

UNCLAS

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ACTION: EXEC

INFO: IPC COS

DISSEMINATION: EXEC /1
CHARGE: PROG

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OO RUEHGB
DE RUEHC #7793/01 1241638
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O R 031634Z MAY 04
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO ALL DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR POSTS IMMEDIATE
SPECIAL EMBASSY PROGRAM
INFO RUEHGB/CPA BAGHDAD 1456
BT
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 STATE 097793

E.O. 12958: N/A

TAGS: IZ

SUBJECT: IRAQ: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON IRAQI SOVEREIGNTY

1. This is an action request. Posts are requested to actively seek opportunities to use the Qs and As in para 3 with host governments, other appropriate contacts and the media. Our aim is to correct misunderstandings that have arisen regarding the transfer of governing authority from the Coalition Provisional Authority to the Iraqi Interim Government (IIG). This telegram has been cleared with SEP.

2. -----Questions and Answers-----

QUESTION 1: Will sovereignty of the Iraqi Interim Government be limited?

ANSWER 1:

--No, Iraq will be fully sovereign.

--However, if the question is, "Will there be limits on the authority of the government that takes office on June

30 (the Iraqi Interim Government, IIG)?" the answer is: we anticipate there will be.

----Any limits will be decided upon by Iraqis. Many Iraqis (including Ayatollah Sistani) and UN Special Advisor Lakdhar Brahimi have spoken of the need for the unelected, short-term IIG to have limited authorities, especially on

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Doc II

Strategic Communications:

General

its capacity to bind future Iraqi governments. This reflects the view that such commitments are best left to an elected Iraqi government; an Iraqi Transitional Government will be elected by January 2005.

---No other country will have any sovereignty over Iraq. Contrary to some press reporting, the Multinational Force will not possess any sovereignty after June 30, regardless of any limits that Iraqis decide to place on the IIG.

Every government is constrained by its country's own constitutions and laws, and by international law. It is common for "caretaker" governments to operate under additional constraints on their actions.

---We certainly are not in a position to pre-judge the outcome of the consultative process that Ambassador Brahimi is leading in Iraq to facilitate the formation of the interim government by the Iraqis. However, it does seem clear that, given the concerns of significant segments of the Iraqi people, the interim government's authorities may be limited in some ways.

---The IIG will need to focus on the day-to-day running of the government, building security, and preparation for elections that will take place no later than January 31, 2005.

---The Multinational Force will continue to have security responsibilities and authorities as outlined by the Transitional Administrative Law, UN Security Council Resolution 1511 and any future Security Council Resolution.

QUESTION 2: What happens on June 30?

ANSWER 2: On June 30, the occupation will end. The Iraqi Interim Government will take office and exercise sovereignty on behalf of the Iraqi people. The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and the Iraqi Governing

Council will cease to exist. The United States will open an Embassy headed by an Ambassador that will be accredited to the government of a fully sovereign Iraq.

QUESTION 3: What will the June 30 government (IIG) look like?

ANSWER 3:

--The UN Secretary General's Special Adviser, Lakhdar

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SECSTATE 97793

Brahimi, has presented a plan to form an Iraqi Interim Government (IIG) by the end of May. The U.S. strongly supports Mr. Brahimi's efforts and his plan.

--In the outline of his plan that Mr. Brahimi presented to the UN Security Council, he called for an IIG that consisted of a President, two Vice Presidents and a Prime Minister leading a Cabinet. He emphasized the importance of technical expertise in the people chosen for these positions.

--Mr. Brahimi also stressed that the priorities for this government would be the day-to-day workings of government and preparing for the elections for the Iraqi Transitional Government to be held by January 31, 2005.

--Mr. Brahimi has said that he will be returning to Iraq soon and hopes to have the Iraqi Interim Government chosen by the end of May so that it has time to prepare to assume full sovereignty on June 30.

--An Annex to the Transitional Administrative Law will codify the structure and authorities of the Interim Iraqi Government.

QUESTION 4: What limits will there be on the sovereignty of the June 30 government (IIG)?

ANSWER 4:

--During Mr. Brahimi's first trip to Iraq in February, many Iraqis made clear their conviction that Iraqis should themselves impose limits on the authority of the IIG which will not be chosen by direct national elections, and which will govern Iraq only for a short time.

-- It will be up the Iraqis, working with Mr. Brahimi, to determine what limitations the Iraqis choose to impose on the authorities of their own government during this interim period.

--The United States will not have any occupation authority or "sovereignty" after June 30, regardless of any limits placed on the IIG.

-- The Multinational Force will continue to have responsibilities and authorities related to security as described by the TAL, UN Security Council Resolution 1511 and possibly a future UN Security Council Resolution.

QUESTION 5: How can the interim government be called "sovereign" if the Iraqi people do not elect its members?

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SECSTATE 97793

ANSWER 5:

--The fact that the government during this interim period will not be elected does not mean that Iraq is not sovereign.

--However, the majority of Iraqis believe only a government chosen via direct national elections will be fully "legitimate." Mr. Brahimi and a broad range of Iraqis with whom he has consulted agree that elections manifesting Iraq's democracy cannot be held before June 30.

--That is why the Transitional Administrative Law a document crafted by Iraqis - set a deadline for elections no later than January 31, 2005. It is why the UN is working with Iraqis now to establish a proper framework for elections.

--Because the interim government will not be elected, a wide spectrum of Iraqis agree that its core task should be to prepare for elections while running the essential day-to-day operations of government until those elections can occur.

--The fact that Iraqis have adopted this two-phase transition, laid out in the Transitional Administrative Law, does not prevent Iraq from being fully sovereign.

QUESTION 6: How can Iraq be sovereign if it has security forces in Iraq (including Iraqi security forces) under US command after June 30?

ANSWER 6:

--Iraqis themselves recognize that their security forces and institutions will not be capable of protecting the Iraqi people after June 30 without help. They thus recognize the need for a security partnership with the MNF, the international force that is providing security in Iraq pending the development of Iraqi forces and institutions capable of doing so on their own.

--This is recognized in the TAL, unanimously adopted by the Iraqi Governing Council, which provides that "consistent with Iraq's status as a sovereign state . . . the Iraqi Armed Forces will be a principal partner in the MNF operating in Iraq under unified command."

--A country putting its forces under another state's command does not diminish that country's sovereignty. Nor does having a Multinational Force operating in a nation's

territory degrade its sovereignty.

--Our intention is that Iraq and the other coalition member countries will form a partnership to provide security in Iraq.

--As part of such similar partnerships, many countries have placed their deployed forces under the operational control of military officers from another country. A sovereign authority may make such a decision when it views it as necessary for its own security, without in any way derogating from its own sovereignty.

--A key goal of the United States, both now and after June 30, is to assist Iraq to build its own security forces and institutions, so that they become capable of guaranteeing Iraq's security on their own, without MNF assistance.

QUESTION 7: What are your intentions regarding a new UN Security Council resolution to legitimize the interim government and impose limits on its authorities?

ANSWER 7: We have stated often that we support the adoption of a new resolution on Iraq before the interim

Iraqi government assumes power on June 30. We anticipate that a new resolution would express the international community's strong support for Iraq's progress toward stability and prosperity, and would endorse the interim government as the first phase in Iraq's transition. However, it will be the choices of Iraqis themselves, as embodied in a Transitional Administrative Law Annex setting out the parameters of the interim government, that will provide crucial legitimacy for the interim government. Iraqis working with the United Nations Special Adviser, Mr. Brahimi, will formulate that Annex.

QUESTION 8: Will the interim government be able to conclude international economic agreements?

ANSWER 8: This will depend on choices the Iraqis will need to make. However, we anticipate that the interim government will have the authority necessary to carry out the essential operations of government, including reconstruction; and that this will include authority to agree to reduce debt, receive new concessional lending, and reach agreements with multilateral and bilateral donors.

QUESTION 9: Will the interim government be able to adopt laws?

ANSWER 9: This will depend on choices the Iraqis will need to make. However, we anticipate that the interim

government will have some authority to adopt rules necessary to carry out the essential operations of government or other functions that it may be assigned. Iraqis, working with Mr. Brahimi, will consider this issue and formulate the authorities of the interim government.

END OF QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

3. Background (for posts information only): As traditionally looked at in the context of occupation law, occupation is considered provisional and the "sovereignty" of the occupied territory is not vested in the occupying power. Along these lines, each of the relevant Security Council resolutions has reaffirmed the sovereignty of Iraq. Thus, Iraq was "sovereign" before the occupation, retained its "sovereignty" during the occupation, and will remain sovereign after the occupation. At the same time, the word is frequently used in public statements in a

different sense - e.g., in Special Adviser Brahimi's statement on 27 April in which he spoke of the formation in Iraq of an IIG "to which sovereignty will be transferred on 30 June". When used in this sense, some have raised questions about whether the IIG will have "full sovereignty" when it assumes power on 30 June if there are some limitations on the IIG's governing authority.

Many segments of Iraqi society have made clear that, during the 7-month period before elections for the Iraqi Transitional Government, they believe that the IIG should serve as a "caretaker" government with certain self-imposed limitations on its authorities. In this context, it is likely that the Brahimi-led process will result in certain constraints on what the IIG can do (e.g., constraints that will exist under the domestic law of Iraq, and constraints that exist on its actions under treaties to which it is a party, such as the UN Charter) but, as of the end of the occupation on 30 June, neither the USG nor the government of any third country will have supervening authority to govern Iraq. There is thus no substance to charges that there will be limits on the "sovereignty of the IIG", even understanding that phrase in the sense sometimes used by Brahimi and others in public statements (and the sense in which it is used above in describing the Iraqi government). Washington is providing the Q's and A's in para 2 for posts' use in dispelling such charges, an effort to which Washington attaches great importance.

4. Minimize considered.
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COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY
BAGHDAD

Communications

ACTION MEMO

March 6, 2004

FOR: THE ADMINISTRATOR
FROM: [REDACTED]
SUBJECT: Iraq Communications and Media Commission (ICMC)

This memorandum forwards for your approval nominees for the three ICMC Commissioners and the Commission's Director General required by CPA Order No. 65 to begin operating the Commission. According to the Order one of these three Commissioners should also be appointed as the initial Chair. The remaining six Commissioners should be appointed by 30 June.

The IGC Media Committee's Chairman Samir Sumaidy would prefer to appoint all nine Commissioners at the same time. However, he is unable to predict how long this might take. As the ICMC is required to be operational by 20 April we need to appoint those required to commence operations now. These names have been approved by the IGC Media Committee and cleared through the CPA/Washington security screening system. They are:

For Commissioner:

- Dr. Amal Shlash ^(Shia) born in Baghdad. Ph.D. in Economics from the UK. Currently a Professor of Economics and Chairperson of the board of Bayt al-Hikma (House of Wisdom), Iraq's premier think-tank. Iraqi member of the "Strategic Review Board". Has written several books and studies on Iraq's economy. Possible Chair although she would prefer just to be a Commissioner.
- Dr. Awni Afram Karoumi ^(Assyrian Christian) born in Mosul. Iraq's leading theatre director and producer. Ph.D. in aesthetics and art from Berlin. Taught drama at Baghdad University in the 80's. Recipient of numerous international, regional and Iraqi awards and prizes for his work. Widely known and respected throughout Iraq.
- Mahdi al-Rahim ^(Shia) born in Baghdad, MA in law from the university of Cairo. Became Vice Chairman of the Rafidain Bank and later Secretary General of the Baghdad Chamber of Commerce. Founded and headed

several companies both in Iraq and abroad. He is currently an active participant in the revival of Iraq's private sector. Although Shia - b6
supported by the Pachachi group. Also a possible initial Chair. b7c

None of the nominees has yet agreed to accept the position of Chair and they would prefer to decide this amongst themselves by consensus once they have been appointed. Their nominee will then be provided to the Administrator for appointment pursuant to Order 65.

For Director General:

- **Dr. Siyamend Zaid Othman:** Born in Arbil. Ph.D. in social sciences from Paris. Six years at Amnesty International responsible for the Arabian Peninsula. Later Vice-President for Strategic Planning at United Press International (UPI). Since 1998 worked as senior media consultant for various media and IT organizations including for the State Department and DoD on Iraq. Strong support across the IGC and civil society. (Kurd) b6 b7c

Announcement: We would wish to announce these initial appointments in a Press Release to be issued on Saturday 10 April if possible.

Remaining Commissioners.

Once the core group have been appointed we recommend that they then work in conjunction with the IGC Media Committee, civil society and the communications and media professions to nominate the remaining 6 Commissioners who we should try to appoint by 30 May although the Order gives us until 30 June. This will also allow for more public transparency and consultation, which as a consequence will confer more legitimacy on the Commission itself. We already have a good list of potential candidates and this will form the basis of these discussions.

Salaries:

Order 65 exempts ICMC salaries from the limits set on State Employees under Order No.30 and says that employees of the Commission shall be compensated at rates prescribed by the Administrator. Salaries for employees below DG level will be approved by the Commissioners through the ICMC budget which will be submitted to you for final approval. However, remuneration of the Commissioners and the DG will have to be agreed and approved by you before we can formally appoint the nominees.

Commissioners: We recommend that the Commissioners should be remunerated at a rate comparable to Ministers. As such we believe that \$24K per year would be appropriate and uncontroversial. Although the Board of Commissioners are only required by the Order to meet once a month we believe that they will have to put in considerably more time during the first six months of operations.

Director General: For the DG we consider that we will have to pay a salary commensurate with other such posts in the region. Bearing Point has looked at what inducements would be necessary to attract a DG with the requisite qualifications. Their conclusions take into account:

- o Similar positions across the region.
- o The economic circumstances in Iraq and whether a higher salary than a minister is required and justifiable.
- o Reducing vulnerability to corruption – with particular relevance to the commercial value of the operating licences.

Taking these factors into consideration we recommend a salary band of between \$120 to \$ 150k plus secure accommodation. We understand that this level would be high in comparison to other Iraqi public salaries and that it will set a precedent for other soon to be established regulatory bodies. The budget of the ICMC will easily be able to sustain this level and those recommended for the Commissioners. We have also discussed them with Samir Sumaidy and he is in agreement with our approach.

RECOMMENDATION: We recommend that you approve the appointment of the four nominations in this Memo at the salary levels outlined.

Approve

Disapprove

Approve with modifications

COORDINATION: Communications/ [redacted] (ok)
General Counsel/ [redacted] (ok)
Governance Team/ [redacted] (ok)



COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY
BAGHDAD

04/29/04
@stratcom

ACTION MEMO

LPB HAS SEEN

April 29, 2004

FOR: THE ADMINISTRATOR
FROM: Deputy Administrator and Chief Operating Officer *AK*
SUBJECT: Iraqi Media Network (IMN) Security Working Group

The purpose is to improve the security of IMN personnel as directed by Ambassador Bremer. Based upon the continued targeting of IMN personnel, we recommend lowering the number of personnel and sites while simultaneously increasing the protection at the remaining IMN facilities. We therefore recommend the following:

1. Due to the current threat situation, site locations, security posture and a desire to maximize IMN coverage, close seven sites. (Al Kut, Diwaniyah, Khanaqin, An Najaf, Umm Qasr, An Nasiriya, Souq Al Sheioukh).
2. Reduce staffing at the remaining sites and only produce the highest priority programming.
3. Move the Karbala operation to outside the city. IMN personnel can accomplish this within one week.
4. Provide one Personnel Security Detachment (PSD) to each site for protection of Iraqi personnel. This will require approximately 20 armored vehicles, 100 personnel, and appropriate equipment (weapons, communications, and vests). IMN's security firm, Reed Inc, believes they can have the vehicles armored locally as another PSD firm (Triple Canopy) has already begun this process. ✓
5. Move to a lower profile PSD vehicle by no longer using government license plates and begin using vehicles that resemble local taxis.
6. Conduct only essential travel.
7. Expedite the receipt of the satellite phones for each site providing video and data capability between sites and subsequently reduce travel requirements. ✓
8. Provide an armored capability to the buses that are used to transport IMN workers to and from the sites.


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RECOMMENDATION: Approve all actions as stated.

Approve: WJG Disapprove: _____ Approve with modification: _____

ATTACHMENTS: NONE

COORDINATION: IMN/Mr  - ok

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q: start com

Jones, Richard (AMB)

From:
Sent:
To:

(b)(6)

Tuesday, March 30, 2004 11:21 PM

(b)(6)

Cc:

Subject:

RE: Media Development and Regulation SITREP

Iraqi Communications and Media Commission

Order 65 establishing the Iraqi Communications and Media Commission (ICMC) was signed by the Administrator on 21 March. The ICMC will be solely responsible for licensing and regulating telecommunications, broadcasting and information services and other media in Iraq. The commission will promote and defend freedom of the media and assist the media community in Iraq to develop, strengthen and maintain professional working practices that support the media's role as a public watchdog.

The MDT is working to ensure that the ICMC is stood up and takes over its responsibilities from the Ministry of Communications within the 30 deadline provided for within the order. A shortlist of names for the Director General, Chairman and Commissioners has been reviewed and is pending final approval and appointment. An interim location for the core staff has been identified and will be prepared at premises in the Green Zone. Contracts are being prepared with the PMO using supplemental funds allocated for regulatory to refurbish and procure equipment for a permanent location in Baghdad.

Broadcast Licensing

Over 65 applications have been received and are at varying stages within the application process. Of these over 40 were for new operations many of which have demonstrated high levels of technical and professional expertise. The Media Executive Committee of the IGC has delegated authority for interim licensing to the CPA Media Development Team (MDT) until the ICMC becomes operational and has endorsed the issuance of 19 applications. The MDT is continuing in its efforts to contact broadcasters who have so far failed to apply for a licence. A website is under construction which will allow broadcasters to download the relevant application forms and apply on-line.

Public Service Broadcasting

Order 66 establishing an Iraqi Public Broadcasting Corporation ("IPBC") has now been signed by the Administrator. The principle aim of this order is to incorporate the IMN into a public broadcasting structure that will educate, entertain and inform the people of Iraq. The corporation will utilise the facilities of the old state broadcaster and will be part funded by public money however the structure will ensure that it remains independent

and free from political or state control. A board of 9 governors is being selected and this process should be complete by mid April. A public tender for national commercial channels is being prepared and is likely to be launched in the next few weeks.

Training - Vocational Media Training Centre

A proposal paper designed to fund the establishment of a Vocational Media Training Centre to meet the identified training needs of Iraq's Media community has been completed. International Organisations will be canvassed for funding against this proposal and NGOs will subsequently be approached to operationalise its formation. The centre will support the development of fair, objective and independent media in Iraq by providing training for journalists, editors, technical staff and managers across the range of professional disciplines and skills.


CPA Media Development Team
3rd Floor, Convention Centre.
Baghdad.



(b2)

(b)(6)

Action

From: (b)(6)
 Sent: Wednesday, March 10, 2004 12:16 AM
 To: Jones, Richard (AMB)
 Subject: RE: Closure of Al-Hawzah Newspaper

(b)(2) *to Strat Com*

I'm totally convinced we should hit them as hard as we can. But the stress is on the "we." I think we should simply shut them down ourselves rather than wait for the GC which may be hesitant to appear so blatantly and publicly on our side. It'll just make them seem more like our lackeys and open them to attack from other similarly scurrilous newspapers. Plus, us moving against MAS' paper will send a good strong signal that we may move more aggressively against him...

