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ACTION: EXEC
INFO: IPC COS

DISSEMINATION: EXEC /1
CHARGE: PROG

AMBASSADOR
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MAY 15 2004

VZCZCBG0421
RR RUEHGB
DE RUEWMFS #6518 1360157
ZNY CCCCC ZUI RUEKJCS6518 1360157
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FM SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//USDP//
TO RUEHGB/CPA BAGHDAD IZ
RUCAACC/CJTF 180CMDGRP
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME
RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN
RUEHWR/AMEMBASSY WARSAW
RUEHNT/AMEMBASSY TASHKENT
RUEHRL/USDAO BERLIN GE
RUEHTV/USDAO TEL AVIV IS
RUEHNE/USDAO NEW DELHI IN
RUEHBUL/USDAO KABUL AF
RUEHRO/USDAO ROME IT
RUEHAM/USDAO AMMAN JO
RUEHWR/USDAO WARSAW PL
RUEHNT/USDAO TASHKENT UZ
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ZEN/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
ZEN/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
ZEN/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI
ZEN/CJTF7 C7
ZEN/CDR CFCA
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/USTRANSCOM SCOTT AFB IL
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/NMCC WASHINGTON DC
ZEN/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//JSJ5//
ZEN/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//USDP//
ZEN/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//USDP ISA//
ZEN/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//USDP ISP//
ZEN/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//USDP SOLIC//
ZEN/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//USDP CHAIRS//
ZEN/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//USDP COUNTRY CLEARANCE//
ZEN/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//USDP ESC//
ZEN/HQ AMC TACC SCOTT AFB IL

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ZEN/890G ANDREWS AFB MD

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ZEN/890SS ANDREWS AFB MD

ZEN/89AW ANDREWS AFB MD//CC//

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ NONE X1 SECTION 1 OF 4

SUBJ: COUNTRY-THEATER CLEARANCE REQUEST FOR UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY, DOUGLAS J. FEITH AND DELEGATION

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- (6 JUNE)
1. (U) THIS IS AN ACTION REQUEST. SEE PARAS: 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, AND 15 FOR ACTION. REQUEST INFORMATION AS INDICATED.
 2. (C) SUMMARY: UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY DOUGLAS J. FEITH WILL TRAVEL (MAY 27-JUNE 7) TO GERMANY, ISRAEL, INDIA, AFGHANISTAN, JORDAN, AND IRAQ TO MEET WITH U.S. AND HOST NATION GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS. USDP WILL ATTEND THE BILDERBERG MEETINGS IN ITALY. IN POLAND, HE WILL ATTEND THE NATO-UKRAINE MEETING. HE WILL ALSO MAKE A BRIEF STOP IN UZBEKISTAN FOR AN AIRCRAFT TRANSFER.
 - 3.A. GERMANY: USDP WILL DISCUSS U.S. GLOBAL FORCE POSTURE REVIEW, AND ISSUES OF STRATEGIC AND REGIONAL INTEREST TO THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT. USDP DESIRES OFFICE CALLS WITH THE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR, THE MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENSE AND WITH THE STATE SECRETARY IN THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, USDP REQUESTS A JOINT

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MEDIA EVENT IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE BILATERAL MEETING WITH THE MOD. USDP ALSO REQUESTS AN OFFICE CALL WITH THE AMBASSADOR AND A COUNTRY TEAM MEETING. ANY ADDITIONAL MEETING REQUESTS WILL BE SENT THROUGH SEPARATE CORRESPONDENCE.

- B. ISRAEL AND INDIA: VISITS ARE FOR THE BILATERAL DEFENSE POLICY MEETINGS. SPECIFIC ISSUES ARE ADDRESS IN SEPARATE CORRESPONDENCE.
- C. JORDAN, AFGHANISTAN AND IRAQ: ONE DAY VISITS ARE TO MEET WITH U.S. GOVERNMENT AND HOST NATION OFFICIALS.
- D. ITALY: USDP WILL ATTEND THE BILDERBERG MEETING IN STRESA. REQUEST ASSISTANCE IN MAKING GROUND TRANSPORTATION AND ACCOMMODATION ARRANGEMENTS IN MILAN OR STRESA FOR DELEGATION MEMBERS NOT ATTENDING THE BILDERBERG MEETINGS. REQUEST BACK-UP TRANSPORTATION ARRANGEMENTS TO GET USDP AND MILITARY ASSISTANT TO STRESA UPON ARRIVAL IN MILAN.
- E. UZBEKISTAN: USDP WILL MAKE BRIEF STOPS IN TASHKENT FOR AIRCRAFT TRANSFER ENROUTE TO AND OUT OF AFGHANISTAN.
- F. POLAND: USDP WILL ATTEND THE NATO-UKRAINE MEETING. SPECIFIC ISSUES ARE ADDRESS IN SEPARATE CORRESPONDENCE.
4. (FOUO) THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE REQUESTS COUNTRY CLEARANCE FOR TRAVEL OF UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY DOUGLAS J. FEITH FOR MEETINGS AND HIS DELEGATION.

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EXTENDED LIST OF DELEGATION MEMBERS LISTED BELOW.

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A. ENTIRE TRIP (ALL COUNTRIES):
-- DOUGLAS J. FEITH, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY
-- MR. PETER FLORY, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
-- COL(P) FRANK WIERCINSKI, PRINCIPAL DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF NEAR
EASTERN AND SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS
-- CAPT RIGOBERTO SAEZ-ORTIZ, MILITARY ASSISTANT
-- MSGT GEORGE INGRODI, COMMUNICATIONS ASSISTANT
B. GERMANY: (IN ADDITION TO PERSONNEL IN PARA 4.A)
-- MR. ANDY HOEHN, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR STRATEGY
-- MS. LISA BRONSON, DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, TECHNOLOGY
SECURITY POLICY AND COUNTER PROLIFERATION
-- KARA BUE, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR POLITICAL
MILITARY AFFAIRS
-- RADM JOHN W. GOODWIN, USN, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, POLICY AND PLANS,
USEUCOM
-- COLONEL AGUSTIN J. TORRES, USAF; OSD COUNTRY DIRECTOR
C. ISRAEL: (IN ADDITION TO PERSONNEL IN PARA 4.A)
-- MS. LISA BRONSON, DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, TECHNOLOGY

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SECURITY POLICY AND COUNTER PROLIFERATION

-- KARA BUE, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR POLITICAL
MILITARY AFFAIRS
-- MR TORKEL L. PATTERSON; DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF SOUTH ASIAN
AFFAIRS BUREAU, DEPT OF STATE
-- RADM JOHN W. GOODWIN, USN, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, POLICY AND PLANS,
USEUCOM

(b)(6)

1. COUNTRY CLEARANCE REQUEST FOR PERSONS FLYING DIRECTLY TO/FROM TEL
AVIV FOR THE DEFENSE POLICY ADVISORY GROUP (DPAG) DISCUSSIONS WILL BE
SENT VIA SEPARATE CABLE.

D. INDIA: (IN ADDITION TO PERSONNEL IN PARA 4.A)
-- KARA BUE, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR POLITICAL
MILITARY AFFAIRS
-- MR TORKEL L. PATTERSON; DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF SOUTH ASIAN
AFFAIRS BUREAU, DEPT OF STATE
-- MAJOR GENERAL ALBERT P. RICHARDS, USAF, RESERVE COMPONENT
ASSISTANT TO COMUSPACOM
-- BRIG GEN GARY L. NORTH, USAF, DEPUTY DIRECTOR POLITICO-MILITARY

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AFFAIR--ASIA, THE JOINT STAFF (J-5)

-- KURT E. AMEND, AFGHANISTAN COUNTRY DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF NEAR
EASTERN AND SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS, OSD.
1. AMEND WILL ARRIVE IN NEW DELHI 1 JUNE AND TRAVEL BY TRAIN TO

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CHANDIGARH TO JOIN MR. FEITHS PLANE ON 3 JUNE FOR DEPARTURE FROM INDIA.

2. COUNTRY CLEARANCE REQUEST FOR PERSONS FLYING DIRECTLY TO/FROM NEW DELHI FOR THE DEFENSE POLICY GROUP (DPG) AND HIGH POLICY ROUNDTABLE (HPR) DISCUSSIONS WILL BE SENT VIA SEPARATE CABLES.

E. UZBEKISTAN: (IN ADDITION TO PERSONNEL IN PARA 4.A)

-- KURT E. AMEND, AFGHANISTAN COUNTRY DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF NEAR EASTERN AND SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS, OSD.

-- BRIG GEN GARY L. NORTH, USAF, DEPUTY DIRECTOR POLITICAL MILITARY AFFAIR ASIA, THE JOINT STAFF

F. AFGHANISTAN: (IN ADDITION TO PERSONNEL IN PARA 4.A)

-- BRIG GEN GARY L. NORTH, USAF, DEPUTY DIRECTOR POLITICO-MILITARY AFFAIR--ASIA, THE JOINT STAFF (J-5)

-- KURT E. AMEND, AFGHANISTAN COUNTRY DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF NEAR EASTERN AND SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS, OSD

G. ITALY: (IN ADDITION TO PERSONNEL IN PARA 4.A)

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-- BRIG GEN GARY L. NORTH, USAF, DEPUTY DIRECTOR POLITICO-MILITARY AFFAIR--ASIA, THE JOINT STAFF (J-5)

-- KURT E. AMEND, AFGHANISTAN COUNTRY DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF NEAR EASTERN AND SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS, OSD

H. JORDAN: (IN ADDITION TO PERSONNEL IN PARA 4.A)

-- DAVID SCHENKER, JORDAN COUNTRY DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF NEAR EASTERN AND SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS, OSD

-- MR CHRISTOPHER C. STRAUB, OFFICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS, NESA

NOTE: SCHENKER AND STRAUB WILL ARRIVE AMMAN BY COMAIR; THEIR TRAVEL INFORMATION WILL BE SENT VIA SEPARATE CABLE.

I. IRAQ: (IN ADDITION TO PERSONNEL IN PARA 4.A)

CHRIS STRAUB, OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS, NESA

J. POLAND: (IN ADDITION TO PERSONNEL IN PARA 4.A)

-- IAN BRZEZINSKI; DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR NATO AND EUROPE

MAJOR GENERAL JEFFREY B. KOHLER, USAF, DIRECTOR, POLICY AND PLANS, USEUCOM

-- COL STEVEN W. DALBEY, USAF, DIRECTOR, OSD/EURASIAN AFFAIRS

-- ERIC T. SCHULTZ, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF REGIONAL POLITICAL-MILITARY AFFAIRS, BUREAU OF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS, STATE DEPARTMENT

-- MR. CHARLES P. KOSAK; DEPUTY DIRECTOR, OSD/NATO POLICY

-- JASON B. GRUBB, NATO-UKRAINE COUNTRY OFFICER, BUREAU OF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS, STATE DEPARTMENT

-- COL. PETER PODBIELSKI, USAR, POLAND COUNTRY OFFICER, OSD/EUROPEAN POLICY

-- MR CHRISTOPHER C. STRAUB, OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS, NESA

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-- DAVID SCHENKER, JORDAN COUNTRY DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF NEAR EASTERN

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AND SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS, OSD

5. ~~(S)~~ ITINERARY FOR U/S FEITH:

USDP TRAVEL WILL BE ON A USAF SPECIAL AIR MISSION AIRCRAFT. MILAIR SCHEDULE IS SUBJECT TO CHANGE AND FINAL DETAILED SCHEDULE WILL BE SENT VIA SEPARATE CORRESPONDENCE (ALL TIMES ARE LOCAL):

DATE	DEPART	ARRIVE	
MAY 27	1800	WASHINGTON	-----
MAY 28	-----	0800	BERLIN
MAY 29	0800	BERLIN	1235 TEL AVIV
MAY 31	1300	TEL AVIV	2200 NEW DELHI
JUNE 2	0700	NEW DELHI	0900 SHIMLA
JUNE 3	0415	SHIMLA	0700 TASHKENT
JUNE 3	0715	TASHKENT	0900 KANDAHAR /KABUL
JUNE 3	1730	KANDAHAR	2135 TASHKENT KABUL
JUNE 3	2200	TASHKENT	-----
JUNE 4	-----	0110	MILAN
JUNE 5	1000	MILAN	1430 AMMAN
JUNE 6	0530	AMMAN	0900 BAGHDAD
JUNE 6	1730	BAGHDAD	1900 AMMAN

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JUNE 6 1920 AMMAN 2135 WARSAW

JUNE 7 1800 WARSAW 2140 WASHINGTON

6. (U) REQUEST NAMES AND CONTACT NUMBERS OF POINT OF CONTACT-CONTROL OFFICERS (HOME, OFFICE, CELLULAR, AND FAX NUMBERS). REQUEST SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS FOR DIALING CELLULAR PHONES FROM OUTSIDE THE COUNTRY. INDICATE POSTS COMMUNICATION CENTER OPERATING HOURS AND SECURE PHONE/FAX CAPABILITIES AND HOURS.

7. (U) REQUEST EMBASSY PROVIDE NOTETAKER FOR ALL MEETINGS UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED. REPORTING CABLES FOR EACH MEETING SHOULD BE PREPARED BY THE DESIGNATED NOTETAKER ON THE SAME DAY AND BE READY FOR CLEARANCE BY USD(P) FOR TRANSMITTAL. REQUEST INTERPRETER SERVICES. COST ESTIMATES FOR SERVICES TO BE PROVIDED TO THE TRIP COORDINATOR.

8. A. (U) REQUEST DEDICATED VEHICLE AND DELEGATION VAN(S) ARE AVAILABLE DAILY, FROM ARRIVAL TO DEPARTURE, FROM 0700 TO 2200 UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED. UPON ARRIVAL AND DEPARTURE, PLEASE PROVIDE ONE VAN WITH DRIVER TO TRANSPORT BAGGAGE TO AND FROM THE HOTEL. COMMUNICATION ASSISTANT WILL ACCOMPANY THE BAGGAGE. REQUEST A BAGGAGE VAN CAPABLE OF CARRYING THE DELEGATIONS SUITCASES BE AVAILABLE AT THE HOTEL TWO HOURS BEFORE SCHEDULED DEPARTURE. REQUEST ADVISE TRIP COORDINATOR/POC OF THE TIMES FOR BAGGAGE CALLS.

