



COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY
BAGHDAD

040609-13

governance

ACTION MEMO

June 09, 2004

FOR: THE ADMINISTRATOR
FROM: (b)(6) Governance
THROUGH: (b)(6) Governance
SUBJECT: Kirkuk Foundation

Steady progress is being made in setting up the Kirkuk Foundation. Consultants are currently working on the Foundation's by-laws, where to incorporate the Foundation, and in which bank to keep the funds.

We are currently in the process of establishing a Board for the Foundation, consisting of leading Iraqi personalities (eg Adnan Pachachi, Abbas al-Bayati, Yonadam Kanna) chosen for their integrity, and perhaps a couple of international figures. In order to take this forward, we need an Iraqi counterpart to work with and around whom to build the Board.

Attached is a memo to Prime Minister Allawi and President Yawer which describes the Kirkuk Foundation and its aims and requests their assistance in identifying Iraqis for the Board.

RECOMMENDATION (1): You approve the attached memo to Prime Minister Allawi and President Yawer.

Approve: _____ Disapprove: _____ Approve with modification: _____

RECOMMENDATION (2): You visit Kirkuk with with Prime Minister Allawi or President Yawer to announce the Kirkuk Foundation

Approve: _____ Disapprove: _____ Approve with modification: _____

ATTACHMENTS: Memo to Prime Minister Allawi and President Yawer on the Kirkuk Foundation

COORDINATION: General Counsel, (b)(6)
Ministry of Trade (b)(6)
CPA-N, (b)(6)

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COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY
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FOR: Prime Minister Allawi and President al-Yawar
FROM: L. Paul Bremer III, Administrator
SUBJECT: Kirkuk Foundation

We all are aware that Kirkuk is one of the most politically complex issues in Iraq and a number of articles in the TAL make specific mention to it. The potential for conflict in Kirkuk should not be underestimated.

Over the last few months there have been discussions with a number of Iraqis about the establishment of a Kirkuk Foundation as a conflict prevention mechanism. The Foundation will have an endowment of \$100m (\$50m from KRG Oil for Food funds and \$50m from DFI).

The objectives of the Foundation are:

- To facilitate the development of a common vision for the Province of Kirkuk
- To assist with the reintegration of internally displaced people s back into the communities
- To develop an enabling environment for economic development
- To strengthen the professionalism of the security services
- To promote reconciliation, equality and rights
- To develop the capacity of civil society to prevent and resolve conflict

The Foundation will have a Board of highly respected Iraqis, who are not members of the Interim Government (for reasons of attachment of funds). As Prime Minister and President, it might be appropriate for you to identify such individuals for the Board. It has also been proposed that a couple of international figures might sit on the Board, contributing comparative experience and expertise. We have some suggestions that we would be happy to propose.

The Board will meet quarterly. Its role will be:

- To contribute policy recommendations to the interim and transitional governments on Kirkuk issues, in accordance with the TAL
- To appoint the Steering Committee
- To select the Project Management Unit
- To agree to by-laws for the Foundation
- To be the final grant-making body

The Steering Committee will consist of recognized political and community leaders in Kirkuk. The Steering Committee will be appointed by the Board. Again we would be happy to propose names of those individuals we believe are well suited to serve.

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The Steering Committee will meet quarterly. Its role is:

- To develop a vision for Kirkuk
- To set priorities for project funding
- To approve projects to be funded
- To monitor project activity

A Project Management Unit – selected by the Board through an international procurement exercise – will manage the dispersal of grants and services, provide expert financial management, and ensure that activities contribute to the overall objectives of the Foundation.

If you are amenable, I would like to visit Kirkuk with either of you before 30 June to publicly announce the establishment of the Foundation.

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COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY
BAGHDAD



Administrator's Weekly Report

Governance

May 15-21, 2004

HIGHLIGHTS

-- The Independent Election Commission nomination submission period exceeded expectations with widespread popular participation throughout the country. More than 1,800 nomination forms were submitted.

I. Transition to Sovereignty

- On May 17, Ezzidin Salim, the (rotating) president for the month of May of the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) and Al-Dawa party member, was killed in Baghdad in a car bomb explosion. IGC member Ghazi Ajil al-Yawar has assumed the role until the transition on June 30.
- A poll was conducted April 20-29 of more than 1,500 Iraqis in Baghdad, Basrah, Mosul, Babil, and Sulaymaniyah. Among the results of the poll:
 - Ali Sistani shows more political support than any other named figure. Muoqtada al-Sadr shows the second largest amount of political support and has gained support from his recent confrontation with Coalition Forces;
 - Respondents favor very broad powers for the Interim Government but would not let them bind future governments; and
 - Only 11 percent of respondents indicated they support a political party.
- Formal transition ceremonies are scheduled for the upcoming week for the Ministries of Interior, Environment, and Transportation.
- To date, CPA has transitioned authority to 13 of the 26 Ministries. These ministries include the following:
 - Health
 - Education
 - Municipalities and Public Works
 - Science and Technology

- Culture
 - Agriculture
 - Planning and Development
 - Displacement and Migration
 - Water Resources
 - Industry and Minerals
 - Foreign Affairs
 - Justice
 - Youth and Sport
- Participants at the May 15 Baghdad town hall meeting discussed the process for national elections. An Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) member and two United Nations (UN) representatives made introductory remarks, followed by an extensive question and answer session for the 250 Baghdad area residents who attended the event. This meeting was the third town hall event for the Baghdad community held this year.

