

*VI-030526-05*  
*Midland to Future*

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*2004-5*

26 MAY, 2003

MEMO TO: SECRETARY RUMSFELD

FROM: PAUL BREMER

SUBJECT: IRAN III

AS PROMISED IN MY NOTE OF YESTERDAY, HERE ARE SOME  
INITIAL RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION AGAINST ~~IRANIANS~~ *Iranians*  
*3/21/04* IN IRAQ.

MY RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING THE SCIRI REFLECT THE  
FACT THAT SCIRI HAS A PRESENCE ON THE LEADERSHIP  
COMMITTEE. ASSUMING WE ALLOW THAT TO CONTINUE, WE  
SHOULD USE CIA CONTACTS TO OBTAIN INTELLIGENCE ON ITS  
PRECISE LOCATIONS WHILE AVOIDING PUSHING SCIRI CLOSER  
TO IRAN. WITH THAT IN MIND, I RECOMMEND THAT WE NOT  
CHALLENGE SCIRI ON ITS IN-COUNTRY BADR CORPS PRESENCE  
UNTIL AFTER THE LATTER DECLARES LOCATIONS BY JUNE 1 AS  
REQUIRED BY OUR NEW WEAPONS POLICY. ONCE WE HAVE  
THOSE LOCATIONS, I WILL RECOMMEND THAT WE MOVE  
PROMPTLY AGAINST ANY UNDECLARED BADR WEAPONS  
CACHES.

MEANWHILE, I HAVE THE FOLLOWING RECOMMENDATIONS  
FOR IMMEDIATE ACTION:

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  
00043

OUR APPROACHES TO SCIRI AND THE BADR CORPS COMPLEMENT EACH OTHER. OUR MAIN TARGET WITHIN SCIRI IS THE INTELLIGENCE CHIEF SHAYBANI. I HAVE TASKED CIA WITH LOCATING SHAYBANI MORE PRECISELY. ONCE LOCATED, WE WOULD USE CJTF-7 FORCES TO DETAIN HIM OR FORCE HIM BACK TO IRAN.

SCIRI AND THE BADR CORPS MAY HAVE GIVEN US THE OPPORTUNITY WE HAVE BEEN SEEKING BY ILLEGALLY OCCUPYING GOVERNMENT BUILDINGS IN BAGHDAD, AND IN SOME CASES USING THESE FACILITIES FOR DELIVERY OF PUBLIC SERVICES. I HAVE REQUESTED AN INVESTIGATION. IF TRUE, MY RECOMMENDATION IS THAT CJTF-7 TAKE ACTION TO STOP SUCH ACTIVITIES QUICKLY BEFORE THEY TAKE HOLD AND DETAIN ANY BADR CORP OR SCIRI MEMBERS FOUND.

IN ADDITION, THE AL-QUDS FORCE OF THE IRGC HAS BEGUN SETTING UP CENTERS FOR CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS IN KARBALA, KIRBIL, KALAR, DARBANDIKHAN AND ELSEWHERE, AS THE IRGC ITSELF CONTINUES TO INFILTRATE MEN ACROSS THE BORDER.

CIA WILL LOCATE THE OPERATIONS CENTERS. ONCE FOUND, MY RECOMMENDATION IS THAT CJTF-7 RAID THEM AND DETAIN ANY FORCES FOUND.

*Coalition Provisional Authority*

***New Iraqi Corps (NIC) Concept***  
***29 May 2003***

## *Purpose*

*Coalition Provisional Authority*

**Seek approval for organizing “New Iraqi Corps”  
as nucleus for armed forces of new Iraq**



## ***Ten Assumptions / Key Principles***


***Coalition Provisional Authority***

- **Coalition in Charge; force will be under US/Coalition TACON**
- **A force for Iraq, not U.S. model**
- **De-Baathification; minimum role for senior ex-officers**
- **Mission is external defense**
- **Military is a *National* force - Apolitical, representative**
- **NIC is an interim step: Fundamental decisions on Iraqi defense policy require Iraqi buy-in: but Coalition can start on organizing first elements**
- **Speedy start essential; NIC a priority for effort, resources**
- **Use Iraqi resources of money, people, facilities, equipment as much as legally possible**
- **Training by US contractors; supervision by US/Coalition officers**
- **Military not only opportunity to employ ex-soldiers.**

## *What is the "New Iraqi Corps"?*

*Coalition Provisional Authority*

- *An interim Iraqi military capability that contributes to defense of the country and is prepared to help Coalition Forces on public order tasks appropriate for military units.*
- *Established in four stages:*
  - *Stage 1: Infrastructure preparation and recruitment*
  - *Stage 2: Organize, train and equip*
  - *Stage 3: Conduct initial operations*
  - *Stage 4: Transition to Iraqi national army (NIAF)*
- *The end result will be three motorized infantry divisions located near Mosul, Baghdad and Basrah with the following missions: Border Security, Point Security to include sensitive sites, Convoy Security, Route Security, Patrolling, UXO awareness, identification, marking and reporting*
- *Under US/Coalition TACON*



## *Plan of Action*

*Coalition Provisional Authority*

- **Short Term:**

- Early start on recruiting, training, organizing, and employing a light infantry force:
  - Start with one Battalion, grow to up to 12,000 (1 Division) in first year, 40,000 (3 Divisions) in a further year
  - Missions: Territorial defense, Protect key facilities / LOC from high end internal threats - under US/Coalition TACON
  - Recruited by nominations from SLG, regional leaders, political religious groups. NOT by approaches to ex-generals.
  - Use Iraqi resources almost entirely - (except for US / contract trainers?)
    - (Note: Separate efforts to organize Iraqi security forces to guard fixed points / installations; stand up Iraqi construction companies, recruit additional police - all of which will use ex-soldiers)

- **Longer Term:**

- Work with IIA on fundamental structural decisions - national security laws, national strategy, MOD structure, force structure, budget allocations
- Restructure military-controlled industries - devolve bona fide dual use to civil sector, close down useless / dangerous ones, keep a few for future military
- "Grow" future Iraqi military leadership primarily from within new forces, not by co-opting former officers

## *Timeline*

*Coalition Provisional Authority*

- Start contracting as soon as funds approved
- Goal is first intake/start training early in July
- Need to be sure facilities/trainers are ready – but speed critical
- First BN “graduates” 9 weeks after entry – Sep if we start in July
- A year from start – 3 “Brigades” of 3 BN each, deployed, one in each region
- Operating under Coalition command



## *Action Requested*

*Coalition Provisional Authority*

- **Approve concept**
- **Will open door to:**
  - **Authorize/allocate money**
  - **Start Contracting**
  - **Finish staffing**
  - **Start recruiting**

## ***Summary: NIC Serves Coalition Objectives***

*Coalition Provisional Authority*

- Iraqis taking increasing responsibility for Iraqi's future
- Multi-ethnic force promotes unity of Iraq
- Opportunity to instill basic principles for a constitutional government (Professional nonpolitical military)
- NIC capabilities support Coalition mission to secure environment
- Strong element of Coalition participation
- New force advances de-Ba'athification and security sector reform
- Forms the nucleus of the new Iraqi armed forces
- Counterweight to militias
- NIC assists Coalition military in the maintenance of territorial integrity / regional stability

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*Coalition Provisional Authority*

*New Iraqi Corps (NIC) Concept  
21 May 2003*

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## *Security Sector Reform*

*Coalition Provisional Authority*

- Dismantle Saddam's structure
- But Iraq will still face security challenges
  - Crime, ethnic based violence, terrorism, Iranian interference, external attack
- Requires a comprehensive approach to reform:
  - Police
  - Court and prison system
  - Gendarmerie
- Also, a new non-political army for self defense
- Fundamental decisions must be made by legitimate Iraqi government
- But immediate steps essential to do jobs and to show the way ahead
  - Police recall, patrolling, and training (UK offer)
  - Stand up court system
  - *Establish the New Iraqi Corps*



## *Vision*

### *Coalition Provisional Authority*

- CPA establishes an *interim Iraqi military capability* (the New Iraqi Corps, NIC) that *contributes to defense of the country and is prepared to help Coalition Forces on public order tasks appropriate for military units.*
- The NIC will be established in four stages:
  - Stage 1: Infrastructure preparation and recruitment
  - Stage 2: Organize, train and equip
  - Stage 3: Conduct initial operations
  - Stage 4: Transition to Iraqi national army (NIAF)
- The end result will be three motorized infantry divisions located near Mosul, Baghdad and Basrah with the following mission:

**When ready, the New Iraqi Corps (NIC) is available for territorial defense and to conduct stability operations subordinate to CJTF-7 and contribute to a stable and secure environment.**

## *CPA Mission*

*Coalition Provisional Authority*

Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) organizes, trains and equips the New Iraqi Corps (NIC) in order for Iraq to have an interim military capability. On order, CJTF-7 assumes TACON of formed and trained NIC units for employment.

