



COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY
BAGHDAD

Polis

INFO MEMO

March 14, 2004

FOR: THE ADMINISTRATOR
FROM: [REDACTED]
SUBJECT: Surveys Say Iraqi Economy Starting to Come to Life

These data are drawn from multiple surveys:

ICRSS January 5-17: Baghdad, Basrah, Mosul, Babylon, Samara, Karbala, Tikrit
ICRSS February 23-29: Baghdad, Basrah, Mosul, Babylon, Diyala, Ramadi, Suleymania
IIACASS January 1-7: Baghdad, Basrah, Mosul, Ramadi, Samara, Karbala
IIACASS January 18-25: Baghdad, Basrah, Mosul, Hilla, Karbala, Ramadi
IIACASS February 22-29: Baghdad, Basrah, Mosul, Ramadi, Samara, Karbala
All results derive from face-to-face interviews in the homes of the interviewee and have over 1,000 valid interviews. Where totals are shown for January and February, totals have been adjusted to compare only same-city to same-city results.

Economic questions on January and February surveys show growth of confidence in the Iraqi economy in the five to six weeks between the surveys.

Improved perceptions of the economy show up various ways:

- **National Economy Improving**
"Do you think that the economic situation in Iraq today is better or worse than the economic situation before the war?" Same cities (Baghdad, Basrah, Mosul, Babylon), same question, same methodology from January to February: (both ICRSS)
 - 20% drop in those who say "worse"
 - 12% jump in those who say "better"
 - Movement in the opposite direction in Mosul.¹

¹ Mosul often reports results out of line with other cities. This holds true with different questions from different pollsters. Theories as to why this would be so vary and there is no clear explanation, but two theories might explain this variance: 1. Mosul is perhaps less of an economic hub than it was before the war. 2. A lot of (former) military personnel live in Mosul and this may affect outlooks.



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Doc 1

Policy Planning

- **Finances of Individual Households Improving**
 "Compared to before the war, would you say that your household's financial situation has improved, worsened, or stayed the same?" Same cities (Baghdad, Basrah, Mosul, Babylon), same question, same methodology from January to February: *(both ICRSS)*
 - 14% drop in those who say "worse"
 - 12% increase in those who say "better"
 - In Mosul the percentage saying things are "better" decreased by 6%, but the percentage saying "worse" decreased by 26%
- **Big Jump in Those Saying they can "Get By," Decrease in Those Saying they Lack "Basic Needs."** *(IIACSS 1-7 Jan & ICRSS 23-29 Feb)*
 On this card, which is closest to your household's present financial situation?
 - We have only the monthly ration
 - We often do not have enough money even for our basic needs, such as food or rent.
 - We can get by if we avoid buying non-essential or expensive items.
 - We have enough to get by but have almost no luxuries.
 - We have enough money to live comfortably
- **Plurality says Prices Decreasing**
 "Over the past few months, do you think the prices of goods and services have been generally increasing, decreasing, or have they remained the same?" Same cities (Baghdad, Basrah, Mosul) from January to February: *(both ICRSS)*
 - 20% decrease in those saying prices are higher
 - 19% increase in those saying prices are lower
- **Retail Purchases**
 Iraqis have been on a shopping binge. By asking what electrical appliances households owned before the war and after, we have determined the percentage of all of a specific type of appliance that has been purchased since the end of the war. Percentages purchased since April 2003: *(IIACSS Jan 18-25)*
 - 96% of all satellite TVs (banned by Saddam)
 - 32% of all air conditioners
 - 22% of all water heaters
 - 40% of all ovens
- **Unemployment Down in Baghdad, Basrah, Mosul and Karbala**
 Employment figures in Iraq are very slippery. Unemployment estimates on some polls have run as high as 50% (Why? When pollsters simply ask: Are you employed? They capture housewives, students and the retired.) All polls certainly mask severe underemployment. (For example, a December IIACSS poll showed that 27.1% of men described themselves as "self-employed"; self-employment often being an indicator of underemployment.)

Another complicating factor is that some pollsters have had a difficult time capturing representative samples of women (because male family members are often reluctant to let women be interviewed). The polls that skew towards men tend to over-report unemployment because many women seek no employment outside the home. (In one

reliable poll, 68% of women report themselves as "Housewife" and an additional 15% report themselves as "Student.") But men are six times (15.4% vs. 2.4% in one poll) more likely to report themselves as "Unemployed."

Nevertheless, the IACSS polls conducted 1-7 January and 22-29 February gained traction by dividing activities into multiple categories: Full-Time Public Sector, Full-Time Private Sector, Part-Time Public Sector, Part-Time Private Sector, Student, Housewife, Pensioner and Unemployed. Thus, the "Unemployed" category is a reasonably reliable indicator of those who consider themselves part of the workforce, but have no employment.

- o 15% report themselves unemployed in early January
- o 8% report themselves unemployed in late February.

ATTACHMENTS: 2 Power Point Slide Sets Illustrating Above Data (one annotated)
Distribution List
COORDINATION: Counselor  b(6)

UNCLASSIFIED


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Economic Growth in Iraq

Polls Show Economic Spurt in
January and February 2004


Jan ICRSS/Feb IIACSS

Jan-Feb Answers to Question: Economic Situation In Iraq Compared to Before the War?




Jan ICRSS/Feb IIACSS

"Compared to before the war, would you say that your household's financial situation has improved, worsened, or stayed the same?"



Jan ICRSS/Feb IIACSS


**Big Jump in those who say they can "Get By";
Decrease in those who say they Lack "Basic Needs."**




Jan ICRSS/Feb IIACSS

Prices Seen Declining

Perception of Prices "Over the Past Few Months" 18-25 January




Perception of Prices "Over the Past Few Months" 23-29 February



Jan ICRSS/Feb IIACSS

Percentage of Electrical Appliances Purchased Since April 2003




Jan ICRSS/Feb IIACSS


Unemployment Shrinks

Baghdad, Basrah, Mosul, Karbala

January



February





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SPOLLS

**National Survey of Iraq
February 2004**

Frequency Tables

Unweighted	Weighted
2,737	2,652

Weighted Data

Governorate

	Count	%
Anbar	133	5.0
Baghdad	732	27.6
Basra	209	7.9
Diyala	148	5.6
Dohuk	51	1.9
Erbil	145	5.5
Kerbala	72	2.7
Missan	81	3.0
Muthanna	55	2.1
Ninewa	271	10.2
Qadissiyah	97	3.7
Suleymaniya	186	7.0
Tameem	97	3.6
Thi-Qar	159	6.0
Wassit	99	3.7
Salah Al-Din	117	4.4
Total	2652	100.0



[Ask all]

Q1 - Overall, how would you say things are going in your life these days – very good, quite good, quite bad, or very bad?

Base = All respondents

	%
Very good	13.4
Quite good	56.6
Quite bad	14.2
Very bad	14.8
Difficult to say	1.1
Total	100.0

[Ask all]

Q2 - Compared to a year ago, I mean before the war in Spring 2003, are things overall in your life much better now, somewhat better, about the same, somewhat worse or much worse?

Base = All respondents

	%
Much better now	21.9
Somewhat better	34.6
About the same	23.3
Somewhat worse	12.7
Much worse	5.9
Difficult to say	1.6
Total	100.0

[Ask all]

Q3 - What is your expectation for how things overall in your life will be in a year from now? Will they be much better, somewhat better, about the same, somewhat worse or much worse?

Base = All respondents

	%
Much better	36.7
Somewhat better	34.3
About the same	9.4
Somewhat worse	3.2
Much worse	3.4
Difficult to say	12.8
Total	100.0



[Ask all]

Q4 - What is the single biggest problem you are facing in your life these days?

Base = All respondents

	%
Academic problems	2.0
Chaos	.4
Terrorist attacks	1.8
Family problems	1.2
Housing problems	4.1
Health problems	1.3
No independence for Kurdistan	.4
Rising prices	9.5
Lack of security/stability	22.1
No job	11.8
The occupation	1.1
Personal problems	1.6
Poor electricity supply	4.2
Social problems	.5
Uncertainty about the political future of Iraq	1.3
Poor public services (water, roads, etc.)	3.7
Ethnic/religious tensions	.2
Poor living standard	3.8
Persecution/imprisonment	.7
Other	2.0
No problem/no single biggest problem	18.0
Not sure/no answer	8.1
Total	100.0

[Ask all]

Q5 - From today's perspective and all things considered, was it absolutely right, somewhat right, somewhat wrong or absolutely wrong that US-led coalition forces invaded Iraq in Spring 2003?

Base = All respondents

	%
Absolutely right	19.6
Somewhat right	28.6
Somewhat wrong	12.9
Absolutely wrong	26.2
Difficult to say	12.7
Total	100.0



[Ask all]

Q6 - Apart from right and wrong, do you feel the US-led coalition force invasion...

Base = All respondents

	%
Humiliated Iraq	41.2
Liberated Iraq	41.8
Difficult to say	17.0
Total	100.0

[Ask all]

Q7 - A - I would like to ask you about today's conditions in the village/neighbourhood where you live. How would you rate the following using very good, quite good, quite bad or very bad?

Base = All respondents

		Very good	Quite good	Quite bad	Very bad	Not sure/no answer	Not applicable	Total
The security situation	%	20.2	28.7	21.1	29.0	1.0		100.0
The availability of jobs	%	6.5	19.1	22.5	46.1	5.8		100.0
The supply of electricity	%	7.9	27.0	27.8	36.6	.7		100.0
The availability of clean water	%	19.7	30.8	21.7	26.3	1.5		100.0
The availability of medical care	%	16.9	34.1	24.4	21.8	2.0	.8	100.0
Local schools	%	36.6	34.6	15.0	11.1	2.4	.4	100.0
Local government	%	17.8	31.7	20.4	17.7	12.4		100.0
Availability of household basics	%	18.0	38.5	23.7	17.3	2.5		100.0
The availability of products and services which go beyond your household's basic needs	%	13.7	35.8	26.5	19.6	4.4		100.0
Your family's protection from crime	%	21.2	31.5	20.4	23.3	3.7		100.0



[Ask all]

Q7 - B - Compared to a year ago, I mean before the war in Spring 2003, would you say [start with first rotated item in Q7A] is much better now, somewhat better, about the same, somewhat worse or much worse?

Base = All respondents

		Much better	Somewhat better	About the same	Somewhat worse	Much worse	Not sure/no answer	Total
The security situation	%	25.9	27.7	18.1	15.0	11.4	1.9	100.0
The availability of jobs	%	12.4	26.5	30.9	16.2	9.1	4.9	100.0
The supply of electricity	%	15.2	28.2	32.0	14.6	8.4	1.6	100.0
The availability of clean water	%	17.6	23.7	40.2	10.4	6.0	2.2	100.0
The availability of medical care	%	16.2	28.1	37.6	10.7	4.9	2.6	100.0
Local schools	%	23.7	23.2	40.8	6.5	2.9	2.9	100.0
Local government	%	17.3	27.1	29.0	10.7	5.7	10.2	100.0
Availability of household basics	%	18.1	28.4	34.6	11.2	5.0	2.7	100.0
The availability of products and services which go beyond your household's basic needs	%	15.5	28.7	34.6	11.3	5.6	4.3	100.0
Your family's protection from crime	%	23.2	27.3	25.9	12.7	7.9	3.1	100.0

[Ask all]

Q7 - C - What is your expectation for [start with first rotated item in Q7A] a year from now, do you expect it to be much better, somewhat better, about the same, somewhat worse or much worse?

