

(b)(6)

**From:** (b)(6) CIV, OSD  
**Sent:** Friday, October 17, 2003 2:27 AM  
**To:** Kennedy, Patrick AMB; Executive Secretariat CPA; Norwood, Scott  
**Subject:** 17 Oct SVTC on Transition Strategy - Joint Staff Slides



Iraq Transition  
SVTC 17 Octobe...



Iraq Campaign  
Plan, 031016.doc...



Iraq Campaign  
Plan.info memo.d...

All,

Please note the time change below.

Reuben asked me to provide you with the attached.

These are intended to provide some foundation for the conversation to come on the Transition Strategy.

(b)(6)

> -----Original Message-----

> From: (b)(6)  
> Sent: 16 October 2003 5:50 PM  
> To: (b)(6)

> (b)(6)

> Subject: 17 Oct SVTC on Transition Strategy

> CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

> Scheduled time for SVTC is now 1300 - 1400 in ESC. USDP will be  
> senior rep from OSD. LTG Sharp will be senior rep from Joint Staff.  
> (b)(6) please note time change for ESC scheduling. CENTCOM Rear  
> already advised of time change. No need to include CENTCOM forward in  
> SVTC. (b)(6) please advise CPA Baghdad of time change. Slides will  
> be distributed as soon as they are available.

> v/r

> (b)(6)



# *A Framework for Strategic Transitions in Iraq*

*SVTC 1300-1400 (EDT)*

*17 Oct 03*



## *Purpose & Attendees*

- **Purpose:** To provide planning guidance in preparation for upcoming DOD Senior Leader discussions on "Strategic Transitions"
- **Attendees:** USD (P)  
JS J5  
CPA – Wash (Mr Jeffery or Mr Smith)  
CPA - Baghdad ( Amb Kennedy)  
CENTCOM – RADM Robb & MG Whitcomb




UNCLASSIFIED

DRAFT WORKING PAPERS

## *Framework for Strategic Transitions*




(b)(5)



## *Concept for SECDEF "Off-Site" . . .*



(b)(5)





October 16, 2003

TO: Reuben Jeffery  
FROM: (b)(6)  
SUBJECT: Iraq Campaign Plan

- You asked me to find out more about the "strategy discussion" that went on earlier today. This is a preliminary response.
  - **TAB A.** The attached outline from Policy was used to guide the discussion at today's lunch (with SD, Feith, Cambone, Di Rita, Craddock, et al).
  - **TAB B.** The Joint Staff has prepared a short brief to help provide a framework for discussion at tomorrow's SVTC (with Feith, Sharp, Kennedy)
  - I will be seeing Mr. Di Rita tomorrow morning on this subject.
- Some time ago, the Secretary asked CJTF-7 and CPA to work closely to develop a strategy that would address Phase IV Operations, e.g. post-conflict activities.
  - The Services sent planners to CJTF-7 with this type of expertise to help develop the requested product.
  - Part of the difficulty is that there is no model to follow.
- There will be a series of meetings in coming days, some or all of which will address this issue.
  - Friday
    - 0700-0730: SecDef / Bremer phone call
    - Policy / Joint Staff SVTC with Pat Kennedy
  - Monday - Tuesday
    - SVTCs with SD, Bremer, Abizaid, et al.

Policy  
October 16, 2003

### Iraq Campaign Plan

#### Objectives:

1. Unity of Command
2. Critical Path for troop exit

#### Define goals:

##### What it is....

- o Iraqis in charge of their own country.
- o Set conditions so that they have a good chance to keep Iraq on the path to freedom and prosperity.
- o Get them launched.

##### What it is not....

- o To establish prosperity
- o To establish a stable government
- o To achieve political and economic end state
- o To establish all their institutions
- o To establish all their laws

#### DoD-to-State transition:

DoD needs to take the Iraqis to the point where Iraq is a sovereign state.  
From there, Department of State can get the Iraqis the items on the "What it is not" list.

#### Security – DoD's mission:

- o Increase Iraqis' capability to maintain security in Iraq.
- o Improve the security situation in Iraq.
- o Turn security responsibility over to the Iraqis as soon as they can handle it.

## COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

FROM: (b)(6)

DATE: 8-Nov-03

FOR: THE ADMINISTRATOR

ORIGINATOR: Executive Secretariat

RF:	Business Development Committee
	Snowflake

Attached is Tom Foley's response to Secretary Rumsfeld's snowflake re Business Development Committee. Original Snowflake attached as well

ATTACHMENTS: As Stated

(Drafted by CPJ) (b)(6)





COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY  
BAGHDAD

8 November 2003

MEMO FOR: Secretary Rumsfeld  
FROM: Paul Bremer *[Signature]*  
SUBJECT: Business Development Committee

There is no approval or permission required for those interested in investing or otherwise doing business in Iraq. However, the process of registering a corporation is currently complicated and tedious. There are two efforts underway to eliminate this problem. The first is that a new company law is being drafted which we hope to have ready by December 15. The new law will make company registrations much easier. The second is a project in the Trade Ministry to streamline the corporate registration process and improve the communication and facilitation capability at the Ministry.

We have a number of initiatives underway to stimulate the private sector economy. We are confident that these initiatives combined with strong foreign interest in investing in Iraq will provide a strong stimulus to the economy and provide models for Iraqi businesses.

031016-51  
October 14, 2005

TO: Mayor Brewer

FROM: Paul Wolfson  
Dane County

RE: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Business Development Committee

My recollection is you have some sort of chair inside development center.

I am directed to express my sincere and rapid approval and commendation for  
for any companies to work in here. It is my intention that we should be able to  
facilitate that to get some stimulus to the economy and it is possible that we  
can get some more.

Very respectfully,

Paul

03/108-10

(b)(6) (PO2)

**From:** (b)(6) (FS01)  
**Sent:** Saturday, November 08, 2003 2:25 PM  
**To:** (b)(6) (O-3)  
**Cc:** Executive Secretary  
**Subject:** RE: Memo to SECDEF - WITHDRAW

We will work on it – use collective Executive Secretary in addition to me personally.

(b)(6)  
Executive Assistant, CPA Administrator  
Head of CPA Executive Secretariat

-----Original Message-----

**From:** (b)(6) (O-3)  
**Sent:** Saturday, November 08, 2003 2:20 PM  
**To:** (b)(6) (FS01)  
**Subject:** RE: Memo to SECDEF  
**Importance:** High

(b)(6)

Please pull this memo. We have received more guidance and will have to make changes. I apologize for the confusion.

(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

**From:** (b)(6) (FS01)  
**Sent:** Saturday, November 08, 2003 12:45 PM  
**To:** (b)(6) (O-3)  
**Subject:** RE: Memo to SECDEF

Thanks.

(b)(6)  
Executive Assistant, CPA Administrator  
Head of CPA Executive Secretariat

-----Original Message-----

**From:** (b)(6) (O-3)  
**Sent:** Saturday, November 08, 2003 12:29 PM  
**To:** (b)(6) (FS01)  
**Subject:** Memo to SECDEF

(b)(6)

I will be dropping a hard copy of this off to you. Let me know if you need anything else.

(b)(6)

11/8/2003



(b)(5)



(b)(5)



(b)(5)



(b)(5)





(b)(5)



(b)(5)



(b)(5)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

JUL 21 2003

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMINISTRATOR, COALITION PROVISIONAL  
AUTHORITY (AMB L. PAUL BREMER)

FROM: Douglas J. Feith, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy *7/21/03*

SUBJ: Using the Governing Council to Generate International Contributions to  
Stability Forces in Iraq

- Some countries, such as (b)(1); whom we have asked to provide troops for stability operations, have replied that they need a more explicit UN mandate as political "cover."
- The Governing Council, by asking countries – in the name of the Iraqi people – to provide such troops, may be able to provide useful political "cover."
- Do you think the Governing Council would be willing to ask countries such as (b)(1); 1.4(d) to provide forces?
- Are there any steps that Washington can take to help in this regard?

*Pat:*  
*any response?*  
*Jaymie*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



29 August 2003

MEMO FOR: Secretary Rumsfeld

FROM: Paul Bremer

SUBJECT: Appointment of Reuben Jeffery as Deputy Administrator,  
Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA)

Request you issue a memo to DoD and the interagency that announces the appointment of Reuben Jeffery as Deputy Administrator, CPA. I recommend the memo identify him as the CPA's single point of contact for coordination on all matters with Washington D.C. I also recommend that the memo specify that he reports to you through me.



## **DORRANCE SMITH**

Dorrance Smith is a veteran television producer, political consultant, and media strategist who has spent 30 years in television and politics.