- Key Tasks:

- Identify usable equipment and potential training/garrison sites
- Identify and refurbish infrastructure for New Iraqi Corps
- Recruit, screen and train soldiers and leadership
- Implement a pay and administrative system for the New Iraqi Corps
- Establish a logistics and support system for the New Iraqi Corps
- Conduct an aggressive IO/PA/PD campaign to encourage Iraqi and regional support of the program

## *Stage 1*

### *Coalition Provisional Authority*

- Approve NIC concept and identify funding (OSD)
- Secure cooperation of regional political and ethnic leaders to support the concept and identify potential recruits (CPA)
- Consult selected Iraqi military and civilian personalities (CPA)
- Assess recruiting centers and training garrisons (CJTF-7)
- Determine uniforms, ranks, pay structure and unit designations (CPA)
- Assess available equipment and critical gaps (CPA and CJTF-7)
- Contract for (CPA) and execute (Contractors):
  - Refurbishing sites and equipment
  - Screening and intake
  - Administering the pay system
  - Training
  - Procuring uniforms and other necessary equipment
  - Logistical and administrative support
- Execute Information Operations, Public Affairs and Public Diplomacy (CPA and CJTF-7)

## *Finding People*

*Coalition Provisional Authority*


- Explain concept to Leadership Group participants, regional and tribal leaders, and emerging local leaders
- Invite nominations of potential recruits and officers from Leadership Group participants, regional and tribal leaders, and emerging local leaders
- Nominated individuals report to the in-processing centers
- Screen according to Coalition screening criteria
- Plan numbers for significant attrition (weed outs and drop outs)
- Identify potential NCOs during enlisted training
- Use training performance as the basis for competitive selection (especially for officers)
- Aim to promote field grade officers from within the officer ranks
- Identify potential students for professional military education in Coalition countries

## *Stage 1 Screening Criteria*

*Coalition Provisional Authority*

- **Absolute disqualification:**
  - Former regime security organization affiliation (RG and worse)
  - Senior Ba'ath party membership (per 16 May order)
  - Terrorist organization affiliation
  - Human rights violations and crimes against humanity
  - Prior rank of Colonel or higher
- **Waiverable:**
  - Criminal history
  - Familial relationship to former regime
  - Non-Iraqi citizenship
  - Extremist organization contacts
  - Financial situation
- **Other considerations:**
  - Medical and psychological suitability
  - Ethnic / regional balance
  - Military experience and special skills


## 8 Week POI



- CMATT directs contractors training the NIC Units
- Officers, NCOs and enlisted initially train IAW separate POIs
- Seek to transition to the "Train the Trainer" model

## Stages 2 and 3 Timelines

*Coalition Provisional Authority*





## *Stage 3 NIC Missions*

*Coalition Provisional Authority*

- Upon completion of 8 week individual and unit training at Central Training Garrison, NIC will be capable of performing:
  - Point Security to include sensitive sites
  - Convoy Security
  - Route Security
  - Patrolling
  - Border Security
  - De-mining
- NIC Units TACON to CJTF-7


**8 week training cycle focuses on individual and collective skills up to company level; follow-on training for higher collective level skills**



## Stage 4 Integration of the New Iraqi Corps


Coalition Provisional Authority

- New Iraqi Corps begins the Iraqi national army
- MOD and military force structure TBD by Iraqis




*Office of the Senior Advisor for the Ministry of Defense, Iraq*

*Coalition Provisional Authority*



## CMATT Structure




## *Funding*

*Coalition Provisional Authority*

- Potential sources of funding:
  - Appropriated ~ \$ 2.475 Billion
  - “Vested”~ \$ 1.7 Billion
  - “Seized” ~ \$ 600 Million
  - Oil revenues \$ TBD
- Cost estimates for one year (JUN 03 to JUN 04) .... XXX

## Command and Control

Coalition Provisional Authority



CMATT – Coalition Military Assistance & Training Team  
OSA – Office of the Senior Advisor to MOD and NIAF  
(Slocombe Group)  
IIA – Interim Iraqi Authority

COCOM  
OPCON  
Coordination  
TACON  
Direct Support  
Advise, assist and evaluate training



## Task Responsibility (Stage 1)

Coalition Provisional Authority

### CJTF-7 Tasks

- Assess recruitment centers
- Assess training programs
- Support leadership identification
- Support consolidation of
- Support recruitment of soldiers
- Conduct information operations
- Support intel operations

### CPA Tasks

- Support funding
- Support contracts
- Prepare contracts for recruits
- Manage all contracts
- Determine informants and OCIE
- Support CIAA logistically

### CPA Contractor Tasks

- Recruitment and training centers
- Support contracts
- Prepare contracts for recruits
- Manage all contracts
- Determine informants and OCIE
- Support CIAA logistically

## *Task Responsibility (Stage 2)*

*Coalition Provisional Authority*

### **CJTF-7 Tasks**

- Conduct Information Operations
- Support Intel Operations

### **CPA (CMATT) Tasks**

- Oversees contractor operations of NIC training

### **CPA Contractor Tasks**

- Organize, train, equip and sustain NIC
- Provide Force Protection

## *Task Responsibility (Stage 3)*

*Coalition Provisional Authority*

### **CJTF-7 Tasks**

- Assume TACON of trained NIC units
- Employ NIC units in initial operations

### **CPA (CMATT) Tasks**

- Oversee contractor operations of NIC training
- Work with IIA on force structure and doctrine for national armed forces, and professional military education

### **CPA Contractor Tasks**

- Continue to field NIC units
- Provide consulting advice on force structure issues



## ***Summary: NIC Serves Coalition Objectives***

*Coalition Provisional Authority*

- **Iraqis taking increasing responsibility for Iraqi's future**
- **Multi-ethnic force promotes unity of Iraq**
- **Opportunity to instill basic principles for a constitutional government (Professional nonpolitical military)**
- **NIC capabilities support Coalition mission to secure environment**
- **Strong element of Coalition participation**
- **New force advance de-Ba'athification and security sector reform**
- **Forms the nucleus of the new Iraqi armed forces**
- **Counterweight to militias**
- **NIC assists in the maintenance of territorial integrity / regional stability**

## *Issues*

*Coalition Provisional Authority*

- **Resolve policy issues:**
  - Screening standards
  - Kurd / Shia participation
  - Use of Iraqi military for internal stability operations
  - Heavy contractor role in establishment of NIC
- **Funding**
  - Variety of sources possible
  - Urgency
- **Manning**
  - Approval and immediate fill of CMATT force structure
  - Approval and immediate fill of OSA
- **Consultation with Iraqis**

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*Coalition Provisional Authority*


*Questions?*

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## 8 Week POI

Coalition Provisional Authority

CMATT oversees contractors training the NIC Units



## ***CJCS Planning Instructions***

*Coalition Provisional Authority*

- **Planning Instructions require:**
  - Recommended criteria for screening and employing former regime military personnel
  - List of tasks NIC will be expected to accomplish
  - Recommended level of training NIC is to receive
  - Proposed manning structure for both NIC and CMATT
  - Proposed timeline for implementation
  - Critical budgetary requirements and constraints
- **CENTCOM planning will address:**
  - Infrastructure support for the organization, training, and sustainment of the NIC
  - Security of NIC infrastructure and personnel during proposed operations in Stages 1 and 2
  - As required, SOF, Civil Affairs, Psyops, and information operations planning in support the overall CPA plan
  - Potential administrative and logistics support, including theater transportation support as required