(b)(6)

Director of the Governance Group
 Coalition Provisional Authority
 Baghdad, Iraq

(b)(2)

-----Original Message-----
 From: Jones, Richard (AMB)
 Sent: Tuesday, March 09, 2004 11:03 PM
 To: (b)(6)
 Subject: FW: Closure of Al-Hawzah Newspaper
 Importance: High

(b)(2)

This rag belongs to Muqtada; I'm tempted to say we should go for stronger measures, but I hope that by the end of 30 days we'll have taken other measures against him anyway. What do you think?
 Dick

-----Original Message-----
 From: (b)(6)
 Sent: Tuesday, March 09, 2004 10:43 PM
 To: Jones, Richard (AMB); (b)(6)
 Cc: (b)(6)
 Subject: Closure of Al-Hawzah Newspaper
 Importance: High

(b)(2)

Gentlemen:

Enclosed please find a 6 Mar Action Memo recommending 30-day closure of Al Hawzah newspaper, and a 9 Mar Action Memo responding to questions that Ambassador Bremer raised upon reviewing the first Action Memo.

How hard do we want to hammer this paper?

(b)(6) Please deliver to addressees a hard copy of the classified memo documenting the coverage that prompted this action.

Many thanks, as always.

Best,

3/10/2004

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS

ARBA'EEN COMMUNICATIONS PLAN

Purpose

Millions of people will be participating in the Arba'een religious festival this week. The pilgrims have already begun traveling to holy sites in Karbala, Najaf, Kadamihya (Baghdad) and Samarra. The main religious activities will occur from April 9-11, with the return of the pilgrims ending on or about April 15.

The purpose of this plan is to outline the mechanism by which we will:

- Manage Iraqi expectations of security;
- Reassure Iraqis that the Coalition and Iraqi government are taking great efforts to prevent/respond to terrorist acts;
- Paint terrorists as dishonorable cowards and enemies of the Iraqi people;
- Solicit help in finding and arresting terrorists;
- Make clear that armed militia are easily mistaken for terrorists and should not be present.

Messages

- The Iraqi people are a critical piece in everyone's overall security. Iraqis need to be aware of and report suspicious terrorist activity. Despite the hard work of Coalition forces and Iraqi security forces, they cannot secure Iraq without the help of the Iraqi people.
- No matter how hard we try, we cannot provide 100% security 100% of the time.
- Even if we built a mile-high wall along the entire border of Iraq, we would not be able to fully protect Iraq's from terrorist attacks.
- The Coalition and the relevant Iraq ministries have been coordinating for weeks to develop plans to prevent terrorist attacks and plans to respond to any attacks that do occur.
- After the attacks during Ashura, we reviewed our security arrangements – just as we do every time an incident occurs.
- Terrorists are attempting to halt progress in Iraq and turn back the clock on the Iraqi people. This will not be tolerated, and they will not succeed.
- The goal of the terrorists like Zarqawi is to attack religious festivals such as Arba'een and create sectarian warfare and civil war in Iraq. They will not succeed.

- Because they are easily mistaken for terrorists, armed militia members at the sites of religious activities will be arrested and their weapons confiscated.

Implementing Tools

- **Informal background briefing for Iraqi journalists at Convention Center** during which Nouri Badran (MOI minister), Steve Casteel (MOI senior advisor), CPA Arba'een Coordinator [REDACTED] and General Mark Kimmitt (CJTF7 operations) [or their surrogates] bring together the Iraqi journalists and:
 - solicit their help in stopping terrorists;
 - reiterate the fact that there is no way to provide 100% security 100% of the time;
 - reiterate the fact that the Coalition is planning for the holiday;
 - explain how militias will be handled during the festival;
 - provide overview on preparations thus far.
- **Joint appearance** by GC President and pertinent ministers (Interior, Justice, Health, Foreign Affairs)
- Insertion of the messages during CPA/CJTF7 daily press conferences
- **Joint op-ed** signed by each of the pertinent ministers and submitted to Iraqi news papers
- **Minute-long PSA** to air on IMN by Nouri Badran (or surrogate), cautioning Iraqis to be aware of their surroundings and report suspicious activities;
- **Statement** issued by Governing Council (or Spokesman)

Timing

Background briefing: Wednesday, April 7

Joint Appearance: Thursday, April 8

Statement: Thursday, April 8

Op-ed: Thursday, April 8

PSA: Thursday, April 8-11, to run on al Iraqiya

Attack Contingency Plan

In the event that there is/are significant attacks on pilgrims and/or crowds during the Arba'een commemoration, the following scenario should be implemented:

- **CPA Statement:** CPA will issue a statement condemning attacks.
- **Special Briefing on Attack:** Joint CPA/CJTF-7 briefing on incident in Briefing Room #3 at the Convention Center, as necessary.
- **Arabic Media Monitoring and Truth Squad outreach:** Similar to our response following the al Howza/Yaqubi/Sadr incidents, we will monitor major pan-Arab media for misinformation and erroneous reporting. CPA StratComm staff will continue to contact these stations to demand clarifications and corrections as necessary.
- **Governing Council joint statement** on incident, by individual members on Arabic satellite stations, including al Iraqiya.
- **Iraqi Police Command Center Media link-up:** CPA will steer media calls, as appropriate, to Iraqi Police public affairs officers— to keep an Iraqi face on the situation.



COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY
BAGHDAD

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INFO MEMO

March 30, 2004

FOR: THE ADMINISTRATOR

FROM: [REDACTED]

SUBJECT: Small Focus Group on TAL, LEC Logos and Ministry of Electricity

On March 28, a nine-member, male-only focus group had some interesting observations on the TAL. This info memo does not address logo issues. The group was one-third Christian and unusually pro-American.

- The anti-TAL campaign has force. One member could cite his opposition to "Paragraph C of Article 61" but did not know the content of the paragraph. (2/3's/3 governates),
- Persuasive you men are going door-to-door to collect anti-TAL signatures.
- This group said they thought the anti-TAL brochure they were shown was "unconvincing" and the product of Islamic organizations.
- The idea that the TAL is "anti-Islam" has strong resonance.
- TAL is recognized as the first step in to Iraqi democracy and the departure of CF.
- Iraqiya is seen as improving, but none could name a time when information programming (apart from the news) was broadcast. I have spoken to Kristin Whiting about scheduling the TAL infomercials at established times each day.
- Poor electrical service attributed more to old equipment and stolen parts than the earlier CPA-is-punishing theory.

ATTACHMENTS: IRI Focus Group Report
Distribution List

COORDINATION: NONE

Jones, Richard (AMB)

From: [REDACTED]
Sent: Wednesday, March 24, 2004 4:38 PM
To: Jones, Richard (AMB)
Cc: [REDACTED]
Subject: Hawa -Terrestrial and Satellite TV Radio license

b(2)

1 Communications

Dear Ambassador Jones,

It was a great pleasure meeting you today at Ambassador Walker's office and I highly appreciate the opportunity I had to share with you my thoughts and vision for Iraq. Our discussions today, were both constructive and fruitful and have really encouraged me to turn to you for a solution to the inexplicably tardy CPA decision to grant a Terrestrial and Satellite TV & Radio license to our group.

Attached, kindly find for your kind attention, the recently exchanged correspondence concerning our application for the license and the responses from the people involved in order for you to have a fuller picture of the situation and where we currently stand. As I mentioned, we have already spent a great deal of time, effort and resources on this project and are looking forward to implementing the plan as soon as possible.

Reaffirming once again our common desire to strengthen bilateral relations in all fields, I highly appreciate your concern and kind assistance.

Sincerely,

[REDACTED]

3/25/2004

Jones, Richard (AMB)

From: [REDACTED]
Sent: Monday, March 22, 2004 12:08 PM
To: [REDACTED]
Subject: Recent Word From CPA

b(2)

Mr. [REDACTED]

The email below came in this morning from [REDACTED] CPA Media Commissioner. [REDACTED] is presently in Berlin, and will return to Cairo on Friday. He is available on his standard mobile number.

Best Regards,
[REDACTED]

----- Original Message -----

From: [REDACTED]
To: [REDACTED]
Sent: Monday, March 22, 2004 9:52 AM
Subject: RE: Meeting

b(2)

I spoke with [REDACTED] yesterday he agreed the processes but wishes to brief his committee today. We are in the process of preparing a brief for the committee now. This should mean we will sign the licences tomorrow.

I know the cheque is always in the post - but I'm in the hands of the post office here so to speak. I think we are there now though at last

Jones, Richard (AMB)

From: [REDACTED]
Sent: Sunday, January 11, 2004 9:38 PM
To: [REDACTED]
Subject: FW: TV & Satellite uplink license

b(2)

-----Original Message-----
From: [REDACTED]
Sent: Sunday, January 11, 2004 2:35 PM
To: [REDACTED]
Subject: TV & Satellite uplink license

b(2)

Dear Mr. [REDACTED]

It was a pleasure meeting you during my recent visit to Baghdad on the occasion of negotiating and signing the GSM License for the Central Region. In my capacity as Chairman and CEO of Orascom Telecom Holding (OTH), I would like to express our sincere appreciation of the aid and support that the CPA has extended to OTH and the management team of IRAQNA, which made it possible for us to build the network and launch commercial services in a record time.

[REDACTED] has forwarded to me your email of January 04, 2004. With regards to the release pertaining to the TV & Satellite uplink license, I would like to point out that no declaration was made by us that we were awarded the license. However, based on the email of Mr. [REDACTED] CPA Media Development & Regulation, dated December 18, 2003 (copy attached), whereby we have been informed that the due diligence of our application for Hawa TV & Radio was completed and there is no problem with granting the license, hence, and since our application was accepted as such, we have accordingly declared in the relevant release that we are expecting to be awarded the the license

Until now, however, the license is not yet issued and consequently the mobilization and henceforth the launch of the project is being considerably delayed.

We hope that the above clarifies the matter and we would like to seek your kind intervention to expedite the process of issuing the license in order for Hawa to be able to move forward.

Thank you and best regards
Naguib Sawiris
Chairman & CEO
Orascom Telecom Holding



video Cairo.rtf (589
KB)

b(6)

Video Cairo Sat.

From: (b)(6)
To: [REDACTED]
Sent: Wednesday, March 17, 2004 1:33 PM
Subject: FW: Hawa License

b(2)

Original Message

From: (b)(6)
Sent: Wednesday, March 17, 2004 1:20 PM
To: (b)(6)
Subject: FW: Hawa License

b(2)

Original Message

From: (b)(6)
Sent: Sunday, March 14, 2004 9:40 PM
To: (b)(6)
Cc: [REDACTED]
Subject: RE: Hawa License

b(2)

The ratification I wanted from Bremer came out of his Office today. So you will have your licence definitely this week. I don't really understand the Minister at all he could have signed this licence three months ago, whatever he told you.

Original Message

From: (b)(6)
Sent: 14 March 2004 19:01
To: (b)(6)
Cc: [REDACTED]
Subject: Hawa License

b(2)

Hi (b)(6)

Good to chat with you the other day.

During Iraqi Minister of Communication Haider Jawad al-Abady's recent visit to Cairo, we were fortunate to meet with him on two occasions, and to provide him a Hawa project overview, conveying the progress and vision of the channel. He was enamoured of the passion with which the development team is planning content, and expressed an eagerness to support our launch in any way he can. It was a nice vote of confidence, and a sign our endeavor will be well received.

The technical and IIR development of Hawa is proceeding at full speed, however we have now arrived at a stage at which it seems continuation will be impossible without CPA authorization. An integral part of our operations map calls for full-time satellite connectivity between Baghdad and Cairo. To this end, we will engage in a contract with

3/17/2004

17/03/2004 WED 18:59 100% BY NEW CAIRO P2

Nilest for lease of a dedicated transponder and space segment. However, as is their policy, they will not enter a commercial arrangement with Hawa without a letter of authorization from your department in lieu of a formally issued license. Additionally, as banking relationships are not formalized, the absence of a license or letter of approval threatens to undermine the signing stage.

In your estimation, is it likely your office would be able to issue a letter of approval, thereby allowing Hawa to continue putting required elements in place? We ask, as it seems less and less likely a license will be forthcoming any time soon, and we are rapidly approaching the point at which the channel will not have the necessary diplomatic support to develop further.

We will value your input, and appreciate your continued willingness to engage our efforts. I hope you're well, and look forward to hearing from you.

Best Regards,

Hawa Television and Radio

3/17/2004

17/03/2004 WED 14:52 UTC/RX NO 74203 14003

[REDACTED]
From: [REDACTED]
Sent: 11 December 2016 11:42 PM
To: [REDACTED]
Subject: Broadcast licence application

b(2)

Hi

We have completed our due diligence on your application for Kawa TV and Radio. Your application was completed to high standard for content and technical detail. I see no problem with granting a licence. The documentation has been forwarded from our office to the Ministry of Communications for final approval and licence issuance.

Before the licence can be issued we need to submit the application of \$500 each for TV and Radio to the Ministry in cash. Please arrange to deliver the fee to our Baghdad office as soon as possible to complete the process.

Yours faithfully

[REDACTED]
CFA Media Development and Regulation
3rd Floor, Convention Centre, Baghdad

[REDACTED] b(2)

(b)(6)

b(6)

p 3/19/04

From: (b)(6)
 Sent: Friday, March 19, 2004 7:41 PM
 To: (b)(6)
 Cc: (b)(6)

b(2)

Subject: RE: Protection of IMN Facilities and Personnel
 Importance: High

All -

Per colonel (b)(6) request I am attaching a listing (with grid coordinates) of most of the IMN sites. Additional site coordinates as well as a listing of those sites mostly likely to be forwarded will be sent to you tomorrow. Please contact me with any additional questions. (b)(6)
 Thanks for your attention to this matter.
 Sincerely,
 (b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) Col
 Sent: Friday, March 19, 2004 6:44 PM
 To: (b)(6)
 Cc: (b)(6)

b(2)

(b)(6)

Subject: Protection of IMN Facilities and Personnel

Sirs - Amb Bremer would like a one day and a seven day look at the above by CJTF-7 / MOI. IMN needs to: 1) forward their "IMN Sites" brief (with grids) as soon as practical and 2) identify any sites of particular concern where immediate security measures might be warranted.

thx much

vr

3/20/2004


b(4) to
end of
slides

IMN Sites Update

Harris IMN
Baghdad March, 2004

Central Region Sites

- | | | | | | | | | |
|---------|---------|-----|---------|--------|---------|----------|-------|--------|
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 |
| Baghdad | Shomali | Kut | Karbala | Tikrit | Dewania | Khanaqin | Najaf | Baquba |



b(4)

Central Region Site Coordinates

(b)(3):10 USC §130c

Baghdad

Shomali

Kut

Karbala

Tikrit

Dewania

Khanaqin

Najaf

Baquba

[REDACTED]

Western Region Sites

SYRIA

IRAN

IRAQ

SAUDI ARABIA

10

11

12


13

Ramadi 10


Haditha 11

Al Qa'im 12

Rutba 13



Western Region Sites



A map of Western Iraq showing the locations of four sites: Ramadi (10), Haditha (11), Al Qa'im (12), and Rutba (13). The map includes labels for neighboring countries: SYRIA to the west, IRAN to the north, and SAUDI ARABIA to the south. The sites are marked with numbered circles and connected by a line. A star symbol is located near the southern border of Iraq.

Site Name	Site Number
Ramadi	10
Haditha	11
Al Qa'im	12
Rutba	13

b(4)

Western Region Site Coordinates

(b)(3):10 USC §130c

Ramadi
Haditha
Al Qa'im
Rutba

b(4)

North Region Sites

- | | |
|------------|---|
| Mosul | 1 |
| Kirkuk | 2 |
| Dahuk | 3 |
| Sulaimanya | 4 |
| Irbil | 5 |
| Sinjar | 6 |




b(4)

North Region Site Coordinates

(b)(3):10 USC §130c

- Mosul
- Kirkuk
- Dahook
- Sulaimanya
- Irbil
- Sinjar

South Region Sites



- | | |
|---|-------------|
| 1 | Basrah |
| 2 | Um Qasir |
| 3 | Nasirya |
| 4 | Amarah |
| 5 | Samawa |
| 6 | Ali Gharbi |
| 7 | Suq-Shioukh |
| 8 | Nasir |

b(4)

South Region Site Coordinates

(b)(3):10 USC §130c

Basrah

Um Qasir

Nasirya

Amarah

Samawa

Ali Gharbi

Suq-Shiuokh

Nasir



COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY
BAGHDAD

040221-06

of Staff Gen.

ACTION MEMO

February 19, 2004

FOR: THE ADMINISTRATOR
FROM: [REDACTED] General Counsel
SUBJECT: Suspension of Al Jazeera Media Activities

This memorandum seeks your approval of a draft letter that suspends for 30 days all Al Jazeera satellite transmissions from Iraq. Upon your approval of the letter, we would provide it to Mr. Nouri Badran for his consideration and possible use.

- CPA Order No. 14 prohibits certain media activity that incites violence or civil disorder. This Order does not define the limits of CPA's authority to control media activities during the occupation.
- The laws and usages of war, and Article 53 of the Hague Regulations authorize the CPA, as occupying power, to seize all property adapted for the transmission of news, even if the property belongs to private individuals. This authority does not require proof of the commission of any offense, and is not conditioned upon any particular security threat or incident. Instead, the authority recognizes the essentially military nature of information operations in an occupation. The CPA must restore property seized under this provision, and compensate owners, upon the cessation of hostilities.
- Repeated incidents of unprofessional and undisciplined reporting by Al Jazeera employees demonstrate Al Jazeera's failure effectively to train and supervise its employees. The resulting media coverage has [been grossly inaccurate and has] a destabilizing effect on security and civil order in Iraq.
- As Administrator, you may delegate your authority under the laws and usages of war and Article 53 of the Hague Regulations to the appropriate interim Iraqi Minister, thereby empowering him to direct the suspension of Al Jazeera's media operations. Precluding Al Jazeera from uplinking satellite transmissions from Iraq is the most effective means of temporarily closing down the most visible and influential form of Al Jazeera's media activity.
- Such a delegation may be conditioned upon a determination by the Iraqi Governing Council that temporarily suspending Al Jazeera's media activities will facilitate the maintenance of civil order and security, and the Governing Council's direction to carry out such a suspension.

UNCLASSIFIED

RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) That the Administrator delegate to the interim Iraqi Minister of Interior his authority under the laws and usages of war and Article 53 of the Hague Regulations to suspend for 60 days Al Jazeera's uplinking of satellite transmissions from Iraq, provided that the Governing Council directs such a suspension, based upon its determination that such action will contribute to the maintenance of civil order and security in Iraq.

Approve:

Disapprove:

Approve with modification:

(2) That the Administrator approve the attached draft letter from the interim Iraqi Minister of Interior to Al Jazeera, imposing the 60-day suspension and stating the basis for that action.

Approve:

Disapprove:

Approve with modification:

ATTACHMENTS: Draft Letter to Al Jazeera

COORDINATION: Deputy Administrator – Ambassador Jones ()
Strategic Communications – [REDACTED] ()
Governance Team – [REDACTED] ()

(b)(6)

February 19, 2004

Majed Khader
Chief, Baghdad Bureau
Al Jazeera

Dear Mr. Khader:

The purpose of this memorandum is to advise you that broadcast media activities of Al Jazeera in Iraq are hereby suspended for sixty days. The Iraqi Governing Council has directed this action, based upon its determination that Al Jazeera has failed to properly train and supervise its employees, as evidenced by the facts set forth below.