In 2001, Smith was designated by FEMA Director Joe Allbaugh to handle all media following the events of September 11<sup>th</sup>. In this capacity Smith was responsible for FEMA's media strategy for print, radio and television. During this time Smith coordinated live interviews with ABC, CBS, NBC, CNN, CNBC, Fox, and MSNBC as well as dozens of live radio and local station interviews. Smith organized and distributed the now famous FEMA video feeds from Ground Zero. Additionally he served as the chief speechwriter for the Director. He then reorganized the Public Affairs Office to meet the post September 11<sup>th</sup> media demands.

A four time Emmy Award winning ABC News and Sports producer, he has held a number of positions at the network, including serving as the first executive producer of "This Week with David Brinkley."

In 1991 Smith left ABC News to become Assistant to the President for Media Affairs at the White House. In this capacity Smith handled all television and radio events involving President Bush, members of the White House staff and Cabinet. In addition his office handled all regional media; coordinated media strategy for administration officials seeking confirmation; and organized the debate preparation during the 1992 political campaign.

From 1989 until 1991, Smith was the executive producer of ABC News "Nightline." During his tenure he was responsible for the weeklong "Nightline" series originating from South Africa, which covered the release of Nelson Mandela. The broadcasts won an Emmy award. In addition he served as executive producer of the prime time special "Tragedy at Tiananmen-The Untold Story," which was honored with the duPont Columbia University Award, the Overseas Press Club Award and an Emmy. "Nightline" also won an Emmy in 1991 for outstanding news coverage of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.

Prior to his work on "Nightline," Smith was the executive producer of the number one rated Sunday public affairs program, "This Week with David Brinkley," a post he

held from the program's inception in 1981 until 1989. During his tenure the broadcast received the first Joan Barone Award, the George Foster Peabody Award, and was named the Best National TV Interview Discussion Program by the readers of the Washington Journalism Review.

At ABC News, Smith became executive producer of all weekend news programming in 1980. He was responsible for the production and programming of "World News Saturday," "World News Sunday," "The Weekend Report," and "The Health Show."

Prior to his weekend assignment, Smith was Washington producer of ABC News' "The Iran Crises: America Held Hostage." He also served as ABC News Senior Producer at the 1980 Winter Olympics, the 1984 Winter and Summer Games, and the 1988 Winter Olympics in Calgary.

From 1978-1979, Smith served as ABC News' White House producer. Smith joined ABC News as a Washington producer in 1977. Previously he was staff assistant to President Gerald Ford.

He began his broadcasting career at ABC Sports in 1973 as an assistant to the producer. In 1974 he was made Manager of Program Planning for ABC's Wide World of Sports.

Smith is a member of the Advisory Council for the George Bush Library in College Station, Texas.

He graduated from Claremont Men's College in 1973 with a Bachelor of Arts degree. He lives in McLean, Virginia.

030513-02



**SECRETARY OF DEFENSE**  
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

MAY 13 2003

**MEMORANDUM FOR PRESIDENTIAL ENVOY TO IRAQ**

**SUBJECT: Designation as Administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority**

Pursuant to the President's letter of May 9, 2003, appointing you as Presidential Envoy to Iraq, and my authority under applicable law, I hereby designate you as the head of the Coalition Provisional Authority, with the title of Administrator. You shall be responsible for the temporary governance of Iraq, and shall oversee, direct and coordinate all executive, legislative and judicial functions necessary to carry out this responsibility, including humanitarian relief and reconstruction and assisting in the formation of an Iraqi interim authority.

As the Commander of Coalition Forces, the Commander of U.S. Central Command shall directly support the Coalition Provisional Authority by deterring hostilities; maintaining Iraq's territorial integrity and security; searching for, securing and destroying weapons of mass destruction; and assisting in carrying out U.S. policy generally.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be "D. A. [unclear]".

cc:  
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff  
Commander of U.S. Central Command



cc. Dsec Def; Faith, Hayner  
030518-04

Final, per discussion of 2230 18 May 03

Message from ACPA to <sup>Sec Def</sup> ~~Sec Def~~ Ministry of defense and related entities.

~~Handwritten~~ Subject: Dissolution of entities; payment policies

I intend to issue the attached order (Tab A) carrying forward the de-Baathification effort by dissolving Saddam's key security ministries. In conjunction with that action, I also intend to implement the policies in Tab B on payments related to the dissolved entities. I believe it is highly desirable to issue these orders as soon as possible to maintain the momentum of our de-Baathification campaign.

The entities to be dissolved were the core of the Saddam system. The property of these entities will vest in the CPA and their employees will be dismissed. <sup>The entire order</sup> Also makes clear we ~~will~~ <sup>will</sup> establish new armed forces for the new Iraq <sup>to provide for his legitimate self-defense needs.</sup>

<sup>Saddam</sup> The generally positive reaction to the earlier de-Baathification order of 16 May 03 leads me to believe this order will generate a good deal of public support, despite its impacting many more people. In any event, it is a critical step in our effort to destroy the underpinnings of the ~~the~~ regime and to demonstrate to the Iraqi people that we have done so, and that neither Saddam nor his gang is coming back.

Some organizations that were undoubtedly in large part also part of the system are left in existence at this stage. For example, ~~MO Interior is not included~~ because it oversees the police, which we are using to help restore order, as well as customs and, incredibly, the sewer system; the Ministry (or commission) of Military Industrialization, because it runs SOEs with significant civil functions; and the Ministry of Higher Education and Science because it administers universities that we are working to re-open. Elements of those entities will likely be dissolved after further review. <sup>do not at this time propose to dissolve the Ministry of</sup>

The order will affect large numbers of people. There were some 400,000 employees of the MOD alone. Therefore it is necessary to establish a policy on payments to employees and retirees of the dissolved entities. I intend to adopt the payment policy outlined in Tab B

That policy continues pension payments for people who were drawing a pension from dissolved entities before the war ended, provides for a termination payment to employees of dissolved entities, and authorizes employment of such persons as individuals in civilian jobs by other Iraqi and Coalition agencies. All this is subject to the overriding principle that no payments will be made to "disqualified persons," i.e., people barred from government employment by the de-Baathification order (notably those in the top three ranks of the ~~BP~~). All military officers with the rank of Colonel and above will be presumed to be Disqualified Persons, unless they can establish otherwise. Moreover, the policy reserves the right to revoke pensions as a penalty for past or future illegal conduct, as well as to modify pension arrangements to eliminate special privileges granted by the old regime.

<sup>partly</sup>



~~#1~~  
(the date of General Trahi's freedom was  
deciding the Ba'ath Party).

There is obviously something that catches in the craw about paying anything to people who worked at the heart of Saddam's regime. However, my view, and the advice I have received, from both military and civilian sources, is that, so long as disqualified persons are not paid, undertaking to pay all pensions, including those of these military retirees who retired before 16 April, and also to make a termination payment to employees of the dissolved entities (other than disqualified persons), is important to the public's acceptance that we are being fair to the large number of relatively low level people caught up in the old system. It will also help to minimize the risk of serious discontent and economic hardship if we were to cut off all military and security sector pensioners in a heavily militarized society.

There will be some delay in making these payments, because, in contrast to the situation for most civilian agencies, we do not, for the most part, have employee rosters, or contacts with administrative officials of the dissolved entities. In conjunction with the intelligence community, we are starting to assemble the necessary data and make the necessary mechanical preparations for the payments envisioned by the policy. When we have those data, at least in approximate form, we will estimate the likely costs and ~~request~~ <sup>request</sup> ~~arrange~~, pursuant to the procedures for civilian agency payments, an allocation of Iraqi funds needed for payment. The mechanics of payments will follow, in so far as possible, the process that has worked fairly well in the case of the "emergency" and salary payments to civil servants in civilian agencies.

In short, I believe these policies, taken together, are necessary to show both our determination to root out ~~the structure~~ <sup>the structure</sup>, at the same time mitigating the ~~discontent that~~ <sup>discontent that</sup> these measures might otherwise cause.

Saddamism

risks to our  
broad objectives for  
security which these  
measures

030518-12

MEMORANDUM FOR OSD CABLES

FROM: Sam Rascoff o/l/o Ambassador L. Paul Bremer

Please retransmit this fax to Jaymie Durnan at home and ask that he call Ambassador Bremer after review and after 10 AM EST.

*Faxed Sunday 5/18*

16:50 (Baghdad)

8:50 AM (Washington DC)

Jayme

Please send/read following to SecDef

Mr. Secretary

I note that the latest draft of the UN resolution we have seen here (late Saturday night our time) has one useful and one potentially troublesome change.

The draft changes the name of the "Iraqi interim Authority" to the "Iraqi Interim Administration." We believe that this change will be a modest help to us here since the Iraqis I met with Friday night were very hung up on the word "authority". Their objections are two: first that the Afghans had an "authority" but also immediately had sovereignty (of course they also had Kharzai); second, though unstated openly, "authority" reminds them of the Palestinian Authority which also has not led to full statehood. If change sticks, we will be able to claim some credit with the Iraqi leaders for having listened to their complaint on this score.

