(5)

Siocombe, Walt B. (SES)

From:

; ;

Sent:

Monday, September 01, 2003 6:05 PM

To: Slocombe, Walt B. (SES)
Subject: Saddam's Services; numbers

You asked on Friday whether I could give you any idea of the size of Saddam's Services.

I have retrieved the full text of the document I previously drew on for the "Close Hold" paper, and can give you a partial answer, based on information known in – I should say – about 2001.

Directorate General of Intelligence: reliable reporting (and more dependable, I suppose, than the yellowcake tosh) suggests around 2,000 employed in Baghdad, and another 2,000 in provincial stations and abroad.

Special Security Organization (Saddam's Gestapo): unhelpfully quotes various reports placing the number of those employed at between 1,500 and 35,000

The Special Emergency Forces: Up to eight battalions.

Directorate General of Security and Directorate of Military Intelligence: The paper is mute. may provide an answer on the latter, in the augmented statistics I have now asked him for.

Special Republican Guard: also nothing in the paper. (or, of course, the INC), may help on this, too.

I hope that the INC may also be able to cough up some Ba'ath Party records, as I have the feeling, without being certain, that the ISG may not have much in this vital area.

If you ever wanted to peer further into this murky area – into, for instance, the position within the apparatus of the MIC – you would be welcome to the document. Alternatively, I could try to extract from it answers to any further questions you may have.



Deputy Director Intelligence Conversion
Office of Security Affairs
Mobile:



CLOSE HOLD-

IRAQ'S INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY SERVICES: A DIGEST

I. DIRECTORATE GENERAL OF INTELLIGENCE (مديرية المخابرات العامة)

Mission:

To monitor and suppress dissident activities at home and abroad
To collect foreign political, economic and scientific intelligence
To penetrate foreign intelligence and security services
To provide operational intelligence and support for weapons procurement
To disrupt and collect intelligence on foreign diplomats and intelligence officers,
and United Nations personnel

DGI Directorates (broadly, I suspect on the KGB model):

The main offending Directorates seem to be:

Directorate I.: Responsible for over-all management. Officers assigned to the Special Projects and Tasks section may have been instructed by their Director to carry out highly sensitive operations (or investigations) unknown to their colleagues working in other parts of the Service. Based in Al Mansur headquarters building.

Directorate IV: Foreign Operations. Included supervision of Illegals operating under natural cover. Based at Al Mansur Headquarters.

Directorate V: Counter Intelligence/Espionage. This involved *inter alia* the investigation of Iraqis suspected of collaborating with foreign intelligence services. Office in Karradat Sharqiyah/Masbah.

Directorate VII: Investigations and judicial matters. Interrogation of Iraqis suspected of working for a foreign intelligence service. Known to have used physical torture in its attempts to extract information. Cooperated with **Psychological Department** which ran courses on the psychological techniques used for interrogation.

Department IX: Scientific and Technical Support. Originally part of the Directorate General of Security and known as the Al Hasan ibn al Haitham Institute, transferred to the DGS in the 1980s. Probably in late 1980s appears to have been re-transferred to MIMI under Husain Kamil, to assist CB weapons programs. Part of the Directorate remained with MIC's Salam factory after the

CLOSE HOLD

Gulf War, and was responsible for work on clandestine communications devices, timing devices, radio transmitters and cipher equipment. This part continued to work closely with the residual Department IX. HQ in Palestine Street. Laboratories at Salman Pak. (destroyed by coalition bombing in 1991).

Department XIV: Responsible for planning and mounting Special Operations (assassinations, assaults, kidnaps, bombings, break-ins etc) against oppositionists living in Iraq and abroad. Also tasked with planting and detecting eavesdropping devices, intercepting phone calls and conducting clandestine photography. Possessed a military-style training camp at Salman Pak.

Directorate XL: Responsible for monitoring the activities *abroad* of groups and individuals opposed to the Iraqi Government. Divided into four sections:

- Religious parties, such as Da'wa
- Reactionary parties, such as the INA
- Leftist parties, such as the Iraqi Communist Party and the International Command of the Ba'ath Party (pro-Syrian).
- Kurdish section

Regional Directorates: Northern (Mosul), Eastern (Kirkuk), Southern (Basra) and Western (Ramadi). Broadly divided up into sections including commercial companies and hotels, counter-intelligence (eg political parties, Kurds, Turkey, Iran, Gulf States, Palestine and Syria), security (arrests, disruption, industrial plants), surveillance, technical operations.

Activities; a note

These included forcing Iraqi expatriates in Kuwait to act as cooptees and informants (1980s), efforts against opposition/exile communities in Europe. State enterprises such as Iraqi airways, Iraqi News agency and the Rafidain Bank were used as well as embassies abroad to provide cover. Eavesdropping equipment was reportedly installed in the Novotel, Rashid, Baghdad, Ishtar Sheraton and the Meridien hotels.

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II. DIRECTORATE GENERAL OF SECURITY (مدرية العمن العام)

Responsible for countering threats to Iraq's internal security from the civil population. Investigated and acted against any individual or group suspected of anti-state activity. Maintained paramilitary forces for quelling civil unrest, though these were under the control of the Special Security Organisation.

Political Directorate: The principal operational part of the DGS. Branches cdedicated to monitoring foreigners and embassy personnel (Branch I), Shi'a oppositionists (Branch II), Kurds (Branch III), Political Parties (?Branch IV), and Religious Organisations, such as Da'wa (Branch V). Also monitored families belonging to Iraqis who lived abroad, and Iraqis who travelled abroad frequently, and businesses in Iraq dealing with foreign firms and individuals. Include the Prisons Security Department, cooperating with the Interior Ministry, the Ministry of Social and Labour Affairs and the DGS Security Directorate in running prisons. Recruited prisoners who might prove useful on release.

III. DIRECTORATE OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE (مدرية الااستخبارات العسكرية)

The activities of the DMI, generally characteristic of most military intelligence services, included maintaining links with Iraqi students abroad who had access to overt specialized military and military-industrial information. Interrogated civilians arrested by the army in prohibited areas. Supervised the areas holding detainees.

IV. SPECIAL SECURITY ORGANISATION (جهاز العمن الخاص)

Primarily involved in overseeing the security of the Saddam Husain, and monitoring and investigating the loyalty to the regime of other intelligence and security services - and of military units integral to the regime's survival (including the Special Republican Guard (SRG) and the Republican Guard (RG). Maintained records on all VIPs and senior commanders of the two Guards, and posted liaison officers into the other services. Also responsible for controlling the operational activity of the SRG and RG. Involved in monitoring UNSCOM and IAEA activity in Iraq and controlled pre-war efforts to hide proscribed material from both agencies. Controlled by Qusay Saddam Husain.

One of the principal Departments within the SSO was the **Department of Special Conspiracies**. It was formed in 1992 to conduct a wide range of intelligencegathering and security operations in Northern Iraq aimed at combating threats to

CLOSE HOLD

the regime posed by Kurdish and Iraqi opposition groups. It recruited elite officers from the other services. It was actively engaged in mounting offensive operations in Kurdish-controlled northern Iraq, many involving assassinations, bomb attacks, break-ins and kidnaps. These probably included attacks on humanitarian relief efforts in northern Iraq.

Subordinate to the SSO was the **Special Republican Guard**, of which Qusay Saddam Husain was also Commander. Its primary function was to protect Saddam Husain. It sought to achieve this, in part, by providing a security cordon around Baghdad and Tikrit to prevent any other Iraqi military units from entering the two cities. It also provided personal bodyguards for Saddam Husain and VIPs, and protected Presidential and sensitive military-related sites.

The **Special Emergency Force** was reportedly made up of units from the SRG, the DGI and the DGS, all subordinated to the SSO. It consisted of up to eight battalions, primarily infantry, though there was some evidence that one or more battalions were equipped with armoured vehicles, used primarily to quell popular and prison unrest.

Bath only

	BATH DEGREE	TOTAL	MAR	MLG	LG	MG	BG	COL	LT.COL	MAJ	CAPT	1ST.L	2ND.L
12		8	1	2	1	4		-					
и	عضو مكتب	65		1	7	40	7	10					
В	عضو آرع	149		1	4	100	16	12	3	_ 1 _	2	10	
5	.عضو شعبة	696		5	31	193	265	78	26	72	22	3	
a	عصو فرقة	5429		2	12	436	1749	1302	1029	487	298	82	32
		6346	1	11	56	773	2037	1402	1958	660	322	96	32

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OTHER	FRKA	SHUBA	FAREE	MKTB	QEADA	TOTAL	GROUP
	5006	652	137	26		5821	Feetige Language
997	262	20	4	1		1284	
431	41	4				476	
566	101	1			7	668	
170	1	1	1 6			172	
22	9	16	7	38	8	100	
48	9	1	1		1	59	
2234	5429	695	149	65	8	8580	

RATIG

مقعة 1 مل 1

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Udw Firqa

- Window of opportunity to co-opt their support
 - They promise to obey all laws of the CPA
 - They pledge to fully cooperate in serving Iraqi people and in building new Iraqi government
- They represent a significant "swing" group
 - 6200 people mostly between LTC and BG
 - Acknowledged and respected as leaders
- Can be very helpful to CPA's security goals in the future

Public Affairs and media campaign

- Shows that the CPA is humanitarian oriented
 - Recognizes needs of the family
- Shieks at Conference in Babil supported the idea of humanitarian assistance to families of Udw Firqa members
 - Would receive wide acceptance among Iraqis

Procedures

- Wife or other family member picks-up check
 - Must present military and civilian ID cads of Udw Firqa member
 - Family member must also present his/her own civilian ID card to prove family relationship
 - Must present food ration (Ministry of Trade) ID card
- List of Udw Firqa personnel affected by this decision provided to each site
 - Only families of those on list are eligible

Pay Scale

Rank	Stipend Amt (\$)/month	Family Gets (\$)/month
BG-MG	120	100
LTC-COL	100	80
2LT-MAJ	80	60
WO/NCO	50	40

Only families of those Udw Firqa who did not commit crimes would receive money

• Those in the intelligence organizations, Fedayeen Saddam, Special Republican Guard, senior advisors, and personal guard would be excluded We should give their issue attention, or else it could escalate to the point where they feel that no one listening and they feel talking will not get them anywhere. In their culture, taking care of their family is paramount. Without work, they cannot provide for their families.

This morning at 0900 I had a meeting with former traqi military officers to discuss the stipend payments process. The men were all members of the Udw Firqa level in the Ba'ath Party. The following is a summary of the meeting:

- Pay these people or they will swing over to the side of those who oppose the USA.
- If someone has no money, they are easy targets to be swayed by those who are working against the USA.
- The needy people will accept this propaganda because they need the money.
- Udw Firqa and below in the Ministry of Education can keep their jobs.
- Udw Shu'ba can get their retirement
- Deputy Minister of Health Dr. Ali Shanon (former military MG- Ba'athist?)
- The military did not fight against the USA
- They want to be friends
- They have not been involved in the violence.
- They want to meet with Mr. Slocombe and/or Mr. Bremer
- · Families of Udw Firqa are without money
- In Ambassador Bremer's order, there is a provision for exceptions on a case by case basis
- Human right means that you should not withhold from a family its ability for subsistence
- Many of these officers were highly respected within their neighborhoods and communities and earned a good living.
- They cannot accept the disgrace and insult of being forced to work, for example, as a laborer. This would dishonor them.
- Officers cannot take a cheap job because people know who they were and the
 responsibilities and respect they commanded previously. To do so now would
 dishonor them. They would lose face, and in their culture they would rather die
 than lose face. If they get to this point in their despair they will not care whether
 they take some Americans with them.
- These men are used to fighting, while civilians are not.
- Udw Firqa around the country are in a bad way because of no money.
- Schools are opening, but they have no money to purchase their kids school supplies.
- After the Najaf explosion, people hlamed the CPA for lack of security
- If you pay the Udw Firqa, security will be improved
- · Paying people money is needed to counter influence of opposition groups
- · Need to do it before start of Ramadan

From:	CIV		Sent:Wed 9/24/2003 3:20 PM
Го:	Slocombe, Walt B. (SES);	(O-6 MoNSD)	
Cc: Subject:	FW: De-Ba'ath Update for CPA Sen	ior Advisors	-F44
Attachn		NOT THEY ROOM	C .
contes won't h	t of wills) except the end of Meghar ave to worry about de-Baathification	n's memo makes it sound lil	ty clear what it all means (there's a ke "Once we get this sorted out, we
Riiiiiigg	ghhhhttttt!!		
125			
	is reported returned. Haven	't seen him yet.	
v/r,			
	_	4	
From: Sent: To: CP	ginal Message (FS01) Tuesday, September 23, 2003 9:33 A Ministries	3 PM	
	ecutive Secretary ct: De-Ba'ath Update for CPA Senio	or Advisors	
Gove	rnance has provided, as pr	omised, the following	g update and interim guidance
on De	-Baathification.	advises th	at CPA is meeting with the
			afterwards, but Governance
does	not expect to resolve all ou	tstanding issues.	

To All CPA Ministry Teams,

The Governing Council recently established the Higher National De-Ba'athification Commission to assume responsibility for the formulation and implementation of deba'athification. This act was in response to pointed urging from Ambassador Bremer for the GC to take responsibility in this area. Iraqis, not foreigners, are best positioned to complete or refine the de-ba'athification process that CPA started.

This Commission issued two "decisions" on September 14. In summary, the commission advanced:

- 1) The immediate dismissal from public positions anyone of the rank of "firqa" and above. All exemptions issued previous to this date were rendered immediately null and void. Those affected by this decision have the right to appeal.
- 2) A ban on people of the rank of "firqa" and above as well as others who have committed crimes and plundered the country's wealth "attaining special positions or responsibility in public positions or political activities or institutions of civil society, and the press and media."

The word "decisions" is in quotation marks because the Commission's decisions cannot have the force of law unless and until CPA issues an order formerly transferring authority to the Higher National De-Ba'athification Commission and ratifies these two decisions. Ambassador Bremer intends to do this, but has first asked for clarification on questions such as: guarantees of due process (particularly mechanisms for appeal), further definition of parameters of de-ba'athification of politics, civil society and the media, and a request to consider the revocation of exemptions on a case-by-case basis, rather than a blanket one.

Once we resolve these outstanding issues, Ambassador Bremer will issue an order

transferring authority and ratifying the Commission's decisions. This will undoubtedly have implications for the ministries, although the exact nature of these consequences is difficult to predict given the number of unanswered questions. For example, it is still unclear whether the Commission intends to revoke all temporary exceptions, or only the ones that have been applied to people who are firqa and above.

When the transfer of the power to enforce de-ba'athification occurs in the very near future, the Coalition will be relieved of the responsibility of identifying and removing Ba'athists, although CPA ministry people are expected to be fully supportive in helping the Iraqis implement the policy as necessary.

We will provide you with more details as soon as they are available.

TO: Ambassador Bremer

FROM:

RE: Assessing De-Ba'athification

DATE: 7 July 2003

Nearly two months have passed since you issued the May 16th De-Ba'athification order. The principle behind the policy - purging Saddam's supporters from positions of power and influence - has won wide-spread support within Iraq and abroad. Yet the implementation of the policy has been uneven at best. Moreover, it has generated considerable confusion among both Iraqis and military and civilian members of the coalition.

We should not seek to amend the policy issued on May 16th. Doing so would be counterproductive, because it would both undermine our continued efforts to root out the worst Ba'athists and damage our broader credibility in Iraq. We should, however, identify the factors that have contributed to the confusion surrounding the policy and mitigate them where possible.

Why the Confusion?

There are five inter-related reasons why our deba'athification policy has generated confusion:

- Complex Nature of the Policy and Revolving Door of Coalition Advisors. The policy involves various tiers of the Ba'ath Party and several layers of management in the ministries. Even after reading the policy closely, many of our implementers have questions about who is affected. The steady arrival of new advisors means that at any given time, there is a group unfamiliar with the basic parameters of the policy.
- 2. Uneven Application of Policy. No two ministry or municipal advisors or military commanders have implemented the de-ba'athification policy in exactly the same way. For example, some of those requesting exceptions have allowed employees to continue working while their applications were pending; others have removed those requesting exceptions until further

notice. Such inconsistencies between ministries and between governorates fuels confusion and the perception of injustice.

- 3. Difficulty in Squaring Competing Objectives.
 Particularly in the governorates where there is little policy guidance from Baghdad, local commanders have seen the de-ba'athification policy to be in conflict with their other responsibilities, such as maintaining law and order. In weighing these competing objectives, commanders have often chosen to soften the debba'athification policy in its implementation, exacerbating confusion by adding to the uneven application of the policy nationwide.
- 4. Disconnect between the Stated Objectives of the Policy and the Reality of its Implementation. Our stated policy aim is to remove the worst Ba'athists, the supporters of Saddam, from positions of influence and power. In reality, the policy has affected a significant number of Iraqis who were not active Ba'ath Party members or defenders of the former regime. Our ministry advisors report that either a majority or large minority of those who have lost their jobs (and pensions) under this policy were "average, hard-working Iraqis" who had joined the party either to avoid harassment of their families or maintain their jobs.
- 5. Slowness of Exception Procedures. The wait for the approval or disapproval of exception applications perpetuates uncertainty. This impedes operations of the ministries and creates the perception that the coalition is ambivalent about de-ba'athification procedures.

Mitigating the Confusion

We can and should take several steps to address the current confusion surrounding our de-ba'athification policy.

Clarify the Policy and Guidelines for its
 Implementation. Attached is a draft memo which
 clarifies our objectives, spells out the parameters of
 the policy, and addresses common questions concerning
 its implementation. It should be distributed to all
 coalition ministry personnel and local commanders, as

well as translated for broader dissemination. This document will serve the dual purpose of providing guidance to those implementing the policy and squashing rumors that the coalition has reversed the de-ba'athification policy or no longer requires its full implementation.

- Appoint a Person to Have Formal Responsibility for Overseeing the Implementation of De-Ba'athification. To date, I (and others no doubt) have sought to explain the policy to ministry advisors and answer their questions surrounding it on a fairly ad hoc basis. Neither I nor anyone else at a working level has had any formal responsibility for monitoring the implementation of the policy, has had the ability to hold people accountable for it, or has had any visibility over the de-ba'athification processes occurring in the governorates. Empowering a person to serve these functions would centralize our deba'athification efforts, facilitate the flow of information in both directions, and diminish current confusion. This person will play a key role in ensuring that the transition of responsibility for deba'athification from the coalition to Iragis is a smooth one.
- 3. Create an Expedited Mechanism for the Consideration of Exception Applications. It was important for you to be directly involved in the first round of exceptions in order to set the standard for approval. However, it is now possible to delegate this responsibility to someone else, preferably the de-ba'athification guru described above. You may wish to make small changes to the implementation guidance laid out below (#____ and # ___ in particular) in order to both simplify exception procedures and ease some of the unintended consequences of the policy.
- 4. Facilitate the Creation of Iraqi Institutions to Deal with De-Ba'athification. While it is neither desirable nor politically palpable for us to make changes to the May 16th policy, Iraqis themselves are in a position to do so. While cracking down harder on criminal Ba'athists, Iraqis may wish to take steps to soften the impact on those largely innocent people caught in the net of de-ba'athification. They could, for instance, decide to offer pensions to those

dismissed from their job on account of full party membership. We should brief the Governing Council on our de-ba'athification efforts thus far and facilitate the establishment of the Iraqi De-Ba'thification Council in any way possible.

Attachment:

Clarifying De-Ba'athification Policy

The Dayton Accords left Bosnia with two armies – a Bosnian Serb and Federation (Muslim-Croat) force. In reality there were three militaries, since the Croats had independent formations within the Federation army.

Dayton also provided for a state-level Standing Committee on Military Matters to coordinate defense planning and work with international military presence (IFOR/SFOR). It was a powerless institution. Dayton provided for no state-level Ministry of Defense or General Staff; and the Serb and Federation entities (sub-national units in Bosnian parlance) retained theirs.

Dayton was intentionally ambiguous on who had supreme military authority and command and control. The Bosnian Serbs asserted Dayton gave their Serb Republic President this authority. The High Representative (Amb. Bremer's equivalent) decreed later that Dayton placed this authority in the state level Tri-Presidency, but this had little impact on actual operations.

The SCMM has a Serb, Croat and Bosniak member, and the chairmanship rotates and reports to the Tri-Presidency.

Initially, the U.S. provided military assistance only to the Federation, in an effort to redress the military balance. We more than did that to Serb distress. In the early years we were also pre-occupied with bringing down troop numbers and weapons stockpiles.

Over the past two years we focused on building up a state dimension for defense. To overcome Serb resistance we opened our military cooperation to both armies, but channeled all programs through the SCMM. We have encouraged other NATO countries to do the same. Similarly, Bosnian participation in NATO's PfP program has been conditioned on a clear state-level command and control structure and these discussions have been worked through the SCMM.

The Serbs recently accepted the principle of state-level C2. This will translate into a new state-level general staff and the removal of all war planning/ making powers from the entities. The Tri-presidency will have direct operational control over all military units throughout Bosnia. The entities retain administration (staffing, supply, etc.) of these units. The SCMM will function as an MOD for the state in all but name. Once Bosnia's in PfP we hope to further integrate the militaries.

The Bosnian lesson: you can get where you want to go without imposing formal structures, by offering the right incentives to the politicians and military professionals.

Slocombe, Walt B. (SES)

From:

Sent: Wednesday, Jur

Wednesday, June 25, 2003 11:52 AM

To: Slocombe, Walt B. (SES)

Cc: Coi

Subject: "Growing" the MOD/Things to Consider

If you agree with these points, I'd like to disseminate them to the rest of the team to start generating more specific ideas, ultimately to form an action plan. Also, if we are convinced this is the direction we want to take, the CMATT planning team can begin to integrate some of these concepts into their deployment and sustainment planning for the NIA.

v/r.



- 1. Our task is qualitatively different from the other ministry advisory teams. Iraq had no Ministry of Defense, nor even a tradition of a Ministry of Defense, of the nature required to support a representative, participatory government. Where the other ministries' advisory teams may think in terms of "reconstruction" and "reform" we need to think in terms of "growth" and "development".
- 2. Traditional force development is an external top-down process. It requires a mature, disciplined bureaucracy to conduct the required analysis and implement the outcomes. That is exactly what we don't have. Our approach should be envisioned as working from the bottom-up and, in some respects, inside-out.
- a. As the New Iraqi Army force is deployed, initial command and control and sustainment support will be provided through CJTF-7. Over time, we will transition these command and control linkages to "Iraqi Owned and Operated". As we make these transitions, the Iraqi systems we put in place will grow to become the infrastructure of the new MOD. We should start thinking about them as the embryonic nerve-endings of a yet-to-be-born MOD as we develop them.
- b. We can build infrastructure from the bottom-up but where will we get top-level management? One approach may be to cultivated it from among the personal networks we are developing among the various Iraqi stakeholders in national security. An approach we may consider is to begin forming informal task/advisory groups among those we identify with common interests. For example, we could probably use a "Manning" advisory group to help us with recruiting and vetting and or a "Services" group to begin thinking through how we will support the NIA.
- 3. The Iraqi armed forces will not be expeditionary armed forces. Accordingly, there may be real advantages, and real efficiencies, in designing the future Iraqi armed forces to draw much of its logistical support from the other ministries. This would significantly change the nature of the infrastructure we would normally associate with the Ministry of Defense. As an example, in the area of health care, the new Iraqi defense force may develop an organic capability for emergency battlefield medicine but rely on Ministry of Health facilities for its in-garrison, readiness and treatment requirements (inoculations, physical exams, treatment of disease and injury. We may need to work out some sort of HMO or other reimbursement scheme to pay the Ministry of Health for these services. Similarly, we should consider whether we are better served to obtain much of our mobility capability from the Ministry of Transportation and our communications capability from the

Ministry of Communications, etc.

Subj: What political scientists have learned about demobilizing armed groups after internal wars

Date: 7/7/2003 8:29:37 PM Eastern Standard Time

From: "Susan Shirk"

To: "Walt Slocombe \
Cc: "Barbara Walter"

File: Walter letter to Slocombe on Iraq disarmament2.doc

Sent from the Internet (Details)

Dear Walt:

When I saw in the news that you were in charge of disarming groups in Iraq I took the initiative to ask my colleague, Barbara Walter, who has done serious research based on a large number of the previous cases of disarming groups after internal war, to summarize what she leamed. I thought that her conclusions might be useful to you as you figure out how best to achieve this difficult objective in Iraq. I hope you find it useful. Let us know. Barbara's email address is above if you wish to communicate directly with her.

The document is attached but also is copied below.

Please take good care of yourself.

Warm regards,

Susan

July 7, 2003

Dear Mr. Slocombe:

I am writing at Susan Shirk's suggestion. I am her faculty colleague at the UCSD Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies, and Susan thought the findings of my research on demobilizing armed groups after internal wars might be of some interest to you as you tackle this challenge in post-war Iraq. I should admit that I'm not an expert on Iraq. What I do know, however, are

the problems that other countries have encountered demobilizing armed factions, and the policies that have worked and not worked in inducing factions to disarm.

In a study of all demobilizations that occurred after civil wars over the last sixty years, this is what I found:

- Across cases, enlisted soldiers and officers almost always refused to disarm and demobilize unless a third party agreed to enforce or verify demobilization. This was not because the soldiers wished to renew the war, or had malignant intentions. Disarmament in the absence of third party enforcement rarely occurred because soldiers had very real concerns about their own security and well-being once they disarmed.
- Faction leaders almost always demanded some form of guaranteed representation in government in exchange for disarmament. Leaders were extremely reluctant to hand over their weapons unless they knew that they would not be permanently shut out of power and possibly imprisoned as a result. Disarmament was intricately tied to the issue of power-sharing, both in government and in the new national military.
- Finally, there was an interesting relationship between power-sharing guarantees and the size of the intervening security force that was necessary to keep the peace. If you look at all civil war settlements that have attempted to demobilize forces and reintegrate them into a new (usually smaller) military, you find an inverse relationship between how inclusive a new government was, and the number of peacekeepers that were necessary for a new government to succeed. The less inclusive a government so, the fewer power-sharing guarantees that were offered to key faction leaders the more peacekeepers were required to ensure peace while this government got off the ground. Narrower power-sharing guarantees required larger peacekeeping forces.

So what lessons can we take for Iraq?

The first is that the decision to disarm and the degree to which factions will disarm, will depend on how much confidence the disarming group has regarding its own security in the short-term, and its own political survival in the long-term. For factions to willingly give up their arms, two conditions must hold. An outside power must be willing to guarantee their safety as they demobilize and prepare for peace. Clearly, this is what the U.S. has in mind with the 140,000 American and British troops that will serve as security guarantors in the region. American and British soldiers must also stay as long as it takes for the new government to grow strong enough to assert its own authority and until it can build and train an effective non-partisan national army. If they leave too early, competing factions within Iraq will simply retrieve weapons or purchase new ones, and seek complete control over the country.

The second lesson is that the disarmament process will be made significantly more difficult if disarmament is not tied to specific guarantees of political and military representation for key leaders. If the U.S. wants to exclude powerful members of the Baath Party as well as high ranking officers in the former Iraqi military, then it must also to be willing to provide a stronger military presence of its own. If the U.S. isn't willing to incorporate "bad-guys" into an interim and then a permanent government, then it must be willing and capable of containing them. If it does not contain them, and does not include them (which is exactly what has occurred in Afghanistan) renewed war between the competing factions is likely as soon as the opportunity presents itself.

History teaches us one final lesson. Uncertainty is the enemy of disarmament. Right now it is unclear to all those involved what type of political institutions will be established and what checks and balances will be in place to prevent backsliding into a one-party state. What we do know is that whatever government is established will almost certainly be biased against the Baath party, a fact that hasn't been lost on influential and powerful members of that group. As long as the outlines of the new permanent government remain unclear, and as long as one particular group is likely to be excluded, those individuals have strong incentives to refuse to disarm. Right now the U.S. has committed the soldiers necessary to address short-term security concerns. What still needs to be done is for the U.S. to commit to the more difficult and longer-term issues of political power-sharing.

Sincerely,

Professor Barbara F. Walter

74	(GBR CIV)	
From:		
Sent:	Monday, September 15, 2003 7:33 PM	
To: Subject:	(GBR CIV) RE: Confernce on Iraq	
,		
Dear		
We are wor	king on the new project outline, and you will get it by the	
	nould know is how many Iraqi and how many CPA representative seminar (minimum, maximum each). Best regards.	es you would like to
	Original Message	
From	n: [(GBR CIV) [mailto: [] (GBR CIV) [mailto	
To:		
Cc :	ect: RE: Confernce on Irag	•
540)	sect. In. conference on frag	
Dear	(feet)	
	ave just received a message from Walt Slocombe regretting the eet you Washington, since he has to be in Maine during the	
Kind	d regards,	
MOSE.		
Depu	ity Director, Military Organisational Reform and Management	
Offi	ice of Security Affairs	
	Original Message	
From Sent	t: Friday, September 05, 2003 3:28 PM	
	Slocombe, Walt B. (SES); Slocombe, Walt B. (SES)	
Cc:	ject: RE: Confernce on Iraq	
	ortance: High	
Dear	r Walt,	
Than	nk you very much for your most valuable comments and sugges	tions re. conference
on Iraq to	be held on 3-4 November 2003 in Geneva. We will immediate syou raised in your message. In this context, it would be	ly startw orking on
could brie	efly meet next week in Washington (in case you are available	e): Arriving from New
York, Tedd	dy and I will be in town from Tuesday (9/9) evening thru Fractional the IISS GSR conference at Lansdowne Resort until	iday (12) noon, and
chen be at	tending the 1155 GSR conference at bansdowne Resort until	Sunday (14).
	the meantime, please copy your reply message to cordinating our programme in the US.	
With	n best regards,	
heral Fp		
	istant Director / Head of Think Tank	
	eva Centre for the Democratic trol of Armed Forces (DCAF)	
Tel		
E-ma	ail:	
	Original Message	70.00
	From: Slocombe, Walt B. (SES) [mailto	(6)(6)

Sent: Thursday, September 04, 2003 5:24 PM

Cc: Cc: (O-6 MoNSD);

(GBR CIV):

(AUS);

CIV

Policy; Slocombe, Walt B. (SES)

Subject: Confernce on Iraq Please see attached note.

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This footnote also confirms that this email message has been swept by MIMEsweeper for the presence of computer viruses.

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Agenda

Over view

International order and concept of comprehensive security

Concept of security sector, and various organs/institutions/forces, including interagency cooperation)

Security Sector Governance

Meaning of "civilian control" - law based/recognition of military expertise not civilian "commissars"

Constitutional/legal frameworks

Civilian governmental oversight (executive branch institutions)

Parliamentary oversight

Judicial oversight

Popular oversight

Specific topics - options available within democratic framework

National strategy - national interests, threats (external, external operating internally, internal, transnational)

National security/national defense policies – models for security ("nation in arms," "regional security," "alliance with great power,"), role of arms control and other agreements

Organs, processes, and legal/institutional frameworks for national security decision-making and leadership, to include resource allocation

Defense strategy options

Missions/doctrine for armed forces

Shape, size, components, structure, organization of armed forces, to include senior (general) staff

Ministry of Defense organization issues

Resource allocation/management issues

I am very grateful that DCAF is willing to contribute so generously to the Iraqi reconstruction effort, and I look forward to working with you on the project.

Walt Slocombe

CC.

	(O-6 MoNSD)	
From:	CIV	
Sent:	Friday, October 10, 2003 4:23 PM	
To:	Siocombe, Walt B. (SES)	
Cc:	(O-6 MoNSD); (GBR CIV)	
Subject:	FW: Conference on Iraq	
Importance	e: High	
Do you have	particular comments you want to insert in reply?	
he response	ated my reactions. Pls just annotate whether you agree/disagree or want to amplify and I want send it.	gii draft i
original	eand send it.	yll draπ L
original	Message - 1- day October 02, 2003 5:58 PM	yll draπ L
original ryom: Sent: Thurso	day, October 02, 2003 5:58 PM (GBR CIV)	yll draπ L
original From: Sent: Thurso	Message - 1- day October 02, 2003 5:58 PM	ylidraπ L
original From: Sent: Thurso	day, October 02, 2003 5:58 PM (GBR CIV) e, Walt B. (SES); CIV	y I drant (

Many thanks for your reply. In the meantime, I have incorporated your suggestions/reactions into the project outline (see attachment). Before we finalize it and embark on the tasking of speakers and inviting the other participants, we would appreciate your comments on the following points in particular:

- Do you agree with adding two more topics/papers: (1) "internal control" of armed forces (such as the German "Innere Führung" model) and (2) defense planning (being a intermediary step between defense strategy and mission/doctrine of armed forces)? Do you want us to include an additional paper on 'all volunteer vs. conscript force'? I think (1) sounds useful we need these guys to think hard about "the role of the military in a democratic society" (they'll get another dose in the DIILS program). However, (2) sounds redundant, and too theoretical we need as much "reality" in this agenda as possible.
- Inviting is a good idea but what is he supposed to talk about: defense strategy (as suggested in th outline)? What about inviting Academic Chair of the Near East-South Asia Center for Strategic Studies at NDU; he recently wrote an interesting policy brief on "Building an Iraqi Defense Force"? Either of these would be excellent personally, I prefer he has more "vision" of the implications of what has happened for the future of Iraq security strategy we could give either of them more direct insight into what we've been doing, why, what we think we've accomplished and where we think this is leading.
- Do you agree that we should invite the UN Secretary-General's Special Representative in Iraq, Ramiro Lopes da Silva? If yes, who will invite him: CPA or DCAF? This is your call, Walt personally, I think we should do it in the interest of transparency but I frankly don't expect much from this guy in terms of substance.
- Do you agree that we should invite the Permanent Observer of the League of Arab States in Geneva, Ambassador Saad Al-Faragi? If yes, who will invite him: CPA or DCAF? Same as for the SecGen Special Rep

- I am inclined to say yes, for sake of transparency plus, in the case of the Arab League, it contributes to the legitimacy of the GC and the NSAC to have this gentleman attend however, the substantive contribution will be marginal.
- Should we invite representatives from the capitals of selected Coalition member states, namely Poland? I think this rapidly becomes unbounded and we should not go there. We should include coalition reps among the CPA reps but not go outside the theme should be "NSAC Offsite" and, as much as possible, all the people there should be present to act as resources and 'thought-provokers' for the NSAC not as 'national reps' and, this is not a 'donors conference'.

I look forward to hearing from you.

All the best,

Assistant Director / Head of Think Tank Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF)

Tel. E-mail:

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10/11/2003

Siocomb	e, wait B. (SES)
From:	
Sent:	Thursday, October 02, 2003 5:58 PM
To:	(GBR CIV)
Cc:	Slocombe, Walt B. (SES); CIV
Subject:	RE: Conference on Iraq
Importanc	e: High
Dear	
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Should w	we invite representatives from the capitals of selected Coalition member states, namely Poland?
	d to hearing from you. Con use how " who saven" Jean all?
	from all?
All the best,	
Geneva Cent	ector / Head of Think Tank tre for the Democratic med Forces (DCAF)
***** ***	**********
	and any files transmitted with it are confidential and
intended sol	lely for the use of the individual or entity to whom they
	ed. If you have received this email in error please notify
the system p	Danager.

IRAQ CIVIL DEFENCE FORCE (ICDC) FUTURE OPTIONS

The current ICDC charter (CPA Order 28) expires in September 2004. A decision has been made to renew the current ICDC charter for an additional 12 months. There are also plans for the ICDC to be increased from 20k-40k including equipment up to heavy machine gun, and to include battalion and/or brigade leadership. The objective of this expansion is to engage more Iraqi security forces rapidly – the same objective which led to the accelerated force development concept for the NIA.

For this extension and expansion of the ICDC to be successful issues of integrated command and control of Iraqi forces and the impact on the concept for developing the NIA – will need to be assessed.

However looming over the horizon is the future withdrawal of the MSC's, the ICDC is tied and intimately connected to the MSC's and CJTF-7 – it cannot sustain itself therefore a decision has to be made on the future force structure and organization of the ICDC sooner rather than later to allow the necessary planning to take place to ensure viable force structure, organization and accountability when transition to a new sovereign Iraqi government takes place

We know that the MSC's will leave the country. The transition of the ICDC units under the command of the 101st which is due to leave first will more than likely act as a model for the Transfer of Authority (TOA) of other MSC's around the country. To have an agreed upon plan will greatly aid the transitional points across the country.

Several options for the future of the ICDC exist which are not all necessarily mutually exclusive. Indeed there may be a combination of the options suggested. Ambassador Bremer will need to have a vision of what is possible and favorable to CPA endstates.

Underpinning all of this is the need for a local of Clivil Annual of this is the need for a local of the combination of the options suggested.

Underpinning all of this is the need for a legal framework (A Defence Force Aid to the Clivil Authority legislation) in the form of a CPA order in the transitional period – which delineates when/how/what the New Iraqi Army (NIA) can be called and used for by the civil authority in internal security and internal defence roles and legal guidance for its relationship with other security services.

Most armed forces around the world are used by their governments for some internal security roles (e.g Atlanta/Sydney Olympics, some counter terrorism, humanitarian emergency assistance etc) but democracies usually have a solid legislative underpinning regulating these roles and ensuring accountability to the parliament and the people. There will be some need in the future for similar legal frameworks for all the security forces, but a CPA Order (eventually forming the basis of future Iraqi legislation) delineating NIA aid to the civil authority is a priority.

No lett

ICDC FUTURE OPTIONS

1. FEDERAL POLICE FORCE/GENDARMERIE.

Duties and functions

A separate Gendarmerie/Federal Police type force established and trained for operations to fulfill the specific internal security needs of Iraq: counter terrorism, transnational crime, major narcotics/trafficking, interdiction of smuggling (oil and natural resources), interdiction of illegal aliens (i.e foreign fighters), riot control, and an emergency response capability. They will effectively be the first responders in internal security situations. They will necessarily be trained to operate effectively and accountably in urban areas and will mitigate the proposed use of the NIA in such areas.

Organizational structure

An important principle of its organization is that it be structured on a functional basis, that is, national divisional commands based on the above functions with regional commands at a level below and answerable to the national divisional commands. This will allay the force developing along geographic/religious/ethnic or political party lines. This essentially follows the sound principles behind the NIA - that is a professional volunteer force representative of all sectors of Iraqi society operating with religiously/ethnically mixed units that are not tied to any political party or regional alliance and are answerable to divisional/regional commanders. Their mandate is to protect the people and the nascent democratically elected government. There is an option of whether they are ultimately under the portfolio of MOD or MOI and this will be contingent upon the shape of command and control of the ICDC in its proposed expansion. This model has the advantage of allowing the CPA to be proactive in planning viable security organizations to fill internal security needs and provide a politically sustainable security service in the face of proposals such as the "political party force" put forward by interim MOI Nouri Badran.

Capability, recruitment, training and size

Capability should be decided once again upon functionality – depending upon the division – but as a baseline light arms, soft skin vehicles and a basic light infantry capability (in times of emergency) will be necessary.

Recruitment should include a mix of the best of the ICDC units, possible political party and tribal participation with the caveat that those militias will be spread across the force, and general recruitment. Once again the NIA recruitment is an excellent model.

Well To

Training: There will be a need to begin specialized training courses to augment the ICDC training and field experience already achieved. Specialized training may be sought from coalition countries national police services - possibly FBI/Australian Federal Police. Training can be integrated into CPA MOI planning for these national type internal security functions

The Size of the force will depend upon recruitment and training cycles however 40-50k with the bulk flowing from ICDC units is a realistic estimate.

Relationship with other security structures

There needs to be delineation of internal security operations between the NIA and such a federal type force. The proposed DFACA CPA Order/ legislation will go some way to clearing this process.

Governance

A policy determining the relationship between regional command and the governors will need to be integrated into Governance's proposed interim political charter to go to Ambassador Bremer. For example, the determinations on the procedures allowing governors to call on both the national divisional command and the regional commanders to request assistance in times of national emergency, disaster relief or humanitarian assistance, needs to be robust enough so as also not to permit the national command to withhold assistance/forces when they are reasonably required by the governors.

2. NATIONAL GUARD

Duties and Function

Operating under the control of the governors they would provide a backup or "QRF" capability to support local police and a capability to reinforce local emergency services when required. To the extent that the future Iraqi government may retain an authority to mobilize them for national-level missions, they could provide a light force to augment the national defense forces.

Given the regional command and control, the role of the National Guard (NG) may be similar to current ICDC operations—performance of duties as a constabulary, patrol in urban areas, conducting search and seizure for illegal weapons, fixed point security/route convoy security, disaster relief, search and rescue and humanitarian assistance and disaster recovery. A NG capacity to fulfill counter terrorism, (counter-insurgencies), transnational crime, counter intelligence, narcotics trafficking/counter smuggling (oil and national resources), emergency response, intelligence gathering is limited by the structural organization i.e no national command. This will lessen NG capability in effectively combating transnational crime or larger organized national crime.

Organizational Structure:

Under this model the MSC's would hand over command of the (expanded) ICDC units to the Governates with some administrative oversight from MOD and with the requisite call up powers in times of emergency by the Commander in Chief. There will necessarily need to be some central command in place for the NG. At the governorate level, under this concept, they would be provided facilities and sustained by funds allocated from the central government in the governorate's operating budget. The NG will be paid by the National government and regional Governors will only be able to mobilize the NG with the approval of the National government.

Capability, recruitment, training and size

Drawn from current ICDC – the units will be more homogenous – there is a real risk of reconstituting local militias if command and control at the governate level is ineffective. Further training to supplement the initial 2 weeks completed by ICDC recruits will be needed. The size of the force will equate with the current expansion plans for the ICDC.

Relationship with other security structures

Legislation/CPA orders will need to be drafted to determine the NG relationship with the national government, the NIA and the local police forces and the requisite call up powers of the Commander in chief.

Governorates

Several issues with governates may impede the hand over of ICDC to them when the MSC's withdraw. Lack of quality and vetting of appointed governors, imprecise relationships between these regional political structures, the central ministries and the GC, a lack of participatory democracy and the subsequent illegitimacy of 'appointed officials and the as yet undetermined funding distribution decisions based on a Central/Governate formula all point to the conclusion that the Governates will not be capable to take on responsibility of ICDC /NG units. If the ICDC were to become a NG force handed over to the Governates to continue the operations ICDC have been used for in the regions, it would necessitate at the minimum the Governates be legitimately established and durable enough to take on this civilian administrative control.

There is a question mark from Governance as to whether the governates will have the required capacity and legitimacy to allow a seamless transition. Governance is preparing for Ambassador Bremer a legal charter consolidating the interim (until a constitution

makes a final determination on political structures) political structure of the Governors and Provisional councils (PC's)

The success of the NG model is dependent upon the relative success of Governance's proposed provisional political structure consistent across all Governates pending constitutional decisions on Federation.

Several interconnected issues include the fact different ICDC units are used differently by different MSC's and whether this practice would continue after handover. An example of the problems that such a transition may face is the lack of consistency in IPS connection and reporting to these regional administrations. Their current lack of legitimacy means that CJTF-7 is effectively the authority local police report to. This raises real questions on whether Governates will be ready to take this on with ICDC when MSC's withdraw. An analysis of the timelines for transition points suggests that the governates will not be sufficiently ready to accept this responsibility. As a result there exists a high risk of the ICDC units becoming ethnic/political or religious militias.

This NG option would be integrated with the overall TOA as coalition units draw down their presence in Iraq. This will require the governorates provide facilities, command and control and sustainment services which are currently being provide by the coalition units. It may well be true that there are no additional costs in transferring the ICDC to the governorates, as long as the central government continues to allocate funds for their support as the CPA has, through CJTF. While this may be a viable option for future employment of ICDC, in the present security environment, such a TOA to the governorates is not feasible because, even if they were given access to the funds, the governorates are completely unable to provide the sort of leadership and supervision the ICDC requires and recieves from the CJTF.

3. POLICE RESERVES

"Police Reserves" are generally equipped and trained identical to regular local police. They usually are issued or reimbursed for the cost of purchasing their own individual weapons. When called into service, they use regular police vehicles and weapons and the facilities and logistical assets of the regular police. In most cases, the additional assets (vehicles, weapons, communications) are held as the property of the regular police, for use by the auxiliary when they are called to service. Their operational use of supplies and consumables all has to be paid for.

Thus the "cost" of "police reserves", man-for-man is almost exactly the same as regular police whenever they are called to duty. When they are in an inactive status, they are not drawing their wages, so this can be seen as a cost savings in that context (U.S.A.). We would not intend police auxiliaries to be inactive in our current context (Iraq). Therefore, as "Iraqi police reserves", we must expect their cost to be very nearly the same as regular police.

Savings that we may achieve by limiting their training or by reducing the distribution of their equipment must be seen as a proportional reduction in capability. The farther we go in limiting training and in reducing equipment distribution, the more this type of police auxiliary becomes indistinguishable from FPS.

INTEGRATION OF ICDC INTO NIA

The ICDC units would eventually be indistinguishable from the NIA.

Prior to the TOA points their will be a need to run ICDC personnel through a combination of training and certification that would raise up ICDC to NIA standards which would then allow their integration into NIA.

DISBANDING ROLLOVER OF ICDC INTO OTHER SECURITY SERVICES

This will essentially ensure that ICDC personnel have employment after their enlistments expire. Rollover into other security services may include the FPS e.g ICDC already doing FPS roles because there are not enough FPS and/or the IPS/Border/customs Guards - ICDC personnel with training and experience they have gained working with coalition forces and performing security missions would provide a much needed personnel capability addition to the IPS /Border customs Guards.

CONCLUSION

The future options outlined above are not all mutually exclusive and an admixture of the proposed force structures and organizational frameworks can be combined to suit the circumstances. However an option needs to be chosen so that the planning cycle begins well before the withdrawal of the MSC's.





There is a secure environment for people and property that enables citizens to participate fully in political and economic life. The Iraqi government has the means, including its own defense and police forces, to assume its responsibility for external and internal security, including policing of its borders. Relationships with regional states and with the international community have been established. The roles and accountabilities of organizations providing security are clearly defined within a legal framework. The legal framework also regulates the private possession and use of weapons.

Coalition forces will help Iraqis to eliminate the threats to their security and will remain in country for as long as they are needed. Over time the transfer of security responsibilities to local military and police forces will determine the speed with which we can advance reconstruction and build up institutions of good governance.

The Iraqi people are already contributing to that effort but must acquire the ability to assume full responsibility for meeting the country's security needs as soon as practicable — thus enabling the drawdown of coalition forces. Our priorities therefore include:

- Development and training of Iraqi security forces, including a new Iraqi army, new civil defense corps and an effective police force
- · Development of civilian national security oversight mechanisms
- Measures to ensure border security
- Measures to build the justice system and improve the penal system
- Ensuring that Iraq is free of weapons of mass destruction.]

Role of Security Forces

An important element in the planning for security forces is achieving the right balance between the local, regional and national security forces and institutions to ensure clear lines of authority, a delineation of duties and functions and planning for a legal framework that underpins security services around the country ensuring they ultimately function accountably and impartially in a future democratic state.

Understanding and shaping the relationships between the security services and the linkages with these security services and the current and provisional political structures is a key ingredient in successfully fulfilling the security endstate. Beyond the rapid operational tempo of raising and training security services, is the important task of demarcating their relationships and linkages consistently and applying a workable and effective security sector structure during the transitional phase, but which at the same time does not impinge upon the prerogatives of a future Iraqi government to determine the final compositions, functions and organizational structures of security services.

The following numbers are planned for:

Pre-Supplemental

Post Supplemental

¹ Check for outcome of Supplemental Appropriation:

Iraqi Police Service:	75,000	75,000 by January 2005
Facilities Protection Service:	31,000	50,000
Border Protection Service:	11,500	30,000
(consisting of 20,000 Border Guards and 10,000 Customs Officers)		
Iraqi Correctional Service	10,000	10,000
Iraqi Civil Defense Corps:	22,000	40,000
New Iraq Army	40,000	<u>40,000</u> (?-)
Total	189,500	245,000

Iraqi Police Service

Under the ministry of the interior, the Iraqi Police Service is responsible for law enforcement. Lightly armed (pistols, shotguns, AK 47), the intention is to increase IPS from a planned strength of 58,800 in early December to a full strength of some 75,000 by January 05, through a (re)training program beginning in November 03 that should progressively increase the quality of the police force over the 15 month period. No decisions have been taken about the final command structure of the Iraqi Police Service – at what level control of IPS forces would be exercised – partly because decisions on the powers of the Governales have yet to be taken.

Facilities Protection Service

Established under Order no 37 as an organization of armed, uniformed entities to provide security for ministry and governate offices, government infrastructure, and fixed sites under the direction and control of governmental ministries and government administrations. Until now, planned to be ca 22,000 strong. Includes Oil, electricity police and port security. Armed with AK47. Vehicles as supplied by Ministries.

Initially, the majority of FPS guards were employed and paid by the various military commands. Ministries are progressing with taking over responsibility for employing and paying FPS guards on their respective sites. Final TOA is planned for mid-lanuary 2004. Ministries are free to contract the provision of FPS guards to private firms. Individual Ministries are responsible for arranging training of their FPS. This can be conducted by the Ministry of Interior instructors, through coordination with Coalition units for 'train-the-trainer' programs, by the Ministries themselves, or contracted out to private firms. In all cases the standard of training is regulated and monitored by the Ministry of Interior (MoI).

The current proposal is for FPS funding in 2004 to be centralized and included in Ministry of Interior's budget. This provides for salaries, Mol approved training, administration, uniforms, equipment, vehicles, communications and badging as well as the establishment of Regional Operations Centers in each Governate. This figure also accounts for payments to tribes along the oil pipelines and electricity lines.

Border Protection Service

Under the Department of Border Enforcement, enforces customs and immigration laws. Lightly armed. Extra Border Police training starts in December, with the aim of progressively transferring MSCs responsibilities for border ports of entry to the BPS in February (101st ABN). March (MND SE), and April (MND SC), concluding finally in May when the BPS should have reached its planned strength of some 10,500.

Iraqi Correctional Service

Under the Ministry of Justice, responsible for prison security, welfare and security of prisoners and detainees.

ICDC

Conceived as a constabulary force, ICDC is authorized under the terms of Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) Order 28 to carry out constabulary duties including parrolling urban and rural areas; conducting operations to search for and seize illegal weapons and other contraband; providing fixed site, check point, area, route and convoy security; providing crowd and riot control; disaster response services; search and rescue services; providing support to humanitarian missions and disaster recovery operations including transportation services; conducting joint patrols with Coalition forces; and participating in other activities designed to build positive relationships between the Iraqi people and coalition authorities including community liaison. In practice, ICDC are deploying at individual, team, squad level, and tasks include fixed site security, convoy / route protection, crowd and riot control, HUMINT and linguistic support as well as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief

Initial planned strength is 8 bahalions of 846 personnel each, increasing to 18 bahalions (15,000) by Jan 04. The current plan envisions each Governate being allocated one ICDC bahalion. Training is conducted by coalition units within their respective regions. The content of the training is determined by the unit's requirements; but certain minimum training objectives have been laid down by CJTF-7. These minimum training requirements cover weapon handling, first aid, the law of land warfare and rules on the use of force. ICDC personnel are armed with Kalashnikovs, provided with body armor like the soldiers they interpret for and serve, as well as some additional support, such as trucks for operational mobility and to pick them up and return them to their local homes each evening.

The main distinctions from other security forces are that ICDC:

- Are intended directly to support Coalition forces' operations. They are currently dependent on
 Coalition forces for training, operational planning, command and control, mentoring, facilities,
 and operational support. They are very helpful in terms of "placing an Iraqi face" on coalition
 forces' operations but are incapable as currently constituted of assuming coalition forces'
 missions.
- Are local and, at 18 battalions, originally sized to provide a battalion-sized force for each of the 18 provinces, controlled in detail at the company/squadron level or lower.
- Have minimal training

End-state: the current intention is to effect a rapid expansion of the ICDC so that, under the executive authority of CJTF7, ICDC units fulfill the following requirements:

- To provide a limited number of provinces with a brigade-sized force each of between 4 and 6 battalions, totaling 6 brigades with 36 battalions by March 2004
- To accelerate ICDC recruitment and training accordingly from the 12 battalions currently in service to 26 by January/February, and then 36 by March
- To provide a command structure of Iraqi officers to command battalions and brigades so that, in
 due course, ICDC units are capable of being self-supporting, assuming the missions of Coalition
 forces in selected areas
- And being equipped with heavier weapons (eg heavy machine-gun)

In other words, instead of being a force protection service for coalition units, they would become a series of local militia forces having some - depending on the degree of investment in training, equipment and infrastructure - of the characteristics of the NIA.

NIA

Order No 22 sets out the NIA's purpose as providing the first step towards the creation of the national defense force of the new Iraq. Operating to a code of military discipline set out in Order No 23, its mission is the military defense of the nation, including defense of the national territory and the military protection of the security of critical installations, facilities, infrastructure, lines of communication and supply, and population. In an effort to distinguish it from Saddam's military apparatus (and the coup-prone army of the monarch before him), the Order specifies that the NIA may not have, or exercise, domestic law

enforcement functions, nor intervene in the domestic political affairs of the country. Its tasks will also include participation in domestic relief operations associated with natural or man-made disasters and humanitarian relief missions.

The 40,000 New Iraqi army soldiers is planned to be deployed in 27 battalions, organized into 3 divisions with a command and control structure, mobility, and minimal light armor and airlift capability to enable them to assume missions currently borne by coalition forces. As the battalions complete training, they are being deployed as an Iraqi coalition component under the operational control of one of the major subordinate commands of the CJTF. When large enough, the NIA will be deployed as a coalition force component reporting directly to CJTF HQs. As a coalition component, the NIA would be available, subject to training and within their operational capabilities, to assume any mission currently assigned to other coalition forces, which includes a wide range of tasks relating to internal security.

From

November 1, 2003

Calls to Jihad Are Said to Lure Hundreds of Militants Into Iraq

By DON VAN NATTA Jr. and DESMOND BUTLER

ONDON, Oct. 31 — Across Europe and the Middle East, young militant Muslim men are answering a call issued by Osama bin Laden and other extremists, and leaving home to join the fight against the American-led occupation in Iraq, according to senior counterterrorism officials based in six countries.

The intelligence officials say that since late summer they have detected a

growing stream of itinerant Muslim militants headed for Iraq. They estimate that hundreds of young men from an array of countries have now arrived in Iraq by

crossing the Syrian or Iranian borders.

But the officials say this influx is not necessarily evidence of coordination by Al Qaeda or other terrorist groups, since it remains unclear if the men are under the control of any one leader or what, if any, role they have had in the kind of deadly attacks that shook Baghdad on Monday. A European intelligence official called the foreign recruits "foot soldiers with limited or no training."

A senior British official, who was in Iraq in September, said most of the foreign men captured there were from the Middle East — Syria, Lebanon and Yemen — or North Africa. He described them as "young, angry men" motivated by the "anti-

British, anti-American rhetoric that fills their ears every day."

Signs of a movement to Iraq have also been detected in Europe. Jean-Louis Bruguière, France's top investigative judge on terrorism, said dozens of poor and middle-class Muslim men had left France for Iraq since the summer. He said some of them appeared to have been inspired by exhortations of Qaeda leaders, even if they were not trained by Al Qaeda.

Mr. Bruguière, who earlier this year opened an investigation of young men leaving France to fight on the side of Muslims in Chechnya, said the traffic to Iraq was now a similar problem. He called the changing pattern "a new threat." The rising agitation in parts of the Muslim world over the American-led occupation in Iraq was clear at Friday Prayers at Al Nur Mosque in a working-class section of Berlin. Dr. Izzeldin Hamad, the director of the Saudi-financed mosque, said political discussion was banned there.

But outside, a 21-year-old man who identified himself as Akmed said that while Saddam Hussein was unpopular, now "there are people who are angry about the American occupation." He and others said that inside the mosque, collections usually requested for Muslims in Palestine and Chechnya were now being

offered for Iraq as well.

An initial hint that Iraq would become a magnet for foreign recruits came just before the war began in March, with the arrest in Syria of four Algerian men, who had been living in Hamburg and attending a mosque frequented by three of the Sept. 11 hijackers. The authorities believed that the men intended to fight in Iraq.

One of them, Abderazak Mahdjoub, whom German investigators have linked to a Spanish-based terror network, is under investigation for alleged involvement in a planned terror strike on a tourist location on the Costa del Bravo in Spain. Syria deported the men to Germany, but none of the four men is in custody, since there is no German law against going to Iraq.

A senior German intelligence official, who spoke on condition of anonymity, said the authorities had detected other cases of immigrants in Germany trying to go to traq. "We know that in Germany there are people in the militant Muslim scene who are willing to go other places to participate in jihad, including Iraq," the official said.

There are scattered reports from other places, including Saudi Arabia, where a senior Saudi official said two Saudi militants, believed to have ties to Al Qaeda, were missing from the kingdom and believed by the authorities to have gone to Iraq.

Intelligence officials, who base their assessment of the traffic into Iraq on surveillance of mosques and Islamic centers and on interrogations of terrorist suspects captured inside Iraq, say they have found no connections between the recruits. "Nobody is organizing this move from Europe to Iraq," a senior European counterterrorism official said. "At least it is difficult to analyze and know who is organizing this. This may be just the beginning of a new phenomenon." United States troops patrolling the long Iraq-Syria border have said they have not detained any foreign recruits entering Iraq, but officials investigating attacks on allied targets say they have little question that militant Muslims are being drawn to the country. "It's pretty clear their number is increasing," a senior American official said.

The number of attacks is also increasing. In the last week, the average number of attacks against allied or international relief targets exceeded two dozen a day, from 12 attacks daily in July.

This week's attacks produced some evidence of the role of foreigners in Iraq. One would-be suicide bomber who was shot and wounded by Iraqi policemen was later identified as a man of Yemeni descent who was holding a Syrian passport.

In addition, Monday's multiple, coordinated suicide bombings were a sign to some investigators that foreign terrorists may have added a level of sophistication to the attacks.

Military officials say they suspect that a senior official in Mr. Hussein's government is recruiting foreign fighters to Iraq. They said Izzat Ibrahim, the "king of clubs" in the deck of cards of the most-wanted members of the deposed government, was believed to be a leading organizer and financier of recent attacks.

But allied forces are still struggling to figure out the dimensions and composition of the opponent they now face in Iraq. "We are quite blind there," said the head of an intelligence agency in Europe. He added: "The Americans and Brits know very little about this enemy. They are trying to fight an enemy they cannot see."

As a result, allied forces assume that they are fighting a loose conglomerate of like-minded opponents. Counterterrorism officials estimated that as many as 15 milltant groups, some with loose ties to Al Qaeda, might now be operating in Iraq. "Al Qaeda, Ansar al-Islam, loyalists, disgruntled former army personnel — they are all suspects, but there is no focus on a specific group," said a senior American counterterrorism official; Ansar is a terror group that had been operating in northern Iraq and is suspected to have had a role in the attacks in recent months.

Mr. Bruguière, the French investigative judge, said there were signs of Al Qaeda's influence in Iraq. "Since we had no evidence of an Al Qaeda connection in Iraq before the war, this is worrying," he said.

American officials closest to the intelligence from Iraq say the definition of the enemy is blurry. "Iraq is a magnet for jihadists just as Afghanistan was," a senior official said. "But the bigger question is whether leadership is evolving or coordination. So far we haven't seen it."

For months, the role in Iraq of "foreign fighters" — particularly those of Al Qaeda — has been a matter of sharp debate among American officials and intelligence officials in Europe and the Middle East.

Before the American-led invasion in March, counterterrorism officials and terrorism experts warned that the military action would be used by militant Muslims to recruit a new generation of terrorists, and that Iraq would draw them into the fray.

Al Qaeda leaders have repeatedly invoked the struggle in traq, in an audiotape broadcast by Al Jazeera satellite network earlier this month, Mr. bin Laden cited traq as the newest front in the terror network's international jihad.

"I say to our brothers, the mujahedeen in Iraq, I share your concerns and feel your pain," Mr. bin Laden said in the 31-minute audiotape. He called on young Muslims to go to Iraq to fight, saying, "You have to go wage jihad and show your muscles."

A day later, President Bush sought to draw a parallel between Mr. bin Laden's call to arms and the effort against terrorism. "The bin Laden tape should say to everybody the war on terror goes on, that there's still a danger to free nations," he said.

But a senior European intelligence official said he doubted that Al Qaeda had established a strong enough organization in Baghdad to pull off attacks, given how fractured Mr. bin Laden's network appears to be.

"Al Qaeda would need a level of organization and sophistication that I don't think it currently has," he said. But he said he did believe that some Qaeda members were now in Iraq "trying to stir up trouble."

There is little debate that more and more people are stirring trouble in Baghdad. Just who they are and where they are from remains a matter of speculation. In September, the authorities in Iraq arrested nine men they suspected of having ties to Al Qaeda. But officials have learned little about them or their connections through interrogations.

"They are not saying much," said one official knowledgeable about the arrests. "But they may just be foot soldiers who don't know that much."

Don Van Natta Jr. reported for this article from London and Desmond Butler from Berlin. Additional reporting was provided by Lowell Bergman and David Johnston in Washington.

20-0	E5	
From:	(O-6 MoNSD)	
Sent: Friday	y, August 22, 2003 12:02 AM	
To:	,E5	
Subject: Booki	FW: ICDC	
	age (O-6 MoNSD) August 21, 2003 11:58 PM	
To:	. (Pod-	
Walt B. (SES); Subject: ICDC	(CIV)	Slocombe,
Fred,		
Traffic be	elow from Mr Slocombe	
======	VR.	
ICDC in much he plans, or intends	/e have a report (quoted below) that Special Plans in NESA is circulating a brie eavier form (i.e. organized units with mortars, light artillery, light armor, etc.) that to train or plan or pay for. Can you track down the paper and send us a copy. ely describes the ICDC:	in any one wants

Coalition military are in the process of recruiting an Iraqi Civil Defense Corps, to work with, and under the close control of, coalition forces. The ICDC will be locally recruited, receive a one- or two-week training course from coalition units in their area, and begin to serve with those units, receiving on the job training and mentoring from those units. They will be armed with AK-47s, not heavier weapons. As the system develops and funds become available, they may have nontactical vehicles and basic comms. Initially they will work as individuals attached to coalition units. As such they will provide a source of information about the local community, help conduct searches and man check points, and serve as interpreters for the coalition units. As they gain experience, the ICDC will gradually become able to operate at the squad level with coalition forces, doing convoy and route security and guarding fixed points, as well as continuing to serve in these individual capacities. Higher level unit organization will be for administrative purposes only. ICDC personnel will live at home and operate only in their immediate areas. Enlistment will be for one year only. Recruiting and training has begun, with some 1400 signed up as of 19 Aug. Eighteen battalions, one in each Iraqi province, totaling about 15,000 individuals, are scheduled to be on duty with coalition units by October 2003. At that point, the program will be evaluated for decision on its longer term future, including whether to continue to add units.

Thanks, Walt

The report we monitored, "Sir – I was having an interesting conversation the other day – I heard that OSD(P) – specifically NESA special plans was circulating a brief showing ICDC in much heavier form (i.e. organized units with mortars, light artillery, light armor, etc.). This is not built into the budget numbers we're working now.

Thought you might find this interesting ~ I'll try to get a copy of the briefing."

CPA FUNDING REQUEST Civil Defense Corp PRB No: 4 (PRB Staff to Assign) Project Name: ICDC Date of Request: 8/9/2003 Date Required: 8/15/2003 Name of Requester: Signature: COL CPA Office/Unit: MoNSD POC/Person Completing Form: SGT Amount of Request: 19.6M DSN/Cell Phone: Project Location: MoNSD (Region) Email Address: 1. Project Category (check all that apply): Reconstruction Health Salaries Humanitarian Transportation Pensions Food Distribution Budget/Ops. Support Economic Programs Water/Sewer Education Other Public Services Electricity Ministry Social Programs Rule of Law/Govern. Police/ Security Cultural Programs Div. Commanders Brig. Commanders Regional Dir. Fund Fund Fund Construction Initiative 2. Proposed Funding Source: 3. Funding Data: (PRB Staff Only) Vested Assets Bank Account Details: Seized Assets Name/Title of Iraqi Receiving Disbursement: Appropriated Funds CPA Rep/Unit Responsible for Oversight: Iraqi Development Fund Engineering Oversight Assigned to: Name of Certifying Official: 4. Clearances: Please indicate you have obtained appropriate clearances, as applicable. (Note: If that coordination cannot be done at the regional level, it will be done by PRC.) Regional Coordinator: Yes No Name: Ministry Senior Advisor: Yes No Name: Office Director/Unit Commander: Yes No Name: Reconstruction/USAID: Yes No Name: International Coordination Council: Yes No Name: Others: **Program Staff Use Only** Date Request Received: mm/dd/yyyy Form Complete: Yes Disposition:

Form PRB-01 ver. 6/19/03

Date Request Submitted to Program Review Committee: mm/dd/yyyy

Date Request Submitted to Program Review Board: mm/dd/yyyy

Disposition:

Disposition:

Date Request Returned to Requester/Submitted to Comptroller: mm/dd/yyyy Disposition (including expenditure authorized):

Description of Program or Goods To Be Purchased - Please See Above Instructions

Ambassador Bremer agreed on 11 July to a CJTF-7 concept to establish an Iraqi Civil Defense Corps of up to 18 Battalions. The personnel assigned to this outlit will operate as individuals, teams and squads; they will provide linguist support, contribute to rebuilding infrastructure and communities, provide security and drivers for Coalition Forces, humanitarian assistance teams, and international NGOs, conduct limited crowd and riot control, fixed site route and convoy security, disaster response services and search and rescue.

In Fragmentary Orders subsequent to 11 July, CJTF-7 has directed its subordinate units to establish these battalions in the following pattern: 9 battalions by September, 1 more by 1 Oct, 5 more by 1 Nov, 2 more by 1 Dec, and the final battalion by 1 Jan 04.

The personnel in these battalions must be paid, fed, clothed, provided with a minimum of field gear and armed with an rifle.

Salary: \$70K/month for each bn on the establishment: Total Salary (Aug to Dec 03): \$4,830K Food Stipend: Subsistence costs to cover 1 meal per man per duty day...\$7.95 cost per MRE ...monthly cost/bn=\$183K: Total Food Stipend (Aug to Dec 03): \$12,627K Uniforms: Each member receives cap, 2 blouses, 2 trousers, 2 T shirts, 3 socks, and a pair of boots...\$90... and 20% overage: Total Uniform Cost: \$1650K (to be purchased from Iraqi vendors) Webbing: Each member receives web belt, suspenders, 2 canteens w/ cover, first aid pouch w/ dressing..\$25... and 15% overage: Total Webbing Cost: \$438K (to be purchased from Iraqi vendors) Weapon Cleaning Kit and Spares: \$1000 per bn: Total Cost: \$18K

The total cost of providing this level of support, based on the directed sequence of building to 18 batallions is \$19.563M for the remainder of CY 03.

CJTF-7 (BG Hahn) and CPA (Mr Slocombe) agree to this level of support, which will be provided to CJTF-7 from the CPA. There will logically be additional O&M costs to Coalition units as they integrate, transport and operate with ICDC elements.

(The CY 04 cost will be worked into the National Security and Defense budget)



Iraqi Civil Defense Corps



Who

New recruits eligible, no previous military experience required.

Screen out Former Iraqi Army (FIA) officers and soldiers.

FiA officers Colonel or higher are excluded.

Reflective of local Governorate Demographics.

Recruited with assistance of local Iraqi leaders

(linkage to CJTF-7 Iraqi leader engagement plan.

Where

Eight battalion equivalents initially 1 x 1AD (ME), 2 x 101AAD, 3 x 4ID, 1 x 1 MEF x 1 MND(SE).

Goal: 18 Total: 1 per Governorate

Why- Put an Iraqi face on daily coalition internal security operations

What

Cooperative initiative between CPA &CJTF-7.

A Security force designed to augment coalition forces individually thru platoon level with language and cultural knowledge, timely and actionable HUMINT, and contractor support (driver & security)

Collective tasks: Joint patrolling, fixed site security, area security, convoy security, and natural disaster assistance.

<u>When</u>

CJTF-7 Execution FRAGO 493 published 24 Jul 03

25 July 03 Begin Recruiting & Registration

31 Jul - Individual training begins.

01 Aug - Eight Battalions stood up

07 Aug - First ICDC soldiers patrol with coalition.

01 Sep - Five more Battalions stand up

01 Nov 03 - Last Five Battalions stand up

18 Battalions by Jan 04.

bus on the suggest PTA level - Tay:

(O-6 MoNSD)

From: Slocombe, Walt B. (SES)

Sent: Saturday, July 26, 2003 10:12 PM
To: (O-6 MoNSD)

Subject: CDC memo

Bremer, Paul

From:

RSS - SecDef CablesESO

Sent:

Wednesday, July 09, 2003 2:23 AM

To:

Bremer, Paul;

Cc:

CIV, OSD

Subject: Analysis of Recent Events in Iraq

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

From:

To:

(CC) Amb Bremer

(CC) Pat Kennedy

(CC) Walt Slocombe

Gentlemen,

Please provide copies of the attachment from Mr. receipt. Thank you.

as listed in the distribution above. Please confirm

Respectfully. MA. ESO, Cables A NEW PAPEL FROM

POINT PAPER

8- From

Subj: ANALYSIS OF RECENT EVENTS IN IRAQ

1. PROBLEM. The recent attacks on coalition troops in Baghdad and the Sunni Triangle are likely the results of an alliance between Baath Party remnants and Islamic extremists. The nature of this proto-insurgency and its ultimate objectives remain a matter of conjecture. However, it can be assumed that it is a temporary alliance, as the ultimate goals of the Baathists and Islamic extremists are ultimately contradictory. It is a fact that this marriage of convenience aimed at the coalition, but particularly the Americans.

2. DISCUSSION

- a. There are three types of insurgencies: (a) coups (2) classic Maoist three phase insurgencies (3) Attempts to foment a mass uprising such as the "People Power uprising in the Philippines and the 1979 uprising that overthrew the Shah of Iran.
- b. A coup is not an option in this case. One would expect that the best alternative for the Baathists would be a classic guerilla campaign. Such operations are custom made for Parties such as the Baathists because they can quietly eliminate troublesome partners such as the Islamic extremists over the course a long campaign. Fomenting mass uprisings is a dangerous course because the ultimate results of such events cannot be controlled. The Iranian communists were liquidated in the wake of the 1979 revolution despite participating in it.
- c. The current proto-insurgent activity appears to be attempting to move from the early stage of a classic three-phase stage insurgency to the popular uprising stage. When the Chinese and Vietnamese attempted to prematurely move from one stage to the other debacles resulted. It would be easy to write this off to mere Baathist incompetence, but we would be wise to consider other motives.
- d. There are two scenarios that would explain the present activities beyond adversary incompetence. Both scenarios contain exploitable opportunities. Determining the real motivation of the current situation should be identified a Commander's Critical Information Requirement (CCIR) if it is not one already. The two scenarios are not necessarily mutually exclusive:
 - (1) We should consider the possibility that the insurgents realize that they have a narrow window of opportunity. It is possible that they feel that a combination of foreign presence and slow rate of infrastructure repair under the occupation represent a fleeting window of opportunity that will close if they do not act quickly. In this scenario, they would accept the danger of loss of control in order to exploit the opportunity.

- (2) The second possibility, and equally plausible scenario, is that of competition. They may be vying for prestige in the "national resistance" leadership"
- e. The Shiia should not be forgotten. All indications are that they are bidding their time. If they think they can make democracy work to their advantage, they will do so. But we should not assume benign intent on their part. Their view of democracy is decidedly non-Jeffersonian. The Shiia are prickly and very honor conscious. Incidents like the one last week with the British should be followed up with good faith negotiations to find out what went wrong and how to prevent reoccurrences. Offering a nominal sum of money or a sheep as a condolence fee is considered an act of good faith; it is not construed as an admission of culpability. If they offer something in return for the death of a coalition member, it should likewise be accepted.
- f. We need to remember that we are an alien presence in a very old cultural landscape. No good will come of the perception that our presence there is open ended.

3. RECOMMENDATIONS

- a. The military should be encouraged to give all possible assistance to occupation authority efforts to restore infrastructure and remove the complaint that things are worse than they were under Hussein.
- b. The previously recommended establishment of a Provisional Iraqi Constabulary and a road map for transition to Iraqi control and Coalition disengagement should be implemented and widely advertised.
- c. When an attack on a coalition member occurs in a locality, all former Baath Party members above the rank of receptionist should be rounded up and interred. They should be given access to phones with the following message to friends and family:
 - (a) If no further attacks occur within eight weeks, we will be released
 - (b) If attacks reoccur after we are released, we will be reinterned.

DOD SUPPORT TO ICDF

OSD 15 July 2003

Agreed Intent

- Primary purpose of ICDF is to relieve coalition troops of point defense and presence missions
- Focus of effort is Sunni Triangle
- Ink Blot strategy will be employed beginning in West Baghdad, and spreading north-west

DOD Support Issues

- Weapons: 650 available; delta of about 3,500
- Interpreters: a mix of Sunni and Shia to match the neighborhoods they will be assigned to
- Human Rights and ROE lessons plans in Arabic
- Uniforms distinct from NIA, police, and coalition forces
- Associated funding issues

Bottom Line

 We will try to resolve these issues in the next two-three weeks

Remaining Local Issue; Who Provides Civilian Oversight?

- Defense does not think it appropriate have defense set the precedent of getting defense involved in internal security
- Interior does not want to militarize police functions
- Both views are valid
- One possible solution is to appoint a Minister Without Portfolio/Special Projects, and assign the ICDF to him as a first project

BACK-UPS

Recommendations From Constabulary Study

- General rule of thumb is one platoon per neighborhood of 10,000
- Platoon is primary unit of action; companies and battalions are admin entities
- Platoon Leaders should not be pre-ordained; should be selected from training cadre
- Company and battalion commanders selected from best platoon leaders

Recommendations (Cont.)

- Platoons should undertake civic action projects ASAP
- Companies should maintain civic action cadre of skill specialists in general support of platoons:
 - Carpenter
 - Electrician
 - Plumber/water sanitation specialist
 - Practical nurse (female)

Key Points of Proposed Press Release (CPA/DOD/CENTCOM Coordinated)

- ICDF is a transition mechanism for areas with security threats beyond normal police capabilities
- Purpose is to free coalition troops from point defense and presence patrolling missions
- It is designed a temporary fix to be replaced by police as the security situation allows
- Training will include a heavy dose of human rights indoctrination and stress on civilian control

DSD idea -

BUILDING AN IRAQI CONSTABULARY CAPABILITY

THE PROBLEM

- The current security situation requires a paramilitary capability something beyond the police in some areas
- The New Iraqi Army will not be capable of taking over security responsibilities in the near future and internal security is probably not a good precedent for them to set as a first mission.

PROBLEM (Cont.)

- The reduction of the American military profile on Iraqi streets would be helpful for improving the attitude of the Iraqi population if a replacement for their security contribution can be found
- US military personnel need to know the OIF commitment isn't open ended

THE PROPOSAL

- Build a temporary Iraqi constabulary militia mentored by US forces in most troubled areas.
- Until it is ready to assume urban patrol duties, the Iraqi constabulary militia will be accompanied by a US mentor force
- Training for the force will include a heavy dose of democracy and human rights education
- As the constabulary matures, US forces will withdraw to a reaction force mode
- Constabulary platoons will conduct civic action projects

DESIRED END-STATE

- US forces in a supporting role and off the streets on a day-to-day basis
- Once security situation allows, the constabulary militia platoons will be disbanded and their functions taken over by regular forces

ADVANTAGES

- A short run fix for the security problem
- US forces can see their "ticket out"
- A potential democratizing influence at the neighborhood level
- US military can train militia type forces; cannot train police

DISADVANTAGES/ CHALLENGES

- Question of who pays
- Ensuring that these militia platoons do not become a repressive political tool; a strong inspectorate system is required

RESOURCES

- US Iraqi expatriates want to help as interpreters
- Former members of USMC Combined Action program and retired SOF trainers are a potential source of training cadre

RECOMMENDATION

- Conduct a feasibility experiment in a troubled area (Fallujah is a good candidate)
- Figuring the need for a fifty man platoon for every 10,000 residents. Fallujah would need a thousand recruits (Fallujah's population is 200,000)

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Iraqi Militia Forces (IMF)

Concept Brief 7 July 2003

Agenda

- Purpose
- Needs Statement
- Organization
- C2 Relationships
- Task List (Individual and Collective)
- Concept
- Milestones
- CAP Policy Modifications
- Approval/Decision

Purpose

- Obtain approval for the immediate establishment of five new Iraqi Militia Battalions with a short term goal of eighteen battalions (one per governorate in one year) comprising three (+) Brigade organizations. Our long term strategic goal is five Iraqi Militia Divisions.
- Resolve CPA policy that must either be developed or amended to support Iraqi Militia Battalion (IMF) concept.
- Obtain approval for 60,000 force cap for IMF authorized manning.

3

References

- Verbal Guidance CJTF CDR- 4 July 03
- Draft CENTCOM PLANORD
- FM 7-7J
- FM 7-8
- FM 7-10
- FM 7-20
- FM 7-30

Requirements Statement


CJTF-7 requests CPA approval to immediately establish five Iraqi Militia Battalions. Approval of this initiative expedites the transition to a new Iraqi government, fosters a sense of Iraqi national pride, stimulates Iraqi economic recovery and creates the foundation for future U.S-Iraqi military relations.

Commander's Guidance

• Prepare Concept/COA briefing for Mr. Solcombe



- Mr. Solcombe's briefing must include CAP IMF policy issues/IMF organization structure/IMF task list and Milestones.
 - TM/SQD/PLT/COMPANY





- CDR's intent for the IMF is to get former Iraqi officers and soldiers under coalition control and executing productive projects supporting the establishment of a safe and secure environment in Iraq.
- Each coalition division immediately hires a battalion of IMF soldiers.
- Five Iraqi IMF battalions form one IMF Brigade.

Commander's Guidance (con't)

- CG accepts IMF qualitative risk IOT expedite stand up of IMF Do not assume that SOF forces are unavailable for FID. Establish requirements document.
- Coalition Divisions will assume responsibility for training IMF.
- Consolidate and cross walk task list with division commanders.- LNOs received consolidated task list at OPT/WG 061500 July 03.
- Define duration of individual service- one year enlisted, three year officers, with the caveat that exception officers and soldiers can be considered for service in NIA.
- Publish FRAGO NLT 9 July.


Organization Talking Points


- IMF organization very similar to NIA organization IOT facilitate future compatibility with NIA.
 - NIA organization adheres to a modified American motorized/airborne/air assault TO&E.
 - IMF is a pure rifle infantry organization with four squad rifle platoons and four squad rifle companies.
 - All squad soldiers are equipped with AK-47's, no grenadiers or automatic riflemen, machine guns, mortars or anti-tank systems.

IMF Rifle Squad and Rifle Platoon Organization


IMF Rifle Squad

IMF Rifle Platoon





HO Section
Platoon Leader
Platoon Sergeant
Radio Telephone
Operator





4 x Rifle Squads




IMF Rifle Platoon= 1/38 men

IMF Rifle Company Organization













Rifle Squads

4/152

4 x 39 soldiers.
Total Soldiers=





Company Headquarters

Commander
First Sergeant
Company Executive Officer
Supply Sergeant
Armorer

Total Soldiers= 2/4


IMF Rifle Company Total Strength= 6/156



7/7/2003

10

Notional NIA Battalion



- Each Line Company:
- 3 Line PLT, 1x MG PLT
- 154 personnel w/ AKs
- 7 medium trucks (2 ½ T)
- Four utility vehicles

- Each MG platoon:
- 6 Machine Guns (3 SQDs of 2 MGs)
- 6 Utility vehicles
- Co has 2 utility vehicles and 2 medium trucks

735 Enlisted

C2 Relationships

- The initial five battalions are TACON to coalition divisions currently serving in the Iraqi area of responsibility (AOR).
 - 1 AD MND- Central 1 X IMF Battalion
 - 1 MEF MND- South Central 1 X IMF Battalion
 - 1 U.K. MND- South 1 X IMF Battalion
 - 4th ID MND- North-Central- 1 X IMF Battalion
 - 101st MND-North- 1 X IMF Battalion
- CJTF-7 assumes responsibility for the manning and training of the first IMF Brigade headquarters.
- CJTF-7 Plan for C2 and training of Division structure-TBD. Anticipate habitual relationship with the Ministry of Internal Security and Defense.

Task List

- Individual Tasks:
 - Linguists
 - HUMINT
 - Civil Affairs Duties
- Collective Tasks: Big Picture
 - Military Specific Fixed Site Security (i.e. Ammo Supply Points (ASP), military compounds)
 - Natural Disaster Assistance
 - Humanitarian and reconstruction work (Many of these projects may transition to the National Jobs Program).
 - Route Security
 - Convoy Security
 - Territorial Security/Border Security (Expect this task to 7/7 transition to appropriate Ministry).

Small Unit Collective Tasks

Squad Battle Drills

Battle Drill 2 React to Contact

Battle Drill 3 Break Contact

Battle Drill 4 React to Ambush

Defend Fixed Site

Guard Military Governorate Assets

Conduct Presence Patrols

Concept

Coalition divisional units execute immediate recruitment of soldiers and officers to man a light infantry Iraqi Militia (IMF) Battalion. Individual training begins immediately with individual IMF soldiers integrated into coalition fire teams within 48 hours (KATUSA concept). Individual IMF soldiers initially augment coalition forces with linguistic, HUMINT and civil affairs skills. At the discretion of coalition division commanders IMF units begin executing fire team, squad, platoon and company level missions. See milestones for proposed concept for advancing to collective tasks.

A day= CPA approval date

A-Day

A+2

Iraqi Militia Force soldiers (IMF) begin patrolling with coalition forces. Primary functions include linguists, HUMINT and civil affairs duties.

A+7

First IMF Fire Teams execute fire team level fixed site security and fire team patrols.

A day= CPA approval date

A+14

First IMF units begin squad level operations. Collective tasks include fixed site security border check point manning and squad size patrols.

7/7/2003

A+21

IMF units begin platoon level operations. In addition to squad level tasks IMF units conduct convoy security and route security operations.

A+28

First IMF units begin company level operations. First squad external evaluations by sponsoring coalition division.

17

A day= CPA approval date

A+42

First IMF units begin battalion level operations. First platoon level external evaluations by sponsoring coalition division.

A+56

CJTF-7 validates first IMF Brigade
Headquarters. Coalition Divisions
begin second training iteration of five
new IMF Battalions. First company
level external evaluations of initial five
IMF battalions by sponsoring coalition
divisions.

A day= CPA approval date

A+84

Second group of five IMF battalions begin battalion level operations. Third Group of five IMF Battalions formed. First five IMF battalions receive external evaluation by sponsoring coalition 7/7/22003 division.

A+106

Last three IMF battalions begin training. (18 total/one per governorate). CJTF-7 validates first IMF Brigade Headquarters. IMF Brigade level operations begin. 2nd Group of five IMF Battalions receive battalion level external evaluation from parent coalition division. CJTF-7 mans & trains 2nd IMF Brigade Headquarters.

A day= CPA approval date

A+148

All 18 IMF battalions trained and operating. Second Brigade Headquarters validated by CJTF-7. CJTF-7 mans and trains 3rd IMF Brigade Headquarters.

A+190

IMF is fully functional and established as a viable institution for the new Iraqi government.

CPA Policy Implications

- IMF adheres to all policies established for the New Iraqi Army (NIA).
- Request concurrence with proposed task list.
- Request guidance on authorized entitlements for IMF officers and soldiers.
- Request that IMF units be allowed to be multiethnic organizations with demographics reflective of local Governorate.

Recommended IMF Policy Implementation

- IMF Pay is IAW NIA pay tables. IMF soldiers will be in full time militia status. \$50/week?
- one year enlisted, three year officers, with the caveat that exception officers and soldiers can be considered for service in NIA.
- Uniform, rank structure IAW NIA. IMF proposed transitional uniform is engineer tape around each upper arm.

MAJ From: G3 FUOPS Sent: Monday, July 07, 2003 3:45 PM To: MAJ CJTF7-C5 PLANS

COL Cc: MAJ: COL CJTF7-C3COL; COL C5CMG3FUOPS

Subject: RE: Notional NIA Battalion.ppt

ALCON.. MAJ is a new C5 Planner. His project is working out the details for implementing the New Iraqi Militia Forces (IMF). More like the IMPOSSIBLE MISSION FORCE.

.No. All I have is the pay tables for the monthly stipend payments. What you require is a policy decision from CPA that I think they have not made yet.

. One more item for your laundry list when you see COL

----Original Message----From: MAJ CJTF7-C5 PLANS Sent: Monday, July 07, 2003 3:32 PM

To: G3 FUOPS

Subject: RE: Notional NIA Battalion.ppt

Do you have a pay table for the NIA? The IMF pay tables need to correspond with the NIA tables and at this time I do not have a copy of the NIA pay charts. Thanks,

----Original Message----From: G3 FUOPS

Sent: Monday, July 07, 2003 10:10 AM
To: MAJ CJTF7-C5 PLANS

Subject: Notional NIA Battalion.ppt

Slocombe, Walt B. (SES)

From: Eaton, Paul

Sent: Monday, July 07, 2003 6:53 AM

To: Slocombe, Wait B. (SES)

Subject: Briefing: Iraqi Militia Forces (IMF)

Sir

Reviewed the CJTF 7 brief on IMF dated 5 July. This appears to be a CJTF 7 initiative, but can't confirm without review of stated reference – Draft CENTCOM PLANORD.

Points Pro:

- Immediate 48 hours increase in security personnel available to the five division commanders
- Provides robust combined arms force with eventual brigade level structure
- Provides for embedded trainer or advisory role proven effective in previous cases (Vietnam) and what we want to see with the NIA
- Puts "an Iraqi face" quickly on military visibility/patrolling

Points Con:

- Competes with NIA for scarce resources weapons, transportation, communications, money
- Competes with NIA for CJTF7 support embedded trainers, logistics
- Sends a "Old Iraqi Army" message by hiring back the same men who brought you the first two defeats and regime support
- Brief makes no mention of "psychological or leadership retraining" period
- Provides yet another initiative for security service, defusing the NIA focus, and still does not address the concept of a Gendarmerie
- Seems to challenge an earlier policy issue on application of combined arms anti-tank and mortars

Recommend a formal briefing with policy issues addressed up front and the support details second. The policy issues should address the leadership aspects of this proposal and how to shift from the previous approach to fighter management. Hire back without retrain and you get the old system. The latter specifically addressing current challenges on recruiting methodology, weapons procurement, funding.

I vote no or delay until NIA has at least two cycles graduated and fully resourced.

VR/MG Eaton.

Iraqi Militia Forces (IMF)

Concept Brief 5 July 2003

Agenda

- · Purpose
- · Needs Statement
- Organization
- · C2 Relationships
- Task List (Individual and Collective)
- Concept
- · Milestones
- · CAP Policy Modifications
- · Approval/Decision

Purpose


- Obtain approval for the immediate establishment of five new Iraqi National Guard Battalions with a long term goal of eighteen battalions (one per governorate) comprising 3 (+) Brigade organizations.
- Resolve CPA policy that must either be developed or amended to support Iraqi National Guard (ING) concept.


References


- Verbal Guidance CJTF CDR- 4 July 03
- Draft CENTCOM PLANORD
- FM 7-8
- FM 7-10
- FM 7-20
- FM 7-30

Requirements Statement

CJTF-7 requests CPA approval to initiate fielding of five new Iraqi National Guard Battalions. Approval of this initiative expedites the transition to a new Iraqi government, fosters a sense of Iraqi national pride, stimulates Iraqi economic recovery and creates the foundation for future U.S-Iraqi military relations.







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C2 Relationships


- The initial five battalions are TACON to coalition divisions currently serving in the Iraqi area of responsibility (AOR).
 - 101st MND-North
 - 4th ID MND- Central
 - 1 AD MND- Central
 - 1 MEF MND- South Central
 - 1 U.K. MND- South
- CJTF-7 assumes responsibility for the manning and training of the first ING Brigade headquarters.


Task List

- · Individual Tasks:
 - Linguists
 - Human Collectors
 - Civil Affairs Duties
- · Collective Tasks:
 - Fixed Site Security
 - Natural Disaster Assistance
 - Humanitarian and reconstruction work
 - Route Security
 - Convoy Security
 - Territorial Security/Border Security

Concept

Coalition divisional units execute immediate recruitment of soldiers and officers to man a light infantry Iraqi National Guard Battalion. Individual training begins immediately with individual Iraqi National Guard soldiers integrated into coalition fire teams within 48 hours (Katusa concept). Individual Iraqi National Guard soldiers initially augment coalition forces with linguistic, human collection and civil affairs skills. At the discretion of coalition division commanders Iraqi National Guard units begin executing fire team, squad, platoon and company level missions. See milestones for proposed concept for advancing to collective tasks.





A day= CPA approval date

A+42

First Iraqi National Guard units begin battalion level operations. First platoon level external evaluations by sponsoring coalition division.

A+56

CJTF-7 validates first Iraqi National Guard Brigade Headquarters. Coalition Divisions begin second training iteration of five new Iraqi National Guard Battalions. First company level external evaluations of initial five ING battalions by sponsoring coalition divisions.

Milestones

A day= CPA approval date

A+84

Second group of five ING battalions begin battalion level operations. Third Group of five ING Battalions formed. First five ING battalions receive external evaluation by sponsoring coalition division.

A+106

Last three ING battalions begin training. (18 total/one per governorate). CJTF-7 validates first Iraqi National Guard Brigade Headquarters. ING Brigade level operations begin. 2nd Group of five ING BN's receive battalion level external evaluation from parent coalition division. CJTF-7 mans & trains 2nd Iraqi NG Brigade Headquarters.

A day= CPA approval date

A+148

All 18 ING battalions trained and operating. Second BDE headquarters validated by CJTF-7. CJTF-7 mans and trains 3rd ING Brigade Headquarters.

A+190

Iraqi national Guard is fully functional and established as a viable institution for the new Iraqi government.

CPA Policy Implications

- ING adheres to all polices established for the New Iraqi Army (NIA).
- Request immediate policy letter approving proposed task list.
- Request immediate guidance on authorized entitlements for ING officers and soldiers.
- Initial period of service for soldiers will be one year, officers three years. Exceptional soldiers and officers will be considered for service in the NIA.
- Request exception to policy for NIA requirement to ethnically mix units. ING units may be ethnically homogenous up to company echelon.

Iraqi Militia Forces (IMF)

9 July 2003

7/10/2003

Agenda

- Purpose
- Needs Statement
- Organization
- C2 Relationships
- Task List (Individual and Collective)
- Concept
- Milestones
- CAP Policy Modifications
- Approval/Decision

7/10/2003

Purpose

- Obtain approval for the immediate establishment of five new Iraqi Militia Battalions with a short term goal of eighteen battalions (one per Governorate in one year) comprising three (+) Brigade organizations. Our long term strategic goal is five Iraqi Militia Divisions.
- Resolve CPA policy that must either be developed or amended to support Iraqi Militia Battalion (IMF) concept.
- Obtain approval for 60,000 personnel authorization to support five Division IMF force structure as called for in CENTCOM draft PLANORD.

References

- Verbal Guidance CJTF CDR- 4 July 03
- Draft CENTCOM PLANORD
- FM 7-7J
- FM 7-8
- FM 7-10
- FM 7-20
- FM 7-30

Requirements Statement

CJTF-7 requests CPA approval to immediately establish five Iraqi Militia Battalions. Approval of this initiative expedites the establishment of a safe and secure environment in Iraqi, facilitates the transition to a new Iraqi government, fosters a sense of Iraqi national pride, stimulates Iraqi economic recovery and creates the foundation for future U.S-Iraqi military relations.

Commander's Guidance

Prepare Concept/COA briefing for Mr. Solcombe



- Mr. Solcombe's briefing must include CPA IMF policy issues/IMF organization structure/IMF task list and Milestones.
 - Fire Team/Squad /Platoon/COMPANY



- Battalion
- Commanders intent for the IMF is to get former Iraqi officers and soldiers under coalition control and executing productive projects supporting the establishment of a safe and secure environment in Iraq.
- Each coalition division immediately hires a battalion of IMF soldiers.
- Five Iraqi IMF battalions form the initial IMF Brigade.