The infractions have been so serious that they have jeopardized the health and safety of Iraqi citizens and Coalition forces. Accordingly, the Governing Council believes it has exhausted all other remedies. In particular, we are moved to take this action due to a serious criminal conviction of an Al Jazeera staff member. We note that Al Jazeera, despite its professed commitment to forthright journalism, has never seen fit to report on this conviction.

On January 28, 2004, Sittar Kareem was convicted by the Central Criminal Court of Iraq of violating paragraph 219 of the Iraqi Penal Code, which makes it an offense to fail to notify authorities of certain crimes of which the defendant had knowledge. He was sentenced to the maximum authorized punishment of five years' imprisonment. The evidence adduced at trial indicated that Kareem was an employee of Al Jazeera at the time of the wrongdoing for which he was convicted. It further indicated that attacks against Coalition Forces were discussed and planned in his presence, on the premises of the Al Jazeera news bureau.

Al Jazeera should have known that one of its employees, using an Al Jazeera office, was engaged in activities that violate the law, not to mention journalistic ethics.

This is the most serious, but not the only incident in which Al Jazeera's failure properly to train and oversee its employees has threatened public order in Iraq. CPA and the Governing Council have repeatedly discussed such incidents with Al Jazeera Baghdad Bureau management. In each instance, Al Jazeera officials promised to institute training programs, write policy and procedures manuals, and instill proper journalistic practice and ethics among its staff.

Yet Al Jazeera, despite such commitments, has repeatedly failed to correct the practices of staff members. Al Jazeera employees have crossed military and police control lines, failed to obey lawful instructions of authorities at the scene of explosions, refused to give full, accurate answers to lawful questions by proper authorities, and hid evidence of their improper conduct.

On February 10, Al-Jazeera carried a discussion between correspondent Abd-al-Azim Muhammad, reporting from Al-Iskandariyah, and presenter Bassam al-Qadiri in Doha. The live

broadcast suggested, falsely, that Coalition forces may have been responsible for an explosion that killed more than 50 people.

[Muhammad, in part] "There has been extreme tension between the U.S. forces and citizens, who insist that the incident was the result of a U.S. strike or something like that. They are saying that a U.S. aircraft was close to the site.

The incident took place near the Al-Iskandariyah police station... There were no U.S. troops there, but they were deployed at some distance away from the site of the incident. The people of the city insist that the strike was from the U.S. troops, while the U.S. troops prevented us from approaching the area and refused to talk to us. Some are saying that a booby-trapped car could have arrived at the scene of the incident. Some wounded say they were wounded by U.S. troops after the explosion which coincided with the presence of a U.S. column near the scene of the incident.

The U.S. troops may have thought they were targeted by the attack, so they began to fire indiscriminately in various directions, killing or wounding a number of citizens, some of whom were moved to the city's hospital. That was according to some of the wounded who were moved to the hospital."

[Al-Qadiri] Have you been able to monitor the views of the Iraqi public regarding the operations that target members of the Iraqi police?

[Muhammad] Regarding this operation in particular, the people of Al-Iskandariyah insist in front of cameras, reporters and the U.S. troops that the operation was caused by the Americans and that there were no booby-trapped cars, for no cars are allowed to reach the site but police cars. Therefore, there was extreme tension and a demonstration was staged in front of the U.S. troops at the scene of the incident. This has prompted the U.S. troops to direct weapons towards the protesters. The U.S. troops were about to beat us and protesters had they not dispersed in various directions. The U.S. troops then moved forward. Nobody in Al-Iskandariyah is talking about a booby-trapped car although the Iraqi police and U.S. troops believe that it was most likely a booby-trapped car."

In fact, the suggestions are false in their entirety. No U.S. forces bombed the police station, and no U.S. troops fired "indiscriminately." Al Jazeera did not seek official comment from CPA. Nor did it identify any of the alleged witnesses or, it appears, ask them for evidence to support the claims.

On February 16, I understand that CPA officials met with Al Jazeera officials to express deep concern about such conduct. The officials included you, Ahmed Al-Sheikh, a member of the Editorial Board, May Welsch, a producer, and Ahmed Al-Samara'e, a correspondent.

You explained that the correspondent, Mr. Muhammad, claimed that he was surrounded by hostile crowds who were threatening to stone him if he did not report their claims. All of the Al Jazeera officials conceded that this situation, if it in fact existed, is not likely to produce accurate,

dispassionate reporting. You promised to consult with headquarters in Doha and work out procedures to avoid similar problems in the future. These were to include establishing a policy and procedures manual specifically instructing correspondents not to broadcast false, inflammatory accusations against Coalition forces, especially unsourced claims of American complicity in violence against Iraqis.

Yet three days later, on February 19, correspondent Maryam Ubayish reported from Hilla in a similarly irresponsible vein. She said, in part:

“The official account of the incident says two booby-trapped cars targeted the headquarters of the Coalition forces stationed in the city, injuring more than 50 soldiers of different nationalities. But the number of Iraqis who were killed and wounded and the damage caused to some buildings near the base suggest another theory.

[Unidentified Iraqi citizen] At approximately 0800 we were sleeping. Most of our children go to schools and to work. We heard the sound of [a missile] launched from the air. As a military man, I know the direction of the missile. I guess they were planes.”

Again, the claims are totally baseless. And again, there was no attempt to identify the alleged witness, to probe the basis of the claim, or to seek comment from Coalition officials.

Such irresponsible actions not only mislead viewers, but also pose the real threat of violence against Coalition forces. [Accordingly,][←this makes it sound like we were reacting to the Feb. 19th report – is that the case?] on February __, 2004, the Governing Council directed the confiscation of equipment providing satellite up-linking from all Al Jazeera studios in Iraq, and prohibited Al Jazeera from further satellite broadcasting in Iraq for a 60-day period.

All Al Jazeera equipment used to uplink its satellite transmissions from Iraq is hereby confiscated. In addition, Al Jazeera is hereby prohibited from employing any other equipment to uplink its satellite transmissions from Iraq. This confiscation and prohibition against up-linking satellite transmissions shall remain in effect until __, 2004.

Additionally, all non-Iraqi citizens employed by Al Jazeera are hereby directed to leave Iraq as soon as possible, but by no means later than 48 hours after receipt of this notice. All entry permits issued to such persons are hereby revoked.

Violations of CPA Order No. 14 or the Governing Council's decision, as implemented by this letter, will subject the culpable employees of Al Jazeera to detention, arrest, prosecution and a potential punishment of up to one year in prison and a fine of up to USD1,000.00.

Nouri Badran
Minister of Interior



COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY
BAGHDAD

Street Com

INFO MEMO

March 13, 2004

FOR: THE ADMINISTRATOR
FROM: Office of General Counsel
SUBJECT: Response to Questions Regarding Temporary Closure of *Al-Hawzah* Newspaper

This memorandum responds to your question, prompted by the enclosed Action Memorandum, subject as above, dated 11 March 2004, concerning the means by which CPA could enforce the temporary closure of the *Al-Hawzah* newspaper.

The temporary closure of this media outlet can be enforced as follows:

- The temporary closure notice would be served on the offices of the newspaper by Iraqi police, with Coalition assistance as necessary.
- The *Al-Hawzah* officials would be advised that any violation of the terms of the notice could result in more severe action, which could include detention of individuals, confiscation of equipment, fines and permanent closure.
- If publication continues during the 60-day closure period, the next step could involve removing equipment, sealing the premises and detaining staff members.

Prior coordination with CJTF-7 will be necessary before enforcing the closure, in order to arrange appropriate support for the Iraqi police.

UNCLASSIFIED



COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY

BAGHDAD

LPS HAS SEEN

ACTION MEMO

March 11, 2004

FOR: THE ADMINISTRATOR
 FROM: Office of General Counsel
 SUBJECT: Response to Questions Regarding Temporary Closure of *Al-Hawzah* Newspaper

This memorandum responds to the following questions you have raised regarding the Action Memo, subject: Temporary Closure of *Al-Hawzah* Newspaper, dated March 6, 2004, (TAB 1) and seeks your signature on the letter at TAB 2 that will close the newspaper for 60 days:

- "Who is owner?"
 - The newspaper is published by an organization, Maktab as-Sayeed as-Shaheed. This refers to Muqtada al-Sadr's father, "the martyr," who was assassinated.
 - The paper *al-Hawza* is part of Muqtada al-Sadr's organization, in that it is a mouthpiece for *al-Hawza al-Natiga*, one of the names of al-Sadr's organization.
 - Almost every edition includes prominent, large photos of Muqtada al-Sadr on the cover page. In addition, his Friday sermons tend to be published on the front page.
- "Why wouldn't I just close it down?"
 - You could. As Administrator of the CPA, you have broad authority to close the newspaper under the law of occupation. CPA Order Number 14 also provides authority for closing the newspaper where the Order has been violated.
 - The relevant CPA policy advisors, however, recommend a graduated response to *Al-Hawzah's* articles, consistent with the manner in which CPA has dealt with other media organizations that have published or broadcast materials tending to incite violence, so as not to appear heavy-handed with the press.
 - A 60-day suspension of *Al-Hawzah* would be consistent with CPA's past practice.
- Although prior closures of media organizations have been accomplished in coordination with the Governing Council and through closure letters executed by the Minister of the Interior, in

What is an enforcement?

this case the nature of the false communications warrant direct action by CPA. Accordingly, the proposed letter at TAB 2 has been prepared for the Administrator's signature.

RECOMMENDATION: That the Administrator close *Al-Hawzah* for 60 days, by signing the letter at TAB 2.

Approve: _____ Disapprove: _____ Approve with modification: _____

ATTACHMENTS: 1) Action Memo, subject: Temporary Closure of *Al-Hawzah* Newspaper, dated March 6, 2004
2) Letter Closing *Al-Hawzah* Newspaper

COORDINATION: Deputy Administrator [REDACTED] (ok)
Governance Team [REDACTED] (ok)
Strategic Communications [REDACTED] (ok)

UNCLASSIFIED



140306-45

COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY
BAGHDAD

ACTION MEMO

March 6, 2004

FOR: THE ADMINISTRATOR
FROM: Office of General Counsel
SUBJECT: Temporary Closure of Al-Hawzah Newspaper

This memorandum seeks your approval of a draft letter suspending any and all operating licenses for Al-Hawzah newspaper (and any other print media published by Shaykh Abbas al-Rubay'i, his organization or his chief editor, Shaykh Hasan al-Zarkani), and ordering the newspaper closed and the premises sealed for a period of 30 days. Upon your approval of the letter, we would provide it to Mr. Nouri Badran for his consideration and possible use.

- CPA Order No. 14 prohibits media organizations from broadcasting or publishing material that, among other things, incites violence against any individual or group or incites violence against Coalition Forces or CPA personnel.
- Penalties for violating CPA Order Number 14 include:
 - Detention, arrest, prosecution and, if convicted, sentence to up to one year in prison or a fine of up to \$1,000.00.
 - Withdrawal of the license, closure of the operation, confiscation of the property, and sealing of the premises of the offending media organization.
- CPA Order Number 14 does not define the limits of CPA's authority to control media activities during the occupation.
- The laws and usages of war, to include Article 53 of the Hague Regulations, authorize the CPA, as occupying power, to seize all property adapted for the transmission of news, even if the property belongs to private individuals. This authority does not require proof of the commission of any offense, and is not conditioned upon any particular security threat or incident. Instead, the authority recognizes the essentially military nature of information operations in an occupation. The CPA must restore property seized under this provision, and compensate owners, upon the cessation of hostilities.
- Over the past several months, and as recently as February 26, 2004, Al-Hawzah has printed numerous articles that have falsely claimed wrongdoing by the CPA and

Coalition Forces. The repeated nature of these false articles demonstrates intent to cause public unrest and to incite violence against Coalition Forces and CPA personnel.

- Suspending Al-Hazwah's license to operate and ordering the newspaper closed and the premises sealed for 30 days is a measured and appropriate response.
- As Administrator, you may delegate your authority under CPA Order Number 14, the laws and usages of war, to include Article 53 of the Hague Regulations, to the appropriate interim Iraqi Minister, thereby empowering him to direct the closure of Al-Hazwah for 30 days.
- Such a delegation may be conditioned upon a determination by the Iraqi Governing Council that closing Al-Hazwah for 30 days will facilitate the maintenance of civil order and security, and the Governing Council's direction to carry out such a closure.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) That the Administrator delegate to the interim Iraqi Minister of Interior his authority under CPA Order Number 14, the laws and usages of war, to include Article 53 of the Hague Regulations, to suspend Al-Hazwah's (and any other print media published by Shaykh Abbas al-Rubay'i, his organization or his chief editor, Shaykh Hasan al-Zarkani) license to operate and ordering the newspaper closed and the premises sealed for 30 days, provided that the Governing Council directs such a closure, based upon its determination that such action will contribute to the maintenance of civil order and security in Iraq.

Approve:

Disapprove:

Approve with modification:

(2) That the Administrator approve the attached draft letter from the interim Iraqi Minister of Interior to Al-Hawzah, imposing the 30-day closure and stating the basis for that action.

Approve:

Disapprove:

Approve with modification:

ATTACHMENTS: Draft Letter to Al-Hawzah

COORDINATION: Governance Team [redacted] (ok)
Strategic Communications [redacted] (ok)



COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY
BAGHDAD

Shaykh Abbas al-Rubay'i
Chairman
Al-Hawzah

Dear Mr. Shaykh Abbas al-Rubay'i:

The purpose of this memorandum is to advise you that any and all operating licenses for Al-Hawzah newspaper (and any other print media published by you, your organization or your chief editor Shaykh Hasan al-Zarkani) are hereby suspended and the newspaper is ordered closed and the premises sealed for a period of sixty (60) days.

This action is based upon my determination that Al-Hawzah has printed numerous articles that have falsely claimed wrongdoing by the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and Coalition Forces and that the repeated nature of these false articles demonstrates intent to cause public unrest and to incite violence against Coalition Forces and CPA personnel in violation of CPA Order Number 14, as evidenced by the facts set forth below.

On February 26, in an article on "Terrorist Operations in Iraq that Targeted Iraqi Army Volunteer Centers," Al-Hawzah claimed that the February 10 explosion in Al-Iskandariyah was triggered by a missile "launched by an Apache helicopter" and not by a car bomb, "as the US Forces announced." In fact, the report is false; no U.S. forces attacked the building.

In the same issue, an article entitled "Bremer in the Footsteps of Saddam" stated that the Coalition is "pursuing a policy of starving the Iraqi people to make them preoccupied with procuring their daily bread" so that they do not have "the chance to demand their political and individual freedoms." Again, this report is false. The Coalition has undertaken unprecedented efforts to feed and care for the people of Iraq, restore and improve the country's infrastructure, and lay a foundation of political, economic, and individual freedom hitherto only dreamt about in Iraq.

Al-Hawzah's false articles about the CPA and Coalition Forces are not of recent origin. As long ago as August 7, 2003, the paper charged that the U.S. "did not come just to overthrow Saddam or take oil," but also "to destroy the whole cultural, moral, and humanitarian structure of the Iraqi people's civilization." Again, on August 21 of last year, Al-Hawzah decried a Coalition incursion into Baghdad's Al-Sadr City, charging: "The U.S. administration has not ceased fighting Islam and its symbols wherever they may be. Last Wednesday's incident has proven its insistence on its despicable crimes." Again, the claims are totally baseless.

Such false articles not only mislead readers, but also pose the real threat of violence against Coalition forces and Iraqis who are cooperating with the Coalition in reconstructing Iraq. Accordingly, any and all Al-Hawzah licenses to operate, as well as any and all licenses for other

print media published by you, your organization or your chief editor Shaykh Hasan al-Zarkani) are hereby suspended. In addition, Al-Hawzah newspaper is ordered closed and the premises sealed. This suspension and closure shall remain in effect for sixty (60) days following the date of this letter.

Further violations of CPA Order No. 14 or the Governing Council's decision, as implemented by this letter, will subject the culpable employees of Al-Hawzah to detention, arrest, prosecution and a potential punishment of up to one year in prison and a fine of up to USD1,000.00.

L. Paul Bremer III
Administrator

Advertising Agency Decision Brief

Almarah Belk and [REDACTED] (b)(6)
Office of Strategic Communications
31 January 2004

Goal:




- Retain a professional advertising agency with experience in Middle East markets to plan, develop, and execute a full communication campaign in support of the Iraq electoral process – to complement and reinforce all other communication initiatives.
 - Campaign goals:
 - Inform and educate
 - Encourage Iraqi participation (call to action)
 - Build support and credibility for the new Transitional Assembly
-

Outline



- RFP
 - Proposals
 - Evaluation Criteria
 - Elimination Round
 - Contenders
 - Recommendation
-



Request for Proposals (RFP)



- RFP posted to CPA website 22 January
- Proposals due by 1700, 28 January
- Evaluation, 29-31 January
 - Management
 - Technical
 - Past Performance
 - Cost (not scored)
- Agency selection decision →
- Contract award – 2 days

Today!

Proposals



- Received 5 proposals
 - J. Walter Thompson
 - Bates PanGulf LLC
 - Bain Euro RSCG
 - BlankCreative LLC
 - Lacuna Research

Evaluation Criteria



- **Management**
 - Experience, qualifications
 - **Past Performance**
 - Demonstrated expertise based on past work
 - **Technical**
 - Understanding of Iraqi, Middle East audiences
 - Sound planning assumptions
 - Link with strategy, statement of objectives
 - Creativity, innovation
 - **Cost**
 - Reasonableness, commensurate with technical approach
-

Elimination Round




- Lacuna Research
 - Possible mistake, didn't address RFP, impossible to evaluate
 - BlankCreative LLC
 - Proposal didn't conform, nor address critical elements of the RFP, such as team composition, references, previous experience/work, media plan
 - Bain Euro RSCG
 - Lack of previous Arab/Middle East experience, creative work; no planning assumptions for compressed timeline; sample work very basic; vague media plan
-

b(2) page



Contenders

- J. Walter Thompson
- Bates PanGulf



J. Walter Thompson



■ Strengths

- Previous experience with CPA on IMN launch
- Experienced team members
- Same team for this project as IMN
- Aggressive, time-compressed media plan
- Phased approach based on key milestones/decisions
- Professional creative work
- #4 in Ad Age's Top 20 Agency Brands WW in 2002
- #7 in Ad Age's Top 10 Agencies in 2003 by int'l creative awards (51 awards)

■ Weaknesses

- Creative samples limited in scope, one-dimensional
- No research-based proposals
- Target audience based on income alone
- Proposed team member also a reference from IMN project (?)

Bates PanGulf



■ Strengths

- Integrated partnership with 3 companies specializing in adv, government communication, marketing
- Experienced team in strategic planning, coordination of complex, multi-disciplinary projects – direct, hands-on experience with the Independent Electoral Commission
- Strong regional, Arab background
- Regional media leverage
- Research-based proposals
- Considered need for Kurdish, and possible Turkish, products
- Monitoring and evaluating the campaign

■ Weaknesses

- Difficult to view, evaluate creative work because of website limitations
- Phased approach doesn't include specific timeline

Recommendation



■ Bates PanGulf LLC

- ❑ Unique partnership with ad agency, UK consultancy firm specializing in political and government affairs, and a local Baghdad-based company for grass-roots information dissemination
 - ❑ Particular experience in strategic planning and the coordination of complex, multi-disciplinary projects
 - ❑ Direct, hands-on experience with the Independent Electoral Commission during South Africa's first democratic elections in 1994
 - ❑ Monitoring and evaluating the campaign
 - ❑ Considered need for Kurdish products
 - ❑ **Overall:** More broad-based experience specifically related to our communication challenges with this initiative
-

Questions?




COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY
BAGHDAD

Strat Com

ACTION MEMO

February 19, 2004

FOR: THE ADMINISTRATOR
FROM:  General Counsel
SUBJECT: Suspension of Al Jazeera Media Activities

60 days ok.

This memorandum seeks your approval of a letter prepared for the signature of Mr. Nouri Badran, interim Iraqi Minister of Interior, which suspends for 30 days all Al Jazeera satellite transmissions from Iraq.

- CPA Order No. 14 prohibits certain media activity that incites violence or civil disorder. This Order does not define the limits of CPA's authority to control media activities during the occupation.
- The laws and usages of war, and Article 53 of the Hague Regulations authorize the CPA, as occupying power, to seize all property adapted for the transmission of news, even if the property belongs to private individuals. This authority does not require proof of the commission of any offense, and is not conditioned upon any particular security threat or incident. Instead, the authority recognizes the essentially military nature of information operations in an occupation. The CPA must restore property seized under this provision, and compensate owners, upon the cessation of hostilities.
- Repeated incidents of unprofessional and undisciplined reporting by Al Jazeera employees demonstrate Al Jazeera's failure effectively to train and supervise its employees. The resulting media coverage has a destabilizing effect on security and civil order in Iraq.
- As Administrator, you may delegate your authority under the laws and usages of war and Article 53 of the Hague Regulations to the appropriate interim Iraqi Minister, thereby empowering him to direct the suspension of Al Jazeera's media operations. Precluding Al Jazeera from uplinking satellite transmissions from Iraq is the most effective means of temporarily closing down the most visible and influential form of Al Jazeera's media activity.
- Such a delegation may be conditioned upon a determination by the Iraqi Governing Council that temporarily suspending Al Jazeera's media activities will facilitate the maintenance of civil order and security, and the Governing Council's direction to carry out such a suspension.

UNCLASSIFIED



COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY
BAGHDAD

RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) That the Administrator delegate to the interim Iraqi Minister of Interior his authority under the laws and usages of war and Article 53 of the Hague Regulations to suspend for 30 days Al Jazeera's uplinking of satellite transmissions from Iraq, provided that the Governing Council directs such a suspension, based upon its determination that such action will contribute to the maintenance of civil order and security in Iraq.

Approve:

Disapprove:

Approve with modification:

(2) That the Administrator approve the attached letter from the interim Iraqi Minister of Interior to Al Jazeera, imposing the 30-day suspension and stating the basis for that action.

Approve:

Disapprove:

Approve with modification:

ATTACHMENTS: Draft Letter to Al Jazeera

COORDINATION: Deputy Administrator – Ambassador Jones ()
Strategic Communications – [REDACTED] ()
Governance Team – [REDACTED] ()

UNCLASSIFIED

February 19, 2004

Majed Khader
Chief, Baghdad Bureau
Al Jazeera

Dear Mr. Khader:

The purpose of this memorandum is to advise you that broadcast media activities of Al Jazeera in Iraq are hereby suspended for thirty days. The Iraqi Governing Council has directed this action pursuant to Article 53 of the Hague Regulations of 1907 and the laws and usages of war, based upon its determination that Al Jazeera has failed to properly train and supervise its employees, as evidenced by the facts set forth below.

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The infractions have been so serious that they have jeopardized the health and safety of Iraqi citizens and Coalition forces. Accordingly, the Governing Council believes it has exhausted all other remedies. In particular, we are moved to take this action due to a serious criminal conviction of an Al Jazeera staff member. We note that Al Jazeera, despite its professed commitment to forthright journalism, has never seen fit to report on this conviction.

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On January 28, 2004, Sittar Kareem was convicted by the Central Criminal Court of Iraq of violating paragraph 219 of the Iraqi Penal Code, which makes it an offense to fail to notify authorities of certain crimes of which the defendant had knowledge. He was sentenced to the maximum authorized punishment of five years' imprisonment. The evidence adduced at trial indicates that Kareem was an employee of Al Jazeera at the time of the wrongdoing for which he was convicted. It further indicated that attacks against Coalition Forces were discussed and planned in his presence, on the premises of the Al Jazeera news bureau.

Al Jazeera should have known that one of its employees, using an Al Jazeera office, was engaged in activities that violate the law, not to mention journalistic ethics.

Deleted: wholly contrary to both Iraqi and international law

This is the most serious, but not the only incident in which Al Jazeera's failure properly to train and oversee its employees has threatened public order in Iraq. CPA and the Governing Council have repeatedly discussed such incidents with Al Jazeera Baghdad Bureau management. In each instance, Al Jazeera officials promised to institute training programs, write policy and procedures manuals, and instill proper journalistic practice and ethics among its staff.

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Yet Al Jazeera, despite such commitments, has repeatedly failed to correct the practices of staff members. Al Jazeera employees have crossed military and police control lines, failed to obey lawful instructions of authorities at the scene of explosions, refused to give full, accurate answers to lawful questions by proper authorities, and hid evidence of their improper conduct.

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On February 10, Al-Jazeera carried a discussion between correspondent Abd-al-Azim Muhammad, reporting from Al-Iskandariyah, and presenter Bassam al-Qadiri in Doha. The live

broadcast suggested, falsely, that Coalition forces may have been responsible for an explosion that killed more than 50 people.

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Muhammad said, in part, "There has been extreme tension between the U.S. forces and citizens, who insist that the incident was the result of a U.S. strike or something like that. They are saying that a U.S. aircraft was close to the site.

The incident took place near the Al-Iskandariyah police station... There were no U.S. troops there, but they were deployed at some distance away from the site of the incident. The people of the city insist that the strike was from the U.S. troops, while the U.S. troops prevented us from approaching the area and refused to talk to us. Some are saying that a booby-trapped car could have arrived at the scene of the incident. Some wounded say they were wounded by U.S. troops after the explosion which coincided with the presence of a U.S. column near the scene of the incident.

The U.S. troops may have thought they were targeted by the attack, so they began to fire indiscriminately in various directions, killing or wounding a number of citizens, some of whom were moved to the city's hospital. That was according to some of the wounded who were moved to the hospital.

[Al-Qadiri] Have you been able to monitor the views of the Iraqi public regarding the operations that target members of the Iraqi police?

[Muhammad] Regarding this operation in particular, the people of Al-Iskandariyah insist in front of cameras, reporters and the U.S. troops that the operation was caused by the Americans and that there were no booby-trapped cars, for no cars are allowed to reach the site but police cars. Therefore, there was extreme tension and a demonstration was staged in front of the U.S. troops at the scene of the incident. This has prompted the U.S. troops to direct weapons towards the protesters. The U.S. troops were about to beat us and protesters had they not dispersed in various directions. The U.S. troops then moved forward. Nobody in Al-Iskandariyah is talking about a booby-trapped car although the Iraqi police and U.S. troops believe that it was most likely a booby-trapped car."

In fact, the suggestions are false in their entirety. No U.S. forces bombed the police station, and no U.S. troops fired "indiscriminately." Al Jazeera did not seek official comment from CPA. Nor did it identify any of the alleged witnesses or, it appears, ask them for evidence to support the claims.

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On February 16, CPA officials met with Al Jazeera officials to express deep concern about such conduct. The officials included you, Ahmed Al-Sheikh, a member of the Editorial Board, May Welsch, a producer, and Ahmed Al-Samara'e, a correspondent.

You explained that the correspondent, Mr. Muhammad, claimed that he was surrounded by hostile crowds who were threatening to stone him if he did not report their claims. All of the Al Jazeera officials conceded that this situation, if it in fact existed, is not likely to produce accurate, dispassionate reporting. You promised to consult with headquarters in Doha and work out procedures to avoid similar problems in the future. These were to include establishing a policy

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and procedures manual specifically instructing correspondents not to broadcast false, inflammatory accusations against Coalition forces, especially unsourced claims of American complicity in violence against Iraqis.

Yet three days later, on February 19, correspondent Maryam Ubayish reported from Hilla in a similarly irresponsible vein. She said, in part:

"The official account of the incident says two booby-trapped cars targeted the headquarters of the Coalition forces stationed in the city, injuring more than 50 soldiers of different nationalities. But the number of Iraqis who were killed and wounded and the damage caused to some buildings near the base suggest another theory.

Deleted: coalition

[Unidentified Iraqi citizen] At approximately 0800 we were sleeping. Most of our children go to schools and to work. We heard the sound of [a missile] launched from the air. As a military man, I know the direction of the missile. I guess they were planes."

Again, the claims are totally baseless. And again, there was no attempt to identify the alleged witness, to probe the basis of the claim, or to seek comment from Coalition officials.

Such irresponsible actions not only mislead viewers, but also pose the real threat of violence against Coalition forces. Accordingly, on February __, 2004, the Governing Council directed the confiscation of equipment providing satellite up-linking from all Al Jazeera studios in Iraq, and prohibited Al Jazeera from further satellite broadcasting in Iraq for a 30-day period.

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All Al Jazeera equipment used to uplink its satellite transmissions from Iraq is hereby confiscated. In addition, Al Jazeera is hereby prohibited from employing any other equipment to uplink its satellite transmissions from Iraq. This confiscation and prohibition against up-linking satellite transmissions shall remain in effect until __, 2004.

Additionally, all non-Iraqi citizens employed by Al Jazeera are hereby directed to leave Iraq as soon as possible, but by no means later than 48 hours after receipt of this notice.

Deleted: Failure to abide by this directive can result in further serious consequences under both Iraqi and international law.

Violations of CPA Order No. 14, other applicable laws and regulations, or the Governing Council's decision, as implemented by this letter, will subject the culpable employees of Al Jazeera to detention, arrest, prosecution and a potential punishment of up to one year in prison and a fine of up to USD1,000.00.

Deleted: Any action by Al Jazeera in violation of

Nouri Badran
Minister of Interior

[REDACTED] b(6)

From: [REDACTED]
 Sent: Tuesday, February 10, 2004 10:32 AM
 To: Jones, Richard (AMB)
 Cc: [REDACTED]
 Subject: FW: Re: Warning letter to Assaah newspaper

① st not can

b(2)

fyl

-----Original Message-----

From: [REDACTED]
 Sent: Monday, February 09, 2004 10:37 PM
 To: [REDACTED]
 Cc: [REDACTED]
 Subject: Re: Warning letter to Assaah newspaper

b(2)

I was escorted today February 9, 2004 by two representatives from CJTF-7/CPA, LTC [REDACTED] form 1st AD, and a task force of approximately 15-20 combined US soldiers and ICDC personnel to deliver a written warning notice to Assaah newspaper over their performance for the past 6 months.

b(6)

Main points I made were similar to the points that were mentioned in the warning letter such as:

- The newspaper is continuing to print numerous articles that have falsely claimed gross misconduct by Coalition Forces and by Iraqi Officials.
- This continuing pattern cannot be attributed to unintentional mistakes and is either an intentional attempt to cause public unrest or a result of serious lack of professionalism on the part of the newspapers correspondents.
- The paper has a responsibility to its readers to relay accurate information that they can depend on.
- In view of its repetitive nature, this false and fictitious reporting risks inciting violence against the Coalition Forces and Iraqi Authorities.
- I have visited the newspaper on three separate occasions. First time was an informal meeting where I introduced myself as a CPA representative and offered my contact information to assist them with answering their queries, setting up interviews, and invited them to be more active with Coalition events in the Convention Center. Second meeting was a semi informal meeting between me, Nabeel Khoury and the Bureau Chief where we both repeated the same invitation to contact us for assistance and participate in our events while discussing their ill conduct in their reporting through a verbal warning on behalf of CPA. This third meeting was an official meeting where I would hand them a final written warning on behalf of CPA and expect them to improve their reporting and professionalism.
- A copy of the warning letter is being hand delivered to the Bureau, and copies are being CC'd for Dr. Ahmed Al-Kubaisi (owner of the newspaper) in the United Arab Emirates, Mr. Mohsen Abd Al-Hamid (current president of the Iraqi Governing Council) and Mr. Samir Sumaida'ie (member of the Iraqi Governing Council).
- I reminded the Bureau Chief that the Coalition Press Information Center has officials available to answer any factual questions they may have, especially about alleged wrongdoing by Coalition Forces.
- I concluded by reminding them that they are still welcome to attend our press conferences and other events and I re-offered them my contact information to contact me with any queries or requests they may have.

I found that the newspaper representative was very argumentative and attempted to make excuses for all the actions his newspaper was blamed for, adding that the CPA is intentionally picking on Assaah newspaper while Al-Jazeera, Al-Arabia and other Iraqi newspapers are allowed to practice journalism in what ever manner they see fit without any criticism or warning. The bureau chief finally stated this is not the way America normally does business, and he signed receipt of the warning letters quite impatiently.

Conclusion:

2/10/2004


The outcome of this meeting was that the Bureau Chief concurred on behalf of the newspaper that they will attempt to work more closely with CPA in providing balanced truthful reporting and that they would train their correspondents to confirm reports before printing them, having acquired these reports from more than one source and verifying their truthfulness.

1st AD will continue to monitor the newspaper as will the Arab media unit for CPA, the true outcome of this meeting will be revealed with time.


Public Affairs Officer
Strategic Communications
Coalition Provisional Authority
Baghdad, Iraq

 b(2)

2/10/2004





COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY
BAGHDAD

INFO MEMO

February 4, 2004

FOR: THE ADMINISTRATOR
FROM: [REDACTED] Strategic Communications
SUBJECT: IPCC Communications Plan

Messages

Messages for Iraqis are:

1. the IPCC is a fair, impartial forum for resolving property disputes created by the actions and policies of Saddam Hussein's regime;
2. decisions of the IPCC will be based on evidence, not the arbitrary whim of the privileged and powerful;
3. the IPCC staff and adjudicators possess legal and property expertise;
4. claims will be adjudicated by Iraqis, applying Iraqi jurisprudence to resolve the disputes.
5. the IPCC will resolve property disputes as efficiently as practicable, this means that when possible, cases will be decided before the December 31, 2004 filing deadline;
6. The IPCC will make an important contribution to healing divisions in Iraqi society

Communications Plan

After establishment of IPCC but before promulgation of Guidelines and Instructions and opening of any offices

Members of the Iraqi Governing Council Legal Committee will take the lead as the face of the IPCC (much like they did upon passage of the Iraqi Special Tribunal statute):

- Dr. Pachachi take part in a **roll-out event** in which he may take questions about the IPCC. He may discuss the IPCC in his remarks before departing for the United States. This is left to his discretion.
- IGC issues **press release** announcing creation of the IPCC
- IGC issues **fact sheets** giving general information about the IPCC
- Communications team distributes Qs and As (in English and Arabic) to IGC, CPA and Coalition military officials who may field questions about the IPCC
- Judge Dara and other members of IGC Legal Committee sit for **interviews** with Iraqi media outlets

At opening of first group of claims offices

The first set of offices will be opening before the rest of the office across the country. This will prohibit a nationwide roll-out plan on location, hours and filing procedures.

- Distribution of office location, hours and filing procedures to the local population by the local CPA offices

After promulgation of Instructions and Guidelines and opening of all claims offices

- **Public service announcements and advertisements** will run in mass media outlets (TV/radio/newspapers). The notices will offer specific information such as when and where to file your claim.
- A **traveling road show** by the Director General to take the messages of the communications campaign directly to Iraqi leaders in each governorate of Iraq.
- Area specific **Qs and As and talking points** to be distributed to CJTF7 MSCs, CPA regional PAOs and staffers, and Regional Commission staffers (if established by this point).
- **Facilitation of media tours** that highlight the physical progress made at IPCC facilities and show the friendly faces of IPCC staffers.
- **Open house** at each regional and/or local office at which regional/local office staffers explain the process to members of the public. At the open house, **fact sheets and brochures** explaining the specific filing process, will be distributed to the public.
- **One-on-one** interviews with TV/radio/newspaper during which the Director General talks about the fairness of the process.
- **Information posters** posted in public buildings around the country. The posters will offer specific information, such as when and where to file your claim. The posters will also contain a slogan that summarizes the themes of legitimacy and trustworthiness.
- **Information handbills** to be distributed by Coalition forces around the country. The handbills will offer specific information, such as when and where to file your claim. The handbills will also contain a slogan that summarizes the themes of legitimacy and trustworthiness.

December 2004

As the December 31, 2004 filing deadline nears:

- **Public service announcements** and advertisements will run in mass media outlets (TV/radio/newspapers). The announcements should remind people of the last day they have to file their claim.

During the hearing period

- **Public service announcements** on television and radio. The announcements should remind people that cases are being heard.
- **Advertisements** in Al-Sabah and local newspapers around the country.
- **Facilitation of media coverage** that will highlight the progress of the IPCC and the success of the voluntary mediation program.
- **Interviews of Director General** with media outlets to highlight the progress of the IPCC.

ATTACHMENTS: 1. Governing Council press release (English version)
2. Governing Council-issued fact sheet (English version)
3. Qs and As on the statute (English version)

COORDINATION: Governance

IRAQI GOVERNING COUNCIL
Baghdad, Iraq

PRESS RELEASE

IRAQI PROPERTY CLAIMS COMMISSION TO RESOLVE IRAQI LAND DISPUTES

Baghdad, Iraq...January 15, 2004 – The Iraqi Governing Council today announced the creation of the Iraqi Property Claims Commission (IPCC), the body that will finally and fairly remedy property disputes resulting from the former Ba'athist regime's arbitrary and forced dislocation of innocent civilian populations which occurred repeatedly over the course of more than 30 years.

The IPCC will resolve the property disputes created by the former regime's practice of forcing Iraqi citizens to abandon their homes or land. Victims of the practice are of all religious and ethnic groups, including Shi'a, Sunni, Christian, Arab, Kurd and Turkomen.

The Governing Council will soon identify the IPCC staff. The Governing Council will now begin the process of drafting Guidelines and Instructions which will detail more specific filing procedures. This information will be communicated to the Iraqi people as soon as it is available.

The IPCC will accept claims through December 31, 2004.

Once an Iraqi files a claim with a property claims office, he or she will support the claim with supporting documentation.

Available remedies include restoration of ownership or possession, confirmation of ownership or possession, and/or compensation when appropriate.

###

Facts about Iraqi Property Claims Commission

- Created on 1/15/04 by Iraqi Governing Council
- Exclusive forum for final resolution of real property claims in Iraq resulting from displacement caused by intentional acts and policies associated with the former Ba'athist regime
- Victims of forced removal include Shi'a, Sunni, Christian, Arab, Kurd and Turkomen
- Regional Committees will be established in each of the 18 Iraqi governorates
- Process in general:
 - Iraqi files claim in Regional Office;
 - filing claimant supports claim with supporting documentation;
 - impartial Regional Committee considers evidence and resolves claim
 - claimants may appeal Regional Committee Decisions to the Appellate Division of the IPCC
- Remedies may include restoration of ownership or possession, confirmation of ownership or possession, and oversee appropriate compensation measures
- The claims period will go through December 31, 2004.
- Impartial three-member Regional Committees will adjudicate the resolution of property claims. Regional Committee members will include: 1) an Iraqi Judge, 2) Director of Property Registration Office, 3) Representative of the Director of State Property
- All Iraqi Regional Committees and Appellate Division
- Enforcement of IPCC orders by Iraqi law enforcement officials
- Appeals granted by Appellate Division

Qs and As on Iraqi Property Claims Commission (IPCC)

Q: What is the Iraqi Property Claims Commission?

