



THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

17 JUN 2003

JUN 21 2003

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: IMPRESSIONS FROM ROMANIA REGARDING IRAQ

- During my visit to Bucharest May 18-19, I met with the Prime Minister, Defense Minister, Foreign Minister, opposition leaders, and members of the press and the community of non-governmental institutions.
- They asserted that the following experiences from Romania's effort to transform from a Communist autocracy to a Western democracy have relevance to Iraq.
- Political reform in Romania began expeditiously.

(b)(1)

- A National Council (unelected) was soon stood up and promulgated quickly an election law.

- (*)
- Free elections were held in May 1990 -just five months after Ceaucescu's execution.

(b)(1)

- The National Council sustained progress, in part, by separating administrative tasks (sanitation, health care, policing) which it handled from more political tasks, such as the Parliament's promulgation of a new constitution.

(b)(1)

(b)(1)

~~SECRET~~

Derived from: Multiple Sources
Declassify on: 19 May 2019

SPL ASSISTANT DIR RITA	6/19
DR MA CHODOCK	
MA BUCCI	
EDICOR MARSHALL	6/18

~~SECRET~~

- The National Council was not an elected body, but one composed of representatives from various parties.
- The government provided quickly tangible benefits to the people. Plots of land were sold in the countryside. Those in cities were allowed to buy their apartments.
- The new authorities provided transparency (press coverage) into their actions. The Parliament's deliberations on the constitution were broadcast nation-wide.

(b)(1)

(b)(1)

(b)(1)

- Some in the non governmental community asserted this inclusive approach is in

(b)(1)

(b)(1)

- On the economic front, a former minister of finance emphasized that it is essential to prevent rampant inflation. To allow pensions and salaries to erode only undercuts confidence in market reform.
- They all warned that (1) transforming Iraq into a democracy will take much time and effort and (2) hard reforms only become more difficult over time.

(b)(1)

~~SECRET~~

~~Derived from Multiple Sources~~

~~Declassify on: 19 May 2019~~

~~SECRET~~

MEMO TO: Secretary Rumsfeld

DATE: July 25, 2003

FROM: Paul Wolfowitz

SUBJECT: What to Call the So-Called "Sunni Triangle"

Don,

(b)(1) the Turks call it the "Devil's Triangle."

That might be a good phrase for us to adopt. (b)(1)

(b)(1)

Cc: GEN John Abizaid
LTG Ricardo Sanchez
AMB Paul Bremer
Clay McManaway
Larry DiRita

~~SECRET~~



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1100 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1100

copy
UIP30730-38
1803
7/18

INFO MEMO

July 18, 2003, 5:42 PM

COMPTROLLER

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dov S. Zakheim

SUBJECT: U.N. Oil for Food (OFF) Contract Audits

- Under the auspices of a Policy-directed Task Force, the DCAA and DCMA have conducted a review of approved and funded Iraqi Oil for Food contracts. The team selected 700 high priority, high-dollar contracts valued at \$7 billion for review; this amounts to roughly 10 percent of the OFF contracts but about 70 percent of the dollars.
- The audit team has briefed interim findings on 312 individual contracts. Of these 312 contracts the audit team believes 172, or 55 percent, of the individual contracts are overpriced. The average amount of overpricing per overpriced contract is 22 percent. The total of potential overpricing of the 312 individual contracts is \$358.7 million. This rate of over pricing, when applied to the 700 high-priority, high-value contracts, could result in as much as \$805 million in overpricing.
- In addition, the audit team found some contracts of questionable (!) value, such as contracts for Cigarette Paper, Mercedes Benz Sedans, Sports Halls (Gymnasiums) and larger than expected quantities of spares, passenger vehicles, and other pieces of miscellaneous equipment.
- The Secretary General has the authority (Pursuant to UNSCR 1483 (2003)), to either postpone action on or negotiate adjustments in the terms or conditions of these contracts. The CPA can advise the U.N. Secretary General of any postponements or adjustments in the terms of the contracts that are believed to be warranted. If postponed, the contract amounts would be deposited into the DFI; if adjusted, the contract amounts could be used to meet current requirements.
- I believe the CPA should pursue this effort with the U.N. If CPA prefers, my office and Policy could act on CPA's behalf. I recommend you discuss this matter with Jerry Bremer.

COORDINATION: USD (P)

cc: Deputy Secretary of Defense

(b)(1); 1.4(d) CIV, OSD

From: (b)(1); 1.4(d)
Sent: Saturday, July 19, 2003 12:30 AM
To: (b)(1); 1.4(d) CIV, OSD
Subject: FW:
Importance: High

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(1); 1.4(d)
Sent: Saturday, July 19, 2003 8:23 AM
To: Kennedy, Patrick AMB
Cc: McManaway, Clayton; Lemmon, Justin; Raphael, Robin
Subject: FW:
Importance: High

Sir - Six months ago SecDef undertook an effort to audit UN OFF contracts. He wanted leverage over the disposition of these funds. The surprise result: 55% are over priced. I understand transfer of OFF to DFI is a done deal now, although Robin has asked for this in writing. See the paper Robin did for Amb Bremer's trip book. If you do not have it, I can forward.
vr jsn

-----Original Message-----

From: McManaway, Clayton
Sent: Saturday, July 19, 2003 8:16 AM
To: (b)(1); 1.4(d)
Subject: FW:
Importance: High

As discussed.

cem

-----Original Message-----

From: McManaway, Clayton
Sent: Saturday, July 19, 2003 5:55 AM
To: Raphael, Robin
Subject: FW:
Importance: High

Robin:

We will need to discuss this as early this morning as possible. Did this get out of the box, or does it have your input and concurrence?

Clay

-----Original Message-----

From: Durnan, Jaymie, CIV, OSD
Sent: Saturday, July 19, 2003 3:08 AM
To: McManaway, Clayton; Oliver, David R., Jr.; Jeffery, Reuben
Subject: FW:

7/19/2003

FW:

Page 2 of 2

-----Original Message-----

From: Zakheim, Dov, Hon, OUSDC

Sent: Friday, July 18, 2003 6:45 PM

To: 'robin cleveland-2'

Cc: Durnan, Jaymie, CIV, OSD

Subject:

<<SDinfoOFFpricing_.pdf>>

FYI.

Dov

UI#30734-44

30 July 2003

MEMORANDUM

TO: Secretary Rumsfeld
FROM: L. Paul Bremer, III
RE: CPA Issues

MEK

- Need to resolve broader strategy as soon as possible.

NATO

- Should we consider issuing invitation to NATO to 1) establish small presence in Iraq of commanders/ advisors or 2) make a statement in support of international troop contributions?
- Endorsement, even in the absence of large troop deployment, could help provide political cover to member countries.

IRAQI GOVERNANCE COUNCIL

- GC elected a new nine-member leadership body to chair the Council on a rotational basis.
- Nine members elected were Ja'afari; Chalabi; Allawi; Talabani; Hakim; Pachachi; Hamid; Bahr al-Uloum; Barzani.

(b)(6) CIV

117-030730-45

From: Carpenter, Scott CIV Ministry of Governance**Sent:** Tuesday, July 29, 2003 12:27 PM**To:** (b)(6) (FSO1); McManaway, Clayton; Putnam, Candace E. (FS-02)**Cc:** (b)(6) Crocker, Ryan, Executive Secretary**Subject:** RE: Dick Nabb's report — on Turk's Military Training

CoS	
Mil Asst	
Exec Sec	

(b)(6)

Here is the draft letter to Paul plus the original report. I'm not sure the DepSecDef note is in the appropriate format but the content is fine.