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B. (U) EMBASSY SECURITY OFFICERS ARE REQUESTED TO COORDINATE BAGGAGE HANDLING TO ENSURE THAT A CLEARED AMERICAN EMPLOYEE ACCOMPANIES THE BAGGAGE FROM THE HOTEL TO THE AIRPORT. WHERE AVAILABLE, LUGGAGE X-RAY AND/OR EOD SWEEP OF BAGGAGE BEFORE THE LUGGAGE IS LOADED ON THE

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PLANE IS REQUESTED.

9. (U) ACCOMMODATIONS:

A. REQUEST ROOM RESERVATIONS AT EACH OVERNIGHT STOP (WITHIN PER DIEM) FOR ALL TRAVELERS. REQUEST LATE CHECK-IN/EARLY CHECK-IN WHERE NEEDED. POST IS REQUESTED TO CONFIRM ALL RESERVATIONS AND INCLUDE THE NAME, ADDRESS, TELEPHONE AND FAX NUMBERS OF HOTELS.

B. ALL INCIDENTAL HOTEL CHARGES ARE THE RESPONSIBILITY OF INDIVIDUAL TRAVELERS, WHO WILL SETTLE THEIR BILLS WITH THE HOTEL BEFORE DEPARTURE.

C. REQUEST ROOM FOR MSGT INGRUDI BE NEXT TO USDPS ROOM. THIS ROOM WILL SERVE AS THE COMMUNICATIONS ROOM. CAPT SAEZS ROOM SHOULD ALSO BE CLOSE TO USDPS ROOM

10. (U) COMMUNICATIONS REQUIREMENTS:

A. THE CAPABILITY TO INSTALL INTERNATIONAL DIRECT DIAL {IDD/ISDN} TYPE LINES/CIRCUITS IN YOUR LOCATION/GUEST FACILITIES.

B. INSTALL ONE ANALOG, CONDITIONED FOR DATA TRANSMISSION IDD LINE

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FITTED WITH A RJ-11 CONNECTOR IN THE COMMUNICATORS ROOM.

C. PROVIDE COMMERCIAL TELEPHONE NUMBERS FOR THE HOTEL AND IDD CIRCUITS WITH INSTRUCTIONS ON HOW TO DIAL FROM WASHINGTON, D.C. FOR DISSEMINATION TO THE OSD, NMCC, ETC. IF A NUMBER IS NOT AVAILABLE PRIOR TO USD{P} DEPARTURE, PROVIDE THE NUMBER TO OSD CABLES TEL: 703-692-7000 AS SOON AS IT IS AVAILABLE.

D. IF AVAILABLE AT HOTEL, COMPUTER WITH INTERNET ACCESS IN USDPS ROOM.

D. CABLE TRAFFIC ADDRESSED TO USD{P} SHOULD BE DELIVERED TO MILITARY ASSISTANT.

E. REQUEST COPIES OF THE DAILY JOINT STAFF INTEL BRIEF AND EARLY BIRD.

11. (U) FUNDING:

FUNDS ARE AVAILABLE TO PAY FOR INCIDENTAL EXPENSES ONLY (DRIVER OVERTIME, EQUIPMENT RENTAL, TRANSLATION SERVICES ETC.)

A. THE USD{P} TRIP COORDINATOR WILL FAX AND/OR E-MAIL WORKSHEETS TO THE ACTION ADDRESSEE DESIGNATED POC{S} FOR USE IN ESTIMATING TRIP COSTS.

B. ACTION ADDRESSEE DESIGNATED POC{S} SHOULD COMPLETE COST ESTIMATE WORKSHEETS, AND FAX/EMAIL THEM TO THE TRIP COORDINATOR OR OUSD{P}

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COUNTRY TEAM DIRECTOR-ACTION OFFICER FOR PROCESSING.

C. THE USD{P} TRIP COORDINATOR WILL PROVIDE FUND CITATIONS VIA FAX/EMAIL AFTER RECEIPT OF DETAILED COST ESTIMATES FROM THE ACTION ADDRESSEE DESIGNATED POC{S}.

D. NO FUND CITE CAN BE PROVIDED UNTIL AN ACCURATELY COMPLETED WORKSHEET IS RETURNED TO THE TRIP COORDINATOR.

E. COST ESTIMATE WORKSHEETS WILL LIST EXPENDITURES IN THE FOLLOWING

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THREE CATEGORIES:

- - REPRESENTATION FUNDS: FUNDS THAT PAY FOR GIFTS, USDP HOSTED EVENTS, AND CEREMONIAL WREATHS.

- - TRANSPORTATION FUNDS: FUNDS THAT PAY GROUND TRANSPORTATION COSTS DIRECTLY ATTRIBUTABLE TO THE USD{P} VISIT, INCLUDING VEHICLE RENTAL COSTS AND DRIVER OVERTIME.

- - ADMINISTRATION FUNDS: FUNDS THAT PAY FOR OFFICIAL ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT, INCLUDING CONFERENCE ROOM, USD{P} MEETING ROOMS, BAGGAGE HANDLING OR PORTER FEES, OFFICE SUPPLIES, FAX AND COPIER MACHINES, AUTHORIZED EMBASSY STAFF OVERTIME, TRANSLATOR EXPENSES, COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT RENTAL OR INSTALLATION, FACILITIES, ESTIMATED CHARGES FOR PHONE CALLS/LONG DISTANCE TOLLS, AND MISCELLANEOUS ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSES.

F. IN DERIVING COSTS, BE MINDFUL THAT ACTUAL EXPENDITURES CANNOT EXCEED THE AMOUNTS AUTHORIZED.

G. REQUEST TWO COPIES OF ALL VOUCHERS OR BILLINGS THAT CITE THESE FUNDS BE FORWARDED TO: DIRECTOR, BUDGET AND FINANCE, WASHINGTON HQ SERVICES, 1145 DEFENSE PENTAGON, WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1145 WITHIN FIFTEEN DAYS FOLLOWING THE COMPLETION OF THE VISIT.

12. ADDITIONAL REQUESTS.

A. CUSTOMS AND COURTESIES: ADVISE THE TRIP COORDINATOR OF ANY LOCAL CUSTOMS WHICH, IF NOT KNOWN, MIGHT CAUSE THE USD{P} OR DELEGATION

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EMBARRASSMENT OR CREATE UNINTENDED OFFENSE.

B. GIFT EXCHANGES:

- REQUEST INFORMATION REGARDING PLANNED AND/OR ANTICIPATED GIFT EXCHANGES.

- REQUEST RECOMMENDATIONS FOR APPROPRIATE SALUTATIONS FOR TOASTS AND GIFTS TO HOST OFFICIALS TO THE TRIP COORDINATOR.

C. ADVISE THE TRIP COORDINATOR OF ANY DESIRE TO HAVE THE USD{P} PARTICIPATE IN EVENTS HONORING OUTSTANDING PERFORMANCE {E.G., PROMOTION, REENLISTMENT}.

D. REQUEST SEATING CHARTS, AS APPLICABLE, FOR ALL OFFICIAL FUNCTIONS INVOLVING THE USD{P}.

E. REQUEST INFORMATION ON ANY HEALTH PRECAUTIONS IN EFFECT.

F. REQUEST ACTION ADDRESSEE DESIGNATED POC PROVIDE A COPY OF THE USD{P} SCENE SETTER MESSAGE TO THE TRIP COORDINATOR.

G. REQUEST ALL ACTION ADDRESSEES PROVIDE DETAILED DRAFT ITINERARIES {TO INCLUDE DRIVE TIMES, MEETING LOCATIONS, MEETING PARTICIPANTS, ETC.} VIA SIPRNET TO THE TRIP COORDINATOR AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

H. REQUEST SEASONAL WEATHER FORECAST AT EACH LOCATION TO ASSIST IN DETERMINING CLOTHING REQUIREMENTS. PROVIDE RECOMMENDED CIVILIAN DRESS AND MILITARY UNIFORM REQUIREMENTS FOR EACH EVENT.

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13. ~~(FOUO)~~ DELEGATION PERSONAL INFORMATION:

-- MR. DOUGLAS J. FEITH, CODE 2, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY, CITIZENSHIP: US; SSN: (b)(6) OFFICIAL PASSPORT: (b)(6)

(b)(6) ISSUED: (b)(6) EXPIRATION: (b)(6) DPOB: (b)(6)

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(b)(6) CLEARANCE: (b)(6)
-- MR. PETER C.W. FLORY, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS;
CITIZENSHIP: US; SSN: (b)(6) PASSPORT: (b)(6) ISSUED: 8
FEB 01; EXPIRATION: (b)(6) DPOB: (b)(6)
CLEARANCE: TS-SCI.
-- MS LISA BRONSON, DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, TECHNOLOGY
SECURITY POLICY AND COUNTERPROLIFERATION; CITIZENSHIP: US; SSN:
(b)(6) PASSPORT: (b)(6) ISSUED: 13 AUG 99; EXPIRATION:
12 AUG 04; DPOB: 21 FEB 58, MASSACHUSETTS; CLEARANCE: TS-SCI.
-- MR. ANDREW R. HOEHN, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR
STRATEGY, CITIZENSHIP: US; SSN: (b)(6) PASSPORT: (b)(6)
ISSUED: 17 AUG 00; EXPIRATION: 15 AUG 05; DPOB: 15 MAY 59,
CLEVELAND, OH; CLEARANCE: TS-SCI.
-- IAN BRZEZINSKI, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR NATO AND
EUROPE; SSN: (b)(6) PASSPORT: (b)(6) ISSUED: 07 DEC 2001;

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EXPIRATION: (b)(6) DPOB: (b)(6) CLEARANCE:
TS-SCI.
-- KARA BUE, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR POLITICAL
MILITARY AFFAIRS; CITIZENSHIP: (b)(6) SSN: (b)(6) DIP PASSPORT:
(b)(6) ISSUED: SPECIAL ISSUANCE PP AGENCY; EXPIRATION: (b)(6)
(b)(6) POB: (b)(6) CLEARANCES: TS/SCI.
-- MAJOR GENERAL JEFFREY B. KOHLER, USAF, DIRECTOR, POLICY AND PLANS,
USEUCOM; CITIZENSHIP: (b)(6) PASSPORT: (b)(6) EXPIRATION: (b)(6)
DPOB: (b)(6) CLEARANCE: TS SCI.
-- MAJOR GENERAL ALBERT P. RICHARDS, USAF, RESERVE COMPONENT
ASSISTANT TO COMUSPACOM; CITIZENSHIP: (b)(6) PASSPORT: (b)(6)
ISSUED: (b)(6) EXPIRATION: (b)(6) DPOB: (b)(6)
(b)(6) CLEARANCE: TS-SCI
-- REAR ADMIRAL JOHN W. GOODWIN, USN, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, POLICY AND
PLANS, USEUCOM; CITIZENSHIP: (b)(6) PASSPORT: (b)(6) SSN:
(b)(6) ISSUED: (b)(6) EXPIRATION: (b)(6) DPOB: (b)(6)
(b)(6) POB: (b)(6) CLEARANCE: TS-SCI
-- BRIG GEN GARY L. NORTH, USAF, DEPUTY DIRECTOR POLITICAL MILITARY
AFFAIR ASIA, THE JOINT STAFF; CITIZENSHIP: (b)(6) SSN: (b)(6)
PASSPORT: (b)(6) ISSUED: (b)(6) EXPIRATION: (b)(6)

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DPOB: (b)(6) POB: (b)(6) CLEARANCE: TS-SCI
-- MR TORKEL L. PATTERSON, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF SOUTH ASIAN
AFFAIRS BUREAU, DEPT OF STATE; SSN: (b)(6) PASSPORT: DIP PPT:
(b)(6) ISSUED: (b)(6) EXPIRATION: (b)(6) DPOB: (b)(6)
(b)(6) CLEARANCE: TS & SCI
-- (b)(6)
(b)(6) CITIZENSHIP: (b)(6) SSN:

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(b)(6) PASSPORT: (b)(6); ISSUED: (b)(6) EXPIRATION: (b)(6)
(b)(6) DPOB: (b)(6) CLEARANCE: TS-SCI.
-- COL(P) (b)(6) PRINCIPAL DIRECTOR, NEAR EASTERN AND
SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS, OSD; CITIZENSHIP: (b)(6) SSN: (b)(6)
PASSPORT: (b)(6); ISSUED: (b)(6) EXPIRATION: (b)(6) b(6)
DPOB: (b)(6) CLEARANCE: TS-SCI.
-- CAPT (b)(6) USN, MILITARY ASSISTANT TO THE UNDER
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY, CITIZENSHIP: (b)(6) SSN: (b)(6)
PASSPORT: (b)(6) ISSUED: (b)(6) EXPIRATION: (b)(6) DPOB: (b)(6)
(b)(6) CLEARANCE: TS-SCI.
-- (b)(6) USAF, COMMUNICATIONS ASSISTANT TO THE
UNDERSECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY, CITIZENSHIP: (b)(6) SSN: (b)(6)
(b)(6) PASSPORT: (b)(6) ISSUED: (b)(6) EXPIRATION: (b)(6)