Troubling however is the new phrase which explains how we are to work with the Iraqis (para 8c). This now says that the UN Special Representative will work with the CPA "including by jointly facilitating a process leading to an internationally recognized representative government of Iraq". I take this to mean that we will be required to work directly with the UN to steer the democratic process here. It will be difficult enough, as we have already found, to work through the Rubic's cube which is Iraqi politics on our own. But to add the dimension of "the UN", a multi-headed hydra itself uncertain of its goals, could render the process nearly impossible. It will at the least make it more difficult to assure that the outcome serves our interests.

Since we are at the end of a rather long and uncertain communications line, we may also be out of touch with the exact wording of the draft or the rationale for the changes. But I am sufficiently uneasy with this change to want to draw it to your immediate attention.

As instructed, we are preparing to be able to offer Iraqi oil for sale on May 22.

Jerry



030520-01

May 19, 2003 6:07 PM

TO: Jerry Bremer  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Briefings for Codels

You might want to have Phil Carroll brief Congressmen or Senators when they are out there. He seems to do a pretty good job.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
051903-50

.....  
Please respond by 5/30/03

*W. J. ...*

4/2  
1930

Scott C  
Any problems?  
4-5122

030521-14,

May 21 12, 2003 2:36 PM

ADVANCE  
COPY SENT

TO: Jaymie Durnan  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: DoD Audit Support of Iraq Contracts

Here is this memo from Dov Zakheim. Would you please process it through Doug Feith, so he can make sure it makes sense to Bremer, then through the General Counsel and Paul Wolfowitz. Then please get it to me for signature.

See if you can pull that off in one week.

Thanks.

Attach.  
5/2/03 USD(C) memo to SecDef re: DoD Audit Support of Iraq Contracts [U06713/03]

DHR:dh  
051203-12

.....  
Please respond by 5/19/03

Dov/Larry Langboth  
Have you cleared w/  
Bremer. Larry has  
the memo.  
Thanks,

cc:



Jaymie Durnan  
5/21



COMPTROLLER

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1100 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON DC 20301-1100  
ACTION MEMO



May 21, 2003, 5:00 pm

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

THROUGH: DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dov S. Zakheim

SUBJECT: DoD Audit Support of Iraq Contracts

- Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) is playing a major role in auditing the Oil-for-Food (OFF) program.
- Specifically, a team of DoD contract auditors (DCAA) and contract administrators (DCMA) are supporting the OSD Policy-led, Oil-For-Food Program evaluation. To date, DCAA has found numerous questionable OFF contracts and cost estimates. These findings need to be briefed to U.N. program officials. One example best illustrates these initial findings – there are a total of five Oil-For-Food contracts (totaling \$247 million) to provide Mercedes Benz saloon cars and other similar brand luxury cars to Iraqi officials. Not only do these contracts appear overpriced, they obviously have nothing to do with humanitarian relief. Even where contracts appear justified (for example, wheat and powdered milk), there are also clear indications of substantial contract overpricing. DCAA, with the OSD(P) support, will continue to press the UN for contract price analyses to further define its audit position.
- RECOMMENDATIONS:
  - Authorize DCAA, with OSD(P) support, to seek assistance from the U.N. Secretary General, or his designees, to clarify and provide audit support for all high risk contracts identified by the audit team;
  - Authorize DCAA, with OSD(P) support, to work with State Department officials in order to obtain voluntary refunds, through U.N. coordination, wherever contracts have been awarded and payments made, and contract overpricing is apparent; and
  - Authorize DCAA, with OSD(P) support and in coordination with the U.N., to initiate negotiations to eliminate any apparent contract overpricing where contract payment has not been made.

APPROVE \_\_\_\_\_ DISAPPROVE \_\_\_\_\_ OTHER \_\_\_\_\_

COORDINATION: Tab A

Prepared By: (b)(6)





Classification: ~~SECRET~~

COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY	
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY	
Response to: (b)(6)	Date: 5/31/03

FOR: AMB. HORAN

CC:                     

TRACKING #: X 030108

RE: Iraq (Karbala ~~and Najaf~~ model applications  
in Najaf)

TASK: Pls Review and respond to Bremer note on  
SicDec memo.

*for Horan -*

*Instructions -  
" Note to*

*Sic Dec 5/30.*

*Morries in Karbala doing a  
great job - please  
Najaf doing an excellent  
job. @*

*→ Inter closed out  
5/31*

DUE DATE: 03 JUN 03 1800L

~~SECRET~~

Log  
File ☒ Sic Dec  
File ☒ X

XA-1737524-01

~~SECRET~~

TO: Jerry Bremer

CC: Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

DA

DATE: May 24, 2003

SUBJECT: Iraq

I have your  
& need your  
suggested reply  
to him, 25  
correct, 130  
8:00AM

It is all second hand, but I am told that for whatever reason, what's happening in Karbala, one of the Shiite holy areas, under the supervision of just a battalion of Marines, is going very smoothly, and they have gotten good cooperation from both religious and secular leaders. I wonder if that might be a model for some other places such as Najaf.

Why don't you take a look at that and let me know what you think.

Thanks.

DJR/azn  
052403.0315

6/5/03

Please respond by: \_\_\_\_\_

~~Classified by: Secretary of Defense  
Donald Rumsfeld  
Reason: 1.4(a)  
Declassify on: 24 May 2013~~

~~SECRET~~

001765 107

**To:** SECDEF(uc) (E-mail); JOINT STAFF(uc) (E-mail); WHITE HOUSE COMMUNICATIONS CENTER WASHINGTON DC; WHITE HOUSE DOMESTIC COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC; WHITE HOUSE MILITARY OFFICE WASHINGTON DC; WHITE HOUSE OF MIL ASST TO PRESIDENT WASHINGTON DC; WHITE HOUSE OMB WASHINGTON DC; WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM WASHINGTON DC; NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC; SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC

**Subject:** Telegraphic Communications Established

**Importance:** Low

UNCLASS CPA 001

E.O. 12356: N/A

SUBJECT: Telegraphic Communications Established

DOD PLEASE PASS APPROPRIATE AGENCIES AND COMMANDS  
DOS PLEASE PASS ALL DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR POSTS

1. *Classified and Unclassified telegraphic communications have been established to/from the Coalition Provisional Authority in Baghdad.*
2. *This is a limited capability and CPA requests that messages of important interest, equivalent to that which would be sent to a post on Minimize, be addressed to:*

HEADQUARTERS COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY BAGHDAD.

3. UNCLASSIFIED routing indicator: (b)(6)
4. CLASSIFIED routing indicator: (b)(6)

BREMER



**From:**  
**To:**

(b)(6)

**Sent:**  
**Subject:**  
Your message

Tuesday, May 27, 2003 9:27 PM  
Delivered: Telegraphic Communications Established

**To:** NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC; SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC; WHITE HOUSE COMMUNICATIONS CENTER WASHINGTON DC; WHITE HOUSE DOMESTIC COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC; WHITE HOUSE MILITARY OFFICE WASHINGTON DC; WHITE HOUSE OF MIL ASST TO PRESIDENT WASHINGTON DC; WHITE HOUSE OMB WASHINGTON DC; WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM WASHINGTON DC; WHITE HOUSE TRANSPORTATION AGENCY WASHINGTON DC; NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC; JOINT STAFF(uc)  
**Subject:** Telegraphic Communications Established  
**Sent:** 5/27/2003 9:26 PM

was delivered to the following recipient(s):

(b)(6)

SEC DEF WASH DC  
NCS WASH DC

SECRET  
REF ID

030531-03

SEC 11 5/31 0945

~~May 29, 2003 1:48 PM~~

TO: ~~Gen. Pranks~~  
CC: Gen. Myers  
~~Gen. Bremer~~  
(b)(6)  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Missing Persons

Attached is a copy of a letter I received. My understanding is that these folks have some very good technology and can be helpful.

You have the responsibility for this activity. Please consider taking advantage of this offer.

Regards,

Attach.  
5/19/03 Kinsey ltr to SecDef

DIIR:dh  
052903-21

Please respond by

6/6/03

SECDEF HAS SEEN

MAY 29 2003

JAMES V. KIMSEY

(b)(6)

WASHINGTON, DC 20006

May 19, 2003

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld  
 Secretary of Defense  
 1000 Defense Pentagon  
 Washington, DC 20301-1000

Dear Mr. Secretary:

In light of recent events in Iraq, I would like to contribute the services & technology of the International Commission on Missing Persons (ICMP) to support the Department of Defense in dealing with the mass graves found and the families of the victims of forced disappearance under the regime of Saddam Hussein.

I assumed Chairmanship of the ICMP at the request of Secretary of State Colin Powell more than two years ago. As you may know, the ICMP was established in 1996 to address the issue of the missing in the regions of the former Yugoslavia. The successes of our projects in Bosnia-Herzegovina demonstrate the magnitude of the contribution we might make in Iraq.