A: The Saddam Hussein regime uprooted thousands of Iraqis from different ethnic and religious backgrounds and forced them to move from their property. The Iraqi Governing Council has responded to the concerns of Iraqis unjustly uprooted from their homes by creating the Iraqi Property Claims Commission to provide fair and final adjudication to real property claims.

Q: What will the IPCC do?

A: The IPCC will receive real property claims and Iraqis will promptly resolve those claims in a fair and impartial manner. The IPCC is the exclusive forum for resolving Iraqi real property claims resulting from displacement due to the actions and policies of Saddam Hussein's regime. The IPCC will have jurisdiction to hear claims based on disputes arising between July 17, 1968 and April 9, 2003.

Q: What role will Iraqi courts have in the IPCC process?

A: One Iraqi judge will serve on each of the 18 Regional Committees and five Iraqi judges, appointed by the Council of Judges, will make up the Appellate Division.

Iraqi laws that give any other institution jurisdiction over real property claims are suspended.

Q: Who created the IPCC?

A: The Iraqi Governing Council created the IPCC. Ambassador Bremer delegated his administrative authority to the Governing Council for the purpose of creation of the IPCC.

Q: Why does Iraq need the IPCC?

A: The Saddam Hussein regime uprooted thousands of Iraqis from different ethnic and religious groups and forced them to move from their property. Now, with Saddam's regime a thing of the past, there are many conflicting claims to the same property, resulting in instability and occasional violence.

The IPCC will provide final adjudication of these conflicting claims.

Q: How will the IPCC be set up?

A: The IPCC will be made up of an 18 Regional Committees, an Appellate Division and secretariats to assist both the Regional Committees and Appellate Division.

Q: How will the claims process work?

A: The Governing Council will soon issue Guidelines and Instructions on exactly how things will work.

Generally, a claimant will file a claim with a Regional Committee. Claimants may file through December 31, 2004. To the extent possible, claims will be decided in order of submission.

The Regional Committee will consider the documentation presented and resolve the claim.

The Regional Committee secretariat will deliver a copy of Commission decisions to the parties.

Q: How will the Regional Committee reach a decision?

A: The Regional Committees will apply rules set out in the Guidelines and Instructions. Board decisions will be based on documentation presented, not the arbitrary whim of the privileged and powerful.

Q: Who will make up the Regional Committees?

A: The Regional Committees will be composed of three members: An Iraqi judge, the Director of the Property Registration Office and a Representative of the Director of the State Property

In addition, Regional Committee members will maintain the highest standards of personal and professional conduct.

Q: What are the remedies available for the prevailing party?

A: The prevailing party will be entitled to occupy the property according to the terms and conditions set forth in the order of the Regional Committee or Appellate Division.

Q: Is compensation ever available?

A: Compensation may be available in circumstances as determined by the IPCC Guidelines and Instructions.

Q: Who will enforce the orders of the IPCC?

A: Upon final judgment, the IPCC will be enforced by Iraqi law enforcement officials.

Q: May a party appeal a decision of a Regional Committee?

A: Yes. After, in accordance with Guidelines and Instructions, an order is issued by a Regional Committee, a party may file an appeal with the Appellate Division within 30 days of the order.

Q: Which groups were most affected by the former regime's policies?

A: All religious and ethnic groups have been victimized. For example, in the 1980s Kurds were victimized by expulsion during Arabization of Kirkuk. In addition, Shi'a were displaced and had their property confiscated in Southern Iraq during the 1980s and early 90s. Also, in Baghdad, Christian, Turkomen, Sunni, Shi'a and political opponents of the regime had homes confiscated during the years of the Ba'athist regime.

b Strat Com

Samir Shakir Mahmood Sumaida'ie
Member of IGC
Baghdad – Iraq

Feb.3, 04
Ajjazzera - Baghdad – Aldoha

Discussed
W. Samin
on 2/8/04
B

On Tuesday Jan.27, 04 Mr. Faisal Al-Qasim presented his program (Aletijah Almuakes). He hosted Mr. Noori Almuradi & Mr. Hameed Alkifae. The topic of the program was "The alleged Israeli Infiltration in Iraq". As usual Mr. Al-Qasim continued what he used to do to Iraq and Iraqis ever since he met Uday Saddam Hussein last year in Baghdad. His hosts, whom he chooses carefully, used as much insults, threats and accusations as they can. He showed no efforts to stop them and no respect to the manners of the profession. In this program they used words like (trash, spies, traitors, thieves and Israeli agents), he also did not give the other party an adequate chance to reply or explain.

Mr. Al-Qasim deliberately used the Israeli issue to stain the reputation of the new Iraq in spite of the sad circumstances our heroic Palestinian people are facing. IGC members, whether Arab or Kurds, confirmed in their statements that the new Iraq is committed to the unity of Arab stand towards the Palestine issue and that Iraq will only agree on what the Palestinians accept.

The "Polishing" of individuals well-known for their ties with the previous dictator regime and presenting them as Iraqi resistance can hardly be considered a bias and objective practice in media.

The program included a very clear incitement and an invitation to kill for political motives, which makes Ajjazzera accused of backing terrorism

This act may subject this channel to international and Iraqi laws aiming at fighting terrorism, like closing their offices, stopping their Iraqi reporters to work with this channel inside Iraq and expelling their Arab and foreign employees.

Ajjazzera endeavor to enhance the Arab mistrust in the integrity of the Iraqi leaders and to the support the Iraqis show to IGC and other Iraqi leaderships

puts a great responsibility on this station, not only before the law, but before God, the Arab nation and Islam.

Mr. Al-Qasim allowed to repeat the same accusations the previous regime used against the late Mohammad Mahdi Al-Hakeem, who was killed by Iraqi intelligence in Khartoum without even trying to check his information, he also allowed his host to insult the late Iraqi Kurdish leader Mullah Mustafa Al- Barzani and other Iraqi parties and characters like Dr. Al-Pachachi and still he showed no effort to stop these insults.

This program uses questionnaires on Iraqi issues that are answered mainly by non-Iraqis simply because Iraqis who live inside Iraq do not have access to phones or internet, and yet he claims the results to be accurate and objective.

The conducts of Mr. Al- Qasim in this program only makes the situation in Iraq tenser and flows in the final goal to serve Iraqis enemies – the terrorists, the insurgents, former regime elements and foreign fighters- and this will endanger Iraq's national security.

We request that Mr. Al-Qasim should present a clear and public apology, on his next program after receiving this letter, in which he announces his responsibility for the offence his host (Noori Al-Moradi) directed towards Iraq and its national security .He should apologize for the allegations about the Israeli presence in Iraq and confirm that there is no evidence to this subject. He must also clarify the percentage of Iraqi participants in the questionnaires he does about Iraqi issues.

We also request a written statement about the stopping of such conducts, in your programs, that are related to Iraqi issues and to adhere to the professionalism standards that are accepted world –wide.

Failing to do so, we will be forced to take the necessary actions to protect Iraq's national security as we see appropriate.


Samir Shakir Mahmood Sumaida'ie
Chairman, executive media committee

① Strategic Comm's: General

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS ORGANIZATION AND TASKS



Office of Strategic Communications



Director's Office

Responsible for overall management of the Office of Strategic Communications

- Director (1)

- Deputy Director (1) – Senior Press Advisor to Ambassador Bremer

- Executive Secretary and Office Manager (1) – Responsible for overall administration of the office, including correspondence and document tracking

- Administrative Assistant (1)



Planning and Projects

•Director, Planning and Projects (1) – Responsible for long-range planning of activities of the press office, CPA Information Operations, and the Military Information Support Team

•Administrative assistant (1)

•Public Affairs Planners (4) – Planning, scheduling, and coordinating future press events

•Information Operations head (1) and planners (7) –

Responsible for all CPA IO planning

•MIST – Head (1) and planners (3) – Responsible for planning, developing, producing, and disseminating public education and information programs in support of CPA



Media Monitoring and Research

- Research Director (1) – Analyzes existing research on all aspects of communications, commissions specialized research for CPA needs
- Press Monitoring head (1), media monitors (2), Arabic press readers (2), researcher (1) – Reviews Western and Arabic electronic and print media, providing daily summary highlighting key issues and trends



Civilian Press Office

- **Director, Press Office (1)** – Responsible for direction of the press office and all aspects of CPA press activity. Also serves as official CPA spokesman.
- **Deputy Director, Press Office (Arabic media) (1)** – Deputizes for the Director and heads the Arabic Media Section, acts as spokesman when needed.
- **Deputy Director, Press Office (1)** – Deputizes for the Director, focuses on special projects and events planning.
- **Administrative assistant (1)**
- **Press Officers' Briefing Unit (2)** – Responsible for the development of 'Talking Points' and 'Lines to Take' in response to events and for contingency planning purposes.
- **Press Officers (5)** – Responsible for CPA media outreach to English-speaking and other Western press.
- **Press Officers, Arabic Media (5)** – Focused on interfacing with the Arabic media (both electronic and print).
- **Press Officers, US/UK LNO (2)** – Focused on liaison with US and UK agencies concerned with CPA press activities (State, ECD, NSC, etc.).
- **Press Officers' Special Projects (2)** – Focused on media support for special projects (e.g., a major newspaper series or TV documentary that cuts across many lines of responsibility).
- **Events Planning Officers (5)** – Facilitates press coverage at events, particularly those involving Amb. Bremer. Facilitates trips by groups of journalists and other opinion leaders.



Regional and Governorate Press

- **Regional Media Coordinator (1)** – Responsible for coordination of press officers in the regions and governorates, including administrative and personnel issues
- **Administrative assistant (1)**
- **Regional Press Officers (3)** – Responsible for the co-ordination of media issues across the regions, including encouraging the development of local media
- **Governorate Press Officers (18)** – Responsible for all media issues in a particular governorate, including encouraging the development of local media



Military Press Office

- Head, Military Press Office (1) – Responsible for the direction of CTJF-7 military press office, activities in support of military related stories and for the maintenance of the military/civil interface on media issues

- Deputy Head, Military Press Office (1) – Official spokesman for CJTF7

CPIC

- Head Briefing Team(1) – Responsible for directing the military media briefing team at the Coalition Press Information Center (CPIC)

- Briefing Team(6) CPIC – Military media briefing and liaison team



Media Services

•Chief, Media Services/Speechwriter (4) – Responsible for the overall direction of media services including the International Visitors Program, Media Training and liaison with the Information Management Unit. Also writes speeches for Ambassador Bremer and other senior CPA officials, as needed

•Web Master (1) – Responsible for overall management of CPA website in both English and Arabic

•Web Developer (1) – Responsible for technical aspects of the CPA website

•Web Content Manager(1) – Responsible for developing and managing the content of the CPA website

•Copy Editor (2) – Responsible for data and content input, collecting data from the Information Management Unit

•Translators (5)



Public Diplomacy

Head Public Diplomacy(1) Public Diplomacy Officer(3)

International Visitors Program

- Program Officer (2) – Organizes exchange visits of academics and other prominent individuals between Iraq and primarily Coalition countries, including organizing transport, accommodation, and scheduling

Media Training

- Media Trainer (4) – Train Iraqi politicians, senior officials, and other prominent individuals on how to conduct media interviews



IMN

- General Manager(1) – Stratcom interface with IMN contractor(s) responsible for managing the development of IMN
- Contract Manager(1) – Acts as contract manager for the IMN contract and liaises with Defense Contract Command Washington



Operations/Admin

- Operations Chief(1) – Coordinates administrative and operational support to Stratcoms
- Administrative Officer(1) – Supports Operations Chief in dealing with logistical, budgetary, personnel, and general administrative issues in support of Stratcom
- Admin Assistant (1)

• Driver (1)



Electronic Media Unit

- Head, Electronic Media Unit(1) – Responsible for Amb. Bremer's appearances on major US media. Also handles other specialized satellite events (press conferences, briefings, etc.) Works with Combat Camera teams to ensure coverage of major events
- Regional Electronic Media Coordinator – Handles appearances of CPA officials on local and regional TV stations
- Combat Camera Team(2) – Military photography (still and video) assigned to support CPA

Broadcasting Operations

- Head Operations Officer (1) – Supports technical aspects of CPA satellite transmissions, maintains and operates equipment, and directs staff
- Operations Officer(3)



① Strategic Comm: General



Coalition Provisional Authority

Governance Strategic Communications Plan

(b)(7)(C)

Office of Strategic Communications

Agenda

- Time frame for action
- Actions to date
- Message
- Ways and means

POC: MA
CNA
DOA
(9)9
b(2)
b(2)

Key Dates

- 28 February 2004

IGC Approves Transitional Administrative Law

- 31 May 2004

Local Caucuses to elect Transitional Assembly Members

- 30 June 2004

CPA Dissolves, Transitional Authority in Place

- 15 March 2005

Direct Elections for Constitutional Delegates

- 31 December 2005

National Elections

POC: MA [REDACTED] b(6)
CPA: [REDACTED] b(6)
DSN: [REDACTED] b(2)

Enduring Themes

- Empowerment
 - End of occupation
 - Start of real democracy
- Reassurance/Security
 - No return of the Ba'athists
 - Coalition remains
 - But at invitation of Iraq's government
- Rights
 - Basic freedoms
 - Speech
 - Press
 - Equality (incl. gender)
 - Religion
 - Assembly
 - Minority rights protected

POC: MA
CPA - Strategic Communications
DSN: [REDACTED] b(6)
[REDACTED] b(2)

Immediate Actions

- Began coordination with:

- Governance
- USAID/OTI
- RTI
- USAID
- PsyOps
- IO
- Al-Iraqiyah

- Topics:

- Theme development
- Initial operational planning


POC: MA [REDACTED] b(6)
CPA [REDACTED] Strategic Communications
DSN [REDACTED] b(2)

Immediate Actions

- Initial preparation for Iraq-wide distribution of transitional timeline “one pager”
 - Arabic and Kurdish
 - 1M copies
 - 100K posters
 - Radio and TV
 - Inserts in OFP food packages
 - CPA Regional Governate
 - CJTF-7/MSC Outreach
 - RTI Distribution
 - National and local press

POC: MA [REDACTED] b(6)
CPA [REDACTED] Communications
DSH [REDACTED] b(2)

Immediate Sequencing



Other December Actions

- Op-Ed written on agreement
 - To b offered to major UK, U.S. and al-Sabah papers
 - Subsequent reprints in local/regional papers
- “Fireside Chats”
 - 4-5 min interviews w/ leading IGC members
 - Carried in local/regional papers, radio and TV
- Explanatory Programming
 - IGC Spokesman and Strat Comms (Heatly) in al-Iraqiyah discussion
 - Broadcast nationally
- Focus Groups pinpoint areas of confusion
 - TV/Radio/Print
- PSAs
 - TV/Radio/Print



Public Venues

- Town Hall Meetings
 - Three televised nationwide
 - All 18 governorates
 - Governate roundtables
 - Academic and professional associations
- Focus Groups
 - First group
 - Assist in theme development
 - Subsequent groups
 - Feedback loop to calibrate message

CY '04 Planning

- Documentary
 - Commissioned and funded by USAID
- GC Outreach Centers
- Road Show
- Televised debates
 - al-Iraqiyah
- On-Going Polling
 - DoS Research
 - Gallup
 - Wide-spread distribution of civic education materials

POC: MA [REDACTED] b(6)
CPA: Strategic Communications
DSH: [REDACTED] b(2)

Under Consideration

- Televised Debates
 - Possible uplinking to ArabSAT
- Explore hiring Ad agency
- Inviting Arab newspaper editors
- Inviting regional media to televise
- NGO Involvement
- Web Logs

Issues

- Approval Process
- Special emphasis
 - Sunni areas
 - Kurdish area
- Governance/RTI
 - Synchronization of effort for Town Hall Meeting
 - Locations
 - Sequencing
 - Focus Group Follow-up timing
- Funding
 - Leaflet distribution, documentaries funding by USAID
 - Budget obligation authority

FOC: MA (u)
OP: (u)
DS: (u)



Questions

FOC: MA [REDACTED] (b)(6)
CPA - Strategic Communications [REDACTED] (b)(2)g
CSN [REDACTED] (b)(2)g



COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY

BAGHDAD

INFO MEMO

December 18, 2003

FOR: THE ADMINISTRATOR
FROM: Major [REDACTED] b(6) Coordinator for Transitional Plan Campaign
THROUGH: [REDACTED] Strategic Communications

SUBJECT: Ministers' Role in the Communication Plan for the Political Process

Iraqi ministers – many of whom have better credibility with the public than GC members – can play a significant leadership role in the Communication Plan for the political process. We need their voices as Iraqi leaders to help educate the public, generate debate on the process, and encourage participation.

Suggested points to make:

- Over the next 6 months, perhaps our greatest challenge is to lay down the foundations of democracy in Iraq.
- Persuading Iraqis not only that they have a choice in their new government, but also to exercise that choice, is a huge task. We all need to be making an enormous effort to change perceptions of politics gained over 35 years of Ba'athism. Iraqis associate government with something imposed on them, and ballot-boxes with voting for Saddam.
- We need your help as political leaders to help spur a national debate. Please use the media – TV, radio television – to get this message out. And you should take every opportunity to engage Iraqis face-to-face.
 - Your regional offices and networks are a vital tool in reaching out to grass roots. We can help you with printed material. But the posture of these offices is key to one of our central themes: “your government”. Iraqi ministries must be seen to serve the people. Open door policies etc will have a big impact.
 - When you travel to the regional offices, you should make it a point to stop in and see local/provincial councils, NGOs and professional/civil society organizations. Bring a film crew—CPA can help provide help with Al Iraqiyah coverage.
 - Call press conferences both in Baghdad and the regions, and write articles for the newspapers – regional and national
 - And please respond positively to requests for interviews, especially on Iraqiya. Make yourselves available, and make sure Iraqiya has your phone number (or that of your press secretary).

[2 more points overleaf]


Ⓢ start con
general

- Of course, raising your own profile can only pay dividends if you have political ambitions beyond 1 July...
- Keep special audiences in mind, especially women and those who feel disenfranchised or distant from the political process.

Four key themes underpin the whole campaign:

- **Empowerment** of the Iraqi people in finally getting representative government
- **Reassurance** that the country will be secure from internal and external threat
- Guarantees that **basic rights and freedoms** will be protected
- The **rule of law** will replace dictatorship

The capture of Saddam Hussein also presents an unparalleled opportunity to emphasize the theme of **reconciliation**, the closure of a dark chapter in Iraq's history and the start of a new brighter future.

COORDINATION: Governance 

UNCLASSIFIED

(b)(6) b(6)

From: (b)(6)
Sent: Wednesday, January 07, 2004 5:45 PM
To: (b)(6)

*State Com
General*

Subject: Announcement by Ambassador Bremer: Conditional Release of Some Iraqi Prisoners

Announcement made earlier today. Cleared for public release.