II. Develop Civic Participation in Governance

Develop indigenous polling capacity; Provide women and youth with the skills necessary to become important participants in the political process; Develop local civil society capacity to conduct advocacy and participate in political life; Develop civic education programs promoting electoral participation and democratic ideals; Build capacity for civil society conflict prevention and mitigation

- The CPA/Local Governance Project (LGP) hosted more than 1,400 democracy development activities (DDA) across Iraq this week. To date, almost 9,000 democracy DDA events have been held across Iraq, including more than 6,400 events for citizens and civic groups. In total, more than 280,000 Iraqis have participated in these events.
- DDA facilitators continue to address questions regarding the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL) and other topics from event participants while also working to explain the TAL to citizens. The comments from the North appear biased toward a Kurdish viewpoint with issues such as Kurdish rights and suggestions for more autonomy regarding the Kurdish population.
- DDA participants continue to discuss the representation of women as proposed in the TAL. Respondents offer mixed opinions on the rights of women in general and as outlined in the TAL. More men typically voice opinion against women's rights and women tend to support the issue of women's rights.
- More than 100 students, including 48 women, attended a May 16 lecture at the Technical Institute of As Sulaymaniyah, the sixth lecture in a series of 12, which aims to engage youth in democratic dialogue. The event was sponsored by the Kurdish Institute for Elections (KIE), under an LGP grant as part of the Youth Civic Education Awareness Campaign.

- In Basrah, more than 500 people participated in 19 DDA events this week. Most participants expressed reservations about federalism. Some participants, however, expressed the view that federalism would add strength to the states. Other feedback from the events include:
 - There should be more emphasis on fair and open elections under the supervision of the United Nations;
 - The Transitional Administrative Law (TAL) must address explicitly how to deal with armed militias in a democratic Iraq;
 - Iraqis who have resided in Iraq during the entire period of the Ba'athist regime should have priority in governing Iraq over those that returned from abroad;
 - The only solution to eliminating violence, killing, and looting is to offer more job opportunities;
 - Honesty and credibility of the media would help in creating a new democratic Iraq; and
 - National reconciliation will secure peace.
- In Sulaymaniyah, the CPA/LGP provided grant funding for the Halabja Women's Center to assist the center in offering literacy classes and a fully equipped library.
- CPA/LGP assistance to the Northern Iraq Women's Mobile Teams is one-third complete. This project will increase access to basic services, improve the health and social situation of women and children, and raise awareness of violence against women and other issues.
- The CPA continued work with the Khatuzeen Women's Center for Social Action to secure equipment for a women's radio station. The center was established in 1983 to focus on support of women and children's issues in the Arbil community. The radio station will enhance the capacity of the center to increase the reach to women in the community and provide them with a greater understanding of current events and political issues.

III. Develop Framework and Capacity for Elections

Support creation of National Independent Electoral Commission; Promote scopes of work and operational linkages between national, regional, and local level election administration authorities

- Response to the Independent Election Commission nomination period exceeded expectations with widespread popular participation throughout the country. Approximately 1,900 nomination forms were submitted. Six percent of the nominees are women.
- The next step in the United Nations-sponsored process is the vetting of the approximately 1,900 submissions and selecting twenty five candidates to be interviewed in Baghdad May 23-28. The UN interview panel will consist of former and current election commissioners and administrators from around the world.

- Fifteen commissioner candidates and three Chief Election Officer candidates will next be submitted to the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) for their review. The final selection, seven Commissioners and the Chief Election Officer, will be approved by the CPA. Candidates who were not selected will be maintained in a central data base for consideration for positions in the provincial electoral administration or vacancies on the Commission.

IV. Promote Respect for Human Rights

Educate on human rights issues; Preserve documentation of past atrocities, raise awareness, and promote reconciliation; Strengthen local capacity to investigate and address past atrocities; Establish Iraqi Special Tribunal (IST) for past atrocities; Incorporate human rights into laws; Develop role of independent human rights NGOs and media; Establish a human rights ministry

- The CPA/Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) continues to support efforts to address human rights and transitional justice issues in regard to abuses and crimes against humanity by the former regime. Two grants to supplement the on-going work of the IST were awarded this week to provide equipment and office space for IST staff. These awards will facilitate the functioning of the IST so that trials may be conducted in a fair, efficient manner consistent with international human rights standards.
- The Ministry of Human Rights is preparing for a nationwide oral history project to train Iraqis to interview thousands of people about regime crimes. This project will supplement the efforts of the IST by providing detailed recordings of victim testimony for missing persons, academic research and an aid to a future truth Commission.
- Ministry of Human Rights staff continues to sort through and identify documents relating to human rights abuses by the former regime. These documents will be scanned at a specialist site, and searched using Optical Character Recognition and automatic translation software so that they may be used for the IST and other Ministry purposes.

V. Promote Durable Solutions for Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)

Facilitate the return of refugees and IDPs; Build local and national capacity to protect and assist refugees and IDPs; Develop and implement the Iraq Property Claims Commission (IPCC) for property disputes

- The Ministry of Displacement and Migration (MoDM) staff compiled five proposals for the Iraq Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq (IRFFI) meeting in Doha, Qatar May 25 and 26. In cooperation with the United Nations High Commission on Refugees (UNHCR), the MoDM has invited donors attending the meeting to a voluntary consultations session at the end of the first day of meetings. The MoDM's Director General for Humanitarian affairs will be the MoDM representative in the Iraqi delegation and will lead the consultations.