Commander's Guidance (continued)

- CG accepts IMF qualitative risk IOT expedite stand up of IMF Do not assume that Special Operations Forces are unavailable for FID. Establish requirements document.
- Coalition Divisions will assume responsibility for training IMF.
- Consolidate and cross walk task list with division commanders.- LNOs received consolidated task list at OPT/WG 061500 July 03.
- Define duration of individual service- one year enlisted. three year officers, with the caveat that exceptional officers and soldiers can be considered for service in NIA.
- Publish FRAGO no later then (NLT) 9 July.


Organization Talking Points

- CJTF-7 designs IMF organization to match NIA organization IOT facilitate future compatibility.
 - NIA organization adheres to a modified American motorized/airborne/air assault TO&E.
 - IMF is a pure rifle infantry organization with four squad rifle platoons and four platoon rifle companies.
 - All squad soldiers are equipped with AK-47's, no grenadiers or automatic riflemen, machine guns, mortars or anti-tank systems.
 - Long term goal (6-9) months is for IMF battalions to be selfsufficient. Hence HHC assets.
 - Brigade and Division IMF structures to be determined (TBD).

IMF Rifle Squad and Rifle Platoon Organization

IMF Rifle Squad


IMF Rifle Platoon







Fire Team A
4 x Rifleman AK-47




Fire Team B 4 x Rifleman AK-47



HO Section
Platoon Leader
Platoon Sergeant


Radio Telephone Operator




4 x Rifle Squads

IMF Rifle Platoon= 1/46 men

IMF Rifle Company Organization








Company Headquarters

Commander
First Sergeant
Company Executive Officer
Supply Sergeant
Armorer
Total Soldiers= 2/4


Rifle Squads

4 x 47 soldiers. Total Soldiers= 4/184



IMF Rifle Company Total Strength= 192 (6/186)

IMF Rifle Battalion Organization



IMF Rifle Battalion Total Strength= 846 soldiers (36/810)

IMF Battalion Headquarters & Headquarters Company (HHC)

HHC Total Strength= 74 Soldiers (9/65)



Company Headquarters

Commander

First Sergeant

Company Executive Officer

Supply Sergeant

Armorer

Total Soldiers= 6 (2/4)





Long Term Goal

6-9 Months

12 x Trucks

2 x Jeeps

7 x Water Carriers

Platoon Leader

Platoon Sergeant

3 x Squad Leaders

15 Soldiers

Total 21 Soldiers (1/20)

7/10/2003



Long Term Goal

6-9 Months

6 x ambulances

Platoon Leader

Platoon Sergeant

Physicians Assistant

4 x medics battalion aid station

12 x medics company aid station

16 x platoon medics

Total 35 Soldiers (2/33)



SI

Personnel Officer

Personnel Sergeant

Personnel Clerk Total: 5 Soldiers (1/4)

Awards Clerk

Reenlistment Sergeant



S3

Training Officer

Assistant Training Officer

Training Sergeant Total 4 Soldiers (2/2)

Training Clerk



S4

Supply Officer

Supply Sergeant Total Soldiers 3 (12)

Supply Clerk

C2 Relationships

- The initial five battalions are TACON to coalition divisions currently serving in the Iraqi area of responsibility (AOR).
 - 1 AD MND- Central 1 X IMF Battalion
 - 1 MEF MND- South Central 1 X IMF Battalion
 - 1 U.K. MND- South 1 X IMF Battalion
 - 4th ID MND- North-Central- 1 X IMF Battalion
 - 101st MND-North- 1 X IMF Battalion
- On or about 1 January 04 CJTF-7 mans and trains the first IMF Brigade Headquarters.
- CJTF-7 Plan for C2 and training of Division structure-TBD. Anticipate habitual relationship with the Ministry of Internal Security and Defense.

IMF Task List

- Individual Tasks:
 - Contractor Security
 - Linguists
 - HUMINT
 - Drivers Contractor Vehicles
- Collective Tasks:
 - Military Specific Fixed Site Security (i.e. Ammo Supply Points (ASP), military compounds)
 - Natural Disaster Assistance
 - Humanitarian and reconstruction work (Many of these projects may transition to the National Jobs Program).
 - Route Security
 - Convoy Security
 - ###Titorial Security/Border Security (Expect this task to transition to appropriate Ministry)

Minimal Individual Proficiency

- Weapons familiarization
- Basic First Aid (Common Soldier Task List)
- Human Rights Training
- Rules of Engagement Training
- Introduction to English
- Basic Physical Fitness Level
- Civics Training

Minimal Small Unit Collective Task Proficiency

Squad Battle Drills

Battle Drill 2 React to Contact

Defend Fixed Site

Guard Military Governorate Assets

Conduct Presence Patrols

Advanced Collective Training (Recommended not required)

Battle Drill 3 Break Contact

Battle Drill 4 React to Ambush

Concept

Coalition divisional units execute immediate recruitment of soldiers and officers to man a light infantry Iraqi Militia (IMF) Battalion. Individual training begins immediately. Individual IMF soldiers initially augment coalition forces with linguistic, HUMINT and security skills. At the discretion of coalition division commanders IMF units can execute fire team, squad, platoon and company level missions. See milestones for example training concept.

In processing Checklist

- Vetting for used by NIA.
- Registration of IMF soldier.
- Registration of personal weapon.
- Basic Medical Screening (HIV, screening by coalition platoon medic).
- English Language Proficiency Assessment.
- Human Rights Class.
- Rules of Engagement Class.
- Assignment to sponsoring coalition squad.

Example Training Concept/Milestones A Possible "Way Forward"

A day= Concept approval date



A+2

Iraqi Militia Force soldiers (IMF) begin patrolling.
ROE & human rights
Training mandatory before accompanying coalition forces. Primary functions include linguists, HUMINT and security assistance.

A+7

In processing complete. IMF soldiers begin expanded individual task training.

Example Training Concept/Milestones A Possible "Way Forward"

A day= Concept approval date

A+14

First IMF units begin first rifle team level operations. Collective tasks include fixed site security and fire team patrols.

A+21

IMF units begin squad level operations. Collective tasks expand to squad size fixed site security, border check point manning and squad size patrols. In addition to squad level tasks IMF units conduct convoy security and route security operations.

Example Training Concept/Milestones A Possible "Way Forward"

A day= Concept approval date

A+28

First IMF units begin platoon level operations. First IMF squad external evaluations by sponsoring coalition division

A+35

First IMF units begin company level operations. First IMF platoon external evaluations by sponsoring coalition division

Example Training Concept/Milestones A Possible "Way Forward"

A day= Concept approval date

A+50

First IMF units begin battalion level operations. First platoon level external evaluations by sponsoring coalition division.

A+60

Coalition Divisions begin second training iteration of five new IMF Battalions. First company level external evaluations of initial five IMF battalions by sponsoring coalition divisions.

Example Training Concept/Milestones A Possible "Way Forward"

A day= Concept approval date

A+100

Second group of five IMF battalions begin battalion level operations. Third Group of five IMF Battalions formed. First five IMF battalions receive external evaluation by sponsoring coalition division.

A+150

Last three IMF battalions begin training. (18 total/one per Governorate). 2nd Group of five IMF Battalions receive battalion level external evaluation from parent coalition division.

Example Training Concept/Milestones A Possible "Way Forward"

A day= Concept approval date

A+200

All 18 IMF battalions trained and operating.

A+210

CJTF-7 begins training first Brigade Headquarters.

CPA Policy Implications

- IMF adheres to all policies established for the New Iraqi Army (NIA).
- Request guidance on authorized entitlements for IMF officers and soldiers.
- IMF units will be multi-ethnic organizations with demographics reflective of local Governorate.

7/10/2003 25

Recommended IMF Policy Implementation

- IMF Pay is IAW NIA pay tables. IMF soldiers will be in full time militia status. NIA pay tables are still under review, therefore IMF soldiers will initially receive \$50/month stipend until publication of INA pay tables.
- Duration of service is one year for enlisted, three years for officers.
 Reenlistment criteria TBD. Exceptional officers and soldiers can be considered for service in NIA.
- Uniform, rank structure IAW NIA. IMF proposed transitional uniform is white engineer tape around each upper arm.
- Request additional CJTF-7 discretionary funding totally \$423,000 to cover two month's stipend payments.
- Prioritization of resource allocation to support national programs, including the Facility Protection Security Force (FPSF), the National Jobs Program, and the Border Patrol.

FYI ON SIPM

MAJ

(0-6 MOD)

From: Sent:

Sunday, August 31, 2003 9:17 PM

To:

(0-6 MOD)

Sublect:

FW ICDC Weblink

- fyi. we ultimately got to the right guy on this. I think his response below answered if not satisfied most the questions from the other day. WR

-----Original Message----

G3 FUOPS From:

Sent: Saturday, August 30, 2003 9:27 PM

To: G3 FUOPS; Cc:

COL FUTURE OPS

Subject: RE: ICDC Weblink

.. See my comments below. I am a bit wordy but I want to make sure my points are understood correctly. I hope that my words do not have an opposite effect and "muddy the waters."

----Original Message-----

From:

Sent: Sat, August 30, 2003 7:08 PM

G3 FUOPS; To:

MAJ

Subject: RE: ICDC Weblink

Thanks for the info, you've been very helpful. I need to see if I can get clarification on a couple points yet, however:

1. I think some confusion may still exist over what "stood up" means wrt Battalions.

A: "Stood up" means that a division recruits, trains, and equips a battalion's worth of people. Essentially, the divisions are starting with nothing, gathering resources (men and equipment) and then making them into something, in this case small units.

Q: I take it that it means that the decision point has been reached and we've decided to proceed?

A: The original plan had a much more orderly implementation over the course of several months. CJTF-7 would recruit, train, and equip eight battalions. The time in between the initial eight and the follow-on battalions was to see if the concept was a good idea and work out the kinks. Over the past month, the leadership, (civilian and military) have made the decision to accelerate the implementation of the battalions. Moving the time forward via orders and fragos does not necessarily mean that we can physically do it. It does give commanders the latitude to do it faster if they can.

2. is it fair or proper to say that some battalions have been organized, say?

A: As we get more people into the program the answer will be yes. At the stage of implementation we are at right now the answer is no. Please understand that this past week was the first week the divisions really started to train ICDC. Training really takes about two to three weeks depending on the methods used by each division. You might be tempted to think that they all do it the same way but this is not the case.

Q: Or are being organized? The excel spreadsheet/update continues to make reference to battalions.

A: Yes, I would say battalions are being organized but this is more for administrative reasons than for employment.

Q: I can see that total trained and operating add up to less than-- but almost-- one battalion, however, I don't think its right to say that only one battalion has been

organized. Are these squads, even conceptually, being organized into battalions?

A: You are correct. The ICDC on the ground are split up into small units. One coalition platoon may have a squad of its own ICDC. One of the intents of the ICDC is to help our soldiers communicate with the people in the communities that they operate. Here are some examples that I have used for demonstration. Please note that these are some ways I see the ICDC being employed. The division commander is ultimately the man who determines how his division will utilize his people.

- 1. A squad is going on patrol downtown in Mosul. The squad takes some of their ICDC with them to use as translators. The ICDC should have been hired from the local area and be able to help guide the squad, know or figure out who doesn't belong in a neighborhood, and start to give the Iraqis some confidence in the security environment. Like Bosnia, if the squad leader handles the situation right it can appear that the ICDC is taking the lead, mainly because of his language skills and give local people confidence.
- 2. Another situation is ICDC conducting convoy security with our troops. If ICDC are riding in convoys with coalition troops the Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) that the enemy is using against us will start to injure or kill Iraqis. This will change the attitude of the people. Instead of foreigners getting killed, they will have to face the reality of their own people being killed. If an ICDC is hired from that area and he gets hurt the local people will really feel the impact. Who knows, they might get the courage to turn in the bad actors or foreign fighters entering the country.
- Q: I need a way to link what's been briefed to Amb. Bremer to what is actually going on now. Even if it no longer is an appropriate way to describe the situation, then what did we mean when we said 8 Battalions stood up?
- A: What was really meant was eight battalion "equivalents" recruited, trained and equipped. The divisions are striving toward this. They are simply using a building block method. For the ICDC, four squads form a platoon. Four platoons make up a company. Four companies and one HHC company form a battalion.
- Q: How do we know if we're hitting our targets, or how behind we are?
- A: Wow, this is a tough one that I have been struggling to figure out the whole time that I have had this project. I don't have an answer for you except that we will know as time goes on. Perhaps in as little as a month or so now that the divisions have started their training programs. I can speculate further but I do not have the expertise to give you a better answer.

I can tell you this, the divisions are moving along as fast as they can with what they have while maintaining all of the other commitments that they are obligated to fulfill as well as the new ones that they get tasked with daily.

Originally, the ICDC were supposed to be an outfit with minimal training, seven days maximum, and then go out to work with our forces. What actually is happening is that divisions are realizing that you can't just give a guy a uniform and a gun and then expect him to know what to do. You have to train him. This is part of what makes our Army great. The divisions know the endstate and they are making the necessary adjustments to make the plan successful.

Q: If you can take a stab, or know someone who can, I'd appreciate it.

A: I am the action officer for the ICDC so I am the one to answer your questions...

r your questions..

----Original Message---From: G3 FUOPS

WR -

Sent: Saturday, August 30, 2003 6:42 PM

To: MAJ;

Subject: RE: TCDC Weblink

Sorry about that, try this. I gave you the link to the internal LAN by mistake..

/sections/g3/NIA_Briefings. http:// ----Original Message----From MAJ Sent: Sat. August 30, 2003 5:58 PM
To: G3 FUOPS Subject: RE: ICDC Weblink nothing attached ----Original Message----From: G3 FUOPS Sent: Saturday, August 30, 2003 5:46 PM To: COL CJTF7-C3COL; COL; Cc: MAJ; COL FUTURE OPS; G3 FUOPS Subject: ICDC Weblink Mr. I have attached the two documents that I think will be most beneficial for you. The spreadsheet is the method I use to track the status of the ICDC.. MAJ \\c5maincpweb\NIABRIEFINGSWEB\ CJTF-7 FUOPS Officer Phone: SIPR email: NIPR email:

"Support 'til your nose bleeds"

UNCLASSIFIED

COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY BAGHDAD

ACTION MEMO

August 28, 2003

FOR: THE ADMINISTRATOR

FROM: Office of General Counsel

SUBJECT: Order Establishing the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps

The enclosed Order establishes the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (ICDC) as a force in support of Coalition operations to assist in providing security and stability to the people of Iraq. As a result of coordination through the interagency process, the Order is silent on two key policy issues:

- Garrisoning and Employment. The Order does not address the garrisoning or regional employment of the force. Language limiting the utility of the force was removed to preserve flexibility. CJTF-7 envisions the force as being employed locally and adding value through their local relationships. OSD Policy has concerns with this approach, fearing that this force may not develop to provide a needed larger force capability and also may lead to the creation of regional militias.
- Heavy Weapons. The Order authorizes the ICDC to possess Heavy Weapons in accordance with Order 3, Weapons Control. Language limiting the possession of Heavy Weapons was removed at the request of OSD Policy and JCS to preserve flexibility. Under Order 3, the ICDC are permitted to possess Heavy Weapons under Coalition Forces supervision. The limitation language was originally included because the ICDC will undergo very limited training and there is concern about their ability to exercise judgment when using Heavy Weapons.

RECOMMENDATION: That the Administrator sign the proposed Order

COORDINATION: Director, Security Affairs; CJTF-7

UNCLASSIFIED

Iraqi Civil Defense Corps

Status: Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (ICDC) has been established to provide tactical support to Coalition ground forces, whilst putting an Iraqi face on daily internal security operations. Currently deploying at individual, team, squad level, tasks include fixed site security, convoy / route protection, crowd and riot control, HUMINT and linguistic support as well as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. Initial planned strength is 8 battalions of 846 personnel each, increasing to 18 battalions by Jan 04. The current plan envisions each Governate being allocated one ICDC battalion.

<u>Update</u>: Recruiting for the ICDC continues. To date 648 ICDC personnel have been trained and are operating with coalition troops. A further 3518 are undergoing training. Currently, ICDC personnel are only being used for joint missions with coalition troops. Training is conducted by coalition units within their respective regions. The content of the training is determined by the unit's requirements; however, certain minimum training objectives have been laid down by CJTF-7. These minimum training requirements cover weapon handling, first aid, the law of land warfare and rules on the use of force.


ICDC personnel are currently paid at the same rate as members of the New Iraqi Army. Once the new rates have been set by the CPA, the ICDC will continue to be paid at the same rate as the Army.

Original funding of \$60.95M has been increased to \$75.584M and included in the FY 04 Supplemental. Additional funding purchases vehicles, communications equipment, personal protective equipment and basic infrastructure. These purchases greatly improve the responsiveness and flexibility of ICDC units and also enable them to fulfill a wider range of mission requirements.


Next Steps: Continue to recruit and train ICDC personnel in accordance with stated aim of 18 battalions by Jan 04. For the near term, ICDC salaries will continue to use the same scales as the Army. Elements within CPA and CJTF-7 are establishing guidelines on salaries for ICDC and Army that correlate to Police and other agencies of the MOI and FPS that adequately reflects and compensates for the element of risk inherent in the job, without contributing to wage inflation. The intent is to put these salary scales in place by 1 October.





!	ICDC Timeline		
01 MAY 03	First Peshmerga soldiers arrive to AO Glory to assist with security of ASP		
27 MAY 03	FIFF/ NISF/ KDP combine to form the Joint Iraqi Security Company		
06 JUN 03	A Co. JISC begins basic training		
07 JUL 03	A Co. JISC graduate basic training and begin ASP security mission		
05 AUG 03	B Co. and C Co JISC graduate basic training		
10 AUG 03	CJTF-7/Division establish Iraqi Civil Defense Corps		
15 AUG 03	A Co. and B Co. merge and C Co. and D Co. merge		
06 SEP 03	B Co. ICDC graduate basic training		
18 SEP 03	D Co. Graduation (1st Bn Training Complete)		
23 SEP - 09 OCT 03	3rd Bn ICDC (Irbil) MTT		
02 Nov - UTC	ICDC – PLDC begins		
08 Nov – 25 NOV 03	4th Bn ICDC (As Sulaymaniyah) MTT		




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	CA	CA
and the second		
rd Pipeline	Guard Irbii Airfield	Guard Ministries, convoy security, CMO, VIP escort
rd Pipeline	Guard Ministries, convoy security, CMO, VIP escort	Guard Ministries, convoy security, CMO, VIP escort
		1.00
rd Pipeline	Guard Ministries, convoy security, CMO, VIP escort	Guard Ministries, convoy security, CMO, VIP escort
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rd Pipeline	Guard Ministries, convoy security, CMO, VIP escort	Guard Ministries, convoy security, CMO, VIP escont
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ipeline Security	C2 Security Ops	C2 Security Ops
Dahuk	Irbii	As Sulaymaniyah
	rd Pipeline rd Pipeline rd Pipeline	ord Pipeline Guard Ministries, convoy security, CMO, VIP escort Pipeline Security C2 Security Ops











ICDC MTT

- 3rd Battalion MTT (Irbil) 854 Soldiers

 - 404th CA Bri set the conditions for MTT at Kanl-Karsh
 - raining completed 9 Oct 03
- 4th Battalion MTT (As Su
 - 854 Soldiers
 - 404th CA/PUK providing As
 - First class begins 08 Nov 03
 - Graduation 25 Nov 03 in As Sulaymaniyan.
- Endstate: 2-44 ADA trained and graduated 3 ICDC t with an endstrength of nearly 3,000 Arab, PUK, and KD, personnel ready to assume security operations in support of coalition missions





ICDC - PLDC

- Objective. Provide ICDC NCOs with a basic leadership foundation.
- 7 Day Instruction includes:
 - Leadership
 - Communication skills
 - · Maintenance
 - Professional Skills
 - Training
 - Military Studies
- Cadre is US and Iraqi
- First Course to begin 02 Nov 03 at Allied Camp

ICDC Issues

✓ Uniforms

- Acquisition of new BDU, winter clothing.
- Require 7000 uniforms for 1st 4th Battalions

Equipment

- Units still lack basic equipment for operations, ie.,
 - · military vehicles, commo, computers, etc.

✓ Pay

- Remains an issue, but no longer a show stopper.
- Mitigated effects of initial pay cut
 - Promoted 54 soldiers in A Co (IAW the ICDC MTOE and approval from G3) IOT get soldiers better pay.
 - Big boost in morale Trust reinforced
 - Payment for weapons
 - · Former Iraqi Military Pay





As of 301600d JUL 03

7.62 X 39MM

EQUIPMENT	TOTAL REQUIRED	CURRENT AVAILABLE	MINIMUM REQUIRED NLT 30 JUL 03	REMARKS
RPK LIGHT MACHINEGUNS	30	66	0	35 issued to KMTB
AK-47 RIFLES	1000	0	1000-93-30- 100-671=106	671 issued Will retrieve when 1000 from Jordan arrive.
9MM PISTOLS	80	2+1+1+1=5	80-26=54	26 delivered to KMTB
9MM PISTOL AMMUNITION	4000	4000	2000 RDS OF 9MMX18MM; 2000RDS OF 9MMX19MM	9x18mm=(2000) 9x19mm-514,000 Available
AK-47 AMMUNITION	400,000	400,000	400,000	Almost 7million rds of 7.62x39mm

AK-47 BAYONETS REMOVED AS A REQUIREMENT (18 JUL 03)

PUSHTO 100 Soon TO KME

SHOUS

Available

INDIVIDUAL EQUIPMENT As of 301600d JUL 03 REQUIREMENTS

EQUIPMENT	TOTAL REQUIRED	CURRENT AVAILABLE	MINIMUM REQUIRED NLT 30 JUL 03	REMARKS
HELMET WITH ACCESSORIES	1000	7334	800	
RUCKSACK (PACK)	1000	7837	800	
BELT (PISTOL)	1000	7837	800	
CANTEENS (2)	2000	35274	0	2200 delivered
CANTEEN CUP	2000	0	0	2200 delivered
CANTEEN CUP POUCH (2EA)	2000	7902	2000	
AK-47 MAGAZINES	4000	8994	4000	
9MM MAGAZINES	160	0	200	Zero 9mm mags
RPK MG, 40/75RD MAGAZINES (2EA)	60	0	100	Zero RPK mags
9MM HOLSTERS	100	5818	50	No longer on report?
SUSPENDERS		7837		
HARNESS (AK-47 VESTS)	1000	9620	0	1000 delivered

CJTF-7 BPT EQUIPMENT AVAILABLE

As of 301600d JUL 03

EQUIPMENT	TOTAL REQUIRED	CURRENT AVAILABLE	MINIMUM REQUIRED NLT 30 JUL 03	REMARKS
DUFFLE BAGS		9264		
IZ UNIFORM BELTS		4329		
IZ UNIFORM SHIRTS		0		Taking off report
IZ UNIFORM TROUSERS		31		Taking off report
LBE		671		
LT WT UNIFORM		100		Taking off report
WOOL UNIFORM		100		Taking off report
UTILITY UNIFORM		100		Taking off report

كالح

CPA FUNDING REQUEST

PRB No: (PRB Staff to Assign)	Project Name: AKs				
Date of Request: 7/27/2020	Date Required: 8/15/2003				
Name of Requester: COL	Signature:				
CPA Office/Unit: MNSD	POC/Person Completing Form: COL				
Amount of Request: \$6.125M	DSN/Cell Phone:				
Project Location: Baghdad (Region)	Email Address:				
1. Project Category (check all that apply):					
Reconstruction Humanitarian Food Distribution Water/Sewer Electricity Rule of Law/Govern. Div. Commanders Fund Construction Health Transportation Economic Prog Education Ministry Police/ Security Brig. Command Fund Construction Initiative	Other Public Services Social Programs Cultural Programs				
2. Proposed Funding Source: 3. Fund (PRB Staff Only)	ing Data:				
Vested Assets Bank Ac	count Details: or				
	itle of Iraqi Receiving Disbursement:				
	p/Unit Responsible for Oversight:				
Iraqi Development Fund	ring Oversight Assigned to:				
Name of	Certifying Official:				
4. Clearances: Please indicate you have obta (Note: If that coordination cannot be done a Regional Coordinator: Yes No Name: Ministry Senior Advisor: Yes No Name Office Director/Unit Commander: Yes No Reconstruction/USAID: Yes No Name International Coordination Council: Yes No Others:	t the regional level, it will be done by PRC.) : Name: Name:				
Program	n Staff Use Only				
Date Request Received: mm/dd/yyyy	Form Complete: Yes No No				
Disposition:					
Date Request Submitted to Program Review Co Disposition:	ommittee: mm/dd/yyyy				
Date Request Submitted to Program Review Bo Disposition:	oard: mm/dd/yyyy				
Date Request Returned to Requester/Submitte Disposition (including expenditure authorized					

Form PRB-01 ver. 6/19/03

Description of Program or Goods To Be Purchased - Please See Above Instructions

Ministries and Military units have identified an immediate need for just over 35,000 AK weapons.

Contracting office will let open bid for 35,000 weapons at \$175 (\$6.125M) for delivery NLT 15 August to 3 COSCOM at Taji Airbase. The weapons will be distributed from there to units.

Request the following items from your list:

- Ammunition:
 - o 7.62 x 39mm ball 13,160,300
 - o 7.62 x 39mm tracer ~ 1,052,800
 - o 9mm x 19mm Hydra Shock 10,000
 - o 9mm x 19mm Ball 40,000
 - o Mortar Bomb, 120mm HE 5,328
 - o Mortar Bomb, 120mm Smoke 396
 - o Mortar Bomb, 120mm WP 1,000
 - o Mortar Bomb, 60mm HE 4,824
 - o Mortar Bomb, 60mm Illum, 660
 - o Mortar Bomb, 60mm WP 7,973
- Weapons and accessories:
 - o Machine Gun, RPK, 7.62x39mm 1,425
 - o Machine Gun Took Kit 3
 - o Magazine, AK-47 30 rd 26,100
 - o Magazine, AKSU 74 30 rd 6,440
 - o Magazine, RPK 40 rd 1,500
 - o Magazine, RPK 75 rd 67
 - o Mortar, 120mm 31
 - o Mortar, 120 barrel w/ access ~ 6
 - o Mortar, 60 mm 4-barrel assy w/ accessory 9
 - o Mortar, 60mm Commando 2
 - o Mortar tube, 60mm Commando 150
 - o Pistol, PPK 2
 - o Rifle, AK-47 13,272
 - o Rifle, AK-74 1,926
 - o Rifle, AKS-74U 936

Thanks!

CPA FUNDING REQUEST

PRB No: (PRB Staff to Assign)	Project Name: NIAWeapons				
Date of Request: 7/24/2003	Date Required: 7/31/2003				
Name of Requester: COL	Signature:				
CPA Office/Unit: NSD	POC/Person Completing Form: COL				
Amount of Request: 10,72	DSN/Cell Phone:				
Project Location: Kir Kush (Region)	Email Address:				
L					
1. Project Category (check all that apply):	_				
Reconstruction Health	Salaries				
Humanitarian Transportation	Pensions				
Food Distribution					
Water/Sewer Education Electricity Ministry	Other Public Services Social Programs				
Electricity Ministry Rule of Law/Govern. Police/ Security					
Div. Commanders Brig. Command					
Fund Fund	Fund				
Construction Initiative	1				
2. Proposed Funding Source: 3. Fund (PRB Staff Only)	ing Data:				
	count Details: or				
	itle of Iraqi Receiving Disbursement:				
; '' : :	p/Unit Responsible for Oversight:				
' '	ring Oversight Assigned to:				
Name of	Certifying Official:				
4. Clearances: Please indicate you have obt					
(Note: If that coordination cannot be done a Regional Coordinator: Yes No Name:	it the regional level, it will be done by FRC.)				
Ministry Senior Advisor: Yes No Name	بم				
	Name:				
Reconstruction/USAID: Yes No Name					
International Coordination Council: Yes No					
Others:					
Prograt	n Staff Use Only				
Date Request Received: mm/dd/yyyy	Form Complete: Yes No No				
Disposition:					
Date Request Submitted to Program Review Co	ommittee: mm/dd/yyyy				
Disposition:	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·				
Date Danier Cultural to Danier Davies D	-4 (4)				
Date Request Submitted to Program Review Bo Disposition:	эмс: шилатуууу				
Disposition,					
Date Request Returned to Requester/Submitte	d to Comptroller: mm/dd/yvvv				
Disposition (including expenditure authorized					

Form PRB-01 ver. 6/19/03

<u>Description of Program or Goods To Be Purchased - Please See Above Instructions</u>

39,000 new AK weapons are needed to equip the soliders of the New Iraqi Army.

(1,000 are needed by 1 August; 4, 000 by 1 Oct - and the remainder every training program over the next 2 years to a total of 39,000)

Jordan has offered to sell up to 65,000 new AKs for \$275 ea.

At that rate, the NIA requirement costs \$10.725M.

Recommend this money be advanced against the NSD budget for the New Iraqi Army.

128	PR8 Seminar 0930-1630
- 200	SECDEF report info due to Exec Sec by 1500
6 ant	
700	CJTF-7 Update
8.00	Senior Advisors Meeting (Amb Office)
900	
LO [®]	Gardner: Oil Security Board
L1 00	
L2 pm	
1 00	
200	
3 00	
-	Program Review Board (Ministries CR)
4 00	2 Program Nevers Court (Primatives Ch.)
5.00	
6 00	
700	
8 00	
9 00	

Sunday

6 and
7 00 C CITF-7 Update
8 00 C Senior Advisors Meeting (Amb Office)
9 00
10 00
11 00
12 pm C Weekly C2 Fusion Meeting (Window Incl travel time - runs 12-2) (Victory Hain)
1 00
2 00
3 00
4 00
5 00
Dinner Iho Amb Sawers (RSVP by COB to either a company of the company

Slocombe, Walt B. (SES)

7/24/2003 6:39 AM

· Do we pita for donation | 5 woder Quis pro que?

clote cycles ?

```
> can to facilitate.
> Thanks.
> MAJ, USAR
> NOTE: The DATT/MAP Chief has infold OSD and CENTCOM on current
                                                             - to de what?
> status of these discussions and asked for their assistance.
> ---- Original Message ----
> From: LTC
> Date: Tuesday, July 22, 2003 7:44 pm
> Subject: RE: RE: RE: Support from Jordanian Military
> > COT
> > See the attached for an update on weapons. More soon. Let me
> > know if you
> > have questions.
> >
>
 >
    VR,
>
 >-
> > LTC
> > Deputy Chief, Military Assistance Program (MAP-Jordan)
> > Mobil
> > SIPR:
> >
> > -----Original Message-- --
                        (0-6 Ministry of Defense)
>
    From:
>
 > Sent: Saturday, July 12, 2003 10:44 PM
>
> > To:
                                                        CIV
> > Cc: LTC
> Ministry of
  > Defense; Slocombe, Walt B. (SES);
> >
> Subject: RE: RE: RE: Support from Jordanian Military
>
         and
>
           Very important that nothing goes back to DAO Amman until Mr
>
>
    Slocombe has cleared it with AMB Bremer.
           - please see me or call me
                                               if you need
>
>
  > to meet
  >
    or clarify guidance.
>
                   Thanks!
>
>
  > -- - Original Message----
  > From: Lt Col
> > Sent: Saturday, July 12, 2003 6:23 PM
> > To:
                        (0-6 Ministry of Defense); LTC
    Cc:
>
                              CIV Ministry of Defense;
Slocombe,
>
  > Walt B
    (SES): - LTC;
  > Subject: RE: RE: RE: Support from Jordanian Military
           Sounds like a plan, thanks
```

```
> > DATT
> >
> > ----Original Message----
 > From:
> > Sent: Thursday, July 10, 2003 1:19 PM
> > To:
                          (0-6 Ministry of Defense); LTC
  > Cc:
>
                                    CIV Ministry of Defense;
>
>
  Slocombe,
> > Walt B
                        - LTC:
> > (SES);
> > Subject: Re: RE: RE: Support from Jordanian Military
> >
> >
> > Sir,
> >
> As discussed today. We met both yesterday and today with the
> Ministry> of
> > Defense and Interior teams. We have a good laundry list of
> > requirements from both that we will pull together and review with
> > COL
             on
> > Saturday.
> >
> > I'll put something out from there for you to float with the
  > Jordanians.
> > If they are in agreement, we can begin to finalize details of
> > logistics, costs, etc.
> >
> > Thanks.
> >
> > MAJ, USAR
> >
> > ---- Original Message -----
> > From: Lt Col
> > Date: Tuesday, July 8, 2003 6:48 pm
> > Subject: RE: RE: Support from Jordanian Military
> > Thanks, sir - I hoped to get there but so much going on here we > > > or I) were not able to get away this week. Was
  >
  > able to
>
> > dlscuss way ahead in a face-to face with you today? I am standing
> > by to help coordinate JO support for the effort.
    > Vr
>
  -
  >
> > |
> > > ----Original Message----
                               <u>ko-6</u> Ministry of Defense)
> > >,
> > >
    > Sent: Sunday, July 06, 2003 10:18 PM
>
  >
  > > To:
>
                                                               CIV
> > > Co: T/TC
> > Ministry of
> > Defense; Slocombe, Walt B. (SES);
    > Subject: RE: RE: Support from Jordanian Military
>
  > >
> >
> >
> >
             Sorry we missed comms today - let's talk tomorrow.
> >
> > >
             Very much agree with your desire to discuss way ahead.
> > >
             Thanks!
> > >
> > >
```

```
> > >
                            COL
> > >
> > > ----Original Message----
> > > From: Lt Col
> > Sent: Sunday, July 06, 2003 6:24 PM
                           (0-6 Ministry of Defense);
> > >
> > > Cc: LTC
 > Ministry of
> > Defense; Slocombe, Walt B. (SES);
> > Subject: RE: RE: Support from Jordanian Military
> > Col |
                  thanks for the invite. We hope to help bridge the
> > Jordanian offer of help made in Washington this May with firm
 > > commitments. I will
> > discuss this issue and visit proposal it with the Ambassador
> > > tomorrow to
> > see
> > if he'll let me (or Lt Col travel. Looking for a detailed
 > > listof
> > requirements from your end (training/equipment/etc) that JO just
> > > may be
> > > able
>>> to help fill.
 > > <u>vr</u>
 > >
> > >
                     Lt Col, USAF
> > Acting Defense Attache
> > > Air Attache & Chief, AF Assistance Pgm
> > USDAO/MAP Amman
 > > mail:
            US Embassy Amman Jordan USDAO
              APO AE 09892
>
> > > phone:
> > >
> > >
> > ----Original Message----
                             (O-6 Ministry of Defense)
> > > <u>From:</u>
> > Sent: Sunday, July 06, 2003 3:26 AM
> > > To: "
 > > <u>Cc: L</u>TC
                            Lt Col
 > > CIV Ministry of Defense; Slocombe, Walt B. (SES)
 > > Subject: RE: RE: Support from Jordanian Military
> > >
 >
  >
 >
            Great!
            My cellphone is (US number) -
 > >
            What's yours?
            Would definitely like to work with you and on
> > Wednesday -
 > > have put placeholder on calendar from 1530-1630...but can
> adjust if
> > > morning makes more sense.
> > >
                           looking forward to this...
> > >
            Thanks,
> > >
```

> > >

> > > ~----Original Message----

```
> > > From:
> > Sent: Saturday, July 05, 2003 10:31 PM
> > To: ______(O-6 Ministry of Defense)
> > Cc: LTC ______ Lt Col
> > > _____ CIV Ministry of Defense; Slocombe, Walt B. (SES)
> > Subject: Re: RE: Support from Jordanian Military
> > > Sir.
> > 3
> > I'll give you a call tomorrow to discuss. I'm curious as to
> > what the
> > issues on this end were/are that are holding this up. I'm not
> > aware of any requests for support that have come through the
> > > Embassy here.
> > Let us know what you need and we can help.
> > >
> > LTC is considering making a trip to CPA this week
> > > (Wednesday) if
> > there is a need to discuss this and other opportunities for
> > Jordanian * support of your efforts. I think it makes a lot of
> > sense as there
> > > is a
> > ton we can provide through the network of support the MAP/DAO team
> > havedeveloped here. Please let us know if you would like to meet
> > LTC on Wednesday so we can arrange.
> > >
> > I will be at CPA on Wednesday as I am coming to work on some other
> > > issues so I will stop by then.
> > >
 >
   > Thanks,
> > >
   >
> >
> >
> > >
> > > ---- Original Message -----> > > From: (0-6 Ministry of Defense)
> > >
> > Date: Saturday, July 5, 2003 5:45 pm
> > Subject: RE: Support from Jordanian Military
> > > >
> > > >
            I'm Walt's MA and will work details from this
> > end...working to
 > > > get more info soon.
> > > >
> > > >
            Thanks!
> > > >
> > >
> > > > -----Original Message-----
> > > > From: Slocombe, Walt B. (SES)
> > > Sent: Saturday, July 05, 2003 6:16 PM
> > > > To:
> > > Cc: LTC
                             Lt Col
                 TIV Ministry of Defense;
> Ministry of
> > > Defense)Subject: RE: Support from Jordanian Military
> > > >
>>> Thanks for the reminded. I am trying to organize a trip to
> > > Amman to
> > > diacuss these issues, but there are scheduling problems (at that
> > > end).> Walt
> > > >
> > > > -----Original Message----
```

```
> > > From:
> > > Sent: Friday, July 04, 2003 5:07 PM
> > > To: Slocombe, Walt B. (SES)
> > > Cc: LTC Lt Col
 > > Cc: LTC Lt Col Lt Col > > JamesCIV Ministry of Defense
> > > Subject: Support from Jordanian Military
> > > > Walt,
 >> > We have met on a couple of occasions during my visits to OCPA.
> > > Usually, the discussion was about sourcing the material for the
> > > uniforms.
> > > During my last visit, I spoke briefly with MG Eaton about the
> > > potentialfor having trainers from Jordan involved with the NIC.
 >>> He indicated an interest in a contribution, but requested that
> > > the Jordanians
> > propose> something rather than we officially requesting a
> > > contribution.>
> > > We have worked on this a bit from our end and it looks as though
> > this> would be well received by the Jordanians. In fact, it
> > > appears there
> > > were commitments made by senior Jordanian military officials at
> > > the Dep. Secy Defense level offering to support your efforts.
> > > >
> > > Unfortunately, the critical follow up was not accomplished
> and the
> > > Jordanians are awaiting some sort of list of what the needs of
> > > MoD are
> > > > for trainers.
> > > I am cc'ing LTC (acting Defense Attache) here at US
> > Embassy> Amman so that he can carry these discussions forward with
> > you or MQ
> > > > Eaton.
                   would like to come down to OCPA this week if
> > possible to
> > > > discuss this.
> > > >
> > > Could you let us know if there are still needs from OCPA MoD and
> > when> may be a good time for LTC to visit?
> > > >
> > > Thanks
> > > >
> > >
> > >
> >
```

SIR, POSSIBLE US) PIECCE ON WPNS (O-6 MoNSD) (b)(B) From: Monday, July 21, 2003 1:50 PM Sent: To: Braun Michael A. (SES-5); (O-6 MoNSD); Kennedy, Patrick AMB; Cc: WILL FOLLOW Subject: FW: WSJ guery that requires response on Monday UP TOU AY. You may want to look at this e-mail which highlights an interview by the WSJ and a Co in the north. I'm not sure what weapons cache they're referring to in Baghdad spoke to a CPA, but I can give you the following update on issues. who he spoke to a CPA, but I can give you the following update on We received a note this morning from that our budget through December has been approved, addressing police uniforms and equipment, weapons and ammunition, vehicles and equipment, public order equipment, forensic equipment for the approximately 30,000 police officers that are on board already and some training facility needs. As for radios and communications, there is an assessment and proposal that will work on a nationwide system that will be interoperable for all MOI agencies. This is for the long term, but for the short, perhaps Col. can do what Baghdad and many other cities have done and that is to acquire small portable point to points to address present necessities. I'll keep you updated. MIKE BRAUN: According to the police advisory team, recalls a Col. Can you please see who he spoke with regards to his quotes. ----Original Message-----From: Sent: Monday, July 21, 2003 2:59 AM
To: (DHG); Braun Michael A. (SES-5) Subject: Fw: WSJ query that requires response on Monday Michael, We need to respond to this by tonight. Grateful for guidance. Coalition Provisionary Authority Iraq ---- Forwarded by /CIC on 21/07/2003 11:55 -----

21/07/2003 10:33

To

O

. Subject

WSJ query that requires response on Monday

In a visit to Mosul I was told to top commanders of the 2nd brigade of the 101st Airborne of the numerous problems they have had obtaining weapons and radios for the Iraqi police and fixed-site security forces they are building there. Some 2,000 policemen are sharing just 10 Motorola radios, Col. told me. Efforts to obtain more radios through the coalition administration in Baghdad have fallen on deaf ears, he said.

Also, the second brigade says it has tried fruitlessly to obtain weapons from caches in Baghdad. When a request was made to the coalition administration, the answer that came back was "you guys solve that problem up north," Col. said. Under the current system troops give weapons seized in raids to the cops, but those weapons oftentimes are old or don't function properly.

According to the second brigade, bureaucracy continues to stifle efforts to bring law and order. Pots of money are strictly designated. For example, the l01st has purchased police uniforms and boots, refurbished a police academy, re-built a prison and are rebuilding police stations -- all using mostly seized Iraqi monies designated for community development. Funds were even authorized to make police batons. But guns, radios and police vehicles don't fall under "projects to help the people," Col.

Perhaps you can respond to these quite serious claims by the military in Mosul. Are more efforts being made to obtain weapons and radios for the police? What is the timetable to do so?

I will need a response today (Monday, 7/21) by 9 p.m. Baghdad time, as this is for a story scheduled to run in Tuesday's Wall Street Journal.

Thanks and best, Alexei

Alexei Barrionuevo Staff Reporter The Wall Street Journal Alexei.barrionuevo@wsj.com

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From min

COL

A meeting was held today at GHO with COL. Dir. Planning and ...

Organization) to hammer out the terms of sale/ transfer. There are several options that came up during the meeting, we need CPA direction ASAP...GHQ would like us to provide them with a written request.

OPTION

85,000 x AK47s at \$275 each = \$17,875,000

Shipping (estimate) \$300,000

OPTION 2

69.000 AK47s at \$275 each = \$17,875,000

30,000 x AK47s (additional), IF USG agrees to replace with M16A1/2s (in the future); JAF uses this 30,000 as "reserve" weapons but would prefer to have M16s

Shipping

There is a third option working in which the USG can purchase \$50,000,000 of Uniform material, and get the weapons free...that needs additional discussion at higher tevels. I spoke with the Vice Chairman this evening and he said whatever the option we choose, he will make it work...he wants a "win-win."

The discussion will continue at 0830 hours tomorrow with MG Kalid Jamoka, ACOS Planning and Defense Resources. Please provide guidance and we'll continue to work it.

VR.

5172.

(O-6 MoNSD)

Mai

From: Sent: To:

Subject:

Tuesday, July 22, 2003 8:26 PM

RESEND

Cc:

Again sent SIPR I'd add that you might want to send an assessment team to see the vehicles.

(O-6 MoNSD)

Sir Our former JTF-West C-4 Maj and I ran all the JTF military convoys out of Jordan. Major is still here finishing up the JTF base redeployment. I had him and I ran all the JTF military convoys out of go today look at the AK-47 cargo and recon the loading area to calculate linehaul requirements. Appears we could probably pick up on the first day they are available, which may be Tuesday the 29th, load out and depart for the border on the 31st with escort needed from Trebil to destination on the morning of the 1st. We can work the linehaul details from here, as we do this from here on a regular basis, vs CJTF-7 having to reinvent the wheel. However, we may need some assistance in securing a more robust security escort than usual, especially east of the hwy 1/12 split.

On another note, I also went to the vehicle storage/rehab base and looked at vehicles. Although they don't have any available for use now in storage, but they have a rehab program which would allow them to take vehicles out of current service and replace them with rehabbed units. I believe the quantities of US made equipment available in within a couple weeks are:

Apporx 55 duece-and-a-halfs and 55 five ton units. We probably could get these within 2-3 weeks (time to clean, repaint and service).

There were also 240 jeep M151A (open top) units, but all needed full rehab and none are serviceable. They indicated that they would be willing to do a full rehab for you it requested but it would be several months for the first unit and I think >\$ based on dilapidated condition,

Available immediately are 19 Jeep liberties less than a year old. They were too small for the intended us here.

Also a vehicle from our Spanish allies, the Spartan APC (6 man tracked APC). There are 80 units available now and they are supposedly nearly new. They are mogas powered and were intended to be reengined with diesel but they have not been able to afford it.


They have US Tank transporters, M-60 tanks, recovery vehicles and other misc vehicles available. They have no cranes or wreckers.

They would really need a breakdown of your requirements as they have not been very imaginative about what they could provide. V/R

US Embassy Amman/MAP HACC-West

SIPRNET Mobile Iridium

Will sort that out in the AM - just covering emails after long trip.



Question: If the country that is offering weapons for sale come through, are you set to "buy" them? I have seen some emails that indicate there are some people that believe they are being donated, and we know that is not the case. Just want to make sure that we are all on the same sheet of music to execute as soon as the agreements are struck.

TO: L. Paul Bremer

FROM:

Walt Slocombe

RE:

DATE:

23 July 2003

THECE

Attached for your approval is a policy paper regarding the priorities for the issuance of weapons to entities of the CPA and units of CJTF 7.

The first step in providing a safe and secure environment in which the government and economy of a new Iraq can develop involves emplacing a properly equipped security structure, including police, Facility Protection Guards, the Iraq Civil Defense Corps, and other organizations. To date, none of these organizations has sufficient weapons to arm its personnel. As weapons become available, a policy decision is required to ensure that they are issued to those organizations that need them the most.

This policy was crafted by a "Weapons and Facility Protective Service Prioritization Board" chartered by AMB Kennedy on 15 July. The Board is co-chaired by the Senior Advisors for the Ministry of Interior and for National Security and Defense. Its members include the CPA Operations Office, the CPA Requirements Coordination Office, and CJTF 7. It was vetted and endorsed by representatives of ministries, Baghdad Central, and CJTF 7 at a detailed briefing on Saturday, 19 July.

We request that you communicate the urgency both of ensuring disciplined adherence to these priorities as well as expeditious yet thorough accountability of weapons as they become available

The paper has been cleared by the individuals below. They did, however, raise the following concerns:

Please sign the attached paper if you approve of the policy as it is presented. _____ Approve _____ Disapprove _____ Approve with Modification

Cleared:

Sent to:

COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY

Policy Paper

Apportionment of Weapons for Security and Military Purposes 23 July 2003

The overriding challenge to establishing a functioning Iraqi government and economy, is the establishment of a commonly recognized and respected security infrastructure. The first step in achieving this infrastructure is an adequate and appropriate apportionment of the weapons necessary for security forces of all kinds.

The police, ministries, military units, governates, the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps, and the New Iraq Army have all identified a critical need for weapons. In total, this requirement exceeds 65,000 weapons. Efforts are underway to obtain weapons from a variety of sources to meet this requirement. The immediate challenge, then, is to logically apportion these weapons.

The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) has decided that weapons for security forces will be apportioned in accordance with the following procedures.

- 1. CPA entities, including Ministries, Governates, and Municipalities, have submitted weapons requirements (rifles and pistols) to the Requirements Coordination Office (RCO) as of 20 July. The RCO will consolidate these requests by geographic area (coinciding with CJTF 7 MSC Areas of Responsibility (AOR)) and submit them NLT 1 August to CJTF 7 C3.
- CJTF 7 C3 will integrate these requirements with those submitted by its MSCs. The result will be a matrix of weapons requirements by type, by unit, for the command.
- 3. Weapons and ancillaries are being acquired from a variety of sources. As they become available, they will be consolidated and inventoried by CJTF 7 C4.
- 4. As soon as accountability is assured, weapons will be issued in accordance with the following priority. (Unless otherwise noted, unit of issue is one weapon with one magazine):
 - a. Weapons present in depot stocks at the date of this policy will be issued immediately to 1AD for issuance to the Baghdad Police.
 - b. The first 1000 available new AK-type rifles, with 4 magazines each, will be issued to the Coalition Military Advisory Training Team (CMATT) for use by the initial battalion of the New Iraqi Army.

 BACHDAM, SUNNI D, SHARM, BASM, NEATH, WEST
 - c. In lots of 1000, weapons will be issued to the following units in order: 1AD, 4ID, 3ID, 1MARDIV, 1UK DIV, 101

 AASLT. 3ACR. The order of issue will be repeated until each unit has received its full requirement or 5000 weapons, whichever comes first. (Units are responsible

for issuing, with proper accountability, weapons to Governing Council Protective Service Details, police, government FPS guards, Border Guards, and ICDC units, in that order, within their geographic areas of responsibility.)

- d. Once this scale of weapons is issued, CJTF 7 C3 will review additional requirements and apportion additional weapons to MSCs as required.
- e. Weapons remaining at the end of this process will be issued to the CMATT for use by subsequent units of the New Iraqi Army.

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY


REPORTING UNIT	AK-47	MAGAZINES	7.62 AMMO	9MM	MAGAZINES	9MM AMMO
1AD	8758	17516	525480	3000	6000	90000
3ACR	2314	9874	294420	3406	10372	155580
101AA	1300	2600	78000			
4ID	7,607	15214	456420	16,982	33964	509460
3ID	2500	5000	75000	3000	6000	90000
IMEF	9000	18000	540000	3000	6000	90000
UK Div	6000	12000	360000	3000	6000	90000
Total	28721	62688	1803840	29388	62336	935040

WEAPONS REQUIREMENTS

MINISTRIES (POC)	AK-47's Required	Recommended	9MM's Required	Recommended
Agriculture	52	建设的 基础的	14	新展門面積
Atomic Energy	300		10	
Culture "	49		48	
Education	500		0	
Electricity	1,300	The same of the same	200	
Finance & Central Bank	425		75	
Foreign Affairs	20		20	
Health	250		50	
Higher Education	574		383	
Housing & Construction	800		200	
Industry & Minerals	940	(1) (1) (1) (1)	600	N. E. W. E. S. V.
Interior	73		510	
Irrigation (729	第二人	0	8年夏11年5日
Justice	1,000		50	
Prisons	500		* 50	A TONE OF THE PARTY OF
Labor & Social Affairs	7		21	
National Standards	- 10		2	OF THE PROPERTY OF THE PARTY OF
Oil	5,600		0	
Planning	10	18 18 18 18 NO. 18 18	5	
Public Works	2,300		200	
Religious Affiars	350		10 500	
Security & Defense	0		0	
Trade "	2,700	The state of the s	300	P. St. Physics
Transportation & Communication	1,146		0	
	165		元 第10 点类	则是不要的
	935		0	
	46	10000000000000000000000000000000000000	0.00	y W Caracal Parts
Youth and Sports	50		50	
SUB-TOTALS	19,685	0	2,788	0
OTHER REQUIREMENTS	AK-47's Required	Recommended	9MM's Required	Recommended
Iraqi Police Force (LTC	400		7,500	
Singapore Training	40		12	
Iraql Civil Defense Force	7,500	SECTION AND ASSESSED.	500	Please and the second
New Iraqi Army (COL	39,000		1,000	
Baghdad Central (LTC)	435		150	The state of the s
TOTALS	66,625	0	11,800	0

Note 1: For all but NIA and ICDF, need one magazine per weapon; for NIA and ICDF need __ magazines per weapon.

Note 2: For all but NIA and ICDF, need 25 rounds of ammunition per AK, 10 rounds per 9MM; for others need __ rounds per weapon.















Armskr.JPG (352 KB)

Arms0001.JPG (715 KB) Arm\$0002.3PG (738 KB) Arms0003.JPG (712 KB) Arms0004.JPG (788 KB) Arm\$0005.JPG (495 KB) Arms0006.JPG (202

Sir,

(E-mail)

Attached is the list that was passed to the DAO at the Embassy in Amman recently. Open with Windows Imaging or to read them clearly. Closer examination shows like they actually have 98,663 new AK-47s (see last page), and 5800 Mls. Apparently they also have a number of used AKs as well that aren't listed here, but based on the number of new AKs available and needed, that doesn't seem relevant now, so we aren't inquiring further on used AKs.

As for pistols, it appears there may not be quanities of any one type that meet your needs except the Mark 5 Lighting Pistol, which we have no idea what type or caliber it is. You may also want to have someone check with the CMOC in Najaf. I recall when we visited them 2 weeks ago they had taken in a large quanity of Iraqi 9mm pistols that looked new.

Let me know if you need any additional info on anything on the list and we will inquire. We can put eyes-on any of these items, such as the Mark 5 pistols if needed as well.