S.

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) (FSO1)**Sent:** Tuesday, July 29, 2003 8:55 PM**To:** McManaway, Clayton; Carpenter, Scott CIV Ministry of Governance; Putnam, Candace E. (FS-02)**Cc:** (b)(6) Crocker, Ryan; Executive Secretary**Subject:** RE: Dick Nabb's report

We will be here at least until 10. You may send it to us electronically to execsec as it appears on the cc line. If not processed tonight, it will be first thing in the morning. Thanks.

(b)(6)

Head of CPA Executive Secretariat
Executive Asst, CPA Administrator

(b)(6) (Commercial line, at desk)

(b)(6) (cell)

(b)(6) (DSN)

-----Original Message-----

From: McManaway, Clayton**Sent:** Tuesday, July 29, 2003 8:15 PM**To:** Carpenter, Scott CIV Ministry of Governance; Putnam, Candace E. (FS-02)**Cc:** (b)(6) Crocker, Ryan; (b)(6) (FSO1)**Subject:** RE: Dick Nabb's report

Please send it to the Executive Secretariat first, thank you.

cem

-----Original Message-----

From: Carpenter, Scott CIV Ministry of Governance**Sent:** Tuesday, July 29, 2003 5:54 PM**To:** Putnam, Candace E. (FS-02)**Cc:** (b)(6) McManaway, Clayton; Crocker, Ryan**Subject:** Dick Nabb's report

Candace,

7/29/2003

Would you please do a note from Ambassador Bremer to DepSec Wolfowicz on the latest developments with the Turks? The letter format can be found on the website. The note should essentially say "I am attaching the latest report from Dick Nabb, our CPA regional director in the north, that indicates our continued difficulties, etc, etc." Feel free to add whatever else you feel relevant. Keep it to less than one page. I'm going out to dinner at 8PM but will back to clear it or Ryan can do it if he's here. In any case, I'd like to get it to him tonight. Thanks.

(b)(6)

7/29/2003

U1230807-34

August 4, 2003

TO: ~~Paul Bremer~~
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Iraqi Envoys at the UN

CHRW

The attached on Iraqi envoys at the UN is self-explanatory. I hope you are working the problem. Let us know what we can do to help.

Thanks.

Attach.
7/18/03 USD(P) memo to SecDef re: Iraqi Envoys at the UN

DHR:dh
080103 10

Please respond by _____

*Handled orally between
Cos/PK and Doug Feith's
aides, during his visit
PK -*

U12966 03

✓
8/1

INFO MEMO

OSD Policy
18 July 2003

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Douglas J. Feith *DJF* 7/18/03

SUBJECT: Iraqi Envoys at the UN

- You asked us to look at the Washington Post article "Saddam's Low Level Envoys Still Work at the UN" and research the facts presented in the article. If true, what do we do about it?
- After discussion with the USUN Mission, we discovered the following:
 - Article refers to 6 diplomats plus 8 staff in the Iraqi Mission.
 - Former Iraqi Ambassador to the UN, al-Douri, designated a Charge d'Affaires for the Iraqi Mission upon his departure. UN currently recognizes him and his staff as legitimate representatives.
 - He maintains status until transferred or challenged by the Credentials Committee.
 - Credentials have not been challenged because they are "cooperative" and their participation is mostly nonexistent.

For example, at the pre-donors' conference assembled a few weeks ago, the Iraqis asked to participate but were denied.

- Iraq's new Governing Council is sending representatives to address the United Nations Security Council next week. We may want the Governing Council to deal with this issue.
- Recommendation: no action required as Iraqi Mission staff has marginalized itself and the new Governing Council has this on its radar screen.

7/30

DUSD (NESA) 18 Jul 03

*I believe The Governing Council (GC)
told UN that the
GC would be sending
new reps
1.1.03*

UI 630813-43

COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY

BAGHDAD

13 August 2003

MEMO TO: Secretary Rumsfeld
FROM: Paul Bremer
SUBJECT: Meetings with the Governing Council on FDI

I had two meetings with the Governing Council today. The first was part of our regular weekly consultations, which are driven by an agenda agreed to earlier in the week. The bulk of our conversation focused on foreign direct investment (FDI). I made the general case why Iraq should be open to FDI. Given the dramatic lack of domestic investment over the past two decades, Iraq needs substantial FDI to create the jobs for its unemployed. GC members did not react in a unified way; some were enthusiastic about the prospect of FDI, while others resisted it – although less for ideological reasons than for ones of political sensitivity. It was, however, obvious that we need to cultivate the debate within the GC on FDI. Beyond expressing a fear that foreigners would buy up real-estate, no member expressed an opinion on any of the five other elements of an FDI policy I identified: restrictions on investment in certain sectors, percentage of foreign ownership, rapid approval mechanisms, the repatriation of capital and profits, and mechanisms for dispute resolution. I hope to facilitate an FDI briefing by a World Bank team on Sunday. I will then push GC thinking by submitting papers laying out the sort of FDI policy we believe is in the best interest of Iraq.

I also discussed with the GC two other issues related to the former regime. First, we spoke about how to handle the former employees of entities that were dissolved under my May 23rd order. We have thus far approached this issue differently depending on the entity dissolved; the military collects stipends, Ministry of Information employees received severance, and the members Office of the Presidential Diwan have acquired no

benefits. GC members did not reject our proposal of paying severance to members of entities close to the former regime. In fact, several pushed for a more generous solution, offering pensions to long-time employees and re-employment for non-senior Ba'athists. Rather than allowing us to move ahead with a severance package, the GC announced its intention to form a committee to look at this issue. On de-ba'athification, members resolved to appoint ten people to the Iraqi De-Ba'athification Council created in order to hand responsibility for de-ba'athification over to the Iraqis. Interestingly, more than one member argued for an amnesty for former Ba'athists who had never committed any crimes.

Later in the day, senior advisor for finance, David Oliver, and I met with the GC Subcommittee on Finance and Economics to discuss the budget. We underscored how Iraq would be in deficit in 2004 and how this would affect key sectors such as security, health, and electricity. We urged the GC to prepare for the Madrid Donor's Conference with a plan to seek funds to cover these gaps. Appointing an interim Foreign Minister, we stressed, would help Iraq increase its outreach and argue its case with donors around the world.

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

LI 430814-44

SEC DEF

AUG - 9 2003

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMINISTRATOR, COALITION PROVISIONAL
AUTHORITY (L. PAUL BREMER)

FROM: Douglas J. Feith, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy *DI 430814-44 8/9/03*

SUBJECT: Oil-for-Food (OFF) Program

- As you know, an interagency Task Force is reviewing the pricing of 760 (roughly 10%) of the approved and funded OFF contracts. Those contracts, valued at \$7B, represent 60% of committed funds.
- The Task Force has reviewed the first 628 contracts. Attached are its initial recommendations.
- The potential savings from implementing the recommendations could be significant
 - Up to \$600M saved if overpriced contracts are renegotiated; and
 - \$2-3B saved if overpriced and questionable contracts are cancelled.
- The CPA has the authority to advise the UN Secretary General to either cancel or negotiate adjustments in OFF contracts. If cancelled, the amounts should eventually be deposited in the Development Fund for Iraq. If adjusted, the amounts could be used to meet current reconstruction and humanitarian requirements.
- You may want to consider the Task Force's recommendations, as you determine how to proceed with the OFF program. My staff is ready to help you.

