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BAGHDAD 00416

Laser1:

ACTION: EXEC

INFO: IPC COS

DISSEMINATION: EXEC /1

CHARGE: PROG

APPROVED: LPBREMER

DRAFTED: LKHALIL

CLEARED: MOSULLIVAN, TFITZGERALD, BGWEBER

VZCZCEGI288

PP RUEKJCS RUEHC RHEHNSC RUEKJCS RUCAACC RUCNRAQ

DE RUEHGB #0416/01 1271007

ZNR UUUUU ZZH

P 061007Z MAY 04

FM CPA BAGHDAD

TO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0835

RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NSC WASHDC PRIORITY 0795

RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHDC

RUCAACC/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL

INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE

BT

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~~SENSITIVE~~

STATE FOR NEA/NGA, PM FOR PMAT

E.O. 12958: N/A

TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PINS, PTER, MARR, IZ

SUBJECT: CPA 1078: May 4 Governing Council Meeting with
Ambassador Bremer on Fallujah

1. ~~(SBU)~~ Summary: On May 4, 2004 Ambassador Bremer and LTG Sanchez briefed the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) on the current situation in Fallujah per their request. The IGC voiced alarm and criticism over the decision to form the Fallujah Brigade. On May 3, the Governing Council had issued a statement on Fallujah (text in para 8). End Summary.

2. ~~(SBU)~~ Ambassador Bremer met with the full IGC on May 4 in a special session regarding the situation in Fallujah. He began by explaining to the council the circumstances under which the Fallujah Brigade was formed. Due to the desire for all involved to find a peaceful solution, the Coalition implemented a unilateral ceasefire and decided to consult with local leaders before it would resume offensive military operations to root out insurgents. Based upon the

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recommendations of the local imam, the Marine commander worked with local leaders to form the brigade and install General Salih as head of the brigade.

3. ~~(SBU)~~ Bremer reassured the IGC that the Fallujah brigade was an auxiliary unit which was not part of the Iraqi Armed Forces. It was formed under exceptional circumstances and it would be dissolved immediately upon completion of its mission. It was not envisioned to be a model for dealing with future security problems in Iraq.
4. ~~(SBU)~~ LTG Sanchez then reported that May 3 was the first peaceful day since sustained violence had erupted in Fallujah. The Marines would maintain operational control and oversee the leadership of the brigade. Bremer, acknowledging that there had been problematic information that had come out on General Salih, announced that General Latif would be installed above him.
5. ~~(SBU)~~ Many IGC members reacted negatively to the formation of the Fallujah brigade, the Shi'a representatives in particular. They stated that it not only set a bad precedent for solving security problems, but it also compromised efforts to get other local militias under control. It rewarded insurgents and terrorists for their violent acts.
6. ~~(SBU)~~ Governing Council members reported that Iraqis were fearful that the Ba'ath party and Saddam Hussein might be reinstated into power and warned that this impression might further sectarian strife. Other members questioned why other provinces could not form their own local force to provide for their own security in a similar way.
7. ~~(SBU)~~ Bremer reacted very firmly to the talk about reinstating Hussein and exaggerations that it would inevitably lead to sectarian strife. He stated that the United States Government had not sent its forces to die in Iraq in order to reinstate the previous regime. He welcomed the notion, expressed in the IGC's May 3 statement, that Iraqis should have more responsibility for their security. But as events of the past month had shown, the Iraqi security forces were not up to the task of quelling the violence in Fallujah. Coalition Forces were forced to use creative means to end the insurgency with little bloodshed. He concluded by noting that this new force would be put to the test. If it proved unable to disarm combatants, and kill or capture insurgents, the Marines would need to step back in to do the job. Bremer warned the GC that, if this scenario were to unfold, he would be looking to those who opposed the creation of this

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new force to support action by the Marines fully.

8. (U) The IGC had issued a statement regarding the Fallujah force the previous day. Begin text:

The best way to serve security in Iraq is to support the position of the Ministerial Committee on National Security and its aim, within the orientations of the Governing Council, to strengthen peace and security in Iraq in general and in Al Fallujah in particular. Subsequently, the Governing Council supports the position of the Ministerial Committee not to consider the force that was formed in Al Fallujah part of the New Iraqi Army.

The Governing Council condemns and cautions against any attempts to go into the direction of relying on forces that spilled the blood of the Iraqi people under the former regime, especially the forces of the Republican Guard, Saddam's Fedayeen and the remnants of the defunct regime.

The Governing Council emphasizes again the need for an Iraqi solution to all the security problems and stresses the importance of consulting with the Governing Council and with its security committee in these matters.

End Text.
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ACTION: EXEC

INFO: IPC COS

DISSEMINATION: EXEC /1
CHARGE: PROG

APPROVED: JOSTER

DRAFTED: MSCHROEDER

CLEARED: JNORMAN, JWEAVER, TBEESON, KBACKES, FRILEY, JAGRESTO

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RR RUEKJCS RUEHC RHEHNSC RUCNRAQ

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FM CPA BAGHDAD

TO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC

RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0843

RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NSC WASHDC 0803

INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE

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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 BAGHDAD 000424

~~SENSITIVE~~

E.O. 12958: N/A

TAGS: EAID, EFIN, ETRD, EPET, PGOV, PHUM, IZ

SUBJECT: CPA 1088: ADMINISTRATOR'S WEEKLY ESSENTIAL
SERVICES REPORT: APRIL 24-30, 2004

1. ~~(SBU)~~ Summary. The Essential Services Report is one of four administrator's reports produced weekly by CPA-Baghdad. CPA-Washington distributes all four administrator's weekly reports - Security, Essential Services, Economic, and Governance - with graphics via email. The Economic, Governance, and abridged versions of the Security and Essential Services reports will be posted after 48 hours on the CPA website, www.cpa-iraq.org. The full Security and Essential Services reports remain sensitive but unclassified. Headlines of paragraphs 3-9 reflect goals in the coalition provisional authority strategic plan. End summary.

2. ~~(SBU)~~ Highlights

-- The seven-day average (April 24-30) of peak electricity production was 4,070 MW.

-- Since May 2003, CPA has reinstated 344,102 cell phone subscribers.

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-- The Ministry of Oil met the Coalition Provisional Authority goal of 15 days of supply of fuel nationwide for kerosene.

Provide Electricity Services that Meet National Needs

3. ~~(SBU)~~ CPA tasks: Improve generating capacity to 6,000 MW by June 1, 2004; fully implement policy on allocation of electrical power; publish draft of long term strategy; minimize sabotage and improve security.

The seven-day average (April 24-30) of peak electricity production was 4,070 MW, an increase of 5.5 percent from the previous week. On April 26, peak production hit a high for the week at 4,374 MW. The spring generator maintenance of several units has recently been completed, which is contributing to the increase in output. However, maintenance will not be finished for several weeks.

-- The seven-day average (April 24-30) total production of electrical energy was 80,703 MWh per day, an increase of 3.5 percent from the previous week. On April 29, the total hours of electrical energy peaked for the week at 85,144 MWh.

-- This past week, an average of 405 MW (12 generators) of generating capacity was on forced (unplanned) outage, and an average of 1,429 MW (29 generators) was on scheduled outage. 5 (400 Kv) and 9 (132 Kv) transmission lines are currently out of service.

-- The following chart presents the daily electric power consumption broken down among the North, Central (including Baghdad), and South regions. Per day during the reporting period, the North, which represents 35 per cent of the total population, consumed an average of 810 MW or 21 percent of total power consumption. The Central region, which represents 44 per cent of the total population, consumed 2,394 MW or 63 percent of total power. The South, which represents 17 percent of the total population, consumed 599 MW or 16 percent of total electricity consumption.

Reconstruct Communications and Postal Systems

4. ~~(SBU)~~ CPA tasks: Build Iraq's First Responder Network;

establish independent regulatory agency; upgrade Iraqi telephone and postal company (ITPC) network for interoperability; build transmission component data network for Iraq, including international gateways; restructure ITPC and its business operations; upgrade and modernize postal systems; upgrade ITPC outside plant for increased subscriber capacity and use.

-- Since May 2003, CPA has reinstated landline telephone service for 178,840 subscribers in Baghdad. Flooding at telephone exchange centers during the past week and subsequent repair prevented any new subscribers. Furthermore, cell statistics were not available this week because of the holiday.

-- The following paragraphs delineate the number of landline and cell phone subscribers in Iraq, and compare them to pre-war estimates. The chart below shows the number of active landline subscribers in April 2003, the current number of active landline subscribers, the number of landline subscribers reinstated post-conflict (since May 2003), and the number of formerly active landline subscribers who remain without service (excluding the three Northern governorates).

-- The three major cell phone companies in Iraq (Asia Cell, Iraqna, and Atheer in the North, Central, and South respectively) continue to enroll new cell phone subscribers. Currently, in Mosul, Sulaymaniyah, and Kirkuk, there are 153,000 cell phone subscribers. In Baghdad, there are 134,000 cell phone subscribers; and in Basra, Al Kut, Amarah, Samawah, and Nasiriyah there are 45,102 cell phone subscribers. Two legacy companies, Sana Tel and Korek, operate in Sulaymaniyah and Arbil, respectively. Sana Tel has 12,000 subscribers. Korek's total is unavailable at this time. Cell phone subscribers total 344,102.

-- There are now 761,440 active landline telephone subscribers in Iraq, compared to 833,000 subscribers pre-war. The total number of telephone subscribers in Iraq, including the cell phone subscribers, is 1,105,542, which is 32.8 percent greater than the number of active landline subscribers pre-war. Cell phone service was very limited pre-war.

-- The penetration rate (the number of active landline telephone subscribers as a percentage of the population) is 2.94 percent (using an estimated population of 25.9 million).

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-- The following chart shows the percentage of operational telephone subscribers compared to the number of active subscribers in April 2003.

-- The following map and table show the penetration rate for cell phone users based on current availability from the cell phone companies. Note: the map and table only includes areas where cell phone service currently exists.

Improve Quality and Access to Healthcare

5. ~~(OSU)~~ CPA tasks: Develop health care organizations, management, and infrastructure; train health care professionals; secure system; public health; pharmaceuticals logistic support; strategic communications.

-- The Ministry of Health (MOH) continues to operate a 24 hour Operations Center with connectivity to its facilities throughout the country. The Ministry is coordinating the reopening of the hospitals in Najaf and Falluja and is preparing to address any medical issues arising from displaced persons that may occur in Falluja or other areas of the country. CPA officials met with the Marine medical contingent and validated the requirements for reopening the Falluja Hospital. They established direct links for coordinating military and medical assistance to the Falluja area.

-- The medical situation in Falluja remains stable. The MOH is able to respond to medical needs in the event combat action intensifies or there is a need to evacuate non-combatants from the area. The MOH is assisting the coalition in planning for the evacuation contingency along with Ministries of Trade, Public Works, and Transportation.

-- The work on the shortages in pharmaceuticals across the country continues. Delivery of the initial \$5 million purchase should begin within the next few weeks. The Defense Logistics Agency Procurement Team conducted "hands-on" training on the \$13 million purchase from international sources with deliveries arriving in-country by the end of the month. Intermediate solutions to resolve procurement and distribution problems have been initiated with the creation of special teams focusing on pharmaceuticals and appliances. Long-term plans include integrating drug requirements at the user level into a comprehensive demand driven model. This will help match purchased medical supplies and pharmaceuticals to the demand. The third emergency purchase of approximately \$10-15 million in pharmaceuticals will fill the critical needs as determined by the governorates.

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-- The Minister of Health presided over a ribbon cutting for a state-of-the-art Emergency Room in the Baghdad Teaching Hospital in Medical City. The 22 bed emergency room was upgraded and equipped through a cooperative effort between the Ministry of Health and the Italian Red Cross.

Provide Food Security for All Iraqis

6. ~~(SBU)~~ CPA tasks: Enhance capacity of Ministry of Agriculture; assure supply of inputs; strengthen research system; ensure adequate stocks for Public Distribution System (PDS); monitor food security; hand over administration of system in the north; initiate reform of rations basket; environmental initiatives.

-- The Ministry of Trade (MOT) and World Food Program (WFP) are combining their separate procurement actions into a comprehensive, integrated Allocation Plan that will schedule the timing and entry corridors of the PDS food commodities over the next several months. The allocation plan will take into consideration population statistics and ration needs, logistics issues, and security concerns.

-- Temporary shortages occurred recently for rice and tea. Rice was delayed in arriving at Umm Qasr (several ships have now arrived) and there were some problems regarding offloading that are being addressed. Procurement actions necessary to address the September/October 2003 draw down of tea stock levels delayed the delivery of tea by one month. CPA is addressing these shortages by making up arrears of rice in subsequent months and by adjusting the per capita ration of tea. In May, rice will begin to be stockpiled throughout the country and the same for tea in June. Other isolated shortages, for example in Nasiriyah in the Governorate of DhiQar, occurred because of transportation security concerns. These are being overcome by assigning security to truck convoys.

-- Capacity building continues under several initiatives, as the CPA and MOT prepare for the handover. These include 1) procurement; 2) establishment of a logistics unit, which is being done in conjunction with WFP support in Rome, while setting up a facility in Baghdad; and 3) communications, to set up a high frequency radio link between Baghdad, all governorates, all border crossing points, and at Umm Qasr. Based on these initiatives, CPA, WFP, and MOT will develop an outline of key future actions to guide investment decisions and work planning after the handover.

-- The following chart shows the current PDS stocks and scheduled commodity arrivals as a percentage of total requirements from April until transition on July 1. The CPA goal is to provide sufficient ration stocks for July, plus a three-month buffer. On the graph below, 100 percent of opening stocks in each commodity category indicates that this goal has been achieved. CPA has procured substantial additional shipments of most food basket commodities; they are not shown as these shipments will arrive after July 1.

-- Note: Oil for Food (OFF) unconfirmed contracts are those contracts for which a valid letter of credit exists but no shipping documentation has yet been received by the Oil for Food coordination center. As OFF contracts are fulfilled they are replaced by MOT and WFP procurement.

Reconstitute Oil Infrastructure

7. ~~(CBU)~~ CPA tasks: Production/exports; product supply; security; structural reform.

-- The graph below shows the daily crude oil production in Iraq over the past nine months. The dashed black line is the current production target goal of 2.5 million barrels per day (MBPD).

-- For the week of April 24-30, the estimated average total crude oil production was 2.43 MBPD (.46 MBPD in the south and 1.946 MBPD in the north). The average crude oil export for the past 30 days was 1.55 MBPD. The average price received for crude oil exports was approximately \$26 per barrel.