V/R

```
From: (0-6 Ministry of Defense)

Sent: Tuesday, July 15, 2003 9:50 AM

To: (E-mail)

Cc: LTC: (E-mail); (E-mail); (E-mail);

Subject: RE: Weapons Available From Jordan
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Gentlemen,

Excellent news - well done!

We are adjusting letter now and will await Derek's next transmission before finalizing for review by Mssrs. Slocombe and Kerik.

Thanks!!!

COL

----Original Message----From: Maj

Sent: Tuesday, July 15, 2003 10:47 AM

To: (E-mail)

Cc: (0-6 Ministry of Defense);

mail); (E-mail); (E-mail)

Subject: Weapons Available From Jordan

Currently it doesn't appear that the Jordanians have yet had enough of the M16A1s replaced

and taken out of service to meet CPA needs, except maybe for use by the Border police. However, Jordan has 40,000 brand new unused AK-47s, Czech made, still in the box, with wood stock, magazines and cleaning kits etc. Major at MAP has seen these at the Zarka armory and the Jordanians have said they are available ASAP. He said we can go look at these to get more info if needed The total AKs available including used but serviceable is up to 100K rifles. Those additional 60K AKs may not all be the same model and are used.

Also that initial offer of 2000 M16A1s was made was apparently also made by Prince Faisal in Washington to OSD as well as to CENTCOM.

While not optimal, the AKs would meet COL basic requirements for time and quantity. They would probably want to donate them vs sell as they would then get a greater return via their own FMS needs from the US. Larger quantities of M16Als would be down the road as they replace them with A2s.

I am scanning a recent list of other weapons besides the AKs they have offered (see its cover letter) including 3000 M14 rifles, 300 M1 training rifles, assorted pistols and light machine guns that are in their current inventory. A shopping list of current inventory so to speak. I'll get that to you within the hour.

ŲS	Embassy	Amman/MAP	HACC-West	
SIF	RNET			
Mob	oile 📒 💮			
Iri	dium			

GHO of Jordan's Armed Forces Directorate of Planning and Organization

No.: TM5/20/JAF Excess Equ./29

Date: 13 April 2003

Colone Chief, MAP and Defense Attaché Embassy of the United States of America Amman - Jordan

- I would like to extend my complements and thanks to you for your constant efforts to further strengthen the cooperation between our Armed Forces and to enclose herewith a list of JAF's excess weapons from different origins (small arms.) machine guns, cannons, and artilleries).
- Since the storage of these weapons has become costly in 2. terms of money and effort, JAF intend to sell or trade these weapons provided that an end-user certificate be provided by the buyer. Therefore, we seek your assistance with the US concerned authorities to obtain their approval to transfer the USorigin weapons to a third party and help to find customers for both U.S. and other origins.
- 3. While highly appreciating your constant cooperation, I assure you of my highest regards and best wishes.

Brigadier General Director of Planning and Organization

Moh'd Taisir Massadeh

Small Arms , Machineguns , Cannons , and Artifleries out of service available as stocks at RMC Main Stores

	1.5	and the second s		QTY		Date in G		10 Page 10
100	PART NO	PARTNAME	servicable	Unserviceable	letel .	service		Modes
1	2237	PISTOL #7	-	2	2	N/A	U.S.S.R	
2	2257	LAMA 7.85 PISTOL	-	5	5	N/A	N/A	
3	2257A	LAMA PISTOL #7	-	12	12	N/A	N/A	
.4	2259	TOUTOU PISTOL (MORRESE)		7	7	N/A	N/A	
5	2268	9 MM STAR PISTOL	32	5	37	N/A	N/A	
6	2275	WIPPLY PISTOL #4		3	3	N/A	NA	
7	2286A	STAR PISTOL #9 "SHORT NOSE"	-	8	8	N/A	, N/A	
9	22888	STAR PISTOL #9 "SHORT NOSE"		9	9	NA	N/A	
9	2257	9 MM PRAWING PISTOL	6	5	11	N/A	BELGIUM	
10	2295	8 38 PRABLLO PISTOL		17	17	N/A	N/A	
11	2298	MARK 2 WIPLLY PISTOL		2	2	N/A	N/A	
12	2301	LAMA PISTOL #9 "SHORT NOSE"	17	18	35	N/A	N/A	
[13]	2307	PRATA PISTOL		4	4	N/A	ITALY	
14	23078	9 MM PRATA PISTOL	-	25	25	N/A	ITALY	
15	2313	9MM ASTRA PISTOL		1.	1	NVA	N/A	
16	2317A	AUTOMATIC PISTOL #7		6	8	N/A	N/A	
17	2318	9MM STYER PISTOL		1	. 1	N/A	SPAIN	
18	2319A	9 MM PISTOL		1	1	NA	EGYPT	
19	2321	MORRESE PISTOL	-	1	1	N/A _	ITALY	
20	2324	PARTA PISTOL		بسنين تناقلها	.1	N/A	ITALY	
21	2306	SPAIN PISTOL		-	1	N/A	SPAIN	
22	2305	WIPLLY 38 PISTOL	1		1	N/A	N/A	
23	2296	WIPLLY 38 PISTOL	1	-	1	N/A	N/A	-
24	2230A	GERMAN PISTOL	4		1	N/A	GERMANY	
25	2230	PISTOL 38		1	1	N/A	N/A	
26	2328	STAR PISTOL	1	-	1	N/A	SPAIN	
27		FAST TYPE PISTOL	1		1	N/A	NA	
28		9 MW LAMA PISTOL		10	10	N/A	N/A	
29		9 MM WILTER PIŞTOL		7	7	N/A	N/A	
30		7MM PROWNING PISTOL		4	4	N/A	N/A	
31		7 MM PRATA PISTOL	2	10	12	NA	ITALY	
32		SMITH PISTOL	3	2	5	N/A	U.S.A	
33		MARK 5 LIGHTING PISTOL	1219	102	1321	1950	N/A	
34		MARK 3 LIGHTING PISTOL	5	4	9	N/A	N/A	
36		LAMA PISTOL #9	6	18	22	NA	N/A	
38		8.35 PISTOL	12	1	13	N/A	ITALY	
37		PISTOL #9	- ;	1	1	N/A	NA	
36		9 MM PARTA PISTOL	-	2	2	N/A	ITALY	
39	2362	PISTOL #6		2	2	N/A	N/A	
40		9 MM SMITH PISTOL	-	5	5	N/A	UŞA	
41		7 MM CARECALL PISTOL	-	1	1	N/A	N/A	
42		7.85 PISTOL			1	N/A	CHINA	
43		22 MM TOUTOU PISTOL (MORRESE)	-	i	1 1	N/A	N/A	
44		M 4 WIPPLY 38 PISTOL		- i	1	NA	N/A	
45		7.65 PARTA PISTOL		1	1	N/A	ITALY	
45		PISTOL #7		6	-6	N/A	N/A	
47	THE RESERVE AND ADDRESS OF THE PARTY OF THE	7.65 PRISA PISTOL	12	13	25	NVA	N/A	
48		MILL PISTOL	-:-	1	1	N/A	N/A	
49		STYER #9 PISTOL		3	3	N/A	AUSTRIA	
50		OLD STANIAN PISTOL	-	7	7	N/A	N/A	
51		7 MM PRABLOW PISTOL		1	1	N/A	N/A	
52		9 MM DIFFERENT TYPE PISTOLS			2	N/A	N/A	
53		12 MM A PISTOL	_ 		1	N/A	N/A	
54		36 P SWM PISTOL		2	2	N/A	N/A	-
55		7.65 MAPE PISTOL		1	1	N/A	SPAIN	· .
56		SPAIN PISTOL			1	N/A	SPAIN	
57		9 MM 9 PA PISTOL			1	N/A	N/A	
58		WATER PISTOL		;- -	1	N/A	N/A	
59		ENGLISHIPISTOL		- i - 	1	N/A	ENGLAND	
60		7 MM MAPE PISTOL		2	2	N/A	FRANCE	
61		7 MM ARMESE PISTOL		12	12	N/A	FRANCE	
62		7 MM PISTOL		25	25	N/A	NA	
63		9 MM PISTOL	$\overline{}$	5	5	N/A	N/A	
		9 MM PISTOL	:-	3	2	N/A	HUNGRIA	
66 68		9 MM ESTRA PISTOL			1	N/A	N/A	
		7.65 PISTOL	:	2	2	N/A	N/A	
86			$\overline{}$	3	- 5	N/A	BELGIUM	
67	2787	7.65 PISTOL		<u> </u>		CKW	OCCORDING	

Small Arms , Machineguns , Cunnons , and Artifleries out of service available as stocks at RMC Main Stores

LH	PART NO	PARTMAME	servicable	Ungerviosable		Date in	Main Supply Source	Modes
68	2789	9 MM PROWNING PISTOL	7	Distance	8	N/A	GERMANY	
69	2830	LIGHTINING PISTOL		1	1	N/A	CHINA	
70	2830A	LIGHTINING PISTOL		1	1	NA	CHINA	
71	2721	9 MM FB PISTOL	1		1	N/A	N/A	
72	2723	7.65 PISTOL	1		1	N/A	GERMANY	
73	2855	STARLINGE PISTOL	1		1	N/A	N/A	
74	2834	MAPE PISTOL		6	7	N/A	FRANCE	
75	3835	9 MM STAR PISTOL	1	10	11	N/A	NA	
78	3837	TARIQ PISTOL	2	29	31	N/A	IRAQ	
77	3638	9 MM PARTA PISTOL	1	2	3	N/A	ITALY	
78	3839	7.5 MM PISTOL	1 1	2	3	N/A	N/A	
79	3857	9MM PISTOL		12	12	N/A	U.S.A	
80	3857A	9 MM PISTOL		1	1	N/A	U.S.A	
81	3858	8MM NAPLION PISTOL		3	3	NIA	FRANCE	
82	3659	MAPE PISTOL		3	3	N/A	FRANCE	
83		TARIQ PISTOL		2	2	N/A	IRAQ	
84	3861	CHILDREN PISTOL	-	1	1	NA	ITALY	
85	3861	SMM WILTER PIOSOL		1	1	N/A	GERMANY	
88	3863	BMM PARTA PISTOL		1	1	N/A	ITALY	
88	3864	MM RECK PISTOL	-	2	2	NA	N/A	
89	3864A 3865	7.65 RECK PISTOL 7.65 ASTER PISTOL	-		1	N/A N/A	N/A	
90	3966	SMM PARTA PISTOL		4	11		NA	
91		BAND PARTA PISTOL	-	11	2	N/A	ITALY	
92	3068	7.65 STAR PISTOL		2	2	N/A	SPAIN	
93	3869	7.65 PARTA PISTOL		4	4	N/A	ITALY	
94		7.65 PARTA PISTOL		1		N/A	ITALY	
95	_	VT 7 PARTA PISTOL		1	1	NA	ITALY	
98	3871	4000 ASTER PISTOL	-	1	1	N/A	NA	
97	3872	SAM ARMESE PISTOL	-	1	1	N/A	N/A	
98	3873	45MM PISTOL		2	2	N/A	SPAIN	
99	3874	STAR PISTOL	-	1	1	N/A	SPAIN	
100	3875	PRABBELLO PISTOL		7	7	N/A	N/A	
101		SMALL PISTOL		3	3	N/A	ITALY	
102	3877	BMM PRABELLO PISTOL		2	2	N/A	GERMANY	
103		22MM PISTOL	-	1	1	N/A	U.S.A	
104	3886	BMM PISTOL		2	2	N/A	GERMANY	
105	3887	9MM PARTA PISTOL	-	1	1	N/A	ITALY	
106	3686	9MM STAR PISTOL		4	4	N/A	N/A	
108	3891	DIFFERENT PISTOLS		2	2	N/A	N/A	
100	3886A	8.5MM EASTERN PISTOL		2	2	NA	N/A	
110	3907	9MM STAR PISTOL		4	4	N/A	SPAIN	
111	3908	9MM PISTOL		D	9	N/A	SPAIN	
112	3909	9MM PARTA PISTOL		1	1	N/A	N/A	
113	3910	SPECIAL MILL PISTOL	-		1	N/A	EGYBT	
114		22MM ASTRA PISTOL			1	N/A	N/A	
115		9MM BA PISTOL		1	1	NVA	NIA	
118	3913A	38 MILL PISTOL		2	2	N/A	N/A	
117		SMM PISTOL (LONG NOSE)	-	1	1	N/A	SPAIN	
118		9MM PARTA PISTOL		1	3	N/A	ITALY	
119		SMM MILL PISTOL	-	1	1	N/A	N/A	
120		45MM WIPLLY PISTOL		2	2	N/A	N/A	
121		N/A PISTOL		7	7	N/A	N/A	
22		DIFFERENT MAUZER PISTOL		2	2	N/A	N/A	
23		38MM LAMA PISTOL		5	5	N/A	N/A	
24		7.65 PISTOL		2	2	N/A	N/A	
25		74 MODEL PISTOL	8		8	N/A	N/A	
26		NA TYPE PISTOL		1	1	NIA	N/A	
27		PISTOLIS		1199	1199	N/A	N/A	
26		MM STAR PISTOL	-	2	2	N/A	N/A	
29		7.65 FAZORE PISTOL	64	70	134	N/A	N/A	
30		22MM PARTA PISTOL	14	4	18	N/A	ITALY	
31		22 MM PARTA PISTOL	-	3	3	N/A	ITALY	
32		AMA PISTOL	1		2	N/A	SPAIN	
33		ZZMM STAR PISTOL	-	1	1	N/A	SPAIN	
34		SMITH 38 PISTOL	2	1	3	N/A	U.S.A	
35		MM PARTA PISTOL	-	10	10	N/A	ITALY	
36		22MM STAR PISTOL		-	1	N/A	SPAIN	
37		MAP PISTOL AMERICAN PISTOL	8	-	1	N/A N/A	FRANCE	
36								

Small Arms , Machineguns , Cannons , and Artilleries out of service available as stocks at RMC Main Stores

SA	PART NO	PART NAME	H	QTY		Date in	Main Supply	States
		46.	-	Linserviceable	total	service	Source	
140	3836A	9MM PISTOL	1	•	1	N/A	GERMANY	
141	3841	9MM PISTOL	1	-	1	N/A	ITALY	
142	3850	GERMAN PISTOL	3	•	3	N/A	GERMANY	
144	3833	MAP PISTOL	3	•	3	N/A	HUNGARIA	
145	3862	0.26 PISTOL	4	-	4	N/A	FRANCE	
146	3854	8MM PISTOL	1	-	1	N/A N/A	U.S.A GERMANY	
147	3842	9MM PARTA PISTOL	1	•		N/A		
148	3843	7.65 PISTOL	+	-	1	N/A	ITALY	
149	3844	7.65 PARTA PISTOL	1	•	1	NVA	ITALY	
150	3854	6.35 MM PISTOL	38		38	NVA	N/A	
151	3846	6.35 MM PISTOL	44		44	NA	GERMANY	
152	3847	6.35 MM PISTOL	1	-	1	N/A	GERMANY	
153	3848	6.35 MM PISTOL	3		3	NA	ITALY	
154	3849	ITALIAN PISTOL	4		4	N/A	ITALY	
155	3712A	SMITH 45 PISTOL		2	2	N/A	U.S.A	
156	3713A	38 MM MILL PISTOL	-	3	3	N/A	N/A	
157	3714A	22MM PARTA PISTOL	1	1	1	N/A	ITALY	
158	3715A	OLD MILL PISTOL		4	4	N/A	N/A	
159	3716	36 MM PISTOL		18	18	NA	N/A	
160	3716A	6.32 MM PISTOL	+ :	13	13	N/A	NA	-
161	3717A	SMITH PISTOL	+ · · · ·	3	3	N/A	USA	
162	3722	RANIWE PISTOL	1	1	1	N/A	ITALY	
163	3722A	DIFFERENT PISTOLS		4	4	NA	NA	
164	3724	7.65 PISTOL	-	3	3	NA	ITALY	
165	3727	JAMPO PISTOL	32	9	41	N/A	ITALY	
166	3729	MILL MORRESE PISTOL		1	1	N/A	N/A	
167		MORRESE 22 PISTOL	- :	1	1	N/A	N/A	_
166	3730	ANDRACOFE PISTOL			1	N/A	USSR	
199	3730A	N/A PISTOLS	11	22	33	N/A	N/A	
170	3733	HUNTING PISTOL # 12			1	N/A	N/A	
171	3734			1	1			
		PARTA PARSOLAM PISTOL	-	1		N/A N/A	ITALY	
172	3735 3737	38 MM PISTOL		1	1		N/A N/A	
173		38 MM PISTOL	-	1	1	N/A	USA	-
174	3758	SMITH PISTOL (SHORT NOSE)	-	3	3	N/A		
175	3765	38 MM SMITH PISTOL	-	1	1	N/A	USA	
176	3772	581 MAGNOME PISTOL		2	2	N/A	USA	
177		PISTOL # 7		3	3	N/A	NA	
178	3830	7 MM PISTOL	1	4	5	N/A	BELGIUM	
179	3832	9 MM PISTOL	8	10	18	N/A	USSR	
180	3827	7.65 PISTOL	2		2	N/A	ITALY	
181	3732	SMITH 38 PISTOL	1	•	1	N/A	USA	
182	3738	5.35 PARTA JAMPO PISTOL	32	-	32	N/A	ITALY	-
7 1		TOTAL	1632	1000	3631			
183	151A	HUNTING CARTRIDGE		3	3	N/A	N/A	
184	379A	HUNTING CARTRIDGE	3	-	3	N/A	N/A	
185	387	HUNTING CARTRIDGE	1 :	6	6	N/A	N/A	
186	391	HUNTING CARTRIDGE # 12	83	13	96	N/A	N/A	
187		HUNTING CARTRIDGE # 12	-	6	8	N/A	N/A	
188	396A	HUNTING CARTRIDGE	100	1	101	NVA	N/A	
189	3761	CARTRIDGE # 12	101		101	N/A	N/A	
10c T	379	TOTAL HUNTING RIFLE # 12		28	216	61/5	B)/4	
			10	66	76	N/A	N/A	
191		HUNTING RIFLE	-	5	5	N/A	N/A	
192		HUNTING RIFLE #9		13	13	N/A	N/A	
193		HUNTING RIFLE # 16	1	6	7	N/A	N/A	
194	436	OLD HUNTING RIFLE		1	1	N/A	N/A	
195		9 MM HUNTING RIFLE	4	. 2	6	N/A	N/A	
196		D.K HUNTING RIFLE	-	1	1	N/A	N/A	
197		9 MM HUNTING RIFLE	1		1	NA	NIA	
198		MAW HUNTING RIFLE		3	3	N/A	N/A	
199		MAW HUNTING RIFLE		1	1	N/A	N/A	
200		TOUTOU MORRESE RIFLE	1	1	2	N/A	USA	
201	3754	HUNTING GUN # 12	52		52	NIA	N/A	
202	3747	AUTOMATIC HUNTING RIFLE	21		21	N/A	N/A	
		TOTAL	. 10	98	183			

Small Arms , Machineguns , Cannons , and ArtHorles out of service available as stocks at RMC Main Stores

16.N°	PART NO	PART NAME		Unserviceable	total	Date in service	Mein Supply Source	Nutes
203	280	ENGLISH RIFLE	. Ser v Acetale	21	21	N/A	ENGLAND	
204	260A	ENGLISH TRAINING RIFLE		2	2	1949	ENGLAND	
205	261	M 1 TRAINING RIFLE	301	452	753	1949	USA	
206	261A	M 16 RIFLE		1	1	N/A	USA	
207	301	G 3 RIFLE		5	5	N/A	GERMANY	
208	301A	G 3 RIFLE	52	28	80	1969	PAKISTAN	
200	301B	G3 RIFLE	<u> </u>		1	N/A	SPAIN	
210	402 402B	AIR RIFLE	5	14	14	N/A N/A	N/A	
212	504	TRAINING RIFLE	3	1	4	N/A	N/A N/A	
213	410	ENGLISH RIFLE	-	60	60	N/A	ENGLAND	
214	410B	MARK I ENGLISH RIFLE		1	1	N/A	ENGLAND	
215	416	EGYPTION RIFLE		1	1	N/A	EGYPT	
216	439_	MORRESE E RIFLE	1	1	2	N/A	ENGLAND	
217	441	MORRESE E - RIFLE		1	1 1	N/A	ENGLAND	
218	445	MORRESE RIFLE	t	5	8	N/A	USA	
219	448	22MM RIFLE	11	1	2	N/A	USA	
220	450	MORRE E22 RIFLE	11	34	45	N/A	ENGLAND	
221	451	TOUTOU RIFLE (MORRESE RIFLE)		1	1 1	N/A	N/A	
222	454 455	MORRESE RIFLE		1	1 1	N/A	USA	
223 224	455 524	MORRESE MORSEGE RIFLE DIFFERENT TYPE OF RIFLES	-	1 20	1 29	N/A N/A	USA N/A	
225	2708	MASS RIFLE		291	1	N/A	FRANCE	
226		NATOW RIFLE	26	19	45	N/A	BELGIUM	
227	2824A	RASHIAN RIFLE		1	1	N/A	USSR	··········
228	2707	SIMINOFE RIFLE	27		27	N/A	USSR	
229	3915	M60 RIFLE	-	1	1	NA	TURKEY	··· ·
230	-	N/A RIFLE	-	1	1	NA	N/A	
231	2655	CHEECIAN RIFLE	12	11	23	N/A	GERMANY	
232		CHEECIAN RIFLE		3	3	N/A	GERMANY	
233		GERMAN RIFLE	14	13	27	N/A	N/A	
234		GERMAN RIFLE		4	4	N/A	N/A	
235		SAMTOFE RILFE		2	2	N/A	USSR	
236		ITALIAN RILFE		2	- 3	N/A	ITALY	
237		CANADIAN RILFE		1	1	N/A	CANADA	
	1.008E+10		5801	4042	9843	1960	USA	
239	1 006E+10		2991	27	301B	1970	USA	
240	142A	TOTAL LAUNCHER MACHINE GUN	9247	4792	14039	N/A	N/A	
241		STEN M2 MACHINE GUN	-; $+$	5	5	N/A	ENGLAND	
242	149	MARK 3 MACHINE GUN		22	22	1965	ENGLAND	
243	-	STEN MACHINE GUN		1	1	N/A	ENGLAND	
244					24			
1	150			24		1949	ENGLAND	
245		STEN MARK 5 MACHINE GUN		24	1	1949 N/A	ENGLAND ENGLAND	
245	158	STEN MARK 5 MACHINE GUN STEN MACHINE GUN		1 1		1949 N/A N/A	ENGLAND ENGLAND CHINA	
245 246 247	158 167	STEN MARK 5 MACHINE GUN		1	1	N/A	ENGLAND	
246	158 167 570	STEN MARK SMACHINE GUN STEN MACHINE GUN SHMAIZAR MACHINE GUN	613	1	1	N/A N/A	ENGLAND CHINA	
246 247 248 249	158 167 570 1316 1901	STEN MARK S MACHINE GUN STEN MACHINE GUN SHMAIZAR MACHINE GUN STEN MACHINE GUN VIKERS MACHINE GUN MACHINE GUN		1 1 760	1 1373 1	N/A N/A 1970 N/A N/A	ENGLAND CHINA CHEECK N/A BELGIUM	
246 247 248 249 250	158 167 570 1316 1901 2095	STEN MARK 5 MACHINE GUN STEN MACHINE GUN SHMAIZAR MACHINE GUN STEN MACHINE GUN VIKERS MACHINE GUN MACHINE GUN TRAINING MACHINE GUN	613	760 1	1 1 1373 1 1 1	N/A N/A 1970 N/A N/A	ENGLAND CHINA CHEECK N/A BELGIUM N/A	
246 247 248 249 250 251	158 167 570 1316 1901 2095 2099	STEN MARK 5 MACHINE GUN STEN MACHINE GUN SHMAIZAR MACHINE GUN STEN MACHINE GUN STEN MACHINE GUN WIKERS MACHINE GUN MACHINE GUN TRAINING MACHINE GUN MARK 1 MACHINE GUN	613	1 760 1 1 1	1 1373 1 1 1	N/A N/A 1970 N/A N/A N/A	ENGLAND CHINA CHEECK N/A BELGIUM N/A ENGLAND	
246 247 248 249 250 251 252	158 167 570 1316 1901 2095 2099 2101	STEN MARK 5 MACHINE GUN STEN MACHINE GUN SHMAIZAR MACHINE GUN STEN MACHINE GUN STEN MACHINE GUN WIKERS MACHINE GUN MACHINE GUN TRAINING MACHINE GUN MARK 1 MACHINE GUN CARLOWGOSTAF MACHINE GUN	613 	1 760 1 1 1 1 272	1 1 1373 1 1 1 1 1 318	N/A N/A 1970 N/A N/A N/A N/A 1970	ENGLAND CHINA CHEECK N/A BELGIUM N/A ENGLAND N/A	
246 247 248 249 250 251 252 263	158 167 570 1316 1901 2095 2099 2101 21018	STEN MARK S MACHINE GUN STEN MACHINE GUN STEN MACHINE GUN STEN MACHINE GUN STEN MACHINE GUN VIKERS MACHINE GUN MACHINE GUN MACHINE GUN MACHINE GUN MARK 1 MACHINE GUN CARLOWGOSTAF MACHINE GUN CARLOW MACHINE GUN	613	1 760 1 1 1 1 272	1 1 1373 1 1 1 1 1 318	N/A N/A 1970 N/A N/A N/A N/A 1970 N/A	ENGLAND CHINA CHEECK N/A BELGIUM N/A ENGLAND N/A N/A	
246 247 248 249 250 251 252 263 254	158 167 570 1316 1901 2095 2099 2101 21018 2832A	STEN MARK S MACHINE GUN STEN MACHINE GUN SHMAIZAR MACHINE GUN SHMAIZAR MACHINE GUN STEN MACHINE GUN VIKERS MACHINE GUN MACHINE GUN MACHINE GUN MARK 1 MACHINE GUN CARLOWGOSTAF MACHINE GUN CARLOW MACHINE GUN DOSHCA MACHINE GUN	613	760 1 1 1 1 1 272 1 1	1 1373 1 1 1 1 1 318 1	N/A N/A 1970 N/A N/A N/A N/A 1970 N/A N/A	ENGLAND CHINA CHEECK N/A BELGIUM N/A ENGLAND N/A N/A USSR	
246 247 248 249 250 251 252 253 254 255	158 167 570 1316 1901 2095 2099 2101 21018 2832A 3500	STEN MARK 5 MACHINE GUN STEN MACHINE GUN SHMAIZAR MACHINE GUN SHMAIZAR MACHINE GUN STEN MACHINE GUN VIKERS MACHINE GUN MACHINE GUN MACHINE GUN MARK 1 MACHINE GUN CARLOWGOSTAF MACHINE GUN CARLOW MACHINE GUN DOSHCA MACHINE GUN SODE MACHINE GUN	613	1 760 1 1 1 1 272 1 1 1	1 1373 1 1 1 1 1 318 1 1	N/A N/A 1970 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A	ENGLAND CHINA CHECK N/A BELGIUM N/A ENGLAND N/A N/A USSR ENGLAND	
246 247 248 249 250 251 252 253 254 255 256	158 167 570 1316 1901 2095 2099 2101 21018 2832A 3500 3500A	STEN MARK 5 MACHINE GUN STEN MACHINE GUN SHMAIZAR MACHINE GUN SHMAIZAR MACHINE GUN STEN MACHINE GUN VIKERS MACHINE GUN MACHINE GUN TRAINING MACHINE GUN MARK 1 MACHINE GUN CARLOW GOSTAF MACHINE GUN CARLOW MACHINE GUN DOSHCA MACHINE GUN 500 E MACHINE GUN 500 E MACHINE GUN	46	1 760 1 1 1 1 272 1 1 1 2 1	1 1 1373 1 1 1 1 318 1 1 1	N/A N/A 1970 N/A N/A N/A N/A 1970 N/A N/A N/A	ENGLAND CHINA CHECK N/A BELGIUM N/A ENGLAND N/A N/A SIR ENGLAND USSR ENGLAND ENGLAND	
246 247 248 249 250 251 252 263 254 255 256 257	158 167 570 1316 1901 2065 2099 2101 21018 2832A 3500 3500A	STEN MARK S MACHINE GUN STEN MACHINE GUN STEN MACHINE GUN STEN MACHINE GUN STEN MACHINE GUN WIKERS MACHINE GUN MACHINE GUN MACHINE GUN MACHINE GUN CARLOWGOSTAF MACHINE GUN CARLOW MACHINE GUN CARLOW MACHINE GUN SOD E MACHINE GUN SOD E MACHINE GUN SOD E MACHINE GUN	613	1 760 1 1 1 1 272 1 1 2 1	1 1 1373 1 1 1 1 318 1 1 2 1	N/A N/A 1970 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A	ENGLAND CHINA CHECK N/A BELGIUM N/A ENGLAND N/A USSR ENGLAND ENGLAND ENGLAND ENGLAND	
246 247 248 249 250 251 252 263 254 255 256 257 258	158 167 570 1316 1901 2005 2099 2101 21018 2832A 3500 3500A 3500B 3511	STEN MARK S MACHINE GUN STEN MACHINE GUN STEN MACHINE GUN STEN MACHINE GUN STEN MACHINE GUN WICKERS MACHINE GUN MACHINE GUN MACHINE GUN MACHINE GUN CARLOWGOSTAF MACHINE GUN CARLOW MACHINE GUN COSHCA MACHINE GUN SOO E MACHINE GUN SMALL MACHINE GUN	46	1 760 1 1 1 1 1 272 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 2 3	1 1 1373 1 1 1 1 318 1 1 1	N/A N/A 1970 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A	ENGLAND CHINA CHEECK N/A BELGIUM N/A ENGLAND N/A USSR ENGLAND ENGLAND ENGLAND ENGLAND CHINA	
246 247 248 249 250 251 252 253 254 255 256 257 258 259	158 167 570 1316 1901 2095 2099 2101 21018 2632A 3500 3500A 3500A 3501 3579	STEN MARK S MACHINE GUN STEN MACHINE GUN SHMAIZAR MACHINE GUN STEN MACHINE GUN VIKERS MACHINE GUN MACHINE GUN MACHINE GUN MARK 1 MACHINE GUN CARLOWGOSTAF MACHINE GUN CARLOW MACHINE GUN DOSHCA MACHINE GUN SOO E MACHINE GUN SOO E MACHINE GUN SOO E MACHINE GUN SOO E MACHINE GUN SMALL MACHINE GUN SMALL MACHINE GUN SMALL MACHINE GUN SMALL MACHINE GUN	46	1 760 1 1 1 1 272 1 1 2 1	1 1373 1 1 1 1 1 318 1 1 2 1 1 1 2	N/A N/A 1970 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A	ENGLAND CHINA CHECK N/A BELGIUM N/A ENGLAND N/A USSR ENGLAND ENGLAND ENGLAND ENGLAND	
246 247 248 249 250 251 252 263 254 255 256 257 258	158 167 570 1316 1901 2095 2099 2101 2018 2632A 3500 3500A 3500B 3579 3858	STEN MARK S MACHINE GUN STEN MACHINE GUN STEN MACHINE GUN STEN MACHINE GUN STEN MACHINE GUN WICKERS MACHINE GUN MACHINE GUN MACHINE GUN MACHINE GUN CARLOWGOSTAF MACHINE GUN CARLOW MACHINE GUN COSHCA MACHINE GUN SOO E MACHINE GUN SMALL MACHINE GUN	613 	1 1 760 1 1 1 1 272 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 3 3 1 1	1 1 1373 1 1 1 1 318 1 1 2 1 1 3	N/A N/A 1970 N/A N/A N/A N/A 1970 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A	ENGLAND CHINA CHEECK N/A BELGIUM N/A ENGLAND N/A USSR ENGLAND ENGLAND ENGLAND ENGLAND ENGLAND CHINA BELGIUM	
246 247 248 249 250 251 252 253 254 255 256 257 258 259 260	158 167 570 1316 1901 2095 2099 2101 21018 2832A 3500 3500A 3500B 3511 3579 3858 3704	STEN MARK 5 MACHINE GUN STEN MACHINE GUN SHMAIZAR MACHINE GUN SHMAIZAR MACHINE GUN STEN MACHINE GUN VIKERS MACHINE GUN MACHINE GUN MACHINE GUN MARK 1 MACHINE GUN CARLOWGOSTAF MACHINE GUN CARLOW MACHINE GUN DOSHCA MACHINE GUN SOO E MACHINE GUN SOO E MACHINE GUN SOO E MACHINE GUN STARLING MACHINE GUN AFEDOW MACHINE GUN AFEDOW MACHINE GUN SMALL MACHINE GUN SMALL MACHINE GUN SMALL MACHINE GUN SMALL MACHINE GUN SMMM STARLING MACHINE GUN	613 	1 760 1 1 1 1 272 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 3 1	1 1373 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 2 1	N/A N/A 1970 N/A N/A N/A 1970 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A	ENGLAND CHINA CHECK N/A BELGIUM N/A ENGLAND N/A USSR ENGLAND ENGLAND ENGLAND ENGLAND CHINA BELGIUM N/A	
246 247 248 249 250 251 252 253 254 255 256 257 258 259 260 261	158 167 570 1316 1901 2095 2099 2101 21018 2832A 3500A 3500A 3500B 3511 3579 3658 3704 3510	STEN MARK 5 MACHINE GUN STEN MACHINE GUN SHMAIZAR MACHINE GUN SHMAIZAR MACHINE GUN STEN MACHINE GUN VIKERS MACHINE GUN MACHINE GUN MACHINE GUN MARK 1 MACHINE GUN MARK 1 MACHINE GUN CARLOW MACHINE GUN CORLOW MACHINE GUN DOSHCA MACHINE GUN SOO E MACHINE GUN SOO E MACHINE GUN SOO E MACHINE GUN AFEDOW MACHINE GUN AFEDOW MACHINE GUN SIMAL MACHINE GUN SIMAL MACHINE GUN SIMM STARLING MACHINE GUN SHMIZAR MACHINE GUN SHMIZAR MACHINE GUN	46	1 760 1 1 1 1 272 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1	1 1 1373 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 2 2	N/A N/A 1970 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A	ENGLAND CHINA CHEECK N/A BELGIUM N/A ENGLAND N/A USSR ENGLAND ENGLAND ENGLAND ENGLAND CHINA BELGIUM N/A	
246 247 248 249 250 251 252 253 254 255 256 257 258 259 260 261 262	158 167 570 1316 1901 2005 2009 2101 21018 2832A 3500 3500A 3500B 3511 3579 3688 3710 3936	STEN MARK S MACHINE GUN STEN MACHINE GUN STEN MACHINE GUN STEN MACHINE GUN STEN MACHINE GUN WIKERS MACHINE GUN MACHINE GUN MACHINE GUN MACHINE GUN CARLOWGOSTAF MACHINE GUN CARLOW MACHINE GUN CARLOW MACHINE GUN SOD E MACHINE GUN SMALL MACHINE GUN SMALL MACHINE GUN SMALL MACHINE GUN SHMIZAR MACHINE GUN SHMIZAR MACHINE GUN SHMIZAR MACHINE GUN SHMIZAR MACHINE GUN	46	1 1 760 1 1 1 1 1 272 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1	1 1 1373 1 1 1 1 1 1 318 1 1 2 1 1 1 3 1 2 1 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2	N/A N/A 1970 N/A N/A N/A 1970 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A	ENGLAND CHINA CHEECK N/A BELGIUM N/A ENGLAND N/A N/A USSR ENGLAND ENGLAND ENGLAND ENGLAND ENGLAND ENGLAND CHINA BELGIUM N/A	
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Small Arms , Machineguns , Cennons , and Artifleries out of service available as stocks at RMC Main Stores

S.N	PART NO	PARTHAME	re ory			Date in	Main Supply	Notes
- In			servicable	Unsarvicaable	total	service	Source	
273	2828A	SHMAIZER MACHINE GUN		31	31	N/A	CHINA	
274	3892	KLASHENCOFE MACHINE GUN	11		11	N/A	USSR	
275	3881	BORESAID MACHINE GUN		1	1	N/A	EGYPT	
275	3826	9MM MACHINE GUN			1	N/A	USA	
277	1 006E+10	A2 MACHINE GUN	158	23	181	1963	USA	
278	1 006E+10	CARBIN MACHINE GUN	9619	424	10043	1963	USA	
279	8003262	KOREAN MACHINE GUN	36		36	1990	KOREA	
280	3748	HK23E MACHINE GUN	1		1	N/A	GERMANY	
281	3739	9MM MACHINE GUN	B3	+	83	1979	AUSTRIA	
2		TOTAL	9935	826	10565			
282	251	ANERGA EJECTOR	992	36	1028	1970	USA	
283	265	ANERGA EJECTOR	1091	4	1696	1970	USA	
284	1.006E+10	ROCKET LAUNCHER	409	196	605	1975	USA	
285	403	MORTER	4		5	N/A	N/A	
286	268	ROCKET LAUNCHER CANNON		42	42	NA	N/A	
287	268A	ROCKET LAUNCHER CANNON		1	1	N/A	N/A	
		TOTAL	3096	280	3376			
286	100082	DIFFERENT SMOKE CANNON		4	4	N/A	N/A	
289	3517	SMOKE CANNON, LEFT	22	5	27	N/A	NIA	
290	3518	SMOKE CANNON, RIGHT	22	9	31	N/A	N/A	
		TOTAL	44	18	62			
291	650	3" MORTER CANNON	-	20	20	N/A	N/A	
292	1000	2 CANNON	48	6	54	N/A	N/A	
293	1851	2 LB CANNON		2	2	N/A	N/A	
294	1858	Z CANNON		2	2	N/A	N/A	
295	151	MORTER 8" CANNON		10	10	N/A	N/A	
296	3504	17 LB CARRIED CANNON		1	1	N/A	N/A	
297	3927	HOWEN 40 MM E CANNON		1	1	N/A	ENGLAND	
298		3.7 MM CANNON		3	3	N/A	N/A	
299		14.5MM MACHINE GUN CARRIAGE	40	-	40	N/A	KOREA	
300	-	DUAL 23 MM MACHINE GUN CARRIA	5		5	N/A	USSR	
301		HOWITZER & CARRIAGE M115+M2	21	0.5	21	N/A	USA	
302	1.025E+10	HOWITZER MED TOWED 155MM CA			18	1970	USA	
303		HOWITZER 155 MM CARRIAGE		14	14	1970	USA	
		HOWITZER 105 MM CARRIAGE	9	1	10	1970	USA	
305		145 MM MACHINE GUN	5		6	NA	KOREA	
		TOTAL	347	60	207		1101112	
204	1.008E+10		72	271	343	N/A	USA	

Unused small arms available as stocks at RMC Main Stores

S.N	P/N	Description	Qty	Status	Date in Service	Source Of Supply	NOTES
1	2688	CLASHINKOFE MACHINE GUN, FOLDABLE BUT	9177	Brand New	1987	GERMANY	
2	2686A	CLASHINKOFE MACHINE GUN, FOLDABLE BUT	1895	Brand New	N/A	CHINA	
3	2686	CLASHINKOFE MACHINE GUN, FIXED BUT	49869	Brand New	1988	HUNGARIA	
4	2686 BG	CLASHINKOFE MACHINE GUN, FIXED BUT	20123	Brand New	1987	GERMANY	
		TOTAL (98663	1			

om:	(O-6 Ministry of Defense)
it:	Tuesday, July 15, 2003 5:39 AM
	LTC, DSCA/ME (COL, V Corps)
	Slocombe, Walt B. (SES)
ect	: RE: Weapons
Ro	ger – got some internal decisions to make.
W	Il be in touch.
Ma	my thanks for working this for us!!!
	The state of the s
	Original Message
	om: LTC, DSCA/ME ent: Tuesday, July 15, 2003 1:04 AM
To	
	ibject: Weapons
Ir	nportance: High
Si	5.
	anks for the update, any future information is always appreciated. The situation as I understand it is a lows:
	CPA requested from CJTF-7 for specific numbers of specific types of weapons and ammunition to be livered by 30 July.
	CJTF-7 has 657 serviceable AK on-hand. Decision has not been made to prioritize these weapons for A use.
3.	CJTF-7 is looking at availability of AKs within the region.
	DOS has informally approached Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. DOS to send formal quest once availability of weapons is known with the region.
A	Iditional questions that need to be addressed.
1.	Has the Program Review Board given approval for the purchase of weapons and ammunition?
2.	If so, still require nomenclature, model numbers and quantities for required weapons.
3.	Has been approached about their ability to purchase initial weapons?
4	POCs in CJTF 7 C4 and CFLCC-PARC, specifically a COL would be appreciated.

Bottom line Sir, I need an answer on if you want to pursue purchasing weapons or receiving donated

weapons?

If you want to pursue the donated weapons I need to tell DOS that found weapons are available but are not being prioritized for the NIA. still require nomenclature, model numbers and quantities for weapons.



Original Message
From: (O-6 Ministry of Defense
Sent: Sunday, July 13, 2003 10:24 PM
To: LTC, DSCA/ME
Cc: (COL, V Corps); Slocombe, Walt B. (SES); Eaton, Paul; Riley, Jonathan P. (Brig Gen); (CIV); 0-6 RCO
Subject: Weapons
We presented attached brief to Amb Bremer and LTG Sanchez on Fri AM.
As you will see, brief captures info you have passed, highlights decision to focus on AK-type rifles, and emphasizes that we need to press ahead to acquire weapons.
Accordingly, could you please continue your efforts to press hard for weapons? We have agreed that POC for inbound weapons will be CJTF 7 C4 and comms will flow through CENTCOM to keep chain of command clear and informed.
COL whom I know you know very well, is good initial POC at CJTF 7. He will
pass you to others as appropriate.
Pls continue to keep me informed.
Thanks,
COL

The Need to Acquire Weapons

11 July 03

Current Situation

- Consolidated requests for weapons (some double-counting)
 - Police, Ministries and Baghdad Central (as of 10 July) = 17,025 AK & 9420 pistols for police and FPS guards
 - CJTF 7 (as of 4 July) needs = 28,721 AK & 29,388 pistols (1AD = 8,758 & 3,000) for police and FPS guards
 - NIA needs min 1000 AKs by 2 Aug, 3000 more by Oct
 - ICDF needs TBD
- AK-47 availability
 - CJTF 7 on-hand in Taji & AO Glory (as of 10 July) 657 serviceable AKs...very few pistols
 - No "white-world" AKs avail in CONUS or Bosnia (JCS J4 & Army G4)
 - MEK weapons awaiting policy decision
 - Peshmerga weapons?
- Other Options
 - War Stocks = 40,000 M16A1 and 2800 M1911A1 (some ammunition concerns)
 - Jordan just transitioned to M16A2 and has M16A1 available DATT is checking
 - DOS informally approaching Poland, Hungary and Czech Republic today

Considerations / Recommendations

Considerations:

- Optics of bringing large numbers of weapons into Iraq
- AK vs M16...local experience, ammo availability, cost, and non-"Americanization" all favor AK
- Poor state of repair of "used" weapons

Recommendations:

- CJTF 7 lead w/ CPA support
- Go with new AK-47 w/ 1 mags and 25 rds as base of issue (more for NIA)
- Full court press to get weapons ASAP from multiple sources:
 - MEK decision
 - Coalition partner donations/sales
 - Allow purchase of weapons from individuals/commercial firms

- Priorities:

- NIA gets 1000 off the top
- Police
- Protection of Oil, Electricity, Water infrastructure

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Slocombe, Walt B. (SES)

From: (O-6 Ministry of Defense)

Sent: Thursday, July 17, 2003 5:58 AM

To: LTC, DSCA/ME; Walters, Tome, Lt. Gen/Dir. DSCA; Millies, Richard, DSCA/FO

Cc: DSCA/MEANFO: DSCA/ME: (E-mail)';

Col, DSAA/FO: CIV, OSD-POLICY DSCA/ER; Slocombe, Walt B. (SES); Eaton, Paul; Riley, Jonathan P. (Brig Gen); (COL, V Corps)

Subject: RE: IRAQ WEAPONS UPDATE

Great summary!

Info you provide below is invaluable for long term efforts for NIA.

Near term solution, we believe, appears to be the Jordanian option you mention. We are on the cusp of getting permission to begin to work the details thru DATT in Embassy Amman; numbers are plentiful and we should be able to move via ground trans.

As far as practical action in support of our weapons needs, please hold. We have the ball to run the Jordanian option to resolution.

Will keep you closely informed - but if you have any questions or concerns - please call or write anytime.

Thanks again You are an absolutely terrific teammate!

From: LTC, DSCA/ME
Sent: Thursday, July 17, 2003 12:17 AM
To: Walters, Tome , , Lt. Gen/Dir. DSCA; Milles, Richard, , DSCA/FO

Cc: DSAA/FO; DSCA/FO; DSCA/FO; (O-6 Ministry of Defense); CIV, OSD-POLICY DSCA/ER

Subject: IRAQ WEAPONS UPDATE

- 1. Decision has not been made reference the 657 serviceable AK47s on hand. In COL update today they are currently working a Jordanian option.
- 2. Based on DOS feedback it looks as if Poland is the best country to approach. Not clear yet how much they would be willing to donate, as opposed to selling. In any event, the Poles are aware of the issue and are prepared to be responsive, so the groundwork is laid for a formal approach. Once CENTCOM verifies there are insufficient quantities of weapons and ammunition available in theater, DOS will send a formal request.

It could be very difficult -- perhaps impossible -- for Poland to supply weapons by August 1. Whether Polish equipment is sold or donated, the transaction would need MoD and Council of Ministers approval (though NO/NO parliamentary vote) before going through Poland's export-control system. A Polish contribution is unlikely before

mid-September at the earliest.

3. I have talked with Mr. Director, Southern Region Contracting Center, Army Contracting Agency and have verified there is no reimbursable procurement line in the contract. The NIAT SOW clearly identifies all training aids, equipment, ammunition etc., as Government furnished. This is a Cost Plus Fixed Fee (CPFF) services contract. I have attached copy of the final SOW, the Letter RFP and a copy of the Letter Contract.

I have also talked with General Dynamics-Ordnance and Tactical Systems (GDOTS). GDOTS currently has contracts working similar issues in Afghanistan and Georgia. This may be the long-term solution for a quality weapon and ammunition source as well as for maintenance and spare parts. If sufficient quantities in acceptable condition cannot be found in country, or be donated, this is an option.

4. For future reference, IFF funds are available for use to purchase weapons and related items, requested by CPA, for the New Iraqi Army troops. Both OSD/GC for Fiscal and International Affairs agree that the IFF funds are available for this purpose.

A key criteria for transfer is that SECDEF notify the Congressional defense committees, NLT 5 days in advance of transfer, the amount and reason for the transfer. The normal rule applies regarding Congress having to be in session when notification periods start.

LTC, USA

Country Program Director
(Algeria, Iraq, Lebanon, Morocco, Tunisia)
Defense Security Cooperation Agency
Middle East, Asia and North Africa (MEAN)
1111 Jefferson Davis Hwy, Suite 303 (East Tower)
Arlington, VA 22202
Phone
FAX
SIPR:
NIPR:

Slocombe, Walt B. (SES)
From: (O-6 Ministry of Defense) Sent: Wednesday, July 16, 2003 11:31 PM To: Walters, Tome , , Lt. Gen/Dir. DSCA
Cc: Col, DSAA/FO DSCA/POLICY DSCA/POLICY; DSCA/POLICY; DSCA/PPPFO; Slocombe, Walt B. (SES); Eaton, Paul Subject: RE: Training programs for promising Iraqi officers
Sir,
Many thanks! You and your team are terrific es always!!!
and and an
Obviously completely new govt, new military, new situation here and we want to get things started – an as there is no base so we start afrash. Given that, we think we are talking more than just IMET, rather the who gamutincluding where to startin-country language programs, Mobile Education teams on a variety of subjectneed for 505 forms completed by the country and filed with Steta, etcall of those things
Where do we start?
Thanks!
From: Walters, Tome , , Lt. Gen/Dir. DSCA Sent: Wednesday, July 16, 2003 3:42 PM To CIV, OSD-POLICY; (O-6 Ministry of Defense) Cc: Col, DSAA/FO; DSCA/POLICY; DSCA/POLICY; , DSCA/PPFO Subject: RE: Training programs for promising Iraql officers
DSCA managas the IMET program and is probably your best starting point. If we can't get something done, we probably know who can.
are our two experts.
Call my exec, Col for advice/answers anytima and we'll help
Tome Walters
Original Message From: CIV, OSD-POLICY Sent: Wednesday, July 16, 2003 7:24 To: (O-6 Ministry of Defense)' Cc: Walters, Tome , , Lt. Gen/Dir. DSCA Subject: RE: Training programs for promising Iraqi officers

this is more of a DSCA-STATE issue, but I will crank it up. I will pass this to LTG Tome Walters Dir of DSCA to get his best thoughts on how to crank it up. My guy for this will be all the best. Break Break ... Torne, is no. 2 to Walt Slocombe and is engaged with recreating the Iraqi Army. He needs advice on irnet, etc.

From: [O-6 Ministry of Defense]

Sent: Tuesday, July 15, 2003 10:39 PM

To: [CIV, OSD-POLICY]

Cc: Slocombe, Walt B. (SES);

Subject: Training programs for promising Iraqi officers

Could you and your team lay out for us the steps we need to take to get promising traqi officers (and civilians) into US training programs?

We are talking more than just IMET, rather the whole gamut...including where to start...in-country language programs, Mobile Education teams on a variety of subjects, etc....need for 505 forms completed by the country and filed with State, etc....all of those things....

Can you establish a point of contact on your team with whom we could work these issues?

Thanks!

VR,

Slocombe,	Walt	В.	(SES)

From: (O-6 Ministry of Defense)

Sent: Friday, July 18, 2003 6:19 AM

To:
Cc: Slocombe, Walt B. (SES); LTC, DSCA/ME: (O-6)

Subject: RE: Iraq

Thanks very much for the note and for the offer.

The service you offer is very attractive and may, in the long term, be the course we need to pursue for rearming the New Iraqi Army.

In the short term, however, we have identified a local source for a substantial number of new AKs and are moving to acquire them now.

I will remain in touch, initially via as the situation develops and as other needs become apparent.

Thanks very much!

COL

-----Original Message----From:
Sent: Friday, July 18, 2003 2:32 AM
To:
(O-6 Ministry of Defense)
Cc:
Subject: 1780

Col.

By way of introduction, my name is and I am the Sr. Manager, International Business Development for General Dynamics Ordnance and Tactical Systems (GD-OTS). I received your contact details from Lt. Col. at DSCA. He suggested I contact you regarding some of the armament and ammunition requirements coming out of your office in Iraq. We understand that there is an immediate requirement for 40,000 AK-47's and associated ammunition, as well as various small arms and ammunition. Although we do not make either of these products, we have been conducting a very successful ammunition "one-stop shop" together with the US Government for the Government of Kuwait under an FMS Case. This has involved the provision of more than 80 line items of ammunition, including items of US, Russian, West/East European and other origin. We procure, consolidate and ship these supplies in country for the Government of Kuwait from 15 countries and 23 suppliers using a proprietary process known as GAPS or "Global Ammunition Procurement System" which General Taylor at USASAC is fully briefed on and supports.

The GAPS system was recently enhanced and under the name of CS3 (for Coalition Supply and Support Services) has enabled us to offer major support across a number of disciplines to include weapons, vehicles, logistics and, of course, munitions, with a full range of support services to USASAC on the highly successful Georgia Train & Equip program. Currently, CS3 is being investigated by CENTCOM as an ideal vehicle for the Afghan National Army's Train & Equip program, UAE, Jordan, Colombia, and several other international customers.

To emphasize the benefits of having a company like GD-OTS under an ID/IQ contract...... we made some preliminary inquiries with our contacts in Eastern Europe and feel that we could provide the AK47's and ammo NLT Sept 2003 and maybe sooner. I hope the above proves to be of interest to you and the rest of your team. If so, this email is attached and his mobile number is the could be in Kuwait and hopes to meet with you and your team in Iraq. He has been fitted with a bullet proof vest and has other gear to help him in his journey. If you would like a meeting sometime next week, although the proof teams in invitation and support for transportation in country (either military or commercial, if available).

Please do not hesitate to contact me if I can provide any further information on the above and I look forward to hearing from you on the subject in due course.

Best Regards,

Sr. Manager, International Business Development General Dynamics - Ordnance & Tactical Systems

Phone: Fax:

Mobile:

The Need to Acquire Weapons

11 July 03

Current Situation

- Consolidated requests for weapons (some double-counting)
 - Police, Ministries and Baghdad Central (as of 10 July) = 17,025 AK & 9420 pistols for police and FPS guards
 - CJTF 7 (as of 4 July) needs = 28,721 AK & 29,388 pistols (1AD = 8,758 & 3,000) for police and FPS guards
 - NIA needs min 1000 AKs by 2 Aug, 3000 more by Oct
 - ICDF needs TBD

AK-47 availability

- CJTF 7 on-hand in Taji & AO Glory (as of 10 July) 657 serviceable AKs...very few pistols
- No "white-world" AKs avail in CONUS or Bosnia (JCS J4 & Army G4)
- MEK weapons awaiting policy decision
- Peshmerga weapons?

Other Options

- War Stocks = 40,000 M16A1 and 2800 M1911A1 (some ammunition concerns)
- Jordan just transitioned to M16A2 and has M16A1 available DATT is checking
- DOS informally approaching Poland, Hungary and Czech Republic today

Considerations / Recommendations

Considerations:

- Optics of bringing large numbers of weapons into Iraq
- AK vs M16...local experience, ammo availability, cost, and non-"Americanization" all favor AK
- Poor state of repair of "used" weapons

Recommendations:

- CJTF 7 lead w/ CPA support
- Go with new AK-47 w/ 1 mags and 25 rds as base of issue (more for NIA)
- Full court press to get weapons ASAP from multiple sources:
 - MEK decision
 - Coalition partner donations/sales
 - Allow purchase of weapons from individuals/commercial firms

- Priorities:

- NIA gets 1000 off the top
- Police
- Protection of Oil, Electricity, Water infrastructure

Slocombe, Walter, CIV, OSD-POLICY From: Tuesday, April 22, 2003 3:26 PM Sent: 'Slocombe, Walter, CIV, OSD-POLICY' To: Subject: RE: What's the reality? Walt, I move Thursday by air. We simply have to get to Baghdad and begin the process of introducing ourselves before more time goes by, as people are already skeptical. has alot of charm, but we need to start to deliver and put fears at rest. It will take awhile before we have a place to work/stay comfortably. Our "compound" still lacks power and water. Biggest problem will be transport and commo. REsources are a problem. We are constantly told we are running out of money. I think has to ask permission for many things wh. drives him crazy. ODS reps emphasize getting someone else to pay, and claiming victory while we move on to the next. There is little appreciation for the enormity of what we have undertaken and how ill-prepared we are on the governance side (humanitarian and reconstruction are known qualtities). The struggle between the social engineers and the pragmatists continues. In short, the chaos continues, although I remain convinced there is an important job to do here, and even more convinced that we MUST finish what we started. Most of the people are talented and dedicated, They just lack coherent leadership and clarity of vision. Do not mean to sound too discouraging. I think we are probably at the lowest point psychologically. I must admit I have never experienced such an uneasy day before opening night -- and virtually everyone here agrees. But we will somehow get through it. My advice is that you send someone perceptive whom you trust to check it out soonest. The best would be you, but you would frankly be too high profile just now. Defense is a long term proposition I think, but a bit less urgent in that it is not a "basic service" at the moment. Hope this helps. Best, ----Original Message----From: Slocombe, Walter, CIV, OSD-POLICY To:

Sent: 4/21/2003 2:35 PM Subject: What's the reality?

forward.

what

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4

I would be grateful for any information you can pass on as to the actual state of affairs out there and your advice to me about whether I should press to get out faster than now scheduled (something like 19 May) and

that you have in fact moved

to try to get settled in advance. Col my MA, will probably be going out to Qatar for a quick ontheground look this weekend, but I would be very interested in your perspective, in particular on the degree to which there is a real chain of command and someone with authority over resources.

(You can reply to my personal e-mail if you prefer.)

Slocombe, Walter, CIV, OSD-POLICY

From:	Friday April 25, 2002 4:02 AM
Sent: To:	Friday, April 25, 2003 4:03 AM COL, JCS J6 Col
Cc:	SSG CENTCOM'; MAJ COL
	CIV, OSD-POLICY '; "Slocombe, Walt (AOL)' '; "Slocombe, Walt (Law Office)'
	'Slocombe, Walter, CIV, OSD-POLICY'; COL 'I' CIV,
	OSD-POLICY (
Subject:	NIC Conceptual Pranning

et. al. -- I will be pulling up stakes soon to move north but should be with you now in Qatar. I would like to pass on my thoughts about the NIC concept before I lose my connectivity with the group.

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As always, comments are valued! If you don't hear from me for a while, it's because my comms aren't up. I have been given a Thuraya phone for use in Iraq -- number is

R

Walter Slocombe

From:

Monday, April 14, 2003 05:31

Sent:

Walter Slocombe

Cc: Subject:

Iragi Military Reform

Sir -- MG Carl Strock asked that I contact you about providing you any information you may need regarding the reformation of the Iraqi military. I am currently serving as the chief of policy and special initiatives in ORHA, on loan from reserach directorate at INSS. By way of background, I served 4 years in OSD(Policy) with the when he was the DASD for Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Assistance, working both peacekeeping and HA issues together.

As you know, much of the Iraqi military has self-demobilized, in all likelihood as a means of avoiding direct combat with US forces. While we have destroyed much of their armor and artillery systems, I doubt that there has been the slaughter that some media venues have suggested. I was here for the last war and thought I would have seen many dead Iraqis but I did not. Empirical evidence suggested that many survived because their units retreated back across the Euphrates, knowing that there was little support for the 91 coalition to pursue them and that they had the strategic depth in which to retreat. However, this time the individual soldiers fled because they knew we would not stop until we had taken over the entire country.

Some have suggested that if these Iraqis have self-demobilized, we should let them go and not try to pull them back into some organized body. I would offer that the need to gather them back together for some form of accountability and verting is critical to the future internal security of the new Iraq. We do not know what soldiers have demobilized or what their motivations were in doing so, other than the obvious one of self-preservation. Some may have fled to their hometowns in an effort to assume a quiet non-political life; others may have fled in order to avoid captivity and to prepare for further mischief. If we can begin to gather soldiers back into some organized process to demobilize them, we can demonstrate to both them and the Iraqi people that the US is committed to reforming the military, ensuring that thousands of unemployed are not dumped at one time on to a non-existent economy, and give us more time and information with which to vet people of interest. My concern is that we not unintentionally create the conditions that would result in a power vacuum such as Afghanistan or Somalia.

On another note, the British have agreed in principal to provide ORHA an expert on internal security matters to help review what has been done by the ORHA staff so far and harmonize their various efforts. I wanted to inform you of this because the Ministry of Defense will be affected by this expert's work/recommendations as we seek to ensure that the repressive internal security organizations of Saddam's era are not rebuilt.

Finally, on the issue of rebuilding the Iraqi military into a new force that provides for the protection of Iraq's terrority, respects civilian rule and doesn't pose a threat to its neighbots, I would like to recommend that a professor from the Naval War College contact you. Dr. is a recoginzed expert on the Iraqi military and has done considerable work on its future organization. I think his work is very good and recommend that you discuss his thoughts with you. If you would like I can have him contact you.

Sir, please let me know if there is anything else that you may need. Once you learn your travel dates, please let me know so we can prepare your quarters, etc.

VR.

Colonel, U.S. Army

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NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY INDUSTRIAL COLLEGE OF THE ARMED FORCES WASHINGTON, D.C. 20319-6000

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Subj:	Thoughts on staffing	
Date:	4/5/2003 11:01:30 AM Eastern Daylight Time	
From:		
To:		
CC:		
Sent from	m the Internet (Details)	

Walt

Good to talk with you yesterday. Thanks for your vote of confidence. This is going to be great!

On the issue of the personnel "package" for the MoD, I think there are probably three sets of folks:

- 1) Core team of Slocombe plus 5 substantive people
- 2) US admin/log/comms/security etc support package
- 3) Iraqi exiles with substantive military backgrounds

On #2, I understand that Centcom has been tasked to provide a full support package to each of the ministries. The sensitive nature and scale of the MoD will require a more "robust" package. I think we are looking at a the following:

Slocombe: 2 secretaries, 1 translator

Core staff (5): 1 secretary and 1 translator each (As a small team, we will likely to need the ability to operate during the day individually, thus the team of translators)

Comms: 5, or however many necessary for 24/7 ops.

Admin: 05 and 3 E-5/6 personnel (O5 oversees complete support package and handles admin liaison with CENTCOM, including security, mil air, access throughout the country, etc.)

Motorpool: In addition to travel back and forth from the residence compound to the MoD, we will need secure transport to various sites in Baghdad and around the country. To begin with we may need only one transport "package" with the ability to draw on CENTCOM assets for additional "packages" if we need to have two teams in different locations.

Security: Need a package that wraps around all of the above, including 24/7 protection for our offices at the MoD.

Other: There is always an "other", but the above list is a good starting point.

On #3, I understand that Policy has put together a team of about 100 Iraqi exiles, trained as doctors, lawyers, civil servants, now living in the United States. A couple of these have formal military training-one was a general who attended Sandhurst. They are potential candidates for senior ministers and will also be useful to the "sorting" process and are obviously fluent in Arabic. Whether these folks become the "Interim Ministers" or remain "technical support", is being debated between the WH, DOD and State.

On #1, the Core Team: I think we need to keep the core staff small. As fewer, we will be more nimble, less obvious in the Ministry, and more easily achieve the unity of effort whereby we can do a "no look" pass from person to person, fully confident that the issue is being handled well. The members of the team should be relatively flexible and interchangeable to handle the flood of issues that we will need to deal with each day. The type of people we need are those who have worked at the top of a large organization, like DoD, and know how to get things done quickly in difficult bureaucratic environments. We will need strong knowledge of the team back in Washington (DoD, State and NSC) and their trust. The core team should understand

defense organizations and have experience in defense strategy and planning at the Ministerial level. As in 1990 in Eastern Europe, we will be dealing with a country that has no tradition of civilian control of the military, never had a national security strategy as we would know it, never had a defense strategy, never had a defense planning document. At least one of these folks should be able to fight the money wars in the US system to make sure we have the funding we need. As you noted, the team will need to be PA savvy, and someone will need, at least unofficially, to watch this issue. The core group will also need to know when and how to bring in issue-specific, occasional expertise for particular issues (munitions disposal, legal, medical policy, etc) through one of the several contract vehicles DoD has in place.

To the specifics, is an excellent choice. He'd bring to the team an in-depth understanding of the Iraqi military and knowledge of Iraq in general.

Beyond we need people responsible for:

- 1) ministry organizational reform and management;
- 2) a strategy, force planning, policy guy; and
- 3) a resources/budget/acquisition person.

My thought is to volunteer for the organizational reform and management portfolios

(in addition to handling PA issues and liaison with other ministries and the civil administrator as collateral duties).

For strategy/policy/force planning, I'd strongly recommend

have known since I hired him 10 years ago. entered OSD as a PMI and
has had an outstanding civil service in Policy (you detailed him to IISS to
write his Adelphi Paper on coalition warfare-copy available on request).

is also a US Navy reserve officer. I'd put him at the very top of my
list. Very innovative and probably the best "ideas" guy in OSD - he was the
lead pen on the 2001 QDR and formulated the post-2 MTW force planning

construct. We going to need someone to work with the Iraqis to help formulate a new Iraqi defense strategy, force structure and basing requirements, and quickly draft up key defense policies and guiding principles for reform. The guy. At present, he's Wolfowitz's special assistant (and has been intimately involved in postwar planning efforts). If Wolfowitz could be persuaded to let him join us for some period of time, he'd be indispensable. This will certainly require a by-name request from you to Wolfowitz but the some period of time.

For the resources/budget/acquisition person, again I'd recommend a career person, this time from PA&E. It is the director for theater assessments and projections and began his OSD career as a PMI. He has also been the PA&E lead for a number of Defense Resources Management Studies we've done in Eastern Europe and Central Asia so he's familiar with the nature of the challenge of standing up a new resource allocation system that can produce some degree of transparency and civilian control. Iterrific - he's versatile and would mesh nicely on a team. Again, as with the issue will be persuading the system to turn him loose.

I would also recommend that you request one or two 05/06 Foreign Area Officers (FAOs) for the core team. In addition to regional and language expertise, it will be useful to showcase US civil-military relations. I don't have immediate names, but if this sounds right, I'll hunt a few candidates down.

I look forward to your thoughts and to working with you.



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From:	COL, JCS J6	Co	Sent:Fri 4/2	25/2003 4:02 AM
To: Cc:	SSG CENTCOM' MA OSD-POLICY'; "Slocombe, Walt (A COL	AJ		CIV,
Subject:				

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
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Walt:

Last night I was at a dinner at the German Ambassador's residence and was fortuitously seated next to an old friend of yours--Janusz Onyszkiewicz, the former defense minister of Poland. Dr. Onyszkiewicz sends his best. However, the real reason for this email is that I took the opportunity to pick his brain about how you go about transforming a military built by a totalitarian system into one suitable for a democratic system. What follows is a summary of what I took away from our conversation.

Obviously, there are considerable differences between Poland and Iraq, and under no circumstances would I suggest that we simply copy the Polish experience. Nevertheless, I think Onyszkiewicz's insights are a useful and helpful input into the process and can help sort out our own thinking.

On vetting officers, Onyszkiewicz's method was to rely first on foreign intelligence services--in the case, the U.S., UK and Germany. He relied on them to pick out the worst of the party hacks from the officer corps. (In the case of Iraq, he and I both felt that soliciting information from the Turks, Jordanians, and Egyptians--all of whom had military-to-military contacts with the Iraqis--might be helpful in the same way. We could simply ask who seemed like good, professional officers, who were party hacks, snitches, or idiots.) Second, he did have people go through personnel records. He had them look for who was competent or not, and who was considered an enthusiastic party supporter. He pointed out that everyone had to be listed as a loyal party supporter, otherwise you could not advance, but he said that if you learned to read between the lines, you could find out who were the most committed to the party and the most involved in party activities--all of these people he cashiered. (He specifically did not use the intelligence files on the officers because he felt they were probably too politicized and "full of junk" to provide and accurate assessment. He also felt that the personnel files were likely to provide the same kinds of information that he wanted-if you knew how to read them--but without the same political junk.) He mainly cashiered people by retiring them (he noted that Poland had a low minimum retirement age which proved very useful to him in this.)

Overall, he suggested that he really did not purge that many officers--perhaps only 10-20 percent of the total. He said he basically erred on the side of leaving people in. He wanted to get rid of the worst of the lot, but felt that beyond them, it would be too difficult to try get down much further. He also felt that by forcing out that many, the rest would get the message and fly right.

The two most important positions in the MoD are the director of personnel and the director of counterintelligence. Having people you

can trust in these two jobs are what count the most. The chief of staff, chief of operations, and all of the other positions are secondary. What matters in this new organization is people--whether it does its job (i.e., defend the country) properly is a distant second. For the moment, the key is transform the institution and that means getting out the dead wood, bringing in new personnel, and keeping the officers who are most trustworthy. Moreover, as he pointed out, if you need someone to run a division, you just have to have a military officer--there just aren't civilian careers that provide a close alternative from which you can draw personnel, so he had to come many of the personnel just to keep the organization functioning.

Onyszkiewicz felt that establishing what civilian control over the military meant was critical right at the start. He said that he purposely laid down a marker early on with the Ministry: the professional officers tried to explain to him that his role, as a politician (as under the old communist system) was to set broad policy guidelines and leave all military technical matters to the officer corps. He told them that "if I want to decide what the organization of a battalion should be, then I will decide what the organization of a battalion should be."

He said that he turned away all of the exiled former Polish military officers because he did not believe the rest of the officer corps would accept them. However, he did seek out Polish military officers still in Poland who had been arrested for subversive activities and he reinstated and promoted them, in part to help push forward the reform agenda.

Finally, he noted that an important factor that made the transition somewhat easy in Poland was that the Polish military appeared to have been expecting the transformation for some time--lower level officials apparently saw the handwriting on the wall beforehand and this seemed to have prepared them psychologically for the blows when they came.

I think you might want to get in touch with him as well. His number in Warsaw is and his email is

In addition, might it be worth bringing together a small number of other officials from Eastern Europe and other countries (South Africa? Chile?) that have undergone similar transitions to get their thoughts on how to go about this?

On another note, I am hearing some pretty disheartening things about how the reconstruction effort is being handled (or not handled, in some cases). I will send a separate email on these points, also suggesting some questions that you might raise with your interlocutors, as you requested.

Best,

Senior Fellow and Director of Research The Saban Center for Middle East Policy The Brookings Institution 1775 Massachusetts Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20016



ATTORNEY

Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered

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WALTER SLOCOMBE (202) 862-5060 wbs@capdale.com

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
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UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE



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Conclusions of USIP Roundtable on Lessons Learned From Prior Vetting Processes*

(January 24, 2003)

I. Why is vetting critical to the success of a democratic transition?

Vetting is necessary in order to:

- 1) Sanction those who have committed abuses and remove them from positions in which they could continue to do so.
- 2) Instill public confidence in the reformed and cleansed institutions of government. The vetting process can serve as a means of inculcating new social norms, promoting government legitimacy, and building a new sense of civic responsibility and national identity. This emphasis is increasingly preferred under international standards to the Point (1)'s focus on patently punitive vetting.
- Render the handling of past abuse more manageable. Even if prosecutions occur
 for abuses of the ousted regime, there will be very few trials relative to the
 number of potential cases.
- 4) Contribute to public order. A hesitant, arbitrary or incomplete vetting process can likewise result in personal vengeance, festering grievances, and lack of public trust in government.

II. Who does the vetting?

^{*}With the encouragement of senior NSC staff, the United States Institute of Peace organized a roundtable discussion on January 9th, 2003 involving former U.S. government officials and non-governmental experts on the experiences of several countries with efforts to screen and purge the security forces and civilian administration during a transition from a repressive system to democracy. Prior cases that were discussed included post-WW II Germany and France, the purge of the military in El Salvador, de-Stasification of various sectors following German re-unification, and police vetting programs in the Balkans, Haiti and elsewhere.

Vetting may be conducted by (1) one centralized government agency or specially established commission; (2) separately by each ministry and agency; (3) by foreign occupation authorities; or (4) by an international interim authority; or (5) by a combination of the above. In the last two cases, it will be essential that carefully selected and publicly credible locals participate in or advise the process. If local authority is to have responsibility for the vetting process, international pressure can be important to ensure implementation, enforcement and fairness of vetting decisions.

Authority: In most cases, vetting is based on the enactment of a law, the imposition of a decree by governing authority, or the provision for vetting in a peace accord. Vetting will often be subject to charges of arbitrariness and "victor's justice," making it important to clarify the standards and procedures to be applied. A greater expectation applies in this regard in the vetting of the civilian sector than security forces. Whenever possible, make use of local laws and legal principles. This legitimates the process in the eyes of both accused and surrounding public.

III. Who gets vetted and when?

Vetting requires balancing the need to purge with the necessity of "keeping the trains running." The need to have sufficient personnel in place to run essential government functions, especially security functions, may constrain the thoroughness of an initial purge. Before beginning any purge, determine (a) the availability of qualified replacements; (b) the time it will take to recruit/train new personnel; and (c) the level of disruption that will ensue in any institution during a gap between dismissed and new personnel.

It is essential to determine—and prioritize—which positions in which sectors should be vetted lest they pose a threat to immediate post-conflict security and undermine public confidence in the transition. (In various cases, this has included the military, security, intelligence forces, judiciary, teachers, financial officials, media, and health professionals.)

In the initial phase, vetting must focus on removal of unsuitable personnel from police and security forces. This serves to enforce immediate public order for the interim administration, break up cabals of corrupt or criminal officers, and dissuade victims from taking private vengeance.

Vetting of prosecutorial and judicial personnel must keep pace with the vetting of security and police forces in order to ensure a functioning justice system. Leaving corrupt judges in place can undermine efforts to reform police forces and can facilitate a return to police abuse.

Vetting must take place in all areas of government, and often in the private sector as well as the public sector, in order for the public to feel justice has been served. Private

sector vetting may follow its own procedures, but should be monitored so as not to violate the democratic principles that will govern under the new regime.

As seen in several prior cases, accusations and purges can easily get out of control. Vetting should be thorough, particularly in the security forces, police and judiciary, but should be constrained.

IV. What Criteria are applied?

In previous vetting programs in various countries, the following categories of implicated personnel have been excluded from key positions on the basis of vetting:

- Senior officers (e.g. from colonels up), except as truly needed
- War criminals and human rights abusers
- Secret police informants
- Senior party officials
- Drug traffickers/members of criminal syndicates
- Those deemed unqualified based on professional history and competence

V. What sources of information provide the basis for vetting?

Ideally, vetting should be based on a comprehensive review of as many sources of information as possible given the possibility of incomplete, missing, and falsified records. It is necessary, therefore, to be able to fuse/filter disparate sources of information and to account for distorted/politically-based allegations.

It is imperative to immediately locate, secure and restrict access to all relevant personnel records, intelligence files, court and prison records, and other relevant databases as quickly as possible. These will provide the main basis for vetting. Unsecured, these records will be destroyed, falsified, or used for blackmail. In addition to records of the new deposed government, vetting can draw on data from publicly available news sources, international human rights groups, and foreign intelligence sources. Compile as many records and sources of information as possible before the transition.

Elements of vetting review:

- (1) Records and data sources as noted above.
- (2) Publication of candidate lists (ideally in local papers and in refugee centers abroad), with a request for the public to submit any relevant information regarding candidates.
- (3) Applicants should be required to self-report their history and activities, with any falsehood being an immediate disqualifier. Self-reported histories can be cross-

checked against available records and witness testimony. Misrepresentations, even impersonations, are common.

(4) Vetting review must not only clear an individual of culpability for abuses of the old regime, but also determine his/her objective qualifications and ability to adapt to the norms and practices of a new, accountable and civilian-led democratic government.

VI. What are the key procedural considerations?

Fewer cases versus faster processing: Vetting can target and purge specific individuals based on past abuses. This is by definition retrospective and retributive, and consequently a higher due process standard is required. Alternatively, all current holders of the designated positions are required to re-apply. In this case, vetting is prospective and, like routine civil service screening, a lower due process burden can be applied to the program. In the second scenario, continuation of the applicants in their jobs is contingent on eventual approval in the vetting process – making it possible to more quickly remove targeted individuals while review of other cases proceeds more slowly.

Due process: Three due process questions routinely arise: (1) Is there a right of the vettee to confront the evidence against him/her? (2) Is representation by counsel permitted? (3) Can vetting decisions be appealed? Provision for a limited appeals process is helpful, particularly for civilian positions, in that a successful appeal by an accused abuser vindicates the legitimacy of the vetting process.

Standardization: Vetting rules may (1) be rigid and uniform, to expedite the process and avoid the appearance or reality of arbitrariness, or (2) allow for subjective evaluation, taking into account such factors as severity of misdeeds, mitigating factors, coercion or other reasons for taking the action in question, later remorse/change in conduct, or distance in time from the abuse.

Duration: Dismissal from the security forces may be permanent, given concern over renewed abuses. Civilian vetting, on the other hand, is usually of temporary duration (typically 5-10 years) to allow breathing space for government and society to re-create itself, after which they move to a level playing field.

VII. What happens to the purged?


Types of sanctions which may result from vetting: Those sanctions which have been employed in various countries include employment dismissal; exclusion from appointed office; exclusion from elected office; exclusion from designated private sector

positions or professions; denial of benefits (including government pension); exclusion from suffrage.

Prevent the purged from becoming spoilers: Those vetted out cannot simply be sent home, but must be placed in some sort of organized, remunerated activity. This temporarily ensures their livelihood so they do not turn to criminal activity, facilitates observation of their interactions with former colleagues, and prevents them from organizing a troublemaking underground force.

VIII. What happens to those who survive the vetting process?

Probation: Those retained – particularly in the police and security forces – should be retained on a probationary basis. The probationary period should be long enough to (1) allow refugees to return and provide additional relevant information, and (2) permit monitoring of performance to ensure suitability. This may last up to two years. It may be useful to put outside personnel in place to closely supervise the work of these remaining employees during this period.



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Iraq Corps - Iraqi Military Reconstruction

On 23 May 2003 the US civilian administrator for Iraq, L. Paul Bremer, abolished several ministries and institutions of Saddam Hussein's regime, and disbanded the Iraqi army, declaring them illegal.

The ministries of defense and information were among institutions being dissolved as well as the military and security courts, the Iraqi Olympic Committee, and the Republican Guard units. Bremer's office said that plans are afoot to create a new Iraq Corps as the first step toward forming "a national self-defense capability for a free Iraq." The statement said the corps will be "professional, nonpolitical, military effective and representative of all Iraqis." The move is aimed to get rid of Ba'athist influences in the military and security institutions. It follows last week's decision to abolish Hussein's Ba'ath party and order the dismissal of party officials from the civil service.

It is estimated that about 400,000 people, mostly military personnel, will lose their jobs.

Originally, the hope was in fact that large elements of the army would stay intact, and that the municipal police [the political security police] would very quickly return to their beats in Baghdad and other areas. The team under the former civil administrator [Jay] Garner was really taken somewhat by surprise in that the apparatus of the Iraqi government went home. The army dissolved.

Ten years of sanctions and continual air patrols, the destruction of nearly all air defense capabilities, and two wars, left the Iraqi military expectantly decimated. If the United States ins not going to maintain a persistent armed presence in Iraq, then Iraq must prepare to defend itself in the absence of or in concert with US forces.

The rebuilding of the Iraqi military will, in all likelihood, be closely supervised and controlled by the United States as part of an overall rebuilding process. The rebuilding of the Iraqi military seems paradoxical considering the amount of time and effort spent dismantling the Hussein regime. However, a stable and well-trained indigenous military force will be key in maintaining internal stability and filling the power-void left by the removal of the Hussein regime.

It is important for the United States to monitor and supervise Iraq's military reconstruction as the US has an interest in reequipping Iraq with US military equipment. The use of US systems would require significant training and allow the US to have continued military influence in the country long after significant US units had departed. Likewise, if left to its own accord Iraq would likely turn to other available systems on the open arms sales markets, most likely Russian, or Russian derivative arms that the Iraqi military already has experience using.

Concerns over Iraq eventually turning these weapons against its neighbors should be limited when one considers that, as in Saudi Arabia, significant dependence on US technical advisors would exist to maintain the most sophisticated weapons systems. In addition the dependence on US technical expertise and training will ensure the US will have a continued military presence within the country.

Naturally, it will be difficult to guarantee that a defense force constructed in any country would maintain a permanent defensive poster. It would be important to formulate a control regime that would monitor Iraqi defense forces as well as integrate US technical personnel to attempt to insure that Iraq would continue to maintain a force structure with limited offensive capabilities.

This assessment assumes that Iraq will be able to resume normal oil production by the beginning of 2004 and military spending will be structured in a way to allow for maximum resources going toward infrastructure reconstruction. Assuming 22 billion dollars in oil revenues with 5 per cent available for defense allocation, Iraq would be able to allocate approximately 1.1 billion per year on defense. Procurement structuring would likely take place over five to ten years with an increasing in defense allocation to coincide with completion of infrastructure projects.

A caveat of military reconstruction will be that none of the systems provided will surpass Israeli systems and the force structure will primarily defensive in nature and therefore not an immediate threat to any of its neighbors.

Security Forces 200,000

Why this number?

These are enough troops to perform internal defense but not enough to launch offensive attacks against neighbors.

Tanks

M1A2 500

M60A3 750

Why this number?

Saudi Arabia and Jordan both utilize M-60 systems and Saudi Arabia has M1A2 tank systems but nearly half are in storage because of a shortage of trained tank crews.

APC

M2 500

LAV 500

M113 1500

Why this number?

Smaller force structure--Iraqi defense force will likely be a much smaller force than the Iraqi army prior to the first gulf war. To be effective, these troops need to be able to be highly mobile.

MOR

81mm

M29 81-mm 400

107mm

M30 107-mm 100

120mm

M121 120-mm 100

Why this number?

This number corresponds with proposed force structure and based on similar sales to other countries

Towed Artillery

105mm

M101/M102 100

155mm

M198 50

M114 50

Why this number?

This number is in line with artillery systems found in Saudi Arabia and Jordan.

Self-Propelled Artillery

105mm

M52 150

155mm

M109A6 110

203mm

M110 100

Why this number?

This number is in line with artillery systems found in Saudi Arabia and Jordan.

MRLS

M270 MLRS 50

RÇL

M-67 90mm 100

M40 200

Utility vehicles

AMEV 100

M548 500

Why this number?

It is like that Iraq would need this number of support vehicles to operate and supply its defense force.

Anti tank weapons

M136 AT4 500

M47 Dragon 750

Why this number?

Iraq will need systems to protect against armor assault from its neighbors. The optimal number of systems was derived from the number of AT systems possessed by Saudi Arabia and the relative size of armored forces possessed by Syria and Iran.

Attack Helicopters

AH-64 50

Why this number?

Attack helicopters have a relatively short range and can not hold territory. As a result they are perfect for a combined role but in and of themselves do not possess an inherent offensive threat. Sophisticated attack helos would be dependent upon US technical expertise for optimal usage and maintenance.

General-purpose Helicopters

S-70 15

UH-60

25

SA-365n 5

Bell 406c 15

Why this number?

These numbers are in line with other militaries' in the region of similar size and structure.

Air Force

25,000

Fixed wing

F-15 40

F-16 160

Why this number?

F-15's are flown by the Saudi air force. They are modern fighting aircraft but are not the most advanced US aircraft being flown in the area. The F-15 is a capable of conducting both air and ground missions however, the variant likely to be sold or leased to Iraq would be the F-15C which is an air superiority craft not a ground attack craft.

The F-16 Fighting Falcon is a compact, multirole fighter aircraft. It is highly maneuverable and has proven itself in air-to-air combat and air-to-surface attack. It provides a relatively low-cost, high-performance weapon system.

In an air combat role, the F-16's maneuverability and combat radius (distance it can fly to enter air combat, stay, fight and return) exceed that of all potential threat fighter aircraft. It can locate targets in all weather conditions and detect low flying aircraft in radar ground clutter. In an air-to-surface role, the F-16 can fly more than 500 miles (860 kilometers), deliver its weapons with superior accuracy, defend itself against enemy aircraft, and return to its starting point. An all-weather capability allows it to accurately deliver ordnance during non-visual bombing conditions.

Naval Forces

FF-1040 Garcia 3

PC- 1 Cyclone 30

Anti mine 5

Service Craft 2

Why this number?

Iraq will have no need for offensive naval systems but well need craft capable of patrolling costal areas and guarding oil assets.

Air Defense

20mm M163 PIVADS 100 30mm AMX-30 50

SAM MIM-104 Patriot 5 MIM-23 Hawk 10 M6 Linebacker 100 FIM-92A Stinger and Redeye missiles 500 MIM-72 Chaparral FAADS 10 Why this number?

Air defense will be a priority. Likely systems would include multi-use missile and air defense systems to protect against scud and mig systems prevalent in the area.

Iraqi Military Reconstruction

Army	200),000
	Armor	
M1-A2	500	
M-60	750	
	APC	
M2	500	
LAV	500	
M113	1500	
	MOR	A DIT OF
81mm		
M-29	400	
107mm		
M-30	100	
120mm		
M-121	100	
	Towed Artillery	
105mm	-	
M-101/102	100	
155mm		
M-198	50	
M-114	50	
	Self-Propelled Artille	ry
105mm		
M-52	150	
155mm		
M-109a1b/a2	110	
203mm		
M-110A2	100	
MRL		
Astros II	50	
RCL		
M-67 90mm	100	
M-40A1 106mm	200	

	Utility vel	hicles	
AMEV	100		
M548A3	500		
	Anti-Tank W	/eapons	
TOW	500		
M-47	750		
Attack Helicopte	r	1,000	
AH-64	50		
Ge	neral Purpose	e Helicopter	
S-70 A	15		
UH-60a (Medivac)	25 (5)		
SA-365n	10		
Bell 406c	25		
Air Force		25,000	
	Fixed w	ring	
F-15c	40		
F-16c	160		
	Naval Fo	rces	
Frigate	3		
Patrol	30		
Anti mine	5		
	Air Defe	ense	
20mm			
M-163	100		
30mm			
AMX 30	50		
	SAM	1922/00/97 (1922)	
PAC	5		
IHawk	10		
M6	100		
Stinger and redeye missiles	500		
M48 Chaparral	10		



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Education and Its Important Role in the National Defense of Iraq

by

Brigadier General (Staff) Najeb M. Al-Salhi

In a country such as Iraq, which has been susceptible to radical political, economic and social changes, and after its participation in several external wars with its neighbors and internal wars in the north, the south and even the country's central region, there has been a resultant intervention and haziness of the doctrine and philosophy of national defense. That doctrine requires a number of educational and training programs in accordance with a new strategy of defense that reflects the policy of a new government. These programs will include the following benefits:

- Education of the people, especially the new generation, in the doctrine of Iraqi
 patriotism and what Iraq means as a geographic region, a people, a political
 system, what are Iraq's international boundaries, Iraq's human resources, Iraq's
 rich popular culture (without chauvinism or fanaticism), and what are the
 rights and duties of the Iraqi citizen
- National symbols, such as the Iraqi flag and the Iraqi national anthem, and their importance
- Peaceful coexistence among the populations inside the Iraqi nation
- The principles of human rights under the auspices of a democratic and pluralistic government
- The meaning of Iraq's national defense, including moral and political defense
 by means of confirmation of love of Iraq and commitment to protection of its
 interests, its land, its resources and culture, and confirmation of its national
 unity and the cohesion of Iraq's people

In regard to military and civil defense, education and training can enable the following:

- A culture of change and transition from war to peace, including the conditions and requirements of such change
- · Civil defense programs
- A culture of protective security and intelligence
- Educational and protective programs about wars of mass casualties, such as chemical, biological and nuclear wars, and training on the use of suitable specialized procedures

- Programs for basic military training of volunteers for limited time-periods and their introduction with recreational and educational programs
- Activation of scouting programs (Boy Scouts), young peoples' programs, and youth camps
- The priority importance of sports programs for physical fitness and readiness, such as programs for parachute jumping, climbing, rifle marksmanship, field navigation and map reading, individual combat, survival camping, etc.
- General awareness of the Iraqi people about wars in the world, their causes, their causes and methods, their results, how to avoid such wars, and the human and material lessons learned from such wars

Walter Slocombe

From:

CIV, JCS J5

Sent:

Tuesday, April 01, 2003 16:53

To: Subject: Walter Slocombe FW: Iraqi MOD







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MOD Guidance.doc TheFutureoftheIraq4I-Salhi CV.doc (32 iMilitary,do...

KB)

Mr. Slocombe --

Col

asked that I forward these to you.

Best,

----Original Message----

From: COL, JCS J5 Sent: Tuesday, April 01, 2003 4:36 PM To: , CIV, JCS J5

Subject: FW: Iraqi MOD

----Original Message----

From:

Sent: Sunday, March 30, 2003 10:57 PM To:

Subject: Iraqi MOD

Please confirm you recieved this. This is in prep for the meeting with Walter Slocombe today. There are a couple of things here.

- Start of paper I drafted on ORHA objectives and Immediate actions. This is a working paper, so comments and corrections are much appreciated.
- 2.) There is also a paper from Najeb Sahli, an Iraqi Brigadier who defected
- in 1995. I met with Najeb last week and friends of his sent me this paper that he worked on with SAIC. It says all the right things, but the word is he is not a trusted agent. We are suspect as to his real motives.
- 3.) Also attached is a CV on Najeb. You might run the trap line on his credentials down there. We are doing it over here.

.
http://join.msn.com/?page=features/junkmail

Free Officers & Civilian Movement November 1st 2001

The Future of the Iraqi Military and Its Role in Civil Society

When we think about a new regime in Iraq and contemplate the horizons of a bright future, our high hopes oblige us to make an effort to formulate a way in which to sketch the features and the essential nature of the Iraqi military establishment, in a way that makes it a vital force which can share, along with the other social and national institutions, in the building of a new and democratic Iraq. At the same time, the military must be able to defend effectively Iraq's national borders and to maintain Iraqi sovereignty and the unity of Iraq's lands.

Iraqi National Security

Any group of nations, regardless of the differing nature of their regimes, will all work to guarantee their national security, which is simply an expression in which are enshrined the following fundamental values which nations strive to perpetuate and to protect:

- 1) the ability to survive and continue as a national entity and to guarantee political independence and the unity of the national territory.
- 2) the ability to attain a certain level of economic well-being.
- the ability to perpetuate and maintain the national characteristics of the country.

In other words, national security means preservation of the manner of living in society, religion, culture, intellectual life, science, and the arts, among others. The effort that the state exerts in order to preserve these fundamental values is called "the national security policy of the state". Every effort or step (and even refraining from taking action) that an individual or a group undertakes to attain or perpetuate these fundamental values is described as serving "the national interest". In addition, the preparation by the state of steps that it will take to guarantee the above-mentioned goals is called "the higher strategy of the state".

Further, the various lines of general action designed to attain the higher strategy are referred to by the term "strategy" and this term can be used to describe many things, such as: political strategy, or economic strategy, or military strategy, or environmental strategy, among others. In each case, the term strategy applies to all the lines of approach deployed in support of a given policy in any particular field, as well as the apparatus used to attain that policy, including all the variations and permutations of approach. On the other hand, something that is too often the case, the pursuit of this grand strategy should not lead to a situation in which a part of the overall strategy ("a branch strategy") ends up harming the grand (overall) strategy or is in contradiction with the other strategies. In other words, it is imperative that in the future the political strategy for Iraq not conflict with the country's military strategy.

At present, discussions about the future policy of Iraq (post-Saddam Hussein) are focused on the creation of a democratic regime, the development of a civil society and the adoption of a policy of openness ("infitah") to the world (and in particular the neighboring countries and the great powers, especially the USA), the settlement of disputes through peaceful diplomatic means, and the adoption of effective economic and social development schemes which would compensate the Iraqis for past backwardness. It is therefore natural that this state of affairs should be reflected in the military establishment in a clear and tangible way. The military should be made into an attractive establishment, well diversified and capable, which is self-controlled and compatible with the new democratic life and with the peaceful tendencies of the new state policy. The Iraqi military will need to make a commitment to adopt modern ideas and theories concerning national security. No longer will security be attained only by the strength of the army or by its size or by the advanced technology of its weapons systems, or by the militarization of the people and placing them in a perpetual mass mobilization.

At present, the concept of security has come to mean comprehensive development and the creation of an educated and aware citizenry which is civilized and liberated and has the power to make its will felt. Democracy is a strength. Economic and social development are strengths. All of these strengths serve to ensure the national security, which is tied to the freedom of the individual with an indissoluble bond, one complementing the other. It is not possible to violate the freedom and the rights of the individual on the pretext of protecting the security of the political regime or of the state from the threats and dangers which surround it, although many dictatorial regimes have used this argument as a justification. In other words, it is not possible to talk about national security in the context of a deprived citizenry which does not enjoy a certain degree of democracy or is living under a repressive regime based upon the denial of intellectual and political pluralism, where constitutional institutions, legislative and executive authorities, and the judiciary have been converted into empty forms. When the right of the citizens to share in political decision-making is undermined, when individual initiative is paralyzed, when justice is demolished, when human existence is distorted, when there is aggression against political, religious, and cultural freedoms, then there is no guarantee for the security or the stability or any political regime which rules under a police tyranny. There is no way to achieve national security other than through a democratic political system that respects the basic freedoms of the individual.

In this regard, the well-known American political expert Henry Kissinger commented that there cannot be a contradiction between the demands of national security and the demands of individual freedoms, because both depend upon the other.

The Military Establishment...and Development

The Iraq of the future is in need of comprehensive development in all aspects (the economy, services, sciences, human resources, and others). In addition, at present military expenditures constitute a terrible waste of the nation's resources, sapping the

national strength and taxing currently ineffective human resources, while weapons, war materials, and equipment are imported at astronomical prices.

Iraqi military expenditure reached (as was reported in an article by Nidhal al-Laythi in "al-Hayat" on July 7, 1995) in the years 1981, 1982, and 1983 the level of 24.6, 25.1, and 25.3 billion dollars respectively. At the same time, the revenues from oil during the same three years were only 10.4, 10.1, and 7.8 billion dollars. This means that the ratio of military expenditure to oil revenue during these three years was 236.1%, 248.5%, and 324%. In addition, these figures are certain to be too low, because they do not take into account secret deals. Further, the level of military expenditures increased markedly during the following years from what it was in 1983. For one thing, the prices of weapons and war equipment have become much more expensive today for many reasons. We should not forget that the estimates of the losses which were inflicted upon the Iraqi economy exceed 600 billion dollars, in other words more than 60 times the real value of the gross domestic product in the year 1993. This figure includes the value of what was destroyed during the Gulf War, compensation paid during the two wars (Gulf and Iran), foreign loans, and the expenditures of the arms inspections committees. We point to the estimates of economic analysts who say that the future of Iraq will be black during the coming years unless the way of doing business is changed and comprehensively reviewed from the bottom up.

Necessity and logic dictate the setting of priorities that guarantee the appropriate level of the necessities of life, of education, and of development of human resources. This in itself will make extensive military expenditure unlikely, or at least military expenditure will take second priority, because development and construction will become the first goal of the state.

The Size of the Military Establishment

The size and capability of the Iraqi military establishment will be determined by many factors that are too numerous to mention in this summary study. There are three principal factors, however, which must be pointed out briefly:

First: We hope that the possible threats to the country, when we are seeking a peaceful democratic regime which will strive to handle its problems with neighboring countries by peaceful means and by good will, far from recourse to weapons and the desire for wars, will be reduced to the minimum through a peaceful and open political strategy.

Second: Iraq's economic and human resources impose upon the country certain limitations that cannot be avoided.

Third: The resolutions of the UN and of the UN Security Council oblige Iraq to abide by certain limits for the armed forces. In addition, the efforts by UNSCOM are a continuation of this mandate to remove WMD and other prohibited weapons, including long- range surface-to-surface missiles. The UN resolutions, however, permit Iraq to maintain military capabilities and defensive missiles which will allow it to react to any aggression, within the restrictions on the size of the armed forces, the limitations on Iraq's military industries, and Iraq's ability to benefit from dual-use technologies. The

issue of lifting the economic and political sanctions on Iraq in the future is tied to the extent to which a future regime is committed to execute the resolutions of the international community. It has become necessary, however, to reexamine all of those resolutions, because they were imposed on an aggressive regime after its attack on and occupation of a neighboring country (Kuwait) and thus were the products of that attack, occupation, and aggression. Thus the removal of those resolutions has become a legitimate Iraqi goal, in the event that the aggressive regime is removed. In addition, the increase in armaments in the region, particularly in Iran and Turkey, makes it necessary for Iraq to have sufficient defensive capabilities to defend its territories and its vital interests and not to be weak. Weakness will only encourage those countries to violate Iraq's vital interests and even to attack Iraqi territory.

An Army for Defense or a Force for Attack

There is no clearly-defined boundary between an army committed only to defense of the country or destined for attacks outside the country. This issue depends on many factors, the most important of which are intentions and legitimate or illegitimate ambitions. The distinction can also be discerned from training programs, from planning, and from political strategies. In the end, the military establishment remains the tool of the policymakers for the attainment of their goals and plans. We can never imagine a defensive army under a regime committed to an aggressive political ideology, just as we cannot imagine the opposite. Indeed, there must be harmony between the overall strategy and its components (policy is the womb in which war grows; it is the political goal which becomes the strategic objective; war is the means to attain this political goal, but one should not view the means separately from the strategic objective.)

For these reasons, what we aspire to in the future is a defensive national army with a size and armament that conform with a policy of national defense and are consistent with the pressing demands of comprehensive development which our country requires and which does not involve of necessity any aggressive intentions. In fact, the size and quality of the Iraqi armaments at present, despite the losses that Iraq has suffered, are considered appropriate to serve as the basis for that defensive force. We will be able to compensate for deficiencies in some highly expensive areas of armament through more effective investment in Iraqi capabilities and expertise, in scientific planning, in sound use of economic resources, with concern for the individual and the development of his personal capabilities, through relationships based on humanity, justice, equality, and a recommitment to the Iraqi social fabric, which has been exposed to splits and breakdowns as a result of Saddam's dictatorial regime.

Volunteers in the Armed Forces

The army of the future must depend upon a significant number of volunteers (officers, noncommissioned officers, soldiers), for they are the important nucleus and support for the military. These volunteers should be qualified educationally, professionally, and in terms of health to form that nucleus. The extreme importance of this element should be stressed to the military leaderships at all levels of the chain of

command, because the most important elements in the command of the soldiers are the noncommissioned officers. In this regard, it will be necessary to treat an ingrained problem in the Iraqi military establishment, because the soldiers and the noncommissioned officers come from certain governorates and locations, while the officers come from other governorates. I am referring here to discrimination between Iraqis, even though they serve the same country. This discrimination is based on unreasonable assumptions and springs from political, confessional, and racial persecution. For that reason, in the future, membership in the Iraqi military and security establishments should be based on national norms, far from any distinction based on any race, religion, belief, or region. This discrimination is no longer valid in the selection of officers, noncommissioned officers, or soldiers. Nor is it acceptable that key leadership positions be filled on the basis of discrimination concerning ideology, race, origin, or politics, as is the case at present.

Indeed, it is necessary for the Iraqi military college, the Iraqi staff college, and the rest of the other Iraqi military schools to include young men and officers of all the different types in Iraq, in a way that truly represents the demographic realities of the country. This point will become a virtual litmus test of the intentions of the new Iraqi political regime and will become a reflection of its true orientation, not only on the level of the military establishment, but also on other political levels. The extent of the regime's seriousness in implementing these reforms will show whether it can move in a positive direction and whether it has a just and evenhanded attitude toward Iraq's citizens. The opposite is true as well. Repeated experiences have caused Iraqis not to believe in promises and not to be satisfied with what is written in the constitution or in the laws or in political pronouncements. Instead, Iraqis look at what is happening concerning the practical implementation of what was published or announced.

What applies to these military training institutions should also be evident throughout the leadership structure of the Iraqi armed forces, for there are many ingrained problems in this area which cannot be solved other than by an evenhanded and egalitarian approach which puts all Iraqis on the same starting line. The regime of Saddam committed serious crimes against the people and favored one soldier over another and one officer over another, including even the positions filled by staff officers who were graduates of the staff college. There is discrimination...it operates in regard to the movement of troops, although it is not permitted in regard to work in the field of military intelligence. This discrimination becomes imbedded in the training process and prevents the exercise of leadership. All of this rises from irresponsible assumptions and is attributed to an anxiety about security. There should not be anything preventing an officer from graduating without restrictions into the armed services other than his competence and his absolute loyalty to the country (Iraq). In other words, his beliefs, his race, or his region should not stand in the way of the fulfillment of the legitimate aspirations of any person in Iraq, most particularly in the armed forces.

The Elimination of Artificial Formations

It has become necessary to review the military formations created to protect the regime, such as the *Republican Guards*, the *Special Republican Guards*, and *various other security organizations*. These units should be disbanded and their cadres should be dispersed, because they were formed in the service of the dictatorial regime and according to discriminatory principles that should not be allowed to continue under a new regime that is committed to democratic equality and to human rights. All of the equipment and arms of these units should be returned to the united, national Iraqi military.

In addition, the persons in these units should be handled with caution. Do not attribute the crimes of Saddam in an overly emotional way to those belonging to all these institutions. These units include honest officers and nationalist elements who have committed no crime against the people. This makes it necessary to be precise and to be completely objective. Accusations should only be directed against active and effective elements who persisted in their support for Saddam. These should be singled out, but only as few as possible.

The Building of Nationalist Armed Forces

