



COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY
BAGHDAD

03/11/18-28

MEMO TO: Secretary Rumsfeld

Cc: Paul Wolfowitz
Dick Myers
John Abizaid
Doug Feith
John Craddock
Keith Kellogg
Reuben Jeffery

FROM: Paul Bremer, Administrator

W 11/28

SUBJECT: Iraqi Security Elements

This is in response to your memo of November 10, 2003 regarding Iraqi security elements. I have designated (b)(6) to advise me on the planning for and current status of the Iraqi security forces. His background in successfully dealing with terrorism/unconventional warfare as well as his experience in organizing and training indigenous police and military forces makes him uniquely qualified. (b)(6) will work with CENTCOM to address the questions raised in your memo. I have asked John Abizaid to appoint a deputy to (b)(6) to ensure full coordination between CPA and CENTCOM. They will establish a reporting mechanism that provides a weekly status of the following:

- The key leadership in each of the Iraqi security services
- The force structure (personnel and equipment), command and control, and training as measured against established milestones to achieve the desired end state for each of the Iraqi security services.
- The operational capability of each of the Iraqi security based on its defined mission
- The vetting of members of each of the Iraqi security services
- The spending profile for each of the Iraqi security services

00534

(b)(1) ; (b)(5) ; (b)(6)

(b)(1) : (b)(5) : (b)(6)

(b)(1) ; (b)(5) ; (b)(6)



COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY
BAGHDAD

November 19, 2003

MEMO TO: Secretary Rumsfeld

Cc: Paul Wolfowitz
General Dick Myers
General John Abizaid

FROM: Paul Bremer, Administrator *WML*

SUBJECT: Pay, Benefits, and Administration of Iraqi Security Forces

After extensive review of job comparability by both senior Iraqi civil servants and a team of specialists from the Pentagon, a new government-wide pay scale was adopted on September 8, 2003. Set out in CPA Order Number 30, it includes all grades and ranks of the various Iraqi security forces. It also provides for pay increases based on both longevity and grade. A survivor benefits policy has been approved to compensate families of members of the security forces killed in the line of duty. The Ministry of Health has adopted a policy whereby members of the security forces are provided free treatment for all line-of-duty injuries. While these policies apply country-wide, misunderstandings continue to occur in the field. A clear policy regarding compensation for members of the security forces that are disabled in the line of duty needs to be formalized. We are closely monitoring the impact of the current compensation scheme for all of the members of the security forces, particularly those engaged in hazardous duties, to determine whether they are sufficient to attract and retain quality personnel. If changes are needed, we will make them.

Regarding administration of pay, I do not concur with the proposal to postpone the transition of funding from CENTCOM to CPA. Administration of pay for most of the members of the security forces has been a CPA responsibility for some time. In my judgment, it makes sense to transition from use of CERP funds to regular budget funding as scheduled. This will also force conformity with the new pay scale. Implementation of a centralized system that can be more readily adopted by the Iraqis is essential as we transfer control. I do not see any nexus between recruiting and training and the payroll system.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

TO: GEN John Abizaid DATE: November 12, 2003
Jerry Bremer

CC: Paul Wolfowitz
General Dick Myers

FROM: Secretary Rumsfeld

D.R.

SUBJECT: Pay, Benefits and Administration of Iraqi Security Forces

Have we come up with a rational pay and benefits scheme for Iraqi security forces? We need to ensure that the forces are adequately compensated to ensure morale and retention and that their families will be compensated if they are killed or disabled. We also need to reward longevity of service and have graduated pay that rewards increases in responsibility. At the same time, we need to move toward equilibrating pay and benefits across north, south, and central sectors. I'd like an update from CENTCOM on where we are with this process to come up with something that makes sense.

I also understand that administration of pay for the Iraqi security forces is scheduled to transition from CENTCOM to CPA on December 1, 2003. I think we should postpone the transition in light of last week's decisions to expand the number of forces. We are unlikely to make progress expanding recruitment and training amidst a major administrative transition.

~~SECRET~~

DRAFT WORKING PAPERS

NO FOR CONTROLL

X04091 /03

Response Balanced 11/15

~~SECRET~~~~SECRET~~

MEMO TO: Jerry Bremer
Dov Zakheim
GEN John Abizaid

DATE: November 12, 2003

FROM: Secretary Rumsfeld

CC: Paul Wolfowitz
General Richard Myers

D.A.

SUBJECT: Increasing Funding for Iraqi Security Forces

It is my understanding that \$1 billion has been transferred from the UN Escrow Account to the Defense Fund for Iraq account. Since security is our top priority, let's set aside \$600 million of that to continue and expand training and equipping activities for generating Iraqi internal security forces.

New funds need to be made available quickly. We can't afford a pause in funding to train and equip forces; without immediate increases US commanders will be unable to increase recruiting and training forces in line with new end-strength targets. There is also an urgent need to provide forces with cold weather gear and other essential equipment, and to improve training.

I'd like GEN Abizaid to report to me on his funding plan for using the money most effectively to expand recruitment while improving training and equipping of the force.

~~SECRET~~

DRAFT WORKING PAPERS

X04089 / 03

SECRET CONTINUED



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON DC 20310-1000

COALITION
PROVISIONAL
AUTHORITY
REPRESENTATIVE

November 17, 2003

TO: Donald Rumsfeld

CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith
L. Paul Bremer

FROM: Reuben Jeffery III

SUBJECT: You requested information on the development of grievance cells in each Iraqi province whereby citizens could engage with the Governing Council

CPA is in the process of developing a comprehensive program to assist the governing council in its outreach efforts to the Iraqi people. A needs assessment is currently being conducted and potentially will include the following:

- Orientation training and skills development to existing and incoming GC staff on their roles and duties. The training should be available to both personal and committee staffers.
- Assist the GC in establishing outreach centers in each of the 18 governorates; this should include training on constituent services and coordination with national and local government authorities.
- Assist the GC members in their public outreach efforts, including the development of strategies for media relations.
- Assist the GC to interact and exchange information with citizens, civil society organizations, and political associations throughout the eighteen governorates. USAID's Local Governance Program is currently active in 16 of the 18 governorates, and may serve as a resource for IRI/NDI as they best determine how to best assist GC members in their outreach efforts.

CPA is currently working with the regions to identify what exactly is needed to refurbish and equip constituent offices and to secure the appropriate funding to provide these needs.

(b)(6)

(P02)

From: Sugar Adam J. (CIV)
Sent: Monday, November 17, 2003 10:48 PM
To: Executive Secretary
Subject: IMPORTANT FOR TOMORROW MORNING
Importance: High

Amb McManaway has called a last minute intel meeting for 0830 tomorrow. Someone may want to run up to C2 in the morning to verify everyone knows about it and will be there.

Requested attendees:

OGA – notified
Gen. Fast (her office notified)
Steve Casteel – email sent, didn't answer phone
FBI – notified
ISG – message should be passed

11/18/2003

~~SECRET~~

031110-16



COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY
BAGHDAD

10 November 2003

MEMO FOR: Secretary Rumsfeld
FROM: Paul Bremer
SUBJECT: Strategy for Iraq's Political Transition

(b)(1); 1.4(d)
(b)(1); 1.4(d)
(b)(1); 1.4(d) Although 20 of 24 GC members support our proposal to choose delegates to a constitutional convention through the use of indirect "local elections," it is now clear that they are unwilling to force that option on the religious Shi'a members of the Council. (b)(1); (b)(5); 1.4(d)
(b)(1); (b)(5); 1.4(d)
(b)(1); (b)(5); 1.4(d)
(b)(1); (b)(5); 1.4(d)
(b)(1); (b)(5); 1.4(d) we have been working to synthesize this notion into an overall political plan that is compatible with our objectives. What has evolved is an alternative way forward that would include the drafting of a transitional constitution or "basic law" by the GC (in coordination with CPA), the conduct of direct elections to fill the legislative and/or executive bodies created by that transitional constitution in late summer or early fall of 2004, and the recognition of a fully-sovereign Iraqi Transitional Government shortly thereafter. The transitional constitution would be unamendable, and would include a sunset provision and a clear timetable for the drafting of a permanent constitution.

In accordance with the provisions of the transitional constitution, the new government would initiate a process for the drafting of a permanent constitution by a separate body to be directly elected by the Iraqi people. This would be followed by popular ratification, national elections, and the first Iraqi government under its permanent constitution.

This alternative would meet many of the concerns about the political timetable raised by members of the GC over the past few months, and would be consistent with our own interests as well. It would give Kurds and Sunnis worried about Shi'a domination the ability to ensure that basic freedoms are protected and that federalism is established in Iraq for at least the period of the transitional constitution. It would meet the requirement

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

of the religious Shi'a that Iraq's permanent constitution be drafted by a directly-elected body. (b)(1); (b)(5); 1.4(d)

(b)(1); (b)(5); 1.4(d)

While ideally we would wait until a permanent constitutional process were complete before ending the occupation, this proposal is the best alternative course of action available to us. The transitional constitution option would ensure an honorable end to the occupation under the desired timeframe. We would recognize a fully sovereign Iraqi government only after establishing a transitional constitution respecting democracy and human rights, and after holding the first free and fair elections in Iraq's history. While there is a risk involved with holding national elections this early, we could mitigate the dangers by making certain that the transitional constitution protects individual liberties, establishes the separation of powers, and presents a clear timetable for the drafting and adoption of a permanent constitution. During this period we would use the time to identify and nurture potential national leaders.

In parallel to this process, we would need to negotiate a series of bilateral agreements with the GC. These would grant authority to the Coalition to continue to station forces in Iraq to conduct stabilization operations, and would govern the management and expenditure of U.S. taxpayer funds for Iraqi reconstruction. We would try to include these agreements in the transitional constitution.

Once the transitional constitution is complete, we would also consider returning to the United Nations Security Council to obtain a third UNSCR. This resolution could endorse the transitional plan, and could make explicit reference to the timelines specified in the transitional constitution for establishing a process by which Iraq would write and ratify a permanent constitution.

(b)(1); (b)(5); 1.4(d)

CC: Secretary Powell
Dr. Rice

~~SECRET~~



COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY
BAGHDAD

9 November 2003

MEMO FOR: Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense

FROM: Paul Bremer, Administrator

SUBJECT: Restriction of Sources for Iraqi Relief and Reconstruction Contracts

It is our intent to limit the competition of Iraqi Relief and Reconstruction prime contracts to firms from the U.S., Coalition partners with troops or personnel in Iraq, and Iraq. Currently, our Coalition partners with troops in Iraq are the following: Albania, Australia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Estonia, Georgia, Honduras, Hungary, Italy, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Mongolia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, South Korea, Spain, Thailand, Ukraine, and United Kingdom. Japan and Singapore have civilian personnel serving in CPA. I am requesting your assistance in coordinating this recommendation and taking actions necessary to implement it.

Accomplishing this result will require determinations to exclude firms from (1) non-coalition countries; (2) those signatories to the World Trade Organization Agreement on Government Procurement that are not Coalition members with troops or personnel in Iraq; and (3) countries that have signed Reciprocal Procurement Memoranda of Understanding with the Department of Defense. These determinations will have to be published in the Federal Register or Federal Business Opportunities and provided to the Congress 30 days prior to contract award.

In making this decision, the following was considered:

- Applicable statutes and policy –
 - The Buy American Act does not apply to construction in Iraq.
 - The Balance of Payments Program (BOPP) has been waived by the Deputy Secretary of Defense for the purchase of construction materials from Operation Iraqi Freedom Coalition Member nations or from Iraq for procurements for the reconstruction of Iraq. BOPP requires the use of domestic construction materials in DOD construction contracts performed outside of the United States.

- Acquisition of products, services, and construction for the reconstruction of Iraq are subject to the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 (TAA). The TAA provides that companies from countries that have signed the multi-lateral Agreement on Government Procurement (listed as "designated countries" on attachment) will have the opportunity to compete for contracts. Additionally, companies from countries with which DOD has reciprocal procurement memoranda of understanding will have the opportunity to compete as well (listed as "qualifying countries" on attachment).
- On June 16, 2003, the Deputy Secretary of Defense authorized Operation Iraqi Freedom Coalition Member nations that are not "designated countries" or otherwise eligible, and Iraq to participate in Iraqi reconstruction procurements (see attachment).
- The Competition in Contracting Act (CICA), FAR 6.301, and the Supplemental Appropriations Act require that Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund ("IRRF") contracts be subject to full and open competition unless one of the seven statutory exceptions applies.
- Limiting contract awards to U.S. firms only –
 - There is no legal requirement that restricts CPA contracts for Iraqi reconstruction to US prime contractors.
 - The Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act requires that IRRF be used for the "purposes" of the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA), but does not subject the IRRF to the provisions of the FAA or its implementing regulations. If the FAA were applicable, it would place numerous restrictions on the use of foreign contractors.
- Limiting contract awards to firms from U.S., Coalition partners with troops or personnel in Iraq, and Iraq –
 - The "Public Interest" exception under CICA would allow restriction of sources to U.S., Coalition partners with troops or personnel in Iraq, and Iraqi sources. It requires Secretariat level approval and 30 days notice to Congress prior to contract award.
 - DOD must coordinate with the USTR to exclude designated countries' firms from the contract competitions. Since the TAA implements the World Trade Organization Agreement on Government Procurement, restricting CPA contracts for Iraqi reconstruction to sources from the US,

Coalition partners with troops or personnel in Iraq, and Iraq and excluding other TAA sources presents political and international ramifications.