-- Three small civilian boats attempted to attack the Al Basrah Offshore Oil Terminal (ABOT) and the Khwar Al Amaya Offshore Oil Terminal (KAAOT) on April 24. One boat (headed for the KAAOT) was intercepted by the US Navy and blew itself up before reaching the terminal. Two boats approached the ABOT and were fired at by security personnel. These two boats exploded away from the terminal, knocking out power to ABOT and damaging a Japanese tanker that had just arrived to begin receiving crude oil. The Japanese vessel sailed away, and exports began again on April 26.

-- Crude production in the south was impacted as a result of the April 24 suicide boat attacks on the offshore oil terminals. Since crude exports from the Al Basrah Offshore Oil Terminal were interrupted, the crude tanks remained full, and production had to be reduced. Production has

since improved.

-- The following table shows the four main fuels in Iraq (diesel, kerosene, liquefied petroleum gas [LPG], and gasoline), the estimated total national daily demand for each, and the percentage of fuel supply that is on hand (weekly average) out of total demand. Liquefied petroleum gas is down because the South Gas Plant was down for four days due to power problems, but is operational again.

-- The graph below shows the total daily supply (domestic production plus imports) for each of the four refined fuel products as a percentage of estimated domestic demand over the past six months.

-- Completed repairs of the 22" pipeline (Bayji to Mushada) on April 25. A faulty valve in the south and a damaged pipeline in the north have reduced crude oil flow to the Daura Refinery. GRD RIO and Iraqi Pipeline Company personnel are addressing the concerns and will provide estimated completion dates soon. Daura Refinery has enough crude on hand to continue to operate through April 30 without additional crude oil supplies. However, crude is still flowing into Daura from the south, although at a greatly reduced rate.

-- CPA received the Federal Aviation Administration waiver required to begin the Aerial Surveillance Mission. AirScan contractors arrived in Iraq on April 30 and will advise CPA once the first mission is scheduled.

-- Fuel distribution throughout Iraq remains difficult due to security. There is a backlog of trucks in the North because of the dangers of traveling south and high stock levels up North preventing downloading.

-- The chart below shows the days of supply on hand as of April 30 for each of the four main fuel products in Iraq. The CPA goal remains to have 15 days of supply (DOS) for each fuel on hand nationwide. CPA met this target for kerosene.

Restore Economically-Strategic Transportation Infrastructure

8. ~~(SBU)~~ CPA tasks: Enable the Iraqi CAA to run a civil aviation system, which will support the country's air transport needs; Enable Iraqi civil aviation to prepare for international commercial aviation and cargo service; enable Iraqi Port Authority (IPA) to administer a port of call with intermodal capabilities and inland container

distribution; enable Iraqi Railroad Railways (IRR) to provide domestic and international passenger and freight capabilities; reform civil service at Ministry of Transportation.

-- The MoT and CPA-South personnel assisted in preventing Maersk, the port manager and operator at Khawr Az Zubayr, from withdrawing on short notice from Khawr Az Zubayr. The CPA is negotiating a letter agreement for a short-term port management/operations agreement with Maersk.

-- Stevedoring Services of America (SSA), port manager at Umm Qasr, indicated that the congestion at Umm Qasr's Inner Anchorage, caused by several vessels being held in the "Smuggler's Box," has rendered this anchorage area unsafe. The military is facilitating a reduction of the number of vessels currently held in this containment area.

-- The MoT and Iraq Port Authority (IPA) moved the floating crane Himreen, from berth 14 to Umm Qasr's South Port, thereby clearing the North Port berths of 12-19 to facilitate dredging. The ship Victoria Island will dredge the berth face from berths 12-19 to increase the depth to 12.5 meters.

-- The CPA met with Coalition Forces (CF) stakeholders to identify and coordinate military and civil security requirements for Baghdad International Air Port (BIAP), which must be adjusted to support the recent changes to the military footprint at the airport. Participants included CF users of BIAP - e.g. Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF), First Armored Division (1 AD), First Cavalry Division (1 CD), and 447th Air Expeditionary Group (AEG) - and other entities such as Custer-Battles, which currently provides security for the airport. The group developed a proposed strategy for the coordination of security concerns and activities, and clarified the security support to be requested of the MoT. In parallel, the aviation team will refine the MoT's plans to enhance contracted security services.

-- The CPA met with the Iraqi Civil Aviation Authority involved with ground support at BIAP - e.g. passenger, baggage, and cargo handling - to identify and define the agreements under which their services are provided. Participants in this discussion included SkyLink, Royal Jordanian, and DHL. The subject agreements have been tentatively identified.

-- The CPA initiated the development of an integrated program to support reconstruction cargo traffic, which will

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be managed by the Program Management Office at several key Iraqi airports, including Baghdad, Basrah, and Mosul. This program will specifically address ground handling support and related services, specialized airport-based security, and, where needed, enhanced air traffic management capabilities.

-- MoT staff met with Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) Director General Fakhir to ensure that the CAA continues to support the current effort to provide on-the-job-familiarization (OJF) to select Iraqi controllers through the RAAF contingent at BIAP tower, and technical training to Iraqi communications engineers on Aeronautical Fixed Telecommunication Network (AFTN) systems to be used at BIAP and other key facilities.

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ACTION: EXEC

INFO: IPC COS

DISSEMINATION: EXEC /1

CHARGE: PROG

APPROVED: SLNORWOOD

DRAFTED: RJONES

CLEARED: SCARPENTER, AGLOVER, JJOHNSON, TFITZGERALD

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INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE

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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 BAGHDAD 000425

~~SENSITIVE~~

E.O. 12958: N/A

TAGS: PREL, PROV, PHUM, KISL, KDEM, IZ

SUBJECT: CPA 1089: ADMINISTRATOR'S WEEKLY GOVERNANCE
REPORT APRIL 24-30, 2004

1. ~~(CDU)~~ Summary. The Governance report is one of four Administrator's Weekly Reports produced weekly by CPA-Baghdad. CPA-Washington distributes all four reports - Essential Services, Economic, Governance, and Security - with graphics via e-mail. The Economic and Governance reports and abridged versions of the Essential Services and Security reports will be posted after 48 hours on the CPA website, WWW.CPA-IRAQ.ORG. The full Essential Services and Security reports remain Sensitive but Unclassified. Headlines of paragraphs 3-7 reflect goals in the Coalition Provisional Authority Strategic Plan. End Summary.

2. ~~(CDU)~~ HIGHLIGHTS

-- The CPA is supporting the United Nations (UN) in meeting the significant logistical and operational requirements for the implementation of the Independent Election Commission (IEC) nomination process.

-- The UN-sponsored nomination process will be conducted

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May 2-15 and lead to the creation of an independent, non-partisan, neutral and professional body, with the exclusive authority to conduct all elections required by the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL).

Transition to Sovereignty

3. ~~(SBU)~~ CPA Tasks: Support Transition

-- CPA co-sponsored a public forum on Iraq's Transitional Administrative Law (TAL) at the Baghdad Convention Center as part of a Town Hall Meeting on April 25. The forum was the latest in a series of meetings in Baghdad and across the nation. Over 150 Baghdad residents from all districts of the city and all ethnic and religious groups were present along with three members of the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC). Two dozen journalists from Baghdad's local press corps participated as well as representatives from international media outlets. Debate was vigorous but cordial and marked by knowledgeable and thoughtful queries.

-- The Baghdad Provincial Council met and selected a first, second and third choice for Governor on April 29. It was a very closely contested, multi-ballot contest. The first choice is Louay El-Erris, a businessman and engineer who was Director of Technical Engineering at Iraqi Airways. All three nominees accepted the results and gave gracious speeches thanking the Provincial Council for its decisions. This is the conclusion of a process which began several weeks ago with 65 candidates applying for Governor based on strict qualifications advertised by the Provincial Council. CPA will now consider the nominees, and is expected to choose one as Governor soon.

Develop Civic Participation in Governance

4. ~~(SBU)~~ CPA Tasks: Develop indigenous polling capacity; Provide women and youth with the skills necessary to become important participants in the political process; Develop local civil society capacity to conduct advocacy and participate in political life; Participate in political life; Develop civic education programs promoting electoral participation and democratic ideals; Build capacity for civil society conflict prevention and mitigation.

-- The following graph from polling conducted in November 2003, and February and March 2004, indicates that interest

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in politics among Iraqi citizens has increased significantly in the past six months. The largest increase in political interest is from Iraqi women, from 30 percent of respondents last November to 53 percent in March 2004.

-- The same polling also indicates that more Iraqi citizens would consider voting today than would have considered voting six months ago.

-- CPA co-hosted the student forum for students from northern universities at Lake Dukan. All major ethnic groups were represented, but Arab participation was below expectations. Security concerns led groups from Basra and Ba'qubah to cancel their participation, and two Arab students from Mosul backed out to protest Coalition actions in Mosul. Participating students from Dohuk, Arbil, Sulaimaniyah, Mosul and Kirkuk engaged in discussions about ethnicity, life on either side of the Green Line, and other issues.

-- CPA officials met with the Democracy Dialogue Activity (DDA) team, the Local Governance Project (LGP) team leader, and Salah ad-Din Governorate Coordinator Mark Kennon in Tikrit on April 23 to discuss the democracy dialogue programs in the Salah ad Din Province, where the 65 DDA team members were recruited to reflect the diversity of the population. It was noted that women are especially interested to join DDA dialogues and take active roles in disseminating information they learn through dialogues.

-- CPA conducted a workshop for 20 non-governmental organization (NGOs), providing assistance in understanding the requirements of Order 45 governing Iraqi NGOs. Order 45 requires that applications be submitted by May 1.

-- CPA has begun disbursing funds to the NGO, Jump Start International (JSI), for clearing and cleaning buildings, and demolition where necessary. This will enable JSI, which already employs more than 1,000 Iraqis, to increase its workforce fivefold within three months. The Baghdad Beautification program, executed through the US Army, is also employing Iraqis during the next three months in projects to beautify public spaces including parks, sidewalks and traffic circles throughout the city.

-- More than 120 women attended a LGP-sponsored women's conference in Al-Refaaee on April 23. Conference topics included the TAL and the mandate for 25 percent female participation in the legislative body, legal rights of women, families and children and local societal problems, including status of health services, public (municipal)

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services and marriage problems. Health topics received the greatest attention and participants noted that the town had a new clinic but without any qualified staff.

-- Representatives of the Advisory Committee on Women's Affairs (ACWA) met with Ambassador L. Paul Bremer on April 30 in Baghdad to discuss security, the economy and the role of Iraqi women in the political process. During the meeting, Ambassador Bremer advised the nine members of the Committee to share their concerns about elections and the future of women with UN Representative Lakhdar Brahimi. The ACWA was formed in December 2003 as the political arm of the Higher Council of Women. The group's mission is to mobilize women to take an active role in the emerging democratic structures embodied in the November 15th Agreement (Transitional Administrative Law, Transitional National Assembly). Municipalities and Public Works Minister Nesreen Berwari leads the ACWA.

-- The Salah Ad Din Women's Committee received a CPA grant to open an office. More than 50 women from Tikrit have come together as the result of a Local Governance Program Civic Dialogue forum and have founded an association to benefit local women. The NGO will initially focus on developing the organization and writing proposals that will enable it to offer services to women in the Salah Ad Din Governorate. During preliminary meetings, the women expressed an interest in activities such as driving lessons, media projects, working with disabled children, language and computer classes, and the establishment of a fitness center for women.

-- The Kurdistan Women's Union has received approval for a CPA grant to offer computer and internet courses for women in Arbil. The grant will provide computers and equipment. The courses will provide the women with marketable employment skills that will help to minimize gender inequity in the workplace. This project targets women who hold a bachelor's degree and have English language skills. The participants will be placed into beginning, intermediate, and advanced groups depending on their level of computer competency.

-- The National Democratic Institute (NDI) held a three day training course for women in Baghdad on public speaking skills. Among the 28 participants were activists, party officials, journalists and a city counselor.

Develop Framework and Capacity for Elections

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5. ~~(SBU)~~ CPA Tasks: Support creation of National Independent Electoral Commission; Promote scopes of work and operational linkages between national, regional, and local level election administration authorities.

-- The CPA has been working with United Nations (UN) election counterparts to support the significant logistical and operational requirements for the implementation of the Independent Election Commission (IEC) nomination process. The May 2-15 nomination process, sponsored by the UN, will lead to the creation of an independent, non-partisan, neutral and professional body, with the exclusive authority for the conduct of all elections required by the TAL. The IEC Board of Commissioners will be composed of seven Iraqis of high professional standing distinguished by their personal independence and judgment. Through this transparent nomination process the UN is inviting Iraqi citizens and organizations to nominate qualified persons to serve as Election Commissioners and to nominate qualified persons to serve as the Chief Electoral Officer who will lead the Electoral Administration.

PROMOTE RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

6. ~~(SBU)~~ CPA Tasks: Educate on human rights issues; Preserve documentation of past atrocities, raise awareness, and promote reconciliation; Strengthen local capacity to investigate and address past atrocities; Establish Iraqi Special Tribunal (IST) for past atrocities; Incorporate human rights into laws; Develop role of independent human rights NGOs and media; Establish a human rights ministry

-- Upon the resignation of the Minister for Human Rights, Mr Abdul Basit Turki, the CPA appointed the Deputy, Mr Bakhtiar Amin, Acting Minister.

-- The CPA has completed a review of 20 boxes of evidence material for the Iraqi Special Tribunal (IST) provided by Indict, AUK non-governmental organization (NGO).

-- CPA, in conjunction with the IST, is coordinating analysis of the documentation collected thus far by the various groups in Iraq for use in forthcoming trials, to locate missing persons, and to build a historical record of the crimes of the former regime.

-- The refurbishment of office space dedicated to Ministry of Human Rights staff within the Abu Ghraib prison

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is nearing completion, and two Ministry lawyers have begun visiting the prison on a regular basis. The first formal visit to prisoners and their families is scheduled for May 4.

-- Over the past year, the CPA has identified 250 suspected mass grave sites and forensically assessed more than 40 of these sites. No exhumations have been conducted to date.

PROMOTE DURABLE SOLUTIONS FOR REFUGEES AND INTERNALLY
DISPLACED PERSONS (IDPS)

7. ~~(SBU)~~ CPA TASKS: Facilitate the return of refugees and IDPs; Build local and national capacity to protect and assist refugees and IDPs; Develop and implement a process to resolve property disputes, through the Iraq Property Claims Commission.