The Iraqi armed forces and the army should be rebuilt according to the tenets and programs of democratic life and the new political atmosphere, and should reflect as well the general situation in the country. There is considerable educational literature that has been published concerning how to remove the military mentality and hostile mind-set and how to develop the latent humanitarian impulse that is also present in each individual. There also must be remedies for the negative effects caused by the dictatorial systems and methods and the paralysis resulting from overly bureaucratized activity, which defined the nature of the forms of social interaction within the armed forces.

Compulsory Military Service

There must be a review of the laws pertaining to compulsory national service and to reserve duty in a way that is appropriate for the special situation in Iraq. The country is in need of comprehensive development, in a way that will mandate a reduction in the length of service to the shortest term possible, with no possibility of extending that term, no matter what the reasons. It is important to treat the problems and the frustrations that have afflicted the youth of Iraq as a result of erroneous policies. There needs to be a new emphasis on scholastic achievement for Iraqi youths, on teaching them various skills, on raising scientific qualifications. This needs to be done in tandem with a new system in the military for recruiting, for selection, and for training. This new approach must also be part of a system that is fair to all Iraqis and guarantees the most productive investment of effort and energy, making compulsory military service a humane and patriotic interval that takes place on an accelerated basis, is a known quantity, and is a positive experience for all.

Respect for Constitutional Institutions

An effort, based on a rapidly-introduced educational program, is needed which can inculcate in the armed forces a respect for democratic, constitutional institutions that represent the will of the people and a commitment to support the decisions of the people. The necessary measures should be taken to prevent a repetition of the old phenomenon of military coups. In addition, instruction on human rights should be one of the primary topics in military educational institutions and in military units, so that the armed forces are in conformity with the prevailing humanitarian concerns of the country. Humanitarian concerns must be impressed upon all those belonging to the armed forces, from officers to soldiers. It is really embarrassing that officers and soldiers receive instruction in security and military intelligence without knowing anything ahout human rights.

Defining the Mission of the Army

The mission of the army is defined as the defense of the country, protection of national sovereignty, and protection of the constitution and the laws. The use of the army in the case of internal problems and disputes is excluded. The natural location for the army is inside the military barracks. The specific duties of the army are to be defense of the horders and protection of national unity. In addition, the army is to preserve the democratic regime and to protect the regime from the dangers of factionalism and from plots.

Political Inclinations and Party Tendencies

The armed forces are to be above political inclinations, party tendencies, and ideological currents, in order to protect their unity, their national identity, and the desired level of professionalism. The military must be removed from the causes of division and factionalism. It must be assured that there is no opportunity provided, that the atmosphere is not allowed to develop, for the formation or the proliferation of blocs within the military, which might be exploited under certain conditions in ways that to not serve the national democratic effort and the true interests of the country.

Indeed, the entry of the military into politics created a dangerous precedent in the political life of Iraq. The result of this intervention was a convulsion in the political stability of the country that exposed the unity of the armed forces to divisions, as well as the removal from the military of effective leaders and commanders. This led to the exploitation of the military and to its inevitable unpopularity, because it was involved in endless adventures, entered numerous wars, and was exploited as an instrument of suppression against the people and liquidation of political opponents. This was in violation of the rights of the citizenry and of the fundamental responsibilities of the military. For this reason, this is no justification for the politicization of the armed forces, which does not in any case accord with the fundamentals of democracy and the objectives for which the military was created.

The Defense Budget

The drawing up of a military budget must be in conformity with a well-considered program that takes into consideration the most pressing requirements for the defensive requirements of the military and the development of its technical and human capabilities. This must be done in a way that conforms to the requirements of comprehensive national development. The size of the military budget should be announced yearly, along with the other ministerial budgets.

Military Manufacturing Enterprises

There should be an effort to make enterprises involved in manufacturing military equipment operate according to their productive capabilities. The programs of the enterprises should be defined according to Iraq's defensive needs. All excess production capacity should be turned into civilian productive enterprises. These military enterprises should participate in meeting the requirements of the army and the armed forces in terms of maintenance and industrial production of traditional defensive items. These enterprises should be developed in a way that assures self-sufficiency within the military and contributes to the comprehensive development of the country.

Supervision of Military Affairs

It has become necessary to have complete supervision over the affairs of the military, to keep an eye on military locations, activities, and ranks. It is essential to make sure of the return of the Iraqi military to normal civilian life. In accordance with that goal, military personnel must be made ready to be effective elements who can participate in the new democratic life of Iraq and can contribute to its prosperity. On another important level, there should be a study concerning compensation for military men who were exposed to dire penalties because of their stands on national principles and policy. This study should examine how to guarantee their professional rights, their retirement rights, and their military accomplishments, specifically salary and military ranks, but also including other rights.

Modern Expertise

There should be reliance upon modern foundations in military education and training, which will cost less in time and money. Modern technical know-bow among the military should be utilized and the military should become open to the world. Iraq should send military technical and cultural delegations to the advanced countries to develop and exchange expertise with the militaries of the modern world. The level of military and political culture of the Iraqi armed forces needs to be raised in a way that strengthens the humanitarian outlook and the desire for peaceful solutions to problems that arise.

The System of Mobilization and Calling to Arms

A new Iraq military of the appropriate size and armament requires a modern system for general mobilization and calling up the people to arms, as well as well-developed plans to call up the reserves. Such a system will save considerable expenses within the armed forces and will prevent damage to the national economy. Such a system will ensure that there is no popular anxiety or fear over the small size of the military during normal times. In addition, the speed and precision of a modern system of mobilization, something every nation is anxious to have, are considered elements of a successful response to possible crisis, particularly under future conditions in Iraq, when economic development will take first priority within the operation of rebuilding and modernizing Iraq.

Intellectual and Morale Considerations

We will need in the future to exert considerable and sincere effort to restore an adherence to the national social framework within the Iraqi armed forces. The spirit of eitizenship and brotherhood must be strengthened among those belonging to the armed forces. An Iraqi national identity needs to be created. In addition, it is essential to deal with any feelings of unreasonable discrimination among members of the military establishment. It is important that the loyalty of everyone in the military establishment be to Iraq, the military, and the constitution. The handling of any attempts within the military to form blocs, interest groups, or regional, confessional, or racial factions must be firm and decisive. The example provided by the national leadership in terms of applying the law with justice to all will be sufficient to lay a strong foundation for this new and lofty military edifice. It is incumbent upon us to foster civilized behavior in military interaction with the people. Sound citizenship depends upon that. Unhealthy attitudes of some military men toward civilians must be eliminated, and the opposite is true as well. A new page must be opened in which relations among Iraqis are governed by respect, decorum, poise, and self-control in relation to others.

The End

Nov. 1st 2001

General Najeb al-Salhi

Secretary General
Free Officers & Civilian Movement

To

Amb. Bremer Walt Slocombe

From: Subject:

Accelerating NIA Deployments

This is a preliminary report on the outcome of MG Eaton's training discussions on Sunday with the Jordanians. Because I know of the interest in Washington and Tampa in speeding up NIA deployment, I want to give you a preview of a concept MG Eaton has developed, and that I support, for doing that in a way that will not only exploit the training facilities of Jordan, but also will make more optimal use of the human resources of Iraq and the experience of the US and British armies in developing junior leadership than our present course.

The initial round of training has shown that we have access to a very large pool of rank and file enlisted men who are reasonably proficient in basic soldier skills. To some degree therefore the current program of basic skills instruction is re-teaching what many of the trainees, both enlisted and officers, already know fairly well. What is lacking is junior officers and NCOs with the leadership skills necessary to transform groups of individually trained soldiers into effective military units.

The basic concept of our proposal – which the CMATT team is developing into a detailed proposal that will be ready in a few days – is to shift our emphasis to focus very heavily on training junior officers and NCOs in the fundamentally new leadership skills needed in a proficient army. This training would be done, for the officers in Jordan using a combination of US and Jordanian military trainers, and for the NCOs, at the Kirkush base by a combination of US active duty military and contractors. The Jordanians say they could be ready to receive large numbers of officer candidates at the beginning of January 2004, and we believe the NCO "academy" at Kirkush (which would not require new facilities) could be staffed and ready by then as well.

At that point, we would stop providing large scale basic training to recruits and instead for several months concentrate entirely on training leaders. The resulting cadre of newly trained officers and NCOs would then mold the intake of former Iraqi (and PershMerga) privates – who already have the basic individual skills of a soldier – into fighting units.³

This approach would allow us by the middle of next year to have a force much closer to the 27 battalion target (probably organized in brigades, rather than divisions) now scheduled for mid 2005.

LTG Sanchez' talks on the other issues went very well, and will be reported in a separate, classified channel.

It would also be sensible to use Jordanian training facilities next year to bring back into the force junior level specialists – from tank drivers to truck mechanics to payroll clerks – who will be needed in the target force and whose specialized training would otherwise atrophy. There is also a case for doing the same with pilots and other air force personnel, but that obviously depends on a basic policy decision whether to move toward any sort of air capability.

The new army cannot rely forever on prior service privates, so eventually, perhaps as soon as the second half of 2004, we would also need to open a basic training facility – staffed almost entirely by Iraqis.

This concept, we believe, is a way to get NIA units into service faster (and probably better) than our current course. It would, however, require that we also accelerate into 2004 funding that would otherwise stretch into 2005, for the equipment and garrisons the units would need, as well as for the structure to administer, maintain, and otherwise manage and support the force. We would also have to substantially expand recruitment and make it more sophisticated, because we would during the course of the next 12 months be recruiting potential officers and NCOs, ex-servicemen with special skill sets, and much larger numbers of ex-privates.

IRAQI CIVIL DEFENSE CORPS PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE

Current as of: 01 0845D Aug 03

PURPOSE: The purpose of this guidance is to provide media handling instructions for the implementation and mission of the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (ICDC).

BACKGROUND: The concept of an ICDC was approved on July 11, 2003 and subsequently referred to at press briefings by senior commanders (such as Lt. Gen. Abizaid and Maj. Gen. Sanchez). It is therefore firmly in the public domain. No details have yet been made available.

CJTF7 FRAGO 488 dated 23 Jul 03 directs all Major Subordinate Commands (MSCs) to begin recruiting immediately. Hiring is authorized and visible activity may have occurred already.

IO is directed to encourage Iraqi support and PAO is directed to ensure ICDC is widely recognized and understood.

POSTURE: The PA posture is Active.

STATEMENT: The Combined Joint Task Force-7 is establishing an ICDC with nine battalions located in Baghdad and throughout Iraq in the north, north-central, south-central and south regions of the country. The ICDC battalions are attached directly to Coalition divisions and work side-by-side with the Coalition to provide an Iraqi face on daily internal security operations. The ICDC security forces will enhance Coalition operations by initially providing language skills, cultural knowledge and support. Eventually the security forces will form units to execute missions as independent fire teams, squads, platoons and companies.

ISSUE AND CONSTRAINTS: The concept of the ICDC places it between the New Iraqi Army and the Facility Protection Service (FPS). The scope of the ICDC as described in the FRAGO means that it will overlap both of these forces, in terms of capability, training, equipment and recruitment. This will confuse external audiences, including potential recruits, and make us vulnerable to accusations of lack of clarity.

In order to avoid these issues, but not unduly constrain commanders, for presentational purposes the scope of ICDC is confined to operating only directly with Coalition Forces, as part of joint forces, and not above squad level.

It will be acknowledged that the ICDC could develop, but that development is not planned. However, if commanders so wish, they can recommend changes. Any changes will be approved only once the concept of the NIA and FPS are fully accepted. Any significant development after the first year would probably be made by those other than CJTF7.

Terms and conditions of service for recruits will need careful handling to ensure they are not misled about their ultimate liability without discouraging recruiting. For example, they may have to serve away from home if included in escort missions. To date Terms and Conditions of Service have not been published, but are needed urgently to prepare for questions and answers.

CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS: Active recruiting for the ICDC will be preceded by a public announcement. This will be made at a central Press Conference in Baghdad and then repeated at MSC level with local emphasis.

PA will prepare a statement and response to questions. The central announcement will be made by a CJTF7 spokesman and a "subject expert" nominated by CJTF7 C3 (Maj. MSC arrangements will be directed by Division PAOs.

A media release will be issued following the announcement by CJTF7.

SUMMARY: For presentational purposes, the scope of the ICDC will be limited. CJTF7 PA will co-ordinate the announcement and preparation of responses to questions and handling of subsequent enquiries.

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS:

Q1: What is the purpose behind the creation of the ICDC?

A1: The initiative expedites the establishment of a safe and secure environment in Iraq, facilitates the transition to a new Iraqi government, fosters a sense of Iraqi national pride, stimulates Iraqi economic recovery and creates the foundation for future U.S.-Iraqi military relations.

Q2: What is the ICDC?

A2: A corps will provide individual Iraqis to augment coalition patrols and provide a highly visible symbol of Iraqis contributing to establishing a secure environment. The individuals may be formed into teams to execute low threat security operations in conjunction with Coalition forces such as convoy security, fixed site security and linguist support.

Q3: Why is the ICDC not a multi-ethnic nationally representative organization?

A3: ICDC is a multi-ethnic organization, but regionally recruited and based. Therefore, the demographics reflect those of the local Governorate.

Q4: Who is excluded? Why are they excluded?

A4: Just like with the NIA, former Iraqi officers holding the rank of Colonel and above are excluded from joining the ICDC.

Q5: Is the ICDC focused towards a certain type of security?

A5: Individuals will execute low threat security operations to include: coalition linguist support, coalition HUMINT enhancement, contractor security, contractor vehicle drivers,

fixed site security, natural disaster assistance, humanitarian aid support, route security and convoy security.

Q6: Is the ICDC, a military organization similar to the National Guard?

A6: No, ICDC security forces are full time. Therefore they cannot concurrently work for the fixed site security program, border guard program, local police organizations, NIA or another employer.

Q7: What type of individuals can join the ICDC?

A7: Recruits will reflect local Governorate demographics and include former vetted NIA officers and soldiers, new recruits with no prior military experience and soldiers recruited with the assistance of local Iraqi leaders.

Q8: Is the ICDC similar to the NIA?

A8: It will have similarities to the NIA but have different responsibilities. It will be locally based and members will live at home. All soldiers will be equipped with AK-47s but not other weapons.

Q9: How will the ICDC be equipped?

A9: Initially the units will be minimally resourced with most of the soldiers living at home. Recruits are encouraged to provide their own personal weapons, which will be controlled by the ICDC.

Q10: What if someone wants to join the ICDC but has no weapon?

A10: If someone does not possess the required weapon, they will be equipped with an AK-47.

Q11: Who will recruit and train the ICDC?

A11: Coalition Divisional Commanders are responsible for recruiting and individual and collective training of ICDC soldiers and integration with Coalition forces. Training is at the discretion of the Brigade Commander based on the area of operations, the performance level of recruits, and security tasks.

Q12: How much will Coalition forces oversee recruiting?

A12: Recruiting districts will correspond to current military regions occupied by Coalition divisions.

Q13: What will be required of people wishing to become part of the ICDC?

A13: Individuals must be able vetted and registered using the same standards as the NIA, they must pass the minimum training requirements, and they must conduct a basic medical screening.

Q14: What are the training requirements?

A14: Candidates will receive basic training instructions to achieve a common standard. Classes will be a minimum of two hours. The curriculum will consist of the following:

Weapons Familiarization, Basic First Aid, Human Rights, Rules of Engagement, Introduction to English, Basic Physical Fitness, and Civics training.

Q15: How will the ICDC be paid?

A15: The Ministry of Internal Security and Defense will coordinate the monthly payment of payroll for ICDC security forces.

Q16: When will the ICDC be implemented?

A16: CPA approved the ICDC program on July 11. Upon completion of individual training, the ICDC security forces initially augment into Coalition forces.

Q17: How much will recruits be paid?

A17: They will be paid the same as the NIA. CPA anticipates releasing the NIA pay tables on or about 15 August. ICDC people in administrative in-processing or individual training status will receive \$60 per month.

Q18: What will be the policy of the ICDC?

A18: ICDC will adhere to all policies established for the NIA and will be aligned with Iraqi law.

Q19: What challenges are expected in arming the ICDC security forces?

A19: Newly hired ICDC security forces are encouraged to bring an unloaded AK-47 to training. Once the individual enters training, the weapon becomes part of the ICDC program. Compensation will be paid for the weapon. The reason ICDC security forces are encourage to bring their own weapon is that the various forces are in competition for weapons including the NIA, the Border Guards, the local police forces and the Facilities Protection Services.

Q20: How are former regime loyalists screened out?

A20: Former members of the top four tiers of Ba'athists are excluded, just as with the NIA. A list of approximately 9,000 Ba'athist individuals is available to the units. If their name is on the list, they will be prohibited from joining the ICDC.

Q21: How long is the training?

A21: All recruits will participate in a seven-day course where they must receive a satisfactory completion of the following tasks:

Required tasks	
1. Wear of uniform	6. Human rights training
2. Understand rules of engagement	7. Basic first aid
3. Weapons training and maintenance	8. Familiarization with Coalition rank
4. Searching a detainee and vehicle	9. Understanding basic commands in
	English
5. Identify UXO/IED	10. Securing a check point

Opening Remarks

The Iraqi Civil Defense Force is an initiative that Combined Joint Task Force-7 is undertaking to establish a safe and secure environment for Iraq that will facilitate the transition to a new Iraqi government, foster a sense of Iraqi national pride, stimulate Iraqi economic recovery and create the foundation for future U.S.-Iraqi military relations.

CPA approved the ICDC program on July 11. Upon completion of individual training, the ICDC security forces initially augment into Coalition forces.


CJTF7 is establishing the ICDC with nine battalions located in throughout Iraq. The ICDC battalions are attached directly to Coalition divisions and work side-by-side with Coalition forces to provide an Iraqi face on daily internal security operations. The ICDC security forces will enhance Coalition operations by initially providing language skills, cultural knowledge and support. Eventually the soldiers will form units to execute missions as independent fire teams, squads, platoons and companies.

A corps of ICDC security forces will provide individuals to augment coalition patrols and provide a highly visible symbol of Iraqis contributing to establishing a secure environment. The individuals may be formed into teams to execute low threat security operations in conjunction with Coalition forces such as convoy security, fixed site security and linguist support.

ICDC security forces will execute low threat operations to include coalition linguist support, coalition HUMINT enhancement, contractor security, contractor vehicle drivers, fixed site security, natural disaster assistance, humanitarian aid support, route security and convoy security.

Recruits will reflect local Governorate demographics and will include former vetted NIA officers and soldiers, new recruits with no prior military experience and soldiers recruited with the assistance of local Iraqi leaders.

Candidates will receive basic training instructions to achieve a common standard. Classes will be a minimum of two hours. The curriculum will consist of the following: Weapons Familiarization, Basic First Aid, Human Rights, Rules of Engagement, Introduction to English, Basic Physical Fitness level, and Civics training.



CJTF-7 Public Affairs BAGHDAD, Iraq XXXXXX

CJTF-7 COALITION PRESS INFORMATION CENTER



Release #XXXX

IRAQI CIVIL DEFENSE CORPS STARTS

BAGHDAD, Iraq – The Iraqi Civil Defense Corps started XXXX by Coalition Forces across the country to work to provide an Iraqi face to daily internal security operations conducted by the Coalition.

The ICDC is split into nine battalions located across the country and fully integrated into the Coalition operations. Initially, the ICDC will provide language skills, cultural knowledge and support to the Coalition. Eventually, the ICDC soldiers will form units to execute independent fire teams and squad level missions.

All recruits will enter a seven-day training course where they will learn rules of engagement, weapons training, searching detainees and vehicles and securing a checkpoint.

The purpose of the ICDC is to expedite the establishment of a safe and secure environment in Iraq, facilitate the transition to a new Iraqi government, foster a sense of Iraqi national pride, stimulate the economy and create a foundation for future U.S./Iraqi military relations.

The ICDC is an organization whose purpose lies between the New Iraqi Army and Facility Protection Service.

COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY BAGHDAD

MEMO

02 September 2003

FOR:

Director, Office of Management and Budget LTG Sanchez, CG, CJTF-7 and BG Hahn CS, CJTF-7

FROM:

Walt Slocoppe, Director of Security Affairs (National Security and Defense)

SUBJECT:

SECURITY SECTOR SALARIES

As we have discussed, over the past 3 days a combined team of personnel from the Ministry of Interior, CJTF-7, Baghdad Central and a number of Ministries that employ Facilities Protection Service (FPS) guards, the CPA staff and our Office of Security Affairs, collaborated to produce an agreed scheme for integrating security sector pay scales in support of the new Salary Progression Chart scheduled for publication on 4 September. This security sector scheme is captured in the attached matrices.

This model is based on the following premises, each coordinated with the Ministry of Finance:

- Persons currently employed under existing security sector pay scales are "grandfathered", at least for near term.
- The new pay scheme will take effect on 1 October 2003 and will apply to all members of the security sector, including those employed by the CPA, CJTF-7, the UN, USAID, and other agencies.
- Base pay for security sector employees will be adjusted above normal civilian rates based on the inherently hazardous and uncomfortable working conditions normally encountered by security forces. This adjustment does not apply to civilian personnel in the employ of security sector entities.
- The base pay for lowest ranking serving members (not trainees) will not exceed the Iraqi Salary Committee recommendation of \$60/month for security forces.
- FPS guards will have a lower pay scale than military, ICDC, or police forces.
- Special allowances will be paid on a case-by-case basis in very rare circumstances and then only to individuals, not groups.
- Annual step pay increases for satisfactory service are allowed.
- No step increases for performance, because performance will be the main factor in performance.
- A Death Gratuity for security forces killed in the execution of their duties will consist of
 monthly payments to the widow or children of the deceased until the children reach age 18 or
 the widow dies, whichever occurs later. The amount paid will be slightly less than the
 person's monthly salary at the time of his death.
- FPS guards in the oil and electricity industries may share in the Ministry's 30% performance bonus, when it is issued, based on documented individual productivity.

I agree that this Integrated Security Sector Pay Scheme is fair and logical. It is endorsed by the Ministry of Interior, other key Ministries and the CPA staff.

I must note, however, my significant concern with the application of these rates as a practical matter. From talking with Coalition Commanders and staffs across the country – literally from Basra thru Tikrit to Mosul – I have become convinced that the current low end of the market pay scale for an entry level policernan or soldier (not trainee) is somewhere between \$100 and \$120. Accordingly, the independent application of these pay scales will not only fail to attract the quality of recruit we seek, I believe it will absolutely prevent us from coming anywhere near manning the New Iraqi Army, the battalions of the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps, or the Iraqi Police Force in the numbers necessary to bring a safe and secure environment to this country, at least if quality is taken into account.

Accordingly, I must as firmly as possible recommend that, if the \$60 entry pay is in fact established, the CPA must put into effect an uncompromising and comprehensive application of the new Salary Progression Chart in every portion of the Iraqi public sector and in every province around the country for all grades and new entrants (subject only to the interim grandfather clause). If this is not done with thorough rigor effective base pay must be raised (possibly by special allowances). For example, the Authority could re-norm the Salary Progression Chart to reflect current market realities and allow payment of \$100 vice \$60 to the lowest ranking servicing members of security forces. This option must be carefully considered. If we don't our efforts at security sector salary reform will fail.

The greatest doubt expressed by both Iraqis and Coalition military personnel about these efforts is the challenge of attracting and retaining skilled, dedicated and honest personnel. Unless their pay is genuinely competitive, we will fail.

I stand ready to discuss any of these points at any time.

Walter B. Slocombe

ATTACHMENTS: Comparative Security Sector Pay Matricies

CORRELATION OF RANKS BY PAY GRADES $\infty \sim 0.04 \times 0.04$

GRADE	NIA / ICDC enlisted	NIA / ICDC commissioned	IPS	BORDER GUARD	FPS
SUPER A					
SUPER B		_			
1			National Commissioner	Director of Border Enforcement	
2		MG	Commissioner	Deputy Director	
3		BG	Dep Commissioner	Bureau Chief	
4		COL	Superintendent	Region Chief	Colonel
5		LTC	Inspector	Asst Chief	
6	SGM / CWO	CPT / MAJ	Lieutenant / Captain	Lieutenant / Captain	Мајот
7	SFC/MSG/WO	2LT / 1LT	Sergeant	Sergeant	
8	SGT	OFC	(Senior) Constable	(Senior) Agent	Captain
9	CPL		Constable	Agent	Sergeant
10	PVT / PFC		Constable (Probation)	Agent (Probation)	Guard
11	RCT		Trainee	Trainee	

COMPARISON OF RANKS (SHOWING INITIAL STEP INCREMENT)

GRADE	NIA / ICDC enlisted	NIA / ICDC commissioned	IPS	BORDER	FPS	
SUPER A						
SUPER B						
1		LG 1	National Commissioner 1	Dir of Border Enforcement 1		
2		MG 1	Commissioner 1	Deputy Director 1		
3		BG 1	Dep Commissioner 1	Bureau Chief 1		
4		COL 1	Superintendent 1	Region Chief 1	Colonel 1	
5		LTC 1	Inspector 1	Asst Chief 1		
6	SGM / CWO 1 2	CAPT/MAJ 1 6	Lieut / Captain 1 6	Lieut / Captain 1 6	Major 1	
7	SFC/MSG/WO 4 7 8	2LT / 1LT 6 7	Sergeant 6	Sergeant 6		
8	SGT 6	OFC 8	(Snr) Constable	(Snr) Agent 6	Captain 1	
9	CPL 7		Constable 5	Agent 5	Sergeant 1	
10	PVT / PFC 4 8		Constable (Probation) 4	Agent (Probation) 4	Guard 1	
11	Recruit		Trainee 4	Trainee 4		

ENTRY LEVEL SALARIES FOR NEW IRAQI ARMY / IRAQI CIVIL DEFENCE CORPS

			STEPS									
		Enlisted Commission	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
	1	LG	493	507	520	533	547	560	573	587	571-71	
	2	MG	382	393	403	413	424	434	444	10-11	10519	724
	3	BG	296	304	312	320	328	336	344		9	66
	4	COL	228	234	241	247	253	259	265		1201	A 1.
G	5	LTC	176	181	185	190	195	200	How it			
R A D	6 6 6	CWO CPT	136 136	139 139 139	143 143			154	158	161	165	
E	7 7 7 7	WO 1LT MSG 2LT SFC				113	116 116	119 119	122 122 122	125 125 125	128 128 128	130
	8	OFC SGT						95	97	99 99	101	
	9	CPL							79	81	83	
	10 10	PFC PVT				60	62	63	65	66 66	68	69
	11	RCT				50	Market St.	100	Tally 14	PER LINE IN	1	

ENTRY LEVEL SALARIES FOR IRAQI POLICE SERVICE

STEPS

					SIL	12						
			1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
[1	National Commissioner	493	507	520	533	547	560	573	587	600	613
	2	Commissioner	382	393	403	413	424	434	444	455	465	475
[3	Dep. Commissioner	296	304	312	320	328	336	344	352	360	368
	4	Superintendent	228	234	241	247	253	259	265	271	278	284
	5	Inspector	176	181	185	190	195	200	204	209	214	219
D	6	Captain						154	158	161	165	169
	6	Lieutenant	136	139	143	147	150		5.230	2	L-13	-66
E	7	Sergeant				113	116	119	122	125	128	130
- [8	Constable (Senior)						95	97	99	101	104
- [9	Constable					75	77	79	81	83	84
	10	Constable (Probation)				60	62	63	65	66	68	69
	11	Trainee				50				B12.	E-0.35	

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ENTRY LEVEL SALARIES FOR FACILITIES PROTECTION SERVICE

STEPS

G	
R	
A	
D	
E	

					DIEL						
		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
4	FPS Colonel	228	234	241	247	253	259	200		1	
5	The second	- Mr	1 21 1			- B. B.	\$30 D	16-49			- 1
6	FPS Major	136	139	143	147	150	154	- RW -			- 10
7			3000	1	6 8 -	27.4	1-14		200	61-11	
8	FPS Captain	83	86	88	90	92	95	168 9	F 35	45 W.	
9	Guard Sergeant	68	70	72	73	75				-23	
10	Guard	56	57	59	60	-X-9	The S				-

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COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY BAGHDAD, IRAQ

15 June 2003

MEMORANDUM FOR COMMANDER OF COALITION FORCES

SUBJECT: Commanders' Emergency Response Program

I hereby redelegate to you certain authority vested in me pursuant to Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, subject: Certain State- or Regime-Owned Property in Iraq, dated May 29, 2003. Specifically, you are hereby authorized to take all actions necessary to operate a Commanders' Emergency Response Program. This Program will enable commanders to respond to urgent humanitarian relief and reconstruction requirements within their areas of responsibility, by carrying out programs that will immediately assist the Iraqi people and support the reconstruction of Iraq. Under the Program:

- (a) Individual division-level commanders may expend seized funds in a total amount not to exceed \$500,000 per commander, provided that the amount of individual transactions carried out by each division-level commander shall not exceed \$100,000 per transaction; and
- (b) Individual brigade-level commanders may expend seized funds in a total amount not to exceed \$200,000 per commander, provided that the amount of individual transactions carried out by each brigade-level commander shall not exceed \$50,000 per transaction.
- (c) As funds are expended by division- and brigade-level commanders in accordance with subparagraphs (a) and (b) above, the funds may be replenished in like amounts not to exceed the limits specified in those subparagraphs.
- (d) Division- and brigade-level commanders shall document programs on the Program Review Board's Funding Request Form (PRB 01), and submit completed forms to the CPA PRB Program Coordinator.

This authority may be exercised in a total aggregate amount not to exceed \$10,000,000; may not be redelegated, and shall be exercised in accordance with the terms and conditions set forth in the above-referenced Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum and such other instructions as the CPA may prescribe. The authority previously delegated to you under CPA Memorandum, subject: Certain State- or Regime-Owned Property in Iraq, dated 3 June 2003, is hereby rescinded.

L/Paul Bremer, Administrator Coalition Provisional Authority

COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY BAGHDAD, IRAQ

15 June 2003

MEMORANDUM FOR REGIONAL DIRECTORS

SUBJECT: Regional Directors' Emergency Response Program

I hereby redelegate to the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) Regional Directors of Iraq certain authority vested in me pursuant to Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, subject: Certain State- or Regime-Owned Property in Iraq, dated May 29, 2003. Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) Memorandum, subject: Region Level Quick Impact Projects, dated 19 May 2003, is hereby rescinded.

Specifically, each Regional Directors is hereby authorized to take all actions necessary to operate a Regional Directors' Emergency Response Program, in order to assist the Iraqi people and support the reconstruction of Iraq, provided that:

- (a) Each Regional Director may expend seized funds in an amount not to exceed \$500,000; and
- (b) The amount of individual projects carried out by a Regional Director shall not exceed \$100,000 per project; provided further, that per project authority in excess of \$100,000 may be granted upon advance request.
- (c) As funds are expended by a Regional Director in accordance with subparagraphs (a) and (b) above, like amounts may be replenished up to the monetary limits specified in those subparagraphs for each Regional Director.
- (d) Regional Directors shall document all expenditures on CPA Program Review Board's Funding Request Form (PRB) Form 01, and submit completed forms to the CPA PRB Program Coordinator.

The authority delegated herein is separate and distinct from the authority delegated to the Regional Directors under CPA Memorandum, subject: Construction Initiative for Iraq, dated 15 June 2003. The authority delegated herein may be exercised in a total aggregate amount not be exceed \$7,000,000; may not be redelegated; and shall be exercised in accordance with the terms and conditions set forth in the above-referenced Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum and other procedures the CPA may prescribe.

L. Paul Bremer, Administrator Coalition Provisional Authority



1010 DEFENSE PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1010



MEMORANDUM FOR ADMINISTRATOR OF THE COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY

SUBJECT: Certain State- or Regime-Owned Property in Iraq

I hereby delegate to you the authority confirmed in the attached memorandum from the President, subject as above, dated April 30, 2003, regarding the seizure, sale, administration, or use of state or regime-owned property in Iraq.

Property taken under U.S. control under this delegation shall be held on behalf of and for the benefit of the Iraqi people, and shall be used only to assist the Iraqi people and support the reconstruction of Iraq. You may redelegate this authority in writing, and assign such duties and responsibilities in writing to other Department of Defense (DoD) officials as you deem necessary, and shall consider the feasibility of contracting out administrative functions related to your exercise of this authority, as appropriate and authorized by law.

The authority delegated herein shall be exercised in accordance with DoD procedures developed in consultation with the Department of the Treasury, the Department of State, and the Office of Management and Budget. These procedures shall ensure that all property subject to this delegation is appropriately accounted for, audited, and used only for the purposes specified herein. Under these procedures, DoD officials remain responsible for property under their control until the property is disbursed to recipients or to a non-DoD entity for distribution to recipients in accordance with safeguards that ensure the property will be (1) secured at all times; (2) used only for purposes authorized by law; (3) provided only to recipients who are entitled to such payments; and (4) subjected to appropriate accounting and auditing controls.

Face Welfoute

This delegation of authority shall expire 1 year following the date of this memorandum.

Attachment:

As stated

cc: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

U07602 /03

THE WHITE HOUSE

Apr:11 10, 2003

CONCRANDOM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBLIECT: Certain State- or Regime-Dwned Property in Iraq

Pursuant Chief of Dest. hief of the Armed Porces, and consistent with the Authorisation for Use of Military Porce Against Ixay Resolution of 2002 (Public av 107-241), I bereby confirm your authority to exarcise all owers, consistent with the laws and usages of war, related to he seisure, sale, administration, or use of state- or regimented cash, funds, or realizable securities in Ixay. Property elsed, sold, or administered under this memorandum shall be used only to assist the Iraqi people and support the reconstruction of rag, and such uses shall be consistent with the laws and usegus authority under the Constitution as Con and consistent us ampare

You are directed, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, the Sacretary of State, and the Director of the Office of Nanagement and Budget, to prescribe procedures to ensure that all property subject to this senorandum is appropriately accounted for, audited, and used only for the purposes specified berein.

Nothing in any prior Executive Order shall be construed to limit the authority berein confirmed, and nothing in this memoration shall be construed to limit authorities that U.S. Armed Porces may otherwise exercise under the laws and usages Ę

Mark

COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY BAGHDAD, IRAO

15 June 2003

MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN, PROGRAM REVIEW BOARD REGIONAL DIRECTORS

SUBJECT: Construction Initiative for Iraq

I hereby redelegate to the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) Program Review Board (PRB) and the Regional Directors for Iraq's North, South and South Central Regions certain authority vested in me by Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, subject: Certain State- or Regime-Owned Property in Iraq, dated May 29, 2003.

The CPA PRB shall review and is hereby authorized to approve all projects carried out under the Local Projects Element of the Construction Initiative for Iraq that exceed \$100,000, and all other projects under the Construction Initiative for Iraq, in a total aggregate amount not to exceed \$100,000,000.

Each of the above-named Regional Directors is hereby authorized to take all actions necessary to operate the Local Projects Element of the Construction Initiative for Iraq, in a total amount not to exceed \$45,000,000, in order to assist the Iraqi people and support the reconstruction of Iraq, provided that each Regional Director:

- (a) may expend seized funds in an amount not to exceed \$15,000,000; and
- (b) may approve projects with a cost of \$100,000 or less, and shall submit project proposals with a cost over \$100,000 to the CPA PRB for approval;
- (c) shall carry out projects under this Initiative in coordination with CPA or Coalition Forces engineering elements available to provide technical advice and support in the Regional Director's area of operations; and
- (d) shall document programs on CPA PRB Funding Request Form (PRB 01), and submit completed forms to the CPA PRB Program Coordinator.

The authority delegated herein may not be redelegated, and shall be exercised in accordance with the above-referenced Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum and such other procedures as the CPA may prescribe.

L. Paul Bremer, Administrator Coalition Provisional Authority

1 6/16/03

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COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY BAGHDAD, IRAQ

Action Memorandum

15 June 2003

TO:

Administrator, CPA

FROM:

Office of General Counsel

SUBJECT:

Delegations of Authority to Use Seized Iraqi Funds

Enclosed for your signature are three delegations of authority that will (1) permit division- and brigade-level commanders to use seized Iraqi funds for urgent humanitarian relief and reconstruction projects in their areas of operation; (2) extend that authority to Regional Directors, in amounts equivalent to those prescribed for division-level commanders; and (3) enable the CPA Program Review Board (PRB) and Regional Directors to carry out the CPA's \$100 million Construction Initiative for Iraq.

- In a memorandum dated April 30, 2003, the President confirmed the authority of
 the Secretary of Defense to seize, sell, administer, or use state- or regime-owned
 cash, funds, or realizable securities in Iraq. The President specified that the seized
 property may be used only to assist the Iraqi people and support the
 reconstruction of Iraq (enclosure 1).
- On May 29, 2003, the Deputy Secretary of Defense delegated to you the authority to use seized Iraqi property for the same purposes (enclosure 2).
- The three proposed memoranda at enclosures 3, 4 and 5 redelegate this authority as necessary to carry out the following CPA programs:
 - -- Commanders' Emergency Response Program. Enables brigade- and division-level commanders to spend seized funds for urgent humanitarian relief and reconstruction projects within their areas of responsibility, in respective amounts that may not exceed \$500,000 and \$200,000 at any one time, and subject to respective per-project limits of \$100,000 and \$50,000.
 - -- Regional Directors' Emergency Response Program. Provides the CPA's four Regional Directors with the same authority conferred under the Commanders' Emergency Response Program, in amounts equivalent to those assigned to division-level commanders.
 - Construction Initiative for Iraq. Authorizes CPA's North, South and South Central Regional Directors to spend up to \$15 million each in construction Projects, subject to per-project limit of \$100,000, and authorizing CPA's PRB to

approve construction projects in excess of \$100,000, and all other projects carried out under the Construction Initiative for Iraq.

ACTION REQUESTED: That the Administrator sig	n the attached delegations of
authority.	then.
COORDINATION: Chief of Staff	, Ms.

(i) avoiding the performance of a duty or negligently performing a duty

Elements

- 1. the accused had a duty to perform; and
- 2. the accused was aware of that duty; and, EITHER
 - (i) the accused did not perform that duty; and
 - (ii) the accused did not perform the duty either deliberately or by neglect, OR
 - (iii) the accused performed the duty to a poor standard; and
 - (iv) the accused performed the duty to a poor standard either deliberately or by neglect

(j) making a false statement concerning any official matter relating to the New Iraqi Army

Elements

- 1. the accused made a statement about official New Iraqi Army matters; and
- 2. the statement was false in a significant way; and
- 3. the accused knew that the statement was false at the time he made it.

(k) without reasonable excuse, fighting with another Member of the New Iraqi Army;

Elements

- 1. the accused was involved in a fight; and
- 2. the accused's involvement in the fight was deliberate; and
- 3. the fight was with another Member of the New Iraqi Army; and
- 4. the accused did not have a reasonable excuse for fighting.

(l) willfully or by neglect damaging or causing damage to or the loss of any property of the New Iraqi Army;

Elements

- 1. the accused lost OR damaged property of the New Iraqi Army; and
- 2. that loss or damage resulted from EITHER
 - (i) the deliberate acts of the accused, OR
 - (ii) the neglect of the accused.

LPB HAS SEEN

Silvan Ithan Character

ACTION MEMO

21 August 03

To: Ambassador Bremer From: Walt Slocombe and

Subject: PAYING KURDISH PESHMERGA COSTS

There are a variety of pressures to move forward on the PeshMerga question. The Kurds, and some others outside the country, argue that it is unfair to pay stipends to the former Iraqi military while leaving the payment of the PeshMerga to the Kurdish authorities. CPA's stated general policy is that eventually the PeshMerga need to be disbanded, on the ground that regionally based armed forces are incompatible with the goal of a unified nation. Paying the PeshMerga who are still in active service is clearly incompatible with that policy, and neither we, nor the Governance people, believe it would be wise to change that policy.

On the other hand, in June when we announced the stipend payments to Saddam's "self-demobilized" military, we said "CPA will... continue pensions to military retirees and payments to the disabled, widowed or former POWs; [and] provide a monthly lump sum to Kurdish authorities in the northern three governorates for payments for wounded PeshMerga and the widows of those PeshMerga killed (these authorities will be responsible for disbursal of payments.)" Pursuant to this policy we are paying the costs of pensions to about 120,000 pre-war Kurdish pensioners, running about \$2.3M/month.¹

At issue is how, if at all, to go beyond this. One non-controversial step is to encourage the Kurdish authorities to enlist current PeshMerga personnel to work in the police, FPS, and CDC. The Kurdish authorities have said that the PeshMerga have traditionally done what should be done by police and security guards, and would presumable be open to this approach. From the point of view of national unity, however, in Kurdistan these functions ought to be performed by organizations that are under certain control — which implies central payment. Since these payrolls are already centrally funded, there would be no net increase in the relevant budgets for the Kurdish governorates, provided of course that we hold the Kurds to national standards for numbers of police and other security people needed relative to population. Transferring PeshMerga members to these organizations is probably a more verifiable and politically acceptable, form of

The 120,000 pensioners are about 2% of the estimated Kurdish population. About a million pensioners are being paid south of the green line (at the same \$20/month average), roughly 4% of the population. MOF representatives from the CPA have examined the Kurds' systems for administering their pension programs and have verified that they have auditable, by-name accountability of their pension payments.

deactivation than formal 'demobilization.' It is also consistent with the GC's recent call for "using some of the existing assets in Iraqi Kurdistan ex-police and army by recruiting young officers and conscripts."

Recommendation: Authorize the Governance team, with support from the commands and from other CPA elements, to start discussions with the Kurdish authorities about making these transfers, with the inducement that CPA will make central funds available for bona fide transfers that meet national standards, e.g., for police training. These costs should be reflected in the 2004 budget plans of the respective institutions.

Approve	18/22	Disapprove	Modify
FI			

More controversial, if only because more costly, is the possibility of agreeing pay some 32,000 "new retired" PeshMcrga, including Kurds who have joined the NIA. Both parties in Iraqi Kurdistan have passed laws establishing criteria and procedures for formal retirement of PeshMcrga, and they have each indicated that about 16-18,000 will so retire from each party's service, for a total of 32-36,000. In practice, the situation of people, assuming they genuinely leave the active ranks, though they may have "reserve" status, is substantially analogous to that of the self-demobilized Iraqi armed forces who are now receiving stipend payments. Our declaration, when we announced the stipend program for the old Iraqi Army, that we would pay the Kurdish authorities funds to pay, inter alia, Kurdish military retirees can fairly be read as applying equally to this class of "new" retirees.

Paying this group at the rate applicable in the south – about \$65/month² -- would cost \$2.3 million per month, if there were 36,000 beneficiaries³. As with the current pension payments, we would not pay the retirees directly, but would provide the funds for the Kurdish authorities to do so.

The problem, of course, is that the additional \$28M/year burden on the budget. Paying for only a few months – say to year end – limits the total cost, but puts the burden on the 2003 budget, which is under the heaviest pressure. Moreover, we have not put any deadline on the payments to the former Iraqi army, and if we are not going to offer the Kurds a payment program that can fairly be described as equivalent to what Saddam's former soldiers get, we would probably do better to do nothing at this point, and simply

The payment rates called for in the Kurdish laws range up to \$500 per month. We have told the Kurdish authorities that we would not be prepared consider paying more than the approximate average payment to the ex-military in the south, i.e., \$65 month. Kurdish officials indicate that they would likely accept this amount as the CPA contribution—though they might chose to augment it from other resources.

We would also pay Kurdish members of the NIA – including trainees – as "retirees" in this category since they are, by definition, out of the Kurdish force. This would produce equal treatment for Kurds in the NIA with prior military service equivalent to that afforded the Arabs in the NIA – a step that is essential to maintaining Kurdish support for the NIA project because, in the absence of any "anti-double dipping" rule, most of the Arab NIA soldier will be paid stipends in addition to their NIA pay, on the basis of their prior service in Saddam's army. The amounts involved are trivial; for example, a September 03 payment based on agreed former-Iraqi military payscales would be only \$12,650, because there are only a 125 Kurds in the first battalion group who are former PeshMerga.

stick to the line that we don't intend to go beyond the current payment of pre-war pensions at pre-war rates until there is a general demobilization of the PeshMerga.

One option, which we both support, is to start paying "new" retired PeshMerga at "stipend" rates, but simultaneously put before the Governing Council a proposal to phase out or limit the payments in both north and south. Options for doing so include (a) simple termination sometime next year; (b) relating duration of payments to length of service, so that, for example, people with less than 5 years' service would lose their stipends after a year, while those with more than, say 15, would be continued indefinitely as pensions, and those in the middle gradually phased out; and (c) instituting a "double dipping rule" that would reduce stipends by, say, half of pay from other employment, at least if the employment was in the public sector. Each of these limitations has its drawbacks, importantly including restoking the anger among ex-military that led us to institute the stipends in the first place.

Recommendation: Start paying up to 32,000 PeshMerga "new" retirees, and budget for \$28M for the purpose in 2004 (and find \$7M to pay in the last quarter of 2003), but propose to the Governing Council phasing out stipends based on length of service and reducing payments by one-half of income from public service employment.

Approve recommendation
Pay only at current retiree rate of \$20 Other

Coordination: Governance, General Counsel, Finance, and CJTF

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COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY BAGHDAD

MEMO

02 September 2003

FOR: Director, Office of Management and Budget CC: LTG Sanchez, CG, CJTF-7 and BG Hahn CS, CJTF-7

FROM: Walt Slocombe, Director of Security Affairs (National Security and Defense)

SUBJECT: RECOMMENDED SALARY GUIDELINES FOR SECURITY SECTOR

As we have discussed, over the past 3 days a combined team of personnel from the Ministry of Interior, CJTF-7, Baghdad Central and a number of Ministries that employ Facilities Protection Service (FPS) guards, the CPA staff and our Office of Security Affairs, collaborated to produce an agreed scheme for integrating security sector pay scales in support of the new Salary Progression Chart scheduled for publication on 4 September. This security sector scheme is captured in the attached matrices.

This model is based on the following premises each coordinated with the Ministry of Finance:

- Persons currently employed under existing security sector pay scales are "grandfathered", at least for near term.
- The new pay scheme will take effect on 1 October 2003 and will apply to all members of the security sector, including those employed by the CPA, CJTF-7, the UN, USAID, and other agencies.
- Base pay for security sector employees will be adjusted above normal civilian rates based on the inherently hazardous and uncomfortable working conditions normally encountered by security forces. This adjustment does not apply to civilian personnel in the employ of security sector entities.
- The base pay for lowest ranking serving members (not trainees) will not exceed the Iraqi Salary Committee recommendation of \$60/month for security forces.
- FPS guards will have a lower pay scale than military or police forces.
- Special allowances will be paid on a case-by-case basis in very rare circumstances and then only to individuals, not groups.
- Annual step pay increases for satisfactory service are allowed.
- No step increases for performance.
- A Death Gratuity for security forces killed in the execution of their duties will consist of monthly payments to the widow or children of the deceased until the children reach age 18 or the widow dies, whichever occurs later. The amount paid will be slightly less than the person's monthly salary at the time of his death.
- FPS guards in the oil and electricity industries may share in the Ministry's 30% performance bonus when it is issed based on documented individual productivity.

I am comfortable that this Integrated Security Sector Pay Scheme is fair and logical. It is endorsed by the Ministry of Interior, other key Ministries and the CPA staff. I add my strong endorsement as well.

I must note, however, my significant concern with the application of these rates. From talking with Coalition Commanders and staffs across the country – literally from Basra thru Tikrit to Mosul – I have become convinced that the current market pay scale for an entry level policeman or soldier is somewhere between \$100 and \$120 US. Accordingly, the independent application of these pay scales will not only fail to attract the quality of recruit we seek, I believe it will absolutely prevent us from coming anywhere near manning either the New Iraqi Army, the battalions of the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps, or the Iraqi Police Force in the numbers necessary to bring a safe and secure environment to this country.

Accordingly, I must as firmly as possible recommend that the CPA commit to the firm, comprehensive, no-nonsense, application of the new Salary Progression Chart in every portion of the Iraqi public sector and in every province around the country. If this is not done with thorough rigor, our efforts at security sector salary reform will fail.

Alternatively, the Authority could re-norm the Salary Progression Chart to reflect current market realities and allow payment of \$100 vice \$60 to the lowest ranking servicing members of security forces.

I stand ready to discuss any of these points at any time.

(Original Signed) Walter B. Slocombe

ATTACHMENTS: Comparative Security Sector Pay Matricies

GRADE	NIA / ICDC enlisted	NIA / ICDC commissioned	IPS	BORDER	FPS
SUPER A					
SUPER B					
1		LG	National Commissioner	Director of Border Enforcement	
2		MG	Commissioner	Deputy Director	
3		BG	Dep Commissioner	Bureau Chief	
4		COL	Superintendent	Region Chief	Colonel
5		LTC	Inspector	Asst Chief	
6	SGM / CWO	CPT / MAJ	Lieutenant / Captain	Lieutenant / Captain	Major
7	SFC / MSG / WO	2LT / 1LT	Sergeant	Sergeant	
8	SGT	OFC	(Senior) Constable	(Senior) Agent	Captain
9	CPL		Constable	Agent	Sergeant
10	PVT / PFC		Constable (Probation)	Agent (Probation)	Guard
11	RCT		Trainee	Trainee	Trainee

b

GRADE	NIA / ICDC enlisted	NIA / ICDC commissio ned	IPS	BORDER	FPS
SUPER A					
SUPER B					
1		LG 1	National Commissioner 1	Dir of Border Enforcement	
2	_	MG 1	Commissioner 1	Deputy Director 1	
3		BG 1	Dep Commissioner 1	Bureau Chief 1	
4		COL 1	Superintendent 1	Region Chief 1	Colonel 1
5		LTC 1	Inspector 1	Asst Chief 1	
6	SGM / CWO 1 2	CAPT/MAJ 1 6	Lieut / Captain 1 6	Lieut / Captain 1 6	Major 1
7	SFC/MSG/WO 4 7 8	2LT / 1LT 6 7	Sergeant 6	Sergeant 4	
8	SGT 6	OFC 8	(Snr) Constable 6	(Snr) Agent 6	Captain 1
9	CPL 7		Constable 5	Agent 5	Sergeant 1
10	PVT/PFC 4 8		Constable (Probation) 4	Agent (Probation) 4	Guard 1
11	Recruit 1		Trainee 4	Trainee 4	Trainee 1

ENTRY LEVEL SALARIES FOR NEW IRAQI ARMY / IRAQI CIVIL DEFENCE CORPS

Carried Assess	-	-	-
ST	100		
200			

				SIErs								
		Enlisted Commission	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
	1	LG	493	507	520	533	547	560	573	587	130	
	2	MG	382	393	403	413	424	434	444		Maria.	3367
	3	BG	296	304	312	320	328	336	344	120 -	200	100
	4	COL	228	234	241	247	253	259	265			-11/13
	5	LTC	176	181	185	190	195	200	TVS F	100		
R	6	MAJ						154	158	161	165	\$1.0
A	6	CWO		139	143	350	E (2.3)	80	1023	F1 E	100	1803
	6	CPT	136	139	143	-5500	5 11 3	30		2.175	1.2.3	- \$2/3
D	6	SGM	136	139	500	17 (02)	E.E.A	B35 (37.		1.23	
E	7	wo								125	128	130
	7	1LT						1	122	125	128	1000
	7	MSG		ĺ		7		2.3	122	125	128	970
	7	2LT	1 1				116	119	122	134		
	7	SFC				113	116	119		5,00	100	1000
	8	OFC						2.7	1	99	1-2-11	1
	- 8	SGT						95	97	99	101	-11/4-1
	9	CPL							79	81	83	1 1
	10	PFC								66	68	69
	10	PVT				60	62	63	65	66	601 (1 4
	- 11	RCT	46				2.2.1	33.01		-2-		100

G R

ENTRY LEVEL SALARIES FOR IRAQI POLICE SERVICE

CIT	all IN	PC
	I N	

				13 A 134	S						
		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
1	National Commissioner	493	507	520	533	547	560	573	587	600	613
2	Commissioner	382	393	403	413	424	434	444	455	465	475
3	Dep. Commissioner	296	304	312	320	328	336	344	352	360	368
4	Superintendent	228	234	241	247	253	259	265	271	278	284
5	Inspector	176	181	185	190	195	200	204	209	214	219
6	Captain						154	158	161	165	169
6	Lieutenant	136	139	143	147	150	154	158	161	165	169
7	Sergeant				113	116	119	122	125	128	130
8	Constable (Senior)						95	97	99	101	104
9	Constable					75	77	79	81	83	84
10	Constable (Probation)				60	62	63	65	66	68	69
11	Trainee	46	War I	100		t-3-1		100		Table 1	130-3

ENTRY LEVEL SALARIES FOR FACILITIES PROTECTION SERVICE

STEPS

G R A D

					21FL2						
		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
4	FPS Colonel	228	234	241	247	253	259	265	271	278	284
5		2 2 3 9				3-1		1 - W	Sec. 2. 1		
6	FPS Major	136	139	143	147	150	154	158	161	165	169
7	1 - 1 1 1 1	Daniel 1					1-2-1/0			30	300
8	FPS Captain	83	86	88	90	92	95	97	99	101	104
9	Guard Sergeant	68	70	72	73	75	77	79	81	83	84
10	Guard	56	57	59	60	61	63	64	66	68	69
11	Trainee	46	Mark 1	Acres 1	3400			16		105	0

OPENING OF THE NEW IRAOI MILITARY ACADEMY

AIM

Determine the necessary conditions and actions for opening, as soon as possible, the New Iraqi Military Academy (NIMA), able to furnish the number of 2nd lieutenants, who will be required by the Iraqi Army.

STRATEGY

Qualities of the officers of the New Iraqi Army must be according to the character of the New Iraq.

Professional efficiency, love to its country, permanent concern for the well-being of the soldiers under its command, high cultural level, democratic mentality, respect and subordination to the civilian power, respect to the human rights and to the international law and prestige amongst the Iraqi society are some of unavoidable qualities required of the new Iraqi Officers.

Combination between the education and training, that will be given by the New Iraqi Military Academy, and the personal conditions demanded from the candidate to be admitted to the it, must be the guarantee of a perfect preparation of the new Iraqi officers.

CONSTRAINTS

- A. In order to increase the confidence of the Iraqi population about the quick rebuilding of its national institution the opening of the Iraqi Military Academy must be a reality <u>before September 2004.</u>
- B. The process of build-up the New Iraqi Army demand a quick availability of 2nd lieutenants in order to complete the new infantry battalions and the brigade's units. By those reasons, temporarily, the New Iraqi Military Academy must work as a one year school. Regular system of working of the Academy will decided subsequently.
- C. The set-up of the New Iraqi Military Academy means expenditures, not only in

operating costs, but also due to the necessity of repairing infrastructures and facilities. All those expenditures must be included in the budget for year 2004. By this reason, a first approach of the refurbishing, equipment and operating costs must be ready before September 1.

- D. Multiethnic character of the New Iraqi Army demand specific attention to those Kurds student who do not speak Arab.
- E. By the moment, Arab and Muslim mentality advise to avoid the admission of female candidates to the NIMA.

ASSUMPTIONS

- A. CMATT is responsible for opening the New Iraqi Military Academy as soon as possible and for establishing the operating conditions in a temporary way. Definitive organization, preparation of study programs, determining of conditions of admission for the candidates and other aspects of the New Iraqi Military College must be arranged, definitively, by the Iraqi MOD, when it would be in conditions of assuming their responsibilities.
- B. Coalition Nations and other friend countries (especially Arab countries such as Egypt and Jordan) would be ready to co-operate to the opening of the New Iraqi Military Academy furnishing teachers and instructors.
- C. Some of the former teachers in the former Iraqi Military College could be employed in the new Academy, after verify its previous behaviour, that they are reliable to the new Iraqi Government and that they are in accord with the character of the New Iraqi Army. Those teachers will be considerer as civilian.
- D. Most of the programs of the former Iraqi Military College (especially those dealing on technical matter) can be used by the students in the NIMA. That means that after screening most of the books and other educational elements, coming from the former Iraqi Military College, could be used in the new one.
- E. Before 1990 it was a tradition of the Iraqi Army to sent the best students of each course to complete its military training overseas (England, Jordan, India and Pakistan). It seems that this tradition must be continued sending yearly some of the best students to the Military Colleges of the Coalition Nations and other

friendly countries. That possibility must be considered as a complementary training and not as a replacement of the course at the NIMA.

- F. In the future, the Iraqi Army must co-operate strongly with the Armies of the Coalition Nations, not only in Iraq, but also in other multinational peace-keeping operations. By this reason, a good knowledge of English language must be one of the conditions required from the new candidates.
- G. According to the old Iraqi Educational system, young people finish the High School when they are 18 years old. That must be the lowest age limit for candidates. Highest limit must be 26 years old, enough to allow young people, with university degrees, to apply as candidate.
- H. 2nd lieutenants graduated from the new Military College must replace the junior officers trained for the new battalions of the NI ARMY that have started its set-up from Oct 03. By this reasons training given by the Military College must be focalised on light infantry. Training for other branches of the Army (Armour, Artillery, Engineers...) must given subsequently.
- In order to help the recruiting of the new Iraqi Battalions all the candidates to be students of the Military College must came from the ranks of those battalions (NCO and privates), no matter the rank that they have reached.
- J. During the last 3 years, more than 6.000 young people were admitted as cadets in the old Iraqi Military Colleges. After a de-ba'athfication process most of them can be acceptable as candidate for the new Military College, but following the requisite of being enrolled in the new battalions.
- K. Without consideration about how many 2nd lieutenants can be required to complete the new Iraqi battalions, the maximum figure of candidates admitted as students at the new Iraqi Military College must be related to the foreseen size for the New Iraqi Army. 300 students must be the maximal number of students that can be admitted for the course to start on September 2004.
- L. In the old Iraqi Army, the total amount of lieutenants was higher than 15.000. After a de-ba'athfication process, it seems possible that most of them can be acceptable as officer for the New Iraqi Army. Training of those officers must be considered independent of the training of the NIMC. It seems that a short course

(of at least of 3 moths), focalised on verify their real capabilities and giving them democratic principles will be enough.

M. Educational level and personal qualities of the former Iraqi NCO were very low. The opening of a NCO school must be taken in account.

ACTIONS:

- A. Verify the present conditions of the former Iraqi Military College and the feasibility of utilisation for the 1st course (from Sep. 04 to Aug. 05).
- B. Estimation of costs for repairing and adaptation of the facilities. (initially, only for a maximum of 300 students).
- C. Estimation of costs to improve the educational equipment of the NIMC according to the western standards (computers, language labs, slide projectors....) and also other necessary equipment (weapons, signal, topographic and field fortification material....)
- D. Evaluation of costs of the necessary furniture and other necessary equipments for the working of the Military Academy.
- E. Evaluation of operating costs including salaries for local teachers and auxiliary workers (maintenance, cleaning, catering, administration, transportation, security, welfare...).
- F. Preparation (before September) of a first draft of budget to be included in general budget of 2004.
- G. In co-ordination with the Education Ministry, drawing up of a first approach of the study and training program for the students of the first course.
- H. Selection of the texts and manuals for the education and training.
- Obtaining of the required texts and manuals.

- J. Shape up a "Selection teacher board". This board must be composed of military officers of the Coalition Nations, CPA personnel of the Education Ministry and Iraqi civilian with former academic experience.
- K. By the "selection teacher board": Selection of the personnel to fill the teacher's posts.
- L. Ask to the Coalition Nations and other friend countries about the possibility to host in their military college students coming from the NIMA.
- M. In co-ordination with the Education Ministry, to determine the educational level required from the candidates.
- N. Give publicity by means of media and other advertising ways to the admission conditions and to the future of the military career.

OTHER REMARKS:


- A. By now, it is considered not necessary to open an Iraqi Air Force Military Academy, due to the fact that by now its not possible an appropriate air training for Iraqi students (lack of training airplanes, financial raisons, ...)
- B. By the same raison, the open of an Iraqi Naval Military Academy must be postponed. The opening of a civilian naval school, in the former facilities seems to be a temporary good solution until a final decision about the future of the Iraqi Navy.

Baghdad. August 25, 2003

SEP OCT NOV DIC JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG


A STUDENT CANDIDATES	Definition of candida announcement of the	ates conditions and official e selection process.		d announcement
B TRAINERS AND TEACHERS	Define teacher's conditions & announcement to enroll	Pre-selection Selection of teachers of teachers	Training Course Participal	tion in
C AUXILIAR WORKERS		Determine required auxiliary Workers & official announcement to enroll them	Selection of of auxiliary workers	
D REFURBISHING OF BUILDINGS			END	
E SYLLLABUS AND TRAINING PROGRAMM	Definition of syllabus & Training Program			
F TEXTS AND OTHER DIDACTIC EQUIPMENT	ППП	Selection & Writing Official announce for the Academy	OI GEST	Reception of texts & manuals
G TACTIC EQUIPMENT (SIGNAL, NBC, TOPOGRAPHY)				END
H WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION				END
I LANGUAGE AND COMPUTERING LABS	computer Alanquage labs	Selection of the best offer	Reception, installation and use of labs for Balaction process	
J STUDENTS PERSONAL EQUIPMENT	Definition of pe equipment for the students	Selection of the best offer		Recaption of the quantum
K FURNITURE AND OTHER EQUIPMENT	Define requirements in Furniture. Official Announcement of purchasing.	Selection of the best offer	Reception of the equipment	
L DEFINITION OF ORGANIC STRUCTURE	END END			


Gross Capital Formation in Iraq: 1980-2001





Source: Ministry of Planning

Iraqi Per Capita GDP










Time line



^{*} Capital Project Personal (100 total) to planning ministry.

Process

2003	2004
CPA with Iraqi Ministry Assist	 Iraqi Ministries with CPA Assist
Allotments based loosely on 2002 in consideration of extreme circumstances	 Hard topline guidance
	Donor Conference Project Development
	Governing Council Review

2004 Budget

Priorities

Security

- Establish an effective police, customs and border force
- New Iraq Army
- International Police Force

Oil Industry


- Provide for the investment necessary to reach pre-war production by October, 2004.

Infrastructure

- Provide for an electrical system which will provide more nationwide power and facilitate rapid micro and small business development.
- Start work on the establishment for an effective water and sewage system.
- Provide a national wireless communication network, and the broadband capability which will facilities commercial development
- Complete necessary rebuilding of looted building and facilities
- Provide other essential services necessary for economic development (eg. Transportation)

Social Safety Net

- Provide for the continuation of the Food Basket Program in it's current form, or in an improved monetized version.
- Provide for training of the Iraqi workforce in computer utilization, for the appropriate retaining of workers made redundant by the restructuring and privatization of the sate-owned enterprises, and appropriate unemployment insurance
- Control unemployment rate to less than 20%
- Provide for continued improvement of health system



August 18, 2003

Iraq's Oli Production
and Consumption, 1980-2002E

3.0

2.5

1.5

Production


Net Experts


Consumption

1000 1904 1908 1902 1908 2000

Note: Production includes crude oil, leans condensate, natural gas liquids, athenol, and relinery gain.

July 16, 2003 Amb Bremer's Revisions Included





Office of Security Affairs 2004 Budget Estimate Accelerated (non-US prices)

	2004 CPA	2004 U. Apri Spriation	2004 CPA	2004 CPA		
		0	perations (Salaries)			
Budget Summary (In US\$ Millions)	Facilities	Equipment		Operations (All Else)	Total	
NIA	\$600.71	\$593.68	\$19.46	\$133,55	\$1,347.40	
US Contractor/Foreign Trainers				\$164,00	\$164.00	
Coast Guard	\$41.00	\$30.00	\$0.98	\$3.89	\$75,86	
Air Force	\$41.00	\$47.20	\$0.88	\$64.49	\$153.57	
Iraqi DSA	\$16.50	\$3.00	\$1.50	\$2.52	\$23.52	
Military Academy	\$46.21	\$4.32	\$0.36	\$0.83	\$51.72	
Purchased International Training				\$6.00	\$6.00	
Civil Defense Corps		\$17,15	\$18.90	\$39.53	\$75.58	
Force Protection Services (Charged to Ministries)	7	\$7.47	\$25.06	\$39.20	\$71.73	
Stipends	- 1	11	\$256.70		\$256.70	
Total	\$746.00	\$703.00	\$324.00	\$455.00	\$2,228.00	
				CPA (Iraqi) CY 04 US Appropriated Supplemental Total		

The key driver for the majority of costs associated with this budget is the training schedule, any changes to it will drive changes to each of the high cost budget items, namely facilities and equipment.

Army - first 27 battalions of first three divisions (including 1 brigade of heavy) plus Army Aviation nucleaus (18 refurbished UH-1Bs) (All of these items provide the ability to shoot, move, communicate,

Army - Equipment procurement model is now primarily non-military spec, commercial off the shelf equipment. The trade off is cheaper equipment faster, but equipment will not be as durable and must

Coast Guard - limited Coast Guard capability with funds allocated for a small patrol best force, support vessels, and a naval infantry battalion.

Air Force - Includes training to retain aircrew competency and a small number of medium lift and fighter second hand aircraft.

Iraqi DSA - stand up and hiring of iraqi Personnel for a Defence Support Agency which has the capacity to morph into a iraqi governed ministry over time.

Military Academy - stand up of the Military Academy.

Stipends include costs for the ex Iraqi Army and Peshmerga.

Civil Defense - 18 battalions only

Salaries assume a 25% factor for special allowances

Office of Security Affairs 2004 Budget Estimate (Accelerated at US Prices)

	2004 CPA	a laka ara sasagi s	2004 CPA	2004 CPA		
Budget Summary (In US\$ Millions)	Facilities	Equipment	Operations (Salaries)	Operations (All Else)	Tota	
NIA	\$600.71	\$775.68	\$19.48	\$133.55	\$1,529.40	
US Contractor/Foreign Trainers				\$164.00	\$164.06	
Coast Guard	\$41.00	\$37.00	\$0.98	\$3.89	\$82.86	
Air Force	\$41.00	\$47.20	\$0.88	\$64.49	\$153.51	
Iraqi DSA	\$16.50	\$3.00	\$1.50	\$2.52	\$23.52	
Military Academy	\$46.21	\$4.32	\$0,36	\$0.83	\$51.72	
Purchased International Training				\$6.00	\$6.00	
Civil Defense Corps		\$17.15	\$18.90	\$39.53	\$75.50	
Force Protection Services		\$7.47	\$25.06	\$39.20	\$71.73	
(Charged to Ministries) Stipends			\$256.70		\$256.70	
Total	\$748.00	\$892.00		\$455.00	\$2,417.00	
The key driver for the majority of costs assu-				CPA (fraqi) CY 04 US Appropriated Supplemental Total		

The key driver for the majority of costs associated with this budget is the training schedule, any changes to it will drive changes to each of the high cost budget items, namely facilities and equipment.

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Cosst Guard - limited Coset Guard capability with funds allocated for a small patrol bost force, support versels, and a naval infantry bestallon.

2007.004

Air Force - includes training to retain aircrew competency and a small number of medium lift and fighter second hand aircreft.


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
Stipends include costs for the ex Iraqi Army and Pestimerga.

Civil Defense - 18 battations only

Salaries assume a 25% factor for special allowances



August 18, 2003



Jan. 2004

Budget Issues

Salarles: Ministries in SOE's assume fiscal responsibility by 1 Jan.

Redundant Workers:

Twelve months salary Funds to establish micro businesses Computer training Vocational training

Budget has Inadequate funds for:

Security Electrical Water

Sewage

Irrigation

Housing

Education

Health

Agriculture

CP	Δ	FO	RM.	1034

PUBLIC VOUCE	HER FOR PURC	CHASES AND SERVICES	OTHER THAN P	ERSONAL		Voucher No. 000004			
CPA Comptroller	's Office		Date Vouche	r Prepared		Schedule	No.		
CPA –(C8)			2003-08-25			•			
			Contract Nun	nber and D	ate	Paid By	Paid By		
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			Requisition N	lumber and	Date				
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Payee's Name	Directorate of	planning and Organization	n						
and Address	P.O. BOX 79/8	316				Discoun	Terms		
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Number and Date of Order	Date of Delivery or Service		a or Services		Quanti	ty Un	a Price	Amount ¹	
		(Enter description, item number of the second secon	f contract or other inform cessary)	ation desmed		Cost	Per		
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		Manufacture Dates not e	arlies than 1987						
		Wishing Colic Dates Bot C	arrici diani 1907]	
	ŀ								
(Use continuation sheet	(s) if necessary)	(Payee mu	st NOT use the	space belo	w)		Total	\$2,832,000.00	
Payment:	Approved for	1 =	Exchange Rate = \$1.00	_					
E)Provisional	\$2,832,000.00		- \$1.00						
□Complete	Ву			Ansc			nount verified; correct for		
Partial	Chief Financia	Officer CPA				\$2,832,000	2,832,000.00		
±xx⊡Fthal	×								
□ Рторре за	Signature	·				Title CFO			
☐ Advance		3							
Pursuant to author		certify this voucher is corre	ct and proper for pay	yment.					
25 August 2003	(24)		·				Title		
Date_		Certifying (Official						
			DFI Accounting D	ata				·	
Paid by Wire Tri	ansfer, FRBNY	for Central Bank of Iraq t	o account number	<u> </u>			сп	TBANK, F.S.B.,	
1400 G ST NW	, Washington, D	C.C. 2005, Account Name	: Jordan Armed Fo	rces PAID	ON 2	8 August 200	3.		
PAID BY	Check Number On (Name of Bank) Check Number On (Name of Bank)								
DFI	Cash	Date		PAY ORDE	R#4				
When stated in foreign	currency, insert name	of currency		1		Per	_		
	and authority to appro-	e are combined in one person, one is	ignature is necessary, othe	rwise the approvi					
³ When a volumer is roo	eipted to the name of a	company or corporation, the name of the mast appear. For example, "John				froat .			
			and company , post rotate	- or i resident		Title			
					- 1				

COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY BAGHDAD

INFO MEMO

31 August 2003

FOR: Director, Office of Management and Budget

CC: Amb. Pat Kennedy, MG Paul Eaton, Ms BG Hahn

FROM: Walte Stocombe, Director of Security Affairs (National Security and Defense)

SUBJECT: MODIFICATIONS TO OSA(NSD) FY2004 BUDGET SUBMISSION

The Office of Security Affairs (National Security and Defense), hereby presents a revised budget submission for 2004. This revision is in response to a request for provision of a cost estimate in order to support an accelerated NIA training program. This submission is provided in two parts. The first part contains the budget estimate calculated using market prices for equipment and the second part is based on US prices. Facilities costs have been calculated based on real life experiences at Kirkush. All prices are in USDS.

Key Affects of this change are:

- 27 Battalions (including 3 heavy) will be operational by August 2004 (vice 9 Battalions currently planned.
- Provision of an Iraqi Defense Support Agency of some 600 civilian personnel which will serve to administer the administrative and logistical support necessary for the ongoing maintenance of the NIA.
- Allows for a modest army helo lift, Air Force and Coast Guard. These forces are leveraging
 off existing equipment and trained personnel wherever possible. I recognize that these have
 been ruled out and so they are separately stated. But I would like the opportunity to
 explain why I think it is important, on both efficiency and effectiveness grounds to start
 these programs in 2004.
- Prices are based on procurement of primarily non-military specification, commercial off the
 shelf equipment, which has allowed for a substantial reduction in price for equipment per
 Bn. By definition the equipment will not be as durable as its military counterparts. And it is
 certainly not to a US military standard. For example, the "US pricing" alternative assumes
 we would buy old M-60s and recondition in the US, not supply the NIA with M-1s.
- Modest increases in the costs for Purchased International Training and for the use of US
 contractors or foreign trainers to augment the existing training capability. This is essential
 for achievement of 27 Battalions by the time required, particular in light of the need for some
 relatively senior officers.
- Includes provisions for the central funding of Iraq's Force Protection Service, which would be administered by the Ministry of the Interior. (Personally, I feel strongly this should be in the Interior budget, but I am conforming to guidance on this, as on every, point.)

- Includes modest increases in the Stipends Payments to reflect the decision to pay certain additional categories, notably disabled officer veterans.
- A bringing forward of facilities costs from out years based on a revised construction schedule to meet the garrison requirements of 27Bns.
- Increase in salaries and subsistence costs for the NIA as more NIA personnel will be brought on faster than previously anticipated. This is simply the consequence of the proposed acceleration.

In accordance with your guidance, this Office has made no recommendation on whether facilities should be paid for using Iraqi or US funds. OSA suggests that equipment and payments to US contract trainers should be paid for utilizing appropriated funds, whilst salaries and subsistence for NIA personnel should be paid for using Iraqi funds.

In addition this is all based on the premise that the FY03 Budget remains unchanged at \$100M for capital and \$45M for operating. Fully recognizing the problems of further CY 03 spending, if we decide to go for the accelerated program, we simply must not wait until the end of the year to start facilities construction. Perhaps the fact that the US FY begins in October will offer some means of not wasting three critical months.

I am, of course, happy to discuss any aspect of this with you or your staff.

Walter B. Slocombe

ATTACHMENTS:

- 1. Revised Budget Submission (non-US prices)
- 2. Revised Budget Submission (US prices)

LTC

From: Sent: LTC CJTF7-FUOPS Thursday, July 31, 2003 11:23 AM

To:

Cc:

LTC COL C5CMG3FUOPS;

COL G3 CHIEF OF OPS;

Subject:

7-25-03 FPSF Status for CJTF71.xls

Importance:

High



7-25-03 FPSF Status for CJTF71...

<<7-25-03 FPSF Status for CJTF71.xls>> FPS WAS AUTHORIZED IN FRAGO 444M BY
CPA TO PRODUCE UPTO 15000 GUARDS. WE ARE AT THE POINT WHERE UNITS SAY THEY
HAVE HIRED OR HAVE IN TRAINING 14340 GUARDS. SOME MAY HAVE QUIT BUT IF THE
UNITS DATA IS CORRECT WE ARE APPROACHING THE UPPER LIMIT, IS SOMEONE GOING
BACK TO CPA AND ASKING THEM TO RAISE THE LIMIT?
LTC [086] PLEASE PROVIDE HARD COPY TO COL [089]

1

	CJTF7	IMEF	1AD	31D	4ID	101AASLT DIV	3ACR	UK
Has it been implemented?	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
If not, when is hiring to begin?	ONGOING	NA	ONGOING	NA	ONGOING	NA	NA	NA
When is training to begin?	ONGOING	NA	ONGOING	2-Jul-03	ONGOING	ONGOING	1-Jul-03	ONGOING
If so, how many hired?	12727	3683	5153	221	1324	1518	401	648
How many in training?	1613	902	321	0	330	60	0	1200+
How many completed training?	8310	3233	4832	221	316	UNK	24	
How many sites are being manned?	139	99	511 Require Protection	27	218	10	3	16
How many total guards are required and over what time frame?	15415	9089	5200	200	2508 for AUG; 27528 when school starts	UNK	926	
What impact will this program have on overall availability of Coalition Forces and in what time frame?	Generally, it is a combat multiplier that frees coalition soldiers from point guard missions to roving and combat missions.	tasks	As of 1 AUG all Tier 2&3 sites will be turned over to	to come off some fixed site security	atlow fraqi government to take	The more sites under FPSF security the more coalition forces available for other requirements (or redeployment)	No answer.	Unfixes forces and allows Coalition Forces freedom to take on more effectively patroling tasks throughout AO and surge forces when required.
Trained plus completed	9923		5153	221		60	24	

TOTAL HIRED AND IN TRAINING

COST PROJECTIONS FOR PROPOSED SALARY STRUCTURE

Costing based on Salary Guidelines (assumes some grade inflation)

Costing based on CPA percentages

	number of employees	percent of employees	estimated cost at salary targets	estimated cost at top of range progression		number of employees	estimated average salary	total cost (000)
Council	24	0%	\$576	\$576	Council			\$576
A	600	0%	\$10,800	\$10,800	A			\$10,800
8	2,000	0%	\$24,000	\$24,000	В			\$24,000
1	12,974	1%	\$83,032	\$95,487	top 1%	12,974	\$6,125	\$79,464
2	38,921	3%			Carlotte.	-		27.24.14
3	77,843				next 9%	116,764	\$4,000	\$467,055
4	129,738	10%						4
5	194,606	15%	The second second		middle 30%	389,213	\$2,400	\$934,111
- 6	194,606	15%						11.500.00
7	194,606		\$264,665	\$304,364	bottom 60%	778,426	\$1,100	\$856,268
8	129,738		\$140,117	\$161,134				3000 X 0000
9	129,738	10%	\$114,169	\$131,294	Total estimate	ed cost: US do	lars:	\$2,372,274
10	129,738	10%	\$93,411	\$107,423				•
11	64,869	5%		\$44,759				
	1,300,000	100%	\$2,396,513	\$2,755,990				

Salary Progression Chart, 2.5% progression per steps; ten steps per grade.

Grade	Step 1	Step 2	Step 3	Step 4	Step 5	Step 6	Step 7	Step 8	Step 9	Step 10
	Monthly sa	laries in I	raqi Dinar	(000)		1				
1	740	760	780	800	820	840	860	880	900	920
2	574	589	605	620	636	651	667	682	698	713
3	444	456	468	480	492	504	516	528	540	552
4	342	352	361	370	379	389	398	407	416	426
5	264	271	278	285	292	299	306	314	321	328
6	204	209	215	220	226	231	237	242	248	253
7	157	162	166	170	174	179	183	187	191	196
8	125	128	132	135	138	142	145	149	152	155
9	102	105	107	110	113	116	118	121	124	127
10	83	86	88	90	92	95	97	99	101	104
11	69	71	73	75	77	79	81	83	84	86
	Monthly sa	nlaries in L	J.S. Dollar	5						
1	\$493	\$507	\$520	\$533	\$547	\$560	\$573	\$587	\$600	\$613
2	\$382	\$393	\$403	\$413	\$424	\$434	\$444	\$455	\$465	\$475
3		\$304	\$312	\$320	\$328	\$336	\$344	\$352	\$360	\$368
4	\$228	\$234	\$241	\$247	\$253	\$259	\$265	\$271	\$278	\$284
5	\$176	\$181	\$185	\$190	\$195	\$200	\$204	\$209	\$214	\$219
6	C \$136	\$139	\$143	\$147	\$150	\$154	\$158	\$161	\$165	\$169
7	\$176 \$136 \$105	\$108	\$111	\$113	\$116	\$119	\$122	\$125	\$128	\$130
8	\$ \$83	\$86	\$88	\$90	\$92	\$95	\$97	\$99	\$101	\$104
9		\$70	\$72	\$73	\$75	\$77	\$79	\$81	\$83	\$84
10		\$57	\$59	\$60	\$62	\$63	\$65	\$66	\$68	\$69
11	The second second	\$48	\$49	\$50	\$51	\$53	\$54	\$55	\$56	\$58

HAZ DIT I ACCOUNTED = \$30

PATION ACTURACE =

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Ministry of Interior Pay Scales

Grade		Pay a	MOUHQ	Service	Dept-of Border . Enforcement	Border/- Customs Police	Border Border Luspections	Security	THE RESIDENCE OF THE PARTY OF T	Management
Super	\$1,500	\$1,500	Minister of Interior							
American P	\$1,000	\$1,000	Deputy Minister							
7	\$493	\$545			Director of Border Enforcement					Director of EMS
	\$382	\$434		Commissioner*	Deputy Director					
	\$296	\$348		Deputy Commissioner*		Bureau Chief of Border Police	Bureau Chief of Inspections		Bureau Chief of Nationality	Fire Commissioner*
	\$228	\$280	Supervising Attorney	Superintendant*	Supervising Attorney	Deputy/Regional Chief	Deputy/ Regional Chief		Deputy/Regional Administrator	Fire Superintendent*
	\$176	\$228	Manager /Lawyer	Inspector*	Senior Manager	Assistant Chief	Assistant Chief		Assistant Administrator	Fire Inspector*
	\$136	\$188	Accounting Manager	Captain*	Accounting Manager	Captain	Captain		Manager	Captain*
1	\$105	\$157	Entry Lawyer /Accountant	Lieutenant*	Entry Lawyer /Accountant	Lieutenant	Lieutenant		Accountant	Lieutenant*
	\$83	\$135	Entry Accountant	Sergeant	Entry Accountant	Sergeant	Sergeant	Captain	Entry Accountant	Sergeant
0	\$ \$68	\$120	Bookkeeper	Constable	Bookkeeper	Agent	Inspector	Lieutenant	Bookkeeper	Journeyman Firefighter
in .	- \$56	\$108	Secretary		Secretary			Sergeant	Secretary	Apprentice Firefighter
<u>1</u>	\$46	\$46	Messenger /Cleaner	Traince	Messenger /Cleaner	Traince	Trainee	Guard	Messenger /Cleaner	Trainec

\$52 Monthly Danger Pay for IPS, Border/Customs Police, Border Inspectors, and Firefighters in Grades 2 through 10 Only Prior service credit of 1 step for every 1 year of prior service (maximum of step 10).

^{*} The title "Chief of Police" or "Fire Chief" is allocated to the top officer in a town. A Chief's rank may be anywhere from Lieutenant to Commissioner; rank determines the pay grade.

ACTION MEMORANDUM

21 June 2003

To: Ambassador Pat Kennedy

From: Walt Slocombe

Subject: Coordinating Security Guards

SUMMARY AND PURPOSE

CJTF7 has determined a need to modify guidance to commanders on hiring Security Guards. The purpose of this memo is to clarify and harmonize Security Guard policies between CPA and CJTF7.

DISCUSSION

CJTF7 FRAG ORDER 286 to OPORD 03-33, "Implementation of the Facility Protection Services" dated 081143Z June 03 is the existing directive document on Security Guards. Since its publication, the situation has evolved and a revision is required. Moreover, a CPA policy on Security Guards is also needed.

RECOMMENDED ACTION

Recommend approval of the following Security Guard tenets. These will be incorporated into an appropriate CJTF7 FRAGO and into a directive CPA document that will be prepared at the completion of the "Security Guard Synchronization Boards" to be conducted late this week. The training and management provisions of FRAGO 286 are not affected by this policy change; they will be reviewed as part of the Board process.

- Security Guards may be hired immediately by military commanders as they see fit.
- Commanders will pay Security Guards from "Vested" funds distributed by the CPA Comptroller via CJTF 7.
- 3. For an interim period, effective immediately, Security Guards will be paid \$50/month. (For reference: Tier 1 salaries for occupations like Teacher and Policeman are \$60/month) Guards already hired at higher rates may be "grandfathered" at their current rate of pay for the duration their current contracts, then paid at the \$50/month rate
- 4. Security Affairs Team will chair "Synchronization Boards" 25-27 June to harmonize operational requirements and funding plans for Security Guards. Board members will include senior members of Ministries Coordination, Budget, Finance, Interior, and CJTF7 Teams. The details of these boards will be promulgated by the Security Team NLT 22 June.
- 5. In preparation for these sessions, CJTF7 will coordinate with Ministrics and appropriate municipalities to establish the number and duties of Security Guards required at each Ministry location. Ministries and municipalities will assume fiscal and operational responsibilities for Security Guards on or about 1 August 2003. On the assumption that Security Guards will be hired as Civil Servants, they would then be paid at Civil Service rates.
- 6. Private firms are not allowed to hire Security Guards until the CPA policy is published.

Further, recommend Requirements Coordination Office be tasked to pass these tenets officially to CJTF7 and Security Affairs Division be tasked to develop CPA Policy on Security Guards for approval NLT 4 July.

Сопсиненсе	COL (CJTF7); MG Strock,
APPROVE DISAPPR	OVEAPPROVE WITH MODIFICATION
04/22/03	Walter B. Stocombo Senior Advisor, Security Affairs

ACTION MEMORANDUM

July 12, 2003

To: Ambassador Pat Kennedy

From: Walt Slocombe

Subject: Establishing a Weapon and Security Guard Prioritization Board

SUMMARY AND PURPOSE

After 3 weeks of detailed study two related security points have become clear. First, the demand for weapons for police and security purposes vastly exceeds the supply and, second, Coalition Forces in Baghdad are unable to secure every site that Ministries desire guarded. The purpose of this memo is to establish a board that will recommend weapon and security guard priorities.

DISCUSSION

Protected Sites in Baghdad: 1AD now covers 417 sites w/ 40-50% avail soldiers – the sustainable rate is 33%. Ministries are requesting Coalition coverage of 105 additional sites

Weapons: Requirements for at least 26,000 weapons for police and FPS; only 657 available. New Iraqi Army and other initiatives are add-ons. CJTF 7 is working hard to obtain numbers required.

Conclusion: Need to establish a CPA process for identifying most critical sites for protection and apportioning available weapons; both Interior and National Security / Defense have equities.

RECOMMENDED ACTION

Establish a CPA Weapon and Security Guard Prioritization Board to recommend priorities for weapon distribution and coverage of key sites by coalition forces, initially in Baghdad.

Recommended Board composition: <u>Co-Chairs</u>: Nat Security and <u>Defense</u> / Interior <u>Members</u>: Principals or representatives of Director of Operations, Requirements Coordination Office, Baghdad Central, and CJTF 7

Board meets initially on 16 July. Takes prioritized lists of sites needing protection and weapons requirements developed by each Ministry and creates draft CPA "1-n" list. The Board then vets this list with Ministries and makes final adjustments before submitting it to CPA Chief of Staff for approval and passage to CJTF 7. CJTF 7 guards most important sites to agreed limit of capability and provides weapons for police and FPS guards iaw CPA approved priority.

CONCURRENCES
for Baghdad Central
Commissioner for Interior
COI and COL for CJTF7
MG Strock for Director of Operations
COL for Requirements Coord Office
102
APPROVE APPROVE W/ MODIFICATION
V_{i}^{0}
Wall Stadonisect have my
SA for National Constituted Defense

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY

DOCUMENT TRACKING SHEET

ACTION :	OFFICE:	Security
----------	---------	----------

ACTION: Prepare views on new security service

SUBJECT: Managing Liquidity in the Banking System

COORDINATE WITH:

Special Instructions See attached.

SUSPENSE:	ROUTING DATE:	CONTROL NO.:
	17 July 2003	030717-20
FORMATION COPIES 1	<u>:01</u>	

To	(b)(6)

Dear Sir:

My name is "["still"]"

A Colonel with Bachelor of Chemical Engineering concerning what we know about your human treatment that you are so careful to employ the military staff and to choose the suitable jobs to this class of people to enable them to live in peace and pride.

I hope you agree to transfer my work from the ministry of defence (the leadership of anti aircraft defence) to another Ministry I.E. Ministry of health, Higher Education, Industry or oil because of my ability and and profession to work in one of these places as achemical engineer.

Finally I hope you would take in consideration the hard circumstances of living that I suffered under the shadows of Saddam regim and till now.

With my respect

	e compasionates the metrify
To ; The Embessed	er Wr. Bremer
 Me at group of P	te-officiales in Ministry of
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clottel that me are mor	Kind now in the combater
Section in Palace.	
The would like to say the	nat use are tited from Plan
inspite of that we have	e huge experience in many
fields like law, compu	tel, Robininistration and
We have experience for	+ 8 reaks.
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The New Iraqi Security Forces





Iraqi Security Forces ~ SITREP

	Required	Hired W/Training	In - Training (as of 18 Sep 03)	Shortfall	
Border Police	11,574	6,026	250	5,298	
Iraqi Police Service	75,000	49,822	5,334	19,844	
Iraqi Civil Defense Corps	21,996	2,364	3,220	15,755	
Facility Protection Service# (Oil+Electric)	4,950	5,328	1,320	+1,698 (1)	
Facility Protection Service # (Others)	16,686	14,115	0	2,571 (1)	
New Iraqi Army (NIA)	40,000	0	731	39,269	
	170,206			81,039	

⁽¹⁾ Note: FPS (Oil and Electric) have over hired by approx 2.0K. This takes up the 2.0K slack in the balance of FPS positions. Effectively FPS has now reached its recruiting ceiling. MSCs informed to stop recruiting.



Iraqi Security Forces ~ Phase 1a: 30 K in 30 Days

INITIATIVES	Total Personnel	Shortfalls	Funding Required	<u>Action</u>
Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (ICDC): Total 9 battalions by end of Phase 1a.	7.6K	- 2 x BNs salaries, uniforms, OCIE. - Request funds via PRB or reallocation NLT 05Oct03 (Action C8).	NIL	-1AD, 4ID – additional: VCA, 130EN, MEF accelerated. -FRAGO 798 published 6 Sep. -FRAGO 804 published 8 Sep. - Funding Justification to be submitted to PRB on 5 Oct for additional battalions.
New Iragi Army (NIA)	<u>.7K</u>		NIL	- No FRAGO requiredTraining Requirements post pass out for 1st BN submitted Pass-out date 4 Oct 03 Not fully equipped until 29 Nov 03. (CMATT).