Attachment
a/s

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

OFF TASK FORCE INTERIM FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Interim Findings

- Of the 628 contracts already reviewed, roughly 50% were assessed to likely be overpriced. The average overpricing is 22% per contract.
- The total value of the contracts assessed to be overpriced is approximately \$2.8B; potential overpricing in the contracts is roughly \$600M.
- The OFF program reflects heavy dependence on old technology, particularly in the electrical sector; significant variability in prices for identical items; and little itemization of training, spare parts, and transportation costs.
- Several items of questionable value were identified, such as contracts for Cigarette Paper, Mercedes Benz Sedans, Sports Halls and larger-than-expected quantities of spares, passenger vehicles and other items such as maize headers.

Recommendations Regarding OFF Contracts

- Request documentation from suppliers for overpriced OFF contracts;
- Assess whether contract terms regarding spares or other items should be amended and whether contracts for "old technology" or items of questionable value are essential for immediate needs;
- Require adjustments in contracts that are overpriced.

Recommendations for Post-OFF Contracting

- Require that future contracts itemize transportation, insurance, and deliverables, including spare parts, services, or other items;
- Require suppliers to provide detailed specifications on items being supplied and detailed cost data for unique (sole source) items; and
- Require competitive bidding for commodity items; limit the use of middlemen.

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY
BAGHDAD

August 15, 2003

MEMO TO: Secretary Rumsfeld
FROM: Paul Bremer <signed>
SUBJECT: Urgent Budget Request

As you know, we have submitted a detailed budget request for funds needed before the end of this calendar year. It is a sizable request; eighteen billion dollars. This request was carefully prepared and a detailed budget was provided with it. We run out of money in January. Without these additional funds, this calendar year, we can not succeed in Iraq.

Now that the proposal has been prepared and submitted for your consideration, our political strategy and the timing of next steps become important for several reasons: 1) the Congressional calendar; 2) the scheduled UN sponsored donors conference; and 3) our political strategy as we seek congressional approval. The last of these looms large and immediate as we face the arrival of important congressional delegations in Iraq. These coming visits sharpen the need to maintain party lines of support. Specifically, I will be pressed hard beginning Monday on our needs for additional appropriated funds by visiting CODELS. Murtha is here Monday and Jim Kolbe will be here Tuesday with McCain. Rep Kolbe already signaled that he knows we need more money and wants to know the amount.

VI-130815-22

signed
✓ sent.

CHRON
SECDEF

I can make the general point about the need for more money and point out that the amount and legislative tactics must be decided by the President. But it would be better if I could go further, at least on the ballpark figure we will be asking for. Tom Korologos believes that the sooner we can discuss our plan with people like Kolbe and Murtha the better the chances are we will get the money we need to succeed here. In that event, we must also insure that other senior appropriators in Washington are informed of our intentions first.

For this reason I ask that you give this your *earliest* attention. Dov has the details. Given the timing of events, I will try to reach you by phone to discuss this later today.

As always, your support is greatly appreciated.

~~SECRET~~

COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY
BAGHDAD

August 15, 2003

MEMO TO: Secretary Rumsfeld
FROM: Paul Bremer <signed>
SUBJECT: Muqtada al-Sadr

For almost a month we have been examining the implications of allowing the Iraqi police to move against a radical, young Muqtada al-Sadr for the murder of highly respected Shi'a Ayatollah Mohammed al-Khoi in April of this year. The investigation of this murder has been underway for the past four months by a fearless Iraqi Investigative Magistrate. He has assembled more than thirty witnesses who support his case against Muqtada al-Sadr for this crime. They include two who are prepared to swear they heard al-Sadr give the order to have al-Khoi killed. Twelve defendants are already in prison in Najaf. Another eleven, including al-Sadr, have been under investigation for planning and masterminding the crime.

Yesterday I sent Major General (Reserve) Don Campbell, a State Supreme Court Justice in New Jersey, to Najaf to interview the Magistrate. Judge Campbell has closely followed the case, as have two experienced American prosecutors at CPA. The case the Iraqi Magistrate has put together appears to them to be fully and convincingly documented. They believe the Magistrate will sign the Arrest Warrant for al-Sadr and his assistants in a matter of days. They conclude that the

~~SECRET~~

XI-030815-33

signed
Sadr.

XCHRON
SECRET

~~SECRET~~

Magistrate is acting on his own without improper outside influence. He has previously told us that if he decides to arrest Muqtada al-Sadr he will use Iraqi police to do so, though he would like Coalition forces prepared to back them up if needed.

We have considered carefully the concerns voiced both about the potential for violence in reaction and about the possibility that Sadr's star is waning and should be allowed to fade without interruption. Our conclusion is that these analyses are wrong, and in particular fail to take into account our obligation to uphold law and order in Iraq and to be seen doing so. We conclude that we should not interfere with the Investigating Magistrate's proceedings even if they reach to the issuance of an arrest warrant for Muqtada al-Sadr for murder. We also conclude that should the Magistrate issue an arrest warrant for murder he should be allowed to carry out his duty and we should support him in that effort as the responsible, legally governing power in Iraq.

To date we have avoided direct confrontation with Sadr. We took no action when his newspaper of July 16 indirectly called for vigilante action against a list of 124 supposed Ba'this and Ba'th Party sympathizers. At least one of those listed was subsequently killed. And we have taken no action as he has bussed thousands of followers from the poorest neighborhoods of Baghdad to Najaf where he verbally attacks the Coalition, the Iraqi Governing Council and the traditional Shi'a leaders of Najaf. Intelligence suggests that he has plans to establish a separate governing body to compete with the Governing Council. He has publicly announced the raising of the "Mahdi Corps". Though to date this group appears to be unarmed, it is not clear how long that will last.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Contrary to the view that Muqtada is fading, our assessment is that his activities are spreading to other areas of Iraq. I experienced this first hand. On a trip to the South yesterday, two Shi'a members of the Governing Council I was traveling with expressed rising concern about Muqtada's activities and urged the Coalition to deal with him (as far as I know, they are unaware of the Iraqi Magistrate's investigation). Our forbearance has been rewarded with a growing religious-based insurgency against the Coalition and the Governing Council.

CPA and CJTF-7 are working together to plan for handling the consequences of an arrest. The arrest will be conducted by Iraqi police, with US forces providing back-up. We are already working to shape the environment and once he is arrested, we will launch a public information campaign that will emphasize the fact that Sadr is an accused murderer violating Iraqi law. We will also contact several Shi'a Clerics who in the past weeks have expressed concerns about Muqtada and seek their public support for the Iraqi Magistrate's decision.

The decision to support the Investigative Magistrate is not an easy one. The likelihood of serious unrest in the poorest neighborhoods in Baghdad, Basra and perhaps elsewhere is real and must be anticipated. But I do not believe that it is best to retreat in the face of this threat.