- The Minister of Displacement and Migration traveled in Iran for nearly two weeks to meet with representatives from the Iranian Interior and Foreign Affairs ministries. A large delegation went from the MoDM and one representative from the Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The delegation met with refugees in a camp in southwestern Iran, near the Iraqi border, and found no signs of overt pressure on refugees to leave, or subtle changes that would encourage refugees to leave. The refugees remaining in the camp cited security concerns about returning to Iraq. The minister continued to encourage the Iranian authorities to not push the return of Iraqis until the situation in Iraq improves.
- The MoDM has requested the International Organization for Migration (IOM) to assist with the return of approximately 100 Iraqis in Baku, Azerbaijan who want to return. The Iraqi Mission in Pakistan has been approached about assisting the return of more Iraqis from Pakistan. The Iraqi Mission has requested logistical support from the United Arab Emirates.
- The return of 378 Iraqis from Lebanon is underway – the returnees are expected in Baghdad on May 23. This return was facilitated by the UNHCR, IOM, MNF-I, the Iraqi Ministry of the Interior and the MoDM.
- Currently, 19 IPCC offices are operating: Duhok, Mosul, Erbil, Sulimania, Tuz, Tikrit, 6 in Kirkuk, Khanakin, Baquba, 3 in Baghdad, Hilla and Basra. The most recent office opened was in Tikrit in Salah ad Din governorate. Large crowds turned out for the opening due to the large numbers of people moved from their land by the former regime. To date 2,582 claims have been accepted.
- The national media campaign has been delayed due to the assassination of IGC President Ezzedine Salim, who was going to lead a national roll out of IPCC on May 22. The MoDM is currently looking at other alternatives for a national media campaign.
- Three major IPCC policy issues remain to be fully resolved:
 - The question of whether the IPCC mechanism can be used by those people forced out of their homes by ethnic conflict since the end of the war.
 - How a compensation scheme, which will be an essential part of the IPCC process, will work.
 - How mediation is to be included in the framework of decision-making for the IPCC.
- There are three pillars of the Regional Commission that the IPCC is working to constitute: Judicial, Land Registration and State Property. Training was successfully undertaken last week for all Judicial Candidates. The process of appointment and organizing candidates from Land Registration and State Property was set back when the Director General for State Property was assassinated several days ago. The IPCC will work with the new Director General to organize and train these candidates who, with the Judicial appointments, will make decisions on claims. The Regional Commissions will begin making judgments at the end of June.

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Prepared by the Information Management Unit



COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY
BAGHDAD

25 May 2004

FOR: Ambassador Jones and Ambassador Ross
FROM: (b)(6)
SUBJECT: Meeting with Sheik Jalal

You are meeting this morning with Sheik Jalal Saghir on the topic of Najaf. Sheik Jalal is the imam of Baratha Mosque of Khademiya and senior member of SCIRI. He occasionally sits in at the Governing Council in the place of Abdul Aziz Hakim. Sheik Jalal has been critical of the Coalition's inability to provide better security.

In addition to speaking about Najaf, Sheik Jalal may raise the issue of the Awqaf. Sheik Jalal wrote Ambassador Bremer a long letter many weeks ago asking for CPA involvement in sorting out corruption and mismanagement in Awqaf (see attached). We have yet to respond formally, although the letter was the basis for the internal meeting we held on the Awqaf tens days ago.

On the basis of the outcome of our meeting, you may wish to make the following points to Sheik Jalal:

- Thank you for your letter to Ambassador Bremer concerning the Awqaf. We take your concerns very seriously.
- We agree that there needs to be increased oversight over the affairs of the Awqaf. We believe that it is most appropriate for the new government to ask for a study of this matter.
- However, in the interest of taking action soon and in order to provide some factual information to the new government on the state of affairs in the Awqaf, we are going to ask the Board of Supreme Audit to conduct an audit of the Awqaf.
- The BSA will investigate its finances and make recommendations to the interim government on restructuring the Awqaf.

ATTACHMENT: Letter to Ambassador Bremer from Sheik Jalal Saghir

**Office of
Sheikh Jalal Al-Din Al-Sagheer**

Excellency Ambassador Mr. Paul Bremer Chief Administrator of CPA

Greetings wishing you continued guidance and success

I would have not written these lines had I not had the feeling of the existence of more than one common factor between you and I which made me bear the responsibility for writing to you. The factors between me as an Iraqi who cares about the reconstruction of Iraq after all the injustice instituted by the regime of the criminal Saddam, and as person put in a position against my wishes by the Governing Council as deputy head of "Shi'te Endowment Diwan" and a member in the educational, cultural and endowment committee of the Governing Council and who finds himself a member in the Endowment consultative commission, and you as an entity put by the present conditions in Iraq in a position of responsibility for what is happening.

So I find myself bound to reveal the fears and doubts I feel inside me. This is based on observations that have come to my notice through my work in endowment. I do not attribute myself infallibility as I can be wrong or I can be right. My hope is that you will get to the absolute truth if you undertake to investigate the nature of circumstances I am going to point out. I am fully confident of your ability and desire to resolve matters in favor of the Iraqi institutions ability to depend on themselves. And if it wasn't for my despair in the reform mechanisms adopted at the present by you through your representative our dear friend "Sa'id Ismai'l Haqqi", the devastation being stronger than him, and by the Governing Council I wouldn't have written this letter at all due to the hegemony of the spirit of factionalism and partisanship in this respect.

I shall not speak about the Sunni Endowment and how things go on there, equally feeding "Ba'athi" and "Wahhabi" extremism and terrorism. I have previously talked to you in our last meeting after my return from Iran, and you have asked Ms Magan and Mr. Scot Carpenter to follow up this matter which you described as very vital, but no meeting took place in this connection.