I would like to take a team from the ICMP with our equipment to Iraq to search for and identify human remains. I am asking for your support in this endeavor. Your support would put the ICMP in a position to seek additional funds to complete its work in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the possible extension of its operations into Iraq.

In light of the criticism that has been leveled toward post-conflict activities in Iraq, it seems obvious that there could be some immediate benefit in taking advantage of the proven capacity of the ICMP.

I will be traveling to Bosnia-Herzegovina and then hopefully into Iraq in mid-June to further assess ICMP's potential involvement in the identification of the missing there. I need your assistance to make this happen.

(b)(6) my Chief of Staff, will be in touch with your office immediately.

Sincerely,

*James V. Kimsey*  
 James V. Kimsey, Chairman  
 International Commission on Missing Persons

*I need your help on this*

PHONE

(b)(6)

FACSIMILE

(b)(6)

*John, Jim has wanted to see you and hear the ICMP does great work. I think they can help with this problem.*

*29/5*



U1 030603-02

MEMO TO SECDEF 6.3.03

From: Ambassador Bremer <sup>613</sup>

Subject: Mass Graves

As you know well, the mass graves situation in Iraq has received a lot of attention, as it deserves. I have been reviewing what more we should be doing, especially with regard to the possibility of bringing those responsible to justice in the future. This is in addition to the Coalition presence provided by the British Forensic Team currently at work in Iraq.

I believe that we should move with some speed to augment the U.K. effort with a robust American Mass Graves Team. The expertise required is highly specific. The full team for the complete processing of a grave site will take some time to assemble, as it should include expertise from several agencies, as well as the capability to conduct the three stages of excavation: 1) Site Assessment, 2) Forensic Recovery, and 3) Identification. However, we need not wait to have this full team to get started with an American presence.

My recommendation is that we move quickly to field (1) a Forensic Support Unit, which I will request CJTF-7 to provide, and (2) a Site Assessment Team from the States led and manned by the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology (AFIP), with the possible exception of one specialty (Forensic Archeologist/Geophysicist), which may have to come from the private sector. We should also request independent observers to verify the independence of all mass grave investigations. This will enable us to get started in a professional way without further delay. There has been discussion of a role for the FBI, but my review suggests that the Bureau is not prepared to move as quickly as we need. I believe that it is more effective to have one U.S. agency responsible, and that agency should be the ~~Army~~ <sup>AFIP</sup>.

I have sent the details to Doug Feith and will appreciate your support. I only bring this to your attention because of the media focus on this situation, and to keep our effort focused in one lead agency.

~~Confidential~~

XI 030403-22

June 3, 2003

MEMO FOR: Secretary Rumsfeld

FROM: Paul Bremck 6/3

SUBJECT: Iraqi Police Force

Bernie Kerik and his team have just completed their preliminary assessment of the Iraqi Police Service. The highlights will give you an idea of the direction we plan to take. We are coordinating this closely with CJTF-7 and Walt Slocombe.

- Iraqi police are not prepared for the task of providing law enforcement without a major training program which we must provide.
- Under Saddam, the police force was a quasi-military institution. As a result, its modus operandi and approach to human rights are totally unsuited for modern policing. New legislation will be needed.
- The police infrastructure was badly damaged or destroyed by the looting. More police return to work each week but their ability to operate effectively is hampered by a substantial lack of equipment.
- The recruitment and training of new recruits, untainted by the association with the former regime, will infuse the Police Service with new ideas challenging existing personnel to rethink now unacceptable behavior.
- Aggressive professional standards will hold officers to a set of internationally accepted policies that will guide the police force long after international advice and assistance have ended.
- Acceptable criminal intelligence gathering legislation will be addressed quickly. Many disenfranchised former governmental officials are poised to begin a new career in organized crime. Saddam's emptying of prisons adds to this threat to Iraq's future.
- We will encourage the separation of regulatory from enforcement duties to minimize opportunities for corruption.

~~Confidential~~

~~Confidential~~

- Administrative and regulatory tasks not requiring the skills of a police officer will be "civilianized."
- Reform of the police is a long-term program requiring considerable international assistance including financial, in-kind contributions and qualified police personnel to train.
- Standing up a new police force in Iraq will take time, but the Iraqi people need a vision of their future police. Ownership of this process by civil leaders, religious leaders, politicians, the public and especially the police will be crucial to the success of this undertaking.

Comment: Overhanging all else is the major decision to be made concerning the overall structure of the police force – will it be national, regional or bifurcated. The ultimate decision will be made by the eventual Iraqi government and will reflect decisions they reach on the degree of federalism in the constitution. However, as long as we are here my guidance is to do all we can to influence the direction toward a federal "one Iraq" police force to reduce the chances of regional power centers coming into being.

~~Confidential~~



I-03/006251



030609-17

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

JUN 9 2003

MEMORANDUM FOR L. PAUL BREMER

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Why We Need an IA Sooner Rather Than Later (U)

(U) I agree with you on the need to move quickly to create a leadership council for the Interim Administration. My thoughts on this include the following:

- ~~(C)~~Perception: It will put an Iraqi face on what is now a Coalition military presence. Overnight, the perception (internationally and internally) will shift from occupation to a shared Coalition/Iraqi enterprise.
- ~~(C)~~Positive News: The very fact of our refereeing a cohesive interim structure out of Iraq's ethnic/political diversity will be an important achievement. Delays/frustrations in restoring public utilities will be seen in perspective. Overnight, much of the attention will shift to the political plane.
- ~~(C)~~Arab Support: Arab leaders told me on my recent trip that they would like to see an IIA soon. It would put an Iraqi face on what is happening and give them Iraqis to work with.
- ~~(C)~~Iraqi Impatience: Indications are that Iraqi political/ethnic groups are restless. Standing still may lead to unraveling. Progress toward an IIA may be essential to retard centrifugal forces.
- ~~(C)~~Countering the Bad Guys: Regime remnants are coalescing to some degree and stepping up sabotage. Their dream is a guerrilla insurgency. But guerrilla insurgencies depend on popular support. Progress toward an IIA will help neutralize if not dry up that popular support.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~DERIVED FROM: Multiple Sources~~  
~~DECLASSIFY ON: NND~~



SECDEF CONTROL# X01873 /03

DRAFT: CPA/GOV: (b)(6)  
APPROVE: CDA - Amb. Bremer  
CLEAR: CPA/GOV - Amb. Crocker

6/5  
XI 030610-18

FROM: HQ COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY BAGHDAD  
TO: SECDEF WASHDC  
SECSTATE WASHDC  
CINCCENT MCDILL AFB FL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ CPA 0012

E.O. 12356: GDS  
SUBJECT: Ambassador Bremer's June 9<sup>th</sup> Economic Consultation Meeting

~~CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR L. PAUL BREMER III, SPECIAL PRESIDENTIAL  
ENVOY~~

1. SUMMARY: Ambassador Bremer met yesterday, June 9, 2003 with a group of Iraqi economic experts, along with IMF, World Bank and UN representatives, to discuss issues facing the Iraqi economy. The participants included Iraqi representatives from the ministries, recommended participants from the political parties, independent businesspeople and academics. The discussion centered around job creation, but other broad issues were raised such as (1) the future of the Iraqi currency; (2) the role of foreign direct investment; (3) invigorating the private sector; (4) reopening banks; (5) the impact security has on economic growth; (6) the need to establish a legal framework and (7) construction projects as a short term solution for job creation. The group also planned to discuss the demobilization of military and Ministry of Information personnel but the number of people eager to speak on job creation prevented the group from getting to the next point on the agenda. END SUMMARY

2. On June 9, 2003 Ambassador Bremer attended a meeting with Iraqi economic experts and representatives from international institutions. Attendees included 22 Iraqis, including (b)(6) (INA), (b)(6) (INC), (b)(6) (INC), (b)(6) (SCIRI), (b)(6) (SCIRI), (b)(6) (PUK), (b)(6) (KDP), (b)(6) (NDP), (b)(6) (IID), (b)(6) (ADM), (b)(6) (KIU), (b)(6) (businesswoman), (b)(6) (Ministry of Trade), (b)(6) (businesswoman), (b)(6) (Ministry of Industry), (b)(6) (Ministry of Trade), (b)(6) (Central Bank), (b)(6) (Ministry of Finance), (b)(6) (Ministry of Planning), (b)(6) (Ministry of Industry), (b)(6) (rep of Ove Arup), and (b)(6) (accountant), (b)(6) (World Bank), (b)(6) (UNDP), and (b)(6) (IMF) were also in attendance. In addition to Ambassador Bremer, the Coalition was represented by (b)(6) and other staff.