- Limiting sources to prime contractors from the U.S., Operation Iraqi Freedom Coalition members with troops or personnel in Iraq, and Iraqi contractors would greatly facilitate the continued cooperation of the coalition members.
- The risk is that our procurement plans could be delayed by the staffing actions necessary to restrict the pool of competing contractors as proposed. On the other hand, I believe that Congress intended to ensure that relief and reconstruction contracts are awarded in a manner that will facilitate our ability to accomplish the mission in Iraq, by fostering the cohesion of our Coalition members.

- If no action is taken –

- Offerors from all designated countries, qualifying countries, Coalition partners, and Iraq will be eligible for award of prime contracts pursuant to executing the work envisioned by the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act (Pub. L. 108-106).

If you concur with our recommendation to limit competition for prime contracts to firms only from the U.S., coalition partners with troops in Iraq, and Iraq, request you refer this recommendation to the White House to push USTR for quick coordination of the justification. Once you give us the go-ahead, we will submit the justification to USTR within 7 days. Finally, the list of "coalition partners with troops in Iraq" will require careful vetting. Our current list is attached.

Snowflake

Copy to [redacted] (b)(6)
He has probably seen
But we probably need a
formal note book
Teacher
Please see him
20 2003

CPA
031115-24

MEMORANDUM FOR AMB L. PAUL BREMER
GENERAL JOHN ABIZAID

SUBJECT: Prosecuting Iraqis for Security Offenses Against Coalition

It is important that people who attack Coalition forces in Iraq – or who are caught in possession of Manpads, RPGs or other special category weapons – are prosecuted and that the trials are prompt and fair. The prosecutions should help discourage these acts, if the trials (and sentences in cases of conviction) are well-publicized.

The fairness of the process will help instruct Iraqis as to good practice. We need to ensure that the offenses are clearly explained, carry appropriate penalties and are known to the public.

As for whether security offenses against the Coalition are tried by Iraqi or Coalition tribunals, I can see some advantages to our taking on the task ourselves. We should be able to move promptly and give the prosecutions appropriately high priority. I know there are arguments for letting the Iraqis do it, but I am concerned that the process seems to be moving so slowly.

Please let me know what your plans are (coordinate between the two of you) for getting such people prosecuted, on what timetable, and with whom in charge. ✓
Please also address the issues involved in detaining people who are convicted, who should hold them and where and what happens after we recognize an Iraqi government. I would like at least a preliminary response quickly.

2-1-03

031113-01

~~SECRET~~
CLASSIFICATION

WASH FAX COVERSHEET SECRETARY OF DEFENSE CABLES
N

TIME TRANSMITTED (LOCAL)

TIME RECEIVED (LOCAL)

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld	OFFICE/DESK: Secretary of Defense	PHONE NBR: (b)(6)		
SUBJECT: INFILTRATION		FAX NBR:		
DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS:		PAGES: 2 (including cover)		
<input type="checkbox"/> HOLD FOR NORMAL DUTY HOURS/ROUTINE <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> IMMEDIATE/URGENT				
NOTE: Furnish after duty hour contact telephone number for each addressee requiring after duty hour delivery.				
TRANSMIT TO				
AGENCY	INDIVIDUAL (NAME)	OFFICE	ROOM NBR	PHONE NBR
CENTCOM	GEN ABIZAID	CDR		
CPA	J. BREMER			
REMARKS:				
X04003-03 - NO FURTHER DISTRIBUTION BY CABLES				
For Cables: Return copy of transmission receipt to OSD/CCB				

WASH FAX OPERATOR (b)(6)

SECDEF CABLES (b)(6)

~~SECRET~~
CLASSIFICATION

~~SECRET~~

November 10th, 2003

TO: Gen. John Abizaid
Jerry Bremer

CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith
LTG John Craddock

REUBEN JEFFERY

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Infiltration

With the large inflow of people into the Iraqi security forces, it is pretty clear we are going to have some get in who should not be there.

I know the vetting problem is a tough one, and we can only do the best we can and get on with the job. However, knowing that the forces are likely to be infiltrated despite our best efforts at vetting at the outset, it certainly argues for seeing that we have counterintelligence activities in all of the elements.

I would be interested in receiving a report sometime about how that is coming.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
110703.3S

Please respond by 11/28/03

X04003 / 03

~~SECRET~~

031113-02

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFICATION

WASH FAX COVERSHEET
 SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
 CABLES

N

TIME TRANSMITTED (LOCAL)

TIME RECEIVED (LOCAL)

FROM: <u>Donald Rumsfeld</u>	OFFICE/DESK: <u>Secretary of Defense</u>	PHONE NBR: <u>(b)(6)</u>		
SUBJECT: <u>ASSASSINATIONS</u>		FAX NBR: _____		
DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS:		PAGES: <u>3</u> (including cover)		
<input type="checkbox"/> HOLD FOR NORMAL DUTY HOURS/ROUTINE <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> IMMEDIATE/URGENT				
NOTE: Furnish after duty hour contact telephone number for each addressee requiring after duty hour delivery.				
TRANSMIT TO				
AGENCY	INDIVIDUAL (NAME)	OFFICE	ROOM NBR	PHONE NBR
CENTCOM	GEN ABIZAID	CDR		
CPA	J. BREMER			
REMARKS:				
X04004-03 - NO FURTHER DISTRIBUTION BY CABLES				
For Cables: Return copy of transmission receipt to OSD/CCB				
WASH FAX OPERATOR <u>(b)(6)</u>		SECDEF CABLES <u>(b)(6)</u>		

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFICATION

~~SECRET~~

November¹⁰ 7, 2003

TO: Gen. John Abizaid
Jerry Bremer

CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith
LTG John Craddock

Reuben Jeffery

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

DA

SUBJECT: Assassinations

I just saw this list of assassination incidents. I had not seen it pulled together that way and was not aware of the pattern that seems to be evolving.

John, I would be curious to know what you think we can do about it and how we ought to approach it.

Thanks.

Attach.
11/7/03 JFCOM CoCom e-mail to SecDef

DHR:dh
110703.45

Please respond by 11/18/03

X04004 / 03

~~SECRET~~

Wol. - D



Iraq: Iraqi Assassination Wrap-up



KEY IRAQI ASSASSINATION INCIDENTS (MAY 03 - PRESENT) ~~(S//REL)~~

7 Jun:	Deputy Police Chief Razzao	(al-Basrah)
29 Aug:	SCIRI Chairman Hakim	(an-Najaf)
20 Sep:	IGC Member Hashimi	(Baghdad)
9 Oct:	Police Chief Rasheed	(Qa'im)
24 Oct:	Police Chief Abu Rashid	(al-Amarah)
29 Oct:	Deputy Mayor Isam	(Baghdad)
3 Nov:	Local Councilman Khaleefa	(Baghdad)
3 Nov:	Judge Shuwali	(an-Najaf)
4 Nov:	Judge Sadiq	(Mosul)



Assassination Locations

ASSESSMENT: FRLs most likely behind assassinations with criminal elements having lesser degree of involvement. Late Oct - early Nov increase in assassinations likely attributed to FRLs' desire to intimidate Iraqis working with Coalition and undermine reconstruction/security efforts ... lower-level officials softer targets than higher-ranking GC members.

~~(S//REL)~~

031166-05

(b)(6)

From: RSS - SecDef CablesESD (b)(6)

Sent: Thursday, November 06, 2003 2:27 AM

To: Executive Secretariat CPA, NIST ORHA (E-mail); (b)(6) CIV, OSD; Bremer, Paul;
(b)(6)

Subject: Bonuses

11/11/2003

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Please forward the attached note from Secretary Rumsfeld to Amb Bremer. Please confirm receipt. Thank you.


Respectfully,

MAJ (b)(6)

*Noted
Min Zuhner
recovered*

11/6/2003

November 5, 2003

TO: Jerry Brenner
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Bonuses

Here's a suggestion that we offer bonuses to Iraqi police to capture terrorists and other wanted individuals. You may want to wash around the idea.

Thanks.

Attach.
10/8/03 Maguire ltr to SecDef

DHR:dh
110503-16

.....
Please respond by _____

TELEPHONE 214/741-5137

MAGUIRE OIL COMPANY

RENAISSANCE TOWER
1201 ELM STREET, SUITE 4000
DALLAS, TEXAS 75270-2105

FAX 214/552-8006

CARY M. MAGUIRE, PRESIDENT
BLAINEY MAGUIRE HESS, VICE PRESIDENT

RODNEY E. COX, VICE PRESIDENT
V. D. FLOURNOY, ASST. VICE PRESIDENT

October 8, 2003

Via FedEx

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
1000 Defense Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301-1000

Dear Don:


I enjoyed meeting with you just before you sat down for dinner at the book festival gala in Washington last week. The President, his father, and Jeb Bush have all been to our home in Dallas. Since under the leadership of President Bush and you, the United States was able to win quickly the substantive part of the war, it is important that the peace does not slip into a slow Vietnam. With the huge number of terrorists and criminals trying to stir up unrest in Iraq in order to undermine the U.S. efforts, I made the following suggestion to President Bush at the dinner, which I hope you will also consider:

A generous cash award program for the various Chiefs of Police and perhaps another program for the police under the Chiefs that will reward capturing the terrorists and criminals. The Iraqi police apparently have a low standard of living to start with so a generous supplemental cash award program, in addition to some type of honor program, could be quite effective and would probably save a number of American lives.

I mentioned this idea to Kay Bailey Hutchinson and she thought it should be pursued.

Keep up the good work!

Yours very truly,



Cary M. Maguire

CMM:jsg

U16733TM/03

(b)(6)

From: Nagelmann, Sarah, CIV, OSD
Sent: Thursday, November 13, 2003 8:39 PM
To: Executive Secretariat CPA
Subject: Snowflakes

2 snowflakes



Snowflake.Turkey's
Role in Ira...



Snowflake.Iraqi
Security Eleme...

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

As requested, here is the latest Turkey snowflake.

As a bonus, I'm also attaching here the Security snowflake that came out the same day. Hard copies were provided to the Boss.

sn

<<Snowflake.Turkey's Role in Iraq.pdf>> <<Snowflake.Iraqi Security Elements.pdf>>

03/13-20

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

November 10, 2003

TO: Gen. John Abizaid
Jerry Bremer

CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith
LTG J. Keith Kellog (Ret.)
LTG John Craddock

Ruben Jeffery

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Iraqi Security Elements

The U.S. is going to put a great deal of money and stake a lot on being successful in developing the Iraqi security elements—army, border patrol, civil defense corps, site protection and police.

Therefore, I need to have a single individual we can go to who will keep track, on a continuing basis, of what is taking place with respect to each of those activities in Iraq. A reporting mechanism will need to be designed so we can monitor regularly and so we are assured if anything is starting to go off track or lag.

The kinds of things we will need to track on at least a weekly basis include:

- How we are doing in assuring appropriate leadership for each of these organizations—leadership is key.
- Fashioning an aid game for each of these organizations and understanding how we will avoid creating local militias.
- Aggregate data to show what is working and not working.

Knowing the rhythm for each of the elements in terms of their training cycles. For example, with the police, some go out with 8 weeks training and some with 4 weeks. Those with 4 weeks' training will be brought back in to get the additional 4 weeks at some point. We need to know the phasing.

- We will need to monitor and assess training procedures and the numbers of trainees, to assure our efforts are adjusted among the four security services to fit the evolving security situation on the ground.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

John Steele

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- We need clarity as to the types of assignments each of the four organizations will undertake.
- The names each element will be called and how ought we to talk about them. Do we want to use "national guard" for example, instead of "civil defense"?
- How well are we managing the vetting process? Can it be improved?
- Are we developing appropriate counterintelligence capabilities to alert us when vetting failed.
- Who is responsible for each activity? How well are they performing?
What is the chain of command for each element and how might they evolve over time?
- How are costs being managed?
- Are we meeting our targets?
- Other.

How do you recommend we approach this? Possibly the new COO of the CPA, General Kellogg, can work with General Sanchez to make a recommendation.

DMR:dh
110700.65

Please respond by 11/21/03

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

030815-33



~~SECRET~~

LPB HAS BEEN

COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY

BAGHDAD

19 October 2003

MEMO FOR: Secretary Rumsfeld

FROM: Paul Bremer <signed>

SUBJECT: Muqtada al-Sadr

Mr. Secretary:

Following up on our conversation yesterday, I thought you should see (b)(6) most recent analysis of the threat Muqtada al Sadr poses to the coalition in his area of operation (the Shia heartland).

