established in Mosul, Kirkuk, Al Hillah, and Basrah; and a Provincial team (PT) in Baghdad. Five interagency teams, consisting of two Foreign Service Officers and military functional specialists including Civil Affairs and public affairs, with a foreign area

officer, will be embedded with and under the operational control of major subordinate commands (MSC) to coordinate with and advise local military commanders.

3. Execution

- a. Intent. In order to maintain continuity with the Iraqi government from the local to the national level, DOS and DOD will establish interagency teams of several different types at national, regional, and provincial levels. These teams will ensure continuity of US operations throughout Iraq in the post-transition phases. They will provide critical linkage from the Chief of Mission to the regional and provincial levels for relief and reconstruction efforts, multinational force security, and to local and regional Iraqi governing bodies. The various teams will ensure unity of effort in civil-military operations and will ensure that Regional Coordinators and local military commanders maintain situational awareness on critical coordination requirements. Iraqi Provincial Governors will exercise full responsibility for their Provinces. The intent is that the Governors will be supported by Regional Teams on an as needed basis and will visit Regional Sites as required. Similarly, the Regional Coordinator will coordinate directly with the Governors and staff as required at either the Regional Site or the Governors' offices. After the Regional Sites and embedded teams are in place, the COM will have assets distributed as shown in Figure 1, below.




Figure 1. Regional Team Locations

- b. Concept of Operations. At the regional level, DOS will establish four regional teams (RTs) under a Regional Coordinator, using existing Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) locations in Mosul, Kirkuk, Al Hillah, and Basrah. (Figure 1) A provincial team will be located with the US Mission in Baghdad. These teams will have geographic responsibilities

congruent to those of the five multinational divisional areas (MNDs) or MSCs. The Regional Team in Mosul will be collocated with MNF-I; however, Regional Teams in Al Hillah, Kirkuk, and Basrah will not be collocated with MNF-I headquarters. In addition, DOS will provide 10 Foreign Service Officers to act as liaison officers (LNOs) and Iraq Provincial Action Officers (IPAOs) as key staff members of embedded teams with MNF-I's five Major Subordinate Command (MSC) headquarters. DOD will provide military Civil Affairs and public affairs personnel, as well as Foreign Area Officers to the teams. An FSO will be designated by the COM to lead these teams which will be OPCON to the MSC Commanders, providing them political advice, and coordinating efforts with the Regional Coordinator in sector. MSCs may also establish three types of civil-military coordination organizations at the provincial or city level to facilitate coordination among and between regional teams, local commanders, PCO and reconstruction contractors, local Iraqi governments, Non-Governmental and International Organizations (NGOs/IOs) and Iraqi Security Forces.

c. Conduct of Operations.

(1) Phases.

(a) Phase I. During this phase, which ended on 31 May, the provincial CMO support concept was developed with MNF-I, PCO, DOS and MSCs. DOS and DOD reached agreement on the 4 + 5 + 1 concept for regional and embedded teams, and initiated detailed planning to establish regional sites. CPA identified currently operated regional and provincial sites for closure and began closing them.

(b) Phase II. During this phase, from 1 Jun to 30 June, the Chief (DCM designee), US Mission Advance Team, will provide initial staffing of regional sites. DOS and DOD will complete planning for regional sites, establish and staff sites with interagency and contractor personnel. DOD will provide security and service support to the four regional sites in accordance with the Security MOAs (Annex S) and Support MOA (Annex T). Civil Military Operations Centers (CMOC) and Provincial Support Liaison Team (PSLTs) implementation planning will occur in all 18 provinces. Teams will achieve Initial Operating Capability (IOC) NLT 15 June (sites identified and secured), Full Operational Capability (FOC) NLT 30 June 2004, with all personnel at site performing functional requirements.

(c) Phase III. During this phase, 1 July 2004-30 September 2004, MNF-I, PCO and DOS will complete staffing of all sites and embedded teams, CMOCs and PSLTs, and Joint Coordination Centers (JCCs) which will operate in accordance with the provisions of this annex.

(2) Regional Teams. The Regional Coordinator is the COM's most senior representative in the region, responsible for communicating with senior Iraqis and international figures in the area. The Regional Coordinator oversees the work of all USG agencies in the region and supports and coordinates with the local MNF-I commanders. Deputy Coordinators at each site may have additional responsibilities as Public Affairs Officers (PAOs).

(a) Key functions of these teams include all or chief components of the following:

- (1) Liaison with Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), governance institutions, civil society, and the judicial system to fulfill Mission Performance Plan goals.
- (2) Support the national political process and the work of the UN.
- (3) Accomplish political and economic reporting.
- (4) Develop a PAO function to perform press and public diplomacy activities; projects to develop capacity of local media.
- (5) Support the efforts of MNF-I.
- (6) Initiate and oversee Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF) projects.
- (7) Work with local Iraqi firms to develop infrastructure.
- (8) Coordinate with the international community and NGOs.
- (9) Other US Government agencies support efforts to increase the capacity of the IIG and its successor(s) to carry out their functions outside the capital, including: courts, police, prosecution, immigration, customs, and border patrol functions.




Table 1. Regional Team Staffing (government employees / contractors)

* UK Consulate – site & support separate but co-located in the RT compound.

- (b) Staff for regional teams will be provided by various US Government agencies, including DOS, US Agency for International Development (USAID), Project and Contracting Office (PCO), MNF-I personnel, and contractors providing Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) services or supporting USAID, USAID grantees, DOJ, or PCO. Preliminary staffing estimates/requests for each regional team by US agency is shown in Table 1. Procedures will be established by the COM to accommodate requests for participation and presence as appropriate by multinational force / international partners at the Regional Sites. MNF-I provides a Foreign Area Officer (FAO), a Public Affairs Officer (PAO), and Civil Affairs personnel to provide a more robust capability.
- (3) Embedded Teams. Teams embedded with and under the OPCON of MSCs consist of DOS Foreign Service Officers (FSOs), MNF-I personnel, PCO staff, and other agency staff as required. They will be assigned to U.S. Major Subordinate Commands (MSC), currently located at Tikrit, Ar Ramadi, Baqubah, Najaf and Karbala although headquarters locations may shift over time. With each team, DOS provides two FSOs acting as an LNO to the commander and an IPAO. MNF-I provides a Foreign Area Officer (FAO) (if available), a Public Affairs officer (PAO), and a Civil Affairs officer to provide a more robust capability. The MSC commander provides staff and administrative support in accordance with Terms of Reference developed between COM and Commander, MNF-I. Although a team, the two FSOs will have different specified responsibilities.
- (a) The State Liaison Officer (SLO), although OPCON to the MSC Commander, will have reporting requirements to the COM through the MSC Commander and Regional Coordinator, serving as political, cultural and area advisors to the commander. LNOs provide political advice and support to the MND Commander; however, he/she will work closely with embedded Iraq Provincial Action Officers (IPAOs) to support provincial outreach activities.
- (b) IPAOs are OPCON to the Regional Coordinator and responsive to the MND Commander, with reporting requirements to the COM through the MND Commander and Regional Coordinator. They promote local governance, civil society and reconstruction activities with the assigned MNF-I Command. Their work requirements include political and economic reporting, and they will chair the Regional Development Assistance Team (RDAT). IPAOs report key political and economic trends and events to the Regional Coordinator and local Commander; promote local civil society and governance and work to get a positive message about US assistance and support out to the local community.
- (c) Civil Affairs personnel will be provided by MSC commanders. Public Affairs Officers and FAOs will be provided from DOD assets.
- (d) Because of the greater synergy achieved at Regional Sites, priority of fill for FAOs and PAOs will be the regional sites, then the MSCs in precedence to be established by MNF-I.
- (4) Civil-Military Operations Centers (CMOCs). Per MNC-I Fragmentary Order 129, MSCs will establish CMOCs in each province to function as security and logistics

coordination centers for civil agencies, contractors and subcontractors, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and international organizations (IOs), and UN missions. CMOCs will ensure the ability to coordinate local government development, reconstruction, and support for elections. CMOCs will coordinate activities with Regional Coordinators and IPAOs for provincial activities. Provincial level CMOCs perform the following functions:

- (a) Produce and disseminate routine unclassified Security briefing products to PCO and other civilian agencies as required.
 - (b) Rapidly disseminate security information to PCO and other civilian agencies as required on imminent threats to project activities.
 - (c) Capture for processing, passive intelligence forwarded from PCO and USAID contractors and other civilian agencies in the field.
 - (d) Validate requirements for routine military support to PCO and other civilian agencies field operations.
 - (e) Forward validated requirements to appropriate Divisional (MSC) Headquarters for approval, planning and execution.
 - (f) Synchronization of PCO and other civilian agencies activities with classified military operations.
 - (g) Coordinate validated military requirements for emergency Logistics or Movement support to PCO/USAID and other civilian agencies.
 - (h) Synchronize Intra-theater movement of PCO/USAID and other civilian agencies personnel/equipment/materials with CF activities in the province.
 - (i) Provide PCO and other civilian agencies with a coordinating point for project activities and other civilian matters that may have security or campaign implications.
 - (j) Liaison with National CMOC located in Baghdad and operated by MNFI.
 - (k) Assist in the transfer of operational responsibilities to nonmilitary agencies where approved.
- (5) Provincial Support Liaison Teams (PSLTs). Per MNC-I Fragmentary Order 129, MSCs will also establish PSLTs in each province. These teams will function, in consonance with policies established by the US Mission through Regional Coordinators and subordinate to the wishes of the sovereign Iraqi government, to support development and growth of the provincial and local governments and to provide liaison between coalition forces, provincial governments, and US mission elements in the provinces. PSLTs perform the following functions:

- (a) Function as non-executive director for the provincial government. Advise the provincial governor on matters of governance, security and other related issues as required.
 - (b) Identify problems and challenges that impact the security situation.
 - (c) Coordinate activities with the DOS entity responsible for COM activities in the province.
 - (d) The PSLT may or may not be an integral part of the provincial CMOC, dependent on local arrangements.
- (6) Joint Coordination Centers (JCCs). Per MNC-I Fragmentary Order 129, MSCs will establish Joint Coordination Centers (JCCs) in every major city as a coordination center for the efforts of Iraqi police, civil defense, and other emergency services in the province, and serve as a communications node between the local Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and coalition forces. As ISF capabilities increase, coalition force manning at JCCs will decrease.
- (7) Security. Each Regional Team will have an emergency action plan (EAP), coordinated with the MNF-I and approved by the US Mission, which clearly lays out procedures, responsibilities and lines of reporting and communication in the event of an emergency. Each Regional Team will be provided compatible/interoperable communications with the US Mission Operations Center (MOC) on a full-time basis to ensure positive Command and Control of all elements within the Region.
- (a) The Regional Coordinator will establish security requirements for each site. The Regional Security Officer (RSO) will have security responsibility on behalf of the Regional Coordinator and will determine security requirements of deployed elements outside the fixed site (movement and at destination), and QRF response, including time. Required security support of teams and/or personnel outside the Site will be coordinated in advance with the CENTCOM supporting commander. Procedures will be established by both the supported and the supporting headquarters to ensure that requirements are identified on a timely basis so that required security support can be provided when needed. (See Annex S – Security MOA).
 - (b) The MNF-I Commander has responsibility for meeting these requirements from resources available to his command. The commander providing support to each site will coordinate security plans and capabilities with the Regional Coordinator or RSO if designated. Security support details are included in Annex K – Security and Annex S – Security MOAs):
 - (c) Fixed facility security to the four regional sites, plus Baghdad, will be in accordance with Annex S - Security MOA.
 - (d) Force protection and QRF to COM activities outside the Green Zone will be provided by CDR USCENTCOM to the greatest extent possible, subject to the availability of forces, IAW the Security MOA.

- (e) The RSO will provide security “inside the wire” and the military will secure the perimeter and provide QRF forces as available.
 - (f) Regional Coordinators have the opportunity to consult fully on security matters and adjudicate requirements with the supporting commander to ensure a complete understanding of requirements and support provided. A second intent is that the MNF-I Commander would ensure that the senior COM representative is kept fully informed of the security situation in his/her area of operations, and when required in his/her judgment, the supporting commander will augment existing security forces, consistent with force availability, as risks increase.
 - (g) COM personnel on CENTCOM facilities will hold an appropriate security clearance or employment verification check issued by COM. Verification of the security clearance or employment verification check will be provided to CENTCOM.
 - (8) Service Support. MNF-I will continue to provide base support operations (BASOPS) to Regional Teams using existing base support capabilities. In Baghdad, the CPA Headquarters Support Group will transition to an Area Support Group (ASG Central) and provide direct base operations support (BASOPS) to the US Mission in the Green Zone and general support to other USG tenants. As part of its mission, ASG Central will also assume general BASOPS support to the Regional Teams.
 - (9) The United Kingdom will establish a large consulate in Basrah and a small representative office (10 people, including personal security details) in Kirkuk.
 - (10) Multinational force / international partners present in a Regional Team site will not be part of the US Mission RT but may be an integral part of a joint multinational mission.
- d. Tasks.

(1) Phases I-II:

(a) Department of Defense.

- (1) Provide base operations support through existing regional base support operations, consistent with requirements and agreements outlined in Annex T, Support MOA between the Departments of State and Defense.
- (2) Incorporate mechanisms in the Security MOA (Annex S - Security MOAs) by which the COM and Commander, MNF-I, establish Regional Team security support requirements, as well as procedures for which the support will be provided. DOS security standards will be met at the Regional Sites and in locations in which personnel under COM authority are located, unless such standards are waived. DOS personnel, embedded in military units will be provided security which meets DOD/multinational force security standards as defined by supporting commanders.

- (3) CENTCOM incorporate embedded COM personnel into established evacuation and security plans.
- (4) MNF-I provide compatible/interoperable communications on a full-time basis between Regional Teams and the US Mission Operations Center (MOC).
- (5) Provide one (1) Foreign Area Officer to each regional site and to each embedded team if available. Priority of fill to regional sites.
- (6) Provide at least one (1) PAO and one (1) CA officer to each regional site and to each embedded team.

(b) Department of State.

- (1) Determine appropriate Diplomatic Security standards for each site, and requirements for waivers.
- (2) Assess the four Regional Team sites to determine requirements to bring them up to appropriate DS security standards.
- (3) Plan to upgrade sites to standard.
- (4) Coordinate the administrative and logistic requirements through the existing local BASOPS support activity for each of the four sites. The broad requirements and conditions for this support would be contained in Annex T.
- (5) Regional Security Officer (RSO) develop Emergency Action Plans, including communications, for each Regional and embedded team and coordinate EAPs with MNF-I.
- (6) Provide 2 FSOs to each embedded team in the MNF- I five MSC headquarters. COM determine team leader for each embedded team.
- (7) Assess ability to house UK security force in the Regional Site at Basrah (See coordinating instructions below).

(2) Phase III:

(a) Department of Defense.

- (1) Provide service support to Regional Team sites and embedded personnel in accordance with Support MOA (Annex T).
- (2) Provide fixed site and mobile security as agreed in Security MOA (Annex S - Security MOA).

(b) Department of State.

Initiate plan to transition full-time communications from MNF-I to COM standards.

(3) Phase IV:

(a) Department of Defense.

- (1) Transition Regional Team BASOPS support from responsibility of tactical commanders to Area Support Groups.
- (2) Provide security as specified in MOA (Annex S) to the Regional Teams.

(b) Department of State.

- (1) In early 2005, conduct a second thorough review of RT requirements after Iraq's elections.
- (2) Continue transition to COM standard communications systems.

(4) Phase V:

(a) Department of Defense.

- (1) Provide ongoing BASOPS support to RTs, as required.
- (2) Provide security as specified in MOA to RTs, as required.

(b) Department of State.

Assess ability to close and / or reduce the presence in Regional sites during Phase V, consistent with COM mission.

e. Coordinating Instructions.

- (1) The UK will embed two (2) officials and eight (8) security contractors in the Regional Team in Kirkuk, receiving the same services as a USG official but on a reimbursable basis.
- (2) The UK plans to co-locate its Consulate with the US Mission Regional Team in Basrah. The Consulate will use private security and services contractors to be self-standing. UK desires to house approximately 140 security personnel within its current CPA accommodations, receiving services on a reimbursable basis, through the end of CY 2004 if housing is available.
- (3) Federal Agencies will decide what representation each agency requires on each regional Team.
- (4) MNF-I / US Mission Iraq will ensure activities are coordinated in each Regional Team to achieve maximum benefit from US Government resources in the Regions.

- (5) DOS/DOD coordinate regularly to determine security and support levels for RTs in accordance with Security MOA, (Annex S). Additional information is contained in Annex K - Security, Annex A - Command and Control, and Appendix 1 of Annex A - BASOPS Support to US Mission.

4. Administration and Logistics

- a. Specifications for admin/log support are contained in Memorandum of Agreement between Department of State and Department of Defense for Support Services in Iraq, which is included in OPLAN Sovereign Iraq as Annex T.
- b. Admin/log support to Regional Teams outside of Baghdad will be provided initially by the supporting base commander. Beginning in November 2004, the appropriate ASG, Base Support Battalion (BSB), or Area Support Team (AST) will provide general admin/log support to RT sites.
- c. The Regional Teams at Basrah and Al Hillah will receive general admin/log support from the ASG Central in the Green Zone. This support may be through LOGCAP or other competitive contracts. Specific support requirements and services will be coordinated "on the ground" between the Regional Coordinator and the Area Support Group Central Commander.
- d. Support at smaller bases will be coordinated by the base commander.
- e. Regional sites not located on a US military base will receive a modified level of support services tailored to each mission, based on servicing ASG and contracted service capabilities, or MOU between US and multinational forces.
- f. Individual personnel or teams embedded with MNF-I units will receive the same level of support services as the MNF-I unit.
- g. Medical support to US government personnel and multinational / international military or government personnel will be in accordance with Support MOA (Annex T) and Annex Q - Health Service Support.
- h. DOD / DOS implementing contractors operating out of regional hub cities and MNF-I locations will receive the same services as US Government officials but on a reimbursable basis.