Iraqi Border Police (IBP)	1.5K	- Money for Radios and vehicles. - Salaries are paid through CERP until 29 Sep 03)	\$10.2M	- FRAGO 828 published 14 Sep. Hire former border and customs officials where possiblePRB to be submitted this week hy Mol This funding will see us through Phases 1a-1c.
Iraqi Police Service (IPS)	5.3K	- Need uniforms, body armor, utility belt, and equipment.	NIL	 No FRAGO required. These are former Police Officers who require personal equipment prior to deploying on the street. Mol already funded, contracts need to be submitted as soon as possible.

As at 26 Sep 03.

Iraqi Security Forces ~ Phase 1a: 30 K in 30 Days

INITIATIVES	Total Personnel	<u>Shortfalls</u>	<u>Funding</u> <u>Required</u>	<u>Action</u>
FPS (Oil& Electric)	1.46K	NIL	NIL	- PRB 01Submitted & approved #425. For \$4.75M FRAGO 828 published 14 Sep, although Electricity Commission already putting this into action – wages through Ministry budget.
Protective weapons, uniforms and		- Personal Equipment. Some weapons, uniforms and vehicles. MSCs are working around this.	NIL (\$1.25M CERP)	- FRAGO 828 published 14 Sep FRAGO required to stop MSCs hiring any more FPS, clearly stating reasoning.
Utilize PESHMERGA (Border Police and/or ICDC)	10K	- Funding stream TBCMay require a different uniform.	S6.4M ON H	Phase 1a, Require S6.4M for 3 months, \$3.6M for salaries and \$2.8M for equipment.
Iraqi Prison Service	<u>1.3K</u>	Nil	NIL	-No FRAGO required Already in motion, completed training by 11 Oct.
TOTAL	33.4K		\$16.6M	

Notes:

- 1. 14.0K realized so far.
- 2. FPS reached recruiting ceiling: FRAGO sent telling MSCs to stop recruiting further FPS personnel.

As at 26 Sep 03.



Iraqi Security Forces ~ Border Police & Customs



Iragi Border & Customs Police

Ministry: Interior (Dept of Border Enforcement)

<u>Duties</u>: Border guarding and patrolling, enforce customs/immigration laws

Uniform: Khaki shirts


Vehicles: Various, mainly all terrain.

Weapons: Pistols, AK 47 Rifles

Pay: Civil pay scale.

"Secure borders make good neighbors".

Border Police undertaking weapon training.





Iraqi Security Forces ~ The Iraqi Police Services

Iragi Police Service (IPS)

Ministry: Interior


Duties: Law Enforcement Uniform: Light blue shirts

Vehicles: Various, modified blue and white. Weapons: Pistols, shotguns, AK 47 Rifles

Pay: Civil pay scale


The first line of future security


Recently Commissioned Police on



UNCLASSIFIED

As at 26 Sep 03.







Effective Police ~ Personnel

	Salaries Paid By (Cerp/MOI)		Number	of Police	Numbers by Level			
MSCs		City Police Officers	Highway Patrol	Traffic Police	FPS w/Arrest Auth.	Effective	Semi Effective	Non Effective
1AD	MOI	9746	0	1965	0	738	6055	4918
101st	CERP	15225	285	500	0	710	12928	900
4 ID	MOI	7155	846	360	130	522	6633	0
82d	UNK	1114	371	In IPS#	*	150	994	782
MND-SC	MOI	12326	0	In IPS#	0	241	12085	0
MND-SE	MOI	8367	0	405	3300	0	8367	0
TOTAL		53933	1502	3230	3430	2361	47062	6600

Iraqi Security Forces ~ Facilities Protection Services

The protection of Iraq's economy and heritage.



FPS Protecting National Monuments in Baghdad

Facilities Protection Service (FPS)

Ministry: Most

<u>Duties</u>: Fixed site protection of Ministerial, Governmental, or private buildings / facilities /

personnel

Uniform: Grey shirts


Vehicles: Provided by Ministries

Weapons: AK 47 Rifles
Pay: Civil pay scale

Note: Formerly known as the Ministry of Vital Institutions.

FPS-Manpower Status







Mulaazem 2nd Lieutenant



Mulaazem Awwal 1st Lieutenant



Naqeeb Captain



Raaed Major



Muqaddam Lt. Colonel



Wakeel Awwal Sergeant Major



Master Sergeant



Aareef Awwal Sergeant 1st Class



Sergeant


Aareef




Naeb Aareef Corporal



Jundi Awwal Private 1st Class



- Background color is brown.
- -Insignia color is black..
- Shoulder board should wrap around the epaulette when affixed.
- Bars are distributed evenly on the shoulder board.




ATTACHMENT 3

- The Eagle is centered on the shoulder board vertically and horizontally.
- -The star is centered between the base of the eagle and the bottom of the shoulder board.



CAP BADGE INSIGNIA

- The eagle is metal.
- -The eagle is one solid color. The color is gold.
- Glossy finish on the insignia.
- The cap badge will be a pin-on type.
- The badge is to be affixed with two pins.



20mm

30mm



Iraqi Security Forces ~ Iraqi Civil Defense Corps

Civil Defense Corps Recruit in Training



Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (ICDC)

Ministry: National Security & Defense <u>Duties</u>: Individuals, teams, and squads who serve as linguists, HUMINT, fixed site security, drivers, Disaster Relief, HA, route/convoy security <u>under command of Coalition Forces</u>


Uniform: Solid brown/tan


Vehicles: 2 jeeps, 12 trucks per Battalion.

Weapons: AK 47 Rifles


Pay: Same pay scale as New Iraqi Army.


The short-term initiative with a longer-term future.







ICDC Stand-up Plan







ICDC Stand-up Plan





Proposed ICDC Stand-up Plan







Manning Recruiting Timeline

18 Battalions

	UNITS	AUG	SEP	ост	RAMADAN 26OCT-26NOV	NOV	DEC	JAN	TOTAL
	101ST	1(JISC)	1 (22 SEP)	2 (12&31 OCT)					4
	4ID		3 (15 SEP)	1(12OCT)					4
	1AD		1 (25SEP)	1 (23OCT)					2
	3ACR/82 ABN MND-CS		1(30 SEP)	1(30OCT) 2(30OCT)					1
TIME	MND-SE		# of BNs Being Trained	Est Date of Completion	3 coys (3 Nov)		1 bn and 1 coy (28 Dec) May be possible to expand this substantailly. Will cfm shortly.	1 bn (18 Jan) May be possible to expand this substantally. Will ofm shortly.	4
	Battalions per Month	1	6	8	1	0	1	1	18
		And the second s	and the same of th	(NLT 01 NOV 03)	NO THE	of the second property of the second	(NLT 01 JAN 04)	(NLT 01 FEB 04)	
	Projected Throughput By Month	846	5076	6768	846	0	846	846	
ÄNEI	Projected Cumulative	846	5922	12690	13536	13536	14382	15228	15228
PERSONNEL	Actual Throughput by Month	648	2025						
P.	Actual Cumulative	648	2673						
	Difference In Projection	-198	-3249						
15	COST PER MONTH	CERP	\$1,484,800.00	\$2,784,000.00		\$2,969,600,00	\$3,155,200,00	\$3,526,400,00	\$17,817,600.00
COST	CUMULATIVE COST PER MONTH		\$1,484,800.00	\$4,268,800.00	\$4,268,800.00	\$7,238,400.00	\$10,393,600.00	\$13,920,000.00	



Manning Recruiting Timeline

21 Battalions

	UNITS	AUG	SEP	ост	RAMADAN 26OCT-26NOV	NOV	DEC	JAN	FEB	TOTAL
	101ST 4ID 1AD 3ACR/82 ABN MND-CS	1(JISC)	1 (22 SEP) 3 (15 SEP) 1 (25SEP) 1(30 SEP)	2 (12&31 OCT) 1(12OCT) 1 (23OCT) 1(30OCT) 2(30OCT)				1(8 JAN)	1 (5 FEB)	4 4 4 1 3
TIME			# of BNs Being Trained	Est Date of Completion			1 bn and 1 coy (28 Dec) May be possible to expand this substantallly. Will cfm shortly.	1 bn (18 Jan) May be possible to expand this substantailly. Will cfm shortly.	1 bn(8 Feb) May be possible to expand this substantailly. Will cfm shortly.	
	MND-SE Battalions per Month	1	6	1 bn(27 Oct)	3 coys (3 Nov)			2	2	5 21
	Battations per Month		(NLT 01 OCT 03)	8 (NLT 01 NOV 03)	NO TNG	(NLT 01 DEC 03)	(NLT 01 JAN 04)		(NLT 01 MAR 04)	2)
EL	Projected Throughput By Month	846	5076	6768	846	0	846	1692	1692	
Z	Projected Cumulative	846	5922	12690	13536	13536	14382	16074 (19BNs)	17766	17766
PERSONNEL	Actual Throughput by Month	648	2025							
Ā	Actual Cumulative	648	2673							
	Difference in Projection	198	-3249							
T	COST PER MONTH	CERP	\$1,484,800.00	\$2,784,000.00		\$2,969,600.00	\$3,155,200.00	\$3,526,400.00	\$3,897,600.00	\$17,817,600.00
COST	CUMULATIVE COST PER MONTH		\$1,484,800.00	\$4,268,800.00	\$4,268,800.00	\$7,238,400.00	\$10,393,600.00	\$13,920,000.00	\$17,817,600.00	

UNCLASSIFIED



Proposed Manning Recruiting Timeline

26 Battalions

	UNITS	AUG	SEP	ост	RAMADAN 26OCT-26NOV	NOV	DEC	JAN	FEB	Current Endstate
TIME	101ST 4ID 1AD 3ACR/82 ABN	1(JISC)	1 (22 SEP) 3 (15 SEP) 1 (25SEP)	2 (12&31 OCT) 1(12OCT) 1 (23OCT) 1(30OCT)			1(31Dec03) 2(31Dec03)	2(88 ??? JAN)	1 (5 FEB)	4 5 5 3
	MND-CS MND-SE COSCOM		# of BNs Being Trained	Est Date of Completion	3 coys (3 Nov)		1 bn and 1 coy (28 Dec) May be possible to expand this substantailly. Will cfm shortly.	1 bn (18 Jan) May be possible to expand this substantailly. Will ofm shortly.	1 bn(8 Feb) May be possible to expand this substantailly. Will ofm shortly.	3 5 1
	Battallons per Month	1 (All T 01 CED 02	6 (NLT 01 OCT 03)	8 (NII T 01 MOV 02)	1 NO TNG	0 (All T 04 DEC 02)	5 (NLT 01 JAN 04)	3 (NII T O4 EER O4)	2 (All T 01 MAD 04)	26
_	Projected Throughput By Month	846	5076	6768	846	0	4230	2538	1692	
NN	Projected Cumulative	846	5922	12690	13536	13536	17766	20304	21996	21996
PERSONNEL	Actual Throughput by Month	648	2025							
0.	Actual Cumulative	648	2673							
	Difference in Projection	-198	-3249							
H	COST PER MONTH	CERP	\$1,484,800.00	\$2,784,000.00		\$2,969,600.00	\$3,987,600.00	\$4,268,800,00	\$4,825,600.00	
COST	CUMULATIVE COST PER MONTH		\$1,484,800.00	\$4,268,800.00	\$4,268,800.00	\$7,238,400.00	\$11,226,000.00	\$15,494,800.00	\$20,320,400.00	What If so of 24 Sep 03

COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY ORDER NUMBER 23

CREATION OF A CODE OF MILITARY DISCIPLINE FOR THE NEW IRAQI ARMY

Pursuant to my authority as the head of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), relevant UN Security Council resolutions including Resolution 1483 (2003), and the laws and usages of war,

Noting that Resolution 1483 appeals to Member States inter alia to assist the people of Iraq to contribute to conditions of stability and security in Iraq,

Recalling in this regard that CPA Order Number 22 created the New Iraqi Army,

Acknowledging the need to ensure that the New Iraqi Army has a system of discipline to maintain order,

Noting that CPA Order Number 22 provides for both military and civilian jurisdiction over members of the New Iraqi Army

I hereby promulgate the following:

SECTION 1 DEFINITIONS

"Accused" means a Member of the New Iraqi Army subject to this Code of Military Discipline, against whom disciplinary proceedings are conducted in respect of an allegation of a Military Offense under this Code of Military Discipline,

"Charge" means a formal accusation in writing, prepared at the direction of the Disciplinary Officer and signed by a Disciplinary Officer, that a Member of the New Iraqi Army subject to this Code of Military Discipline has committed a Military Offense,

"Commander of the New Iraqi Army" means the Iraqi officer appointed by the Administrator of the CPA to command the New Iraqi Army,

"Disciplinary Proceedings" means the investigation into, hearing of and the decision reached, under this Code of Military Discipline in respect of an allegation of a Military Offense and includes any appeal of any such decision,

- "Elements of Military Offenses" means the elements of the Offenses required to be proved to the required criminal standard before a member of the New Iraqi Army can be convicted of a Military Offense.
- "Junior Disciplinary Officer" means either the officer of at least Captain in rank who at the time of any part of the Disciplinary Proceedings in respect of an allegation under this Code of Military Discipline commands the company or equivalent unit, or battalion or equivalent unit of which the Accused is a member, or the officer of at least the rank of Captain who is appointed, in accordance with the provisions of this Order, by an officer in command of a Brigade to be the Junior Disciplinary Officer of the Accused for the Disciplinary Proceedings,
- "Member of the New Iraqi Army" means a person serving in the New Iraqi Army from the time of attestation until the date of termination of service,
- "Military Court" means a civilian court with a civilian judge who has been appointed as a Military Judge pursuant to Section 5 of this Order,
- "Military Judge" means a civilian judge with jurisdiction over Military Offenses in accordance with the provisions of this Order,
- "Military Offense" means an act or omission described in Section 3 of this Code of Military Discipline,
- "New Iraqi Army" means the military forces of Iraq organized for the purposes set forth in this Order including all components of the national armed forces of Iraq, specifically including the ground forces recruited, trained, and organized as the first step in the process of creating a military defense force for the new Iraq. Unless the context clearly requires otherwise, all references to the "New Iraqi Army" are references to any element of the national defense forces of Iraq,
- "Senior Disciplinary Officer" means either the officer of at least Colonel in rank who at the time of any part of the Disciplinary Proceedings in respect of an allegation under this Code of Military Discipline commands the Brigade or Division of which the Accused is a member, or the officer of at least the rank of Colonel who is appointed, in accordance with the provisions of this Order, by the Commander of the New Iraqi Amy to be the Senior Disciplinary Officer of the Accused for the Disciplinary Proceedings.

SECTION 2 MILITARY JURISDICTION

- 1) Members of the New Iraqi Army are subject to this Code of Military Discipline at all times from the date of their attestation until the date of termination of service.
- 2) A Member of the New Iraqi Army who is subsequently determined to have been ineligible for service in the New Iraqi Army remains subject to the Code of Military Discipline until discharged.
- 3) All Members of the New Iraqi Army will remain subject to the jurisdiction of the civilian courts while serving as Members of the New Iraqi Army; provided, Members of the New Iraqi Army enjoy immunity from civilian criminal prosecution or civil liability for acts or omissions arising within the scope of their duties and authorized operations to the same degree as other governmental officials.

SECTION 3 MILITARY OFFENSES

- 1) Any Member of the New Iraqi Army subject to this Code of Military Discipline who commits any of the following shall commit a Military Offense and shall be liable on conviction to any punishment laid down in Sections 10 and 13 of this Order.
 - (a) mistreatment of Members of the New Iraqi Army of inferior rank;
 - (b) causing or engaging in a disturbance or behaving in a disorderly manner:
 - (c) behaving in an insubordinate manner;
 - (d) striking a Member of the New Iraqi Army or a member of another armed force of superior rank or civilian instructor placed in authority over the accused;
 - (e) while on sentry duty either
 - (i) engaging in misconduct, or
 - (ii) failing to do the Member's duty;
 - (f) disobeying a lawful order;
 - (g) drunkenness if, owing to the influence of alcohol or any drug, whether alone or in combination with any other circumstances, the Member is:
 - (i) unfit to be entrusted with his duty,
 - (ii) unfit to be entrusted with any duty which the Member was reasonably aware that he could be called upon to perform,

- (iii) behaving in a disorderly manner, or;
- (iv) behaving in any manner likely to bring discredit on the New Iraqi Army;
- (h) absence without leave;
- (i) avoiding the performance of a duty or negligently performing a duty;
- (j) making a false statement concerning any official matter relating to the New Iraqi Army;
- (k) fighting with another Member of the New Iraqi Army;
- (l) willfully or by neglect damaging or causing damage to or the loss of any property of the New Iraqi Army;
- (m) conduct to the prejudice of good order or military discipline;
- (n) behaving in a manner likely to bring discredit on the New Iraqi Army.
- 2) The Elements of the Military Offenses are contained in Annex A to this Order.
- 3) Any Member of the New Iraqi Army subject to this Code of Military Discipline who commits a civilian criminal offense shall be guilty, by reason of so doing, of a Military Offense against this Section and liable to trial, and on conviction, to any punishment under the provisions of this Order.
- 4) Any Member of the New Iraqi Army subject to this Code of Military Discipline or any other person who by the law of war is subject to trial by a Military Court for any crime or offense against the law of war as adopted by Iraq. In the event the law of war convention or treaty was adopted without specifying the penalty for violations the maximum penalty shall be the maximum penalty specified for the most closely analogous offense under the civilian criminal code.

SECTION 4 DISCIPLINARY OFFICERS

- 1) Junior Disciplinary Officers have jurisdiction over all Military Offenses created under this Order, with the exception of the Military Offenses created under Sections 3(3) or 3(4), in respect of Members of the New Iraqi Army below the rank of Lieutenant.
- 2) An officer in the New Iraqi Army, not below the rank of Captain may be appointed in writing as a Junior Disciplinary Officer by an officer in command of a Brigade to be the Junior Disciplinary Officer of the accused in respect of the allegation of the commission of any Military Offense.

- 3) Senior Disciplinary Officers have jurisdiction over all Military Offenses created under this Order, with the exception of the Military Offenses created under Sections 3(3) or 3(4), in respect of members of the New Iraqi Army in the rank of Lieutenant and above, so long as the Senior Disciplinary Officer is at least one rank above the Accused. Senior Disciplinary Officers have jurisdiction over all appeals of decisions of Junior Disciplinary Officers.
- 4) An officer in the New Iraqi Army, not below the rank of Lieutenant Colonel may be appointed in writing as a Senior Disciplinary Officer by the Commander of the New Iraqi Army to be the Senior Disciplinary Officer of the accused in respect of the allegation of the commission of any Military Offense.

SECTION 5 MILITARY COURTS AND MILITARY JUDGES

- 1) Military Courts have jurisdiction over those Military Offenses created under Sections 3(3) and 3(4) of this Order.
- 2) Military Judges have jurisdiction over those Military Offenses created under Sections 3(3) and 3 (4) of this Order.
- 3) In circumstances in which allegations against an Accused involve Military Offenses under both Section 3(1) and Section 3(3) or 3(4), then the Military Court and Military Judge to which such matters are referred will have jurisdiction over Military Offenses under Section 3(1) in addition to those under Section 3(3) or 3(4).
- 4) Military Judges will be selected from sitting civil judges. The Senior Advisor, Ministry of Justice, in coordination with the Interim Minister of the Justice will appoint such civil judges, as he may deem appropriate, to be Military Judges on a standing basis who will sit as Military Judges when a Military Offense is referred to them in accordance with the provisions of this Order.
- 5) A civil court in which a Military Judge is conducting Disciplinary Proceedings in respect of a Military Offense will be deemed to be a Military Court for the duration of those Disciplinary Proceedings.

SECTION 6 APPELLATE COURTS

In circumstances in which a Member of the New Iraqi Army has been convicted by a Military Court then the appellate court to which any appeal is made will have jurisdiction over any Military Offense referred. Appeals will be made to the appellate court with jurisdiction to hear appeals from the trial court.

SECTION 7 ARREST

- 1) Any Member of the New Iraqi Army subject to this Code of Military Discipline found committing a Military Offense, or reasonably suspected of committing a Military Offense, may be arrested in accordance with the provisions of this Section.
- 2) A Member of the New Iraqi Army subject to this Code of Military Discipline may be arrested by (a) a Member of the New Iraqi Army of superior rank, (b) by a civilian instructor placed in authority over the accused, (c) by a civilian police officer acting within the officer's authority, or a Member of the New Iraqi Army serving in a provost position.
- 3) As soon as possible, but in any event no later than 24 hours following arrest, the arrested Member of the New Iraqi Army must be informed of the reasons for his arrest.
- 4) Within 24 hours of arrest, unless the exigencies of operational circumstances prevent it, a Disciplinary Officer must be informed of the arrest and must consider the necessity of retaining the Member of the New Iraqi Army in arrest. The Disciplinary Officer shall order the release of the arrested Member of the New Iraqi Army unless he reasonably believes that if released:
 - (a) the arrested Member of the New Iraqi Army will absent himself or flee disciplinary proceedings;
 - (b) there is a risk that evidence will be lost, tainted or destroyed; or
 - (c) the arrested Member of the New Iraqi Army will commit further Military Offenses if released.
- 5) If, in accordance with Section 7(5) of the present Order, the Disciplinary Officer shall have determined that the member of the New Iraqi Army under arrest shall be further retained, the period of such further retention shall not, unless the exigencies of operational circumstances prevent it, exceed 48 hours.
- 6) Except for the exigencies of operational circumstances or the referral of the matter to a Military Court, before the expiration of the period of 72 hours of arrest, the Disciplinary Officer must have either released the Member of the New Iraqi Army under arrest from arrest under this Section or dealt with the allegation of the

Military Offense upon which the arrest is based through Disciplinary Officer action or referral to a Military Court.

- 7) In circumstances in which a suitable facility within a military location in which the Accused can be retained under arrest is unavailable, use may be made, with the agreement of the civilian police, of such civilian police or prison facilities as may be available.
- 8) Upon referral to a Military Court, that Military Court will determine whether an Accused shall remain in arrest on the basis of the civil procedures applicable in that court.

SECTION 8 INVESTIGATION OF ALLEGATIONS

- 1) An allegation that a Member of the New Iraqi Army has committed a Military Offense created under Section 3(1), Section 3(3), or Section 3(4) shall be reported to a Disciplinary Officer, who shall cause each such allegation to be investigated.
- 2) In circumstances involving an allegation of a Military Offense under Section 3(3) or Section 3(4), the Disciplinary Officer will act in accordance with Section 13 of this Order.
- 3) In circumstances in which allegations against an Accused involve Military Offenses under both Section 3(1) and Section 3(3) or Section 3(4), the Disciplinary Officer shall, if the Disciplinary Officer considers it is in the interests of justice for the matters to be tried together, refer all allegations to a Military Judge in accordance with Section 13 of this Order.
- 4) During the course of an investigation into an allegation of a Military Offense under section 3(1), if it becomes necessary to speak to the Accused, the Accused shall be offered the opportunity to have an officer of the member's choice, if reasonably available, and of at least the rank of the investigator present during the conversation to assist the Accused. It shall be explained that the Accused is not obliged to say anything unless the Accused wishes to do so. The answers of the Accused will be written down sequentially, together with the questions asked and the Accused shall have an opportunity to sign the record as accurate.

SECTION 9 DECISION BY DISCIPLINARY OFFICERS ON CHARGING

- 1) In the case of an allegation against an Accused with respect to of a Military Offense under Section 3(1), the Disciplinary Officer will decide whether the evidence discovered during the investigation would support a Charge being preferred against the Accused.
- 2) If the Disciplinary Officer determines that a Charge should be preferred, the Charge shall be reduced to writing, signed by the Disciplinary Officer and a copy given to the Accused.
- 3) At the same time or as soon as reasonably practicable thereafter the Accused shall be provided a copy of all documentary evidence and access to all real evidence with respect to the charged Military Offense.

SECTION 10 DISCIPLINARY HEARING

- 1) The Accused shall have at least 24 hours to prepare for the Disciplinary Hearing. The 24-hour period shall begin when the written Charge or copy of the evidence is provided to the Accused, whichever is later.
- 2) The Accused shall have the assistance of an Officer of his choice, subject to reasonable availability, in preparing for and during the Disciplinary Hearing.
- 3) Disciplinary Hearings will not be open to the Public.
- 4) Disciplinary Hearings will be conducted in accordance with the procedures set forth in Administrative Instructions issued by the Administrator of the CPA or by a civilian member of the CPA reporting directly to the Administrator and to whom authority to issue such Administrative Instructions is delegated.
- 5) Disciplinary Hearings shall be conducted in a manner that provides for the basic rights of an Accused, including but not limited to the following rights:
 - (a) the Accused shall have the Charge explained by the Disciplinary Officer:
 - (b) the Accused shall have the right to question witnesses called to give evidence against the Accused;
 - (c) the Accused shall have the right to present evidence in support of his case, and if convicted, to present evidence or speak in mitigation of his punishment

- (d) the Accused shall have the right to remain silent and have no adverse consideration taken by the exercise of this right
- 6) A Disciplinary Officer, having considered all the evidence presented to him, will only find an Accused guilty of the Military Offense charged if the Disciplinary Officer is satisfied that Accused committed the Offense in respect of each of the elements of the Military Offense listed in the Annex to this Order.

SECTION 11 PUNISHMENTS BY DISCIPLINARY OFFICERS

- 1) In adjudicating cases involving enlisted or non-commissioned personnel, a Disciplinary Officer may award the following punishments in respect of each Military Offense of which the member has been found guilty:
 - (a) Detention for a period not longer than 7 days;
 - (b) Fine not exceeding 14 days' pay;
 - (c) A reprimand;
 - (d) Extra duties to a maximum of 7 days;
 - (e) In respect of a Private First Class, Corporal, or Sergeant, reduction by one rank;
 - (f) Stoppages of pay in respect of damage or loss caused by the act or acts which formed the basis of the Offense charged, not exceeding 14 days' pay.
- 2) A Junior Disciplinary Officer may combine those punishments listed in Sections 11(1)(b) and 11(1)(f), except that no more than 28 days pay may be taken from the convicted member of the New Iraqi Army in respect of all the Offenses dealt with by the Junior Disciplinary Officer at one hearing.
- 3) Detention may only be awarded to a Private, Private First Class, or Corporal. It may not be combined with any other punishment except stoppages of pay.
- 4) Reduction in rank may not be combined with any other punishment.
- 5) A reprimand and extra dutics may be combined with any other punishment not otherwise excepted under this Section.
- 6) In adjudicating cases involving officers, a Senior Disciplinary Officer may only award the following punishments in respect of each Military Offense of which the member has been found guilty:

- (a) Fine not exceeding 14 days' pay;
- (b) A reprimand;
- (c) Extra duties to a maximum of 7 days;
- (d) Stoppages of pay in respect of damage or loss caused by the act or acts which formed the basis of the Offense charged, not exceeding 14 days' pay.
- 7) A Senior Disciplinary Officer may combine those punishments listed in Sections 11(6)(a) and 11(6)(d), except that no more than 28 days pay may be taken from the convicted Member of the New Iraqi Army in respect of all the Offenses dealt with by the Senior Disciplinary Officer at one hearing.
- 8) A reprimand and extra duties may be combined with any other punishment not otherwise excepted under this Section.

SECTION 12 APPEAL FROM DISCIPLINARY OFFICER

- 1) An Accused who has been convicted by a Junior Disciplinary Officer of a Military Offense under Section 3(1) of this Code of Military Discipline shall be entitled to appeal to the Senior Disciplinary Officer. An Accused must submit the appeal and any supporting evidence in writing to the officer in command of the convicted member within 14 days of the Disciplinary Hearing.
- 2) An Accused who is an officer of the New Iraqi Army who is convicted by a Senior Disciplinary Officer of a Military Offense under Section 3 (1) of this Code of Military Discipline shall be entitled to appeal to the Commander of the New Iraqi Army or the senior Commander of the New Iraqi Army. An Accused must submit the appeal and any supporting evidence in writing to the officer in command of the convicted member within 14 days of the Disciplinary Hearing.

SECTION 13 REFERRAL FOR TRIAL BY MILITARY JUDGE

- 1) In the case of an allegation of a Military Offense under Section 3(3) or Section 3(4) the Disciplinary Officer will refer the allegation, together with all available evidence relating to the allegation, to a Military Judge for consideration.
- 2) Where an investigation into an allegation of a Military Offense under Section 3(1) discovers evidence of additional Military Offenses under Section 3(3) or Section 3(4), the Disciplinary Officer shall terminate the investigation and refer the allegation, together with all available evidence, to a Military Judge for consideration.

- 3) In accordance with Section 8(3) of this Order, where there are allegations against an Accused involving Military Offenses under both Section 3(1) and Section 3(3) or Section 3(4) the Disciplinary Officer shall, if the Disciplinary Officer considers it in the interests of justice for the matters to be tried together, refer all allegations, together with all available evidence, to a Military Judge.
- 4) The Military Judge will investigate and otherwise deal with the allegation of the Military Offense referred in accordance with this Section in the manner applicable for civil Offenses laid down in the Iraqi Law of Criminal Procedure 1971 as amended by Iraqi law and by CPA Orders.

SECTION 14 PUNISHMENTS BY MILITARY JUDGE

The Military Judge will apply the sentences appropriate to the civil Offense charged under the provisions of Section 3(3) or Section 3(4), except that in determining the appropriate level of sentence within the sentencing range for the Offense, the Military Judge may consider the impact that the Military Offense had on good order and discipline within the New Iraqi Army.

SECTION 15 APPEAL FROM MILITARY JUDGE

- 1) An Accused who has been convicted by a Military Judge of a Military Offense shall be entitled to appeal in accordance with civil procedures.
- 2) The court hearing the appeal will consider the matter appealed in accordance with the applicable law and procedure for civil Offenses laid down in the Iraqi Law of Criminal Procedure 1971 with amendments and as amended by CPA Orders and the Third Edition of the Iraqi Penal Code 1969, with amendments and as amended by CPA Orders.

SECTION 16 SUSPENSION OF IRAQI LAWS

The Iraqi Military Law Code Number 13 of 1940, the Iraqi Military Procedures Code Number 44 of 1941, the Code of Legal Notification of Military Personnel Number 106 of 1960, Punishment of Military Deserters Law Number 28 of 1972, and the Penal Code of the Popular Army Number 32 of 1984 have been suspended under CPA Order Number 21 entitled Creation of a New Iraqi Army.

SECTION 17 ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS

The Administrator of the CPA or a civilian member of the CPA reporting directly to the Administrator and to whom such authority is delegated may issue Administrative Instructions not inconsistent with this Order, prescribing all matters that are necessary or convenient for giving effect to or carrying out the purposes of this Order.

SECTION 18 ENTRY INTO FORCE

This Order shall enter into force on the date of signature.

L. Paul Bremer, Administrator Coalition Provisional Authority

ANNEX A TO COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY ORDER NUMBER 23

CREATION OF A CODE OF MILITARY DISCIPLINE FOR THE NEW IRAQI ARMY

ELEMENTS OF MILITARY OFFENSES CREATED UNDER SECTION 3

(a) mistreating in any way of a Members of the New Iraqi Army of inferior rank:

Elements:

- 1. an act that amounted to mistreatment; and
- 2. the act was committed by a Member of the New Iraqi Army of superior rank (hercinafter in this subsection "superior rank") on a Member of the New Iraqi Army or a member of another armed force acting with the New Iraqi Army of inferior rank; and
- 3. the superior rank (accused) knew the victim was inferior in rank; and
- 4. the superior rank (accused) deliberately carried out the act; and
- 5. the superior rank (accused) knew that the act amounted to mistreatment

"Mistreatment" means unwarranted, harmful, abusive, rough, or other unjustifiable treatment which, under all the circumstances:

- (a) results in physical or mental pain or suffering, and
- (b) is unwarranted, unjustified and unnecessary for any lawful purpose.

(b) causing or engaging in a disturbance or behaving in a disorderly manner;

Elements:

- 1. the accused EITHER
 - (i) caused a disturbance, OR
 - (ii) became involved in a disturbance, OR
 - (iii) behaved in a disorderly manner; and
- 2. the accused acted in such a manner deliberately.

(c) behaving in an insubordinate manner;

Elements

- the actions OR words of the accused were insubordinate, insulting or disrespectful to a Member of the New Iraqi Army or a member of another armed force of superior rank (hereinafter in this subsection "superior rank") or a civilian instructor placed in authority over the accused; and
- 2. the actions OR words of the accused were used in the presence of the superior or civilian instructor placed in authority over the accused; and
- the accused knew that the superior or civilian instructor placed in authority over the accused was his or her superior or civilian instructor placed in authority over the accused; and
- 4. the accused deliberately spoke or acted in such insulting or disrespectful manner.
- (d) striking a Member of the Iraqi Army, a member of another armed force acting with the New Iraqi Army of superior rank, or civilian instructor placed in authority over the accused (hereinafter in this subsection "superior")

Elements

- the accused struck a Member of the New Iraqi Army, a member of another armed force acting with the New Iraqi Army, or civilian instructor placed in authority over the accused; and
- the accused had no lawful excuse for striking the superior or civilian instructor placed in authority over the accused; and
- the accused knew that the superior or civilian instructor placed in authority over the accused was his or her superior or civilian instructor placed in authority over the accused; and
- 4. the accused deliberately struck the superior or civilian instructor placed in authority over the accused

"Strike" means an intentional blow, and includes any offensive touching of the person of the superior, however slight.

- (e) while on sentry duty either
 - (i) engaging in misconduct, or
 - (ii) failing to do the Member's duty;

Elements

the accused was on sentry duty; and

2. the accused EITHER

- (i) deliberately engaged in misconduct, OR
- (ii) the accused failed to carry out a duty whether deliberately or by neglect.

(f) disobeying a lawful order

Elements

- 1. an order was given to the accused; and
- 2. the order was lawful; and
- 3. the accused was aware of the order having been given to him; and
- 4. the accused deliberately or by neglect did not obey the order.
- (g) drunkenness if, owing to the influence of alcohol or any drug, whether alone or in combination with any other circumstances, the Member is:
 - (i) unfit to be entrusted with his duty,
 - (ii) unfit to be entrusted with any duty which the Member was reasonably aware that he could be called upon to perform;
 - (iii) behaving in a disorderly manner, or;
 - (iv) behaving in any manner likely to bring discredit on the New Iraqi Army;

Elements

- 1. the accused knowingly took alcohol OR drugs; and
- 2. as a result thereof the accused EITHER
 - (i) was unfit to be entrusted with his duties, OR
 - (ii) was unfit to be entrusted with any duty that he was reasonably aware he could be called upon to perform, OR
 - (iii) behaved in a disorderly manner, OR
 - (iv) behaved in a manner likely to bring discredit on the Defence Force.

(h) absence without leave

Elements

- 1. the accused was required to be at his place of duty; and
- 2. the accused was not at his place of duty; and
- 3. the accused later returned to his place of duty; and
- 4. the accused did not have permission or a reasonable excuse for being away from his place of duty.

(i) avoiding the performance of a duty or negligently performing a duty

Elements

- 1. the accused had a duty to perform; and
- 2. the accused was aware of that duty; and, EITHER
 - (i) the accused did not perform that duty; and
 - (ii) the accused did not perform the duty either deliberately or by neglect, OR
 - (iii) the accused performed the duty to a poor standard; and
 - (iv) the accused performed the duty to a poor standard either deliberately or by neglect

(j) making a false statement concerning any official matter relating to the New Iraqi Army

Elements

- 1. the accused made a statement about official New Iraqi Army matters; and
- 2. the statement was false in a significant way; and
- 3. the accused knew that the statement was false at the time he made it.

(k) without reasonable excuse, fighting with another Member of the New Iraqi Army;

Elements

- the accused was involved in a fight; and
- 2. the accused's involvement in the fight was deliberate; and
- 3. the fight was with another Member of the New Iraqi Army; and
- 4. the accused did not have a reasonable excuse for fighting.

(l) willfully or by neglect damaging or causing damage to or the loss of any property of the New Iraqi Army;

Elements

- the accused lost OR damaged property of the New Iraqi Army; and
- 2. that loss or damage resulted from EITHER
 - (i) the deliberate acts of the accused, OR
 - (ii) the neglect of the accused.

(m) conduct to the prejudice of good order or military discipline

Elements

- 1. an act or omission by the accused; and
- 2. such act or omission was likely to prejudice good order or military discipline
- 3. the accused was aware, at the time of such act or omission, that the same was likely to prejudice good order or military discipline.

(n) behaving in a manner likely to bring discredit on the New Iraqi Army

Elements

- I. an act or omission by the accused; and
- 2. such act or omission caused discredit to the New Iraqi Army; and
- 3. the accused was aware, at the time of such act or omission, that the act or omission was likely to bring discredit on the New Iraqi Army.

UNIFIED SECURITY SERVICES CONTRACT FOR IRAQ

Surrounding Circumstances: The intent of this contract is to obtain high quality security services of various types for a wide variety of customers across Iraq. The contract is intended to obtain these services from a contract services provider who is fully qualified, trained, equipped, and capable of mission performance. An Indefinite Delivery/Indefinite Quantity (ID/IQ) contract is contemplated, with initial qualification of candidate firms who gain acceptance to a Pool of Qualified Security Service Contractors based on fulfillment of qualification criteria as established by the Ministry of the Interior. From this Pool are selected competitors who compete for award of individual Delivery Order requirements as they become available under the contract. These competitions are intended to be accomplished easily and rapidly in order to respond to the dynamic circumstances being experienced in the Iraqi security environment. It is contemplated that, at a minimum, every 3 months a qualification window will be opened to consider firms that have demonstrated in the interim that they meet the minimum qualification standards. Therefore, acceptance of contractors into the Pool of Qualified Security Service Contractors is possible across the life of the ID/IQ contract.

Contractor Responsibilities: The contractors selected for award, as a result of the source selection process initiated through Delivery Orders issued under this contract, will be responsible for including in their price all costs, including costs associated with the following items. The following list is not intended to be all inclusive but is representative of the types of costs for which contractors will be responsible in their price. It is anticipated that, over time, the Ministry of Interior may promulgate regulations, or other laws or regulations may be enacted, which govern the operation of security service contractors. The contractors will be responsible for compliance with all such requirements without additional cost.

- Insurance. The contractor shall be responsible for maintaining insurance in the
 types and amounts as may be required by the Ministry of the Interior or by law or
 regulation, or as otherwise required under the competition for a Delivery Order
 under this contract. All costs associated with such insurance are the
 responsibility of the contractor and must be included in their price.
- Bonding. The contractor shall maintain Bonding in the types and amounts as may
 be required by the Ministry of the Interior or by law or regulation, or as otherwise
 required under the competition for a Delivery Order under this contract. Costs
 associated with such bonding are the responsibility of the contractor and included
 in their price.
- Uniforms. The contractor shall be responsible for providing all uniforms required
 in the performance of work under this contract. Uniforms shall comply with
 requirements as may be established by the Ministry of the Interior or by law or
 regulation, or as otherwise required under the competition for a Delivery Order
 under this contract. Costs associated with uniforms are the responsibility of the
 contractor and included in their price.

- Training. The contractor shall be responsible for providing security personnel fully qualified and trained in accordance with Ministry of the Interior standards for the types of security service being provided or by law or regulation, or as otherwise required under the competition for a Delivery Order under this contract. Training updates and maintenance of ongoing training which may be required by the Ministry of the Interior shall be the responsibility of the contractor. Costs associated with training are the responsibility of the contractor and included in their price.
- Weapons. The contractor shall be responsible for providing all weapons necessary and appropriate for the performance of work. Weapons will be maintained on the work site in a secure weapons cage or facility, in accordance with Ministry of the Interior requirements or by law or regulation, or as otherwise required under the competition for a Delivery Order under this contract. Weapons will not normally be transported to or from work by security personnel; exceptions are allowed for security services of a nature such that transport of weapons is a necessary compliment to the work being done. For example, in providing security services for an electrical transmission system, the nature of the work may inherently require transportation of weapons over wide geographic areas. In all cases, weapons will be secured, transported, maintained, and operated in accordance with Ministry of Interior requirements or by law or regulation, or as otherwise required under the competition for a Delivery Order under this contract. All costs associated with provision and maintenance of weapons shall be the responsibility of the contractor and included in their price.
- Weapons Cards and Identification Cards. The contractor will provide personnel
 who have appropriate Weapon and Identification Cards. Offerors are placed on
 notice: it is anticipated that requirements for Weapons Cards and Identification
 Cards will evolve over time, changing in type and configuration. There may be
 licensing, testing, and qualification or user fees associated with these evolving
 requirements. Any such costs shall be the responsibility of the contractor and
 included in their price.
- Ammunition. The contractor shall provide all ammunition. The ammunition
 provided shall be in the types and amounts required to perform the security
 mission. The cost for all ammunition is the responsibility of the contractor and
 included in their price.
- Vehicles. The contractor shall provide all vehicles necessary for the performance
 of all work under this contract, unless otherwise explicitly stated in the Delivery
 Order Statement of Work initiating the security requirement. The customer will
 not be responsible for the transportation of contractor employees to or from the
 work site, or within the work site unless explicitly stated in the Delivery Order's
 Statement of Work initiating the security requirement. All vehicular costs for

vehicles provided by the contractor are the responsibility of the contractor and included in their price.

- Communications. The contractor shall be responsible for providing all communications equipment necessary for the performance of mission requirements. The contractor shall be responsible for providing all communications equipment required for internal communications within the secured site. The contractor shall be responsible for providing all communications equipment required for full integration of the secured site into the external local geographic emergency response system. Such integration shall include local geographic police and emergency response personnel and organizations as well as local military organizations. All costs associated with providing such communications equipment shall be the responsibility of the contractor and included in their price.
- Food. Unless otherwise provided by the customer as outlined in the Delivery
 Order establishing this security requirement, the contractor shall be responsible
 for providing all food and water requirements for security personnel. All costs
 associated with providing food and water shall be the responsibility of the
 contractor and included in their price.

Integration into Local Geographic Entities: Contractors performing under this contract shall fully integrate all security personnel and security activities into local emergency response plans and organizations. This integration requirement shall extend to the local government and shall include local government first-responders, local police, local fire departments, and other local organizations as may be required by local government regulations and Ministry of Interior regulations.

Contractors performing under this contract shall also be responsible for fully integrating all security personnel and security activities with all military organizations, both Iraqi and Coalition, which have responsibility for the geographic areas where work is to be performed.

By the term "integration" it is meant that contractors performing under this contract are required to be pro-active and to take the initiative to be fully communicative with, and working in compliance with, local emergency response organizations. The contractor shall be responsible for contacting local emergency response organizations daily and coordinating all ongoing security activities. This integration shall include the ability to communicate directly with local emergency response organizations by radio, telephone, or whatever combination of communications technology complies with local governmental regulations, local practice, and Ministry of Interior regulations.

It is essential that security contractors performing under this contract have clear understandings with regard to relationships between on-site security personnel and personnel from local government first responders. Contractor personnel at the locations being secured must clearly understand these on-site response relationships. Contractors

shall establish Standard Operating Procedures for communications operations and a copy shall be provided to the Contracting Officer at the time of application for inclusion into the PoolRules with regard to these relationships must be clearly posted in writing at the work site in a prominent location. Weekly training must address these relationships and be accomplished and documented with written records signed by the personnel being trained. In all communications and training, a clear distinction must be made between the relationships which exist between the contractor and local civilian response organizations and the relationships which exist between the contractor and local military response organizations.

Contract Description: The contract will be an Indefinite Delivery/Indefinite Quantity (IDIQ) contract. The contract will pre-qualify contractors for placement within a Pool of Qualified Security Service Contractors who are then eligible to compete for security work which comes available under the contract. The pre-qualification process places contractors within the pool of qualified contractors only after the firms applying for qualification have demonstrated they satisfy threshold requirements. Threshold requirements are defined as those requirements established by the Ministry of the Interior for Security Service Providers. These requirements may include such things as bonding, insurance, training, uniforms, and equipment standards. Offerors are placed on notice that these requirements are expected to evolve and change over time, and that new requirements may be added. In each case, contractors who are within the Pool of Qualified Security Service Contractors will be expected to accomplish whatever remedial action is necessary in order maintain their qualified status. Failure to maintain standards in accordance with Ministry of Interior requirements for Security Service Providers MAY RESULT IN BEING REMOVED FROM THE POOL OF QUALIFIED SECURITY SERVICE CONTRACTORS until the standard is again achieved.

Contractor Qualification: Placement of an offeror within the Pool of Qualified Security Service Contractors does not guarantee the award of any work under this contract. Placement within the pool means that offerors are eligible to compete for work which may come available under this contract. There is NO guarantee that any work will come available under this contract. This is not a contract which is mandatory for use by its potential customers. Coalition customers are free to seek other alternatives to meet their security needs, including writing other contracts and conducting other contract competitions.

Customer Orders: Orders are placed by customers when they fill out, and submit to the office designated to perform as the Contracting Office, a Delivery Order accompanied by a simple description of the work to be done (a Statement of Work) with a commitment of funds sufficient to cover at least the minimum quantity of work to be done.

Order Competition: Upon receipt of a properly completed Deliver Order from a customer, the Contracting Office will take action to conduct a competition to fulfill the order requirements. The nature of this competition is to award a Delivery Order to the competitor who offers the "Best Value" in their proposal; that is, the proposal which

offers the best combination of technical proposal, past performance, management and team, and cost in the competition. The selection process will involve an integrated assessment of all offers, measured against the evaluation factors outlined below. The competition will take place as follows:

Selection of Competitors: The Contracting Office will select a number of contractors from within the Pool of Qualified Security Service Contractors to compete on each Delivery Order requirement received from a customer. The selection will be influenced by four considerations:

First, the nature of the security service requirement and the capabilities indicated by the competitors. The wide variety of security services offered under this contract may mean that not all competitors can offer the full array of services. Obviously, a company would not be asked to compete for work of a type for which they are not capable. Capability data will be identified by offerors on their application forms when they request placement within the Pool of Qualified Security Service Contractors.

Second, the geographic area within the nation of Iraq in which the work is to be performed. It is understood that not all security service firms will have the capability to operate across the entire nation. The selection of competitors will, of course, be made in accordance with the geographic availability of the competing firms in mind. Geographic availability data will be identified by offerors on their application forms when they request placement within the Pool of Qualified Security Service Contractors.

Third, the dollar value of the requirement. The number of contractors selected by the Contracting Office to compete for a specific Delivery Order award from the Pool of Qualified Security Service Contractors will be sufficiently large to ensure that meaningful competition is accomplished. In general, the larger the dollar values of the requirement the larger the number of competitors that will be invited to compete.

Fourth, the characteristics of the available pool of competitors. When the Contracting Office is selecting contractors to participate in the competition for a requirement, AT LEAST ONE HALF of the competitors will be selected based on demonstrated past performance in performing work under this contract. Past Performance scores are determined based upon scores received in the Award Fee Evaluations to be accomplished by customers.

AVERAGE PAST PERFORMANCE UNDER THIS CONTRACT (AVERAGE AWARD FEE SCORE)	PAST PERFORMANCE CATEGORY
ABOVE 98 % AVERAGE	OUTSTANDING
BETWEEN 90 % AND 97% AVERAGE	EXCELLENT
BETWEEN 80 % AND 89 % AVERAGE	GOOD
BETWEEN 70 % AND 79 % AVERAGE	FAIR
BELOW 70 % AVERAGE	POOR

For example, for a requirement at the \$ 70 thousand dollar level, the Contracting Office might identify 5 competitors who will then provide meaningful competition and

compete for the Delivery Order Award. At least 3 of those competitors must be selected to compete based on their demonstrated past performance under this contract, as demonstrated by scores earned in Award Fee Evaluation. For example, companies selected to compete based on past performance scores will be selected in rank order from highest score downward, from the "Outstanding" category first. If there are fewer than 3 companies that fall into the "Outstanding" category, additional firms will be selected from the "Excellent" category and so forth until 3 firms have been selected for the competition based on past performance. For the 2 firms selected to compete, based on their availability on the Pool of Qualified Security Service Contractors and not their past performance scores (principally this will be firms which have not yet had an opportunity to earn a past performance score under this contract or who have not earned scores sufficiently high enough to qualify based on demonstrated superior past performance) the list of contractors chosen to compete will be accomplished by selection from the "Pool of Qualified Security Service Contractors" using a Bidder's List rotation technique. Obviously, when work is first initiated under this contract, none of the competitors will have demonstrated past performance under this contract; therefore, a simple Bidder's List rotation system with random selection to compete will be employed until a past performance data base is built.

Evaluation Factors: While there may be special situations which will require special evaluation factors, the following information is provided with respect to typical contractor evaluation and source selection. It is anticipated that the vast majority of evaluations and source selections will utilize these standard factors. If factors other than these standard factors are to be used, the special factors will be spelled out during the competition for that particular Deliver Order. The standard factors are provided below in descending order of importance for selection purposes.

Assessment and Technical Proposal: The first step in each competition for a Delivery Order requirement will be an Assessment and Technical Proposal. The Assessment activity is considered of utmost importance in this competition. Unlike security services performed in many other areas of the world, security services in Iraq stand a high probability of being violently tested. It is considered absolutely essential that offerors take the opportunity to visit the site to be secured and to make on-the-ground assessments of such things as the nature of the threat, fields of fire, avenues of approach, previous security challenges at the site, and similar considerations. We are not interested in proposals which are not based on a real-world assessment by qualified security professionals. Upon selection for competition, competitors will be provided an opportunity by the Contracting Office to meet as a group at the location where work is to be performed. Offerors are expected to attend and to accomplish an assessment. At that time and location the Customer will accomplish a walkthrough of the performance site and provide the competitors an opportunity to observe local conditions and to fully understand the nature of the security requirements. Competitors are encouraged to ask questions and take whatever steps are necessary to thoroughly understand the nature of the work required. There will be no second chances to visit the site. If competitors are

unable to meet at the location or time established for walk-through, they will be disqualified so that another qualified competitor has the opportunity to compete.

Within two days following the on-site walkthrough, the competitors will provide to the Contracting Office an Assessment and Technical Proposal that outlines the results of the competitor's assessment and the Technical Approach intended by the competitor to best achieve the goals of the customer. It is anticipated that the Contracting Officer will normally establish a page limit on the length of the technical proposal consistent with the nature of the requirement. Proposals will only be evaluated to the length of the page limit (e.g., a 6 page proposal submitted in response to a Delivery Order requirement with a 5 page limit will only be evaluated to page 5). Each offeror's Assessment and Technical Proposal will be evaluated in order to determine which competitor best achieves the customer's goals.

Past Performance: The second most important factor for selection will be the demonstrated past performance accomplished by contractors in the performance of previous work under this contract. Past Performance assessments will be accomplished by a review of Award Fee scores earned by the competitors under earlier work performed under this contract. There is no requirement for any information to be submitted by the competitors during the competition with respect to this factor. Competitors are cautioned that their Past Performance scores are being earned during the performance of work accomplished under Delivery Orders accomplished through this contract. Competitors should strive to always perform well in order to earn the highest possible past performance scores. Past performance scores are important because of the score's impact in earning the opportunity to compete and then in their importance in being selected for award.

Management and Personnel: The third most important factor for selection will be the team proposed for performance of work under the proposed Delivery Order. Each competitor will put together a Proposed Management Plan in accordance with the Contracting Officer's instructions. It is anticipated that there will be a page limit established for Management and Personnel proposals reflective of the nature of the technical requirement. The proposal should outline the makeup of the personnel and the management personnel the competitor proposes to use to satisfy the customer's requirements.

Key Personnel: The Plan should address the Key Personnel to be used and their qualifications. Information should be provided with respect to their education, training, and experience which uniquely qualify them to provide superior security service performance. Please note that this solicitation does not establish minimum qualifications requirements. Competitors are expected to provide the best possible team members, especially with respect to key managers. The competitive environment will help ensure the best qualified teams are selected.

Team Makeup: The plan should address the makeup of the team, with special attention given to the training and qualifications of the team members.

Cost: The least important consideration for selection will be cost. It is anticipated that competitions conducted under this solicitation will be of a "Propose to Budget" nature and that selection of contractors will be based on "Best Value" assessments. The intent is to select the proposal which best meets the customer's requirements and provides the Best Value for the funds available. Recognizing that there are many different ways with which to provide security services for a given area, the nature of the service provided and the range of security technologies employed is likely to be bounded by budget considerations. In order to ensure the greatest performance within available budget, the competition will establish the budget within which the competition will be conducted. Thus, the offeror who offers the most effective security approach, and who provides the greatest content within available budget, will be providing the Best Value and will receive the award.

Offerors are cautioned that the Source Selection Authority may employ analytical measures to review the effort proposed within the budget in order to ensure that the proposed level of work can actually be performed within the budget. This technique, known as "Most Probable Cost" ensures the integrity of the cost proposal. Offerors who propose levels of work which cannot be accomplished within available funding levels will have their cost scores reduced for lack of realism.

The disclosure of budget information will include the disclosure of the Award Fee Pool established within the Delivery Order to reward excellent contract performance.

Source Selection Relative Order of Importance: The Evaluation Factors above are listed in their order of importance. Their relative order of importance is as follows:

- The Assessment and Technical Proposal is the most important factor and is slightly more important than Past Performance.
- Past Performance is the second most important factor than slightly more important than the Management and Personnel
- Management and Personnel is the third most important factor and is much more important than Cost.
- Cost is the least important factor.

Source Selection Authority: Normally the selection of the successful offeror will be made by the Contracting Office on behalf of the customer for whom the Delivery Order is being accomplished. In those cases, the Contracting Office will ensure the accomplishment of all documentation in support of the award and will complete the selection and award activities. In some cases the customer may serve as the Source Selection Authority. In those cases, the Contracting Office will assist the customer in the evaluation process but the documentation in support of the award will be the responsibility of the customer making the selection. After the customer making the selection completes the documentation activities, the Contracting Office will the complete selection and award activities.

It is the goal of this ID/IQ contract to enable the entire process of source selection to normally be accomplished, and for a Delivery Order award to be completed, within one week after receipt of a complete Delivery Order requirement from the customer. This one week period includes selection of competitors, a site visit, receipt and evaluation of the Assessment and Technical Proposal, evaluation of the Past Performance of the offerors, evaluation of the proposed Management and Personnel, and an integrated assessment against the cost of the proposal in order to determine which proposal represents the Best Value for the money spent. A different time schedule may be established for Delivery Order award by the Contracting Officer.

In cases of large dollar value requirements, more extensive or highly technical requirements, or requirements which extend over wide geographic areas, this evaluation may take longer than one week. It is always the intent of this contract, however, to accomplish evaluation and award as rapidly as possible, consistent with good stewardship of the monies involved.

Award Fee: In order to ensure the highest possible performance by the providers of security services under this contract, an Award Fee will be used. An Award Fee is a preestablished amount of money (called an "Award Fee Pool") which is set aside to reward contractors for good performance. Normally an amount of 10% of the available budget is set aside for use as an Award Fee prior to initiating the competition process. This Award Fee amount will be disclosed during the competition for award so that the competitors clearly understand the entire budget and compensation opportunities available under the contract. An Award Fee amount in the 10% range is considered relatively high and reflects the seriousness with which security services are taken. We expect top flight performance and will reward such performance accordingly. Contractors who perform at less than the highest levels will experience reductions in Award Fee awards accordingly.

Mechanics of Award Fee: The total Award Fee Pool will be divided equally into sums which will be made available for Award Fee Pool Determination each 3 months during contract performance. For example; an Award Fee Pool of \$100 thousand, established for a contract with a performance period of 2 years, would have 8 Award Fee evaluations performed, each on an Award Fee amount of \$12,500. The purpose of the Award Fee is to encourage high quality performance by the contractor and to HELP ENSURE THE CONTRACTOR PAYS CLOSE ATTENTION TO CUSTOMER REQUIREMENTS. In order to ensure that the contractor has every opportunity to earn the maximum possible fee, discussions should be held frequently (AT LEAST once a month) to keep the contractor informed of how the customer views their performance. Contractors should not be surprised by Award Fee evaluation scores.

The CUSTOMER serves as the Award Fee Determination Official. As the Award Fee Determination Official, the customer evaluates contractor performance on an Award Fee Evaluation Form and determines how much of the Award Fee the contractor

has earned. The determination is made in terms of a percentage of the Award Fee available to be awarded to the contractor. (For example; in the \$12,500 example given above, an Award Fee determination of 90% would result in an award of \$11, 250). This determination is documented on an Award Fee Determination Worksheet, signed by the customer and forwarded to the Contracting Office. The Contracting Office then awards the percentage earned to the contractor. IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT THIS PROCEDURE BE KEPT FAST AND SIMPLE. A simple Award Fee Determination Worksheet sample is included in this document. This determination process should only take a few minutes but is essential to keeping contractors highly motivated to provide good performance. It is also essential in documenting contractor past performance which plays a significant role in the selection of contractors for award. It is also essential in helping contractors learn how to improve their scores by providing good performance and meeting their customer's expectations.

The Philosophy of Award Fee: An award fee which cannot be earned is not an incentive to contractor performance. If we place money in an Award Fee Pool it is placed there with the intent that it CAN be earned. The Award Fee Pool is a tool intended to reward good performance and Award Fee Determination Officials should use that tool for its intended purpose: to reward good performance. The ideal situation is that contractors earn 100% of Award Fee, because such a score indicates that the contractor has provided very good performance. Very good performance does not imply PERFECT performance. Human beings never perform perfectly. Use good common sense. On the other hand, the Award Fee approach provides an opportunity for a customer to strongly communicate displeasure with contractor performance and to ensure the contractor understands the consequences of poor performance.

Availability: It is intended that this contract will be available for use by a wide variety of users. The requirement for security services across Iraq is ubiquitous and making such services readily available will improve the overall security environment. It is intended that this contract will be available for use by all Coalition Partners, and all Iraqi Governmental Organizations. The contract will be available for use by these organizations within limitations which may be established by law, regulations promulgated by the Ministry of Interior, or other laws which may govern security service contracts.

Organization and Staffing: The intent of this contract is to ensure the ready availability of high quality security services which can be accessed in a competitive manner, quickly, and with a minimum of effort. In order to ensure this outcome it is essential that certain minimum qualifications be established for the security services personnel to be used in tactical security settings. These standards, which are mostly physical in nature, are not applicable to personnel who may be employed in sedentary or clerical jobs.

Physical Requirements:

Minimum age = 18 years

- Run a kilometer in less than 7 minutes
- 20 pushups without rest
- 20 bent knee situps without rest
- Carry your own weight 15 meters within 1 minute
- No physical abnormalities to prevent performance

Other Requirements:

- No criminal record
- Basic literacy
 - o Able to read and understand written orders
 - o Able to write reports
 - o Able to learn simple English phrases

Available Services: The following types of services are contemplated under this contract. This list is not to be considered all inclusive. If additional security services of a type not contemplated here are identified at a later date as being necessary, they may be added to the available services at that time. Offerors will be requested to identify the types of services which they can provide.

- Tower guards
- Motorized or airborne roving patrols
- Entry point control
- Quality control
- Personnel escorts
- Supply
- Offsite services
- Port security
- Electrical transmission facilities

- Alarm and Security monitor
- Electronic surveillance
- Dog teams
 - o Explosives detection
 - Personnel control
 - o Other
- Security Safety
- Security equipment maintenance
- Convoys
- Pipeline

Training: The intent of this contract requires that the personnel provided by the contractors be highly qualified and properly trained. The nature of the competitive environment envisioned by the source selection process to be accomplished under this contract will help ensure that competitors ensure such training and qualifications. Offerors are placed on notice that it is anticipated that training requirements, promulgated by the Ministry of the Interior, will probably evolve over time. Such changes may result in the de-qualification of competitors who were fully qualified at an earlier point in time. Competitors are expected to promptly take action in such circumstances to re-qualify their personnel. Failure to re-qualify personnel in accordance with Ministry of Interior regulations could result in removal of the competitor from the Pool of Qualified Security Service Contractors.

Contractors under this contract are responsible for providing personnel who meet all requirements established by the Ministry of the Interior. The contractors are responsible for accomplishing this training. The Coalition Provisional Authority will recognize and accept any and all training which meets Ministry of the Interior training requirements when proof of training is provided. The Ministry of the Interior may establish requirements for documentation and proof of training; should such requirements be established, contractors will be required to provide such documentation and proof in whatever manner is required by Ministry of the Interior regulations.

At a minimum, all security service personnel who are expected to take an active physical role in security activities will be required to be trained in the areas of:

- Weapons familiarization
- Use of force

Communications procedures

Integration with Geographic and Military Organizations: The contractor must report all sites guarded by security service personnel to local police, local military, and civil authorities. This reporting must be accomplished in accordance with local regulations and procedures.

At a minimum, the contractor must report, in accordance with local police, military and civil authorities, the following information for <u>every</u> site where security services personnel are located:

- Address
- Grid Coordinates
- Number of security personnel present (total for 24 hours)
- How to communicate with the security guard force
- Other information in accordance with local procedures

The contractor must also maintain a company-wide roster of approved and employed personnel, with a current copy monthly to the Ministry of the Interior and with a copy to the Contracting Office. This roster must include at a minimum:

- Name of each employee
- Assignment location of each employee
- Rank or pay category of each employee
- Other identifying data as may be required

Pay and Benefits: There is no Government-established pay rate for this contract at any level. Contractors are free to pay at any rate as determined by market conditions.





IRAQ INFRASTRUCTURE RECONSTRUCTION

The Way Ahead

Oct 2003

The Challenge

- Supplemental is progressing towards enactment.
- The focus will soon turn to Baghdad to learn what will be done and how it will be accomplished effectively, efficiently and in compliance with the legislation.
- Important Programs to be funded by the supplemental are counting on funds immediately to do work that is crucial to their success

- TEXT + Ammaput


DRIVERS

- Funding rules
- Contracting rules
- Close scrutiny and transparency
- Complex program in accelerated timeframe – the art of the possible
- Cross cultural sensitivities
- · No fail mandate

PMO Basic Tenets

- Financial and Contract Authority follows chain of responsibility i.e. with CPA in Baghdad
- Innovative and highly leveraged total program management approach including contracting strategies that comply with Federal Acquisition Regulations must be used
- Maximum transparency in everything we do
- Accountability rests entirely with one office of CPA

Program Management Organization




Areas of Contention

- Contracting approach and control
 - Washington
 Washington
 - PMO → wherever it makes sense
- Interface between AID, COE, Army and others who are contracting for work in Iraq
- Size and role of PMO office
- Integration of existing programs into the overall approach

Actions Underway Currently

- Project definition in progress
- Building staff here and in Washington
- PMO process and procedures being assembled
- Acquisition plan being written in Washington
- Acquisition actions like contract scopes under preparation
- Technology plan under preparation and actions started

Process Overview



- Br on Ash

February 1 2004

SIGN CONTRACTS

January 9 2004

PROPOSALS EVALUATED &

RECOMMENDED

December 24 2003

PROPOSALS SUBMITTED

December 12 2003

ANNOUNCEMENT OF SHORTLISTS

November 26 2003

EXPRESSIONS OF INTEREST IN

November 18 2003

INDUSTRY DAY

November 11 2003

RFI


November 7 2003

SECTOR SCOPES COMPLETED


NOW

APPROACH APPROVED

Key Next Steps



- Prepare for the attention shifting to Baghdad after supplemental is signed
- Establish effective interface with CPA, Ministries, IGC and others
- Find acceptable solutions for programs that have urgent requirements (NA), Oil, Electricity, etc.)
- Accelerate staffing, project identification, UST, WHAT NOT? prioritization and package for construction
- Execute





Synchronization Exercise October 10, 2003 1300-1700



Purpose of Exercise



To create an environment in which Ministry and Coalition personnel identify milestones, policy issues and resources needed to achieve CPA's security end state.


· Why?

To provide decision support guidance to AMB Bremer and GEN Abizaid (and to SECDEF) to enable them to identify decisions that need to be made ahead of time to ensure CPA reaches its endstate.



Conceptual Exercise Framework





Time



Anticipated Outcomes



A refined strategic plan that ensures synchronization between CPA and CENTCOM activities

The outputs will support the decision-makers and you by:

- Identifying dependencies between events/tasks
- Identifying critical paths to help AMB Bremer and GEN
 Abizaid "see" the decisions they need to make ahead of time
- Identifying policy decisions required and identify decision owners
- Identifying resource gaps/misallocations
- Identifying transition points towards building Iraqi capacity
- Determining areas that may require contingency planning



Exercise Protocols



- Exercise is conducted at Secret level
- Each ministry/entity is allotted 5 minutes per turn to present their plan for achieving end state
- Each participant will brief based on a previously prepared PowerPoint representation of the entity's plan
- Three turns at approximately 1 hour per turn with two 15 minute breaks



Behind the Scenes Work to Prep



MS Project is Not Intended for Use During the Exercise - Just to Help Prep

				1		4th Quarter			1st Quarter			2nd Quarter			3rd Quarter			4th Q	
D	Asse	17.50	Task Name	Start	Finish	Sep	Oct	No	v Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oc
0	0	12%	Security Strategic Plan	9/30/03	11/30/05	1		ij.		1		1					1		
1		0%	1 Achieve a Secure and Stable Environment	10/1/03	12/31/84	1				15	4								
17	0	13%	2 Public Safety	10/1/03	1/1/05	1	-	1	10		1								
18		0%	2.1 Develop and apply consistent vetting policies and pr	10/1/03	1/31/04		-								-		1 1		
21		1%	2.2 Establish Governance Framework for Internal Secur	10/1/03	1/1/04	1	-		1	7	1								
29	0	16%	2.3 Create an effective and accountable Police System	10/1/03	12/31/04	1					-								
55	0	06%	2.4 Create the FPS	10/1/03	1/1/05		-	1	4	1									
61	0	30%	2.5 Form the ICBC	10/1/03	3/2/04	1	-	-		+	ź.	7							
65		2%	2.6 Reconstruct Civil Defense and Establish Mine Action	10/1/03	12/31/04	1		1	1	1	5								
72	0	3%	2.7 Develop Effective Border Security	10/1/03	12/31/04	1		7			Ť-								
73		0%	2.7.1 Develop Border Policy	10/1/03	2	()	6	A.	AugsWe "	E .									
74		21%	2.7.2 Hire and train Staff for DBE (13658)	10/1/03	11	1		10 A		DBE	Total	Pers	onne	DBE-	[otel[2,865	Person	inel)	
75		0%	2.7.3 Deploy 13K Officers	12/35	M	7		1	1	♦ De	c 31 'I)3							
76		0%	2.7.4 Deploy 14.1K Officers	1 1	04			-	1	T			♦ Me	r 31 'l	14		1		
77		0%	2.7.5 Deploy 16K - 25,7K Officers	R	12/31/04		1	1	1		1	Γ							
78		0%	2.7.6 Select Bureau chiefs	1/00	1/1/04		11 - 12 - 12		-	N ₄	1		1						
79		0%	2.7.7 Begin Uniform Issue	10/1/03	1/1/04				416	De la						13			
30		0%	2.7.8 Start building renovations	10/1/03	1/1/04		12/A/20	A STATE					1 3						
81	0	0%	2.7.9 Major Airports Op 10 Maj Air Traffi	10/1/03	2/1/04	1		1	3.1		7								
86	0	0%	2.7,10 Implement Control	10/1/03	1/1/04			(2)		i.e	1								
37		0%	2.8 Develop 5 macy ment C2 System	10/1/03	1/1/04	1		4	- 4	7	1								
89	0	20%	3 Build Justice	9/30/03	12/31/04	1		1	3								: :		
16		27%	4 Develop IZ defem abilities and oversight mechanism	10/1/03	4/1/04	1	-	1					7						
41	0	22%	5 Enable IZ to become a responsible member of the interne	10/1/03	1/1/04	1		1	1	7							1		
53		0%	6 Quad II (IZ Local Control)	1/1/04	4/1/04			1	1	-	:								
56		0%	7 Quad III (IZ Regional Control)	4/1/04	1/1/05			2	-		-	4	-						-
60		0%	8 Quad IV (Strategic Overwatch)	1/1/05	11/30/05			1	1		1						1		



Team Scripts Per Turn



Prepare one slide per turn for your line

- Announce assumptions
- Identify milestones
- Identify dependencies between events/tasks
- Identify transition points (to Iraqis)
- Identify gaps that require policy or resource decisions
- Highlight major risks



NSD - Turn # 1: Now to Apr '04 (example)



Oct '03

Turn #1

Apr '04

Troop Strength

Milestone

Equipment

Milestone

Milestone

Milestone

Milestone


Focus on headline deliverables:

- Numbers of forces, prisons beds, capabilities
- Key capabilities (e.g. special units, internal controls, governance capacity)
- Major events (e.g. economic shocks)



Focus is on Key Tasks and major milestones







As you prepare ...



- Ask yourself "So What" before you speak please. Help your audience leap to a deeper understanding of how they and you link. Don't assume we can intuit.
- Understand your plan before you come in at the MS Project Level as well as the PowerPoint level. Know the answers to your script because you will brief it.
- Rehearse what you have to say and then cut it in half save time for others to help you with your plan – that's the point.
- Immediately pull yourself up from the weeds or the rat hole as soon as you sense yourself going there – don't go there, table it for another time.
- Remind yourself of our deliverables as if you had to explain them eventually to SECDEF yourself.
- Focus on what you can do for others in this exercise not the opposite.



Next Steps



Friday October 10th 1300-1700, Ambassadors' Conf Room

We are here to help you prepare



MOI - # 1: Oct 03 to Apr 04



Issues

75,000 IPS of which ?? Newly trained

1,000 IPTF starting to deploy


11.5k BP TIP trained

FPS size depends on budget decisions

MOI new structure & staffing complete Feb 04

Police oversight mechanisms established

Baghdad C3 network complete





MOI - # 2: Apr 04 to Oct 04




Issues

Special investigative units require intensive training

Police capability outside urban areas?

NIA role on borders?

Regional Operations Centers & C3 network operational country-wide






MOI - # 3: Oct 04 to Apr 05



<u>Issues</u>

All rehired police phased out? Corruption and efficiency levels?





TF RIE UPDATE



2 Oct 2003

TF RIE Commander: BG (P) Steven R. Hawkins




MISSION



TF Restore Iraqi Electricity (RIE) supports CPA and CJTF(7) in the delivery of reliable and consistent electrical power to the country of Iraq to assist the Iraqi people by providing services that meet or exceed pre-war standards on a reliable and predictable basis.




COMMANDER'S INTENT




Endstate:

 TF RIE, by upgrading generation, transmission, and management / control systems, supports the Electricity
 Working Group Fiscal 04 Power
 Program. Seamlessly transition projects to CPA's Program Management Office,
 Ministry of Electricity and it's senior civilian advisor.






Project Overview



- Direct support to CPA
- CENTCOM and CPA requested USACE support due to demonstrated expertise
- Work accomplished through existing competitive contracts
- USACE provides the engineering and contracting expertise, with an end date of 20 Dec 2003
- TF RIE tasks include new generation, rehab of existing facilities, restoring transmission lines, management and control systems, increasing national power reliability
- One member of the "Team of Teams"



Project Criteria



- Baghdad center of gravity NEW POWER
- Improve transmission lines to stabilize grid
- Consumption priority=fuel oil, crude, Natural Gas & finally-diesel
- Use stand-alone generation at key facilities
- Avoid duplication of effort-deconflict with other efforts
- Build project packages based on funding levels
- High-impact projects-10 MW system threshold

GENERATION PROJECTS



Project #	TF RIE PROJECT NAME	CPA ESTIMATE	START		
GENERA	ATION TOTAL: \$643M (15 Proj -10 Started,	5 waiting fu	unds)		
4	NEW GENERATION: QUDAS - 180 MW	\$100M	26-Sep-03		
28	NEW GENERATION: BAJI - 160 MW	\$100M	26-Sep-03		
27	NEW GENERATION: TAJI - 66 MW	TION: TAJI - 66 MW \$29M			
30	NEW GENERATION: NASIRIYA - 150 MW	ENERATION: NASIRIYA - 150 MW \$50M			
31	NEW GENERATION: QUDAS - 250 MW	Need funds to start			
9	NEW GENERATION: BUZULGAN - 40 MW	26-Sep-03			
32	NEW GENERATION: KESSEK - 201 MW	\$108M	Need funds to start		
3	NEW GENERATION: NORTH -10 Industries	\$14M	26-Sep-03		
1	CUT from GRID: 100 MW - Baghdad Water	Funded by USAID	26-Sep-03		
2	NEW to GRID: 270 MW of SDMO GEN	Funded by DFI	26-Sep-03		
5	REHAB/REPL Khor Al-Zubayr: Units #2 and #4		26-Sep-03		
6	REHAB Dibis: Units #4 and #6 \$20M		26-Sep-03		
7	REHAB Najaf: Units #1and #2	\$20M			
8	REHAB Hilla: Units #1 and #2		Need funds to start		
26	BACK-UP GEN: 200 MW (Japan GenSets)	\$26M	26-Sep-03		

Fifteen projects begun totaling \$643 M



TRANSMISSION PROJECTS



TRANSMISSION: \$3	95M - (8 Proj	ects - all started)
-------------------	---------------	---------------------

		T	1			
11	400 KV LINE: Baghdad (W) to Haditha	lad (W) to Haditha \$20M				
12	400 KV LINE: Baghdad (W) to Bajii	\$20M	26-Sep-03			
13	400 KV LINE: Baghdad (S) to Diwaniyah	\$20M	26-Sep-03			
16	400 KV LINE: Hartha to Qut Wassit	\$60M	26-Sep-03			
17	11/33 KV SCADA: Baghdad only	\$100M	26-Sep-03			
14	132/400 KV SCADA - IRAQ - Phase 1 only	\$120M	26-Sep-03			
15	REHAB: 4 Baghdad Control Centers	\$5M	26-Sep-03			
18	REHAB: Priority 11/33 KV Substations	\$50M	26-Sep-03			

Eight projects begun totaling \$395 M repairing the Nation's transmission system



PROPOSED PROJECTS




MANAGEMENT AND CONTROL: \$36M (3 Projects - 1 started)				
22	DESIGN MOE LOGISTICS MGMT SYSTEM	\$30M	26-Sep-03	
23	EQUIP POWER POLICE -1500 men / 1 year	\$4M	Need funds to start	
25	PROVIDE SECURITY DETECTION EQUIP	\$2M	Need funds to start	

Three proposed projects totaling \$36 M



TASK FORCE "RIE" PROJECT OVERVIEW



Project Not Started

Project Begun, 0-50% Complete

Project on track, 50 - 100%

Project Complete & Energized

COUNTRY WIDE PROJECTS











Project	PROJECT DESCRIPTION	PROJECT	PERCENT	
#	TERIE PROJECT NAME			
GENERA	ATION TOTALS: \$643M (16 Projects -11 S	tarted, 5 Ws	iting fund	
4	NEW GENERATION: QUDAS - 180 MW	20-Dec-03	0.0%	
28	NEW GENERATION: BAJI - 180 MW	50-Dec-03	0.0%	
27	NEW GENERATION: TAJI - 66 MW	30-Mir-04	plend funde to	
30	NEW GENERATION: NASIRIYA - 150 MW	30-Mar-04	Need funds to	
31	NEW GENERATION: QUDAS - 250 MW	30-May-04	Need furnit to	
9	NEW GENERATION: BUZULGAN - 40 MW	30-leno-04	0.0%	
32	NEW GENERATION: KESSEK - 201 MW	90-4404	Need Banda I.	
3	NEW GENERATION: NORTH -10 Industries	30-Jan-04	0.0%	
1	CUT from GRID: 100 MW - Bagitdad Water 20-Dec-03			
2	NEW to GRID: 270 MW of SDMO GEN 20-Date-03			
5	REHAB Khor Al-Zubsyr: Units #2 and #4	20-Dec-03	0.0%	
6	REHAB Dibis: Units #4 and #6	30-Jul-04	0.0%	
7	REHAB Najaf: Units #1 and #2	20-Dec 05	0.0%	
8	REHAB Hilla: Units #1 and #2			
26	BACK-UP GEN: 200 MW (Japan GenSets)	30-Misr-04	0.0%	
TRANSA	AISSION: \$305M - (& Projects - all started)		
11	400 KV LINE: Baghdad (W) to Haditha	20-Deti-03	0.0%	
12	400 KV LINE: Baghdad (W) to Bajii			
13	400 KV LINE: Baghdad (S) to Diwaniyah	20-Dec-03	0.0%	
16	400 KV LINE: Hartha to Qut Wassit	20-Dec-03	0.0%	
17	11/33 KV SCADA: Baghdad only	20-Dec-05	200%	
14	132/400 KV SCADA - IRAQ - Phase 1 only	20-D-en-03	0.0%	
15	REHAB: 4 Baghdad Control Centers	20-Dec-01	0.0%	
18	REHAB: Priority 11/33 KV Substations	20-Cres-03 0.0		
MANAG	EMENT AND CONTROL: \$36M (3 Projects	- 1 started)		
22	DESIGN MOE LOGISTICS MGMT SYSTEM	20/Dec 00 0.0%		
23	EQUIP POWER POLICE -1500 men / 1 year	Need Juneta in afairt.	Chaptonida	
25	PROVIDE SECURITY DETECTION EQUIP	Patient florests to:	Linknown	



Baghdad Iraq

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


Facilities Protection Services Transition Plan

Mr MAJ










Beghded Ireq

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FPS-Manpower Status



DN2016

UNCLASSIFIED

note any li



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Constraints/Limitations

 COMMAND & CONTROL: PROGRAM IS DECENTRALIZED TO MINISTRIES NO C2 AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL PROVIDING GUIDANCE AND STANDARDS

The gaineds and ce hom PERSONNEL: CONSTRAINTS IN PERSONNEL PREVENT FULL MANNING OF FPS RESULTING NO DEDICATED FPS REPRESENTATIVES IN THE MINISTRIES

- 10 menently no ages to FT autil Polad -

· RESOURCES: LIMITED EFFECTIVENESS DUE TO WEAPONS FIELDING WHICH WILL BE COMPLETED NLT 1 JAN 04 PROVIDING WEAPONS FROM

JORDAN ARRIVE. - AKS delayed by frenders - NO - - UTC Thom: inners from MEK stone?

\$24 M in Sage for FYO4- is The Item - (2016 game of \$100/ most

Uniform - PCD wies get \$2,4 m

UNCLASSIFIED

CERP \$11 for Nov-Dec.

20K



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Proof Of Principle

Mot day policy / training Standardyale -. Next only 2 FTES

- RESOURCE A MANAGEMENT CELL AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL
- TRANSITION BY EVENTS STARTING 3 OCT AND ENDING 15 JAN 04
- CREATE A TRANSITION TEAM TO SERVE AS MINISTRIES FPS POC
- SYNCHRONIZE TEAM EFFORTS ~ MINISTRIES TO MSC
- COMPLETE 90% OF THE SITES BY 15 DEC =
- * USE CERP FUNDS UNTIL MINISTRIES ASSUME SALARIES UNTIL 1 JAN 04

 ω, α actually have to le phased ως TOA. (Con one get comp # from Impp.)

The aspiration that Ministries pick up all salary payments from 1 Nov 03 onwards will not be realized, because:

- Ministries may not accept all MSC hired FPS personnel. (MYS kes agreed & take
- . Ministries may not be fully geared up to achieve this within the designated timeframe. Local One



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TOA Criteria

SECURITY PERSONNEL ARE SCREENED AND TRAINED.

- "Join well"
- Maining by MSC, Mcil.

Some annistres"
- will apon Mcil traum site
outside Bodal -

SITES THAT ARE MONITOR ONLY, AND ANY NEW SITES, MUST HAVE AS A MINIMUM: A SITE-BOOK (PERTINENT DATA) AND MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT (MSC AGREES TO MONITOR SITE/MINISTRY AGREES TO BE ACCOUNTABLE FOR FORCE PROTECTION)

- how hould site that wear he covered.

- T-RAGO hery staff. So are how date for trouset

CARDS - Med as the get - des 80d -

- Cld + compon " can problem WEAPONS CARDS FOR EACH PERSON _ UPS: WIT ≥ TOA issue - problem is wielend
UNCLASSIFIED TO TOA-



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Show Stoppers

·Funding:

<u>CAUSE</u> ~ EXCEED HIRING GOAL ESTABLISHED MY MINISTRY. MINISTRIES

NOT ABLE TO ACCEPT SALARY PAYMENT OF NUMBERS GREATER THAN 20k

EFFECT ~ CAUSES MSCS TO CONDUCT LAY-OFFS/FIRE EMPLOYEES LOCALLY

CAUSE ~ UNABLE TO PURCHASE UNIFORMS (Left of PEB.

EFFECT ~ EMPLOYMENT OF PERSONNEL LACK EFFECTIVENESS


· Personnel:

<u>CAUSE</u> ~ NO C2 ELEMENT TO MANAGE FPS AT NATIONAL LEVEL 1 ** | Maria Angulia CAUSE ** NO CPA REPRESENATIVE @ GOVERNATE LEVEL ** 100 LO CONTROL OF CAUSE ** NO CPA REPRESENATIVE @ GOVERNATE LEVEL ** 100 LO CONTROL OF CAUSE ** NO CPA REPRESENATIVE @ GOVERNATE LEVEL ** 100 LO CONTROL OF CAUSE *

EFFECT~ NOT AVAILABLE TO TOA SITES

MONITOR SITES WELL INTO 2004 = e.g. Paloce, Nord. St. 20

(Some)





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Course of Actions

COA 1

MSCS RETAIN SECURITY ROLE

CHARACTERISTICS; TOA IS DELAYED UNTIL MINISTRIES HIRE FPS MANAGERS AND C2 CELL IN MOI

FAVORS: MINISTRY ALLOWS THEM TIME TO STANDUP THE FPS SECURITY CELLS FROM NATIONAL LEVEL DOWN TO LOCAL

PROBLEM: REQUIRES MSCS TO CONTINUE TO HIRE/TRAIN/EQUIP AND C2

COA 2

·MINISTRIES ASSUME SECURITY ROLE

CHARACTERISTICS; MINISTRY ASSUMES "AS IS" WITH LITTLE C2/STAFF

FAVORS: MSCS ALLOWING COMMANDERS TO SHIFT C2 AND MOVE INTO A MONITOR ONLY ROLE.

PROBLEM: MINISTRIES ARE NOT STRUCTURED TO ASSUME

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COA 3



 MINISTRIES ASSUME WITH 90 DAY HELP FROM CJTF7 on

CHARACTERISTICS; CJTF7 **AUGMENTS IN ORDER TO** JUMPSTART MOI C2 CELL, MINISTRIES AGGRESSIVELY HIRE FILLS

FAVORS:

MSC & MINISTRIES

PROBLEM: REQUIRES CJTF7 TO SUPPORT WITH PERSONNEL . NO GUARENTEE THAT MINISTRIES WILL HAVE PERSONNEL AT END OF 90 DAYS



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Personnel Resource Requirements

Location Requirement Recommend Support 1 Supervisor (Officer -03) Office Assistant- (E6 up) National Level Management Cell Trainers- (E1-E5) 21 Personnel/OH Operations Cell-Plans, Policy, Standards Training Cell- Standardize & Execute Training Logistics Cell- Draft/ procure requirements **Budget Cell-Monitor & Submit purchases** FPS Governate Level **Transition Managers** 26 Personnel/11 Implement- Plans, Policy, Standards, coordinate Training with Management Cell prepare equipment requirements & submit purchases. Assume TOA **FPS** Site level Site Managers 1156 Personnel/unk UNCLASSIFIED



Baghdad Iraq

Public Safety and Security for All Iraqis



Concept

Facility Protection Services Program National Level TOA 15 Jan 04

PHASE I: ISTABLISHMENT: Assist in Enforcing Standards & Accountability

PHASE I:
ESTABLISHMENT:
RESOurce
Ministries
With
I cansilium

Managers

PHASE II: IRANSITION: Bertom-Up Stugge: Abnistry Sites To MSC 3 Oct - 15 OCT PHASE III: NATIONAL LEVEL
TRANSITION: THIS PHASE IS
TENTATIVELY SET FOR15 JAN 04. IT
DEPENDS ON TOA TO BE AT LEAST 90
PERCENT COMPLETE. IN SOME CASES
MSCs WILL CONTINUE TO PROTECT
TIER 1/1A AND SOME TIER 2 SITES
UNTIL RELIEVED BY MINISTRY HIRES
IAW HIRING GOALS FOR CY 04.

PHASE I: ESTABLISHMENT: National Level FPS Management Cell

PHASE I: ESTABLISHMENT: THIS BEGINS ON DEVELOPING THE FPS STRUCTURE
NEEDED TO MANAGE AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL (THE FPS PROGRAM TRANSITION OF SPECIFIC FUNCTIONS (HIRING, VETTING AND PAYMENT OF SALARIES), PURCHASE
OF UNIFORMS AND FILLING FPS SECURITY MANAGEDS AT

OF UNIFORMS AND FILLING FPS SECURITY MANAGERS AT THE MINISTRY LEVEL.

PHASE I IS COMPLETED WHEN EACH AREA IS STOOD UP.

PHASE II: <u>TRANSITION</u>: THIS PHASE COMMENCES O/A 3 OCT 03 WITH 1 AD CONDUCTING TOA AND ENDING ON 15 JAN 04. TOA IS CONDUCTED BY SITE WITH REPRESENTATIVES FROM EACH MINISTRY AND MSC REPRESENTATIVES.
PRIORITY OF EFFORT IS 1 AD,101 AA, 4 ID, MND CS, MND SE, 82D AB.

CJTF assists in "Jumpstarting"




Baghdad Iraq


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Command & Control

1156 Sites (local, Govern ate/National Structures)







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Priority Of Effort

Ministry	1-15 Oct	15-31 Oct	1-15 Nov	15-30 Nov	1-15 Dec	15-30 Dec 1-15 Jan
Agriculture	1 AD	101 AA	4 ID	MND CS	82d	
Central Bank	1 AD	101 AA	4 ID	MND CS	82d	
Culture	1 AD	101 AA	4 ID	MND CS	82d	
Education	1 AD	101 AA	4 ID	MND CS	82d	
Finance	1 AD	101 AA	4 ID	MND CS	82d	
Foreign Affairs	1 AD	101 AA	4 ID	MND CS	82d	
Health	1 AD	101 AA	4 ID	MND CS	82d	
Higher Education	1 AD	101 AA	4 ID	MND CS	82d	
Housing & Construction	1 AD	101 AA	4 ID	MND CS	82d	
Industry & Minerals	1 AD	101 AA	4 ID	MND CS	82d	
Interior	1 AD	101 AA	4 ID	MND CS	82d	
Justice	1 AD	101 AA	4 ID	MND CS	82d	A
Labor & Social Affairs	1 AD	101 AA	4 ID	MND CS	82d	Open Dates
Office of Security Affairs	1 AD	101 AA	4 ID	MND CS	82d	
National Standards	1 AD	101 AA	4 ID	MND CS	82d	
Public Works	1 AD	101 AA	4 ID	MND CS	82d	
Planning	1 AD	101 AA	4 ID	MND CS	82d	
Religious Affairs	1 AD	101 AA	4 ID	MND CS		
Science & Technology	rs 1 AD 101 AA 4 ID MND CS 82d					
Trade	1 AD	101 AA	4 ID	MND CS	82d	
Trans & Communications		F				
Water Resources	1 AD	101AA	4ID	MND CS/MND SE	82d	
Youth & Sports	1 AD	101 AA	4 ID	MND CS	82d	
Oil & Electric	1 AD	101 AA	4 ID	MND CS/MND SE	82d	

Reschedules



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1 AD

Lessons Learned & Contention Points

- Ministries unwilling to assume MSC hires:
- Ministry of Trade and Ministry of YS: Want to contract the service
- ☐ FPS personnel walking off and joining ICDC
- ▶ Better Pay
- ☐ TOA 3 OCT at CPA for signatures
- > Having difficulty in providing TOA sheets

8,40



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Progress Review Board

- · A review board held to resolve contentions; frequency to be determined
- · Panel (4-members) review locations that are in contention
- Panel composition (2 CJTF, 2 CPA)

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- Panel send recommendation to Decision Panel (Chairman/0-10-CENTCOM and (2) Co-Chairpersons (1-CJTF, 1, CPA)) on resolution
- Co-Chairpersons provide impacts and recommendation/ vote
- · Chairman serves as swing vote and decides



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Progress Review Board



Site in Contention Ministry will not accept Even though criteria is being met.



Panel Review

4 member Panel reviews
Contention points and recommends
To Decision Panel

1 day Process





CJTF7

Maintain on site

Or move to monitor & support

Decision Sent to Ministry and MSC



Decision Panel

Must have 2:1 Decision in Favor of recommendation

1 day Process



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Way Ahead

"hove 5 5an

- ➤ Brief Commanding General and obtain approval
- ➤ Issue FRAGO directing execution of Transition
- ➤ Commence Transition 3 Oct (1 AD Lessons Learned)

Establish C2 Cell 15 Oct

With 15 Fe Coll 95 Aug Conduct Periodic Updates to the Commanding General

Strategy of Feet Strategy Seven Strategy Seven Strategy Seven Strategy Seven Seven Strategy Seven Strategy Seven Seven Strategy Seven Strategy Seven Seven Strategy Seven Seven



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Coalition Provisional Authority Ministry of the Interior

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Back-up Slides



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Facts/Assumptions

FACTS

- FOLLOW-ON FORCES WILL HAVE LESS MANPOWER
- MINISTRIES ARE LIMITED TO COMBINE 20,000 FPS CAP UNTIL 1 JAN 04 (DROVE BY FUNDING LIMITS)
- MINISTRIES ARE RESPONSIBLE TO ASSUME SALARY PAYMENT 1 DEC 04
- MSCS MAKE FINAL PAYMENT SALARY 1 NOV (COVERS OCT)
- FPS PROGRAM IS THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE MINISTRIES
- CURRENTLY, CPA-FPS IS NOT STRUCTURED TO TAKE ON FPS SECURITY
- 3 OCT 03 1 AD INITIATES THE TOA PROCESS IN BAGHDAD
- MINISTRY OF TRADE DOES NOT WANT MSC FPS HIRES COUNTRY WIDE
- MINISTRY OF YOUTH DOES NOT WANT MSC FPS HIRES IN BAGHDAD



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Concept

Facility Protection Services Program
National Level TOA 15 Jan 04

PHASE I: ESTABLISHMENT: Assist in

Enforcing Standards
& Accountability

PHASE 1:

ESTABLISHMENT:

Resource Ministries With Transition

Managers

PHASE II:

TRANSITION:

Bottom-Up Stagger

Ministry Sites
To MSC

3 Oct - 15 OCT

PHASE I: ESTABLISHMENT: National Level C2 Cell



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Facts/Assumptionscont.

ASSUMPTIONS

- FOLLOW-ON FORCES WILL HAVE SUFFICIENT MANPOWER TO COVER SITES NOT COMPLETED
- NATIONA LEVEL TOA WILL BE ON 15 JAN 04
- WITHIN 30 DAYS CPA/FPS WILL HAVE THE STRUCTURE TO TAKE ON FPS SECURITY
- MINISTRIES WILL HAVE THE ABILITY TO CONDUCT TOA
- MINISTRIES WILL BE PREPARED TO TAKE ON RESPONSIBILITY FOR MSC HIRES NLT 15 JAN 04 (NATIONAL TOA)
- CERP MONIES WILL BE AVAILABLE UNTIL 1 JAN IOT PAY MSC POSITIONS UNTIL TOA
- MSC WILL HAVE SUFFICIENT CERP FUNDS TO PAY SALARIES
- MINISTRIES ASSUME PURCHASE OF UNIFORMS 1 JAN
- 50% OF THE MINISTRIES ARE STAFFED WITH FPS MANAGERS
- CONTRACTORS CAN ABSORB MSC HIRES
- PERSONNEL NOT RETAINED BY FPS CAN SHIFT INTO ICDC



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Concept

TRANSITION IS CONDUCTED OVER THREE PHASES AND IS <u>EVENT</u> DRIVEN AND WILL RUN SIMULTANOUSELY TO EACH OTHER

PHASE I: <u>ESTABLISHMENT</u>: THIS BEGINS ON DEVELOPING THE FPS STRUCTURE NEEDED TO MANAGE AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL (THE FPS PROGRAM TRANSITION OF SPECIFIC FUNCTIONS (HIRING, VETTING AND PAYMENT OF SALARIES), PURCHASE OF UNIFORMS AND FILLING FPS SECURITY MANAGERS AT THE MINISTRY LEVEL. PHASE I IS COMPLETED WHEN EACH AREA IS STOOD UP.

PHASE II: <u>TRANSITION</u>: THIS PHASE COMMENCES O/A 3 OCT 03 WITH I AD CONDUCTING TOA AND ENDING ON 15 JAN 04. TOA IS CONDUCTED BY SITE WITH REPRESENTATIVES FROM EACH MINISTRY AND MSC REPRESENTATIVES. PRIORITY OF EFFORT IS 1 AD,101 AA, 4 ID, MND CS, MND SE, 82D AB.

PHASE III: <u>NATIONAL LEVEL TRANSITION</u>: THIS PHASE IS TENTATIVELY SET FOR 15 JAN 04. IT DEPENDS ON TOA TO BE AT LEAST 90 PERCENT COMPLETE. IN SOME CASES MSCs WILL CONTINUE TO PROTECT TIER 1/1A AND SOME TIER 2 SITES UNTIL RELIEVED BY MINISTRY HIRES IAW HIRING GOALS FOR CY 04.



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Specified Task