"Stability is the sine qua non of our success in this region. The challenge posed by Muqtada al-Sadr now dominates the political and security situation in our region's Shi'ite provinces and directly threatens the success of our mission. As both the GCs and I have reported in detail, Sadr's baleful and destructive influence is now felt in all five provinces of the Shi'ite Heartland, from al-Wasit to Najaf. His actions in Karbala, which have sparked a crisis costing the lives of three American military personnel and several Iraqi police, very nearly took that city from our grasp, at least for a short while. It is no exaggeration to say that his growing influence threatens to undo all the progress we have made here since May.

Permit me to restate my strongly held view that Sadr and his twelve senior aides, listed in the warrants referring to the death of Ayatollah al-Khoie, should be arrested for murder. Until Sadr and his henchmen are behind bars, we will know no peace in the Shi'ite Heartland. It is abundantly clear from his actions and statements that his ultimate purpose is to achieve supreme power in Iraq in a manner similar to that employed by al-Khomeini in Iran 24 years ago. Like Khomeini, Sadr believes in the doctrine of "wilayat al-Faqih," or the rule of Islamic religious scholars. The longer we leave him unpunished, the greater his prestige grows in the eyes of the fanatical minority already devoted to his cause, and the greater is the intimidation and fear felt by the vast majority of Shi'a who hold him in disdain.

Moreover, our own prestige in the region will continue to decline so long as the Shi'ite majority believe that we are afraid to punish Sadr for his crimes. The primary motivating idea of Shi'ite Islam is a profound demand for justice, a demand that the Shi'ite faithful believe is often ignored in this world. Unless justice is seen to be done with regard to Sadr, we will never be able to establish true stability in this region of Iraq."

CC: Secretary Powell
Dr. Rice
General Abizaid

~~SECRET~~

31101-23

JK


October 30, 2003

TO: Jans Brecht

CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Douglas Feith

*For John Seader
Larry Di Rita*

JK



FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Enhance Iraqi Pollution System

Here is an interesting poll from the Department of State on attitude in Iraq. It seems to me there is material in there you could use in fashioning your own approach.

Regards,

Attn:

Transmitted to Mr. Wolfowitz & Mr. Feith for a copy of the report. (b)(6)
Respectfully,
[Signature]

.....
Please respond by

*PA Comments and the poll message Don Rumsfeld to you
have been at 4:16 attached*
[Signature]

✓
10/30

OFFICE OF RESEARCH

OPINION ANALYSIS

October 21, 2007

MO-31-07

Iraqi Public Has Wide Ranging Preferences for a Future Political System

This Office of Research survey among urban residents of Baghdad, Fallujah, Ramadi, Basrah, Najaf, Samarra and Erbil reveals a wide range of political aspirations. At the same time, the results show strong consensus on the importance of good governance and pluralism. The data helps attach to these ideals provides guidance to emerging leaders as they seek to gain public acceptance, rebuild civic trust and establish and a new government.

Key Findings

- Iraqis in these seven cities divide on whether a democracy, an Islamic state or a mix of the two is best for Iraq's future. But regardless of their preferences for a political system, large majorities emphasize the importance of free and fair elections, the rule of law, the right to criticize the government and inclusiveness in politics.

- The main difference between those who support a democracy and those who support an Islamic state is their views on the appropriate role of religion in politics.

- Historical experience has sullied the image of political parties, especially outside of Northern Iraq where no more than one-third express confidence in parties. In addition, when asked to volunteer the name of a leader they trust most, two-thirds do not name anyone.


- In the new political environment, emerging leaders are still relatively unknown. Majorities have not heard enough to evaluate most members of the Governing Council, and religious leaders have better name recognition and ratings. But Iraqis place greater value on expertise and experience in staffing their government than they do on sectarian or ethnic interests.

This report is based on a total of 1,000 interviews conducted from July through September 2007 in Baghdad, Fallujah, Ramadi, Basrah, Najaf, Samarra and Erbil. Between August 26 and September 7, 2007, the Office of Research commissioned a RSC in Baghdad to carry out the following: 1) face-to-face Office of Research in-depth interviews (primaries) and 2) telephone interviews in the absence of any findings from a survey cell in Baghdad. 3) interviews field dates August 18-20, September 4, 2007.

Strong Consensus on Value of Free Elections and Fair Representation

In all seven cities, the Office of Research poll finds Iraqis support what are generally considered to be democratic values. Nine in ten think it is very or somewhat important that people vote in free and fair elections (95%), that people abide by the law and criminals are punished (94%), that people can criticize the government (89%), and that minor nationality (89%) and religious groups share power (87%). Majorities also value media that are independent of government censorship (78%) and rights for women that are equal to those of men (71%) [Figure 1]. There is very little regional variation among the values on these components, and there are only minor differences between men and women in the attitudes toward gender equity.

Figure 1. Importance of Selected Political Values in Iraqi Society.
Combined Responses for Baghdad, Ramadi, Falluja, Basra, Najaf, Suleymania, and Erbil



Some Groups More Welcomed Than Others

A smaller majority (50% overall) favor a role for religious leaders in politics, and these attitudes vary widely by region [Figure 1 above and Appendix, Figure 1]. Disapproval is highest among residents of the northern cities (74% Suleymania, 20% Erbil), while approval is highest in Najaf (68%). In a similar pattern, residents of Najaf are far more likely than others to support the inclusion of Iraqi clerics (95% vs. 75% overall) and formerly exiled religious leaders (87% vs. 52% overall) in a future Iraqi government [Appendix, Table 1 and Figure 2, next page].

There is some hesitance among Iraqis to include other groups in a government. Overall, no more than a third approve of including formerly exiled politicians (36%) and Christian leaders (32%), military leaders (24%) and descendants of the royal family (20%). There is muted approval for including formerly exiled clerics (52%), women (60%) and businesspeople (42%) [Figure 2, next page].

Residents in Sunni-dominated Fallujah and Ramadi stand out in their support for including military leaders and their opposition to formerly exiled politicians and formerly exiled clerics. Residents of Najaf are far more likely than others to support a role for women in politics. (Appendix 4, page 11)

Figure 2. Support for the Inclusion of Various Groups in Future Iraqi Government, Continued
Responses for Baghdad, Ramadi, Fallujah, Basrah, Najaf, Suleymaniah, and Erbil




Wide Ranging Preferences for Future Political System

While there is widespread endorsement for the values of inclusiveness, rule of law and accountability, there is no public consensus on what type of political framework is best for Iraq. The public divides among those who support a democracy based on human rights, those who support an Islamic state based on Sharia law, and those who support a mix. (Figure 3, next page) Preferences tend to differ geographically.

- In Erbil and Suleymaniah, about two-thirds prefer democracy.
- In Basrah, a plurality prefers democracy.
- In Baghdad, the public is evenly divided.
- A plurality in Fallujah and about half in Ramadi show support for an Islamic state.
- In Najaf, there is overwhelming support for an Islamic state.

Photo courtesy of Al-Jazeera. Photo credit: Al-Jazeera. Photo credit: Al-Jazeera.

Figure 8. Preferred Political System for Iraq



Appropriate Role for Religion Differentiates Preferences

Data analysis shows that what differentiates Iraqis who support a democratic state from those favoring an Islamic state is whether they support a role for religious leaders in government. As Table 1 on the following page shows, just 35 percent of those Iraqis who prefer a democratic state endorse a role for religious leaders in politics compared to 75 percent among those who support an Islamic state.¹ However, those who favor an Islamic state are no less supportive of democratic values than those who prefer a democracy. (The same pattern holds across all seven cities [figures not shown].)

Taken together, the data suggest that Iraqi citizens have different ideas of what democratic and Islamic political systems mean on a functional level. They also show that support for the involvement of religious figures in government does not necessarily preclude support for leadership accountability and responsiveness to the Iraqi people through such mechanisms as elections and free speech.

¹ Those supporting an Islamic state are also more likely than others to identify themselves as Shi'ites or Sunnis or "just Muslims," and to look toward Iran or conservative Sunni states as political models. When respondents were asked to select from a list the country they viewed as having the best political model for Iraq, about a third of those preferring an Islamic state chose Iran as a model system, compared to 12 percent of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, or the U.S. as models (Appendix, Figure 1).

Table 1. Support for Political System by Support for Various Political Values*

Values people care about	Those who prefer a		
	A Democracy	A Mix of Democracy and Islam	An Islamic State
Religious Leaders Involved in Politics	35%	58%	77%
Free and Fair Elections	98	95	95
Law and Order	94	92	92
Criticize Government	86	86	87
Nationalities Share Power	92	89	87
Major Religious Sects Share Power	87	89	88

Source: Office of Research, August 20-September 5

* Percentages reflect those viewing the political values as "important" or "very important."

Parties Distrusted as Legacy of Past

The new Iraqi leadership will have to overcome distrust of political parties and politicians. About half of Iraqis and Suleymaniah but no more than a third elsewhere express confidence in the political parties in Iraq today – to represent people like me” (Appendix, Figure 3). In addition, when asked which leader in the “country they trust most, two-thirds (64%) could not volunteer a single leader, and no one single leader was named by more than 12 percent (Appendix, Table 3).

Office of Research in-depth interviews underscore the poor image of politicians among average Iraqis, who tend to see them as self-serving. “At first they call for home and freedom and after that they all become like Saddam,” a 46-year-old male from Kirkuk comments. A 30-year-old male from Baghdad has similar fears: “I see that there are too many parties, and I fear that they might act against the people like the Baath party.”

Iraqis Want Leaders with Expertise and Compassion, Sectarian Affiliation Less Important

The perceived inability of political parties to represent ordinary Iraqis is a major failing, since nine in ten Iraqis say that it is important for their leaders to “represent people like me” (Figure 4, next page). While a large majority also says that qualifications and experience are important, the public places relatively lower value on nationality and sectarian interests.

For the most part, average Iraqis seem careful not to draw attention to the Shia-Sunni power struggle that is often described in international media. Large majorities in every city endorse the representation of major religious groups in government (Appendix, Figure 6). But perhaps as a signal that these tensions between Sunni and Shia lie under the surface, many Iraqis are uncomfortable identifying themselves as Sunni or Shia, preferring to describe themselves as “just Muslim” (Table 2, next page).

Across all cities, more than a third (36%) believe in a nation on a *shariat* (or “representing sect”). There is more variation among those who value a leader who “represents his constituency,” with a higher percentage valuing nationality traits in Mosul (88%) – perhaps in reaction to the influence of foreign countries such as Iran – and in Suleymaniah (59%) – probably a desire to express their Kurdish identity and autonomy (See Appendix, Figures 4 and 5).

Figure 4. Important Leadership Characteristics:
Combined Responses for Baghdad, Ramadi, Fallujah, Basrah, Najaf, Sulaymaniyah, and Erbil




Table 2. Sunni/Shia Affiliation by City*


	Shia	Sunni	Just Muslim
Baghdad	57%	3%	62%
Basra	8%	0%	44%
Najaf	0%	0%	0%
Fallujah	0%	0%	0%
Ramadi	0%	0%	8%
Sulaymaniyah	0%	41%	7%
Erbil	0%	26%	7%

*Other religious categories were not identified. The overall percentage of respondents identifying themselves as Christian was 0.7 percent.

New Leadership Not Yet Known to Public

In addition to suspicions of political parties and politicians, the transitional nature of the current Iraqi leadership and the overall political environment contributes to a general lack of awareness of emerging leaders. Between 69 and 82 percent in the Office of Research survey have not heard enough to voice an opinion on 15 of 25 Governing Council members [Figure 5, next page, interviews collected before death of Council member Akila al-Hashimi].

Figure 5: Awareness of Governing Council Members



Results of in-depth interviews touch on Iraqis' unfamiliarity with new politicians, although some people interviewed say that over time parties may be able to gain public trust. In Karbala, a male age 21 asks, "Who are they? Where did they come from? We know nothing about their past." Another young man of 20 in Kirkuk observes, "I don't know anything about these new parties because we were afraid to even whisper about any other parties except for the Ba'ath party. I think we need a lot of time to get used to so many parties."

At present, among council members, Shia religious leaders who have returned from abroad tend to have better name recognition and favorability ratings than others. Just over half in the Office of Research surveys give Abdul Aziz al-Hakim (58%), Sayyed Muhammad Bahr al-Uloom (57%), and Ibrahim Jafari (54%) a favorable rating (figure 6, next page). The ratings of these three figures, however, vary greatly by region, and are stronger in Najaf and Basrah, moderate in Baghdad, Erbil, and Sulaymaniyah, and weaker in the Sunni-dominated areas of Ramadi and Fallujah.