(b)(6)
Coalition Provisional Authority
Baghdad, Iraq

email: (b)(6)
Telephone: (b)(6)
Postal Mail: CPA- Amb. Bremer's Office
APO, AE 09335 USA

b(2)

1/8/2004



L. Paul Bremer
Administrator
Coalition Provisional Authority
Conditional Release Announcement
7 January 2004

This Friday, Iraq will celebrate 9 months of freedom from Saddam's dictatorship. Since liberation, the Iraqi people have steadily acted to realize a shared vision of the new Iraq, one which is stable and democratic.

More than ever, it is clear that the old ways of coups and corruption and divide-and-rule are over in the new Iraq. The tyrant Saddam Hussein is a prisoner; most of his henchmen are dead or captured.

It is time for reconciliation, time for Iraqis to make common cause in building the new Iraq. Thousands of conversations and newspaper columns and poll after poll have shown that the overwhelming majority of

As Delivered

Iraqis want democracy—a government that draws its legitimacy from the freely expressed will of the people.

In the coming 24 months these Iraqis will make a number of choices. They will decide the shape of democratic government when an elected assembly of Iraqis writes Iraq's new constitution early next year. They will decide who will lead their interim and their constitutional governments.

Other Iraqis have opted against the new Iraq. They made a mistake and they know it, but we are prepared to offer some of them a new chance.

To give impetus to those Iraqis who wish to reconcile with their countrymen, we are announcing today that the Coalition will permit hundreds of currently detained Iraqis to return to their homes and to their families.

As Delivered



Tomorrow, the Coalition will release the first 100 detainees. While there are specific requirements for release, two are of great importance:

- First, the person released must renounce violence and,
- Second, the person released must have a guarantor, such as a prominent person in his community or a religious or tribal leader who will accept responsibility for the good conduct of the individual being set free.

Let me underscore an important point. This is not a program for those with blood-stained hands. No person involved in the death of or serious bodily harm to any human being, an Iraqi, a citizen of the Coalition or anyone else will be released. Nor will we release anyone accused of torture or crimes against humanity.

As Delivered

Hundreds more detainees will be freed in this way in the coming weeks. We are also exploring ways to provide greater family access to those detainees not released.

But everyone must understand that this program in no way diminishes our zeal for pursuing the major criminals who plague this country, attacking Iraqis and Coalition Forces alike.

While the Coalition seeks to promote reconciliation, we recognize that some will never reconcile themselves to democracy in Iraq or to the new Iraq.

If they remain unreconciled, if they continue to fight, the Coalition is prepared to capture or kill them and, I am convinced, the coming Iraqi Government will be prepared to do the same.

As Delivered



To deal with these criminals, we have announced a reward program. We will pay \$10 million for information leading to the capture of Izzat Ibrahim al-Douri or information that he is dead. We will also pay \$1 million each for 12 other notorious criminals on our black list.

Today I am pleased to announce another rewards program. We will offer up to \$200,000 in rewards for information leading to the capture of lesser criminals or information that that person is dead. The names of the individuals and the amount of the reward for each will be released within 24 hours.

Dr. Pachaci, you have pointed out to me, peace and reconciliation and sovereignty will ultimately flow not from the Coalition, but from the acts of Iraqis.

As Delivered



You are of course right. Reconciliation and democracy will be Iraqi achievements. We in the Coalition hope that we have made a small contribution to this process today.

On behalf of all members of the Coalition, Dr. Pachachi, I express my hope that all Iraqis will converge into the great current of democracy which will carry you and your fellow Iraqis forward to your future of hope.

Mabruk al Iraq al jadeed.

As Delivered



(b)(6)
From: (b)(6)
Sent: Sunday, January 18, 2004 11:45 AM
To: (b)(6)
Cc: (b)(6)

Stratcom General
4(a) p

Minister,

Here is the statement we have released. (b)(6) or I will forward to you the latest factual report on the bombing as soon as we receive it, to enable you to put out your written statement on the facts.

(b)(6)

Ambassador Bremer has issued the following statement on the car bomb this morning in Baghdad:

"Today's terrorist bombing in Baghdad, which killed at least 16 Iraqi citizens, is an outrage - another clear indication of the murderous and cynical intent of terrorists to undermine freedom, democracy and progress in Iraq. They will not succeed.


The attack, which took place at the height of rush hour in Baghdad, was clearly timed to claim the maximum possible number of innocent victims. Once again, it is innocent Iraqis who have been murdered by these terrorists in a senseless act of violence.

I share the deep outrage of my Iraqi friends and colleagues at this tragic and inexcusable loss of life. I pass my deepest condolences to the families and friends of those murdered.

Our determination to work for a stable and democratic future for this country is undiminished. Our plan to hand over remaining authority to a new Iraqi government in July this year remains unchanged.

The Coalition is doing all it can to assist the Iraqi security and emergency services in dealing with the aftermath of this terrorist attack. Many of the Iraqi wounded are being treated in a nearby Coalition military hospital, and will be given the best care available."

1/18/2004



Press Release

Contact: Michael Pierson
Office of Strategic Communications
1-914-360-6205

COALITION PROVISIONAL
AUTHORITY
BAGHDAD, IRAQ

CPA hands over authority for donor cooperation

Baghdad – Dec 10, 2003 – The Administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) in Iraq, L Paul Bremer, has today announced the establishment of a new Iraqi-led development coordination mechanism. This new mechanism will be responsible for all donor activities in the country, including the prioritization of needs and the approval of project proposals.

The new mechanism, which has won agreement from the United Nations, the World Bank and major donor countries will be made up of three parts:

- A five member Iraqi Strategic Review Board, which will provide overall policy guidance and approval for reconstruction activities
- A new Ministry of Planning and Development Cooperation (MoPDC), which will follow up on donor pledges; recommend sectoral allocations and funding sources to the Board; establish guidelines for developmental activity among the Ministries; and monitor implementation, including identifying developmental gaps.
- The Council for International Coordination (CIC), newly under the Chairmanship of the Minister for Planning and Development Cooperation and currently consist of 23 countries involved in the reconstruction of Iraq, will be the main forum for dialogue amongst donors and between donors and the Iraqi authorities.

Speaking in Baghdad, after meeting with the Minister for Planning and Development Cooperation, Dr Mehdi Hafeedh, Ambassador Bremer said that Iraqis needed to take the lead in guiding the reconstruction process.

"Managing national reconstruction by matching different funding sources with prioritized needs is a complex business. This is why, after consultation with the Governing Council, we decided to establish a dedicated Ministry to deal with this task. I believe that Dr Hafeedh and his team of Iraqi and international advisers will manage this process effectively."

Ambassador Bremer also called on all donor nations, including those who have not yet committed to assist in the reconstruction process, to work with the new structure for the benefit of the Iraqi people.

Dr Hafeedh welcomed Ambassador's Bremer's signature of Regulation Number 7 which created the new donor coordination mechanism.

-MORE-

"This is an important step towards full political and economic sovereignty. Iraqis were greatly encouraged by the success of the Madrid Conference and the support offered by the international community. We will work in close partnership with donors to ensure that funds are expended in the most timely, transparent, and effective manner possible."

"In this regard we look forward to working with the World Bank and United Nations Trust Funds as well as with the many bilateral donors and international financial institutions that have offered their assistance."

Ambassador Bremer and Dr Hafedh today jointly announced the composition of the new Iraqi Strategic Review Board. Apart from the Minister for Planning and Development Cooperation, it will comprise the minister of Finance, Mr Kamel Gailani, two appointees of the Governing Council, Dr Amal Shalash and Mr Mahmoud Othman, and the CPA's Director of Economic Policy, Ambassador Marek Belka.

On 6 December 2003, Dr Hafedh took over the leadership of the Council on International Coordination from its Australian Chair, Mr Andrew Golezdzinski. Mr Golezdzinski will continue to work closely with the Ministry, the Board and the Council in his new capacity as the CPA's Director for Development Cooperation.

-END-

BACKGROUND

1. The Madrid Donors Conference on Iraq, 23-24 October 2003, agreed on the need for Iraqi leadership in the identification of reconstruction priorities and needs, and in coordinating donor efforts to meet those needs (Para 19. Chairman's Concluding Statement, International Donors Conference, Madrid).

2. On 5 December, Ambassador Bremer signed Regulation No.7 establishing a new Iraqi-led mechanism and handing over authority for the coordination of all donor assistance.

3. The mechanism has three parts, as follows:

i) Iraqi Strategic Review Board:

In accordance with the Regulation, the Board will "provide overall policy guidance with respect to multilateral and bilateral financial and economic development assistance for Iraq, setting and prioritizing needs in a transparent manner that does not unfairly discriminate among Iraq's geographic regions and cultural and religious groups". It will also "take action on recommendations from the Ministry of Planning and Development Cooperation (MoPDC) regarding the allocation of international financial and other assistance against Iraq's needs".

The Board consists of five members:

- the Minister of Planning and Development Cooperation, Dr Mehdi Hafedh,
- the Minister of Finance, Mr Kamel Gailani,
- two appointees of the Governing Council: Dr Amal Shalash, who is the Head of the Economics Department at the Al Hikma Institute, and Mr Mahmoud Othman, a financial expert from the private sector, and

- the CPA's Director of Economic Policy, Ambassador Marek Belka, who is a former Minister of Finance and a former Deputy P.M. of Poland.
- ii) Ministry of Planning and Development Cooperation:

This new Ministry (based on the old Ministry of Planning), will have the following functions. It will:

- follow up on pledges and liaise with donors;
- recommend sectoral allocations, donor work programs, and funding sources to the Board;
- establish guidelines and principles for developmental activity among the Ministries; and
- monitor implementation, including the identification of developmental gaps.

At a recent meeting of Iraqi and CPA representatives with UN and World Bank representative (in Amman Jordan on 3 December) it was agreed that the Ministry of Planning and Development Cooperation will be the Iraqi Administration's primary liaison with the UN and World Bank Trust Fund Facility. Projects to be funded under the Trust Funds will need to be developed in consultation with the MoPDC and will be subject to approval by the Iraqi authorities.

Regulation 7 also deals with future lending and other assistance programs by the International Financial Institutions (IFIs). In the case of the World Bank the MoPDC will be the main point of contact. In relation to IMF assistance, however, it will be the Ministry of Finance that will be responsible for overseeing negotiations.

Recommendations to the Strategic Review Board will be made with the concurrence of the Ministry of Finance to ensure conformity with the overall budgetary framework. The Ministry will also work closely with the CPA's Program Management Office to ensure that pre-existing bilateral commitments, including the U.S. Government appropriation, is taken into account in its recommendations to the Board.

iii) The Council for International Coordination

The Council for International Coordination (CIC) was established by Ambassador Bremer on 17 June 2003 to support and facilitate the participation of the International community in Iraq's recovery and reconstruction. It currently has 23 member states, has acted as the main point of contact between donors and the CPA, and had primary responsibility for the Madrid Donor Conference. As part of the overall transfer of authority to the new Iraqi-led mechanism, on 6 December the leadership of the Council passed from its Australian Chair, Mr Andrew Goledzinowski, to the Minister for Development and International Cooperation, Dr Hafeedh.

Although the Council is not a decision-making body, it will provide donors—both large and small—with a forum for discussing development activities and will accord them direct access to the Minister and his senior colleagues. Sectoral sub-committees will be created as necessary. Upon assuming the Chairmanship, Dr Hafeedh said that he expected the Council to grow to include other donor and potential-donor countries, the main international organizations, and representatives of the NGO community. Mr Goledzinowski, a career diplomat who holds Assistant Secretary rank in the Australian foreign service will continue to work closely with the Ministry and the Council in his new capacity as the CPA's Director for Development Cooperation.

[REDACTED]

b(6)

Strat Com

From:

Sent:

To:

Cc:

Subject:

[REDACTED]
Friday, January 02, 2004 6:53 PM

[REDACTED]
FW: Request from Ambassador Bremer on the regulatory commission

General



Communications Action Memo_Brem
regulator - upd... er_DRS_Disappr...

Please find attached a brief update report on the status of efforts to establish an independent communications regulatory commission, as submitted today to Ambassador Bremer. Also attached is a copy of an action memo submitted to Amb Bremer by [REDACTED] - the two documents are complementary.

Regards,

[REDACTED]

CPA Media Development & Regulation Team
3rd floor, Convention Centre
CPA Baghdad

[REDACTED]

b(6)

**COMMUNICATIONS/MEDIA REGULATOR AND PUBLIC
BROADCASTING PROGRESS.**

General.

The Media Development Team, the Ministry of Communications, Strategic Communications and Governance are working together on producing CPA Orders for the establishment of a Communications and Media Commission and a Public Broadcasting Service for Iraq. The deadline for the issuing of these Orders with IGC approval is 15 Jan 04.

Draft Orders.

The Draft Orders fully staffed through the CPA for both the Commission and the PBS will be ready for presentation to the IGC by 7 Jan 04. This will allow 8 days for obtaining final agreement from the IGC.

The Orders will be accompanied by a Legal Memorandum that will explain how the institutions will be established and function. These will include selection criteria and job specifications for the Commissioners and PBS Board of Governors. The PBS Order will also be presented along with a draft Statute or Charter that will lay down the essential principles that should govern the service.

Initial drafts for both institutions will be presented for final internal consultation within the CPA and in particular the General Counsel, by 4 Jan 04 as they are already nearing completion.

Suggest presentation to Amb. Bremer on 7th or 8th Jan to obtain endorsement prior to presentation to IGC.

Position with IGC.

Extensive discussions have taken place with Samir Shakir and members of the IGC Media Committee and they are supportive of the concept for an independent converged communications and media regulator and a PBS along the lines of the concept papers which have formed the basis of our discussion. They are aware of, and recognise the need for urgency but have not been briefed by us yet on Amb Bremer's intentions vis specific deadlines.

Samir Shakir has indicated that the IGC has given the Media Committee "executive powers" to make decisions on behalf of the IGC on media issues. We are not sure as yet what this means exactly.

The Media Committee seem comfortable with the principle of independence and believe that the IGC will approve the establishment of both institutions along the lines discussed. However, it is likely that the nominations of the Commission's members will be the subject of considerable argument which could delay the process. The same is likely for the PBS Board of Governors.

On 22 December we understand that the Minister of Communications presented his

concept for a temporary Telecommunications Commission- directly under his jurisdiction. It is understood that the IGC approved this in its decision 135 signed by Al Panchachi. Samir Shakir and the Media Committee claim not have known about this.

We do not believe that this proposal which keeps the authority for regulation inside the Ministry will be acceptable to the CPA. Dan Sudnick is also of this view as are Governance. We also understand that it is not acceptable to the IGC Media Committee. This apparent conflict within the IGC will need to be resolved.



COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY
BAGHDAD

ACTION MEMO

January 1, 2004

FOR: THE ADMINISTRATOR

FROM: [REDACTED] Senior Advisor, Ministry of Communications

SUBJECT: Establishment of an Independent Regulatory Commission for
Telecommunications and Broadcast Media

I recommend that you disapprove the recommendations of the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) which decided in favor of a proposal to found a "Temporary Commission" reporting to the Minister of Communications.

In mid-November, you and I had met with Minister Haider. One of the discussion topics was your desire to establish an independent regulatory commission for telecommunications. Minister Haider agreed to bring forth a proposal to the IGC. He did so.

After a subsequent and more recent meeting on this topic with Mr. [REDACTED] and me, you had directed me to expand the scope of the planned regulatory agency to include broadcast media.

To these ends, Mr. [REDACTED] has been working closely with me and my MOC team to prepare the necessary proposed charters, organization plans, functions, and *pro forma* budgets. We have also continued discussions with others close to this proposal. Lastly, we have drafted an amendment to CPA Order 11 (Telecommunications) and are coordinating its preparation with Office of General Counsel (OGC).

During this interval, Minister [REDACTED] submitted a letter (translated copy attached) to the IGC. In the letter, he proposed the "2-step" process. Apparently, the IGC has endorsed Haider's proposal. Attached is a copy of its decision that was forwarded to me on 30 December by CPA Governance.

Unknown at this time is the composition of the endorsing body of the IGC, votes taken, and deliberative processes employed. The proclamation, nevertheless, endorses the 2-step process that would retain executive and administrative control under the Minister of Communications.

The decision of the IGC and its recommendations, specifically item #2, are untenable. The recent actions surrounding the issuance of the wireless licenses suggest that telecommunications operators will be unable to receive fair and impartial oversight by a politically-appointed, sole regulator.

UNCLASSIFIED

Ironically, Minister Haider stated to me this past Sunday that he does not wish to be involved in the issuance of broadcast television licenses. Apparently, he had approved one or more broadcast licenses and is receiving recriminations from his political opponents. (The fact that he is issuing licenses presents yet another distinct and confounding topic.)

RECOMMENDATION (1): I recommend that you not endorse the decisions of the IGC with respect to the recommended executive action.

Approve: _____ Disapprove: _____ Approve with modification: _____

RECOMMENDATION (2): I recommend that you authorize other proponents to advocate to the IGC a proposal which will result in the desired recommendations to you. These recommendations will then constitute the constructive policy framework of the Executive Order that you intend to issue on 15 January.

Approve: _____ Disapprove: _____ Approve with modification: _____

ATTACHMENTS: As discussed

COORDINATION: [REDACTED] OGC
Strategic Communications, IMN
Governance

UNCLASSIFIED

of Strat Com

Transition to Sovereignty: Information Campaign Status Report



Office of Strategic Communications



Outline



- Team structure
- Themes
- Campaign Structure
- Capabilities
- Current Activities
- Feedback and Evaluation
- Challenges



The Communications Team

A Coordinated Effort

- CPA Governance Team
 - CPA Office of Strategic Communications
 - Governance Communications Task Force
 - Coordination and Fusion Cell
 - Military Information Support Team
 - Regional Operations Office
 - USAID
 - Local Governance Program
 - Office of Transition Initiatives
 - Research Triangle Institute
 - Military
 - Civil Affairs battalions
 - Tactical Psychological Operations Teams
 - Governance Support Teams
-



(C) (S)

Enduring Themes



- Empowerment
 - End of occupation
 - Acceleration of representative government
- Reassurance
 - No return of the former regime
 - Coalition remains to ensure Iraq's security
 - At invitation, only until Iraq establishes robust security capability
- Rights
 - Basic freedoms
 - Minority rights protected by democratic process
 - Independent judiciary
 - Civilian control of the military



Campaign Structure



- **Four phases:**

- Transitional Administrative Law (Now-28 February 2004)
 - Inform, Educate, encourage support
- Caucus formation period (1 Mar-31 May 2004)
 - Encourage participation
- Transitional Assembly (1 June-30 Jun 2004)
 - Build credibility
- Post CPA elections (1 July 2004-December 2005)
 - Support Transitional Administration



Current Activities

- General civic education 'principles' products
 - 500K handbills per week on basic civic terminology (to run to April)
 - First one in production; distribution at end of week
- Town Hall Meetings/Democracy Dialogues
 - Baghdad 28 Jan 04 (Intl/Regional/Local TV coverage invited)
 - Ba'qubah 29 Jan 04 (Intl/Regional/Local TV coverage invited)
 - Kirkuk 15 Feb 04
 - Tikrit mid Feb 04
 - Erbil mid Feb 04
 - CPA (SC) meetings to run 10-20 Feb - not confirmed
 - CPA (S) meetings to run late - Feb not confirmed
- Civic Education
 - Civic Education 'Tool kit' in draft circulation
 - Recruitment of teachers ongoing; target is 400 by end Feb
- Roadshow
 - Recruitment ongoing
- Ad campaign
 - \$5M funding agreed (DFI)
 - Invitation to tender ends 27 Jan
 - Evaluation board 28 Jan



Capabilities



■ MIST Products

- Leaflets//Handbills
- Poster
- CDs


■ Town Hall Meetings/Democracy Dialogues

■ Media


- Public Service Announcements in all outlets
- TV/ radio and Sabah newspaper coverage of all press conferences and town hall meetings
- 'Khatawat', weekly explanatory Al Iraqiya program for the Agreement; continued for the TAL

■ Civic Education

- Designed both to develop understanding of the fundamental principles of democracy and to assist in explaining the political process.
-
- 



Capabilities



- Professional Conferences
 - Direct Outreach
 - CJTF7 and the CPA GCs interface directly with Iraqi people, particularly in remote areas where face to face meetings are primary means of communication in absence of local media.
 - Roadshow
 - Iraqi experts visit local meetings across Iraq to explain political process
 - Ad campaign
 - TV/Radio Advertisements
 - Posters/Billboards
-



Feedback



- **IRI Focus Groups**

- IRI focus group report completed
- Planning 3 focus group cycles - Feb through Apr
- Training additional facilitators

- **Opinion polls**

- Monthly polls:
 - Independent Institute for Administrative and Civil Society Studies (IIACSS)
 - Iraqi Center for Research and Strategic studies (ICRSS)
- Major Gallup poll
 - Survey Feb
 - Report 15 Mar





Challenges



- Recruitment of road show speakers
- Development of material for local use
- National event organization
 - Venues
 - Logistics
 - NGO partnerships
- Information flow from regions, governates, IGC



Questions?