3. Ambassador Bremer began by welcoming the group and reiterating President Bush's vision for a democratic, peaceful and economically viable Iraq. He stated that he was actively seeking advice and proposals from Iraqis on these issues. He invited Mr. (b)(6) of the Central Bank to begin with his opening remarks, which were brief. IMF and World Bank representatives also made opening remarks outlining the issues to be addressed in order to invigorate the Iraqi economy. (b)(6) of the IMF expressed concern that state expenditures not be too heavily relied on to jumpstart the economy and that targeted community based projects are needed to stimulate the private sector. He also spoke of the need to solve the currency crisis, reopen banks, and promote lending. (b)(6) of the World Bank agreed with his general point and spoke of the need to establish a legal regulatory framework for business development.

4. It was stated by all participants that many of the problems facing Iraq's economy require long term solutions, but that short term actions can, and need, to be taken to alleviate unemployment. Mr. (b)(6) of the UNDP highlighted the work they were doing in terms of funding small scale projects targeted to particular communities and sectors to repair schools, hospitals, sewers, etc. He suggested this model as one that can be used throughout all of Iraq to create jobs in the short term and to relieve distress in the communities.

5. Ambassador Bremer asked for statistics on unemployment. Mr. (b)(6) of the National Democratic Party volunteered the results of a study that he submitted to UNDP on unemployment, but some of the participants expressed skepticism regarding their accuracy. There was broad agreement among participants, however, that unemployment was high – perhaps in the range of 40%. (b)(6) of the Ministry of Trade stressed the need to examine the structure of unemployment before policy decisions are made to address the problem. He saw foreign direct investment as a long term solution for job creation. He proposed the creation of a Business Center as a coordinating mechanism. Ambassador Bremer said that he planned to announce the opening of such a center and foreign firms have indicated their interest in establishing operation in Iraq but were uncertain due to ownership laws.

7. Both (b)(6) and (b)(6) pointed to the fact that legal issues, such as ownership laws, need to be worked out before foreign firms have the inducement to invest in Iraq. (b)(6) a KDP representative, was concerned that the unresolved decision on what a new Iraqi currency would be is stifling investment, but that he was pleased that salaries are being paid and that budgets are being worked out.

8. (b)(6) of the Ministry of Planning brought up the issue of job creation in the private sector as a way to improve standard of living. He was concerned that we were relying on too many projects that require government expenditures. He felt there needed to be more focus on private sector job creation.

9. Ader Samarra of the Ministry of Industry countered by stating that it all comes down to government expenditures and that much of our efforts need to be focused there as a means to keep the economy running- even if we run deficits. (b)(6) also of



~~(CONFIDENTIAL)~~  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

XID30619-07

JUN 19 2003

MEMORANDUM FOR JERRY BREMER

FROM: Donald H. Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Response to your "should we pay the ex-military" proposal

I agree with the need to address the unemployment situation among Iraq's ex-military personnel. The longer we wait to address this problem the more susceptible they will become for recruitment by organized crime and/or Baathist elements.

I believe your first option -- "paying them on a continuing basis an amount less than what they would have received had they retired" -- is preferable to the other options. Payments distributed in this manner reduce the incentives for former military personnel to engage in anti-coalition activities.

This option should buy us time for former military personnel to reintegrate into Iraqi society. However, the preferred option is to hire them to do real work that is needed in Iraq--police, border guards, oil industry protection, trash removal, construction, etc.



X02056 103

SCC

15 June 2003

CPA Memo

To: SecDef  
From: Ambassador Bremer  
Subject: Should we pay the ex-military?

We have been studying the problems that the disbanded Iraqi armed forces pose to force protection, general security, and law and order. When we dissolved the MOD and the old armed forces, we dismissed their employees. That has left some 230,000 officers and NCOs unemployed. At the time of dissolution, we decided to continue to pay pensions to widows and disabled and also to officers who had retired prior to April 16, 2003, and, consistent with the basic de-Baathification edict, we made clear we would not pay anything to those in the top four party ranks, who turn out to number about 9000. That still leaves tens of thousands, some of whom have been demonstrating in cities around Iraq protesting their not having been paid. This discontent among a respected group with training in weapons and with networks of contacts and loyalties presents a significant threat.

Virtually all above the rank of LTC, and about half those below, would have been eligible to retire under the regime's laws. The issue is how, if at all, they should be paid. There are essentially three options: (1) pay on a continuing basis an amount not too much short of what they would have received had they retired; (2) make a single termination payment; and (3) defer the issue until there is an Iraqi body that can at least share in the decision.



The military commanders here strongly favor the first course, because they believe it would forestall an increasingly vocal and violent opposition from the former military that threatens to become a grave danger to both our troops and our mission but could be reclaimed by such payments. Paying the necessary amounts would, however, mean a big disparity between what the military and civil service retirees get, with heavy pressures for very expensive equalization of benefits. The second option is what the dissolution order contemplated, but one-time payments would be far less likely to calm military protests. The third option forces the Iraqis to share in a hard decision, with long-term implications, but it leaves the issue a continuing source of controversy with an increasingly impatient group of officers which will pose a further risk to our troops here-- and may accelerate the debate over how the IIA will participate in decisions that affect security.

I would welcome your guidance during our call Monday afternoon, since I intend to raise the issue at this Thursday's Political Committee meeting. I will seek to get their sense of how a decision for any of the three options would be received by the general public and affect the attitudes of former military and how the emerging political leadership would view a decision to defer the issue until the IIA can participate.

20 JUN  
FILE

030620-15

June 19, 2003

MEMO FOR Secretary Rumsfeld

FROM: L Paul Brembly

SUBJECT: Former Army Rank Structure

I may have misinformed you Monday about the rank structure in the former army. It now appears from the army rosters which have come into our possession, that NCOs made up 113,000 of a total force of 506,000 (conscripts accounted for 315,000.)

... attached

June 20, 2003

TO: Secretary Rumsfeld  
FROM: L. Paul Bremer *LPB*  
SUBJECT: June 19 Political Consultation with Iraqis

---

UK Ambassador John Sawers and I met yesterday with 21 Iraqis, ranging from political leaders, to independents, to government bureaucrats and professionals. UN SRSG De Mello's chief of staff sat in as an observer at the meeting. Three issues were discussed: the overall political process, the currency and what to do about payments to the dissolved military.

During the discussion regarding the political process, Iraqi participants stressed that immediate needs – such as security, and regular electricity – must take priority in order to create the conditions necessary to successfully form stable national bodies. Some of the participants, including several political party representatives, argued that because the Constitutional Conference is so critical, and will “shape Iraq's destiny”, there should be direct elections for the delegates even if this meant delay. Conversely, many participants argued that the political process must move forward as soon as possible, and that the lack of a formal Iraqi entity to date was causing confusion and insecurity on the street. Both the KDP and SCIRI representatives asked that a specific timeframe and date be announced for the formation of the Political Council (to which I replied that both the Council and the Constitutional Conference would be set up by the end of July).

A brief discussion on currency issues indicated a consensus among all but one of the Iraqi participants that the CPA should use Swiss Dinars as the official Iraqi currency prior to the creation of a new currency, designed and issued by a future Iraqi government. Walt Slocombe gave a short briefing on the future of the Iraqi military and the formation of the new Iraqi army. While there were few questions about Slocombe's comments, the participants were unanimous in their reaction to my presentation of three possible options for dealing with the ex-military: do nothing, pay one lump sum, or pay a stipend to those eligible for retirement pending a decision by an Iraqi government. All argued that we should continue to pay “the salaries” of former military members; many made the point that the regular army was as much of a force for Saddam to manage as it was a source of support for him. Participants felt that such payments made sense on security, humanitarian, legal, and other grounds. Interestingly, participants did not distinguish between “pensions” and “salaries,” with most maintaining that payments should be made to all ex-military, not only those of retirement age.

*Sent via e-mail  
per attached  
PB*



**Kennedy, Patrick AMB**

---

**From:** Kennedy, Patrick AMB  
**Sent:** Friday, June 20, 2003 1:31 PM  
**To:** (b)(6) CIV, OSD  
**Subject:** FW: Final Memo to SecDef on Pol Consults  
**Importance:** High

Please pass SECDEF

6/20/2003



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

030627-04

J. Bremer  
T. Koptogor

JUN 19 2003

The Honorable Bill Frist  
Majority Leader  
United States Senate  
Room H-230 Capitol  
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Mr. Leader:

I have talked to the Commander of Central Command (CENTCOM), General Tom Franks. He believes the situations in Iraq and Afghanistan have improved to the point that it is possible now to further loosen the arrangements with respect to Congressional delegations in the region.

I suggest that we open it up and treat Afghanistan and Iraq like other countries in CENTCOM, with the understanding that their situations may vary from month to month. There may still be practical issues in moving around the countries, and there may be some limitations on staying overnight. Within these broad guidelines, we will work with delegations to fashion programs that are appropriate for them and that fit the situation and capabilities of the military to assist.