## ***Information Operations (1 of 4)***

***Coalition Provisional Authority***

### **IO Objectives**

1. Influence support for the New Iraqi Corps (NIC) ( IZ PSYOP, PA, PD)
2. Influence Iraqis to join the NIC; leaders to nominate candidates (IZ PSYOP, PA, PD)
3. Influence external elements to not interfere with the NIC (PD, PA, CENTCOM PSYOP)

### **Target Audiences**

- Iraqi youth (Obj: 1, 2)
- Former RA soldiers (Obj: 1, 2)
  
- Former RA military leaders (Obj: 1, 2)
- Ethnic groups/tribes: Sunni, Shia, Kurd, Turkomen (Obj: 1, 2)
- Political groups and leaders (Obj: 1, 2 [3?] )
- Paramilitary, terrorist groups (Obj: 1, 2, [3?] )
- Regional/International audiences (Obj: 1, 2, 3)
  
- \* *Strategic IO via Public Diplomacy (PD) and Public Affairs (PA)*

## *Information Operations (2 of 4)*

*Coalition Provisional Authority*

### Themes

- Iraqi Self-Determination
- Professionalism in Iraqi Government/military
- Multi-Ethnic participation in Iraqi institutions
- Temporary Coalition Presence

## *Information Operations (3 of 4)*

*Coalition Provisional Authority*

### Messages

- Appeal to professionalism of former RA leaders/soldiers
- Pride in Iraq and the NIC
- Set the example for all Iraqis
- NIC will work for the good of all Iraq
- Volunteer for an honorable profession
- NIC not for internal repression
- NIC for the protection of the Iraqi people
- Coalition enables the NIC and will help recruit, train, equip
- Iraqis will be consulted on NIC development
- NIC is a capable force to protect the integrity of Iraq
- NIC will be a representative force of all ethnic groups in Iraq
- Patience – NIC will take time to form
- NIC is new, not a continuation of the old army or of any militia



## *Information Operations (4 of 4)*

*Coalition Provisional Authority*

### Strategic PD, PA Messages



- NIC is the beginning of the new professional non-political army to defend the country (PD, PA)
- Don't interfere with the development of the NIC (PD, PA)

### IO Issues

- Require PD to shape the environment to ensure success
- Recruiting mechanism required to disseminate messages throughout Iraq (print, radio, etc)

## Notional NIC Battalion


Coalition Provisional Authority



- NIC Battalion: 774
- 39 Officers
- 735 Enlisted


## Transition of Command and Control

Coalition Provisional Authority



CMATT – Coalition Military Assistance & Training Team  
OSA – Office of the Senior Advisor to MOD and NIAF  
(Stocombe Group)  
IIA – Interim Iraqi Authority  
I-MOD Iraqi Ministry of Defense

### NIC Stage 4



COCOM  
OPCON  
Coordination  
TACON  
Direct Support  
Advise, assist and evaluate training

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## *Coalition Participation*

*Coalition Provisional Authority*

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## *Alternative Concepts*

*Coalition Provisional Authority*

- **"CCC" Construction BNs**
  - + Cheaper, no threat, faster – useful work
  - Why military? – Based for civil jobs, do with civilian contractors
- **"Top Down" – Vet reconstituted RA units**
  - + Experience, structure, possibly faster
  - Revives old system, "Anoints" senior generals
- **"Cadre" – train officers / NCOs first, then main NIC**
  - + Iraqi face, controls officer / NCO selection, thorough training
  - Time, still need to pay for later unit training
- **"Go straight to NIAF"**
  - + Fully structured units, more capable balanced force
  - Time lost, no Iraqi buy-in
- **"NIC"**
  - + Speed, ethnic Iraqi balance, useful missions
  - Lack of continuity / experience, coalition prominence, units not fully complete, will require coalition support operations

## *Who Trains?*

*Coalition Provisional Authority*

- **SOF?**
  - + Experience, flexibility, avoids duplication US models
  - Policy bar, very scarce resource
- **CJTF-7 Military?**
  - + Speed, integration with CJTF efforts
  - Ties US / Coalition military down, costs hidden
- **Other countries?**
  - + Reduces US label, US footprint, relevant
  - Time, capacity to do at required scale, who pays?
- **Contractors?**
  - + Experience, reduced burden on US / Coalition military
  - Cost, time (?), requires supervision (CMATT)



**Memo for: Amb McManaway**

**From: Amb Bremer**

**Subj: Free Iraqi Fighting Forces**

**FYI.**

vr

jjl

5/21/2003 12:48am

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Information Paper

AFRD-C3

15 Jan 03

MEMORANDUM FOR: ADC-O, ADC-S, Chief of Staff, C3

SUBJECT: Free Iraqi Forces (FIF)

1. The Free Iraqi Fighting Forces (FIFF) deployed from Bashur, Iraq on 4 Apr 03 to demonstrate indigenous support to coalition operations during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. CENTCOM issued an execution FRAGO on 3 Apr 03 directing CFLCC to RSO&I, equip and integrate FIFF elements in support of combat operations. CFSOCC provided an ODB and four ODAs to train and support FIFF combat operations.

2. FIFF elements arrived at LSA Adder between 4-5 Apr 03 and began small unit training at an abandoned Iraqi Army camp approximately 15 KM north of LSA Adder. FIFF were armed with captured AK-74s/PK machineguns and ammunition, provided US Army OCIE and "Chocolate Chip" DCUs. FIFF training continued through 9 Apr 03, focusing on small unit operations including patrolling, individual movement techniques, fire and movement, vehicle searches and check point operations. The final assessment was FIFF units would be employed in company-sized elements, accompanied by an ODA, in support of V Corps and I MEF operations.

3. FIFF companies supporting V Corps deployed between 14-16 Apr 03 and the company supporting I MEF deployed on 17 Apr 03. The FIFF company operating in Baghdad was demobilized on 1 May 03. The "Baghdad" FIFF company created an adverse impact on coalition operations due to their association with Dr. Chalabi and the Iraqi National Congress. The remaining FIFF companies were demobilized from 15-20 May 03.

4. The FIFF company supporting I MEF was demobilized on 15 May 03 by I MEF, with assistance from the ODA supporting FIFF operations. The remaining FIFF companies supporting V Corps operations are currently demobilizing. 3ID FIFF paid/demobilized. 4ID FIFF paid/demobilization continues. FIFF members will buy civilian clothes then turn in uniforms. Pay officer will move from 4ID to 101st tomorrow. Anticipate completing demobilization by 22 May. Uniforms, issued equipment and ID cards were recovered and turned over to 377 TSC for disposition.

5. POC is the undersigned at (b)(6) SIPR email is (b)(6)

(b)(6)

MAJ, GS  
CFLCC C35

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030514-12

14 May 2003

**TASK FORCE JUSTICE:**

WHO: From I MEF Command Element

WHAT: Exploitation and discovery of mass graves-potentially for identification of Kuwaiti POW and war crimes. To date have accomplished the following:

- Initial assessment to include photos and diagrams of site.
- In custody at Umm Qasr: (b)(6) who was in charge of 38 others that apparently assisted in executions.
- Excavated approximately 2000 bodies (men, women, small children)
- Dr. Rafid - local doctor assisting with excavation.
- Assisting Iraqi onsite personnel with exploitation and life support (tents and water).

WHERE: Currently conducting exploitation of AL HILLAH site.

WHY: 12 of 26 mass gravesites are located in I MEF's area of operation. (As Samawah (6); Al Hillah (3); Al Hadr (2); An Najaf

HOW: Small, task-organized unit comprised of Reserve Major (FBI), Reserve GySgt (forensics specialist); PAO, security detachment (platoon-size inf); 2x counter-intelligence specialists.

On 15 May, NCIS will send 2 x forensic specialists to assist in exploitation and identification of bodies. CI teams will conduct initial information gathering effort, to include potential witnesses of what may have happened at the site.

~~SECRET~~

30 May 03

Memo for Administrator, CPA

From: Walt Stocombe

Subject: Status of work on NIC project

Walt  
see notes  
4/31

Jerry - as you will know from my e-mail last night, I briefed Sec. Rumsfeld late yesterday evening on the NIC concept (slides attached), and he approved it. That has given me a license to ask Dov Zakheim to take the necessary steps to approve the funding and to start greasing the ways for a highly-accelerated contracting process.