RTI/IRI NORTHERN FOCUS GROUPS

Contact: Steven Moore, IRI

Gurbax Singh, RTI

b(2)

Background

RTI were asked to conduct focus groups in Basrah, Najaf, Hillah, Baghdad, Baquba, Mosul, Erbil and Sulaymania around public opinion regarding the agreement between the CPA and the Iraqi Governing Council. IRI and RTI previously reported on the southern groups, conducted in December.

This report reports on groups conducted in Mosul, Erbil and Sulaymania, from January 8 through January 13, 2004, plus an extra, unrequested session conducted in Basrah after two days after the December 29 Basrah town hall meeting.

Methodology

This series of groups has drastically decreased bias associated with the groups being connected with Americans or CPA. The groups were conducted in a university setting with only Iraqi staff using the name of the Independent Institute for Administrative and Civil Society Studies (IIACCS), a new public opinion research firm in Baghdad with which IRI works. IRI expatriate staff reviewed video tapes of the groups taped on a small security type camera at IRI offices in Baghdad and discussed the findings at length with IRI local staff.

Even without Americans present, suspicious Iraqis accused the moderators of being CIA and in league with other various organizations. The anti-American bias was much more pronounced in the southern focus groups.

Recruitment remains the most challenging aspect of this type of project. IIACCS recruited some of the participants in some cities, while IRI local staff recruited participants in other cities. Participants were paid 25,000 dinar for their participation, but IRI local staff found that providing recruits the opportunity to have their opinion heard was a superior recruiting technique. That being said, difficulties associated with recruiting created a bias toward educated (particularly academic) Iraqis who are more affluent than average.

While not very representative of the population at large, the participants are opinion leaders, whose provide valuable information.

IRI moderators have increased in skill level over the last six weeks. Rather than asking questions on the discussion guide and accepting any answer, the moderators have learned to probe to get the answers they need. They also have come to better understand the importance of being objective, decreasing bias associated with giving their opinion to the group.

Key Findings

- The main problem with the agreement is not that Iraqis do not like the agreement. Quite the contrary. Most groups were quite happy with the prospect of the agreement, but virtually none of the groups believed it would happen.
- There is little correlation between educating the participants on the agreement and their willingness to believe the agreement. However, virtually all of the participants felt that the education process is important and welcome.
- The antidote to Iraqi disbelief is action by the CPA. Specifically, the Iraqis need to believe that the security situation is improving. However, any promise by the CPA that is kept will likely have a positive result.
- The word "respect" in referring to the Islamic majority in Iraq tends to annoy Arabs. They react to it like it is condescending.
- Freedom of press and freedom of expression are both very much less important to the Kurds than the right to exist the right to not be discriminated against.
- Arabs tend to feel that freedom of press and freedom of expression will increase civil strife by people publishing newspapers and sniping at rival groups. This is not just felt between Sunni and Shiia, but as well (perhaps more) between Shiia factions.
- Even in the Kurdish north, where the largest reservoir of goodwill toward the Coalition remains, there is little faith in the ability of the Coalition to provide for the rights of Kurds in the transition process.
- Similarly, Arabs are citing the UN as an objective arbitrator for the handover of sovereignty.
- In terms of timespan waiting for the elections to come, the Kurds think it is too short, and the Basrahns think it is too long.
- The Kurds do not trust the Arabs. They feel like they have had some 12 years of democracy, effective government and relative prosperity. They are unsure why the Kurdish people should cast their lot in an election that is dominated demographically by Arabs.
- Without strict direction by IRI moderators, the answer to every question in Arab cities is "security." Similarly, in Kurdish cities, the answer to every question is "Kurdish autonomy" or "Federalism."
- In about a third to a half of the groups in both the north and south, there existed an undercurrent of self-reliance in the matter of security. One or two people in these

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groups would place responsibility for security on the Iraqi people themselves, rather than point to the Coalition as failing to provide security.

- As with the December groups, the Iraqi police are seen as ineffective, corruptible and poorly trained.
- All groups were concerned about what should happen if a substantial number of Iraqis do not approve the constitution in the referendum. One woman was worried about a number as low as 1% rejecting the constitution.
- Many of the opinion leaders feared that the less educated people would waste their vote because they would associate the referendum with the Saddam referendums, where the outcome was pre-ordained.
- The Kurds in particular feared that the southern masses would swayed to vote in a particular way by just a few religious leaders.

Analysis

Following is a focus group discussion guide with responses from the participants and analysis answering each question, with the city from which the information came noted. Questions from the discussion guide are bolded, while participant quotes are italicized.

On 15 Nov the CPA announced that political authority would be transferred to the Iraqi government. Were you aware of this decision?

In general, the northern cities were much less aware and much less educated on the agreement.

"Why has the media not told us about these agreements?" -- 24 year old female student from Sulaymania

These groups were conducted prior to the town hall meeting in Mosul, which could be a contributing factor. Additionally, IRI found that education efforts by non-CPA organizations were stronger in the south.

How did you find out?

Satellite TV, specifically Al-Jazeera, was the most frequently mentioned source of news. However, focus groups cannot measure penetration of message, and this information is valid only for the people in the groups. Note that these groups skew educated and affluent, which are the group of people most likely to have access to satellite TV.

Note as well that in many of the groups, people say that Iraqi TV should take a greater role in educating people on the agreement. In particular, the focus group participants

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were worried that the lesser educated Iraqis would cast an uninformed vote, or would vote by the order of their cleric. Many suggested a television campaign as an effective way to educate the masses.

"The caucuses will be better understood if people get to watch TV programs to explain them, rather than watching some television sit-com." – 28 year old female computer programmer from Basrah

What were your feelings upon hearing of this decision?

I am afraid that the authority will be held by an Arab so that there will be no difference than the last regime. – 24 year old female student in Erbil

Do you believe it?

In general, the feelings of northern Iraqis mirror our findings throughout Iraq. People want to believe the agreement, but are reluctant to do so.

I am optimistic about the prospect of power being transferred to the Iraqis, but I don't trust that it will happen – 21 year old female law student in Erbil

What makes it believable/unbelievable to you?

We don't know if the GC knows about it or not! Why did they not talk about it for a month after they wrote it? – 43 year old male political science professor in Erbil

Now I'm going to give you an overview of the agreement.

<istribute agreement>

Let's take a few minutes to look over it and then we'll talk about it. Please write down your first impressions. Especially, write down the parts of the agreement that you may have questions about. Or, think about those parts of the agreement that may not be very clear to the least educated Iraqis.

<Take agreement back up>

What is your first impression of the agreement?

Do you believe it?

The problem with the agreement is not in whether the Iraqis like it – it is in whether they believe it will happen. The focus groups did not reveal any correlation between knowledge of the agreement and believability of the agreement.

*"I believe in it, but it is not easy to make real. I wish it were more than just ink on paper."
– 25 year old woman in Mosul*

In general, people are waiting for some application or external event to validate the agreement.

"This (the agreement) is happy story, but the CPA say that they will provide the security. In my opinion, if they can't provide security for themselves, how can they provide it for us?" – 28 year old female computer programmer from Basrah

"I will believe it if the Americans leave, and that is impossible." – 36 year old male education administrator from Mosul

In central and southern Iraq the answer to every question, regardless of the question, is "security." In northern Iraq, security is an issue as well, but the answer to every question is "What about the Kurds?"

"The paper we read is obscure and foggy and needs a lot of clarification in order for it to be understandable for the simple people and even for us. The Kurdish issue hasn't been mentioned in any way." – 24 year old female student in Sulaymania

"I feel pessimistic, and I don't want the agreement to be applied. There must be a self-governing system given to the Kurds. Their rights must be preserved before writing the constitution."—35 year old woman with a bachelor's degree from Erbil

Let's take some of the specific parts of the agreement and put them on the white board.

By February 28, 2003, the Governing Council will approve a Transitional Administrative Law that guarantees basic rights for all Iraqis during the transition, including freedom of speech and freedom of press.

What questions do you have about this?

What questions do you think that cleaning people and taxi drivers might have about it?

What fears and concerns do you think people will have about this part of the agreement?

probe: do you think that Iraqis are worried that their basic rights will suffer under this agreement?

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probe: what do you think about the governing council writing this? Who should write the Transitional Administrative Law to manage the transition to sovereignty?

Probably most surprising about this part of the agreement from a Western perspective is the undercurrent of fear of freedom of speech and freedom of the press in the focus groups.

The freedom of speech... what if that speech wasn't right and critical toward certain issues? I think the freedom of speech thing is an over-rated thing. – 37 year old male health worker in Mosul

"Is the freedom of press when everyone will say the thing that they want?" -- 42 year old female physician in Mosul

"The Iraqi people need the freedom, but there must be control of it." – 26 year old female BA in French arts in Mosul

The Kurdish groups feel they are working from a much more basic right than freedom of speech and freedom of the press – the right to exist, religious rights, the right to have a representative in the government, equal job opportunities, and the right not to be discriminated against in general.

"Why mention this obscure right about the media?" – 30 year old female pharmacologist in Sulaymania with agreement from most of the group

"What about the rights of the Kurdish people?" – 3 male teachers in their early twenties in Erbil

"(the agreement) should reflect the free and honest opinions of the Kurdish people, not just the rights of the media." – 34 year old male masters student from Sulaymania

Even in post-town hall meeting Basrah, the women's group felt that freedom of the press and freedom of speech would exacerbate ethnic and religious differences and might lead to civil strife.

"We are in a critical condition. There is no benefit from the freedom of expression since it will create a civil war. There should be limitations to prevent mistakes." -- 28 year old female computer programmer from Basrah

"People from different religions will start newspapers on their own and start trouble." – 65 year old female professor in Basrah

Probing by the moderators revealed that these Basrah opinions even apply to censoring the Shiia majority in the south of Iraq. Participants noted that Shiia are fractured, and felt that widespread freedom of expression would lead to further splintering and violence among the Shiia sects.

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While not revealed directly by the focus groups, the IRI local staff conducting the groups said that earlier in the day some local representatives of the Islamic Da'wa Party held a meeting on the campus of the university explaining the IGC/CPA agreement. IRI local staff felt that these opinions among the men's group were generated as a result of that meeting.

The Transitional Administrative Law will respect the Islamic identity of the majority of the Iraqi people, while providing guarantees of religious freedom for all Iraqis.

What questions do you have about this?

What questions do you think that cleaning people and taxi drivers might have about it?

What fears and concerns do you think people will have about this part of the agreement?

The similarities in response of the groups on this subject breaks down between the Kurdish cities and Basrah/Mosul.

Three of the four groups in Basrah and Mosul (the exception being the Mosul women) took exception to the word "respect" in this part of the agreement. The reaction was particularly profound in Basrah – possibly due to the aforementioned Islamic party meeting on the university campus, or perhaps the difference is due to a wider difference between Islamic passions in Mosul and Basrah.

The Mosul men's group used the opportunity to talk about the importance of Islam as the foundation of Iraq, while the Basrah groups tended to feel that "respect" was condescending.

"What do they mean by 'will respect?' We want them to respect us as Iraqis and understand that 80% are Muslims. We were raised with Christians, Sabia, Sunna... we don't need others to teach us how to respect." – 39 year old college female teacher in Basrah

"If this part will give all the religions their freedom, there will be a fragmentation between the Iraqis." – 19 year old female student in Basrah

"I am provoked by the word 'respect.' Why don't they just confess that Islam is the religion of this country?" – 31 year old male with a post-graduate education in Basrah

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"What do they mean by respect the Islamic identity...? Do they mean only respecting the relationship between the person and God? What we want is that Islam is the basis of the law of Iraq." – 61 year old male retired teacher in Mosul

"Instead of respect it would be better to say guarantee the protection of the other religions." – 62 year old male ex-military officer in Mosul

They have to change this part and write that the formal religion in Iraq is the Islam with respecting the other religions. – 49 year old male headmaster of a teacher's institute in Mosul

The Kurdish groups were on the whole more interested in the rights of minorities, perhaps since they are a minority themselves, although Islamic pride did play a significant role in the groups.

I prefer that Iraq be liberal country with respect to all religions. – 23 year old male administrator in Erbil, 23 year old male teacher in Erbil and 43 year old political science professor

Being Kurds we feel that there is no need for this section, for we are not racist, unlike the Arab who always tried to control the minorities and religiously differentiate between Sunni and Shiite, Christianity and Islam. – 23 year old female law student

Other group members pointed out the hypocrisy of the racist nature of this statement, but the fear of more abuse at the hands of the Arabs seems to be present in all of our Kurdish focus groups.

Here in Sulaymania we don't discriminate basing on religion. We can say our society live in a harmony, so this item will not provoke any question. – 56 year old female professor, with agreement from the group

Both groups in Erbil said they thought the specific minority religions should be mentioned in the basic law. One can assume that this is indicative of the Kurdish desire to have their rights mentioned in the basic law, and a willingness to coalesce with other minorities.

The agreement should contain something to explain the freedom of all religions. – Erbil male 21 year old college student

I want the rights of each religion to be equally represented in the constitution – 42 year old female high school educated employee in Erbil

Every religion has it own ideas, so it would be better if these ideas are mentioned in the new constitution. – 30 year old female civil servant in Erbil

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Basrah women have fear of control by outside groups, and use it as an excuse to be concerned about allowing too much religious freedom.

Sure the people will have fears and concerns about (this section of the agreement). The law has to determine the type of religion and the type of freedom. For other religions they can publish a newspaper or a magazine, they can enjoy their holy days but without affecting the Muslims. – 22 year old female researcher in Basrah

Other people from outside Iraq are trying to make a problem here; the Jewish, the Wahabi. -- 39 year old female university professor in Basrah

Based on the Transitional Administrative Law, by May 31, 2004, local caucuses will be convened in each of Iraq's 18 governorates to elect delegates from among their number for an Iraqi Transitional National Assembly.

What questions do you have about this?

What questions do you think that cleaning people and taxi drivers might have about it?

probe: do you think that people understand what a caucus is? What do you think the difference is between a caucus and an election?

What fears and concerns do you think people will have about this part of the agreement?

The caucuses are widely misunderstood in all the cities. The numerous questions are detailed in the attachment labeled "Questions." Only in three Kurdish groups and Basrah did useful information come out about concerns of the participants.

The men in Erbil were unanimous in their concern about the transitional period. One participant pointed out that the Iraqi constitution has been transitional since 1970. All were concerned about the instability that might come about during a transitional period.

The caucuses caused concern among women in Erbil.

Who will manage this process (the election of the representatives), I think this part of the obscure of this agreement & this will lead to serious negative results. – 31 year old woman from Sulaymania with a post-graduate education

As we have seen all over Iraq, security remains a major issue.

How can hold an elective convention while we suffer a bad security condition?—28 year old woman with a post-graduate degree in Erbil

(in agreement) We want active steps to afford security than we should move to the elective convention. – 28 year old female in Erbil

In Basrah, even well educated male participants are looking toward outside validation for the caucus – clerics and the United Nations.

This part is clear for us but we depend on our clerics who have notes about this part.— 46 year old male PhD in Basrah

We want the UN to be the supervisor of the election because it represents an independent doesn't relate to any country – 53 year old male physics professor in Basrah

By March 15, 2005 direct, one-man, one-vote elections will be held for a constitutional convention. This convention will meet to write a permanent constitution.

What questions do you have about this?

What questions do you think that cleaning people and taxi drivers might have about it?

What fears and concerns do you think people will have about this part of the agreement?

Probe: Do you think Iraqis will wait until this long for an election?

This section provokes numerous questions, detailed in the Questions attachment to this document.

There is a stark contrast between the north and south in terms of the length of time the participants are willing to wait for an election. The south wants elections very quickly, while the north prefers to wait as long as possible.

The female group in Sulaymania all felt that waiting for a constitution was OK, and that the Kurds would wait as long as it took to assure Kurdish rights in the constitution. This was echoed in Erbil.

We don't care if the constitution is civilian; we just care about the federal point – 28 year old male law researcher from Erbil

Since most of our focus group participants are well-educated opinion leaders, there is concern among some of them about what the lesser educated Iraqis will do in an election. Many of them are concerned that the vote of the lesser educated masses will be

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determined by only a few people. Think of this comment from a focus group participant in Mosul in context of the numerous comments from Basrah about the necessity of following the will of the clerics in choosing a leader.

"I think since the simple people don't understand the procedure in the right way and they don't know the exact value of their votes, how will they determine the fate of Iraq? Certain groups can affect the mind of the simple people and change their opinions. This is a problem since there are so many uneducated people." – male accountant, high school education, 50 years old in Mosul

While the dependence upon the opinions of clerics in the south, the northern Iraqis are much less reliant on the opinions of their religious leaders.

"As a citizen I can freely elect the person who will represent me, not depending only on the clerics. We can elect the person who will serve our country and people." – 53 year old male doctor of physics in Basrah

In fact, while the Kurdish groups showed an undercurrent of affinity for the Shiia who had been similarly oppressed by Saddam, the Kurds are quite concerned about leaving their own fate up to the southern masses.

People should make choices far away from external influence in the referendum, in order to be responsible for their choice. – 28 year old woman from Erbil with a post-graduate degree.

Kurds in general don't want to be governed by Arabs, and believe that this is a pivotal point for their independence – if they don't get it done right now, then they believe that there is fifty years of armed struggle ahead of them. The Erbil women's group felt that the Arabs would not choose the sort of Federalism desired by the Kurds (3 regions vs. 18 regions), if they chose Federalism at all.