However, I am going to write down some quick notes about what is happening in the Shi'te Endowment, pointing out from the start that since my appointment as deputy head of the "Diwan" and until this day, no piece of paper has been forwarded to me from this "Diwan" nor from any other in spite of my request for that from the "Diwan" Head and in the presence of Mr. Sa'id and also in his absence, for an exact description of the deputy head function. Nothing of that happened at all and this despite the absence of the "Diwan" Head (about a month-October-last year and two months this year, the majority of which after the "Haj" season). My words here are not to be taken that I am looking for work as I am very busy and my determination to resign is my real desire. However, I was put in this situation only because of the insistence of Messrs Abdul Aziz Al_Hakim and Sa'id Isma'il Haqqi in addition to the demands of the Religious References in Najaf from me to stay for interests seen by them.

Let me write down my observations in the following items:

First: There is no regulation for work in the Diwan, whether on the administrative level or on the legal level. Even though five months have passed, the head of the Diwan cannot show any plan of work that may be adopted to determine these regulations and activate them, apart from not submitting a structure for administrative and functional work (I heard that he has submitted something about this structure to the Cultural and Educational Committee in the Governing Council four days ago, but as a member in the Council I am not sure that this have been done officially, and if it did happen, then one cannot but wonder how work was being done throughout the previous period).

Second: Even though the Governing Council has approved the establishing of a Committee for the dismantling and separation between the Shi'te and Sunni Endowments, however, according to my knowledge this committee has met only twice and in a very improvised manner. I did not attend because I was only informed of these meetings the same day. Up to the present, the head of the Diwan has no intention of activating them.

Third: The management of the Diwan funds is being handled in an arbitrary manner and without any plan for a real budget which we have not seen until now even after all this time and also in the midst of talk about wide financial corruption, and in the absence of a body for real monitoring of financial expenditures.

Fourth: The Diwan has not faced up to any of the major tasks assigned to it; the functional chain has not been taking care of or its vacancies filled, nor has the refurbishing of what was left after the Sunnis left their Diwan, the majority of whom were in leading positions. What remained in the Diwan are lower rank employees as cleaners and others. Many areas are complaining for not having a branch of the Diwan in their area because the Sunnis were in control in these areas and took over the ministry's location for them. Until now there is no branch for the Shi'te Diwan in Mosul, Diyala, Saladin, Kirkuk despite important commitments for this Diwan in these areas.

Fifth: The Diwan was involved in vast violations in the issue of Haj (pilgrimage) on both the administrative and financial level, and if I don't talk about the financial issue, which unfortunately is very shocking, and leave it for your investigation, I wonder about the reasons that kept the Diwan totally idle in the Haj season? And it had no relation and all its institutions with the Haj issue. Many employees have traveled to the Haj not according to the Haj regulations and without reference to the Finance and Administration department which decides the employees who can travel without causing a disruption in the Diwan's work.

Sixth: There is a lot of talk about the bad use of the Endowment money as is happening now, for example, with the talk about a hotel in Al Kadhemia area.

Seventh: No money has been spent at all in the reconstruction or building of any vital facility that is connected with the Shittie Endowment, despite the elapse of all this time, and also despite the destruction that took place in Kadhimia and Karbala after the explosions. The head of the Diwan did not move on estimating the damage and in taking charge of the repairs, in addition to determining the party responsible for the security breach which led to the penetration of the Khadhimia Shrine in this way.

Eighth: The emergence of favoritism widely in the appointments done so far. I will not talk about empowering elements involved in known administrative and financial corruption on the Diwan, as I'll leave this also to your investigations. It can also be seen that many appointments were made without the existence of legal staffing for it.

Ninth: The exposure of the Endowment funds to many dangers. The status of many of these funds is not known and how they are being managed. Here I have to draw your attention to the fact that to the fund donor and to the people, this fund is associated with a legitimate sacred entity and in consequence is religiously entrusted to the "Religious Reference". If the people felt that the legitimate funds (are being mismanaged), then much unwanted consequences will result.

Tenth: The consultative commission decisions have not been respected in many matters. For more than five months, this commission have been completely stopped from being active.

Eleventh: The "Holy Shrines" have been neglected in such a way that some became under the control of extremist or irresponsible groups.

At the time that I want to avoid going into the details of every item, I hope your Excellency investigate every item I mentioned and I am willing to cooperate in this respect. I hope you take into consideration that I do not accept my nomination by Governing Council members for the post of "Diwan" Head or any other post. I remain in this position, not running away from responsibility, but rather doubting the seriousness of the desire to come out with significant results for the common good. But for that, I will be honored to serve my people and country.

It remains for me to mention that your representative, the overall supervisor on the "Diwans" Mr. Sa'id Isma'il Haqqi is in full knowledge of these notes and I do not know if he has taken any position concerning them. I thank you your kindness and apologize for wasting your time. Please accept my greetings again and my wishes for your safety and security.

Sheikh Jalal Al Din Al-Sagheer
14/3/2004

Copy to:

Office of his eminence Grand Ayatullah Sayyed Ali Al-Sistani (God protect him), for information

Office of his eminence Grand Ayatullah Sayyed Muhammed Sa'id Al-Hakim

(God protect him), for information

Office of his eminence Grand Ayatullah Sheikh Muhammed Ishaq Fayyadh (God protect him),
for information

Office of his eminence Sayyed Abdul Aziz Al-Hakimli, for information



COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY
BAGHDAD

4

Administrator's Weekly Report

Governance

April 3-9, 2004



HIGHLIGHTS

The United Nations (UN) Election Assessment Team and the International Foundation for Election Systems (IFES) are currently consulting with Iraqi leaders to determine how to proceed in establishing an electoral system for Iraq. Elements to be included in the electoral administration are the establishment of an Independent Election Commission (IEC) and promulgation of election and political party orders.