Base = All respondents

		Much better	Somewhat better	About the same	Somewhat worse	Much worse	Not sure/no answer	Total
The security situation	%	42.2	31.8	10.0	2.7	2.6	10.7	100.0
The availability of jobs	%	37.7	35.3	10.6	2.0	1.9	12.5	100.0
The supply of electricity	%	40.1	33.7	11.3	2.8	1.8	10.2	100.0
The availability of clean water	%	42.8	32.1	12.6	2.3	1.2	9.0	100.0
The availability of medical care	%	42.7	31.8	12.0	2.0	1.4	10.1	100.0
Local schools	%	44.4	29.6	14.1	1.5	1.0	9.4	100.0
Local government	%	40.1	28.9	12.4	2.1	1.7	14.7	100.0
The availability of household basics	%	43.2	33.0	10.4	1.9	1.3	10.1	100.0
The availability of products and services which go beyond your household's basic needs	%	41.9	32.7	10.4	2.2	1.2	11.5	100.0
Your family's protection from crime	%	41.6	33.0	11.3	1.8	1.8	10.6	100.0



[Ask all]

Q8 - A. I am going to read some ideas about priorities for the next 12 months. Please tell me which one is your first priority, your second priority and your third priority.

Base = All respondents

	1 st priority	2 nd priority	3 rd priority	Total
	%	%	%	%
Regaining public security in the country	64.4	13.5	7.0	84.8
Ensuring that oil production increases	2.3	6.7	4.0	13.0
Reviving the economy	3.2	14.7	9.9	27.8
Dealing with the members of the previous government	.5	.9	.4	1.9
Rebuilding the infrastructure	6.9	28.6	19.2	54.7
Ensuring that most people in this country can make a decent living	4.5	8.5	16.7	29.7
Regaining Iraqi control over governing this country	3.3	5.5	8.2	16.9
Rebuilding the education system	.9	3.8	5.8	10.5
Ensuring that Iraq could not be attacked from the outside	.9	2.3	4.3	7.5
Ensuring that religious ideals are followed	3.3	5.3	7.3	15.8
Holding elections for national government	8.1	8.5	13.5	30.1
Seeing that people have more say about how things are done in their communities	.7	.6	2.1	3.3
Difficult to say	1.1	1.2	1.6	4.0
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	300.0

[Ask all]

Q8 - B. Also, please tell me which one you think is no priority at all.

Base = All respondents

	%
Regaining public security in the country	-
Ensuring that oil production increases	3.1
Reviving the economy	.7
Dealing with the members of the previous government	62.0
Rebuilding the infrastructure	.0
Ensuring that most people in this country can make a decent living	.2
Regaining Iraqi control over governing this country	.8
Rebuilding the education system	.4
Ensuring that Iraq could not be attacked from the outside	1.3
Ensuring that religious ideals are followed	2.3
Holding elections for national government	.8
Seeing that people have more say about how things are done in their communities	1.6
Difficult to say	26.6
Total	100.0



[Ask those who mentioned at least one priority in Q8A]

Q9 - A. Who should take care of [read out first priority mentioned in Q8A]? Please mention only one

B. Who should take care of [read out second priority mentioned in Q8A]? Please mention only one

C. Who should take care of [read out third priority mentioned in Q8A]? Please mention only one

Base = Respondents who mentioned at least one priority

	1 st priority	2 nd priority	3 rd priority	Total
Army/Police/ Ministry of Interior	6.9	2.9	1.5	11.3
Coalition Forces	4.8	3.8	3.1	11.6
Coalition Forces and Iraqi government	.1	.1	.1	.3
CPA	.6	.3	.5	1.4
Educated people/experts	.1	.4	.3	.9
Governing Council	5.4	5.7	4.4	15.4
Iraq	.4	.3	.6	1.4
Iraqi government	33.3	38.1	35.6	106.8
Iraqi government and people	.3	.2	.3	.9
Iraqi people	17.3	14.1	14.8	46.1
Iraqi President	.5	.7	.6	1.8
Local government	.6	.4	.3	1.3
Political parties	.9	.5	.6	2.1
Regional government/leaders	.5	.2	.1	.8
Religious leaders	2.7	2.3	2.1	7.1
UN	1.0	1.2	2.1	4.4
USA	7.7	7.2	6.6	21.4
Other	1.3	1.2	1.6	4.1
Not sure/no answer	15.7	20.3	24.6	15.7
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	254.7



Regaining public security in the country – Who should take care ...

	%
Army/Police/ Ministry of Interior	12.0
Coalition Forces	5.3
Coalition Forces and Iraqi government	.1
CPA	.6
Educated people/experts	.1
Governing Council	4.9
Iraq	.3
Iraqi government	30.9
Iraqi government and people	.3
Iraqi people	18.3
Iraqi President	.4
Local government	.5
Political parties	.3
Regional government/leaders	.3
Religious leaders	.9
UN	.6
USA	7.3
Other	.9
Not sure/no answer	16.0
Total	100.0

Ensuring that oil production increases – Who should take care ...

	%
Army/Police/Ministry of Interior	.2
Coalition Forces	5.1
CPA	1.5
Governing Council	5.0
Iraq	.8
Iraqi government	42.9
Iraqi people	11.6
Regional government/leaders	.6
Religious leaders	.5
UN	.8
USA	7.8
Other	.9
Not sure/no answer	22.4
Total	100.0

Reviving the economy – Who should take care ...

	%
Army/Police/Ministry of Interior	.3
Coalition Forces	2.6
Coalition Forces and Iraqi government	.1
CPA	.4
Educated people/experts	.8
Governing Council	5.1
Iraq	.4
Iraqi government	46.3
Iraqi government and people	.6
Iraqi people	11.8
Iraqi President	.6
Local government	.3
Political parties	.2
Regional government/leaders	.3
Religious leaders	.1
UN	.7
USA	7.1
Other	.6
Not sure/no answer	21.6
Total	100.0



Dealing with the members of the previous government – Who should take care ...

	%
Coalition Forces	4.9
Governing Council	5.9
Iraqi government	30.7
Iraqi people	11.8
Iraqi President	1.6
Political parties	1.3
USA	8.6
Other	5.5
Not sure/no answer	29.7
Total	100.0

Rebuilding the Infrastructure (electricity, water supply, telephone, etc.) – Who should take care ...

	%
Army/Police/Ministry of Interior	.4
Coalition Forces	5.0
CPA	.3
Educated people/experts	.2
Governing Council	5.1
Iraq	.5
Iraqi government	45.2
Iraqi government and people	.3
Iraqi people	10.8
Iraqi President	.4
Local government	.7
Political parties	.1
Regional government/leaders	.4
Religious leaders	.5
UN	1.2
USA	9.0
Other	1.4
Not sure/no answer	18.6
Total	100.0

Ensuring that most people in this country can make a decent living – Who should take care ...

	%
Army/Police/Ministry of Interior	.6
Coalition Forces	3.5
Coalition Forces and Iraqi government	.2
Governing Council	4.4
Iraq	.6
Iraqi government	48.5
Iraqi government and people	.3
Iraqi people	10.6
Iraqi President	1.6
Local government	.4
Political parties	.4
Regional government/leaders	.4
Religious leaders	.5
UN	.7
USA	6.2
Other	.6
Not sure/no answer	20.4
Total	100.0



Regaining Iraq control over governing this country – Who should take care ...

	%
Army/Police/Ministry of Interior	1.1
Coalition Forces	2.3
Coalition Forces and Iraqi government	.1
CPA	.2
Governing Council	9.1
Iraq	.4
Iraqi government	25.2
Iraqi government and people	.5
Iraqi people	26.2
Iraqi President	.7
Political parties	.1
Religious leaders	1.2
UN	3.5
USA	8.8
Other	.8
Not sure/no answer	20.0
Total	100.0

Rebuilding the education system – Who should take care ...

	%
Army/Police/Ministry of Interior	.3
Coalition Forces	1.3
CPA	.7
Educated people/experts	3.0
Governing Council	1.7
Iraq	1.4
Iraqi government	52.4
Iraqi people	11.8
Local government	.3
Regional government/leaders	.9
UN	.3
USA	3.8
Other	.6
Not sure/no answer	21.6
Total	100.0

Ensuring that Iraq could not be attacked from the outside – Who should take care ...

	%
Army/Police/Ministry of Interior	2.8
Coalition Forces	8.6
Coalition Forces and Iraqi government	.3
CPA	1.1
Governing Council	2.8
Iraqi government	24.3
Iraqi government and people	.2
Iraqi people	13.1
Iraqi President	1.8
Local government	.7
Religious leaders	1.5
UN	2.2
USA	14.4
Other	2.4
Not sure/no answer	23.8
Total	100.0



Ensuring that religious ideals are followed – Who should take care ...

	%
Coalition Forces	.2
CPA	.7
Educated people/experts	.3
Governing Council	1.0
Iraq	.2
Iraqi government	18.2
Iraqi government and people	.3
Iraqi people	10.3
Iraqi President	1.0
Political parties	6.8
Religious leaders	26.0
UN	.2
USA	1.3
Other	5.0
Not sure/no answer	28.3
Total	100.0

Holding elections for national government – Who should take care ...

	%
Amy/Police/Ministry of Interior	.3
Coalition Forces	1.6
Coalition Forces and Iraqi government	.2
CPA	.3
Educated people/experts	.1
Governing Council	6.7
Iraq	.6
Iraqi government	18.2
Iraqi people	23.9
Iraqi President	.3
Local government	.5
Political parties	1.2
Religious leaders	4.4
UN	6.0
USA	5.3
Other	2.2
Not sure/no answer	26.2
Total	100.0

Seeing that people have more say about how things are done in their communities – Who should take care ...

	%
Coalition Forces	2.3
Governing Council	2.5
Iraq	2.5
Iraqi government	39.7
Iraqi people	14.0
Iraqi President	1.7
Political parties	.8
Religious leaders	1.5
USA	10.5
Other	4.2
Not sure/no answer	20.2
Total	100.0



[Ask all]

Q10 - Considering everything, which country could serve as a model for Iraq in the coming years? If you think Iraq needs no model, please tell me so.