In-depth interviews show that religious figures are appreciated in communities for being "closer to the people" and "not looking after people's pockets." These interviews also attribute the appeal

of the religious leaders to their dissident status under Saddam. Two men in their thirties from Basra comment: *They were the most persecuted group during the ex-regime. The former regime's hatred against religious men makes them popular now.*

Figure 6: Popularity of Governing Council Members



Governing Council Considered a Positive Step, but its Independence is Questioned

While the individual members have yet to make themselves known, Office of Research in-depth interviews show that many consider the establishment of the Iraqi Governing Council *“the beginning of a positive change,” “a good step forward,” and “equal for these circumstances.”* In addition, a Gallup survey in Baghdad (August 18-September 4) finds that six in ten residents of the capital have a favorable opinion of the Council (61% vs. 33% unfavorable, 2% “don’t know”). But three-quarters think the policies of the Governing Council are “mostly determined by the coalition’s own authorities” versus 16% who say the IGC is “fairly independent.”

In-depth interviews conducted in Samarra were unusually negative toward the Governing Council; several participants questioned its independence. A 46-year-old Shia male states: *“The CPA brought those leaders and the Iraqi people did not choose them.”* A female resident of

Saifara, age 25 (Sunnī) has the same complaint: *The people who should be in the new council are not there.* Another male, age 25 (Sunnī) sums up: *The new makes hands with the Americans is not one of us.*

Many in-depth interviewees also focused on the ethnic and religious composition of the council. For the most part, Iraqis seem to feel the makeup of the council is fair. A Sunni male, age 51, from Baghdad gives his view: *The representation of religious council is good. Even if the Shi'as are in the majority, it is fair.* While a Kurdish participant in Kirkuk is satisfied that the Kurds *have a strong voice in the council*, a fellow Kirkuk resident complains that *there is only one representative for the Christians and we are a great sect.* Another Sunni male, age 29, also from Kirkuk, has a big picture view: *The Governing Council is an objection to Sunnis and Shi'as more Shi'a than Sunnis, but the most important thing is that this is a new government and it will not be like the previous.*

METHODOLOGY

Office of Research

Survey:

Face-to-face interviews were conducted among 1,444 Iraqi adults residing in the cities of Baghdad, Najaf, Basrah, Ramadi, Fallujah, Erbil and Sulaymaniyah. Interviews were carried out between August 20 and September 5. The overall response rate was 89 percent, ranging from 93% in Baghdad to 100% in Sulaymaniyah and Erbil. Eleven percent of those selected refused to participate in the study.

A multi-stage probability-based sample was drawn, utilizing residential listings from Iraq's 1997 Population and Housing Census. Census sub-districts were utilized as primary sampling units (PSUs), with 80 PSUs being selected using probability-proportional-to-size procedures. Due to the size of Baghdad, the city was stratified by neighborhood to ensure that all city areas were represented in the sample. Interviewers were given all address details for households at four sampling points within each PSU. Five interviews were conducted at each sampling point. Within each selected household, one respondent was randomly selected using the last birthday method.

The margin of error, assuming a 95% confidence level and the clustering effects of a multi-stage design, is approximately $\pm 3.4\%$ for the overall sample. The margin of error varies across the samples of the individual cities as follows:

City	Sample Size	Margin of Error
Baghdad	680	$\pm 4.9\%$
Basrah	235	$\pm 8.5\%$
Najaf	193	$\pm 9.7\%$
Ramadi	87	$\pm 13.7\%$
Fallujah	29	$\pm 17.7\%$
Erbil	100	$\pm 13.7\%$
Sulaymaniyah	100	$\pm 13.7\%$
Total	1444	$\pm 3.4\%$

In-depth Interviews:

Approximately 260 in-depth interviews were carried out in the cities of Baghdad, Basra, Najaf, Karbala, Kirkuk and Samara from roughly August 25 to September 20. Questions asked respondents about their attitudes toward Iraq's image, CPA performance, the Governing Council, and Iraq's future political system. Respondents comprised a mix of men and women from various ages and with differing educational and religious backgrounds.

Gallup


Face-to-face interviews were conducted among 1,178 adults who resided in urban areas within the governorate of Baghdad. Interviews were carried out between August 28 and September 4. The response rate was 97 percent; 3 percent of those selected refused to participate in the study.

A probability-based sample was drawn utilizing 1997 census data. Census districts were utilized as primary sampling units (PSUs). A total of 122 PSUs were chosen using probability-proportional-to-size methods. About 10 interviews, one per household, were conducted at each location. Interviewers were given all relevant address details for each PSU. Within each selected household, respondents were selected using the Kish method.

For the results based on this sample, one can say with 95% confidence that the margin of error is approximately $\pm 2.7\%$.

APPENDIX

Appendix Figure 1: Importance of Religious Leaders Playing Large Role in Politics



Appendix Table 1: Regional Variations in Support for the Inclusion of Various Groups in Future Iraqi Government (%)

	Baghdad	Basra	Najaf	Al-Anbar	Al-Ramadi	Salah al-Din	Erbil	Overall
Important	78	77	95	87	76	74	75	78
Christian religious leaders	19	40	51	7	22	18	20	32
Formerly Exiled Politicians	14	4	45	6	8	42	33	16
Formerly exiled religious leaders	53	6	87	16	12	16	28	52
Military officers	23	18	17	39	51	8	13	24
Descendants of the fallen fighters	24	27	4	22	17	7	14	20
Women	62	58	72	23	43	59	52	60
Businesspeople	46	40	51	17	36	17	33	42

Source: Survey, 2006. N = 1,444.

Survey conducted by the author, 2006.

Survey conducted by the author, 2006.


Appendix Table 2. Gallup Survey in Baghdad: Preferred and Expected Political Models

	Acceptable	Preferred	Likely
Multi-party system, democratic, such as systems in European nations, the U.S., and some Asian countries	43%	39%	42%
An Islamic system, based on Sharia law, as in Iran	14	29	17
An Islamic theocracy, such as religious leaders in Iran who have a strong influence on the political system	13	10	8
A constitutional monarchy, such as the one which operated in Iraq before 1958	23	8	7
A consociational system, such as the one in South Africa	8	5	4
An Islamic democracy, such as that in Pakistan	1	2	2
Continuation of Baathist rule, such as that which existed in the former Taliban regime in Afghanistan	4	8	3
Don't Know/No Response	1	6	55

Response rates for each category are 100% for the multi-party system, 100% for the Islamic system, 100% for the Islamic theocracy, 100% for the constitutional monarchy, 100% for the consociational system, 100% for the Islamic democracy, 100% for the continuation of Baathist rule, and 100% for the former Taliban regime in Afghanistan.

* Excludes "Don't Know/No Response."


Appendix Figure 2. Preference for Political System by Country Model



Note: The chart shows the percentage of respondents who prefer the system, broken down by country model.

Bar chart categories are assigned to the following categories:

Appendix Figure 3. Confidence in Political Parties to Represent the Views of Iraqis




Appendix Table 3. Leader Trusted Most

	Percentage
Bin Laden	12%
Abdul Aziz Al-Husseini	4
Jalal Talabani	4
Saddam Hussein	3
Muhammad Barzani	3
Adnan Pachachi	2
Muhammad Abdul Hamid	2
Muhammad Al-Sudri	1
Sayeed Muhammad Badr al-Din	1
Amr al-Chalabi	1
Abdullah al-Bayati	1
Abdul Karim Qasbi	1
Other	4
Don't Know/No Response	64


Total 100%*

* Due to rounding, figures does not add to 100 percent.


Appendix Figure 4 Importance of Nationality as Leadership Characteristic



Appendix Figure 5 Importance of Sect as Leadership Characteristic



Appendix Figure 6: Importance of Major Religious Groups
Sharing Power in Government



(b)(1) ; (b)(5) ; (b)(6)

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CPA

October 29, 2003

TO: *Gen. Bremer*
Gen. Dick Myers
Gen. Pete Pace
Gen. John Abizaid

CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Vaught Letter on Iraq

Attached is a letter from LTJG James Vaught, retired.

Thanks

Attach:
1028 of Vaught Ltr to Sec Def

END

.....
Please respond by _____

U18099-103

Fax For LTG Craddock, Please Pass to Sec De ~~York~~
Thank You

LTJ. GENERAL JAMES B. VAUGHT
(U.S. ARMY RETIRED)

(b)(6)

28 October 2003

Dear Secretary Rumsfeld,

The enemy foreign and domestic read your memo. They are turning up the heat to try to prove that the coalition, including friendly Iraqis, is losing the security and stability battle. I only know what the media and friends tell me. I have not been to Bagdad since the war. Establishing security and stability in Iraq and elsewhere may not be a "long hard slog" if things are done right. Right now we must slog ahead. We have all the right tools. The challenge is to get our troops in the right places under determined qualified combat experienced leaders who have accumulated some wisdom. Not managers who are trying to be politically correct. Much of what we are trying to do in Iraq can be compared to a small boy standing in a bucket while trying to pick himself up with the handle.

Some thoughts from an old Soldier Veteran of three wars and other expeditions follows:

1. Recognize the fact that the terrorist have caused great losses other than 911. Add up the cost. Billions in the Airline Industry, billions to build security systems throughout the world. Diversion of large numbers of talented people into trying to decide where the enemy will strike next. Fact-no major damage since 911-Why? -very low organized terrorist capability and an alert public.
2. Ask President Bush to emphasize that the US must mobilize to win this war. We can't win a war while most of our citizens follow the good life. The DOD is carrying more than its share of the load. Why is Boeing taking so long to build more CH-47? Why is Lockheed taking so long to build more AC-130 Gunships. Business as usual at home but not in Iraq.
3. Keep Rules of Engagement to none or absolute minimum. Just follow the Geneva Convention Rules. Commanders know how to fight and use common sense. They do not need a lot of rules their soldiers must recall and follow before they respond to a surprise attack. Only those who have been in several fights should make the rules. Put the rule maker in the contest and they will understand or die.
4. National Intelligence: Having been the beneficiary and the victim of our national system since 1945, it is clear that there have been and still are significant gaps in the system. Current law and traditions since the early sixties has enabled

and sustained this no-conflict problem which is that the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) is also the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI). Hence, we have the "Fox"-DCI guarding the hen house CIA. All national intel agencies are supposed to pass their products to the president thru the DCI. When there are multiple conflicting estimates about the same issue the DCI is supposed to resolve the controversies and pass one agreed report to the President and other authorized clients. Over time the CIA has been and still is the favored child. Accordingly, other members of the intel community believe their reports are wasted hence leaks and wasted talent.

Recommendation: Select and appoint another person (former Cabinet Officer, Ambassador, Chairman of the JCS) As DCI. Give him tasking ability, over CIA, DIA and all others engaged in intelligence. This structure will help cure the problem and preclude another 9/11.

5. Stop worrying about political correctness. Do profiling. Why? It is much less expensive, takes fewer resources and will get the job done. It was Saudis, who attacked the U.S. Why did TSA agents make me take off my shoes when they knew I was a retired U.S. General officer? (Several TSA agents, former soldiers, apologized and said we know this is stupid, but, these are the rules) Observation: Was this some more of Secretary Penata's politically correct stupidity?

6. Get all Clinton appointees, Senior civilians and reluctant General officers out of the policy and decision chain throughout the Government.

7. Open Bagdad International Airport to commercial flights. Invite middle Eastern Countries to send their flights in first. Do some security escort planning (Have six or more armed Helicopters and an AC-130 gunship on patrol when commercial planes arrive and depart) Remember President Bush reopened Reagan National when all the safe siders said, don't do it.

8. Put more emphasis on capturing Bin Laden and Saddam. While both armies have been largely neutralized they are still a psychological threat symbol. Their capture by Muslims would be a big boost for all.

9. Stop playing two faced games with Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Syria. All three are supporting both sides to some extent. Give them a choice, join and support the war against terrorism, no holding back, or we will neutralize them. Send a Special Presidential Envoy (High ranking military officer or Hard-Line Ambassador) to pass the message.)

10. Recognize and tell the world that Iraq is the worlds largest un inventoried crime dump. Hence, it is easy for all enemies to obtain explosives to use in

making a variety of bombs, IED, demolitions and rockets. Tell the world where Saddam got them. (France, Germany, Russia and etc.) Ask the Iraqis to report and turn in all kinds of explosives. Pay rewards and get joint or only Iraqi officials to praise those who help. Set up Boss-line-Hotline so Iraqis can call in tips about security concerns and wrong doing.

11. Move the maximum number of Americans out of downtown Bagdad. Expand the Bagdad Airport base to a facility much like Long Binh was in Vietnam. Everything we did in Vietnam was not wrong. We just did not have a winning strategy.

12. Stop the "Fortress Mentality" building walls, etc. Go on the offensive. Terrorize the terrorist. Follow the principles of war with a new technology added. Please remember defense and bunker building are not principles of war or a part of a winning strategy. For 2000 years only those who followed the principals have won. We failed to follow them in Vietnam until Gen. Abrams got in charge. By then it was too late.

13. Establish random round the clock check points in highly contested area (this tactic was very effective in northern Ireland and Germany after WWII.)

14. Form a Counter-Terrorist cell in Washington. Bring in persons of all ages and backgrounds. Use the wisdom and the knowledge they bring. Remember, an old warrior coach just won the World Series.