I. Support Transition to Iraqi Sovereignty

- The recent violence in South Central Iraq will reduce programming throughout the region, especially in Najaf, Al-Kut, Fallujah, and Karbala.
- The following are among the highlights of a poll of more than 1,000 Iraqi citizens, conducted from March 24 through April 2 (and thus not reflecting recent violence) in Baghdad, Basrah, Mosul, Nasiriyah, Ramadi & Karbala:
 - Even when told that it is not possible to elect an interim government, almost 60 percent will not/cannot name a group suited to select an Iraqi government. Of those who name a group, more name "judges" than the rest combined;
 - Asked specifically about a Legislative Council naming a government, 59 percent favor the idea, but there is a sharp divide between the Southern cities and the rest. A plurality (34 percent) favors an assembly of between 100-125 members, 22 percent opt for fewer than 50 and only 23 percent want more than 400;
 - Opinion splits among cities over permitting Legislative Council members to be part of the interim government, but opposition to Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) members participating in interim government is overwhelming everywhere except Baghdad; and
 - Iraqis have little enthusiasm for foreign supervision of their elections.

- The same poll indicated that public understanding of the TAL is poor. The following two charts indicate that among the 56 percent of respondents who say they have heard something about the law, the most popular provision of the TAL is freedom of expression (12 percent); the least popular is federalism (17 percent).



Source: ILACSS April 2004

II. Develop Civic Participation in Governance

Develop indigenous polling capacity; Provide women and youth with the skills necessary to become important participants in the political process; Develop local civil society capacity to conduct advocacy and participate in political life; Develop civic education programs promoting electoral participation and democratic ideals; Build capacity for civil society conflict prevention and mitigation

- As the first step toward developing a women's network that stretches across many parties and civil society organizations, the National Democratic Institute (NDI) facilitated a series of public speaking workshops for women. Before the training had to be cancelled due to security concerns, 28 women were trained over three days, including political activists, party officials, journalists and a city councilor.
- The CPA provided funding to the Kurdistan Institute for Elections to conduct women's rights awareness courses in three rural areas of Sulaymaniyah. The award will fund sixteen courses that will focus on women's rights, discrimination and violence. Women throughout Iraq have been deprived of the right to lead a healthy and civilized life and have encountered many forms of violence. Discrimination, abuse and violence are even more prevalent in the rural areas. This grant proposes to target men and women, raising the awareness of women's rights and focusing on issues of discrimination and violence.
- CPA officials met with the leadership of the Future Society for Iraqi Women to discuss their future plans for ensuring women's political participation and the proposals that the group is planning on submitting. Some members are interested both in the Candidate Training that NDI is offering and CPA-sponsored media training.
- Twenty women leaders from around the country met in Baghdad on April 6 with United Nations representative Ambassador Lakhdar Brahimi to discuss women's roles in the new democratic processes and institutions in Iraq. The discussion focused on the next three stages of the transition, the goal of 25 percent of government seats for women, and the role of political parties.
- CPA officials met with the members of the Women's Alliance for Democracy in Iraq in Baghdad on April 8 to review their group's goals and proposal for candidacy and advocacy training for women. OWA recommended several ways to utilize existing resources in the area, including sessions with IFES, NDI, IRI, and Strategic Communications and suggested too that they contact the Iraq Foundation to see if there were any possibilities of resource sharing (as they are also developing an advocacy training course).
- The CPA continues to support and facilitate the implementation of CPA's Democracy Dialogue Activity (DDA) as part of the National Civic Dialogue Program (CDP). More than 1,100 DDA events took place this week, although the overwhelming majority of activities took place in the North. DDA facilitators promote open discussions on

democratic themes such as elections, and political party systems among Iraqi men, women, and youth in preparation for the transition to sovereignty.

- In the culmination of a week-long public selection process, the Ninewa Provincial Council selected Dr. Oussama Kashmoula the new governor of the province on April 5. After the resignation of former Governor Ghanem Al Basso on March 29, CPA-Ninewa and the Provincial Council agreed upon a selection method for the position based on a list of criteria. The Provincial Council interviewed 39 candidates and selected three for the final vote. After the three candidates conducted a televised public debate, the Provincial Council voted 25-7 for Kashmoula.
- On April 3, the CPA hosted Mr. Atta Abd Alwahab, Deputy to Governing Council member Mr. Adnan Al-Pachachi, in a panel discussion for facilitators of the Civic Dialogue Program and other invited guests. This discussion was the second in the "Saturday Series of Democracy Dialogues" that CPA is sponsoring in Baghdad. Mr. Alwahab discussed the status quo in Iraq and its effects on democracy and reviewed the events relating to the establishment of the Governing Council and the upcoming transition on June 30. Mr. Alwahab ended his presentation stating, "We seek to end the occupation and find a new democracy in Iraq."
- On April 3, 51 Iraqis, including nine women, participated in the final in a series of seven conferences on Arbil Governorate economic development at Salah ad Din University. Discussions focused on strengthening institutions to enable the governorate to become an active participant in the global economy.
- From March 31 to April 5, 17 local government officials, including four Governorate Council members, participated in training in Kirkuk on the tools and strategies of how to increase transparency with regard to the media, civil society organizations, and citizens. Specifically, the sessions addressed how to field questions and develop effective responses to media attention. Trainees had the opportunity to see themselves on camera as they responded to mock interview questions by a member of the media.

III. Develop Framework and Capacity for Elections

Support creation of National Independent Electoral Commission; Promote Scopes of work and Operational Linkages between national, regional, and local level election administration authorities

- The United Nations (UN) Election Assessment Team and the International Foundation for Election Systems (IFES) are currently consulting with Iraqi leaders to determine how to proceed in establishing an electoral system for Iraq. Elements to be included in the electoral administration are the establishment of an Independent Election Commission (IEC) and promulgation of election and political party orders.