Base = All respondents

	%
Bahrain	.4
Egypt	.7
France	2.2
Germany	1.8
Iran	2.6
Japan	4.8
Jordan	.5
Kuwait	6.1
Lebanon	.7
Qatar	.4
Russia	.4
Saudi Arabia	3.6
Syria	1.3
United Arab Emirates	21.1
United Kingdom	2.3
United States	6.5
European Union	.4
Denmark	.4
Sweden	.5
Switzerland	1.7
Other	2.2
Iraq needs no model	23.6
Not sure/no answer	15.9
Total	100.0



[Ask all]

Q11 - Which countries/organisations should play a role in the rebuilding of Iraq?
You may mention up to three countries/organisations in order of importance

Base = All respondents

	1 st country %	2 nd country %	3 rd country %	Total %
Algeria	.1	.1	.1	.2
Bahrain	.4	.3	.7	1.4
Egypt	1.0	1.0	1.3	3.3
France	5.9	9.5	6.2	21.6
Germany	3.7	6.3	6.7	16.7
Iran	2.0	.8	1.1	4.0
Israel	.1	.2	.2	.5
Japan	19.8	8.0	8.1	35.9
Jordan	.6	1.5	1.0	3.1
Kuwait	2.7	2.1	1.9	6.7
Lebanon	.2	.5	.8	1.5
Libya	.1	.1	.0	.2
Morocco	.1	.1	.1	.3
Oman	.1	.2	.1	.4
Qatar	.2	.4	.7	1.3
Russia	1.3	2.4	2.4	6.1
Saudi Arabia	2.2	3.4	2.0	7.6
Syria	1.4	1.3	1.4	4.1
Tunisia	.1	.1	.1	.2
Turkey	.2	.3	.6	1.1
United Arab Emirates	3.8	2.0	2.8	8.6
United Kingdom	3.9	12.5	5.1	21.5
United States	20.4	9.4	5.8	35.7
Arab League	.1	.9	.5	1.5
European Union	.3	.9	.9	2.0
Red Cross	.2	.1	.2	.5
Relief organisations	.1	.2	.0	.3
UN - United Nations	3.6	.8	1.3	5.7
UNICEF	.6	.5	.3	1.4
Aruba	.1	.4	.2	.7
China	.1	.7	1.0	1.8
Italy	.3	.6	.4	1.3
Korea, South	.0	.4	.2	.7
Spain	.1	.2	.6	.9
Sweden	.1	.1	.2	.4
Switzerland	.4	.2	.8	1.4
Yemen	.0	.1	.1	.3
Other	.9	1.5	2.1	4.4
None	6.3	1.7	3.8	6.3
Not sure/no answer	16.5	27.9	38.3	16.5
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	228.2



[Ask all]

Q12 - Which countries/organisations should not play a role in the rebuilding of Iraq? You may mention up to three countries/organisations in order of importance

Base = All respondents

	1 st country	2 nd country	3 rd country	Total
	%	%	%	%
Afghanistan	.3	.3	.1	.7
Algeria	.1	.2	.2	.5
Bahrain	.1	.6	.4	1.1
Egypt	3.5	3.1	2.4	9.0
France	1.8	1.2	1.1	4.1
Germany	.3	1.1	1.1	2.5
Iran	6.7	7.7	5.1	19.5
Israel	22.8	7.9	6.1	36.8
Japan	.3	.4	.5	1.2
Jordan	2.6	3.4	4.8	10.8
Kuwait	6.5	5.2	5.2	16.9
Lebanon	.2	.3	.1	.6
Libya	.2	.4	.2	.8
Oman	.2	.1	.1	.4
Pakistan	.2	.1	.2	.4
Qatar	.1	.3	.3	.7
Russia	2.6	1.8	1.6	6.0
Saudi Arabia	1.0	2.1	1.5	4.6
Syria	3.5	5.4	3.7	12.6
Tunisia	.2	.0	.1	.3
Turkey	5.6	3.9	3.9	13.4
United Arab Emirates	.1	.1	.2	.4
United Kingdom	2.1	6.2	3.6	11.9
United States	8.3	4.1	1.8	14.1
UN - United Nations	.0	.0	.2	.3
Australia	.0	.2	.1	.3
China	.2	.5	.4	1.2
Italy	.0	.2	.1	.3
Korea, North	.1	.1	.1	.2
Spain	.0	.1	.2	.4
Yemen	.1	.2	.4	.7
Other	.6	1.3	1.5	3.4
Unsure of specific country/organisation	7.0	3.1	3.8	7.0
Not sure/no answer	22.7	38.5	48.7	22.7
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	205.8



[Ask all]

Q13 - A. Which national leader in Iraq, if any, do you trust the most?

Base = All respondents

	%
Abdul Aziz Hakeem	3.1
Adnan Pachachi	3.5
Ahmed Chalabi	.2
Bahr Uloom	.0
Ibrahim Jaafari	7.7
Salahuddin Bahaiddin	.0
Jalal Talabani	5.9
Massoud Barazani	6.0
Muafaq Rubaee	.2
Muhsin Abdul Hameed	2.0
Muqtada Sadr	.6
Saddam Hussein	3.3
Sharif Ben Al Hussein	.6
Saeed Sistani	4.7
Sultan Hashim	.7
Sheikh Fawaz	.1
Mohammed Al Doori	.1
Unadim Yousif Kana	.1
Kareem Mahmood	.1
Al Hawza	.0
Noori Abdulla Tahir	.0
Tariq Aziz	.0
Ayad Alawi	.2
Falah Hassan Naqeeb	.1
Saad Mahir Ahmed	.2
Ayad Jalaluddin	.1
Adnan Thabit Bukanan	.0
Jamal Abdul Nassir	.0
Naji Sabri Hadeethi	.2
Mohammed Saeed Sahaf	.1
Moamar Qathafi	.1
Majeed Hameed Moussa	.1
Members of previous regime	.2
Any Kurdish leader	.1
Any Shia leader	.1
Religious parties	.2
Other	.4
None	22.1
Not sure/no answer	36.7
Total	100.0



[Ask all]

Q13 - B. And, if any, which one do you not trust at all?

Base = All respondents

	%
Abdul Aziz Hakeem	1.8
Adnan Pachachi	1.2
Ahmed Chalabi	10.3
Ali Hassan Majeed	.1
Bahr Uloom	.1
Ibrahim Jaafari	.5
Salahuddin Bahaaddin	.0
Jalal Talabani	.9
Massoud Barazani	.2
Muafaq Rubaee	1.3
Muhsin Abdul Hameed	.2
Muqtada Sadir	.3
Saddam Hussein	3.1
Saeed Sistani	1.3
Osama Bin Laden	.0
Mishaan Jibbory	.0
Kareem Mahmood	.1
Ayad Alawi	.5
Hushiar Zebani	.0
Abid	.0
Yassir Arafat	.0
Mahmoud Othman	.1
George Bush	.1
Members of previous regime	.2
Governing Council	.2
Any Shia leader	.1
Baath Party	.0
Religious parties	.0
Other	.3
None	27.3
Not sure/no answer	49.6
Total	100.0



[Ask all]

Q14 - A. I am going to read a number of organisations. For each one, could you please tell me if you have heard of them or not

Base = All respondents

	% of Responses	% of Cases
Iraq's religious leaders	5.2	54.9
New Iraqi Army	8.6	89.6
The (Iraqi Governing) Council	9.2	96.1
Ministries in Baghdad	8.3	87.2
The police	9.5	99.1
The CPA	9.1	95.1
The United Nations	9.4	98.1
Political parties	9.0	94.1
US and UK occupation forces	9.4	98.5
Iraqi Media Network TV	8.9	93.7
Local leaders in your community	6.2	64.6
Press	7.3	76.0
None	.0	.4
Total	100.0	1047.3

0 missing cases; 2,652 valid cases

Q14 - B. How much confidence do you have in [first organisation respondent has heard of]: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or none at all?

Base = Respondents who are aware of this organisation

	A great deal	Quite a lot	Not very much	None at all	Not sure/no answer	Total
	%	%	%	%	%	%
Iraq's religious leaders	42.4	27.6	12.6	8.9	8.5	100.0
New Iraqi Army	17.8	38.2	24.9	9.7	9.4	100.0
The (Iraqi Governing) Council	11.3	27.9	27.0	25.6	8.3	100.0
Ministries in Baghdad	11.1	32.9	30.1	14.6	11.4	100.0
The police	26.4	41.4	19.7	8.2	4.4	100.0
The CPA	7.9	20.0	26.9	35.3	9.9	100.0
The United Nations	13.7	26.6	25.5	25.8	8.4	100.0
Political parties	7.1	20.7	25.4	35.7	11.1	100.0
US and UK occupation forces	7.9	17.4	23.5	42.8	8.4	100.0
Iraqi Media Network TV	13.3	36.8	24.1	15.7	10.1	100.0
Local leaders in your community	16.6	33.6	22.3	15.8	11.7	100.0
Press	11.8	31.1	28.4	17.6	11.0	100.0



[Ask all]

Q15 - A. People have different ideas about what Iraq needs at this time. How about you? How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements?

Base = All respondents

		Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree	Not sure/no answer	Total
A (single) strong Iraqi leader	%	68.5	14.6	4.7	9.4	4.9	100.0
A group of strong Iraqi leaders	%	23.9	29.1	17.4	21.2	8.5	100.0
Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA)	%	9.7	21.9	21.4	38.9	10.1	100.0
A government made up mainly of religious leaders	%	27.4	25.8	16.2	24.0	6.7	100.0
A government made up mainly of Iraqi military leaders	%	11.1	23.2	20.3	37.3	8.1	100.0
A UN transition government	%	15.1	23.7	18.2	33.1	9.9	100.0
An Iraqi democracy	%	72.2	13.7	4.1	4.6	5.4	100.0
An Iraqi government made up of experts and/or managers, not politicians	%	34.6	32.4	11.8	11.4	9.7	100.0
The (Iraqi Governing) Council	%	16.2	28.3	16.4	27.7	11.4	100.0

Q15B - What do you think Iraq needs in 12 months time? Please mention only one choice.

Q15C - What do you think Iraq needs in five years time? Please mention only one choice.

Base = All respondents

	Q15B – In 12 months %	Q15C – In 5 years %
A (single) strong Iraqi leader	46.6	35.5
A group of strong Iraqi leaders	3.3	2.7
The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA)	.7	.7
A government made up mainly of religious leaders	10.4	9.8
A government made up mainly of Iraqi military leaders	.7	.2
A UN transition government	1.4	.6
An Iraqi democracy	28.0	41.6
An Iraqi government made up of experts and/or managers, not politicians	2.5	2.4
The (Iraqi Governing) Council	1.6	.4
Not sure/no answer	4.8	6.2
Total	100.0	100.0



[Ask all who responded to Q15C]

Q15D - Can you tell me the [single] reason for your choice [in Q15C]?

Iraq needs an Iraqi democracy in 5 years time – Reason for choice (41.6% of sample)

	%
Dictatorship/autocratic rule is no good	2.6
It guarantees equality and justice	6.3
It guarantees freedom	34.2
It guarantees security/peace	5.2
It guarantees the rights of all national/religious groups	2.1
It improves the situation/brings progress	2.5
It is government by the people for the people	5.2
It is the best system	1.8
It provides unity	2.2
We want/need democracy	2.2
To make life better	1.5
To get rid of foreign occupation	.3
To have a president/government/leader chosen by people	1.0
Other	5.5
Not sure/no answer	27.3
Total	100.0

Iraq needs a (single) strong Iraqi leader in 5 years time – Reason for choice (35.5% of sample)

	%
For avoiding violence	1.7
He guarantees equality and justice	3.6
He guarantees security/peace	17.8
He guarantees the rights of all national/religious groups	1.1
He improves the situation/brings progress	2.0
It is the best system	2.8
He provides unity	11.7
We need strong people to do things	4.9
To take control of the country	24.7
To protect Iraq	1.9
To get rid of foreign occupation	.7
He knows best	1.9
To represent the will of people	1.9
Other	6.8
Not sure/no answer	16.4
Total	100.0

Iraq needs a government made up mainly of religious leaders in 5 years time – Reason for choice (9.8% of sample)

	%
They follow God's guidance	27.6
They guarantee equality and justice	10.7
They guarantee security/peace	4.8
It is the best system	5.1
People trust them	6.9
Other	15.5
Not sure/no answer	29.4
Total	100.0



Iraq needs a group of strong Iraqi leaders in 5 years time – Reason for choice (2.7% of sample)

	%
Dictatorship/autocratic rule is no good	12.0
They guarantee security/peace	7.7
It is government by the people for the people	4.0
To take control of the country	18.4
To solve problems	4.3
Other	31.9
Not sure/no answer	21.6
Total	100.0

[Ask all]

Q16 - In designing a new political order for Iraq, which of the following would be most important? Which one would be second most important? Which one would be third most important? And which one would be least important?