-- Transition of authority to the Ministry of Displacement and Migration (MoDM) is scheduled for the first part of May. The Advisory Office is working intensively with the Ministry on final issues, such as locking in key appointments, and finalizing the agreement on the organizational structure.

-- On April 22 the Lebanese government returned 310 Iraqi detainees being held in Beirut. A return of 600 Iraqis in Lebanon - both failed asylum seekers in prison and others living in Lebanon freely - was planned for early April but was delayed due to security reasons. Through coordination among Iraqi and coalition partners in Lebanon, Jordan, Syria and Iraq, and the International Organization for Migration, the Iraqis returned to Iraq safely on April 24.

-- The Baghdad IPCC offices have received more than 1,100 claims since opening on March 15. More than 25,000 forms have been distributed.

-- In northern Iraq, Sulimaniyah, Arbil, Kirkuk, Salah ad Din and Diyala provinces have opened IPCC offices and have accepted more than 500 claims. The Dahuk office is scheduled to open on the May 15.

-- The Mosul IPCC Office which opened March 30, 2004 has been visited by approximately 1,250 claimants, mostly from Mosul. To date, the office has completed 213 claims, including the oldest that date back to 1975 and the most

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recent to 2002.

-- In central Iraq, the Babil IPCC office is open and providing claims forms. Wasit, Karbala, Anbar and Najaf are addressing security concerns and are on hold for starting offices. Qadissiya has obtained a building and is locating staff. These offices are expect to open in mid-May.

-- In the south, the Basra IPCC is expecting to open on the 10th of May. Three regional offices outside Basra are expected to be open by late May, assuming the security situation allows freedom of movement for staff and office supplies over that period.

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APPROVED: CSLANEY
DRAFTED: RJONES, JOSTER
CLEARED: PJAMISON, MWISE, ESCHMULTS, ARATHMELL, DTESSLER, DBRANNAN

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~~SENSITIVE~~

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PINS, PREL, PTER, PINR, PGOV, PROV, PHUM, KISL, IZ
SUBJECT: CPA 1090: ADMINISTRATOR'S WEEKLY SECURITY REPORT:
APRIL 24-30, 2004

1. ~~(CDU)~~ SUMMARY. The Security Report is one of four Administrator's Weekly Reports produced by CPA-Baghdad. CPA-Washington distributes all four weekly reports - Security, Essential Services, Economic, and Governance - with graphics via email. The Economic, Governance, and abridged versions of the Security and Essential Services Reports will be posted after 48 hours on the CPA website, www.CPA-Iraq.org. The full reports remain sensitive but unclassified. Headlines of Paragraphs 3-7 reflect goals in the Coalition Provisional Authority Strategic Plan. End Summary.

2. ~~(CDU)~~ HIGHLIGHTS

-- Coalition and Iraqi security forces are working to develop an auxiliary force in Fallujah. This will be a temporary unit integrated with Coalition Forces, comprised primarily of former Iraqi soldiers living in and near Fallujah who have volunteered to assist the Coalition in restoring order to the area.

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-- The Iraqi Civil Defense Corps planned and conducted its first mission independent of Coalition Forces, which successfully targeted counterfeiters in northern Iraq.

ACHIEVE A SECURE AND STABLE ENVIRONMENT

3. ~~(SBU)~~ CPA TASKS: Assist in the Establishment of Basic Law Enforcement; Complete the Neutralization of Destabilizing Threats and Influences; Assist in the Establishment of Iraqi Armed Forces - Field and Equip ICDC and IAF; Maintain Territorial Integrity of Iraq; Eliminate Munitions Caches, Unexploded Ordnance, and Excess Military Equipment; Maintain Freedom of Movement along Commercial and Military Lines of Communication.

-- Meetings between CPA and Fallujah government officials continued to encourage a political solution to hostilities. CPA officials visited Fallujah this week to discuss surrender of weapons, suspension of hostilities, facilitation of humanitarian assistance, and continuation of infrastructure reconstruction.

-- The First Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF) continued operations in and around Fallujah. During the unilateral cease-fire this week, Marines were attacked by insurgents inside mosques and private residences and responded in force, including use of air and tank support. I MEF is working with the Ministry of Defense to create an auxiliary force in Fallujah. This will be a temporary unit subordinate to I MEF comprised primarily of former Iraqi soldiers living near Fallujah who have volunteered to assist the Coalition in restoring order to the area. When established, this battalion will conduct patrols in Fallujah with I MEF and other Iraqi Security Forces in order to isolate foreign terrorists and criminals of the former regime. It will be dissolved when regular Iraqi forces take over security responsibility in Fallujah.

-- In a recent public opinion survey conducted by Oxford Research International, Iraqis have identified lack of security and unemployment as leading causes of instability. In addition, most Iraqis polled increasingly view the Coalition Forces as "occupiers" rather than "liberators." Creation of the auxiliary force in Fallujah is expected to immediately employ 600 to 1,110 personnel, to put security of Fallujah more directly in the hands of those who live there, and to create stability that will foster job growth by allowing more relief and reconstruction programs to

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proceed.

-- On April 24, several Coalition servicemen were killed in an explosion while attempting to board a suspicious watercraft near the Basrah at-sea oil terminal in the Persian Gulf. Two additional boats exploded near moored ships at Iraq's main oil terminal in the Persian Gulf. This was the first attack of its kind in the Persian Gulf Theater since Coalition operations began. The high profile style of this attack and the car bomb attacks on police stations April 21 may indicate that terrorist organizations connected to al Qaeda are operating near Basrah.

-- Iraqis in the Najaf area expressed their concern that weapons were being stockpiled in schools, mosques and shrines. Coalition officials declared that this would not be tolerated, and that restoration of these holy sites to places of worship must begin immediately. Operations against the Sadr militia that is scattered throughout south-central Iraq were limited to cordon and search operations outside the holy cities of Najaf and Karbala.

-- The chart below represents the status of Iraqi Armed Forces (IAF) personnel as a percentage of each branch's authorized strength. Current authorized strength for each branch is listed on the left side of the chart. These numbers will change depending on assessment of domestic and regional security issues. This week, the Iraqi Army has lost approximately 100 personnel assigned to duty. Some of these soldiers have been sent for retraining, some were killed or injured in the line of duty, and some have been removed from the Iraqi Army for actions supporting the insurgency.

-- The ICDC planned and conducted its first independent mission on April 27. Three cordon and search operations targeted counterfeiters in northern Iraq, and resulted in detention of two individuals and confiscation of identification card counterfeiting equipment.

-- Four battalions of the Iraqi Army are now conducting their normal training and leave cycle. Three new battalions have been staffed by cadre and are preparing to train new recruits.

-- The following chart depicts significant insurgent activities reported throughout Iraq. Significant activities (SIGACTS) include reported attacks using improvised explosive devices (IED), vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIED), mortars, rocket propelled grenades (RPG), and improvised rockets. This does not include small arms fire, hand grenade attacks, and

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other hostile activities. This chart includes those actions affecting Coalition operations reported and documented through Coalition Joint Task Force-7. The dark line indicates daily totals, while the red line indicates the seven-day centered moving average, which "smoothes" the trend. Continued hostilities in the west account for most of the SIGACTS variance this week. This may be due to more carefully documented violations of the cease-fire through daily reports in Fallujah.

PUBLIC SAFETY: DEVELOP INSTITUTIONS THAT ARE EFFECTIVE IN
PROTECTING SOCIETY AND CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER

4. ~~(CEU)~~ CPA TASKS: Develop and Apply Consistent Vetting Policies and Processes; Establish Governance Framework for Internal Security; Create an Effective and Accountable Police System; Create a Facilities Protection Service; Form the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps; Reconstruct Civil Defense Organization and Establish Mine Action Programs; Develop Effective Border Security; Develop Emergency Management Command and Control System for Iraq that can Coordinate Police, Fire, Rescue, and Emergency Medical Assistance in the Event of a Natural or Manmade Disaster.

-- The Ministry of Interior and the CPA Office of Security Cooperation have begun the process of Iraqi Police Service (IPS) reconstitution in order to re-equip and retrain the IPS, and to replace operatives who performed poorly or defected in the last two weeks. The initial reconstitution efforts will introduce a new IPS code of conduct and disciplinary code and create a new collective training program.

-- The IPS, Department of Border Enforcement (DBE), and Facilities Protection Service (FPS) are the lead civilian agencies for maintaining order within Iraq. The Ministry of Interior is responsible for training all law enforcement personnel, and for operations of the IPS and DBE. The FPS is managed by each Ministry. The chart below shows the status of Iraqi civilian law enforcement personnel as a percentage of authorized strength. This week, the number of IPS operatives assigned to duty has again dropped by more than 100 operatives because of IPS performance assessments following the past two weeks' activity.

-- The FPS completed transfer of authority, requiring each Ministry to be responsible for hiring, payment, and operational management of personnel assigned to it. The Ministry of Interior continues to be responsible for

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training and transfer of FPS guards between ministries as needs continue to be defined. The Ministry of Finance is assisting other ministries with payroll transactions, to ensure guards are properly paid until modernized banking systems are in place. While the transfer has been largely successful, CPA advisors are working with Iraqi officials to identify and resolve payroll issues for approximately fifteen percent of the FPS force. The FPS has begun to create ten regional commands which will monitor, certify, and assist local FPS sites to ensure consistency of operations among ministries.

-- In January 2004, the Ministry of Interior provided the Baghdad Police Department with equipment and training to begin compiling and distributing crime statistics. Trained statistics information officers now reside in the East (Rusafa) and West (Karkh) divisional headquarters and in the Baghdad main headquarters. The chart below depicts murder rates as recorded by the Baghdad Police Department from May 2003 to February 2004. Comparisons to other cities must be made with extreme caution because of differences in reporting accuracy and legal definitions. The statistics information officer at Baghdad Police Department discussed his beliefs about the prevalence of under-reporting. He believes that the percentage of all crimes not recorded is between 10 and 25 percent, but almost all murders are reported. Note that manslaughter, deaths due to terrorist actions, and Iraqis killed by Coalition Forces are not included in the totals. Therefore this represents only domestic crime, and is not reflective of overall safety. Crime statistics will continue to be collected and analyzed by the Baghdad Police Department and Coalition advisors.

BUILD JUSTICE

5. ~~(CDB)~~ CPA Tasks: Establish Independent Judiciary; Reform Judicial System; Improve the Penal System; Establish Commission on Public Integrity; Solidify Real Property Rights.

-- The Central Criminal Court of Iraq (CCCI) was created as a model court for Iraq, to try cases of national importance and to showcase new rights accorded criminal defendants. Since its creation in July 2003, 154 cases have been referred to the CCCI. Until this week, cases were referred by CPA advisors, but now the CCCI is also investigating cases referred by other Iraqi courts. The CCCI will eventually handle up to ten investigations and

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five trials per week. This week the CCCI tried four cases. Because the recent security situation has in some cases prevented the Iraqi Correctional Service from transporting prisoners, not all trials began as scheduled.

-- This week, the first of six judicial training sessions was completed. This program is designed to train judges on norms of due process, rule of law, human rights, judicial independence, ethics, developments in international law over the past 35 years, and CPA Orders. Each five-day session will train approximately 30 judges.

-- New criminal defendants' rights include the right to defense counsel at all stages of criminal proceedings. Training for judges on how to implement and enforce these rights was included in the sessions that began this week. Training for court-appointed defense attorneys will begin later in May.

-- In calendar year 2004, Baghdad courts have adjudicated (dismissed, convicted, or acquitted) over 16,000 criminal cases, including misdemeanors and felonies.

-- CPA officials are initiating plans to make detainee processing more transparent. Individuals detained by Coalition Forces are now being posted weekly by name at Coalition information centers across the nation. This week, 323 detainees were released from Coalition custody. This number includes some who were transferred to the IPS for criminal processing. Coalition Forces detained 434 new individuals over the same period.

-- Iraqi court liaisons are working with Coalition security officials to review case files of detainees. Currently, 68 cases have been referred to the CCCI and 512 cases have been referred to the Iraqi Criminal Court.

Photographs depicting several U.S. soldiers apparently mistreating detainees at the Abu Ghraib Prison Complex were made public this week. Many U.S. officials have condemned these actions. Through an investigation of the situation, six military personnel have been charged with criminal offenses. An update to media representatives and tour of Abu Ghraib will be conducted May 5. The visit will include an update from Major General Geoffrey Miller on changes, a tour of the detention facilities at Camp Ganci and Camp Avalanche, a tour of the detainee hospital, a tour of the unoccupied interrogation facility, and a tour of the family visiting center.

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DEVELOP IRAQI DEFENSE CAPABILITIES AND OVERSIGHT MECHANISMS

6. ~~(SBU)~~ CPA Tasks: Develop National Security System; Develop National Defense Institution; Build Iraqi Defense Capacity; Develop Ministry of Defense Headquarters Infrastructure; Enable Ministry of Defense Standup; Consult with Iraqis for Ministry of Defense Standup; Support State Department Weapons of Mass Destruction Non-Proliferation Activities; Plan for Post-CPA Transition.

-- Iraq defense capabilities continue to grow. The largest member of the Coalition, including domestic security, is Iraq. Total Iraqi Security Forces number just under 200,000 people. U.S. military presence is approximately 138,000 strong during the current troop rotation. Other Coalition members, 33 other nations, contribute approximately 25,000 troops. The chart at right represents the percentage of forces participating in the Coalition by these three groups.

-- Iraqi officials, CPA, and Coalition Forces are developing a plan to disband militias and integrate their members into Iraqi society and security forces.

-- The Ministerial Committee on National Security, which includes the Ministers of Defense, Interior, Finance, Justice, the National Security Advisor, and the Iraqi National Intelligence Service Director General, has been established and is meeting on a regular basis to address the current situation in Iraq.

ENABLE IRAQ TO BECOME A RESPONSIBLE MEMBER OF THE
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

7. ~~(SBU)~~ CPA Tasks: Develop Iraqi Foreign and National Security Policy Options; Build Iraqi Foreign and National Security Policy Capacity; Reform Iraqi Diplomatic Representation; Resolve Refugee and Internally Displaced Person Issues.

-- The CPA will transfer authority to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on May 12, marking another significant step toward Iraqi sovereignty.

-- Foreign Minister Zebari continues to focus on strengthening Iraq's relations with its neighbors. The Minister is scheduled to travel to Kuwait, Cairo, and Tunis over the next several weeks.