~~SECRET~~

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY
DOCUMENT TRACKING SHEET

ACTION OFFICE: Strategic Comms
ACTION: PLEASE Prepare Response for the Administrator's Signature
SUBJECT: TV in Iraq
COORDINATE WITH:

Special Instructions: *SEE ATTACHED SNOWFLAKE FROM SECRET*

SUSPENSE:	ROUTING DATE:	CONTROL NO.:
COB 08 AUG 03	8/7	030807-20

INFORMATION COPIES TO:

(b)(6)

ACTION TAKEN/RESPONSE:

Document Info

Received:

Doc. Date:

Origination:

U I 434823-18

COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY
BAGHDAD

23 August 2003

MEMO FOR: Secretary Rumsfeld

FROM: Paul Bremer, Administrator 8/23/03

SUBJECT: Kevin Woelflein

We have hired Kevin Woelflein. He will work in CPA's OMB. His first major task will be to develop better processes for pushing government funds through the banking system for execution of regional, provincial, and municipal programs

August 21, 2003

TO: Doug Feith
CC: Reuben Jeffery
Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Kevin Woelflein

Sometime back I recommended a man named Kevin Woelflein for consideration to go to Iraq. This is a person with banking experience. My recollection is he may even speak Arabic, but I am not sure of that. I sent the material on him to somebody.

I was told today that he was told that his services were not needed. I would be curious to have someone check into that and explain to me what in the world is going on. I thought we needed people out there.

Thanks.

DRH:dh
082103-2

.....
Please respond by 9/5/03

TO: Gen. John Abizaid
CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Amb. Jerry Bremer
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: August 30, 2003
RE: SADR

11-030831-33
~~SECRET~~
5 Nov 03

12:41 PM

LPB HAS SEEN

If SADR is publicly calling the Coalition "the enemy," we really need to think through carefully where the red lines are, and what we are going to do if red lines are crossed. If people want to define themselves as our enemies, then I think they've crossed over a line.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
083003.03

Respond by: _____

UNCLASSIFIED

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

29 August 2003

Mission: TF Reconstruction of Iraqi Electricity (TF RIE) deploys to Iraq and is operational within two weeks in order to support CPA in the delivery of reliable and consistent electrical power to the Iraqi people.

Concept of Operations:

- *In concert with guidance, achieve the objective of 4400 MW by 30 SEP 03 and 6000 MW by EOM MAY.
- *Rapidly deploy and carefully integrate a planning and management team with CPA, Iraqi Ministries, CJTF-7. TF RIE will be under the command of BG Hawkins.
- *As much as possible, leverage USACE personnel and resources in country.
 - Intent is to invigorate and empower current effort, not to scrap everything and start all over again
 - Right mix of using existing command and support structure with appropriate augmentation for maximum effect
- *Rapidly establish a tele-engineering network at each of the 18 major power plants and selected distribution nodes for in-country coordination and reachback to industry experts.
- *Leverage reachback with private industry for expertise through tele-engineering.
- *Continue to develop a mid-, and long-range plan of action that will mesh with the CPA PMO.
- *Deploy a power system security assessment team (RAM-T) to develop a national level infrastructure security plan.

The following support is required for implementation:

- \$500M under TF RIE control as initial seed money in order to leverage current USACE contracts and fund TF RIE
- Need to draft a "terms of reference" for the C2 piece so everyone knows (CPA/CJTF 7) how we fit and how we will be an executing agent for OPS. This will save an incredible amount of pain later. e.g. Mr. Bremmer and General Abizaid need to agree on the approach and empower their respective staffs with understanding of who is doing what to whom.
- Full acquisition authority
- Security in support of operations
- Authority and funding to conduct an expedited CRC process
- Logistic support for TF RIE (Beddown, communications, etc.)
- A senior civilian mentor who is a world class power infrastructure expert. Our research has identified a person with these characteristics (not contacted though) named (b)(6) Naval Academy Graduate, Bonneville Power Administrator (1993-

1998), CEO Seattle City Light (second largest municipal power company in U.S., currently a power industry consultant. Augmenting such an individual could be senior professional representatives from BPA (could be made available), TVA or a large private power company such as Duke Energy.

Approved By: _____

William E. Mortensen
Major General, USA
Director of Logistics

Prepared By: _____

(b)(6)
Colonel, USA
Chief, Engineers
29 August 2003

(b)(6)

From: Browning, Stephen E SES
Sent: Monday, September 01, 2003 10:02 AM
To: (b)(6) Strock, Carl
Subject: FW: Presentation on Exercise Essayon/ TF RIE
Importance: High

FYI on Tampa CENTCOM letter—response to.

Regards,

(b)(6)

Some initial comments:

This plan focuses on generation.

There is little or no reference to the security and restoration of 400kV transmission lines – the area where we feel that a task force type of approach will be most useful and effective

We are not aiming for 4400kW but 4400MW (slides 4 and 5)

Security problems are not nodal (site security has not been too much of a problem). The issue is security of power lines and pipelines. This is where we need military support.

Slide 13: the management/planning function must not be separate from the CPA electricity team (described as a cell within this presentation). It must report into the existing team. To do otherwise would add complexity. The contracting officer should fit within the CPA Contracting Authority (led by Col Tony Bell).

Slide 6: The assumption that no new assessments are required is incorrect. We would welcome FEST support in conducting assessments – that would be most useful.

In reality, we do not expect that Exercise Essayons will be able to contribute greatly to the 4400MW programme, simply because of deployment timescales. On October 1st, we will commence an autumn maintenance programme.

There are not really 18 major power stations – the ones that count are smaller in number. It would be more effective to provide larger teams at a fewer plants.

Questions.

For how long do we expect to retain the services of the additional staff of Exercise Essayons?

How does Exercise Essayons fit in with Task Force RIP or RIE?

What accommodation requirements does Exercise Essayons have?

Is it understood that we are expecting 18 Bechtel engineers to arrive within the next few days?

The key point that we wish to get across is that, although we warmly welcome more support and applaud the enthusiasm of Centcom, we have already have a team structure and approach that is correct and that is starting to get results. We wish to augment this team rather than create parallel management structures.

9/1/2003

9/2/2003

DRAFTED: JKREUL

AUTHORIZED: PBREMER

CLEARED: SCARPENTER, TKRAJESKI

FROM: HEADQUARTERS COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY
TO: SECDEF WASHDC
SECSTATE WASHDC

UNCLAS HQ CPA

E.O. 12358: N/A

TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PTER, ASEC, IZ

SUBJECT: CPA ADMINISTRATOR MEETING WITH IRAQ GOVERNING COUNCIL, SEPT 1, 2003

1. (U) CPA Administrator Bremer met with the Governing Council (GC) today (9/1/2003) to discuss security in the wake of the Najaf bombing. Administrator had met with the GC on Sunday night to discuss their plans to announce the new cabinet. They released the list of ministers today and plan an official event to unveil the cabinet on Wednesday.

2. (U) Today's session began with a short meeting with the full GC. Administrator offered his condolences to the members for the deaths in Najaf and reiterated that the U.S. stands ready to provide any assistance requested. He said that security clearly was the highest priority concern for the country at this time and he welcomed the GC's agreement to convene the Joint Security Committee. Administrator underlined USG support for putting an Iraqi face on security as quickly as possible.

