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Dealing with Iraqi WMD: The Inspection Option

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Outline

- **Goal.**
- **Strategy.**
- **Background.**
- **Key Lessons from UNSCOM.**
- **Current Status of UN Inspection Regime.**
- **Action Plan.**
- **Timeline.**

12/19/01 11:20 AM

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The Strategic Goal -- Eliminate the Iraqi WMD Threat

- WMD is the core of the danger that Saddam poses.
- Eliminating it *may* ultimately require military action.
- However, we may *first* want to try to put in place an inspection regime that
 - is based on the Gulf War ceasefire and UNSC Resolution 687,
 - but incorporates the lessons of the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM).
- *Later*, we could assess whether (a) the new regime ensures elimination of the WMD threat, or (b) further action, including military action, is required.

*Ultimate question: Are we satisfied that Iraqi WMD threat
has been eliminated?*

12/19/01 11:20 AM

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Strategy

- **Develop an inspection regime derived from the key lessons learned from UNSCOM:**
 - Even intrusive inspections over several years missed significant parts of Iraqi program and failed to detect an ongoing buildup.
 - Unilateral intelligence capability is required to complement inspections.
 - Counterintelligence capability is required to deal with Iraqi attempts to penetrate and deceive inspection teams.
 - Ability to enforce inspection regime required.
- **No inspection regime that fails to incorporate these lessons is even worth proposing.**

12/19/01 11:20 AM

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History

- Iraq initiated deception on declarations as soon as UNSCR 687 created UNSCOM.
 - Began seven year campaign of interference with inspectors.
 - Denied access, removed material from sites.

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- Iraq successfully pressured the UN.
 - Dictated timing, access, scope of inspections.
 - Demanded vote on inspection team composition.
 - Rejected USG nationals in October 1997.
 - Rejected random/no-notice inspections August 1998.
 - Halted UNSCOM activity in October 1998.

Despite its formal powers, and some on-the-ground accomplishments, UNSCOM regime eventually failed.

12/19/01 11:20 AM



Key Lessons from UNSCOM

- **UNSCOM proved inadequate to uncover and dismantle Iraqi programs.**
 - **Despite hundreds of highly intrusive inspections, UNSCOM missed significant parts of Iraqi program and failed to detect an ongoing buildup.**
 - **The defection of Hussein Kamel in August 1995, not UNSCOM inspections, forced the Iraqis to disclose weaponization of Botulinin and anthrax.**
- **A credible inspection system would require (at a minimum) a return to enforcement of existing UNSC mandates and the Gulf War ceasefire agreement.**
 - **But even the most intrusive inspection regime can only hinder Iraqi WMD/missile development, not eliminate it.**

Even highly intrusive inspections are of limited value in the absence of sufficient intelligence—and the international community has no effective response to Saddam's defiance. Sanctions are not sufficiently coercive and not sustainable.

12/19/01 11:20 AM

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Current Status of UN Inspection Regime

- UNSC RES 1284 (17 Dec 99) created UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC)
- UNMOVIC is weaker than UNSCOM...
 - Lacks staff expertise to baseline/evaluate Iraqi compliance.
 - Knowledgeable inspectors have left.
- ...and is structured to reduce USG influence:
 - Chairman and staff chosen based on Iraqi "sensitivities."
 - No U.S. national in top leadership.
- USG unwilling to share intelligence with untrustworthy organization.

Therefore, we assess that Saddam could accept UNMOVIC and still build WMD/missiles without detection.

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Iraqi Reaction to UNMOVIC

- **Saddam has up to now rejected any inspections as a matter of "principle."**
 - **However, he could do a sudden about-face, just as he did with respect to "oil-for-food."**
- **Worst outcome for US would be international pressure to accept UNMOVIC as meeting the disarmament requirements of the Gulf War ceasefire.**

U.S. could demand immediate Iraqi answer to a new U.S.-proposed inspection regime, to preempt Iraqi attempt to negotiate on basis of UNMOVIC.

12/19/01 11:20 AM

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Plan of Action

Demarche

- **Conditions:**

- Team led by an American.
 - Access to anywhere in Iraq to anyone (including information and data) in timeframe determined by the inspectors.
 - Authority to impound equipment or shut down facilities.
 - Interference with teams prohibited.
 - No delays.
 - Unrestricted overflight rights for fixed and rotary-wing aircraft, including UAVs.
 - Team has authority to demand use of a designated Iraqi military facility as a base (e.g. H-3 airfield in western Iraq).
- **Short timeline for acceptance of inspection regime.**
 - Collection plan should be in place prior to demarche.

***Iraq to be informed that lack of cooperation
will subject it to military action.***

12/19/01 11:20 AM

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Plan of Action (cont.)

Immediate Inspection (no later than one month from Iraqi acceptance)

- Deploys from Bahrain, targets high-value sites.
- Staffed by mix of people now in/out of USG.
 - may include some inspectors from selected other nations.
- U.S. will recruit Iraqis inside and outside of Iraq.
 - offer rewards/sponsorship/relocation.
- List of specialties/capabilities will parallel UNSCOM.
 - with the addition of physical security experts and counterintelligence capabilities.
- Authority to task intelligence and call on CENTCOM-provided support.
- Military extraction plan for team is essential.


Longer-term Inspection Presence

- Teams based in North, South and Central Iraq.

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Timeline



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