Base = All respondents

	Most important %	2 nd most important %	3 rd most important %	Least important %
A broad government	31.3	29.8	19.8	10.2
A strong government	23.9	21.4	20.7	25.2
A liberal government	19.6	26.5	28.9	16.2
A government which follows religious ideals	16.7	13.7	21.8	38.3
Difficult to say	8.4	8.6	8.8	10.0
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

[Ask those who answered 1, 2, 4, 5, or 7 in Q15B]

Q17 - There can be differences between the way government is set up in a country, called political system, and the type of people who run that system, called actors. From the six options I am going to read to you, please choose one system and one type of actors.

Base = All respondents

Political system	%
Strong leader	27.5
Islamic state	20.5
Democracy	48.5
Difficult to say	3.5
Total	100.0

Base = All respondents

Political actor	%
Democrats	55.3
Religious politicians	13.7
Strong leader	27.3
Difficult to say	3.7
Total	100.0



Base = All respondents

	%
Strong leader and democrats	7.0
Strong leader and religious politicians	1.0
Strong leader and strong leader	18.8
Strong leader and difficult to say	.7
Islamic state and democrats	6.0
Islamic state and religious politicians	11.4
Islamic state and strong leader	2.8
Islamic state and difficult to say	.3
Democracy and democrats	41.7
Democracy and religious politicians	1.3
Democracy and strong leader	5.5
Difficult to say and democrats	.6
Difficult to say and strong leader	.2
Difficult to say and difficult to say	2.7
Total	100.0

[Ask all]

Q18 - Irrespective of whether you would like democracy for Iraq or not, what would you say is the most important component of a democracy? What else? What else?

Base = All respondents

	1 st component %	2 nd component %	3 rd component %	Total %
Better life	.5	1.0	.4	1.9
Civil society	.8	.8	.5	2.0
(Fair) Elections	7.4	5.6	1.6	14.6
Equality	.7	2.7	2.0	5.4
Issues of freedom	34.2	9.4	3.3	46.9
Responding to people's needs	1.3	1.4	.6	3.3
Government by the people for the people	1.1	.8	.6	2.5
Human rights	.3	.4	.2	.9
Independence	.7	.9	.4	2.0
Jobs	.4	.7	.3	1.4
Justice	2.7	3.4	2.2	8.2
Multi-party system	.6	1.0	.3	1.9
Parliament	1.6	1.0	.6	3.2
Security/Stability	3.0	4.1	1.1	8.2
Unity of Iraq	.7	.4	.1	1.2
Other	4.3	6.4	3.9	14.6
Do not know any/further component of democracy	9.8	6.5	5.4	9.8
Not sure/no answer	29.9	53.5	76.7	29.9
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	157.9



[Ask all]

Q19 - And what would you say is definitively not a component of a democracy?

Base = All respondents

	%
Appointed government (not elected)	.7
Dictatorship/Autocracy	14.9
Extremism	.9
Freedom without certain limits	.8
Ignoring people's opinions	.6
Injustice and exploitation	5.0
No freedom	2.0
No security	1.4
Occupation and foreign control	1.4
Racism	1.5
No division between state and religion	1.1
Terrorism	2.8
Rigged/unfair elections	1.6
Political violence	2.6
Fear	.4
Corruption	.8
Other	4.4
Do not know any components of democracy	23.0
Not sure/no answer	34.0
Total	100.0

[Ask all]

Q20 - Which structure should Iraq have in future?

Base = All respondents

	%
One unified Iraq with central government in Baghdad	79.0
A group of regional states	14.0
Dividing the country into separate independent states	3.8
Difficult to say	3.3
Total	100.0

[Ask all]

Q21 - How interested would you say you are in politics?

Base = All respondents

	%
Very interested	17.5
Somewhat interested	36.4
Not very interested	21.7
Not at all interested	19.8
Not sure/no answer	4.7
Total	100.0



[Ask all]

Q22 - Over the past 12 months, would you say your interest in political matters has increased, stayed the same or decreased?

Base = All respondents

	%
Has increased	30.9
Stayed the same	48.0
Has decreased	10.0
Difficult to say	11.0
Total	100.0

[Ask all]

Q23 - Now I would like you to look at this card. I am going to read out some different forms of political action that people can take, and I would like you to tell me, for each one, whether you have actually done any of these things, whether you might do it or would never, under any circumstances, do it.

Base = All respondents

	Have done	Might do	Would never do	Not sure/no answer	Total
	%	%	%	%	%
Talking with other people about politics	46.0	15.0	35.6	3.4	100.0
Voting at elections	17.5	61.8	18.4	2.3	100.0
Joining a political party or action group	4.8	13.4	75.3	6.5	100.0
Taking action such as demonstrating	5.1	19.3	70.3	5.2	100.0
Using violence or force if it becomes necessary	.5	11.9	82.1	5.6	100.0



[Ask those who have heard of political parties (Q14A) and have or would vote at elections (Q23)]

Q24 - A. As you may know, there are now a variety of political parties in Iraq. Please tell me which one you would vote for in a national election.

B. And, which party/parties would you never vote for?

Base = Respondents who are aware of political parties and have/would vote at elections

	Party would vote for	Party would not vote for
	%	%
Islamic Al-Dawa Party	10.0	2.4
Kurdistan Democratic Party / PDK	7.7	.3
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan / PUK	6.9	.5
Iraqi Islamic Party	4.2	.4
Higher Council of Islamic Revolution	3.9	1.6
Al-Baath Party	1.7	6.1
Islamic Union Party	1.2	1.3
Iraqi Communist Party	.8	7.5
Allah Party	.8	.6
Iraqi Democratic National Movement	.7	.1
Followers of Al-Said Mohammed Sadiq Al-Sadir	.6	.4
Democratic National Party	.5	.1
Ashurian Democratic Party	.4	.1
Wifaq National Movement	.2	.4
Al-Taliah Party	.2	.2
Kurdistan Islamic Union (Yagerto)	.1	.3
National Iraqi Conference Party	.2	1.4
The Movement of Free Officers	.1	-
Ashurian Union	.1	.1
Constitutional Monarchy Movement	.1	.1
Al-adalah wal tanimiah Al-Iraqi Party (Justice and Development Party)	.1	-
Turkmen Islamic Party	.1	.0
Al-Bajaje Party (Independent Politicians Movement)	.0	-
Kildan Ashurian Party	.0	.1
National Iraqi Movement	.0	.7
Socialist Al-Nassiry Party	.0	-
Turkmen Front Party	.0	.4
Zahmatkeshan	.0	-
National Alliance Movement	-	.1
Liberal Democratic Party	-	.1
National Coalition Movement	-	.0
Other	1.0	.9
Refused	27.8	34.5
Don't know	30.2	39.2
Total	100.0	100.0



[Ask all]

Q25 - Now that you have told me about your political action, I would like to ask you what you find acceptable or not acceptable about the political action of other people.

Base = Respondents who are aware of the organisation

	Acceptable	Not acceptable	Not sure/NA	Total
	%	%	%	%
Attacks on coalition forces	17.3	78.0	4.7	100.0
Attacks on the CPA	13.6	81.7	4.6	100.0
Attacks on foreigners working alongside the CPA	10.2	85.7	4.0	100.0
Attacks on Iraqis who work for the CPA	4.6	92.7	2.7	100.0
Attacks on foreigners who work for the UN and similar international humanitarian organisations	4.3	92.6	3.1	100.0
Attacks on Iraqis who work for the UN and similar international humanitarian organisations	2.7	95.1	2.2	100.0
Attacks on the New Iraqi police	1.5	96.6	2.0	100.0

[Ask those who heard of the coalition forces – Q14A]

Q26 - Do you strongly support, somewhat support, somewhat oppose or strongly oppose the presence of Coalition Forces in Iraq?

Base = Respondents who are aware of the coalition forces

	%
Strongly support	13.2
Somewhat support	26.3
Somewhat oppose	19.6
Strongly oppose	31.3
Difficult to say	9.6
Total	100.0



[Ask those who heard of the coalition forces – Q14A]

Q27 - If you have had personally any encounters with Coalition Force soldiers, was your last encounter very positive, somewhat positive, somewhat negative or very negative?

Base = Respondents who are aware of the coalition forces

	%
Very positive	3.5
Somewhat positive	5.8
Somewhat negative	2.5
Very negative	5.9
Never had a personal encounter with coalition forces soldiers	77.5
Difficult to say	4.8
Total	100.0

[Ask all]

Q28 - For each of the following, please tell me whether you think it would be very effective, somewhat effective, not very effective or not at all effective in improving security.

Base = All respondents

		Very effective	Somewhat effective	Not very effective	Not at all effective	Not sure/no answer	Total
Creating job opportunities for the unemployed	%	91.1	4.9	1.0	.5	2.5	100.0
Training and hiring more Iraqi local police	%	76.7	16.7	2.0	1.4	3.3	100.0
Transferring all political authority to an Iraqi government	%	68.3	18.9	3.7	2.4	6.7	100.0
Retraining and rehiring military officers and soldiers from the old regime	%	39.5	21.0	10.1	20.9	8.4	100.0
Increasing foot patrols of U.S. and coalition forces in Iraqi neighbourhoods	%	25.0	21.4	15.1	27.8	10.8	100.0
Immediate departure of coalition forces	%	30.2	12.7	14.0	29.8	13.4	100.0
Giving more authority to independent neighbourhood militias	%	23.1	18.7	11.1	31.1	16.0	100.0



[Ask those who heard of the coalition forces – Q14A]

Q29 - How long do you think U.S. and other Coalition Forces should remain in Iraq?

Base = Respondents who are aware of the coalition forces

	%
They should leave now	15.1
They should remain for a few months	8.3
They should remain for six months to a year	6.1
They should remain for more than one year	4.3
They should remain until security is restored	18.3
They should remain until an Iraqi government is in place	35.8
They should never leave	1.5
Difficult to say	10.6
Total	100.0



\$Polls

ABC NEWS POLL: IRAQ - WHERE THINGS STAND


EMBARGOED FOR RELEASE AFTER 6:30 P.M., Monday, March 15, 2004

While Ambivalent About the War, Most Iraqis Report a Better Life

A year after the bombs began to fall, Iraqis express ambivalence about the U.S.-led invasion of their country, but not about its effect: Most say their lives are going well and have improved since before the war, and expectations for the future are very high.

Worries exist – locally about joblessness, nationally about security – boosting desire for a “single strong leader,” at least in the short-term. Yet the first media-sponsored national public opinion poll in Iraq also finds a strikingly optimistic people, expressing growing interest in politics, broad rejection of political violence, rising trust in the Iraqi police and army and preference for an inclusive and ultimately a democratic government.

More Iraqis say the United States was right than say it was wrong to lead the invasion, but by just 48 to 39 percent, with 13 percent expressing no opinion – hardly the unreserved welcome some U.S. policymakers had anticipated.




As m... the country; more
oppo... though most also say

they should stay for the time being); and relatively few express confidence in those forces, in the U.S.-led Coalition Provisional Authority, or in the Iraqi Governing Council.

These results are from an ABC News poll conducted among a random, representative sample of 2,737 Iraqis in face-to-face interviews across the country from Feb. 9-28. Part of ABC's weeklong series, "Iraq: Where Things Stand," marking the first anniversary of the war, the poll was co-sponsored with ABC by the German broadcasting network ARD, the BBC and the NHK in Japan, with sampling and field work by Oxford Research International of Oxford, England.