3. (U) Administrator Bremer, LTG Sanchez, Sr. Advisor Slocombe, and Sr. Advisor Kerik then joined UK Representative Richmond for a smaller meeting with the GC's representatives to the Joint Security Committee. Administrator reminded the GC members that the Coalition had adopted a less intrusive posture in providing security for Najaf at the request of the local religious and government leadership, and that when those leaders did ask for more assistance we were quick to deliver. He also made clear that he did not appreciate the public criticism directed against the Coalition by GC members in the wake of the bombing and that additional unhelpful comments would make it difficult for the U.S. to continue its strong support for the GC. The GC members present were sympathetic but resisted taking responsibility for setting the record straight.

4. (U) While there was some discussion of arming militias, most members present agreed that creating unaccountable militias would only undermine security. All agreed that the situation in Najaf was extraordinary because of the city's religious importance and that we should arrange a joint GC-Coalition delegation to visit Najaf and develop a plan to improve security there. Some members argued that the Coalition needed to "take off the gloves" and make mass arrests of suspected Ba'athists to send a reassuring message to

the public. Some also called for comprehensive registration of all foreigners in the country accompanied by increased police supervision. The Administrator pushed back on mass arrests as being reminiscent of the previous regime. Registration was a good idea but would take years to implement.

5. (U) Administrator responded by offering a series of proposals in addition to the Najaf assessment: create an intelligence service and analysis center in the Ministry of Interior; establish customs/visa policies to improve immigration controls; provide military LNOs to each ministry to help coordinate security and Facilities Protection Service activities; solicit governors' nominations for Ministry of Interior governorate security coordinators; enlist GC members' assistance with recruiting for the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps; and accelerate build-up of the police and the New Iraqi Army.

6. (U) A follow-on meeting later in the day covered similar ground. The new Interim Minister of Interior agreed to create a joint MOI-Coalition working group to study ways to improve border security and CPA agreed to beef up security at key Sunni shrines that could be at greater risk following the Najaf bombing. The Administrator also offered to arrange for his chief of staff to brief the GC on measures CPA is taking to address members' concerns about their personal safety and the security of the GC complex.

7. (U) COMMENT: There is no doubt that security will continue to be the dominating issue for at least the near future.

BREMER

21/09/2008 00:33

(b)(6)

TAOS GUEST HOUSE

PAGE 02

8:58 PM

Chaw
TO: Jerry Bremer
Gen. John Abizaid

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: August 25, 2003

SUBJECT:

Attached is a letter I received from Retired Lt. Gen. James B. Vaught. I thought it had some interesting ideas, and you might be interested in reading it.

Thanks.

DHR/asm
082503.41

Attach: Letter to SD from LTG Vaught 8/21/03

RT → SN -

*pls. Scan & send to
L.P.B.M. + Clay -*

Jerry/Clay -

*Is Any follow up on the
below called for?*

*I have no view on "C", but
"B" strikes me at least as
interesting, if Iraqis would participate.*

Red

AUG-21-02 THU 02:00 PM LT. GEN. (RET) J. B. VAUGHT 045 247 2712 P.01

Fax For LTC Craddock, O&P-
 Please pass to your leader. *Jim Vaught*

LT. GENERAL JAMES B. VAUGHT
 (U.S. ARMY RETIRED)

U.S.

(b)(6)

BUSINESS PHONE/FAX: (b)(6)

HOME PHONE: (b)(6)

21 August 2002

Dear Secretary Rumsfeld:

Thanks for your continuing, determined leadership in the Global War Against Terrorism (GWAT). Listed next are some thoughts, for your considerations, to help stabilize the situation in Iraq, a confrontation some now say is beginning to turn negative in the eyes of your former supporters. Without a lot of elaboration, I suggest the following:

- A. Impose a dusk to dawn curfew each night along all of Iraq's international borders. Announce via all media that all person within 10,000 meters of the border who move around during curfew, will be shot by American Aircraft (AC-130's or other weapons platforms). During daylight hours, the borders will be surveilled by air and ground patrols. This action will stop the outsiders and Saddam sanctuary loyalists.
- B. Activate several thousand former Iraqi professional soldiers and place at least one (unarmed) in or on each American vehicle, positioned so they are visible while the vehicle is outside a secure base. General Patton did this with great success in the U.S. Zone of occupied Germany during 1945-46.
- C. Recall B/G Dave Grange to active duty, appoint him to the grade LTC, and make him the special security advisor to Ambassador Bremer (CIA and other advisory representation notwithstanding). His presence would not undercut Gen. Abizaid's authority. On the contrary, he would facilitate the CENTCOM liberation and security goals. (Note: I have not talked to Dave or Pete Schoolmaker. However, I am sure they both would concur) Dave knows what to do. He does not need a long list of guidance. There may be others who believe they are equally qualified, however, I don't know who they are and would like to compare their credentials with Dave Grange's. He has done it all, served at all levels, and still knows how to work as a member of a multi-discipline allied civilian/military team. He has served with me four times, (in peace and war) beginning when he was a Lieutenant.

Thanks again and press on with your VISION TO VICTORY!

Jim Vaught
 Jim Vaught

cc LTC Cody, B-3, US Army
 LTC(P) Doug Brown, US CENTCOM

3

TIKRIT

Introduction: Tikrit is well known as the homeland and heartland of Saddam and his family. Security operations to mop up remaining senior baathists absorb a considerable amount of US forces effort in this area. Ethnically, Tikrit is mainly Sunni Arab with smaller Turcoman and Kurdish populations in the northern city of Tuz Khormatu, the scene of recent violence following the destruction of a Turcoman shrine. Politically, Tikrit and environs house a constituency of "disgruntled" Sunni who feel that they are being side-lined in the national political processes.

Political: Despite being further behind its northern neighbours in political developments, Tikrit is just about to start enagaging in the process of selecting a governing council for the governorate of Salahaddin. Although there has been an appointed interim governor in place since shortly after the liberation of Iraq, he has had mixed reviews from community leaders in the governorate. And so Coalition Forces helping locals to organise the process have built on the formats used in Kirkuk and Diyala. Representatives of each of the main municipalities in the governorate will gain representation at the governorate level from the process. Tribal and community leaders from 8 municipalities have the opportunity to develop the political processes in the governorate. The selection process begins this week, with the governing council of 25 expected to be selected and functioning by the middle of September.

Economic: The Baiji refinery is in the Salahaddin Governorate. This facility is the primary refinery for processing Iraq's oil and a cornerstone in the pipeline to transport oil to Turkey. Despite a number of engineering challenges - a legacy of years of neglect and disrepair, the pipeline and refinery are improving and continue to increase capacity for processing.

*needs
update*

Reconstruction: The bridge over the Tigris at Tikrit has recently been awarded a Bechtel reconstruction contract. This will close the bridge for a short time while modernisation and repair work is carried out.

Humanitarian assistance: There is much non-conflict reconstruction and governance work to be done in Tikrit, particularly in areas outside the Saddam palaces and compounds. However, a reluctance by the UN even before the Baghdad bombing to consider this area permissive has limited UN visibility over the needs in Tikrit and has also limited the number of NGOs willing to consider working in the area. CPA North and the Coalition Forces have been working actively to persuade NGOs to do so.

MOSUL

Mosul has traditionally been Iraq's second city in the north. It has an ethnically diverse population with a majority of Sunni Arabs - both urban and tribal, a large population of Kurds, and sizeable but mixed Christian and Assyrian community. There is also a Turcoman community.