IV. Support Development of Sustainable Political Parties/Associations

Support development of political associations

- The National Democratic Institute (NDI) hosted training in voter targeting, message development, voter contact and coalition building in Baghdad on April 4. Of the 24 participants that attended the session, six were women. Some party members were Christian, and many spoke very good English, suggesting a party base that is urban, secular and well-educated. Islamic Democratic Trend members were very engaged and easily grasped the new ideas. Applying the concepts to the party platform may prove difficult, however. Participants grappled with the challenge of making the party's central message, that "Islam and democracy are compatible," relevant for voters with everyday concerns.

V. Promote Respect for Human Rights

Educate on Human Rights Issues; Preserve documentation of past atrocities, raise awareness, and promote reconciliation; Strengthen local capacity to investigate and address past atrocities; Establish Iraqi Special Tribunal (IST) for past atrocities; Incorporate Human Rights into laws; Develop role of independent human rights NGOs and media; Establish a Human Rights Ministry

- The Iraqi Special Tribunal was established by the IGC to bring former Ba'athist regime officials to justice for war crimes and crimes against humanity. Grants from CPA (USAID Office of Transition Initiative) will help develop the capacity of the tribunal to conduct these trials in a fair and efficient manner, consistent with international human rights standards. The first grant will provide equipment to convert evidence to electronic form, allowing it to be more easily searched, analyzed, and protected. The second award will furnish and equip offices for the investigative and prosecutorial staff of the tribunal.

VI. Promote Durable Solutions for Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)

Facilitate the return of refugees and IDPs; Build local and national capacity to protect and assist refugees and IDPs; Develop and implement the Iraq Property Claims Commission (IPCC) for property disputes

- IPCC offices are now open in Baghdad, Mosul, and Sulimaniyah. Security issues have caused delays in opening offices in Najaf, Karbala, Al-Kut, Anbar and most of central Iraq. In the south, CPA continues efforts to open offices by late April, but security is an issue in this region also. The IPCC national information campaign has been delayed pending the appointment of the IPCC spokesperson. Until then, regional locations are continuing education of the public on the role of the IPCC in property restitution.



COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY
BAGHDAD

of Governance

INFO MEMO

DATE 1 April 2004

FOR: THE ADMINISTRATOR
FROM: (b)(6)
SUBJECT: Key Challenges in the Political Transition

This memo will address key challenges in the political transition, a few of which I was able to mention to you tonight and others I will summarize here.

Selling the TAL

We need to be more vigorous, agile, and adept at selling and defending the TAL. This should include improved capacity to address the specific concerns that Iraqis are raising around the country, to clarify confusion and misunderstanding, to dispel rumors, and to rebut serious criticisms. The document, "Questions and Answers about the TAL," which we have drafted here in Governance is being distributed now. I think it is vitally important that we get this out to all the Governance teams, civil-military affairs teams, and civic education efforts around the country, and that we keep updating it if necessary to take account of new issues that arise. I hope a leaflet will be distributed soon en masse that presents some of the key issues and answers.

As I said to you, I really applaud the excellent public service announcements you have recorded on the TAL. But we need to get Iraqis saying these things as well, on radio and TV. I think it is particularly important—and I mentioned this in a brief encounter with Paul Bell of Bell Pottinger today—that future TV ads show Iraqis engaging one another and articulating some of these themes, questions, and answers, in their own words. And Iraqi leaders also need to do this publicly in their own public meetings.

Two additional points must be emphasized in particular. As you keep saying, the TAL provides a path to what Iraqis want: sovereignty, elections, and a permanent constitution. But we must add to this appeal first that the TAL in no way limits or defines what will be in the final constitution. It is purely a transitional document, and Iraqis are free to adopt different provisions for the final document. Second, we must make clear—and I think it is important that this come directly from you—that the TAL does not permit the Interim Government to conclude a treaty with a foreign power, and the United States will not do so. A firm commitment in this regard would really help to take some steam out of the public criticisms and suspicions.

Constructing the Interim Government

I want to underscore the depth of public cynicism about and antipathy toward the Governing Council that I have encountered in my public meetings and private sessions (usually with local and provincial council members) in Baghdad, Tikrit, Balad, Basra, Nasariya, and Hilla. Many of the people who have expressed these feelings are generally sympathetic to the Coalition, and to what we are trying to do here. But they regard the Governing Council in general as a narrow, self-serving body that has not established any real constituency. (I did not, by the way, hear this in Basra, where people engaged and seemed supportive of Governor Wa'ad).

I think it would be a huge mistake to constitute the Governing Council simply by preserving and enlarging the Governing Council. Not only will the country in general strongly oppose it, but I think (partly as a result of what it will hear and partly because of its initial instincts) the UN team will as well. I hope whatever method we choose to construct an Interim Government will be significantly more inclusive and participatory, leading to the convening of a meeting or body to choose the new government that is seen as substantially more representative than the Governing Council.

Finally, the Iraqi Higher Women's Council is very concerned that there be an open and participatory process that will give women at least one-quarter of the seats in any body that chooses the Interim Government. I hope we can engage with them actively on possible means of achieving this goal.

Standing Up the Electoral Commission

I am worried about the length of time that it is taking to identify possible candidates for the Independent Electoral Commission. I believe and hope we can make very good progress with the UN team on the structure of this body, but I have not gotten the cooperation I had hoped for in identifying possible candidates. The problem is simple and familiar: everyone is extremely busy. Mike Dittoe has talked to the relevant judges and come up with an excellent list of five judicial candidates. We have about a half dozen others. But it is not a deep list. Someone must take charge of this process intensively and you must make clear to staff the overriding importance of this. Otherwise we won't get there fast enough.