- CONDUCT TOA FROM MSCS TO MINISTRIES
- PROVIDE SUPPORT TO MINISTRIES
- PROVIDE SECURITY COVERAGE (ESTABLISH LOCAL STAND-OFF



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Implied Task(s)

- PREPARE FRAGO THAT WILL PROVIDE DIRECTION FOR TOA
- CONTINUE TO PROVIDE COALITION GUARDS AT TIER 1 SITES THAT CAN NOT BE TRANSITIONED (COMMANDERS ASSESS OTHER LOCATIONS GUARD V. MONITOR)
- TRANSITION OF SALARIES CONDUCT AS SITES COMPLETE TOA PROCESS
- ENSURE HAND-OFF OF DATA BASE FOR EACH SITE
- ENSURE SUFFICIENT FUNDS ARE AVAILABLE (MINISTRIES HAVE SUFFICIENT PAY DOLLARS/CERP FUNDS
- ENSURE GUARDS ARE PROPERLY VETTED/TRAINED IAW MINISTRY STANDARDS
- ENSURE GUARDS ARE PROPERLY EQUIPPED (UNIFORM/WEAPON)



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Task & Purpose

T1: Conduct Transition of Authority of Ministry Sites

P1: IOT transition security from CJTF7 to the Iraqi Government and establish local standoff

T2: Conduct Support Operations to the Ministries

P2: IOT to support the sustainment of a safe and secure environment

T3: Conduct Site Security of Critical Sites

P3: IOT to safeguard critical sites




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Weapons Fielding



Based of 1:3 Ratio for 19,650



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The Way Ahead

Mr (Mol)
Col (CJTF-7)

BG Gallinetti (Chief of Staff)

UNCLASSIFIED

FRAGO 3 to 2BCT OPORD 03-204 (FPS)

- (5) TF's will ensure and verify that each subordinate unit has conducted appropriate right seat and left seat rides with the FPS hirees at each site. No unit is authorized to pull U.S. troops off of currently manned sites until approved by BDE. No unit is authorized to pull U.S. troops off designated sites (see attachment 1) until approved by the BDE CDR.
- (6) TF's will ensure, by the presence of a unit representative able to identify their hirees, that the designated number of hirees attend training on the appropriate dates as follows. The unit representative will coordinate with the BRT to accompany them for initial link up and screening/class roster on the first day of class, and will coordinate with the BRT for a location and time following graduation (e.g. the following morning at 0900) to allocate and direct/transport trained FPS to each site.

5-6 JUL 03 40 th EN 1-35 AR	80 40
7-8 JUL 03 1-35 AR	120
9-10 JUL 03 1-6 IN 2-6 IN	60 60
12-13 JUL 03 4-27 FA 40 th EN	60 60

(7) Payment Instructions:

(a) Payment is according to the following guidelines for payment of FPS (TF CDRs do not have the authority to exceed these guidelines);

HOURS	GUARD	SHIFT SUPERVISOR	SITE SUPERVISOR
24hrs/week	\$50/month	\$60/month	\$70/month
36hrs/week	\$70/month	\$80/month	\$90/month
48hrs/week	\$100/month	\$110/month	\$120/month

- (b) Payment schedules will be designated by the TF. TF's will identify, on orders (see attachment 3) a Certifying Officer/ Project Procurement Officer for the CERP funds utilized for payment of the FPS salaries. TF's will use attachment 5 and SF 1034 for payment tracking.
- (c) Payment Agents will retain the original SF 1034's and rosters (see attachment 4). Copies of the completed SF 1034's and roster will be retained by the Certifying Officer and copies will be forwarded to the BDE FPS project officer NLT the last day of each month.
 - (8) Uniforms:
- (a) Interim Uniforms are being contracted by BDE and will be distributed as received (o/a 10 JUL 03).
- (b) Uniform requirements will be turned in by the TF's as part of attachment 2. Uniform sizes can be in U.S. or Iraqi size equivalent.

UNCLASSIFIED

FRAGO 3 to 28CT OPORD 03-204 (FPS)

(9) Weapons: The requirement for weapons is one weapon per guard position (e.g. a guard position with 3 guards covering a 24 hour period in 3 shifts will be authorized one weapon), or one weapon for a tier 3 site.

5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL. POC for this order is CPT XXXXXX, 2BCT FPS Project Officer, DNVT

ACKNOWLEDGE



OFFICIAL:



ANNEXES

Attachment 1 2bctMASTERSITELIST for distro Attachment 2 FPS Site Employment Roster

Attachment 3 Duly Appointment for Certifying Officer

Attachment 4 FPS Payment Roster

FPS RECOMMENDED SITES

UNIT	ZONE	SITE	SITE NAME	SITE DESCRIPTION	TUER 1 GRID MINIMUM (6 DIGIT)	PER DAY 8/12/24 HOURS	- 40	# OF FPSF CURRENTL Y WORKING	RY ROLE	SUPERVISOR NAMES
2-6 IN			Propane Point	M of Oil	MB 517804	8	9	-	1	
2-6 IM	11/A		Muaskar Power Plant	Electricity Commission	MB 494 639	24	27		3	
2-6 IN	32/0		Power Transformer	Electricity Commission	MB 557 739	В	4		1	
2-6 IN	32/0		Power Transformer	Electricity Commission	MB 567 742	8	4		1	**
2-6 IN	11/A		Baghdad Power Plant	Electricity Commission	MB 490 835	м	27		3	
2-6 IN	49/F		Power Transformer	Electricity Commission	MB 525 796	8	4		1	
2-5 IN	11/A		Rasheed Military Hospital	M of Health	MB 495 826	24	12		3	
2-6 IN	11/B		Medical VIP Ward	M of Health	MB 494 821	24	12		3	
2-8 IN	48/11		Water Treatment Facility	water distribution	MB 535 773	24	12		, _	
1-35 AR	Salhiye		Rasheed Bank	M of Finance	MB 434877	8	7		1	
1-5 IN			Baghdad Nuclear Fuel Group	M of AE	MB 44758340	16	27		3	
1-6 IN			Riol Bank	M of Finance	MB 44998401	24	12		3	
1-6 IN			Large Gas Station	M of Oil	MB 448833	9	7		1	
1-6 IN			Small Gas Station	M of Oil	MB 464850	9	3		1	
1-6 IN			Mezba Bank	M of Finance	MB 473845	8	3		1	
1-6 IN			Water Works		MB 459832	24	9		, =	
1-6 IN			Children's Hospital	M of Health	MB 490855	24	15		3	
1-6 IN	Babil		Gas Station	M of Oil	MB 44838339	20	18		2	
1-6 IN	Karadah		St Raphael Hospital	M of Health	MB 46308561	24	15		3	
1-6 IN	Babil		Ministry of Finance Free Zone	M of Finance	MB 47448444	24	9		3	
1-35 AR	Kindi		Clinic	Min of Health	MB4081385336	24	9		3	
1-35 AR	Kindi		Clinic	Min of Health	MB 40908695	24	9		3	
1-35 AR	Tashree		Clinc	Min of Health	MB44098588	24	9		3	


				TOTAL		Mary Street		
4-27 FA	Janaid	GAS STATION #2	M of Oil	M8 413 866	16	. 34	2	
4-27 FA	Railyard	Gas Station	M of Oil	MB 403892	8	5	1	
4-27 FA	Karkh	Gas Station	M of Oil	MB428 878	8	9	1	
4-27 FA		South Gate		MB 41808680	24	12	3	
4-27 FA		Pension Bullding		MB 43058875	и	93	12	
4-27 FA	Mahallat	Al Karkh Public Hospital	M of Health	MB 40948974	24	15	3	
1-27 FA	Al Allam	Al Karama Hospital	M of Health	MB 42108810	24	12	3	
4-27 FA	Karkh	Al Rasheed Bank	M of Finance	MB 42888842	24	24	3	le (e
4-27 FA	Mahallat	Sewage Treatment Facility		MB 41328974	24	12	3	
1-35 AR	Salhiya	TELEPHONE COMPANY	Min of Information	MB42908768	24	•	3	
1-35 AR	Salhiya	CARDIAC HOSPITAL	Min of Health	MB4315787737	24	9	3	
1-35 AR	Tashree	Clinic	Min of Health	MB44428577	24	9	3	

		TIER 2												
UNIT.	ZONE	SITE	SITE NAME	SITE DESCRIPTION	GRID MINIMUM (6 DIGIT)	REQUIRED: HOURS OF COVERAGE PER DAY 8/12/24 HOURS	# OF GUARDS REQUIRED	# OF FPSF CURRENTL Y WORKING	# OF FPBF WORKING IN A SUPERVISO RY ROLLS	SUPERVISOR NAMES				
2-6 IN	49/G		Old Ammo Collection Point (ACP)	M of Delense	MB 525 805	24	12		3					
2-8 IN	11/A		Al Numan Clouster bomb and fuze Factory	M of Delense	MB 494 834	- 24	12		3					
2-0 IN	32/0		Baghdad Ag and Bio Rsch Ctr, Tuwitha	M of Atomic Energy	MB 548 745	6	4	11 = 1	1					
2-6 IN	32/0		Baghdad Nuclear Menufacturing Facility	M of Atomic Energy	MB 535 741	8	4		1					
2-6 N	49/G		Nuclear Reasearch Center	M of Atomic Energy	MB 524 505	24	36		3					
2-6 IN	4894		Nuclear Reasearch Center	M of Alomic Energy	MB 520 776	8	4		1					
2-6 IN	4864		Boat Landing Facility	M of Transportation	MB 517 771	8	4		1					
2-6 IN			Chemical Cannister She	M of Defense	MB 487799	24	24		,					
2-6 IN			Baghdad Barracks School BDE HQ	M of Defense	MB 506839	24	12		3					
2-0 JH	32/0		Yellow Cake Factory	M of Atomic Energy	MB 564 722	24	36	l i	3					
40th EN	Zawrar		Monument to Fallen Soldiers	historical monument	MB 431856	24	8		3					
1-6 IN	10		University Entrance CP 1	M of Higher Education	MB 42828251	24	15		3					
1-6 IN	10		University Entrance CP 2	M of Higher Education	MB 43018239	24	15		3					
1-6 IN	10		University Entrance CP 3	M of Higher Education	MB 41948278	24	15		3					
1-6 IN	14		University of Technology	M of Higher Education	MB 485860	24	36		8					
4-27 FA			Iraqi National Museum	M of Culture	MB 42908760	24	30	14.	3					

	-	200		-	TIER 3	200	-	-	-	
UNIT	ZONE	SITE	SITE NAME	SITE DESCRIPTION	CHOT)	REQUIRED HOURS OF COVERAGE PER DAY \$112/24 HOURS	# OF GUARDS REQUIRED	# OF FPSF CURRENTL Y WORKING	POFFPSF WORDING IN A SUPERVISO RY ROLE	SUPERVISOR NAMES
35 AR			Ministry of Information	M of Information	MB 43778758	24	•		3	
35 AR			Minutey of Foreign Affairs	M of Foreign Affairs	MB 43208695	24			3	1
-35 AR			Cirls School	M of Education	MB 442870	24			3	
-35 AR			Orphanage	M of Health	MB 436871	24	•		, _	
-35 AR	Kindi		School Complex	Ministry of Education	MB4111165808 MB4118085622 MB4108985887	24			3	
-35 AR	Kindi		School Complex	Min of Education	MB4130185244 MB4120985236	24			3	
1-35 AR	Kindi		School	Min of Education	MB4082685241	24			3	
1-35 AR	Kindi		Apartment Complex Entrance	Min of Housing	MB43508520	24	16		3	
1-35 AR	Kindi		Military Museum		MB40608530	24	,		3	
1-35 AR	Selhye		IRAQI PARLIAMENT	Min of Justice	MB42518708	24	•		3	
1-35 AR	Saltrya		BAGHDAD THEATER		MB43648809	24	9		3 =	
1-35 AR	Selviye		Southern Shooping Pleza		MB43476724	24	10		4	
40 EN	Zawrar		200		MB 4286	и	78		10	
2-6 IN	11/A		Tigns TCP		MB 487836	8	4		1	
2-6 IN	49/E		Cement Industrial Site		MB 494 818	8	4		1	
1-6 IN	13		Lebian School	M of Education	MB 45828454	8	1		1	
1-6 IN	13		Noful School	M of Education	MB 46028441	- 6	1		1	
1-6 IN	13		Bagridad Secondary School	M of Education	MB 44978359	8	1		1	
1-6 IN	13		Al-Nakwa Secondary School	M of Education	MB 45798396	8	1		1	
1-6 IN	13		Virgin Mary Catholic School	M of Education	MB 45968396	8	1		1	
1-6 IN	13		Al-Koweit School	M of Education	MB 45998394	8	1		1	
1-6 IN	13		School	M of Education	MB 47768449	8	1		1	

1-6 IN	13	Syrian Catholic School	M of Education	MB 466856	24	9	3	
1-6 IN	13	Leather Factory		MB 453635	24		3	
1-6 IN	13	Cigarette Factory		MB 452831	24	9	3	
1-8 IN	13	Distillary		MB 456832	24		3	
1-6 IN	13	Virgin Mary Church		MB 45998396	24		3	
1-0 IN	13	Synan Catholic Church		MB 468856	24	9	3	
1-6 IN	13	St Marks Calholic Church		MB 462856	24	9	3	
1-6 IN	14	Dutch Embassay			24	12	3	
4-27 FA	Reliyerd	V/orld Food Warehouse		MB 40618945	24	15	3	
4-27 FA	Railyard	Warehouses		MB 40588935	24	24	3	
4-27 FA		Ministry of Culture and Tourism		M8 42608840	24	18	3	
4-27 FA		Ministry of Information		MB 43508810	24	18	3	
4-27 FA		Girls High School		MB 42668912	24	6	3	
4-27 FA		Lawyer Convention Center		MB 40708680	24	12	3	
4-27 FA		Girls High School		M8 39878648	24	3	3	
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Site Supe	ervisor:							
	upervisor:				 			
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY Headquarters and Headquarters Company 2nd Brigade, 1st Armored Division Unit 23704 APO AE 09034

OFFICE SYMBOL

DATE

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Duty Appointment, Certifying Officer

- 1. Effective immediately, CERTIFYING OFFICERS RANK, FULL NAME, SSN, and UNIT is appointed to the following duty: Certifying Officer to TF COMMANDERS RANK, FULL NAME, and UNIT.
- 2. Above individual is authorized to certify SF 1034's for the purpose of paying Facility Protection Services Forces from the BDE Commander's Emergency Response Fund.
- 3. POC is XXXXXXX at xxx-xxxx.

CERTIFYING OFFICER CPT, IN Certifying Officer TF COMMANDER LTC, IN Commanding

DISTRIBUTION: Individual S4, 2nd BDE, 1st Armored Division Cdr, 8th Finance Battalion (FWD) G8, 1st Armored Division

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY 2nd Brigade, 1st Armored Division Unit 23704 APO AE 09034

AETV-THO 01 JUL 03

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Delegation of Duty Appointment, Certifying Officer

- 1. Effective immediately TF Commanders within my command are authorized to appoint, on orders, Certifying Officers for the express purpose of certifying SF 1034's for the purpose of paying Facility Protection Services Feeses from the BDE Commander's Emergency Response Fund.
- 2. POC is XXXXXXX at xxx-xxxx.

COL, IN Commanding

DISTRIBUTION: Individual S4, 2nd BDE, 1st Armored Division Cdr, 8th Finance Battalion (FWD) G8, 1st Armored Division

								
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Shift 1	NAME	TRANSLAT OR STATUS (Y/N)	SALARY ASSIGN ED	PHOTOGRAPH	HRS/WEEK	PAYME NT DATE	AMOUNT PAID	PAY STATUS (e.g. Currently being paid / not being paid)
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Shift 2	NAME	TRANSLAT OR STATUS (Y/N)	JOALARY	PHOTOGRAPH	HRS/WEEK	PAYME NT DATE	AMOUNT PAID	PAY STATUS (e.g. Currently being paid / not being paid)
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
UNCLASSIFIED

Headquarters, 2BCT, 1AD Baghdad, Iraq 011300JUL03

FRAGO 3 to 2BCT OPORD 03-204 (FPS)

References:

- a. FRAGO 249A [Modification 7 to recruitment for establishment of the Facility Protection Security Force] to OPORD 03-215 [Iron Stability]
- b. 2BCT OPORD 03-204 (Establishment of FPSF), 10JUN03
- c. FRAGO 071A (Recruitment for Establishment of the Facility Protection Security Force) to 1AD OPORD 03-215 (Iron Stability), 05JUN03
- d. FRAGO 089A (Mod 1 to 1AD FRAGO 071A), 07JUN03
- e. FRAGO 101A (Mod 2 to 1AD FRAGO 071A), 08JUN03
- f. FRAGO 114A (Mod 3 to 1AD FRAGO 071A), 09JUN03
- g. FRAGO 122A (Mod 4 to 1AD FRAGO 071A), 10JUN03
- h. Meeting with Ministry of Interior, 14JUN03
- 1. SITUATION. (No Change.)
- 2. MISSION. (No Change.)
- 3. EXECUTION.
 - a. Commander's Intent. (No Change.)
 - b. Concept of the Operation. (No Change.)
 - c. Tasks to Subordinate Units. (No Change.)
 - d. Coordinating Instructions.
- (1) Task Force Commanders are responsible for establishing the command and control structure of each site in their respective AOR's.
- (2) TF's will recommend the number of translators per site using the following criteria (note: Translators may not exceed two (2) per site.):
 - 1. Number of Guards per shift.
 - 2. Nature of the Location (e.g. threat)
 - 3. Size of the Site (e.g. visibility)
 - Experience level of the Guards.
 - 5. Tier priority of the Site (e.g. 1,2,3)
 - 6. Other factors as determined by the TF Commander.
- (3) TF's will update the 2bctMASTERSITELIST for distro (see attachment 1) with Shift Supervisor names NLT 030800JUL03 and 0800 every Thursday thereafter.
- (4) TF's will submit a by name list of hirees per site upon completion of left seat ride at the site. (see attachment 2)



FORMATION OF THE NEW IRAQI ARMY JUNE 2003

PAGE 1

FORMATION OF THE NEW IRAQI ARMY

INTRODUCTION:

- 1. THE IRAQIS, AFTER THE FORMER REGIME, MUST PROVE THEIR GENUINE NATURE BY OVERCOMING THE PRESENT SITUATION WITH OPTIMISM IN ORDER TO BUILD THE BRIGHT FUTURE OF THEIR COUNTRY AND ARMY, AND TO MINIMIZE THE NEGATIVE EFFECT OF DISMANTLING THE FORMER IRAQI ARMY ON THE IRAQI PERSONALITY AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. THE IRAQIS MUST DO THIS LEARNING FROM THE HISTORY OF OTHER NATIONS THAT HAVE GONE THROUGH SIMILAR EXPERIENCES.
- 2. IRAQ IS ABLE TO REALIZE SOME OF THE GOALS USING ITS VARIOUS CAPABILITIES. HOWEVER, CERTAIN GOALS MUST BE ACCOMPLISHED BY THE USE OF ARMED FORCES. WITH ARMED FORCES IRAQ CAN DIRECTLY REPEL AND CONTAIN ANY HOSTILE ATTACK OR ANY THREAT TO ITS NATIONAL SECURITY. ALL THIS IS POSSIBLE IF IRAO HAS SUFFICIENT POWER.

PURPOSE:

- 3. THE PURPOSE OF THIS DOCUMENT IS TO OFFER A SPECIAL AND BRIEF STUDY ABOUT THE FORMATION OF THE NEW IRAQI ARMY, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE FOLLOWING SPECIFICATIONS:
 - A. AN ARMY WITH DEFENSIVE CAPABILITIES.
 - B. AN ARMY REMOVED FROM POLITICS AND CLEAN WITH ITS ELEMENTS.
 - C. ITS SIZE IS SIMILAR TO THE SIZE OF THE IRAQI ARMY BEFORE THE FORMER REGIME.
 - D. CONTEMPORARY ARMY, FROM THE ARMAMENT, EQUIPMENT AND TRAINING PERSPECTIVES.
 - E. ABSOLUTELY HAS NO MILITIA COMPONENT.

PAGE 2

COMPOSITION, ORGANIZATION AND BALANCE:

- 4. IN ORDER TO EXERCISE THE FULL RANGE OF THE NEW IRAQI ARMY, IRAQ MUST OWN ORGANIZED AND BALANCED LAND (INFANTRY) FORCES, AIR FORCES, AND COAST GUARD FORCES THAT ARE CONSISTENT WITH ITS SPECIAL NEEDS. EACH OF THESE FORCES HAS ITS OWN CAPABILITIES, IN SUCH A WAY THAT NO ONE FORCE CAN BE TASKED OF CARRYING ALL THE RESPONSIBILITIES.
- 5. BASIC ELEMENTS OF ORGANIZING DEFENSE AT THE HIGHER LEVELS:
 - A. POLITICAL AUTHORITY: CERTAIN CONSTITUTIONS REQUIRE THAT THE HEAD OF STATE IS (KING -PRESIDENT) THE COMMANDER OF THE ARMED FORCES. IN OTHER COUNTRIES' CONSTITUTIONS, THE HIGHER RESPONSIBILITY FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE IS CARRIED BY THE PRIME MINISTER, INDIVIDUALLY (BEING THE HEAD OF THE EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY) OR BY THE MINISTERIAL COUNCIL AS A GROUP. AS FOR THE PERSON WHO WOULD HOLD THE POSITION OF DEFENSE MINISTER (EITHER A CIVILIAN OR RETIRED MILITARY OFFICER) HE WOULD BE CONSIDERED DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER, RELATIVE TO DEFENSE POLICY MATTERS. CONSEQUENTLY, HE WOULD BE IN CHARGE OF THE MANAGEMENT, CONTROL AND EXECUTION OF DEFENSE POLICY. DESPITE THAT, ALL POLITICAL DECISIONS ARE MADE BY THE MINISTERIAL COUNCIL.
 - B. MINISTRY HEADQUARTERS: THE HEADQUARTERS OF THE DEFENSE MINISTRY WOULD BE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE MANAGEMENT OF NECESSARY DAILY WORK.
 - C. ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF COMMAND: THIS IS HEADED BY THE ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF, THE AIR FORCE COMMAND IS LINKED TO IT AS WELL AS THE COMMANDS OF DIVISIONS AND COAST GUARDS.

ROLES AND TASKS:

6. ABILITY TO REPEL FOREIGN ATTACK: THE LAND FORCE CARRIES THE MAIN RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE MANAGEMENT AND CONTINUOUS MAINTENANCE OF THE LAND FOR THE PURPOSE OF IMPOSING THE NATIONAL NEED ON THE PEOPLE AND THE DEFENSE OF THE HOMELAND AGAINST ANY HOSTILE ATTACK. THE LAND FORCE (INFANTRY) IS DESIGNED SPECIFICALLY FOR

COMBAT AND FOR REPELLING OF RELATIVELY LARGE HOSTILE LAND FORCES, AS WELL AS DEFENDING IMPORTANT STRATEGIC AREAS.

PAGE 3

- 7. PROVIDING HIGH LEVEL OF SECURITY AT HOME: THE LAND FORCES PROTECTS THE INTERNAL SECURITY OF IRAQ WITHIN ITS GEOGRAPHIC BOARDERS AS NEEDED.
- 8. THE INFANTRY FORCE DEPENDS ON THE AIR FORCE IN GETTING AIR SUPPORT, RECONNAISSANCE AND AIR DEFENSE, IN ADDITION TO AIR TRANSPORT OF SOME OF ITS ELEMENTS.
- 9. THE AIR FORCE ORGANIZES AND OPERATES WITH THE EXPECTATION OF FULFILLING WHAT IS NEEDED OF IT, BY ACQUIRING AND USING FIGHTER AIRCRAFT, INFANTRY SUPPORT AIRCRAFT, AIR TRANSPORT, HELICOPTERS AND AIR DEFENSE AIRCRAFT.
- 10. THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE COAST GUARD IS TO PROTECT IRAQI PORTS OVERLOOKING THE GULF.

SIZE OF FORCES:

- 11. IN DETERMINING THE SIZE OF THE NEW IRAQ ARMY WE TOOK THE FOLLOWING ASSUMPTIONS INTO ACCOUNT:
 - A. FIRST ASSUMPTION: TO ENSURE THE REPELLING OF FOREIGN ATTACKS, WE TOOK INTO ACCOUNT THE WORST CASE SCENARIO, WHICH IS FACING THE THREAT FROM THE EAST (1200 KM). THIS REQUIRES AN ACTIVE LAND FORCE NOT LESS THAN FIVE DIVISIONS. IN THIS CASE, THE EFFECT OF VARIATION OF TOPOGRAPHIC AXES ON THE QUALITY (TYPE) OF UNITS MUST BE CONSIDERED.
 - B. SECOND ASSUMPTION: TO GUARANTEE THE INTERNAL SECURITY THE FOLLOWING TWO MEASURES MUST BE ADOPTED.

FIRST: SIZE OF LAND SPACE / PROVINCES' GEOGRAPHIC BORDERS.

SECOND: THE SIZE OF POTENTIAL THREAT TO INTERNAL SECURITY.

THE ABOVE TWO MEASURES REQUIRE THE PRESENCE OF A FORCE NOT LESS THAN FIVE DIVISIONS IN ORDER TO

REPEL THE THREATENING FORCE. THIS FORCE IS SIMILAR TO THE ONE MENTIONED IN ASSUMPTION ONE ABOVE.

- C. THIRD ASSUMPTION: IN CASE OF THE REALIZATION OF ONE OF THE ABOVE TWO ASSUMPTIONS, WE SEE THE NEED FOR COOPERATION AND COORDINATION WITH THE ALLIED FORCES UNDER THE COMMAND OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. IN ADDITION, THERE IS A NEED FOR THE ADOPTION OF AN ADVANCED MOBILIZATION SYSTEM TO DEAL WITH THE SHORTAGE OF THE ACTIVE FORCES, AS WELL AS FOR INSURING WELL-TRAINED RESERVE FORCE.
- D. FOURTH ASSUMPTION: IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN RAPID INTERVENTION (DEPLOYMENT) FORCE THERE HAS TO BE AN AIRBORNE BRIGADE TO BE USED AS A FAST GENERAL RESERVE IN THE HAND OF THE ARMY HIGH COMMAND.

12. COMPARISON OF QUALITATIVE AND QUANTITATIVE ADVANTAGES:

A. QUANTITATIVE ADVANTAGES:

FIRST: OPERATION IRAQ FREEDOM HAS PROVED THAT GOOD ARMED FORCES, NOT LARGE ARMED FORCES, IS WHAT WINS THE BATTLE. THIS CONCEPT IS VERY TRUE; VERY LARGE FORCES REPRESENT A DRAIN ON HUMAN, MATERIAL AND FINANCIAL RESOURCES, AND THIS REDUCES THE VALUE OF NATIONAL SECURITY INSTEAD OF ENHANCING IT.

SECOND: THE MOBILIZATION CAPABILITY THROUGH ADVANCED MOBILIZATION SYSTEM MAY ADD TO THE ACTIVE FORCES POSITIVE ELEMENTS. DESPITE THE VARIATION OF THESE SYSTEMS FROM ONE COUNTRY TO ANOTHER, MOST COUNTRIES USUALLY MAINTAIN SMALL, PERMANENT ACTIVE ARMIES, WHILE THEY DEPEND ON COMPLETING THEIR STRUCTURAL UNITS IN A VERY SHORT TIME WITH SKILLED RESERVE FORCE.

B. QUALITATIVE ADVANTAGES:

FIRST: ABSOLUTE NUMBERS ARE MISLEADING MOST OF THE TIME. INDIVIDUALS' EFFECTIVENESS IS EQUAL IN IMPORTANCE TO NUMBERS. CULTURE AND NATIONAL MODE, SUCH AS WHETHER THE PEOPLE ARE PEACE OR WAR LOVERS, OR NEUTRAL OR INEFFECTIVE PROVIDES ONLY ONE INDICATOR. WHILE DISCIPLINE, LOYALTY, CHALLENGING SPIRIT AND HIGH MORAL, INCLUDING ONE'S ATTITUDE

TOWARDS MILITARY SERVICE ARE ALL TOGETHER ANOTHER INDICATOR.

SECOND: NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE, CULTURE, AGE AND PHYSICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL BUILT, TOUGHNESS AND ABILITY TO WORK UNDER VARIOUS CIRCUMSTANCES, AND TO KEEP CALM UNDER PRESSURE, AND ABOVE ALL, EFFECTIVE LEADERSHIP ARE THE CHARACTERISTICS THAT DISTINGUISH THE HUMAN RESOURCES OF A NATION. TRAINING AND BATTLE EXPERIENCE AFFECTS THE FINAL RESULTS AND THE QUALITY OF PEOPLE.

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- C. THE SYSTEM OF SELECTING AN OPERATION: MODERN ARMIES DEPEND ON AN ADVANCED SELECTION SYSTEM FOR CHOOSING (OFFICERS AND ENLISTED) AND OTHER ELEMENTS, FOR THE REALIZATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF THE APPROPRIATE MAN AT THE APPROPRIATE PLACE, DUE TO THE PRINCIPLE OF ADOPTING THE CONSCRIPTION SYSTEM (100%) FOR THE ENTIRE RECRUITS OF THE NEW IRAQI ARMY, AND TO GUARANTEE MAKING THIS ARMY BALANCED AND MODERATE, AND TO INCLUDE ALL SECTORS OF THE IRAQI PEOPLE WITHOUT DISCRIMINATION, IT IS INEVITABLE THAT ALL INDIVIDUALS WISHING TO BE RECRUITED (INCLUDING OFFICERS AND ENLISTED, WHETHER THEY ARE RETIREES, OR THOSE WHO WERE IN THE SERVICE BEFORE THE DISSOLVING OF THE ARMY, IN ADDITION TO CIVILIANS AND CITIZENS WHO WISH TO JOIN) TO PASS THROUGH A STAGE OF SELECTING WITHOUT ANY DISCRIMINATION OF NATIONALITY, RELIGION, CREED, OR GEOGRAPHICAL REGIONALISM.
- 13. CONCLUSONS: CONCLUDING WHAT WAS MENTIONED ABOVE; IT IS POSSIBLE TO ACHIEVE THE FOLLOWING:
 - A. IT IS NECESSARY TO FORM AN ARMY CONSISTING OF A MODERN BALANCED INFANTRY FORCE THROUGH VOLUNTEERING FROM DIFFERENT IRAQI SECTORS AND WITH A SIZE OF (5) DIVISIONS (2 INFANTRY) AND (3 MECHANIZED INFANTRY), AND TO MAINTAIN ONE AIR-BORN BRIGADE.
 - B. IT IS NECESSARY TO ESTABLISH A NUMBER OF HEADQUARTERS FOR THE LEADERSHIP AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF THIS ARMY, AND IT SHOULD BE AS FOLLOWS:

FIRST: THE HEADQUARTERS OF THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE IN BAGHDAD WOULD BE SIMILAR TO OTHER MINISTRIES OF THE GOVERNMENT. (REFER TO ATTACHMENT A) ATTACHED FOR INFORMATION ABOUT THE STRUCTURE OF THE ORGANIZATION OF THIS HEADQUARTERS. WE SUGGEST THAT IT WOULD BE IN THE SAME PLACE OF THE FORMER DEFENSE MINISTRY.

SECOND: THE HEADQUARTERS OF CHIEF OF STAFF IN BAGHDAD. REFER TO (ATTACHMENT B) ATTACHED FOR INFORMATION ABOUT THE ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF THIS HEADQUARTERS. WE SUGGEST THAT IT MUST BE IN THE SAME PLACE INSIDE THE BUILDING OF THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE.

- C. FORMATION OF THE AIR FORCE COMMAND IN BAGHDAD. WE SUGGEST IT TO BE IN THE SAME PREVIOUS LOCATION.
- D. FORMATION OF THE COAST GUARD COMMAND IN BASRAH. WE SUGGEST IT TO BE IN THE BUILDINGS OF THE PREVIOUS HEADQUARTERS OF THE NAVAL FORCE.

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MECHANISM OF THE FORMATION OF THE NEW ARMY

Battom to Top

14. THE FIRST CHOICE (FROM TOP TO BOTTOM)

A. ADVANTAGES:

FIRST: AVAILABILITY OF LARGE NUMBER OF HUMAN RESOURCES SECOND: POSSIBILITY OF IMMEDIATE TRAINING AT THE EARLIEST TIME.

THIRD: TO SECURE THE FORMATION OF A FIGHTING FORCE TO BE AS A NUCLEUS IN EVERY BRIGADE AND DIVISION.

B. DANGERS:

FIRST: THE DIFFICULTY TO FORM UNITS BECAUSE OF LACK OF EXISTENCE OF SUPREME HEADQUARTERS OF CONTROL.

SECOND: DIFFICULTY OF ADMINISTRATING THE TRAINING OF THOSE UNITS WITHOUT ADOPTING A CLEAR TRAINING POLICY.

THIRD: IMPOSSIBILITY OF SECURING NECESSARY EOUIPMENT, VEHICLES, AND WEAPONS WITHOUT THE PRESENCE OF SPECIAL PARTIES WHO WOULD ASSUME THIS RESPONSIBILITY.

FOURTH: IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO START BUILDING UNITS WITHOUT COMPLETING THE ENACTMENT OF LAWS AND SYSTEMS

PERTAINING TO THE SERVICE AND RECRUITMENT OF OFFICERS AND NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS AND ENLISTED.

FIFTH: IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO SELECT INDIVIDUALS (OFFICERS AND ENLISTED) WITHOUT PREVIOUSLY FINALIZING THE FORMATION OF A SCIENTIFIC SOUND SYSTEM.

SIXTH: IT IS DIFFICULT TO FIND GOOD SUITABLE LOCATIONS AT THE PRESENT TIME TO PROVIDE HOUSING FACILITIES FOR THOSE UNITS, WITHOUT PREVIOUS DETERMINATION TO BUILD THEM, AND CONSEQUENTLY COMPLETE THEM AND EQUIP THEM.

SEVENTH: THE FORMATION OF AN ARMY REQUIRES LONG TIME, THAT WHAT CAUSE THE PEOPLE TO BECOME IMPATIENT, AND (WE) WOULD NOT ACHIEVE THE CREDIBILITY OF THE FORMATION OF THE NEW ARMY.

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15. THE SECOND OPTION (FROM THE HIGHEST TO THE LOWEST)

A. ADVANTAGES:

FIRST, GUARANTEE OF LEADERSHIP WITH HIGH COMPETENCE FOR SUPERVISION AND CONTROL OVER THE ALL OF THE BASIC COMPONENTS OF THE ARMY AND THE EXECUTION OF THE PLANS WITH PRECISION AND AT THEIR CORRECT TIMES.

SECOND, GUARANTEE THE GENERAL STAFF THE COMPETENCE TO OCCUPY THE HIGHER POSITIONS AND PREPARE THE DIRECTIVES AND THE NECESSARY INSTRUCTIONS, INCLUDING TRAINING

THIRD, PLANNING TO GUARANTEE A REGULAR SYSTEM FOR THE NECESSARY MODERN WEAPONS, MATERIAL AND IMPLEMENTS.

FOURTH, COMPLETE THE REQUESTED RESTORATION AND FURNISHING OF THE MILITARY BASES BEFORE THE TIME, ACCORDING TO A REGULAR SCHEDULE.

FIFTH, PREPARATION OF THE SYSTEMS AND SPECIAL LAWS FOR VOLUNTEERING AND MILITARY SERVICE, IN ADDITION TO THE COMPLETION OF A SELECTION SYSTEM AT AN APPROPRIATE TIME.

SIXTH, THE CREATION OF HIGH POSITIONS IN THE ARMY LOOKS TO REASSURE THE PEOPLE AND DEEPEN THE TRUST IN THE GOOD INTENTIONS OF THE COALITION FORCES ON ONE HAND, WHILE GUARANTEEING A POSITIVE SPIRIT OF COOPERATION ON THE OTHER.

SEVENTH, WASTE LESS TIME IN FORMING THE ARMY.

B. DANGERS:

FIRST, TAKES LONGER TO CREATE COMBAT UNITS.
SECOND, THE PRESERVATION OF A LARGE NUMBER OF
LOW-RANKING DEMOBILIZED SOLDIERS (OFFICERS AND
ENLISTED) FOR A LONG PERIOD OF TIME WITHOUT JOINING
THE ARMY.

- C. THE THIRD OPTION:
 FIRST, THE ADVANTAGES: THIS OPTION CONTAINS
 ADVANTAGES OF THE TWO OPTIONS ABOVE.
 SECOND, THE DANGERS: TREATS THE DANGERS OF THE TWO
 OPTIONS ABOVE.
- 16. CONCLUSION: WE BELIEVE IN THE SUPERIORITY OF THE THIRD OPTION.

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A MODERN, BALANCED ARMY

- 17. THE MODERN, BALANCED ARMY MUST BE DISTINGUISHED BY THE FOLLOWING:
 - A. IT MUST BE FORMED OF COMPATIBLE, BALANCED LAND AND AIR FORCES AND A COAST GUARD, IN ADDITION TO THE NECESSARY SUPPLIES AND SERVICES TO ENTER AND DIRECT JOINT OPERATIONS.
 - B. IT MUST HAVE THE ABILITY TO REMAIN IN THE MODERN BATTLEFIELD.
 - C. IT MUST HAVE AN ADVANCED SYSTEM FOR COMMAND AND CONTROL, INTELLIGENCE, COMMUNICATIONS AND CALCULATING.
 - D. IT MUST DEPEND ON A SCIENTIFIC AND EFFICIENT SYSTEM TO GUARANTEE EQUALITY JOINING THE ARMY WITHOUT DISCRIMINATION BASED ON ETHNICITY, RELIGION, CONFESSION, GEOGRAPHIC LOCATION... ETC. AND IT MUST APPLY THE PRINCIPLE: THE RIGHT MAN FOR THE RIGHT JOB.
 - E. IT MUST HAVE SUPERIOR TRADITIONAL FIREPOWER.
 - F. IT MUST BE DISTINGUISHED BY A HIGH DEGREE OF MOBILITY ON LAND AND IN THE AIR.
 - G. IT MUST HAVE AN EFFICIENT SYSTEM FOR MOBILIZATION IN ORDER TO HANDLE THE SMALL SIZE OF THE ACTIVE ARMY.
 - H. IT MUST HAVE A SMALL, POTENT, EFFICIENT AND HIGHLY TRAINED FORCE FOR RAPID INTERVENTION TO DEAL WITH EXPECTED AND UNEXPECTED SITUATIONS. (AIR-BORN MAJOR GENERAL)
 - I. IT MUST DEPEND ON THE GREAT EXPERIENCE AND ABILITIES OF THE COALITION FORCES IN ALL AREAS (ARMING, TRAINING AND MOBILIZATION).

RECOMMENDATIONS:

- 18. WITH THE AIM OF CREATING A NEW IRAQI ARMY, THE COMMITTEE BELIEVES IT NECESSARY TO TAKE THE FOLLOWING RECOMMENDATIONS KEEPING IN MIND THE EXPECTED LIMITS:
 - A. AN ARMY OF VOLUNTEERS (100%). RELIANCE ON A SUITABLE SYSTEM FOR VOLUNTEERING (FOR OFFICERS, NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS, AND ENLISTED), AFTER OFFERING THE OPPORTUNITY TO JOIN THE ARMY TO IRAQI PEOPLE FROM ALL SPECTRUMS WITHOUT REGARD FOR THEIR ETHNICITY, RELIGION, CONFESSION, OR GEOGRAPHIC LOCATION.

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- B. POLITICIZATION IS BARRED: ANY POLITICAL ACTIVITY NO MATTER WHAT SHAPE OR FORM IT IS WITHIN THE NEW ARMY IS FORBIDDEN. IT IS NECESSARY TO INTENSIFY THE AWARENESS OF HOW IMPORTANT IT IS TO SERVE THE PEOPLE AND THE NATION BY IMPLEMENTING THE POLICIES OF THE LEGAL AND ELECTED GOVERNMENT.
- C. FORMING MILITIAS IS NOT ALLOWED: THE PRESENCE OF ANY TYPE OF ARMED MILITIAS INSIDE IRAQ IS NOT ALLOWED FOR ANY REASON WHATSOEVER.
- D. FORMING MODERN AND BALANCED FORCES: IT IS NECESSARY TO FORM THE NEW ARMY, A MODERN AND BALANCED ONE, MADE UP OF LAND AND AIR FORCES AS WELL AS A COAST GUARD.
- E. SIZE OF THE NEW ARMY: THE COMMITTEE BELIEVES THAT THE BEST APPROPRIATE SIZE AT THE PRESENT TIME (AS AN OPERATING FORCE) IS TO BE MADE UP OF (5) FIVE DIVISIONS WHILE KEEPING AN AIRBORNE BRIGADE WITH A SUFFICIENT AIR FORCE AS WELL AS A COASTGUARD FORCE.
- F. A SUITABLE GENERAL STAFF SYSTEM: IT IS NECESSARY TO SET UP A SYSTEM OF A SUITABLE GENERAL STAFF FOR ALL FORCES. THE COMMITTEE SEES IT IS MOST APPROPRIATE TO SET UP THE GENERAL STAFF ESTABLISHED IN THE BRITISH ARMY OR THE ARMY OF UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.
- G. THE BEST CHOICE FOR FORMING AN ARMY: THE COMMITTEE SEES THAT THE THIRD OPTION IS THE BEST ONE TO BEGIN FORMING AN ARMY FROM TWO DIRECTIONS (FROM THE TOP AND THE BOTTOM SIMULTANEOUSLY) BECAUSE OF NUMEROUS CHARACTERISTICS. IT WILL ALSO GUARANTEE SPEED AND BALANCE.

H. TRAINING: THE COMMITTEE SUGGESTS TO BEGIN TRAINING IN THE FOLLOWING PLACES:

FIRST: FOR OFFICERS UP TO CAPTAIN INCLUSIVE

- (1) TRAINED SESSIONS IN SCHOOLS OF BROTHERLY AND FRIENDLY ARMIES (IN THE MIDDLE EAST, JORDAN FOR EXAMPLE, OR IN EUROPE OR IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA).
- (2) ADOPT THE WESTERN/AMERICAN IDEOLOGY IN TRAINING AND MOBILIZATION ACCORDING TO THE NATURE OF ARMAMENT AND EQUIPMENT INTENDED TO BE SECURED.
- (3) SERVICE ACADEMIES SHOULD BEGIN ADMINISTERING SESSIONS INSIDE IRAQ IN CASE TRAINED OFFICERS AND NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS RETURN TO THE COUNTRY.

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SECOND: NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS

- (1) TRAINING SESSIONS IN ALL SERVICE ACADEMIES OF BROTHERLY AND FRIENDLY ARMIES.
- (2) BEGIN ADMINISTERING SESSIONS INSIDE THE COUNTRY SCHOOLS WHEN THEY RETURN.
- I. THE ADOPTED DRESS CODE: THE COMMITTEE BELIEVES THAT IT IS NECESSARY TO DECIDE ABOUT THE MOST APPROPRIATE TYPE OF MILITARY DRESS CODE FOR THE NEW IRAQI ARMY BY BENEFITING FROM THE COALITION FORCES EXPERIENCE IN THIS DOMAIN. THIS REQUIRES A SPECIAL STUDY. THE COMMITTEE BELIEVES IN THE USE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MILITARY DRESS CODE BY TAKING INTO ACCOUNT IRAQI CHARACTERISTICS.
- J. ADVANCED SELECTION SYSTEM: IT IS NECESSARY TO CREATE AN ADVANCED SELECTION SYSTEM TO GUARANTEE JUSTICE ACROSS THE ENTIRE SPECTRUM OF THE IRAQI PEOPLE AND SECURING QUALIFIED AND CAPABLE ELEMENTS FOR THE NEW ARMY (OFFICERS, NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS AND ENLISTED) BY USING THE EXPERTISE OF THE UNITED STATES AND GREAT BRITAIN ARMIES.
- K. THE FORMER MILITARY BUILDINGS AND INSTALLATIONS: IT IS NECESSARY TO KEEP THE FORMER MILITARY BUILDINGS AND INSTALLATIONS FOR THE NEW ARMY, BEGIN REBUILDING THEM ACCORDING TO A CAREFULLY STUDIED PLAN AND DEFINE PRIORITIES

ACCORDING TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ARMY FORMATION. THE COMMITTEE SUGGESTS KEEPING THE INSTALLATIONS OF THE FORMER MINISTRY OF DEFENSE HEADQUARTERS FOR THE SAME PURPOSES.

- L. THE COALITION FORCES' ACCUMULATED EXPERIENCE: ADOPTING THE COALITION FORCES' ACCUMULATED EXPERIENCE IN FORMING THE ARMY. THE COMMITTEE SUGGESTS ALSO THE USE OF EXPERTS AND ADVISERS FROM THESE FORCES TO ACHIEVE THIS PURPOSE.
- M. SPECIAL STUDIES: THIS BRIEF STUDY IS CONSIDERED AS THE GENERAL OUTLINES TO FORM THE NEW ARMY. SPECIAL STUDIES MUST FOLLOW IN MANY FIELDS AND ACCORDING TO PRIORITY NEEDS.
- N. APPROVING THE STUDY: THE COMMITTEE IS PREPARED TO CLARIFY ALL ASPECTS MENTIONED IN THIS STUDY IN ORDER TO GET IT APPROVED. THE COMMITTEE ASSERTS ONE MORE TIME THAT THIS STUDY REPRESENTS ONLY GENERAL OUTLINES FOLLOWED BY SPECIAL DETAILED STUDIES ACCORDING TO THE NEED. THE COMMITTEE ALSO CONFIRMS THE NECESSITY OF THOROUGH COORDINATION AND COOPERATION WITH COALITION FORCES IN ALL STAGES WHETHER RELATED TO THE COMPLETION OF SPECIAL STUDIES OR BEGINNING THE IMPLEMENTATION.

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IN CONCLUSION, THE COMMITTEE HIGHLY APPRECIATES ALL CONCERNED PARTIES THAT PLACED THEIR TRUST IN THIS ELECTED COMMITTEE OF OFFICERS AT THIS SENSITIVE STAGE. THE COMMITTEE WOULD LIKE TO CONFIRM THAT IT DOES NOT SPARE ANY EFFORT IN THIS NOBLE ATTEMPT TO FORM THE NEW IRAQI ARMY. IT IS READY TO COOPERATE UNTIL FRUITION OF THE STUDY. SINCERE APPRECIATION.

STAFF LIEUTENANT GENERAL NEMAT FARIS, PRESIDENT COMMITTEE STAFF MAJOR GENERAL MUHAMMAD MAJM-AL-DIN AL-NAQASHBANDI, MEMBER

STAFF MAJOR GENERAL (AIR FORCE) AHMAD KHAYRI, MEMBER STAFF MAJOR GENERAL AMJAD HASAN AL-ZUHAYRI, MEMBER STAFF MAJOR GENERAL FAYSAL FARID, MEMBER STAFF MAJOR GENERAL 'ABD-AL-MUN'IM SULAYMAN, MEMBER STAFF BRIGADIER GENERAL 'ABD-AL-RAZZAO YA'QUB, MEMBER STAFF BRIGADIER GENERAL NABIL KHALIL SA'ID, MEMBER STAFF BRIGADIER GENERAL 'IMAD MUHAMMAD HASAN, MEMBER ATTACHMENT A

ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE FOR THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE HEADOUARTERS

(TN: ATTACHMENT IS A ONE-PAGE CHART, TRANSLATED AND DESCRIBED BELOW AS FOLLOWS)

MINISTER OF DEFENSE

OFFICE OF THE MINISTER (TN: OFF TO THE RIGHT SIDE)

DEPUTY MINISTER OF DEFENSE (TN: DIRECTLY SUBORDINATE TO THE MINISTER OF DEFENSE)

THE INSPECTOR GENERAL (TN: OFF TO THE LEFT SIDE OF DEPUTY MINISTER)

ARMED FORCES COUNCIL (TN: OFF TO THE RIGHT SIDE OF DEPUTY MINISTER)

ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF (TN: DIRECTLY SUBORDINATE TO DEPUTY MINISTER OF DEFENSE, BOX IN MIDDLE OF DIAGRAM)

(TN: EACH OF THE FOLLOWING IS ALSO SUBORDINATE TO THE DEPUTY MINISTER OF DEFENSE)

- -- ASSISTANT MINISTER FOR FOLLOW-UP AND VERIFICATION
- -- ASSISTANT MINISTER FOR ACCOUNTING AND BUDGET
- -- ASSISTANT MINISTER FOR GENERAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE AFFAIRS
- --ASSISTANT MINISTER FOR LEGAL AFFAIRS
- -- CHIEF OF THE HIGHER MILITARY COURT

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ATTACHMENT B

ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE FOR THE ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF

(TN: ATTACHMENT IS A ONE-PAGE CHART, TRANSLATED AND DESCRIBED BELOW AS FOLLOWS)
ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF

PRIVATE OFFICE (TN: OFF TO THE RIGHT SIDE)

(TN: DIRECTLY SUBORDINATE TO THE ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF ARE FOLLOWING OFFICES WITH THEIR SUBORDINATE POSITIONS)

ASSISTANT ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR ADMINISTRATION AND ??
OFFICERS ADMINISTRATION DIRECTORATE
ENLISTED ADMINISTRATION DIRECTORATE
CONTRACT AND SALES DIRECTORATE
LABOR AND HOUSING DIRECTORATE
MOTORPOOL DIRECTORATE
MEDICAL DIRECTORATE
EXERCISES AND MOVEMENT DIRECTORATE
MECHANICAL AND ELECTRICAL ENGINEERING DIRECTORATE
MILITARY OFFICERS DIRECTORATE

ASSISTANT ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR THE GENERAL STAFF
OPERATIONS AND PLANNING DIRECTORATE
INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE
TRAINING DIRECTORATE
STAFF DUTY DIRECTORATE
COMMUNICATIONS DIRECTORATE
INFANTRY DIRECTORATE
ARMOR DIRECTORATE
ARTILLERY DIRECTORATE
MILITARY ENGINEERING DIRECTORATE

CORPS COMMAND

AIR FORCE AND AIR DEFENSE FORCES COMMAND

COAST GUARD COMMAND

From:	
Sent:	Thursday, July 17, 2003 2:58 AM
To:	
Cc:	
Dear	
- f	forwarded your note about private security. The following article is a good
summary	about the state of the art. The organization cited, IPOA, is run by a
friend,	He is one of the most knowledge persons on the subject. His
email i	. If you can be more specific about what exactly you
T heer	will be more than happy to help you on this issue.

Again, our thanks to you for all your support. I have some great photos that I would like to send you. I guess the APO is best.

Take care and stay safe. Your boss has been getting some very good press these days.

Private Military Services Companies For Peacekeeping Peter W. Singer of the Brookings Institution has written a long article about private military services entitled Peacekeepers, Inc.

The contrasting experiences in Sierra Leone between the military provider firm Executive Outcomes and the U.N.'s peacekeeping operation are the most often cited example of privatization's promise. In 1995, the Sierra Leone government was near defeat from the ruf, a nefarious rebel group whose habit of chopping off the arms of civilians as a terror tactic made it one of the most truly evil groups of the late twentieth century. Supported by multinational mining interests, the government hired the private military firm, made up of veterans from the South African apartheid regime's elite forces, to help rescue it. Deploying a battalion-sized unit of assault infantry (numbering in the low hundreds), who were supported by firm-manned combat helicopters, light artillery, and a few armored vehicles, Executive Outcomes was able to defeat the RUF in a span of weeks. Its victory brought enough stability to allow Sierra Leone to hold its first election in over a decade. After its contract termination, however, the war restarted. In 1999 the U.N. was sent in. Despite having a budget and personnel size nearly 20 times that of the private firm, the U.N. force took several years of operations, and a rescue by the British military, to come close to the same results.

The UN is incredibly expensive and ineffective. The British military is more cost effective. But what about Executive Outcomes? I bet they were cheaper still. So where are they?

Curiously, while the Executive Outcomes home page still exists in Google Cache if you click thru to the ExecutiveOutcomes.com web site you now are redirected to an organization that sounds like it offers the same kinds of services: Northbridge Services Group Ltd. They have all sorts of services available:

Northbridge Services Group prides itself on the success of its team which is comprised of a highly professional workforce. We have a track record of over 5000 man-years of military knowledge, combat and training experience, with staffing from organizations such as the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, U.S. and British

special forces. All personell are hand picked and highly trained, assuring you nothing less than the best. Our success record is as yet unequalled. The corporation is most probably the largest of its type in the world.

Northbridge offers a wide range of services designed to meet the needs of most organisations. Whether it is strategic advice, intelligence support, humanitarian disaster relief, counter-terrorism, support for law and order or close protection teams, we have the services and resources to suit.

Wouldn't it be easier and cheaper to pay these folks to change the government in Liberia and to make it a relatively peaceful place? This may sound funny or somehow irreverant perhaps. But think about this seriously. Why not contract out peacekeeping if private organisations can do it more cost effectively? Iraq is probably too big a problem to be tackled by a private company. But Liberia is a whole lot smaller. A company like Northbridge could probably name a price for the removal of Charles Taylor and various other prices for other desired outcomes. Singer reports that Executive Outcomes claimed it could have handled the Rwanda situation more quickly, cheaply, and with much less loss of life:

Similarly, the aforementioned Executive Outcomes performed a business exploration of whether it would have had the capacity to intervene in Rwanda in 1994. Internal plans claim that the company could have had armed troops on the ground within 14 days of its hire and been fully deployed with over 1,500 of its own soldiers, along with air and fire support (roughly the equivalent of the U.S. Marine force that first deployed into Afghanistan), within six weeks. The cost for a six-month operation to provide protected safe havens from the genocide was estimated at \$150 million (around \$600,000 a day). This private option compares quite favorably with the eventual U.N. relief operation, which deployed only after the killings. The U.N. operation ended up costing \$3 million a day (and did nothing to save hundreds of thousands of lives).

Singer also mentions an association of private military services companies called The International Peace Operations Association (IPOA) whose own web site description makes it sound like just another industry trade association.

The International Peace Operations Association (IPOA) is an association of Military Service Provider companies - companies who work or are interested in international peace operations around the world. This includes companies that do everything from mine clearance, to armed logistics, to emergency humanitarian services, to actual armed peacekeepers.

The association was founded to institute industry-wide standards and a code of conduct, maintain sound professional and military practices, educate the public and policy-makers on the industry's activities and potential, and ensure the humanitarian use of private peacekeeping services for the benefit of international peace and human security.

Update: One reason to be for the use of private militaries is that the US military is not big enough. As I've previously posted, the US military is too small for its current responsibilities. We already can not sustain current force levels in Iraq indefinitely. Also, see Trent Telenko's lengthy post on the overstretched US military. If the UN or the Europeans or US liberals want something done about Liberia then it is time to hire a private army to get the job done. This will spare the already overstretched US Army and save money.

Memoradim

To: Ambassador Bremer

CC: LTG Feliu, MG Eaton,

From: Walt Slocombe

Date: 7/16/2003

Re: Timelines for National Security and Defense

Attached, with apologies for my limited table generating skills, is a matrix showing where we should be in the National Security and Defense areas over the next year and a half – notionally the point of turnover to the Iraqis of full sovereignty – or at least of essentially full power over security issues, subject to a theoretical CPA veto. Note that the projections are limited to national security fairly strictly defined and within the scope of this office. Police, border controls, law enforcement, infrastructure protection, the criminal justice and penal systems, and the like are not addressed.

The matrix is divided into the main categories that I see as constituting our work, and for which the end states are as described:

- National security institutions all key constitutional, legal, and institutions approved and in formation
- National armed forces (including NIA) heading for 18 infantry BNs trained and operating, with support elements, and higher echelon HQs and staffs named and at work
- Ex-military -- Stipend programs ready to phase down or convert into retirement payments; retraining courses and job matching in full operation
- Intelligence -- Agency (or agencies) with both internal and external focus (to include vetting/clearance system) in place, under effective oversight arrangements

- Defense industry (including current MIC) SOE's fate settled (keep, transfer, sell, or close), minimal indigenous military industry operating to supply armed forces
- Governing Council/IIA involvement Decisions made, on the basis of consultation and analysis facilitated by CPA, on all critical national security constitutional and legal provisions and on institutions and policies, including national strategy, international security relations, interagency national security oversight, MOD and military staff structure, resource allocation system, force structure
- US resources Contracting and budgeting process in synch with US schedules; modest grant FMF/IMET program in place; decisions made on long term security relationship with Iraq
- Iraq resources Basic decisions on sustainable scale of spending on national security made, resource allocation system in place
- Third country role Steady state third country support arranged, chiefly training and technical advice
- IDCF Having been fully functioning as augmentation to Coalition forces, ready for decision by Iraqis on future role, if any
- Paramilitaries Status decided and implemented as function of broader political settlements with Kurds, Shia community; demobilization assistance operating

(I acknowledge that this is not the most logical sequence, but my efforts to reorder the boxes by manipulating the Microsoft Table functions have been unavailing.)

MATRIX FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AND DEFENSE National	Immediate (to mid Aug)	Short term (Sep-Oct) GovCon Adv. Com at	Medium term (end 03) Training on-going for civilians	Long term (end 04) (Assumes constitution approved) Legislation on nat sec
Security Institutions	Disciplinary Order issued GovCon advisory commission on Nat Sec forming	work Interim Min for MIC appointed	for MOD, nat sec jobs GC making decisions on future nat sec structure/legislation	enacted NSC, new MOD, GenStaff, resource allocation system in process
National Defense Forces, including NIA	1st Bn training underway	Officer cadre chosen 1st Bn commissioned and operating 2d-4st BN training started, applying LL from first Identify potential foreign training opportunities Start process for rebid/expand training contract for specialized training Decide and prep garrisons for deployed BNs Define equipment needs for full NIA force	BNs 2-4 trained, commissioned, operating Promising officers selected and assigned for foreign training (Jordan)/ELT Set up Defense Support Agency for logistics, personnel, admin fens ISO NIA Start long-term acquisition programs, in Iraq/foreign Select and prepare garrisons for additional BNs Start decision process on combat capabilities beyond motorized infantry, e.g. armor, air components	Inf BNs 5-9 trained, commissioned and operating, by mid-04; addn'I BNs training Support BN(s) trained, equipped and operating Training increasingly shifting to Iraqis Brigade (& DIV??) staffs in place; Provisional Gen staff in place Substantial Iraqi participation in IMET/other international training Plans underway for high end capabilites
Ex-Military (incl. stipend program)	1st round of CO/NCO stipends paid; Conscript one-time payments started IOM registration system in place Adapt payment	Conscript payments complete 2d, 3d CO/NCO stipends paid IOM registration system extended to CO/NCOs	Stipend payments largely shifted to banks IOM/DOL job matching program started	Decisions made on continuation of stipend program "Double-dipping" policy decided and implemented Job matching program in Iraqi hands

	system IAW LL			
Intelligence	Vetting system agreed	Vetting system in place	Nat sec adv commission briefed on intell structure/oversight issues, starts consideration of options	National intelligence system (internal/external) in place; Oversight established
MIC/Defense industry	Inventory assets/personnel Pursue WMD issues Initial de- Baathification complete; followup investigations started	Initial decisions on SOE retention, transfer to other mins, privatization, closure Finish de-Baathif of MIC/SOEs Plan to establish/restart local defense industry (small arms, vehicles, uniforms, personal gear)	Implementation of decisions on fate of SOEs Decision on structure for retained enterprises (keep MIC? In MOD?) Plans made for intergration of most military support in civil economy Start minimum foreign buys/arrange donations (comms? Helos?)	Iraq largely self-sufficient on most military equipment (small arms, vehicles, light arty, some comms) Civil spt system operating
Governing Council/IIA Involvement	Brief on all initiatives, advisory commission appointed	Briefings on issues to be addressed; DCAF international conference on options Approve establishment of DefSpt Agency Start work on 04 budget	GC adopts statements of principles for national security/constitutional provisions Advisory commission report on options to consider/recommendations on national strategy; international security relations; interagency nat sec organization, MOD structure; resource allocation; military staff structure; force structure. Approve plans for senior staff structure of NIA Approve 04 nat sec budget	Decisions by IIA on national security structural issues; Draft legislation on national security Constitutional provisions agreed
Resources: US	Identify likely needs for appropriate funds to continue NIA, fund IMET/FMF	Secure OSD/OMB/Hill OK for additional funds for FY 04	Insure inclusion of necessary funds in US budget for FY 05 Start flow of FMF US analysis underway for decisions on future security relationship with Iraq	FMF-financed imports of arms under way Budget request for FY 06 Permanent mutual security arrangements agreed and in place

Resources: Iraqi	Fund NIA from budget Monitor budget adequacy	PRB approval of funds to cover overruns Prepare and approve budget for CY04 costs		Prepare and approve CY 05 budget
3d Country Role	Requests to Jordan	Solicit spaces in PME Solicit equipment contributions support	Address possible multi-lateral mutual security arrangements for region	Steady support – mostly training and technical assistance
IDCF	Start first 8 BN	8 BNs operating w/CJTF Evaluate operations, decide on continuing If continuing, recruit addn't BNs	Addn'l BNs operating as augmentation to CF units Decide on future of IDCF	Phase out, fold into FPS, or other final disposition
Paramilitaries	Pay K-stan "pensions"	Decisions on MEK	Decisions on future of Pesh; Badr Corps Pay stipends to de-mobbed paramilitaries Job inventory, training programs for ex-paramilitaries	Permanent arrangements for Pesh, Badr in place

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2	B/1-36 IN	15	AA	AL RASHEED HO	JUSTICE	MB4471589412				
3	6/1-36 IN	15	AE	BAB AL MUADAM	JUSTICE	MB4265489661				
4	B/1-36 (N	15	AF	NEW BAGHDAD . PATROL HO	JUSTICE	MB4518589836				
5	B/1-36 IN	15	AG	SHAHID ADNAN HOSPITAL	HEALTH	MB4213189628				
6	8/1-36 IN	15	AH	SPECIALIST HOSPITAL (SADDAM MEDICAL CLINIC)	HEALTH	MB4195589695				
7	B/1-36 IN	15	A	SPECIAL NURSING HOSPITAL	HEALTH	M84173489896				
8	6/1-36 IN	15	AJ	CHILDREN'S	HEALTH	MB4178090043				
9	B/1-36 IN	15	AK	HOSPITAL BLOOD BANK	HEALTH	MB4199689855				
10	B/1-36 IN	15	AL	DOCTOR'S RESIDENCE HOSPITAL	HEALTH	MB4153789816				
11	B/1-36 IN	15	AM	EMERGENCY	HEALTH	MB4224189793				
12	B/1-36 IN	15	D	BAGHDAD MINISTRY OF TREASURY	FINANCIAL	MB42508980				
13	B/1-36 IN	15	F	NORTHERN BANK WITH GOLD BARS	FINANCIAL	MEI42908970				
14	B/1-36 IN	15	н	BANK DISTRICT	FINANCIAL	MB43509010				
15	B/1-36 IN	15	T	FIRE STATION	EMERGENCY	MB43509040				
16	B/1-36 IN	15	1	CENTRAL BANK OF IRAQ	FINANCIAL	MB4359688867				
17	B/1-36 IN	15	L	BANK DISTRICT	FINANCIAL	MB43608800				-
18	8/1-36 IN	15	W	BANK DISTRICT	FINANCIAL	MB437888				
19	B/1-36 IN	15	P	AREA BANK	FINANCIAL	MB4437389232				
20	B/1-36 IN	15	s	WATER SEWAGE BUILDING	WATER	MB44506860				
21	B/1-36 IN	15	Т	BAGHDAD MINISTRY OF FINANCE	FINANCIAL	MB44508870				
22	B/1-36 IN	15	v	TAXATION	FINANCIAL	MB44608870				
23	A/1-36 IN	16	B	BANK	FINANCIAL	MB4425290650				
24	A/1-36 IN	16	D	ALKINDI HOSPITAL	HEALTH	MB4517889986				
25	A/1-36 IN	16	G	BANK	FINANCIAL	MB4553789349				
26	A/1-36 IN	16	H	BANK MINISTRY OF	FINANCIAL	MB456892				
27	A/1-36 IN	16	M	FINANCE	FINANCIAL	MB46309030				
29	A/1-36 IN	16	Υ.	MOF BUILDING BAGHDAD	FINANCIAL	MB45359108				
29	B/1-36 IN	179	c	MINISTRY OF HEALTH	HEALTH	MB42308990				
30	B/1-37 AR	12W	L	AL SA'ADOUN	JUSTICE	MB4585586980				
31	3-124 IN	17N	1	FIRE STATION	EMERGENCY	MB42709270				
32	3-124 IN	17N	0	AL ADEMIYA POLICE STATION	JUSTICE	MB4302392489				
33	3-124 IN	17N	R	IRAQI JUDICIAL INSTITUTE	JUSTICE	MB4291492845				
34	C/1-36IN	22	С	JAMILA SEWAGE SUBSTATION	WATER	MB46209470				
35	C/1-36IN	22	O	POWER STATION	BLECTRICITY	MB46209480				

36	C/1-36 IN	22	н	KASRA WA ATASHA LPG BOTTLE FILLING WAREHOUSE	GAS / PROPANE	MB47409560			ı	
37	A/1-37AR	50	^	AL RASHIDIYAH SEWAGE SUBSTATION	WATER	MB42509800				
38	A/1-37AR	50	D	AL SHA'AB POLICE STATION	JUSTICE	MB4425597353				
39	C/1-37AR	52	E	HOSPITAL UNK	HEALTH	MB3710097100				
40	C/1-37AR	52	G	AL MASNOUR COMP. (WATER TREATMENT FACILITY)	WATER	MB3840097100				
41	C/1-37AR	52	,	TAJI POWER PLANT/SEWAGE SUBSTATION	ELECTRICITY	MC33870146				
42	C/1-37AR	52	L	AL TAJI POLICE STATION	JUSTICE	MC32050078				
43	2-3FA	18	F	AL ADAMEIAH POLICE STATION	JUSTICE	MB4058092461				
44	2-3FA	20	A	POWER STATION	ELECTRICITY	MB4302494918				
45	2-3FA	20	В	POWER	ELECTRICITY	MB43609150				
46	2-3FA	51W	A	STATION SABA NISSAN WATER TREATMENT PLANT	WATER	MB3960097700				
47	2-3FA	51W	8	WATER PUMP PLANT	WATER	MB39209760				
48	2-3FA	51W	С	BAGHDAD SUSPECT NUCLEAR FACILITY, AL-	ELECTRICITY (SSE)	MB3933197270				
49	2-3FA	51W	E	HARITH 7 APPLES WATER	WATER	MB3939897583				
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23						168	222	- 0	- 3
1		1-1-	Now Beeblad		2ACR				
2	1/ZACR	30	New Baghdad Power Plant	ELECTRIC	MB 554 861	24	48	48	1
3	1/2ACR	30	Rastimyah Sewage Treatment Plant 1	WATER	MB 565 818	24	28	20	
4	1/2ACR	30	Restimyah Sewage Treatment Plant 2	WATER	MB 585 833	24	28	26	1
5	1/ZACR	24	Water Treatment Facility	WATER	MB 555 926	24	12	12	
6	1/2ACR	24	Water Treatment	WATER	MB 556 901	24	12	12	1
7	1/2ACR		Water Treatment			24	12	12	0
8	1/ZACR	24	Facility Sewage	WATER	MB 551 872	24	8	8	1
		9	Treatment Plant Sewage	WATER	MB 508 920				
9	1/2ACR	9 9	Treatment Plant	WATER CITY	MB 516 902	24	8	8	1
11			Ministry of Oil Water Treatment	Govt Facility OIL	MB 513 929	24	8	-	
11	2/ZACR	21	Facility	WATER	MB 521 957	240	172	164	7
-					заст			1,4	
1			FIRE STATION -						
	1-13	28NE	HURIYA	FIRE STATION	MB 37109230	24	13	0	0
3	1-13	28NE	BANK MEDICAL	BANK	MB 36309390	24	8	0	0
3	1-13	28NE	STORAGE FAC.	WAREHOUSE	MB 37599190	24	25	. 0	
4	1-13	28NE	SUBSTATION		MB 35209230	24	13	0_	
5			BAGHDAD						
	1-13	27	CHILDREN HOSP		MB 38909320	24	17	17	1
6	1-13	27	WATER TREAT	WATER TREATMENT	MB 38529345	24	13	0	_ 0
7	1-13	27	KASIMAYN HOSPITAL	HOSPITAL	MB 38719311	24	33	0	C
8	1-13	27	KADEMIA WATER WORKS		MB 36819291	24	13	0	0
9	1-13	27	FIRE STATION -	FIRE STATION	MB 38909320	24	13	0	0
10	1-13	27		AL JAWADEEN BRANCH		24	9		
11	1-13	27	KADIMIYAN GENERAL HOSP	HOSPITAL	MB 39109370 MB 37209310	24	33	0	0
12	1.40	27		WATER TREATMENT					
13	1-13	BN	AL HABBANIYAH NEW BANK	FAC BANK	MB 37469405 MB 41099111	24	13	0	- 0
14	1-13	BN	SHALCHIYA WATER TREAT.	WATER TREATMENT	MB 40209110	24	17	0	0
15	38CT	1-325 IN	JAMIYAH POWER SUBSTATION	POWER	38SMB 338918	24	41-	- 0	
16	звст	1-325 IN	WATER TREATMENT PLANT	WATER	38SMB338009080 0				
17	3801	1-325 IN	KARKH NORTH WATER TREATMENT PLANT	WATER	38SMB336489110				
18	1807	1-325 IN	WORLD FOOD PROGRAM DISTRIBUTION CENTER	NGO	38SMB378578921 6				
19	38CT	1-325 IN	HOSPITAL UNK	HEALTH	385MB328009240 0				
20	звст	1-325 IN	SEWAGE PUMPING STATION # 2	WATER	38SMB326009090				

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j l			BACHDAD HOSPITAL		 1				<u> </u>
21	390.7	1-325 IN	SADDAM CHILDREN'S PARK NURSE	HEALTH	38SMB383458837 6				
22	38CT	1-325 IN	LOCAL	HEALTH	185MB315900		<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>
23	2-70 AR		Auto parts	 .	MB28808620		20	0	0
		33	watehouse	Warehouse		24 24	30		2
24	2-70 AR		Service Station SF Camp BN HQ	Gas Station	MB32006690				
25	2-70 AR	33	(FQB)	2-70 AR HQ F08	M832509510	24	°	0	
28	2-70 AR	33	Race Track Security (FOB)	A COV1-41 FOB	M033500650	Q	0	0	0
27	2-70 AR	33	kragi CNF (FOB)	8 CO/2-70 FOB	M825408630	8	6	0	0
28	2/70 AR	33	Al Solamor School	School	MB29906600			L	<u> </u>
29	2/70 AR	35	Reshid Bank	Bank	M923408520	24	20		2
30	2/70 AR	35	School Security	School	MB24806580	24	(·
31	270 AR	36		BDE CAHA	MB25208940	24		<u> </u>	<u> </u>
32	2-70 AR	35	AMMO PLANT	Ammo Plant	M625708840	24	60		3
33	2/70 AR	36	School Security	School	MB25308690	- 8	<u>6</u>	<u> </u>	0
34		35	School Security	School	MB25308700	8		0	- 5 -
35	2/70 AR	35	School Security	School	MB25508680	. <u></u> 8	5	0	
36	2/70 AR	35	School Security	School	MR25408630	- 8	6	0	0
37	2-70 AR	35	GS Maint Facility	2-70 AR FTCP	MB25008730	00		<u> </u>	
38	2/70 AR	35N	Gas Station	Gas Station	MB33908570	24		<u> </u>	- 0
39	2010 AR	36N	School Security	School	ME34008400	24		6	11
40	2/70 AR	36N	School Security	School	MB34108510	24	6	0	a
41	2/70 AR	36N	Religion Bank	Bank	MBI34708460	24	25	75	2
42	2-70 AR	361	LPG Sea	LPG Distribution Contar	14634508450	24	20	9	0
43	2-70 AR	36Ni	Baeth Perty HQ (FOB)	A CO/2-70 FO8	M834906500	0	0	0	0
I 44	2//0 AH	35N	(School Security	School	MS33808420	8	6	<u> </u>	
45	2/70 AR	36N	School Security	School	MB333809420	8	6	6	
45			Andreas Property		546	360	250	17	10
					2/02/ABM		plant.	- 1/	15
1			Water Treatment		440-00				
1 '	1-1 CAV		Water Treatment Plant	WATER	MB 376731				L
2	1-1 CAV	<u> </u>	Saft Factory	BALT	MB 405743				
3	A/2-325 AIR		Water Treatment Plant	WATER	MS 426904				<u> </u>
4	A/2-325 NR		Power Substation	POWER	M9			}	
5	A/2-325 A/R		Rasheed Benir	FINANCE	M8			<u> </u>	
6				Of.	ME 459824				
7	6/2-325 AIR	 -	Daura Oli Refinery Sewage	-· 	-			 	<u> </u>
	C/2-325 AIR	}	T (continued Flant	WATER	MS 427749	 		 	
8	B/2 319 FAR		Daura Power Plant	POWER	MB 419802				
9	3-325 IN		Water Treatment Plant	WATER	M6 375802				
10	3-325 IN		SEWAGE PUMP	WATER	MB 364780				
	- <u></u>								
11	3-325 IN	[ISKAN SEWAGE	WATER	MB 385819				<u> </u>
				184500				ļ	
12	3-325 <u>IN</u>		SEWAGE PUMP STATION #2	WATER	MR9 381824				
13	3-325 IN		RAFADIAN BANK (AL RISILAH)	FINANCE	MB 386811]	
1 1	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·				777			i ———	
14	3-325 #N		RACHEED BANK	FINANCE	ME 368805				
1		 	LIPE ON LATERY		. we 100003			 	
15	0.225 11.		BAYAA CRIMINAL	CRVII.			}		
١	3-325 fN	 	SEWAGE		M838578159				
18	y-325 (N	┝╸┾	STATION #5 CREDIT BANK OF	WATER	M9391775			 -	
17	3-325 IN		RAG	FINANCE	M8386808			L	
18			FRASHEED BANK	FINANCE				}	Į
, ,	3-325 IN		(AL BAYAA)		M8390823			ļ	ļ
19	3-325 IN		SEWAGE PUMP	WATER	MB 359790			!	
20	3-325 IN		GIRL SCHOOL SECURITY	EDUCATION]			ļ	
20	A-STED IN		OCCUPAL S	ELAKA IRAN	M6_	0	0	0	0
**/						<u> </u>			

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						THER 2				
	UNIT	ZOWE	SITE	SITE NAME	SITE DESCRIPTION	GRID MINIMUM (8 ENGIT)	REQUIRED HOURS OF COVERAGE PER DAY 8/12/24 HOURS	# OF GUARDS REQUIRED	# OF FPSP CURRENTLY WORKING	OF PPSF WORKING IN A SUPERVISORY ROLE
1	BY1-38 (N	15	AB	GAS STATION (ALGAILANI)	GAS / PROPANE	MB4578988317				
2	B/1-36 IN	15	E	POWER STATION	ELECTRICITY	M84268189912				
3	89/1-36 IN	15	a	BAGHDAD MUSEUM	CULTURE	MB43308930				
4	B/1-36 IN	15	0	POWER	ELECTRICITY	MB4415988526				
5	9/1-36 IN	15	R	BAGHDAD MINISTRY OF IRREGATION	RRIGATION	MB44408860				
6	EV5-36 IN	15	U	BAGHOAL) MINISTRY OF ARCHITECTURE	HOUSING & CONSTRUCT	MF344608660				
7	B/1-36 IN	15	w	OF PROPERTY AND DEEDS	HOUSING & CONSTRUCT	MB4476788301				
8	8/1-36 IN	15	Y	BUS STATION	TRANSPORT	MB44708840		-		
10	A/1-36 IN A/1-36 IN	16	A	GAS STATION GAS STATICH	GAS / PROPANE GAS / PROPANE	MB43969150 MB46209030				
11	A1-36 IN	16	K.	FOOD DISTRIBUTION	FOOD DISTRO	M846308880				
12	A/1-36 IN	16	S	WAREHOUSE GAS STATION	GASTPROPANE	MB46809030				
13	A1-36 IN	16	T	LPG DISTRIBUTION	GAS / PROPANE	MB46909030				
14	A/1-36 R1	16	U	SITE GAS STATION	GAS / PROPANE	MB46909130				
15	A71-36 IN	16	V	GAS STATION	GAS / PROPANE					
16	A/1-36 IN	16	w	POWER	ELECTHICITY	MB4720590434				
17	B/1-37 AR	12W	A	STATION GAS STATION	GAS / PROPANE	MB4541887116				
18	B/1-37 AR	12W	В	GAS STATION	GAS / PROPANE	MB4552387882				
19	B/1-36 IN	175	A	POWER	ELECTRICITY	MB42009020				
20	8/1-36 M	178	В	GASSTATION	GAS / PROPANE	MB42359085				
21	B/1-36 IN	175	D	POWER STATION BAGHDAD	ELECTRICITY	MB43109030				
72	9/1-37 AR	12W	1	TELECOM SWITHING HUB (IPTC SWITCH SITE)	COMMUNICATIONS	MB45608680				
73	B/1-37 AR	12W	J	GAS STATION	GAS / PROPANE	MB45808830				
24	B/1-36IN	175	J	MUSTANSIRIYAH UNIVERSITY	EDUCATION	ME44409220				
25	A/3-124 IN A/3-124 IN	17N 17N	G	GAS STATION GAS STATION	GAS I PROPANE GAS I PROPANE	MB42209090 MB42209150				
27	A/3-124 R4	17N	н	COLLEGES / UNIVERSITY	EDUCATION	MB42309170				
26	8/3-124 IN	17N	J	IRAGI CHEMICAL INSTITUTE	EDUCATION	ME42909280				
29	B/3-124 IN	17N	М	GAS STATION	GAS / PROPANE	MB43809150				
30	8/3-124 IN	17N	N	MINISTRY OF MINERALS STATE BATTERY SITE	MINERALS	MB43909180				
31	B/3-124 IN	17N	Р	MIN OF LABOR AND SOCIAL WORK	LABOR	M843909280				
32	3-124 IN	177N	s	PRINTING PRESS WAREHOUSE	COMMUNICATIONS	MB				
33	8/1-36 fN	15	2	BAGHDAD IAEC COMPUTER CENTER	ELECTRICITY (SSE)	MB4510088160				

TOTAL

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34	6/1-36 IN	15	9	BAGHDAD ROYAL PALACE ABBASID	CULTURE (SSE)	MB4254189705				
35	C/1 36 IN	72	٨	TELEPHONE SWITCH 14 JULY	COMMUNICATIONS (SSE)	MB461950				
36	C/1-36IN	22	E	CENTER (WFP SILO)	FOOD DISTRO	MB4751397621				
7	C/1-36IN	22	F	(WFP) WAREHOUSE	FOOD DISTRO	MB4751397621				
39	C/1-36IN	22	G	WAREHOUSE	WATER	MB480964				
19	A/1-37AR	50	E	DISTRIBUTION SITE	GAS / PROPANE	MB45864				
10	C/1-37AR	52	B	BAGHDAD TRANS STA SABIAT-132KV	ELECTRICITY	MB3577597687				
41	C/1-37AR	52	C	TAJI	WATER	MB363985				
				IBN FERNAS (AL KAWTHER)						
12	Cri-37AR	52	D	AERONAUTICAL RESEARCH CENTER	EDUCATION (SSE)	MB3708198917				
13	C/1-3/AR	52	н	BAGHDAD (AL MANSOUR) ELECTRONICS PLANT AND COMPUTER CENTER	ELECTRICITY (SSE)	MB3840097100				
14	C/1-3/AR	52	K	ALTAJI ELECTRONICS PRODUCTION FACILITY	BLECTRICITY (SSE)	MC3469502998				
15	2-3FA	18	A	GAS STATION	GAS / PROPANE	MB40409255				
46	2-3FA	18	C	GAS STATION	GAS / PROPANE	MB407926				
47	2-3 FA 2-3 FA	19	8	GAS STATION	GAS / PROPANE GAS / PROPANE	MB408948 MB4153594604				
19	2-3FA	19	Q	LPG DISTRIBUTION	GAS / PROPANE	MB415946				
50	2-3FA	51W	1	GAS STATION	GAS/PROPANE	MB40659635				_
51	23FA	51W	J	BAGHDAD BIOLOGY LAB	HEALTH	MB3976697439				
52	23FA	51W	K	SABABKAR TELEPHONE SWITCH	COMMUNICATIONS	MB408968				
52			_				0	9	0	0
			1	Old Ammo		MCT				
1	2-6 IN	49/G		Collection Point - (ACP)	M of Defense	MB 525 806	24	12		3
2	5-8 IN	11/A		Al Numan Clouster bomb and fuze Factory	M of Onfense	MB 494 834	24	12		3
3	2-6 IN	32/0		Beginded Ag and Bio Rech Ctr. Tuwedia	M of Atomic Energy	MB 548 745	24	38		3
4	2-8 IN	32/0		Beginded Nuclear Menufacturing Fecility	M of Alamic Energy	MB 535 741	24	34		3
5	2-6 IN	(B)G		Nuclear Reasearch Center	M of Alomic Energy	MB 524 805	24	38		3
6	2.6 84	48/11		Nuclear Reasearch Centur	M of Alomic Energy	MB 520 778				
7	2684	48/1		Does Landing Facility	M of Transportation	MB 517 771				
8	2-6 IN	32/0		Nuclear Research Curier	M of Alomic Energy	MB 545 740				
9	20 IN			Chemical Cannester 566	M of Defense	MB 487799	24	24		3
10	2-6 IN			Baghdad Barracks	M of Defense		24	12		3

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1	2-6 IN	32/0	Yellow Calue Factory	M of Atomic Energy	MB 564 722	24	36		3
2	40th EN	Zawrar	Monument to Fallen Soldiers	historical monument	MB 431856	24	8		3
3	1-35 AR	Tashree	Convention Center		MB 433862				
4			Government Control Center		MB 444863				
5	1-35 AR	Turbon	SSO HQ National		MB 443861				
6	1-30 APR	Tashree	Regime CP and		MB 436859				
7			Bunker Girls School	M of Education	M8 442870				
			Orphanage		MB 436871				
9	1 35 40	0.10	Radio Station		ME 437877				
0	1-35 AR	Salhiya	TV Tower		MB 436880				
1			Ministry of information		MB 440871				
2	1-8 ev	Jame's	Baghdad University	M of Higher Education	MB 4281	24	12		3
3		Mahellat	Savage			24	12		3
	4-27 FA	+ +	Treatment Facility		MB 412698				
4	4-27 FA	Railyurd	World Food Warehouse		MB 406894	24	12		3
5	4-27 FA	Railyard	Warehouses (E)		MB 407894	24	12		3
6	4-27 FA	Railyard	Warehouses (B)		MB 400901	24	12		3
6		,,	10/1			336	272	0	42
-					SECT				
	1-13	27	BAGHDAD TRANS 41-33KV	TRANSFORMER STATION	MB 39619340	24	13	0	0
2			BAGHDAD TRANS NW-	TRANSFORMER			1		
	1-13	27	132KV	STATION	MB 37389266	24	13	0	0_
	1-13	8N	BAGHDAD 33KV TRANS #16	TRANSFORMER STATION	MB 36709140	24	13	ō	0
	1-13	en	BAGHDAD 33KV TRANS #19	TRANSFORMER STATION	MB 38639027	24	13	0	0
	SECT	1-325 IN	GRAIN DISTRIBUTION SITE	F000	38SMB351885				
ı	звст	1-325 IN	HOSPITAL UNK	HEALTH	385MB328009241 0				
,	38CT	1-325 IN	SEWAGE PUMPING STATION#3	WATER	38SM834808900				
3	3BCT	4-1 FA	COMMO FACILITY	COMMUNICATIONS	3ASMB382833				
)	3BCT	4-1 FA	C2 NOX	COMMUNICATIONS	38SA4637748348				
0	39CT	1-13 AR	BAGHOAD 33KV TRANS STA 18	POWER	38SMB387049140				
1	3801	1-13 AR	BAGHDAD TRANS STA NW- 132KV	POWER	36SMB373879286 0				
2	SOCT	1-13 AR	BAGHDAD TRANS 6TA 41- 33KV	POWER	38SMB396169340 9				
3	3BCT	1-325 IN	SHAHIO HAMUDI AL-AZAWI PUBLIC SCHOOL	EDUCATION	38SMH371873				
4	38CT	1-325 IN	TRAIN STATION	TRANSPORTATION	MB2891				
5	38CT	1-325 IN	YAMOUKE SEWAGE SUBSTATION	WATER	385M6362889				
5	SACT	1-325 IN	BAGHDAD TRANS STA WEST-132KV	POWER	38SMB373808820 8				
7	заст	1-325 IN	HURRIYA SEWAGE SUBSTATION	WATER	38SMB338918				
8	3801	1-325 IN	BAGHDAD TRANS STA NW 2-132KV	POWER	385MB334888887 0				
9	38CT	1-325 IN	MAARI- BAGHDAD SEWAGE SUBSTATION	WATER	38SMB374882				

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20	38CT	1-325 IN	FAROOD SEC SCHOOL (GIRLS)	EDUCATION	38SMB366808604 0				
21	38CT	1-325 IN	AL-AMEAN INTERMED SCHOOL (GIRLS)	EDUCATION	38SMB364508593 0				
2	3807	1-325 IN	JAMIL-BAGHDAD SEWAGE SUBSTATION	WATER	385MB338508				
3	2-70 AR	36	Abu Ghurayb Hospital	Hospital	MB238853	24	20	20	ō
4	2-70 AR	33	Saad Sub powerstation	Powerstation	MB258676	24	20	20	2
5	2-70 AR	33	IPA Research	Research Center	MB274860	24	20	0	0
5			University Storage		MB293875	24	20	G	0
	2/70 AR	33	Site	Storage site	MINE BOOK O	-	-	-	
7	2/70 AR	33	Veterinary School	School	MBZ99860	24	20	20	2
8	2/70 AR	33	Battery Plant	Factory	MB299864	24	20	0	0
9	2-70 AR		Overpass Security		MB337877	24	20	0	0
3	27074	33	Civerpasa Security	Overpess	38D337D77	49	20	-	
Q	2/70 AR	34	Chlorination Plant	Cassan.	MB182849	24	20	0	0
	ZIVAR	34	Water Treatment	Factory		-			
1	2/70 AR	34	Plant	Water Treatement Plant	MB202860	24	20	20	2
2	2/70 AR	35	Power Substation	Powerstation	MB233856	24	۵	0	0
3			Abu Ghuayo Town	Abu Ghuayo Town Hall	MB234852	24	20	20	2
	2/70 AR	5N	Hali					1	
4	2-70 AR	33	Ministry Of	University	MB294861	24	20	20	2
5			Imgation Office		MB325853	24	20	20	2
	2/70 AR	36N	Complex	Imgation Officer					
8	2/70 AR	36N	Power Plant	Village	MB327839	24	60	60	- 4
7	2/70 AR	36N	Distribution	Substation	MB343856	24	0	0	0
8			Central Bank		MB3463585697	24	20	0	0
9	2/70 AR	36N	Building	Bank			-		_
	2/70 AR	36N	Printhouse Power	Prinhouse	M8346856	24	20	0	0
0	2/70 AR	36N	Transformer	Transformer	M8350650	24	20	0	O
5	3BCT	41FA	Power Sub-Station	POWER	MU35518532				
1					SKEABN	528	412	200	16
	A/2-325 AIR		Al-Askan Library	EDUCATION	M8				
	B/2-319 FAR		Phone Center	COMMUNICATIONS	MB 437796				
			AL ENTESAR	PST SITE					
	3-325 IN				MB 37707838				
i			PST	100000000000000000000000000000000000000					
	3-325 MV		LPG SITE #1	FUEL DISTRO	MB 368901				
	3-325 IN		LPG SITE #1	FUEL DISTRO FUEL DISTRO	M8 364793				
			LPG SITE #1 LPG SITE #2 LPG SITE #3	FUEL DISTRO FUEL DISTRO FUEL DISTRO	M8 364793 MB 359 371				
	3-325 IN 3-325 IN		LPG SITE #1 LPG SITE #2 LPG SITE #3 LPG SITE #4	FUEL DISTRO FUEL DISTRO FUEL DISTRO FUEL DISTRO	MB 364793 MB 369 371 MB 367 755				
	3-325 IN 3-325 IN 3-325 IN		LPG SITE #1 LPG SITE #2 LPG SITE #3	FUEL DISTRO FUEL DISTRO FUEL DISTRO	M8 364793 MB 359 371				
1	3-325 IN 3-325 IN 3-325 IN 3-325 IN		LPG SITE #1 LPG SITE #2 LPG SITE #3 LPG SITE #4 LPG SITE #5 LPG SITE #6 GAS STATION	FUEL DISTRO FUEL DISTRO FUEL DISTRO FUEL DISTRO FUEL DISTRO	MB 364793 MB 359 371 MB 367 755 MB 384 756				
0	3-325 IN 3-325 IN 3-325 IN 3-325 IN 3-325 IN		LPG SITE #1 LPG SITE #2 LPG SITE #3 LPG SITE #4 LPG SITE #5 LPG SITE #6 GAS STATION AL JIHAD	FUEL DISTRO	MB 364793 MB 369 371 MB 367 755 MB 384 766 MB 376 784				
0	3-325 IN 3-325 IN 3-325 IN 3-325 IN 3-325 IN 3-325 IN		LPG SITE #1 LPG SITE #2 LPG SITE #3 LPG SITE #5 LPG SITE #6 GAS STATION AL JIHAD TRANSFORMER	FUEL DISTRO	M8 364793 M6 369 371 MB 367 755 MB 384 766 MB 376 784 MB 388802				
1	3-325 IN 3-325 IN 3-325 IN 3-325 IN 3-325 IN		LPG SITE #1 LPG SITE #3 LPG SITE #3 LPG SITE #4 LPG SITE #6 LPG SITE #6 GAS STATION AL JIHAD TRANSFORMER STN	FUEL DISTRO	MB 364793 MB 369 371 MB 367 755 MB 384 766 MB 376 784				
1	3-325 IN 3-325 IN 3-325 IN 3-325 IN 3-325 IN 3-325 IN		LPG SITE #1 LPG SITE #2 LPG SITE #4 LPG SITE #5 LPG SITE #5 LPG SITE #6 GAS STATION AL JIHAD TRANSFORMER STN HAY SADOAM	FUEL DISTRO	M8 364793 MB 369 371 MB 367 755 MB 384 756 MB 376 784 MB 388602 MB 362821				
1	3-325 IN 3-325 IN 3-325 IN 3-325 IN 3-325 IN 3-325 IN 3-325 IN		LPG SITE #1 LPG SITE #2 LPG SITE #2 LPG SITE #5 LPG SITE #5 LPG SITE #6 GAS STATION AL JIHAD TRANSFORMER STN HAY SADOAM PST	FUEL DISTRO POWER PST SITE	M8 364793 M6 359 371 M8 367 755 M8 384 756 M9 376 794 M8 388072 M8 362821 M8 365807				
1	3-325 IN 3-325 IN 3-325 IN 3-325 IN 3-325 IN 3-325 IN		LPG SITE #1 LPG SITE #2 LPG SITE #4 LPG SITE #5 LPG SITE #5 LPG SITE #6 GAS STATION AL JIHAD TRANSFORMER STN HAY SADOAM	FUEL DISTRO POWER PST SITE PST SITE	M8 364793 M8 359 371 M8 367 755 M8 384 756 M8 376 784 M8 368802 M8 362821 M8 365807 M8 3359 8167	-			
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-	TIER 3									
	UNIT	ZONE	SITE	SITE NAME	SITE DESCRIPTION	GRID MINIMUM (9 DIGIT)	REQUIRED HOURS OF COVERAGE PER DAY 9/12/24 HOURS	#OF GUARDS REQUIRED	SOF FFSF CURRENTLY WORKING	# OF FPSF WORKING IN A SUPERVISORY ROLE
					Para Carrier Control	IBCT	1 - 1000 1100110			
1	BV1-36 IN	15	AN	MEIR-TAWEIG SYNAGOGUE	RELIGIOUS SITE	MB4356488635				
2	6V1-36 W	15	С	MINISTRTY OF DEFENSE	MILITARY DEFENSE	MB42508950				
3	B/1-37 AR	12W	D	PALASTINE HOTEL	COMMERCIAL	MB4592286573				
4	8/1-37 AR	12W	н	PC-3 MEETING HOUSE	GOVERNMENT	MB45508670				
5	3-124 IN	17N	к	AL KARAMA (AL WAZERIYA) MISSILE AND ELECTRONICS PLANT	MILITARY DEFENSE (SISE)	MG4326292657				
6	B/3-124 IN	17N	L	MISSLE AND ELECTRONICS PLANT	MILITARY DEFENSE	MB43269265				
7	B/1-36 RV	16	В	BAGHDAD ROYAL PALACE ABBASID	CULTURAL (SSE)	MB4254189705				
8	1-38 IN	12W	E	BAGHDAD DGS HQ AND UGF	MILITARY DEFENSE (SSE)	MB4625087281				
9	C/1-37AR	52	A	FATAH MISSLE COMPONENT FACTORY	MILITARY DEFENSE (SSE)	MB35509910				

POSSIBLE ÁDA SITE (TAIL 10 C/1-37AR 52 4 MILITARY DEFENSE MC34000210 FACILITY) B 11 2-3FA 18 AZDAYA MARKET COMMERCIAL MBM051492657 AL RASHIDIYAH POSSIBLE F 12 2-3FA 5tW MILITARY (SSE) MB3940796962 CENTRIFUGE FACILITY 12 MICT. 1-35 AR MFA Complex MB 432858 16 2 Saihiya M of Foreign Affairs Embassy Externa 2 1-35 AR MB 432868 Salhya M of Foreign Allairs Security 3 1-35 AR Seihiya Al Mansour Hotel 40 EN M8 4786 24 78 3 Coment Industrial 5 2-5 IN 4.FE MB 494 818 Site 5 45 88 SECT 1 1-13 0 IN HUMAN APPEAL MEDICAL WAREHOUSE MB 40419121 24 25 0 2 38C7 1-325 IN MARKETAMALL MARKET 38SM935008820 KARKH NORTH 38SMB338009100 3 **38CT** 1-325 IN WATER RESERVOIR TELEPHONE 38CT 1-325 IN SWITCHING COMMUNICATIONS 385MB372882 EQUIPMENT AL ADIL 3BSMB372008820 5 **38CT** 1-325 IN TELEPHONE COMMUNICATIONS O ADMIN OFFICE 8 SACT 2-70 AR Veterinary School SCHOOL MB299860 2-70 AR Iraqi Village VILLAGE MB327839 Anarran 8 39CT 2-70 AR MEDIA MR346856 Printhouse REGIME RADIO 9 3BCT 2-70 AR MEDIA 36SMB312961 STATION 38SMB313008790 10 **39CT** 2-70 AR CLINIC UNK UNKNOWN 0 HOME OF IYAD 38SMB342216383 11 SPCT 2-70 AR TAHA SHIHAB AL 3 DURI 38SMB400913 38SMB391009370 12 3**9**01 1-13 AR PRISON CORRECTIONS 13 36CT 1-13 AR BANK FINANCE 0 NGO AND CMO 385MB36909320 BECT 1 13 AR NGO SECURITY FEDAYEEN 38SMB382969079 15 3BCT 1-13 AR CAMP TRAINING CAMP n TELEPHONE 38SMB382009150 16 30CT 1-13 AR EXCHANGE AL COMMUNICATIONS KARKH **BCT** 1-13 AR ASP 17 MILITARY 385M835909310 IS DEPARTMENT 38SMB401119393 18 **39CT** 1-13 AR M 7 RECORDS ARCHIVES AND ARCHIVES 38SMB327008860 19 38C7 1-325 IN CLINIC UNK UNKNOWN 0 38SMB334309184 20 3BCT 1-325 IN CLINIC UNK LINKNOWN 21 3BCT 2-70 AR CP 38SMB307835 ASR TAHL MIH 22 3BCT 2-70 AR AIRPORT (VIP CIVIL 38SMB29358623 AIRPORT) 23 2-70 AR Overpass Security 0 M8224874 24 20 0 24 2-70 AR Overpass Security MB254875 24 20 0 0 35 25 Overpass Security MB294872 0 0 2/70 AR 33 BAGHDAD IS SENIOR 385MB398848642 28 3BCT 4-1 FA ANALYSIS ARCHIVES 6 CENTER UGF STRUCTURE

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8	3-325 IN		BUS STATION	TRANSPORTATION	NO GRID				
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COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY

MILITARY INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION

TRANSFER OF ENTITIES & PERSONNEL BETWEEN MINISTRY OF SECURITY AFFAIRS TO MINISTRY OF HOUSING AND CONSTRUCTION

The Military Industialization Commission is one of the Iraqi government agencies under the control and jurisdiction of the Senior Advisor for National Security Affairs and Defence. The SOEs under MIC control include a number of companies involved in construction work. Included in their portfolio of companies are SAAD Engineering and Al Fao Construction.

In an effort to promote the effective provision of housing and construction services across Iraq, it is appropriate that SAAD Engineering and Al Fao Construction be transferred from the MIC to and the Ministry of Housing and Construction, and that responsibility for them within CPA be transferred to the Senior Advisor for the Ministry of Housing and Construction.

This will enable these valuable entities to be used in enhancing the effectiveness of the Ministry of Housing and Construction thereby addressing a pressing need for such skills in the reconstruction of parts of Iraq. This is, however, an interim measure that will be reviewed periodically, and may be modified if, inter alia, the effective organization of the armed forces for the new Iraq so require and is subject, in due course, to the agreement of an internationally recognised, representative government, established by the people of Iraq and assuming the responsibility of the CPA.

Mr W Slocombe Senior Adviser for National Security and Defence

Senior Adviser
Ministry of Housing
and Construction

5 July 2003

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Mr W Slocombe Senior Adviser for National Security and Defence

Senior Adviser
Ministry of Housing
and Construction

5 July 2003

Memorandum for: Mr Ted Morse

6 July 2003

From: COL

Subject: Funds for Security Assessment

Per the advice of the CFO, who indicated that he will reimburse these funds should that be necessary, request \$1500 from the Baghdad Central Regional Coordinator's Emergency Response Fund for the purpose of paying for a security assessment of Iraq's major power lines.

I understand the explicit condition that this money will be paid only to indigenous Iraqis.

(Note: This memo supercedes a similar memo of 5 July requesting \$1000)

Thank You!

COL

From Ted Morse

To: COL (b)(6)

Approved.

Ted Morse

Baghdad Regional Coordinator

Memorandum for: LTG Sanchez

6 July 2003

From: Walt Slocombe

Subject: Security Assessment Authorization

The security of Iraq's national power distribution system is vital to the development of the Iraqi economy.

Traditionally, local tribes have assisted in the security of key power lines. With a view to establishing a relationship between the Coalition Provisional Authority and key tribal leaders for this purpose, AMB Bremer has authorized former-Iraqi Brigadier and IRDC member Tawfik Al-Yassiri and 5 companions to travel from Baghdad generally along the route of the major power lines to meet with the major tribes. He will report on the results of his efforts upon return.

To facilitate this assessment, request you sign the attached letter authorizing Brigadier Al-Yassiri and his companions unrestricted travel within the CJTF 7 AOR from 7-25 July and giving them permission to carry small arms for self-protection.

W. BS Counter

Thank You,

Walt Slocombe

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Memorandum for: Mr Ted Morse	6 July 2003
From: COL	
Subject: Funds for Security Assessment	
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(Note: This memo supercedes a similar memo of 5	July requesting \$1000)
Thank You!	
COL	
From Ted Morse	
To: COL	
Approved.	
Ted Morse	

Ted Morse Baghdad Regional Coordinator

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COL	
From Ted Morse	_
To: COL	
Approved.	
Ted Morse	

Ted Morse Baghdad Regional Coordinator

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
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CRITTARI IZA THIS EFFEORT. - BEFORE COMMISTANT
WYST BR ASSUME + NOT LOVE CARD BILLIM,



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- RECONSTRUT/REONL FLAC PUR 1/2	-
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- ABOUT 4 WKS TO RECAM + DISMO	
- IN MAD MAN TO 1000 PREVIOUS (1000+1000)	
- ora Romo:	
- 1000 RIFLES 150 PISTOUS (NON ONLY 150 RIFLES)	
- URHICL ES- 54 TYPES -> 28 PROVINCES/26 BA	KHDAD VIC
- ONW 12 ->42	
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UNCLASSIFIED
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OAAUZYUW RUEOEGA3739 1600053-UUUU--RUEASRT RUERPHB. ZNR UUUUU O 081143Z JUN 03 FM CDRCJTF7 DOHA KUWAIT KU//C3// TO RUPPAVC/CDRVCORPS HEIDELBERG GE RUHHIOA/CG I MEF FWD ZEN/CDR377THTSC DONA KUWAIT KU ZEN/CG 32D AAMDC DOHA KUWAIT KU ZEN/CDR416TH ENCOM DOHA KUWAIT KU ZEN/CDR513THMIBDE DOHA KUWAIT KU ZEN/CDR335THSIGCMD DOHA KUWAIT KU INFO RUERNOK/CDRUSFAC FT SILL OK//75THXTF// RUCADHQ/USCENTCOM FWD RUCAACC/USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL RUCAICS/COMSOCCENT MACDILL AFB FL RHSDAAA/COMCFSOCC RUEPVBT/CJTF 20//J3// RUEORYK/COMUSARCENT SA//S3// RUEASRT/CDRCJTF7 HQS FT MCPHERSON GA//WATCH// OPER/IRAQI FREEDOM// MSGID/GENADMIN CDRCJTF7 DOKA KUWAIT KU//C35FUOPS// SUBJ/CDRCJTF7 FRAGO 286 TO OPORD 03-033 IMPLEMENTATION (U)// OF THE FACILITY PROTECTION SERVICES (U)// REF/A/MSG/COMCFLCC/190600ZAPR03// REF/B/MSG/COMCFLCC/090100ZAPR03// REF/C/MSG/COMCFLCC/2415012MAY03// REF/D/MSG/COMCFLCC/220301ZMAY03// REF/E/MSG/COMCFLCC/220800ZMAY01// REF/F/DOC/CPA/ORD/16MAY03/01// REF/G/DOC/CPA/ORD/23MAY03/02// NARR/ REF A IS COMCFLCC OPORD 03-033, OPERATIONS IN IRAQ. REF B IS A COMCFLCC MESSAGE THAT DIRECTS MSCS REGARDING CAPTURED ENEMY EQUIPMENT. REF C IS A CDRCJTF-7 FRAGO 96 TO OPORD 03-033 THAT ESTABLISHES THE NATIONAL IRAQI WEAPONS POLICY. REF D IS CDRCJTF-7 FRAGO 164 TO OPORD 03-033 PAYING IZ CIVIL SERVANTS. REF E IS CDRCJTF-7 FRAGO 136 TO OPORD 03-033 ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE FOR PAYING IZ CIVIL SERVANT SALARIES NATIONWIDE. REF F IS THE ORDER OF

COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY (CPA) REGARDING THE DE-

IMPLEMENTING THE FACILITY PROTECTION SERVICE.//

BA'ATHIFICATION OF IRAQI SOCIETY. REF G IS CPA ORDER REGARDING THE DISSOLUTION OF IRAQI ENTITIES. THIS FRAGO OUTLINES PROCEDURES FOR

- TUATION. BACKGROUND: THE VITAL INSTITUTE PROTECTION FORCE

 F) WAS AN ORGANIZATION UNDER THE SADDAM HUSSEIN REGIME THAT

 VIDED GUARDS FOR ALL THE MINISTRIES. ALMOST HALF OF THIS FORCE

 ERE COMPRISED OF MILITARY FORCES.
- 2. MISSION. NO CHANGE.
- EXECUTION.
- 3.A CONCEPT. THE CPA SUPPORTS THE ESTABLISHMENT OF FUNCTIONAL IRAQI MINISTRIES WITH THE CREATION OF A TRAINED AND PROFESSIONAL FACILITY PROTECTION SERVICE (FPS) THAT REPRESENTS THE NEW IRAQI INTERIM GOVERNMENT. THE FPS PROVIDES SECURITY FOR IRAQI MINISTRY BUILDINGS AND MINISTRY SITES IN ORDER TO PREVENT THE THEFT OF GOVERNMENT EQUIPMENT, DOCUMENTS, AND PROPERTY. THE CREATION OF THIS NEW FPS ALLAYS THE FEARS OF MANY IRAQIS WHO DID NOT TRUST THE PREVIOUS REGIME SECURITY FORCES AND VIPF. THE CPA IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE INITIAL RECRUITMENT, TRAINING AND SUPERVISION OF THE FPS. THE FPS WILL BE EMPLOYED UNDER THEIR RESPECTIVE MINISTRIES, WITH CENTRAL OVERSIGHT (TO INCLUDE TRAINING) BY THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR. CURRENT SECURITY FORCE SUCH AS THE NORTH AND SOUTH OIL COMPANY SECURITY, WORLD FOOD PROGRAM SECURITY, AND OTHERS, WILL TRANSITION AND BECOME PART OF THE FPS. THIS WILL BE A FOUR PHASED OPERATION THAT RUNS CONCURRENTLY. PHASE I - RECRUIT, PHASE II -SCREEN, PHASE III - TRAIN, AND PHASE IV - EMPLOYMENT BY THE MINISTRIES.
- 3.A.1. PHASE I RECRUIT. THIS PHASE BEGINS IMMEDIATELY UPON RECEIPT OF THIS ORDER. TARGET AUDIENCE IS FORMER VIPF, FORMER MILITARY AND THEN CIVILIANS. USE BROADCAST AND PRINT MEDIA TO ENCOURAGE APPLICATION AND HIRING TO THESE POSITIONS. ENDSTATE FOR THIS PHASE IS TO DRAW A LARGE POOL OF FPS APPLICANTS TO ENABLE THE HIRING OF A FORCE STRUCTURE THAT IS ETHNICALLY REPRESENTATIVE OF THE REGION'S TOTAL POPULATION. CUTF-7 WILL DEVELOP THE FPS REQUIREMENTS PER MINISTRY. THIS PROGRAM CONTINUES UNTIL THE REQUIRED NUMBER OF FPS IS HIRED.
- 3.A.2. PHASE II APPLICATION AND SCREENING PROCESS. THIS PHASE BEGINS UPON RECEIVING THE IRAQI APPLICATION THEN SCREENING TO DETERMINE IF THE APPLICANT CAN BE HIRED IMMEDIATELY. ONLY INDIVIDUAL IRAQIS MAY SUBMIT APPLICATIONS AS FPS. FORMER MILITARY UNITS ARE NOT PERMITTED TO APPLY. APPLICATIONS MUST BE FILLED OUT COMPLETELY BEFORE PROCEEDING TO THE SCREENING PROCESS. ALL CANDIDATES MUST FILL OUT THEIR OWN APPLICATION WITHOUT ASSISTANCE FROM OTHERS. THIS WILL TEST THEIR ABILITY TO READ AND WRITE. ALL APPLICANTS MUST BE ABLE TO READ, WRITE AND SPEAK ARABIC, AND BE OVER THE AGE OF 18. APPLICANTS MUST ALSO COMPLETE THE DEBARATHIPICATION QUESTIONNAIRE. IF THE APPLICANT DOES NOT FALL INTO ONE OF THE CATEGORIES DESCRIBED BELOW, HE MAY BE HIRED. THE SCREENING CRITERIA ARE AS FOLLOWS:
- 3.A.2.A. NON-WAIVERABLE DISQUALIFICATION:
- 3.A.2.A.1. MEMBERS WITH FORMER REGIME SECURITY ORGANIZATION AFFILIATIONS LIKE A FORMER MEMBER OF THE SPECIAL REPUBLICAN GUARD (SRG).
- 3.A.2.A.2. SENIOR BA'ATH PARTY MEMBERS.
- 3.A.2.A.3. TERRORIST ORGANIZATION AFFILIATION/HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATORS.
- 3.A.2.A.4. PRIOR RANK OF COLONEL OR HIGHER IN IRAQI ARMY OR SECURITY FORCES.
- 3.A.2.B. WAIVERABLE:
- 3.A.2.B.1. CRIMINAL HISTORY.
- 3.A.2.B.2. FAMILY RELATIONSHIP TO FORMER REGIME MEMBER.
- 3.A.2.B.3. NON-IRAQI CITIZENSHIP.
- 3.A.2.B.4. EXTREMIST ORGANIZATION CONTACTS.
- 3.A.2.C. SUBMIT ALL APPLICANTS' NAMES TO THE MOI FOR RECORD

NG. SUBMIT NAMES OF ALL CURRENT SECURITY GUARDS PROTECTION ISTRY FACILITIES (IE OIL INFRASTRUCTURE, WORLD FOOD PROGRAM REHOUSES) TO THE MOI FOR RECORD KEEPING. MOI IS THE OVERSIGHT AGENCY FOR THE FPS. IT IS THE CPA'S GOAL TO HAVE A QUALITY FPS THROUGH PROPER SCREENING RATHER THAN TO RELIEVE PERSONNEL AFTER FURTHER REVIEW OF THEIR RECORDS.

3.A.2.D. THE ENDSTATE IS A GROUP OF QUALIFIED, PROPERLY SCREENED CANDIDATES FOR FPS TRAINING.

3.A.3. PHASE III - TRAINING. THIS PHASE ENCOMPASSES THE REQUIRED TRAINING FOR FPS. THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR WILL PROVIDE THE PROGRAM OF INSTRUCTION FOR STANDARDIZED TRAINING. MSCS CONDUCT TRAINING OF FPS CANDIDATES. DO NOT TERMINATE EMPLOYMENT OF CURRENT SECURITY GUARDS BECAUSE THEY HAVE NOT MET THE MINIMUM TRAINING REQUIREMENTS. CONDUCT TRAINING OF CURRENT SECURITY GUARDS TO MEET MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS. CANDIDATES ARE IN A PROBATIONARY STATUS UNTIL COMPLETION OF TRAINING. UPON COMPLETION OF TRAINING, CANDIDATES ARE ELIGIBLE TO RECEIVE SALARIES. NOTIFY MINISTRY OF INTERIOR OF THE NUMBER OF CANDIDATES UNDERGOING TRAINING IOT PRIORITIZE THEIR UTILIZATION. THE GOAL IS TO TRAIN, EQUIP, AND EMPLOY APPROXIMATELY 15,000 FPS. ENDSTATE WILL BE TO PROVIDE TO THE MINISTRIES AN FPS TRAINED IN USE-OF-FORCE AND SAFE WEAPON USE, PROPER REPORTING PROCEDURES, AND FAIR AND JUST TREATMENT OF PEOPLE.

3.A.3.A. MINIMUM TRAINING REQUIRED:

3.A.3.B. SCOPE OF RESPONSIBILITY TO THE MINISTRIES AND TO THE NEW IRAQI GOVERNMENT. (2 HOURS)

3.A.J.C. INTERPERSONAL COMMUNICATIONS SKILLS TRAINING; VERBAL PERSUASION; HUMAN RIGHTS AWARENESS. (2 HOURS)

3.A.3.D. WEAPONS SAFETY; USE OF FORCE; WEAPONS FAMILIARIZATION WITH SIDE ARMS/AX 47. (2 HOURS)

3.A.3.E. ACCESS CONTROL/STATIC GUARD PROCEDURES; REPORTING PROCEDURES; BOMB THREAT PROCEDURES; PERSONNEL AND VEHICLE SEARCHES; CHARACTERISTICS OF A SUICIDE BOMBER. (2 HOURS)

3.A.3.F. ON-THE-JOB TRAINING (OJT) WITH COALITION FORCES (1 DAY). 3.A.4. PRASE IV - EMPLOYMENT BY MINISTRIES, MSC'S NOTIFY MINISTRY OF INTERIOR POCS, MR. JIM ANDERSON OR MR. JOHN HUGKES JONES, WITH THE NUMBER OF FPS AT EACH LOCATION AS TRAINING SESSIONS FINISH. MINISTRY OF INTERIOR WILL PROVIDE IRAQI MINISTRY PRIORITIES FOR FPS. MINISTRY OF INTERIOR WILL CONSIDER THE CANDIDATE'S POINT OF APPLICATION, AND MINISTRY REQUIREMENT FOR FPS ASSIGNMENT. FPS UPON EMPLOYMENT AT A MINISTRY SITE, FPS WILL RECEIVE UNIFORMS AND EQUIPMENT AS THEY BECOME AVAILABLE. REPORT UNIFORM REQUIREMENTS TO THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR REPRESENTATIVE. WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION FOR FPS WILL BE CENTRALLY LOCATED AT THE MINISTRY SITE. FPS WILL HAVE RANK STRUCTURE IN ORDER TO HAVE SUPERVISION OVER SECURITY. FPS EMPLOYMENT CONCEPT IS PHASED, JOINT COALITION OPERATIONS WITH FPS, THEN COALITION MONITORING AND SUPERVISING FPS AND LASTLY TO HAVE THE MINISTRY ASSUME FULL RESPONSIBILITY OF THE SECURITY OPERATIONS. CURRENT SECURITY GUARDS WILL TRANSITION INTO THE FPS. ENDSTATE IS MINISTRY SITES SECURED BY FPS. OCPA HAS A THREE TIER PRIORITIZED LIST FOR MINISTRIES. TIER ONE IS THE HIGHEST PRIORITY. 3.A.4.A. TIER ONE MINISTRIES: ELECTRICITY, FINANCE, TRADE, OIL, HEALTH, EDUCATION, INTERIOR, JUSTICE, AND ATOMIC ENERGY. 3.A.4.B. TIER TWO MINISTRIES: AGRICULTURE, LABOR AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS, HIGHER EDUCATION AND SCIENTIFIC RESIDENCE, HOUSING AND CONSTRUCTION, INDUSTRY AND MINERALS, IRRIGATION, AND TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATION.

3.A.4.C. TIER THREE MINISTRIES: FOREIGN AFFAIRS, PLANNING, CULTURE, NATIONAL GRGANIZATION FOR STANDARDIZATION QUALITY CONTROL, YOUTH, RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS, DEFENSE, INFORMATION, AND MILITARY INDUSTRIALIZATION.

- TASK TO UNITS.
- 1. IMEP AND V CORPS.
- A.1.A. RECRUIT AND HIRE FPS APPLICANTS IN ORDER TO PROVIDE THE INISTRIES A VIABLE SECURITY FORCE FOR THEIR STATIC SITES.
- 3.B.1.B. CONVERT EXISTING SECURITY GUARDS AT MINISTRY SITES TO FPS. CONDUCT THEIR TRAINING RETROACTIVELY.
- 3.8.1.C. PROVIDE LOCATION, DATE, AND TIME FOR RECEIVING APPLICATIONS TO LOCAL MEDIA AND CJTF-7 LNO TO MOI.
- 3.B.1.D. CONDUCT AN INITIAL SCREENING OF APPLICANTS IAW APPENDIX 29 (SCREENING AND VETTING PROCEDURES), ANNEX C, COMCFLCC OPORD 03-
- 033. HIRE THOSE THAT ARE NOT IN QUESTION. LOCAL AREA COALITION COMMANDERS (COMPANY OR HIGHER) HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO APPROVE WAIVERS FOR APPLICANTS.
- 3.8.1.E. CONDUCT THE STANDARD TRAINING IAW PROGRAM OF INSTRUCTION OUTLINED IN PARA 3.A.3.A.
- 3.B.1.F. ISSUE UNIFORMS, EQUIPMENT AND TWO TO FPS. CONTINUE TO IDENTIFY THE UNIFORM REQUIREMENTS FOR FPS TO THEIR MINISTRIES.
- 3.B.1.G. PROVIDE SIDE ARMS OR AK 47 WITH COLLATERAL AMMUNITION FROM AVAILABLE CAPTURED WEAPONS TO MINISTRIES. IDENTIFY SHORTAGES OF WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION TO THE 377TH TSC.
- 3.B.1.H. NOTIFY MINISTRY OF INTERIOR WITH THE NUMBER OF FPS COMPLETING TRAINING AT EACH LOCATION.
- 3.8.1.1. REPORT THE NAMES AND NUMBER OF CURRENT SECURITY GUARDS AT CURRENT MINISTRY SITES TO THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR IOT TRACK THEM AS PART OF THE FPS.
- 3.B.2. 217TH TSC.

 3.B.2.A. PROVIDE THE REQUIRED ARMS AND AMMUNITION TG V CORPS AND I MEF FOR THE FPS.
- 3.B.2.B. PROVIDE UNIFORMS AND EQUIPMENT TO V CORPS AND I MEF FOR THE FPS.
- C. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS.
- 3.C.1. TIMELINE.
- 3.C.1.A. 15 JUN, BEGIN LOCAL RECRUITMENT OF FPS APPLICANTS TO SUPPORT MINISTRY SITE SECURITY.
- 3.C.1.B. 21 JUN, MSCS ACCEPT APPLICATIONS AND HIRE QUALIFIED APPLICANTS.
- 3.C.1.C. 23 JUN, BEGIN TRAINING FOR POTENTIAL FPS.
- 3.C.1.D. 25 JUN, PROVIDE QUALIFIED FPS TO THE MINISTRIES FOR EMPLOYMENT. BEGIN JOINT COALITION OPERATIONS.
- J.C.1.E. 28 AUG, BEGIN COALITION MONITORING AND SUPERVISION OF FPS.
- 3.C.1.F. 7 SEP, ALL MINISTRIES GUARDED BY THE MINISTRY FPS
- 3.C.2. THE FPS ARE NOT LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS AND DO NOT HAVE EXECUTIVE LAW ENFORCEMENT POWERS. THEY DO NOT HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO ARREST, INVESTIGATE OR CONFINE PERSONNEL.
- 3.C.3. THE FPS WILL DETAIN INDIVIDUALS FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS TO ACCEPT CUSTODY OF THE PERSON.
- 3.C.4. THE FPS HAVE THE RIGHT TO BE ARMED WITHIN THE CONFINES OF THEIR FACILITY WHILE ON-DUTY.
- 3.C.5. FPS WEAPONS ARE MAINTAINED IN THE FACILITY. THE FPS WILL NOT BE ARMED WHEN OFF-DUTY.
- 3.C.6. ALL CURRENT MEMBERS OF THE FACILITY PROTECTION BERVICE WILL NEED TO COMPLETE THE APPLICATION FORM AND THE DE-BA'ATIFICATION QUESTIONNAIRE. VETTING OF THE CURRENT APPLICANTS WILL BEGIN WITH THE HIGHEST RANKING PERSONNEL AND WORK DOWN TO THE LOWEST LEVEL.
- 3.C.7. FALSIFICATIONS OR OMISSIONS TO THE DE-BA'ATHIFICATION QUESTIONNAIRE WILL BE GROUNDS FOR DISCIPLINE TO INCLUDE TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT.
- 3.C.8. THE MINISTRY EMPLOYING THE FPS WILL PAY THE SALARY. SALARY FOR FPS WILL START AT \$100 PER MONTH FOR GUARDS.

1 020 - 01

COMMAND AN	D SUPPORT. NO CHA	NGE.	
. OCPA MOI P	OC, MR.	OR MR.	AT DS
	CJTF-7 LNC	TO MOI, MAJ	DSN
/			
BT			
#3739			
NNNN			
********	*********	*********	********
*	UNCLA	SSIFIED	*
*********	**********	***********	**********

Nazaroff, Boris A.

From:

(b)(6) LTC CJTF7-FUOPS

Saturday, June 28, 2003 1:45 PM

C5CM-IMEFLNOMAIN (b)(6); C5CR-G4CHS&S

(b) LTC; (b)(6) LTC: (b)(6) COL

RADCLIFFE, R COL G3 CHIEF OF OPS Cc: FW: Facilities Protection Service (FPS) Subject:



Sent:

To:

I MEF FRAGO 1-03 IMPLEMENTAT

below is the 1 mef SPSF plan. It comes the closest to answering the mail and points up two issues we have to solve to make this functional. 1 is arms uniforms and equipment. and LTC (b)(6) is working a FRAGO on that right The other is pay and turning these people over to ministries to pay future. There are some things not in the report we need, I MEF in the future. Is the list in priority order? Is it complete?

(b)(6)

(b)(6) LTC):

Which ones are being guarded by FPSF?

What equipment do you need to address the shorfalls you noted? That is how

many radios, uniforms, weapons, ammo, vehicles.
4 ID did a good job of laying out what it needed it terms of money, radios, and equipment. But we need a nation wide program to standardize radios, allot frequencies, and buy vehicles.

Solicit your help in moving this through CPA.

Ask that I MEF augment their submission with the requested info. Again it is the most complete I have recieved.

LTC. CFD 49 DSVT DSN

>

----Original Message--(b)(6) CJTF7-C3 Current OPS > From: day, June 28, 2003 12:37 PM (b)(6) LTC CJTF7-FUOPS > Sent: Saturday, To: FW: Facilities Protection Service (FPS) > Subject:

----Original Message-----> From: C5CM-IMEFLNOMAIN

Saturday, June 28, 2003 8:17 AM (b)(6) CJTF7-C3 Current OPS > To: > Subject: FW: Facilities Protection Service (FPS)

----Original Message-----IMEFDF G3 COC SWO > From:

Saturday, June 28, 2003 8:21 AM

> To: C5CM-IMEFLNOMAIN

> Cc: IMEFDF G3 COC CUR OPS O

> Subject: Facilities Protection Service (FPS)

> Gentlemen,

If anyone asks, the MEF's plan for Facilities Protection Service > (FPS) is captured in the attached I MEF Frago. This frag is well > written and detailed.

Facility									ds	
	MILGRID	Functional	Looted Y/N	Burned Y/N	Staff #	Bidgs #	Size	Photo Y/N	Contract Guards	Remarks
Water				,				_	-	
Karkh Water Treatment Plant								- 1	50	
7N Water Treatment Plant									20	
Wathba Water Treatment Plant	MB 41710 90380	Υ	N	N	18	5-6	250 x 250m	Y	0	Water intake system across street incl boat and dredge MB 41644 90392
Karama Water Trealment Plant	MB 40146 91018	Y	N	N	25	10	100 x 300 m	Y	0	water intake across street MB 40146 91018
Qadisya Water Treatment Plant	MM 40424 84047	Y		N	15	12	300x200m	Y	D	10 ft walls around perimeter, not burned, good condition
Wahda Water Treatment Plant	MM 48181 83854	Y	N	N	15	6-8	100 x 400m	Y	12	good condition
Rashed Water Treatment Plant	MM 49169 83039	Y	N	N	15	4-5			12	good condition
Dora Water Treatment Plant	MM 42364 80354	Y	N	N	40	6+	200 x 300m	Y	12	Functional, with good staff, Located in good neighborhood
Dora Pumping Station	MM 42172 77464	Y	N	N	7	4	50 x 100m	Y	0	functional with small staff, on site
North Reservoir									0	
South Reservoir									0	
Abugraib Reservoir									20	
Taji Reservoir	MC 30239 02424	Y	N	N	16	4	150 x 150M		27	very good shape, access dispute with people in rear of facility due to new factory next door blocking access
Amin Reservoir								1	40	
Rustumiya Reservoir	MM 56056 83091	Y	N	N	6	4	75 x 100m	Y	0	
Kamaliya Reservoir		7.4							0	
Ubaidy Reservoir					1.75				0	
Kasratash Warehouse	MM 47566 98105						800 x 500m	Y	18	Badly looted and damaged, staff unable to return until secure
Taji Warehouse		1							15	
Youshya Warehouse	MM 40743 74031		7			0	1 x 1 km +	*	16	Huge waterpipe warehouse, completely destroyed, constant looting, needs roving patrols and comms, staff unable to return until secured
Wahda Warehouse								1	0	
Main Workshop	MM 47711 93480		F	*		8	200 x 400m	Y	0	warehouses and car shops, destroyed and unmanned, staff unable to return until secured
Abu Nawas RWPS									0	
Wathba Fuel Reserve									6	
Habibiya PS	MM 49213 91966	Υ	N	N	7	2	25 x 50m	Y	0	
Talbiya PS			- 1						0	
Zafraniya RWPS									0	
Falh CU	MM 52110 76984	Υ	N	N		3	?	Υ	0	
Ubor CU		E (1)							0	
Tariq					-				0	
									0	

Facility									7	
	MILGRID	Functional	ooted Y/N	Burned Y/N	Staff #	# sldgs #	Size	Photo Y/N	Contract Guards	Remarks
Sewage		-	_		- 0,	14.5		-	0	
		-	1	-						Severely looted of all manner of electrical equipment,
Rustumiya 0,1,2	MM 56462 81891	Alle	1	2	35	16	700mx1km	Y	22	buildings damaged
Rustumiya 3	MM 56344 83327	W 15		S	35	16	900mx2.5k	Y	20	Severely looted and not functional - firelight on site
Karkh	MM 47345 75190	6 3	10.0	N	30	16+	2 x 3 km	Y	25	very large complex - 10mil gal fuel reserve
Rainfall Warehouse	MM 44454 89495	in the	D. W	N	30	8-12	200 x 300m	Y	0	urban workshop area
Habibiya Warehouse	MM 49900 90980	Y	1	N	5	4.	200 x 150m	Y	25	storage yard, small building not damaged, caretaker on site
O									0	
Construction		-	-	-		-			0	
Zone 1 Gazaliya		-		-				-	5	
Zone 2 Saydla Zone 3&4 Shab									5	
		+				-				
Curb Casting Unit Karkh Intersections		-			-			-	0	
Transfer of the second		-	-		-			-		
Rasala Intersections								\vdash	0	
Traffic Light		+							6	
Traffic Signs Zone 5 Bayaa		-							0	
	E 10 400 40 TE 100	4.7500			400	-	D. Char	-	C 17	to a decrease of the day
Asphalt Plant Dora	MM 40949 75490 MM 28238 05253			S	100	?	3 x 5 km	Y	13	heavily damaged and looted
Asphalt Plant Taji	MW 50538 00503	W = Ini	16	N	50	12	2.5km sq	Y	11	somewhat looled
Babsharki Batching Plant	140 4740 1 07404	Y	S	N	6		175 x 175m	Y	0	and the second of the block of the second of
UR Balching Plant	MB 47437 97431	1	3	IN	0	3	1/5 X 1/5m	1		needs generator for lighting also minor repairs
Maintenance Unit	E4D 40004 07404	and Take	-		20	2.4	200 000	-	0	and that I have always and series at all
Concrete factory	MB 49064 97431	W Y		N	30	3-4	200 x 300m	Y	9	severely looted, forms storage yard across street
Karatash Batching Plant	MB 48804 97635	1	N	N	20	3	200 x 300m	Y	6	protected by caretaker very good condition
Shulla Batching Plant		-							6	
Quarries	1414 20000 54894	-		-	90		20	Y	0	Court IIO beatless
Building Department	MM 38960 91831	Y	N	N	35	3	30m x 50m	3	0	Small HQ buildings
Workshops									0	
Mechanics Workshop	MM 44897 89708		14	N	64	24+	300 x 400m	Y	12	Mechanical workshop in industrial area tooled and damaged
Heavy Vehicles Workshop	MM 44789 89711	包有	16.N	N	77	3	150 x 200m	Y	12	heavy machine repair
Carpentry Workshop	MM 44635 89939	報用機	直接	N	48	?	100 x 150m	Y	12	carpentry workshops
Workshop Dept. HQ	MM 44606 89954	W. in	14	N	65?	Torri	50 x 120m	Y	12	
Benzene Vehicles W	MM 44649 89980	横雪斯	R.A	養湯	7	?	120 x 120m	Y	12	completely looled, no staff present
Tires and Batteries Warehouse	MM44709 89970		-	in a	?	?	40 x 90m	Y	12	completely looted, no staff present
Leyland Workshop	MM 44616 90131	31. Va.	B. di	N	?	2-3	30 x 100m	Y	12	completely looted, no staff present

Facility									Sp	
	MILGRID	Functional	Looted Y/N	Burned Y/N	Staff #	Bldgs #	Size	Photo Y/N	Contract Guards	
Maintenance Workshop	MM 44591 90159	16		N	7	3	30 x 60m	Y	12	completely looted, no staff present
Submersible Pump Repair Shop	MM 45156 89708			N	40	6	100 x 120m	Y	12	underwater pump storage and repair (fountains)
Fuel Station	MM 45469 89550	Y	N	N	6		40 x 60m		12	
Flat Trailer Warehouse	MM 48468 90734	1		N	33	20		Y	12	fuel and oil storage, heavy loader parking, car wash, 2 family caretakers
Car Wash	MM 48480 90856	No.	L. Li	N	7		20 x 30m	Y	0	car wash looted and destroyed, squatters on-site
Habibiya Lubricant Warehouse	MM 48811 90115	# D	6 5	N	7	6	150 x 400m	Y	12	completely looted and destroyed
Canal Warehouse	MM 49087 89924	10	1	N	7	5	200 x 400m	Y	12	tire and ballery warehouse/storage and asphalt heating pool (sunk HMMV)
Generator Workshop	MB 48991 97552	5 3		N	25	6	100 x 200m	Y		severely looted, warehouse destroyed
									Ö	
Electrical									0	
Baghdad - Nahtha	MM 44601 89593	SE	4	F	68	1			0	multiple departments within warehouse area considered not safe in late afternoon, needs equipment and parts
			-						0	
Parks						3			0	
Baghdad Forest	MB 35320 97705								0	
Saad Nursery	MB 42260 95847	S	5	N	14	2-3			0	trailer mounted water pump stolen - required
Khalid Nursery	MB 42137 95601	Y	N	N	16				0	
Japanese Garden	MM 51700 87200	Y	S	N	5	3			0	
Canal Nursery	MB 49206 88938			N	20	6	1200 x 600m	Y	0	severely looted buildings, water pipes damaged and stolen, Iraqi army vehicles on site, artillery shells (UXO) on site - reported
Garage	MB 40314 87608	Y	N	N	32	0	150 x 150m	Y		parking lot for equipment that works at Zawra Park may relocate to park
Office HQ	MB 40918 86008	Y	N	N	20	1	40 x 40m	Y	0	Small HQ building
Zawra Park	MB 42691 86684		1	N	113	12+		Y	0	Major park incl zoo - huge facility-special requirements
			1000						0	
Rasafa Municipality									0	
Main Office	MM 44878 89653	2 , 13	4.5	1	100	1		Y	20	
Garage	MM 44741 89598	, ill		N	16	4	100 x 100m	Y	0	Mun HQ and parking lot for city trucks, has many hulks and oil spills
Kifah Maint Center	MM 43853 89527	Y	N	N	20	2	30 x 30m	Y	0	Broken water pipes, caretaker on site
Paisten Maint Center	MM 46773 91237	Y	N	N	13	5-6	30 x 30m	Y		sewage and water main office
									0	
Karkh Municipality									0	
HQ Bidg	MB 43306 88242	Y		N	130	. 1	30 x 50m	Y	19	Stage I renewal, functioning, staff on site
Car & Truck Garage 1	MB 42331 88479	Y	N.	N	70	2-3	30 x 60m	Y	0	Employees take vehicles home for safeguarding.

Facility									Sp	
	MILGRID	Functional	Looted Y/N	Burned Y/N	Staff #	Bidgs #	Size	Photo Y/N	Contract Guards	Remarks
Cas à Tauri Carras D	ND 44525 00453						40	.,		Storage and vehicle canabilization for keeping other vehicles
Car & Truck Garage 2	MB 41575 88457	Y	N	N	5	2	40 x 60m	Y	0	operational
		+						-	0	
Adhamiya Municipality		+					_		0	
Municipal HQ		+	-		-				6	
Car & Truck Garage 1		1							14	
Car & Truck Garage 2									0	
Series Consider		1							0	
Kahdmiya Municipality									0	
									0	
					1				0	
									0	***
									0	
Thawra Municipality									0	
									0	
									0	
									0	
									0	
Mansoor Municipality									0	
102	MB 40253 87546	S	N	N		5	100m ×100m	Y		Sewage treatment facility severely damaged pre-war and not functional. Pumping station OK. Two warehouses well stocked and organized, no looting, new electrical equipment and pumps in stock
Municipal HQ Bldg	MB 38948 87959	Y	N	N.	150	1	30 x 50m	Y	0	Good shape, 3 guards - 1 on site
Municipal garage	MB 38937 87884	Y	N	N		2 rows	50 x 200m	Y	0	Dirt lot with low L shaped row of small buildings. Trash and water trucks on site.
El Adil Equipment Storage	MB 37530 88659			N	7	3	50 x 100m	Y	0	Heavily looted. Major equipment/truck damage due to looting.