Mosul is the administrative center for the Ninevah governorate which has a large Kurdish/Yazidi Kurdish population in its northern region, and a large Turcoman community in Tall Afar. There are also key branches of the Shammar and Jibbouri tribes among a myriad of tribes in the agrarian areas of the governorate. The governorate was the victim of large scale social-engineering programs under Saddam, including the establishment of collective towns which displaced many Kurdish village populations and placed them in one center, and of Arabization where Kurds and Turcomans were expelled from the city and the governorate, losing property and land rights and title. Most were forced into the areas controlled by the KDP and PUK.

The legacy of these social engineering programs which has left a large displaced population from Mosul and Ninevah Governorate in the northern governorates has been one of the key issues since the liberation. Especially in the early days after the conflict, Kurds displaced from the governorate attempted to return, in some cases displacing Arabs living in the area. In advance of the May/June harvest season, Coalition forces established short-term harvest arrangements to acknowledge the disputed ownership of arable land but enable Arabs who had planted the summer crop to benefit from half the profits of the harvest.

Mosul is also the home of 30% of the officer corps of the former Iraqi army. On the announcement of the dissolution of the armed forces following liberation, there were demonstrations and finally a riot where former officers demanded salaries until they could find new jobs. The establishment of the stipend structure and initial programs for the New Iraqi Army has gone some way to calming this volatile group.

Mosul was one of the first governorates in post-liberation Iraq to select an interim City/Governorate Council. With the help of the Coalition forces in the area, local community leaders shaped a process which gave representation to all key ethnic and religious groups present in the governorate. The Council is headed by an Arab Mayor and a Kurdish Deputy. There are also Assyrian, Turcoman and Tribal assistant mayors.

Moslawis say that their number one priority is security. Many lawyers and security enforcement personnel acknowledge that Saddam's amnesty which released a large number of prisoners into the city have contributed to the security problems experienced since liberation. The city escaped large-scale battle damage (though there were some good surgical strikes) but fell victim to widespread looting. Reconstruction and rehabilitation of key city functions and infrastructure continues to be a priority of coalition forces on the ground.

Unfortunately this process was conducted in such a way as to explicitly divide representatives on the council on an ethnic basis

Mosul boasts a key university. As in other parts of Iraq, Baathism was endemic in the teaching system. But through agreement with the Coalition Provisional Advisor, a mechanism was found to enable students to complete their end of year exams, with tutors who had baathist affiliations employed on temporary 'at will' contracts. Mosul University is beginning to re-establish links with the three Kurdish Universities in the northern governorates. CPA North is working with the universities to help establish liaison mechanisms for sharing resources, personnel and expertise.

Mosul also has the capacity for a dynamic industrial and tourism sector. Local economists, industrialists and bankers are clamoring for national investment legislation to be established to free them from the old centralized system. There is plenty of entrepreneurial spirit in the city but the old State Enterprises have limited economic viability. The Governorate's main sulfur factory, already badly neglected before the conflict, was badly damaged in a sabotage attack in June.

Other key economic concerns include fuel supply. Mosul has benefited directly from a road 'pipeline' of benzine and LPG from Turkey which has alleviated fuel distribution problems and helped secure the successful completion of the summer harvest. Now concerns turn to continued supplies, and the supply of kerosene required for winter fuel.

U1030903-01

(b)(6) (CIV)

From: Krajewski, Thomas
Sent: Wednesday, September 03, 2003 9:07 AM
To: Executive Secretary
Subject: RE: FW: SECDEF trip - Read ahead Material for SECDEF visit Tasker

Tikrit paper attached. Mosul on the way.

Tom Krajewski
Deputy
CPA Governance
Cell: (b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) (CPT)
Sent: Tuesday, September 02, 2003 9:00 PM
To: Krajewski, Thomas
Subject: RE: FW: SECDEF trip - Read ahead Material for SECDEF visit Tasker

Tom,

Thank you.

(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: Krajewski, Thomas
Sent: Tuesday, September 02, 2003 8:29 PM
To: (b)(6)
Cc: Carpenter, Scott CIV Ministry of Governance; Executive Secretary
Subject: RE: FW: SECDEF trip - Read ahead Material for SECDEF visit Tasker

Dick, CJTF and DOD are dinging us for one-pagers on Mosul and Tikrit. Do have something we can send?

Tom Krajewski
Deputy
CPA Governance
Cell: (b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6)
Sent: Tuesday, September 02, 2003 8:40 AM
To: Krajewski, Thomas; (b)(6)
Cc: Carpenter, Scott CIV Ministry of Governance
Subject: Re: FW: SECDEF trip - Read ahead Material for SECDEF visit Tasker

Have already provided the BIODs for Mayor and Dep to Marian. I'll work something up for the two cities but I think the Divs are doing that. Dick

>From: "Krajewski, Thomas"

9/3/2003

>To: "Dick Naab (CPA-N)", "Liane Saunders (Mosul)", "Emma Sky (Kirkuk)"
 >CC: "Carpenter, Scott CIV Ministry of Governance"
 >Subject: FW: SECDEF trip - Read ahead Material for SECDEF visit Tasker
 >Date: Tue, 2 Sep 2003 07:30:47 +0400

>
 >Dick, Could you get us a bio for the mayor of Mosul as well as your
 >points for a "read-ahead" for the SecDef's proposed visit to Mosul and
 >Tikrit. Don't worry about format, we'll sort that out.

>Thanks. Need it by COB today.

>Tom Krajewski

>Deputy

>CPA Governance

>Cell: (b)(6)

>-----Original Message-----

>From: (b)(6) (CPT)

>Sent: Monday, September 01, 2003 9:57 PM

>To: Kerik, Bernard B.; Carpenter, Scott CIV Ministry of Governance

>Cc: Krajewski, Thomas; Braun Michael A. (SES-5); Executive Secretary

>Subject: FW: SECDEF trip - Read ahead Material for SECDEF visit Tasker

>Mr. Kerik: Please answer #4 Tasker 030901-45 DUE COB 2 SEP 03

>Scott Carpenter/Tom Krajewski: Please answer 1, 2, and 3. Tasker

>030901-46 DUE COB 2 SEP 03

>(b)(6)

9/3/2003

>
>
>Just got a call from (b)(6) in OSD
>trying to get some info for the Secretary's trip book. She said that
>she needed the info ASAP She said that you coordinated a prior trip so
>I am sending you the info. You can get all of this info from the
>Governance team.
>
>
>
>1 Bio for Gov/Vice Gov of Mosul
>
>2 Governing Council Bios
>
>3 Read-ahead on Mosul and Tikrit (1 pg max setting climate,
>history, etc)
>
>4 1 pg bio on the Brit that runs the Abu Gharib prison (Ministry
>of Interior should be able to get it for you)
>
>
>
>So good to be back.
>
>
>
>Cheers,
>
>Justin
>

Get MSN 8 and help protect your children with advanced parental controls.

9/3/2003

117-03 09030

117-03 09030

3 Sep 2003

MEMORANDUM

TO: Secretary Rumsfeld
FR: Paul Bremer
RE: CPA Talking Points

Ok
also 2 weeks
like 5 minutes at
end of sec Net

NAJAF

- Yesterday's funeral uneventful. USG helping with investigation.

ELECTRICITY

- Crossed 3400MW mark today enroute to goal of 4400MW by 30 September.
- Signed agreement to import 50-75MW from Turkey. Close to agreement with Syria for 100MW of power.
- Proposed ACE-led task force on electricity.