15. Do a better job of training US Soldiers and Iraqis on how to cope with the current enemy. Bring in additional competent police officers from the US-Ireland and elsewhere to help. Hire more former Iraqi Soldiers and keep forming and using joint patrols.

16. Get 90% of all Strykers owned by the Army to Iraq and form joint constabulary patrols. Tanks and other tracked vehicles are not cost effective patrol vehicles.

17. Put a fixed wing STOL aircraft in the field to provide forward area logistic support for Army and Marine forces (A Modern Version of the Caribou used by the 1st Air Cav until they were transferred to the Air Force and left the forward area in the fall of 1967). We then had to use CH-47's, a more costly system, to do the job. If the Air Force doesn't want to fly Army logistic mission then provide planes to the Army and it will do the job (Fixed wing per-ton mile cost are much less than Helicopter cost.)

18. Get more snipers into the fight. Camouflage the country. There are plenty of

trained and other professional snipers who can help. Snipers are very effective against terrorists. Remember Shagan in Mogadishu.

19. Follow the four "F's" in conducting counter terrorist operations:

- a. Find the enemy
- b. Fix them: surround, isolate, use intel, etc.
- c. Fight them: by developing a plan to neutralize them with a dynamic attack
- d. Finish them off, search the area, kill or capture all enemy element armed and others. Return area to local authority and depart. Optimally, use joint-coordinated attack team.

20. Creation of a Unified Command Center and Resources and Situation

Awareness Center in the Pentagon is a great idea. Should have been done 20 years ago after I conducted the Iran Rescue Attempt. If the 911 damage to the Pentagon was corrected in one year why must the new Command Center take 2 years?

21. Get more return out of Army Helicopters. Most of the Army Aviation fleet flies less than 15 hours per month. Reduce the inventory and fly operations and training mission with helicopters that fly up to 20 hours per day. Helicopters that fly and stay operational when flown daily. Left on the ramp and flown 15 hours per month is stupid. Could an equipment rental company survive with billions invested in equipment used less than 15 hours per month? Yes, we need contingency back-up but not the way we do it now. I am the "Godfather" of the 160th Avn. Regt the "Night Stalkers" where man "first in Army" Aviation feats have been achieved since the unit was activated in May 1980. The 160th knows how to get the most out of Helicopters. Our Army needs 5 pilots per seat for each Operational Aircraft: One in trained reserves, one in schools and three in the unit that flies the aircraft. Presently, the Army has less than two pilots per seat.

22. Get many of Active Army Troops out of Korea soonest. Replace them with the National Guard and then withdraw the Guard after South Korea says it can conduct its own defense and win with precision weapons and other modern arms.

23. Enable selected Airmen to learn how to use precision weapons. South Korea's Air Force can become proficient and with our intel and target planning system they can knock out North Korea's command and control and win.

24. Activate four Ranger Battalions, one for each Corps. This will create a Special Operations and Special Forces recruiting, support, and training base for future leaders. Get the spacers out of the Korean draw down.

CC-USA
- B-3 USAF

Page 4

Handwritten signature/initials.

03/029-1/

October 27, 2003

TO: Gen. John Abizaid
Jerry Bremer

CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Ramadan

Attached is a paper of interest on Ramadan.

Thanks.

Attach.
10/10/03 E-mail on Ramadan in Iraq

DHR:dh
102703-2

.....
Please respond by _____

U17895 /03

Subject: for dr s: ramadan in iraq/public info campaign for iraq-my trip observations

Date: Fri, 10 Oct 2003 09:19:30 EDT

From: (b)(6)

To:

SUBJECT: Ramadan in Iraq

Ramadan is one of the most holy of Muslim holidays, focusing on sacrifice and prayer. This sacrifice is manifested in almost daily visit to the Mosque and an increase in providing for their "poorer brethren." Ramadan this year begins on 20/27 October and ends w/e 24/20 November.

Ramadan is a period of increased religious observances, fasting and celebrations. The fasting for most citizens (above 5 years old, excluding the infirmed and very elderly) begin at daybreak and end at dark. ~~Not even water or tea are allowed.~~ The fasting is followed by night-long dining celebrations with the last meal just before dawn. People will be out in the streets going to pray, to eat, to visit friends, to shop, etc. Therefore, curfews will be problematic.

In Iraq it will be the first time the various religious communities will be able to

observe this religious occasion openly without the constraints imposed by Saddam's regime

RECOMMENDATION.

This also will be the first experience the majority of US/Coalition military on the ground in Iraq have with Ramadan. It is recommended that a booklet or factsheet on the history of Ramadan, its customs, expected changes in behavior of the citizens and instructions for the soldiers on how to react to (or participate in) various situations be prepared and distributed to all military personnel and contractor personnel in Iraq.

We would expect Ramadan to be celebrated somewhat differently this year in Iraq, especially in the South where in the past these celebrations were controlled by Saddam. This makes Coalition respect for and understanding of the importance and holiness of this first Ramadan for free Iraqis essential.

Because the fasting/celebrating cycle continues each day for 30 days, the population can become irritable during the day, and likely to be less disciplined at night. Thus, creating the potential for increased run-ins with coalition military. There will be less traffic and movement during the day and because celebrations are held with extended family and friends and run throughout the night, curfew violations will be more numerous. Military and contractors should expect increased tardiness or absences from their local employees.

It will be important for all coalition military to understand these customs and for the Command to determine new procedures/rules (or reinforce current procedures/regulations) for the military and the public. For example, it is considered extremely impolite and disrespectful to eat, drink or smoke in public during the day light hours of the fast.

CPA and the Command should know that the Government of Iraq under Saddam provided Ifar dinners/celebrations for the poor. It is important that food distribution take into account the traditions and timing of this holiday.

In addition to written materials for the military and contract employees, Public Service Announcements over available television and radio outlets, as well as printed media, outlining for the public "the regulations" for this time period will be important in preventing misunderstandings and possible tragedies. We recommend that these PSAs be done by members of the Governing Council or senior Iraqi law enforcement officials.

Where appropriate, it is recommended that coalition military work with local leadership officials so that coalition military can participate with the townspeople in these important holiday celebrations. The coalition military units may also wish to host some celebration dinners with the townspeople. However, the increased celebrations and gatherings will offer increased opportunities for terrorist activities.

PUBLIC INFORMATION CAMPAIGN FOR IRAQ Observations from the Iraqi Public at Large

The following is a compilation of comments and insights shared by a cross section of Iraqi people-- men and women, professionals, academics, current and former officials, and ordinary citizens-- from various levels of Iraq's socio-economic sphere collected during my visit to Baghdad July 5-11.

This first section contains the strongest and most often repeated perspectives and ideas presented by my contacts. The Iraqi people are

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extremely confused and poorly informed about what is going on. They are not interested in listening to music, sports news or history. Our public relations campaign must be pro-active and truthful. It must target all segments of the Iraqi population, including Shia, Sunni, Kurd, victims, criminals, Ba'athist, normal people, and religious leaders. The battlefield has shifted to winning the hearts and minds of the Iraqi people and exposing the brainwashing and atrocities Saddam's regime inflicted during his years of rule.

Current sources of accurate information are limited and slow. Many rumors and much disinformation are floating around Baghdad and throughout Iraq. It is critical to provide accurate and up-to-date information about the situation in Iraq and plans for the future. This can easily be rectified by facilitating a public information campaign via radio, television, newspapers, and most importantly fliers, a common form of communications in-country. Because of the electricity situation, all three forms of media are essential to spread this information.

The Iraqi people are extremely eager to hear official information instead of music or miscellaneous talk.

1) The people are eager to hear about the crimes of Saddam and his henchmen. Reading and showing official documents, including security documents, depicting these crimes would provide concrete evidence for the people of Iraq that crimes were committed and would go a long way to convince them of the criminal behavior of the past regime.

2) It is critical to provide the Iraqi people with information about the planning, operations, and updates on the progress of the OCPA, reconstruction, political process, and situation reports in the various sectors.

3) It is important to provide concrete information about the goals of the OCPA, not just to liberate the Iraqi people and develop a democracy.

4) Provide information about salary levels to reassure people of the future, to give people hope that they can one day live in a house that can be paid through a mortgage, will have an acceptable job with acceptable salaries and the ability to provide for their families.

5) Show the people what will be done in Iraq for the future. Using Eastern Europe as an example, explain how those people have advanced from almost nothing.

6) Give all Iraqi people hope. Tell Saddam's old colleagues they will live better and will be treated fairly if they stop fighting a losing battle.

7) Show the Iraqi people how northern Iraq has progressed in the recent past, the freedoms they enjoy, the higher standard of living, their sustainable political process, their level of organization and lack of chaos. The people in the rest of Iraq, unaware of the progress in the North, should be shown progress is possible, that their lives can and will get better.

8) It is extremely important to tell and show the Iraqi people what Saddam did to whole families, how he killed them, and why. Once again, the Iraqi people only hear rumors and know a few personal stories; thus it is important to show the full magnitude of Saddam's atrocities.

9) Explain Saddam's bad intentions, plots, and why and how he made the Iraqi people suffer in order to make them believe the UN embargo was the main cause for their suffering. Show that it was not the fault of the international community or the embargo, but Saddam who was to blame.

10) Weapons of mass destruction were owned and used by Saddam, a proven fact. So if you don't find them now, does that change anything or make Saddam a good man?

Indictment of Saddam as Criminal

It is critical for the United Nations to indict Saddam as a world criminal. This will provide the nail in the coffin and eliminate any notion in the minds of the Iraqi people that Saddam will regain power. If the Iraqi people see that the entire world now rejects Saddam, they will never allow him to come back to power. The Arab and Muslim states must declare publicly what they have said privately throughout all these years – that Saddam is a criminal. He must be defamed publicly by the world community which should not be difficult to achieve once the evidence is prominently revealed. The UN should say he is a criminal, not the United States, and the OCPA must put all its effort to get such a resolution and it must be simple and clear.

The following are potential results of such an indictment:

1. Saddam will have no chance of thinking he might come back.
2. Saddam's men who are causing the current problems will realize Saddam is finished, give up and seek a new leader (the OCPA and new Iraqi government council) to follow.
3. The rest of the Iraqis will get over their fears that he might come back.

America's Intentions

Why did America come to Iraq? Most Iraqi people do not know for certain, but they do not believe that the U.S. came only to free Iraq from Saddam. They are told by all the Arab television channels and Saddam's men that the U.S. came to steal the oil and serve Israel.

The US must continue to tell them that Iraqi oil will be sold by Iraqis to any buyer who will pay the world price. All Saddam's oil clients were receiving oil for free or at severely reduced prices. Saddam was bribing them with oil to go against the U.S. The Iraqi people must be reassured and shown that the money gained from the sale of Iraqi oil will stay in Iraq and used for the betterment of Iraq.

Regarding Israel's safety, the U.S. wants to end the Middle East conflict with the help of the parties to the conflict and others in the region. The people of the Middle East should be pleased and hopeful in the future once the Iraq conflict is over. We should try, with the help of all Arabs and the Israelis, to make the Middle East an area where the people spend their wealth on the advancement of their countries instead of buying arms and building armies.

Saddam and men like him have spent trillions of dollars in the pretext of fighting Israel, but in fact it was only to keep themselves in power not to make their people happy and healthy. When this problem is over, the peoples of the Middle East will be much better off. The Palestinians are working to this end and the future will show that this is the only sound path.

We want to ensure that no young man of countries ruled by military and para-military governments will seek solutions by following terrorists such as Osama Bin Laden. We want the Middle East to be a part of the world, enjoying advances in agriculture, health, technology and learning in

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cooperation.

Order and Safety in Iraq

The old police force consisted of corrupt and contented people who were serving their master because of the huge gains they realized from receiving bribes. Now this force will be more than willing to serve the new order provided they get the money they were making or more. We cannot have policemen taking bribes so they should be highly paid in order to stem this behavior and ensure they cooperate fully with the orders of the new government. They should do their job with the understanding that if they conduct themselves inappropriately or against the rules, they will lose their jobs. Former police chiefs should serve in the same areas where they live so they can better relate to the people. They know who the bad guys are and will keep their areas safe and orderly SO LONG AS they are paid ample salaries. During Saddam's time, policemen had a salary of \$3-4 per month, but they made more than \$100 per month from bribes. So unless the salaries are the equivalent of what the policemen previously made, including bribes, they will not be dedicated.

Members of the Iraqi police force will stand in line to serve and follow orders, allowing the OCPA to keep the soldiers in other more critical areas or out of harm's way. Saddam's men are looking for easy targets, don't give them a chance. Give the dirty job to the Iraqi police and support them with proper supervision, training, salaries, and helicopter surveillance in emergencies.