I have this morning submitted a formal request to Dov for approval of funding - which our very preliminary estimate would be about \$160M for the first year - with about \$35M of that representing payments to US contractors (for the actual training and in-processing); the rest being spent in Iraq (on preparing facilities and equipment, providing life support to the trainees and trainers, and paying the Iraqi troops). I have proposed that all the money come from Iraqi sources, but, as you know, the Hill appropriators are likely to take the position that at least the payments to US contractors have to come from US appropriated money.

On the contracting front, I met with LTG Tome Walters, head of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, and he agreed to support a very ambitious schedule for competing and awarding a contract for the US trainer element of the effort. He is working with the Army - as executive agent tasked to support you - to get the contracting manpower needed and to expedite the process. (Sole sourcing might be faster, and there is a risk of some technical misstep in a limited competition effort leading to a protest, but I think it is in everyone's interest to compete the contract if it can be done consistent with the need for starting the intake as quickly as possible.)

I have a SVIC with CENTCOM, CITE, and ORHA people in a few hours. The main agenda will be making sure that the site identification is on track, and that the necessary preparations are being made for the large amount of in-Iraq contracting that will be needed.

We also will need to start planning for how to consult with relevant Iraqi groups and leaders - which is important not just to get their understanding and support, but as a source of candidate trainees. I know that we have to keep that process in sync with the broader political consultation effort. Given that we need to have a fairly definite timetable assured when we start talking about the idea publicly, this consultation/discussion probably can safely wait until I get back to Baghdad, but if you have a different view, please let me know.

I will  
preview  
to policy  
leaders on  
Sunday

I met yesterday with MG Eaton, and briefed him on his task. He is enthusiastic about the project, though conscious of the challenge. He summarized his view by saying, in substance, "This is what I know how to do - take recruits and turn them into competent infantrymen in about two months." He is now back at Ft. Benning, working with his infantry training experts to flesh out the detailed requirements for the training operation. He will turn over his command on 9 June and arrive in Baghdad a few days thereafter.

In short, we are getting good support on moving as fast as possible. My target - a very ambitious one - is to have the first intake of trainees in early July. That will require lots of moving parts to come together - and we need to be sure we have a smooth start, with facilities and training ready to go - but lots of people are energized to make it happen.

During the meeting with SecDef, the following specific issues were raised:

- The relative priority of the NIC effort. I said that, in the areas I know anything about, it is second only to increased policing capability.



- He stressed that in his view a key value of the NTC is that, besides territorial defense, it will contribute to security inside the country, by helping with border control and route/site security and patrolling duties.
- He asked about the planned total size of the effort (three divisions, 40K troops, in 27 BN) and whether we planned to create an NCO corps (yes).
- On schedule, he emphasized the need for speed, but commented that our proposed schedule (12K people - a division within a year) is a lot faster than has been achieved in Afghanistan. I said it is an ambitious schedule, but there are many advantages in Iraq over Afghanistan - in particular lots of people with experience in a relatively sophisticated military.
- He expressed bafflement at the insistence of the appropriators that payments to US contractors come from US tax money, rather than Iraqi sources.


✓ 2 agree

At the end of the brief, he asked CJCS his view; Gen. Myers replied that "it's a good idea and a good start." Rumsfeld then said, "Looks good to me" and told me to move forward to implement. (He asked me to brief the Deputies Committee next Tuesday, so the interagency will know what is going on - and OMDs brought on board the funding concept.)

I did not raise the reporting chain issue to SecDef, because I had met briefly with CJCS before the meeting with SecDef. In that meeting, I mentioned the issue of Gen. Franks' preference that, as the head of the training effort, MG Eaton report directly to you. I explained the reasons I would prefer to have him report through me, pending the conversion of the entire OSA(MOD) into an Office of Military Cooperation that would, of course, report directly to the US ambassador to Iraq. Myers said he would talk to Franks and see what can be worked out. I agree this is not an issue to create a fight over, but I think it is desirable to keep the chain of reporting as I briefed to you. If Myers can work it out, fine; if not, we'll live with Franks' preference so far as the wiring diagram is concerned.

2 agree

## *Purpose*



**Seek approval for organizing “New Iraqi Corps”  
as nucleus for armed forces of new Iraq**



## ***Ten Assumptions / Key Principles***

- Coalition in Charge; force will be under US/Coalition TACON
- A force for Iraq, not U.S. model
- De-Baathification; minimum role for senior ex-officers
- Mission is external defense
- Military is a *National* force - Apolitical, representative
- NIC is an interim step: Fundamental decisions on Iraqi defense policy require Iraqi buy-in: but Coalition can start on organizing first elements
- Speedy start essential; NIC a priority for effort, resources
- Use Iraqi resources of money, people, facilities, equipment as much as legally possible
- Training by US contractors; supervision by US/Coalition officers
- Military not only opportunity to employ ex-soldiers.

## *What is the "New Iraqi Corps"?*

- *An interim Iraqi military capability that contributes to defense of the country and is prepared to help Coalition Forces on public order tasks appropriate for military units.*
- *Established in four stages:*
  - *Stage 1: Infrastructure preparation and recruitment*
  - *Stage 2: Organize, train and equip*
  - *Stage 3: Conduct initial operations*
  - *Stage 4: Transition to Iraqi national army (NIAF)*
- *The end result will be three motorized infantry divisions located near Mosul, Baghdad and Basrah with the following missions: Border Security, Point Security to include sensitive sites, Convoy Security, Route Security, Patrolling, UXO awareness, identification, marking and reporting*
- *Under US/Coalition TACON*

**When ready, the New Iraqi Corps (NIC) is available for territorial defense and to conduct stability operations subordinate to CJTF-7 and contribute to a stable and secure environment.**

## *Plan of Action*

### • Short Term:

- Early start on recruiting, training, organizing, and employing a light infantry force:
  - Start with one Battalion, grow to up to 12,000 (1 Division) in first year, 40,000 (3 Divisions) in a further year
  - Missions: Territorial defense, Protect key facilities / LOC from high end internal threats - under US/Coalition TACON
  - Recruited by nominations from SLG, regional leaders, political religious groups. NOT by approaches to ex-generals.
  - Use Iraqi resources almost entirely - (except for US / contract trainers?)
    - (Note: Separate efforts to organize Iraqi security forces to guard fixed points / installations; stand up Iraqi construction companies, recruit additional police - all of which will use ex-soldiers)

### • Longer Term:

- Work with IIA on fundamental structural decisions - national security laws, national strategy, MOD structure, force structure, budget allocations
- Restructure military-controlled industries - devolve bona fide dual use to civil sector, close down useless / dangerous ones, keep a few for future military
- "Grow" future Iraqi military leadership primarily from within new forces, not by co-opting former officers



## *Timeline*



- Start contracting as soon as funds approved
- Goal is first intake/start training early in July
- Need to be sure facilities/trainers are ready – but speed critical
- First BN “graduates” 9 weeks after entry – Sep if we start in July
- A year from start – 3 “Brigades” of 3 BN each, deployed, one in each region
- Operating under Coalition command

## *Action Requested*

- Approve concept
- Will open door to:
  - Authorize/allocate money
  - Start Contracting
  - Finish staffing
  - Start recruiting

## ***Summary: NIC Serves Coalition Objectives***

- Iraqis taking increasing responsibility for Iraqi's future
- Multi-ethnic force promotes unity of Iraq
- Opportunity to instill basic principles for a constitutional government (Professional nonpolitical military)
- NIC capabilities support Coalition mission to secure environment
- Strong element of Coalition participation
- New force advances de-Ba'athification and security sector reform
- Forms the nucleus of the new Iraqi armed forces
- Counterweight to militias
- NIC assists Coalition military in the maintenance of territorial integrity / regional stability



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CJCS WASHINGTON DC//

CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB, FL//

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PERSONAL FOR GEN FRANKS FROM GEN MYERS//

MSGID/GENADMIN/CJCS//

SUBJ/PHASE IV OPERATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS AND GUIDANCE//

REF A/PRESIDENTIAL MEMORANDUM/APPOINTMENT OF PRESIDENTIAL ENVOY/9 MAY 03//

REF B/SECDEF MEMORANDUM/SUBJECT - DESIGNATION AS ADMINISTRATION OF COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY/13 MAY 03//

RMKS/ 1. ~~(S)~~ IN THE WAKE OF LAST WEEK'S APPOINTMENT OF THE ADMINISTRATOR FOR THE COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY (A-CPA), REFS A AND B GERMANE, THIS MESSAGE SERVES TO CLARIFY THE INTENT FOR USCENTCOM'S DIRECT SUPPORT RELATIONSHIP WITH A-CPA, DELINEATE POLICY DEVELOPMENT RESPONSIBILITIES AND DESIGNATE NEAR-TERM PRIORITIES IN ASSISTING THE A-CPA.