We look forward to cooperating fully with the Congress in its oversight responsibilities.

Sincerely,



~~CLASSIFIED~~  
Coalition Provisional Authority  
Highlights for Secretary Rumsfeld  
20 June 2003

XI 030628-21

**Security:**

- (1) • Appropriated funds for New Iraqi Army (NIA) training contracts cleared the Congressional notice period on Thursday. On 24 June, CPA will review bids from Iraqi contractors to reconstruct a training base site at Kerkesh. Working with CJTF-7 on a plan to integrate training and integrating with other command initiatives.
- Briefed Iraq Political Committee yesterday on NIA and received a favorable response. Most members, including those known to be quite critical of the old army, felt strongly that we should continue to pay ex-military. Considering options and expect to forward a note on this subject in the near future.
- Developing a plan to hire Iraqi contractors to refurbish Police Training Academies in Mosul, Baghdad, and Basra. Strategy for mid-term development of Iraqi police and security forces including international support will be ready next week.
- (2) • Implementing "Security Guard Synchronization Board" process to coordinate military and Ministry security guard requirements and funding requests.

**Economy:**

- April salary payments have been fully completed in Baghdad except for the Ministry of Youth and Sport, which will be completed on Saturday. May/June salary payments will begin on Saturday.
- Three million dollars in 250 Iraqi dinar notes was delivered to the Iraqi Central Bank yesterday. The notes will be available for exchange with 10000 dinar notes.

**Oil/Fuel:**

- LPG domestic production and imports averages around 2400 tons per day, about 57 % of the historical average daily consumption. Distribution of LPG cylinders in the Baghdad area continues at over 80,000 cylinders, 60 % of the normal prewar usage in the Baghdad area.
- The gasoline inventory exceeds 50 million liters in the Baghdad area.
- Crude oil export sales remain on schedule; all deliveries anticipated to be completed by the end of the month.

(3)

~ 250 million



### Health Affairs:

- Agreed with Dr. Rice that Operation Hope representatives would visit Iraq to conduct an assessment of pediatric hospitals. We will consider a plan to refurbish existing hospitals and raise private donations for a new, state-of-the-art referral center.
- Haveman meeting with David Nabarro of World Health Organization (WHO), who expressed interest in providing technical assistance/expertise and other support. WHO is due to lose its staff on 21 Nov when the Oil for Food program ends.

### Political Process:

- (4)
- reached  
N & S.  
of deadline
- Meeting yesterday with 21 Iraqis including political leaders, independents, government bureaucrats and professionals. UN SRSG De Mello's COS participated. Three issues were discussed: the overall political process, the currency and what to do about payments to the dissolved military. *50% 12% 100%*
  - Political team members returned from Mosul and Basra areas where they met with professionals, intellectuals, university professors, lawyers' groups, tribal shaykhs, and others. In Amara (capital of Maysan Province), the team also met with the supervisory council, including its leader, resistance fighter Abu Hatem. In each meeting the teams briefed the plan for the national political process and sought to identify individuals who might play a part in the national political process.
  - Over the weekend, teams will travel to Al-Samawah and Al-Nasirya to continue the national consultative process.

### Public Affairs:

- 5-1
- Iraqi  
delegation
- Taped weekly TV/radio/print address to the Iraqi people; focus was on new criminal justice initiatives.
  - Interviewed by BBC Arabic Radio.
  - Submitted oped on Iraq economic reform to the WSJ, for print in their US, Europe, and Asian editions.
  - Working on possibility of sending Iraqi journalists covering donor's conference to Washington, D.C. for interviews and meetings.

### Other Comments:

- Promulgated two financial management regulations: Regulation for the Development Fund for Iraq and a Regulation for CPA's Program Review Board (PRB). The PRB will prioritize funding requirements for relief and recovery activities in Iraq and develop funding plans that propose allocations of resources.

Human R. - watch report in Fallujah

6/20

Sec Def

100 - regular

Whitecomb

No evidence synchronized C&C

Less sophisticated attacks recently

How many police water wide?

25G in drug - 900 on ground - who in charge?


? if not knowledgeable of what is in country  
get them involved

11 034703 04

2 July 2003

## MEMORANDUM

TO: Secretary Rumsfeld  
FROM: L. Paul Bremer, III  
RE: CPA Priority Issues



### Electricity

- Prior to recent sabotage, running about 3200MW nationwide and 1300MW in Baghdad. Now at approximately 950MW in Baghdad and 3000MW nationwide, but on the way back up.
- Security: Implementing new security plan for electrical infrastructure.
- Short-term plan: Expect to reach previous goal of 4000MW by 25 July, which will provide approx. 16-20 hrs throughout Iraq. Investing \$2m in repairs to increase efficiency of existing equipment and \$3m in communications equipment. Established task force to locate and repair 200-300 generators of 10MW and higher throughout country within next three weeks.
- Mid-term: Will purchase and install 400MW generators (\$200m). Won't be in place this season, but will be helpful next summer.
- Long-term: Evaluating plan to provide additional 1200MW/yr. for each of next 4-5 years with goal of 8000MW by 2009. (\$1.2b/yr.) Also considering \$500m/yr. for transmission distribution.

Syria  
Turkey

### Governance Council

- Timing: Next two weeks.
- Process: Vetting 18 names with Leadership Council (see attachment); another 7 or so names will be added over the next few days. Once vetted, group meets and declare themselves, with our endorsement, to be the "Governance Council."
- Goals: 1) narrow majority of Shi'as; 2) at least one Turkoman and one Christian; 3) roughly equivalent numbers of Sunnis and Kurds; 4) more internals than externals; 5) several women.
- Challenges: Basra rep; Sunni women.
- Constitutional Conf.: Will proceed after establishment of Governance Council.



### **The South/ British Concerns**

- Pace of funding:

- In last six weeks, the Coalition has initiated almost a billion dollars on projects in Iraq, much of which has been focused on the South. Examples: Irrigation -- 3000 workers employed; cleared 350 kilometers of irrigation channels. By end of the month, expect to have 50,000 at work on over 5000 km of channels. Port -- Now dredged to 12 meters and open for commercial activity; nearly 2 million cubic meters of material have been cleared. \$26m being spent for dredging; wreck removal and security; \$11m for startup of Grain Facility. The "British USAID" has also committed £150m to UN agencies, the Red Cross/ Red Crescent and NGOs for humanitarian assistance.
- Cong. notice period will soon begin on additional amounts for South including: Transmission lines: \$4.2m to erect a tower and lines; Water: \$42m for water and wastewater treatment.
- Action needed: Ensure rapid implementation of one-day training course for contractors.

- Priority:

- Fully aware of importance of the South. Focus of nat'l political process and of local efforts.
- Najaf: Governor arrested for corruption. News of arrest received enthusiastically by Najaf resident and senior Shi'a clergymen in Baghdad. W/in one week, town council, by caucus, will designate a new Governor. When new Governor is elected, CPA will announce package of Najaf development projects.

Welfaritz - \$25 million - Saddam

## GOVERNANCE COUNCIL

- 18 names:

Mohsen Abdulhameed (Sunni, internal Baghdad);  
Ayad Alawi (Shi'a, external Baghdad);  
Masud Barzani (Kurd, internal, Irbil);  
Mohammed Bahr al-Ulum (Shi'a, external, Baghdad/ Najaf);  
Naseer Chadirji (Sunni, internal, Baghdad);  
Ahmed Chalabi (Shi'a, external, Baghdad);  
(b)(6) (woman, Shi'a, internal, Babel);  
Abdel Aziz Hakim (Shi'a external, Baghdad/ Najaf);  
Ibrahim Jaafari (Shi'a, external, Baghdad);  
Ayad Jamal al Din (Shi'a, external, Nasiriyah);  
(b)(6) (Shi'a, internal, Karbala);  
Yonadam Kanna (Assyrian, internal, Irbil);  
Karim Muhammadawi (Abu Hatim) (Shi'a, internal, Maysan);  
(b)(6) (woman, Turkomen, Kirkuk);  
Adnan Pachachi (Sunni, external, Baghdad);  
Farqad Qizwini (Shi'a, internal, Hilla);  
Jalal Talabani (Kurd, internal, Sulaymaniyah);  
Ghazi al Yawr (Sunni, external, Mosul).


- Additional names under consideration:

Lina Abood (woman, Sunni, internal, Baghdad);  
Sharif Ali (Sunni, external, Baghdad);  
Dara Nor al Din (Kurdish, internal, Baghdad);  
Khosra Goran (Kurd, internal, Mosul);  
Akila Hashimi (woman, Shi'a, internal, Najaf/ Baghdad);  
(b)(6) (woman, Sunni, internal, Baghdad);  
Mowaffaq al-Rubai (Shi'a, external, Baghdad);  
(b)(6) (Shi'a, external, Basra);  
Safia Souhail (woman, Shi'a, external, Baghdad);  
Alaa Talabani (woman, Kurd, external, Baghdad);  
(b)(6) (woman, Kurd, internal, Kirkuk);  
Ahmad al-Barak Abu Sultan (Shi'a, internal, Babel).