The poll finds that 78 percent of Iraqis reject violence against coalition forces, although 17 percent – a sixth of the population – call such attacks "acceptable." One percent, for comparison, call it acceptable to attack members of the new Iraqi police.

There are huge differences in these and many other questions between Arab Iraqis, who account for 79 percent of the population, and the Kurdish minority (17 percent). Forty percent of Arabs say it was right for the United States to invade; that soars to 87 percent of Kurds. Just one-third of Arabs say the war liberated rather than humiliated Iraq; it's 82 percent of Kurds. Thirty percent of Arabs support the presence of coalition forces, again compared with 82 percent of Kurds. Positive views of the invasion also are held disproportionately in the South of the country, as well as in the Kurdish north.




US-led invasion:	All	Arabs	Kurds
Was right	48%	40%	87%
Was wrong	39	46	9

Liberated Iraq	42%	33%	82%
Humiliated Iraq	41	48	11
Presence of coalition forces:			
Support	39%	30%	82%
Oppose	51	60	12
Attacks on coalition forces:			
Acceptable	17%	21%	2%
Unacceptable	78	74	96

PERSONAL LIVES – On a personal level, seven in 10 Iraqis say things overall are going well for them – a result that might surprise outsiders imagining the worst of life in Iraq today. Fifty-six percent say their lives are better now than before the war, compared with 19 percent who say things are worse (23 percent, the same). And the level of personal optimism is extraordinary: Seventy-one percent expect their lives to improve over the next year.

Again there are regional and ethnic differences. In the Kurdish north, 70 percent say their lives overall are better than before the war; in the south, 63 percent. That declines to 54 percent in the central region, and falls under half – to 46 percent – in the greater Baghdad area, home to more than a quarter of Iraqis.



How Iraqis see their lives overall

How things are going today:	All	North	South	Central	Baghdad
Good	70%	85%	65%	70%	67%
Bad	29	14	34	28	32
Compared to a year ago, before the war:					
Better	56%	70%	63%	54%	46%
Same	23	15	21	22	31
Worse	19	13	13	23	23
How they'll be a year from now:					
Better	71%	83%	74%	70%	63%
Same	9	4	6	10	16
Worse	7	1	4	9	10

Locally, unhappiness is highest by far with the availability of jobs (69 percent say it's bad) and the supply of electricity (64 percent negative). Local schools are rated positively (by 72 percent), and smaller majorities give positive ratings to the availability of basic household goods and the adequacy of local crime protection. About half give positive ratings to the availability of medical care, clean water and household goods beyond the basics, and to local government.

Iraqis divide in their rating of the local security situation now, but strikingly, 54 percent say security where they live is better now than it was before the war. However, for some, local security clearly is a great concern; 22 percent call it the single biggest problem in their lives, more than any other mention ("no job" is second, 12 percent). Local security concerns peak in greater Baghdad, where they're cited by 36 percent as the top problem, compared to a low of eight percent in Kurdistan.

Notably, across the country, no more than 26 percent say any of these conditions are worse now than a year ago; in each about four in 10 or more say things are better; and in each sizable majorities – mostly three-quarters – expect things to improve over the next 12 months.


There's political danger, of course, if these expectations go unmet.

Ratings of specific local conditions

	Today		Compared to pre-war			Expectations-1 yr.		
	Good	Bad	Better	Worse	Same	Better	Worse	Same
Schools	72%	26	47%	9	41	74%	3	14
Household basics	56	41	47	16	35	76	3	10
Crime protection	53	44	50	21	26	75	4	11
Medical care	51	47	44	16	38	75	3	12
Clean water	50	48	41	16	40	75	4	13
Local gov't	50	38	44	16	29	69	4	12
Additional goods	49	46	44	17	35	75	3	10
Security	49	50	54	26	18	74	5	10
Electricity	35	64	43	23	32	74	5	11
Jobs	26	69	39	25	31	73	4	11

SECURITY – While less of a local issue for many Iraqis, security at the national level is a vast concern; the public's top overall priority, by a huge margin, is "regaining public security in the country." Sixty-four percent give it "first priority" for the next 12 months; out of a dozen issues tested, no other even breaks into double digits.

Combining first, second and third priorities produces a more complete list: Eighty-five percent mention security in one of those slots; 55 percent, rebuilding the infrastructure; 30 percent, holding national elections; 30 percent, "ensuring that people can make a decent living" and about as many, "reviving the economy." Last on the list: "Dealing with members of the previous government," cited as a priority by only two percent.



	First, second or third priority*	First Priority
Regaining public security	85%	64%
Rebuilding the infrastructure	55	7
Holding elections for national gov't	30	8
Ensuring that people can make a decent living	30	4
Reviving the economy	28	3
Regaining Iraqi governance	17	3
Ensuring that religious ideals are followed	16	3
Increasing oil production	13	2
Rebuilding the education system	10	1
Ensuring that Iraq could not be		

attacked from the outside	7	1
Giving people more say in their communities	3	1
Dealing with members of the previous government	2	1

*Up to three answers accepted

COALITION FORCES – As noted, 51 percent oppose the presence of coalition forces – but that doesn't mean most want them withdrawn immediately, likely because of security concerns. Fifteen percent of Iraqis say the forces should leave the country now; by contrast, 36 percent say they should remain until a new government is in place; 18 percent, until security is restored.

How long should coalition forces remain?

Until Iraq gov't is in place	36%
Until security is restored	18
Leave now	15
Six months or more	10
Few months	8

Just over three-quarters of Iraqis – 77 percent – say they personally never have had any encounter with coalition forces. Those who've had such encounters divide on the experience: about half call it a positive encounter; half, negative.

POLITICS – Politically, the survey finds that Iraqis overwhelmingly want their nation to remain united and centralized – 79 percent say so, compared with 14 percent who prefer a federated group of regional states, and four percent who want the country broken into separate nations. Among Iraqi Kurds, federated regional states – but not fully independent ones – are preferred.

Preferences for Iraq's future governance

	All	Arabs	Kurds
Unified country, central government in Baghdad	79%	90%	26%
Regional states with a federal government	14	5	58
Divide into separate independent states	4	2	12

There is relatively little support for a religious theocracy – it's low on the list of preferred forms of government.

In one change from the first national poll in Iraq by Oxford Research International last fall, more now call for a "single strong Iraqi leader" – 47 percent say one will be needed a year from now, up from 27 percent previously. That's more than say "an Iraqi democracy" will be needed, now 28 percent (essentially unchanged).

This interest in a strong leader (not necessarily an undemocratic one) seems based in security concerns. In an open-ended follow-up, references to "freedom" dominate support

for democracy, while those who express support for a single strong leader are more apt to cite the need for security and order in their country.

Iraq's needs for governance

	In 1 year	In 5 years
Single strong Iraqi leader	47%	35%
Iraqi democracy	28	42
Government of religious leaders	10	10
Group of strong Iraqi leaders	3	3
Government of experts/managers	2	2
Iraqi Governing Council	2	*
UN transition government	1	1
Government of Iraqi military leaders	1	*
Coalition Provisional Authority	1	1

In another question, without a time frame mentioned, democracy wins more support than two other options – a strong leader, but one who rules “for life”; or an Islamic state. Forty-nine percent choose democracy, 28 percent a “strong leader” and 21 percent an Islamic state.

Preferred political system

Democracy	49%
Strong leader “for life”	28
Islamic state	21

As noted, more Iraqis express interest in politics – 54 percent, up from 39 percent in November – and 31 percent say their interest in politics has increased in the past year, three times the number who say it's decreased. Women are more apt than men to express interest in politics, though it's up among both groups.

FRAGMENTATION – But other results suggest a level of political fragmentation that may challenge the country's political development, and throws into some question the notion of early elections. Despite interest in a strong leader, six in 10 Iraqis can't name a single national leader they trust (though even more can't name one they specifically mistrust).

Sixty-one percent express little or no trust in political parties, and nearly seven in 10 don't identify themselves with any party. The only parties that emerge with more than minimal support are either Islamist or Kurdish; respondents named more than 25 individual parties, but most had less than one percent support. (All were volunteered in response to an open-ended question.)

Political party support

Islamic Al-Dawa Party	14%
Kurdistan Democratic Party (PDK)	11
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK)	10

Iraqi Islamic Party	6
Higher Council of Islamic Revolution	5
All other individual mentions	2 or fewer

Three-quarters say joining a political party is something they "would never, under any circumstances, do"; indeed after decades of repression, more than a third, 36 percent, say that simply talking with other people about politics is something they would never do.

	Have done	Might do	Would never do
Talk with others about politics	46%	15	36
Vote in elections	17	62	18
Join a political party	5	13	75
Take action like demonstrating	5	19	70
Use violence/force if needed	*	12	82

Choices also are fragmented when Iraqis are asked which national leader they "trust the most"—more than 40 individual answers, each with few mentions. Only five received mentions from more than three percent:

- Ibrahim Al-Jaafari, eight percent (main spokesman for the Islamic Dawa Party);
- Massoud Barzani, six percent (leader of the Kurdistan Democratic Party);
- Jalal Talabani, six percent (leader of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan);
- Sayyid Al-Sistani, five percent (the country's leading Shiite cleric, sometimes described as the most powerful man in Iraq); and
- Adnan Pachachi, four percent (foreign minister in the government deposed by Saddam Hussein in 1968, he founded the Independent Democratic Movement last month.)


One figure, meanwhile, was cited by 10 percent as a leader they "don't trust at all" — Ahmed Chalabi, former leader of the London-based Iraqi National Congress, now a member of the Iraqi Governing Council.

TRUST — In terms of confidence in institutions, the gainers, as noted, are the Iraqi police — 68 percent express trust in it, up from 45 percent in November — and the Iraqi army, with 56 percent trust, up from 39 percent in the fall.

Confidence (not necessarily in political terms) peaks at 70 percent for "religious leaders." No other institutions receive majority trust; notable are the IGC, at 39 percent, the CPA, at 28 percent; and the U.S. and U.K. forces, at 25 percent.

	% confident
Religious leaders	70%
The police	68
New Iraqi Army	56
Local leaders in your community	50
Iraqi Media Network TV	50
Ministries in Baghdad	44
The press	43

The United Nations	40
The (Iraqi Governing) Council	39
The CPA	28
Political parties	28
US and UK occupation forces	25



MODEL – Few Iraqis see non-Arab nations as a model for their country – just six percent cite the United States, five percent Japan – but many more want those nations to play a role in rebuilding Iraq. Among top mentions, 36 percent say the United States should play a role in rebuilding the country, 36 percent Japan, 22 percent the United Kingdom, 22 percent France, and 17 percent Germany.

Again in terms of a model for the country, 24 percent say it doesn't need one. The only other mention above single digits is the United Arab Emirates, a primarily Sunni federation of largely independent city-states (it was cited by 26 percent of Sunnis compared with 15 percent of Shia Muslims, but was top-ranked, by far, in both groups.)

RELIGION – In religious terms, 96 percent of Iraqis are Muslim. In this poll 40 percent identified themselves as Sunni Muslim, 33 percent as Shia, and 23 percent did not cite an affiliation within Islam. Given the potential of sectarian strife and history of repression, there may be reluctance to discuss religious matters in Iraq; just 55 percent say they had even heard of "Iraq's religious leaders," in aggregate. Of those who say they had heard of them, 81 percent of Shia Muslims expressed confidence in these leaders, compared with 57 percent of Sunnis.

In another difference, 92 percent of Shiites prefer a unified Iraq with its central government in Baghdad, compared with two-thirds of Sunnis. And a quarter of Sunnis called attacks on coalition forces acceptable, compared with 11 percent of Shiites.