2. ~~(S)~~ DIRECT SUPPORT RELATIONSHIP WITH A-CPA: CDRUSCENTCOM WILL DIRECTLY SUPPORT THE A-CPA AND IS AUTHORIZED TO ANSWER DIRECTLY TO A-CPA'S REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE. WHILE SECURITY IN IRAQ REMAINS THE KEY TO ALL OUR STABILITY OPERATIONS, ASSISTING THE A-CPA IN ITS WORK IN

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THE NEAR TERM IS JUST AS CRITICAL. CDRUSCENTCOM SHOULD SUPPORT, WITHIN MEANS, ALL A-CPA DIRECT SUPPORT REQUESTS TO INCLUDE BUT NOT LIMITED TO PLANNING STAFF, COMMUNICATIONS, LOGISTICS, TRANSPORTATION SUPPORT, ENGINEERING AND CIVIL MILITARY OPERATIONS. CDRUSCENTCOM WILL IDENTIFY REQUIREMENTS BEYOND CURRENT MEANS. CONFLICTING PRIORITIES BETWEEN A-CPA REQUIREMENTS FOR DIRECT SUPPORT AND EXISTING USCENTCOM PHASE IV MISSIONS THAT CANNOT BE RESOLVED WILL BE RAISED TO SECDEF FOR RESOLUTION.

4. ~~(S)~~ NEAR TERM PRIORITY FOR ASSISTING CPA: IMPROVING THE RELIABILITY AND BREADTH OF COMMUNICATIONS FOR THE A-CPA IS THE TOP PRIORITY. UNTIL AN IRAQI INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY INFRASTRUCTURE CAN BE REESTABLISHED, THE JOINT STAFF J-6 WILL CONTINUE COORDINATING WITH A-CPA AND CDRUSCENTCOM FOR SHORT-TERM COMMERCIAL SUPPORT TO MEET NEAR-TERM REQUIREMENTS. AS A STOP GAP, USCENTCOM MUST ASSIST THE CPA WITH AN EFFECTIVE COMMUNICATIONS INFRASTRUCTURE USING APPROPRIATE IN-THEATER C4 ASSETS.

5. ~~(S)~~ POLICY DEVELOPMENT RESPONSIBILITIES: BECAUSE OF THE UNIQUE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE A-CPA AND CDRUSCENTCOM, THE FOLLOWING GUIDANCE FOR POLICY, MANNING AND FUNDING IS OUTLINED BELOW TO CLARIFY KEY RESPONSIBILITIES AND PROCEDURES:

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A. POLICY DEVELOPMENT: SECDEF OR HIS DESIGNATED REPRESENTATIVE IS THE FINAL APPROVAL AUTHORITY FOR POLICY ISSUED TO A-CPA AND CDRUSCENTCOM. REQUESTS FOR POLICY GUIDANCE MAY COME FROM THE INTERAGENCY, OSD, JOINT STAFF, CPA AND/OR CDRUSCENTCOM AND WILL BE FORWARDED TO USU(P). USU(P) WILL DESIGNATE LEAD ORGANIZATION FOR DRAFTING AND COORDINATING POLICY. OSD WILL COORDINATE DRAFT POLICY WITH THE JOINT STAFF, THE CPA, AND INTERAGENCY AS APPROPRIATE. JOINT STAFF WILL COORDINATE WITH USCENTCOM, USEUCOM AND SERVICES AS APPROPRIATE. APPROVED POLICY GUIDANCE APPLICABLE TO A-CPA AND CDRUSCENTCOM WILL BE DISTRIBUTED VIA MEMO FROM THE SECDEF TO A-CPA AND VIA MESSAGE FROM CJCS TO USCENTCOM. IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT A-CPA AND CDRUSCENTCOM COORDINATE ON DETAILS OF POLICY IMPLEMENTATION.

B. ~~(S)~~ A-CPA POLICY IMPLEMENTING PRODUCTS DESIGNED TO COMMUNICATE APPROVED SECDEF POLICY TO THE IRAQI PEOPLE, SHALL BE SUBMITTED TO OSD(P) FOR REVIEW PRIOR TO RELEASE.

C. ~~(S)~~ MANNING: A-CPA MILITARY MANNING WILL BE REQUESTED THROUGH OSD AS REQUIREMENTS ARE IDENTIFIED. OSD WILL COORDINATE REQUESTS THROUGH THE JOINT STAFF. CIVILIAN MANNING FOR A-CPA WILL ALSO BE REQUESTED THROUGH OSD. SECDEF IS THE APPROVAL AUTHORITY FOR ALL MANNING REQUESTS.

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D. ~~(S)~~ FUNDING AND RESOURCE ALLOCATION: CONTINUE TO WORK FUNDING ISSUES THROUGH NORMAL CHANNELS, RECALLING THAT AMBASSADOR BREMER HAS BEEN GIVEN THE RESPONSIBILITY BY THE PRESIDENT TO OVERSEE THE USE OF ALL USG APPROPRIATIONS, TO INCLUDE NON-DOD MONIES, IN IRAQ. OSD COMPTROLLER WILL ISSUE INSTRUCTIONS IN THE NEAR FUTURE FOR HANDLING AND RESOLVING FUNDING OR RESOURCE ALLOCATION ISSUES THAT CANNOT BE RESOLVED BY THE A-CPA.

have  
we  
seen?

6. ~~(S)~~ REQUEST USCENTCOM ASSESS THE MOST PRESSING DIRECT SUPPORT ISSUES WITH PARTICULAR EMPHASIS ON ADDITIONAL MILITARY SUPPORT REQUIRED, IF ANY. BECAUSE SUCCESS IN IRAQ DEPENDS UPON EFFECTIVE AND TIMELY CPA OPERATIONS, EVERY EFFORT, INCLUDING DIRECT MILITARY SUPPORT, MUST BE MADE TO MAKE THOSE SUPPORTING ORGANIZATIONS AS EFFECTIVE AS POSSIBLE DURING THIS CRITICAL PHASE.

7. (U) WARMEST REGARDS, DICK.//

~~DECL/CLBY: LT GEN WALTER L. SHARP, USA, D3 5; RES: 2.5 (A); DECLON:~~

~~X4//~~

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May 16, 2003 7:12 AM

TO: AMB Bremer  
Gen. Myers  
Gen. Pace  
~~Gen. Franks~~  
~~LTC Abizaid~~

CC: LTG Craddock

DSD  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Priorities

I asked several people to redo the priority list we issued in early April. I know John Abizaid is working on it. I did, however, want to send along Steve Cambone's contribution. I think it is a pretty good construct.

Why don't you folks look at it, and let's see if we can coordinate with John Craddock and develop an agreed-upon set of priorities. There is no question but that the ones from April 9 are out of date.

Thanks.

Attach.  
5/15/03 Cambone memo to SecDef re: "Iraq—Priorities"

DHR:dh  
051603-2

.....  
Please respond by 5/30/03

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UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENT(S)  
DOCUMENT BECOMES UNCLASSIFIED




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**SECDEF HAS SEEN**

MAY 1 6 2003

15 May 2003, 1600

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE**

**FROM: STEVE CAMBONE** 

**SUBJECT: IRAQ—PRIORITIES (U)**

(U) You asked for my view on updating your April 9 paper on priorities (attached).

~~(C)~~ In setting priorities for the Iraq joint task force's (CJTF-7's) and, by extension, the Coalition Provisional Authority's effort in Iraq, I believe it is helpful to identify the main areas of work on which we want them to concentrate and then, within each area of work, priorities that they should follow in the allocation of resources over time. Resources include personnel, intelligence, logistics support, funding, etc.