The Ba'athist Party

Party members are divided into multiple groups:

1. One percent (1%) are true believers;
2. Thirty (30%) became party men because they wanted to make a better life for themselves and were willing to do anything to advance themselves in the party. These were the bad guys who wrote reports on their friends and neighbors, who followed people, who enlisted in different militias, and were Saddam's eyes in every corner of the country. They were ready to do anything to please Saddam.
3. The rest of the Ba'athist are people who became members to be safe from the bad guys and live in peace. Teachers had to be Ba'athist, army officers had to become members, etc. What should be done with these people? There should be few problems with this third category. If they are paid well, respected and allowed to explain why they became Ba'athist, they will support the new Iraqi government. It is not hard to find this group of people as they will readily tell you they were Ba'athists, but no one will accuse them of doing bad things and they will be ready to sign such a statement.

What to do with the bad guys? It is unfortunate that many of these people are highly efficient and professional, and the country needs their services. They should be separated from the criminals who should have no part in public service and those who show promise in becoming part of this new Iraq and public service. Highly intelligent and well informed people should determine the separation between these types of Ba'athists. Those with promise should be given an opportunity.

Electricity and Water

This should be considered one of the highest priorities of the OCPA. Saddam is gaining sympathy because the people are suffering the most from the lack of water and electricity. His men are telling lies that the Americans are punishing the Iraqis because of a few resisters. The people should be informed of the truth via radio, television, newspaper, and airdropped leaflets, including blaming Saddam and his gang... Saddam blamed America for 35 years for every bad thing under the sun, so when his gang destroys a pipeline or electricity line, make it clear that Saddam and his followers are at fault. When a rumor spreads, tell the people it is a lie and let them know the truth, using airdropped leaflets to the utmost.

Pipeline Protection

The pipelines that carry Iraqi oil should be protected by dividing the pipe routes into zones. Each zone should be protected by the tribes who claim these zones as their land. Those who cooperate should be rewarded with respect and civil support for their areas rather than with direct cash assistance, and those who do not should be told in a direct manner that they will be held responsible and considered suspect if any damage occurs to the pipeline in their area.

The American Soldiers

They should not be asked to do too much. They are humans and standing in the sun day in and day out will adversely affect their morale and cause them to make poor decisions. Place 80% of them in air-conditioned safe places, give them good food and drink, and rotate them in and out to do the jobs they have to do. Enlist Iraqis, paid proper salaries, to stand in the sun and assist to the people. Iraqis should stand at the checkpoints with proper supervision and patrol the streets. If the soldiers continue to try and do everything, they will get worn out and the Iraqis will feel less involved in the whole process. The Iraqis should do these jobs and take responsibility. They will be effective with the people because they can communicate better with them and would be afraid to lose jobs. US soldiers should be kept safe so Iraqis have a better chance of building a new Iraq. If Saddam and his followers want to harm the Americans, it must be made very difficult.

The River Boat Patrols

One source living on the Tigris river mentioned the American boat patrols passing by several times a day. Because the water level is low, the banks are higher, and the river passes in front of many unpopulated and tree-lined areas unfriendly to coalition forces. He believes this is a dangerous mission, making US forces virtual sitting ducks. Given the revenge Saddam's backers are seeking having lost everything, they cannot be trusted. Until they are captured or converted, the boat patrols should be stopped or covered by helicopter surveillance to thwart the bad guys.

(b)(6)

prepared

July 14, 2003

STANDARD FORM 64

FORM 64-100

031030-05

October 29, 2003

TO: Jerry Bremer
Gen. John Abizaid

CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Gen. Pete Pace
Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Tribes in Iraq

Attached is an interesting article.

Thanks.

Attach.

Baram, Anatolia. "Victory in Iraq, One Tribe at a Time," *New York Times*, October 28, 2003.

DHR:dh
102903-1

.....
Please respond by _____

U18015 /03

New York Times
October 28, 2003

Victory In Iraq, One Tribe At A Time

By Amatzia Baram

While we do not yet know who was responsible for the latest series of attacks across Iraq, there is no question that some of the bombings — including, American officials suspect, the missile attack on the hotel where Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz was staying — were the work of forces loyal to Saddam Hussein. That these terrorists, mostly Sunni Muslims from the so-called Sunni Triangle northwest of Baghdad, retain a stubborn fealty to the former dictator seems to puzzle the coalition leadership. But it should not: their loyalty is rooted in part in centuries-old tribal kinship and religious identity. Only by understanding these ties and then using them to its advantage will the coalition authority reduce the resistance.

A letter earlier this month signed by Saddam Hussein and addressed to the sheiks of the Arab tribes in the Sunni Triangle insisted that Iraq "has been a poison" to the American soldiers and that "victory is near." It was one more sign that the former dictator understands that the tribal values of Iraq are ripe for exploitation.

But what works for Saddam Hussein can also be made to work against him. The coalition is eminently capable of winning over many tribes. An old saying in Iraq has it that you cannot buy a tribe, but you can certainly hire one.

And the nation's Sunni minority is open to offers. With Saddam Hussein's downfall, Sunnis, who make up only 15 percent of the population, were deprived of their long-standing political hegemony. The Sunnis from the triangle lost their prestigious and well-paying jobs in the armed forces and internal security apparatus. They were humiliated in the conflict and have had their homes and communities searched in its aftermath. Last but not least: they have been largely frozen out of the Governing Council and the senior bureaucracy.

The Sunni network was held together by a web of patronage, perks and favors that filtered down from the presidential palace to the tribal sheik to the "tribesman in the field." Of course, retribution played a role, too. Tribes were severely punished for transgressions (like refusing to abide by the whims of Baathist officials or allowing illicit traffic across borders without the dictator's permission), with the sheiks occasionally deposed and sometimes executed. In the south, whole villages were razed. But much more often the tribes were handsomely rewarded for cooperation — with money, weapons, state lands or even the property of rival clans.

While this network has been fractured, many of the older tenets of tribal life linger, and help to fuel the pattern of violence in the triangle today. Attacks on coalition troops should be viewed through the prism of tribal warfare. This is a world defined in large measure by avenging the blood of a relative (al-tha'r); demonstrating one's manly courage in battle (al-muruwwah); generally upholding one's manly honor (al-sharaf). For some of these young men, killing American soldiers is a political act, but it is also not unlike what hunting lions was to British colonial officers in 19th-century Africa: it involves a certain risk, but the reward is great.

Yes, religious fanaticism may also serve as a motivation, but in Iraq the rural tribes have generally been less inclined toward religious fanaticism than the city dwellers. The problem for the coalition is that religious fanaticism and tribal values are now working in the same direction. The coalition leaders must bear in mind that while the violence is endemic, it is not unstoppable — in large part, we are dealing with people who are open to persuasion.

Specifically, the Governing Council and its American supporters must come up with a coherent tribal policy. Certainly they can be excused for not having one — they've racked up many other achievements while focusing on more pressing problems. Moreover, the hesitation to give power to tribal leaders has been understandable: cultivating the tribes and the sheiks might be seen as a contradiction of the new leaders' stated goal of forming a democratic Iraqi civil society in a modern way. But to avoid increasing violence in the Sunni Triangle, there is a need to rethink that approach.

There are about 10 large tribal federations in central Iraq, but there are hundreds of subgroups, each with its own sheik. He is the leader of the people, and in return for his services — mediation, arbitration, attracting government services to the tribal area — he is respected and obeyed.

New efforts ought to be made to persuade the sheiks to assert their influence and help keep the peace. The easiest would simply be to hire the sheiks and their tribesmen — putting them on salaries and allowing them to spread the wealth among their people. In addition, sheiks in areas where coalition soldiers and oil pipelines are coming under frequent attacks should be told that the only way their tribes can receive luxuries — extra government services, construction aid, easy access to senior officials in Baghdad — is by making sure that there are no attacks against coalition soldiers in their domain.

If a sheik refused to cooperate, not only could his perks be withheld, they could be given to a neighboring sheik. This would eventually pit the uncooperative sheik against his own tribesmen, who would see that he was not serving their interests. If this weren't enough to get the sheik into line, it wouldn't be too difficult for the coalition to enact "regime change" on a small scale: almost every tribal leader has rivals within the group who covet his position.

For such a policy to be effective, however, it would require a deeper sense of local history. The coalition forces and the Governing Council (which is comprised largely of former exiles and urban Iraqis) must start sending civil officials to rural areas for extended periods so they can get a true picture of each region's tribal hierarchy and affairs. And while military units must be rotated, the civil officers should stay on, serving as social guides to the newly arrived units.

It is vital that the coalition officers develop close relationships with the sheiks and other influential figures in the tribes. These men will provide the coalition forces and the Iraqi government with the best information and advice. And the coalition authority should insist that the new Iraqi government set up a bureau for tribal affairs to serve as a repository for knowledge of the tribes and their traditions.

A policy giving special treatment to tribal leaders will have plenty of critics, in Iraq and in America. Yes, it would allow a degree of war-lordism. However, Iraq is not Afghanistan — these tribes are not miniature armies, and the Sunni Triangle is not surrounded by impassable mountains that make policing almost impossible. Most important, the central government in Iraq, with its foreign aid and eventual oil profits, will have far more to offer its tribespeople in terms of services and perks than does its Afghan counterpart.

Victory In Iraq, One Tribe At A Time

(b)(6)

In the Middle East, more often than not, tribes have been willing to give up a great degree of their autonomy in exchange for government services, and Iraq is no exception. The risk is worth taking.

Amatzia Baram is professor of Middle Eastern History at the University of Haifa in Israel and a senior fellow at the United States Institute of Peace.

031022-14

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(O-3)

From: (b)(6) CIV, OSD
Sent: Tuesday, October 21, 2003 9:53 AM
To: Executive Secretariat CPA; (b)(6)
Cc: Jeffery III, Reuben, CIV, OSD; (b)(6) COL, OSD-POLICY; (b)(6) CIV, OSD
Subject: FW: Prosecuting Iraqis for Security Offenses Against Coalition (U)

See below.

CPA ExecSec - Please pass a copy to Scott Castle.

Sarah

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) CIV, OSD-POLICY
Sent: Tuesday, October 21, 2003 12:05 PM
To: Allen, Charles, , OUSDP; Bergner, Kevin J., COL, JCS J5; Nagelmann, Sarah, CIV, OSD; Dalbey, Steve, COL, OSD-POLICY; Sharp, Walter L., LTG, JCS J5; Manaskie, George E., CAPT, JCS J5; Wierdinski, Frank, COL, OSD-POLICY; Bruner, Bill, CIV, OSD-POLICY; Hulley, Paul, CIV, OSD-POLICY; Jones, Kevin, COL, OSD-POLICY; Luti, Bill, CIV, OSD-POLICY; Shulsky, Abraham, CIV, OSD-POLICY
Cc: (b)(6) CDR, OSD-POLICY; Henry, Ryan, HON, OSD-POLICY; (b)(6)
(b)(6) COL, OSD-POLICY
Subject: FW: Prosecuting Iraqis for Security Offenses Against Coalition (U)

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

FYI - SD signed the attached.

-----Original

<<Prosecuting Iraqis for Security Offenses Against Coalition.pdf>>

(b)(6)

SSgt, USAF

NCOIC, USDP Executive Secretariat

(b)(6)

For (b)(6)

This may contain information exempt from mandatory disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).

10/22/2003

USP

OCT 20 2008

MEMORANDUM FOR AMB L. PAUL BREMER
GENERAL JOHN ABIZAID

SUBJECT: Prosecuting Iraqis for Security Offenses Against Coalition

It is important that people who attack Coalition forces in Iraq – or who are caught in possession of Manpads, RPGs or other special category weapons – are prosecuted and that the trials are prompt and fair. The prosecutions should help discourage these acts, if the trials (and sentences in cases of conviction) are well-publicized.

The fairness of the process will help instruct Iraqis as to good practice. We need to ensure that the offenses are clearly explained, carry appropriate penalties and are known to the public.

As for whether security offenses against the Coalition are tried by Iraqi or Coalition tribunals, I can see some advantages to our taking on the task ourselves. We should be able to move promptly and give the prosecutions appropriately high priority. I know there are arguments for letting the Iraqis do it, but I am concerned that the process seems to be moving so slowly.

Please let me know what your plans are (coordinate between the two of you) for getting such people prosecuted, on what timetable, and with whom in charge. Please also address the issues involved in detaining people who are convicted, who should hold them and where and what happens after we recognize an Iraqi government. I would like at least a preliminary response quickly.



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OCT. 17. 2003 9:32AM

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LPB HAS SEEN

4:35 PM

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CARPENTER

(b)(6)

TO: Jerry Bremer
GEN John Abizaid

CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith
GEN Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: October 15, 2003

SUBJECT:

I talked to Colin Powell today. He raised the subject of troops from Pakistan and Bangladesh.

Given the flap between the Governing Council and Turkey, the question is, will the Governing Council request troops from Bangladesh and Pakistan, or are they going to oppose having any Muslim troops in the country? (b)(5)

(b)(5)

Let's discuss this.

Thanks.

DHR/asm
101503.02

Please respond by:

10/30/03

*2 spoke to him
on 10/17/03*

U17226 /03

031016-27

October 14, 2003

TO: Jerry Bremer

CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Business Development Committee

My recollection is you have some sort of a business development committee.