Some members of the male group in Erbil were quite passionate about getting back to their homes in Kirkuk, and were willing to trade away Kirkuk's oil revenues to do so.

The Sulaymania women's group thought that the whole process is complicated and even the term (constitution) is too obscure for the simple people to understand.

Most participants in Basrah's female focus group felt that the USA was benefiting from the (in their view) long period of time before the elections.

"I think the reason that it is taking a long time because they are writing the constitution in the United States and will send it here." – 28 year old female computer programmer from Basrah

This is a joke, but it was agreed to by everyone.

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Many of our participants felt that less educated Iraqis will associate referendums with the phony elections of the former regime. They think that these people will not vote, or will not mark their ballots in an informed fashion.

"The Iraqi people used to try many referendums (under the former regime) but never once did they respect the procedure since they already know the results... this is what people know about referendums." – 22 year old female biology student from Basrah

"...people know about the old way (the way of the former regime) of referendums, but they need to know now what is the real meaning of the referendum." – 39 year old female college professor from Basrah

The Kurds are proud of their last 12 years of democracy, and are reluctant to give up their already functioning government to become part of the rest of Iraq's instability.

We want Federalism, but the kind of this federalism is still unclear. Here in Kurdistan we have a constitution approved by our parliament. What about that? Will it be considered or not in the new general constitution?—male PhD from Sulaymania

Their concerns are likely valid. One of the more educated male members of the Basrah focus group provided a structure into which he classified Basrahns.

"People can be divided into three groups: the first one is those who follow the clerics, the second one is those who follow parties and the other group is those who don't follow anybody but I see that the majority of the people are in the first group." – 31 year old man with a masters in Arabic literature

While there is much confusion surrounding the constitutional drafting process, at least one of the group members was anxious to participate.

"One man one vote – what does that mean? What does a person need to do to nominate himself?" – male accountant, high school education, 50 years old in Mosul

After the constitution is drafted, it will be approved by the Iraqi people in a referendum.

What questions do you have about this?

What questions do you think that cleaning people and taxi drivers might have about it?

probe: do you think that people understand what a referendum is?

What fears and concerns do you think people will have about this part of the agreement?

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The entire men's group in Sulaymania was concerned about the referendum, and how it might impact Kurdish rights.

All the groups showed concern about what might happen if substantial (or less substantial) portions of the Iraqi electorate did not vote for the constitution.

If the Iraqi people didn't approve the constitution, what will happen then? Even if 1% refuses it, that 1% is not a small ratio. What can we do then? -- 39 year old female college professor in Basrah

While no group came out and said that less than unanimous acceptance of the constitution would cause civil strife, that was implied.

Many groups have concerns about the "all or nothing" nature of a referendum, and propose a "line item" vote.

Some group members felt that the process excluded them, and that they didn't have much of a choice in the matter should the Iraqis desire independence.

"We must accept the constitution even if we don't like it. If we don't vote for it, then we will not have independence, so we must vote for it!" – 19 year old female college student from Basrah

By December 31, 2005, national elections for a new Iraqi government will be held based on the new constitution. The elected government will assume power. The transitional government will be dissolved.

What questions do you have about this?

What questions do you think that cleaning people and taxi drivers might have about it?

What fears and concerns do you think people will have about this part of the agreement?

There is a conflict in public opinion regarding the shame of being protected by foreigners versus the need for a well-trained, well-equipped force to keep security in Iraq. This need for the CF to keep security was well-documented in December's groups.

"The Iraqi people cannot accept being protected by foreigners. The persistence of the CPA for a longer time means the persistence of instability. – 39 year old female college professor in Basrah

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The period is too short; one year is not enough to make election -- 51 year old sociology professor in Erbil

Even in Kurdistan, where our moderators saw more of a reserve of US sympathy than anywhere else we have conducted groups, there is pessimism about the US conducting the election.

If the US going to supervise the elections, our rights will be lost. – 18 year old female high school student in Erbil

I'm afraid if the same people ruling now will remain in power, I mean the GC and the coalition forces; they will not preserve the rights of the Kurdish people. – 41 year old college educated male from Sulaymania & 52 year old high school educated male from Sulaymania

Throughout this process, Coalition Forces will continue to work side-by-side with new Iraqi police and security institutions to ensure a peaceful transition to a sovereign, democratic, secure Iraq.

What questions do you have about this?

What questions do you think that cleaning people and taxi drivers might have about it?

What fears and concerns do you think people will have about this part of the agreement?

People in many groups had concerns about just what the role of the CF might be, and how the Iraqis might have sovereignty if the CF remained.

"If the CPA is going to be part of providing security, then I don't think we can call this transferring authority." – 20 year old college student studying Arabic in Basrah

"Keeping security is the work of the Iraqi people without depending on the CPA." -- 22 year old male pharmacy student in Basrah

This is in keeping with the small strain of self-reliance in the focus groups. In many groups, one or two people talk about self-reliance of the Iraqi people in the matter of security. This vein of public opinion could be tapped through a public education campaign on how Iraqis can participate in their own security.

In a couple of the groups, some of the members showed disdain for the new Iraqi police uniforms, which remind them of the US uniforms.

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"Who are the Iraqi police? Those who have no weapons and don't train enough. It is not a realistic thing because police now can't keep security – they are not ready for that. When I see police with their new uniform, it is not respectful." 31 year old Basrah male with a masters in Arab literature

The sense that the CF only protect themselves was prevalent in December's focus groups in the south, and showed itself in an undercurrent in this set of groups.

The Americans aren't supporting the IPF unless it is for their own protection. Since the previous Iraqi army is involved in war crimes and it won't be able to come back, people will think it is better to provide the IPF with advanced weapons and equipment. -- male accountant, high school education, 50 years old in Mosul

"Most of the police are kids only working for salaries. We want a mix of the old experience with the police." – 38 year old female high school graduate in Mosul

Mosul groups also expressed an interest in seeing the return of the military, the old army, to keep security. This opinion is more pronounced in Mosul, and perhaps they the rest of Iraq isn't quite as anxious to see the return of the military. Mosul has a reputation as a military city, which may explain why it is interested in seeing the old army return. One of our moderators said that the running joke in Mosul is that a man cannot find a woman to marry him if he holds a rank below lieutenant.

However, this is indicative of the desire for alternatives to the current security situation.

Finally, the security question underpins everything in Iraq. This sentiment was found in groups throughout Iraq. Participants are reluctant to believe anything CPA says while security is still a problem.

Good end to the story, but the CPA says that they will provide the security for us. But in my opinion, if they couldn't provide security for themselves, how can they provide it for us? – 28 year old female computer programmer from Basrah

QUESTIONS

Following are questions that Iraqis had about the process, reported by city.

Erbil men

- Where is the right of the Kurdish people?
- There are eighteen governorates, so where is the right of the Kurdish people?
- Why do we need this transitional period?
- Is the constitution is coming from the election or vise versa?

Erbil women

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- Only two kinds of freedom were mentioned (freedom of speech, freedom of press), were they mentioned exclusively or they were mentioned only to give examples?
- Why should the GC write the law, why not the university masters from different nationalities and sects?
- The elective convention going to be applied in the northern provinces of Iraq?
- Row can hold an elective convention while we suffer a bad security condition?
- Shall we have an elected representative or appointed one?
- Shall we elect a representative or we vote on an appointed one (referendum)?
- We want to know the specifications of the new constitution, is it federal democratic or not?
- Are the people going to write the constitution, or elect people write the constitution?

Mosul men

- What do they mean by the respect of the Islamic religion are they talking about secularism or it's going to be an Islamic republic?
- The transitional government, how it's going to be, which political parties will participate?
- Why did they mention the freedom of speech and press and they didn't mention the freedom of the political parties?
- What are the caucuses? are they representing parties, unions, associations?
- One-man, one vote? What does the person need to nominate himself? Who is going to write the constitution,? And how many votes are required so the person can join the writing of the constitution?
- The people who will write the constitution, are they appointed or elected?
- In case there are points in the constitution against our habits and principles and morals what can we do with that?
- If more than 50% refuse the constitution, what will happen?
- What they mean by the government, will there be a President or a prime minister?
- Will be there a paper with the names of the nominated people in it?
- What are the security institutions, why we should wait so long to have security, it's a must for all people to know that all what we care about now is the security, where are the police forces, why didn't they arrange for that since the beginning?
- If the IGC and the CPA will dissolve, why are they going to arrange the security issue?
- What is the meaning by the dissolve of the CPA?
- Why don't they start early with the security problem?

Mosul Women

- What if a ratio of the Iraqi people refuse the constitution? What will happen?
- If more than 50% they have to change, if less I think it will remain, but I wonder are people from different cultural level of the people will participate in the writing of the constitution?

~~Preliminary Draft – For Discussion Purposes Only~~

Sulaymania men

- wondering about the date specifically. What is the mechanism of choosing the date?
- I wonder about who has the authority to sign this agreement with the CPA? Are they the same persons who are announced by the CPA themselves? & do they know about this agreement or not?
- I am wondering about the Kurdish people why they would accept this unclear cloudy agreement?
- government election or government plus parliament? We are talking about the constitution but we don't know what kind of constitution we are talking about...
- Which is first? The government or the parliament...? Does the government is formed by the constitution or the parliament? How is the government formed without the existence of the legislative authority?

Sulaymania women

- I think one of the questions is now there are elections of the city advisory consuls (CAC). Is it the same elections mentioned in the agreement? Or the eighteen representatives (one from each governorate) are going to elect the president? – There are no explanations for the future election system?
- There will be eighteen representatives are they the candidates for the presidency? - On which basis the candidates will participate in the presidency elections? Depending on their relations with the political parties? Or basing on their ethnic background?
- What's the purpose behind this? What they are waiting for to explain the agreement to the Iraqi people?
- If it is going to be religious ruling, is the president going to be Shiite, Sunni, Arabic or Kurdish?
- What are the bases of candidacy? Are they going to enter themselves or they are going to be chosen by The GC or the coalition Forces?
- What is the role of the constitutional committee? How many persons will compose it? And whom they will represent?
- How many Kurdish representatives are going to be in this committee?
- Do the elected persons will have legal and political experience?
- Are the educational and the intellectual going to be conditions to choose the candidates?
- If some of the elected persons are not Kurds, are they going to neglect the Kurdish rights?
- If the Iraqi people refused the constitution, are they going to do amendment on it? And who will do these amendments, is it the same committee?
- If the Iraqis refused the constitution, is it going to be imposed on them?
- What type of government going to be? Is it going to be republican or royalty?
- What do you mean by new police? You mean they will replace the existing police force that worked during Saddam's era?

Basrah Men

~~**Preliminary Draft – For Discussion Purposes Only**~~

- Why is it a transitional government? We need permanent one.
- How will be the supervisor of the election and writing the constitution?
- Now how long that we need to write a permanent constitution for our country?
- Where is Iraq state? It is Islamic country depend on Islam in each field of life.
- Do we have a permanent constitution in Iraq? Can the GC establish a committee to write the constitution?
- Do you want the occupation forces to put the constitution for us?
- We need the end of the occupation, when does it end?

Basrah Women

- Where will the members of the IGC after the IGC will be released?
- Regarding the caucuses -- it's understood, but I'm I going to select who is going to represent me, or other people will perform that?

Strat Com

ARAB AND IRAQI MEDIA ISSUES

- With the arrival of several new staff members recently, we have started a significant increase in our engagement with the Arab and Iraqi media. We now have, or are on the point of having:
- One full-time Arabic spokesman – [REDACTED] – focusing solely on the Arab and Iraqi media. [REDACTED] will start to spend most of his time in the forward press office (in the convention center), so that he is readily accessible.
 - A second Arabic spokesman – [REDACTED] – who will serve as Gareth's alternate, providing additional depth and ensuring full cover during absences.
 - A senior Arabic spokesman – Ambassador Chris Ross – who can do longer, in-depth interviews with the written and broadcast media, when we need a senior authoritative voice.
 - A head of the Arabic media section [REDACTED] – leading on strategy and building the team (including through the transition – see below)
 - An Arabic media desk officer – [REDACTED] – who establishes and maintains regular contact with the various pan-Arab and Iraqi media outlets.
2. We now need to build out the additional supporting members and functions of a full team. In particular, we are trying to:
- Establish a more comprehensive monitoring operation.
 - a. The bare minimum is a proper summary of the local press daily by mid-morning which we are still unable to do.
 - b. A more ambitious plan is to have full real-time monitoring of the Arabic broadcast media as well, which would increase our rapid rebuttal ability. We continue to face serious logistical challenges to achieve this.
 - Broaden the remit of the team to cover more public diplomacy activities. Some of this is being done at the moment in [REDACTED] team, and simply requires better coordination. In due course, we may need to restructure to prepare for the transition to embassies.
 - Hire a full complement of translators and other Iraqi staff.
3. We would appreciate your help on some of the more intransigent logistical problems which we have been unable to resolve:
- **Budget** The Arabic Media Section (like the rest of StratComms) still has no budget, despite repeated requests. We have no way to buy Iraqi newspapers, and rely on ad-hoc arrangements. We owe Az-Zaman newspaper for advertisements for which we cannot pay. We cannot take out new advertisements. Whether we get the budget from DFI or other funds, we need one.
 - **Hiring local staff** We have identified many of the Iraqis we want to work as translators and media monitors. But:
 - a. KBR is refusing to hire any more Iraqis
 - b. We need to put some of the better staff onto proper contracts now, in anticipation of the transition, to ensure that we do not lose them to other embassies, NGOs, companies, the UN etc. We have no ability to do this at the moment.
 - **Space** We want to run the majority of our Arabic media operation out of the convention center, not the palace. It is much easier to get Iraqi staff into the convention center, and the press is there, not here. We are working with CJTF-7 on space allocation in the existing

[REDACTED] —28 Jan 04

media area (the "CPIC" behind the briefing room), and hope to locate the key team members who need regular and close access to the press center (ie journalists) there. But we will need significant more space for the monitoring operation, and to accommodate anyone whom we displace from that room. In any case, Strategic Communications needs space in the convention center, since we are "maxed out" in the green room, and have a significant number of new staff arriving. We have talked to [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] about this, but will need your support to ensure that our needs are a priority as people start to fight over new space coming on-line shortly in the convention center.

4. Assuming that we can solve the above problems, we would anticipate being able to deliver the following within a matter of a few weeks:
 - A daily summary of the Iraqi press, checked by a Arabic-speaking coalition official with a political eye, by 11 am.
 - A daily briefing of the Iraqi and pan-Arab press, with additional interviews by an Arabic spokesman.
 - Regular joint briefings with the GC: we have done a few joint briefings now with [REDACTED] (GC spokesman) which have worked well.
 - A regular (once a week/two weeks) roundtable for you with the Arabic press, as you have been doing.
 - Rapid rebuttal of incorrect or unbalanced reports on the Arabic broadcast media. We are doing some of this now - eg rebutting the ridiculous reports on LBC of an attack on your convoy on Monday - but we need comprehensive monitoring capabilities to do this.
5. Immediate issues we will be working on in the next few weeks are:
 - Deciding how ambitious we can realistically be in our monitoring and rebuttal ability. To-date we have relied on FBIS and BBC Monitoring. But this leaves significant gaps (and is far from real-time). On the other hand, we have to be realistic about the size of the challenge: trying to monitor even the major TV and radio stations in real time is a huge operation. We don't do this comprehensively even for US broadcast media. On the other hand, if we could manage to cover the major outlets from Baghdad, this could be a resource for the USG/coalition as a whole, and it would be much cheaper to run from Baghdad than from Washington.
 - Finalising the transition plans for the post July 1 phase. [REDACTED] is leading on this, in close consultation with the State Department. Dan is keeping an eye on the differing expectations in State and NSC/other departments. The key issues include:
 - a. Size of the operation, including whether we should continue to have regional PAOs post July 1.
 - b. Should we split the operation into a traditional embassy public diplomacy team focusing on the local media, and a more US media-focused operation answering to Washington?
 - c. Coalition or bilateral. The majority of post July 1 media work will be bilateral, but should we have some coalition activities? Or will close coordination suffice?

(b)(6) (FS-4)

From: (b)(6)
 Sent: Monday, February 02, 2004 11:32 AM
 To: (b)(6)
 Cc: (b)(6)
 Subject: RE: Operating Budget for Stat Com

Thanks. Will do.

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6)
 Sent: Monday, February 02, 2004 12:33 AM
 To: (b)(6)
 Cc: (b)(6)
 Subject: RE: Operating Budget for Stat Com

(b)(6)

Please get with Col (b)(6) and work out the details of your requirements. Thanks.

s/ (b)(6)

Colonel, USMC
 Deputy Chief of Staff
 Coalition Provisional Authority
 Baghdad, Iraq

DSN

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6)
 Sent: Sunday, February 01, 2004 7:53 AM
 To: (b)(6)
 Cc: (b)(6)
 Subject: RE: Operating Budget for Stat Com

I am not sure I understand. What is the requirement \$100K, \$175K or \$275K. The numbers change on every e-mail. If it is an operating budget line they need, we can set that up. Since this is APF, it will not be a petty cash fund. We are available to provide them the training on the correct documentation needed to make the payments.

(b)(6)

(b)(6) Col, USAF
 CPA Comptroller
 Room M107

(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6)
 Sent: Saturday, January 31, 2004 11:11 PM
 To: (b)(6)
 Cc: (b)(6)
 Subject: RE: Operating Budget for Stat Com

2/3/2004

(b)(6)

As we discussed earlier, this is a real priority and one that probably needs to be funded sooner than later. Can we begin renovations with LOGCAP or do we have to RRB? \$175,000.00 is small compared to other renovation projects. We really have to figure out how to get past the constipation we are all experiencing with projects critical to CPA mission. AS I read the email, this is a show stopper for strategic comms. What are the options?

s/ [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
Colonel, USMC
Deputy Chief of Staff
Coalition Provisional Authority
Baghdad, Iraq

(b)(6)
OSN

-----Original Message-----
From: Jones, Richard (AMB)
Sent: Saturday, January 31, 2004 10:03 PM
To: [REDACTED]
Cc: [REDACTED]
Subject: FW: Operating Budget for Stat Com

(b)(2)

What are the possibilities, if any, for helping StratCom out on this? DJ

-----Original Message-----
From: [REDACTED]
Sent: Saturday, January 31, 2004 9:32 AM
To: Jones, Richard (AMB)
Subject: RE: Operating Budget for Stat Com

(b)(2)

On another matter...

As you may know, we have a space/resources crunch in the Green Room. Last year, in anticipation of this, we secured the use of a small "villa" (a real stretch) for equipment and office space for those who do not need to be in such prime real estate in the Green Room. However, we have since learned that CPA has run out of funds for renovation. The cost is \$161,000 for renovation, and \$14,000 for furniture and equipment, for a total of \$175,000. We need this money -- or we need another solution. Otherwise, we will have press officers sitting in the rotunda without desks, phones or any of the other tools needed to do their jobs. That is a recipe for frustration.

-----Original Message-----
From: Jones, Richard (AMB)
Sent: Saturday, January 31, 2004 1:57 AM
To: [REDACTED]
Cc: [REDACTED]
Subject: Operating Budget for Stat Com

(b)(2)

In a January 30 conversation, LPB mentioned to me that he would like to carve out \$100,000 for Strat Com from the CPA operating budget to use for procurement of goods and services to accomplish its mission. How can we go about doing this? DJ

2/3/2004