~~(S)~~ Below is an outline of areas of work, with priorities and their time frames for completion. The clock would start from the time this guidance is issued. I assumed existing guidance on "de-Baathification," etc.

**I. Military Operations:**

- A. MEK/BADR Corps/IRGC/KDEK: Disarm and Neutralize Organized Military Resistance Within Iraq (begin immediately, through completion)
- B. Aggressive presence patrols (begin immediately, through such time as local police/paramilitary forces can maintain public order)
  - 1. Urban
  - 2. Countryside
  - 3. Border Areas
- C. Train and deploy Iraqi police/paramilitary (30-90 days)
- D. Integrate foreign troops (60-120 days)

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E. Train Iraqi national security forces (90-180 days)

II. Stability Operations

A. Impose control in Baghdad to provide security (immediate-5 days)

1. Follow-on actions as required elsewhere (e.g., Tikrit) (15-30 days)

B. Provide most urgent energy needs (e.g., gasoline, propane, electrical service) (immediate)

C. Impose, then develop indigenous capability for political control of key centers (immediate with aim of transition of authority in approximately 180(?) days)

1. Baghdad
2. An Najaf
3. Mosul

D. Key ministry stand-ups (30-45 days)

E. Provide essential capabilities for internal communications (45-90 days), e.g.,

1. "Thin-line" microwave (45 days)
2. Restoration of switched network (90 days)

F. Other infrastructure restored to essential levels of service (60-180 days), e.g.,

1. potable water
2. sewers/water treatment
3. roads

G. Apprehend black list personalities (as opportunities arise, without impacting above)

1. Regime
2. War criminals

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III. Survey and Exploitation Tasks

- A. Secure highest-priority known sites and critical ad hoc sites
  - 1. Nuclear, biological, and chemical

Note: Establish terms for international inspection
- B. Find, interview, interrogate second- and third-tier individuals with useful information on:
  - 1. WMD-related activities
  - 2. Political activities, situations, etc.
  - 3. Economic functions of the state
  - 4. War crimes
  - 5. Intelligence activities, etc.
  - 6. Prisoners/Prisoners of war

Note: Employ rewards, punishment, amnesty programs
- C. Triage documents cache
- D. Dismantle/Destroy, as necessary, WMD-related facilities

IV. External to Iraq (continuous through completion)

- A. Work with other countries to conduct survey and exploitation tasks in Iraqi embassies abroad (USDP/State)
- B. Pursue results of interviews/interrogations and document triage to locate Iraqi wealth deposited outside the country (USDP/Treasury)
- C. Work with other countries to manage Syrian, Iranian, Saudi, Turkish, and other NGOs' undue influence in Iraq (USDP/State)

Attachment

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April 9, 2003  
5:44 PM

### Iraq—Key Task Priorities

NOTE: THIS IS A LIST OF KEY TASKS—IN PRIORITY ORDER.

#### WHAT IT IS NOT:

IT IS NOT A WAR PLAN.

IT IS NOT A HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE PLAN.

IT IS NOT A STABILIZATION PLAN.

IT IS NOT A RECONSTRUCTION PLAN.

SUCCESSFULLY ACCOMPLISHING MANY OF TASKS LISTED ON THE FOLLOWING PAGES MAY WELL HELP TO WIN THE WAR AND/OR HELP IN HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE, STABILIZATION AND/OR RECONSTRUCTION. BUT THAT IS NOT THE PURPOSE OF THIS MEMO.

#### WHAT THIS MEMO IS:

THE PURPOSE OF THIS LIST OF KEY TASKS IS TO HIGHLIGHT THE IMPORTANT FACT THAT THERE ARE EXCEEDINGLY IMPORTANT TASKS THAT NEED TO BE DONE EARLY, BEFORE THE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES AND/OR BEFORE THE UN OR THE IIA HAVE A MAJOR ROLE AND BEFORE COALITION FORCES ARE PARED DOWN, AND TO SET PRIORITIES IN TACKLING THESE TASKS.

USE OF U.S. AND COALITION CAPABILITIES FOR THESE PURPOSES SHOULD BE BALANCED AGAINST THE TASK OF WINNING THE WAR AND STABILIZING THE COUNTRY.

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Periods for US Activities in Iraq

Period 1—Period before cessation of hostilities—the US will have the “maximum” freedom of action

Period 2—After Period 1, and before an international coalition, the UN or the Iraqi Interim Authority (IIA) will have a major role, the US will have “medium” freedom of action

Period 3—After Period 2, when an international coalition and/or the IIA assumes significant influence

Major Coalition Tasks:	Office Responsible	Due Date
N/A To the extent possible, tackle as top priorities those tasks that may require kinetics before the cessation of hostilities.	CENTCOM CIA	N/A
N/A Address the rest of the tasks after kinetics end, but before the coalition is restricted by the UN and/or the IIA.	CENTCOM CIA	N/A
✓ Aggressively use “rewards programs,” “amnesty,” “war crimes tribunals” and “IO” to accelerate achieving our key priorities in all periods.	CC/USD(P)/ OGC	Rewards 29 Apr Amnesty 15 Apr WCT 22 Apr
✓ Incorporate lessons learned from Eastern Europe regime changes in fashioning the new Iraq government. <i>“stability tasks”</i>	USD(P)	4/15/03 to CC
✓ Establish exploitation and interrogation process to achieve US priorities.	CC/JS	4/15/03
✓ Priorities should focus US intel collection efforts and use of military and OGA assets, but targets actually pursued will depend on the availability of good intel; we will act opportunistically.	CC	Ongoing

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Phase 2 - Security & Intelligence

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Period 2—After Period 1, and before an international coalition, the UN or the IIA have assumed a major role	Office Responsible	Due Date
Find and exploit WMD sites.	CC/CI/SP	Ongoing
Locate wealth: in Iraq—money, gold, etc.—and find documentation about Saddam Hussein and the leadership's wealth outside of the country.	CC/USD(P) US Dept Treas	Ongoing
Locate documents relating to Iraq's war machine that connect sources of illegal proliferation.	CC/GIA (S)	Ongoing
Manage Syrian, Iranian, Saudi, Turkish and subversive NGOs' influence in Iraq.	CC/USD(P)	Ongoing
Monitor borders to prevent outflow of WMD and contraband..	CC/USD(P)	Ongoing
Establish interim Iraqi government by means of IIA.	CC	Ongoing
Reduce illicit commerce	USD(P)/CC	Ongoing

Period 3—After Period 2, when an international coalition and/or the IIA assumes significant influence	Office Responsible	Due Date
Find and bring to trial the top 50 on the black list.	CC/ETA	Ongoing
Find and bring to trial all surviving war criminals.	CC/ETA	Ongoing
Deal with Iraqi embassies abroad.	USD(P)/ETA	Ongoing

DRAFT  
Iraqi Provisions

✓ = already in SC's draft  
○ = added by transfer to SC's draft

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030518-06

**Bremer, Paul**

**From:**  
**Sent:**  
**To:**

(b)(6)

**Cc:**

**Subject:**

Classification: ~~SECRET~~  
Caveats: NONE

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ALCON.

Today's notes:

- CG concurred with DIRLAUTH between V Corps & ORHA in that it facilitates coordination & execution, but noted that when get into missioning & resourcing, CJTF-7 must cut FRAGOs - if don't, then will end up with the HQs working at cross-purposes. For example, could have overmissioning of units if ORHA & V Corps coordinate a mission w/o CJTF-7 visibility and then we put out a tasking thinking those forces/resources are available.

- CG emphasized importance of a CJTF-7 & ORHA meeting tomorrow where ORHA will itemize all requirements across all lines of operation & ministries and then prioritize them for CJTF-7 to allocate resources. CG guidance to DCG-O is that "police are at or near the top" of the prioritization.

- CG talked to CJTF-7 leaders about ongoing transition of lead for civil reconstruction in IZ. Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) is AMB Bremer who is now on board. He is in charge in IZ and ORHA is subsumed as part of his organization. CJTF-7 is in Direct Support to CPA, even as our chain-of-command remains to CENTCOM. CG made clear that CPA priorities are our priorities; that what CPA needs done, we will do all we can to do. CG noted there will be continued turbulence as ORHA personnel rotate in coming days and weeks but that CJTF-7 needs to facilitate success so staff isn't to hesitate to send personnel to Baghdad, link-up with ORHA and work things out. Does no good to point out shortcomings and wait for someone else to fix them before acting. CG told CJTF-7 leadership not to get frustrated with ORHA & CPA if things are not as clear-cut as we would like or are used to - they come from different cultural base.