5. Command and Control.

- a. Command.
 - (1) All USG employees not under the authority of Commander, MNF-I, will fall under COM authority. Commercial contractors and grantees in the Regions will report to their employing agency and also comply with the security plan established between the Regional Coordinator and the security force commander supporting the Regional Site.

- (2) The Regional Coordinator (Senior DOS officer) will serve as the COM's representative and be in charge of the US Mission Regional Team.
 - (3) State LNOs will be under operational control of the MSC commander they support, with reporting requirements, for technical oversight, through the commander to the Regional Coordinator to the COM.
 - (4) IPAOs will be under operational control of Regional Coordinators in sector, with reporting requirements, for technical oversight, through the commander to the Regional Coordinator to the COM.
 - (5) While US Government agencies are under COM authority, they will legally be the executing agency for their contracts. Per US Federal Acquisition Regulations, contractors are responsible to the executing agency (signatory) to their contract.
 - (6) Military Civil Affairs personnel, including PSLTs, will be under the Command of MNF-I and appropriate chain-of-command but will coordinate with RT regional coordinators to promote unity of effort.
 - (7) Contractors in a Region will be responsible to their employer, which will ultimately be held accountable by the relevant USG agency to fulfill their contract.
- b. Signal.
- (1) Communications requirements for the four major Regional sites must be established by 15 June 2004 with a detailed plan to expand capacity as funds become available and the security environment permits.
 - (2) The Information & Communications Technology (ICT), MNFI, and COM ICT architectures will be designed to be interoperable, and implemented, consistent with the availability of funds.

ANNEX P TO
OPLAN SOVEREIGN IRAQ
11 JUNE 2004

ANNEX P – JUSTICE

- References:
- A. NSPD-36, Subject: USG Operations in Iraq
 - B. NSPD-37, Subject: US Assistance to the Iraqi Special Tribunal
 - C. CPA Order 13 (Revised) (Amended), The Central Criminal Court of Iraq, 22 April 2004
 - D. CPA Order 35, Reestablishment of Council of Judges, 18 September 2003
 - E. CPA Order 10, Management of Detention and Prison Facilities, 5 June 2003
 - F. UN Security Council Resolution 1511 (2003)
 - G. UN Security Council Resolution 1546 (2004)

1.S situation

a. Current Situation.

- (1) The Iraqi justice system is in its early stages of transition and development, as demonstrated by the reconstitution of the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of the Interior and the criminal court system. The CPA has worked to restore both the justice system and a sense of confidence in the Iraqi people that the system is fair and transparent.
- (2) The Iraqi Governing Council, under delegation of authority from the CPA, created the Iraqi Special Tribunal (IST) to prosecute senior regime officials accused of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and violations of certain Iraqi laws.
- (3) The Council of Judges, re-established by CPA Order 35, is charged with the supervision of the judicial and prosecutorial systems of Iraq and is independent of the Ministry of Justice. The Central Criminal Court of Iraq (CCCI), established by CPA Order 13, exercises jurisdiction over those accused of attacks or attempted attacks against Coalition / Multinational Forces and of select major crimes under the Iraqi Criminal Code. Iraqi Criminal and Civil Courts exercise jurisdiction over all other cases.
- (4) The Ministry of Justice, pursuant to CPA Order Number 10, is responsible for all prisons and detention facilities. The Ministry of Justice also represents the Iraqi Ministries, government agencies and State-owned enterprises in foreign litigation and arbitration matters, as well as before the United Nations Compensation Commission. The Iraqi Ministry of Justice no longer has any role in the judiciary. Its authority over judges and prosecutors, including their administrative support, has been removed in its entirety and placed under the Council of Judges.
- (5) The Ministry of Interior is responsible for the Iraqi Police Service (IPS), the Department of Border Enforcement (DBE) and Facilities Protection Service (FPS).

- (6) The Iraqi Governing Council, under delegation of authority from the CPA, established the Commission on Public Integrity (CPI) to combat corruption within the Iraqi government. The CPI trains and monitors public officials, investigates allegations of corruption, and refers cases to the Iraqi courts for prosecution. Additionally, CPI is specifically charged with developing and implementing a Code of Conduct for all Interim Iraqi Government (IIG) employees, a financial disclosure initiative for top officials, and other transparency programs. CPI is also charged with encouraging ethical public service and accountability by developing and executing public relations and educational initiatives. Finally, CPI provides community outreach, anonymous tip hotlines, proposes legislation, and coordinates international training and assistance.
- b. Enemy Forces.
- (1) Insurgency and terrorist threats remain the primary risk factors that threaten the successful completion of relief and reconstruction efforts. The security situation hinders the operation of the internal security forces and the courts.
 - (2) Similarly, these threats are an obstacle to foreign governments providing liaison officers to assist and advise the IIG on the prisons, police facilities, and other ministry work, particularly in locations outside of Baghdad, on a continuing basis. (See Annex B - Intelligence).
 - (3) These threats hinder the work of Iraqi judges and prosecutors, particularly those handling cases involving captured insurgents or high-profile suspects.
- c. Friendly Forces.
- (1) The CPA advisors (liaison officers after 30 June) are in place throughout Iraqi ministries and their sub-organizations.
 - (2) MNF-I.
 - (a) MNF-I is conducting detainee operations holding both security internees and a limited number of criminal detainees.
 - (b) A Joint Service Law Enforcement Team composed of uniformed attorneys, investigators, and support personnel is assisting in the investigation and prosecution of crimes against Multinational Force personnel before the CCCI.
 - (c) Office of Security Transition (OST) is responsible for organizing, equipping, training, mentoring and certifying all Iraqi security forces.
 - (3) Department of Justice (DOJ).
 - (a) The Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance and Training (OPDAT) Program is providing training and advice to Iraqi judges and prosecutors, all of whom are within the Council of Judges.

- (b) The International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) is developing and implementing training and technical assistance programs for the Iraqi Corrections Service. Additionally, ICITAP is providing similar services to the IPS through OST.
 - (c) The US Marshals Service (USMS) liaison staff is working closely with Iraqi counterparts to develop sound programs for courthouse security and protection of witnesses, judges, and prosecutors.
 - (d) The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is conducting counter-terror intelligence gathering and investigations. The FBI's mission in this area will be defined after transition to a Legal Attaché Office. It is also training and advising the IPS, through OST.
 - (e) DOJ is leading US efforts supporting the Iraqi Special Tribunal (IST) through the CPA Regime Crimes Liaison Office (RCLO) by providing prosecutors and investigators to work with their Iraqi counterparts.
 - (f) The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) is providing training and mentoring in Post-Blast Investigation and supporting Explosive Ordnance Disposal training to the IPS Counterterrorism Emergency Response Unit through OST.
 - (g) The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) is providing training to their Iraqi counterparts through OST.
- (4) Department of State.
- (a) The Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) is funding the OPDAT and ICITAP programs of DOJ to provide training to judges, prosecutors, police, and corrections personnel. It is also funding specialized training to be conducted by FBI, ATF, DEA, and ICITAP through OST.
 - (b) Diplomatic Security / Office of Antiterrorism Assistance (DS / ATA) is supporting the training, equipping, and mentoring of an Iraqi Police Counterterrorism Emergency Response Unit through OST.
- d. Assumptions.
- (1) UN Security Council Resolution 1511 (2003) and Resolution 1546 (2004), and any successor resolutions along with orders of the CPA which continue in force after 30 June, will provide post-occupation authority to multinational forces to continue detention and to apprehend insurgents / terrorists in coordination with officials of the IIG.
 - (2) Orders of the CPA providing for the establishment and organization of justice agencies will be retained through Phase V by the IIG.

2. Mission

The US Government supports the Iraqi Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Interior, the Iraqi Special Tribunal, the Council of Judges, and the Commission on Public Integrity in developing the capacity to administer justice, enforce the laws, and institute a national strategic anti-corruption campaign within Iraq that is effective, efficient, and within international standards while respecting human rights.

3. Execution

- a. Concept of Operations. The US Government will continue to assist the Iraqi Interim Government and its successors in the development of its justice and law enforcement sector agencies through training, technical assistance, mentoring, certification and advice to these agencies and their personnel. The US government will continue to assist Iraqi courts, prosecutors, and investigators which are investigating and prosecuting criminal cases of interest to the United States, in particular cases before the IST and cases based on crimes against the MNF which are being tried before the CCCI. Assistance is rendered throughout Iraq including but not limited to crime scenes (e.g., mass graves), IPS and DBE training and facilities, prisons, and courts in all remote locations. The US Government will assist in the construction or renovation of necessary physical infrastructure to support justice sector activities. Transition from US / Coalition management to a sovereign Iraq will take place in the following strategic phases.
- (1) Phases I and II. During these phases, ITPT, Baghdad, with support from Transition Teams in Washington, D.C., will identify and outline Embassy functions to be initiated and maintained during the Phases III through V. The current liaison teams to the Ministries of Justice and the Interior, the Council of Judges and the courts, and the CPI will continue their missions. Liaison teams grow to planned end strength and receive equipment. DOJ and DOD support to the Iraqi Special Tribunal will continue. In accordance with NSPD-37 on US Support to the IST, the Regime Crimes Liaison (RCL) will take leadership of all USG efforts in support of the IST, which will become part of the Regime Crimes Liaison Office (RCLO). Under MNF-I, the Joint Service Law Enforcement Team (JSLET) and the Director of Detainee Operations and the Detainee Organization will continue to support the Central Criminal Court of Iraq, while transferring as many detainees as possible from Coalition / MNF-I to Iraqi custody. The US Mission will establish a Justice and Law Enforcement Working Group (JLEWG) under the leadership of the COM or his designee to coordinate the activities of all agencies, including OST, working in this area. The liaison teams to the ministries and the Commission on Public Integrity will be assigned to IRMO. The Civilian Police Advisory Training Team (CPATT) will be responsible for organizing, equipping, training, mentoring and certifying IPS, DBE, and FPS, under the OST. Phase I ends with the dissolution of the CPA and the designation of US Mission Advance Team as the US Mission Iraq. Phase II ends with the transfer of sovereignty to the Iraqi Interim Government.
- (2) Phase III to Phase V. Liaison teams continue their work, now under authority of COM. The MNF Director of Detainee Operations and Detainee Organization continues to hold security internees. JSLET continues to support the CCCI. The RCLO assists in investigations and prosecutions before the IST. The arrests, trials and investigations with implications for US-Iraqi relations are reported to the COM. The

CPATT, in conjunction with interagency partners, will be responsible for organizing, equipping, training, mentoring and certifying IPS, DBE, and FPS, under the OST.

b. Tasks.

(1) Phases I and II.

(a) Department of State.

- (1) Fund OPDAT and ICITAP programs through the INL program budget.
- (2) Review and approve NSDD-38 requests from justice sector agencies.
- (3) Incorporate needs of justice and law enforcement sector agencies into decision-making on establishment and operation of Regional Teams (RTs).
- (4) COM or his designee will convene the JLEWG at US Mission Advance Team to facilitate transition of justice sector functions from CPA to the US Mission Advance Team and later US Mission. Membership will include DOS, Department of Homeland Security (DHS), DOJ, DOS INL and OST representatives, as appropriate.
- (5) Identify chair or co-chairs of the JLEWG.
- (6) Establish guidelines and procedures for proposed referrals of criminal cases by COM to the CCCI in accordance with reference C.
- (7) Support RCLO as requested by RCL in accordance with reference B.
- (8) Provide support to CPATT, through DS / ATA, for the training, equipping, and mentoring of IPS Counterterrorism Emergency Response Unit.
- (9) Provide support to DOD for the reconstitution and training of Iraqi security forces.

(b) Department of Justice.

- (1) Submit NSDD-38 requests for all appropriate programs, including RCLO.
- (2) Identify the senior DOJ representative who will coordinate all DOJ programs in country on behalf of the COM.
- (3) Identify requirements for transportation, workspace, and living quarters away from US Mission Baghdad and provide details to the DOS/COM to facilitate planning for US Mission facilities outside of Baghdad.
- (4) Stand up RCLO.

- (5) Recruit and flow additional personnel for OPDAT, ICITAP, and RCLO into Iraq.
 - (6) Continue to provide basic and specialized police training; technical assistance; training and management of the corrections system; and technical assistance, training, and other support to the CCCI, CPI, and other courts and justice sector entities.
- (c) Department of Homeland Security.
- (1) Submit NSDD-38 request.
 - (2) Identify and deploy the DHS Country Director who will coordinate all DHS programs in country on behalf of the COM.
 - (3) Identify requirements for transportation, workspace, and living quarters away from US Mission Baghdad and provide details to the DOS to facilitate planning for US Mission facilities outside of Baghdad.
 - (4) Recruit and flow additional personnel for DHS programs into Iraq consistent with security and pending identification of funding.
 - (5) Coordinate with OST for DBE training and mentoring requirements.
- (d) Department of Defense.
- (1) CDR USCENTCOM will be responsible for organizing, equipping, training, mentoring and certifying IPS, DBE, and FPS, through MNF-I.
 - (2) Create a detainee organization under MNF-I responsible for detainees in Iraq. The detainee organization Director will report to Commander, MNF-I.
 - (3) Continue to provide support through the JSLET for the investigation and prosecution of cases before the CCCI involving crimes against the Multinational Forces.
 - (4) Coordinate with US Mission Advance Team on method of referring cases of interest to the CCCI.
 - (5) Support RCLO as requested by RCA in accordance with reference B.
- (2) Phases III, IV, and V.
- (a) Department of State.
- (1) Assume all responsibilities formerly held by CPA in relation to the RCLO, in accordance with reference B, to include preparation and implementation of a strategic communications plan directed at both Iraqi and international

audiences concerning the activities of the IST and the role of the RCLO in support of the IST.

- (2) Provide logistical support, security, living and workspace for agencies with approved NSDD-38 requests. (See Annex S – Security MOA and Annex T – Support MOA).

(b) Department of Justice.

- (1) Continue to support the IST through the RCLO, requesting support from other agencies in accordance with reference B.
- (2) Continue to provide basic and specialized police training; technical assistance; training and management of the corrections system; and technical assistance, training, and other support to the CCCI, CPI, and other courts and justice sector entities.
- (3) Provide liaison between the military and intelligence community and the CCCI through creation of the Prosecution Targeting Liaison within the OPDAT program.

(c) Department of Homeland Security.

- (1) Initiate training and advice to Ministry of Interior and other appropriate IIG agencies in the areas of immigration, customs, border security, and transportation security through OST as appropriate.
- (2) Provide a visa security unit when the Embassy begins to accept visa applications from the Iraqi public at large.

(d) Department of Defense.

- (1) CDR USCENTCOM will continue to organize, equip, train and certify IPS, DBE, and FPS, through MNF-I OST.
- (2) Continue to provide support through the JSLET for the investigation and prosecution of cases before the CCCI involving crimes against the Multinational Forces.
- (3) Refer cases of interest to the CCCI through the COM.
- (4) Support CCCI prosecutions by providing evidence and intelligence to the CCCI through the Prosecution Targeting Liaison.
- (5) Support RCLO as requested by RCA in accordance with reference B.

c. Coordinating Instructions.

- (1) All detentions, investigations, or prosecutions with the potential for Iraqi or international media attention will be reported to the OLA and the COM/COM-designate through his PAO as soon as they are identified.
- (2) OST is responsible for all Iraqi security forces training programs. Other agencies will provide support as required.

4. Administration And Logistics. See Annex I - Logistics; Annex O – Regional Teams; and Appendix 2 of Annex A– Base Support Operations in Support of US Mission.

5. Command and Control

- a. The COM will provide policy guidance to all USG agencies operating in the justice and law enforcement sectors in Iraq.
- b. COM provides policy guidance to the RCL . The RCL will receive technical guidance from the Attorney General. See reference B.
- c. CDR USCENTCOM, through MNF-I OST, with the policy guidance of the COM, shall direct all USG efforts and coordinate international efforts in support of organizing, equipping, training, mentoring, and certifying all Iraqi security forces.
- d. COM coordinates with the Commander, MNF-I, to provide guidance regarding detainee operations and JSLET operations in support of the CCCI.
- e. Commander, Detainee Organization, exercises responsibility for supporting detention operations.