OIL

- Crude oil production has exceed 1.5M barrels per day for two weeks. Back-up generators delivered to southern oil fields have resulted in consistent production above target.

GOVERNING COUNCIL

- Interim ministers appointed today.
- Governing Council focus on security after murder of Mohammed Baqr Al Hakim.
- Shia GC member Mohammed Bahar Al Uloum suspended membership in GC over "coalition failure to provide security for holy sites."

ECONOMY

- J.P. Morgan-led consortium will run Trade Bank.
- Opening banking sector to international banks.

41-654112 23



Chlor



SEC DEF :
Iraq Status Update

11 SEP 03

9/14/2003



Coalition Provisional Authority Vision

"No thoughtful person would suggest that the coalition should govern Iraq for long. Although Iraqis have freedoms they have never had before, freedom is not sovereignty and occupation is unpopular with occupier and occupied alike. We believe Iraqis should be given responsibility for their own security, economic development and political system as soon as possible."

"...the path to full Iraqi sovereignty is clear. The journey has begun and three of the seven steps on this path have already been taken. The first step came two months ago with the creation of a 25-member Governing Council broadly representative of Iraqi society. The second step took place last month when the Governing Council named a preparatory committee to devise a way to write a constitution. The third and most important was putting day-to-day operation of Iraqi government in the hands of Iraqis. Last week the Governing Council named 25 ministers. Writing Iraq's new constitution is the fourth step. It begins after the preparatory committee recommends a process for writing a constitution to the Governing Council later this month. Step five, popular ratification of the constitution, is indispensable. For the first time in history, Iraq will have a permanent constitution written by and approved by the Iraqi people. The sixth step, election of a government, follows naturally. The seventh step, dissolving the coalition authority, will follow naturally on the heels of elections."

"Last night the President called upon Americans to continue to support the Iraqis in their progress. I am confident that the American people will rise to this challenge as they always do."
 9/14/2003 Announcement by L. Paul Bremer III, 9 September 2003



Strategic Priorities

Report organized by five principal objectives:

- **SECURITY** – establish a secure and safe environment.
- **ESSENTIAL SERVICES** – restore basic services to an acceptable standard.
- **ECONOMY** – create the conditions for economic growth.
- **GOVERNANCE** – enable the transition to a legitimate, constitutional government.
- **INTERNATIONAL PARTICIPATION** – maximize contributions from international partners and organizations.

9/14/2003



Progress on Priorities Security Update

- **Border Enforcement is divided into three bureaus: Border and Customs Police, Border Inspections, Nationality and Civil Affairs.**
 - **Border and Customs Police:**
 - Enforce the immigration and customs laws and regulations along the border between the ports of entry and the interior of Iraq.
 - The current number of personnel is about 4,000 of the 6,000 required.
 - **Border Inspections:**
 - About 2,500 customs inspectors who inspect imported and exported products.
 - Approximately 350 Border Guards who perform perimeter and internal security of the respective port of entry compounds.
 - **Bureau of Nationality and Civil Affairs:**
 - This bureau is divided into three sections: Passport, Nationality and Civil Affairs, and Immigration.
 - Total required personnel is about 2,250.
- **Traffic Police**
 - The Iraq Traffic Police has 5,200 officers and 27 Office buildings countrywide.

9/14/2003



Progress on Priorities **Essential Services**

Food

- Food distribution through Public distribution System (PDS) continuing smoothly.
- WFP brought in 139,200 MT in August; slightly down from the planned 150,000 MT because of bombing of the UN building.

Water

- Ministry of public Works' water & sanitation goals are 80% restoration by October & 100% by end of year; currently at 68%.

Health & Medical

- Ministry of Health priorities are: 1) security of hospitals & warehouses; and 2) no major disease outbreaks.

9/14/2003



Progress on Priorities


National Power Update

- Electricity generation reached its highest point on 29 August was 3,734 MW; 7-day average of 3,488 MW.
- CPA is making immediate repairs to power stations and transmission lines as part of the plan to increase power to 4,400 MW by 30 Sep 2003.
- The Oil-Power Fuel Task Force is working to ensure adequate fuel is available for increased generation. Shortage of diesel is a limiting factor and other fuel sources are being sought.
- Signed agreement with Turkey to import 50 MW, growing to a potential of 100 MW in exchange for dollars & #6 fuel oil.

9/14/2003



Power / Baghdad



9/14/2003

Power Production Timeline

*Monthly averages. Estimated date to achieve pre-war baseline: 1 October '03



Progress on Priorities Fuel Status Update


- Iraq-Turkey (IT) Pipeline.
 - Contract issued 4 Sept to repair nine pipelines damaged late evening 29 August, including 40", 32" and 30" crude pipelines.
- Repairs finished to 16" natural gas pipeline north of Bayji, discovered afire on 29 August.
- Basra Refinery on independent power, producing all products.
- 14" LPG line in South repaired, preparations underway to pack with gas – will improve distribution of LPG throughout Iraq.
- Loading of crude oil tankers at Mina al Bakr (Persian Gulf) now averaging 600,000-700,000 barrels/day.

9/14/2003



Crude Oil / Iraq

Iraqi Crude Oil Production: Targets & Trends



Near Target (Jan 04): 1.75 MBPD

Mid-term Target: 2.1 MBPD (Pre-War Average 2002)

Long term Target: 3.1 MBPD (Pre-War Capacity)

Jan 03 Average = 2.45 MBPD

Apr 03 Average = 0.14 MBPD

May 03 Average = 0.30 MBPD

June 03 Average = 0.67 MBPD


July 03 Average = 0.91 MBPD

August 03 Average = 1.44 MBPD



Gasoline / Iraq


Iraqi Gasoline/Benzene: Production & Imports vs. Pre-War Production





Kerosene & Diesel / Iraq


Iraqi Kerosene & Diesel: Current Supply vs. Pre-War Production





Liquid Propane Gas / Iraq

Iraqi LPG: Production & Imports vs. Pre-War Production



9/14/2003
NB: Spike on 2 Sep 03 due to 8000 metric ton import of LPG by ship




Salaries: CPA Order Number 30

- **Effective 1 October 2003 until 30 September 2004**
- **A new public sector salary system reform aimed at fostering transparency in payments & to regularize payments to ensure comparable pay for comparable work across all areas of public service.**
- **Establishes 13 Grades with 10 internal promotion Steps.**
- **Effects all ministries, state owned enterprises and other public agencies.**
- **Requires employees to report to work or not be paid.**
- **Allows for dismissal; establishes merit promotions.**

9/14/2003



Governance



31/14/2003



Arab League Grants Seat to Iraqi Governing Council

- **League of Arab States offered seat to interim foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari**
- **Establishes international recognition that the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) is the political voice of Iraq.**
- **Limited to one year, allowing IGC time to prepare a constitution, a national vote & the formation of an elected government.**

9/14/2003



International Participation

- **46 nations potentially supporting Iraqi Stability and Humanitarian Relief.**
 - **30 Countries with military forces in Iraq:** Albania, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Czech Rep, Denmark, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Estonia, Georgia, Honduras, Hungary, Italy, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Mongolia, Macedonia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, South Korea, Spain, Thailand, Ukraine, and UK.
 - **2 countries committed to provide forces in Iraq:** Moldova and Portugal.
 - **14 others are considering decision to provide forces for Iraq.**

9/14/2003



Iraq Status Update



•POC: (b)(6) OSD SO/LIC Stability Operations

(b)(6)

9/14/2003

11T-OR17-24

LFB HAS SEEN

INFO

September 16, 2003

Received 17 SEP 1758L

CoS		
Mil Asst		
Exec. Sec	jm	9/17

TO: Jerry Bremer
Gen. John Abizaid

CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith
Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Afghanistan and Iraq

Attached are some notes I made after a meeting with some editorial boards in New York.

