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UNMOVIC

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MEMORANDUM FOR UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY

FROM: Abe Shulsky, (b)(6)

AS

SUBJ: NSPD on Support to UNMOVIC

Attached are

- Draft NSPD on support to UNMOVIC
- Draft OSD comments

Comments are due to NSC (Bob Joseph) by mid-morning tomorrow.

Bill Luti called after his Bob Joseph meeting at the NSC to say that "the train has left the station," i.e., that a decision has been made to provide full (and basically unconditional) support.

Nevertheless, recommend that we put our position on the record.

10/31/02

→ Abe Shulsky
Try to get DSD's
comments, if any.
Then get the
comments to Bob
Joseph.

Thanks.

DJF

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31 October 2002, 2:00 PM**USG Support for UNMOVIC and the IAEA**

- The NSPD requires "full support" to UNMOVIC with only the vaguest assurances from Blix.
- The NSPD should require UNMOVIC assurances in:
 - Intelligence sharing (including a liaison office).
 - Safeguarding USG intelligence sources and methods.
 - Security of USG sensitive technology/equipment.
 - Permitting USG personnel to include military members to participate in inspections without having the restriction of having to become an employee of the UN.
 - Reimbursement to USG for services rendered.
- Even with the above assurances, the NSPD should set out criteria for evaluating on a case by case basis whether requested support should be provided (e.g. protection of intelligence sources and methods, protection of information whose dissemination could pose dangers to USG national security).
- The NSPD should lay out a strategy of using potential support to UNMOVIC as leverage to obtain the assurances listed above.

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OCT. 31. 2002 9:00PM

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Support for UNMOVIC and the IAEA

*draft NSAD
Comments by
OOB INa*

BACKGROUND

In 1991, Iraq agreed to a UN-negotiated ceasefire to end the war of aggression it had launched against Kuwait. The ceasefire terms included Iraq's voluntary acceptance of, and cooperation with, comprehensive, unfettered inspections to ensure compliance. For eleven years Iraq deceived UN inspectors and defied the inspections regime before finally denying inspectors access completely in 1998. (U)

The Iraqi regime must now show that it has made a strategic shift in its approach and decided to comply with its obligations. A new UN inspection regime provides a means to test whether the Iraqi regime has made this strategic shift and is willing to give up its weapons of mass destruction. There can be zero tolerance for further deception or noncompliance. To be successful, inspections must place priority on testing Iraq's willingness to cooperate and to be disarmed of weapons of mass destruction. (U)

UNITED STATES SUPPORT FOR INSPECTIONS

Subject to successful completion of work underway in the UN Security Council to pass a new resolution on Iraq, and to receiving necessary assurances regarding the principles under which inspections will operate, and in pursuit of the goals outlined above, the United States will provide full support to the United Nations Monitoring Verification, and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) and the International Atomic Energy Agency in the accomplishment of their missions. While we progress on fulfilling these conditions, it is time now to begin to prepare to support the UNMOVIC and IAEA missions in Iraq. ~~(S)~~

Fulfilling these missions requires that UNMOVIC and the IAEA employ a strategy of robust, flexible, and secure inspections that use, as appropriate, the full range of relevant technical and human capabilities. The United States will respond to UNMOVIC and the IAEA requests for material, operational, personnel, ^{(b)(1)} as well as suggest such support to UNMOVIC and the IAEA, sufficient to accomplish the responsibilities mandated for them by the relevant UN Security Council Resolutions. ~~(S)~~

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The Proliferation Strategy PCC will coordinate development of policy guidance regarding inspections in Iraq and U.S. support for them. The Department of State will be responsible for official communications with UNMOVIC and the IAEA, and for coordinating U.S. support and assistance to UNMOVIC and the IAEA within policy this guidance. The Departments of Defense, Energy, Treasury, and the Central Intelligence Agency will provide such support as needed. ~~(S)~~

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