*Asla - Turkmen - related to Turkish gov't  
Kulbektz drop -  
Turkish list -*



(b)(1) : (b)(5) : (b)(6)





(b)(5) ; (b)(6) ; (b)(1) Sec. 1. 4 (d)



7 July 2003

# MEMORANDUM

TO: Secretary Rumsfeld  
FROM: L. Paul Bremer, III  
RE: CPA Priority Issues

## Turkey

- Arrest of special forces
  - Of 32, 8 released almost immediately; 24 detained at BIAP. 1 UK handed to British. 23 others returned to Sulaymaniyah and will be held at the compound pending resolution of the investigation.
  - Information that COL (b)(6) a subject of the allegations) is back in Northern Iraq as part of the investigative delegation.
  - We will want to clarify what prior understanding, if any, existed between the U.S. and Turkey regarding the presence of TUSF in Iraq. Then we must address the future of such forces here.
  - Turkish general from Silopi met with PUK PM Barham Salih July 6; said Turkey intends to restaff the office in Sulaymaniyah. Salih replied that the issue of restaffing the office was a decision for the CPA. We should not permit this.
- Recommendations forwarded with respect to Turkish offers of non-military assistance. We recommended against accepting offers to reopen Consulate General offices in Mosul or open additional border crossing.

## Iraqi Budget

- Approved budget for remainder of '03.
- Assumes: \$3.4b in receipts from oil sales; \$900m from military downsizing and elimination of regime's "special programs"; \$200m from Oil for Food refunds; \$60 from Iraqi taxes and other revenues.
- Allocates: \$610m for capital expenditures (compared to \$473m for Jul-Dec '02); \$862m for operations (compared to \$404m for Jul - Dec. '02). Despite increases, austere budget situation for remainder of year. Total expenses are foreseen to be \$2 billion more than revenues this year.
- Going forward: develop longer-term salary scale by late August; restore revenue sources (electricity, water, passports, luxury taxes, etc.); develop '04 budget by October.
- Will forward proposal for '04 supplemental request by early September.

### **Currency**

- Will announce today our intention to print and issue new Iraqi banknotes.
- Will begin distribution on 15 October. The period of exchange will last for three months.
- The design will be similar to the so-called Swiss dinars in circulation in the north; currency denominations will be similar to the so-called Saddam dinar that circulates in Baghdad and the south.
- Conversion rate between the Swiss and Saddam dinars was selected following consultations with leaders in the north.



UI 730710-03 ~~SPB~~

PK

July 9  
July 6, 2003

HORAN

CRUCKER

SILVERBERG

(b)(6)

→ SARAH

TO: Paul Wolfowitz  
Doug Feith  
Jerry Bremer

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Baghdad

Attached is an article on Baghdad and Frank Lloyd Wright's interest in it. I found it interesting.

Thanks

Attach:  
Ringle, Ken: "The Gropius in the Architect's Group," *Washington Post*, June 29, 2003

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

washingtonpost.com

## The Genie in an Architect's Lamp

Frank Lloyd Wright's '57 Plan for Baghdad May Be Key to Its Future

By Ken Ringer  
Washington Post Staff Writer  
Sunday, June 29, 2003 (Page B01)

Many stories in recent weeks have told us that the United States fights an uphill battle for public support in Iraq, partly because of a persistent belief on "the Arab street" that the West is intent on erasing Islamic culture. How can the United States convince Iraqis that it's not true?

Two Middle Eastern specialists at the Library of Congress say the answer lies in little-known plans by the celebrated American architect Frank Lloyd Wright for rebuilding Baghdad into a glittering capital of Islamic culture like the one that once dazzled the world.

Why not call on Iraqis to embrace Wright's grand vision, the scholars ask, a dazzling new, high-tech Baghdad deliberately rooted in its fabled past?

It is impossible to overemphasize the power of such a vision to unite Iraq's religious factions and tribes, says Mary Jane Deeb, who has lectured on Arab history and culture from Sweden to Morocco as well as in her native Beirut.

Even the most illiterate Iraqi child — or, indeed, any Arab child, she says — has heard of the Baghdad of Scherazade, Sinbad and "The Arabian Nights." They all know that when Europe was wallowing in feudal darkness, "Baghdad was a triumph of civilization — a place of tolerance and philosophy, of poetry and art, and great architecture and science. Why should it not be that sort of city again?"

Mina Marcetat, Rockefeller fellow in Islamic Studies at the Library of Congress's Kluge Center, agrees.

The significance of the Frank Lloyd Wright drawings, she says, is that they show such profound respect for the very cultural heritage to which the West is supposed to be hostile.

"Iraqis think we want to kill their culture," she says. "Yet when America's greatest architect drew a plan for Baghdad" in 1957, "where did he turn for inspiration? Not to American or European 'modernism,' which was so fashionable at the time, but to Arab and Persian architecture, which had shaped the famous Baghdad of the 8th and 9th century."

That realization might help inspire Iraqis to lift their sights beyond the immediate squabbles and resentments of occupation, she says. "Wright's vision for Baghdad need not be the only vision," she says. "Other architects, Iraqi architects, could be called on to submit designs. The key factor is to focus on the ingredients that made Baghdad great long ago" and challenge Iraqis to make their greatest traditions live again in a reborn city.

Marcetat is hoping to arrange an exhibit of Wright's Baghdad drawings both at the Library of

Congress and in Baghdad. She is also hoping to interest some filmmaker in making a documentary about Wright's Baghdad project.

Wright's plans for Baghdad remain a little-known last act in the long career of the flamboyant architect. He was 93 when he traveled to Iraq in May 1957 to take up a commission for an opera house that would "help modernize" the capital city of what was then a kingdom ruled by King Faisal II. Dissatisfied with the site selected for the opera house, Wright lobbied for and received permission to build a instead, on an island in the Tigris River. He then expanded his proposal to include a civic amphitheater, a landscaped park with monuments, fountains and waterfalls, a parking deck in the shape of a three-story ziggurat, museums for both ancient and modern art, botanical gardens and even a casino, a bazaar, an amphitheater, and an entire university complex. He also designed a new post office in the old city of Baghdad.

"We've got a great opportunity there," he wrote, "to demonstrate that we're not destructive but constructive, where the original forces that built the civilizations of the world are concerned. We are not there to slam them in the face but to do honor to them."

In chapter 34, entitled "Wright's Baghdad" in the book, Frank Lloyd Wright: Europe and Beyond, Marceta wrote that Wright's proposed Baghdad civic center "was intended to reinforce a cultural identity rooted in a rich historic past. To this end he mined both Islamic and pre-Islamic imagery, seeking as much to invoke myth and memory as to honor historical context. His circular plan was in fact reminiscent of al-Mansur's city" and featured "domed shapes and fortification" of Islamic imagery plus ziggurats and terraces "alluding to the ancient Assyrian and Mesopotamian heritage" of Iraq.

Mindful of such modern urban challenges as traffic flow and communications towers, she added, "what Wright prepared in Baghdad was a rare mixture of respect for the past and for the technology of the future. . . . But the city he evoked was [the] 'city of memory'—of imagination, the Baghdad of Scheherazade and Sinbad—powerful enough to endure for centuries even when the real city was long destroyed."

However much Arab storytellers have embroidered it over the years with magic lanterns and flying carpets, Deeb and Marceta point out, the fabulous Baghdad of the Middle Ages was more than just an Islamic Camelot. It really did exist.

It was built between 762 and 766 by 10,000 slaves laboring under the orders of the Abbasid al-Mansur, the second of the 17th caliphs of that dynasty. Mansur thought himself an architect. He envisioned a perfectly circular walled city roughly a mile and a half in diameter, its sections radiating out from a central palace and mosque like the sections of an orange. To verify the geometry of his design before construction, Arab chronicles say, he had his workers outline the path of Baghdad's intended wall with a shallow trench, fill it with a mixture of cottonseed oil and oil and set it afire while he watched from a nearby height.

But Baghdad was destroyed in 1258 by invading Mongols who burned its mosque and minarets and libraries and looted its splendors, and went on killing for 40 days. Arabs have been mourning its loss ever since.

"There is no way to exaggerate the hold the myth of Baghdad has on the Arab imagination."



Deeb says, "Arabs know their civilization was great once. They don't understand why that greatness passed away. The fundamentalist Muslims tell them it is because they have been corrupted by 'infidel teachings from the West'" -- no one mind that Baghdad was sacked not from the West, but from the East.