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(b)(6) DPOB: (b)(6) CLEARANCE: TS-SCI.
-- MR CHRISTOPHER C. STRAUB, OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
AFFAIRS, NESA, SSN: (b)(6) PASSPORT: (b)(6) ISSUED: (b)(6)
(b)(6) EXPIRATION: (b)(6) DPOB: (b)(6) CLEARANCE:
TS-SCI.
-- MR. KURT E. AMEND, AFGHANISTAN COUNTRY DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF NEAR
EAST AND SOUTH ASIA, OSD; CITIZENSHIP: (b)(6) SSN: (b)(6)
PASSPORT: (b)(6) ISSUED: (b)(6) EXPIRATION: (b)(6) DPOB: (b)(6)
CLEARANCE: TS-SCI.
-- COLONEL AGUSTIN J. TORRES, USAF; OSD COUNTRY DIRECTOR,
CITIZENSHIP: (b)(6) SSN: (b)(6) PASSPORT: (b)(6) ISSUED: (b)(6)
(b)(6) EXPIRATION: (b)(6) DPOB: (b)(6) CLEARANCE:
TS-SCI.
-- COL STEVEN W. DALBEY, USAF, DIRECTOR, OSD/EURASIAN AFFAIRS;
CITIZENSHIP: (b)(6) SSN: (b)(6) PASSPORT: (b)(6) ISSUED: (b)(6)
(b)(6) EXPIRATION: (b)(6) DPOB: (b)(6) CLEARANCE:
TS-SCI. b(6)
-- ERIC T. SCHULTZ, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF REGIONAL
POLITICAL-MILITARY AFFAIRS, BUREAU OF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS, STATE
DEPARTMENT; CITIZENSHIP: (b)(6) SSN: (b)(6) PASSPORT: (b)(6)
ISSUED: (b)(6) EXPIRATION: (b)(6) DPOB: (b)(6)
CLEARANCE: TS-SCI.
-- JASON B. GRUBB, NATO-UKRAINE COUNTRY OFFICER, BUREAU OF EUROPEAN
AFFAIRS, STATE DEPARTMENT; CITIZENSHIP: (b)(6) SSN: (b)(6)
PASSPORT: (b)(6) ISSUED: (b)(6) EXPIRATION: (b)(6)
DPOB: (b)(6) CLEARANCE:
TS-SCI.
-- COL (b)(6) USAR, POLAND COUNTRY OFFICER, OSD/EUROPEAN
POLICY; CITIZENSHIP: (b)(6) SSN: (b)(6) PASSPORT: (b)(6)
PAGE 04 RUEWMFS6521 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
ISSUED: (b)(6) DPOB: (b)(6) CLEARANCE: TS-SCI.
-- MR. CHARLES P. KOSAK, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, OSD/NATO POLICY;
CITIZENSHIP: (b)(6) SSN: (b)(6) PASSPORT: (b)(6) ISSUED: (b)(6)
(b)(6) EXPIRATION: (b)(6) DPOB: (b)(6)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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142004Z MAY 04

CLEARANCE: TS-SCI.

14. (U) TRIP COORDINATOR/POINT OF CONTACT INFORMATION:

A. THE OVERALL POINT OF CONTACT FOR ALL TRIP ACTIVITIES IS CAPT RIGOBERTO SAEZ, USN. HE IS RESPONSIBLE FOR ALL MATTERS PERTAINING TO TRIP LOGISTICS, ITINERARY, ACCOMMODATIONS, AND DELEGATION ATTENDANCE AT MEETINGS, SOCIAL EVENTS, AND LIKE ACTIVITIES.

B. TRIP COORDINATORS CONTACT INFORMATION: TEL (b)(6) OR DSN

(b)(6) FAX (UNCLAS) (b)(6) FAX (CLASSIFIED: (b)(6)

UNCLAS E-MAIL: (b)(6) CLASSIFIED E-MAIL:

(b)(6) U.S. MOBILE PHONE: (b)(6) IF

PRIMARY MEANS ARE UNSUCCESSFUL, TRIP COORDINATOR CAN BE REACHED

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142004Z MAY 04

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indicating that the second-highest ranking officer at the station had been abducted, beaten, and then released by members of Moqtada's militia. Colonel May and CPA staff expressed our continued strong support for the Governor's effort to address the situation.

3. ~~(SBU)~~ A planned May 14 march organized to call for Moqtada's militia to withdraw from the holy cities was cancelled due to "concerns over bloodshed". At 2ACR's request, CPA Najaf had previously worked through local contacts to inform march organizers that it was imperative participants be unarmed.

4. ~~(SBU)~~ Approximately 60 potential Iraqi Civil Defense Corps members arrived at Camp Baker today for medical and other screening. Some of these recruits will work and reside on the base, which also houses U.S. and Salvadoran military personnel as well as CPA staff.

KARBALA

5. ~~(SBU)~~ There was a revival of fighting between Coalition Forces and the Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) in the southwest quadrant of the old city of Karbala beginning at about 1000 hrs May 13. One American soldier was severely wounded and airlifted for medical treatment. According to a report from a credible source who had participated in the fighting, many of the buildings in the southwest quadrant of the old city near the al-Mukhayyam Mosque (called the Iranian quarter) had been heavily damaged. Stray firearm rounds (but not explosive shells) had damaged the facade of the Shrine of al-Imam al-Hussein. The JAM was barricading itself into the small alleyways, shops, and apartment buildings of the quarter and was firing at the CF troops who were deployed against them on one side. The skill and determination of these JAM militiamen was far better than at the beginning of the uprising, an indication, perhaps, that they were being reinforced by fighters from Falluja and from other organizations.

6. ~~(SBU)~~ This source also mentioned that U.S. troops came under fire while "consolidating" the stockpiles of ammunition and weapons in the al-Mukhayyam Mosque (i.e., while bringing them from other buildings and moving them into the al-Mukhayyam Mosque). The soldier who was seriously wounded today was participating in this activity when he was struck, according to the source. He said that some American soldiers were grumbling that the materiel is being moved to the mosque to provide visuals for the

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television crews that are filming there.

7. ~~(SBU)~~ On other fronts, about one hundred Iraqi Police were in the al-Mukhayyam Mosque with Coalition troops. They declined to take up positions at the Tribal Democracy Center building and other sites on the road that leads into the city center from the northeastern suburb of Nahyat al-Hurr because they felt too exposed to the JAM elements hiding in the adjacent neighborhoods.

8. ~~(SBU)~~ Apparently the structure of the Tribal Democracy Center was intact, even though it was partially burned. It may have to be leveled, however, as it appears to have been thoroughly booby-trapped. The former Ba'ath Party House had been destroyed, according to this source.

9. ~~(SBU)~~ Judging from the seriousness of the fighting, it appears as if beginning the work of converting the al-Mukhayyam Mosque into a health clinic will have to wait until the situation downtown stabilizes.

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(b)(1) ; (b)(5) ; (b)(6)

(b)(1) : (b)(5) : (b)(6)

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(b)(1) : (b)(5)

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BAGHDAD 00457

Laser1:

ACTION: EXEC

INFO: IPC COS

DISSEMINATION: EXEC /1
CHARGE: PROG

MAY 11 2004

APPROVED: MADLER
DRAFTED: RJONES
CLEARED: SMILEY, PKOSNETT

VZCZCBGI712
RR RUEKJCS RUEHC RHEHNSC
DE RUEHGB #0457 1321152
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 111152Z MAY 04
FM CPA BAGHDAD
TO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0894
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NSC WASHDC
BT
UNCLAS BAGHDAD 000457

~~SENSITIVE~~

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: MOPS, KISL, KDEM, OPRC, IZ
SUBJECT: CPA 1115: NAJAF SITREP FOR MAY 10, 2004

OVERVIEW OF THE LOCAL POLITICAL/SECURITY SITUATION

1. ~~(SBU)~~ New Najaf Governor Adnan al-Zurufi and GC Kosnett returned from Baghdad on May 10. After a meeting with Second Armored Cavalry Regiment (2ACR) Commanding Officer Colonel May, al-Zurufi proceeded to the governorate building, which continues to be under the protection of U.S. troops.
2. ~~(SBU)~~ According to one of our local contacts, Haji Hassan is seeking to arrange a deal whereby Badr Corps, following some sort of rapprochement with Moqtada's militia, will offer its services as part of a joint security force. (COMMENT: This reported plan is reminiscent of a previous deal struck some months ago when Moqtada and Haji Hassan's men shared "security responsibilities" at the Shrine of Imam Ali. Both groups subsequently withdrew at the request of leading clerics. While this could possibly be a rumor, if a plan of this kind is truly in the works, it likely represents an effort by Badr Corps to profit from the current situation.)

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PUBLIC AFFAIRS

3. ~~(S)~~ PAO has worked with CNN to arrange a profile of the new governor, which should be taped May 11.

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Laser1:
ACTION: EXEC
INFO: IPC COS

DISSEMINATION: EXEC /1
CHARGE: PROG

MAY 11 2004

APPROVED: RJONES
DRAFTED: ESKY
CLEARED: DPITTMAN, SMILEY

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FM CPA BAGHDAD
TO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
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RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NSC WASHDC
BT
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000459

INFO IRAQ COLLECTIVE

STATE FOR NEA/NGA

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PINS, PTER, KDEM, IZ
SUBJECT: CPA 1120: AMBASSADOR BREMER'S MEETING WITH
GOVERNOR OF NINEWA

1. Summary. The newly selected Governor of Ninewa met with Ambassador Bremer, thanked him for U.S. support on the rebuilding of Mosul, and lamented that the media fails to show the world the great contribution that the U.S. is making to Iraq. He requested an increase in the numbers of police and the development of Iraqi counter terrorism capacity. End Summary.

2. The Governor of Ninewa, Dr. Ousama Youssif Kashmoula, met with Ambassador Bremer on 2 May. Kashmoula is new in post, elected as Governor following the resignation of Governor Ghanem al-Basso on 29 March 2004.

3. The Governor described Mosul as quiet, and spoke of how people are rebuilding their homes. They realize that the Coalition came to Mosul to help rebuild the Province. He complained that the media fails to show the world how the U.S. is contributing to the development of Mosul. However, the average person in Mosul understands and is grateful for

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the extra \$2 million given by the Coalition to Mosul. This is being used for projects with real impact such as traffic lights, new roads, and renovation to the Old Town of Mosul. The Governor described how he had met with Admiral Nash and spent hours prioritizing projects for the Province. He presented Ambassador Bremer with a spreadsheet, showing different levels of prioritization. He expressed gratitude for the forthcoming \$20 million grant. He described how a cultural center for the university will be built, noting how the previous one was removed by Saddam. The Governor said the citizens of Mosul regard the dollars as a reward from Ambassador Bremer and the U.S. for Mosul remaining stable.

4. The Governor said that there were some problems in the Province resulting from outsiders such as Wahhabists and Ansar al-Islam. He said that most of the population does not support them. There were some random attacks the week of May 2-8 on a hospital, a mosque and a parking lot. The Governor said that the security situation was stable but that there were not enough police. He described Ninewa as a large province which needed greater numbers of police in order to cover the rural areas and prevent militias ruling. He described the militias as tribal and said that they could be integrated into a legitimate police force belonging to the state. A curfew was currently in place in Mosul; the Governor wanted to lift it but the public asked for it to remain in place.

5. The Governor expressed his concern that on 30 June the contracts for "temporary" police would expire. Ambassador Bremer expressed his concern at their being "temporary police" and stated that all police should be on the Ministry of Interior payroll. [Comment: The "temporary" police have been funded to date through CERP. Extra funding has been found to pick up the tab after 30 June.]

6. The Governor requested that a police Rapid Response Force (RRF) be established. He said that he had presented the proposal to BG Ham who thought it a good idea and that a feasibility study was being undertaken. The Governor said that the RRF would go out to "hot spots" if there was trouble, and then return to barracks. He said the RRF would consist of 275 people, who the Governor could personally select. The RRF would be under the command of the police but only used for counter-terrorism.

7. The Governor brought up the issue of the new Iraqi flag, which was causing problems. The timing for its introduction was not right. He said that it was "agitating" society. [Comment: There have been several

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demonstrations against the new flag in Mosul and further ones are planned. The Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) is revising the initial proposed design. End comment.]

8. As for the economy, the Governor said it was starting to take off. Some companies were beginning to invest in tourism, trade and agriculture. The Governor said that the Council was grateful for the new authorities granted to the Province through the Local Governance Order.

9. The Governor spoke about Arabs who were moved to Kurdish areas under the Arabization policy, and had since become internally displaced persons (IDPs) after the Kurds had taken their land back. These Arabs were now homeless. He described how he had formed a committee of community leaders to find out where the Arab IDPs were from and where they wanted to go. He asked whether it would be possible to provide them with agricultural land in order to give them real opportunities to earn a living. The Governor said that they did not want the IDPs to live inside the city because it had an impact on the demographics. He described how he had ensured that one Arab IDP community would be provided with ten telephone lines, water, and municipal services; \$800,000 had been devoted to the area. He also described how they were planning to form a police station in the community.

10. In response to Ambassador Bremer's question, the Governor said that the IPCC office was now open and had accepted 1,800 claims.

11. Ambassador Bremer congratulated the Governor on his appointment and praised him for the great start that he had made. The Governor described himself as a "son of Mosul", a professor at the University and dedicated to its welfare. Some political parties had tried to cause problems, but they had been dealt with. He described how he and the Governorate Coordinator had gathered different political parties together to discuss their differences.

12. Ambassador Bremer asked how people felt about 30 June and the transfer of authority. The Governor replied that people were involved in their own concerns, and basically did not look beyond how to "attain a loaf of bread." He said that people were tired after 40 years and had lost confidence in the political parties. Ambassador Bremer said that he hoped he could visit the Governor soon in Mosul. The Governor said that Ambassador Bremer would be very welcome. He said that the voice of Mosul needed to be heard in the rest of Iraq and the world. The whole world is taking a stand against the U.S. because of Iraq. However, the world failed to see how the U.S. came to Mosul

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to help rebuild it.

Comment

13. Governor Kashmoula is highly positive and empowered. Although he has been in post less than a month, he is quickly developing a vision for the future prosperity and stability of the Province.