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/18/2014

TAGS: PREL, UNSC, IZ

SUBJECT: UN/IRAQ: MNF-IIG RELATIONSHIP KEY TO RESOLUTION

~~Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt,
Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).~~

1. ~~(C)~~ Summary. "Informal informal" discussions May 6 to hear Council members' views about concepts for the next Iraq resolution produced no headlines, although clear markers were laid on the imperative of calibrating correctly the relationship of the MNF to a sovereign Iraqi government (IIG). Members stressed that the linkage between the MNF and the IIG, including the command arrangements for Iraqi forces, will reflect the credibility of the IIG as a sovereign entity. All agreed that the main purpose of a resolution should be to give a clear signal that the transfer of sovereignty was genuine, with visible Iraqi ownership of the political process. Such differences as were aired were nuanced and not ideological. Russian Charge Konuzin narrowly raised the issue of UNMOVIC and IAEA, asking for a report so that the Council could react; only Brazilian Permrep Sardenberg otherwise made mention of UNMOVIC. End summary.

U.S. - UK thoughts on elements

2. ~~(C)~~ Ambassador Cunningham led off the discussion by noting

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that we continued to flesh out our approach, and that the resolution should be narrowly confined to those political, security, and economic elements which were "must do" points. The resolution should support and reinforce Brahimi's efforts and progress on the ground on the electoral process. We could not predict when there would be progress politically, and we needed to pay careful attention to getting the timing of the resolution right.

3. ~~(C)~~ UK Permrep Jones Parry outlined broad categories for discussion:

-- The end of the occupation, the CPA, the Governing Council, and the commensurate assumption of power by a sovereign Iraqi government. This should be a fundamental political statement that the situation had changed.

-- The political process, although much remained to be determined, and an endorsement or blessing for the structures of the new Interim Government of Iraq.

-- The MNF: perhaps the most complex issue, given that SCR 1511 authorized the MNF through the end of the political process (i.e., constitutional elections) yet there was also the view that the transfer of sovereignty meant that a "new face" was needed. There was no fundamental incompatibility between Iraqi sovereignty and foreign security forces operating on Iraqi soil. The MNF would also encompass a dedicated force responsible for UN security. Iraqi capacities would need to be developed as well.

-- The future UN role, which should be consistent with what the Iraqis want and the UN's capacities, with key priorities acknowledged (e.g., elections and constitutional drafting).

-- Last, "other" subjects, such as the arms embargo, financial arrangements with respect to the DFI, and the rule of law.

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MNF - IIG Relationship as a
Symbol of Credible Sovereignty
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4. ~~(C)~~ Ensuing discussion broadly focused on the linkage between the MNF and the IIG, and how the relationship of Iraqi forces to the MNF and the IIG would reflect the credibility of the IIG as a sovereign entity. All agreed that the main purpose of a resolution should be to give a clear signal that the transfer of sovereignty was genuine, with visible Iraqi ownership of the political process. That

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said, sovereign status of the IIG would have to be reconciled with the situation on the ground, and the MNF's authorization would have to be defined in that context. Brazilian Permrep Sardenberg noted that, while governmental power and responsibility were indeed different concepts from "sovereignty," a sovereign government, to be credible, must exercise some genuine power. Algerian Permrep Baali made a similar point: the situation on the ground must reflect the sovereign status of the IIG, and thus an invitation for the MNF to operate would "make sense in balancing the relationship between sovereignty and the continued task of the MNF." Philippines DPR Mercado also sought clarity on the relationship, adding that an invitation from the IIG would serve as an indicator of its exercise of sovereignty. Russian Charge Konuzin seconded the desire for an invitation from the IIG.

5. (C) German Permrep Pleuger also stressed the relationship of security to the political framework and the credible transfer of sovereignty. While Coalition forces were essential to the provision of security, "security could not be entirely in the hands of the MNF." What forces would constitute the MNF, and what Iraqis, if any, might be included? The IIG should have control over its own forces and the police, for otherwise the situation effectively continued as the status quo, but with a different label, he added. Chilean DPR Magueira asked bluntly whether the MNF would respond to the IIG or not. How would the MNF's status be defined vis-a-vis the IIG?

6. (C) Pakistani Permrep Akram also had questions: would the MNF authorities be the same as in SCR 1511, or different -- and if so, how? In addition, who would command Iraqi forces? If the IIG's powers were limited "too much" then they would not possess "effective sovereignty." Separately, why not a Blue Helmet operation to protect the UN? Baali raised the command structure as well, adding that, "in an ideal situation," Iraqi forces would be placed under the IIG. He acknowledged that a mechanism to ensure force action "in a coherent way" would be imperative, or the consequences would be disastrous.

7. (C) French Permrep de La Sabliere stated that the IIG must have a say in security arrangements, although it would clearly be critical to avoid any criticism of the MNF on the part of the IIG. But the IIG must exercise governmental authority over Iraqi forces, and the MNF should not be able to take a decision on the use of Iraqi forces absent the consent of the IIG, he added.

8. (C) On the duration of an MNF mandate, all possibilities

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were raised. Konuzin said that authorization should be for one year with a possibility of extension or renewal. Pleuger said that the mandate should offer a "clear perspective" to the Iraqis on its prospective duration, and thus should not go beyond the December 31, 2005 target date for constitutional elections. La Sabliere agreed that the prospect for foreign forces' withdrawal should be visible at the end of the process, but argued that any authorization should end with the elections by January 31, 2005 of the Transitional National Assembly, which would constitute the first "legitimate government," but leaving the door open to renewal upon their request.

9. (C) More broadly on the sovereignty and authorities issue, Pleuger acknowledged that the IIG would be limited in certain areas of authority until elections could take place, but asked who would supervise those limitations. Would a body of judges be appointed to do so? The Coalition clearly could not. For example, who would manage the prisons, of particular importance given recent revelations, and into whose custody would current detainees be remanded? These were politically important issues that would influence perceptions about the credibility of the IIG's sovereignty. (Baali also obliquely raised the prison issue.) In the same vein, Akram underscored the need for compatibility between the legal situation and the situation on the ground, which should be consistent. Any resolution would have to be careful to neither under- nor overstate the reality. Cunningham made clear that the IIG would be sovereign, but agreed that, as a caretaker government, there would be limits on its authorities. The IIG would not have the capacity to address security, and should not address long-term arrangements that exceeded the scope of its tenure.

10. (C) Cunningham also agreed that the optics of the relationship between the MNF and the IIG would be key, and that it would be quite complex to calibrate the relationship correctly. The worst outcome would be a breakdown in the coordination process over disagreements, but there were ample precedents that that could be avoided. He also noted that the TAL provided for a continued presence of the MNF, and outlined the concept for protection of UN personnel through a dedicated force of 1500-2000 forces, responsible for protection of UN facilities, personnel, and movements. A UN Blue Helmet operation outside MNF unified command was neither feasible nor desirable, and the SYG had made that clear.

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UN Role
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11. ~~(C)~~ Konuzin said the UN's role could only be defined based on a request from the IIG as a sovereign government, with which Pleuger agreed. Others stressed that the UN should play a central role in the political process, and grappled with the question of a broader role beyond the political priority. SYG Annan would have to be consulted, and the UN's current capacities would have to be determined in light of the security reality. Ambassador Cunningham stressed that the UN had a leading role in the political process, and that there was a role beyond the political process that we would like to see the UN play as well. The UN could now focus on the key political tasks without large numbers of people, allowing us to move beyond the "as circumstances permit" rubric of SCR 1511. La Sabliere agreed, saying that the Council should reflect political assistance as a priority, and wait for the situation on the ground to determine the scope of the UN's other contributions.

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Other Issues
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12. ~~(C)~~ Konuzin advocated for an international conference as a stepping stone to validating Brahimi's work. He also proposed that UNMOVIC and IAEA present a report on WMD, opening the door for a Council discussion and decision on their future activities. Only Sardenberg also raised UNMOVIC, simply wondering whether now or later would be more appropriate. Cunningham responded that it was not necessary to address the issue of UNMOVIC and IAEA now.

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Next Steps
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13. ~~(C)~~ Cunningham made clear that the Council would need to be flexible in charting a response to the unfolding political process. While Konuzin had argued for a separate resolution welcoming the IIG, with subsequent action to come later, we would need to see how the process unfolded before making determinations about how best to proceed. Council members agreed to continue discussions informally in the same format in the next week.

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APPROVED: RJONES

DRAFTED: JVANREST

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STATE FOR NEA/NGA

E.O. 12958: DECL:05/04/14

TAGS: PREL, PGOV, KDEM, KISL, IR, IZ

SUBJECT: CPA 1070: FUNDING FOR POLITICAL PARTIES

~~CLASSIFIED BY CPA DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR RICHARD JONES, FOR
REASONS 1.4 (E) AND (D).~~

1. ~~(C)~~ Summary: Since the liberation of Iraq, there has been an explosion of political parties. At last count, more than 200 have emerged on the political scene. Many of them purport to represent the new "silent majority" in Iraq: the non-sectarian, non-ethnic, moderately nationalistic mainstream. Several of these organizations have demonstrated the ability to grow into sustainable organizations and many of them have begun to come together in coalitions in order to have a better chance at electoral success. Unlike many of the established parties, however, which have benefited from foreign sources of funding and weapons, the newer, more centrist parties lack resources and basic technical assistance. None want to be militias; almost all want to see the militias of the parties shut down. Technical assistance for parties is being funded through the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) from the '04 Emergency Supplemental Act for Iraq. However, there is little direct funding available for political parties'

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operating expenses and election activities, which is a serious concern, given the well-funded Islamic parties with which they will compete. This policy should be changed to permit direct funding of emerging political parties. End Summary.

2. ~~(S)~~ Since liberation, the International Republican Institute (IRI) and the National Democratic Institute (NDI) have documented the existence of well over 200 political parties in Iraq. Together they represent a broad spectrum. There are moderate Islamic parties, nationalist parties, parties based on tribal affiliations, liberal parties and others. Among them are those smaller parties that represent the now "silent majority" in Iraq. These parties seek to represent those who wish to see a united, non-sectarian, non-ethnic Iraq. Some of these parties have the potential to become sustainable organizations and have to cooperate with like-minded parties. However, these political parties need support and assistance on a variety of levels, including basic organizational and election preparation skills. The National Endowment for Democracy (NED), through funding from the '04 Emergency Supplemental Act of Iraq, has provided IRI and NDI with approximately \$6 million each for an 18-month program to train Iraqi political parties in all aspects of party organization, to help them prepare for elections and to become lasting organizations. Both organizations are concentrating their efforts on newly emerging parties, and none of their funds are specifically budgeted for direct support for operating expenses and/or campaign activities.

3. ~~(S)~~ U.S. policy with regard to overt direct funding for political parties was set in 1961 in the Foreign Assistance Act. Section 116(e) of the Act authorizes development assistance (DA) support for "studies to identify, and for openly carrying out, programs and activities which will encourage or promote increased adherence to civil and political rights," thereby allowing DA funding for democracy and governance assistance, including political party assistance. Section 116(e) concludes, with the following caveat: "None of these funds may be used directly or indirectly, to influence the outcome of any election in any country." USAID, however, broadly applies Section 116(e) to the democracy and governance programs it provides.

4. ~~(S)~~ In 2003, USAID established a Political Party Assistance Policy in which it afforded greater flexibility to the Institutes for providing parties with commodity support. Such support is governed by two principles: (1) that programs support representative, multiparty systems;

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and (2) that programs not seek to determine election outcomes.

5. ~~(S)~~ The guidelines for the policy state that: (1) USAID programs must make a good faith effort to assist all democratic parties with equitable levels of assistance; (2) Commodity support valued at \$50,000 or less may be provided annually to each political party that qualifies for assistance; (3) Political party assistance should be suspended for a reasonable time period prior to voting.

6. ~~(S)~~ The policy lists several prohibited activities. These include providing commodity support valued over \$50,000 to any individual party and providing cash grants to any political party. However, the policy includes a waiver procedure if such support is determined to be in the interests of U.S. foreign policy and the funds involved include Economic Support Funds (ESF), Freedom Support Act (FSA), Assistance for Eastern European and Baltic States (AEEB), or Transition Initiative (TI) funds. No waiver is possible for use of DA funds. At this time, no such waiver has been sought either by CPA or the Institutes.

7. ~~(S)~~ In the past, and in very few instances, the NED has provided direct financial assistance to democratic political party coalitions, but under strict guidelines that prohibit financing of campaigns or candidates for public office, or individual political parties. At this point in Iraq's democratic development, NED could not provide such funding since coalitions are only in the early stages of formation. In addition, NED does not have funds for such an endeavor and would likely have to receive Congressional approval before doing so.

8. ~~(S)~~ At present, IRI and NDI's programs are focused on helping newly emerging parties with technical preparations for upcoming elections and to nurture organizational infrastructures. Both Institutes have set up offices in Iraq and have been working with a wide variety of political organizations to provide them with training and consultations. Iraqi parties are eager for this type of assistance but several new and promising Iraqi democratic political parties have expressed concern that they cannot compete against already well-funded political organizations, such as SCIRI. For the moment, neither Institute has plans, nor funds, to support a given coalition of parties as it is still too early to determine which parties might prove themselves viable.

9. ~~(S)~~ CPA Regional and Governorate Coordinators have identified efforts believed to originate primarily in Iran

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to back parties whose policies and activities appear inimical to democratic values and United States interests. By whatever means they are funded, their presence on the ground is a reality that causes grave concern for the post-June 30 world. It is an essential United States interest to have emerging, genuinely democratic parties able to compete for votes against anti- or non-democratic parties backed by Iran.

10. ~~(S)~~ As one emerging political party leader, 'Abd al-Aziz al-Yasiri, put it, "What is the difference in Iraq between a big party and a small party? A big party is a small party with foreign financing and guns." Some political parties, including a number represented on the Governing Council, have reportedly turned to corruption and selling influence to finance their activities, an obviously unacceptable alternative.

11. ~~(S)~~ Some parties will reject USG funding on the ground that it taints their independence. Others would accept funding only if it were secret. There should be a level playing field that does not disadvantage emerging democratic parties that we support. However, it is in the long-term interest of the United States to encourage Iraq to adopt a policy that requires all sources of funds to be disclosed, including foreign funds.

12. ~~(S)~~ It would be inconceivable to have invested as much as the United States has in Iraq only to have emerging democratic parties squelched by Iranian-backed parties whose democratic credentials are demonstrably open to question. Direct support for emerging political parties should be an important tool in Iraq.