ANNEX Q TO
OPLAN SOVEREIGN IRAQ
11 JUNE 2004

ANNEX Q – HEALTH SERVICE SUPPORT

- References:
- A. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, 12 August 1949
 - B. DOD Directive 1404.10, "Emergency-Essential (E-E_ DOD US Citizen Civilian Employees", 10 April 1992.
 - C. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 12 August 1949
 - D. Joint Pub 4-0, 6 April 2000, "Doctrine for Logistics Support in Joint Operations"
 - E. Joint Pub 4-02, 30 July 2001, "Doctrine for Health Service Support in Joint Operations"
 - F. Joint Pub 4-02.1, 6 October 1997, "JTTP for Health Service Logistics in Joint Operations"
 - G. Joint Pub 4-02.2, 30 December 1996, "JTTP for Patient Movement in Joint Operations"
 - H. DOD Regulation 4515.13R, "Air Transportation Eligibility," November 1994
 - I. DODI 6000.11, "Patient Movement System," 9 September 1998
 - J. The Foreign Service Act of 1980 (22 U.S.C. 3901 et seq. as amended)
 - K. The State Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (22 U.S.C. 2651a et seq., as amended)
 - L. National Security Presidential Directive #36, 11 May 2004

1. Situation.

- a. Current Situation. The DOD provides medical support to all military, as well as eligible USG employees working under COM authority and USG-funded contractor personnel (who are US nationals) in Iraq. Personnel requiring hospitalization and/or surgical support are treated at the Combat Support Hospital (CSH) located in Baghdad and Balad, or by DOD medical assets at other bases throughout Iraq. Patient movement out of Iraq is currently supported by DOD aeromedical evacuation (AE) assets. USG-funded contractor personnel (who are US nationals) are managed by DOD in the same manner as eligible USG employees working under COM authority in Iraq. If these personnel require evacuation out of Iraq, they will be transferred to their appropriate non-USG healthcare provider(s) and movement resources at the earliest opportunity

- (1) The purpose of this Annex is to provide a concept of operations, assign tasks, and provide guidance to ensure an effective Health Service Support (HSS) system for all eligible USG employees working under COM authority and USG-funded contractors

(who are US nationals) in Iraq until such time as Iraqi or other contracted medical services achieve a satisfactory availability and standard of care, and the security situation permits the use of local hospitals in accordance with guidance contained in references (a) through (l). This annex applies to all Department of Defense (DOD), US Mission, eligible USG employees and USG-funded contractor personnel (who are US nationals) supporting Operation Sovereign Iraq.

- b. Enemy Forces. See Annex B - Intelligence.
- c. Friendly Forces. See Annex A - Command and Control.
- d. Assumptions.
 - (1) Health Service Support, to include patient movement, is both a National and organizational responsibility. However, because of the security situation and limited medical resources currently available in Iraq, all deployed DOD medical assets will be considered Joint assets and available for use by all US national USG employees and other designated eligible USG employees working under COM authority.
 - (2) The Host Nation (HN) medical infrastructure has been severely stressed as a result of the war and should be considered austere and overburdened by requirements to support the indigenous population. At this time, reliance on HN medical support for near-term requirements is untenable and should not be factored into the HSS architecture needed to support US personnel.
 - (3) Threat levels will remain high in Iraq due to continued instability. The risk of traumatic injury as a result of contact with enemy factions or terrorists' employment of explosives and man-portable weapons will continue to necessitate access to medical support above the primary care level.
 - (4) Regional US resources (military bases and/or US Embassies) and / or HN facilities in such countries as Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Bahrain, and Qatar, when authorized by appropriate government entity, will be utilized for access to HSS and patient movement resources if unavailable in Iraq.
 - (5) Deploying US Mission personnel will be healthy, fit, and will have appropriate immunizations/chemoprophylaxis and personal protective equipment (PPE) to counter threats endemic to Iraq.
 - (6) DOS will screen USG employees under Chief of Mission (COM) authority prior to deployment to ensure personnel meet the parameters of this assumption (e.g., no chronic illness, compliance with required immunizations, etc.). DOD Force Health Protection (FHP) guidance supporting this assumption is available from the US Central Command (USCENTCOM) Surgeon's Office.

- (7) To the greatest extent possible, USG-funded contractors deploying to Iraq will also be free from chronic illness and/or injury, and will be sufficiently healthy and fit to perform their contractor duties. Contractor organizations that deploy employees to Iraq should be familiar with the necessary immunization/chemoprophylaxis and PPE requirements for forces employed in Iraq, and take the necessary steps to provide these resources to their employees. Failure to take these steps will put contractor employees at risk and increase the potential liability of the contract organizations.
- (8) Multinational Force-Iraq (MNF-I) will continue to provide HSS to eligible US personnel in Iraq, including US national USG employees, other designated eligible USG employees working under COM authority, and USG funded contractor personnel who are US nationals, until DOD resources transition out-of-theater or Iraqi or other contracted medical services achieve a satisfactory availability and standard of care, and the security situation permits the use of HN medical facilities, whichever occurs first.
- (9) Once established, the US Mission Health Unit will provide primary and ambulatory care HSS (defined as basic or general health care traditionally provided by physicians or nurse practitioners who specialize in broad scope family practice or internal medicine) to US national USG employees and other designated eligible USG employees under COM authority.
- (10) DOS will be responsible for coordinating with DOD for any ancillary care (defined as those tests and procedures ordered by healthcare providers to assist in patient diagnosis and / or treatment, e.g., radiology, laboratory, pathology, etc.) support requirements needed for personnel under COM authority, as long as DOD assets remain available in Iraq.
- (11) DOS will be responsible for coordinating with DOD MNF-I for all patient movement and aeromedical evacuation requirements until such time that the US Mission can establish adequate medical evacuation support (to include patient movement personnel resources, e.g., critical care providers) for US Mission employees.
- (12) For eligible persons, DOS will be responsible for coordinating with DOD MNF-I for all mortuary services and transportation of human remains until such time that the US Mission can either obtain acceptable HN mortuary support for the preparation of human remains and/or arrange for transportation of deceased persons to regional US bases capable of providing mortuary support and preparing for onward transportation back to the US.
- (13) USG-funded contractor organizations with employees in Iraq will be required to provide organic primary and ambulatory care assets to support their employees or arrange such care from another contractor organization. Failure to do so will place

an unsupportable burden on US Mission medical resources and place contractor personnel at-risk of not having access to routine medical care.

- (14) US national USG employees and other designated eligible USG employees working under COM authority and USG funded contractor personnel (who are U.S. nationals) requiring extensive care above the primary care level (e.g., critical / intensive care, surgery, etc.) will require evacuation out-of-theater.
- (15) Per reference (L), DOD will not require reimbursement for all direct medical care (including hospitalization and surgery), ancillary care support, patient movement, and mortuary services and transportation of human remains provided to US national USG employees and other designated eligible USG employees working under COM authority. Similarly, medical support provided to USG-funded contractor personnel (who are U.S. nationals) will not require reimbursement. Until such time as local commercial mortuary services are available, mortuary services to other US citizens will be provided on a reimbursable basis in accordance with 10 U.S.C. Section 1486.

e. Limitations.

- (1) There are limited numbers of in-theater hospital beds to support patient hospitalization. This will necessitate an emphasis on medically / surgically stabilizing critical care patients and placing them in the aeromedical evacuation system for return to the Continental US (CONUS) as soon as practicable. All HSS provided by DOD is subject to limitations of space and capabilities.
- (2) According to CPA medical personnel, the medical infrastructure in and around Baghdad has been severely degraded by the war. It will be some time before they are sufficiently recovered to be able to be factored in as potential medical resources to the US personnel working in Iraq.
- (3) There are limited types of specialty providers in-theater. This will require either access to telemedicine capabilities for those patients who can be managed by primary care providers receiving specialty consultation, or by evacuating complicated, non-life threatening cases out-of-theater.
- (4) Once DOD has transitioned out of Iraq, there will be limited patient movement and aeromedical evacuation resources. DOS and USG-funded contractor organizations will have to rely on either organic or contractor assets to support patient movement and aeromedical evacuation requirements.
- (5) Once DOD has transitioned out of Iraq, there will be limited command and signal resources to support rapid response in an emergency medical situation. DOS and USG-funded contractor organizations will have to create adequate medical communications architectures to support response requirements.

- (6) Once DOD has transitioned out of Iraq, DOS will utilize established DOD medical logistics infrastructure for resupply of medical and pharmaceutical resources as long as they are available (see section 4.a. [Medical Materiel] of this Annex). USG-funded contractor organizations will have to create adequate medical logistics infrastructures to support equipment and supply requirements for their medical support assets.
- (7) Blood supplies from HN sources in Iraq should be considered not in compliance with American Red Cross standards and should therefore not be utilized. Once DOD assets have transitioned out of Iraq, DOS and USG-funded contractor organizations will have to negotiate for organic supply and storage of blood and blood products needed to support trauma/critical care patients.

2. Mission.

US Government provides an effective Health Service Support (HSS) system for all US national USG employees, other designated eligible USG employees working under COM authority, and USG-funded contractor personnel (who are US nationals) in Iraq during the transition. As directed, DOD continues to provide access to adequate medical, surgical, and mortuary support services to eligible USG personnel in Iraq. When directed, DOS sources and staffs the US Mission Health Unit (USMHU) to provide primary care medical support to all US national USG employees and other designated eligible USG employees working under COM authority. When directed, USG-funded contractor organizations with employees in Iraq provide adequate organic primary care assets to support their contractor personnel or arrange such care through another contractor organization.

3. Execution.

- a. Concept of Operations. The DOD/MNF-I has established conditions and Theater deployment health standards to deploy healthy and fit personnel; employ an early forward, responsive Force Health Protection and disease surveillance system; achieve situational awareness; clear the battlefield of casualties; stabilize patients using forward surgical teams; and move patients rearward for hospitalization or return to duty. DOD / MNF-I will coordinate with DOS to provide HSS for all US national USG employees and other designated eligible USG employees working under COM authority. DOS will establish the US Mission Health Unit to provide Primary Care support services to eligible USG employees under the authority of the COM. As USG-funded contractor personnel transition to Iraq to assume support functions, contractor organizations sourcing these personnel will provide organic primary care medical support or arrange such care from another contractor organization.

- (1) Transition. As DOS establishes the US Mission, the DOS will assume responsibility for the provision of primary care medical support to US national USG employees

and other designated eligible USG employees working under COM authority. Should space requested for the US Mission Health Unit not be completed at the time of the transition, DOS will coordinate with DOD / MNF-I to establish an interim arrangement whereby the US Mission medical staff can provide primary and ambulatory care to its personnel at the closest DOD / MNF-I Level III medical treatment facility (MTF). As USG-funded contractor personnel transition into Iraq, they will establish organic primary care medical support or arrange such care from another contractor organization.

(2) Hospitalization.

- (a) As long as DOD Level III MTF's remain in Iraq, they are to be considered Joint assets and as such, available to provide hospitalization and care for all US national USG employees, other designated eligible USG employees working under COM authority, and USG-funded contractor personnel (who are US nationals).
- (b) Multinational Force Level III MTF's will likewise be available for hospitalization and care of all US Government personnel in extreme situations. US personnel admitted to Multinational Force Level III MTF's will be transferred to a US MTF as soon as it is proper to do so.
- (c) Hospitalization will be limited to stabilization and short-term medical treatment with an emphasis on returning patients to a full duty status. Patients who will require additional treatment or those whose condition(s) preclude a rapid return to duty will be placed in the Aeromedical Evacuation (AE) system for return to CONUS and more definitive care.
- (d) If US national USG employees, other designated eligible USG employees working under COM authority or USG-funded contractor personnel (who are US nationals) are hospitalized in US or Coalition / Multinational Force - Iraq MTF's, the US Mission and USG-funded contractor organizations respectively, in coordination with the MNF-I, will provide administrative support, to include: facilitating patient movement requirements; develop adequate patient tracking and support mechanisms to provide visibility on patient location and status; and provide adequate administrative support functions (e.g., finance, communications outside the MTF, personal support functions, etc.).
- (e) If US national USG employees, other designated eligible USG employees working under COM authority, or USG-funded contractor personnel (who are US nationals) are hospitalized in Iraq or in regional Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) State hospitals, the US Mission and USG-funded contractor organizations respectively will be responsible for providing the same level of administrative support enumerated above.

(3) Patient Movement.

- (a) Casualties in Iraq will be evacuated using all available modes of transportation, to include ground, dedicated rotary-wing aircraft, opportune rotary-wing aircraft, and fixed-wing aircraft. Evacuation of patients out of Iraq will be made by fixed-wing assets available to support the patient movement mission. For planning purposes, evacuation directly from Iraq to CONUS can be made when strategic lift resources are available. The Joint Patient Movement Requirements Center (JPMRC) will coordinate movement of patients within Iraq; JPMRC will coordinate with the European Command (EUCOM) Theater Patient Movement Requirements Center (TPMRC) for movement of patients out of Iraq. The US Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) Regulating and Command and Control Evacuation System (TRAC2ES) is the automated information system (AIS) for patient movement and tracking that will be used by all Level III MTF's and the JPMRC.
- (b) DOD will continue to provide aeromedical evacuation (AE) under this Annex at both the tactical and strategic-level when requested/required, as long as it does not interfere with the DOD mission; is considered emergent or lifesaving; is authorized by statute; or is requested by the Head of an Agency or Government pursuant to the Economy Act.
- (c) Commercial lift may be used to support patient movement requirements when it is considered expedient to the movement mission or at such time that DOD lift resources cannot be secured or the patient movement requirements do not fit the aforementioned parameters.
- (d) DOS and USG-funded contractor organizations respectively are responsible for coordinating with MNF-I for all patient movement of US national USG employees, other designated eligible USG employees working under COM authority, and USG-funded contractor personnel (who are US citizens). MNF-I will continue to oversee regulating of these personnel between MTF's in Iraq until such time as the US Mission and USG-funded contractor organizations can establish support for their own personnel.

(4) Host Nation Support.

- (a) Because of the difference in medical standards between the United States and Iraq, HNS for direct medical care and supplies will be considered only when those facilities / supplies meet US standards of care.
- (b) As noted in the Assumptions section of this Annex, the Iraqi Medical and Public Health infrastructure has been severely strained by the impact of the war and the

following civil unrest. Setting aside the physical degradation of the Iraqi medical facilities, it is now and will continue to be difficult for Iraq to provide adequate medical support to its indigenous population. Therefore, for at least for the near-term, US personnel should not rely on HNS for the provision of medical care.

- (c) As the recovery matures, and the Iraqi Public Health and Medical infrastructure are deemed to be more capable, the US Mission and USG-funded contractor organizations may deem it acceptable to seek HN medical support at medical facilities determined to be sufficiently near US standards of care.

(5) Other Health Service Support.

- (a) Care of Private U.S. Citizens. In support of consular operations and consistent with paragraph 3(a)(3) of Annex J, DOD will only provide medical services to private US citizens when life, limb, and eyesight saving support is required. This support will continue until such time as Iraqi companies or agencies are able to perform those services in a manner consistent with host country practices elsewhere in the world.
- (b) Care of Host Nation Civilians. Within available capabilities, DOD and Coalition / Multinational Force – Iraq MTF’s can provide HSS to Host Nation civilians when necessary for life, limb, or eyesight saving support. When DOD / MNF-I Level III MTF’s transition out of Iraq, the primary care resources of either the US Mission or USG-funded contractor organizations will not be capable of providing medical care and / or support to Host Nation Civilians.
- (c) Mortuary Affairs. Mortuary support will be provided to eligible USG employees working under COM authority and USG-funded contractor personnel (who are US nationals) working for DOS in Iraq. Mortuary Service will include search, recovery, identification, and disposition of remains and personal effects will be provided IAW Annex I (Logistics). Until such time as local commercial mortuary services are available, mortuary services to other US citizens will be provided on a reimbursable basis in accordance with 10 U.S.C. Section 1486.
- (d) Civil Affairs. DOD / Multinational Force medical units currently participate in Civil Affairs programs as directed by the Commander, USCENTCOM. DOD / MNF-I medical units will continue to participate as directed. Medical assets that provide organic support to the US Mission and organic medical assets of USG-funded contractor organizations are not expected to have sufficient resources to engage in Civil Affairs programs.
- (e) Mass Casualties. US Mission Iraq and USG-funded contractor organizations will ensure that a mass casualty plan is developed and coordinated with DOD / MNF-I.

(6) Joint Blood Program.

(a) The USCENTCOM Joint Blood Program (JBP) is a Theater-wide system for the receipt, storage and distribution of blood and blood products managed by the Joint Blood Program Office (JBPO). The USCENTCOM JBPO manages Theater blood resources and procures additional blood resources from CONUS via the Armed Services Blood program Office (ASBPO), WASHINGTON, DC.

(b) Blood resupply will be with packed red cells. There is no frozen blood prepositioned in Theater.

(c) DOD / MNF-I will continue to utilize the established Theater JBP. US national USG employees, other designated eligible USG employees working under COM authority, and USG funded contractor personnel (who are U.S. nationals) will have access to JBP blood program resources if admitted to CENTCOM Theater Level III MTF's. Since the US Mission Medical Unit and USG-funded contractor organizations will only be providing primary care medical support to its personnel, blood supply will not be resourced to those units.

(7) Force Health Protection. DOD Force Health Protection (FHP) guidance is available from the US Central Command (USCENTCOM) Surgeon's Office. DOS and USG-funded contractor organizations deploying personnel to Iraq should institute effective elements of FHP measures and health surveillance programs to prevent disease and injury. These programs are integral to pre-deployment, deployment, and post-deployment operations. Health and environmental threat estimates are also available from the CENTCOM Surgeon's Medical Intelligence Estimate of Iraq, and should be consulted prior to deployment to ensure adequate training and countermeasures are in-place.

(8) Theater Evacuation Policy. There will be no stated Theater Evacuation Policy for DOS and USG personnel employed in Iraq. However, when patient care requirements exceed available medical resources, the decision to move patients out of Iraq will be made as soon as lift is made available and the patient's medical condition permits.

(9) Dental Services. Dental care will be limited to treatment necessary to relieve suffering and alleviate impairment of an individual's ability to adequately perform assigned missions. US national USG employees, other designated eligible USG employees working under COM authority, and USG funded contractor personnel (who are U.S. nationals) requiring dental services will access DOD / MNF-I resources for treatment. Since the US Mission Medical Unit and USG-funded contractor organizations will only be providing primary care medical support to its personnel; dental services will not be organically available to those units. Once DOD / MNF-I has transitioned out-of-theater, emergency dental care will have to be

accessed either outside of Iraq at the nearest DOD location, if authorized, or through HN dental providers deemed to be within an adequate standard of care.