Is it designed to establish ground rules to rapidly approve and give permission for foreign companies to work in Iraq? It seems to me that we need to find a way to facilitate that to get some stimulus to the economy and also provide models for Iraqi businesses.

Any thoughts?

Thanks

DRF:es
10/20/03

.....
Please respond by 10/21/03

0310 16-26

October 14, 2003

TO: Jerry Bremer

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Garner Memo

Attached is a memo Jay Garner sent me, which I found interesting and compelling. Why don't you take a look at it and tell me what you think. Let's talk about it.

Regards,

Attach

072903 Garner memo to SecDef

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10140: 00

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Please respond by 12/1/03

m/c

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10/14

September 29, 2003

Mr Secretary,

As I look at our problems in Iraq I place them in three major categories: Security, Sovereignty, and Time Available. For what it's worth here are my brief thoughts starting with the Time Available.

- Time Available: It appears that most of the projects we have planned for Iraq are on a time table to be completed in a year or less. This is excellent considering the magnitude of the tasks. However, when viewed in the same sandbox as the coming Presidential election, that time table is too short. By March, we need to have, at least, the appearance of completion or near completion of major asks. In other words, let's develop a six month strategy of "near completion" for those areas that are the most politically volatile, i.e., government, and security/ law enforcement. If we take this approach and attack with robust, dedicated "Tiger Teams" we can achieve remarkable results by March. I believe that any decision after March, no matter how good or how viable, will be criticized as "an Administration decision made under duress and pressure".
- Sovereignty: I believe Jerry Bremer's 7 step plan for government is logical and correct, but it is too slow and we can take a half-step now. Continue with Jerry's plan but by December declare the Committee of 25 a "Provisional Government." The Provisional Government would remain under the oversight of the U.S. but would have increased power and authority such as: A budget, (which is testable and auditable), nomination and approval of Reconstruction projects, and prioritization of security areas (to include selection of restationing locations of the new Iraqi Army) etc. Provisional status while keeping us in charge gives them a mantle of real authority but more importantly a voice in their own future and makes them directly responsible for its outcome.
- Security: Take a modular approach with both the National Police and the Iraqi Army. There are 18 Provisional areas in Iraq (17 provinces plus Baghdad). The

three Kurdish provinces are not a security problem, so the focus should be the remaining 15. Immediately begin a program that upgrades and provides individual training to police and regular Army (one Infantry battalion per province) in 5 provinces per quarter. The training won't be great, but it will be sufficient. Upon completion of each 5 provinces, put the U.S. Forces into garrison and only use them as emergency reaction forces. Let the Iraqi police and Army be the visible security force. Contract this effort, make it a turn key operation with award fees for achieving the desired time table. Use a proven contractor such as MFRI, who does this type thing world-wide, on short notice and with superb results. After the contractor has finished each of the five provinces, place a small contingent of U.S. military advisors with each Army company and each police detachment. The advisors would be responsible for their collective training gained through daily operations.

If we do this, by end of March we'll have a credible governmental structure that is recognizable to the Iraqi people and we'll have Iraqi faces on the security effort for the two-thirds of the country. All of this is doable, it simply means that we need to: Sharply focus our effort, change from the tightly centralized over controlling process we now have, and finally we need to trust that the Iraqis can do this. As I stated previously T.E. Lawrence had it right, "It is better that they do it imperfectly than that you do it perfectly. For it is their country and your time here is limited." Over to you, thanks for the opportunity to correspond.

Jay

031016-25

October 15, 2003

TO: Jerry Bremer
CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
Gen. John Abizaid
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsted

DR

SUBJECT: Iraqi Army

I am concerned about the pace of the recruiting and training of the Iraqi army. It feels slow. I wonder if we could consider requiring each U.S. division to recruit and train a brigade of former soldiers every quarter. This would be a strenuous requirement, but it would produce about 16 brigades annually. Even if we did half that, it would be a good thing.

As I recall, MPRI trained an army from recruits, not former soldiers, in Croatia and Bosnia. That is a thought as well.

Thanks

DR
10/16

.....
Please respond by 10/16/03

031016-28

October 14, 2003

TO: Reuben Jeffery

CC: Jerry Brenr
Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsted *DA*

SUBJECT: US Sponsors

Why don't you test the idea with Jerry about the possibility of having American cities sponsor Iraq cities with populations of 100,000 or more.

Also look at the possibility of American universities sponsoring Iraqi universities.

I suppose we could also request US professional organizations--athletic, theatrical, musical, etc. - to help provide instruction for Iraqi children.

Why don't you look into that for me.

Thanks.

DRR:J
10/15/03


.....
Please respond by 11/7/03

031016-29

October 15, 2003

TO: Gen. John Abizaid

CC: Jerry Bremer
Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsteld 

SUBJECT: Ramadan

Attached is a note from Jim Schlesinger that raises some useful questions.

Thanks.

Attach:

10-15-03 Schlesinger memo to Sec Def

DNK
10/15/03

.....
Please respond by _____

10-10-2003

031016-30

✓
19/15

MEMORANDUM

FOR: Donald Rumsfeld
FROM: James Schlesinger *JS*
DATE: 10 October 2003

Don:

Are you ready for Ramadan?

More importantly, are your troops, contractors, and CPA ready for Ramadan?

This is the first post-Saddam Ramadan and, thus, will be less controlled.

The faithful must fast all day and, thus, may be more irritable and difficult to control during the day. At night, they go out—they pray, shop, visit friends, etc. Thus, the public will be less disciplined at night. Curfews must be reexamined.

Finally, Saddam distributed food to the poor, also the troops might be distributing candy, crayons, etc. to the children.

More if you want.

cc. Dir Rte
LTG Craddock



031016-31

October 14, 2003

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
CC: Gen. John Abizaid
Jerry Bremer
Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsteld *DR*

SUBJECT: Sunni Triangle

Attached is an e-mail from a person on the ground in Iraq with some strong views.
It is worth reading and thinking about.

Thanks

Attach

9/29/03 Bing West e-mail to James Schlesinger re: Report from Sunni Triangle

DIRK:cn
10/14/03

.....
Please respond by 15 OCT 2003

Subject: Fwd: Report from Sunni Triangle

Date: Mon, 29 Sep 2003 13:58:42 -0400

From: Bing West (b)(6)

To: "Schlesinger James R. (b)(6)"

The Marines should be sent into the toughest area ASAP.
Begin forwarded message:

Original Message:

From: Bing West (b)(6)

Sent: Monday, September 29, 2003 10:14 AM

To: Schlesinger James R. (b)(6)

Subject: Report from Sunni Triangle

Below is a summary report from a friend who is a Foreign Service officer and a major in the Army's Special Forces

Dear Bing,

I spent a week in Bagdad and then a week in the Shia heartland in Hilla and finally landed six weeks ago as Ambassador Bremer's Covert Ops Coordinator in Ramadi, southern part of the Sunni Triangle. I worked with the 3d ACR for four weeks and am now with the 82d Airborne Division, but the most consistent danger I have experienced. These IEDs and RPG attacks are psychologically worse than combat and are taking a toll on the troops. While it is statistically improbable that one will be hit, they remain unnerving, especially for those of us that have been through an attack.

Difficult to establish ground to us here, because of the diversity from North to Center to South. It certainly is a different world in Najaf and Karbala than what we experience here with the angry Sunnis. Marines in Karbala - (b)(6) and his battalion - did really incredible work.

All depends on whether one is a winner or a loser in the new Iraq I suppose. The game is to expand the realm of winners so they squeeze out the operating space of the losers, but I have to say that in my neighborhood we are losing that fight, as the bad guys are playing a contrary game with some effectiveness. Fallujah has a level of rage that I haven't seen since Mogadishu and I would have to guess is right at the tipping point of a wholesale revolt. The problem is we lost so much time that we are now playing a desperate game of catch up, and it may be too late.

I think we have six months here, and whatever we accomplish in six months is what we will be able to do. We can stay around through pure force, but Iraq will be set up the next half year and if we are still in the muddle we are in now, I think we will have completely lost the initiative.

It is all about power (electrical power), police, and political process, and if we can deliver on those three, we could still make this work. But we need a surge in all three, not the little of that kind of approach we have had to date. I still find the police program maddening for its lack of focus and the inability five months into this to have something in place that would be producing a quality force.

During the Cold War America employed a "we pay, you fight" policy of national defense, using proxies to wear the Soviet Union down on its behalf. This evolved during Gulf I to a "you pay, we fight" policy, as wealthy Arab sheikhs and Asian oil consumers financed the U.S.-led expulsion of Saddam Hussein from Kuwait. We have now adopted a "we pay, we fight" policy, as around the globe America is doing it all, and paying for it all. It is a policy that is wearing us down, made all the worse by the ready availability of allies that have not been fully empowered to enter the fight.

70 70

(b)(6)

10/1/2003 10:14 AM

67-11 0002-101-1000

0610 0600

A quality Iraqi police force, properly armed and equipped, could take over many of the risky jobs American soldiers are performing, such as keeping the roads cleared of improvised explosive devices and controlling the borders that are reportedly being infiltrated by terrorists. Police in Iraq could be employed for \$2 per day. But they are not being employed in anything close to the numbers that are needed, and those that are on the beat are shabbily armed and largely untrained.

Forming quality security forces is a hurry has been done before. In 1983 President Reagan made a determination to stop the advance of FMLN guerrillas in El Salvador. Over a period of four months the entire Salvadoran junior officers corps was brought to the United States for basic officer's training, while whole battalions were brought to bases in the U.S. and Honduras for unit training. A newly empowered Salvadoran Army took to the field and rapidly turned the tide, leading the country into peace talks in 1989 and in a full participatory democracy that included the country's former guerrilla forces thereafter.

Iraq needs a proficient and well-equipped police force in a hurry so that our soldiers can go home -- for our sake, and for Iraq's sake, since our expense is quickly wearing out.

(b)(6)

0310632

October 15, 2003

TO: Jerry Bremer
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Article

Attached is an article by a professor from National Defense University that I found interesting. I think there is merit to some of his thoughts.

Regards,

Attach:
Moshir, mohorz, "Creating a New Iraq"

gdb
10/15/03

.....
Please respond by _____

By Fariborz Mokhtari

No one expected Iraq's reconstruction to be an easy task, yet after a few months in the trenches it has proven even more difficult than anticipated. While nearly every political quarter is offering opinions on the procedure and the timetable to transfer sovereignty, a proven model for success seems to have been innocently overlooked.

The model is a former colony that gained independence by reliance on a militia of farmers facing a superior force of well-trained, well-disciplined and well-equipped European troops. Consider a former colony that established a successful representative government, created a constitutional regime and devised a Bill of Rights. Consider a former agricultural economy that industrialized, promoted commerce and created an impressive service sector without neglecting agriculture. Would that model not present a useful model for Iraq?

If this model fits the aspirations for Iraq, it could not possibly be more familiar to us. That model is indeed the United States of America. It would be ironic if we ignore the vast heritage we share with the less-developed countries. Those countries have often viewed the United States with a sense of inspired admiration. The urge to send their young to the United States for an American college education should be enough to highlight the sentiment. It is not unreasonable to argue that the hard feelings expressed by the developing countries stem from their perception that the United

Creating a new Iraq America can be a role model

States has betrayed its former colonial brethren by making common cause with colonial interests.

All current planners and commentators want for Iraq an effective central government, a fair constitution, a representative republic and adequate safeguards to protect minorities. What seems overlooked is that our model did not begin with a strong central government or a federal constitution to impose governance upon every state, every town and every village. The path of our model to success was indeed the opposite. Government began at the localities. Self-governing villages and towns became the building blocks of statehood. The federal government was created by the states and the people, not the other way around. The federal government and the U.S. Constitution, and did so through trial and error.

Most Iraqis maintain strong attachments to their tribes and local origins. Ethnic, tribal and rural loyalties of the Kurds in Northern Iraq are well-publicized. Arabs of the south and central regions have similar attachments. Rural societies have common to their political domination of major cities with concentrated populations, creating a political balance between major cities and the rest of the country will go a long way to allay rural concerns, but may not be

enough. Rural self-government, however, may instill sufficient confidence in the population to permit it to lay out a national government that is not subject to the whims of a central government that may not support rural empowerment, as it will challenge their own. Yet, the road to obedience must start from small localities, where everyone knows everyone else and opposes

What seems overlooked is that our model did not begin with a strong central government or a federal constitution to impose governance upon every state, every town and every village.

ing a fairly elected government of eldersmen (inevitably tribal sheikhs and local notables) by sabotage or assassination would be impractical, if not unthinkable.

Such self-governing villagers will not require a large security force for their internal safety and will enable conflict troops to become less viable. Rural governments may require advice, training and assistance. The assistance should come in

the form of construction materials and equipment to avoid fostering dependence.

Self-governed, self-secured villages and towns could initiate drafting provincial constitutions and establishing provincial governments before contemplating a national government. National governments of most former colonies after independence failed, perhaps because they tried to impose order on their nations, rather than allowing governance to take root from within.