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Laser1:
ACTION: EXEC
INFO: IPC COS

DISSEMINATION: EXEC /1
CHARGE: PROG

MAY 11 2004

APPROVED: RNEUMANN
DRAFTED: JGARDNER
CLEARED: SMILEY

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DE RUEHGB #0461 1321713
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
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INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0900
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NSC WASHDC
BT
UNCLAS BAGHDAD 000461

~~SENSITIVE~~

E.O. 12958: NA
TAGS: PREL, PHUM, CASC, ASEC, IN, IZ
SUBJECT: CPA 1123: MISSION DEBUNKS MEDIA REPORTS OF ABUSE
OF INDIAN WORKERS BY US ARMY

REF: (A) NEW DELHI 2795

1. (U) This cable is in response to REF A.
2. ~~(SBU)~~ Kellogg, Brown, and Root (KBR), a subsidiary of Halliburton in Baghdad and present at the "FOB Regulars" camp manned by MNB (N) - previously known as Q-West - conducted a site investigation. They found the allegations to be exaggerated and largely false. They did not find outward abuse to the workers or the working conditions to be poor. KBR has also investigated its payroll data and found the records to be in order without payroll deductions. The Indian contract workers were paid their base salary and their overtime as appropriate. All four names mentioned in REFTEL had departed for India April 6. Their employment was terminated by "resignation".
3. ~~(SBU)~~ The USG has no responsibility toward second tier sub-contract workers by "privity of contract" law. The USG awarded contracts to KBR, which then awarded a subcontract

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to Gulf Coast Company, and they in turn awarded a subcontract to Subhash Vijay Company (SVC). Under the privity of contract, the USG has responsibility only for the prime contractors.

4. ~~(SBU)~~ CPA/MFA spoke to Indian Ambassador to Iraq Tyagi to convey the Coalition's concern for the welfare and safety of Indian citizens. Tyagi thanked us for investigating the matter and said he would contact CPA with any further information. CPA/Defense Contracts Management Agency (DCMA) COL Mills, who oversees KBR's activities, will continuously work closely with KBR to clarify any further misgivings.

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Laser1:

ACTION: EXEC

INFO: COS IPC

DISSEMINATION: EXEC /1
CHARGE: PROG

MAY 11 2004

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FM AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4074
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 9895
RUEHLM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO 2067
RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA 2034
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 4777
RUEHKT/AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU 2588
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 8625
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 6647
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 9714
RUEHNEC/AMCONSUL CALCUTTA 8864
RUEHCG/AMCONSUL CHENNAI 5973
RUEHBI/AMCONSUL MUMBAI 5245
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 5461
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 0695
RUEHGB/CPA BAGHDAD 0023
RHHJJPI/PACOM IDHS HONOLULU HI
RUCAACC/HQ USCENCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI
BT
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ NEW DELHI 002852

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/10/2014
TAGS: PREL, PHUM, ELAB, KCRM, IN, IZ
SUBJECT: INDIAN WORKERS IN IRAQ BLAME RECRUITING COMPANY,
NOT USG

REF: A. NEW DELHI 2685
B. NEW DELHI 2766
C. NEW DELHI 2795

~~Classified By: DCM Robert O. Blake, Jr. Reason 1.5 (E,D)~~

1. (C) Summary: The four Indian workers from Kerala who the Indian media alleged had been mistreated by American soldiers in Iraq further contradicted these reports in conversations with Embassy FSNs on May 8 and 9. One of the cooks, Faisal, told Chennai FSN that his Moroccan supervisor, an employee of Kellogg, Brown & Root (KBR), beat and slapped them, and that

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American soldiers had not abused them. Faisal and Shahjehan claimed that they told KBR they wanted to leave the military camp in Iraq in which they worked, but were told they must complete their six month contract. This story continues to attract media and political attention in India, and further reports may surface. Amconsul Chennai has not been able to verify reports of widespread anti-American protests in Kerala resulting from these cases. End Summary.

Subcontractors Galore

2. (U) According to Indian press accounts, the four cooks paid fees to the Mumbai-based manpower agency Subhash Vijay Company (SVC) to find work for them outside of India. SVC supplied labor to Gulf Catering Company (GCC), based in Saudi Arabia (Ref B). GCC, in turn, was hired by Kellogg, Brown & Root (KBR) to provide food services at six American bases in Iraq. The four men worked on a camp called "Q-West" outside of Mosul, Iraq.

Contractors' Employees Responsible

3. ~~(C)~~ Contacted by Delhi Pol FSN on May 8, Shahjehan said he and his brother, Hameed, had not been beaten by any American, as Indian press reports had alleged, but were merely yelled at if they did not respond to orders quickly. He asserted that he was slapped by Mahdani, a Moroccan supervisor, commenting that he was unsure to whom Mahdani reported. When Shahjehan told the contractors that he wanted to return home, they responded that he had to work at least six months before he would be allowed to do so. When he brought up his plight to American soldiers, they reportedly asked him to talk to Mahdani. Faisal stated to a Chennai FSN on May 9 that while he had little contact with Americans, US soldiers oversaw Mahdani's work. Faisal also complained that at the beginning of his second month on the job, his American employer cut his pay and was told by Mahdani that he could not leave until he completed one year of work.

Comment

4. ~~(C)~~ Our follow-up conversations with the workers provide further evidence that the local media are exaggerating reports of abuse of Indian workers by Americans in Iraq. Given the desperation of so many Indians to work in the Gulf to escape poverty, additional cases may surface. As the GOI has not been issuing permits to work in Iraq, however, these reports suggest that Indian manpower firms are, in effect,

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trafficking their own nationals to their final destinations.

5. (U) Mission will share this information with the Ministry of External Affairs.

6. (U) Minimize considered.

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Laser1:

ACTION: EXEC

INFO: IPC COS

DISSEMINATION: EXEC /1
CHARGE: PROG

APPROVED: RJONES
DRAFTED: JVELEZ
CLEARED: RNEUMANN, SMILEY

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RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0884
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUCAACC/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 0009
BT
UNCLAS BAGHDAD 000450

STATE FOR NEA/S/CT

~~SENSITIVE~~

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV, IZ, PINS, PTER
SUBJECT: CPA 1114: POSSIBLE AMBUSH OF RUSSIAN CONTRACTORS

1. ~~(SBU)~~ Summary. CPA Ministry of Foreign Affairs received a phone call at 1945 hours from the US military mortuary at the BIAP reporting that the remains of a Russian national had been dropped off by a U.S. patrol. The victim allegedly was killed in a vehicle ambush (location and date unknown). The Iraqi police informed the U.S. patrol that one other Russian national managed to escape and two other Russian nationals were taken hostage. End Summary.

2. ~~(SBU)~~ This is a preliminary report and further details are not available. Mortuary personnel report that the deceased did not have any documents on his person; however, a construction "hard hat" was brought in along with the remains (Comment: The ambush took place south of Baghdad and is consistent with the location of Russian contractors engaging in the reconstruction effort. End comment.).

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MAY 11 2004

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3. ~~(SBU)~~ Notification has been made to the Russian liaison mission in Baghdad and a visit to the mortuary has been scheduled for 11 May 04.

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BAGHDAD 00440

Laser1:

ACTION: EXEC

INFO: IPC COS

DISSEMINATION: EXEC /1
CHARGE: PROG

APPROVED: AUTHORIZED: LPBREMER
DRAFTED: DRAFTED: DNASH
CLEARED: CLEARED: SMILEY

MAY 10 2004

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RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0857
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NSC WASHDC
INFO RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0019
BT
UNCLAS BAGHDAD 000440

E.O. 12958: N/A

TAGS: EAID, PINS, PGOV, PREL, EAID, IZ

SUBJECT: CPA xxxxl100: DAILY SITREP #13 - ACCELERATED
IRAQI RECONSTRUCTION PROGRAM (AIRP)

CURRENT STATUS

1. Ramadi / Fallujah. Due to the security situation in Fallujah, the contractor suspended rubble clearing work. A task order was issued to the Iraqi Engineering Consulting Bureau to complete the design review of new schools for Ramadi and Fallujah (\$8 M each). Fifty-two engineers are employed for this and other projects (e.g., designs for a multi-purpose building in Fallujah and an observation tower for Iraqi bBorder patrol in western Al Anbar). Seven CERP funded projects totaling \$2.3 M are under construction in Ramadi including Road Repair, Curb and Gutter Replacement, and Trash Collection Sites. Eleven projects for \$4.2 M are under construction in Fallujah including Road Rrepairs, Repair Fallujah Courthouse, and Trash Collection Sites.

2. Baghdad. A meeting was held to clarify task orders for Al Rashid Sewer Improvement (six projects totaling \$40 M), Sadr City Sewer Improvement (six projects

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totaling \$40 M), and Second Baghdad Landfill (one project for \$20 M). Two Design-Build contractors were consulted to confirm their ability and willingness to perform the work despite the security situation; both responded in the affirmative.

3. Baquba. A meeting was held with Fluor-AMEC for the following projects: wastewater collection system, rehabilitation of water distribution network and landfill (combined project cost of \$9 M). To speed execution, Fluor-AMEC will initially work on cleanup and the landfill. Fluor-AMEC requested government transportation and security to Baquba for initial site visit, so that their project manager can contact local authorities and develop a subcontractor lists.

4. Mosul. The Project Management Office (PMO) was unable to establish communications with Mosul point of contact for AIRP and CERP.

5. Samarra/Tikrit. The technical tiger team met with local district engineers to review scopes of work. Developed four more scopes of work for a total of 32 out of a total of 102 projects. Also, five additional SOWs were developed for contracting officer review.

FUTURE PLANNED ACTIONS

6. Ramadi/Fallujah. PMO will negotiate with Iraqi Engineering Consulting Bureau on 10 May to design two projects: Repairs for Fallujah Mosque/Minaret and Fallujah Water Distribution Center (related to AIRP projects for Fallujah Rural Potable Water and Storage Tanks). PMO will continue working on scopes of work as previously reported.

7. Baghdad. Plan to award two sewer and one landfill task orders (\$105 M out of the total approved funding allocation of \$125 M). Following these awards, PMO will define the scope of work for the Kudus Street main sewer line (one project for \$20 M).

8. Baquba. PMO will complete the draft task order for Diyala Bridge NLT no later than 10 May 10 with the goal to award the first road project and the Diyala Bridge contract on or about 15 May 15.

9. Mosul. Ninewa RPC Regional Program Coordinator will coordinate work with appropriate organizations to obtain

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approval for the revised project list.

10. Samarra/Tikrit. Technical tiger team will continue working on the scopes of work for the approved projects (102 projects for a combined cost of \$42 M). Upon the arrival of the contracting officers, scopes of work will be reviewed with solicitations to follow.

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DISSEMINATION: EXEC /1

CHARGE: PROG

MAY 10 2004

APPROVED: LPBREMER

DRAFTED: WCATO

CLEARED: AMORRISON, LDEAN, PHISLOP, SCARPENTER, CDALE, SSARGENT

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/10/14

TAGS: PGOV, MOPS, PTER, IZ

SUBJECT: CPA 1108: Turning the Tide in Sadr City

~~Classified By CPA Administrator L. Paul Bremer for
reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).~~

1. (S) Summary. Moqtada Sadr's Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) and Sadr Bureau have declared war in Sadr City, Baghdad -- a war of bullets, ideas, and intimidation. To counter this offensive, CPA and CJTF-7 have initiated a vigorous response. At the fore are efforts to apprehend the leaders responsible for the recent violence. This will allow the Coalition to implement initiatives to restore civic institutions, strengthen the security apparatus, and build the economy. CPA and CJTF-7 have formed a working group to track the progress of these efforts, integrating security and reconstruction. Gunmen loyal to Moqtada Al-Sadr have not "taken over" Sadr City, as characterized in the wildly exaggerated lead of a report in the May 10th internet edition of the Washington Post. End Summary.

The Sadr Bureau: Organized, Violent and Entrenched

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2. ~~(C)~~ The Sadr Bureau and JAM in Sadr City are well organized, well-funded organizations devoted to an increasingly successful campaign of undermining the Coalition and assuming pseudo-governmental authority. The intertwining sympathetic organizations frequently resort to violent, criminal acts to achieve their ends. Intimidation, extortion, robbery, assault, kidnapping and murder are well-documented Bureau activities. A sophisticated agitprop campaign disguises these actions as "justice" against "collaborators" and enforcement of Islamic values.
3. ~~(SBU)~~ The Bureau's efforts to halt the development of a democratic, secular local government in Sadr City took a deadly turn on Friday, April 23, when Sheikh Abd al-Hadi al-Daraji, the Sadr Bureau chief for east Baghdad, preached a sermon at the Hakma mosque in which he reportedly said that local Council members should be killed for "collaborating with the occupation." The next day, April 24, Council member Hamid Ghulam al-Sa'eedi was kidnapped and murdered. Men dressed in the all-black clothing and green face-masks typical of JAM subsequently dragged his bullet-riddled body through the streets, hacking it to pieces in front of a local police station, and hanging the body parts from lamp posts for several hours. A letter found in his shirt pocket warned his family that they would be attacked with RPGs if they attempted to hold a funeral.
4. ~~(SBU)~~ On April 29, the Chairman of the Sadr City District Council, Siwade Shati, was kidnapped from his home by six armed assailants, again dressed in JAM clothing. Despite intensive efforts to locate and rescue him, he was found dead the next morning, hanging from a lamppost. Family members had approached the Sadr Bureau's Security Chief for Sadr City, Ibrahim Hashim al-Jabari, to request Shati's release. While not acknowledging that the Bureau was holding him, al-Jabari reportedly said that Shati was a traitor, adding: "What do you expect. Traitors are executed."

Coalition Force Operations

5. ~~(S)~~ The Washington Post's characterization that JAM "took over" Sadr City on Sunday, May 9, "seizing control of police forces, municipal administration and schools" is wildly exaggerated. Indeed the trend is in the opposite direction. While there was significant combat

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activity in Sadr City on May 9, only 300 JAM are estimated to have been on the streets; JAM road-blocks were cleared within hours of being set-up; the civil administration is still in Coalition hands; and JAM do not even have access to their own HQ building, let alone control over the whole district.