Once we identify and name the nine commissioners, it is going to take a long time to get them functioning as an electoral management body. Then the tasks will overwhelm them. I am worried that a decent voter registration alone could take six months. Every day is precious at this point and I hope we can make this a compelling priority for everyone in Governance, both in Baghdad and in the field. Keep in mind that we will need to identify provincial commission candidates as well. The women in the Higher Women's Council are alerted to these needs and stand ready to help.

Leveling the Political Party Playing Field

I will not repeat at length the points I have already made, but I think it is vital that the Political Parties Law provide for transparent public funding of parties. As you know, I have exchanged emails with Dick Jones on this, and I like his own ideas very much. Our friends—who are also some of the most promising democrats in this country—are being overwhelmed by the money that is being poured into certain parties from Iran and also Saudi Arabia. We need to

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lift up all serious parties to some minimum threshold of financial viability. This will require a fund of several million dollars initially, perhaps more, with criteria that a small but serious party could meet (in terms of the number of verifiable signatures required, distributed among a minimum number of provinces). To qualify for this distribution, parties should have to adhere to the Code of Conduct for parties, account in some way for the money, and eschew any other foreign funding. We can work with the UN electoral team on this and gather ideas from other countries, but we need to establish the principle and find the money to create the fund and then replenish the fund for a new distribution as the electoral campaign is about to begin.

Choosing the Electoral System

It is vital that we design an electoral system that is fair, reasonably simple to understand, and does not confer a special advantage on well organized parties that have had a long head start and may be in some cases among the most dubious in their commitment to democracy. The Anglo-American system of single-member-district, first-past-the-post will be a non-starter for many reasons (it would be hugely unfair to minorities, yield a very disproportionate outcome of seats to votes, and would require a hellish exercise to draw the districts). But I particularly want to underscore the instinct I am sure you already have that any system of list proportional representation must be done in districts. I have spoken with a few members (Mowaffak) and staff (of Mohsen and Pachachi) of the GC, and they all warm to the idea of PR in moderately sized multi-member districts (5-10 members). The women like this system, too. Some Governorates could be districts of their own, the bigger eight or so would need to be divided in two (and Baghdad perhaps into four). Some number of seats (about 20 percent, IFES estimates) would have to be held back to be distributed to the parties in a "second tier" distribution to ensure overall proportionality of seats to votes, and to help ensure adequate representation of women. As we discussed, we would want to establish some minimum threshold of the vote for this second distribution, maybe 2 or 3 percent, but we have to allow small parties to survive, and in any case I think everyone in Governance feels that it is vital that we allow and indeed encourage the election of independents from the districts. This will provide an important bulwark against a possible electoral juggernaut by radical or undemocratic forces funded from the outside.

Modifying De-Baathification

I have been hearing from a number of people, including many of our own who have engaged the Sunni heartland, that we need to be more responsive to Sunni grievances. One thing they are calling for that I think we should pursue is some modification of the de-Baathification program so that it is not applied so indiscriminately to former higher officials. The principle should be more one of individual responsibility for specific crimes and abuses. Former senior officials should be kept out of the security apparatus but otherwise allowed to seek office and assume positions in politics and government. And Chalabi should be replaced as head of the De-Baathification commission. Some visible progress in this regard, along with greater Sunni heartland inclusion in the Interim Government, could help to take some of the steam out of the insurgency.

Demobilizing the Militias

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I have been very pleased to learn of our plan for transition and reintegration of the militias. But we all know this won't work if we don't make dramatic progress in forcibly demobilizing and shutting down Muklada Sadr's Mehdi army, and his other growing infrastructure of terror, intimidation, and human rights abuses. The "95 days" memo stated the problem well, noting the vital complementarity of negotiations with and cooptation of the more mainstream forces and confrontation with those that will not cooperate. However, I would put the challenge more pointedly. This is not just another critical element. It is the one above all others that will make or break the viability of a transition to stable, reasonably democratic government in Iraq.

Nothing else we do in our transition program can succeed unless the problem of militias in general is vigorously tackled, and the problem of Muklada Sadr in particular very soon. If we move well into May with no action on this front, I believe the downward spiral of fear, anxiety, deceit, and competitive armament will take on a new and possibly unstoppable momentum, leading ultimately to civil war. It is important for the Administration to understand that if this descent occurs, it will begin quite visibly, and perhaps horrifically, well before November 2.

c.c. Ambassador Dick Jones

(b)(6)

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

J. G. ...

**COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY ORDER
NUMBER []**

POLITICAL ENTITIES IN IRAQ

Pursuant to my authority as Administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), and under the laws and usages of war, and consistent with relevant U.N. Security Council resolutions, including Resolution 1483 (2003) and Resolution 1511 (2003),

Reaffirming the right of the Iraqi people, as recognized in Resolutions 1483 and 1511, to freely determine their own political future;

Noting that the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL) for the State of Iraq provides for the Iraqi people to choose their government through free and fair elections no later than 31 January 2005;

Determined to achieve the transitional goals of the Transitional Administrative Law for the State of Iraq, including the drafting and ratification of a permanent constitution;

Underscoring the need for international cooperation to achieve these goals and the important role to be played by the United Nations and other internationally recognized experts in electoral administration;

Noting the desire of the Iraqi people to exercise their newly won freedom to select representative forms of government at every level;

Having consulted with persons representing all aspect of Iraqi civil society, including members of the Iraqi Governing Council [and representatives of the United Nations],

I hereby promulgate the following:

**Section 1
Purpose**

This Order shall govern the recognition, registration and operation of lawful Political Entities [in Iraq] during the Transitional Period.