Attach.
9/15/03 MFR

DHR:dh
091503-71

.....
Please respond by _____

September 16, 2003

(Attachment)
FROM: SECDEF

SUBJECT: Afghanistan and Iraq—The message

In New York at two editorial board meetings, I received the following suggestions:

- Our message isn't getting through
- It will take video and pictures—not just print.
- We could use some polls to prove there is recognition of progress in Iraq.
- We have to control the spectrum.
- We have to do something about improving Al-Jazeera and Al Arabiyah.
- We may need some creative events.

DHR:dh
091503-64

11-030417-25

ALL HAD BEEN

INFO

September 16, 2003


Received 1752P 1758L

CoS	
Mil Asst	
Exec. Sec	

TO: Jerry Bremer
Gen. John Abizaid

CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith
Powell Moore
Dov Zakheim
Reuben Jeffery

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT: Pending \$87 Billion Presidential Request

It looks as though the key witnesses on the \$87 billion Presidential request will be Ambassador Jerry Bremer and General John Abizaid. The thinking currently is that several committees in the House and Senate would be holding hearings on it, possibly September 24 and 25.

I wanted to mention this to you immediately, so you would have it in your thinking in terms of travel plans. While it is not set, there is at least a reasonable possibility that the folks are going to want you back here as the lead witnesses.

Regards,

DHR:dh
091603-16

.....
Please respond by _____

U13-030911-23

September 17, 2003

TO: Jerry Bremer
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith
Reuben Jeffery
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Business Development

What can we do to get more business people interested in Iraq? What can I do to help?

Thanks.

DRR:sh
091703-13

.....
Please respond by 10/3/03

U15533-03

UI-030918-29

September 17, 2003

TO: Jerry Bremer

CC: Gen. John Abizaid
Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith
Reuben Jeffery

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Generators

I met with some people from the region the other day, and they said there are a number of five-megawatt generators that can light up a city in Bahrain, Kuwait and various Gulf locations. Why don't we borrow them and get them into Iraq? Can we be helpful?

Thanks

DHR:dh
091703-9

.....
Please respond by 9/26/03

UNCLASSIFIED

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
CABLES DIVISION

FAX TRANSMISSION COVER SHEET

Telephone: Comm (b)(6)

18-Sep-03 / 09:27

To: Ambassador Bremer

From: Secretary Rumsfeld

Subject: Business Development

Fax #: (b)(6)

Pages: 2
(Including cover)

Remarks:

CABLES DISTRIBUTION	
DEF	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
SECDEF	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
ASST	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
CHIEF	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
OP	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
DI	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
IN	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
D	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
CH	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
CH	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
CABLE CH	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
FILE	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>

UNCLASSIFIED

P. 1

* * * TRANSMISSION RESULT REPORT (IMMEDIATE TX) (SEP 18. 2003 10:21AM) * * *

FAX HEADER:

DATE	TIME	ADDRESS	MODE	TIME	PAGE	RESULT	PERSONAL NAME	FILE
SEP 18.	10:19AM	(b)(6)	03ES	1'53"	P.	2 OK		549

: BATCH
M : MEMORY TX
S : STANDARD
* : FC
2 : ASYNC MODE

C : CONFIDENTIAL
L : SEND LATER
D : DETAIL
+ : ROUTING
1 : MIL STD MODE

* : TRANSFER
* : FORWARDING
1 : FINE
O : RECEPT. NOTICE REQ
3 : RICOH MG3/COMPATIBLE MODE

R : POLLING
E : ECM
J : REDUCTION
A : RECEPT. NOTICE



COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY
BAGHDAD

1 October 2003

MEMO FOR: Secretary Rumsfeld
FROM: Paul Bremer <signed>
SUBJECT: Training Iraqi Police

I have your note of September 29.

As I mentioned to you September 30, we welcome assistance from the military in the police program. The single most useful service they can immediately provide is helping us with the recruitment of police. To come up the some 40,000 recruits we need to train over the next 18 months, we will need a pool of over 200,000 candidates. We will use the military for this urgent task. And we will see how they can help us with the logistics as we ramp up the training in Jordan.

I intend to keep responsibility for police training with the Ministry of Interior. I have asked Rick Sanchez to detail staff into the MOI to coordinate the support activities which the military can provide.

September 29, 2003

TO: Jerry Bremer
Gen. John Abizaid

CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Assistance from Germany

Colin Powell told me this morning that the Germans have offered to help train police in Iraq. I mentioned that I thought they had done a pretty slow job in Afghanistan. Condi said she thought the reason was because they did the facilities first, and now they are ready to really get going in Afghanistan.

I don't know if that is going to happen or not, but we sure ought to check and see what they have done in Afghanistan. Then we ought to decide what we want them to do in Iraq. If they are stepping up and offering it, my instinct is to grab it and have them help us.

Thanks.

1:11M dm
092903-27

.....
Please respond by 10/17/03

U16081 /03

0430
030430-062
73

September 29, 2003

TO: Jerry Bremer
Gen. John Abizaid

CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

DA

SUBJECT: Training Iraqi Police

I understand your interest in making sure the police are trained in a way that is appropriate for police. On the other hand, it is urgent that we get a rapid expansion of the police capability in Iraq.

The only capability we have to really get something done fast in that country is the U.S. military. We have plenty of people offering assistance, such as the Department of State, Germany, Jordan, UAE and others.

My suggestion is that I name CENTCOM the "executive agent" for police training, and that the Coalition Provisional Authority hold control over the curriculum, the type of training they receive and who does the actual training. Since Bernie Kerik left, I understand things have slowed down on police training. I think this would be a good way to get it going. CENTCOM can help with all the heavy lifting.

Please talk about this.

Thanks.

DRB:ds
10/01/03

.....
Please respond by 10/11/03

U16083 /03

030930-066
72

September 29, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita
CC: Jerry Bremer
Paul Wollowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsted *DR*
SUBJECT: Press in Iraq

I am told that the press people are frightened to leave Baghdad. I wonder if we ought to arrange for them to get out on a space available basis to go to places like Mosul, so they can see the rest of the country.

Thanks.

DAIR dh
10/2/03 15

.....
Please respond by 10/11/03

U16082 /03

COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

FROM: Adam Sugar

DATE: 29-Oct-03

ACTION REQUESTED

FOR: Ambassador Kennedy

ORIGINATION: ExecSec

RE: Snowflake on Garner Memo

This October 14 memo is still marked as in with LPB. We want to determine whether this requires a written response back to SecDef, or if we can assume this was covered during Ambassador Bremer's consultations in Washington. If you believe no further response is necessary, we can close the loop with CPA-Rear and confirm we will not be sending a written reply.

Attachment(s): As stated

No (2nd) necessary
PK