6. ~~(S)~~ The killings come in the context of intensive efforts to drive JAM members from Sadr City streets. Since April 4, when JAM elements began concerted armed action in Sadr City, the frequency of attacks by anti-Coalition Forces has decreased during the day, but nighttime assaults continue to plague U.S. military patrols. The 1st Calvary Division (1CD) has been careful not to use excessive force, or to risk civilian casualties. The brigade responsible for Sadr City has mounted a vigorous counter-attack, with from one to three patrols in every neighborhood every day. They are operating under the revised ROE under which JAM are considered a "hostile force." (Note: Details of the ROE are not released to the media, nor are they necessarily part of our declaratory policy re: specific groups.)

7. ~~(S)~~ Since April 4, Coalition forces estimate that as many as 715 armed JAM combatants have been killed in Sadr City. Some senior Sadr Bureau leaders have already been apprehended, including Amar Al-Husseini -- the operations chief for Sadr City, Amjed Al-Swadi -- head of the financial committee, Abbas Al-Zubaidi -- the Bureau's communication chief, and Khaled Al-Fartusi -- former deputy to Mohammed Fartusi. These detentions will have a direct impact on JAM capabilities in Sadr City, although it is important to note that the most senior layer of leadership (e.g. Sheikh Qais, Tabtabai, Al-Daraji, Al-Jabari) and many others in the second rank are still at large.

8. ~~(S)~~ As a capstone to these efforts, the detention of Sadr Bureau and JAM leaders in Sadr City is essential to get programs for democratization and reconstruction back on track. Thus far, none of the senior leaders has been captured, and with the increasing success of national efforts against MAS, supporters now in Najaf and elsewhere are likely to return, replacing street fighters who have been killed or captured. CPA is examining options involving both additional security detentions by the Coalition and Iraqi law enforcement. A joint CPA-CJTF7 working group, which will consult with Iraqi advisors, has been established to consider proposals to enhance our capabilities against the Bureau leadership. At the same time, the Ministries of Interior and Justice, and the General Counsel are exploring taking action under CPA order number 45, on

non-governmental organizations. Sadr Bureau and JAM are engaged in military activities as NGOs, and have not registered as NGOs and thus can be shut down, with all property confiscated. The change of status would provide simplified legal grounds for their surveillance and arrests. The simultaneous detention of large numbers of known Sadr Bureau operatives could encourage witnesses to come forward, while minimizing the chance of retribution against council members, Sadr City residents, and Coalition forces.

Strengthening the Security Apparatus

9. ~~(c)~~ The Coalition and national-level Iraqi authorities must take the lead in this effort because, thus far, the Iraqi Police (IP) in Sadr City have had neither the inclination nor the capacity to take on the Sadr Bureau. Many IP in Sadr City are sympathetic to MAS, and some have undoubtedly become Bureau informants. The District Chief of police has been observed at Sadr Bureau events. The usual IP back-up, the paramilitary Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (ICDC), has also been unreliable in this area; 170 ICDC officers in Sadr City were recently relieved because of questionable loyalty. To bolster the IP, U.S. Military Police accompanied by translators have been embedded in police stations across Sadr City. In addition, plans are under review to rotate new officers into the district, including a stronger Police Chief with tribal ties in the community and a record of support for democratic institutions, if such an individual can be found.

10. ~~(c)~~ The shortage of IP officers on the ground in Sadr City must also be addressed. Nationally, MOI has set a target ratio of one police officer for every 300 residents. At present, Sadr City has less than a tenth of this target number -- only 500 officers for a population estimated at 1.5-2.5 million, or about one officer per 4000. A reallocation of officers from western Baghdad and an increased allocation of spaces at the Police Academy would provide Sadr City with much needed resources. Transferring IPs from southern Iraq (where many Sadr City families originate) could also help, although the numbers will be limited because cities of southern Iraq also need to increase the strength of their police forces.

Restoring Civic Institutions

11. ~~(SBU)~~ As noted above, Sadr City's local Councils -- the nucleus of local government under the Transitional Administrative Law -- are under particular pressure. The Councils have now all but ceased to function. Their last full meetings were held the week of March 27th. Fearing for their safety, many representatives have fled Sadr City. Others have resigned their posts. Those who remain are reluctant to leave their homes and many have stopped answering their phones. A \$500,000 security package has been approved to provide Sadr City council members with urgently needed protection. In addition, options are being examined to assist families of slain Council members through a compensation system.

Protecting our Economic Initiatives

12. ~~(SBU)~~ Additional resources totaling more than \$60 million have already been earmarked for Sadr City reconstruction. A solid waste collection program has been underway since mid-April and \$51.7 million in sewage, water, and roads repairs in Sadr City, in conjunction with repairs to the electrical grid, is beginning on May 10th under the supervision of the Project Management Office, working closely with the 1st Cavalry Division (1CD) and CPA. For both security and engineering reasons, these projects are starting in the safer southern areas of Sadr City and will gradually move north, neighborhood by neighborhood, to areas of greater Sadr Bureau control. The Sadr Bureau, however, is highly skilled at infiltrating Coalition reconstruction programs. As many as two-thirds of the sub-contractors in last year's "clean-up campaign," for example, were discovered to be Sadr Bureau associates. Proceeding too far before a substantial percentage of Sadr Bureau operatives are detained, we would risk seeing these projects infiltrated and subsumed by the Sadr Bureau and subcontractors sympathetic to them. As has happened before, the Bureau may attempt to skim off project funds for its own operations. As the situation is stabilized, one neighborhood at a time, we can move to full implementation of these programs.

13. ~~(SBU)~~ At present, most of Sadr City is inundated with pro-Moqtada al-Sadr images -- including posters, banners and billboards. This has created a reality on the ground -- especially in the poorer northern part of the District -- in which some people believe that the

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Sadr Bureau and Jaysh al-Mahdi, not the Coalition, are the authorities actually in charge and responsible for reconstruction programs. An aggressive anti-Sadr Bureau media campaign -- including our own banners, posters and flyers and the removal of Sadr Bureau propaganda -- is currently underway to counter this. On May 8, ICD held a press conference to highlight ongoing and future initiatives with media and local residents to thwart Bureau attempts to claim responsibility. In addition, the creation of a StratCom-based tiger team that would spend much of its time in Sadr City is being explored.

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INFO: IPC COS

DISSEMINATION: EXEC /1

CHARGE: PROG

APPROVED: RJONES

DRAFTED: MADLER

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UNCLAS BAGHDAD 000448

MAY 10 2004

~~SENSITIVE~~

E.O.: 12958: N/A

TAGS: PREL, KDEM, KISL, PINS, IZ

SUBJECT: CPA 1110: NAJAF SITREP FOR MAY 9, 2004

OVERVIEW OF THE LOCAL POLITICAL/SECURITY SITUATION

1. ~~(SBU)~~ At noon today, 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment (2ACR) assets entered the industrial area which faces Camp Golf across the main Najaf-Kufa road. Numerous indirect and direct fire attacks have been launched toward Camps Golf and U.S. checkpoints from this area. Later in the day, Camp Golf received approximately 4 rounds of mortar fire. There were no reports of damage or casualties.
2. ~~(SBU)~~ One of our key local contacts informed us that the Iraqi police on duty at the governorate building have expressed concern over the risks they face by helping U.S. forces guard the site. Our contact indicated that local IPs who are of Najafi origin feel particularly vulnerable to retaliation against themselves and their families.
3. ~~(SBU)~~ The same local contact emphasized that Najafis are keen to see positive changes resulting from the inauguration of the new governor. The contact - who has

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been coordinating the preparation of potential small-scale projects in Najaf's sub-districts - said that while many Najafis are hopeful about the new administration, they are also anxious to see concrete results. Our contact told us "people have been talking to them about projects for the last six months. Now they want to see the work start.

4. ~~(SBU)~~ SCIRI's Najaf office issued a statement today by a local imam that included veiled criticism of Moqtada while maintaining distance from the Coalition. The statement called for sovereignty and Islamic unity in Iraq, as well as for demilitarization of the holy cities. The statement held coalition forces and "elements of disorder hiding behind the local population" equally responsible for the current security situation in the region.

PUBLIC AFFAIRS

5. ~~(SBU)~~ PAO and a local contact have identified approximately 50 targets for civil affairs projects throughout Najaf province. Army civil affairs personnel have also identified targets. Security concerns and recently emerging constraints with micro-purchase funds have complicated our efforts, but we hope to begin project work within in a day or two.

6. ~~(SBU)~~ PAO and Army psychological operations personnel completed the text for two large billboards to be placed on and near Camp Golf, in plain view of traffic on the main Kufa-Najaf road. The message reads: "Security, Jobs, Democracy, Freedom... The new Iraq."

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INFO: IPC COS

DISSEMINATION: EXEC /1
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E.O. 12958: N/A

TAGS: PINS, PGOV, PREL, EAID, IZ

SUBJECT: CPA 1104: DAILY SITREP #14 - ACCELERATED IRAQI
RECONSTRUCTION PROGRAM (AIRP)

CURRENT STATUS

1. Ramadi/Falluja. CPA Program Management Office (PMO) developed a timetable for Ramadi and Falluja execution targeting awards for 7 projects totaling \$27M by 15 May and another 15 projects totaling \$41M by 1 June. Two projects were already awarded for \$2M for rubble clean up. When fully implemented, the program will employ an estimated 3800 Iraqis. The Marine Engineering Group will execute most of the projects. PMO will execute sewage and water projects through a design-build construction contractor. Task orders for Al Ramadi and Al Falluja Courthouses Remodeling are being reviewed by the Ministry of the Interior.

2. Baghdad. Received funding authorization for \$125M for Baghdad AIRP projects. Task orders finalized and plan to award the following the evening of May 9: Al Rashid Sewer Improvement (six projects totaling \$40M), Sadr City Sewer Improvement (five projects totaling \$40M), and

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Second Landfill for Baghdad (one project for \$20M).

3. Baquba. Regional Program Coordinator (RPC) is on-site in Baquba. He is coordinating transportation, security, and billeting for initial site visit by a Fluor-AMEC team for the wastewater collection system, rehabilitate water distribution network, and landfill (combined project cost of \$9M).

4. Mosul. RPC is in transit to Mosul, awaiting transportation in Tikrit. Mosul Library Enhancements project is ready for award (\$200K). A revised project listing that maintains the \$20M funding allocation has been submitted. A memorandum from PMO to the Administrator requesting approval for the revised project listing has been drafted and will be submitted.

5. Samarra/Tikrit. Technical tiger team is on-site. Two contracting officers arrived May 9. 42 scopes of work out of 102 projects have been completed. 24 were submitted to the Contracting officer who has approved 8. Three have been put out for bid.

PLANNED ACTIONS

6. Ramadi/Falluja: PMO will investigate accelerating landfill project by modifying an ongoing trash storage site contract. PMO will continue working projects to meet the scheduled award dates.

7. Baghdad: After award of first three task orders (totaling \$105M out of \$125M allocated), begin development with First Calvary Division a task order for the Kudus Street main sewer line (one project for \$20M) for award to the design-build construction contractor.

8. Baquba: PMO will expedite initial site visit for Fluor-AMEC for the wastewater collection system, rehabilitate water distribution network, and landfill projects. The team will plan the project mobilization, contact local authorities, conduct site assessment, and compile a listing of potential subcontractors; will complete the draft task order for Diyala Bridge no later than 10 May. The goal is to award the first road project and the Diyala Bridge contract on or about 15 May.

9. Mosul: RPC scheduled to be in Mosul on 11 May.

10. Samarra/Tikrit: The technical tiger team will

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continue working on the scopes of work for the various approved projects (102 projects for a combined cost of \$42M). The contracting officers will assist in reviewing the scopes of work and preparing the solicitations.

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INFO: IPC COS

DISSEMINATION: EXEC /1
CHARGE: PROG

MAY 10 2004

APPROVED: RJONES

DRAFTED: GOVERNANCE/DPITTMAN

CLEARED: SCARPENTER, CROSS, YLEMPERT, SMILEY

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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000449

STATE FOR NEA/NGA

E.O. 12958: N/A

TAGS: PGOV, PINS, PTER, IZ

SUBJECT: CPA 1107: Anbar Officials say Fallujah Still
Tense, PMO Projects Welcomed

1. Summary. CPA Administrator L Paul Bremer hosted the Anbar Governor and several members of the Provincial Council in Baghdad on May 8. The delegation underscored continued tension in Fallujah and the fact that thousands of Fallujans remain outside the city as ongoing concerns. The Governor highlighted positive efforts to restore basic infrastructure in Fallujah, but voiced concern over inability of the police and civil defense forces, many who fled in face of insurgency, to carry out their duties. Over lunch, Provincial Council Secretary and Director of Endowments Dr. Khalid Suleiman Hamood listed a number of religious projects that could help improve conditions. All urged that detainees be released as expeditiously as possible to prevent their continued detention being exploited. End Summary.

2. As part of his continuing outreach efforts, Ambassador Bremer hosted Anbar Governor Abdulkareem Barjas, Anbar

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Provincial Council (PC) Chairman Sheik Amir Abduljabar Ali Suleiman, PC Secretary Dr. Khalid Suleiman Hamood and PC Vice Chairman Mahmoud Sami Rasheed for meetings and lunch in Baghdad on May 8. Also attending portions of the event were Ambassador Chris Ross, Ambassador Robert Blackwill, Admirable David Nash, Anbar Governorate Coordinator Stuart Jones and CPA Governance Deputy Director Dean Pittman.

3. The Governor provided an update on the situation in Fallujah. He said his government had established teams to work on rebuilding the city's infrastructure, with particular attention to water and electricity. His aim, he said, was to "bring back life" to Fallujah. He added, however that the security situation remained tense and insurgents continued to strike fear among the local population. The Governor speculated that some of the insurgents, which he numbered at less than 1000, were foreigners, but said some were clearly from Fallujah. Some Fallujah residents who fled the city had returned, but the majority (approximately 36,800) of those who left remain outside the city.