**CJTF-7 must and will support them - our success only comes with their success & CJTF-7 will support.**

- Police Issues:

\* CG emphasized to staff, and PMO in particular, the importance of expediting delivery of police uniforms. If they come in tomorrow as scheduled, they need to be broken down tomorrow & flown north immediately - "want them distributed fast"

\* Regarding police cars, suggestion made to paint them all bright red for visibility w/ a precinct number on them - any reason not to do that?

\* Regarding 16th AASLT remaining in IZ another 60 days, CG indicated we will use them primarily to train police & perhaps other tasks too.

- CJTF-7 Transition:

\* D/CofS to ensure JMD & unit recommendations have CG review before going to CENTCOM.

\* CG made clear that 1 UK Division will not change C2 relationships before 15 June, they will remain under I MEF until I MEF departs and manne presence goes to a MEB. At that point, 1 UK becomes a multi-national division under CJTF-7. Staff must think through the implications as it will effect all battlefield functions - commo being a great example: how deal w/ SIPR, TACSAT, etc

- Discussion about the daily PAO Press Release that focuses on Security - CG wants statistic that 96 of 100 gas stations in Baghdad are now open (up from 40 last week) included. Beyond that, all need to know that every day the C2, C3 & PAO are running a battle drill to put out a daily press release that talks to security conditions out all of Iraq, with some emphasis on Baghdad. PAO to provide the press release, via XO, to CG daily. Staff needs to feed information appropriate for the release into the PAO daily.

- Fuel Distribution:

\* CG wants to orchestrate fuel deliver in a predictive way as opposed to reacting to shortages as they are identified. GSTs report back through 352d CA daily; they need to report fuel status for their region - C9 to roll together all the GST reports daily.

\* C2 to do IPB of fuel infrastructure security for purpose of developing an "ISR like plan" to use aerial platforms to enhance pipeline & fuel infrastructure security

- CFLCC (CFLCC "hat" of CJTF-7 if before CJTF-7 TOA) to assume control of KU redeployment camps from V Corps soon, 377th TSC will control the camps.

- CG talked at length today about problem of soldier standards in theater - improper uniforms; operating vehicles w/o helmet & seatbelts. Many offenders are new units falling in on & learning bad standards. Standards must be integral part of RSOI & 377th to reinforce standards & standards enforcement as part of RSOI. CG is prepared to take MPs out of security mission in IZ if he has to since the chain-of-command continues to fail to enforce, but it will be last resort and he made clear he will be displeased if he is forced to do that. Standards enforcement is near top of CG's list of important things and must be so with everybody. Related topic was allegation that units are going into and stopping to eat or shop in downtown Kuwait City - PMO to provide CG list of units caught doing that.

- CJTF-7 Transition:

\* CG told CJTF-7 leaders not to get fixed on 15 June date for CJTF-7 TOA - it is a target, but TOA will be event driven when CG & V Corps Cdr agree all the conditions are met, not simple adherence to a pre-determined date. Staff to work respective lanes to get TOA right; don't wait to be told & be sensitive to overloading V Corps by just dumping tasks on them.

\* When TOA does take place, there will be a phased withdrawal of CFLCC Forward HQ in Baghdad. EECF will be the last piece out & it could remain there a while if there is a need.

\* After TOA, our HQ will retain three roles: CFLCC (for a long period of time - until the last Marine & coalition soldier leaves theater), ARCENT & 3d Army. At least some of the Title X support we had been doing for CJTF-180 before Operation Iraqi Freedom will resume.

\* Regarding long-term ARCENT/3d Army HQ in theater, CG's intent is to figure out a smart way to downsize the HQ enough to eventually allow for a rotation of permanently assigned personnel, particularly those who have been here the last two years.

- Perception Management: critical to success in Iraq, media interface is where center of gravity seems to be [my term for CG's thrust]. CG said we will continue to do press conferences, the Press Releases is our effort to seize the initiative. Perception Management isn't just task of Command Group G.O.s though, all contribute by:

1) provide information for the PAO to use

2) seek out press & engage them to tell the other 9 good news stories that exist for each bad news story that gets reported.

- CG wants entire energy of the ESB, with IO & PMO leads, put into implementing CJTF-7 Weapons Policy with proclamation this week. CG reminded everyone AMB Bremer & SECDEF have approved for execution. C3 to release an order implementing it. C3 IO to work with 1SG Haddad's translation & develop a dissemination plan using all means available - again, to be executed this week. CG noted that policy does not disarm IZ, will discuss Weapons Policy at 20 May IIA meeting.

- CG talked to CJTF-7 leadership about fact that we are killing a soldier or marine a day in non-hostile actions - vehicle accidents, falling off things, negligent discharges, UXOs, etc. Staff & particularly commanders need to figure out what they can do to help stem accidents. Relates closely to standards discussed above - CG noted that at Camp Doha can see vehicles speeding & failing other safety standards. Leaders need to step out & make corrections - never be too busy to make an on the spot correction as a leader. CG spoke w/ anger of two lieutenants driving a HMMWV in T-Shirts w/o helmets - stopped by CSM they told him while laughing about it that "yes, they were wrong and would get in uniform" like acknowledging failure and willingness to correct it made their behavior OK while their actions set standard for not only their soldiers but all the others they encountered as well. CG ended by telling leaders that success of the campaign will be determined over the summer months - all must "stay with it."

- Regarding 507th Main Investigation, SJA to get involved with process to determine releasability of information, who can & should see results and how quickly both within the Army & outside the Army. Seems clear some internal Army organizations should hear the results quickly - TRADOC for example. CG indicated that perhaps greatest good that can result from the investigation will be improved equipping (e.g. increase MTOE authorization for ring-mounts for all their crew served weapons, MK-19 & 50 cal ) & training of CSS units - given characteristics of modern warfare, CSS units will continue to find themselves in combat situations in America's future conflicts.

(b)(6)  
COL, Cmd Grp  
DSN (b)(6)

\*\*\*\*\* ~~SECRET~~ \*\*\*\*\*

Classification: ~~SECRET~~  
Caveats: NONE

~~SECRET~~  
with attachment

030518-09

18 May 2003

**MEMO FOR:** Mr. Walt Slocombe


**FROM:** (b)(6) Military Assistant to Mr. Bremer

**SUBJECT:** Enforcing Deba'athification

Sir

Please see Mr. Bremer's note on the attached.

Very respectfully



~~SECRET~~  
with attachment

**Thoele, Daniel MAJ**

**From:** (b)(6) LTC CFLCC-C3  
**Sent:** Friday, May 16, 2003 11:21 AM  
**To:** ORHA.C33; Ballazar, Tom  
**Subject:** FW: De-Baathification Letter from AMB Brenner

FOR ALL--ESPECIALLY THE FRONT OFFICE

LT Col Brunnauer

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Lewis, Owen MAJ CFLCC-S1A  
**Sent:** Friday, May 16, 2003 5:30 PM  
**To:** (b)(6) COL CFLCC-C3; CFLCC LNO TO ORHA MAIN  
**Cc:** CFLCC-C35 FUOPS ESB  
**Subject:** RE: De-Baathification Letter from AMB Brenner

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

Caveats: NONE

S:

Attached below are the V Corps "de-Baathification" products for individuals returning to work. One for former members (disavow) one for those who were not (denunciation).

vir,

MAJ Lewis

-----Original Message-----

**From:** (b)(6) COL CFLCC-C3  
**Sent:** Friday, May 16, 2003 9:27 AM  
**To:** CFLCC LNO TO ORHA MAIN (E-mail)  
**Cc:** CFLCC-C35 FUOPS ESB  
**Subject:** FW: De-Baathification Letter from AMB Brenner

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

Caveats: NONE

LTC Jones - Frank. Need you to pass this on to ORHA. Will have MAJ Lewis (SJA) send you the letter that V Corps is using.