- (10) Veterinary Services. Combined Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) remains the executive agent for veterinary support services to all US agencies and contractor organizations deployed to Iraq.
 - (11) Other Areas. Not applicable.
- b. Tasks. (Phases I through V)
- (1) Department of Defense.
 - (a) While deployed to Iraq, provide HSS to US national USG employees, other designated eligible USG employees working under COM authority, and USG funded contractor personnel (who are U.S. nationals).
 - (b) Provide medical and pharmaceutical re-supply to the US Mission Health Unit (USMHU) via the Single Integrated Medical Logistics Manager (SIMLM) supporting USCENTCOM's area of responsibility (AOR).
 - (2) Department of State.
 - (a) Ensure US national USG employees and other designated eligible USG employees working under COM authority are medically screened and provided with all appropriate force health protection resources prior to deployment.
 - (b) Deploy appropriate HSS resources to support US national USG employees and other designated eligible USG employees working under COM authority.
 - (c) Establish the USMHU to provide organic primary care medical support to US national USG employees and other designated eligible USG employees working under COM authority.
 - (d) Provide initial medical and pharmaceutical supplies to support the USMHU. Coordinate with DOD for medical and pharmaceutical re-supply via the DOD's SIMLM (Unit Identification Code [UIC] required).
 - (e) Coordinate all HSS planning and execution above the primary care level with the MNF-I Command Surgeon's Office.
 - (3) All USG-funded Contractor Organizations.
 - (a) Ensure organic primary medical care support is available for all contractor

personnel employed in Iraq.

- (b) Ensure medical and pharmaceutical supplies are available to support the primary care mission for contractor personnel in Iraq.

(4) Coordinating Instructions.

- (a) DOD will provide FHP and health surveillance program information to DOS and USG-funded contractor organizations to help prevent/minimize disease and injuries in the Iraq Theater of Operations.
- (b) DOD and DOS will coordinate an interim agreement to allow US Mission medical personnel to utilize DOD / MNF-I Level III MTF's to provide primary care support to US national USG employees and other designated eligible USG employees working under COM authority.
- (c) DOD, DOS, and USG-funded contractor organizations will determine what services, care, supplies, and patient movement support will be provided to eligible USG employees working under COM authority and USG-funded contractor personnel (who are US nationals).

4. Administration and Logistics.

- a. Medical Materiel. Planning and executing the Health Service Logistics Support (HSL) mission in Iraq will require close coordination between the DOD / MNF-I and the US Mission medical staffs. Under the DOD aegis, USCENTCOM has designated the (Combined Forces Land Component Commander (CFLCC) to serve as the Executive Agent for the SIMLM for HSL in the USCENTCOM AOR. The designation of the SIMLM facilitates the delivery of HSL by centralizing management and reducing excess redundancy of services and logistics capabilities within the AOR. Medical supply and re-supply in support of the US Mission Health Unit will be coordinated through the DOD SIMLM; remuneration for DOD-provided medical and pharmaceutical supplies provided to the US Mission Health Unit and U.S. Mission-funded contractor organizations will be a US Mission and USG-funded contractor organization responsibility, respectively.
- b. Reports. As appropriate under established organizational requirements.

5. Command and Control.

- a. The command and control relationship between DOD, DOS, and USG-funded contractor organizations is coordination.
- b. Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Information (C4I) Systems. Participating agencies and organizations must identify / coordinate HSS communication

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requirements with their information management (IM) / communications personnel to ensure these requirements are included in the communications architecture and supporting communications capabilities.

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Version 3.0

CHANGE 1 TO
ANNEX R TO
OPLAN SOVEREIGN IRAQ
2 JULY 2004

ANNEX R – PUBLIC AFFAIRS

References: A. OPLAN Sovereign Iraq

1.S situation

a. Current Situation.

- (1) Intensive media interest in Iraq has produced a relentless flood of news stories, often slanted against the US-led occupation or overly anti-American (in the case of the pan-Arab media), that will continue for the foreseeable future. A variety of tactics and resources are required for communications effectiveness, given the nature of US and international media reporting in Iraq, which tends toward the following: immediate-term coverage of terrorist attacks, multinational force and Iraqi casualties, religious and civil dissent, military operations, speculation with regard to mission success; and political and process coverage of multinational partnerships and US political and interagency issues.
 - (2) The Coalition Provisional Authority's (CPA) current media and communications organization includes personnel and components aligned to emphasize mission successes to key audiences through US domestic regional and national media, international press, independent Iraqi media, and the Arab and Middle Eastern regional press.
 - (3) The current size of the CPA's Public Affairs organization reflects the high priority of its mission and the complexity involved in executing effective public affairs programs in Iraq. Staffed by 80-plus personnel, the organization tends to be non-hierarchical and task-oriented and has achieved a significant degree of success in a challenging operational environment. It is an organization without equivalent in the Department of State (DOS) or Department of Defense (DOD) with military, career and non-career civilian, political, interagency and international staff collocated for immediate coordination on strategy, messaging and tactics.
- b. Enemy Forces. See Annex B – Intelligence
- c. Friendly Forces. See Base Plan – OPLAN Sovereign Iraq
- d. Assumptions. The current media environment will remain for the foreseeable future.

2. Mission

Not later than 30 June 2004, Department of State establishes a public affairs organization under the authority of the Chief of Mission, US Mission Iraq, to design and implement a public affairs plan, in coordination with Commander, MNF-I, to achieve the communication objectives of the United States and its multinational partners.

3. Execution

a. Concept of Operations.

- (1) Intent. Demonstrate ongoing success in Iraq; create and reinforce growing capability of the Iraqis and their institutions to take responsibility for a future of their choosing, articulate US and multinational force / international partner policies and initiatives to domestic, regional, international and Iraqi audiences; build and sustain support for Iraqi participation and investment in Iraq's transition to a stable, sovereign government of their choosing; build and sustain support in the US, among multinational force / international partners, and in the international community for Iraq's reconstruction.
- (2) The COM will establish a communications organization to design and implement a public affairs plan to achieve the communication objectives of the US in coordination with its multinational partners. The organization, now called STRATCOM, will be renamed the Public Affairs Office (PAO) which will be responsive and responsible to the normal PA Office of the Embassy. The COM will have full authority over PAO, and the Director of PAO will report to the COM and will be responsible for both planning and executing all tasks within the purview of the Office.
- (3) The PAO will serve as the media's point of contact and will coordinate closely with all communications activities in the US Mission. PAO also will coordinate message content and strategies before release of information by any activity under the authority of the COM.
- (4) The PAO will coordinate closely with the media and communications offices of the MNF-I, USCENTCOM and leverage collocated assets to ensure that the public affairs missions and plans meet US communication objectives.
- (5) The PAO will coordinate with similar public affairs offices of multinational and international partners.

b. Conduct of Operations.

- (1) The PAO will be sized to achieve the critical missions assigned to it. It will initially be staffed with approximately 127 public affairs personnel. (See Figure 1) After 31 December 2004, it may be reduced in size by the COM based upon its scope of mission. It will retain the following capabilities as it transitions on 30 June 2004:
 - (a) Communication ability with regional, western and Arabic media.
 - (b) Ability to host press events.

- (c) Close coordination with CJTF-7 (MNF-I) / CPIC / CENTCOM (Public Affairs Division).
- (d) Close coordination with USAID and other US interagency personnel.
- (e) Satellite broadcast/video communications.
- (f) Web site management.
- (g) International Press Center (If this facility is not turned over to the Iraqis).




Figure 1. Proposed Public Affairs Organization

- (2) The PAO will develop a media monitoring capability based in Baghdad, focused on Iraq and regional Arab media. This capability would become part of a more robust research and analysis component. The PAO will perform its missions throughout the five phases addressed in this operations plan. It will adjust its message and target audience as circumstances dictate.

c. Tasks.

- (1) Phase I.

(a) Department of State.

- (1) By 1 June 2004, establish the PAO and ensure that it retains a strategic focus upon operations in Iraq.
- (2) Support the PAO in the US Mission while retaining an independent, higher order strategic focus on communications and media missions and opportunities.

(b) Department of Defense.

- (1) Be responsible for DOD communications strategies and programs and coordinate strategic communication objectives with the the PAO in the US Mission Iraq.
- (2) DOD Psychological Operations (PSYOP) and Information Operations Staff will continue close cooperation and liaison with the PAO in the US Mission Iraq.

- (2) Phases II through V: Both COM and Commander, MNF-I continue communications operations.

d. Coordinating Instructions.

- (1) The COM PAO will coordinate and establish liaison with the following activities:
 - (a) Office of Public Diplomacy (PD) and PD staff in the Regional Teams.
 - (b) COM's press attaché office.
 - (c) USG-funded broadcasters in Iraq: Radio Sawa and Al-Iraqia TV.
 - (d) Iraqi Media Network.

4. Administration and Logistics

- a. Funding. Operational funding will be provided by the US Mission Iraq.
- b. Location. The PAO may be located in the Convention Center in Baghdad, the current International Press Center location, or at a location designated by the COM.

5. Command and Control

The PAO will be under the authority of the Chief of Mission.

ANNEX S TO
OPLAN SOVEREIGN IRAQ
11 JUNE 2004

ANNEX S – SECURITY MEMORANDA OF AGREEMENT

1. Situation. See attached Security Memoranda of Agreement between Department of State and Department of Defense.
2. Mission. See attached Security Memoranda of Agreement between Department of State and Department of Defense.
3. Execution. See attached Security Memoranda of Agreement between Department of State and Department of Defense.
4. Administration and Logistics: See attached Security Memoranda of Agreement between Department of State and Department of Defense.
5. Command and Control. See attached Security Memoranda of Agreement between Department of State and Department of Defense.

MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT
BETWEEN
THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AND
THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
REGARDING PHYSICAL SECURITY, EQUIPMENT
AND PERSONAL PROTECTIVE SERVICES

1. PURPOSE:

This Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) provides for physical security, equipment and personal protective services to be provided by Commander, US Central Command (CDR USCENTCOM), to the US Chief of Mission (COM), US Mission Iraq, pursuant to reference 2.a and 2.g. This MOA also establishes procedures to request and receive such support. Nothing in this MOA shall in any way limit the scope of CDR USCENTCOM's authority to conduct current or future full spectrum operations. Provisions relating to security responsibility are covered in reference 2.b.

2. REFERENCES:

- a. National Security Presidential Directive 36, United States Government Operations in Iraq (May 11, 2004)
- b. Memorandum of Agreement between Commander, US Central Command and US Chief of Mission, US Mission Iraq regarding Security Responsibility (June 2004)
- c. DOD Directive 4500.56, DOD Policy on the Use of Government Aircraft and Air Travel (March 1997)
- d. DOD 4500.36-R, Management, Acquisition, and Use of Motor Vehicles (March 1994)
- e. DOD 4515.13-R, Air Transportation Eligibility (November 1994)
- f. Joint Publication 1-02, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (April 12, 2001)
- g. 22 U.S.C. §4805

3. Description of the Parties and their areas of responsibility:

- a. US Chief of Mission: The COM is the principal officer of the US diplomatic mission charged with the mission to protect America's vital interests and promote the growth of freedom and democratic institutions. The COM retains the primary responsibility for contact and coordination with the government of Iraq. The Regional Security Officer (RSO) remains the COM's point of contact in dealing with security issues.
- b. Commander, US Central Command: CDR USCENTCOM plans and executes military operations in Iraq to promote a safe and secure environment that facilitates the growth of democratic institutions. These operations include the

development of Iraqi security forces that are both capable and loyal to the Iraqi government.

4. GENERAL RESPONSIBILITIES:

- a. CDR USCENTCOM retains operational control (OPCON) over DOD-provided physical security and personal protective services under this MOA. Except as otherwise agreed, it is understood that the support contemplated by this MOA can be provided with in-theater assets.
- b. This MOA does not prejudice the ability of the Secretary of State to make requests for support not specifically mentioned herein. Except in emergency circumstances, requests for additional significant or long-term support beyond that provided for herein will take the form of a written request from the COM to the Commander, Multinational Force-Iraq (MNF-I), or when appropriate, an Executive Secretariat memorandum from DOS to DOD.
- c. Local commanders are authorized to act in an emergency (imminent threat to life, limb, or property of US personnel) without coordination otherwise required under this MOA.
- d. The COM is responsible for physical security, equipment and personal protective services for US Mission Iraq not specifically provided for in this MOA unless otherwise agreed.
- f. Personnel under Chief of Mission authority ("COM personnel") agree to follow all USCENTCOM rules and regulations with respect to all services provided. Such rules and regulations shall be provided, in text format, to the COM for dissemination to its field personnel. Likewise, DOD personnel under the authority of CDR USCENTCOM but working in US Mission facilities agree to follow all COM security requirements in the Mission including but not limited to screening of vehicles/visitors, vetting of employees, protection of classified material (in concert with established DOD policies), emergency procedures, and COM weapons policies as locally coordinated.
- g. The COM and CDR USCENTCOM agree that military capabilities may be requested to provide physical security, equipment and personal protective services only when security requirements exceed available Marine Security Guard Detachment (MSGD), DOS Diplomatic Security Service (DSS), and DOS-contracted security support capabilities. The security situation and employment of military capabilities will be reviewed on a semi-annual basis, or upon the request of either party.
- h. The Emergency Action Committee (EAC) has primary responsibility for evaluating information pertaining to the security of Americans. The EAC also

recommends DOS threat levels. The EAC will also serve as a forum to facilitate discussion and resolution of force protection issues. The EAC will be chaired by the Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) and include the RSO, all section heads, other agency heads, military intelligence representation, public affairs personnel, and the US Defense Representative (USDR). CDR USCENCOM will appoint a representative to attend the EAC meetings.

- i. The COM and CDR USCENCOM will closely coordinate on all matters related to security and force protection issues.
- j. Personal Security Detachment (PSD) duties currently provided by Protective Service Unit (PSU) in Iraq, composed of CID, OSI and NCIS personnel, will be continued through September 30, 2004. From June 30, 2004 to September 30, 2004, DOS DSS will establish PSD capabilities to enable DOS DSS to relieve the PSU of those responsibilities by September 30, 2004. Changes to levels of PSD support and dates of service will be as agreed by COM and CDR USCENCOM.
- k. The COM and CDR USCENCOM will jointly inventory CPA-controlled security-related equipment, establish source, method of acquisition, and ownership of equipment, and distribute CPA resources (determining accountability according to source and ownership) to support mission requirements no later than June 15, 2004.
- l. The COM will be responsible for conducting security surveys for all COM facilities. CDR USCENCOM will be responsible for conducting security surveys for all CDR USCENCOM facilities. The COM and CDR USCENCOM will coordinate in advance any requests for COM surveys of CDR USCENCOM facilities and any CDR USCENCOM surveys of any COM facilities through the RSO and the USDR.
- m. The COM and CDR USCENCOM agree to consult fully on all issues concerning force protection and security of US personnel in Iraq, including the source and composition of forces providing such security under this MOA.
- n. The COM and CDR USCENCOM may delegate their responsibilities provided for in this MOA.

6. ANNEXES:

The Parties further agree to the following annexes:

ANNEX A DEFINITIONS

ANNEX B COM/CDR USCENCOM COORDINATION

- ANNEX C GREEN ZONE SECURITY
- ANNEX D SECURITY OUTSIDE THE GREEN ZONE
- ANNEX E PERSONAL SECURITY DETACHMENT (PSD)
SECURITY
- ANNEX F COMMAND AND CONTROL/INTELLIGENCE
SHARING

7. EFFECTIVE DATE, MODIFICATION AND TERMINATION:

As of the date of signature, the Parties will begin to phase in support and support arrangements as contemplated in this MOA in order to enable this MOA to enter into full force and effect upon dissolution of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). The Parties will review this MOA semi-annually, or more frequently as circumstances indicate, for currency and applicability. This MOA may be amended in writing as mutually agreed by the Parties.

Signed:

Signed:

Deputy Secretary
US Department of State

Deputy Secretary
US Department of Defense

Date:

Date:

ANNEX A

DEFINITIONS

1. Security (from reference 2.f): 1. Measures taken by a military unit, an activity or installation to protect itself against all acts designed to, or that may, impair its effectiveness. 2. A condition that results from the establishment and maintenance of protective measures that ensure a state of inviolability from hostile acts or influences. 3. With respect to classified matter, the condition that prevents unauthorized persons from having access to official information that is safeguarded in the interests of national security.
2. Force Protection (from reference 2.f): Security program designed to protect military personnel, civilian employees, family members, facilities, and equipment, in all locations and situations, accomplished through planned and integrated application of combating terrorism, physical security, operations security, personal protective services, and support by intelligence, counterintelligence, and other security programs.
3. Quick Reaction Force (QRF): For purposes of this MOA, a Quick Reaction Force is a generic military force, designated by the combatant commander (or his representative) and associated with a particular COM activity that responds to a security threat endangering the given COM activity. The QRF does not travel with, nor provide force protection for, the given COM activity but instead responds to eliminate the threat only when called upon by the COM activity and directed by CDR USCENTCOM. A QRF is associated with a response time that is dependent upon the time it takes to deploy the QRF from its remote location to the scene of the COM activity.
4. Embedded: For purposes of this agreement, an “embedded” element is a non-military unit assigned to and operating under the rules and auspices of a US military unit. These embedded personnel will reside with and operate from within the security perimeter of the US military unit with which they are embedded and will depend on the US military unit to provide site security.