4. Responding to Ambassador Bremer's question on what additional measures the Iraqi government should take to improve the Fallujah situation, the Governor indicated that he needed additional support from the ministries to ensure public works projects went forward. He also said that government institutions need to be reestablished. Police and civil defense forces abandoned their posts at the outset of the conflict. The government issued a warning to them to return in 3 days or lose their jobs. He said about 500 police and about 800 civil defense forces had returned. The governor indicated that Fallujah had a number of rival city councils established and these needed to be consolidated. There was a city administrator, but he was not recognized by the various councils.

5. Ambassador Blackwill asked for the Governor's views on ridding Fallujah of the insurgency. Governor Barjis stated that he would not have ended the siege when the Coalition did. He predicted that had the siege continued for four more days, the insurgents, now centered in the Jolan area, would have been isolated and eliminated. The Governor had no comment on the effectiveness of the recently created Fallujah Brigade, but confirmed that the police and civil defense forces as currently constituted were not up the task of providing effective security.

6. The Governor indicated appreciation for the efforts of Admiral Nash in identifying major infrastructure projects in the province. He raised concerns, however, that

projects had not started yet. Admiral Nash said contracts were being let each day and the major clean up project would begin this week.

7. PC Chairman Sheikh Ali Suleiman indicated security was a critical element to successful political development adding that security was generally improving. He cautioned, however, that Coalition Forces needed to be judicious in the use of force. While he acknowledged Iraq could not control security without the assistance of the Coalition Forces, it would be better if they were not positioned too heavily in Iraqi cities.

9. Ambassador Bremer responded that after the transition on June 30, the occupation ends and the Coalition and Iraqis will be partners in maintaining security. We were now working to rebuild the police and civil defense as well as establish proper command and control. He noted that we had taken steps to reduce military presence in the cities, citing the example of Baghdad.

10. PC Secretary Dr. Hamood pointed out that terrorism was a problem not for just the U.S., but everywhere. Terrorism is counter to Islamic teaching. He raised concern over the influence of Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Iran, all of which he maintained did not want to see democratic institutions developed in Iraq. He recommended inclusion of marginalized Sunnis in an expanded Governing Council that could lead the country during the transition period. We should also try to bring Baathists, not "tainted with blood" back into the tent. He made a pitch for utilizing religious institutions in building democratic institutions and sought support for rebuilding and rehabilitating mosques and religious institutions. Finally, Dr. Hamood strongly praised the recently issued order on local governance powers, saying that it was an important step towards giving real power to the provinces.

11. Ambassador Bremer stated that the local governance order furthered the principles of decentralization embodied in the Transitional Administrative Law. He lauded efforts to build nongovernmental institutions and noted that we had budgeted significant amounts of money to support democratic institutions. He explained UN Envoy Brahimi's discussions regarding the formation of an interim government, underscoring that the governing body would be just that, an interim body. The real key to Iraq's future would be direct national elections when Iraqis would have the opportunity to select their leadership.

12. Vice Chair Mamouon Sami Rasheed related that the

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torture at Abu Graib prison sent a very bad message and needed to be confronted with a dramatic gesture. He recommended the release of all unindicted detainees and providing compensation for those who had been victimized. Such actions would "pull the rug" out from those who wanted to exploit the issue against the Coalition.

13. Ambassador Bremer stated emphatically that the reported torture of the prisoners was outrageous and overshadows all the good works the Coalition military forces had done in Iraq. He noted that the Coalition also wanted to release the detainees as soon as possible, adding that 75% of the detainees had already been released. Ambassador Bremer further explained that notable community leaders could secure the release of certain detainees by providing written guarantees of responsibility for the detainee once released. Mamouon strongly welcomed the initiative.

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INFO: IPC COS

DISSEMINATION: EXEC /1
CHARGE: PROG

MAY 10 2004

APPROVED: PMO/POWERS
DRAFTED: RJONES
CLEARED: SMILEY, GWOLFE, JOSTER

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E.O.: 12958: N/A
TAGS: EAID, KSPR, PREL, IZ
SUBJECT: CPA 1109: PROGRAM MANAGEMENT OFFICE (PMO) REPORT FOR
MAY 9, 2004

1. Summary. This is the sixth in a series of weekly reports documenting the activities of the Program Management Office. Included in this report is the status of programs. Future reports will focus on upcoming challenges for PMO in the run up to June 30 with an emphasis on accelerated reconstruction activities. End Summary.

2. The 2004 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense and for the Reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan provided funding for reconstruction projects. PMO tracks the progress of funds from appropriations until final pay-out including OMB apportionments, CPA commitments, and obligations. (Note: for these purposes, to commit is to reserve funding, and obligation occurs with award of the actual contract. End Note). The current status of each sector, as reported to the Interagency Group on May 7, follows:

Security and Law Enforcement

Of the \$2,976 million total apportioned and approved by the CPA Administrator, \$1,636 million are committed and \$862 million obligated.

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Electricity

Of the \$2,538 million apportioned and approved by the CPA Administrator, \$1,824 million are committed and \$1,259 million obligated.

Oil Infrastructure

Of the \$1,701 million apportioned and approved by the CPA Administrator, \$1,397 million are committed and \$463 million obligated.

Justice, Public Safety, and Civil Society, (Including Democracy)

Of the \$1,276 million apportioned and approved by the CPA Administrator, \$680 million are committed and \$286 million obligated.

Education, Refugees, Human Rights, Governance

Of the \$259 million apportioned and approved by the CPA Administrator, \$37 million are committed and \$32 million obligated.

Roads, Bridges, and Construction

Of the \$270 million apportioned and approved by the CPA Administrator, \$211 million are committed and \$12 million obligated.

Health Care

Of the \$512 million apportioned and approved by the CPA Administrator, \$31 million are committed and \$4 million obligated.

Transportation and Telecommunications

Of the \$467 million apportioned and approved by the CPA Administrator, \$220 million are committed and \$25 million obligated.

Water Resources and Sanitation

Of the \$816 million apportioned and approved by the CPA Administrator, \$509 million are committed and \$152 million obligated.

Private Sector Development

Of the \$136 million apportioned and approved by the CPA Administrator, \$54 million are committed and \$15 million obligated.

3. Construction. Last week PMO awarded 17 new project task orders in all 6 sectors with a value in excess of \$300M. Public Works sector task orders increased in excess of \$100M. This brings the total value of FY04 Supplemental construction projects to slightly more than \$1.9 billion. Work continued at the four existing New Iraqi Army sites (Al Kasik, Tadjil, Umm Qasr and An Numaniya). Mobilization activities are underway at the recently awarded contracts for new bases at Tallil and Kirkuk, and additional phases of construction at Al Kasik and Tadjil.

4. Construction Security Impacts. Security concerns have resulted in decreased numbers of laborers reporting for work. On 11-12 April, the number of Iraqi workers at four labor intensive sites dropped to 20% of the March employment highs. Since then, the number of Iraqi laborers increased, yet remains steady at 35% of the March highs. Work never stopped at any of the sites and some of the reduction is directly attributable to issues unrelated to security. During the past week, an additional 500 Iraqi workers reported for work at FY04 supplemental funded projects, bringing the daily average to 6,500. Compared to early April, security has improved and PMO placed approximately \$25 million of additional construction this past week.

5. Non-Construction. CPA Contracting Activity (Baghdad) awarded 118 contracts during this reporting period, totaling \$186 million. \$43 million in Development Fund for Iraq (DFI) funds supported 102 of these awards. Sixteen awards were made using 2004 Emergency Supplemental dollars; notable among the awards were purchases of weapons, training and vehicles in support of the Iraqi Defense Forces. An \$11 million payment was made to Jordan for training Iraqi military officers. Ninety-six awards for a total of \$20.7M were made to Iraqi firms under the Iraqi set-aside program. CPA Contracting Activity (Southern Region) awarded 73 contracts, for a total of \$19.3 million during this reporting period.

6. Accelerated Iraqi Reconstruction Program. The final approved project list comprises 164 projects for a total \$277M of in DFI funds. This week, 9 projects were awarded, a total \$13.2 M. Of these, two projects have started and employ 108 Iraqis: clean up of rubble in Ramadi and Fallujah. For the

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other seven projects, contractors are mobilizing and on-site work is expected to begin within two weeks. Meanwhile, scopes of work are being prepared along with contract solicitation documents, with the goal of awarding all 164 projects by 15 June.

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MAY 08 2004

APPROVED: TKELLY

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INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000436

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/09/14

TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PINS, IZ

SUBJECT: CPA 1095: GOMPert AND CASTEEL MEETING WITH
MASOUD BARZANI - SITUATION IN FALLUJAH AND CENTER SOUTH

~~CLASSIFIED BY CPA ADMINISTRATOR, L. PAUL BREMER III, FOR
REASONS 1.4 (D) AND (D).~~

1. (C) Summary: David Gompert, Senior Advisor for National Security and Defense, and Steve Casteel, Senior Advisor for the Ministry of Interior, along with a team from CPA and CJTF-7 met with Masoud Barzani and representatives (Masrour Barzani, General Ali, General Sherwan, and other staff) of the KDP to update Barzani on the situation in Fallujah and Center South (CS). Gompert provided an overview of the situation in Fallujah and Center South, and asked Barzani for his insights into Iranian influence in Center South and the situation in Fallujah. Barzani affirmed that the approach taken by the Coalition is reasonable, and that a peaceful solution is desirable. However, he emphasized that if force is needed, it should be applied decisively. He noted that most Iraqis are against Sadr and that the media and neighboring countries are intentionally warping the situation to cause the Coalition to fail. End Summary.

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2. ~~(C)~~ Gompert briefed Masoud Barzani et al about the status of the "Fallujah Brigade" and its former and current commander, and the approach being taken in CS with Moqtada al-Sadr and his militia. Casteel thanked Barzani for the use of the Irbil Police Academy to prepare Iraqi police officers for Najaf. Barzani responded on a number of points.
3. ~~(C)~~ Barzani asserted that since March 8 (the day the TAL was signed), he considered himself an Iraqi, and stood ready to assist in Iraqi security issues however he could and anywhere in the country.
4. ~~(C)~~ Barzani believed that the pro-terror movement in Iraq was exploiting the Coalition's commitment to humanitarian principles, and that the major Arab media outlets as well as neighboring governments were complicit in this exploitation. He believed that the media was intentionally distorting the news, and that neighboring countries were tolerating if not assisting the enemies of the coalition.
5. ~~(C)~~ Barzani stated that during his presidency he talked at length with the Arab members of the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) about this situation, and asked them what would have happened in a city like Fallujah had Saddam been in power. He made every effort to convince them that their, and the country's, future is tied to the success of Coalition efforts. He asserted that he had been talking with tribal leaders as well, and encouraged them to speak out against Sadr. He had told both groups that they should either support or at worst not hinder the Coalition, and that they should not believe that any neighboring countries will help Iraqis. He claimed to have emphasized that placing faith in Arab nationalism in 1920 lead to 80 years of oppression.
6. ~~(C)~~ Barzani argued that the situations in Fallujah and CS should have been dealt with decisively from the start, but understood why the Coalition decided not to do so. He believed that most Iraqis simply want security, and would support whoever provided it; that most are against Sadr; that had the Shia parties taken a firm stand against Sadr early in the uprising it would have failed; and that the Shia parties on the IGC were now turning against Sadr.
7. ~~(C)~~ Barzani asserted that the Coalition approach now being taken in Fallujah and Najaf was reasonable, that he supported having an Iraqi lead for the effort, and that he had no objections to the Iraqi general the Coalition has

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put in charge. However, he asserted that if a solution could not be reached without bloodshed, then the military actions should be decisive and quick. A drawn-out effort would only play into the hands of our enemies and be exploited by the Arab press.

8. ~~(C)~~ Barzani stated that the Irbil Police Academy was available for continued assistance for training Iraqi police, should the Ministry of Interior (MOI) need it. He believed that two principles were needed to build a successful police force: (1) providing professional education that includes respect for human rights; and (2) building trust with the people through demonstrated professionalism. He illustrated this with an anecdote of how he made his nephew turn himself into the police for an unspecified infraction to demonstrate that no one was above the law and to enforce respect for the police.

9. ~~(C)~~ In response to a question from Gompert about Iranian influence in Iraq, Barzani indicated that it was evident but not uniform. He asserted that there was some influence with SCIRI and that of the two Da'wa party factions, one was and one was not under Iranian influence. He believed that Basra is largely not under Iranian influence. He asserted that Iran was not limiting itself to influencing political parties, but was also working on smaller organizations, and focusing on individuals within the political parties as well. To illustrate this point, he mentioned that the head of Abdul Aziz Hakim's body guards is an Iranian IRGC officer that the KDP "knows well." He asserted that these parties should be controlled and kept under observation. He further stated that there were many Shia that could be helpful in countering Iranian influence, and that these included (phonetically spelled) Jamal Wakihi, Isash Bender and Jabar Shabut, and that the Arab tribes, in particular the Iraqi National Gathering of Tribes, should be approached to help as the Coalition's best opportunity to counter Iranian influence. On a similar theme as that above, he asserted that those who were pro-democracy were not as effective, because they restricted themselves to legal actions while those who support Iran do not so restrict themselves. He again emphasized that the Coalition and the majority of Iraqis stood against a minority of fundamentalists and terrorists.

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CHARGE: PROG

MAY 08 2004

APPROVED: LPBREMER
DRAFTED: SSSONTY
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RUCAACC/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC
RUEATRS/US DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 000435

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, KDEM, ETRD, ENRG, EPET, ECON, EAID, IZ
SUBJECT: CPA 1094: ADMINISTRATOR'S MEETING WITH IRAQI
MINISTERS MAY 8

1. Summary. On May 8, 2004, CPA Administrator Bremer met with Iraqi Ministers to brief them on the political process; and to discuss anti-corruption strategy, the progress of rolling out the budget plan for 2005, and preparations for the May 25-26 Doha donor conference. All Ministries now have Inspectors General (IGs); and Ministers supported their introduction, while expressing concerns about their resourcing. The Administrator agreed to consider IG presence in the governorates. The Ministers' discussion of budget issues reprised concerns from their last meeting about the failure to address macroeconomic issues of state subsidies, but also showed a willingness to consider how best to engage the governorates in the national budget setting process. End Summary.