Water Pipe Warehouse	MB 35429 85020	Y	N	N	20	2	100m x 3	Y	0	Triangular lot. Security guard on site
									0	
Nissan Municipality									0	
Municipal HQ									60	
Car & Truck Garage 1									0	
Car & Truck Garage 2									0	
Warehouse									0	
Warehouse									0	
									0	
Rashed Municipality						-			0	

Facility				F					ards	
	MILGRID	Functional	Looted Y/N	Burned Y/N	Staff #	Bidgs #	Size	Photo Y/N	Contract Guards	Remarks
Municipal HQ									30	
Car & Truck Garage 1									0	
Car & Truck Garage 2									0	
Warehouse	-								0	
Warehouse									0	
Slorage Warehouse					-				0	
Karada Municipality				_					0	
Municipal HQ	MB46033 86778	Y	N	N	85	1	50 x 60m		34	
Main Garage	MB45349 89535	Y	GE TANK	N	150	2	70 x 150m		0	heavy equipment storage
Car & Truck Garage 2 (Al Zafrania)	MB 52376 81241	Y	N	N	21	2	80 x 35m		0	
Cemeteries Dpt									0	
									0	
Landfill Dpt									0	
HQ Building									0	
Garage									0	
									0	
new	Scania Volvo Plant	-					-		12	
new	Mercedes Plant								12	
	Albaya Fuel Station								12	

Facilities Protection in Baghdad

3 JULY 03

AGENDA

- Background and Current Gudiance
- Actions by First Armored Division to secure key sites
- Challenges
- Way ahead

Background

- Former regime:
 - Vital Installation Protection force
 - 7000 members
 - Preserve installations for regime not people
- No orderly transition
- Immediate actions
 - Ministry initiatives
 - Lack of coordination, training, personal protection, communications, etc.
- Coordination and Guidance (May June)
 - Result: "FRAGO 286"
 - Coop w/ Min INT + CAPF & (OLD)

Current Guidance

- FRAGO 286 to OPORD 03-33, 8 June 03, "Implementation of the Facility Protection Services"
 - FPS provides security for ministry buildings and sites in order to prevent theft of equipment, documents, property.
 - Oil Company, WFP, other security all become part of FPS
 - Phases; Recruit, Screen, Train, Employment by Ministries
 - Designates Ministries by prioritized "Tiers"
 - 1 Electricity, Finance, Trade, Oil, Health, Education, Interior, Justice, Atomic Energy
 - 2 Apriculture, Labor & Social Affairs, Higher Education & Scientific Residence, Housing and Construction, Industry and Minerals, Irrigation, Transportation and Communication
 - 3 Foreign Affairs, Planning, Culture, Standards, Religious Affairs, Defense, Information, end Military Industrialization
 - Tasks to Military units
 - · Recruit, hire, convert, screen
 - . Train to standards (set by Ministry of Intenor)
 - Issue uniforms, equipment, and weepons
 - · Provide numbers and names to Ministry of Interior

Timeline

- 25 June Provide qualified FPS to Ministries for employment; begin Joint Coelition Operations
- 28 August Begin Coalition monitoring and supervision of FPS
- 7 Sept All Ministries guarded by Ministry FPS
- Salary: Starts at \$100/month for Guards

• 26 Augu • 7 Sept -- Salary: Sta

· A cupley (de facts)

POLICE
MEDIFICATION BY AND LE
- \$50/mo
- CIVILLE

1AD Pitch

Challenges (Baghdad only)

- Coordination with and Transition to Ministry or Municipal lead:
 - Military> Transition to Iraqi FPS>military patrols and QRF only>Police takes over from military
 - Ministry organization vs geographic dispersion
- Acquiring Material:
 - Weapons, uniforms, commo gear
- Certifications:
 - Training certificates, badges, weapons cards
- Pay:
 - No standardized pay-scale
- Dealing with particular challenges of certain Ministries:
 - Eg. Oil and Electricity
- · CILFILEL Und + Hent polen in essential

Document Requirements:

Numbers of guards for each Ministry and the Municipality of Baghdad

Material requirements, esp. weapons but also uniforms and comms gear

Being consolidated now by

S: 4 July

Fill Requirements

CPA RCO icw CJTF 7 and other sources

Apportion resources by prioritized requirements

Develop management structure

Idea: Baladiya boundaries = BCT Boundaries... facilitate coordination and response....role of Baghdad municipality in coordinating FPS?


Consider other approaches

Contracting for Security Guards

Next Steps

- · Weekly meetings
 - Tuesdays 1000 (Tied to 1100 Police Coord meeting)
 - Attendees: CPA Staff, CJTF 7, 1AD, Ministries, Municipality (Chair: Baghdad Central?)
 - Specific Tasks and Timelines
 - Next Meeting: 081000 July right here....
- Find solution for weapons & uniforms
 - Gardner / Crawford-Noble w/ CJTF 7
- Recommendation on Management Structure
 - w/ Baghdad Central

Summary: FPS is critical piece of long term security for Baghdad—needs attention of all within lanes.....



Facility Protection Services (FPS)

Intent

This short brief aims to lay out the Kroll Team's understanding of the current security situation in Iraq and make an outline FPS implementation proposal for the MOI.

Kroll Team Meetings and Discussion

In the limited time available the Kroll Team has tried to cover as wide a programme as possible in order to understand fully the policy, perceptions, problems and challenges to be addressed. The programme has included:

- Visit to the Office of the Director of Oil Policy.
- Visits to the CPA Ministries of Housing and Reconstruction, Industry and Minerals.
- Discussions with the Iraqi Ministers of Industry and Minerals, Trade and the ex Minister of Electricity.
- A meeting in the Office of the Director of Operations.
- Meetings with the Office of the Director of Security Affairs.
- Meetings with General Eaton and the NIA Staff.
- A meeting with the Director of Interior.
- A visit to the Office of the Director Press and Public Affairs.
- A meeting with MG Viggers DCG CJTF 7.
- A visit to 82nd Airborne (Dora oil refinery) and 1 AD Security Training Team.
- Discussions with Company DGs of the Ministry of Industry and Minerals.
- Visit to KBR.

Strategic Objectives

As a priority:

Protect essential industries - oil, electricity and water related.

Start to enable economic revival.

Involve Iraqi's in their own security.

Thereby taking disbanded military elements off the street and paying them.

Promote Iraqi morale and self-confidence.

Free up coalition forces from static KPs and lower their profile.

Providing positive media material.

Security Policy and Organisation for Facility Protection

Security Policy promulgated by CPA Ministry of Interior (MOI) and including basic model training objectives.

The debate on FPS organisation has been between:

- A centralized FPS under the MOI.
- Each Ministry controlling their own organic FPS.

Neither of these options is workable. The MOI has many other issues to address and neither has the capacity to implement an FPS programme nor would it encourage operational connectivity to other authorities such as the police. The latter consideration of "stovepiping" operational command applies to organic Ministry guard forces. A further consideration is that there is a reluctance to re-establish the ministry guard forces that existed under the previous regime. In many cases they were part of the problem as they were themselves corrupted. The decisive issues are:

- Operational control and linkage to the civil authorities and police services.
- Maintenance of the integrity of FPS

Therefore the emerging model, based on Baghdad, is that FPS will be provided by the Municipality, or the Governorates, to the various ministry facilities in their areas of responsibility. This will ensure the correct operational connectivity and ensure an even implementation of MOI policy and regulations.

Current Situation

Facility security for the former regime was primarily entrusted to ministry guards. In many cases these were corrupted and part of the problem. They also included informers. Some facilities, particularly pipe and powerlines, included tribal support. This meant the buying in of the local tribes to ensure protection. The involvement of local tribes, whether as recruits to the new FPS or in outlying areas to provide depth or cover linear resources, is seen as a key continuing factor. The immediate response, in the aftermath of military operations, has been the identification by the coalition forces of 150 KPs in the Baghdad area and the organization of their security by the coalition forces. This has been done through local recruitment in conjunction with facility managers, their training and basic equipping. This has tied coalition forces to static positions. These local guard forces will need to be handed over and maintained. Elsewhere in the Governorates the same model will have to be applied. The situation there is less clear. Discussions with various facility managers suggest that they are making do with local arrangements including the use of old guard forces and paying local protection. However there are sound lessons to be learnt from these initial initiatives:

- Local involvement is essential.
- Recruitment must be of suitably qualified individuals.
- Recruits must be vetted as best as possible.
- The better elements must be kept on but the older, weaker or corrupted elements must be weeded out.
- Pay must be balanced so as to include enough of an incentive but also be affordable.

- Equipment uniforms, radios etc must be adequate to instill pride.
- Constant advice and management is required to advise and therefore maintain morale and standards.
- Armoury security is essential.

This has all to be done in a sensitive manner. The task has to be sensitive to local custom and sensibilities with Iraqi commanders and guards backed by professional assistance.

Role For Kroll as a Commercial Security Company

In broad terms there is a pressing need to accelerate the implementation of the FPS programme, essential to Iraqi confidence and regeneration, and relieve coalition forces. The role for a commercial security company is to assist the Iraqi's in the implementation of the FPS programme, on behalf of the MOI and in conjunction with the Baghdad Municipality and Governorates. There is judged to be a strong will on the Iraqi part to implement this programme. The key input from Kroll is ensuring that the FPS implementation does not simply create what went before. Therefore the main effort is in assisting Iraqis in establishing the FPS with a new professional culture. Although the will is there the understanding and expertise to do this in detail – establishment of proper manning, a disciplined approach and clear procedures – cannot be expected.

Tasks

The tasks envisaged at this stage are below. It is stressed that all of these have to be developed in conjunction with the MOI AND Iraqi chain of command:

- The consistent implementation of MOI policy.
- Feedback on policy issues recruitment, vetting, management, equipment etc.
- Liaison with the MOI, Baghdad Municipality, Regions and Governorates.
- Liaison with coalition forces.
- Security advice on the organisation and management of the FPS.
- An assessment of the priorities for the implementation of the FPS plan.
- Assessment of each sites security requirement.
- Site security plans and orders for each site.
- Development of basic operational procedures in conjunction with local police etc.
- Development of an FPS Manual.
- Development of the training module.
- Training of FPS officers and guards.
- Training of an FPS training Cadre and establishment of a central school.
- Advise on suitable and affordable equipment procurement.
- Write an equipment strategy for the longer term.
- Purchase and distribute basic equipment.
- Equipment management and repair chains.
- Development of a Career Handbook.
- Constant programme review.

Phase Development and Timelines

Kroll is currently configured to take on the role of FPS implementation. It has the management and field assets and resources available at short notice. The phase development, depending on CPA initial approval in principle, is anticipated as follows:

- Phase 1 Between 4 and 8 July Agreement in principle with MOI/CPA that there is merit in pursuing the implementation programme outlined in this brief.
- Phase 2 14 July Kroll deploys permanent team to develop detailed proposal in conjunction with the MOI.
- Phase 3 21 July at earliest If proposal agreed start to bring Kroll elements into Baghdad to start handover/takeover from coalition forces and development of FPS overall assessment and organization in Baghdad.
- Phase 4 28 July Start initial site assessment, plans and training.
- Phase 5 Beginning of August Simultaneously start assessment of Governorate requirements.
- Subsequent phases, simultaneously executed, continued implementation, establishment of Training Cadre and officers course, development of FPS Manual, Career Handbook etc.

Kroll Team Structure

The Kroll team structure will to some degree depend on the urgency of the programme and the available funding. These factors will determine the number of assessment and training teams. The structure below should give a feel for the eventual size of the Kroll team:

- A London office manager.
- A Project Leader.
- A Baghdad office operations officer, manual and development officer, equipment procurement officer, finance officer, secretary and translator (or translation contracted out).
- Four two man assessment and plans teams.
- Four training teams.
- An officer and cadre training team.
- Four regional liaison officers to cover the Regions and Governorates.
- Drivers and interpreters as required.

Total less the in country support 28 to 30.

Key Issues

The following issues are seen as key to the early implementation of the programme:

- A seriously deteriorating security situation.
- Slow decision making.

Late identification of key Iraqi officers.

Early establishment of the Iraqi chain of command.

Recruitment of the suitable guards.

- Insufficient or incorrectly structured funding.

- Clear delineation of responsibilities.

Favourable, but realistic, pay and conditions of service.

Suitable equipment for the threat and task.

Kroll Requirements

The Kroll Team would be self supporting. The main requirement would be access to the CPA and MOI, possibly an office/desk within the building, and access to the coalition forces.

Summary


The creation of a professional FPS is a key objective in the overall strategy of reconstructing Iraq. The Kroll Team fully understands the current situation in Iraq and can call on an extensive and unrivalled base of expertise worldwide. It can mobilise rapidly for the task. This outline brief is tendered in order to seek an early decision from MOI/CPA so that the Kroll Team can move to the next stage of detailed programme development and a possible contract.



Kroll Inc

Iraq Armed Forces Reconstruction Support Program






COSTS

1. Costs: All costs would be rough order of magnitude (ROM) and cannot be finalized until the Client's requirements are provided.

2. Governmental Support for all Options:

- A. The government will furnish office space, to include furnishings, computer hardware/software, class A telephone and long-distance telephone service for official business, DSN access, facsimile access, copy machine access, computer network file server access, printer access via network server, internet access (Classified/Unclassified) and electronic mail service and shall provide the contractor team members with necessary access to functional points of contact for ORHA/ITCA activities.
- B. Additionally, in the theater of operations, the government will provide housing in a secure environment, subsistence, laundry, health/medical support and PX/BX support, interpreter support, personal security teams, body armor, MS Project tracking software, POL products, Chem/Bio detection capability, and necessary communications and transportation support (to include GS aviation support) for contract team members.






Iraqi Armed Forces Reconstruction Support Program Put Them to Work

Concept: Immediately put former IAF members & Civilians to work in support of reconstruction.

Key Aspects of Program:

- Stand up an IAFRSP command, control and management structure that can implement the Phase II Reconstruction Plan
- Ensure integration of IAFRSP into the overall reconstruction planning and execution.
- Manage the Reconstruction Process.
- Put people to work now, demonstrating the U.S. commitment to rebuilding Iraq to the international community and to the Iraqi people.
- Contribute to the overall national reconstruction effort and make visible local level improvements. Identify IAF and governmental leaders for a future role in the future of Iraq.
- Facilitate the transition of the reconstruction program to the post-war Iraqi leadership.






Iraqi Armed Forces Reconstruction Support Program Recruitment

Concept: Immediately employ future IAF volunteers in minor reconstruction projects while conducting basic military skills necessary in preparation for entry into the IAF training center.

Key Aspects of Program:

- Eliminates the need for the completion of a formal training center prior to start-up since the Recruiting Team will be conducting low level training while accomplishing reconstruction tasks.
- · Provides the recruits limited basic military orientation, prior to their transfer to Basic Training.
- Regional and Reconstruction Team Indigenous Coordination Cells will hire local interpreters/translators
- Provides gainful employment of recruits through minor reconstruction projects prior to basic training, for as long as required, thus reducing the possible formation of tribal militia groups or criminal gangs.
- Form COHORT units as recruits arrive and then progress the MTT through the training, providing assistance as required and gathering information and lessons learned for the training of future units. The MMT will stay with COHORT unit until mission essential task are certified in basic squad security tasks (six months).
- · Provides a mechanism for the identification of potential future leaders for NIC/future IAF.






Establish and Operate IAF Training Centers

Concept: Replace the Coalition Military Advisory Team and expand capability to support the initial entry/advance training of the future IAF.

Key Aspects of Program:

- · Operate the Iraqi Training Centers.
- Integrate the COHORT recruiting system with the Training Center in order to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the training process.
- Establish a NCOES/Officer progressive education system.






Stand up the New Iraqi Armed Forces

Concept: Recruit, organize, train, equip, evaluate and continue to improve the readiness of the NIC & IAF.

Key Aspects of Program:

- Follow the successful model used in Bosnia and Afghanistan.
- Capitalize on the Phase II COHORT Recruiting model.
- · Capitalize on the Training Center concept.
- Cascade the National Military Strategy to the IAF Mission Essential Tasks and down to squad and platoon level.
- Institutionalize the Force Management System and a multi-year budget process.






Equipment Consolidation, Repair and Redistribution Iron Mountain

Concept: Immediately begin the identification, consolidation, inventory management, repair and redistribution of materiel.

Key Aspects of Program:

- Utilize future IAF personnel in the identification, consolidation and movement of equipment to Regional Depot location centers (proposed).
- Coordinate movement's control of materiel to centralized location.
- Overhaul, repair, modify, retrofit, test and modernize military equipment; trucks, tanks, artillery, helicopters, engines and components.
- Develop logistics plan for the identification and consolidation.
- Develop database of equipment and supplies.
- Develop Depot system for future sustainment.
- Develop Hub and Spoke system for future logistical support operations.
- Form the training base for maintenance training at Depot.





Other Support Capabilities

Concept:

- 1. Provide Rear Detachment functions and movements control coordination for ORHA.
- 2. Provide Base Defense operations center (BDOC) in support of ORHA operations in Baghdad.

Key Aspects of Program:

- · Provide LN NCO at CRC (Bliss/Sill).
- · Run Kuwait rear detachment.
- Provide Kuwait arrival reception, processing and transportation operations center.
- · Provide Baghdad avail/departure reception, processing and transportation operations.
- Provide Command, Control and coordination for all aspects of Base Security for ORHA.




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STANDING UP THE NEW IRAQI CORPS (NIC)


(Enclosure 1)

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STANDING UP THE NEW IRAQI CORPS (NIC)

(Enclosure 2)



STANDING UP THE NEW IRAQI CORPS (NIC)

1. Facts:

- a. A professional Iraqi military firmly under civilian direction and control needs to be established ASAP to meet Iraq's security needs and allow coalition forces to redeploy.
 - b. The NIC will be the first unit to stand up in the new Iraqi Armed Forces (IAF).
- c. The Coalition Military Advisory Training Team (CMATT) will be established to set up a training center to train the NIC.
- d. A contractor will be needed to assist in recruiting, forming/mentoring COHORT units, and capturing policies and procedures for establishing a permanent training center when CMATT withdraws.
 - e. MPRI is available and has extensive experience in this arena.

2. Assumptions:

- a. NIC organization will be three division-size units with one each in the north, south and central regions.
- b. After the NIC is established CMATT will turn over the new training center to the IAF and contractors will assist them in running it until they are ready to take it over.
- c. Brigades will be the largest combat units allowed in the new IAF to facilitate firm civilian control over the military and reduce the threat of a military sponsored coup.
 - d. A total of 45K personnel will need to be recruited to field a NIC 40K strong.

3. Execution:

- a. The intent will be to recruit, organize, train, equip, evaluate, and (for a period of time) assist in continuation training Iraqi units.
- b. MPRI will modify its proposed IAFRSP Phase II organization to meet the intent (see enclosure 1).
- (1) The Country Team (CT) will coordinate and lead the recruiting effort with a goal of 7,500 per month nation-wide. Additionally, as the CMATT identifies Iraqis to take over the training center and conduct training, the CT will institutionalize CMATT's processes and procedures and prepare to assist the Iraqis upon the departure of the CMATT (after the first NIC is trained).
- (2) The Regional Teams (RTs) will lead the recruiting effort in their region through the hiring of indigenous coordination cells (ICCs) in key localities and assist the CT in institutionalizing end-of-cycle collective training and FTXs. They will also assist brigades in transitioning to their regions and setting up their GDP positions and training plans.
- (3) The Unit Teams (UTs) will form COHORT units as recruits arrive and then progress through the training with them, providing assistance as required and gathering information and lessons learned for the training of future units. They will also assist units in transitioning and to their regions and setting up their GDP positions and training plans.
 - c. A model for training the NIC is at enclosure 2.
- 4. The costs for year one (assisting/shadowing CMATT) and subsequent years (taking over the operation) are at enclosure 3.

MAJ MPRI numbers proprietary don't email it aound I don't want to get sued. LTCOriginal Message From: Sent: Thursday, May 08, 2003 5:04 PM To:	From:		LTC CFLCC-CJTF4
Subject: FW: NIC Classification: UNCLASSIFIED Caveats: NONE MAJ MPRI numbers proprietary don't email it aound I don't want to get sued. LTC Original Message From: Sent: Thursday, May 08, 2003 5:04 PM To:	Sent:	Monday,	May 12, 2003 1:05 PM
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Sent: Thursday, May 08, 2003 5:04 PM To:	Origin	al Message	***
To:	From:		
		sday, May 01	I, 2003 5:04 PM
Cc:	_		
Subject; RE: NIC	1		

Encl 3 was just a spreadsheet that I used to extrapolate figures provided by corporate for certain packages into a best guess for what this package of 339 people would cost. I'll give you the numbers I came up with, but be advised they are just a guess on my part (though an informed one) and could be off from the actual number, possibly badly off (higher or lower).

\$72M First year, with most teams arriving as needed one to six months into the operation

\$87M Subsequent years, with all 339 folks on the ground the whole year

When I divide this out it seems high, actually, perhaps as much as 10% or more, but I'd rather be high than low (we consider ourselves different from most contractors who tend to bid low and pile it on later). As with the other numbers I gave you, this number may seem high, but it pays for a lot more than just salaries. To get top quality people, especially on short notice, you've got to pay them adequately and it requires a robust and aggressive human resources department to get them (and we've got the best). It also pays for company benefits such as medical, insurance, retirement, etc. Then there's transportation costs, equipment, preparations for deployment, etc. And, of course, there is a slice for company overhead and profit--there are a lot of smart guys up at corporate that provide us with the direction, strategic vision, and horsepower that enable us to provide a quality product over time. I sound like a salesman, but I'm not. I'm not even a full time MPRI guy. I'm a retired 05, former BC, SAMS grad, etc., but now I run a farm and teach school when I'm not helping with these kinds of projects. I believe in this company and I especially believe that

successfully rebuilding Iraq is vital to this region and our country. I did not hesitate to come over here when the company called me. The other guys here with feel the same way. Please be careful how you use this information as corporate would not approve of me trying to do their job for them. I'm copying my boss, (LTG (b)(6), so he knows I've gone outside my left and right limits a little bit in giving you this information, in case he wants to reign me in. I'm also CC'ing our log planner. Hope this helps. Call any time or write if you have questions. >From: LTC CFLCC-CJTF4 >To: >Subject: RE: NIC >Date: Thu, 8 May 2003 15:16:10 -0000 >Classification: UNCLASSIFIED >Caveaus: NONE >Do you have enclosure 3 mentioned in the NIC concept doc? >-----Original Message----->From: >Sent; Wednesday, May 07, 2003 3:23 PM >To: >Subject: NIC >Here are the documents I prepared for the NIC. They're just the

>beginning--still lots of work to be done. Some of my assumptions might not

>be on target, but it was a starting point.

>STOP MORE SPAM with the new MSN 8 and get 2 months FREE*

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• FW: NIC Page 3 of 3

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Caveats: NONE



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MEMORANDUM

FOR:

COLONEL

C-5, ORHA

FROM:

LAWRENCE CRANDALL, VICE PRESIDENT FOR

INTERNATIONAL PROGRAMS

SUBJECT

New Iraqi Corps (NIC) PILOT IMPLEMENTATION PROJECT

IN IRAQ:

DATE

May 8, 2003

INTRODUCTION

This memorandum with attachments describes one potential option among several for jump starting a six-month pilot project to inaugurate demobilization and retraining of selected Iraqi groups. It is based on Coalition thinking made available to the RONCO Consulting Corporation as of close of business May 7. Other options are possible.

A potential decision tree for identifying the more important ones is found in slide three of the enclosed Power Point presentation. The basic approach is both scaleable in terms of the optimal level(s)-of-effort and modular in terms of the choice(s) of Pilot Project elements. In essence, any element of the Pilot Project can be modified or deleted according to policy dictates, funding constraints, and/or changing field conditions. There are no inherent suppositions in the modular/scaleable approach about untouchable elements. There are no sacred cows. This facilitates flexible decision-making and is highly sensitive to the critical throughput level which is discussed below.

Some of the key underlying assumptions are discussed in the "Planning Variables" section below.

Attached are:

- ATTACHMENT 1 A proposed Concept of Operations reflects the above.
- ATTACHMENT 2 All of this is captured in an augmented Power Point presentation. In order to assist readers of the predecessor brief, changes are limited to two additional slides.
- ATTACHMENT 3 A detailed draft budget for facilitating the establishment of the NIC, using some 35,000 Peshmerga (PUK and KDP) as well as approximately 5,000 SCIRI/Badr Brigade fighters as an illustrative recruiting base. These numbers give an assumed size for the New Iraqi Corps (NIC) of approximately 40,000. Training will start with three bartalions identified through three Rehabilitation and Development Centers or "Markaz" in Mosul, Baghdad and Basrah. The NIC training will occur at a to-be-determined site south of Baghdad and will require an unknown amount of renovation. A catering facility is needed for recruits while they are at the NIC training and deployment facilities. The initial weapons and transportation requirements will come from captured stocks. Monthly stipends will be paid by the Pilot Project administration but from sources outside the Project budget. An appropriate IO campaign will be mounted by the Eighth PsyOps Group. Budget notes explain the more relevant, non self-evident numbers.
- ATTACHMENT 4 Role descriptions explain the capabilities of the prime contractor, RONCO, and each subcontractor. These statements essentially represent "sub-ConOps" and are the building blocks for the ConOps. They dovetail with the budget.
- ATTACHMENT 5 While Coalition thinking as of May 7 only included an initial training cohort of three battalions, an optional fourth battle area, mine and DU (depleted uranium) clearance battalion is proposed. It would be comprised of two regional Mine Action Centers for the middle and southern regions. (The north is already covered by a number of NGO clearance activities.) The proposed fourth battalion fits with known policies to clear priority areas of unexploded ordnance and mines and to employ Iraqis—especially former combatants—in productive enterprises as quickly as possible. This option also helps create an early positive public image for the NIC and captures important economies-of-scale by piggy backing onto sunk costs of already existing efforts for the NIC. This offers a potentially cost effective way for feeding policy needs and containing costs. The incremental cost would run to \$8.8 million for roughly one year. This figure is not included in the attached "NIC budget", though a separate indicative budget for mine/UXO clearance is attached.

PLANNING VARIABLES

ORHA expects rapid processing of recruits so that the NIC can be formed in the shortest time possible consistent with appropriate registration, screening, processing and training. This expectation helps set the overall level-of-effort parameters including the budget totals.

There are shifting unknowns with respect to the actual size and even physical condition of the NIC populations to be treated under the Pilot Program. As soon as these factors are better understood, then more accurate scale training site catering, medical screening and other elements can be refined.

The physical state of the chosen NIC training site south of Baghdad also will affect the budget. If the site is in relatively good condition, then little renovation will be required. If not, then more extensive physical rehabilitation will be needed. At this point, the final site has not been selected, though some surveys have been conducted. An indicative renovation budget figure is included. It may need revision.

Transportation requirements are unknown in at least three ways. First, will a sufficient number of appropriate and serviceable former Iraqi Army vehicles be made available? If not, then the budget must be augmented. Second, how many, how often and how far must recruits be transported from the Centers and to the training site? Finally, will RONCO be fully, partially or not at all responsible for transportation under the Pilot? These factors must be weighted against desired lift and load requirements and the need for maximum efficiency. Accordingly, the vehicles and minimal maintenance shown in the draft budget are placeholders.

The following points amplify the budget notes.

- 1. Due to the pilot nature of the activity, the evolving conditions under which it is implemented and the large number of unknown and potentially uncontrollable variables, it is anticipated that budget modifications will be necessary and advisable as implementation matures. In order to minimize the number of modifications, concurrence is requested for utilizing at RONCO initiative, a lifteen (15) percent adjustment authorization between approved line items. This would include all appropriate advance discussions and coordination with the field COTR. Every effort should be made to minimize modifications which implicitly suggest administrative delays that negatively impact on the need for rapid implementation.
- 2. The contract originally negotiated with RONCO calls for two separate 120 day option periods. If funding for the Pilot cannot be contracted in the near future, then it is recommended that the option periods be activated in advance of the Pilot Project funding itself. This would allow for robust implementation planning including all needed site visits, preparation of implementation plans and preliminary mobilization. Obviously, battlefield events greatly exceeded both the expectations and planning assumptions used in the original proposal. Thus, activating the 120 day options recognizes the limitations of the original contract and would allow for necessary pre-deployment actions to proceed within the flexible format required to successfully deploy for and begin implementation of the Pilot. This would not be necessary if Pilot Project funding is available in the near-term.
- 3. In formulating the burdened rates detailed in the budget, RONCO utilized approved salary levels under its existing GSA contract. These rates are consistent with those proposed under our initial contract. All individuals employed for the Pilot activity will be paid in accordance with U.S.G. regulations i.e., no individual(s) will paid a daily salary rate(s) above what is authorized by U.S.G. policies.

Because of the many variables, a Contingency Liability figure is included in the budget to cover what we partially understand or don't know. As noted throughout this presentation, every effort will be made to contain costs within established implementation standards to include expectations with respect to rapid processing of recruits and standing up the NIC.

THE RONCO TEAM

The RONCO Consulting Corporation will be the Prime Contractor for the Pilot project. RONCO will manage and supervise all operations related to implementation in full accord with U.S.G. policies and related programs under the supervision of designated Coalition personnel. Each of the proposed sub-contractors, as well as RONCO, has incurred considerable project preparation costs outside the original contract. If a Pilot Project contract is granted, then reasonable reimbursement for such costs is requested.

RONCO plans to use five (5) subcontractors to help implement the Pilot according to the brief descriptions offered below. Individual functions may metamorphose or even disappear following the decisions raised on matters in this cover Memorandum and others that may be mutually identified.

The balanced use of both regional and U.S. sub-contractors was a studied decision. This approach reduces the American footprint and thereby limits potential political tensions; it increases the culturally sensitive Arab presence and linguistic capability that will be critical for success; it reduces costs; it enhances the chances for completing the Pilot within expectations; and, shows appreciation for regional friends and their contributions to Coalition efforts. Additional information on each partner is in the attachments.

-Cochise Consulting will be responsible for selected vetting as well as required NIC military training. The President and CEO is the former SOCCENT Commander during Desert Storm. He enjoys excellent contacts throughout the region. Recently, Cochise trained elite Saudi forces under FMS sponsorship. Already written and tested proprietary Arabic language training syllabi for each required training segment preclude the need for curriculum development, thereby saving considerable costs and time. The Arabic syllabi are available to the Pilot at no additional cost.

--Arabi Holding Group (Kuwait) will be the Procurement and Logistics Services Agent for both the prime and sub-contractors as directed by the prime. They provide the "U-Call, We Haul" services on a task order or demand basis The Kuwait-wide McDonalds franchise is among Arabi's many businesses. Arabi is well and favorably known to the U.S. Embassy in Kuwait. As appropriate, individual subs may undertake their own procurement especially when this helps contain overall contract costs. If desired by ORHA, Arabi can organize and deploy short-term Kuwaiti volunteer interpreter/translators who would help contain overall costs. These are proven individuals who were seen accompanying both print and media journalists during open hostilities in Iraq. For the most part, they are college students.

—The Sahara Trading Company (Jordan) will be responsible for identifying, contracting, and managing local construction firms to refurbish and/or construct facilities that are needed to house our staff and NIC trainees at each of the processing and training centers. They are also responsible for contracting for facility and camp management, including catering services at each of the centers. Sahara has subcontracted a seasoned Jordanian firm that has extensive catering experience in Iraq. It is important to note that this firm provided catering services to coalition forces during Desert Storm, and intends to utilize local Iraqi staff to facilitate their operations. Sahara will also provide human resources support to identify and employ local hire staff, including translators/interpreters, security personnel, and administrative staff. Sahara is well and favorably known to the U.S. Embassy in Amman. The owners are naturalized American citizens.

--The International Foundation for Election Services (IFES/U.S.) will be responsible for registration of recruits and sharing information in the database with the Coalition and Interim Iraqi Government as and when requested. Their worldwide experience performing elections registration services offers tremendous registration experience as well as a transparency window to external groups who may wish or "need" to find fault. In time, and at the discretion of the U.S.G., portions of or all the database may also be shared with appropriate international organizations, non-governmental organizations and the media.

-Affiliated Computer Services (ACS/U.S.) through its Welfare and Workforce Services Division and supported by its Jordanian affiliate, TAGI, will implement non-military training through existing Iraqi institutions if/as appropriate. This will include utilizing still functional Iraqi vocational and technical institutions to feed finished trainees to the Interim Iraqi Government, donors and private sector employment opportunities. ACS ranks fourth on Fortune Magazine's most admired companies.

EXPECTED THROUGHPUT


The Coalition's primary intent for the Pilot Project is to recruit, register, screen selected individuals (vetting), medically clear, provide basic military training skills to NIC recruits and deploy them as quickly and effectively as possible within the six-month Pilot implementation period. Understanding the NIC throughput parameters is critical in this regard. The parameters are, of course, tempered by some of the planning variables given above. Still, expected throughput levels can be met if contracting occurs soon and financial resources are adequate and appropriate to the tasks e.g., stipend money is available from non-contract sources.

Calculating the level-of-effort for the desired throughput is both art and science, given both the known and unknown variables. All recruits must be registered, medically screened and a determination made for military suitability.

With ten registration stations per center, each can register 381 per day or over 1,000 for three centers per day. Twenty-thousand can be registered in approximately three months. We assume the same period of time for medical screening.

Only selected recruits will be vetted for their past activities. For example, those with military rank of licutenant colonel and above will automatically be subjected to an indepth examination process unless there are contrary indicators. Others may be subjected to the same process if there are reasons to do so. We assume roughly 100 licutenant colonels per division—four divisions for a 40,000 NIC gives 400 licutenant colonels. Add to this another 1,600 personnel of potential interest for a total of 2,000 in depth interviews. The mix of ranks may vary but the 2,000 cohort provides a useful five percent planning figure (2,000 divided by 40,000 equals five percent).

In the box below, we offer a NIC training level-of-effort that creates 19,200 trainees at the end of the six-month Pilot. To reach the 40,000 figure, the training personnel level-of-effort may not have to be doubled in budget terms but would need personnel augmentation. At this point, lesser cost Jordanian trainers would be introduced as a force multiplier. In addition, the Cochise training program will utilize the train- the-trainer concept whereby selected individuals from each training course will be used as assistant instructors for the subsequent training periods. Under this concept, the Iraqis will eventually assume responsibility for the entire training program. This approach helps contain costs.



DELIVERABLES

All deliverables will be provided in paper and electronic form to the COTR. RONCO proposes the following deliverables and timelines:

- Pilot program decision brief based on site survey and additional coordination;
- Implementation plan within two weeks of contract award that includes annexes for recommended vetting criteria, basic Arabic training program of instruction (POI), recommendations for an Information Campaign and for a shared data base;
- · Daily, weekly and monthly situation reports upon initiation of the Pilot;
- · Monthly lessons learned reports:
- · Final out brief within 30 days after redeployment; and, a
- Final report within 60 days after redeployment.

LEGAL RESPONSIBILITIES

RONCO is cognizant of the legal parameters surrounding this Pilot program. Implementation will occur in full compliance with the rules of the Geneva Convention and the Laws of Land Warfare, as applicable. When/as appropriate, Pentagon legal advice will be sought. When/as appropriate, RONCO legal counsel will be used. The modalities will be established during meetings between the two legal entities. Additionally, as noted in the cover letter of our original proposal, we request that this pilot activity not preclude RONCO from future related opportunities in Iraq.

ATTACHMENTS

- 1. Concept of Operations
- 2. Pilot Project Power Point Brief
- 3. Draft Budget & Budget Notes
- 4. Team Capability Statements with subcontractor concepts of operations
- 5. Battle area and Mine Clearance Option The 4th Battalion

ATTACHMENT ONE - Concept of Operations

5/10/2003

CONOPS for the Pilot Program to facilitate the establishment of the New Iraqi Corps (NIC).

- 1. Situation. With the declaration of an end to major combat operations, destruction of Iraq's military and the establishment of a permissive environment in most of Iraq, Coalition efforts now focus on reconstruction and creating a secure and stable environment in Iraq. A key condition in support of a secure and stable environment as well as facilitating the transition to a new Iraqi Government is the creation of a professional and representative Iraqi military. An initial step in raising a new Iraqi military is the establishment of the New Iraqi Corps (NIC). The NIC will be a pascent military capability that assists Coalition efforts. However, initial efforts to establish the NIC will have to be prudent and measured. The reason is that after more than 12 years of sanctions and wars, there is a tremendous lack of jobs. Un and underemployment estimates run as high as 80 per cent. It is safe to say that the Iraqi economy and infrastructure are extremely weak. Therefore, the sudden infusion of more than 350,000 self-demobilized and EPWs Iraqi soldiers places dangerous additional strains on the economy. The NIC will provide some of the on and/or underemployed Iraqi soldiers a productive way to support themselves and their families, and prevent some of them from seeking or being drawn into other means of employment that cause instability. However, initial efforts to start the NIC will be tailored to attract the right kinds of volunteers as well as ensure that the process is not overwhelmed.
- 2. Mission. Team RONCO conducts operations to facilitate the processing, selection, and training of the New Iraqi Corps (NIC).

3. Concept.

a. Commander's Intent. Purpose. The purpose of the pilot program is to promote stability through the establishment of a basic and competent military capability the NIC. Additionally, establishment of the NIC provides an opportunity to address the problems associated with over 350,000 self-demobilized Iraqi soldiers and other armed groups such as the Peshmerga and the Badr Corps. The NIC is the first step in transforming the Iraqi military into an institution that is professional, reflective of the population demographics and a source of national pride. The raising of the NIC will be initially facilitated by the establishment of three strategically located Rehabilitation and Development Centers, a Central Training Facility and three NIC camps. Methodology. The three centers, central training facility and three NIC camps will provide a location where Iraqi volunteers will be processed, selected and trained for the first three NIC battalions. Additionally, the central training facility and the three camps will provide all basic life and administrative support throughout the process for each selected soldier. At the completion of processing those volunteers selected for the NIC are transported to the central training facility for basic training. At the end of basic training, the NIC soldiers are transported to one of the three camps. Further, the pilot may provide those not selected and/or washout alternative skills resulting in viable employment. End State is the rapid and effective establishment of a basic and competent Iraqi military capability.

This new capability will assist Coalition efforts in sustaining a stable environment, solidify the transition to Phase IV operations, as well as demonstrate the Coalition's resolve to create the necessary conditions to transfer authority to a new Iraqi government as quickly as possible.

b. Scheme of Maneuver. The process to facilitate the rapid and effective establishment of the NIC will be conducted in five phases. During Phase I, Team RONCO will conduct detailed planning in order to facilitate the prompt assembly and deployment of the required resources to establish the three rehabilitation and development centers, the central training facility and three NIC camps. Each center will have the necessary capabilities to conduct all activities required including registration, vetting, medical screening, and basic military skills training to facilitate selecting qualified volunteers for the NIC. The Central training facility and the three NIC camps will be capable of housing, feeding, providing basic medical care as well as administrative support. Concurrently, during Phase I, Coalition Forces will conduct a comprehensive, coordinated and carefully tailored and sequenced (with Team RONCO) Information Campaign in an effort to attract a specifically targeted portion of the population. Additionally, Team RONCO will coordinate with Coalition and ORHA representatives in order to identify opportunities for the integration of qualified tragis into the Centers, Central Training facility and Camps i.e., doctors, nurses etc. In Phase II. Team RONCO will establish the three rehabilitation and development centers, central training facility and three camps. The three centers will be established in key demographic locations throughout Iraq. The initial locations will be in Mosul, Baghdad and Basrah. The central training facility will be established in the vicinity of Baghdad and the three camps will be strategically located throughout the country in order to facilitate assisting Coalition operations. The center in Baghdad will also serve as the headquarters for the Pilot project. During Phase III, volunteers will be registered, medically screened, vetted when necessary and assessed for their military training. At the completion of processing, those volunteers that are selected for the NIC will be transported to the central training facility where they undergo basic training. At the completion of basic training, they will be transported to one of three NIC camps. Those volunteers not selected for the NIC as well as those that washout during basic training may be provided appropriate skills training and case management activities facilitating viable employment. During Phase IV, Team RONCO, in coordination with ORHA, will conduct an assessment of the process as well as initiate appropriate coordination in order to facilitate a smooth and seamless transfer of processing and training activities to a new Iraqi Government. At the completion of hand-off, Team RONCO initiates Phase V operation, redeployment. Throughout all five phases, close coordination will be made with Coalition Forces and the new Iraqi Government to ensure that appropriate measures are implemented to ensure an effective and efficient processing and training program.

c. Concept of the Operation.

1. Phase 1 – Planning & Preparation. Team RONCO, consists of the necessary capabilities to conduct planning and management, processing, refurbishment of the three rehabilitation and development centers, central training facility and three NIC camps. Additionally, Team RONCO conducts detailed planning and coordination with ORHA, CFLCC, CENTCOM, Coalition Forces, Coalition members, Iraqi Government and appropriate International Organizations (IOs) and Non governmental Organizations (NGOs). The intent is to develop and deliver a comprehensive plan for the conduct of all

associated operations to facilitate the establishment of the NIC. Planning will include development of selection criteria, development of a focused IO campaign, development of vetting criteria, development of medical selection criteria and development of a program of instruction with the intent of producing competent Iraqi soldiers capable of conducting basic military operations in support of Coalition efforts.

Further, Team RONCO will assemble and deploy all of the required capabilities that will coable it to rapidly move into Iraq in order to quickly and proficiently establish the three rehabilitation and development centers, the central training facility and three NIC camps that will be utilized to process, select and train volunteers for the NIC.


Additionally, ORHA and Coalition Forces will conduct carefully constructed Information Campaign that targets specific elements of the population in order to initially attract a representative and manageable number of volunteers.


- Phase II Mobilization. Team RONCO conducts appropriate activities to identify, deploy, establish and operationalize the three rehabilitation and development centers, central training facility and three NIC camps.
- 3. Phase III Processing, Selection and Training. Team RONCO is postured to receive, process, facilitate selection and train volunteers for the program. The first step of processing will be registration. Registration will be conducted by Team RONCO in order to enable appropriate personnel activities in support of each volunteer. The registration data base will be synchronized and shared with the PWIS data base in order to facilitate personnel administration for those selected for the NIC as well as follow-up activities for those not selected for the NIC. The second step will be to medically screen each volunteer in order to identify any disqualifying physical and psychological problems. Simultaneously, the volunteers are screened and their military skills assessed. In some cases there will be volunteers who warrant follow-up. Those volunteers identified for follow-up will undergo an in-depth interview. After undergoing processing, Team RONCO will prepare a recommendation for each volunteer to enable a Coalition decision. After a decision, those selected for the NIC will be transported to the central training facility where they will be given basic training. At the completion of basic training, they will be transported to one of three NIC camps and then handed off to the Coalition. Those not selected for the NIC will participate in a reintegration survey in order to sort them into groups for potential skills training. The purpose of the survey is to place them into appropriate technical training, skills training, and vocational training programs. Those who are washed out of basic training will be sent back to the rehabilitation and development center and may be provided with skills training and case management. Additionally, there is a chance that there may be volunteers who are not suitable for the NIC as well as skills training. They will be returned home. All personnel who enter a center will receive a stipend according to the duration of their participation. Concurrent to the processing and training of each volunteer, Team RONCO will conduct appropriate planning and coordination in preparation for Phase IV - Transition to Iraqi Government.
- 3. Phase IV Transition. Transfer of processing and training activities to new Iraqi Government. During this phase, Team RONCO transfers all responsibilities associated with processing and training activities to the new Iraqi government with a

view to institutional strengthening. Additionally, Team RONCO conducts appropriate planning and coordination for redeployment.

5. Phase V - Redeployment. Team RONCO conducts activities to close-out and redeploy.









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Conditioning Factors

Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance

- · Pashmerga & Badr Brigade have not been disarmed & demobilized. They pose a threat to stability
- Over 350,000 regular lengt soldiers self-demobilized
- . Those soldiers who left the battlefield have rising expectations
- . The self-demobilized soldiers will gravitate to where they can find a job the major population centers
- . The New Iraqi Corps (NIC) is likely to start with 3 Bellations. One in the north, center and south
- 80 per cent of the average household income is constituted by the food ration
- 60 per cent of the population rely solely on the monthly food basilet to meet all household needs and would be directly and seriously affected by a disruption of the food distribution system.
- Estimates very, but employment in Iraq runs between 50% (UN) and 80% (CIA)
- Approximately two-thirds of Iraqis depend on government food hand-outs, and 49% of Iraqi femilies sernings do not meet their basic reads

The self-demobilized & other armed groups are aldn to Kapten's "loose molecules" and must be given a positive states in society to ensure stability






Intent of Rehabilitation & Development Centers


office of Reconstruction and Humaniferian Assistance


- · Scaleable and modular approach frees Coalition personnel
- Promote stability by demobilizing and reintegrating the Peshmerga & Badr Brigade
- · Facilitate establishment of the NIC and/or QDI
- · Provide employment opportunities through skills & vocational training
- Case management & counseling to help prevent problem cases from causing instability i.e., banditry
- · Capacity building in support of MOD processing and training
- Establish the preconditions to reintegrate the 350,000 self-demobilized


Centers are a key building block in support of stability


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










- · identify individuals with aidlis key to reconstruction to offer training and
- Determine priority training programs for demilitarized personnel
- Regulate distribution of civillan reintegration packages (i.e. vouchers, materials, funds)
- · Long-Term (Six Months to Five Years)
 - Create the basis for efficient and democratic public administration;
 - * Facilitate the creation/renewal of out-of-date, damaged or lost public
 - Provide voter registration data and verification for eventual elections
 - Reduce costs of public data maintenance through centralization of core. information









UNCLASSIFIED

Why Vetting is Important

Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance

- Facilitates the rehabilitation and reintegration process, and at the same time supports Coalition intelligence collection efforts to identify and capture "undesirables"
- . Contributes to public order and safety
 - Identifies and removes undesirables from the workforce pool
 - Lack of or a poorly conceived and managed vetting process can result in acts of vengeance, unnecessary public grievances, weak or no trust in a new government and even weakened "new" institutions.
 - Helps strengthen public confidence in a *reformed" or new "democratic" government
- Vetting promotes government legitimacy and helps build a new national identity
- If done in a transparent and orderly manner, public perceptions of "punitive vetting" can shift to more positive perceptions of increasing Iraqi adherence to widely accepted international norms of behavior






Vetting Process

ffice of Riconstruction and Humaniterian Assistance

- Preliminary screening and interviews used to separate volunteers/others into three categories:
 - · Cat 1 No threat
 - > Allowed to enter into the rehabilitation and reintagration process
 - Provides a worldorce pool of eligible returnees (NIC, QDI, demining, reintegration training, etc)
 - Cat 2 Needs further screening In-depth screen
 - > Held for additional vetting
 - > Possible use of advanced vetting techniques (DVSA or VSA)
 - > Depending on findings reclassified as Cat 1 or Cat 2
 - · Cat 3 Threat
 - > Referred to Coalition or other responsible agency
 - > Possibly returned to EPW camp for processing and detention





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Medical Screening & Primary Care

office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance

- Each Center will provide medical screening and primary care for all individuals
- Demonstrates USG commitment to ensure the health and welfare of former combatants (confidence building initiative)
- Encourages participation in the program, facilitating the recruitment process
- Provides job placement opportunities for demobilized medical personnel
- Provides a mechanism to establish health records on all processed individuals (medical database interfaces with PWIS and the center's registration database)

17





UNCLASSIFIED


Preliminary Medical Screening


Office of Reconstruction and Humanitation Assistance

- · Separates individuals into three categories:
 - Cat 1 Healthy or treatable
 - > Eligible for reintegration training
 - > Treated at primary care level
 - Cat 2 Needs further screening
 - > Held for additional laboratory screening
 - > Test results determine if individual is reclassified as Cat 1 or Cat 3
 - Cat 3 Sick
 - > Not treated at the "Markaz"
 - > Referrals to proper treatment centers
 - ➤ Case follow-up to ensure patient receives proper treatment











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Initial Policy Issues

Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance

- If pilot begins with the Peshmerge end Badr Brigade, does this indicate a predisposition to leave the 350,000 self demobilized out of the process?
- Will the IO campaign exclusively target the Peahmergs and Badr Brigade or will it be more encompassing?
- 2. Will the Coalition disarm Peshmerga and Badr Brigade prior to processing?
- Will the 350,000 self-demobilized and paroled EPWs be the source of recruits for the NIC? If not, where will they come from?
- 4. Are separate centers required for each of the Pershmerga factions and the Badr Brigade?
- 5. Will vetted Peshmerga & Bedr Brigade individuals be allowed into the NIC?
- 8. Will vetted Peshmerga & Badr Brigade individuals be allowed into the NIC?

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Initial Policy Issues (contin..)

Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance

- Will stipends be paid during processing? If so, where will the money come from and how will it be paid?
- 8. The Peshmerga are relatively well known to the Coalition. Is vetting required?
- 9. The Badr Brigade is not as well known. What level of vetting is required?
- 10. Are there problems co-locating the process to demobilize and reintegrate the Peshmerge and Badr Brigade with the process to register, screen and train the NIC recruits?
- 11. If extensive refurbishment is required of the facilities, then will be a requirement to either increase the level of effort or extend the time line.


Policy field is filled with "Hebson's Choices". A scaleable modular approach gives policy makers maximum flexibility and known choices for mid course corrections.

Su

Summary

- Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance

 A Scaleable and modular approach provides flexibility, frees Coalition personnel and contains costs
- · Provides a mechanism to process the Peshmerga & Sadr Brigade
- Another opportunity to catch & identify potential undesirables
- . Provides a mechanism to process recruits for the NIC and/or QDI
- Processing & training apparatus represents institutional capacity building that can be transitioned into MOD
- Establishes preconditions to process the 350,000 plus soldiers who have stepped aside and/or self-demobilized
- . A source for trained & vetted work force for Iraqi Government and others
- A billiored IO campaign is necessary to encourage targeted groups/individuals to report to rehabilitation & development centers to evoid becoming potential threat to stability
- · A place & process for NGOs, IOs and other Donors to provide additional support
- A scaleable & modular approach provides Policy makers with a flexible decision making tool with numerous start/stop points according to empirical evidence





Local Training Providers


- Kuwait partner intends to establish an Iraqi company that is able to hire local trainers and case managers
- Sources of local trainers and case managers include:
 - Mosul
 - University of Mosul
 - College of Medicine
 - College of Engineering
 - Various Technical Institutes


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Local Training Providers (continued)

- Sources of local trainers and case managers include:
 - Baghded
 - University of Technology
 - ~ Department of Mechanical Engineering
 - Department of Electrical Engineering
 - Department of Building and Construction Engineering
 - Department of Computer Science
 - Various Technical Institutes
 - Basra
 - · University of Basra
 - College of Science
 - College of Engineering
 - College of Medicine
 - Various Technical Institutes





	Reintegration Matrix			
Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance				
General Categories	Specific Categories	Wethods	Communic	
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Advisored technical	Smartly, develop, marked, and againston, remittee and	Exhibiting and equipm-leads copyrige at private and guides and private behing providers	Equilibries impossible on officia and in empired with during-training work experience	
Spinits reserved skills	Corporate, phordaing, same ligano of against are	Information of the Control of the Co	Footbales recommended places and are diffe cognised on the job	
Basic orithmeta, creating, valling	Corporaty, plansisting	Contern-designed courses at entiring training training training training contents, cooperating colorein	Facilities reconstruction afforbs and greenly 'streshold required' stills, psychiad prior to, or storing, training	
Advanced arthreats, reading, wiley	Hesphalle, healthwaise,	Confirms designed convents of quinting tegicing terphylisms, temperating extensis	Only "sheekship respired" shifts, provided polar to, or desire, training	
Mid-in-militariouslygy	Assure mechanic, computer programme, parameter, management	Existing and audien-ball courses of private and public and private training providers, e.g., restroyed polytostudes	Coupled with during-existing work experience	
			·	31



مركز التأهيل و التطوير

"Markaz Al-Ta'heel wa Al-Tatweer"
Rehabilitation &
Development Center Brief
May 07, 2003




Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance

Purpose: To facilitate a decision to: 1) process, support and assist problematic groups in a post-War Iraq; and/or, 2) to facilitate the establishment of the New Iraqi Corps (NIC) and/or the Quwatt ad-Difa'a al Iraqia (QDI).



Scaleable & Modular Options



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Conditioning Factors

Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance

- Peshmerga & Badr Brigade have not been disarmed & demobilized. They pose a threat to stability
- Over 350,000 regular Iraqi soldiers self-demobilized
- Those soldiers who left the battlefield have rising expectations
- The self-demobilized soldiers will gravitate to where they can find a job the major population centers
- The New Iraqi Corps (NIC) is likely to start with 3 Battalions. One in the north, center and south
- 80 per cent of the average household income is constituted by the food ration
- 60 per cent of the population rely solely on the monthly food basket to meet all household needs and would be directly and seriously affected by a disruption of the food distribution system
- Estimates vary, but employment in Iraq runs between 50% (UN) and 80% (CIA)
- Approximately two-thirds of Iraqis depend on government food hand-outs, and 49% of Iraqi families' earnings do not meet their basic needs

The self-demobilized & other armed groups are akin to Kaplan's "loose molecules" and must be given a positive stake in society to ensure stability



Intent of Rehabilitation & Development Centers


Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance

- Scaleable and modular approach frees Coalition personnel
- Promote stability by demobilizing and reintegrating the Peshmerga & Badr Brigade
- Facilitate establishment of the NIC and/or QDI
- Provide employment opportunities through skills & vocational training
- Case management & counseling to help prevent problem cases from causing instability i.e., banditry
- Capacity building in support of MOD processing and training
- Establish the preconditions to reintegrate the 350,000 self-demobilized

Centers are a key building block in support of stability




Rehabilitation & Development Process






Option #2 - Pilot Process






Scheme of Maneuver for Establishing the NIC



- Three Rehabilitation & Development Centers strategically located to target specific groups
- Centers are scaleable & modular in design
- Centers process NIC volunteers in order to facilitate selection
- Utilize existing Iraqi infrastructure where possible
- Centers provide job opportunities for Iraqis, i.e., doctors, nurses etc




Scheme of Maneuver for Establishing the NIC



- Those that opt for and are qualified for the NIC are transported to NIC Training Facility – south of Baghdad
- NIC Training Facility is scaleable and modular
- NIC Training Facility conducts basic training
- NIC Training Facility provides all life support and administrative support
- NIC Training Facility provides job opportunities for Iraqis, i.e., doctors, nurses etc...
- Trained NIC soldiers are transported to their Battalion camps



Scheme of Maneuver for Establishing the NIC




- Three NIC Battalion camps are scaleable and modular
- Camps provide all life support and administrative support
- Three camps could provide the foundation for the QDI
- Utilize existing Iraqi infrastructure where possible

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


Center Implementing Elements





Processing





Registration

Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance

Short- and Medium-Term (Immediate to Six Months)


- · Identify potential recruits for the NIC from demobilized population
- Identify individuals with skills key to reconstruction to offer training and employment
- Determine priority training programs for demilitarized personnel
- Regulate distribution of civilian reintegration packages (i.e. vouchers, materials, funds)

Long-Term (Six Months to Five Years)

- Create the basis for efficient and democratic public administration;
- Facilitate the creation/renewal of out-of-date, damaged or lost public records
- Provide voter registration data and verification for eventual elections
- Reduce costs of public data maintenance through centralization of core information




Registration Process






Registration Input/Output





Registration Stages





Why Vetting is Important

- Facilitates the rehabilitation and reintegration process, and at the same time supports Coalition intelligence collection efforts to identify and capture "undesirables"
- Contributes to public order and safety
 - Identifies and removes undesirables from the workforce pool
 - Lack of or a poorly conceived and managed vetting process can result in acts of vengeance, unnecessary public grievances, weak or no trust in a new government and even weakened "new" institutions.
 - Helps strengthen public confidence in a "reformed" or new "democratic" government
- Vetting promotes government legitimacy and helps build a new national identity
- If done in a transparent and orderly manner, public perceptions of "punitive vetting" can shift to more positive perceptions of increasing Iraqi adherence to widely accepted international norms of behavior




Vetting Process

- Preliminary screening and interviews used to separate volunteers/others into three categories:
 - Cat 1 No threat
 - > Allowed to enter into the rehabilitation and reintegration process
 - Provides a workforce pool of eligible returnees (NIC, QDI, demining, reintegration training, etc)
 - Cat 2 Needs further screening In-depth screen
 - > Held for additional vetting
 - > Possible use of advanced vetting techniques (DVSA or VSA)
 - Depending on findings reclassified as Cat 1 or Cat 2
 - Cat 3 Threat
 - Referred to Coalition or other responsible agency
 - > Possibly returned to EPW camp for processing and detention



Basic Military Skills Training





Medical Screening & Primary Care

- Each Center will provide medical screening and primary care for all individuals
- Demonstrates USG commitment to ensure the health and welfare of former combatants (confidence building initiative)
- Encourages participation in the program, facilitating the recruitment process
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


Preliminary Medical Screening

- Separates individuals into three categories:
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
Reintegration Process



- Participating individuals will be screened and vetted
- For those who want to return to civilian life; training, employment, and retention services will be available




Employment Services Process



- Skills Training
 - IT Technicians
 - English as a Second Language (ESL)
 - Security
 - Demining
 - Reconstruction skills (Electricians, Mechanics, Carpenters, Paramedics)
- Will develop local Iraqi staff as trainers and case managers
- Goal is to transition to self sustaining Iraqi national institutions



Flexible Implementation Time Line





Consequences for Inaction


Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance

- Peshmerga and Badr Brigade hold onto their weapons
- Evidence of growing competition between tribes
- Emergence of lawless armed gangs increasingly motivated by unemployment
- Emergence of Mafia type elements that pose a political & security threat to government
- Population openly carries individual weapons for "safety" cultural norms require retention of individual weapons
- Questionable allegiance to new government and institutions
- · Population becomes demonstrably uncooperative

Security and jobs are cornerstones of stability



Initial Policy Issues



- 1. Will the IO campaign exclusively target the Peshmerga and Badr Brigade or will it be more encompassing?
- 2. Will the Coalition disarm Peshmerga and Badr Brigade prior to processing?
- 3. Will the 350,000 self-demobilized and paroled EPWs be the source of recruits for the NIC? If not, where will they come from?
- 4. Are separate centers required for each of the Pershmerga factions and the Badr Brigade?
- 5. Will vetted Peshmerga & Badr Brigade individuals be allowed into the NIC?
- 6. Will vetted Peshmerga & Badr Brigade individuals be allowed into the NIC?



Initial Policy Issues (contin..)

Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance

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Policy field is filled with "Hobson's Choices". A scaleable modular approach gives policy makers maximum flexibility and known choices for mid course corrections.



Summary



- A scaleable and modular approach provides flexibility, frees Coalition personnel and contains costs
- Provides a mechanism to process the Peshmerga & Badr Brigade
- Another opportunity to catch & identify potential undesirables
- Provides a mechanism to process recruits for the NIC and/or QDI
- Processing & training apparatus represents institutional capacity building that can be transitioned into MOD
- Establishes preconditions to process the 350,000 plus soldiers who have stepped aside and/or self-demobilized
- A source for trained & vetted work force for Iraqi Government and others
- A tailored IO campaign is necessary to encourage targeted groups/individuals to report to rehabilitation & development centers to avoid becoming potential threat to stability
- A place & process for NGOs, IOs and other Donors to provide additional support

A scaleable & modular approach provides Policy makers with a flexible decision making tool with numerous start/stop points according to empirical evidence

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Back-ups





Local Training Providers

- Kuwait partner intends to establish an Iraqi company that is able to hire local trainers and case managers
- Sources of local trainers and case managers include:
 - Mosul
 - · University of Mosul
 - College of Medicine
 - College of Engineering
 - Various Technical Institutes




Local Training Providers (continued)

- Sources of local trainers and case managers include:
 - Baghdad
 - University of Technology
 - Department of Mechanical Engineering
 - Department of Electrical Engineering
 - Department of Building and Construction Engineering
 - Department of Computer Science
 - Various Technical Institutes
 - Basra
 - · University of Basra
 - College of Science
 - College of Engineering
 - College of Medicine
 - Various Technical Institutes



Civil Registry






Reintegration Planning

- Design of short-term curricula formats for soft skills training (e.g., job readiness, motivation in Arabic) and hard skills training (IT technicians, paramedics, plumbers, electricians, mechanics, carpenters, demining etc.)
- Selection of training providers in Iraq who will help complete the curriculum format for hard skills training
- Selection of software customized for case management
- In coordination with Coalition and donor entities, design strategies for job creation; and,
- Identify specific employers involved in the reconstruction of Iraqi infrastructure



Reintegration Matrix

General Categories	Specific Categories	Methods	Supports immediate need to resume communication and is coupled with during-training work experience.	
Professional skills	IT specialist, English as a Second Language (ESL), mechanical engineer, senior financial management	Existing and custom-built courses at private and public and private training providers and professional development organizations, e.g., selected national universities and polytechnics		
Advanced technical skills	Security, demining, medical, and agriculture management	Existing and custom-built courses at private and public and private training providers	Facilitates humanitarian efforts and is coupled with during-training work experience	
Basic manual skills	Carpentry, plumbing, some types of agriculture	Informal apprenticeship	Facilitates reconstruction efforts and are skills acquired on-the-job	
Basic arithmetic, reading, writing	Carpentry, plumbing	Custom-designed courses at existing training institutions, cooperating schools	Facilitates reconstruction efforts and are only "absolutely required" skills, provided prior to, or during, training	
Advanced arithmetic, reading, writing	Hospitality, bookkeeping,	Custom-designed courses at existing training institutions, cooperating schools	Only "absolutely required" skills, provided prior to, or during, training	
Mid-level/technology	evel/technology Aircraft mechanic, computer programmer, paramedic, management at pol		Coupled with during-training work experience	



- Team RONCO will register 350 people per day per center (Mosul, Baghdad, Basra);
 Team RONCO will medically examine 160 people per day per center;
- Team RONCO will conduct an initial vetting/military assessment on 160 people per day per center;
- Team RONCO estimates the need for an in-depth screening of 2000 volunteers; Team RONCO will provide basic military training for 3200 volunteers per four-week period;
- . Team RONCO may provide civilian skills assessment and training for those who opt-out of the NIC;
- Team RONCO will deploy four trained 800-person battalions every four weeks for a total of 19,200;
- If the mine and battle-area clearance option is chosen, one of the twenty-four battalions will be specially trained for this mission.

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

Iraqi National Coalition General Secretariat

OUR REF: 4

Date: 24/7/2003



الاتتلاف الوطني العراقي الأمانة العامة

امند: ک

قارح: ۶۶ څوز ۲---

To Mr. Paul Bremer

The Executive manager for the civil authority - Baghdad

Dear Sir:

- On behalf of my colleagues (the retired Iraqi army officers) and my self, I wish to declare the followings to your Excellency:
 - Most of the retired officers who are anti Saddams regime were obliged by the ex-regime to retire where the majority have fled abroad due to political reasons.
 - Saddams regime has ruined their lives from all aspects for being deprived from their right to work as most of them are professionals and below the age of retirement.
 - 3. Their salaries were less than \$3.00 per moth, they have families of not less than 5 persons. That's why most of them have either sold their own property or have to perform humble works.
 - 4. Retired officers comprise a large number and possessing a remarkable influence in the community.
 - 5. Your authority paid every retired officer \$40.00 as a gift while officers of Saddams army who have already enjoyed the privileges of that regime have been paid \$ 120.00 per moth, so they are enjoying the privileges every time.
 - 6. Because of feeling unfair due to the discrimination in the rights, we suggest the followings to your Excellency:
 - The amount of the gift should be distributed equally among ex- officers and the retired officers.

- Ex-regime officers have enjoyed many privileges from Saddam such as a land, a car and high salaries while retired officers gain nothing but \$3.00 a month.
- Retired officers are looking forward and hoping to be included by your kind care to justify them.
- The Iraqi National Coalition confirm all the above mentioned informations and deeply hoping the kind care and attention of your Excellency to justify them.
- Retired officers refused the call of Saddam to them to join the (Elite forces) and they paid a lot because of this situation while ex army officers have joined the Elite forces and gained many privileges from Saddam.

Our best regards and respect.

Taufeeq Alyassiri

Secretary General



To: Colonel Military Assistant to the senior advisor

You have driven away all the members of Ba'ath party specially the senior officials of the Iraqi army. We have been hurt by the ex-regime not only us (the senior officials as you called them) but even the low ranking figures, we are all victims.

The tyrant regime tortured me because my cousin was punished for he was a member of Islamic party, they also ordered me to divorce my wife because her brother was in one of the opposition movement at that time. They also prohibited me from gaining any privileges which I worth for the previously mentioned reasons.

They have confined me for years since they knew about my relatives and their relations with some of the opposition movement, as I mentioned before. I have many documentary papers to prove my case including the divorce case.

Sir, not all of the Ba'ath members parts are criminals, they joined the party to save their families from the humiliation they would face if they didn't join it ,as you know they have been forced us to join it by many oppressive ways. I can't write it all down because the papers won't be enough.

So, I would ask for an exception because I didn't receive my salaries since March 2003 and I have four minors children and I'am basically an academic person, I would ask to transfer me to one of the universities to practice my duties as an academic my C.V. and my certificates are enclosed.



To:
Military Assistant to the senior advisor

Appeal

Dear Sir,

Following a list of names and signatures of the staff and students of (M.T.I) Military Technical Institute that appeal to you the acceptance of exemption forms filled by the group members of some institute staff of the Deba Athification. The following reasons are to justify our appeal:

- 1- He does not experience any harmful deed what so ever.
- 2- He is well educated and academic scientific staff who served this institute faithfully over 26 years.
- 3- We are the one's who nominated him to be a group member in the demolished Ba'ath party to fill the posts given to the institute.
- 4- He is very qualified in this subject that his leave will affect the teaching process badly.
- 5- He is supervise many postgraduate thesis in different stages of progress.
 Therefore his absence will be very harmful on many postgraduate students
- 6- He holds:
- B.Sc. In Mechanical Engineering "Belgrad University College of Engineering "-1981.
- M.Sc. In Applied Mechanics "University Of Belgrad Mechanical Engineering Department"-1983.
- M.Sc. In Power Mechanics" University of Technology Mechanical Engineering Department"-1995.
- P.Hd. In Thermal Power Mechanics "University of Technology Mechanical Engineering Department" - 2001.
- B,Sc. In Business Administration, "Al- Moustansyria University" 1992.

Thanking you in anticipation.

AGREEMENT TO DISAVOW PARTY AFFILIATION تصريح قطع العلاقة مع حزب البعث

I, Dr. Jamal - Hamid (name), hereby disavow and renounce my membership in the Arab Socialist Renaissance Party of Iraq (Ba'ath Party). I understand that the Ba'ath Party is disestablished and abolished. I expressly reject and denounce the Ba'ath Party and Saddam Hussein and his regime, as well as my previous association with it.

I acknowledge that any continued association with, or involvement in, the Ba'ath Party or its activities constitutes a violation of an order by the Coalition Provisional Authority. I pledge to cooperate fully with the Coalition Provisional Authority in serving the people of Iraq and building a new Iraqi government. I will obey the laws of Iraq and all proclamations, orders and instructions of the Coalition Provisional Authority. As God is my witness:

انا المولور ممال كريم وهيم (إسم الموقع) اصرح الاناه رفضي لعضويتي في حزب البعث العربي الاشتراكي السابق في العراق. و افهم بان حزب البعث قد إنتهى. و انا اعبر و اعلن عن ندمي الانتسامي في سابقا الى حزب البعث و نظام صدام حسين.

اقر و اعترف بان اي تعامل بشتراك او الاستمرار مع حزب البعث او المشاركة في فعالياته سيكون نقضاً لاو امر قوات التحالف. و اتعهد بالتعاون الكامل مع قوات التحالف لخدمة الشعب العراقي و بناء حكومة عراقية جديدة. وسوف اطيع كافة القوانين العراقية و لاو امر و لتعليمات الصادرة عن قوات التحالف و اشهد الله على ذلك.

Attachment 4

Personnel Questionnaire

You must complete this questionnaire in full, and truthfully answer all questions in order to be considered for continued employment in the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research and/or higher education institutions, including universities, colleges, and centres. The information provided here may also be used to determine your eligibility for exemption from provisions of the Order of the Coalition Provisional Authority Regarding De-Baathification of Iraqi Society, dated 16 May 2003.

To certify the truthfulness of your answers, sign the statement at the bottom of the questionnaire.

You may use and attach additional pages to answer any questions for which there is insufficient space on the questionnaire.

1. - State your full name, including tribal name if any.

Jamal Hamid Whaib AL-AZawi

2. State your date and place of birth.

3. State your current address

4. Current position:

. Deputy Dean MTI (X-MTI)

5. State your educational background, including name, location, and years of attendance at any university or specialized institute, and degrees received, or anach full C.V.

As attached in C.V.

State your full employment history, including places of employment, where these employers
were located, positions held, and the time during which each position was held, or attach full
C.V.

As attached in C.V.

- 7. Were you ever a member or affiliate of the Ba'ath Party? Yes
- 8. If so, when did you join the Parry? Since my Joining the army
- State all levels of membership that you have ever held in the Ba'ath Party, and the times
 during which you held them.

RANK	Y/N	DATES	
'Udw (Member)	7 1	1991	
'Udw 'Amil (Active Member)	YI	1992	
'Udw Firqah (Group Member)	1	2002	
'Udw Shu'bah (Section Member)	NI		
'Udw Far' (Branch Member)	NI		
'Udw Qutriyya (Regional Command Member)	N		-

10. Status in the Ba'ath Perty as of 16 April 2003:

Terminatted

Because they forced us to join the party and we are obliged to do so in order hot to be excuted or exiled.

12. Why did you remain in the Ba'ath Party?

To maintain the continuation in the job

Since lam responsible of family

(Wife + 4 children)

13. Did you ever renounce Ba'ath Party Membership, or were you ever removed from the Party?

I have been freezed for 2 years, since my cousin was one of the apposition movement members to saddam regime. In-addition to my brother in law who was one of the opposers.

14. Were you ever arrested, prosecuted, or detained for any reason under the regime of Saddam Hussein? If so, state the occasions for each arrest, prosecution, or detention.

I was under continous monitoring for the reasons mentined in (13). A copy is attached to prove their montoring.

15. Service in any of the armed forces, security services, military organizations, or any other entity dissolved pursuant to order number 2 (CPA ORD/23 May 2003/02);

I was in military scientific institute (Ministry of defence, Air force)

To certify the truthfulness of your answers, sign the following statement:

I certify that all my answers in this questionnaire are truthful, I certify that I have read the 16 May 2003 Proclamation of the Administrator, Coalition Provisional Authority. I understand that if I have provided any false information, this will result in my immediate termination from office and or possible prosecution.

Jamal Hamid Whaib

11/8/2003 ·



Iraqi Security Forces ~ Phase 1a: 30 K in 30 Days

INITIATIVES	Total Personnel	Shortfalls	Funding Required	Action
Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (ICDC); Total 9 battalions by end of Phase Ia	<u>7.6K</u>	- 2 x BNs salaries, uniforms, OCIE. - Request funds via PRB or reallocation NLT 05Oct03 (Action C8).	NIL	-1AD, 4ID – additional: VCA, 130EN, MEF accelerated. -FRAGO 798 published 6 Sep. -FRAGO 804 published 8 Sep. - Funding Justification to be submitted to PRB on 5 Oct for additional battalions.
New Iraqi Army (NIA)	<u>.7K</u>		NIL	- No FRAGO requiredTraining Requirements post pass out for 1st BN submitted Pass-out date 4 Oct 03 Not fully equipped until 29 Nov 03. (CMATT).
Iraqi Border Police (IBP)	1.5K	- Money for Radios and vehicles. - Salaries are paid through CERP until 29 Sep 03)	\$10.2M	- FRAGO 828 published 14 Sep. Hire former border and customs officials where possiblePRB to be submitted this week by MoI This funding will see us through Phases 1a-1c.
Iranji Philips Service (1981)	5.3K	- Need uniforms, body armor, utility belt, and equipment.	NIL	 No FRAGO required. These are former Police Officers who require personal equipment prior to deploying on the street. Mol already funded, contracts need to be submitted as soon as possible.

As at 26 Sep 03.

Iraqi Security Forces ~ Phase 1a: 30 K in 30 Days

INITIATIVES	Total Personnel	<u>Shortfalls</u>	Funding Required	Action
FPS (Oil& Electric)	1.46K	NIL	NIL	- PRB 01Submitted & approved #425. For \$4.75M FRAGO 828 published 14 Sep, although Electricity Commission already putting this into action – wages through Ministry budget.
Facilities Protective Services (FPS)	<u>2.9K</u>	- Personal Equipment. Some weapons, uniforms and vehicles. MSCs are working around this.	NIL (\$1.25M CERP)	- FRAGO 828 published 14 Sep FRAGO required to stop MSCs hiring any more FPS, clearly stating reasoning.
Utilize PESHMERGA (Border Police and/or ICDC)	10K	- Funding stream TBCMay require a different uniform.	\$6.4M ON H	Phase 1a, Require \$6.4M for 3 months, \$3.6M for salaries and \$2.8M for equipment.
Iraqi Prison Service	<u>1.3K</u>	Nil	NIL	-No FRAGO required Already in motion, completed training by 11 Oct.
TOTAL	33.4K		\$16.6M	

Notes:

- 1. 14.0K realized so far.
- 2. FPS reached recruiting ceiling: FRAGO sent telling MSCs to stop recruiting further FPS personnel.

As at 26 Sep 03.



Iraqi Security Forces ~ Border Police & Customs



Iraqi Border & Customs Police

Ministry: Interior (Dept of Border Enforcement)

<u>Duties</u>: Border guarding and patrolling, enforce customs/immigration laws

Uniform: Khaki shirts


Vehicles: Various, mainly all terrain.

Weapons: Pistols, AK 47 Rifles

Pay: Civil pay scale.

"Secure borders make good neighbors".

Border Police undertaking weapon training.



Iraqi Security Forces ~ The Iraqi Police Services



Iragi Police Service (IPS)


Ministry: Interior

<u>Duties</u>: Law Enforcement Uniform: Light blue shirts

<u>Vehicles</u>: Various, modified blue and white. Weapons: Pistols, shotguns, AK 47 Rifles


Pay: Civil pay scale


The first line of future security





As at 26 Sep 03.







Effective Police ~ Personnel

MSCs (Cerp/MOI) Officers Patrol Police W/Arrest Auth. Effective Auth. 1AD MOI 9746 0 1965 0 738 101st CERP 15225 285 500 0 710 1	Semi Effective 6055	Non Effective 4918
101st CERP 15225 285 500 0 710 1		4918
	40000	
AID MOI 7155 946 360 130 522	12928	900
410 1001 7133 646 360 130 322	6633	0
82d UNK 1114 371 In IPS# * 150	994	782
MND-SC MOI 12326 0 In IPS# 0 241 1	12085	0
MND-SE MOI 8367 0 405 3300 0	8367	0
TOTAL 53933 1502 3230 3430 2361 4	47062	6600

Iraqi Security Forces ~ Facilities Protection Services

The protection of Iraq's economy and heritage.



FPS Protecting National Monuments in Baghdad

Facilities Protection Service (FPS)

Ministry: Most

<u>Duties</u>: Fixed site protection of Ministerial, Governmental, or private buildings / facilities /

personnel

Uniform: Grey shirts


Vehicles: Provided by Ministries

Weapons: AK 47 Rifles Pay: Civil pay scale

Note: Formerly known as the Ministry of Vital Institutions.

FPS-Manpower Status





Iraqi Security Forces ~ Iraqi Civil Defense Corps



Civil Defense Corps Recruit in Training



Iragi Civil Defense Corps (ICDC)

Ministry: National Security & Defense

<u>Duties</u>: Individuals, teams, and squads who
serve as linguists, HUMINT, fixed site security,
drivers, Disaster Relief, HA, route/convoy
security under command of Coalition Forces


Uniform: Solid brown/tan

Vehicles: 2 jeeps, 12 trucks per Battalion.

Weapons: AK 47 Rifles


Pay: Same pay scale as New Iraqi Army.

The short-term initiative with a longer-term future.




Proposed ICDC Stand-up Plan





*5 Add'l BNs are in Yellow





ICDC Battalion Equipment Table

	Items	Required per Battalion	Unit Cost	Cost for One Battalion	Remarks
Vehicles:	Jeeps	2	\$8,641.75	\$17,283.50	
	Trucks	12	\$18,873.80	\$226,485.60	
	Water Carriers	7	\$6,000.00	\$42,000.00	
	Spares Pkg.	1	\$50,000.00	\$50,000.00	
OCIE:	Uniforms and Individual Equipment			\$80,000.00	
Personal	Helmet	930	\$225.00	\$209,250.00	
Protective	Body Armor	930	\$325.00	\$302,250.00	Includes 10% overage
Equipment:	Winter Gear	930	\$50.00	\$46,500.00	
Weapons:	AK-47	846	\$100.00	\$84,600.00	O/NSD procures
Training Accessories:	Miscellaneous			\$2,500.00	
Communications	PLT/CO Radios	99	\$508.00	\$50,292.00	
Communications:	HQ Radios	22	\$3,050.00	\$67,100.00	
	Tentage	2	\$6,680	\$13,360.00	
	Portaloo	8	\$500.00	\$4,000.00	
Basic Infrastructure:	Plastic Chairs	50	\$3.00	\$150.00	
	Plastic Tables	10	\$10.00	\$100.00	
	ISO Containers	2	\$100.00	\$200.00	(Used Containers)




ICDC Battalion Annual Running Costs

		Cost Per Month	Cost per Annum	Remarks
Salaries		\$70,000.00	\$840,000.00	
O. balata a an	MRE	\$45,684.00	\$548,208.00	Stipener \$2.00 Daily
Subsistence	Water	\$0.00	\$0.00	151.67/
Basic Infrastructure	Fuel	\$1,000.00	\$12,000.00	131,976
V-bi-l (M-i-t F N	Trucks	\$6,720.00	\$80,640.00	
Vehicles (Maintenance and Fuel)	Jeeps	\$800.00	\$9,600.00	
Operations and Maintenance		\$7,000.00	\$84,000.00	
MONTHLY COST FOR 1 BATTALION>>		\$131,204.00	\$1,574,448.00	< <annual 1="" bn<="" cost="" for="" td=""></annual>

ICDC Battalion Equipment Table Costs	\$1,196,071.10		
ICDC Battalion Annual Running Costs	\$1,574,448.00		
ANNUAL TOTAL FOR ONE BATTALION	\$2,770,519.10		
ANNUAL TOTAL FOR 26 BATTALIONS	\$72,033,496.60		

As at 26 Sep 03.



ICDC Current Status

What is funded for the original 18 battalions?

- \$2.2M for individual equipment and uniforms
- \$17.4M for salaries and subsistence
- \$1.6M for MND(SE) vehicles and equipment

How much is spent/Committed?

- \$2.2M committed for 26 BN sets of uniforms and individual equipment (FY03)
- \$1,524,800.00 spent on divisions for salaries and subsistence (Sep 03)
- \$15,875,200.00 of \$17.4M remaining for 18-21 battalions.
- \$1.6M for MND(SE) is being administered by MND(SE)



ICDC Projections

What do we need to Stand-Up 26 battalions?

- \$2.8M per Battalion for Eqpt @ 1 year x 26 battalions = \$72.8M
- \$21.2M already allocated through PRB
- Therefore require \$51.6M
- Supplemental Budget Request is \$75.6M
- Balance outstanding (assuming supplemental in full) is a \$24M credit

How can we get it?

- Program Review Board (PRB)
- Commanders Initiative Fund (CIF)
- Foreign Assistance Act
- Security Assistance Act

What are our options to stand up by Jan 04?

- Need the money now in order to have assets by end of Jan 04.
- If we want to have the equipment here by Jan 04 we will need to buy outside of Iraq



Iraqi Security Forces ~ The New Iraqi Army

New Iraqi Army

Ministry: National Security & Defense

<u>Duties</u>: Collective military tasks to protect the territorial integrity of Iraq under Iraqi military

leadership, serving side-by-side with Coalition forces

<u>Uniform</u>: Desert camouflage Vehicles: Wheeled vehicles.

Weapons: AK47 rifles, RPK LMGs, Mortars


Pay: Special payscale approved by the Finance Ministry

Strength: 27 Light Infantry Battalions by Sep 04. 3 Div of 9 Battalions each. Combat support and support elements to follow.

The longer-term security
Initiative

New Iraqi Army training in Kirkush







Public Safety and Security for All Iraqis

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AGENDA

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• AGENDA

IPS STAND-UP STRATEGY/ACCELERATION - CH CONST BRAND/COL

FINANCIAL UPDATE

FPS STRATEGY

• GUIDANCE

- COS

- COL

- MR LTC

- MR.

- CG



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Iraqi Police Services Stand-Up Strategy and Options for Acceleration





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Aim

To provide a joint CPA/CJTF 7
Brief on the stand-up strategy for the Iraqi Police Services and the options to accelerate that strategy.



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Agenda

- Where we are now ~ the current statistics.
- Current Training Methods.
- Where we are going, and how ~ the MoI Strategy.
- Acceleration Options.
- How they would affect the Strategy.
- · Recommendations.



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Where we are now ~ the current statistics.



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
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Iraq Police Services ~ The Statistics

- · Based on 1:300 in population.
- End State 75,000.
- On Duty 59,057.
- TIP trained 3,330.
- Jordan 25,000.
- On Duty (55,306) + Jordan (25,000) = 80,306.
- Retirement approximately 5,000.
- Equals End State 75,000.






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Police Effectiveness by MSC

- <u>Effective</u>: Former IP, TIP trained working in a police capacity with a uniform and a weapon. <u>Total 3,330</u>
- <u>Semi Effective</u>: Former IP working in an active police capacity in a uniform with a weapon. <u>Total 55,823</u>
- Non Effective: Former IP, paid but not working in a police capacity. Total 4,552





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Current Training Methods.



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AVAILABLE TRAINING METHODS

- TRANSITION INTEGRATION PROGRAM (TIP): CONDUCTED AT MSC LEVEL FOR 3 WEEKS TARGETS FORMER IRAQI POLICE OFFICERS ONLY.
- THE JORDANIAN ACADEMY: NEW POLICE OFFICERS WITH NO PREVIOUS EXPERIENCE, UNDERTAKE AN 8 WEEK TRAINING COURSE:
 - ☐ Commence 25 Nov 2003.
 - ☐ First class of 500 students.
 - □ 1500 students per month soon thereafter (1200 IPS and 300 IBP).
 - ☐ DynCorp Contract.
- Three Regional Academies:
 - Baghdad From 1 Jan 04 capacity 800.
 - Irbil and Basrah From Nov 04, capacity 500 each.

CURRENT TRAINING MOSUL New Recruit Tng (8 Weeks) 100 Dahuk 27 Sep - 4 Dec Tall Afar TIP (3 Weeks) 122 29 Sep Start Date MOSUL Salaymaniya Nitrawa TIP (3 Weeks) 120 **Airkuk** SALAD AD DIN Start Date 20 Sep As Sulaymaniyah TIP (3 Weeks) 75 04 Oct Start Date DIYALA TIP (3 Weeks) 50 B Start Date 26 Sep Samana Qaim Al Anbar 50 TIP (3 Weeks) Baqubah . BAGHDAD 11 Oct Start Date TIP (3 Weeks) 250 Air red mards Bayndad Start Date Fallujah 🔾 Al Hillah TIP (3 Weeks) 100 Al Kut Al Hillah **Start Date** 4 Oct **Ukranian Run Awaiting Info** Al Anbar ORDAN Are Hajar Par Diwaniyah Ad Diwaniyah Karbala TO COVERY TIP (3 Weeks) 192 TIP (3 Weeks) 100 Graduated 3 Oct As Sama wat **Start Date** Mid Oct And Ivas I was Ahvaz An Najaf TIP (3 Weeks) 200 4 Oct **Start Date** Blue - Future Class **TOTAL** Basrah Red Past Class In TIP Tng = 917 TIP (3 Weeks) 150 eters. Black - Present Class **December Projected Start** In Other Tng = 100TIP Tng 150 Completed TIP = 3,330Other Tng

Charles Charle



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
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Where we are going ~ the Mol Strategy.



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Where we are going ~ the Mol Strategy.

Training Beyond TIP

- Field Training: i.e. Prisoner Handling Course.
- In Service Training: i.e. Leadership, Forensics.

To be phased into Regional Academies as <u>capacity and capability</u> becomes available.



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Acceleration Options.



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
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
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



Options For Acceleration

- <u>OPTION 1</u> Reduce TIP Training from 3 to 2 weeks, but a firearms week still remains at the tail end.