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ACTION: EXEC

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DISSEMINATION: EXEC /1

CHARGE: PROG

APPROVED: AUTHORIZED: LPBREMER

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BT

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000412

E.O. 12958: N/A

TAGS: PINS, PGOV, PREL, EAID, IZ

SUBJECT: CPA 1069: Daily SITREP #9 - Accelerated Iraqi
Reconstruction Program

1. The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) is implementing an accelerated reconstruction program to rapidly and visibly improve the daily lives of citizens in seven key cities. This effort includes previously funded quick start work plus projects that are being selected and funded now which will result in additional immediate, mid-term and long-term projects.

2. AIRP Ramadi/Fallujah Team: The Marine Engineering Group (MEG) advertised and is ready to award three \$500K Indefinite Delivery, Indefinite Quantity contracts for a total of \$1.5M dollars. MARDIV is continuing to work with MEG to develop scopes of work for all approved projects.

3. AIRP Baghdad Team: The AIRP team is drafting task orders for a Design-Build contract for the following projects: Al-Rashid Sewage Improvement Program and Al Sadr/9 Nissan Sewage Improvement Program for a combined total estimated cost of \$85M. They are also developing a draft task order for a second landfill in southern Baghdad for an estimated cost of \$35 M.

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4. AIRP Baquba Team: The AIRP team drafted a statement of work that combines the three Water Sector projects (wastewater collection system, rehabilitate water distribution network, and landfill) in Baquba into a single contract task order for the Design-Build construction contractor. The Regional Program Coordinator and AIRP team leader completed their site visit today and provided copies of the task order to the CPA and military representatives for review and comment.

5. AIRP Mosul Team: The team extended the existing home loan program by \$2 Million. The Qayarra Refinery Renovation of Bitumen Plant contract (\$400K) can proceed with signature by the successful contractor and then award. Various other projects are in the solicitation stage. One team member remains on-site to oversee the execution and contracting of the initial \$20M.

6. AIRP Samarah/Tikrit Team: The AIRP team has provided on-site support in Tikrit with three members to date, who are assisting with development of scopes of work. Nine project scopes of work were completed and submitted for bids. An additional ten are being processed for solicitation and are expected to be ready in another one to two days. The military command reports that all available resources, including Civil Affairs and other military engineering assets, are committed to managing previously funded CERP (Commander's Emergency Response Program) projects.

FUTURE PLANNED ACTIONS

7. The AIRP team will monitor and report on all CERP and R3P (Rapid Regional Response Program) plans, as well as the Supplemental Appropriation projects. R3P funds will be spent on projects to benefit the Iraqi people in accordance with UN Resolution 1483. Commander's Emergency Response Fund (CERP) funds are required for emergency requirements that, in the determination of the Commanding General/CMATT, require immediate response to deal with the current situation. The team is currently collecting data on these programs.

8. AIRP Ramadi/Fallujah Team: The MEG will award initial contracts and further develop scopes of work for additional contracts. AIRP team will develop initial scopes of work for the larger water and sewer projects by next week.

9. AIRP Baghdad Team: The Team expects to have task

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orders completed by close of business today and will meet tomorrow with 1st and 5th Brigade of 1st CAV, Baghdad Central, Corps of Engineers, and USAID to review and edit the task orders and finalize them for contracts for planned award on Sunday.

10. AIRP Baquba Team: The Team is proceeding to award to the Design-Build construction contractor. Assign the Regional Program Coordinator to Baquba to provide on-site coordination and assistance. Expect first road project to commence on or about 15 May.

11. AIRP Mosul Team: The Team continues to develop executable scopes of work for solicitation.

12. AIRP Samarah/Tikrit Team: PMC will assist with the urgent and large AIRP workload. Desired engineering and contracting support alternatives will be selected and implemented. Additional support, including contracting officers and engineers, will be on-site this week.

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INFO: COS IPC

DISSEMINATION: EXEC /1
CHARGE: PROG

APPROVED: DPITTMAN
DRAFTED: JBUZBEE
CLEARED: TFITZGERALD

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TO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
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INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000405

SENSITIVE

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV, KDEM, IZ
SUBJECT: CPA 1067: Democracy Dialoguers Charge Coalition
Forces with Humiliating Iraqis, CPA with Ignoring the
Average People

Summary:

1. ~~(S)~~ Summary. In a May 2 meeting with visiting CPA North Regional Coordinator, participants in RTI Salah ad-Din's Democracy Dialogue Activities (DDA) criticized Coalition Forces for abuse of detainees, aggressive searches of homes and people, plodding convoys that snarl traffic, and alleged disrespect of Iraqi culture and tradition. The activists said that CPA did not reach out to average Iraqis and had not brought true democracy to the country. One cautioned that "Iraq is about to explode" because of unemployment and opposition to occupation. RC responded that Coalition military leaders wanted to ensure detainees were treated with respect and that those responsible for abuses would face criminal charges when the evidence warranted it. Coalition Forces had to respond to security threats and tried to avoid damage to homes and

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cars, but sometimes damage was unavoidable, and sometimes soldiers might cause offense without realizing it, she said. She added that CPA was reaching out to Iraqis across the country, and as a result of her own travels, she was made optimistic by the evidence of people working together for the future. End Summary.

2. ~~(SBU)~~ A dozen facilitators in RTI's DDA program came from across Salah ad-Din to meet with visiting CPA North Regional Coordinator at the CPA office in Tikrit on May 2. Although the program participants are outspoken grass-roots advocates of democracy, the rule of law, and other goals shared with CPA, they devoted nearly all of the session to criticizing CPA and Coalition Forces for a variety of perceived failings while touching only briefly on the promotion of human rights and women's rights. (Note: Recent photos of abused detainees may have fueled the confrontational atmosphere, although the complaints ranged across a wide spectrum of military and political issues.)

Aggression, Destruction and Humiliation

3. ~~(SBU)~~ In response to concerns about published photos of abused detainees, RC said that abuse was unacceptable and that criminal charges would be brought against those responsible when the evidence supported it. In addition, LTG Sanchez had asked for a broader review of the treatment of detainees in order to ensure that they were treated with dignity, she said.

4. ~~(SBU)~~ One participant from Tikrit raised the issue of aggressive searches of homes, damage to cars in the street, and humiliation of Iraqis during searches. Americans would not accept these conditions in the United States, he said. Iraqi police should conduct any searches that are necessary, and they should have search warrants from courts, he said. Another participant added that as a result of unemployment among former government employees and anger at perceived military abuses, "Iraq is about to explode."

5. ~~(SBU)~~ RC responded that 1st ID Commander, MG Batiste, took these concerns seriously and tried to minimize problems, but that Coalition Forces had to deal with security concerns when they arose. That included returning fire when they were attacked and pursuing wanted personnel. In response to concerns expressed about slow-moving convoys, she said that convoys had been attacked in the past and that soldiers were only ensuring their own

security when they forbade other vehicles to pass.

Talking to All, Developing Women's Role

6. ~~(SBU)~~ A Samarra journalist who participates in the program said that CPA had failed to give Iraqis the rights enjoyed in the West. "Why not give us true American democracy?" he asked. RC responded that democracy was not perfect anywhere, but that CPA and Coalition Forces were contributing to the development of democracy in Iraq. In response to the charge that CPA talked only to elites in the government and ignored average Iraqis, she said that CPA was reaching out to all levels of society and at the same time was working with government councils in order to develop democratic institutions.

7. ~~(SBU)~~ RC agreed with a participant from Tuz about the importance of promoting human rights and women's rights and encouraging women's participation in the political process. "We must be able to hear the voices of women we're working with in the provincial councils to increase the number of women, helping women to become politicians."

Iraq After June 30

8. ~~(SBU)~~ Regarding the immediate future, RC said that nations that had been hesitant to establish a presence in Iraq before June 30 will begin to arrive after an Iraqi government assumes sovereignty, and at the same time Coalition nations would maintain a strong presence. The United Nations was still developing plans for Iraqi elections leading up to a permanent constitution, she added. One idea under renewed discussion was the convening of a consultative congress to advise the interim government. Regardless, she said, "Iraqis will govern the country themselves. UN partners will be able to help."

9. ~~(SBU)~~ RTI Tikrit Team Leader Suhair Al-Mossuli told the group that the DDA program could help by creating bonds among people at different levels of society. RC added that evidence of such cooperation gave her hope. "When I travel around the region, I'm made optimistic by seeing people work together." She said she understood that the participants' concerns and questions represented the concerns of Iraqis they worked with in democracy dialogues, and likewise she urged them to explain the views of CPA and Coalition Forces when they had these discussions.

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10. ~~(SBU)~~ Comment. The sharp tone of the exchange was a departure from previous discussions with participants in this program, who tend to focus more on building democracy than on perceived misdeeds of Coalition Forces and CPA. The recent publication of photos of abused prisoners no doubt contributed to the confrontational atmosphere. We believe the discussion offered a useful opportunity to clear the air and expect that the participants will follow the RC's request to explain our perspective in their discussions on the future of Iraqi democracy. End Comment.

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APPROVED: RJONES

DRAFTED: JKWESTON

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E.O. 12958: N/A

TAGS: PREL, PGOV, IZ, PINS, PTER, EAID

SUBJECT: CPA 1064: Oil-for-Food: Goods'

authentication/verification post-June 30 and new UNSCR
language

1. ~~(SBU)~~ Summary. Continuation of Oil-for-Food goods' authentication services -- currently performed by the Cotecna company -- requires reconsideration in advance of Iraq's June 30 sovereignty transfer date. Many Iraqis have expressed strong opposition to any follow-on authentication procedures and would prefer to return to normal commercial practices. The new Security Council resolution under interagency discussion provides an opportunity to remove strict requirements for independent authentication which were imposed to prevent sanctions violations but did little to control corruption. Such a modification would also be in keeping with stated Iraqi desires for greater economic autonomy. We recommend new procedures for remaining OFF contracts that include audits and external verifications. End Summary.

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IRAQI SENSITIVITIES

2. ~~(SBU)~~ Iraqi officials in Baghdad have argued against retaining authentication services post-July 1. They stress that the current Cotecna service is unnecessary, costly and subject to corruption because goods are verified as delivered at the border, not at the end destination in Iraq. They further emphasize that Iraq should return to normal commercial practices; third-party authentication, while necessary when Iraq was under UN sanctions, would hinder their efforts to stand-up internal capacity to handle receipt and verification of OFF contracts.

TECHNICAL ISSUES

3. ~~(SBU)~~ Extending the authentication mechanism would require additional steps and commitments by CPA and/or Iraqis, most of which would prove cumbersome. The existing authentication database, currently hosted by UN Treasury, would have to be maintained - whether in NY or elsewhere; additionally, each Iraqi Ministry would require access to this database which would be difficult to accomplish. Any amendments to existing OFF contracts would need to be transmitted to the database administrator for entry.

SUPPLIER CONCERNS

4. ~~(SBU)~~ A preliminary survey of OFF suppliers indicates that many would not/not oppose discontinuation of the current authentication mechanism. Suppliers that have traditionally been viewed negatively by Iraqi Ministries due to shoddy products or unreliability in past OFF phases, however, might raise concerns about a "changed" system. We believe any such concerns would likely be small in number and manageable.

5. ~~(SBU)~~ Communicating to suppliers a shift from authentication to verification could be accomplished via the Coordination Center website, as well through UN Missions in New York. A transition period, beginning in early June (or as soon as a resolution is adopted), would allow sufficient time for the message to be conveyed to all suppliers.

INDEPENDENT VERIFICATION

6. ~~(SBU)~~ We support a system for OFF and other contracts that provides for independent audits and verification of deliveries to warehouse, silos, and other sites. We have preliminarily discussed with the Board of Supreme Audit a

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verification system; under this proposal, BSA would employ an outside audit firm on contract to "spot-check" deliveries and audit contracts and inventory records. The independent verification should provide reassurance to suppliers that the procurement process is transparent and reliable. It will also ensure a higher level of accountability.

7. ~~(SBU)~~ We recommend that any new Security Council resolution eliminate the requirement for independent authentication, as such a requirement would likely result in the continuation of Cotecna. In its place, we suggest language that would provide for a system allowing independent audits or verification based on normal commercial practice. Such language should also allow the IIG to assume contracts without amending letters of credit.

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APPROVED: RHJONES
DRAFTED: TFITZGERALD
CLEARED: SBUCCI, EUSHER, FBOYNTON, BMILLER

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 000409

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/03/14
TAGS: ASEC, PTER, PGOV, MOPS, MARR, PREL, IZ
SUBJECT: CPA 1063: May 3 Emergency Action Committee
Meeting: Assessment of Current Situation in Najaf and
Maysan

REF: A) BAGHDAD 372/CPA 1024, B) STATE 97324, C) STATE
98140

~~CLASSIFIED BY CPA DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR RICHARD W. JONES FOR
REASONS 1.4 (A AND B).~~

1. ~~(C)~~ Summary. At the May 3 Emergency Action Committee (EAC) meeting, CPA and CJTF-7 reviewed the current security situation in all seventeen provincial posts according to four criteria: CPA mission activity level; threat level; security posture; and post sustainability (Ref A). They focused specifically on the current situation in Najaf and Maysan, where the level of recent attacks had risen sharply, calling for a more detailed breakdown of the non-essential contractor staff at those two provincial posts in order to determine whether they should remain. In addition, the EAC sought to achieve a standardized definition across all 17 regional posts of essential and non-essential personnel. The EAC also decided to recommend

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that Administrator Bremer consider getting out in front of the story of U.S. soldiers having abused detainees at Abu Ghraib prison. The group thought that Ambassador Bremer's emphasis on the fact that the story was emerging because the soldiers had already been investigated and charged with criminal offenses might help calm public sentiment. List of meeting attendees is at para 9. End Summary.

2. ~~(C)~~ Deputy Administrator Ambassador Richard Jones chaired an Emergency Action Committee (EAC) meeting Monday, May 3, which covered several agenda items: 1) whether the threat posture for AmCits in Iraq needed to be raised in the wake of the attack on Western contractors in Saudi Arabia (Ref B); 2) what to do about the severely negative press reports about the mistreatment of detainees at the Abu Ghraib prison; 3) a review of the security and sustainability status of all 17 regional posts; and 4) options for CPA's Office in Najaf and Maysan as the security situation in those locales has deteriorated. The EAC first considered the security situation in Iraq with respect to the terrorist attack on civilian contractors in Yanbu, Saudi Arabia. Jones noted that U.S. civilian personnel in Iraq were already operating at the highest level of security posture. He and the committee considered whether another warden message to AmCits in Iraq might be warranted in the wake of the Yanbu attack, but ultimately agreed that there was nothing more to be gained with a new one, having just encouraged Americans in a warden message the week before to urgently review their personal security situations (Ref A).