DEMOGRAPHICS - The poll also paints a compelling demographic portrait of the Iraqi people. In just 20 percent of Iraqi households does the main breadwinner hold a full-time, outside job; 58 percent are self-employed. Average household income is the equivalent of \$164 per month, for an average of eight people per household.

Eighty-one percent of households have a refrigerator; 44 percent, an air conditioner (the average daily high temperature in Baghdad in August is 108 degrees); 44 percent, a washing machine; 37 percent, a telephone; 21 percent, a still camera. There are disparities across regions, with the south of the country substantially poorer.

The poll was conducted among Iraqis age 15 and up; those under age 18 accounted for 10 percent of the total sample (their attitudes are not strikingly different from their elders'). Iraq is a young country: Sixty-six percent of Iraqis 15 and up are under age 35, compared with 36 percent of Americans age 15 and up.

METHODOLOGY - This poll was conducted for ABC News, ARD, the BBC and NHK by Oxford Research International of Oxford, England. Interviews were conducted in person, in Arabic and Kurdish, among a random national sample of 2,737 Iraqis age 15 and up from Feb. 9-28, 2004. The results have a two-point error margin.

Analysis by Gary Langer.

ABC News polls can be found at ABCNEWS.com on the Internet at:

<http://abcnews.go.com/sections/us/PollVault/PollVault.html>

Media contact [REDACTED] or [REDACTED]

Results follow.

*= less than 0.5 percent.

1. Overall, how would you say things are going in your life these days - very good, quite good, quite bad, or very bad?

	-----Good-----			-----Bad-----			No
	NET	Very	Quite	NET	Quite	Very	opin.
2/28/04	70	13	57	29	14	15	1

2. Compared to a year ago, I mean before the war in Spring 2003, are things overall in your life much better now, somewhat better, about the same, somewhat worse or much worse?

	-----Better-----			About	-----Worse-----			No
	NET	Much	Somewhat	the same	NET	Somewhat	Much	op.
2/28/04	56	22	35	23	19	13	6	2



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BAGHDAD

Lead/Ad

CPolls.

INFO MEMO

March 14, 2004

FOR: THE ADMINISTRATOR

FROM:




SUBJECT: Notes on 13 March IRI Focus Group on Ad Campaign, Story Boards and Elections


The attached IRI report on the election campaign covers perceptions of Iraqiya and Hoorah as well as general political perceptions. This info memo covers only matters that relate to polling and other information about Iraqi opinion. StratCom will report separately on story boards and ad campaign.


- Polling supports the positive assessments of Al-Iraqiyah, which now enjoys considerable confidence.
- We are going to field a poll to test the sense that Jazeera and Arabiyah are anti-Iraq.
- A number of polls show the UN is not particularly trusted here. Generally speaking, the UN enjoys a level of trust that is about at par with the GC and above that of the Coalition. We are fielding a poll with questions testing who is trusted to run elections.


ATTACHMENTS: 13 March IRI Memo on story boards, elections focus groups
Distribution List


COORDINATION: StratCom -



















COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY
BAGHDAD

Safe/Beal

Polks

INFO MEMO

March 5, 2004

FOR: THE ADMINISTRATOR

FROM: [REDACTED]

SUBJECT: 24 February IRI Focus Group in Nasariyah

The report reaches you late because technical communications failures prevented delivery to CPA.

As usual, [REDACTED] report contains important nuggets.

- As before, "making and keeping promises," is a resonant theme.
- IGC adequate interim solution, but not a substitute for elections.
- Chalabi seen as an American who arrived in Nassariyah on an American tank in an American uniform.
- Nasariyahns want someone who will work not just for Iraq, but for them.
- They are pleased that the Italians moved out of the center of town, but now deride them as cowards who use the Iraqi Police to protect them.
- They like 15-minute speeches more than Saddam's long ones, but only if you have something to say.
- They said they would probably tune-in your speeches if they knew ahead of time when you were speaking and what the subject was to be.

ATTACHMENTS: IRI focus group report: "Local Politics and Perceptions of Amb. Bremer in Nasariyah"

COORDINATION: NONE



Beamer
COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY
BAGHDAD

CPA/15.

INFO MEMO

10-Mar-04

FOR: THE ADMINISTRATOR
FROM: [REDACTED]
SUBJECT: INR Analysis of 22-29 Feb IIACSS Data
REF: 3 March INFO MEMO "First Look at 2 March Results"

The INR opinion alert does not cover new data. It is their take on same data used in Ref INFO MEMO. For example, INR's analysis notes geographic breakdowns which the "First Look," memo did not.

INR's opinion alerts are circulated in the Department of State and to the national security community in Washington.

The opinion alert summary says findings "underscore the challenges of finding an acceptable form of interim government, particularly within the current security environment which heightens Iraqi concerns over sectarian conflict and U.S. motives for staying in Iraq."

The opinion alert emphasizes the following:

- High acceptability of caucuses in Baghdad, Basrah, Mosul and Ramadi and rejection in Karbala and Hillah.
- High value Iraqis place on direct vote
- Support for women's rights.
- Suspicion that CFs responsible for attacks and that CFs want to stay.
- Concern over sectarian war

I have sent an email to INR expressing concern over the sub-head, "Attacks Heighten Concern over Sectarian Tensions and U.S. Motives for Staying in Iraq." First, the assertion that concern is "heightened" by the attacks is not supported by the data or text; and, second, that the casual reader will assume that the "attacks" mentioned are the Ashoura attacks (even though the report notes that the poll was taken before Ashoura).

ATTACHMENTS: INR "Opinion Alert"
Distribution List

COORDINATION: Counselors [REDACTED]

OFFICE OF RESEARCH

NEAR EAST OPINION ALERT

DEPARTMENT OF STATE - WASHINGTON, DC 20520

March 8, 2004

L-05-04

Iraqis Value Nationwide Elections and Women's Rights in Formation of New Government; Few Favor Role for Governing Council in the Interim

Attacks Heighten Concern over Sectarian Tensions and U.S. Motives for Staying in Iraq

A February survey fielded just before the Iraqi Governing Council's Constitutional agreement and the Ashura attacks shows that most Iraqis look forward to voting in 2005 and support the interim constitutional provision giving women a significant role in the new government. Other findings underscore the challenges of finding an acceptable form of interim government, particularly within the current security environment which heightens Iraqi concerns over sectarian conflict and U.S. motives for staying in Iraq.

Many in Baghdad, Basrah, Mosul and Ramadi Say Local Caucuses Acceptable to Create Interim Government

When presented with four possible alternatives for creating an interim Iraqi government, Iraqis in Ramadi (89%), Mosul (84%) and six in ten in Baghdad (61%) and Basrah (60%) think an "acceptable" approach would be to use "local caucuses to select a legislature to create an interim government."

No more than half in any city would find it acceptable to create the interim government by expanding the Governing Council, and even fewer would accept turning interim authority over to the current members of Governing Council. No more than a quarter in any city would accept "an unelected body of Iraqis appointed by the UN."

Iraqis in Hilla and Karbala have issues with each of these options. No more than 1 in 10 finds any of them acceptable; nine in ten say each are unacceptable (with eight-in-ten saying they are completely unacceptable).

**Table 1. Support for Possible Alternatives to Create Interim Government
(% Somewhat or Completely Acceptable)**

	Baghdad	Basrah	Mosul	Ramadi	Karbala	Hilla
Local caucuses select a legislature and the legislature creates an interim government.	61%	60%	84%	89%	6%	12%
The current Iraqi Governing Council becomes the interim government.	36	35	26	32	8	6
An expanded form of the current Iraqi Governing Council becomes the interim government.	38	46	39	22	7	7
An alternative unelected board is appointed by the UN as an interim government.	22	24	21	17	2	4

Findings from the Office of Research survey in Iraq are based on face-to-face interviews conducted among 1187 urban Iraqi adults, ages 18 and over, in Baghdad (N=402), Basrah (N=195), Mosul (N=237), Hilla (N=109), Karbala (N=116) and Ramadi (N=128). The poll was carried out between February 22 and 29, 2004. The margin of error for the entire sample is approximately ± 4 percent, but varies among cities. Prepared by [REDACTED]

Iraqis Underscore Value They Place on Casting Direct Vote

The interim constitution calls for nationwide elections to be held no later than January 31, 2005. Majorities say they would be willing to wait even "as late as December 2005" to transfer sovereignty to an Iraqi government in order to hold direct elections (58% Mosul, 67% Baghdad, 77% Basrah, 84% Ramadi, 90% Hilla, and 91% Karbala). No more than a third believes it is more important to transfer power as soon as possible to an Iraqi government "if it means giving power to an unelected government" (36% Mosul, 29% Baghdad, 17% Basrah, 10% Ramadi, 7% Hilla, 6% Karbala).

Large Majorities Support Basic Rights for Women

Large majorities in each of these cities support the right of women to hold any job for which they are qualified (95-99%); to vote without influence from her family (82-98%); and to have the same civic and economic rights as men, such as practicing trades or being a member in vocational and social organizations (72-98%).

Most also support women having the same legal rights as men (62% in Mosul and 76-91% other cities). Six in ten in Karbala (61%) and larger majorities in the other cities believe women should have the right to choose their clothing without the government enforcing an Islamic dress code (71-96%).

There is more of a divide on whether women should be allowed to hold the same political offices as men. Majorities (57-74%) in Ramadi, Basrah, Baghdad and Mosul agree, but majorities *disagree* in Karbala (66% vs. 32% agree) and Hilla (57% vs. 42% agree). Asked separately whether the new constitution should require that "some positions, such as seats in the legislature and ministries" be reserved for women, half in Karbala and majorities elsewhere agree.

Support for Women's Right to: (% overall)

hold any job qualified for	97%
vote without pressure	95%
equal civic & econ rights	85%
choose style of clothing	84%
equal legal rights	78%
Hold pol. office	71%

Table 2. Percent Who Strongly Agree:

	Baghdad	Basrah	Mosul	Hilla	Karbala	Ramadi
The attacks are an attempt to incite divisions and civil war in Iraq.	70%	85%	84%	91%	94%	13%
The attacks are an effort to disrupt the plan for transferring responsibility for our security to Iraqi forces.	59	66	78	91	91	3
➤ The attacks are an effort by U.S. forces to persuade others that they need to remain in Iraq.	54	53	29	75	70	81
The attacks emphasize the need for the continued presence of Coalition Forces in our country.	43	52	44	37	36	6
The attacks are an effort to liberate Iraq from U.S. and Coalition occupation.	6	9	1	2	1	80

Most See Attacks as Effort to Heighten Sectarian Tensions and Disrupt Transfer of Security to Iraqi Forces


According to survey results gathered before the Ashura bombings, six in ten in Ramadi and eight in ten or more in other cities strongly or somewhat agree that such attacks are attempts to incite ethnic and sectarian divisions and civil war in Iraq (Table 2 above shows percentages that *strongly* agree). Similar majorities also interpret the attacks as an effort to disrupt the transfer of security responsibilities to Iraqi forces.

Many Suspect that U.S. Forces Are Involved In Attacks To Justify Need For Them to Stay

About two-thirds in Baghdad, Basrah and Mosul and fewer in Karbala (51%), Hilla (45%) and Ramadi (43%) strongly/somewhat agree that the attacks reinforce the need for continued presence of Coalition Forces. At the same time, large majorities (between 72-94%, 55% Mosul) believe that U.S. forces are involved in the attacks in order to justify the need for their continued presence in Iraq.