ANNEX B

COM/CDR USCENTCOM COORDINATION

1. THE COM RECOGNIZES THE CDR USCENTCOM'S NEED FOR UNITY OF MILITARY COMMAND IN COUNTERING INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL THREATS TO A SECURE AND STABLE IRAQ, AND CDR USCENTCOM RECOGNIZES THE COM'S CHARGE TO PROTECT AMERICA'S VITAL INTERESTS AND PROMOTE THE GROWTH OF FREEDOM AND DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS IN IRAQ. TO THIS END, THE COM AND CDR USCENTCOM WILL WORK TOGETHER CLOSELY ON ALL MATTERS RELATED TO THE INTERESTS OF THE US GOVERNMENT, INCLUDING PROVIDING FOR THE SAFETY, SECURITY, AND PROTECTION OF THE US MISSION, THE GREEN ZONE, AND INTERESTS OF THE US GOVERNMENT AT LARGE IN IRAQ.
2. The COM and CDR USCENTCOM shall keep each other up-to-date on all issues affecting security, including force protection condition (FPCON) and threat condition (THREATCON) changes and status. They will ensure that a full exchange of information affecting threat protective measures and threat levels for USG entities in Iraq is coordinated closely to reduce differences in standards of protection. FPCON and THREATCON conditions do not have to be linked.
3. THE SENIOR US MILITARY COMMANDER IN IRAQ WILL BE THE SENIOR MILITARY ADVISOR TO THE COM. HE WILL RECEIVE STRATEGIC DIRECTION FROM CDR USCENTCOM AND TYPICALLY WILL COORDINATE WITH THE COM FOR FORCE PROTECTION OF COM ACTIVITIES. COMMANDERS OF USCENTCOM SUBORDINATE UNITS DEPLOYED TO IRAQ WILL COORDINATE SECURITY MEASURES REGARDING COM ACTIVITIES AND PERSONNEL WITH THE COM, VIA THE CDR USCENTCOM, USDR, AND RSO.
4. The Parties agree that a close working relationship between the COM and CDR USCENTCOM in Iraq will enhance USG ability to coordinate rapidly and respond effectively to a wide range of humanitarian and natural disasters. DOD will support the COM's Emergency Action Plan Committee with representation and survey team support.
5. To facilitate support of DOS, the COM will provide information to CDR USCENTCOM regarding COM activities within Iraq including, but not limited to, needs assessments, plans, policies, and initiatives. The COM will keep CDR USCENTCOM apprised of activities and projects being worked under COM authority within Iraq, including the locations and progress of COM activities.

ANNEX C

GREEN ZONE SECURITY

1. CDR USCENTCOM, IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE COM, WILL PROVIDE FOR THE SAFETY AND SECURITY OF THE GREEN ZONE AND ENSURE PROTECTION OF THE US MISSION IRAQ.
2. SECURITY CAPABILITIES WILL NOT BE DOWNGRADED DURING THE TRANSITION FROM CPA TO COM ACTIVITIES. SECURITY CAPABILITIES WILL BE MAINTAINED AT A LEVEL COMMENSURATE WITH THE THREAT ENVIRONMENT.
3. Prior to July 1, 2004, CDR USCENTCOM, in coordination with DOS DSS, will conduct a security threat assessment of the Green Zone to determine whether any new security requirements should be implemented due to the establishment of the US Mission and transition to Iraqi sovereignty.
4. CDR USCENTCOM will designate an officer to coordinate security within the Green Zone.
5. The designated officer coordinating security within the Green Zone will keep the USDR and RSO apprised of security arrangements for the Green Zone, including the nature of protection of the Green Zone perimeter comprised of the river waterway.
6. The RSO will coordinate fully with the designated officer regarding security of the US Mission within the Green Zone.
7. In providing for security of the Green Zone, the designated officer coordinating Green Zone security shall ensure:
 - A. PROVISION OF SECURITY AT ENTRY CONTROL POINTS;
 - B. COORDINATION OF FIXED SITE SECURITY BY US MILITARY FOR:
 - (1) EMBASSY ANNEX COMPOUND;
 - (2) COM RESIDENCE;
 - (3) CHANCERY/USAID COMPOUND;
 - C. COORDINATION OF FIXED SITE SECURITY FOR:
 - (1) CONVENTION CENTER;
 - (2) AL RASHEED HOTEL;

- D. MAINTENANCE OF FORCE PROTECTION BARRIERS SURROUNDING THE GREEN ZONE;
 - E. EMPLOYMENT OF MOBILE VEHICLE AND CONTAINER INSPECTION SYSTEM (MVACIS);
 - F. OTHER FACILITIES AS AGREED UPON BY THE COM AND CDR USCENTCOM.
8. Fixed site security for the Embassy Annex Compound and the Chancery/USAID Compound will be provided by CDR USCENTCOM as follows:
- a. For the Embassy Annex Compound, a security force will be provided to protect the perimeter of the Embassy Annex Compound. This force will provide access control and will respond to threats to the Compound.
 - b. For the Chancery/USAID Compound, a security force will be provided to protect the perimeter of the Chancery Compound. This force will provide access control and will respond to threats to the Compound.
 - c. These security forces are provided in support of the COM for site security.
 - d. The RSO will define standards and requirements, and provide oral and/or written guidance to the Officer-in-Charge (OIC) or senior officer who will execute the mission.
9. QRF SUPPORT IN THE GREEN ZONE WILL BE PROVIDED BY CDR USCENTCOM (AND DEPLOYED UNDER THE COMMANDER COORDINATING GREEN ZONE SECURITY) TO RESPOND TO EMERGENCIES IN THE GREEN ZONE INCLUDING AUGMENTING FIXED SITE SECURITY AT US MISSION FACILITIES.

ANNEX D

SECURITY OUTSIDE THE GREEN ZONE

1. FIXED SITE SECURITY OUTSIDE THE GREEN ZONE WILL BE PROVIDED BY CDR USCENCOM FOR REGIONAL OFFICES AS FOLLOWS:
 - (A) THE COM WILL COORDINATE WITH CDR USCENCOM IN CONDUCTING SECURITY SURVEYS AND SECURITY THREAT ASSESSMENTS OF FIXED FACILITIES THAT WILL COMPRISE THE "HUB" LOCATIONS OF REGIONAL OFFICES IN MOSUL, KIRKUK, HILLAH, AND BASRA.
 - (B) THE COM'S SENIOR SECURITY REPRESENTATIVE FOR EACH SITE WILL BE A DOS DSS SPECIAL AGENT, AN "ON-SITE RSO." CDR USCENCOM'S SENIOR SECURITY REPRESENTATIVE FOR EACH SITE WILL BE THE OFFICER-IN-CHARGE (OIC) OF THE UNIT PROVIDING SECURITY. THESE INDIVIDUALS WILL COORDINATE ON ALL ASPECTS OF SITE SECURITY AND FORCE PROTECTION.
 - (C) CDR USCENCOM WILL PROVIDE FIXED FACILITY SECURITY AND QRF SUPPORT TO THE FOUR REGIONAL OFFICES PLUS BAGHDAD.
 - (D) DOD PERSONNEL PROVIDING FIXED FACILITY SECURITY AT THESE LOCATIONS WILL BE UNDER THE DIRECT AUTHORITY AND OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF CDR USCENCOM AT ALL TIMES.
 - (1) These security forces are provided in support of the COM for site security.
 - (2) The RSO will define standards and requirements, and provide oral and/or written guidance to the Officer-in-Charge (OIC) or senior officer who will execute the mission.
2. Force protection and QRF support outside fixed sites and outside the Green Zone will be provided by CDR USCENCOM to COM activities to the greatest extent possible, subject to the availability of forces, in accordance with the following protocol:
 - (a) Force protection and QRF support desired for COM activities outside of the Green Zone will be requested by the COM or his RSO, of the CDR USCENCOM or his designated representative.
 - (b) The request will be made detailing:

- 1) The specific geographic area of the COM activity;
 - 2) The number of personnel and nature of the COM activity;
 - 3) Inclusive dates of the COM activity;
 - 4) Names and POC phone numbers for the COM activity;
 - 5) Method of travel utilized by the COM activity.
- (c) For each activity requested, CDR USCENCOM will consider force availability and provide to the greatest extent possible force protection and QRF designation for the requested activity.
- (d) When providing force protection to COM activities outside of the Green Zone, CDR USCENCOM will promulgate force protection regulations to all involved parties. COM personnel traveling under CDR USCENCOM force protection shall follow all applicable security rules and regulations of the unit under whose force protection they are traveling.
- (e) When providing QRF designation to the COM or his RSO, CDR USCENCOM shall provide expected response time for the QRF and the communications circuits (primary and secondary) that will be monitored by the QRF. The COM or his RSO will be responsible for promulgating the response time and communication circuits to be monitored to appropriate parties of the subject COM activity.
- (f) Should force protection and/or QRF designation for a given COM activity not be possible at the time of the request due to other military commitments, CDR USCENCOM or his designated representative shall so inform the COM or his RSO. CDR USCENCOM shall provide a "best estimate" alternative regarding the timeframe within which force protection and/or QRF assets may be made available at some future time.
- (g) When notified of the non-availability of force protection and/or QRF assets, the COM or DCM will consider the "best estimate" timeframe provided by the CDR USCENCOM. The COM or DCM will then decide, taking full responsibility, to proceed with the activity without force protection and/or QRF asset availability, or delay the activity until such time as the CDR USCENCOM can support the activity. Upon reaching the "best estimate" timeframe, the COM or DCM will again request force protection and/or QRF designation from CDR USCENCOM or his designated representative in accordance with the previously established protocol.
- (h) All forces providing force protection countrywide will remain OPCON to CDR USCENCOM at all times.

(i) Upon the development of an emergent security situation:

- 1) If force protection assets assigned to the COM activity outside of the Green Zone are needed for other military commitments, CDR USCENCOM will provide notification to the COM at the earliest possible time and make arrangements to ensure the safe withdrawal of the Regional Team, unless the COM advises CDR USCENCOM that the specified force protection assets are not required.
- 2) If QRF assets designated for a COM activity outside of the Green Zone are needed for other military commitments, CDR USCENCOM will provide notification to the COM or RSO at the earliest possible time and make every effort to arrange for another force to be assigned QRF designation.

(j) This protocol shall be updated semi-annually and modified as the security situation dictates.

3. COM personnel under the immediate security responsibility of CDR USCENCOM will coordinate activities or missions conducted pursuant to this MOA with CDR USCENCOM in advance of planned travel.
4. COM personnel will not proceed to any location outside the Green Zone pursuant to this MOA without having received prior approval for travel from both the COM and CDR USCENCOM, regardless of mode of transport or under whose authority transportation is acquired.
5. All local movements of COM personnel embedded within USCENCOM subordinate units will be coordinated in advance with CDR USCENCOM. The COM agrees that COM personnel will comply with any and all restrictions on movements or travel imposed upon USCENCOM personnel, including convoy requirements, curfews, and no-travel zones, unless specifically exempted from such requirement by CDR USCENCOM.

6. Transportation

- a. The COM will submit all requests for transportation support in accordance with locally established procedures.
- b. COM personnel, while embedded within a USCENCOM element, will be provided with transportation by the unit providing support. CDR USCENCOM will provide ground transportation in support of the COM's activity to the maximum extent possible, but retains final say in the method and availability of the transportation.

- c. To the extent it is consistent with reference 2.a and this agreement, use of military transportation will be in accordance with references 2.c, 2.d and 2.e, and any other applicable regulations, directives and instructions.

ANNEX E

PERSONAL SECURITY DETACHMENT (PSD) SECURITY

1. The overall mission to provide personal security will be staffed by DOS DSS agents and security contractors, and assisted by DOD PSD and other DOD force protection assets.
2. All requests for PSD details to provide personal security (including the Ambassador's detail, DOS personnel, USAID personnel, ministry advisors, and any other activity under COM authority) will be made to the RSO.
3. The US Embassy will:
 - a. Prioritize the requests;
 - b. Notify the Protective Service Unit (PSU) of upcoming PSD commitments and requirements.
4. DOD will staff the overall Officer-in-Charge (OIC) of the personal security detail for DOD PSD assets. DOS will staff the overall OIC of the personal security detail for COM PSD assets.
5. DOS DSS will provide an Agent-in-Charge and DOD will provide a senior DOD representative to assist the OIC in coordinating personal security operations.
6. All personnel involved in a scheduled PSD detail will assemble for a pre-brief at a time and location specified by the RSO.
7. The RSO will provide a pre-brief to the OIC before each detail.
8. Encrypted radios and communication gear used by DOS will be provided to DOD vehicles. DOS will also provide training on use of radios and communications gear to DOD users. DOD will provide capability to call in QRF support if necessary. Should an attack upon the personal security detail occur, both tail and lead vehicles will report the attack using both DOD and DOS communications circuits designated in the pre-brief.
9. DOS will provide blue force tracking capability to be installed in motorcade vehicles as soon as available.
10. DOD PSD operations of PSU
 - a. The US Army Criminal Investigation Command (CID) will continue to be the Executive Agency for DOD PSD assets deployed in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom and during the interagency transition from CPA to US Mission

Iraq. The DOD PSU is a multi-service mission, composed of assets consisting of CID, the Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI), and Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS).

- b. The mission of DOD PSD assets is to provide close-in personal security for designated high-level principals as outlined in this Annex. Specifically, DOD PSD assets have the responsibility to plan, coordinate, supervise and execute protective service operations, including threat assessments, on-site advance security plans for all locations to be visited, motorcade security, route security and close-in protection for the principal, in a manner that ensures his or her safety against assassination, kidnapping, injury and embarrassment.
 - c. DOD PSD will continue to provide personal security operational support within their operational and organic capabilities, to the COM and RSO for the following high-level dignitaries and personnel (hereinafter referred to as Principals): US Mission Tier II Level Principals, including assigned and TDY DOS Principals of Ambassadorial title or the equivalent; US Government cabinet-level officials; visiting US Congressional Delegation (CODEL); and support whenever possible to DOD-designated visiting Principals.
 - d. DOD PSD assets will retain operational control of their personnel and equipment. They will remain as an autonomous detachment reporting through their own established chain of command and performing personal security operations in accordance with their own regulations, standard operating procedures (SOP), and training guidelines.
 - e. DOD PSD assets will not be co-mingled with private contracted security firms and DOS DSS personnel for the purpose of executing tasked personal security operations, nor will DOD PSD assets be required to train them on methods of operations.
 - f. DOD PSD assets will retain their level of authority to decline requests/demands that are outside of this MOA/Annex and their respective rules and regulations, or that exceed their level of ability to support. In these cases, the PSU will so inform the RSO of the declination (and reason of declination) at the earliest possible opportunity.
11. In extraordinary circumstances, DOS may request that DOD PSD details provide security for parties other than those listed in para. 10.c above. PSD in these circumstances will be provided only as mutually agreed upon by both the COM and CDR USCENTCOM.
12. In Baghdad, DOD will continue to provide up-armored HMMWV support at current levels to PSD operations. Upon request, and dependent upon force availability, DOD may provide aerial and/or vehicular route reconnaissance assets.

ANNEX F

COMMAND AND CONTROL/INTELLIGENCE SHARING

1. COM and CDR USCENTCOM personnel will freely exchange past and future assessments and evaluations of an unclassified nature conducted at locations within Iraq. The RSO US Embassy and CDR USCENTCOM may share classified assessments as they deem appropriate. All information regarding threats to US persons, facilities, and interests will be shared immediately between the COM and CDR USCENTCOM.
2. The COM and CDR USCENTCOM will coordinate on matters of security throughout Iraq. The US Mission Operations Center (MOC) in the Embassy Annex Compound in Baghdad will coordinate on matters of security with MNF-I headquarters at Camp Victory, Baghdad.
 - a. The MOC will be linked electronically with the MNF-I operations center at Camp Victory to provide the COM and CDR USCENTCOM with a common awareness and understanding of threats, operations, and activities throughout Iraq.
 - b. CDR USCENTCOM will provide full-time US military liaison participation in the MOC.
3. DOS DSS will provide one special agent and five intelligence analysts to support activity of the DOD intelligence fusion cell at MNF-I headquarters.
4. Coordination shall be conducted in concert with multinational partners, in accordance with applicable security classification regulations and foreign disclosure determinations, when jointly agreed upon by DOD and DOS, to achieve efficiency of operations.

MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT
BETWEEN
COMMANDER, US CENTRAL COMMAND
AND
CHIEF OF MISSION, US MISSION IRAQ
REGARDING SECURITY RESPONSIBILITY

Pursuant to the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), dated 16 December 1997, signed by the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense, the Chief of Mission (COM) of the US Mission Iraq, and Commander, US Central Command (CDR USCENTCOM), exercising the respective authority of the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense, hereby agree to the following provisions for implementing the MOU in Iraq. This agreement will be reviewed as required.

1. Chief of Mission Responsibility

The COM shall have security responsibility for the Department of Defense (DOD) elements and personnel (including dependents at such time as they are authorized) identified in Annex A. These DOD elements and personnel include those specified in MOU Section III.D. (1) - (3), and those that the COM and CDR USCENTCOM agree shall be under COM security responsibility pursuant to MOU Section III.D. (5). These elements and personnel will be integrated with all other agencies represented at the Mission with regard to security briefings, personnel identification programs, residential surveys and the Embassy Emergency Action Plan. The Regional Security Officer (RSO) remains the COM's point of contact in dealing with security issues.

2. Combatant Commander Responsibility

CDR USCENTCOM shall have security responsibility for all other DOD elements and personnel (Annex B) except those specifically enumerated in Annex A. The US Defense Representative (USDR) will remain the point of contact for the COM in coordinating security matters for all DOD elements and personnel identified in Annex A. CDR USCENTCOM agrees to designate a POC for all antiterrorism and force protection (AT/FP) matters in Iraq. Likewise, the USDR will coordinate all COM security issues with the RSO and a CDR USCENTCOM-designated officer as well as with other appropriate commanders. Commanders of USCENTCOM subordinate units deployed to Iraq will coordinate security responsibility issues with the COM, via USCENTCOM, the USDR and RSO.