The more likely explanation for the decline, she says, is that the greatest thinkers of the Arab world were killed by the Mongols. The surviving Muslims, much like Catholic Spain in the same era, turned against rationality and scientific inquiry, considering them subversive of religious orthodoxy and faith. That attitude in Spain inspired the notorious Inquisition, expulsion of the Jews and a long twilight of bloodshed and intolerance. In the Arab world it led to increasing Islamic fundamentalism and tribal enmity and a long decline in the face of the technologically superior West.

Nowadays, Deeb says, young Arabs are being asked to choose between a faith-based Islamic fundamentalism with ties to their cultural past and a high-tech Western culture that they're told exploits them to mortality.

"They look around and see nothing that echoes this great past they've heard about. The prospect of a Baghdad rebuilt to mirror that greatness could be a profoundly inspiring and healing vision," she says. "One ideal not just for Iraqis, one in which all Arabs could feel they share."

Wright had grown up with the "Arabian Nights" tales and was so fond of them he adorned his own children's playhouse in Oak Park, Ill., with a mural depicting "The Fisherman and the Genie," Maretta wrote. But his involvement in Baghdad was anything but fantasy.

Iraq had come into being as a nation in 1924, its boundaries conforming not to any resemblance of its past kingdoms but to the negotiated wishes of the great European powers in the wake of World War I. The British, who with the aid of Lawrence of Arabia had evicted the Turks during the Great War, and, in time, dominated the Arab lands, installed Faisal I of the Hashemite family as Iraq's king. They continued to influence Iraqi affairs even after World War II, when the country nationalized its much-coveted oil production, making vast sums available for public development projects.

In 1950 Iraq created a Development Board to chart a path for using the oil money to move the still primitive desert country into the modern age. For the first five years the board targeted the country's infrastructure: roads, flood control, sewerage, hospitals, schools and the like.

By 1957 the basics had been taken care of and the board was ready to move on to more ambitious public works. With Iraqi architects scarce at the time, leading architects from the West were invited to submit proposals for specific projects.

Among those who did were Germany's Walter Gropius, France's Le Corbusier and Italy's Gio Ponti. Wright was enlisted almost as an afterthought.

The irony, says Maretta, is that Wright was the only one giving a thought to Iraq's cultural heritage in his designs, and his weren't built. The others created "modern" architecture of the era that had little or no relation to Iraq or its history.

Those designs, she said, influenced the design of buildings in the years since, "so that today Baghdad looks like any Western city — maybe Los Angeles. The chance to reshape it with a distinctive character was lost.

It is the chance to recover that character, she says, that continues to fuel her fascination with Wright's vision.

"Americans — and I am one myself — are not very good at grasping the importance of traditional culture in a country like Iraq," she says. "We tend to think that because our political and economic system makes life good for us, it will solve problems for others if we just transport it. But Iraqis don't feel they are holding onto the culture that makes them happy as they adapt their society to the post-Saddam era. They are a proud people. We should help them express that cultural pride in a constructive way. It would solve so many of their present problems. And ours, too.

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11 July 2003

**MEMORANDUM**

TO: Secretary Rumsfeld  
FROM: L. Paul Bremer, III  
RE: CPA Priority Issues

**IRANIAN ENCROACHMENT:**

- Next steps?

**MEK WEAPONS:**

- What is the status of the request to use MEK weapons for new Iraqi Police and Army?

**GOVERNING COUNCIL:**

- On track for a Sunday announcement.

**IRAQI CIVIL DEFENSE FORCE**

- Plan to stand up 8 battalions quickly (next 45 days).

**KADEK:**

- As CENTCOM develops COAs, caution that we not divert military forces away from a fragile security situation.



11:03 AM

HO. 512

P. 2

September 16, 2003

TO: Honorable Colin Powell (by hand)

CC: Gen. Dick Myers  
Paul Bremer  
Paul Wolfowitz  
Reuben Jeffery

CoS			
Mid Assl			
Exec. Sec			

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Iraq Personnel

I understand you believe there are two or three hundred State Department personnel awaiting some sort of clearance to get to Baghdad and help staff the CPA. Could you please send me the list, so I can help push that along?

Thanks.

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## Captured Personnel in Iraq

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July 19, 2003

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### *Disposition of EPWs and MEK*

#### **Enemy Prisoners of War (EPWs)**

- Since the cessation of major combat operations, EPW captures are rare.

(b)(1) EPWs remain in custody as of 17 July 2003.

- CENTCOM continues to screen and release EPWs as appropriate.

- Policy Guidance #12 (03 April 2003) authorizes CENTCOM to release non-combatants who are not subject to prosecution or considered a security threat and to parole EPWs if they agree not to take up arms against the coalition.

- Those suspected of atrocities may be tried by Iraqi or other courts

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*Disposition of Criminal Detainees / Civilian Internees*  
**Criminal Detainees**

- In most cases they will be tried by Iraqi courts, including the new Central Criminal Court of Iraq (CCCI)
  - Iraqi Criminal Code has been established
  - Central Criminal Court has been created
  - CPA Examining ways to prosecute

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
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July 24, 2003

The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld  
Secretary of Defense  
U.S. Department of Defense  
1000 Defense, The Pentagon  
Washington, DC 20301

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I don't want to flood your in-box, but I do want to share the results of a seminar we just held on building a new Iraqi constitution.

Immediately following Undersecretary Feith's presentation at CSIS on July 8, we gathered together a small group of comparative constitutional scholars, policy veterans, Iraqi nationals and members of the business community. Their task was to think specifically about the problems of creating a solid basis for the long-term political environment in Iraq. Several of the participants had traveled independently to Iraq in recent months and had held wide-ranging conversations with a variety of people there. I hope the insights from this seminar can help inform and enrich the discussions you are having internally, both in Washington and Baghdad.

Several conclusions emerged from the discussions. The first is that the most important prerequisite for a successful political transition in Iraq is adequate time. There is indeed urgency in having Iraqis take responsibility for their own future. But the experts were in unanimous agreement that rushing political reconstruction will critically handicap it, locking in a permanent advantage for well-organized groups whose interests are inimical to our own.

Based on their experiences with constitution-writing processes in other regions, the experts argued that, at this stage, we need to buy some time. In particular, they suggested that the interests of long-term stability would be best served by directing short-term energy into the creation of an interim document resembling a Bill of Rights. Such a document should set ground rules for future political activity in the country and lay down a clear marker for how Iraq's future will differ from its past. At the core of such a document must be the determination that one's rights in the new Iraq derive from status as an individual, and not from membership in a sectarian group. If such a document were tied to an international standard, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, it would undermine critics who would see such a document as serving American, rather than Iraqi, interests. Building the immediate political tasks in Iraq around rights rather than processes allows time for Iraqis to be educated politically. It also gives them time to think of themselves in ways to which they have not yet become accustomed. Further, an emphasis on individual rights rather

than group rights or the division of spoils along sectarian lines decreases the likelihood of a future Iraq in which various parties battle for assets to support massive patronage networks. Carrying this off would certainly involve a coalition-led public education effort. Equally importantly, it would require recruiting a group of Iraqis to lead a grass-roots effort to guide their own country toward democracy.

Extending the timeline would also give members of the recently appointed Governing Council a chance to prove themselves and to deepen their networks in Iraq. Many on the ground have stronger networks and interests quite contrary to our own. In addition, extending the timeline would create opportunities for popular political leaders whom we have not yet identified to emerge from the Iraqi populace.

Drawing on their other experiences, the experts also underlined the importance of immediately placing a stress on local governance. By local, they meant largely municipal issues, not about federalism or politics at the provincial level. A stress on local governance would help convince Iraqis they are responsible for their own future, build a cadre of political leaders who acquire credibility through competent stewardship, and help shape the development of issue-oriented, rather than ideology-oriented politics. In such a sequence, democracy would grow from the grass roots, rather be extended down by a collection of capital-city elites dividing the spoils in constitutional conventions.

The experts' final theme was one that our trip report stressed, and is in many ways self-evident: for Iraqis to support U.S.-led political change, they must believe that the U.S. has helped improve their lives.

These suggestions seem sound to me, and I hope they seem sound to you. To my mind, they reflect some thoughtful directions for future action that have some perspective and comparative experience behind them. The director of our Middle East Program, Dr. Jon B. Alterman, ran the July 8 meeting. He would be happy to follow up with your staff on any of the issues contained here. He can be reached by phone at (202) 775-3295, and by email at [jalterma@csis.org](mailto:jalterma@csis.org). As always, we remain willing to help in any way we can.

Sincerely,

John J. Hamre  
President and CEO

CSIS – "Creating Strategic Insights and Solutions"

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XI 030729-06

June 21, 2003

TO: ~~Jeffrey Bremer~~

CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

*D.R.*

SUBJECT: Romania's Lessons for Iraq

Here is an interesting report from Paul Wolfowitz that you might find helpful.

Thanks.

Attach.

6/17/03 DepSecDef memo to SecDef re: Impressions from Romania Regarding Iraq

DJR:dh  
062103-1

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Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

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