These suspicions feed Iraqi expectations that the coalition forces will not leave Iraq voluntarily. Only minorities (8-23%) believe that the U.S. will depart Iraq as promised. Majorities across the board think they will leave only when "forced" or that they will "stay in Iraq forever."

Do You Believe the U.S. Will...?



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
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
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COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY
BAGHDAD

INFO MEMO

25 February 2004

FOR: THE ADMINISTRATOR

FROM: [REDACTED]

SUBJECT: Baghdad Focus Group: Don't Celebrate Regime Fall; Make & Keep Promises

Steve Moore of IRI has presented another tight and useful focus group report. Two focus groups (men and women) met yesterday. Key findings:

- Do not celebrate the April 9 fall of the regime. Any observation should be somber. Names like "Day of Sorrow" were preferred. (DRH Comment: This suggests that a somber ceremony commemorating Saddam's victims would be appropriate.)
- This group also said they want to see you "meeting with average Iraqis, listening to their problems and working to solve them. Men and women want to see you on television weekly.
- The physical scars of war matter. (DRH Comment: Destroying and removing war-damaged buildings should probably move up on our priority list. Implode them and hire Iraqis to haul away the rubble.)

ATTACHMENTS: IRI Public Opinion Report: "One Year Anniversary of the Fall of the Regime and Perceptions of Ambassador Bremer"

DISTRIBUTION:

Stratcom: [REDACTED]

Governance: [REDACTED]

IRI: [REDACTED]

EXEC: [REDACTED]

Counselors: [REDACTED]

(b)(6)



COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY
BAGHDAD

Φ Polls-

INFO MEMO

DATE 21 February 2004

FOR: THE ADMINISTRATOR


FROM: [REDACTED]

SUBJECT: Iraqis Unlikely to Support GC as Interim Government

The attached analysis draws on public opinion polling to illustrate why Iraqis are unlikely to support the Government Council as an interim government.

ATTACHMENTS: Analysis of Iraqi Opinion: "Iraqis Unlikely to Support GC as Interim Government"

COORDINATION: Governance, [REDACTED] - Copy Only
Strategic Communications [REDACTED] - Copy Only
Strategic Communications [REDACTED] Copy Only
Strategic Communications [REDACTED] - Copy Only
IRI, [REDACTED] - Copy Only
Deputy Administrator, Ambassador Jones - Copy Only
Counselor [REDACTED] b(1a)





Analysis of Iraqi Opinion


21 February 2004

Iraqis Unlikely to Support GC as Interim Government

A number of polls indicate that the Governing Council is unlikely to have much popular support as an interim government, even if expanded to include more members.


While the GC enjoys some popularity in relatively tranquil areas such as Diwaniyay and Hillah (IRI Poll Dec 11-18)...

Fate of GC after 30 June



[REDACTED]

After 30 June Covering Council Should...



Even this limited support is suspect because of the “patriotism effect,” whereby Iraqis place confidence in nascent or suspect institutions simply because they are Iraqi. That the “patriotism effect” may be working for the GC as a whole is borne out by the low popularity of individual GC members, only four of whom (Jafri, Pachachi, al-Hakim and ul-Uloom) have higher positives than negatives.

Support for Individual GC Members - IACSS Jan 18-25



Additionally, the pre-test (Baghdad only) of a new questionnaire to be fielded in the coming days (results due 3 March) shows disapprovals around 90% when respondents are asked about either the GC or an expanded GC as an interim government. (NB: Pre-tests, which are used to test the comprehension of questions being asked and other technical issues, are much less reliable than the final poll. They indicate general directions and likely outcomes. It is unlikely that the final poll will show such high negatives as the pre-test.)

Drafted: 

4 points

Preliminary data from new State Department poll

Very large majorities think attacks more harmful than helpful

Security and safety are the most urgent issues in all cities but Mosul, followed by Infrastructure and Economy and Jobs. Overall across the six cities, half have heard a great deal or fair amount about the Ramadan attacks against the Red Crescent, the Al Rasheed and the Iraqi police.

Very large majorities overall say that the attacks against the following targets are more harmful than helpful

- international organizations involved in the reconstruction of Iraq (94%),
- Iraqi police (96%),
- foreign embassies (89%),
- Iraqi civilians (98%),
- power and water systems (98%) and oil pipelines and refineries (98%)

Slightly smaller majorities overall think that attacks against civilian officials of the CPA (80%), including with Iraqi civilians who work for the CPA (83%), are more harmful than helpful.

. What is your opinion about the most urgent issues Facing your community currently? [OPEN-ENDED, PRE-CODED] [INTERVIEWER CODE FIRST RESPONSE].							
	Baghdad	Basra	Mosul	Kirkuk	Hilla	Diwaniya	Overall
- General security and safety/crime	61%	54	9	44	46	60	48
- Repairing infrastructure, such as electricity, gas, power, water	13%	5	18	12	23	11	13
- Economic issues/unemployment/poverty	12%	22	56	19	17	18	23

People have differing views on whether certain actions taken for Iraq's liberation are more helpful or more harmful for the development of our country. In your opinion, do you think the Attacks against U.S. and other coalition forces are more helpful or harmful?

	Baghdad	Basra	Mosul	Kirkuk	Hilla	Diwaniya	Overall
helpful	23%	32	23	26	17	13	23
harmful	67%	51	65	60	75	82	66

Do you think the Attacks against international organizations involved in reconstruction have been carried out by:

	Baghdad	Basra	Mosul	Kirkuk	Hilla	Diwaniya	Overall
Groups within the country	10	11	5	6	12	9	9
Groups outside the country	33	18	21	35	25	13	26
mix	45	55	44	47	51	57	48
Remainder dk/da							

When totals do not add up to 100 percent, responded either declined to answer or said they did not know.

Polling was conducted by the Iraqi "Independent Institute for Administration and Civil Society Studies" (IIACSS) using Iraqi interviewers. State/INR/R paid for the poll, devised the questions and approved the methodology. They are double checking the data with a special eye on Basra.



OPINION ANALYSIS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE • WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520

January 29, 2004

M-13-04

In Key Cities, Iraqis Believe Security Has Improved; Most Have Greater Confidence in Police than in Coalition Forces *In Sunni Triangle, Iraqis want Troops to Go Home Immediately*



*An Office of Research survey conducted December 31st to January 7th in Baghdad, Basrah, Mosul, Fallujah, Samarra and Karbala shows that urban Iraqis differentiate between threats to their personal safety and larger threats to their country's security; they lack confidence in Coalition Forces to protect them from either type of threat. Though some Iraqis see benefits from joint patrols of Iraqi and Coalition security forces, residents of Sunni towns tend to feel more threatened than protected by Coalition soldiers, which explains why they see Coalition Forces as part of the problem, not the solution.**

- Iraqis tend to fear general street crime and low-grade explosions as the greatest threats to their *personal security*. In Karbala, there is particular concern for large terrorist-type attacks, while in Mosul, Fallujah and Samarra, residents worry about violence caused by encounters with Coalition soldiers. Most Iraqis see the greatest threat to their *country's security* to be sectarian or ethnic conflict and large-scale attacks.
- Compared to assessments from last August, considerably more in Baghdad, Basra and Fallujah say that conditions both for peace in Iraq and for safety in their neighborhoods have improved.
- No more than 21 percent in any city say the Coalition Forces are very effective in "keeping law and order on the streets," and no more than one-third believe they are very effective in protecting Iraqis from "major threats like invasion and civil war."
- Still, many in Baghdad, Basrah and Mosul, and to some extent in Karbala, endorse joint patrols of Coalition and Iraqi security forces for the next six months. Residents of the Arab Sunni towns are less supportive of such cooperation. In sharp contrast to opinion elsewhere, majorities in Fallujah and Samarra say they would feel *safer* if Coalition Forces left immediately.
- Jobs, transfer of governance to Iraqis and hiring Iraqi police continue to be seen as the best ways to improve security.

**Findings from the third Office of Research survey in Iraq are based on face-to-face interviews conducted among 1212 urban Iraqi adults, ages 18 and over, in Baghdad (N=429), Basrah (N=216), Mosul (N=209), Fallujah (N=140), Samarra (N=103) and Karbala (N=115). The poll was carried out between December 31, 2003 and January 7, 2004. The margin of error for the entire sample is approximately ± 4 percent, but varies among cities. Please see appendix for specifics and methodological details, including a map displaying the location of the cities surveyed.*


Street Crime Top Personal Threat; Residents of Sunni Towns Feel Threat from Coalition Forces

When asked which type of violence they consider most dangerous to themselves and their families (from a list of options), Iraqis in Baghdad, Basrah, Mosul and Fallujah most often name general street crime. Baghdad and Basrah residents identify low-grade ("street") bombs next, while those in Mosul and Fallujah identify violence caused by encounters with coalition forces (Figures 1 and 2, and Appendix Table 1). In Samarra, residents are as likely to name violence caused by encounters with coalition forces as they are to name street crime. In Karbala, Iraqis are just slightly more likely to name large-scale bomb attacks ("such as those against Iraqi police stations and international organizations") than street crime or explosions from low-grade ("street") bombs.




Iraqis Fear Sectarian or Ethnic War Most for Country's Security

Except in Karbala, urban Iraqis worry most about the potential for sectarian or ethnic conflict to threaten their country's security (combined, up to 55% in Mosul and 57% in Samarra) (Figures 3 and 4). Many are also concerned about both large and small-scale bombings. In each city, about one in ten worries about violence caused by encounters with Coalition Forces (up to 17% in Fallujah) or external threats (up to 13% in Basrah; Appendix Table 2).



2




Some Sense of Improvement in Security Conditions and Neighborhood Safety

Despite concerns about these threats, considerably more in Baghdad, Basrah and Fallujah now say that conditions both for peace in Iraq and for safety in their neighborhoods have improved (Figures 5 and 6 below). Currently, six in ten in Basrah and half in Baghdad believe that conditions for peace have improved over the last three months. In Karbala, evaluations are more negative, with six in ten saying conditions have deteriorated over three months' time; slight pluralities in Fallujah and Samarra believe conditions have worsened (see Table 1 below, and Appendix Table 3).

Iraqis are more positive about the safety of their neighborhoods. Six in ten in Mosul (63%), Fallujah (61%) and Samarra (63%), and about half in Karbala (51%) and Baghdad (46%), report feeling "very safe." But only a third in Basrah (31%) feel very safe (Appendix Tables 4 and 5). This increased sense of safety may be linked to the return of local police to Iraqi neighborhoods. Seven in ten across all cities express confidence in the new Iraqi police – more than levels of confidence in the new Iraqi army, Iraqi ministries or the Governing Council (Appendix Table 6). No more than about a third in any of these cities express confidence in Coalition troops to improve the situation in Iraq (38% in Baghdad, 32% Basrah, 27% Mosul), and levels are particularly low in Fallujah (10%), Samarra (18%) and Karbala (20%).

**Figure 5. Conditions For Peace:
Percent Who Say Improved**



**Figure 6. Neighborhood Safety:
Percent Who Feel Very Safe**




Table 1. Over Last Three Months Conditions for Peace Have...