3. Temporary Duty Personnel

Security for DOD personnel on temporary duty to Iraq will generally be the responsibility of CDR USCENTCOM. However, those military and civilian personnel assigned on temporary duty to Iraq in support of an element under the COM, listed in Annex A (and, when authorized, their dependents), shall be the security responsibility of the COM. DOD personnel assigned on temporary duty in

support of an element, listed in Annex B (and, when authorized, their dependents), shall be the security responsibility of CDR USCENTCOM. The country clearance and temporary duty orders will specify the authority responsible for security.

4. Emergency Action Committee (EAC)

The EAC has primary responsibility for evaluating information pertaining to the security of Americans. The EAC also recommends DOS threat levels. It includes the USDR and may include participants from each CDR USCENTCOM component with military forces in Iraq, as appropriate.

5. Host Nation Coordination

The COM will continue to have the primary responsibility for contact and coordination with the Government of Iraq regarding security issues, except as provided by National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 36. CDR USCENTCOM will continue to conduct military-to-military contacts.

6. COM/CDR USCENTCOM Coordination

The COM and CDR USCENTCOM shall, in accordance with the MOU, continue to keep each other currently informed on all issues affecting security, including force protection condition (FPCON) and threat condition (THREATCON) status. They will ensure that a full exchange of information affecting threat protective measures and threat levels for USG entities in Iraq is coordinated closely to reduce differences in standards of protection.

7. The following Annexes are included and made part of this MOA:

ANNEX A DOD ELEMENTS AND PERSONNEL UNDER THE SECURITY RESPONSIBILITY OF THE CHIEF OF MISSION

ANNEX B DOD ELEMENTS AND PERSONNEL UNDER THE SECURITY RESPONSIBILITY OF THE COMBATANT COMMANDER

ANNEX C SECURITY OF NON-DOD PERSONNEL

Signed:

Signed:

Chief of Mission-Designate
US Mission Iraq

Commander
United States Central Command

ANNEX A

DOD ELEMENTS AND PERSONNEL UNDER THE SECURITY RESPONSIBILITY OF THE CHIEF OF MISSION

1. Marine Security Guard Detachment.
2. The following DOD personnel detailed to other USG departments or agencies.
 - a. Iraq Reconstruction and Management Office as advisors to Iraqi Ministries.
 - b. US Mission Strategic Communications (STRATCOM)/Public Affairs organization.
 - c. Other related organizations listed in approved Joint Manning Documents.
3. DOD elements and personnel of the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) in-country under the provisions of NSDD-38, Staffing at Diplomatic Missions and their Overseas Constituent Posts (June 8, 82).
4. Project and Contracting Office.
5. Iraqi Reconstruction Office of the Inspector General.
6. DOD temporary duty (TDY) personnel assigned in support of an element under COM authority (and, when authorized, their dependents) whose country clearance and deployment TDY orders specify the COM as responsible for security.
7. US Army Corps of Engineers in support of USAID or other US Mission elements.
8. DOD legal personnel working in the Office of the Legal Adviser, US Mission.
9. Other DOD personnel as jointly agreed upon by the COM and USCENCOM.

ANNEX B

DOD ELEMENTS AND PERSONNEL UNDER THE SECURITY RESPONSIBILITY OF THE COMBATANT COMMANDER

1. USCENTCOM-assigned forces, except as specified in Annex A.
2. Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA).
3. All other DOD elements and personnel except those specifically enumerated in Annex A.
4. While present at a US Mission facility, DOD personnel will comply with all relevant security guidance and procedures, including but not limited to screening of visitors and vehicles, vetting of employees, protection of classified information (taking into account established DOD policies), emergency procedures, and COM weapons policies as locally coordinated.

ANNEX C

SECURITY OF NON-DOD USG PERSONNEL

1. CDR USCENTCOM will be responsible for the provision of security to non-DOD USG personnel during periods while operating or embedded with operational forces to the same level as that provided to those operational forces. This will include:
 - a. COM personnel including DOS Foreign Service personnel and/or Political Advisors and other agency personnel embedded in US major subordinate command headquarters elements;
 - b. DOS DSS special agents and intelligence specialists supporting an intelligence fusion cell at MNF-I headquarters (Camp Victory);
 - c. Non-DOD USG personnel working in support of the Office of Security Transition as jointly agreed between the COM and CDR USCENTCOM;
 - d. Other USG personnel as jointly agreed upon by COM and CDR USCENTCOM.
2. General Safety and Security
 - a. COM personnel will comply with US military safety and force protection guidelines briefed upon their initial arrival at USCENTCOM facilities or organizations.
 - b. While present at a USCENTCOM facility, COM personnel will comply with all guidance and direction provided by CDR USCENTCOM or the Officer-in-Charge (OIC) on all matters related to security. The determination of which matters fall within the scope of this provision is solely at the discretion of the units' commanders or OICs, or in their absence the senior military officer present. Personnel under COM authority on USCENTCOM facilities are not authorized to carry weapons except as agreed upon by the COM and CDR USCENTCOM.
 - c. USCENTCOM organizations will incorporate embedded COM personnel into established evacuation plans.
 - d. COM personnel on USCENTCOM facilities will hold an appropriate security clearance or employment verification check. Verification of the security clearance or employment verification check will be provided to USCENTCOM.
 - e. All local movements of COM personnel, embedded in USCENTCOM organizations under this MOA, will be coordinated beforehand with CDR USCENTCOM. Such COM personnel will be permitted to move as needed in support of their mission, in accordance with USCENTCOM procedures. COM agrees that these COM personnel will comply with any and all restrictions on

movements or travel imposed upon USCENTCOM personnel, including convoy requirements, curfews, and no-travel zones, unless specifically exempted from such requirement by CDR USCENTCOM or the OIC.

Glossary of Terms

A/LM/AQM: Bureau of Administration/Office of Logistics Management/Office of Acquisitions
(DOS)

AAFES: Army Air Force Exchange Service

ACSA: Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreements

AE: Aeromedical evacuation

AIS: Automated information system

AOR: Area of responsibility

AQ: Al Qaeda

ASBPO: Armed Services Blood Program Office

ASC: Acquisition Support Command

ASG: Area Support Group

AST: Area Support Team

AT: Antiterrorism

BASOPS: Base operations support

BSB: Base Support Battalion

C2: Command and Control

C4I: Command, control, communications and computer information

CAA: Controlled Access Area

CCCI: Central Criminal Court of Iraq

CDR: Commander

CEFMS: Corps of Engineers Financial Management System

CFLCC: Combined Forces Land Component Command

CFO: Chief Financial Officer

CG: Commanding General

CID: Criminal Investigation Division

CIO: Chief Information Officer

CJTF-7: Combined/Coalition Joint Task Force 7

CLO: Community Liaison Office / Officer (US Mission)

CMATT: Coalition Military Advisory Training Team

CMR: Chief of Mission Residence

CODEL: Congressional Delegation

COG: Center of gravity

COM: Chief of Mission

CONUS: Continental United States

COOP: Continuity of operations plan

CPA: Coalition Provisional Authority

CPATT: Coalition Police Advisory Training Team

CPA-IG: CPA Inspector General (transitions to IR-IG)

CPATT: Civilian Police Advisory Training Team

CPI: Commission on Public Integrity

CPIC: Coalition Press Information Center
CSH: Combat support hospital
CSO: Communications Support Office
CSR: Commander's Situation Room (also termed the JOC FWD; transitions to the MOC)

DA: Department of the Army
DBE: Department of Border Enforcement (GOI)
DCG: Deputy Commanding General
DCM: Deputy Chief of Mission
DCMA: Defense Contract Management Agency
DFAS: Defense Finance and Accounting Service
DFI: Development Fund Iraq
DFID: Department for International Development (UK)
DHS: Department of Homeland Security
DISA: Defense Information Systems Agency
DO: Disbursing Officer
DOD: Department of Defense
DOIM: Director of Information Management
DOJ: Department of Justice
DOS: Department of State
DOT: Department of the Treasury & Department of Transportation
DS: Direct support
DS: Diplomatic Security (DOS)
DS/ATA: Diplomatic Security Office of Antiterrorism Assistance (DOS)
DSS: Diplomatic Security Service

EA: Executive Agent
EAP: Executive Action Plan
ELTP: Executive Level Transition Panel (CIOs with Iraq responsibility)

FAR: Federal Acquisitions Regulation
FF: Foreign fighters
FHP: Force health protection
FOC: Full operational capability
FP: Force Protection
FPS: Facilities Protection Service (GOI)
FRE: Former regime elements
FSN: Foreign Service national (see also LES)
FSO: Foreign Service officer
FY: Fiscal year

GC-M: Office of the General Counsel, US Mission
GCC: Gulf Cooperation Council
GIS: Global Information System

GOI: Government of Iraq
GOIC: Government of Iraq Center
GRD: Gulf Regional Division, USACE
GS: General support
GSO: General Service Office / Officer (US Mission)
GST: Governorate Support Teams, also termed GT
GT: Governorate Teams, also termed GST
GWOT: Global War on Terrorism

HCA: Head of Contract Authority
HN: Host nation
HSLs: Health service logistics support
HSS: Health service support

IA: Individual augmentee
IAF: Iraqi Armed Forces
IAMB: International Audit Management Board
IAW: In accordance with
ICASS: International cooperative administrative support services
ICC: International Civilian Consultants
ICDC: Iraqi Civil Defense Corps
ICDF: Iraqi Coastal Defense Force
ICITAP: International Criminal Investigative training Assistance Program
ICMC: Iraqi Communications and Media Commission
ICT: Information and communications technology
IED: Improvised explosive device
IER: International Evacuation Report
IG: Inspector General
IIG: Interim Iraqi Government
IIS: Iraqi Intelligence Service (former regime)
IMO: Information management officer (DOS)
INL: Bureau of International Narcotics & Law Enforcement (DOS)
INTF: Iraqi National Task Force
IOC: Initial or Interim operational capability
IPAO: Iraq Provincial Action Officer
IPS: Iraqi Police Service
IR-IG: Iraq Reconstruction Inspector General (successor to CPA-IG)
IRDC: Iraqi Reconstruction and Development Council
IRM: Bureau of Information Resource Management (DOS)
IRMO: Iraq Reconstruction Management Office
IRRF: Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund
ISF: Iraqi Security Forces
ISG: Iraqi Survey Group
IST: Iraqi Special Tribunal

IT: Information technology
ITO: Iraqi Theater of Operations
ITPC: Iraq Telegraph and Post Company
ITPT: Interagency Transition Planning Team

JBPO: Joint Blood Program Office
JCC: Joint Coordination Center
JIACG: Joint Interagency Coordination Group
JOC FWD: MNF-I Joint Operations Center Forward (transitions to the MOC)
JPMRC: Joint Patient Movement Requirements Center
JSLET: Joint Service Law Enforcement Team
JTR: Joint Travel Regulation

KBR: Kellogg Brown Root

LCH: Local civilian hire
LNO: Liaison officer
LOGCAP: Logistics Civil Augmentation Program
LES: Locally employed staff (See also FSN)

MEPP: Middle East Peace Process
MJOC: US Mission Iraq Joint Operations Center
MND: Multinational division
MNF-I: Multi-National Force-Iraq
MOA: Memorandum of agreement
MOC: Ministry of Communications (GOI)
MOC: US Mission Operations Center
MOD: Ministry of Defense (GOI)
MOU: Memorandum of understanding
MPATT: Mission Police Advisory Team (DOS)
MPP: Mission Program Plan/ Mission Performance Plan
MSG: Military Support Group
MTF: Medical treatment facility
MWR: Morale and welfare

NEA-I: Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, Office of Iraqi Affairs (DOS)
NETOPS: Network status monitoring and operations
NGO: Non-governmental organization
NLT: No later than
NSC: National Security Council
NSDD: National Security Decision Directive
NSPD: National Security Presidential Directive

OASA (I & E): Office of the Assistance Secretary of the Army for Installations & Environment

OBE: Overcome by events
OGC: Office of General Counsel
OIF: Operation Iraqi Freedom
OMB: Office of Management and Budget
OPCON: Operational control
OPDAT: Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance and Training Program
ORHA: Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance
OST: Office of Security Transition

PAO: Public Affairs Office
PCO: Project and Contracting Office (successor to PMO)
PMO: Program Management Office (transitions to PCO)
POM: Program Objective Memorandum
POLADS: Political advisors
PPE: Personal protective equipment
PSD: Personal security detail
PSYOP: Psychological operations
PT: Provincial Team

QRF: Quick reaction force

RCL: Regime Crimes Liaison
RCLO: Regime Crimes Liaison Office
RMWG: Resource Management Working Group (Interagency Iraq WG)
RSCO: Regional Security Coordination Office (CPA)
ROE: Rules of Engagement
ROF: Rules of Force (rules for use of force)
ROM: Rough order of magnitude
RPG: Rocket Propelled Grenade
RRB: Requirements Review Board
RSO: Regional Security Office / Officer
RT: Regional Teams (successor to GSTs)

SAALT: Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics
SAM: Surface-to-air missile
SIMLM: Single Integrated Medical Logistics Manager
SJA: Staff Judge Advocate
SOFA: Status of Forces Agreement
SPS: Standard Procurement System
SRG: Special Republican Guard (former regime)
SSG: Senior Steering Group (for ICT Iraq)
SSO: Special Security Organization (former regime)
STRATCOM: Office of Strategic Communications (CPA, transitions to the PAO)

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TAL: Transitional Administrative Law
TCN: Third Country National
TO: Task order
TPMRC: Theater Patient Movement Requirements Center
TRANSCOM: Transportation Command
TRAC2ES: TRANSCOM Regulation and Command & Control Evacuation System

UK: United Kingdom
UIC: Unit Identification Code
UNSCR: United Nations Security Council Resolution
USA: US Army
USACE: US Army Corps of Engineers
USAID: US Agency for International Development
USC: United States Code
USCENTCOM: US Central Command
USG: United States Government
USMHU: US Mission Health Unit
USMS: US Marshals Service

VBIED: Vehicle-borne improvised explosive devise

GLOSSARY-6
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ANNEX A

FACILITIES MANAGEMENT SUPPORT

1. Type of Support Being Provided:

Support under this Annex will be provided by both DOD and DOS and will evolve as a sufficiently permissive security environment and political stability allows the Government of Iraq to assume greater control and also allows the US Mission Iraq to operate in a manner similar to that of other US Missions worldwide.

2. Support Providers:

DOD: USCENTCOM through the Area Support Group (ASG) is the provider.

DOS: US Mission Iraq through Embassy Management Section is the provider.

3. Details of Intended Support:

DOD

- a. Coordination of administration of real property:
 - DOD will provide overall coordination of administration of real property, as coordinated with each agency responsible for individual properties.
 - Currently, five properties are assigned to the US Mission Iraq under DOS control - Chancery and USAID Compound, Embassy Annex Compound, COM Residence, site for the New Embassy Compound, and one other site to be designated and agreed upon by the COM and CDR USCENTCOM.
 - DOD will vacate the New Embassy Compound site upon notification by DOS and coordination with CDR USCENTCOM.
 - ASG-recommended assignments of property within the GZ shall be coordinated with and approved by the COM.
 - Current and future US diplomatic and consular property will be administered and controlled by the US Mission.
- b. DOD will provide the US Mission essential facility support on a priority basis. This would include services provided and/or facilitated by the ASG (e.g., power, water, sewer, fire protection, drainage, waste management, hazardous materials (hazmat)/environmental services, and topographic), as well as services provided by the ASG or other DOD organizations (e.g., construction design, environmental engineering, force protection barriers, and parking lots).

DOS

- a. For DOD units, elements, personnel and contractors collocated with the US Mission, whether or not under COM authority, Embassy Baghdad provides facilities (housing, office space, and related equipment and services) as agreed between the COM and the relevant military commander.

- b. Embassy Baghdad conducts liaison with the ASG for the purpose of providing guidance on issues related to the political conditions in the country and potential diplomatic ramifications of ASG actions.

ANNEX B

CONTRACTING SUPPORT

1. Type of Support Being Provided:

- a. Support to US Mission in Iraq: Contracting support as requested to supplement DOS and other agency contracting support in order to meet internal US Mission requirements. Agencies within the US Mission may appoint contracting officers to carry out operational and program contracts.

2. Support Providers:

- a. The Department of the Army (DA) will continue to provide a Head of Contracting Activity (HCA) and Principal Assistant Responsible for Contracting (PARC) in Baghdad after June 30, 2004. The Army Acquisition Executive (AAE) will also coordinate with the COM to provide contracting officers, contract specialists and other contracting support personnel (e.g., cost and price analysts and schedulers) to staff the office of the PARC at a level commensurate with evolving requirements. The office of the PARC will interface with DOS/Embassy for the generation of requirements and information vital to the maintenance and support of the contracting effort needed.

3. References:

- a. Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum: "Organizational Establishment and Placement of the Project and Contracting Office (PCO) within the Department of the Army" (June 2004)
- b. Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR)
- c. Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS)
- d. Army Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (AFARS)
- e. US Corps of Engineers Interagency Support Agreement #GRD/PMO 001

4. Details of Intended Support:

- a. Before July 1, 2004 (Phases 1 and 2): The Project and Contracting Office (PCO)/DA will inform DOS Procurement Executive before awarding any new acquisitions falling under Chief of Mission responsibility with performance periods extending beyond June 30, 2004 unless DOD will be administering and responsible for such acquisitions until they expire or are terminated. DOD shall notify DOS regarding any expiring acquisitions with sufficient acquisition lead time to facilitate any follow-on acquisition required. DOD shall provide to DOS and maintain a list of acquisitions in place or planned for Iraq reconstruction upon request.
- b. July 1, 2004 and after (Phases 3, 4 and 5): The PCO/DA will coordinate and provide acquisition support for requirements of US Mission Iraq, as requested. The support will be provided in Iraq where needed or from outside Iraq where feasible.