- <u>OPTION 2</u> Accelerate the Stand-Up of the Regional Academies and commence 8 week (alternate training to Jordan) course. From Jan 2004 in Baghdad capacity 500. Basrah and Irbil by mid 04 add 1,000. Total capacity 1,500. CONFLICTS WITH SPECIALIST & PROFESSIONAL TRAINING.
- OPTION 3 Establish an Auxiliary Police Training Program of 4 weeks duration at the Baghdad Academy only to provide rapid acceleration to police numbers in the City. Graduates remain on 10 month probation and must attend the 8 week course in the future.
- OPTION 4 A combination of the above.














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Acceleration Option 5 - How it affects the Strategy







Oct May Dec Jer tep May ba May Jul In In the



Ministry of the Interior Public Safety and Security for All Iragis

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Recommendations

- Modify TIP Training to double output by reducing course to 2 wks.
- Support the Train the Trainer with the "Right" individuals and establish Baghdad Academy by Dec 03 with 1000 capacity by Mar 04. Run 8 week courses from Jan 04.
- 101st Continue their 8 week-course, and cease any further new recruit 8 week training courses in Iraq other than Baghdad.



Ministry of the Interior Public Safety and Security for All Iraqis

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The Way Ahead

- · Agree Recommendations.
- Get the "Right" people on Train the Trainer in Jordan.
- Accelerate the stand-up of the Baghdad Academy.
- Provide the following support to the Mol:
 - Help with firearms training post TIP.
 - · Recruiting.
 - · Medicals.
 - Processing (CA personnel).
 - Movement / Transport to Jordan.



Public Safety and Security for All Iragis

COMBINED JOINT TASK FORCE 7



FINANCIAL UPDATE





Public Safety and Security for All Iraqis

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Ministry of Interior Funding

	FY 03 Budget Jun – Dec 03	PRB Approved FY03 Unfunded	Supplemental	FY04 Budget Jan – Dec 04
Iraqi Police Service	\$11.0M	\$129.1M	\$1,274M	-
Border Enforcement	\$9.5M	15.6M	\$150M	-
Facility Protection Service	-	\$68.9M	\$67M	-
Mol General	\$2.4M	-	\$150M Fire/CD \$500M	\$124.8
Total	\$22.9M (18.9M)	\$213.6M	\$2,141M	\$124.8

Note: Salaries for IPS centrally paid by MoF in FY03 (Except for 101st AOR) Salaries for Border and FPS paid with CERP in FY03



COMBINED JOINT TASK FORCE 7 Public Safety and Security for All Iragis



Funds Required Near-Term

- \$8M Request for Border Enforcement
- \$12M Request for Police Radios
- √ \$50M Request for Int'l Training Academy
- \$2M FPS Uniforms
- \$4M FPS C2 Cell, National Level



Public Safety and Security for All Iragis

COMBINED JOINT TASK FORCE 7



Mol Funding Outlook

- FY03 & Supplemental Funds Sufficient
- Supplemental Issue Timing
 - -- Bridging Funds Unworkable
 - -- Ready to Execute Requirements
- Supplemental on Pace for Late Next Week
- FY04 Budget Salaries Under Funded
 - -- MoI has until December to Adjust



Public Safety and Security for All Iraqis

COMBINED JOINT TASK FORCE 7



FPS STRATEGY

Mr



Public Safety and Security for All Iragis

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CAT Recommendation~ FPS C2

- ☐ CG Due Out
 - ☐ Revisit "C2" piece, refine concept and COAs
- ☐ Team Reviewed four COAs:
 - ☐ COA 1 Decentralized Control~ CPA Ministries Control
 - □ COA 2 Centralized Control ~ Single CPA Ministry Control
 - ☐ COA 3 Localized Control ~ Regionally
 - ☐ COA 4 Localized Control ~ Governate
- ☐ Team selected COA 2 as the recommendation



Ministry of the Interior Public Safety and Security for All Iragis

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Pre-War ~ The Facts

- Protection of critical sites managed by the Ministry of Vital Institutions
- Essentially an arm of the Iraqi Intelligence Agency
- Centrally Controlled throughout the country
- Only selected ministries were provided protection
- Ministry was corrupt
- Ministry charged for protection



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Post-War ~ The Facts

- Coalition Provisional Authority elected not to have a central agency
- Fear of establishing the old regime of "Ministry of Vital Institutions"
- Wanted a decentralized program within CPA where ministries are in control
- Wanted to eliminate corruption within the organization
- Wanted one ministry to serve as quality assurance and enforce standards only
- First consideration was Ministry of Security Affairs and Defense
- Ministry of Interior was second option but selected option



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Dilemma

What is the best solution for providing a protection service that will secure and safe guard Iraqi facilities and serve the Iraqi people?



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COA 1: Decentralized Control within CPA

- Each Ministry is responsible for:
 - Maintaining it's own FPS section, within the ministry.
 - Administrative actions i.e. "pay".
 - Equipping there own personnel.
 - Managing it's own crisis and consequence management.

30 Ministries managing an average of 20 sites within each Governate x 18 Governates = potentially 10,800 different variations of managing FPS.

Probability of change is greatest due to too many chiefs with hands in the pot



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COA 2: Centralized Control within CPA

- One Ministry responsible for:
 - Maintaining FPS throughout Iraq/Governates.
 - Administrative actions "pay"
 - Equipping all sites and personnel
 - Managing any crisis and consequence management within Iraq

Single Ministry managing an average of 4 CPA Regional FPS site managers. An average of 20 sites per ministry = 2,400 similar ways of managing FPS

Probability of change is lesser than decentralized due to less chiefs with hands in the pot



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COA 3: Localized ~ Regional

- 4 Regional (CPA) Offices responsible for:
 - Maintaining FPS within specific regions only.
 - Administrative actions "pay".
 - Equipping all sites and personnel.
 - Managing crisis and consequence management within sector.

4 Regions "managing" 30 Ministries with an average of 20 sites per ministry = 2,400 similar ways of managing FPS

Probability of change is equal to Centralized and is greater than decentralized due to less chiefs with hands in the pot



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COA 4: Localized ~ Governate

- 18 Governate Offices responsible for:
 - Maintaining FPS within specific governate areas only
 - Administrative actions "pay"
 - Equipping all sites and personnel
 - Managing a crisis and consequence management within area

18 Governate Offices managing 30 Ministries with an average of 20 sites per ministry = 10,800 different ways of managing FPS

Probability of change is equal to decentralization but is lesser than centralized and Localized at the regional level due to more chiefs with hands in the pot



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The Criteria (Slide 1 of 2)

• <u>Security</u>: Ability to quickly lower and increase Protection posture; fight complacency; not allowing a lowering of standards to accommodate personal beliefs.

Benchmark: The less outside influence on procedures the better. influence equal to or < 3

- Management: Ability to administer systems; handle crisis & consequence management Benchmark: The less levels managing a site the better.
 levels equal to or < 3
- Training: Ability to teach a common set of methods, practices and techniques that coincide with knowledge, skills and abilities

Benchmark: The least amount of variation in Program of Instructions the better. variation equal to or < 2



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The Criteria (Slide 2 of 2)

- •Quality Assurance: Ability to ensure standards in the field are being maintained

 Benchmark: The least amount of agencies conducting quality assurance the better.

 amount must be equal to or < 1
- <u>Standardization</u>: Ability to produce one product that is common throughout the country such training, procedures and equipment

Benchmark: The least amount standards being produced the better. amount must be equal to or < 1

- Corruption: Ability to quickly identify illegal activity
 Benchmark: The least amount of opportunities for corruption to exist.
 amount must be equal to or < 1
- <u>Cost</u>: Ability to manage cost effectively

 Benchmark: The ability to minimize changes bearing on cost.

 amount of changes that can be made must be equal to or < 2



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Comparison Analysis (10f 3)

Most Desirable

Desirable

Least Desirable

Security

Localized~Regional < Centralized < Localized ~ Governate < Decentralized

Localized-Regional offers the best option for security in that all locations will answer to one person and can not be degraded due to personal beliefs or complacency of tenant agencies.

Most Desirable

Desirable

Least Desirable

Management

Localized~Regional < Centralized < Localized ~ Governate < Decentralized

Localized-Regional offers the best option for management in that centralized offers flexibility in pay and can allow monies to shift to accommodate growing concerns or threats.

Most Desirable

Desirable

Least Desirable

Training

Centralized < Localized ~ Regional < Localized ~ Governate < Decentralized

Centralized offers the best option for management in that centralized offers one program of instruction in that is common to all and allows for changes to be affected quickly ...common language.



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Comparison Analysis (2 of 3)

Quality Assurance Most Desirable

Desirable

Least Desirable

Centralized < Localized ~ Regional < Localized ~ Governate < Decentralized

Centralized offers the best option for quality assurance in that all locations will answer to one agency and can not be degraded due to personal beliefs or complacency of tenant agencies.

Most Desirable

Desirable

Least Desirable

Standardization Centralized < Localized ~ Regional < Localized ~ Governate < Decentralized

Centralized offers the best option for standardization in that centralized offers a common thread at all locations with in Iraq ultimately keeping cost down.

Most Desirable

Desirable

Least Desirable

Corruption

Localized~Regional < Centralized < Localized ~ Governate < Decentralized

Localized regional offers the best option for detecting corruption but in this society where bargaining is Critical to building ones image it can exist in all COAs the hardest to detect will be in a decentralized program



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Comparison Analysis (3 of 3)

Most Desirable

Desirable

Least Desirable

Cost

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Centralized < Localized ~ Regional < Localized ~ Governate < Decentralized

Centralized offers the best option for cost in that all locations will have one standard program, and equipment and will allow monies to be shifted to strength an area without requesting more dollars from the government



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Weighting Criteria

60	Cost 2	Corruption 1	Management 4	Training 3	Security 5	Standards 4	Quality Assurance 3
Decentralized (COA 1)	60	30	120	90	150	120	90
Centralized (COA 2) 1-5	2	5	20	3	25	4	3
Localized ~ Regional (COA 3) 4	8	4	16	12	20	16	12
Localized ~ Governate (COA 4) 18	36	18	72	54	90	54	54

The lower the number the better



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Weighting Criteria

660	Cost 2	Corruption 1	Management 4	Training 3	Security 5	Standards 4	Quality Assurance 3
Decentralized (COA 1)	60	30		m Jul	150	120	90
Centralized (COA 2)	2	5	20	3	25	4	3
Localized ~ Regional (COA 3)	8	4	16	12	20)	16	12
Localized ~ Governate (COA 4) 18	36	18		ين ين	90	54	54

The lower the number the better



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Pros & Cons Centralized COA 2 v.s Localized (Regional CPA) COA 3

- Cost: Centralized is better than Localized (Regional CPA)
- Corruption: Localized (Regional CPA) is better than Centralized
- Management: Localized (Regional CPA) is better than Centralized
- Quality Assurance: Centralized is better than Localized (Regional CPA)
- Security: Localized (Regional CPA) is better than Centralized
- Standardization: Centralized is better than Localized (Regional CPA)
- Training: Centralized is better than Localized (Regional CPA)

Most Impact —	Impact	Least Impac

• Security > Management > Training > Quality Assurance > Standardization > Cost > Corruption



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Recommendation

COA 2 Centralized

- Because of it's ability to standardize, train and provide better quality assurance and keep costs down better than the
 other COAs.
- Provides an almost equal service by being able to better respond (flexibility) to national level crisis and consequence type incidents (managing from the "beart" of the country)
- · Possess an ability to shift assets unimpeded without delay.
- Centralized Control presents the least amount of vulnerabilities and ensures that Iraq will be safe and secure
- · Centralized Control will be easiest to execute during TOA



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Ministry of the Interior

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10 Oct 03

COA 2 Up-close

1 Ministry (CPA) Lead/CJTF Support Command & Control	Personnel	Cost ~ Pay	Travel	Pros & Cons Centrally Managed
Ministry (CPA) FPS Cell National Level	7 CPA 5 Iraqis	\$1.5 Mil per year	7-10 days	+ Fast method to stand-up FPS Cell at all levels + Site Managers existing hires + Easiest to Transition off to Iraqi Government
FPS Managers DIV/GST Regional Level	9 CPA 9 Iraqis	\$1.8 Mil per year	14-21days	+ Incident CMD + Greater Flexibility + Reduces vulnerabilities + Better system for checks and balances - Ministries not in control of FPS
FPS Site Mangers Local Level	30 Iraqis per Region	\$648,000 per year	Now	* Way Ahead 1-2 yrs out CPA transitions to Iragi Government



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GUIDANCE

<u>CG</u>

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HHC	13134		CPL	16-Aug-03		Mag	16	15001		
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COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY Policy Paper Facility Protective Service (FPS) Guards 23 July 2003

<u>Background</u>: Facility security is vital to returning the functions of government to the people of Iraq. This makes security of public (and private) facilities a priority in the reconstruction of Iraq. Without facility security, workers cannot return to a safe work environment nor can the facilities be refurbished and provided with new equipment lest it be stolen or destroyed again.

Under the previous regime there was a vital infrastructure facility protection service, aka "police guards", that guarded many public facilities. To many Iraqi's this was an integral, though blatantly corrupt and thoroughly unprofessional, component of an overall security scheme. This guard service was a national-level force under the Ministry of Interior's (MOI) police function; it was assigned to multiple locations throughout the nation as required.

Guidance:

- The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) has decided that new Iraqi Ministry of Interior will no longer provide this force but will establish and enforce the standards for the training and employment of FPS guards. Those standards are listed in Annex A. The Ministry of Interior will also license private firms that employ or provide FPS guards. These standards take effect 1 August.
- 2. A CPA contracting vehicle will be established NLT 30 August under which FPS guards may be hired by public or private entities. Contractors will be licensed by the Ministry of Interior before providing any services and are subject to inspection by the Ministry at any time.
- 3. Each Ministry and municipality will hire PPS guards as it sees fit. These may be temporary hires or contracted guards; they will not be civil servants, they will comply with all standards established by the Ministry of Interior, and they will coordinate their actions with local police and other security forces.
- Regional Governates will coordinate the integration of FPS guards with police and other security forces within their areas of responsibility.
- 5. Private firms may hire or contract for FPS-like guards. They will be licensed by the Hinistery of Interior and operate in cooperation with local police and other security forces.
- 6. In Baghdad, by 5 August, CJTF 7 and the CPA will emplace a sustainable FPS model that appropriately protects all sites with added emphasis on those deemed most critical by the CPA. By this date, CJTF 7 will ensure that FPS guards on all protected public sites in Baghdad are in uniform, appropriately armed, and appropriately trained for their responsibilities. From this date, however, CJTF 7 will supervise and pay only those FPS guards on the "Most Critical Site" list at Annex B. All other FPS guards will be paid and supervised by Ministries and the Municipality of Baghdad.
- 7. Countrywide, by 1 October, CJTF 7 will hand over full responsibility for all FPS sites to Ministries or regional governates and will provide only reaction forces as coordinated by local commanders.

Annex A (FPS Standards)

- Uniform: FPS Guards will wear a grey shirt, navy blue trousers, grey beret, and brassard over left shoulder with "Facilities Protective Srevice" in bold Arabic text and small letters "FPS" in English below. Brassards may be further embroidered with the symbol of the organization for whom the Guards are working.
- 2. Guidelines for the Employment of FPS Guards:
- 3. Training:
 - a. FPS guards will receive a minimum of 3 days training in the minimum following subjects:
 - i. Interacting with the public.
 - ii. Standards of behavior
 - iii. Use of force
 - iv. Etc
 - b. Firms desiring to be licensed to train security guards will submit detailed programs to the Ministry of Interior for approval before training begins.
- 4. Individual Certification, Licensing, Badging:
- 5. Communications:
- 6. Licensing Contractors and Private Firms:
- 7. Inspections:

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The CJTF-7 Daily

02 October 2003

Operations

NORTH

- North AO Received 3.872 MIL Liters of Benzene, 5.946 MIL Liters of Diesel, 0.246 MIL Liters of Kerosene and 920 Tons of Propane.
- The Nineveh Schools Opened 01 OCT 03.
- 101AA Held a Ribbon Cutting at the Birzgirtan Primary School Northeast of Mosul.
- · A Total Of 2,123 Former Iraqi Military Paid

WEST

- A 3ACR Civil Affairs Team Went to Al Anah and Met with Sheik Jamal, the Acting Mayor, to Make the Final Payment of \$5,000 for the City's Water Project.
- 3BDE CA Personnel Went to the Town of Nassir Wa Al Salaam and Met with the Mayor and Engineers to Discuss the On-going Sanitation Project There.

CENTRAL SOUTH

 2,525 Schools in the Area of Operations are Open or Will Be Opened in the Next Ten Days. School Rehabilitations Have Provided Safe, Functional Classrooms for Students and Teachers.

NORTH CENTRAL

- . 2BCT Held a Ribbon Cutting Ceremony in the Diyala Province for the Employment Center and the Social Center Offices in Bagubah.
- Soldiers from the Division Surgeon's Office Began a Major Effort to Update the Medical Library at Tikrit Medical College.
- School Attendance in all North Central Provinces is Over 90%.



 Schools Opened in Baghdad Today Without Incident and with Considerable Positive Response to the Work Done Over the Summer.

SOUTH

- · 290 New Iraqi Army Recruits Departed Basrah Today for Balad.
- 57 Recruits have Completed ICDC Training with 472 Individuals Still Undergoing Training.
- A Total of 1,583 Former Iraqi Military Paid

Total Former Iraqi Military Paid To Date: 110,332

Meetings

Meeting 0700 Tactical Update Assessment Briefing Ambassador Meeting **CMATT Meeting** 0830 Strategic Communications Meeting 0900 Ministry of Health Staff Meeting 1130

Security Meeting 1200 1600

Ministry Audit Meeting Requirements Synchronization Board Program Review Committee (PRC)

Where CJTF-7 Ops Center AMB Bremer's Office CMATT Conference Boom CPA Conference Room **CPA MOH Offices** CJTF-7 Conference Room Baghdad Convention Center CJTF-7 Conference Room Ministries Conference Room

Attendees

CG & Staff, CPA Representatives CG, AMB Bremer, CPA Representatives C3, CMATT, CENTCOM PAO, CPA SC, IO SURG, MOH Representatives C9, Justice, Interior, Labor, Social Affairs CG, Selected Governate Council Members C3, C4, C7, C9, RCO C8, CPA Committee Members

Issues

Governance

 National Weapons Card Policy Awaiting Approval (JOC: COL CPA: Mr.

MOI CAT (JOC: COL CPA: Mr

Economy

 Ministry of Trade and Transportation Will Be Requesting Support for OFF Deliveries/Security (JOC: LTC 100.06)

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Expanded Narrative – Issues – 02 October 2003

OIL INFRASTRUCTI	JRE ISSUES	
POC: (C7, CPT	DNVT	DSN (
(TF RIO, CPT	CPT 289	DSN

Distribution:

- (U) The repairing of the 14" product line (Basarah to Nasiriyah).
 - o Repairs originally assessed to be done by end of Aug.
 - o TF Rio, traveled down to Basra on 25 Sept.
 - SCOP is trying to flush benzene out of the pipeline from Nasiriyah to Shuaiba. They cannot cut the pipe until this is done.
 - They are pumping water in, but nothing is coming out the other end, so they are troubleshooting.
 - After the benzene is flushed they will put in the 19 new bends and then hydrostatic test the pipe.
 - They are estimating 3 weeks to finish, but a lot depends on how long it takes to troubleshoot the flushing problems.
 - KBR offered assistance with on-site training to pump operators.
- (U) 101st Reported a pipeline fire at grid NE of Tall Afar
 - The initial investigation of the fire suggests it was caused by sabotage.
 - There is a 2-foot hole in the pipeline that appears to have been caused by and explosion.
 - The pipeline is not operational and the fire is the result of residual oil. Will allow fire to burn out.
 - No Impact as this is a low priority/inactive pipeline.
- (U) On 30 SEP 03, 1BCT (4ID) reported that a 3-66 AR patrol identified a suspected leak in a natural gas pipeline 18KM SW OF Bayji
 - The leak was identified because of the odor and "hissing" sound coming from the pipeline.
 - 3-66AR has contacted the Bayii refinery, and DTAC notified DIVENG.
- (U) 01 Oct TF-RIO reported a pipeline break 10 km South of Naftkhana.
 - TF-RIO says it's a 10" crude line.
 - No major Impact.
 - No further details; more to follow.

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Electrical Infrastructure Issues:

POC: LTC			CELL
CPT	DVNT	DSN	

Distribution:

- (U) An oil pipeline fire at Qayyarah West caused four towers along the Bayji-Mosul #2 line to collapse
 - Impact: The damage to the #2 line (1 of 2) will reduce the amount of power Mosul can distribute to Bayji or Bayji can distribute to Mosul.
 - Redundancy in the system is lost. Therefore, if the #1 line trips, it could cause regional or national grid failure.

COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY

Office of the Senior Advisor National Security and Defense Directorate of Industrial Conversion Baghdad, Iraq

July 16, 2003

HAND DELIVERED /IMMEDIATE ATTENTION

Director, Al-Khazin Company Iraq

Sir:

Thank you for your recent letter to Ambassador Bremer, concerning Al-Khazin Company problems. I have been asked to respond to you and to this problem immediately.

Enclosed please find a copy of an Official Memorandum confirming the transfer of your company.

Also enclosed please find an Official and Public Notice of Termination which is relevant to your complaint.

With best regards and with good wishes for a new Iraq.

Sincarely

Office of the Senior Advisor
National Security and Defense
Directorate of Industrial Conversion

Attachments

Bosides firing as
clinected by Amb. Bremes.
You can also follow up
that the original complaintant
to Amb. B (see a Hacked) rec'd
letter hand delivered
Thursday July 17. This
closer file completely

Excellency Ambasador Bremer

sub: CPA Decision Reversal by Ba'thist command sire,

An order was issued by the CPA (Mr. Slocum) to more my center Al. Khazin from MIC to the Ministry of Industry due to the need of the Ministries of oil and Industry for over services as a company. The Ba'th Porty commanders who still reign in MIC today reversed the CPA order for personal reasons. I happen to be discriminated against for several reasons. I am a Shi'ite, all my immediate family live in the USA, I happen to be a common of meaning the in the USA,

I request of your honor to investigate the matter to reactivate the original CPA order to move "AL-Khazin" to the Ministry of Industry. We forsee a great future in the upcoming rehabilitation of I ray and beyond. We see a

rehabilitation of I ray and beyond. We see a future in technological joint ventures with the west and privalization which we worked very hard to mature the past two months. Staying with MIC would be killing our additions and freedom

to decide our future

In behalf of all the employees of Al. Khazin I thank your Excellency for giving us back our freedom.

yours & incerely

Office of the Administrator Coalition Provisional Authority Baghdad, Iraq

July 13, 2003

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF, COMBINED JOINT TASK FORCE 7

FROM ADMINISTRATOR, COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY

SUBJECT: Tasking Letter - Weapons and Ammunition for New Iraqi Army (NIA)

Reference: Request from the Ministry of National Security and Defense (MND)

I request that the Commander, Combined Joint Task Force 7 take the appropriate action to provide the following items to the MND in order to train the NIA.

WHAT - 1000 AK-47s

4000 AK-47 magazines

30 light machine guns

80 9mm pistols

160 9mm pistol magazine

300,000 rounds of serviceable AK-47 ammunition

100,000 rounds of serviceable light machine gun ammunition

400 rounds of serviceable pistol ammunition

WHEN - No later than 30 July 2003

WHERE -- NIA training base at Kir Kush (West of Mandali in the sector of the 1st Battalion, 10th Cavalry Regiment, /Avn/4ID(M)

Direct coordination between the tasked unit(s) and the CPA representative listed below is requested.

The point of contact MND, NIPRNET em	for this request is CPT		nmercia	ice
(RCO) point of conta	ct is LtCol	or (NIPRNET)	He can be reached at	100
(3:sgr.)	or DSN	or Com	mercial Cell (MIC)	

Patrick Kennedy Chief of Staff

MEMORANDUM FROM Directorate of Medical Military Affairs

SUBJECT Membership Proposal

1. Propose the following personnel as interim members of the Executive Committee for the Directorate of Medical Military Affairs pending official approval from OCPA:

MG Dr. Hashim Husain Hashim
BG Dr. Zaid Fadhil Al-Saffar
BG Dr. Ali Hameed Rasheed
BG (Pharmacist) Faiz Fareed
COL Dr. (b)(6)
COL Dr.
LTC Dr.
LT Dr. (DX)
Warrant Officer Nurse
Warrant Officer Nurse

Specialty in Management and Fieldwork
Post Graduate Student in Plastic Surgery
Psychiatrist
Former Kimadia Military Representative
ENT Specialist
Dentist
General Practitioner
Resident
Nurse (Female)
Nurse (Male)

- The aforementioned meet the established OCPA criteria for committee membership and agree to adhere to all rules and regulations set forth by OCPA and the Ministry of Health.
- 3. The point of contact for this information is the undersigned, COL at DNVT or Thurya or Thurya or Thurya

S. Amachie
BG Dr. Shakir Mahmood Al-Ainachi

Director General

Directorate for Military Medical Affairs

COL

Senior Advisor, Military Medical Affairs

CJTF-7 Surgeon

Dear Dr payinolegred pour of view _ ations | had mudays. ane Really these are prosperly desirers Soldiers ivery you structure of tragi suices is

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build Irray of elevant—the level of Irray; poipus;—this is because mass Thing about this print, and it will be a very promision tray to elevant this morale of make his to the format of their children to toget about any oggresion.
- Thomkyon with best regards
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12° h / June / 2003

ACTION MEMORANDUM

1 July 2003

TO:

Presidential Envoy L. Paul Bremer

Administrator, Coalition Previsional Authority

FROM:

Senior Advisor, Minist

SUBJECT: Maximum-security prison-

SUMMARY AND PURPOSE

A maximum-security prison is urgently needed. Only Abu Ghraib prison could safely house an appreciable number of high-security detainees within three years. I therefore recommend that you approve reconstruction of temporary maximum-security cell blocks at Abu Ghraib, despite its grim reputation, pending construction of a new maximum-security facility at Kanban'i Saad. A memorial should be located at Abu Ghraib as soon as possible, with appropriate notice to the public.

DISCUSSION

As we discussed last week, the Coalition lacks a maximum-security prison for high-security detainees. Currently such detainees can only be confined at temporary facilities using tents and razor wire barriers. As you are aware, the deficiencies in such facilities have occasioned a number of demonstrations, riots and breakout attempts, resulting in two prisoners killed and over thirteen injured. Although to my knowledge no Coalition soldiers have been seriously injured, they are at grave risk.

Several alternatives for providing a maximum-security prison were investigated by and of the CPA Prisons Department-whose combined experience working in and operating prison systems exceeds a half-century -- and myself. Those alternatives are outlined in the attached memorandum from



Mr. ______to me. LTG Sanchez and I visited the Abu Ghraib and severely looted Kanban'i Saad prison sites on 28 June. We concluded that the only expeditious way to realize a safe maximum-security facility is to rehabilitate Abu Ghraib cell blocks, which could contain four thousand maximum-security prisoners within twelve months. No other facility could be established in appreciably less than three years. We have therefore already begun the first phase of reconstruction at Abu Ghraib.

All agree that Abu Ghraib's deservedly horrid reputation counsels against perpetuation of its use as a prison any longer than operational necessity demands. But the only alternatives we have available are even less palatable. Immediate reconstruction can and should therefore begin for a maximum-security facility at Kanban'i Saad, the next fastest alternative, for completion in three years or less. This would signal to Iraqis the phasing-out of Abu Ghraib, part or all of which should be turned into a memorial for those who suffered there. Ex-prisoner groups have expressed an interest in helping to establish such a memorial.

RECOMMENDED ACTION

That you approve the rehabilitation construction of a maximum-security prison facility already underway at Abu Ghraib and immediate ground-breaking for a replacement facility at Kanban'i Saad.

APPROVE	_ DISAPPROVE	_ APPROVE WITH MODIFICATION
(Attachment)		
Coordinated with:	LTG Sanchez	

Bernard Kerik

Senior Prisons Consultant

MEMORANDUM

TO:

FROM: Department of Prisons

SUBJECT: Alternatives for Maximum Security Prison Facilities

We are continuing to examine potential alternatives for housing maximum security and dangerous detainees/inmates in lieu of using the maximum security compounds located at the Abu Ghraib Prison complex for the shortest possible timeframes.

1. Review of existing assessed prison facilities earmarked for reactivation to support the Iraq criminal justice system currently and in the short term.

a. Al Hakmia (116 maximum security beds)

This prison complex was operated by the Iraq Internal Security Agency, commonly called the Secret Police. This facility housed high security "political" and foreign prisoners. It also obviously served as a major headquarters for the Agency. All buildings are brick/masonry structures with a plaster finish. The four-story main structure is the housing areas for all prisoners as well as a large administrative headquarters. Prisoner housing was on the 3rd and 4th floor levels. The third floor consists of 50 cells. Each cell was 9' x 9'. This cell block can accommodate 100 maximum security prisoners. The fourth floor consists of 8 additional maximum security cells. This facility can provide a total of 116 maximum security beds for high custody or dangerous inmates.

Kanban'i Saad Prison.

In the assessment team's initial inspection on May 24th of this new prison—that was under construction when the coalition forces began hostilities, there were 20 new cell blocks in two compounds that—provided—approximately 2,800 secure beds. Following the initial phase of hostilities, 153 Arab families moved into the complex. By June 12th, these Arabs had substantially disassembled the walls and structures rendering the facility unusable. Even though the structures have been mostly destroyed and cannot be refurbished for use in the immediate or short terms, there are foundations, infrastructure and some cell block structures that can be renovated and rebuilt. It would be necessary to relocate the Arab families in order to do a thorough estimate of what is needed to rebuild the cell blocks for permanent use. Although the team has not been able to do a complete assessment of the complex, it is estimate that the previously existing prison beds could be placed back into operation within twelve to eighteen months.

The Kanban'i Saad prison site is also considered an ideal location for future construction of a replacement maximum security prison(s) for the Abu Ghraib Prison complex. The complex is very large and has the potential capability of providing separate prison compounds to support the future Iraq criminal justice system's needs. Construction time for a new secure maximum security prison on this complex is estimated to be approximately thirty to thirty-six months.

Therefore, it is again strongly recommended that action be taken to relocate the Arab families occupying the site, and that the military secure this site so that planning and assessments can proceed in the near future.

c. No other prisons found throughout the country of Iraq are capable of housing maximum security inmates.

Other Alternatives.

New Construction. The team has recommended that a minimum of three (3) maximum security 3,000 bed modern modular designed state-of-the-art prisons be constructed throughout Iraq. The first one in the central area (Baghdad), and duplicates built in northern and southern Iraq. It is estimated that each of these prisons will cost approximately \$180 to \$200 million, and take 30 to 36 months to complete. This is considered to be the long-term permanent solution to fully support the needs of a fully operational criminal justice system.

Prefab cell Housing. The team is currently collecting information and data on the feasibility of bringing into Iraq prefab maximum security cell housing that can be placed in a timely manner to support the growing needs of the criminal justice system. There are companies that prefab cells that can be brought in and set in place, connected to sewer, water, electrical systems and be in operation quickly. Normally these systems are used to expand existing facilities. A US/UK company has been contacted for information. It is unknown if quantities of such prefab cells are available, how long it would take to obtain this type of housing, and what the costs of such construction would be. We hope to be able to have answers to these questions in the near future. This information may be available by the close of business on 26 June 2003

Prison ships/barges. The team is attempting to gather information on the feasibility of obtaining prison ships/barges that could be placed in the area of the Port of Um-Qasser. It is unknown if any such ships or barges exist that would be available within the near future, the cost of such a facility, and the ability to have the ship brought to Iraq. One team member has in the past researched this option and determined that it takes 12-18 months to build a prison ship or barge.

The major disadvantage of locating a prison ship at Um-Qasser is the logistics of transporting high security inmates on a twelve hour trip from Baghdad to southern Iraq. Given the opportunity for escape and ambush, the trip would be extremely labor intensive to insure safety and security of the transporting contingent.

The prison assessment team will continue to explore other alternatives to the use of Abu Ghraid Prison. At this point in time, we have found no other facilities that can provide up to 4,000 maximum security beds between now and the end of this year. The team supports the use of Abu Grab prison only until new facilities can be constructed. The estimated time frame would be 30 to 36 months once approval for new construction is received. Once assessed, perhaps the use of the Kanban'i Saad prison site can shorten the estimated time that a new prison could be constructed and in operation.



cc: Deputy Senior Advisor, Ministry of Interior





1st Armored Division Tier 2 & 3 Site TOA

30 July 2003



1AD Commander's Intent



1st Armored Division transfers authority of 200 Tier 2 sites and 115 Tier 3 sites to the Ministries' Facility Protection Service (FPS) guards, while continuing to monitor the security of Baghdad's vital facilities and infrastructure.



Review of TOA Criteria



- TOA criteria include the following:
 - 100% of fixed-site security requirements filled by hired, screened, and trained FPS
 - FPS site and employee database submitted to CPA
 - FPS command and control (C2) and communications architecture proposal submitted to CPA
 - FPS employees provided temporary identification badges and ROE cards
 - Assessment phase scheduled and implemented by 1st
 Armored Division



Current Issues



1 of 2

- · Uniforms.
 - Berets on hand
 - 550 uniforms on hand
 - Brassards due-in 30 Jul 03
 - Additional uniform requisition
- Badges
 - Temporary badges issued to guards
 - Permanent badges produced by DynCorp (Ministry of Interior)
- · Weapons.
 - 1 per every 2 guards Level 2 Sites
 - 1 per every 3 guards Level 3 Sites



Current Issues



2 of 2

- · Communications.
 - 1AD contracted 350 radios (1 per site and corresponding IP station) with expected delivery date of 15 Aug 03
 - 1AD provided CPA with 1.75M contract for short- and long-term C³
- Salary.
 - 1AD is currently paying employee salaries until CPA is ready to assume responsibility (projected as 1 Sep)
 - Payments will be made through Commanders
 Emergency Response Program (CERP) funds



Tentative Timeline



- 31 Jul 550 sets of uniforms to Thawra & 9 Nissan
 1 Aug TOA (Tier 2 and 3)
- ~1 Aug Receipt of weapons from CPA
- ~15 Aug Receipt of uniforms
 ~15 Aug Receipt of radios
- By 1 Oct TOA (Tier 1 sites)
- Aug-Dec Security assessment



TOA Conclusion



- 1AD will continue to designate Baghdad's 532 fixed sites as named areas of interest.
- Units will conduct security assessments of these sites after TOA.
- As Iraqis return to work and live in facilities, they will provide an additional layer of security – CPA must leverage this layer





1st Armored Division Chief of Staff



Facts



- · Our goals are mutual
- There will be some mistakes; we cannot let this stop progress
- Every US soldier guarding a fixed site is one less soldier finding bad guys
- Your soldiers are paying in blood, and in two cases with their lives, to guard fixed sites
- The 1AD Force Protection
 Team will visit every critical
 Tier I site and assess the protection provided in the next 60 days



1LT Jonathun D. Rozier KIA: 19 July 2003 Bagkdad



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

HEADQUARTERS, 1ST ARMORED DIVISION UNIT 24309 APO AE 09252

AETV-THW-A

11 July 2003

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Requirements for FPS Communications

- 1. 1AD is looking for communications support for FPS sites across Baghdad. The sites are
 distributed across the city and require the capability to talk to a regional FPS site or to the
 local police station in a crisis. A network will be established from the FPS sites to a districts
 base station. The FPS site will provide power for the radio charger and for base stations
 where installed. The requirements are:
 - a. One vendor for all 532 FPS sites and 35 police stations
 - b. Each FPS site will include
 - i. I radio with extra battery and charger
 - ii. Power connector
 - c. One base station for each district (9 total)
 - d. Programming software for each radio
 - e. Radios will be unsecure
 - f. Installation of base stations
 - g. Training on use and programming of the radio systems.
- 2. Concept of the operation: Each FPS site will have one radio for emergency communications to a regional base station or local police station. Each police station will also be provided a radio for use on the FPS net. One base station will be set up in each of the nine districts to monitor activity. MP police base stations can be programmed to scan the unsecured network as an additional means for communications connectivity.

3.	Point of contact for IAD is MAJ	(6Me)	or
		(bu6)	
		MAJ, SC Deputy G6	

Washington Times October 6, 2003 Pg. 1

Use Of Private Security Firms In Iraq Draws Concerns

By Borzou Daragahi, The Washington Times

KIRKUSH, Iraq — The use by the Pentagon of more than a dozen private security companies to guard key installations and train a new Iraqi army has helped extend U.S. military resources but raised concern among some active-duty soldiers and civilian U.S. officials.

That trend was on display recently here in northeastern Iraq, where the U.S. authority proudly displayed a battalion-size set of recruits it hopes will form the core of a new pro-American Iraqi army.

The camouflage-clad recruits — young and middle-aged, Kurdish, Arab and Turkoman — marched in formation, launched ambushes and fired their weapons for a group of visiting reporters.

But their training was being handled not by U.S. forces but a group of gray-suited specialists under contract from the Vinnell Corp., a subsidiary of American defense giant Northrop Grumman. Vinnell, in turn, has subcontracted most of the Kirkush training to MPRI, an Alexandria firm that helped train the new Croatian and Bosnian armies.

"The Iraqi army is such an essential component for the future of Iraq in terms of avoiding civil war," said Rex Wempen, a Baghdad-based security consultant and former Special Forces member. "It shows how embedded the [private military contractors, or PMCs] are in the thinking of the Department of Defense that they would use them to train that army."

At a time when the overstretched U.S. military is struggling to persuade other nations to send troops to help secure Iraq, PMCs can relieve some of the pressure on American forces.

"If you're going to keep the number of troops down, this is the way to do it," said Mr. Wempen. "The expense is the same or more. But politically it's much less expensive."

Staffed by ex-military personnel, the private firms are playing an increasingly visible role in Iraq:

- *Armed employees of Custer Battles, a Fairfax firm, guard Baghdad airport, manning the type of checkpoints often operated by American soldiers.
- *Erinys, a British company with offices in the Middle East and South Africa, guards the oil fields.
- *Global Risk, a British firm offering "risk management" advice, has the contract to provide armed protection for the Coalition Provisional Authority, the U.S.-led power.
- *DynCorp of Reston has been hired to help train Iraq's police.

Much of the work is conducted by former soldiers who retain high security clearances, said an Iraq-based former U.S. military official who requested anonymity.

6 October 03

Memorandum for Ambassador Bremer

From: Walt Slocombe

Subject: Conscript Payment Issues

This memo outlines what we know about the payment for former Iraqi Army conscripts, the disturbances across the country, and my recommendation on whether to reopen for payments and where.

Briefly, here are some statistics:

- Before Saturday, we had paid 329,777 of roughly 440,000 former conscripts on the old MOD list we have and that we used as the sole test of eligibility (75%)
- On Saturday, we paid an additional 16,802 at 8 of 9 sites. We did not pay anyone at Basra, where there were significant disturbances.
- Our conscript payment numbers therefore now stand at 354,096 or roughly 80.5% of the mid-April roles. (Note that the total number of former conscripts is less than our mid-April records show due to deaths, incarcerations, emigrations, people who don't think \$40 is worth the trip, etc....so the paid percentage is certainly higher of those who are both eligible and want to seek payment.)
- At 3 locations, Diwaniya, Nasariya, and Mosul, local Commanders and Stipend Payment teams, of their own accord, determined that, due to delays from minor disturbances on Saturday and people standing in line in orderly fashion when they closed they needed more time so they opened on Sunday, paying an additional 7517 personnel.
- No other location paid on Sunday (or today, Monday, so far as we can tell).

Bear in mind that, at least at Baghdad, relatively few of those who showed up on Saturday were on the roster, and therefore are not ever going to be paid no matter how long the sites stay open. Given the high percentage who have already been paid, that is likely to be the case for many others who would seek payment on additional dates, if we offered them.

I believe we need to make decisions on continuing payments at 3 locations only:

Baghdad: We remained open Saturday until every person in line was attended to...2115 hrs. Unfortunately, earlier in the day an unnamed, low-ranking police official, acting independently, had told some of the crowd to come back the next day for pay, and some people may have gone home in reliance on that. An undetermined number likely in the hundreds did. Those were the ones you heard about this AM. They may have been told - again by a policeman without authority—to try again today. To the best of our

knowledge no one showed up at the site this morning. We understand that some Baghdad radios are saying that the station will re-open tomorrow.

_Recommendation: I believe we should <u>not reopen</u> the Baghdad site.. We physically cannot reopen tomorrow, because the teams don't know to come in. Having stayed open late on Saturday, most of those most eager to be paid have been taken care of. We cannot validate unauthorized police promises, much less media rumor. While there may be more trouble, we will do better to firmly announce that payments at Baghdad are finished.

Approved: Disapproved: Open Baghdad as soon as possible:

Basra: The crowd that overran the Basra site burned all of our payment records. These paper records were the only documentation of who had been paid and who had not. We believe that there are approximately 6000 former conscripts from Basrah, Medinat al Mudun, and Maysan on the list who have not been paid – a somewhat higher percentage than overall. However, it would take us several weeks, well into the Currency Conversion period, before we could resume payments, because we would need to transcribe individual chits filled out by those who received pay and consolidate them into an reasonably accurate and inclusive list to use as the basis for checking any future payments. I am also concerned that the type of violence we saw Saturday will recur if we reopen the Basra site.

Recommendation: Accordingly, I recommend we not reopen Basra.

Approve: Disapprove: Reopen Basra as soon as a list is ready Other:

Babel/Hilla: At this pay-site there was a minor disturbance on Saturday, but the crowd generally remained disciplined and quiet. The site paid 4598 former conscripts that day, over 600 more than any other site, including Baghdad. The local commander and site manager closed the site at 1900 on Saturday at dark for security reasons with persons still in line. They did not open on Sunday as they did not think they had the authority. We estimate 15,000 former conscripts on the list remain unpaid at this site. (The conscript population was heavily Shia.) Both the site manager and the local (Polish) unit want to reopen the site. We estimate it will take 4 days to complete payments there.

Recommendation: Nevertheless, I believe we should <u>reopen</u> the Babel / Hilla site and pay for 4 days, starting at an early date determined by the local commander.

Approve: Disapprove: Keep it closed for consistency:

والمحافظة المراجع والمستحدث والمناع والمناعد المارية

2ND.L	1ST.L	CAPT	MAJ	LT.COL	COL	BG	MG	LG	M.LG	HAR	TOTAL	GROUP	Ì
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مقعة 1 من 1

ء منهمين ۲۰۰۶

OTHER	FRKA	SHUBA	FAREE	MKTB	QEADA	TOTAL	GROUP
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431	41	4				476	قدانيو صدام
566	101	1				668	جرس چمهوري څ ا ص
170	1	1	1200	-		172	مخابرات
22	9	16	7	38	8	100	كبار المستشارين
48	9	1	1			59 .	هيئة المرافقين
2234	5429	695	149	65	8	8580	

Both Party Military Intel Fedayean Special Rep. Guard Intelligence Sr. Advisors Body Guards

Bath only

2ND.L	1ST.L	CAPT	MAJ	LT.COL	COL	BG	MG	LG	M.LG	MAR	TOTAL	BATH DEGREE	
							4	1	2	1	8	عضو قبادة قطرية	Udw aigadal
					10	7	40	7	1	15	65	عضو مكتب	UNW Makto
	10	2	1	3	12	16	100	4	1		149	عضو أترع	Udw Fira
	3	22	72	26	78	265	193	31	5		695	عضو شعبة	Udw Shuba
32	82	298	487	1029	1302	1749	436	12	2		5429	عضو فرقة	Udw Firea
32	95	322	560	1058	1402	2037	773	55	11	1	6346		

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بالحة ا من ا

Memorandum Addressed to the Honorable Walt Slocombe By Staff Lieutenant General Neemat Fares (Retired)
Submitted By Major General Mounzer Nalo (Retired)

Problems Facing Iraq At The Present Time

- 1. Iraq is facing several problems at present and the most important are:
 - a. Security
 - b. Unemployment
 - c. Services especially Security
- 2. If we were to focus on those major problems, we would find that they are inter-related; therefore, unemployment causes insecurity because it incites feelings of revenge. Certainly, the occupation is one of the causes of unemployment. Moreover, there are thousands of unemployed due to the disbandment of the Iraqi armed forces, Internal Security Force, Intelligence, Information (Ministry) and other employees from other ministries which had compounded past problems.

In my judgment, this latest unemployment would lead to acts of revenge which may look individualistic at first. However, in due course it would be organized in small and secret cells to undertake group revenge or terrorist acts; and it would ultimately lead to loss of security and control over utilities and government facilities.

The interruption of electricity for a long time during the day and in difficult weather conditions in addition to psychological effects due to the occupation disrupts of individual and collective security, as well as the security of the occupier, and in turn encourages blackmail, theft and looting of public and private properties, and organized killings of individuals and groups in darkness. Consequently, it will lead to a loss of control and security which would show the complete impotence of the Coalition Forces.

The Coalition Forces do not understand Iraqi society and cannot thoroughly explore the feelings and thoughts of the people, unless they rely on Iraqis in this difficult and complicated mission. Otherwise, the security situation will get out of control and will cause internal infighting. This has appeared recently in the incidents between the Turkmen and Kurds; and it could take place in other areas in the south.

- 3. In this kind of situation that Iraq is traversing, there will be a race between those forces which are striving to convulse security and stability and those which are working to restore stability, re-building of state institutions and to start up the government. Surely, this requires effective and rapid measures among which are the following:
- a. Perhaps, the Coalition Forces had a reason to disband the Iraqi Army because it feared that that Army would pose a threat in the near future. However, the manner in which the disbandment was executed and the way that was carried out were not appropriate. This has surely caused the loss of security due to unemployment, and the fostering of feelings of revenge because it deprived people of an income and a status that they had enjoyed under the previous regime. This also applies to the resources of Security Forces, Intelligence and Police. It would have been more appropriate to gradually vet (weed out) the undesirables in those institutions, especially those ones who had committed crimes, and would have retained the rest and entrusted them with missions of internal security and border control.

In order to provide a quick solution to the security problems, I opine that:

First: Recall to active duty the Border Forces and assign to them the mission of surveillance and control especially on the eastern and western borders. In case that this proposal is approved, then the border will be controlled and protected through fixed positions, roving patrols among those fixed positions, with the retention of a reserve force as a back-up.

Second: The same applies to the Oil Protection Forces (facilities, pipelines). I suggest recalling immediately those forces and assigning to them the mission as it was done in the past. This does not preclude the participation of tribes in certain areas, whereby they are assigned to partake in the mission in exchange for contracts and salaries and holding them responsible for any security shortcomings.

Third: There used to be a clear importance attached to the Internal Security Forces, whereby they controlled the streets by knowing the criminals, pursuing them and maintaining information about them. In order to ensure a secure and stable situation, the assistance of those forces would be sought to undertake security missions either by re-constituting the security departments, having its members rejoining them and vetting the undesirable

elements or by creating security departments affiliated with Police general departments in the capital and in the governorates.

Fourth: The counter-criminal departments maintain a lot of information on criminals and those with a criminal past. Those departments were fully capable of pursuing and arresting criminals any time a security disturbance occurred. I call for the re-constitution of those departments as soon as possible in order to assist in the mission of security and stability, and to punish those who are guilty of crimes past and present.

- b. Creation of National Guard units in each governorate. The size of the units will correspond to the size of the population in each governorate. And therefore, I suggest the creation of these units from members of the disbanded Iraqi Army or from the New Iraqi Army as a matter of expediency.
- c. The CPA has a duty to ensure well-being and therefore to give special attention to the security factor because it is one of the duties of the occupier in accordance with the Geneva Convention. This could be accomplished in cooperation between the Coalition Forces and the Iraqis.

The Iraqis are most capable than any other international force because they are aware of the intricacies of the situation, and they are knowledgeable about people, traditions, customs and language. Therefore, I believe the necessity of excluding Arab forces is due to, first, the sensitivity of Iraqis, and second, to avoid the experiences of Arab armies in other Arab countries such as the Iraqi Army in Jordan, the Syrian Army in Lebanon and the Egyptian Army in Yemen. In addition, there is the possibility of those armies being sympathetic with extremist fundamentalists or terrorists or being exploited by the terrorists. As a consequence, it will create new security conditions fiercer than at the present time. The hope is not to solve a problem by creating a bigger one.

d. A state cannot be truly called a state unless the following conditions are fulfilled:

First, the policeman to preserve security.

Second, the soldier to defend the nation.

Third, the judge to ensure justice and accountability.

Therefore, I suggest to recall immediately most of the police (local and rescue) and reinforcing them with adequately trained members to ensure security and stability. The same applies to the Border Force and Oil Protection Forces, and other forces to protect the governorates and the borders from outside infiltration coming from the east (Iran, Afghanistan and Chechnya) and from the west (Wahabi fundamentalists, and members of Al-Qaida and the extremist jihadists).

The acceleration of restoring prestige to the judges and courts in order to play their role in achieving accountability and justice.

- e. Democracy does not mean political and media chaos, also it does not mean absolute liberty. It is imperative during the transitory period that Iraq is going through; there should central guidance in this domain. It is inappropriate that there are more than 100 daily newspapers which publish as they please. Whereas in Austria, we see no more than 5 newspapers published daily.
- 4. Reliance by the Coalition administration at the present time on Iraqi individuals, who were overseas for a long period of time due to the political situation, may not produce sound advice in most circumstances because of their long absence from the country. And because they were not aware of the numerous misfortunes which befell the country neither did they suffer as the Iraqis who remained in country. I therefore suggest that the Coalition should seek the advice of those Iraqis who have lived in Iraq, through a high-level advisory committee consisting of known figures of political, military and technocratic backgrounds, to assist the Coalition and to ensure a sound path for the nation.
- 5. Managing the Border Forces, the Oil Protection Forces and the National Guard in the governorates, and the units of the New Iraqi Army require in my opinion the establishment of a supreme headquarters, which is capable to command and manage in coordination with the Coalition Forces and Administration during the transitory period; thus ensuring the best command, control and management. This could be done through a ministry of defense or by creating a general command for the armed forces with all the required organizational and administrative staffs, in order to enable a minister or commander-in-chief to carry out their mission thoroughly.

- 6. The annihilation of the Iraqi Army units and also its disbandment may have caused the proliferation and distribution of its weapons all over Iraq, be it heavy, medium or light. These weapons present an appealing target to terrorists and fundamentalist extremists who are spending money to buy them and use them. Therefore, the manner upon which the Coalition Forces have relied to collect those weapons is inadequate because it lacks the incentive to relinquish them. A system of compensation and reward must be adopted in order to collect the weapons and deny the terrorists from acquiring them; the rewards and compensations should be measured against the value of the weapons. I suggest that a statement would be released through the Iraqi and even Arab media; provided that the statement is well deliberated prior to its release, so that it meets the desired target.
- 7. In closing, I am well aware that the problems are plenty and the responsibilities shouldered by the new regime are great. However, it is possible to attain the desired goal and establish security and stability by providing the basic needs of life especially those that are services related, and by achieving security through measures which I have outlined above.

I emphasize that security is everybody's mission, beginning with the occupation force being one of its main responsibilities as well as of the Iraqis who have a vested interest in the stability of their country, its progress and prosperity. Certainly, the mission of security has to be accorded a very special significance, due to the fact that there is a quick race between those who want instability for Iraq and those who desire progress, prosperity and stability.

Original Signed

Staff Lieutenant General Neemat Fares 24 August 2003

Instructions from the CPA

- 1. A one-time \$40 stipend payment to military conscripts will begin on 13 September 2003 and end on 4 October 2003. This payment will be for conscripts who were on active duty as of 16 April 2003. No one else is eligible to receive this payment. Eligible former conscripts will also be asked to provide some information concerning their civilian and military education and training. This information will be used by the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, assisted by the International Organization for Migration, to design future employment and training programs. Iraqi administrators chosen by the Coalition Provisional Authority will administer the stipend payments.
 - 2. The following pay sites will service those people who were conscripted through induction centers as detailed below:

Payment	Payment Site Location	Old Iraqi Military
City		Conscription Center
Mosul	Sanobar Restaurant-close to Mosul forest	Nineva, Ashur, Al Jazeera
Kirkuk	Main Shopping Center	Kirkuk, Dialah, Eastern Areas
Tikrit	Al-Alam Youth center	Salahadin
Ramadi	Social Security Bldg- across from the main court bldg	Al-Anbar, Western Areas
Baghdad	Muthena Airport	Rasaafa, Karkh, Salaam, Saddam, Rasheed, Waasit
Diwaniyah	Diwaniyah Textile Factory	Qaadisiyah
Babil	Address to be announced later	Babil, Karbala, Najaf
Nassariah	Nassariah Stadium	Thi Qar, Ur, Muthena
Basrah	Basrah Port	Basrah, Medinat al Mudun, Maysan

3. Hours of operation will be from 8:00 AM to 4:00 PM, except on Fridays. Those in line at 4:00 PM who are still waiting to be paid will be allowed entrance into the pay site. The following categories will be paid on the days shown below:

1st Letter of Name	Birth Year	Date
a	1981 and below	13 September
a	1982, 1983, 1984	14 September
ხ,t,th.j		15 September
H	1981, 1982, 1984	16 September
H	1983, 1980 and below	17 September
Kh,d, <u>d</u> ,r		18 September
z,s,sh		20 September

s, <u>s,t,th</u>		21 September
ain	1980 and below	22 September
ain	1981, 1984	23 September
ain	1982	24 September
ain	1983	25 September
gain,q,f		27 September
k,l,n		28 September
m	1980 and below	29 September
m	1981, 1982	30 September
m	1983,1984	1 October
h,w,y		2 October
Make-up		4 October

- 4. Conscripts must bring the following documents to the pay site:
 - Ration ID Card
 - · Civilian ID Card
- 5. Your name must be on the list to be paid.
- 6. You must fill out a registration form prior to being paid. This form will be distributed at no charge to the recipient.
- 7. You must go to your designated pay location on the day corresponding to the first letter of your first name, as shown in the above list, or else you will not be paid.
- 8. Absolutely no weapons will be allowed on the pay site. People who are disorderly will be removed from the pay site and will not receive their stipend payment. Those attempting to bribe officials will be detained.
- 9. The pay sites will not be used to recruit people for the New Iraqi Army.
- 10. Additional requirements may be announced later.
- 11. We request your cooperation and assistance to make this a beneficial and successful process.

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CENTCOM

"Iraqi Energy Production & Distribution Conference" 25-27 Aug 03

- Background
- Draft Conference Goal & Objectives
- Draft Agenda
- Draft Attendance List
- Draft Conference Roles (CENTCOM Staff Tasking)
- Planning Timeline
- Breakout Group Guidelines

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25-27 Aug "Iraqi EP&D Conference"



Background

"Disaffection among the population, associated with the inability to restore basic services, is a principal source of instability. The obstacles to progress in this area include a lack of production and distribution capacity, the dilapidated and fragile infrastructure, corruption and smuggling, and sabotage and looting, the effects of which are magnified by the infrastructure's fragility and lack of redundancy. The problem of power generation and distribution is the most fundamental source of popular disaffection because it causes unemployment, encourages criminal activity, dashes expectations that the Coalition would affect significant improvements, complicates oil and fuel production and thereby reduces government revenue, prevents production of other critical commodities, reduces water availability, and is the primary cause of general discomfort and inconveniences in Iraqi daily life. Moreover, plans to distribute limited electricity among the provinces and the city of Baghdad risk reinforcing Iraqi sectarianism because local leaders view power distribution as a zero sum game. General disaffection among the populace is building and provides a pool of manpower to those who are inciting (and paying for) attacks against coalition forces and infrastructure " -- COL FOR CENTCOM CAG, 10 Aug 03



25-27 Aug "Iraqi EP&D Conference"



Conference Goal & Objectives (Draft)

- Goal: Outline way ahead to develop a CENTCOM "energy production and distribution" campaign plan to improve the security and stability of Iraq
- Objectives / Deliverables: Immediate ("triage") and long-term ways forward for:
 - · Infrastructure security (oil & power) and counter-smuggling
 - Oil infrastructure repairs and upgrade
 - · Electric infrastructure repairs and upgrade
 - · Fuel (petroleum) distribution

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UNCLASSIFIED 25-27 Aug "Iragi EP&D Conference"



Conference Agenda (Draft)

- · Sun. 24 Aug (Day 0) Non-CENTCOM Participants Travel
- Mon. 25 Aug (Day 1) Introductory Briefings to non-CENTCOM Participants CENTCOM Participants (CPA, CJTF-7, etc.) Travel
 - Iraqi Security Situation Overview (J3)
 - · Iraqi Oil Infrastructure and Production Situation Overview (J4-E)
 - Iraqi Electric Power Infrastructure Situation Overview (J4-E)
- Iraqi Fuel Distribution Sauation Overview (J5-CMO)
 Tue, 26 Aug (Day 2) Current Situation Briefs and Working Group Sessions
 - · Morning CPA & CJTF-7 Current Plan Briefs oil industry, electric industry, distribution, security
 - · Afternoon Breakout Sessions:
 - · Electric and Oil Infrastructure Security Improvements Breakout Session (J3)
 - · Oil Infrastructure Repairs & Improvements Breakout Session (J4-E)
- Electric Power Infrastructure Repairs & Improvements Breakout Session (J4-E)
 Fuel Distribution Breakout Session (J5-CMO)
 Wed, 27 Aug (Day 3) Wargaming & Out-Briefs (Decision Briefs?) to CDR, USCENTCOM

 - · Morning War-Garning Sessions (1 hour per functional area x 4)
- Afternoon Out-Briefs & Campaign Way Ahead Recommendations to CDR (J4. Gp Ldrs) . Thu, 28 Aug (Day 4) - Travel to Home Stations, all Participants

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25-27 Aug "Iragi EP&D Conference"



Conference Attendees

- HO USCENTCOM: CDR, J3, J4 (J4-E, S4-M, JMC), J5, J6, J8, JSD, SJA
- CPA: Administrator or CoS, Directors of Economic and Security Policy, Bechtel & KBR reps
 CJTF-7: CDR or D/CDR, C3, C4, C5, C7, C8, SJA, TF RIO, USACE IPC
- · Iraqi Govt: Interim Oil, Electricity, Hydrology and Transport Ministers
- US Govi Agencies:
 - · Joint Staff · US Army Corps of Engineers
 - DIA
 - DESC
 - · Dept of Energy
 - · Dept of Transportation
- US Industry Reps.
 - · Tennessee Valley Authority

 - Oil Industry Reps (ChevronTexaco, Shell, or other)
 Bulk Fuel Distribution/Transport Industry Reps (Mattack or other)
- · UK (MND-SE or other) Reps

CHALLENGE: Balance need to get all important players & SMEs in versus keeping group small enough to be effective

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25-27 Aug "Iraqi EP&D Conference"



Conference Roles - Staff Tasking (Draft)

- · Conference Facilitator J4 lead
- Conference Host (Admin/Log Support) J4 lead, with J1, PA, & Protocol assist
- Breakout Session Leaders:
 - Infrastructure Security Breakout Session J3 lead, J8 & JAG participate
 - Electric Power Production Breakout Session J4-E lead, J8 & JAG "
 - · Oil Production Breakout Session J4-E lead, J8 & JAG participate
 - Fuel Distribution Breakout Session J5-CMO lead, J8 & JAG participate
- "Campaign Plan" Way Ahead Milestones J4 lead, full staff assist

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25-27 Aug "Iraqi EP&D Conference"



Conference Planning Timeline (Draft)

- NLT 13 Aug CDR/J4 message announcing conference & inviting attendees (J4 draft)
- NLT 14 Aug Non-US Govt attendees invited by letter from CDR (CAG draft w/ SJA, Protocol & J4 assist)
- NLT 19 Aug All admin/log support in place (conference site, billeting, etc.) (J4)
- NLT 20 Aug Read-Aheads approved by CDR and published to attendees (J4 w/ J3 read-ahead on security and J5 read-ahead on fuel distribution)

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25-27 Aug "Iraqi EP&D Conference"



Breakout Group Guidelines

- · Way Ahead proposals must be broken into two categories:
 - · Immediate ("triage") recommendations
 - Long Term improvements
- J8-RM and JAG rep with every Breakout Group to provide resource & legal advice
- Pol-Mil rep (PoAd, PA, State, USAID, as available) with every group or rotate among groups to provide diplomatic and informational advice



NECESSARY INFRASTRUCTURE FOR SUPPORT AND SUSTAINMENT



Every modern Army in the world has an infrastructure that feeds it, equips it, pays it, sends it replacements, and generally directs its activities.....THE NEW IRAQI ARMY IS NO DIFFERENT!




Prior to, but no later than, the roll out of the first operational battalion in the new Iraqi Army, specific elements of its infrastructure must be established in order for it to be supported and sustained.



Functions needed to support and sustain the new IA:

- Base detachments (nucleus), administrative in nature, that are established for every garrison to provide necessary base management and support.
- Brigade HQs (nucleus) that are operationally and/or administratively capable, and available to CJTF-7
- •An Army HQ (nucleus) that will provide the support and sustainment down to the IA units.





(1) Unit Cooks work in base mess halls when not deployed



Brigade Command Element


(Three needed within nine months)





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SUMMARY OF INFRASTRUCTURE NEEDED:

- 1. Four Base Detachments for garrisons currently planned for:
 - Up to (21) officers, (196) enlisted men and civilian employees (TBD).
 - Miscellaneous commercial vehicles, office furniture, warehouse equipment, etc.
 - Contracted services wherever possible (TBD)



SUMMARY OF INFRASTRUCTURE NEEDED:

2. A Brigade HQ (nucleus) by 1 December 03; a second one by 15 February 04; and a third one by 1 May 04:

- Up to (28) officers and (304) enlisted men each
- Tactical vehicles, communications equipment, and engineer equipment (if combat engineer company(s) established).



SUMMARY OF INFRASTRUCTURE NEEDED:

3. Army Headquarters staff (nucleus)

- Up to (97) officers, (214) enlisted men and (TBD) civilian employees.
- Miscellaneous commercial vehicles, office furniture, warehouse equipment, etc.
- Contracted services wherever possible (TBD)

SUMMARY OF INFRASTRUCTURE NEEDED:

Totals needed:

- Up to (265) officers
- Up to (1914) enlisted men
- Up to (TBD) civilian employees
- Various vehicles, engineer equipment, and organizational property associated with this infrastructure.



ACTIONS NEEDED:

Done

Approval to create a new Iraqi Army

By 20 Aug • Delegation of authority to create the Army

clarified ASAP

By 25 Aug • Establish officer selection, vetting and appointing criteria

By 25 Aug • Determine and allocate FY03 and FY04 funds necessary for this infrastructure

By 25 Aug • Implement refurbishment plan and contract for interim IA HQ buildings



ACTIONS NEEDED:

- By 1 Sep Convene officer selection boards.
- By 6 Sep Establish an interim G-1 officer/enlisted assignments section
- By 15 Sep Plan POI for a short IA officers Orientation

 Course for officers receiving direct

 appointments.

Agenda

- Finance
 - Current FY03 Financial State
 - The Problem
 - Options
 - Observations of the financial process
- Logistics & Communication Issues
- If we get time (heads up on construction plan – noting may change as a result of today).

Current FY03 Financial State

CAPITA	_	OPERATING						
Approved Budget:	120.00M	Approved Budget:	45.00M					
Incl PRBs worth:	10.40M	Incl PRBs worth:	9. 70M					
Plus extra PRBs:	9.84M	Plus extra PRBs:	19.79M					
TOTAL:	129.84M	TOTAL:	64.79M					
PRBs Dispersed:	1.03M	PRBs Dispersed:	3.49M					
Other Dispersements:	11M?	Other Dispersements:	24M?					
CURRENT STATE:	117.81M?	CURRENT STATE:	37.7 M ?					
Planned:	212M	Planned:	173.6M					
(172M in Facilities)		(102M in Stipends)						
SHORTFALL:	82.16M	SHORTFALL:	108.81M					

USA Appropriations are in addition to the above

THE PROBLEM!

Need to drop \$20M from the Capital Budget in an environment where we actually want an additional \$82M

Even with \$120M we cannot build the facilities required, in the places required to meet C5 defined capability requirements & the training schedule.

2 Options presented and effects explored

FACILITY	JUN 03	JUL 03	AUG 03	SEP 03	OCT 03	NOV 03	DEC 03	END OF YEAR FY 03	FUNDING		
RECRUITING .45M FY 03	P	PHI	3 X	RECRUIT	ING STA	TIONS C	2100 102 7	3 RECRUITING STATIONS AND ADDITIONAL STATIONS READY FOR CONSTRUCTION	.45		
KMTB TRAINING 50 M FY 03	P	PH BA		RE SE IIB I (E1)	PHA	2BN (E2) 3B) IN (C4) 4BN (E1)	2 BNS TRAINED 2 BNS IN TRAINING 3 BNS STARTING TRNG IN NEXT QUARTER	50 M		
GARRISON 30M FY 03 20M FY 04		[PRE		PH	BN 2 ASE IIC REP III	BNS PH III	3 BNS AND BDE HQ GARRISONED	30 M		
TADJI 50M FY03 20M FY03 40M FY04		PREP PHASE II - REFURB PREP PH I PH I - CLEARAI		3 18N		2BNS AND BDE HQ GARRISONED	50 M 20 M				
N NUMAANIA 20M FY03 80M FY04				PREP	1	REFURB		1 BN GARRISONED	20 M		
MOSUL 100M FY04				•			PREP	CONTRACT TO BE LET ON 01 JAN 04	0		
ARMY HQ 1 X BRKS .15M FY03				PREP	PREP	PHI	PH (I	1 X BARRACKS	.15 M		
NAVAL/AF BASE 80 M FY04								PLANNING FOR NAVAL AND AF BASE	0		
OFFICER TRAINING 40M FY04								PLANNING FOR OFFICER TRAINING BASE	0		
					BAS	E M	AINT	AND USACE SPT TMS	1.4 M		
							TO	TAL FACILITIES COST	172 M		

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Assumptions on which Calculations were based

Cost per Bn

Facilities:

\$25M/35M1

Equipment Bn Set

\$15M

Subsistence

\$600k p/month

Salary

\$60k p/month

Avg Time to build a Facility:

2.5 Months²

- •20% upfront payment on construction assumed. Balance on acceptance.
- These figures are based on Kirkush, not US price estimates.
- •Vinnell Costs (\$2M p/month) are not included appropriated funds.

Option 1

- Reduces FY03 Capital Budget to \$100M as instructed.
- 2 Bns will be ready by end CY03.
- 3 Bn training will start in Dec 03. Training 2 Bns in parallel will not start until Mar 04. 3 in parallel in Oct 04.
- No new construction work, beyond Kirkush, this year.
- Work planned on Tadji and An Numahniya for FY03 will now commence in FY04.
- 3Bn will be in Kirkush not Tadji (4 Bn).
- Will push most construction work planned for FY04 to the right. Increase in \$ required for FY04 and more pressure on construction program.
- Planned facilities work for FY03 totaled \$172M now \$54M.
- Increase in training cost per Bn as contract with Vinnell is time based.

SUGGESTED TRAINING SCHEDULE

N FACILITY	AUG 03	SEP 03	OCT 03	NOV 03	DEC 03	JAN 04	FEB 04	MAR 04	APR 04	MAY 04	JUN 04	JUL 04	AUG 04	SEP 04		
1 K	1 Bn	TRG	2 Bn	TRG	3 Bn	TRG	4 Bn	4 Bn TRG		6 Bn TRG		8 Bn TRG		10 Bn TRG		
2 K								1 Bn	Garrison							
3 K						2 Bn Garrison										
4 K						3 Bn Garrison										
5 K								5 B	n TRG	7 Br	TRG	9 Bn	TRG	11 Bn		
6 T											4 Bn Ga	rrison				
7 T											5 Bn Garrison					
<i>B</i> T												6 Bn G	arrison			
9 A												7	Bn Garri	son		
10 A													8 Bn G	arrison		
11 A														9 Bn (
12 K					12	th Site w	ill be th	ird Trai	ning Fac	ility						

SUGGESTED TRAINING SCHEDULE (INCL COST/FACILITIES BUILD)

IN FACILITY	AUG 03	SEP 03	OCT 03	NOV 03	DEC 03	JAN 04	FEB 04	MAR 04	APR 04	MAY 04	JUN 04	JUL 04	AUG 04	SEP 04	
	1 Bn	TRG	2 Bn	TRG	3 Bn	3 Bn TRG 4 Bn TRG 6 Bn TF				TRG	RG 8 Bn TRG			10 Bn TRG	
K	Bu	ild					1 Bn Garrison								
3 K			Buil	d	2 Bn G					Garrison					
4 K					Build 3 Bn Garrison							/			
5 K						uilo	1	5 B	n TRG	7 Br	TRG	9 Bn	TRG	11 Bn	
6 T							Buil	d			4 Bn G	Sarrison			
7 T		TOT			100M 40M 54M			Build		5 Bn Garrison					
8 _T		Bn F	iets: acilitie						Buil	Build		6 Bn Garrison			
9 A			sisteni er Faci			3M 3M				Buil	d	7	Bn Garri	son	
10 A			Pay Sites: Recruit Centre								Buil	d	8 Bn 0	arrisor	
11 A		1000	D Mai A HQ	int & C)A-							Buil	d	9 Bn	
12 K		-		12 th	Site will	be third	Trainin	g Facili	ity				Build	d	

The 7M & 28M amounts are sunk costs as already committed to Kirkush.

SUGGESTED TRAINING SCHEDULE (INCL COST/FACILITIES BUILD)

BN FACILITY	AUG 03	SEP 03	OCT 03	NOV 03	DEC 03	JAN 04	FEB 04	MAR 04	APR 04	MAY 04	JUN 04	JUL 04	AUG 04	SEP 04			
	1 Bn	1 Bn TRG 2 Bn TRG		TRG	3 Bn TRG		4 Bn TRG 6 B		6 Bn	n TRG 9 B		n TRG 12 Bn TRG		n TRG			
K	Bu	Build						1 Bn Garrison									
3 K			Build	t					Garrison								
4 K					Build		3 Bn Garrison										
5 K							Build 5 Bn TRG				8 Bn TRG 11 Bi		n TRG 14 Br				
6 _T							Buil	d			4 Bn Ga	rrison					
7 K	70	TOTAL: 1					Build		7 Bn TRG		10 Bn TRG		13 Bn TRG				
8 T	Br	Sels			40M			В	Build		5 Bn Garrison						
9 T	SU	Facil Ibsiste	nce:		54M 3M		Build			d 6 Bn Garrison							
10 A		Other Facilities, Pay Sites; Recruit Centres BLD Maint & QA NIA HQ			3M				Build		7 Bn Garrison						
11 A										Buil	ild 8 Bn Garrison			son			
12 A											Build	d	9 Bn G	arriso			
13 A											Build	d	10 Bn (Garriso			

Option 2

As per Option 1, except:

- Will have 3 Bns in Training from Apr 04.
- 10 Bns will be garrisoned and available from Aug 04.
- Potentially larger facilities cost than in Option 1.
- Potentially less impact on Vinnell contract.

Recommended

SUGGESTED TRAINING SCHEDULE

BN FACILITY	AUG 03	SEP 03	OCT 03	NOV 03	DEC 03	JAN 04	FEB 04	MAR 04	APR 04	MAY 04	JUN 04	JUL 04	AUG 04	SEP 04
1 K	1 K 1 Bn TRG		2 Bn TRG 3 Bn TRG		4 Bn	TRG	RG 6 Bn TRG		9 Bn TRG		12 B	TRG		
2 K								1 Bn	Garrison					
3 K									2 Bn	Garrison				
4 K										3 Bn G	arrison			
5 K								5 B	n TRG	8 Br	TRG	11 Bi	TRG	14 Br
6 _T											4 Bn Ga	rrison		
7 K		7 Bn TRG 10 Bn			TRG 13 Bn TRG									
8 _T											51	Bn Garri	son	
9 _T												6 Bn G	arrison	
10 A	7 Bn G						arrison							
11 A												8 1	3n Garris	son
12 A													9 Bn G	arriso
13 A													10 Bn (arriso

Agreed course of action?

Observations of the Financial Process


Observations:

- Need for a OSA CFO
- Way we account/manage our finances needs to improve.
- Delegations, rollup of accounts and each areas roles & responsibilities need to be documented and understood.

Logistics and Communication Issues

- Maximum Work by Industry thru SLA with Ministry's.
- Need Iraqi OSD (NSD) involvement to ensure capital acquisitions, basing decisions, organisation models etc will survive post CPA – Need the panel/committee ASAP.
- For C7. If want A/C in FY05 will need to recruit PLAAF and train in FY04, will require recruitment early in FY04 (may affect schedule for facilities).
- Major capability acquisition would also need to start then

 Political issue of committing large Iraqi \$ (Maybe FMS solution).
- Using logistics as a constraint to capability? If so, equipment should restrict mobility, ie no purchase of own water/fuel trucks, etc.
- DM at Base or Offsite. Suggest Offsite reduce ability to project force & infrastructure for DM should be industry requirement, reduce NIA setup costs.





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WEAPONS REQUIREMENTS

MINISTRIES (POC)	AK-47's Required	Validated	9MM's Required	Recommended
Agriculture (NKS)	52	A STATE OF	14	-
Atomic Energy	300		10	
Culture (*X6)	49		48	100
Education (Date)	500		0	
Electricity (bus)	1,300		200	
Finance & Central Bank (***)	425		75	
Foreign Affairs (****)	20	20	20	5 6-5-
Health (1016)	250	250	50	
Higher Education (1999)	574		383	
Housing & Construction (690)	800		200	
Industry & Minerals [IDKO]	940	940	600	
Interior (interior	73	2,500	510	
Irrigation (hite)	729	500	0	
Justice	1,000		50	
Prisons (PRO)	500		50	200
Labor & Social Affairs	7		21	100
National Standards (6)(8)	10	8	2	-
Oil (h)(n)	5,600	1,000	0	
Planning (Min)	10		5	1
Public Works (6)(6)	2,300		200	
Religious Affiers (6x6)	350		0	
Security & Defense	0		0	
Trade	2,700	-17-00	300	
Transportation & Communication	1,146		0	
Railroads)	165	50	0	1000
	935		0	
	46	A STATE OF THE PARTY OF THE PAR	0	No.
Youth and Sports (****)	50	50	50	
SUB-TOTALS	19,685	5,318	2,788	0
OTHER REQUIREMENTS	AK-47's Required	Recommended	9MM's Required	Recommended
Iraql Police Force (LTC (6)(6)	400		7,500	
Singapore Training	40		12	
Iraqi Civil Defense Force	7,500	The same of the sa	500	3
New Iraqi Army (COL (6)36)	39,000		1,000	
Baghdad Central (LTC	435	435	150	
TOTALS	66,625	5,753	11,800	0

Note 1: For all but NIA and ICDF, need one magazine per weapon; for NIA and ICDF need __ magazines per weapon.

Note 2: For all but NIA and ICDF, need 25 rounds of ammunition per AK, 10 rounds per 9MM; for others need __ rounds per weapon.

AGREEMENT BETWEEN CPA AND CITF-7 CONCERNING CY 03 FUNDING FOR ICDC BATTALLONS

1. Given:

- a. There will be ICDC Bns with establishment of 846 personnel organized roughly on US Light Inf Bn personnel structure. (Per CJTF-7 FRAGO 601 dtd 050038D Aug 03, there will be a total of 18 total battalions: 9 Stood up by 1 Sept 03, 1 more in Oct, 5 more in Nov, 2 more in Dec, and a final battalion by 1 Jan 04.)
- b. C2 for ICDC Bns, to including provision of basic means of communication with Coalition units, is provided by Coalition Forces; they are attached to and supported by Coalition Forces and they operate jointly with Coalition Forces.
- c. ICDC missions include: linguist support, contribute to rebuilding infrastructure and communities, security and drivers for CF, for humanitarian aid, international NGO, and commercial contractors, limited crowd and riot control, fixed site, route and convoy security disaster response services, search and rescue, limited humanitarian assistance,
- d. ICDC personnel live at home and commute to work on a daily basis using own means of transport or with assistance from CJTF-7.
- e. Arms will be limited to AK-47s.
- f. This agreement covers payments for ICDC Battalions through 31 Dec 03 only. After that point they will be paid by the CPA budget for National Security and Defense which will require different procedures.

2. CPA, through O/NSD, agrees to:

- a. Provide CITF 7 funds to pay end of month salaries for each established ICDC Bu (Pay scale at NIA pay rates = \$70,000 per Bn/Month) This money will be provided to CITF-7 NLT the 25th of each month. CITF-7 will ensure payment on a by-name/by-rank basis with excess funds returned to the CPA by the 15th of the subsequent month.
 - i. Cost Calculation = \$70K /month for each bn on the establishment by the end of that calendar month. (EOM Aug = 9 Bns, Sept = 10, Oct = 15, Nov = 17, and Dec = 18 Bns).
- b. Provide CJIF 7 funds to pay for uniforms for each ICDC member.
 - i. Uniform = cap, 2xBlouse, 2 x T shirt, 2 x trousers, belt, 1 x pair boots, and 3 pair socks...cost per set = \$90
 - ii. Cost Calculation = $$90 \times 18 \times 846 + 20\%$ overage = 18,273 sets = \$1,650K one time cost
 - iii. Uniforms will be purchased from Iraqi vendors on basis of a standardized design used by all suppliers
- c. Provide CITF-7 funds to purchase OCIE for each ICDC member
 - i. OCIE = web belt, suspenders, 2 canteens w/ cover, first aid pouch and dressing.
 - ii. Cost calculation: \$25 x 846 x 18 + 15% overage = 17,512 sets = \$438K one time cost
 - iii. These will be purchased from Iraqi vendors.
- d. Provide CJTF-7 monthly subsistence costs for ICDC members (assumes 1 meal on duty per day and 1 day off per week) Food stipend equivalent to cost of 1 x MRE per day. Cost calculation = 846 x \$3.80/MRE x 2 x 27 = \$174K month
- e. Provide CJTF-7 with 7,000 AK-47s w/ one magazine, sling, and ancillaries

Cost calculation = No cost - funds already approved by PRB; deliveries subject to agreed priorities for allocating weapons among various security-related users (GC PSD, police, NIA, FPS, as well as ICDC)

f. Provide CJTF-7 with funding for AK-47 spares

Cost calculation = SWAG of \$1000/Bn = \$8K one time cost

Summary:

One time cost for 18 ICDC Battalions: \$1,706K -- August thru Dec 03
Monthly salary for ICDC Battalions: (Aug = \$630K, Sept = \$700K, Oct = \$1,050K, Nov = \$1,190, and Dec = \$1,260K) Total = \$4.830K

Monthly subsistence for ICDC Battalions: (Aug = \$783K, Sept = \$870K, Oct = \$1,305K, Nov = \$1,479K, and Dec = \$1,566K) Total = \$6,003K

Total ICDC cost for CY 03 = \$12,539K *

This is the maximum amount that will be provided to CJTF-7. It is subject to approval of funding by the Administrator, Coalition Provisional Authority.

Walter B. Slocombe

CPA Oirector Security Affairs (National Security and Defense)

UB Streamles

Dan Hahn, BG, USA Chief of Staff, CJTF-7

August 8, 2003 August 8, 2003

	(CPT) NIPK
From:	[^{(C)(C)}] (FS01)
Sent:	Tuesday, October 14, 2003 12:31 PM
То:	COL, OSD CIV COL GBR CJTF7-C3 (O-6 MoNSD); Slocombe, Walt B. (SES)
Cc:	Wilkinson, Molly A. (SES); LtCol, JCS J5; LtCol, JCS J5;
	LTC, JCS J5; LTC, JCS J5; Powell, Owen C. (SES); Executive Secretary; (CIV); (CIV); (CIV);
	William B. (SES-5); (GS-12); Executive Secretary;
	William B. (SES-5); (GS-12); Executive Secretary; Civ. OSD

Subject: Questions re Border Police and Security Forces/Slide from J-5

CPA ExecSec acknowledges receipt from J-5 Joint Staff Response Cell inquiry of 9 Oct via SIPR entitled "NSC Query on Iraqi Border Police." Our experts here deem this information request unclassified, and the attached slide from which questions arose is itself designated unclassified. We are therefore transmitting our interim response via unclass email. Please be advised that your inquiry was not received in a timely manner because of SIPR malfunctioning. In addition, our entire border and customs team (four people) is out in the field evaluating border posts; they return tonight and will review your request at that time.

CPA Ministry of Interior Senior Advisor tells us that a protocol has been established to de-conflict inconsistent data and metrics re traqi security forces. Your point of contact should be Col British officer, C3 Effects Division Chief at Camp Victory, CJTF-7 Main, DSN

CPA ExecSec has distributed the attached slide internally within CPA to all concerned parties, along with J-5 Joint Staff Response Cell questions. You should not consider the slide attached to the email inquiry to be CPA-approved or authorized.

UNCLASSIFIED

NSC query on Iraqi Border Police

From: CAT J5LO , JCS NMCC

Sent: Monday, October 13, 2003 5:23 PM To: Executive Secretariat CPA;

COL, OSD;

CC: CAT J5LO , JCS NMCC; CAT TMCHF, JCS NMCC; CAT DEPTMCHF, JCS NMCC Subject: NSC query on Iraqi Border Police

RETRANS to CPA per CPT request

We forwarded the below questions to CPA ExecSec via CENTCOM on 9 Oct. Any idea when we might expect a response? (Our suspense to SecDef / NSC is 12 Oct.) The original questions are in black; I've provided some clarification in blue. Appreciate your assistance.

- 1) why did the "Border Guards" category change to "Border Police," is there a difference in what makes up these groups? Previous versions of the attached slide referred to "border guards" rather than "border police service." We modified the slide because our understanding from current CENTCOM products is that "border police service" is now the correct term for what used to be called generically "border guards." Please confirm or provide proper name that we should use for this category -- Is it "Border Police Service," or "Border and Customs Police," or other? -- and define what constitutes that group.
- Why did the goal for the number of Border Guards/Border Police change from 20,000 to 11,574? Understand that the goal comes off the JPERSTAT (from CENTCOM) but the goal should have remained constant. I can clarify this, but I have a follow-on question. The "20,000" was reported for one week; someone used a very rough estimate for the entire Department of Border Enforcement rather than reporting the goal for just the "border police" portion of that Department. In contrast, previous versions of the slide included only the "border police" component of the Department of Border Enforcement as being part of the overall "Iraqi Security Forces," and we have reverted to construct in the attached slide. Does CPA concurthat only the "border police" component of the Department of Border Enforcement should be counted as part of the overall "Iraqi Security Forces"? If not, please provide recommendation. (Ties in to question #1 above.) If so, is the currently reported goal of 11,574 accurate?
- 3) The goals for Civil Def Corps (21,996), Border Police (11,574) and Facility Protection Svc (22,674) are very specific. How did CENTCOM arrive at these numbers? The issue here is not only how the goals were at these numbers? The issue here is not only how the goals were established but also whether we should report the numbers to this level of specificity. (Perhaps better to round, as done with "Police" and "NIA" qoals.)

Please note: All numbers on attached slide were derived from CENTCOM JPERSTAT report.

v/r

Lt Man Team 1B LTC - Team 2B LTC Team 3B

J-5 Liaison Officer Joint Staff Response Cell / NMCC / Joint Staff

STU-III DSN / Comm DRSN

<<Extract from Iraq Status brief1.ppt>>

Page 1



COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY BAGHDAD

For: Col Dennis Sabal,	D/COS	October 10, 2003
From: COL	C/S Office of Security Affairs (OSA) and	C/S,

Subject: MOU for Establishment of the Iraqi Defense Support Agency (DSA)

Given: With the graduation of the First Battalion of the New Iraqi Army (NIA), the DSA must be stood up immediately in order to support the battalion's operational deployment and...

Given: That the DSA will not be permanently established in the Palace or the Green Zone and...

Given: That OSA must immediately hire Iraqi members and cross-train them with the Coalition Military Advisory Training Team (CMATT) in order to provide support to the NIA...

Therefore, the undersigned agree to the following:

- 1. The OSA will be allowed to hire and obtain CPA badges for up to 50 new personnel to form the initial cadre of the DSA. These personnel will be allowed to work in the Palace until not later than 1 February 2004 while permanent locations are being established.
- 2. The OSA will establish permanent locations for the DSA in the former Iraqi Air Force buildings at MB 420872 and the building at MB 445869.
- 3. The initial cadre of the DSA will work in the CMATT spaces in the North Palace Ballroom until they leave for their permanent accommodations.

Me):			
	Colonel, USMC	Colonel, IN, US Army	Colonel, USMC
	D/COS, CPA	C/S, ØSA	C/S, CMATT

Governing Council

Dr Ebrahim Jafari Al Eshaiker

Main Spokesman of the Islamic Da'wah Party. Born in Karbala', educated in Mosul University as a medical doctor.

Dr Ahmad Chalabi

Head of the Iraqi National Congress (INC), a Professor of Mathematics and a businessman. Founder of the INC.

Ahmad Shya'a al-Barak

General Coordinator for the Human Rights Association of Babel. General Coordinator for the Bar Association in Babel. Graduate of the Law Faculty, Babel University. Graduate of the College Management and Economy, Baghdad University. One of the tribal leaders of Al Bu Sultan tribe in Babel.

Dr Ayad Allawi

Secretary General of the Iraqi National Accord. PhD in medicine. Started to oppose the dictatorial regime in the early 1970s and was in the forefront of efforts to organise opposition both within Iraq and abroad.

Dr Jalal Talabani

Jalal Talabani is Secretary General of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan and a leading figure of the Iraqi democratic movement during the last 50 years.

Hamid Majeed Mousa

Secretary of the Iraqi Communist Party since 1993. Born in Babil province. An economist and petroleum researcher. Left Iraq in 1978 and returned in 1983 to continue his political activities against the dictatorial regime

Judge Dara Nor al Din

A Judge who as a member of the Court of Appeal, held one of Saddam's edicts (confiscating land without proper compensation) unconstitutional. Was sentenced to 2 years in jail. Served 8 months at Abu Ghraib before being released in the general amnesty last October.

Dr Raja Habib Khuzai

Head of maternity hospital in Diwaniya. Studied and lived in the UK from the late 1960s until 1977 when she returned to Iraq.

Samir Shakir Mahmood Sumaidy

From the Al-Sumaidy clan with documented lineage from the Prophet Mohammed through Mousa Al-Khadhum. Ancestral lands located near Haditha in the Al-Anbar region. Writer, designer and entrepreneur. A prominent figure in the opposition to the Saddam regime.

Salahaddin Muhammad Bahaddin

Elected as Secretary General of the Kurdistan Islamic Union in the first conference of the party in 1994, was reelected in the second and third conferences and still holds the post. Born in Halabja. Has written several books in Kurdish and Arabic.

Songul Chapouk

From Kirkuk and from the Iraqi Turkoman Community. A trained Engineer and teacher. She heads the Iraqi Women's Organisation (based in Kirkuk) which aims to bring together all the female communities of Iraq.

Abdul Zahra Othman Mohammed

Head of the Islamic Da'wah Movement (Harakat al Dawa al Islamiya) in Basra. Writer, thinker and political activist. Editor of numerous newspapers and magazines.

Abdul Aziz al-Hakim

Abdul Aziz al-Hakim is a religious and political leader and the current leader of the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq. He is the brother of Muhammad Baqr al-Hakim. They both returned to Iraq after 20 years of exile and are both the sons of the late Ayatollah Sayyid Mohsin al-Hakim.

Abdul Karim Al Muhammadawi

Head of Iraqi Party of God in Al Amara. Member and Rotating Chairman of Interim Supervisory Council in Maysan Province. Dubbed "Prince of the Marshes" for leading the resistance movement against Saddam in the Southern Marshes for 17 years, for which he spent 6 years in prison.

Dr Adnan Pachachi

President of the Iraqi Independent Democrats. Former Foreign Minister and Permanent Representative to the United Nations.

Dr Akila Al Hashimi

Diplomat. Led Iraqi delegation to New York donors' conference. PhD in Modern Literature and Bachelors in Law. Working with UN programmes in Iraq since 1991 in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Ghazi Ajil Al-Yawar

Born in Mosul. A civil engineer. Recently Vice President of Hicap Technology Co. Lyd., Riyadh. Married with 4 children.

Dr. Mohsen Abdul Hameed

Secretary General of the Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP). Born in the city of Kirkuk. Author of more the 30 books in the field of interpretation of the Holy Quran. Detained in 1996 on the charge of reorganising the IIP. Professor in the College of Education in Baghdad University.

Dr Seyyid Muhammed Bahr ul-Uloom

Highly-respected Shi'a clergyman. Returned from London where he headed the Ahl al-Bayt charitable centre. Elected as the Shi'a member of a leadership triumverate by the Iraqi opposition after the Gulf Conflict.

Mahmoud Othman

Independent politician and long-term leader of the Kurdish National Struggle.

Masood Barzani

President of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP). He rose to this position from peshmerga. He was elected President in 1979 and reelected in 1999.

Mowaffak al-Ruhaie

Born in al-Shatra. Member of British Royal Doctors' College. Consultant in internal medicine and neurology. Author of the Declaration of the Shia of Iraq. Activist in human rights. Student of the martyr Imam Baaker al-Sadr.

Naseir al-Chadirchi

Leader of the National Democratic Party. Resident of Baghdad. Lawyers, businessman and farm owner.

Judge Wael Abdulatif

Born in Basra and practiced civil and criminal law before being disbarred and imprisoned by Saddam. Had been head judge at Nasiriya and now deputy head judge in Basra. Elected Governor of Basra on 4 July 2003 by the interim local council with the support of all the leading political and religious parties.

Yonadam Kanna

Secretary General of the Assyrian Democratic Movement. Active member of the Assyrian-Chaldean community. Former Minister of Public Works and Housing and Former Minister of Industry and Energy in Iraqi Kurdistan. Engineer since 1975. Activist against the dictatorial regime since 1979.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

HEADQUARTERS, 20 BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM, 1ST ARMORED DIVISION CIVIL-MILITARY ASSISTANCE CENTER-KARKH DISTRICT APO AE 09004

14 October 2003

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MEMORANDUM FOR MINISTRY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Draft dodgers seeking "rights"

- 1. Several young men from Basrah visited the Al Karkh CMAC/DAC Hall on 13OCT03. They all suffered the loss of at least one ear for failing to join the army. They claim to represent as many as 450 would-be soldiers from Basrah. We referred them to the Rights Violations Office in Al Mansour, Baghdad. This trip produced no results for them.
- 2. They have two requests, or demands:
 - They want ear surgery reconstructive
 - They want compensation for suffering
- 3. Request the CPA Ministry of Defense consider their case and propose any possible solutions to the Iraqi MOD or Governing Council. This office will not expect a response, as these men traveled from Basrah and any actions are likely to be "institutional" and in the hands of the new Iraqi Government.
- 4. We hope that these types of rights violations are seriously considered by the new government, and will ask these men to watch and listen for news in this regard.
- 5. POC is the undersigned at the Karkh DAC Hall on Karradat-Meriam Street. Cell phone

MAJ, CA DIRECTOR, CMAC AL-KARKH 2BCT, 1AD

DISTRICT INFORMATION OFFICE TO CPA ROUTING FORM

	DATE OF REQUEST: UCT. 15, 2003
(, REQUEST FOR INFORMA	NTION
REQUEST FOR YOUR AS	SISTANCE/ACTION
REPORT FOR YOUR INFO	ORMATION
SUGGESTED ROUTING:	
MINISTRY MOD National Securit	CONTACT ?
SYNOPSIS: Former pas	inditary prisoners want
	suffering
DETAIL:	
There is a large from various wars	prisoners were also paid. - population of former prisoners who were not paid for
whatever reason	- not on list, did not know to go. t
DEMONSTRATION DETAIL	Du-1 21)
ENTITY:	Society of Free Iragi Prisoners
NUMBER IN CROWD.	50'
NUMBER REPRESENTING:	-5
	D C1
NATURE/BEHAVIOR:	Peaceful
PREVIOUS DEMONSTRATION	1(S) DATE/LOC: Multiple July 75EP
DEMANDS ATTACHED?	(v) N
CIVIL AFFAIRS CONTACT: M	AT TORK
	c," or what is now known as the "Karkh DAC Hall"
MGPS (GPID): MP4/3870	, of what is now known as the Narkh DAC Hall
RAILDE ALDIIN RADAAAAAA	

422d CIVIL AFFAIRS BATTALION - KARKH DISTRICT INFORMATION OFFICE

In the Name of God the most merciful the most gracious

Memorandum for protest

We are war prisoners in 1991 (Kuwait war) held a peaceful demonstration more than three times in front of the Iraqi forum in Baghdad and hence we demand (Ambassador P. Premier and the governing council) to listen and to pay your attention to our request and to be aware of our suffering from the beginning of the war 1981 - 1991 and the problems that we are in recently and because of the latest war we hope you to apply the same criteria and justice to all prisoners with out discrimination and we state for you that tyrant Saddam got discriminated between us and we have evidences for that. So, some prisoners in Iran war had not gained their rights. Most of the prisoners in 1991 had reserved service more than 14 years and that against humanity. The same prisoners after our return back to the country Saddam had got stayed us in the military and that was contrary to the Geneva Convention that concerned with prisoners and we state for you the following:

- I- The prices of food began to rise more than doubles
- 2- The renting of houses rose up to more than we expect
- 3- Unemployment more than 75%

For all that above mentioned we feel hopeless, only freedom, non rights, we want to say (cutting for our necks and not cutting the living of our children) we hope you to take a suitable decision as quick as possible to solve a critical position. Finally, our request is to give us an argent emergency payment and that followed by all rights of prisoners. Thank you.

Authorized by all war prisoners