3. ~~(C)~~ Governance Director Scott Carpenter cautioned that all his Iraqi contacts had warned that the headline stories of the U.S. soldiers allegedly abusing Iraqi detainees at Abu Ghraib prison were going to have a strong impact on Iraqi public opinion and make the security situation for Americans in Iraq much worse. Ambassador Jones noted that this was actually an old story - the events in questions had occurred months ago and an investigation had begun as far back as January 2004. The photographs running on Western and Arab news programs over the past few days were apparently part of the evidence collected in the criminal investigation. Jones asked whether Ambassador Bremer should address this issue on Iraqi media. Strategic Communications Director Robert Tappan stated that Bremer had a weekly Iraqi TV availability, providing an opportunity as needed. He pointed out that IGC member Dr. Mowaffaq al Rubaie had been on Iraqi TV pointing out that a few bad apples did not tell the full story of the U.S. presence in Iraq.

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4. ~~(C)~~ Deputy Chief Operating Officer BG Ed Usher noted that some of the soldiers had already had their cases investigated by the military equivalent of a grand jury. The group concluded that it would be good for Ambassador Bremer to use Iraqi media to emphasize that justice was being rendered and those found culpable for criminal actions would be punished. The Office of General Counsel would be consulted on exact language for the Administrator to use. UK Military Adviser to Ambassador Richmond Ian Blanks added that the accusations against British soldiers for similar allegations of abuse of detainees were also being thoroughly investigated. Steven Smith, CPA Chief of Staff, suggested that Ambassador Bremer might point out that all prisons where detainees had been held in Iraq were being investigated for any signs of abuse.

ASSESSMENTS OF PROVINCIAL POSTS

5. ~~(C)~~ The EAC then reviewed the current security assessments for all seventeen provincial posts to determine whether any actions, were warranted at this time. ((BACKGROUND NOTE: CJTF-7, CPA Office of the Director for Infrastructure and Operations and the Regional Operations Office have compiled assessments of each of the seventeen provincial posts, focusing on four elements: level of the CPA mission activity (defined by the CPA Governance Office), level of threat (defined by CJTF-7), security posture (defined by CJTF-7 and Regional Ops), and sustainability of the post (defined by Regional Ops and KBR). Each element is coded red (severely restricted operations), yellow (restricted operations), or green (unrestricted operations). Each element has different criteria for determining color code, such as ability to continue reconstruction and development tasks (CPA mission activity), enemy ability to conduct coordinated attacks (threat level), co-location with CJTF-7 military support unit (security situation), and days of supply of water, food, fuel (sustainability). Each post has or is in the process of developing an evacuation plan, which will ideally be coordinated and rehearsed with its nearest military supporting unit. End Background Note.))

6. ~~(C)~~ EAC members took note that the threat levels for Tikrit, Babil, Basrah, and Nasariyah had gone from amber to red in the past week, while Baqubah, Mosul, Kirkuk, Al Amarah (in Maysan Governorate), al Diwaniyah, Ramadi, Karbala, Najaf and Wassit had remained red. RSO Bill Miller observed that Najaf had endured eight mortar attacks in the month from March 12 to April 12, but had experienced

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34 more hits since April 12, including several more rounds that morning. However, logistics for several posts had moved from amber to green as the supply routes had improved and KBR convoys were operating more steadily.

7. ~~(C)~~ Ambassador Jones asked whether the EAC should consider removing non-essential personnel and selected contractors from Najaf and al Amara in Maysan in particular. In Najaf the essential personnel could rely upon logistics support from recently co-located U.S. forces there. EAC members determined that the PSD in Najaf would still be needed, but more information was needed on the KBR contractors to determine which ones could be pulled out. General Usher noted that many of the KBR cooks and other support personnel were locals who could simply be instructed not to report for work.

8. ~~(C)~~ In Maysan, COL Frank Boynton of the Regional Operations Center noted that the Governorate Coordinator's Office in al Amarah had begun to take more frequent and more accurate mortar fire from a closer range. He said he would be meeting with KBR management after the EAC to review the status of its personnel in the regions. Jones requested that Boynton obtain greater specificity on the types of personnel at critical locations so that a determination could be made soon on their need to remain or not, especially for Najaf and Maysan. The EAC urged COL Boynton to develop a standardized definition on essential and non-essential personnel throughout the region to simplify EAC decision-making on drawdowns. The group discussed improving HF radio communications at several regional posts. Radios had been installed at four new locations, but technical difficulties at three of them meant they were not yet fully operational. The instructions in Ref C came in after the May 3 EAC meeting and will be addressed at the next one.

ATTENDEES

9. (U) List of Attendees:

- Deputy Administrator Ambassador Richard Jones, Chief Policy Officer
- General Ed Usher, USMC, Deputy COO
- Colonel Frank Boynton, USMC, Chief of Staff for Infrastructure Directorate
- Colonel Steven Buccia, USA, Military Assistant to CPO
- Joe Adamczyk, Deputy Director Office of Regional Operations

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--Andrea Reidy, Director, UK Coordination Office
--Colonel David Homer, Deputy C-3, CJTF-7 (UK)
--Ambassador John Holzman, Chief, Transition Team
--Paul Boyd, U.S. Consul
--Bill Miller, RSO
--Scott Carpenter, Director, Governance Office
--Stephen Smith, CPA Chief of Staff
--Dean Pittman, Deputy, Governance Office
--Colonel Thomas Husband, Director, Office of Special
Investigations
--Robert Tappan, Director, Strategic Communications
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UNCLAS BAGHDAD 000403

E.O. 12958: N/A

TAGS: PINS, PGOV, PREL, EAID, IZ

SUBJECT: CPA 1062: Daily SITREP #7 - Accelerated Iraqi Reconstruction Program

1. The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) is implementing an accelerated reconstruction program to rapidly and visibly improve the daily lives of citizens in seven key cities. This effort includes previously funded quick start work getting underway currently plus projects that are being selected and funded now which will result in additional immediate, mid-term and long-term projects.

2. The plan includes reconstruction projects to be executed by Coalition Military Commanders, the Program Management Office (PMO) and governorate coordinators. This new money is in addition to projects already identified as part of the \$18.4 billion U.S. reconstruction and relief effort as well as funds provided in Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) and Rapid Regional Response Program (R3P) categories funded by DFI funds.

3. The PMO was tasked to coordinate the development and execution of the seven-city reconstruction plan. Accelerated Iraqi Reconstruction Program (AIRP) teams

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composed of representatives of Coalition Military Commanders staffs, CPA Regional Governorates offices, and PMO have visited the seven high priority cities and compiled a prioritized list of projects. Ambassador Bremer approved the following initial additional DFI funding allocation for the seven cities: Baghdad (\$40M), Baquba (\$20M), Tikrit/Samarah (\$42M), Ramadi (\$35M), Fallujah (\$35M), and Mosul (\$20M). The AIRP teams have worked closely with local government representatives to ensure that the projects and their respective priorities reflect the true needs of each community.

4. The plan is complete and the work is continuing on previously funded work and commencing next week on newly funded projects. This work has all been harmonized with the work funded by the Supplemental to ensure a coordinated approach to the reconstruction of these cities. CPA Program Management Office (PMO) was tasked by Ambassador Bremer on 22 April to oversee the development and execution of the plan to accelerate the reconstruction effort. Joint teams consisting of CPA, PMO, Ministry of Planning and Development Cooperation (MoPDC) and CJTF-7 members were formed to identify unfunded high priority, high impact projects that can be executed immediately in addition to other previously funded work underway in each city.

5. The teams visited the seven Iraqi cities to meet with the military and city leadership and obtained their most pressing current reconstruction concerns. The teams developed proposed project lists, integrating requirements from various sources including: projects funded by the FY04 Supplemental Appropriation, CPA local projects, Ministry of Planning and Development Cooperation projects provided to potential donors, and the lists of projects planned by local military commanders for their area.

PROJECT EXECUTION PROCESS

6. In addition to developing a prioritized listing of projects, the joint teams developed for each project a preliminary execution strategy. Wherever possible, the responsibility for project execution was retained at the field command level to simplify the execution process and to reinforce the field commander's position in the minds of the community. For projects that were considered too large or too technically complex, the PMO was assigned execution responsibility using DFI funds. Upon receipt of the approved project listing on 1 May, the execution plan was reviewed and revalidated. The proposed project

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list was sent to field commands for execution on 2 May.

7. The CPA contracting office is actively supporting field commands to either award contracts that exceed the warrant authority of military contracting officers or to assist local contracting officers in awarding contracts within their authority. In addition, the CPA contracting office is assisting in contracting procedures and coordinating CPA regional contracting officer assets.

8. As directed by Ambassador Bremer's 22 April 2004 memo of direction, PMO has established a Regional Program Coordinator organization to coordinate, track, and report the execution of these projects.

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Laser1:

ACTION: EXEC

INFO: IPC COS

DISSEMINATION: EXEC /1
CHARGE: PROG

MAY 04 2004

APPROVED: DRAFTED: POWERS
DRAFTED: AUTHORIZED: RJONES
CLEARED: CLEARED: RSPEER, EXECSEC, GWOLPE, JOSTER

VZCZCBGI029
RR RUEKJCS RUEHC RHEHNSC
DE RUEHGB #0404/01 1240902
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 030902Z MAY 04
FM CPA BAGHDAD
TO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 0786
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0806
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NSC WASHDC 0767
BT
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000404

E.O.: 12958: N/A
TAGS: EAID, KSPR, PREL, IZ
SUBJECT: CPA 1061: PROGRAM MANAGEMENT OFFICE (PMO) REPORT
FOR MAY 1, 2004

1. Summary. This is the fifth in a series of weekly reports documenting the activities of the Program Management Office. The status of programs and upcoming challenges for PMO, with an emphasis on accelerated reconstruction, are at the end of the report. End Summary.

2. The 2004 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense and for the Reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan provided funding for reconstruction projects. PMO tracks the progress of funds from appropriations until final payout including OMB apportionments, CPA commitments, and obligations. (Note: for these purposes, to commit is to reserve funding, and obligation occurs with award of the actual contract. End Note). The current status of each sector, as reported to the Interagency Group on April 29, is as follows:

Security and Law Enforcement

Of the \$2,976 million total apportioned and approved by the CPA Administrator, \$1,576 million were committed and \$710 million were obligated.

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Electricity

Of the \$2,538 million total apportioned and approved by the CPA Administrator, \$1,824 million were committed and \$1,191 million were obligated.

Oil Infrastructure

Of the \$1,701 million total apportioned and approved by the CPA Administrator, \$1,366 million were committed and \$435 million were obligated.

Justice, Public Safety, and Civil Society, (Including Democracy)

Of the \$1,276 million total apportioned and approved by the CPA Administrator, \$676 million were committed and \$282 million were obligated.

Education, Refugees, Human Rights, Governance

Of the \$259 million total apportioned and approved by the CPA Administrator, \$37 million were committed and \$32 million were obligated.

Roads, Bridges, and Construction

Of the \$270 million total apportioned and approved by the CPA Administrator, \$211 million were committed and \$8 million were obligated.

Health Care

Of the \$512 million total apportioned and approved by the CPA Administrator, \$31 million were committed and none were obligated.

Transportation and Telecommunications

Of the \$467 million total apportioned and approved by the CPA Administrator, \$219 million were committed and \$22 million were obligated.

Water Resources and Sanitation

Of the \$816 million total apportioned and approved by the CPA Administrator, \$510 million were committed and \$41 million were obligated. Commitments went down this week due to a pullback of funds pending a reallocation of water project priorities.

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Private Sector Development

Of the \$136 million total apportioned and approved by the CPA Administrator, \$54 million were committed and \$15 million were obligated.

3. Construction. Last week PMO awarded \$19 million in task orders in the Transportation and Communications Sector for construction of village roads in nine Governorates. This brings the total value of FY04 Supplemental-funded projects under construction to slightly more than \$1.5 billion. Work continued at the four existing New Iraqi Army sites (Al Kasik, Tadjil, Umm Qasr and An Numahniya). Premobilization activities were underway on the recently awarded contracts for new bases at Tallil and Kirkuk, with additional phases of construction at Al Kasik and Tadjil.

4. Construction Security Impacts. Fewer laborers reported for work due to security concerns. On 11-12 April, the period of Arba'een, the number of Iraqi workers at four labor intensive sites dropped to 20% of March employment highs. Since then, the number of Iraqi laborers increased, yet remains steady at 35% of the March highs. Work never stopped at any of the sites and some of the reduction is directly attributable to issues unrelated to security. Compared to early April, security has improved and PMO placed approximately \$50 million of additional construction this past week.

5. Non-Construction. During this reporting period, the CPA-Contracting Activity awarded a total of 68 contracts valued at \$110 million. Of these 68 awards, 61 involved Development Fund for Iraq (DFI) dollars valued at \$17 million and included purchases of police uniforms, riot gear and weapons in the amount of \$2.3 million. Seven awards were made using Supplemental dollars and included the purchase of vehicles for Iraqi forces and uniforms for the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps. A total of \$14.4 million was awarded this week under the newly established "Iraqi Set-Aside" program. This program requires that any contract valued at \$500K or less must be awarded to an Iraqi firm. Additionally, CPA awarded a contract valued at \$1.6 million to an Iraqi firm for the purchase of riot police gear.

6. Non-Construction Security Impacts. Due to the security situation in Iraq, many freight forwarders have suspended all trucking/transportation services from Aqaba, Amman,

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Kuwait and Dubai/UAE. Many other items of equipment are also held up at points of entry into Iraq. As an example, shipments held up in Amman include exchanger tubes and turbine parts for the Ministry of Interior. PMO and CPA continue to work with other coalition forces and transportation firms to find alternate ways into the country.

7. Accelerated Iraqi Reconstruction Program. Last week, we continued to target areas in Iraq for accelerated relief and reconstruction. The goals of the program are to identify key locations that offer the ability to immediately start useful projects and employ Iraqi labor. Our initial review recommends near-term projects worth \$252 million. Projects will be funded with DFI using the best vehicle of execution to include Commanders Emergency Relief Program (CERP), Regional Rapid Response Program (R3P) and PMO contracts.