- c. The PCO/DA will not transfer any acquisitions to DOS without documented agreement from the DOS Procurement Executive. This authority may be delegated to DOS's Head of the Contracting Activity (HCA), Director of the Office of Acquisitions Management (A/LM/AQM).
- d. The DA will coordinate oversight for the acquisition support provided by DA to DOS through established DA acquisition channels.
- e. DOS/US Mission will make requests under this MOA for acquisition support through the Chief of Mission or designee. Under such acquisitions, a DOS representative may be designated as a contracting officer's representative, as needed.
- f. The DA, through the HCA and the State HCA, shall act to resolve all issues that arise concerning operational support. Issues that prove to be irresolvable at that level will be forwarded to the AAE and State Procurement Executive for resolution, or if that fails, to higher authorities within DOD and DOS as appropriate.

ANNEX C

MEDICAL SUPPORT

1. Type of Support Being Provided:

The purpose of this Annex is to establish between DOS and DOD the levels and types of medical care support services to be provided to eligible USG employees working under COM authority and USG-funded contractor personnel (who are US nationals) in Iraq. Health Service Support (HSS) covered by this agreement, as described below, will include both primary care and those aspects of HSS above primary care, including hospitalization, surgery, ancillary care support (e.g., pharmacy, laboratory, diagnostic, and associated services and procedures), and patient movement. DOD support under this Annex is subject to limitations of space and capability.

2. Support Recipients:

Section 904 of the Foreign Service Act authorizes DOS to provide medical care to "members of the Service, and (when incident to service abroad) other designated eligible Government employees, and members of the families of such members and employees," which would include US national USG employees and other designated eligible USG employees working under COM authority at the US Mission in Iraq. All other individuals present in Iraq are not eligible for primary medical care under the authority of the DOS Medical Program. DOD will provide HSS above primary care level to all eligible USG employees and USG-funded contractor personnel (who are US nationals) in Iraq. DOD will also provide certain emergency care service as described below to other US citizens, third country nationals and host country nationals.

3. Support Providers:

DOD, USCENTCOM, and DOS.

4. References:

- a. Foreign Service Act of 1980 (22 U.S.C. 3901 et seq. as amended)
- b. State Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (22 U.S.C. 2651a et seq., as amended)
- c. DOD Directive 1404.10, "Emergency-Essential (E-E) DOD US Citizen Civilian Employees"
- d. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 12 August 12, 1949
- e. Joint Pub 4-0, April 6, 2000, "Doctrine for Logistics Support in Joint Operations"
- f. Joint Pub 4-02, July 30, 2001, "Doctrine for Health Service Support in Joint Operations"
- g. Joint Pub 4-02.1, October 6, 1997, "JTTP for Health Service Logistics in Joint Operations"
- h. Joint Pub 4-02.2, December 30, 1996, "JTTP for Patient Movement in Joint Operations"
- i. DOD Regulation 4515.13R, "Air Transportation Eligibility," November 1994
- j. DODI 6000.11, "Patient Movement System," September 9, 1998

5. Details of Intended Support:

a. Concept of Support.

The Secretary of State (DOS) utilizing his authority provided by the Foreign Service Act of 1980 (22 U.S.C. 3901 *et seq.*), as amended, will establish primary health care services for US national USG employees and other designated eligible USG employees working under COM authority at the U.S. Mission in Iraq.

The Secretary of Defense (DOD) has established conditions and theater deployment health standards to deploy healthy and fit personnel; employ an early forward, responsive Force Health Protection and disease surveillance system; achieve situational awareness; clear the battlefield of casualties; stabilize patients using forward surgical teams; and move patients rearward for hospitalization or return to duty. DOD/USCENTCOM will continue to provide Health Service Support (HSS) to all DOD supported personnel according to the standards already established and in place.

DOD/USCENTCOM will coordinate with DOS to provide HSS for US national USG employees and other designated eligible USG employees working under COM Authority at the US Mission in Iraq. DOS will establish the US Mission Health Unit to provide Primary Care support services to US national USG employees and other designated eligible USG employees working under COM authority at the US Mission in Iraq.

As specified by National Security Presidential Directive-36, May 11, 2004, Subject: US Government Operations in Iraq, and the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense and for the Reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan, P.L. 108-106, services or other support provided by DOD to DOS shall be provided on a non-reimbursable basis.

6. Transition:

At the time DOS establishes the US Mission, DOS will assume responsibility for the provision of primary care medical support to US national employees and other designated eligible USG employees working under the COM. Should space requested for the US Mission Health Unit not be completed at the time of the transition, DOS and DOD/USCENTCOM will agree on an interim arrangement whereby the US Mission medical staff can provide primary and ambulatory care to its personnel at the closest DOD/USCENTCOM Level III medical treatment facility (MTF). Additionally, DOS will be responsible for contacting DOD counterparts to arrange/coordinate ancillary care support requirements (defined as those tests, procedures, and services ordered by healthcare providers to assist in patient diagnosis and/or treatment, e.g., radiology, laboratory, pathology, pharmacy, etc.) needed for US national employees and other designated eligible Government employees working under COM authority, as long as DOD assets remain available in Iraq.

7. Hospitalization:

Level III MTFs will be available for hospitalization and care of all US national USG employees and other designated eligible USG employees working under COM authority, and USG-funded contractor personnel (who are US nationals) in Iraq.

Hospitalization will be limited to stabilization and short-term medical treatment with an emphasis on returning patients to a full-duty status. Patients who will require additional treatment or those whose condition(s) preclude a rapid return to duty will be placed in the Aeromedical Evacuation (AE) system.

If US national USG employees and other designated eligible USG employees working under COM authority are hospitalized in US or Coalition MTFs, the US Mission in coordination with the USCENTCOM, will provide administrative support, including: facilitating patient movement requirements; utilize US Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) Regulating and Command and Control Evacuation System (TRAC2ES) to track patients while in the DOD evacuation system and support mechanisms to provide visibility on patient location and status; and providing other administrative support functions (e.g., finance, communications outside the MTF, personal support functions, etc.).

HSS and patient movement resources for US national USG employees and other designated eligible USG employees under COM will be accessed by DOS utilizing the Regional US resources (military bases and/or US embassies) and/or Host Nation (HN) facilities in such countries as Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Bahrain, and Qatar, if these are unavailable in Iraq.

If US national USG employees and other designated eligible USG employees working under COM authority are hospitalized in Iraq or in regional Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) State hospitals, the US Mission will be responsible for providing the same level of administrative support enumerated above.

8. Patient Movement:

Casualties in Iraq will be evacuated using available modes of transportation, including ground, dedicated rotary-wing aircraft, opportune rotary-wing aircraft, and fixed-wing aircraft. Evacuation of patients out of Iraq will be made by fixed-wing assets available to support the patient movement mission. For planning purposes, evacuation directly from Iraq to CONUS can be made when strategic lift resources are available. The Joint Patient Movement Requirements Center (JPMRC) will coordinate movement of patients within Iraq; JPMRC will coordinate with the Theater Patient Movement Requirements Center (TPMRC) for movement of patients out of Iraq. TRAC2ES is the automated information system (AIS) for patient movement and tracking that will be used by all Level III MTFs and the JPMRC.

DOD will continue to provide AE under this Annex at both the tactical and strategic-level when requested/required, as long as it does not interfere with the DOD mission or whenever it is considered emergent or lifesaving.

Commercial lift may be used to support patient movement requirements when it is considered expedient to the movement mission or at such time that DOD lift resources cannot be secured or the patient movement requirements do not fit the aforementioned parameters.

DOS is responsible for coordinating with USCENTCOM for all patient movement of US national USG employees and other designated eligible USG employees working under COM authority. USCENTCOM will continue to regulate movement of these personnel between MTFs in Iraq until such time as the US Mission can establish support for their own personnel.

9. Host Nation Support:

Because of the difference in medical standards between the US and Iraq, Host Nation Support (HNS) for direct medical care and supplies will be considered only when those facilities/supplies meet US standards of care.

The Iraqi Medical and Public Health infrastructure has been severely strained by the effects of the war and civil unrest. Setting aside the physical degradation of the Iraqi medical facilities, it is now and will continue to be difficult for Iraq to provide adequate medical support to its indigenous population. Therefore, at least for the near-term future, US national USG employees and other designated eligible USG employees working under COM authority will not rely on HNS for the provision of medical care.

As the recovery matures, and the Iraqi Public Health and Medical infrastructure is deemed to be sufficiently capable, the US Mission may deem it acceptable to seek HN medical support at medical facilities determined to be sufficiently near US standards of care.

10. Other Health Service Support:

Mass Casualties. The US Mission will ensure that a mass casualty plan is developed and coordinated with DOD / USCENTCOM.

Joint Blood Program. The USCENTCOM Joint Blood Program (JBP) is a Theater-wide system for the receipt, storage and distribution of blood and blood products managed by the Joint Blood Program Office (JBPO). The USCENTCOM JBPO manages Theater blood resources and procures additional blood resources from CONUS via the Armed Services Blood program Office (ASBPO).

Blood re-supply will be with packed red cells. There is no frozen blood pre-positioned in Theater.

DOD/USCENTCOM will continue to utilize the established Theater JBP. US national USG employees and other designated eligible USG employees working under COM authority will have access to JBP blood program resources if admitted to USCENTCOM Theater Level III MTFs. Since the US Mission Medical Unit will only be providing primary care medical support to its personnel, blood supply will not be resourced to those units.

Force Health Protection. DOD Force Health Protection (FHP) guidance is available from the USCENTCOM Surgeon's Office. USG deploying personnel to Iraq should institute effective elements of FHP measures and health surveillance programs to prevent disease and injury. These programs are integral to pre-deployment, deployment, and post-deployment operations. Health and environmental threat estimates are also available from the USCENTCOM Surgeon's Medical Intelligence Estimate of Iraq, and should be consulted prior to deployment to ensure adequate training and countermeasures are in-place.

Theater Evacuation Policy. There will be no stated Theater Evacuation Policy for USG personnel employed in Iraq. However, when patient care requirements exceed available medical resources, the decision to move patients out of Iraq will be made as soon as lift is made available and the patient's medical condition permits.

Dental Services. Dental care will be limited to treatment necessary to relieve suffering and alleviate impairment of an individual's ability to perform assigned missions adequately. US national USG employees and other designated eligible USG employees working under COM authority requiring dental services will access DOD/USCENTCOM resources for treatment. Since the US Mission Medical Unit will only be providing primary care medical support to its personnel, dental services will not be organically available in the US Mission Health Unit. Once DOD/USCENTCOM has transitioned out-of-theater, emergency dental care will have to be accessed either outside of Iraq at the nearest DOD location, or through HN dental providers deemed to be within an adequate standard of care.

11. Tasks:

DOD

While deployed to Iraq, provide HSS to US national USG employees and other designated eligible USG employees working under COM authority.

Provide medical and pharmaceutical re-supply to the US Mission Health Unit (USMHU) via the Single Integrated Medical Logistics Manager (SIMLM) supporting USCENTCOMs area of responsibility (AOR).

DOS

Ensure US national USG employees and other designated eligible USG employees assigned to work under COM authority are medically screened and provided with all appropriate force health protection resources prior to deployment.

Deploy appropriate HSS resources to support US national USG employees and other designated eligible USG employees working under COM authority.

Establish the USMHU to provide organic primary care medical support to US national USG employees and other designated eligible USG employees working under COM authority.

Provide initial medical and pharmaceutical supplies to support the USMHU. Coordinate with DOD for medical and pharmaceutical re-supply via the DOD's SIMLM (Unit Identification

Code (UIC) required).

Coordinate all HSS planning and execution above the primary care level with the USCENTCOM Command Surgeon's Office.

12. Coordinating Instructions:

DOD will provide FHP and health surveillance program information to USG agencies to help prevent/minimize disease and injuries in the Iraq Theater of Operations.

DOD will allow US Mission medical personnel to utilize DOD/USCENTCOM Level III MTFs to provide primary care support to US national USG employees and other designated eligible USG employees working under COM authority.

13. Administration and Logistics:

Medical Materiel. Planning and executing the Health Service Logistics Support (HSLs) mission in Iraq will require close coordination between the DOD/USCENTCOM and the US Mission medical staffs. Under DOD, USCENTCOM has designated the Combined Forces Land Component Commander (CFLCC) to serve as the Executive Agent for the SIMLM for HSLs in the USCENTCOM AOR. The designation of the SIMLM facilitates the delivery of HSLs by centralizing management and reducing excess redundancy of services and logistics capabilities within the AOR. Medical supply and re-supply in support of the US Mission Health Unit will be coordinated through the DOD SIMLM.

Reports. As appropriate under established organizational requirements.

Command and Control. The command and control relationship between DOD and DOS is coordination.

Once DOD has transitioned out of Iraq, there will be limited command and signal resources to support rapid response in an emergency medical situation. DOS will have to create adequate medical communications architectures to support response requirements.

14. Other Health Service Support:

Personal Services Contract employees. Section 904 of the Foreign Service Act authorizes the Department of State to provide medical care to "members of the Service, and (when incident to service abroad) other designated eligible Government employees, and members of the families of such members and employees." Accordingly, individuals employed under Personal Services Contracts are eligible for medical care by the US Embassy Health Unit, provided that required medical clearances are obtained and that the employing agency provides funding for medical evacuation and/or treatment, if recommended by State Department medical officers and not otherwise provided by DOD assets.

Private U.S. Citizens, Third Country Nationals, and Host Nation Civilians. Section 904 of the Foreign Service Act authorizes the Department of State to provide medical care to “members of the Service, and (when incident to service abroad) other designated eligible Government employees, and members of the families of such members and employees.” Accordingly, private US citizens, third country nationals, and Host Nation Civilians located in Iraq are not eligible for medical care under the authority of the DOS Medical Program, and therefore are not covered by this agreement, except as noted below:

- a. DOD/USCENTCOM may continue to provide HHS to private US citizens, third country nationals, and foreign nationals when necessary for life, limb, and eye-sight saving support. DOD will not seek reimbursements for costs of these services from DOS.

ANNEX D

ADMINISTRATIVE AND LOGISTIC SUPPORT

1. TYPE OF SUPPORT BEING PROVIDED

Facilities Maintenance and Services

- a. Facilities and Services
- b. Water (potable and non-potable)
- c. Shower and Latrine Facilities
- d. Billeting and Office Space with Power and Environmental Control Units
- e. Equipment Maintenance
 - (1) Generators and other infrastructure
 - (2) Vehicle
 - (3) Office Equipment
 - (4) Power Generation
- f. Vector Control
- g. Waste management, sewer, hazmat/environmental services
- h. Fire protection
- i. Topographic

Personal Services

- a. Laundry services
- b. Food service operations
- c. Postal operations in accordance with Appendix 2 to Annex H of OPLAN SOVEREIGN IRAQ 2004
- d. Morale and welfare
- e. Army & Air Force Exchange Service (AAFES)
- f. Mortuary services (see Appendix 3)

Logistics and Supplies

- a. Retail fuel support
- b. Transportation operations
 - (a) Air terminal/airfield services
 - (b) Redeployment staging base operations
 - (c) Shuttle bus
 - (d) Vehicle motor pool
 - (e) Rotary wing support (see Appendix 2, para. 5)
 - (f) Fixed wing support (see Appendix 2, para. 5)
- c. Freight and container handling services
- d. Vehicle and personnel decontamination
- e. Property accountability for property purchased under contracts, and supply operations
- f. Equipment and supplies procurement
- g. Class V ammunition storage and sales to US Mission

Personnel

- a. Contract interpreter/translator services, as currently provided
- b. Dedicated personnel augmentation support from ASG-Central for specified functions, described in Appendix 1 - ASG-Central
- c. Personnel in Support of US Mission
- d. Communications personnel augmentation as determined by ASG-Central Director of Information Management (DOIM)

2. Other Support Recipients:

- a. Certain non-DOD contractors and assistance providers funded by the US Government on a reimbursable basis, if authorized by law, and as approved by the COM and CDR USCENTCOM;
- b. MNF-I in US Mission facilities;
- c. Coalition civilians in US Mission facilities.

3. Support Providers:

- a. Support for the US Mission Baghdad will be provided by the ASG Central. CDR USCENTCOM, in coordination with the US Mission, will determine the method of meeting requirements.
- b. Support will be provided by the local ASG. ASG-Central supports regional office Basra.
- c. Support at smaller bases will be coordinated by the base commander.
- d. Internal support for the US Mission will be provided by the management section and in some cases, if authorized by the COM, by other agency organic staff.

4. Details of Intended Support:

Movement of Personnel and Goods

- a. The COM and CDR USCENTCOM will establish a mechanism to ensure information sharing regarding movement of personnel under COM authority, movement or activities of US government contractors in Iraq and other categories of personnel as agreed.
- b. DOS will continue to utilize Federal Deployment Centers (FDC) at Ft. Belvoir and in Kuwait until September 30, 2004 or until the FDCs close.
- c. DOS will use commercial logistics services when safe and available for staff, programs, and goods.

Regional/Provincial/Mobile Teams

- a. All mobile teams will be assigned permanent housing at one base site and will require the same type of support provided to the regional teams at their base sites.
- b. Mobile teams preparing for travel in Iraq must submit requirements for logistics support prior to leaving base sites.
- c. Individuals and mobile teams away from base sites may receive a different level of support depending on the capabilities of the supporting base support activity.

- d. Regional offices not located on a US military base will receive a modified level of support services.