To be fair, many post-colonial national leaders had admirable intentions. Good intentions, however, are not reliable shields against riots, coups, revolts and violence. Experiencing the responsibility of self-governance at the lowest levels of society may provide the self-confidence, self-respect and loyalty necessary to preserve the national government. Vermonters will get together in their towns and villages in March to vote on all local problems — from property taxes and school budgets to salaries and snow removal in a single day every year. Showing the town meetings at work to the Iraqi sheikhs may be more than instructive. It will be an eye opener for all of us.

Fariborz Mokhtari is a professor at the National Defense University.

11J-031003-22

MEMORANDUM FOR AMBRT, PAUL BREMER

FROM: Douglas J. Feith, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

DJF by 1A
16/3/03

SUBJECT: Ramadan

The attached was done by my staff. It may be of some use to your
CPA personnel, though they may know much or all of this already.

OSD Policy
10/1/03

Considerations for Ramadan 2003

- Ramadan is the holiest of Muslim holidays and will impact operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.
- Among the changes of behavior is the daily fast (no water, food or smoking) from sunrise to sunset.
- There will be increased activity in mosques.
- Expect increased street activity during the night, as families break their fast, entertain and prepare for the Suhoor Feast (The meal one hour before fasting begins).

Most shopping and visits will be conducted during the night.

- U.S. forces need to be aware of the changes in behavior that may include dehydration and irritability during the daylight hours.

Anticipate Iraqi police working with Coalition Forces to be dehydrated and exhausted during the day.

Iraqis working with the Coalition may ask for an amended schedule to accommodate their religious observance of Ramadan.

- The Coalition must be sensitized to religious and cultural norms emphasizing respect and understanding of the importance of Ramadan for Iraqis and Afghans. Smoking and eating during fasting hours is considered insensitive.
- Under Saddam Hussein religious expressions were curtailed during Ramadan. Expect more activity in the loudspeakers of local mosques.
- This is an opportunity for U.S. forces to connect with Iraqis helping the CPA.
- Saddam used to offer extra food rations to the poor during Ramadan.
- Key days in Ramadan that can be exploited by anti-coalition elements:

19th of Ramadan (approximately November 4th), Prophet Muhammad's first military victory against the Meccans in the Battle of Badr.

- 27th of Ramadan (approximately November 21st), the Night of Power, the day in which Angel Gabriel revealed the Quran to Muhammad.
- Of interest is Thanksgiving (November 27th) will fall on or about the third day of Eid-al-Fitr, a three day holiday celebrating the end of Ramadan. As both holidays involve feasting, this may offer a cultural exchange opportunity.

Prepared by LCDR (b)(6) ISA NESA: (b)(6)

11:32 AM

TO: Jerry Bremer
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: October 2, 2003
SUBJECT:

I received your memo on the training of the police from October 1. Abizaid's real concern is not with who does the training. He agrees that civilian police experts should do that.

His concern is that the CPA lacks the resources and administrative capacity at the present time to adequately support the activity - the police, the training and the like. Even those already on duty. Their equipment is old and inadequate. They need police cars, radios and the like. I am convinced that engaging Abizaid fast is the right thing to do.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
100203.43

Please respond by: _____

C013

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

9244

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 2, 2003

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT
DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: Iraq Stabilization Group (U)

Pursuant to our conversation, in order to strengthen interagency support to the Department of Defense and the Coalition Provisional Authority and to help prepare for the next phase of the reconstruction effort in Iraq, we are creating several interagency working cells. These cells will be responsible for Iraq-related issues across a broad range of areas. ~~(S)~~

Each cell will be chaired by a Deputy Assistant to the President and will focus on the following:

- politics/governance (Bob Blackwill);
- counter-terrorism/jihadist activities (Fran Townsend);
- economics (Gary Edson); and
- media/message issues (Anna Perez). ~~(S)~~

I ask that each of you provide an appropriate representative to these cells at the level of Under Secretary. ~~(S)~~

Frank Miller will continue to chair the Executive Steering Group (ESG) which coordinates support to daily activities of the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq. ~~(S)~~



Condoleezza Rice
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by: Condoleezza Rice

Reason: 1.5(a)(d)

Declassify on: 10/1/2013

Condoleezza Rice
- C/P
- P/P
- C/C
- C/C

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2

cc: Rich Armitage
Paul Wolfowitz
Steve Hadley
Lewis Libby
Joel Kaplan
John McLaughlin
Pete Pace
Ambassador Jerry Bremer
Reuben Jeffery

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



031004-72

COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY
BAGHDAD

October 9, 2003

MEMORANDUM

TO: CJTF-7 Chief of Staff – MGen (Sel.) Jon A. Gallinetti, USMC
USACE Iraqi Provisional Command – BG Robert L. Davis, USA

SUBJECT: Kuwaiti Generating Equipment

Any information provided from Washington on potential availability in Kuwait of portable (3-5 MW) generating equipment is to be routed to CPA and not to be directly discussed with the Government of Kuwait.

/s/
Patrick F. Kennedy
Chief of Staff

MEMO TO: Secretary Rumsfeld

DATE: September 23, 2003

FROM: Paul Wolfowitz

CC: Ambassador Bremer
General Myers
General Abizaid

SUBJECT: Your Snowflake on Electrical Generators

Don,

We contacted Brent Scowcroft's office, who identified the Kuwaiti gentleman you spoke with as Mr. (b)(6). We got in touch with Mr. (b)(6) and he explained that there were several 3-5MW portable generators available in Kuwait and other nearby countries and they could be transported to Basra, if we needed them.

(b)(6) gave us the name of the Minister of Electricity in Kuwait who would be the point of contact - (b)(6)

(b)(5)

Under no circumstances
may they do this. If
much be done by CPA.
Please inform me that
this has been cancelled.

W
10/5

OCT. 8. 2003 1:37PM

NO. 718 P. 3
M P 1024

9/22
0920

22
September 28, 2003

TO: Gen. John Abizaid
Jerry Bremer

CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Electric Generators

As I think I mentioned to one or both of you, I was told that Kuwait, Bahrain and other countries in the Gulf have five-megawatt portable, movable electric generators that would light up a whole city. They are there in the region, they are not being used, and if we went to them and told them we needed them, they could be available. I was told this by a fellow from Kuwait in a meeting Brent Scowcroft had.

Please tell me what we can do to help you track that down and figure it out, if in fact it is something we ought to take advantage of.

Thanks,

DRL:da
092003-2

.....
Please respond by 10/3/03



~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

OCT 9 2003

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMINISTRATOR, COALITION PROVISIONAL
AUTHORITY
COMMANDER, U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND

SUBJECT: Clarification of Guidance

- This is to clarify previous guidance, issued on 212025Z JUL 03, subject, "Radiation Sources in Iraq."
- USCENTCOM is responsible for locating, packaging, transporting and securing any radiation source material that is not properly contained, adequately secured, or in the positive custody of trained personnel. CPA should assist, as appropriate
- USCENTCOM is authorized and encouraged to use Iraqi Ministry of Science and Technology (MoST) personnel to support expeditious accomplishment of this mission. CPA and/or USCENTCOM should provide oversight in these instances.
- The radiation source material should be transported to Tuwaitha, Location B and transferred to Task Force Defense Threat Reduction Agency, which will package and prepare the material for removal from country.
- This is a priority tasking. Loose radiation sources must not be left unattended and susceptible to acquisition by forces with interests inimical to the interests of the U.S., the Coalition and Iraqi people.



U168314/03

06/17/2003 9:35AM

NO. 853

P. 2

03/017-12

17
October 17, 2003

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith

CC: Gen. Abizaid
Jerry Bremer
LTG John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Meeting on Campaign Plan

*Job
-TRANS
CEM
CJTF-7*

I would like to schedule a meeting, where we have plenty of time for Abizaid and Bremer to jointly present their campaign plans. I would prefer it on Friday or Saturday of this week, or if needed, on Monday of next week.

We need to allow sufficient time for good discussion – at least 2 ½ hours.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
101503-55

.....
Please respond by _____

U17224 /03



COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY
BAGHDAD

October 4, 2003

FOR: Secretary Rumsfeld
FROM: L. Paul Bremer III, Administrator *10/4*
SUBJECT: Update on Iraqi Media Network (IMN) Activities

I wanted to advise you on a number of steps we have and will be taking to make IMN's TV programming more appealing to viewers, more professional in its approach, and more directly supportive of CPA objectives.

Among the recent developments:

- On Thursday, October 2, IMN began the first in a series of half-hour programs entitled, "Meet the Minister." Minister of Culture Mofeed al-Jazaeri discussed his goals in preserving the cultural history of Iraq and trying to revitalize Iraq's artistic and cultural communities after years of repression. Future segments will cover all 24 additional Iraqi ministries.
- This weekend, we send an initial contingent of 16 IMN employees for an intensive two-week training session at Dubai Media City on the art and craft of television production. (Training will take place at state-of-the-art facilities in Dubai, with the active support of the government of Dubai.
- We are also currently hosting a multi-functional team of specialists from Dubai who are helping us select future trainees and assessing local conditions, so that all of the training our people receive in Dubai is tailored to our existing facilities and equipment.
- Also this weekend, we are having a first-ever gathering of IMN station managers from across the country. The purpose will be to explain our new programming strategy, and to discuss topics such as local program origination.
- Plans for a new programming schedule are on track. Special Ramadan programming will begin on or about October 26, when Ramadan begins, and, at the request of the Secretary of State, a virtually all-new lineup of programs will debut on November 23, when Ramadan ends. That accelerated "re-launch" of IMN will replace the one we'd originally been planning for January 1st.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

- In addition to new programming, the "new IMN" will feature an expanded program day; new-look, new concept newscasts; more and better public affairs programs; more and better public affairs announcements; new faces, and a whole new on-air "look-and-feel."
- As an integral part of that, IMN TV will also take on a new name – "Al Iraquiya." It literally means "The Iraqi" – as in "The Iraqi TV." The name was chosen deliberately to stake out the same ground as Al Jazeera and Al Arabiya – as a major regional TV broadcaster.
- The network will have a new logo, depicting two rivers – the Tigris and Euphrates – and a uniquely Iraqi Arabic font, in blue and steel gray. The logo and color scheme will infuse every aspect of promotion and advertising.
- We have engaged the J. Walter Thompson advertising agency for a publicity campaign aimed at generating excitement about the new programming. It will be timed to peak for the re-launch in late November.
- In addition, we've hired an Iraqi survey firm highly recommended by the State Department to conduct two highly-focused random sample audience surveys for us, the first over the next two weeks, before Ramadan and its new program schedule, and the second in December, after all of the foregoing has taken place. Our purpose is to determine if our improvement strategies have worked, and make more changes if they haven't.
- We have also commissioned propagation field studies designed to reveal the actual signal strength of IMN transmitters in the South, where powerful Iranian cross-border signals have been a concern. Armed with the results, we will know if we need to beef up our own transmission capabilities in that region.
- We plan a similar field strength survey of the entire country to ensure we are getting our signals out loud and clear nationwide.
- Later this month, my Director of Strategic Communications will be heading to Mosul and points north to ensure that IMN signals will be restored in the north, where Saddam Hussein's propaganda from Baghdad was not welcomed. He will be co-coordinating with the 101st Airborne, whose leadership has taken an active interest in TV and radio transmission.
- We believe the UK government is on the verge of allocating some \$20 million US in order to beef up program production and transmission in Basrah and expand sports programming nationwide targeted at young males – a particularly critical audience segment.
- We are making progress on re-starting the Iraqi Satellite Channel, on the Arabsat direct-to-home satellite. Satellite distribution is what has made Al-Jazeera such a powerful and influential channel. It's important to understand, however, that going up on this satellite will mean substantial outlays of funds – perhaps up to an additional \$20 million dollars.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

per year -- because the program rights we have purchased to this point are for terrestrial broadcast only. Those contracts will be adjusted upward if we reach the larger audiences tuning in on satellite.

- Eventually, however, we will have to be on satellite. Satellite dishes are constantly sprouting on Iraqi rooftops. We estimate that in 18 months time, Iraq -- like most other Middle Eastern countries -- will be a satellite TV market. We need to be ready well in advance.
- There are other challenges ahead: expanding news and public affairs programming in Baghdad, Mosul and Basrah, expanding programs and public service announcements on governance and civil society, and beginning the information campaign in advance of the constitution-writing and electoral process. We believe that exposing these advances to the larger Arab world will have a profound impact. Arabs watching other Arabs go to the polls will inevitably raise the question, "Why not here?"
- Finally, and significantly, we have announced on the Defense Contracting Command's website our intention to re-compete the IMN contract currently held by SAIC. The objective is a "world class radio and television network" to be established by the end of calendar year 2004. The successful contractor must "include the assurance that indigenous Iraqi personnel are schooled, coached, practiced and proven in the principles and techniques of their craft" -- and ensure "IMN leads all mass media in providing comprehensive, accurate, fair, and balanced news and public affairs to the Iraqi people."

I will keep you advised of significant benchmarks.

Cc: Secretary Powell
Dr. Rice

UNCLASSIFIED