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INFO: IPC COS

DISSEMINATION: EXEC /1
CHARGE: FROG

MAY 03 2004

APPROVED: AUTHORIZED: LPBREMER
DRAFTED: DRAFTED: DGOMPERT
CLEARED: CLEARED: RTAPPAN, TFITZGERALD

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DE RUEHGB #0399 1231824
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 021824Z MAY 04
FM CPA BAGHDAD
TO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 0781
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0801
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NSC WASHDC 0762
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
BT
UNCLAS BAGHDAD 000399

~~SENSITIVE~~

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: OPRC, PGOV, PINS, PTER, IZ
SUBJECT: CPA 1058: Public Guidance on Fallujah Auxiliary Force

1. (U) The following guidance has been agreed between CPA/CJTF7 and Iraqi ministers.
2. ~~(SBU)~~ The goals of Iraqi and Coalition authorities in Fallujah are clear and unchanged: restore government control and the rule of law in the city; take custody of all heavy weapons; and eliminate the foreign terrorists and Saddamist criminals that have committed atrocities. Every effort is being made to achieve these goals without military escalation. Several initiatives are underway.
3. ~~(SBU)~~ One such initiative is to assemble ex-soldiers from the Fallujah area and to use them as an auxiliary unit under Coalition command and control to help restore order and achieve our goals. We call upon the people of Fallujah to cooperate with this auxiliary unit of Fallujan ex-soldiers in securing the city and isolating foreign terrorists and Saddamist criminals.
4. ~~(SBU)~~ This is a temporary unit assembled for the special

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conditions of Fallujah. It is not a part of the Iraqi Armed Forces.

5. ~~(CDS)~~ As conditions permit, regular MoI and MoD forces will take over security duties in Fallujah.

6. ~~(CDS)~~ When no longer required, the auxiliary unit will be dissolved.

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CHARGE: PROG

APPROVED: AUTHORIZED: RJONES

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MAY 03 2004

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TO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 0784

RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0804

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UNCLAS BAGHDAD 000401

~~SENSITIVE~~

E.O. 12958: N/A

TAGS: PINS, PTER, PGOV, PREL, MARR, IZ

SUBJECT: CPA 1059: Consulting on Themes of Security Partnership

Ref: Baghdad 400/CPA 1056

1. ~~(SBU)~~ Summary. After months of consultations, we have reached a common assessment with the Iraqis on the major threats facing the country in the years to come. We also agree in general, if not in detail, that Iraqi security forces are not capable of dealing with those threats and that therefore Coalition Forces will be needed in large numbers after July 1. Most Iraqi interlocutors are comfortable describing the new relationship as a partnership, though they have not articulated their view of what that means. The next step is to begin to inform Iraqi thinking about the nature of the partnership. End summary.

2. ~~(SBU)~~ At a recent meeting with David Gompert, Senior Advisor for National Security and Defense, Ayad Allawi, chairman of the IGC security committee, proposed a path for consultations on a security partnership with sovereign Iraq. Allawi is a strong supporter of a security partnership and

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would like to begin these discussions as soon as we are ready. He intends to assist by hosting a series of dinners for informal discussions between Iraqi and Coalition national security leaders and opinion makers. This mechanism was used in prior consultations and proved very useful. Allawi recommends that we also use the Ministerial Committee on National Security (MCNS) as a means of more formal consultation. At the end of May, he proposes to report to the Iraqi Governing Council on the results of the consultations and on conclusions reached on the Iraqi side. Handled right, his process represents an opportunity to shape Iraqi views on the partnership without compromising US positions.

3. ~~(SBU)~~ We urge that U.S. national security officials consider visiting Baghdad in the next month to participate in this discussion. This not only will demonstrate that Iraq will be treated as a partner, but will also facilitate a broader exchange of ideas and establish the contacts and relationships that will be important for this partnership to function effectively.

4. ~~(SBU)~~ See reference cable for CPA input on partnership themes that could form the basis for U.S. participation in such discussions.

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INFO: IPC COS

DISSEMINATION: EXEC /1

CHARGE: PROG

MAY 03 2004

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RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0801

RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NSC WASHDC 0762

INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE

BT

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~~SENSITIVE~~

E.O. 12958: N/A

TAGS: OPRC, PGOV, PINS, PTER, IZ

SUBJECT: CPA 1058: Public Guidance on Fallujah Auxiliary Force

1. (U) The following guidance has been agreed between CPA/CJTF7 and Iraqi ministers.

2. ~~(SBU)~~ The goals of Iraqi and Coalition authorities in Fallujah are clear and unchanged: restore government control and the rule of law in the city; take custody of all heavy weapons; and eliminate the foreign terrorists and Saddamist criminals that have committed atrocities. Every effort is being made to achieve these goals without military escalation. Several initiatives are underway.

3. ~~(SBU)~~ One such initiative is to assemble ex-soldiers from the Fallujah area and to use them as an auxiliary unit under Coalition command and control to help restore order and achieve our goals. We call upon the people of Fallujah to cooperate with this auxiliary unit of Fallujan ex-soldiers in securing the city and isolating foreign terrorists and Saddamist criminals.

4. ~~(SBU)~~ This is a temporary unit assembled for the special

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conditions of Fallujah. It is not a part of the Iraqi Armed Forces.

5. ~~(SBU)~~ As conditions permit, regular MoI and MoD forces will take over security duties in Fallujah.

6. ~~(SBU)~~ When no longer required, the auxiliary unit will be dissolved.

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DISSEMINATION: EXEC /1
CHARGE: PROG

APPROVED: AUTHORIZED: RJONES
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MAY 03 2004

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INFO RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0018
BT
UNCLAS BAGHDAD 000401

~~SENSITIVE~~

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PINS, PTER, PGOV, PREL, MARR, IZ
SUBJECT: CPA 1059: Consulting on Themes of Security
Partnership

Ref: Baghdad 400/CPA 1056

1. ~~(SBU)~~ Summary. After months of consultations, we have reached a common assessment with the Iraqis on the major threats facing the country in the years to come. We also agree in general, if not in detail, that Iraqi security forces are not capable of dealing with those threats and that therefore Coalition Forces will be needed in large numbers after July 1. Most Iraqi interlocutors are comfortable describing the new relationship as a partnership, though they have not articulated their view of what that means. The next step is to begin to inform Iraqi thinking about the nature of the partnership. End summary.

2. ~~(SBU)~~ At a recent meeting with David Gompert, Senior Advisor for National Security and Defense, Ayad Allawi, chairman of the IGC security committee, proposed a path for consultations on a security partnership with sovereign Iraq. Allawi is a strong supporter of a security partnership and

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would like to begin these discussions as soon as we are ready. He intends to assist by hosting a series of dinners for informal discussions between Iraqi and Coalition national security leaders and opinion makers. This mechanism was used in prior consultations and proved very useful. Allawi recommends that we also use the Ministerial Committee on National Security (MCNS) as a means of more formal consultation. At the end of May, he proposes to report to the Iraqi Governing Council on the results of the consultations and on conclusions reached on the Iraqi side. Handled right, his process represents an opportunity to shape Iraqi views on the partnership without compromising US positions.

3. ~~(S)~~ We urge that U.S. national security officials consider visiting Baghdad in the next month to participate in this discussion. This not only will demonstrate that Iraq will be treated as a partner, but will also facilitate a broader exchange of ideas and establish the contacts and relationships that will be important for this partnership to function effectively.

4. ~~(S)~~ See reference cable for CPA input on partnership themes that could form the basis for U.S. participation in such discussions.

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DISSEMINATION: EXEC /1
CHARGE: PROG

APPROVED: AUTHORIZED: LPBREMER
DRAFTED: DRAFTED: ONSA/CWARD
CLEARED: CLEARED: DGOMPERT, TFITZGERALD, BATHURST/CJTF7, RJONES

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O 022031Z MAY 04
FM CPA BAGHDAD
TO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0782
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0802
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0763
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 0016
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000400

E.O. 12958: 5/2/2014
TAGS: PINS, PREL, PGOV, MARR, IZ
SUBJECT: CPA 1056: Dialogue on Themes of Security
Partnership

Ref: Baghdad 348/CPA 998

~~CLASSIFIED BY ACTING EXECUTIVE SECRETARY STEPHANIE MILEY FOR
REASONS 1.4 (A) (B) AND (D).~~

1. ~~(CDU)~~ Summary. CPA appreciates positive response from Washington (via SVTS) to the approach to partnership-building suggested in Ref A. With an increasingly responsible national security leadership and the creation of the IIG less than a month away, CPA intends to begin informal dialogue with various Iraqi interlocutors on some themes of partnership (below). Key Iraqis are comfortable with the concept of a partnership, but want to hear about and discuss what it means. End Summary.

2. ~~(CDU)~~ Beginning such a dialogue will increase Iraqi confidence that we mean Iraq to be a true partner, and will help to deemphasize a "contractual" approach in favor of one based on common purposes and effective consultative machinery.

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3. (U) As key Iraqis visit Washington and US officials visit Baghdad in the weeks to come, we urge that these themes be reinforced.

4. ~~(C)~~ Themes of Partnership:

Common Goal: A secure environment for the development of Iraqi democracy.

Full Iraqi Sovereignty: The IIG will exercise full sovereignty on behalf of Iraqi people. Seeking and receiving international help in providing security is a sovereign prerogative and responsibility.

Multinational Partnership: With the encouragement and mandate of the UN, the United States, United Kingdom and as many other countries as possible should join with sovereign Iraq in forming a security partnership in pursuit of the common goal. Thus, a foreign Coalition is replaced by a unified partnership with Iraq at its center.

Leadership: In this partnership, Iraq and the United States will take the lead - Iraq by virtue of its sovereign responsibility and scale of contribution and the United States by virtue of its contribution and global standing.

Responsibilities: As leaders, Iraq and the United States each have critical responsibilities:

Iraq: assign forces to the MNF-I and officers to its command and control structure; operate Iraqi police operate in close cooperation with the MNF-I; continue to improve police and military forces; provide adequate funding and support to man, train and equip Iraqi forces to a high standard; provide intelligence to its partners; uphold internal security laws; and provide the MNF-I the support and latitude it needs to succeed.

The United States: provide large combat forces to back internal security and deter foreign aggression; provide training, advisory and other assistance in manning, training, and equipping Iraq police and military forces; command the MNF-I; provide intelligence to its partners; and use its influence to urge neighboring and other countries to foster security in Iraq.

Effectiveness of security operations: The partnership relies on effective operations of security forces. This requires capable command and control of both police and military forces, as well as close coordination between the two command-and-control chains. Within the partnership:

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Iraq's MoI is responsible for police operations; the unified command of MNF-I is responsible for military operations; Iraq's MoD is responsible for providing high-quality forces to the MNF-I and officers to the MNF-I unified command.

Partnership policy guidance, consultations and decision-making: Like any military force, the MNF-I will need guidance on broad objectives and missions. This guidance should be shaped by the partnership, based on a common assessment of the threats to Iraq's democratic development and a common view of how to defeat those threats. Thereafter, a contact group, consisting of high representatives of major partnership governments and the Commander MNF-I, should consult on any changes in objectives or missions and on especially sensitive operations. In addition, the Commander MNF-I will convene a council to ensure close coordination with MoI and MoD. (Note: CPA appreciates the difficulty of balancing the need for clear guidance to MNF-I with the need for unity in the partnership. This question requires extensive reflection and debate within the USG. The purpose here is to stimulate that debate in preparation for questions sure to be raised by our Iraqi partners.)

Information Sharing: Two-way sharing of intelligence and other information will be essential for the strategic, operational and tactical effectiveness of the partnership. Key Iraqi officials and officers will have access to needed information. As Iraq develops its ability to protect classified information, this sharing will be institutionalized.

A Common Approach in the Region: The policies of Iraq's neighbors will have a large effect on creating a secure environment for its democratic path. The partners will jointly expand and deepen regional security cooperation, gain stronger regional support for defeating terrorism, and dissuade and deter those who would impair progress toward a secure democratic Iraq.

Growing Iraqi Responsibility: The partners are committed to cooperate in the enhancement of Iraqi national security institutions, police forces, military forces, intelligence capabilities, and other instruments of security. The United States will continue its effort to this end. For its part, Iraq will take increasing operational responsibilities as its institutions and capabilities grow. Via this dynamic, Iraq's leading role in the partnership will expand. Even in the background, the United States will do whatever is necessary to ensure the success of democratic Iraq.

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ACTION: EXEC

INFO: COS IPC

DISSEMINATION: EXEC /1

CHARGE: PROG

MAY 02 2004

APPROVED: AUTHORIZED: RNEUMANN

DRAFTED: DRAFTED: DTESSLER

CLEARED: CLEARED: TBARTLETT (SUBSTANCE), ADEATON

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INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/01/14

TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PTER, KCRM, JO, IZ

SUBJECT: OFF BY AN ORDER OF MAGNITUDE

~~CLASSIFIED BY DIRECTOR FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS RONALD NEUMANN
FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)~~

REF: (A) AMMAN 3301

1. ~~(C)~~ CPA/MFA works closely with Jordanian Liaison Mission chief Demiye Hadad on the issue of Jordanian detainees in Iraq. Hadad has emphasized to CPA/MFA the sensitivities among many groups in Jordan about this subject, and CPA/MFA continues to provide information on detainees as requests arise. We also continue to remind Hadad that all detainees are treated in accordance with the Geneva Conventions. In addition, the Jordanian Liaison Mission is in contact with the ICRC, which has access to detainees.

2. ~~(C)~~ According to CJTF-7, there are currently ten individuals who have identified themselves as Jordanian nationals in Coalition custody. CPA/Ministry of Justice reports there is one Jordanian national in the Iraqi Corrections system. This total figure of Jordanians in custody contrasts greatly with the allegations of a Jordanian parliamentarian that there are 1000 missing or

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detained Jordanians in Iraq (REF A).

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ACTION: EXEC
INFO: IPC COS

DISSEMINATION: EXEC /1
CHARGE: PROG

MAY 02 2004

APPROVED: AUTHORIZED: SCARPENT
DRAFTED: DRAFTED: GOVERNANCE/
CLEARED: CLEARED: TFITZGERALD

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RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NSC WASHDC 0759
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000397

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/01/14
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, KDEM, KISL IZ,
SUBJECT: CPA 1055: CPA MEETING WITH ADNAN PACHACHI

REF: BAGHDAD 00395/CPA 1052

~~CLASSIFIED BY DIRECTOR OF CPA GOVERNANCE GROUP SCOTT
CARPENTER FOR REASONS 1.4 (D) AND (D).~~

1. (C) Summary. On May 1, Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) member Adnan Pachachi discussed the Brahimi Plan for the interim government. Despite his own personal agreement with the plan, Pachachi noted that the overwhelming majority of those consulted by both he and the IGC thus far believed that the government should be chosen by a council of Iraqis formed through a national conference. Pachachi also disagreed with Brahimi's proposed ban on the interim government's President, Deputy Presidents, and Prime Minister from running for office in the January 2005 elections. When asked about his own preferred candidate for a Shi'a Prime Minister, Pachachi stated that he had heard three names mentioned as possibilities - SCIRI deputy Adil Mehdi, Mehdi al Hafez (Pachachi's former deputy and the current Minister of Planning), and Minister of Defense Ali Allawi. End Summary.