Coalition and United Nations

- a. Coalition personnel authorized by the COM to collocate with US Mission Iraq will receive the same level of support services as USG personnel on a reimbursable basis.

Contractors

- a. Certain non-DoD contractors and assistance providers funded by the US Government collocated with US Mission Iraq will receive support services on a reimbursable basis as agreed upon by the COM and CDR USCENCOM.

ASG Augmentees

- a. Augmentee requirements are described in Appendix 1.
- b. The COM will provide office space within Embassy Annex for ASG Central.

**APPENDIX 1 – US MISSION AND AREA SUPPORT GROUP-EMBASSY
PERSONNEL IN SUPPORT OF US MISSION**

I. Human Resources (HR)

A. DOS will provide HR support to the US Mission as follows:

- American Program: Human Resources Officer (HRO) in Baghdad to manage. (An in-processing center in Washington will replace certain functions normally done by an Embassy HRO.)
- Locally Engaged Staff (LES) program: HRO to manage. (DOS will establish Iraq Support Unit in Amman to manage most of the LES program.)
- IRMO employees hired under U.S.C. Title 5, Section 3161: HRO assigned to IRMO will manage; IRMO in DOS NEA/I will provide primary management.

B. ASG augmentation of HRO Baghdad to provide:

- Country clearance processing
- In and out processing of PCS and TDY personnel
- Badging

C. When authorized by the COM, other USG agencies may provide organic HR support to agency personnel.

II. Logistics/Operations

A. DOS will provide Logistics (General Services Office) (GSO) support to the US Mission as follows:

- Personnel to manage, process and approve logistical services requirements under contract, provided that DCMA authorize GSO to be Contracting Officers Representative (COR).
- Visitor/delegation support
- Housing management
- Local procurement
- Support of regional teams
- Coordination of secure transportation support with RSO
- Staff in Mission Operations Center (MOC) as required

B. ASG augmentation of GSO Baghdad to provide:

- Manage military airlift requests in support of personnel, goods and programs under COM
- Visitor/delegation support

- Logistics support in and for MOC
- Confiscated property management
- Key control
- Office equipment management
- Office space management
- Topographic services

III. Facilities Management

A. DOS will provide Facilities Maintenance support to the US Mission for three facilities (Chancery, Embassy Annex, CMR) as follows:

- Facilities managers to support processing and approving facilities maintenance requirements under contract.

B. ASG personnel augmentation: None

C. Facilities management support will also be in accordance with Annex A.

D. Other agencies may, with COM approval, provide organic support for their facilities.

IV. Financial Comptroller

A. DOS will provide financial/comptroller support to the US Mission as follows:

- Budgeting
- Voucher processing
- Accounting
- Cashiering

B. ASG augmentation requirements:

- Comptroller services to close out CPA financial responsibilities for the period through June 30, 2004.
- Facilitate provision of U.S. currency for Embassy cashier operations.

C. Other agencies may, with COM approval, provide organic financial support in support of their mission.

V. Out-of-Country Support.

A. Iraq Support Unit Amman will provide support including coordination of transportation of goods and personnel; procurement and contracting; human resources; financial operations.

**APPENDIX 2 – MILITARY AIR SUPPORT OPERATIONS IN
SUPPORT OF US MISSION**

1. DOD will provide Military Air support for official transportation of U.S. Mission Personnel, including all official USG travelers in support of the Mission, between locations within Iraq until alternative transportation is determined to be safe and available.

2. U.S. Mission intends to use commercial surface and air carriers to move freight and diplomatic pouches into Iraq in support of Mission requirements provided it is safe and available. However, if commercial service is unavailable, DOD will provide Military Air support to move needed materiel.

3. DOD will provide Military Air support for official transportation of U.S. Mission Personnel, including all official USG travelers in support of the Mission, into and out of Iraq until alternative transportation is determined to be safe and available.

4. DOD will coordinate Military airlift support requirements for personnel, goods and programs under the COM.

5. Until such time as commercial air transportation has been deemed safe, and remains so for a reasonable period of time, DOD will support DOS air transportation needs according to the following:

- a. Fixed Wing: MILAIR Travel is provided by USCENTCOM Air Mobility Division (AMD) through Joint Movement Center (JMC) requests according to schedules and routes as requested. The initial Embassy request will be for a daily shuttle: Kuwait/Baghdad/Amman/Baghdad/Kuwait. USCENTCOM will coordinate with AMD to ensure that the COM has appropriate air routes, at appropriate periodicities, to support COM business in-country and out-of-country.
- b. Rotary Wing: Each day, USCENTCOM will allocate two UH-60 Blackhawk helicopters to be available on a priority basis, at the same level of priority assigned to Commander MNF-I. Daily (by 0900 if possible), the COM will release these aircraft, if not needed for COM use. Even if the dedicated craft have been released back into the pool for the day, aircraft from the pool will be available for COM use upon request, at the same priority level as Commander MNF-I.

If additional helicopters are needed to meet mission requirements, requests will be submitted per the normal SOP, with as much advance notice as possible, in accordance with priorities based on principal passengers.

APPENDIX 3 – MORTUARY SERVICES

1. DOD will provide mortuary service and transportation of human remains to eligible USG employees working under the Chief of Mission (COM) authority, and USG-funded contractor personnel (who are US nationals) working for DOS in Iraq. Mortuary Service as covered by this agreement will include search, recovery, identification, and disposition of remains and personal effects.
 2. The COM and CDR USCENTCOM may coordinate to designate other individuals or organizations to receive these services.
 3. Mortuary services will be provided per the OPLAN Sovereign Iraq (reference k to this MOA), and the following:
 - a) Joint Pub 4-06, Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Mortuary Affairs in Joint Operations, August 28, 1996
 - b) CCR 638-1, Deceased Personnel Mortuary Affairs Support, 2004
 - c) USCENTCOM Message, Mortuary Affairs Reporting Procedures in USCENTCOM AOR, DTG 292209Z OCT01
 - d) USCENTCOM Message, Mortuary Guidance for OEF, DTG 292141Z OCT01 (S)
 - e) USCENTCOM Message, Procedures for Preservation of Evidence, DTG 131618Z APR04
 - f) CCR 600-8, Casualty Services
 - g) 10 U.S.C. § 1486
 4. Remains of USG employees working under the COM, USG-funded contractor personnel (who are US nationals) working for DOS in Iraq will be processed in a manner similar to that provided for US military personnel, including reports. Until such time as local commercial mortuary services are available, mortuary services to other US citizens will be provided in accordance with 10 U.S.C. § 1486. Provision of these services to non-USG employees will be on a reimbursable basis. DOD will not seek reimbursement for the cost of these services from DOS.
 5. Until such time as commercial airlift is available in Iraq, mortuary support will be coordinated through the Theater Mortuary Affairs Executive Agent (TMAEA) in Camp Arifan, Kuwait, and through the Mortuary Affairs (MA) officer assigned to MNF-I.
 6. DOD will:
 - a) provide mortuary services as described above;
 - b) coordinate all requests for waivers to move US civilians by MILAIR;
 - c) ensure the COM, including the Consular Section, is kept well informed of all appropriate MA issues.
 7. DOS will:
 - a) coordinate all required mortuary services with the USCENTCOM J-4 and MNF-I C-4;
 - b) coordinate all US civilian mortuary movements with the MNF-I C4.
-

ANNEX E

INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY SUPPORT

1. Type of Support Being Provided:

The USG Information and Communications Technology (ICT) mission is to install, transition, operate and maintain reliable seamless communications and ICT for DOS and DOD organizations deployed throughout Iraq. DOD and DOS communication assets in Iraq will also support other USG interests, as determined by the COM and CDR USCENTCOM. Specific support provided by this activity will include those services described in the matrix in paragraph 5 below.

2. Other Support Recipients:

The intent is to support those individuals or organizations designated by the COM, in coordination with CDR USCENTCOM.

3. Support Providers:

Support will be provided by: DOD, through its Communications Support Group (CSG); and DOS, through its Information Resource Management (IRM) bureau.

4. Details of Intended Support:

- a. DOS IRM will eventually provide all ICT support to organizations falling under COM. DOS IRM will use as many of the existing ICT assets purchased in support of CPA as practical, in coordination with the CSG. DOS will not remove assets from an operation network providing services to DOD or personnel under COM authority unless approved by the CSG.
- b. DOS will provide all COM-unique ICT support to embedded regional offices and teams. DOD communication assets, as part of the CSG, will be used initially to provide ICT services.
- c. The following table outlines the ICT support services provided by DOS and DOD, including designation of current service provider, the assigned follow-on provider, and the anticipated date of transition in those cases where responsibility for indicated services will transfer between agencies.

FUNCTIONAL AREA	CURRENT PROVIDER	FOLLOW-ON PROVIDER	ANTICIPATED TRANSITION DATE	COMMENTS/ASSUMPTIONS
Frequency/Spectrum Management	DOD	Iraqi Government	30-Jun-04	Existing assigned frequency spectrum will convey beyond June transition.
Communications Security (COMSEC)				Specific to DOD and/or DOS requirements
<i>DOD Provisions</i>	DOD	DOD		
<i>DOS Provisions</i>	DOS	DOS		Other Agencies will provide unique COMSEC capabilities.
Bandwidth				USCENTCOM CSG will continue to provide bandwidth services to DOS/IRM in order to effect equipment efficiencies until such time as DOS obtains other sources for this support.
<i>DOD Provisions</i>	DOD	DOD	Enduring	
<i>DOS Provisions</i>	DOD	DOS	30-Jun-04	
Network Operations Management and Security Center (LAN, WAN, Wireless)				
<i>DOD Provisions</i>	DOD	DOD		DOS intends to use NIPRNET & SIPRNET (as needed) until OpenNet Plus and ClassNet are in full use (by end Q2FY05 dependent upon staffing, space, funding, HVAC and power).
<i>DOS Provisions</i>	DOS	DOS	by end of Q2FY05	
Domain Administration	DOD/DOS	DOD/DOS	Enduring	
Contingency Operation (COOP) and Storage Area Network Systems (SANS)	DOD	DOS	01-Jan-06	DOS and DOD will plan to provide mutual access to ICT infrastructure areas such as the Intermediate Distribution Frame (IDF).
Asset and Configuration Management	DOD	DOS	01-Jan-06	
Help-Desk / Customer Support				Investigate establishing connectivity between DOD's Altiris and DOS's UTT Application with support provided by either a help desk or duty officer.
<i>DOD Provisions (24x7 Support)</i>	DOD	DOD		
<i>DOS Provisions</i>	DOD	DOS		

FUNCTIONAL AREA	CURRENT PROVIDER	FOLLOW-ON PROVIDER	ANTICIPATED TRANSITION DATE	COMMENTS/ASSUMPTIONS
Audio and Video Teleconferencing (Multi-station and Point-to-point) <i>DOD Provisions</i> <i>DOS Provisions</i>	DOD DOS	DOD DOS		Required Diplomatic Security waivers in place
Workstation/Terminal Equipment	DOD	DOS	TBD	
Website Management (English and Arabic)	DOD	DOS	no later than 30-Sept-04	Existing CPA websites will transition to DOS Bureau of International Information Programs
Automated Collaborative Tools	DOD	DOS	01-Jan-06	Currently Groove collaboration tool in use
Voice Services (Telephone) Secure Phone Lines Non-Secure Phone Line	DOD DOD	DOD/DOS DOD/DOS	01-Jan-06 01-Jan-06	USCENTCOM CSG will continue to provide these services to DOS/IRM to effect equipment efficiencies until DOS obtains other sources for this support.
GSM - Cell Phones	DOD	TBD	TBD	
Radio -- HF, Handheld / Mobile <i>VHF</i> <i>UHF</i>	DOD N/A DOD	TBD DOS DOD	TBD Currently being installed N/A	Some UHF assets will be transferred to Gov of Iraq
Regional Team Communications <i>DOD Provisions (embedded sites)</i> <i>DOS Provisions</i>	DOD DOD	DOD DOS	Enduring 01-Nov-04	IIAB contract expires 08-Nov-04; DOS will provide connectivity solutions after this date
Postal Services				As provided and described in OPLAN.

- d. By direction of the COM and CDR USCENTCOM, DOS and DOD organizations in Iraq will provide the following support services, or establish the following lines of authority:
- (1) Requirement validation and prioritization will be adjudicated through normal channels, consistent with requirements validation processes, with all initial requests being submitted and processed through the originating organization (COM or CDR USCENTCOM). DOD requests will be processed by CIS (director of Communication and Information Services) or designated organization, while DOS

requests will be processed by the IPC. For all unfunded ICT requirements, an executive-level Senior Steering Group (SSG) has been formed in Baghdad to provide awareness of ICT initiatives ongoing throughout Iraq, and to recommend prioritization of projects, equipment, training, and sustainment of command, control, communication, computer and intelligence (C4I) operations for USG systems.

- (2) This Steering Group will help create and maintain the most cost efficient, effective ICT architecture for USG operations in Iraq. It is comprised of senior ICT stakeholders from the DOS, DOD, CPA, USCENTCOM, the Intelligence Community, and the Senior Liaison for the Ministry of Communications as appropriate. The SSG will be co-chaired by DOS Information Management Officer (IMO) and the CSG, once established. The SSG is tasked with ensuring the sharing of USG ICT resources and contractual vehicles as practical in an attempt to find cost efficiencies, while capitalizing on existing infrastructure investments. The SSG provides advice on the implementation of the architecture during transition and in the subsequent phases of operations in Iraq. For those decisions beyond the control of the senior ICT representatives themselves, each member of the SSG has the responsibility to staff the recommendations of the SSG through their respective chains of command, resolving these issues at the lowest level possible, e.g. USCENTCOM Chief of Staff and the Deputy COM.
- (3) An Executive Level Transition Panel (ELTP) has been established in Washington, DC, comprised of the Chief Information Officers (CIOs) of DOD, DOS, and the Intelligence Community to seek resolutions not attainable in theater. The SSG will continue to monitor the installation of large-bandwidth satellite downlinks in the Green Zone to prevent unnecessary duplication. The SSG will also work with the Ministry of Communications civil reconstruction effort to ensure that USG efforts are synchronized with Iraq reconstruction priorities, creating opportunities to shift some ICT services onto the Iraq civil telecommunications infrastructure.
- (4) In accordance with the guidance of the DOD and DOS Chief Information Officers to share ICT infrastructure whenever possible to minimize duplication and ensure the maximum return on USG ICT infrastructure equipment essential for the provision of service by either COM or USCENTCOM, DOD will provide an inventory of all ICT equipment that provides ICT infrastructure to USG personnel in Iraq prior to June 30, 2004. DOD is responsible for correcting any errors or omissions in the Kellogg Brown & Root (KBR)-managed property book and other property books (e.g., containing assets under T.O. 44, T.O. 20, and D.O. 25). DOD and DOS will review the updated property inventory and mutually agree how equipment should be allocated between DOD and DOS so each can perform its individual mission.

Once DOD and DOS agree on the allocation of ICT equipment between USCENTCOM and DOS, they will cooperate to ensure that equipment allocated to USCENTCOM is transferred from the KBR-managed property book onto the property book of an organization to be designated by CDR USCENTCOM or his representative. Insofar as DOD and DOS identify ICT equipment that neither DOD nor DOS will need, they will mutually advise USCENTCOM on how to dispose of

it. Equipment remaining on the KBR-managed property book will transfer to DOS upon establishment of the US Mission. After transfer of assets, the owner of each asset will maintain full financial responsibility for it.

Although each item on this list is the property of its owner, items cannot be permanently removed if their removal would inhibit the ability of the COM to carry out its mission. Since the equipment on this list was intended for the operation of the CPA, as long as it is involved in supporting CPA's successor organization (the US Mission), the equipment on this list should remain for use in support of the US Mission, the Green Zone, or regional/provincial teams in Iraq until both DOD and DOS agree it can be removed. When USCENTCOM no longer utilizes this equipment to support the COM and DOS removes the equipment from its infrastructure supporting those organizations, the equipment owner can utilize or dispose of the equipment as it sees fit.

- (5) DOD and DOS, through the CSG and IRM, will coordinate on planning and budgeting to ensure a smooth transition.
- (6) Physical access to common ICT areas to provide for accomplishment of DOS and DOD missions in Iraq will be negotiated between the COM and CDR USCENTCOM designees.
- (7) Authorized Service Interruption (ASI) (scheduled outages) will be coordinated directly between DOD and DOS network management centers.
- (8) DOD will provide and DOS intends to use existing NIPRnet and SIPRnet assets where necessary, until such time as OpenNet and ClassNet are fully operational.
- (9) DOD and DOS will conduct an inventory of all USG cell phones currently used in support of CPA operations. In turn, DOD and DOS will establish use-justification standards, and will then implement plan to control toll charges.
- (10) DOD, via KBR, will provide DOS with a list of ICT inventory by June 30, 2004.
- (11) DOD/CSG and DOS/IRM will agree on a list of ICT assets to be transferred to USCENTCOM by June 15, 2004.
- (12) DOD/CSG and DOS/IRM will agree on a list of shared ICT assets critical to the operation of either the DOD/CSG or DOS/IRM networks by June 15, 2004.
- (13) DOD and DOS will continue to share the use of audio/video teleconferencing assets.
- (14) DOD and DOS will transition CPA web sites to the Bureau of International Information Programs.
- (15) DOD and DOS will establish joint knowledge management and data transfer procedures in support of enduring operations. Historical files will be available based on functional requirements.
- (16) DOS will support all USG agencies in the regional offices with computer, radio, and telephone. DOD will continue to provide current levels of support until DOS support is in place. DOD will support DOS personnel embedded in USCENTCOM units.

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