	Baghdad	Basrah	Mosul	Fallujah	Samarra	Karbala
	01/04	01/04	01/04	01/04	01/04	01/04
Improved	51%	59%	38%	33%	34%	27%
Worsened	25	17	39	44	43	61
No difference	24	24	22	23	22	10

Office of Research survey, December 31, 2003 – January 7, 2004

Coalition Forces Not Seen as Effective in Protecting Iraqis

While Iraqis tend to credit Coalition Force efforts to protect coalition troops and compounds (Appendix Table 7), they are less impressed with Force efforts to prevent threats to Iraqis. No more than 21 percent say Coalition Forces are very effective at "keeping law and order on the streets," and no more than a third believe the Forces are very effective in protecting Iraqis from "major threats like invasion and civil war."

Many in Baghdad, Basrah, Karbala and Mosul See Value in Iraqi-Coalition Security Cooperation
Cooperation between local Iraqi and Coalition security forces does have some appeal as a way to improve security. Majorities in Baghdad (86%), Basrah (89%), Mosul (63%) and Karbala (61%) believe that increasing cooperation and joint patrols of Coalition Forces and the Iraqi police would be at least somewhat effective for improving security. And residents in these cities do not want the Coalition Forces to leave Iraq any time soon. Majorities (and a prevailing half in Karbala) say they would feel *less safe* if the Forces were to withdraw immediately (Table 2).

When people are asked to consider the next six months and to choose whether Coalition Forces, Iraqi security forces or joint patrols should take primary responsibility for larger security threats ("like civil war and invasions"), opinions in these four cities are divided (See Table 3a and 3b). But on matters of local security ("maintaining law and order on Iraqi streets"), residents in these cities narrowly prefer that Iraqi forces take the lead. In Karbala, 44 percent prefer Iraqi forces over joint efforts or the Coalition alone (18% combined, but 39% don't know).

In Sunni Triangle, Iraqis Oppose Security Cooperation and Say Troops Should Go Home

Residents of Fallujah and Samarra are less convinced than others of the benefits of increased cooperation between Iraqi and Coalition Forces. These Iraqis are at least twice as likely to say that Iraqi armed forces alone – rather than Coalition Forces alone or a joint Coalition Force/Iraqi security team – should have primary responsibility for protecting Iraqis from both major and personal security threats. In fact, of all cities surveyed, only in Fallujah and Samarra do majorities believe that they would feel *more safe* if the Coalition Forces left immediately.

Table 2. If Coalition Forces Left Immediately, Iraqis Would Feel...											
	Baghdad		Basrah		Mosul	Fallujah	Samarra	Karbala	Kirkuk	Hilla	Diwaniya
	11/03	01/04	11/03	01/04	01/04	01/04	01/04	01/04	11/03	11/03	11/03
More Safe	12%	19	6%	17%	28%			24%	15%	7%	13%
Less Safe						29	41				
No Difference	13	15	8	12	10	12	2	13	14	5	1

Office of Research surveys, November 19, 2003 - January 7, 2004

Table 3a. In Next Six Months, Primary Responsibility for Protecting Iraqis from Major Security Threats Should Be...						
	Baghdad	Basrah	Mosul	Fallujah	Samarra	Karbala
Iraqi Armed Forces	50%	38%	58%	71%	64%	50%
Coalition Forces	7	8	12	4	9	14
Joint Iraqi-Coalition Efforts	42	51	27	19	23	26

Office of Research survey, December 31, 2003 - January 7, 2004

Table 3b. In Next Six Months, Primary Responsibility for Maintaining Law and Order on Iraqi Streets Should Be...						
	Baghdad	Basrah	Mosul	Fallujah	Samarra	Karbala
Iraqi Armed Forces	56%	53%	53%	67%	71%	44%
Coalition Forces	6	9	10	4	5	2
Joint Iraqi-Coalition Efforts	38	35	26	22	20	16

Office of Research survey, December 31, 2003 - January 7, 2004

Jobs, Iraqi Governance and Hiring Local Police Seen as Most Effective Means to Increase Security
As in other Iraqi cities surveyed previously, large majorities in this survey believe that training and hiring more Iraqi police would be very effective in improving the security situation, along with transferring all political authority to an Iraqi government and – above all – providing jobs to the unemployed (Table 4). Six in ten or more across cities also believe that rehiring and retraining the Iraqi military would improve security.

Table 4. Best Ways to Increase Security									
<i>% who say following actions would be VERY effective</i>									
	Baghdad	Basrah	Mosul	Fallujah	Samarra	Karbala	Kirkuk	Hilla	Diwanliya
	01/04	01/04	01/04	01/04	01/04	01/04	11/03	11/03	11/03
Creating job opportunities for the unemployed	98%	97%	99%	100%	99%	97%	98%	99%	99%
Transferring all political authority to an Iraqi government	90	76	90	96	93	91	89	83	83
Training and hiring more Iraqi local police	91	72	84	76	84	80	86	92	92
Retraining and rehiring military officers and soldiers from the old regime	87	57	85	82	87	83	73	55	55
Office of Research surveys, November 19, 2003 – January 7, 2004									

Prepared by Dina Smeltz and Jodi Nachtwey (smeltzD@state.gov; nachtweyJL@state.gov).
Issued by The Office of Research, U.S. Department of State (202-203-7932).


METHODOLOGY

Face-to-face interviews were conducted among 1,212 Iraqi adults residing in the cities of Baghdad, Basra, Mosul, Fallujah, Samarra, and Karbala. Interviews were carried out between December 31, 2003 and January 7, 2004. Please note that the size of the sample for each city is not proportionate to the overall population.

A multi-stage probability-based sample was drawn, utilizing residential listings from Iraq's 1997 Population and Housing Census. Census sub-districts were utilized as primary sampling units (PSUs), with 80 PSUs being selected using probability-proportional-to-size procedures. Due to the size of Baghdad, the city was stratified by neighborhood to ensure that all city areas were represented in the sample. Interviewers were given all address details for households at four sampling points within each PSU. Five interviews were conducted at each sampling point. Within each selected household, one respondent was randomly selected using the last birthday method.

The margin of error, assuming a 95% confidence level and the clustering effects of a multi-stage design, is approximately $\pm 4\%$ for the overall sample. The margin of error varies across the samples of the individual cities as follows:

City	Sample Size	Margin of Error
Baghdad	429	$\pm 6.7\%$
Basrah	216	$\pm 13.3\%$
Mosul	209	$\pm 13.6\%$
Fallujah	140	$\pm 16.6\%$
Samarra	103	$\pm 19.3\%$
Karbala	115	$\pm 18.3\%$
Total	1212	$\pm 3.9\%$



Appendix Tables

Appendix Table 1. Greatest Threat to Self and Family						
	Baghdad	Basrah	Mosul	Fallujah	Samarra	Karbala
Street crime	47%	63%	45%	42%	38%	22%
Street bombs	26	20	13	11	11	19
Large bombings such as those against Iraqi police stations and international organizations	9	4	6	5	3	29
Armed encounters between Iraqis and Coalition Forces and others	7	4	26	26	38	9
Armed encounters with religious or tribal militia	1	1	--	--	2	2
Revenge killings/Baath killings	3	4	3	5	1	--
Financial extortion	1	1	2	2	--	4
Sectarian war	6	3	1	7	4	4
Ethnic war	1	--	1	1	1	--
Outside threats	--	1	--	--	--	1

Office of Research survey, December 31, 2003 – January 7, 2004

Appendix Table 2. Greatest Threat to Iraq						
	Baghdad	Basrah	Mosul	Fallujah	Samarra	Karbala
Street crime	8%	11%	5%	13%	6%	15%
Street bombs	12	16	6	7	7	10
Large bombings such as those against Iraqi police stations and international organizations	25	18	6	9	2	25
Armed encounters between Iraqis and Coalition Forces and others	8	9	10	17	10	15
Armed encounters with religious or tribal militia	2	2	2	--	3	2
Revenge killings/Baath killings	2	3	3	1	5	1
Financial extortion	1	1	2	4	3	4
Sectarian war	31	26	36	26	45	6
Ethnic war	6	2	19	11	12	2
Outside threats	5	13	7	11	8	6

Office of Research survey, December 31, 2003 – January 7, 2004

Appendix Table 3. Over Last Three Months Conditions for Peace Have...													
	Baghdad		Basrah		Mosul	Fallujah		Samarra	Karbala	Ramadi	Najaf	Suleymania	Erbil
	8/03	01/04	8/03	01/04	01/04	08/03	01/04	01/04	01/04	8/03	8/03	8/03	8/03
Improved	22%	51%	24%	59%	38%	25	33%	34%	27%	16%	15%	56%	58%
Worsened	53	25	58	17	39	63	44	43	61	66	71	18	9
No difference	24	24	18	24	22	10	23	22	10	17	10	25	23

Office of Research surveys, August 20 – September 5, 2003 and December 31, 2003 – January 7, 2004

Appendix Table 4. How safe do you feel in your neighborhood?										
	Baghdad				Basrah				Fallujah	
	08/03	11/03	01/04		08/03	11/03	01/04		08/03	01/04
Very safe	24%	31%			24%	18%	31%		37%	
Not very safe			42							27
Not safe	26	12	11		17	12	11		4	11
Office of Research survey, December 31, 2003 – January 7, 2004										

Office of Research survey, December 31, 2003 – January 7, 2004

Appendix Table 5. How safe do you feel in your neighborhood?										
	Mosul	Samarra	Karbala	Kirkuk	Hilla	Diwaniya	Najaf	Ramadi	Suleymanla	Erbil
	01/04	01/04	01/04	11/03	11/03	11/03	8/03	8/03	8/03	8/03
Very safe				42%			35%	41%		
Not very safe	28	27	29	40	30	22		44	33	36
Not safe	9	10	15	12	4	7	12	14	1	3

Office of Research surveys, August 20 – September 5, 2003 and December 31, 2003 – January 7, 2004

Appendix Table 6. Confidence in Institutions						
% somewhat or very confident						
	Baghdad	Basrah	Mosul	Fallujah	Samarra	Karbala
Iraqi police	82	89	80	74	72	71
New Iraqi Army	72	79	54	52	35	55
Iraqi ministries	60	64	43	54	36	51
Governing Council	62	67	33	27	30	57
CPA	42	41	31	10	14	27
Coalition Forces	38	32	27	10	18	20

Office of Research survey, December 31, 2003 – January 7, 2004

Appendix Table 7. Coalition Forces Seen as Less Effective in Protecting Iraqis						
% who Coalition Forces are VERY effective in the following activities						
	Baghdad	Basrah	Mosul	Fallujah	Samarra	Karbala
Keeping law and order in the streets	21%	17%	21%	5%	15%	16%
Tracking down criminals	15	11	14	5	12	11
Protecting Iraqis from major threats	32	22	33	13	21	18
Working cooperatively with Iraqi security forces	43	27	34	12	27	27
Protecting their forces and compounds	63	68	60	31	47	55

Office of Research survey, December 31, 2003 – January 7, 2004

Appendix Table 8. Actions Taken by Coalition Forces Seen as Less Effective to Improving Security											
% who say following actions would be SOMEWHAT OR VERY effective											
	Baghdad		Basrah		Mosul	Fallujah	Samarra	Karbala	Kirkuk	Hilla	Diwaniya
	11/03	01/04	11/03	01/04	01/04	01/04	01/04	01/04	11/03	11/03	11/03
Immediate departure of Coalition Forces	43	53	44	43	56	79	72	63	52	32	40
Increasing cooperation and joint patrols of Coalition Forces and the Iraqi police	--	86	--	89	63	37	52	61	--	--	--
Increasing foot patrols of U.S. and Coalition Forces in Iraqi neighborhoods	41	40	55	48	32	18	19	25	53	36	39

-- not asked in December

Office of Research Survey, December 31, 2003 – January 7, 2004