2. (C) On May 1, CPA Director of Governance Scott Carpenter

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met with Adnan Pachachi to discuss issues surrounding the establishment of the Iraqi Interim Government (IIG). Pachachi indicated that the IGC had held three formal consultation/outreach meetings to date. Thus far, he said, the majority of Iraqis with whom the IGC had met felt that the new government should be chosen by a council of Iraqis to emerge from a national conference. Pachachi stated that he personally supported the broad outlines of Brahimi's plan, but he felt that the Iraqi public would demand a broader role be given to a larger consultative assembly. He noted that he had made the argument to Iraqis that there was not enough time to convene a national conference prior to June 30. Accordingly, he proposed that an alternative means of granting the assembly greater powers, and thereby gaining it greater acceptance among Iraqis, would be to give it legislative authority (though all legislation would need to be initiated by the Cabinet), and the mandate to have a vote of confidence in the interim government in July. Pachachi emphasized that most Iraqis did not support the idea of a purely advisory council without any real substantive role.

3. ~~(C)~~ The conversation moved on to discuss the current Cabinet. When asked, Pachachi indicated that a number of current ministers were doing excellent work, and should not be removed from office on July 1. He recommended retaining the Ministers of Defense, Interior, Foreign Affairs, Planning, Water Resources, and Municipalities & Public Works. He also strongly recommended keeping the current Minister of Education in the Cabinet, but perhaps moving him to the Ministry of Health. He also gave an endorsement (though not as strong as those given to the others) to the current Minister of Electricity, a Pachachi appointee.

4. ~~(C)~~ On the mechanisms for forming the IIG, Pachachi recommended that the President, Deputy Presidents, and Prime Minister be selected first. The PM could then play an active role in helping to put together his Cabinet. He said that the bulk of the IIG's power should be exercised by the Cabinet, but that the Presidency should also have the ability to veto or approve major Cabinet decisions. The Presidency should oversee the Cabinet's work, but without interfering in the day-to-day operations of the government.

5. ~~(C)~~ When asked about Brahimi's suggestion that members of the IIG pledge not to stand for elected office in January 2005, Pachachi objected. He argued that it would be especially important for the President, Deputy Presidents, and Prime Minister to be political figures, and that it would not be wise to ban them from running for office in January.

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6. ~~(C)~~ When asked about specific candidates for PM, Pachachi, noting that his remarks were premised on the assumption that the PM would have to be a Shi'a Arab, said that he had heard three names mentioned as possibilities - SCIRI deputy Adil Mehdi, Mehdi al Hafez (Pachachi's former deputy and the current Minister of Planning), and Minister of Defense Ali Allawi. (Comment: In previous meetings Pachachi had expressed his support for Adil Mehdi; he was more ambiguous in this session. End comment.)

7. ~~(C)~~ Comment. Pachachi's comments suggest two possible challenges with carrying forth the Brahimi Plan as currently envisioned. The first concerns the role to be played by the consultative council. It may be necessary to give it a number of substantive authorities to make it popularly acceptable - even if these authorities do not include the right to select the interim government or to legislate. The second potential problem is Brahimi's preference that members of the IIG not stand for office in January 2005. Not surprisingly, Pachachi agrees with many of his fellow politicians on the IGC that the IIG should not be purely technocratic, and that at the very least members of the Presidency and the Prime Minister should be political figures. End Comment.

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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000394

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, EAID, KDEM, KWMN, IZ
SUBJECT: CPA 1051: BAGHDAD TOWN HALL MEETING: DIALOGUE ON
THE TRANSITIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

1. Summary. A public forum on Iraq's Transitional Administrative Law (TAL) was held on April 25, 2004 in Baghdad, the latest in a well attended series of meetings here and across the nation. Over 150 Baghdad residents from all districts of the city and all ethnic and religious groups were present, along with three members of the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC). Two dozen journalists from Baghdad's local press corps covered the event, as well as representatives from international media outlets. Dozens of citizens actively questioned IGC members Dr. Mahmoud Othman, Ezzedine Salim, and Ahmed al-Barak on individual rights, federalism, civil rights and liberties, the current security situation, equal protection under law and the process for creating a permanent government. Debate was vigorous but cordial and marked by knowledgeable and thoughtful queries. IGC members were generally constructive and informative with their comments, but had no qualms about contradicting and criticizing the CPA, including one statement by Dr. Othman, severely criticizing the Coalition's security plan. End Summary.

2. Panelists. The following Iraqi Governing Council

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members served as panelists and spoke on key elements of the TAL:

-- Dr. Mahmoud Othman, a Sunni Kurd who held various posts in the Kurdistan Democratic Party in the 1960s and who founded the Kurdish Socialist Party in London, focused on the rule of law;

-- Ezzedine Salim, a Shia and head of the Da'wa Islamic Party based in Basra, focused on decentralization.

-- Ahmed al-Barak, a Shia and head of the union of lawyers and human rights league in the central city of Babylon, focused on individual rights;

3. Audience. The audience consisted of a diverse cross-section of Baghdad society, including officials from all jurisdictional levels of councils (Provincial, Regional, District, Neighborhood), women, business people, academics, lawyers, members of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO's), and sheiks. Audience members were vetted by CPA staff and selected based on attendance at other democracy-building events. Participants at this meeting were generally well-versed on specifics of the Transitional Administrative Law, its substance and procedures. This was somewhat expected, as a large portion of the attendees were locally-elected officials in Baghdad.

4. Setting. For security reasons, organized by CPA's Baghdad Central Office, the event was held at a conference room in the Baghdad Convention Center, within the Green Zone. Audience members were provided Arabic language event brochures and a booklet on the TAL. Over 40 domestic and international press outlets were represented and the event was broadcast live on Iraqi Media Network (IMN) as well as taped for future broadcasting and other distribution by IMN and the Armed Forces Network.

5. The Moderator, Gorges Bakoos, a member of the Iraqi Reconstruction and Development Council (IRDC), began with a description of the agenda as well as the ground rules for the question and answer period of the event. He gave a general overview of the various "tenets" of the TAL and introduced the panelists.

6. Dr. Mahmoud Othman focused on the legitimacy of the TAL. He discussed the development and agreement on the TAL as a historic shift from rule of one person to rule of law and an abandonment of the heritage of the Hussein Regime. The fact that Iraqis across the spectrum of religious and cultural beliefs could agree on the TAL was an

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accomplishment. He closed by noting that while there were shortcomings in the TAL which must be addressed, Iraqis themselves would resolve any and all issues.

7. Ezzedine Salim discussed decentralization of authority as a guarantee against a return to tyranny, particularly the local councils that have been established by local communities. He noted that these administrative units, divided geographically, would minimize any dictatorial moves by a higher jurisdiction, protect the rights of minorities, and provide for better services, as local government was more attuned to the needs of the local community. He urged that there was a role for a federal government to address national level issues that required one product or service, such as one army, one currency, etc. He pointed out that Federalist states were the most stable and offered the best model for Iraq; federalism in the region actually dated back to the Ottoman Empire.

8. Ahmed al-Barak discussed individual rights and noted that under Saddam, Iraq had a constitution which covered human rights but was useless. Assurances were needed to guarantee real human rights, and that was what was being developed through independent courts and elections. He also pointed out that equal treatment under the law, including travel, peaceful demonstrations and freedom of speech had been codified, as had economic guarantees such as social security and jobs. He closed by noting the New Iraq would respect people for their humanity regardless of race, ethnicity, gender or nationality.

9. Questions and Answers. During the question period, audience members asked questions or made statements on:

-- The make-up of the interim Iraqi government after the June 30 transition and standards for its membership. All three IGC members said that the IGC, CPA and the UN were in discussions on this issue and hoped to have a plan in May.

-- The overall legitimacy of the TAL. One audience member noted that the TAL was created under an occupation and not voted on popularly. Mr. Salim replied that the TAL was a start in the right direction, especially in this period of transition.

-- TAL Article 61(c). There was criticism of this article, which contained a perceived "Kurdish veto power" (via referendum) over the draft permanent constitution.

-- TAL goal of 25% female Assembly. Dr. Othman said it was a worthy goal and that he hoped that the country could

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surpass the 25% target.

-- Concern with Arabic and Kurdish being the official languages (as Iraq would cease to be an "Arab" country).

-- Concerns over restoring properties as well as legal rights for people who had fled the former Regime. The discussion was in favor of addressing these concerns, which were echoed by all IGC members.

-- Overall security concerns. Dr. Othman described the Coalition's security plan as terrible and said that he was anxious for Iraqis to reclaim control of security duties.

10. The Moderator encouraged those present to attend the next Baghdad Town Hall meeting on May 15, 2004, which would focus on the make up of the interim Iraqi government and the electoral system for choosing the Iraqi National Assembly. He assured participants that the meeting would be broadcast on IMN TV so that the people all over Iraq could hear their opinions. He also noted that IGC and Coalition authorities would receive their written comments and questions.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000395

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/01/14
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, KDEM, KISL, IZ
SUBJECT: CPA 1052: SHIA CAUCUS AND THE IIG

~~CLASSIFIED BY AMEMBASSOR L. PAUL BREMER III FOR REASONS 1.4
(S) AND (B).~~

1. ~~(C)~~ Summary. Recent CPA conversations with Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) deputy Adil Mehdi and Iraqi National Congress (INC) leader Ahmad Chalabi suggest that the Shia caucus is developing a unified response to the Brahimi Plan for forming the Iraqi Interim Government (IIG). This response is likely to focus more on the composition of the government than on the process by which it is chosen. The Shia caucus (perhaps excluding Dawa leader Ibrahim Jaafari) is likely to present a unified position to Ayatollah Sistani for his approval before submitting it to the United Nations and CPA. This unified position will almost certainly include a proposal that Adil Mehdi become Prime Minister under the IIG. The Coalition should encourage UN Envoy Brahimi to consult with Sistani as soon as possible to promote his vision of a technocratic, non-partisan interim government. End Summary.

2. ~~(C)~~ Over the past few days, CPA staff have had separate detailed conversations with Adil Mehdi and Ahmad Chalabi concerning the Brahimi Plan for forming the IIG. Both men

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appeared willing to accept the general outlines of the plan. (Though Chalabi noted that there was still a desire among some to have an expanded Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) choose the presidency and Prime Minister. In a May 1 meeting Bahr al-Uloum made the same point to Ambassador Bremer, and so the idea is still alive.) Both disagreed vehemently, however, with the idea that the leaders of the new government should be technocrats free of any political affiliation. Both affirmed their view that the Shia caucus (and even the IGC) would be capable of developing an agreed list of candidates for the various posts.

3. ~~(c)~~ Both men indicated that the leading Shia figures had been in touch with the religious authorities concerning a coordinated response to Brahimi's proposals. Mehdi said that he had discussed the Brahimi plan in Najaf with Mohammed Ridha and Ayatollah Mohammed Said al-Hakim, and that they had agreed that the composition of the new government would be the key factor in judging its acceptability. Chalabi volunteered that the Shia caucus of the IGC had been approached in recent days by representatives of Ayatollah Sistani, who (Chalabi claimed) was eager to agree on a unified approach to the Brahimi Plan together with Iraq's leading Shia politicians before making his views known publicly and to the UN.

4. ~~(c)~~ If such a unified Shia position develops, it is highly likely that it will endorse Adil Mehdi as Prime Minister (though this unified position is not likely to be endorsed by Jaafari, who is not part of the Hakim, Mehdi, Bahr al-Uloum, Chalabi Shia inner circle). Mehdi has already indicated to CPA officials his desire to serve as Prime Minister. Last night, Chalabi declared that Mehdi would receive his endorsement as well. Adnan Pachachi has twice told CPA that Mehdi was the best Shia candidate for Prime Minister, and Mehdi himself claims to have the support of the KDP and PUK (though CPA has not received confirmation of this directly from Barzani or Talabani).

5. ~~(c)~~ Leaving aside the fact that the Brahimi Plan appears to envision a Prime Minister who does not have a clear political-party affiliation, CPA believes that Mehdi would be the best of any possible Shia Islamist candidates. Mehdi's instincts are far more moderate than those of Abdel-Aziz al-Hakim or Jaafari. He is a brilliant analytical thinker and an effective advocate who has shown an ability to work well with individuals across the political spectrum. The chief problem with Mehdi as Prime Minister, of course, would be the extensive ties that he and SCIRI have with the Iranian government. Mehdi would also be likely to bring Ahmad Chalabi into a leading ministerial position in the new

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government (unless Chalabi were chosen to serve as Deputy President).

6. ~~(C)~~ In his May 1 meeting with Ambassador Bremer, Bahr al-Uloum threw an entirely new idea on the table. He argued strongly for a Shia President because this would be a great symbolic gesture to the Shia, who have been out of power for a hundred years. He said he recognized that the Prime Minister would have more power, but the "Shia people" would be greatly swayed by seeing a Shia President.

7. ~~(C)~~ Comment. The recent conversations with Mehdi and Chalabi suggest that the IGC is likely to work within the framework of the Brahimi Plan to achieve the outcome they most desire - an interim government dominated by some of the leading political forces and figures. If the Shia caucus does not receive Sistani's support for their efforts, we have little to fear. If Sistani does support the Shia caucus in any particular formula, the political pressure on the UN and CPA to accede to his demands will be difficult - if not impossible - to overcome. It is therefore critical for the Coalition to head off any possible bargain within the IGC that might gain Sistani's support. The most important step will be to encourage UN Envoy Brahimi to meet with Sistani or his representatives as soon as possible, so as to give him the opportunity to make a case for a pre-dominantly technocratic, non-political interim government. In addition, the Coalition will continue its efforts to consult widely with other IGC members to determine where they stand and promote Brahimi's vision. Bahr al-Uloum's idea of a Shia President will not get much support from the politicians. But he may be right that such a move would garner support among the public which might be less concerned about the intricacies of the day to day running of the government and more attracted to the symbolism of one of their own "taking the salute". End comment.

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