OPENING REMARKS

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2. On May 8, 2004, CPA Administrator Bremer met with Iraqi Ministers to discuss Iraq's strategy to combat corruption, the status of the 2005 Budget formulation process, and ongoing preparations for the Doha donor conference. He opened with brief remarks on the status of the political process. He announced the arrival of United Nations elections specialists on May 1, who were collecting nominations for the Iraqi Independent Electoral Commission. He encouraged the Ministers to report any nominations to their respective Senior Advisors by May 15. At the end of this process, the UN team would present its recommendations to the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC).

3. Ambassador Bremer also announced the return of UN Special Representative Lakhdar Brahimi to consult with the Iraqi people and members of the IGC; Brahimi arrived, he said, with "an open mind and a general plan." He expected Brahimi to undertake broad consultations with many people while he was in Iraq. Brahimi did not arrive with a list of nominees for the Iraqi Interim Government (IIG). That was the purpose of the consultations. Brahimi's plan would also include a national conference after June 30, which would have a role in the electoral process until the planned elections in January. Bremer reiterated the U.S. and UK governments' official position of support for Brahimi's approach. Finally, Bremer reminded the Ministers that the election process was a strategic goal for Iraq, and that the IIG's role would be to prepare for the elections, to monitor day-to-day operations and to manage the 2005 budget.

ANTI-CORRUPTION ANNOUNCEMENTS

4. Ambassador Bremer announced that Inspectors General (IGs) had been appointed for all 26 Ministries, the most recent appointment being the IG for the Ministry of Defense. The IGs were holding weekly meetings, and had already turned up some criminal cases for prosecution. This was a good sign, he said, reflecting the impact the IG system was already having on corrupt practices. He also noted the upcoming appointments of the President and two Deputy Presidents) of the Board of Supreme Audit and the Commissioner for Public Integrity, the remaining two pillars of the anti-corruption tripod.

5. Minister of Housing and Construction (MOHC) Baker Al Zubaidi urged that the appointment of IGs was a good step,

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but that they should hold the same rank as Deputy Ministers, rather than that of Directors General. Director for Civil Affairs Giles Denham agreed, and said that CPA would produce a policy memorandum to this effect within a few days. Minister of Municipalities and Public Works (MMPW) Nesreen Barwari cautioned that, with the increasing emphasis on decentralization of services to the governorates, the central Ministry IGs might not have sufficient oversight on local government practices. Ambassador Bremer agreed that further thought needed to be given to the role of IGs in governorates, as the resources directly controlled by local councils increased.

6. Minister of Health (MOH) Khudair Abbas described the steps taken by the MOH against corruption, such as a training program for staff run by the IG and the Ministry's new legal advisor; this program ran the gamut of potential issues of concern, from professionalism and management to religion and morality. He also noted the MOH's identification of the most heavily corrupt areas of operations (pharmaceutical purchase and distribution) and attempts to break this up; a proactive attempt to assemble and investigate allegations and complaints; and a new counter-narcotics addiction policy, worked with the Ministry of Interior. Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Hamid Al-Bayati recommended a strengthening of the Ministry's IG function to inspect Iraqi foreign missions, which had allegedly been engaged in corrupt procedures under the former regime. Minister Al-Hafedh noted that the Ministries need not staff IG offices with new people, ultimately reducing overall Ministry salary commitments. However, other Ministers were skeptical of the suitability of many existing staff for these roles.

7. Minister Barwari warned that having to consult with the Ministry of Planning and Development Cooperation (MOPDC) and MOF on every shift in funds within a Ministry budget also limited flexibility. She also commented that the new salary scale left no room to reward high performance, and she suggested the creation of a separate "incentives fund" for this purpose, for example to encourage staff who revealed corrupt practices.

8. Ambassador Bremer observed that IGs should share good practices with each other; he underscored Minister of Finance (MOF) Kamel Al-Gailani's point that the Iraqi economy was at a delicate moment in debt negotiations, the government already spent a disproportionate amount on public sector wages as a result of a bloated bureaucracy and could not afford to increase this.

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DEVELOPING THE 2005 BUDGET

9. Minister of Planning and Development Cooperation (MOPDC) Mehdi Al-Hafedh said that the 2005 Budget planning guidance had now been issued to Ministries. This proposed a 20% reduction in the Ministries' operating costs provided in the 2004 Budget, to fund pension increases. He reiterated his request from the April 20 Ministerial meeting, soliciting budget submissions from all Ministries by June 15.

10. Minister Al-Hafedh described the recent MOF-MOPDC delegation to Irbil and Suleimaniyya as a successful experiment of coordination between the central government and the provinces. Minister Barwari inquired which authority was responsible for delineating the roles of Ministries and municipal governments in budget formulation. She also thought the deadline for budget submissions did not leave time for proper center-province coordination. Minister Al-Hafedh responded that a financial management law was currently being studied by the IGC. He hoped this would include a formula for managing the allocation of funds by governorate. In the meantime, he stressed that the budget proposals for the next fiscal year would have to be prepared in an ad hoc manner, but that he believed there would still be enough time for center-province coordination.

11. The Ministers returned to economic policy debate, picking up from the April 20 meeting. Minister of Electricity Aiham Al-Sammarae asked Ministers Al-Gailani and Al-Hafedh why they were so anxious about taking loans to revitalize the Iraqi market. For his part, Minister of Displacement and Migration Muhammad Khdeir expressed his opposition to the elimination of subsidies, as providing Iraqis jobs and housing in the short run was the only way to avert another security crisis. Minister of Interior Samir Sumaid'ie suggested that a segment of the Iraqi population had no need for free electricity and subsidized oil by-products; by eliminating these subsidies and raising gas and electricity prices, resources could be directed to a Social Security program to compensate those in greatest need or used for debt repayment.

12. Minister of Youth and Sports Ali Al-Ghabban sought information from Minister Al-Gailani on the status of frozen assets. Al-Gailani responded that the Governments of Japan and Tunisia, per United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1483, had frozen Iraqi assets, but had since transferred them to the Development Fund for Iraq

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(DFI) for current use. The MOF was currently negotiating USD 500 million in Iraqi assets with the Government of Lebanon, and the process was currently in the "technical phase," which was a sign of progress.

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13. Minister Al-Hafedh delineated the two objectives of the upcoming Donors' Conference meeting in Doha, Qatar: (1) to review progress since the previous Conference in Abu Dhabi as to how their respective allocations (about USD 600 million to the United Nations Fund and USD 400 million to the World Bank Trust Fund) were being implemented and (2) to determine methods to activate members' pledges for the two funds. Minister Al-Hafedh noted that 727 projects from all Iraqi Ministries were on the current list, from which a "short list" of the most urgent projects should be drawn up by each Ministry. He noted that the Ministries should be represented at a technical level (without sending too many people), as they were in the best position to explain the technical merits of their respective projects. He emphasized that the Ministries were free to prioritize which projects merited more attention.

14. Minister Al-Zubeidi inquired as to whether there was a delay with the remainder of the 18 billion USD expected in funding from the Program Management Office (PMO), as USD 15 billion remained unaccounted for. Minister al-Hafedh added that the donor countries' pledges were channeled bilaterally or multilaterally. Minister of Higher Education Zeiad Aswad said the MOHE would present the World Bank with a project matrix directly. Finally, Minister Al-Hafedh encouraged line Ministries to enter into negotiations directly with counterparts; Minister Al-Hafedh said that just as Minister Barwari was doing with the UN and World Bank, Ministries should have direct contact but ensure the MoPDC was informed.

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CHARGE: PROG

MAY 08 2004

APPROVED: RNEUMANN

DRAFTED: DTESSLER

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INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BAGHDAD 000433

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/07/14

TAGS: PREL, PGOV, ASEC, PTER, IZ

SUBJECT: CPA 1092: Arab Nationalists See Fallujah as
Victory

~~CLASSIFIED BY DIRECTOR FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, RONALD NEUMANN
FOR REASONS 1.4 (D) AND (D).~~

1. ~~(C)~~ Summary. Insurgents and Arab nationalists viewed the situation in Fallujah as a great victory, Iraqi FM Zebari told CPA Foreign Affairs Director Neumann and Ambassador Chris Ross. While a year ago anti-Coalition forces feared the U.S. military, today they were no longer scared. Regarding the situation in the South, Zebari said the Shia leadership resented Sadr for the violence and turmoil he had caused. The Foreign Minister agreed with the Coalition's approach to dealing with Sadr and said that developments were moving in the right direction. End Summary.

Fallujah

2. ~~(C)~~ Zebari explained to Neumann and Ross that Fallujah did not represent a reemergence of the Ba'ath party.

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Rather, Fallujah symbolized "Arab nationalism fighting the occupation." He said that Arab nationalists regarded the situation in Fallujah as a great victory and Zebari predicted the scenario would be replicated in other Iraqi cities.

3. ~~(C)~~ Zebari explained that the local and regional culture interpreted the seemingly constant change of CPA policy as defeat. He argued that consistency was valued and respected.

4. ~~(C)~~ Regarding foreign fighters and support for the insurgency, Zebari suggested that Iraq publicize evidence of foreign intervention when available. He said the publication of seized weapons caches and arrested foreign fighters would help put pressure on certain countries in the region, specifically Syria. Zebari said that our refusal to publicize those we had arrested because of our legal rules was a mistake. It was incomprehensible to Arab publics and was costing us further credibility.

The Situation in the South

5. ~~(C)~~ Zebari agreed with the Coalition strategy to isolate Sadr and neutralize him. He noted high-level Shias, including a deputy of Iranian Ayatollah Rafsanjani, recently made statements discouraging violence against the Coalition and criticizing Sadr. Ross highlighted the Coalition argument that Sadr was destroying the Shia community and should be dealt with by the Shia leadership. He told Zebari that Sadr wanted a confrontation with the Coalition, but would not get it if we could neutralize him by other methods. Instead, the Coalition would continue applying steady pressure to disband Sadr's armed elements as a military force and compel Muqtada al-Sadr to face Iraqi judicial authorities.

6. ~~(C)~~ Zebari noted the recent establishment of Coalition Force checkpoints between Kufa and Najaf had greatly worried Sadr. He said the situation in the South was more important than Fallujah. We should not let too much time pass before we finish with Muqtada -- but the strategy was correct.

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CHARGE: PROG

APPROVED: RNEUMANN

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RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC

INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BAGHDAD 000433

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/07/14

TAGS: PREL, PGOV, ASEC, PTER, IZ

SUBJECT: CPA 1092: Arab Nationalists See Fallujah as Victory

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FOR REASONS 1.4 (D) AND (S)~~

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DISSEMINATION: EXEC /1
CHARGE: PROG

APPROVED: RJONES
DRAFTED: EXECSEC/JPIECHOWSKI
CLEARED: EXEC BOARD, SCATTLE, JLECROY, SREDD, DSUDNICK

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~~SENSITIVE~~

E.O.: 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, IZ
SUBJECT: CPA 0739: Minutes of CPA Executive Board, March 7

REF: Baghdad 62 and previous

1. (U) This is part of a continuing series of cables to document the activities of the CPA Executive Board. The minutes of the 7 March 2004 Executive Board meeting follow.
2. (U) Summary. At its meeting on 7 March 2004, the CPA Executive Board discussed the UK Department for International Development (DFID) and its newly released Interim Country Assistance Plan; received an update on Strategic Communications (StratComm) priorities; and reviewed the status of the CPA strategic plan. End summary.

U.K. DEPARTMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT UPDATE

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3. ~~(S)~~ Yusaf Samiullah, Head of Baghdad Office of the UK Department for International Development (DFID) and Lindy Cameron, the Deputy Head, reviewed for the Board DFID's newly released Interim Country Assistance Plan (ICAP), valued from the Madrid Conference pledge at 544 million pounds sterling (approximately \$900 million) for the April 2003 to March 2006 period. Of this amount, 248 million pounds sterling had already been committed, and approximately 110 million pounds sterling disbursed. Samiullah advised that in the initial post-war crisis, DFID focused on humanitarian assistance (food, potable water, emergency health supplies), channeling \$120 million to the United Nations and \$50 million to the Red Cross/Red Crescent. There was also ad hoc/emergency aid provided to other NGOs. Currently, according to Samiullah, the ICAP focused on providing support on three levels - internationally (anticipated to be approximately 60% of the total), nationally, and in southern Iraq:

4. ~~(S)~~ The DFID international programs sought to increase the effectiveness of multilateral assistance by supporting the UN and World Bank International Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq (IRFFI), as well as the Iraqi Ministry of Planning and Development Cooperation in donor cooperation. In this regard, DFID was keen to help facilitate pledges made by others such as the Japanese at the Madrid Donors' Conference. DFID was also working with Canada and the Scandinavian countries to promote their return to Iraq, as well as with the EU. The international program included the initial British pledge of \$120 million, to be committed by the end of March. DFID would soon decide which monies would go to the UN, and which will go to the WB, with the WB likely to receive a larger share of the tranche, due to its current level of preparedness. In the future, decisions would need to be made as to whether donor monies would be channeled through the Ministry of Planning or the Ministry of Finance.

5. ~~(S)~~ At the national level, the DFID funding was directed towards projects that benefit the poor, the political process, economic reform, and the strengthening of public administration. The goal was to create an enabling environment, not dependency. At this level, for example, DFID was spending \$7 million promoting political reform, especially dialogue. It was also trying to streamline Iraqi regulations, working in judicial sector reform, to include a \$10 million contract to send Iraqi judges to the UK for training, and on broader human rights issues. In the future, DFID wanted to sponsor programs that support civil society and women's rights, working with NGOs and redefining their roles in Iraq. DFID had also

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been engaged in work on the security sector but further discussion with the U.S. was needed. In February, DFID had begun work on the civil service reform project, working in the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Municipalities and Public Works, where the project is based, and was interested in expanding its support to other ministries. Over the next 6 weeks, DFID would conduct fiduciary risk assessments and an institutional training needs assessment. DFID was also looking at the linkage between central and local funding in the Iraqi government. DFID had advisors working with CPA and a variety of other ministries, some of whom would remain in Iraq past 1 July.

