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DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1010 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1010

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MEMO FOR: THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL  
SECURITY AFFAIRS

SUBJECT: The UN and Inspections: The End Game

The President's September 12 speech to the UNGA transformed the public debate on Iraq – both here and abroad – and correctly focused attention on the question of whether “the promise of the United Nations would be fulfilled in our time.”

The President's decision to try the inspections route was taken – with full recognition of the danger that Iraq would again engage in “cheat and retreat” tactics – in order to gain the needed domestic and international support for disarming Iraq. However, I believe we have raised the risks of an inspection regime to a dangerously high level by the concessions that have been made (b)(1)

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1) (b)(1)

2) (b)(1)

3) We did not demand the dismantling of the Special Security Organization (SSO), Iraq's denial and deception apparatus.

In the course of negotiating the new resolution, we have made further concessions by agreeing to the following:

- We agreed to omit non-WMD issues the President raised in the September 12 speech (tyranny, support for terrorism, threats to neighbors).

• (b)(1)



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- There is no requirement to have USG representatives on any inspections teams.
- We dropped the right for the U.S. to designate sites to be inspected and individuals to be interviewed, as well as the right to demand that interviews be held outside Iraq. (Requiring interviews outside of Iraq is left to the sole discretion of Hans Blix, who has already made it clear that he doesn't believe in the idea.)

- (b)(1)

- UNMOVIC does not have the right to regional "operating bases" anywhere it wants them but only to establish regional "offices."
  - Any UN security force is limited to protecting UNMOVIC facilities – it will not accompany the inspectors on site inspections.
  - Finally, and of particular concern to the Department of Defense, Iraq is not required to "immediately cease" firing on aircraft patrolling the no-fly zones, implying that the current enforcement of the no-fly zones is not "to uphold" Security Council resolutions. (b)(1)
- (b)(1) But that is precisely the point – the previous resolutions have failed to provide an adequate basis for effective disarmament.)

Because of the prolonged period without any inspections – as well as the decade-long Iraqi effort to reconstruct their whole program in a way that permits more effective concealment – the inspectors will have difficulty knowing where to go. Successful inspections would require a combination of information gathered from interviews from knowledgeable people and documents secured from their computers, along with surprise of a kind that will be extremely hard to achieve without a very strong resolution.

#### An Alternative Course of Action

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That gives us an opportunity to withdraw some of our earlier concessions and put forward a

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stronger resolution, one that would at least give us a hope of making an UNMOVIC inspectorate effective.

(b)(1)



(b)(1)



We

would then need to present Iraq with a U.S. ultimatum to accept effective disarmament arrangements. But we would still be one step away from imposed regime change, and still be in a position of offering an alternative to war.

(b)(1)



In this struggle, our

position would be greatly strengthened by actively pursuing the following courses of action:

- Floating immediately the idea that our next step is not a war with Iraq but the imposition of "coercive inspections;"

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(b)(1)



*Paul W. Galt*

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