5/16/2003



VR

(b)(6)

COL IN

C3 FUOPS

"C3: - Tip of the Operational Bayonet"

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Thurman, James MG CFLCC-C3

**Sent:** Friday, 16 May, 2003 12:10

**To:** (b)(6) (E-mail); (b)(6) COL CFLCC-C3

**Subject:** FW: De-Baathification Letter from AMB Brenner

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

Caveats: NONE

PLAUDY,

NOTE ..... PASS TO THE LNOS AT ORHA

THURMAN

-----Original Message-----

**From:** WALLACE, WILLIAM LTG (VCORPS CG )

**Sent:** Friday, May 16, 2003 08:55

**To:** Thurman, James MG CFLCC-C3

**Subject:** RE: De-Baathification Letter from AMB Brenner

Do we want to add the fact that when we find low level, baath party beaurecrats willing to be part of the solution of forming a new Iraq, and once they are vetted (not criminals or bad-actors)... we are having them sign a paper which declares their renunciation of the Baath party and old regime, and their allegiance to the new Iraq... if they won't sign, we don't place them in position... this is a policy decision, and out of my zone, but worth a thought

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Thurman, James MG CFLCC-C3

(mailto:(b)(6))

**Sent:** Friday, May 16, 2003 11:49 AM

**To:** Stalder MajGen Keith J; IMEFDF G3 COC CUR OPS O; IMEFDM G3 ACS, HAHN,

DANIEL (BG CoS C5MAIN); HicksS (Hicks, Stephen COL); CSCM-G3CHOPS (b)(6)

(b)(6) COL)

**Cc:** William LTG (VCORPS CG) 'Wallace (E-mail) (E-mail); Conway LtGen James T

**Subject:** FW: De-Baathification Letter from AMB Brenner

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

Caveats: NONE

ALL,

SEE ATTACHED THURMAN

-----Original Message-----

**From:** CFLCC LNO TO ORHA MAIN

**Sent:** Friday, May 16, 2003 06:35

**To:** (b)(6) COL CFLCC-CMD GRP (EECP); (b)(6) CTV CFLCC-CMD

5 16 2003



GRP (EECP); CFLCC-C3 CHOPS (FWD); CFLCC-C3 CHOPS (Main); Thurman, James MG CFLCC-C3; Blackman, Robert MajGen CFLCC-CMD GRP; Blackman, Robert MajGen CFLCC-CofS (EECP); Della Jacono, John COL CFLCC-CMD GRP; (b)(6) COL CFLCC-C3; McKiernan, David LTG CFLCC-CG (EECP); Webster, William MG CFLCC-DCG OPS (EECP)

**Subject:** De-Baathification Letter from AMB Brenner

Sir:

AMB Brenner is planning to announce the beginning of De-Baathification as early as a news conference today at 1300hrs.

**His question for us is "What tasks can the military perform to assist with this process, and when can we start them?"**

I need confirmation that the following are acceptable answers at least as a start for this question:

1. Military forces have ~~removed symbols of the regime, and~~ Saddam in particular since they entered Iraq. Our forces will continue to remove these symbols as we encounter them and/or assist the Iraqi people in removing them.
2. Where military forces are assisting with establishment of local governance structures, we are vetting emerging Iraqi leaders to identify previous key Ba'athist leaders. Where practical, former key Ba'ath personnel are not performing roles in conjunction with military forces. However, per the Ambassador's comments at his news conference yesterday, there are some cases where former Ba'ath members are the only personnel with particular skills or knowledge to accomplish given tasks. Over time, we ~~will disengage our~~ interaction with these individuals as other capable personnel are identified or trained.
3. When appropriate, IAW the 5<sup>th</sup> paragraph of this document, military forces may assist Iraqi law enforcement officials in detaining or removing undesirable personnel.

VR/LTC Jones

**CFLCC LNO TEAM TO ORHA**

DSN: (b)(6)

DNVT

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

Caveats: NONE

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

Caveats: NONE

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

Caveats: NONE

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

Caveats: NONE

5/16/2003

## AGREEMENT TO DISAVOW PARTY AFFILIATION

### تصريح قطع العلاقة مع حزب البعث

I, \_\_\_\_\_ (name), hereby disavow and renounce my membership in the Arab Socialist Renaissance Party of Iraq (Ba'ath Party). I understand that the Ba'ath Party is disestablished and abolished. I expressly reject and denounce the Ba'ath Party and Saddam Hussein and his regime, as well as my previous association with it.

I acknowledge that any continued association with, or involvement in, the Ba'ath Party or its activities constitutes a violation of an order by the Coalition Provisional Authority. I pledge to cooperate fully with the Coalition Provisional Authority in serving the people of Iraq and building a new Iraqi government. I will obey the laws of Iraq and all proclamations, orders and instructions of the Coalition Provisional Authority. As God is my witness:

أنا \_\_\_\_\_ (اسم الموقع) أصرح انهاء رفاصي لعصويتي في حزب البعث العربي الاشتراكي السابق في العراق. و افهم بان حزب البعث قد إنتهى. و لذا اعلن و اعبر عن ندمي لانضمامي في سابقاً الى حزب البعث و نظام صدام حسين.

أقر و اعترف بان اي تعامل إستراتيجي أو الاستمرار مع حزب البعث أو المشاركة في فعالياته سيكون نقضاً لأوامر قوات التحالف. و اتعهد بالتعاون الكامل مع قوات التحالف لخدمة الشعب العراقي و ببناء حكومة عراقية جديدة. وسوف اطيع كافة القوانين العراقية و لأوامر و تعليمات الصادرة عن قوات التحالف و أشهد الله على ذلك.

التاريخ 2003 \_\_\_\_\_ 2003 \_\_\_\_\_  
DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

(name of signatory)  
(اسم الموقع)

(signature)  
(التوقيع)

(name of witness)  
(اسم الشاهد)

(signature)  
(التوقيع)

(name of witness)  
(اسم الشاهد)

(signature)  
(التوقيع)

## DENUNCIATION

### تشجيب لحزب البعث

I, \_\_\_\_\_ (name), am not, nor have I ever been, a member of the Arab Socialist Renaissance Party of Iraq (Ba'ath Party). I understand that the Ba'ath Party is disestablished and abolished. I expressly reject and denounce the Ba'ath Party and Saddam Hussein and his regime.

I acknowledge that any association with, or involvement in, the Ba'ath Party or its activities constitutes a violation of an order by the Coalition Provisional Authority. I pledge to cooperate fully with the Coalition Provisional Authority in serving the people of Iraq and building a new Iraqi government. I will obey the laws of Iraq and all proclamations, orders and instructions of the Coalition Provisional Authority. As God is my witness:

انا \_\_\_\_\_ (اسم الموقع) ليس الآن و لم اكون ابدا عضو في حزب البعث العربي الاشتراكي السابق في العراق. و افهم بان حزب البعث قد إنتهى. و انا اعير و اعلن عن رفضي لحزب البعث و نظام صدام حسين.

اقر و اعترف بان اي تعامل و اشتراك مع حزب البعث او المشاركة في فعالياته سيكون نقضا لاولامر قوات التحالف. و اتعهد بالتعاون الكامل مع قوات التحالف لخدمة الشعب العراقي و بناء حكومة عراقية جديدة. وسوف اطيع كافة القوانين العراقية و لاولامر و التعليمات الصادرة عن قوات التحالف و اشهد الله على ذلك.

التاريخ: \_\_\_\_\_ 2003 \_\_\_\_\_ 2003 . DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

(name of signatory)  
(اسم الموقع)

(signature)  
(التوقيع)

(name of witness)  
(اسم الشاهد)

(signature)  
(التوقيع)

(name of witness)  
(اسم الشاهد)

(signature)  
(التوقيع)

030518-03

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
(with attachment)

18 May 2003

MEMO FOR: Mr. Phil Carroll

FROM:

(b)(6)

SUBJECT: Syrian Purchases of Petroleum Products

Sir

Mr. Bremer asks: "Are we encouraging Syrian oil purchases?" See attachment.

Thanks.

*Not direct Syrian/ Iraqi deals. The guidance to the Ministry is to get the fuel tax, I suppose, waived at the Jordanian airport. This should not be difficult with a swap in the region. Most of 1 million lbs/day to gasoline, I suppose, is in the Jordanian market.*

*(Comes across Jordan border)*