6. ~~(S)~~ In southern Iraq, DFID has spent \$45 million on infrastructure to maintain essential services. DFID has also supported the Governorate Coordinators. Assistance had been responsive to emergency need, but would now be more focused on economic development. There was also a BBC World Service Trust-sponsored \$10 million project to develop independent and effective news media in the south.

7. ~~(S)~~ Samiullah responded to Board inquiries on the level of DFID staffing that there were five DFID staff in the office in Baghdad, four full-time consultants in the ministry team, plus 10 secondees in CPA and up to 15 short-term consultants arriving. Additionally, there are 30 secondees in CPA South and three governorates in southern Iraq. The Board also discussed the partnership between DFID and developmental NGOs, and how that interaction would continue in the future. Samiullah explained that the security situation constrained DFID, causing it to maintain physical distance from NGOs to avoid the perception that those groups were part of the Coalition. DFID hoped in the future to be able to work more with domestic NGOs.

----- STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS -----

8. ~~(S)~~ Rob Tappan, Director of Strategic Communications, (StratComm), briefed the Board on reorganization goals for StratComm, upcoming and current information campaigns, and transition planning for both the pre- and post-July 1 periods. A recent development cited was the creation of an Advance Team Unit to handle press and site logistics for the Administrator's trips and events within Iraq. The Advance Section was being expanded to support CPA and Ministry events as well.

9. ~~(S)~~ Tappan's immediate focus has been on establishing internal processes and planning capabilities, with an emphasis on being a full-service communications resource

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for Senior Advisors and their respective ministries. Current information campaigns being conducted by StratComm included ones in support of the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL) and the electoral process. Tappan advised that a consortium of agencies had signed contracts with CPA to conduct an education campaign focused on the TAL and the electoral process, including a \$5.8 million expenditure for print and TV ads. An important component of this strategy was to purchase advertising time on pan-Arab channels that reach far across the region. This will provide the Coalition with regional reach on democracy-building issues, an Administration priority. A third campaign involved the Project Management Office (PMO), which would be launched with the announcement of several initial contracts awarded for reconstruction and development in Iraq. StratComm was also working on a suitable commemoration of the one-year anniversary of the beginning of the military campaign that accorded with the somber tone recommended by an assigned focus group.

10. ~~(S)~~ Part of the StratComm transition plan was to stand-up a Public Affairs (PA) Section for Embassy Baghdad after the 30 June transition, while still maintaining a separate but parallel-track StratComm operation. Tappan cautioned that some of StratComm's current functions may overlap with a new PA section at the outset. For example, StratComm was active in supporting Iraqi ministries with press and plan officers, and it was also active training Iraqi ministry employees in communications. After transition, these training activities could become even more important. An issue that the Board thought would be an important item in the transition was the control and fate of the Convention Center briefing room. A decision would have to be made in Washington regarding the future of the property. National Security Affairs Director Gompert asked that an information campaign be developed for the announcement of the new Ministry of Defense.

11. ~~(S)~~ At the Board's request, Tappan agreed to return to brief the Board on upcoming information campaigns for the strategic plan pillars- economy, essential services, governance, and security- as well as the plan for events on the transition date itself.

----- STRATEGIC PLAN REVIEW -----

12. ~~(S)~~ Kevin Kuklok, Office of Policy Planning and Analysis, provided an update for the Board on the Strategic Plan. The Board heard updates on items of serious and

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significant concern: (red) items that were not progressing or even deteriorating, (amber) items of serious concern, which were not progressing, and (green) items, progressing according to plan. The Board debated whether the creation of the border police removed that issue from an area of concern, and the Board agreed that it did not. Under Governance issues, Kuklok warned that a serious and significant area of concern was the continued illegal occupation by the PUK of the first NGO Resource Center, which would be based in Baghdad (Note: Subsequent to the meeting, a proposed resolution was a property swap. End Note). Other areas of serious concern were that a social security strategy had not yet been developed due to a lack of substantive expertise and that the nomination of an Inspector General had not yet been accomplished for the Ministry of Communications because of lack of ministerial approval. However, a social security team has arrived, so the process should begin. The establishment of the Commission on Public Integrity (CPI) was on track. This included the proposal of Commissioners, funding, the selection of new civilian and military staffers, and the reconstruction of the building to house CPI. The Board approved a proposal for a special session to consider the draft local authorities order and its fiscal implications. Compert proposed a briefing on militia reintegration, possibly for the following week.

PENDING ACTION ITEMS FROM THE MARCH 7, 2004 BOARD MEETING:

1. Updates from the CPA Advisors to the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs and the Ministry of Construction and Housing.
2. Briefing on militia reintegration, and the impact on funding retirement and jobs programs.
3. Follow-up on Iranian property claims.
4. Scheduling of a special session on the draft local authorities order.
5. Follow-up briefing from StratComm on information campaigns linked to the four pillars of the CPA strategic plan.

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ACTION: EXEC
INFO: IPC COS

DISSEMINATION: EXEC /1
CHARGE: PROG

APPROVED: DJONES
DRAFTED: EXECSEC/SSSONTY
CLEARED: EXEC BOARD, SCASTLE, JLECROY, SREDD, DSUDNICK

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RR RUEKJCS RUEHC RHEHNSC RUEKJCS RUCAACC RUEAWJA
DE RUEHGB #0062/01 0710613
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 110613Z MAR 04
FM CPA BAGHDAD
TO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 0115
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0123
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NSC WASHDC 0108
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHDC
RUCAACC/CDR USCENCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC
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E.O.: 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, IZ
SUBJECT: CPA 0710: Minutes of CPA Executive Board, Feb.
29

REF: CPA 0678 and previous

1. (U) This is part of a continuing series of cables to document the activities of the CPA Executive Board. The minutes of the 02/29/04 Executive Board meeting follow.
2. (U) Summary. At its meeting on 02/29/04, the CPA Executive Board discussed the telecommunications sector, Ministry readiness for the transition, and updating the Strategic Plan. The Board highlighted the importance of incorporating various Ministries into a modern communications system; the principal challenge ahead would be to socialize the idea of establishing private industry. The Executive Board endorsed the plan to create a template for a questionnaire to the Ministries on transition readiness, to help guide for future action.

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TELECOMMUNICATIONS SECTOR UPDATE

3. ~~(CSU)~~ John Weaver, representing Dan Sudnick, the Senior Advisor to the Ministry of Communications (MOC), presented the Board with an update on the telecommunications sector, including the Ministry's main priorities, an approach to strengthen the MOC, and an overall strategic plan.

4. ~~(CSU)~~ Currently in its first phase, the MOC is building the First Responder Network (FRN), the nationwide communication system for police, fire department, emergency medical, border patrol, civil defense forces, and other public sector agencies. For the FRN's second phase, the MOC will build inter- and intra-agency voice and data communications in Baghdad by April 2004; voice communications in Basra, Mosul and Sulaymaniyah by May 2004; and voice communications in 40 more cities by June 2004.

5. ~~(CSU)~~ At this time, the FRN is inoperable with Joint Operations Commands (JOCs), but the MOC is cooperating with the Coalition Military Assistance Training Team (CMATT) and Iraqi Armed Forces (IAF) to expand the network. The border control points are included in the network, but among the Board there is concern that without a satellite system, some control points will not have line of sight to establish communication.

6. ~~(CSU)~~ The MOC is establishing an independent regulatory commission, which will serve as the equivalent of the Federal Communications Commission in the US. This commission will be the first independent regulator for communications in Iraq, meeting requirements for World Bank loans and further depoliticizing monitoring functions. The commission will be a national body, though enabling activity at the provincial level.

7. ~~(CSU)~~ In restoring the communication system in Iraq, the MOC replaced 18 of 22 damaged switches and restored service to 111,000 customers. Current service exists for 694,000 customers, 83 percent of the prewar level. Mobile phone use is growing at a faster rate than landline use and now serves more than 200,000 customers, exceeding prewar levels. Mobile and land-line use combined exceed the prewar level of phone access. MOC continues to establish a broadband network for the banking system, and upgrade the fiber backbone.

8. ~~(CSU)~~ The Board discussed how customer requirements

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are met by the communication system in Iraq. Data comes from many sources: the ITPC, Bechtel, and information collected in the Lucent switches. In addition, Bearing Point is examining the current conditions, projecting future goals, and setting out options to reach them. The communications system will also include mobile trailer units that can move to areas where infrastructure is destroyed.

9. ~~(S)~~ Other Ministries and agencies will need to know what to do and how to be prepared in order to be integrated into the communications system. There will be an interagency review, and an IT team on the ground is working to support this effort. Most importantly, the Ministry of Finance, the Central Bank, and Ministry of Defense need to be prepared to be a part of a modern communications system as soon as possible. Satellite communications capability will be first established in Baghdad, and the communications system will expand from there. Other challenges include shifting from paper to electronics in the banking system.

10. ~~(S)~~ The MOC is restructuring the Iraqi Telephone and Post Company (ITPC) along business lines by establishing wholesale and retail systems, data and voice capabilities, and by corporatizing the postal system. They are providing training support in areas like business management, internationally accepted accounting practices, and regulatory training. They are modernizing the postal service by restoring facilities, modernizing equipment and delivery services, restoring parcel mail, and establishing a five digit zip code; the embargo on parcel mail is about to be lifted. The ITPC also has a Savings Portion, similar to the US pension plan, holding 70 billion dinars in reserves.

11. ~~(S)~~ The Board discussed use of the postal service as a distribution center, particularly for payments. Currently, the 253 operational post offices are often used for payments as well as international calls and email access. The Coalition Forces have been spending much time handing out payments, when a better system could be instituted. The number and geographic spread of post offices could be a better alternative than banks for paying pensions and unemployment checks.

12. ~~(S)~~ Overall, the principal challenge for the MOC is to socialize the idea of establishing private industries. Nonetheless, Iraqis have proven to be cooperative, inviting accountants to examine their books. The Minister of Communications is resistant to delegate responsibility, but new authority given to Dan Sudnick by

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the Administrator may solve that problem.

MINISTRY TRANSITION READINESS REVIEW

13. (U) CPA Director of Civil Affairs, Giles Denham, and Office of Policy Planning (OPPA) Deputy Director Kevin Kuklok briefed that as the Executive Board continued to analyze the progress of Ministry Transition Readiness, two key questions should frame discussion: Firstly, how far has the Ministry come in its development? Secondly, and more importantly, how far has the Iraqi management of the ministry bought into the transition plan. The Board recognized that the ministries were not required to perform every task detailed in the strategic plan. The overarching CPA goal was Iraqi ownership of the transition process. The Board acknowledged that the Iraqis ministries were not as engaged as they should be, and that the CPA approach to full Iraqi engagement needed to be tailored to each ministry's circumstances - some required a "hands on" approach; others were more responsive to a "hands off" approach. Some needed to focus on distinct problem areas of high risk (red) areas; others needed to focus on partial readiness, rather than trying to achieve full readiness.

14. (U) The Board also acknowledged that it was not useful to apply the same standard of assessment for readiness to all Ministries. The Ministry of Interior appeared on first glance to be the most problematic; this was largely because the Iraqi management had been unaccepting of CPA support. Denham suggested that other ministries needing more attention at this time included the Ministries of Finance, Defense, Human Rights, and Environment. Those which were deemed "most likely to succeed" included the Ministries of Health, Education, Municipalities and Public Works, and Water Resources.

15. (U) The Executive Board endorsed the plan to create a template for a questionnaire to the Ministries, for the approval of Ambassador Bremer and Ambassador Jones, to determine how far they themselves believe they had come. The questionnaire would help guide future action. Finally, the Board discussed the need to "stand down" CPA senior advisors, turning authority over to Ministries, and relinquishing decision-making power.

STRATEGIC PLAN REVIEW

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16. ~~(SSO)~~ Kevin Kuklok, Office of Policy Planning and Analysis (OPPA), updated the Board on the status of the Strategic Plan, reviewing the five core foundations and focusing particular attention on risk areas (red-colored) and significant trends. Due to the uncertainty surrounding the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL), an Order on Local Governance Authority has not been issued. (Comment: The TAL was signed on March 8 at 2 p.m., which might pave the way for its issuance in the next few weeks.) The Office of Strategic Communications continues to focus on Governance issues, while establishing programs for women's issues and extending support to the Project Management Office (PMO).

17. ~~(CDU)~~ Significant "red risk" areas included the ongoing search for an Inspector General by the Ministry of Communications, continued personnel shortages in the Commission on Public Integrity causing the project to stagnate, the underdeveloped Social Security System, and need to stand up the reformed Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs. The only significant "amber warning" area was the issue of border security. The policy for border, customs, and immigration was drafted; however, next steps needed to be fixed. General Gallinetti predicted progress for the Ministry of Interior, as the Office of Security Cooperation (OSC - the future organization incorporating MOD and MOI) will have organized men, training, and equipment to sustain the Iraqi Armed Forces (IAF) and the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (ICDC) beyond July 1.

18. (U) The Board also discussed the need to delegate specific responsibilities with regards to finances. In the Board's view, the TAL outlined how the administration of governorate and municipalities should operate, but not in sufficient detail to delegate financial role and responsibilities. Executive Secretary Jessica LeCroy expressed the need to articulate financial roles soon. General Figgures suggested that the Executive Board hold a special session before April 1, based on the data from CPA's Office of Management and Budget.

PENDING ACTION ITEMS FROM THE FEBRUARY 29, 2004, BOARD MEETING:

1. Briefing on the status of the Office of Strategic Communications;
2. Review of the Ministry of Housing and Construction;

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3. Review of Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs
4. Working Groups on Iran update.
5. Local Authorities Order Follow-up
6. DFID plan review.

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