**Section 2
Definitions**

For purposes of this Order, the following definitions shall apply. Words importing the singular include and apply to several persons, Entities, or things; words importing the plural include the singular; and words importing the masculine gender include the feminine:

- 1) "Transitional Period" means the period beginning on 30 June 2004 and lasting until the formation of an elected Iraqi government pursuant to a permanent constitution as set forth in Article 2 of the TAL.
- 2) "Commission" means the Independent Electoral Commission of Iraq, established in CPA Order No. __.
- 3) "Administrative Division" means the Administrative Division of the Commission, established in CPA Order No. __, Section 5(10)(c), in charge of carrying out the core administrative functions of the Commission related to Political Entities and campaigns.
- 4) "Register" means the Register of Political Entities, maintained by the Administrative Division, as described in Section 3.
- 5) "Political Entity" or "Entity" means an organization of individuals who voluntarily associate on the basis of common ideas, interests or views, for the purpose of obtaining [lawful ?] influence and having their representatives elected to public office. This entity could be a party, a citizens group, a coalition of parties, or an independent candidate.
- 6) "Statute" means the rules that govern the operation of the Political Entity as a whole, as described in Section 15 of this Order.
- 7) "Annual Report" means a status report on [the administration, the activities and any organizational changes] of the Political Entity, presented annually by the president of the Political Entity to the General Assembly, as described in Section 15(10) of this Order.
- 8) "Contribution" means any gift, subvention or bequest of any kind to a Political Entity, whether in cash or in-kind, and includes the Payment of Entity debts and the provision, on other than commercial terms, of any property, loan, services or facilities for the use or benefit of the Entity. Services provided to a Political Entity by individuals voluntarily, on their own time and free of charge shall not be considered to be Contributions. A Contribution is made at the time the benefit of the Contribution is received by a Political Entity.

- 9) "Payment" means any transfer of valuable consideration, including payment in-kind. A Payment is made at the time the benefit of the Payment is received.
- 10) "Assets" means all real or personal property owned directly or indirectly, including cash on hand and bank deposits, as well as any proceeds derived therefrom by way of sale, disposition or other agreements, the value of businesses owned, and any item owned having a value greater than 690,000 Iraqi dinars and with an expected economic life exceeding 2 years.
- 11) "Liability" means any monetary sum that a Political Entity is obliged to pay to any other person.
- 12) "Financial Representative" means the person who is personally responsible for keeping the Political Entity's financial records, ensuring the Entity's compliance with this Order and communicating with the Administrative Division on financial matters.

Section 3

Administrative Division Authority

- 1) The Administrative Division shall have the authority to promulgate procedures, rules and regulations, as necessary to implement this Order.
- 2) To the extent necessary, the Administrative Division will provide assistance to applicants to ensure that they understand the requirements imposed upon them and are able to fulfill them.
- 3) The Administrative Division shall maintain a Register of certified Political Entities. The Register shall contain the registration applications of the Entities, but the lists of signatures given in support of those applications [will][need] not be included in the Register.

Section 4

Eligibility of Political Entities

A Political Entity may lodge an application to register if the Political Entity:

- 1) is committed to principles of democracy;
- 2) is committed to upholding the sovereignty, unity and integrity of Iraq;

- 3) operates consistent with the fundamental rights set forth in Article 20 of the TAL;
- 4) agrees to abide by the electoral and regulatory framework established in this Order and CPA Order Nos. __ and in the procedures, rules and regulations promulgated by the Commission;
- 5) agrees to abide by public meeting ordinances, prohibitions on incitement to violence, hate speech and intimidation, and on support for, or the practice of, terrorism or drug trafficking;
- 6) agrees to abide by campaign finance laws, regulations and reporting requirements;
- 7) is not endorsed or financed by the militia or a militia member, does not put forth any candidate who is or has been a member of the militia for at least eighteen (18) months, and does not establish a militia;
- 8) does not have a name, acronym, symbol or platform that [is likely to] incite hatred or violence;
- 9) does not have a name acronym or symbol which is the same as or similar to the name, acronym or symbol of a previously registered or previously established Political Entity;
- 10) has a written constitution and an internal democratic process reflecting transparent, open and fair candidate selection procedures; and
- 11) has submitted an application that does not have any prima facie deficiency or inaccuracy in the items contained therein.

Section 5

Registration of Political Entities

- 1) A Political Entity meeting the requirements in Section 4 of this Order may register with the Commission by submitting an application with the Administrative Division.
- 2) This application must be submitted by an officer authorized to do so under the Statute of the Political Entity.
- 3) The submission of any application for registration of a Political Entity will not be accepted any later than 21 days prior to the commencement of the

campaign period for an election. The date of commencement of the campaign period shall be declared no later than 30 days before the commencement of the campaign period.

- 4) A Political Entity registered and certified pursuant to this Order may nominate candidates for election. A Political Entity not registered and certified pursuant to this Order may not nominate candidates for election.

Section 6 **Application for Registration**

An application for registration shall be in writing pursuant to the forms and procedures prescribed by the Administrative Division. The application shall, at a minimum, contain the following items:

- 1) the full name, acronym and symbol of the Political Entity;
- 2) the address or other contact information of the primary office of the Political Entity to which all correspondence to the Political Entity will be addressed;
- 3) the address and other contact information for all branch offices of the Political Entity;
- 4) the name, address, other contact information and signature or personal mark of the president of the Political Entity and the members of its highest executive body;
- 5) the name, address, other contact information and signature or personal mark of the financial representative of the Political Entity;
- 6) the Statute(s) of the Political Entity conforming to the requirements of Section 15 of this Order;
- 7) [a statement of assets and finance containing a full description of all assets of the Entity, a full description of all Liabilities of the Entity, and a list of all donors and sources of financial support;]
- 8) The political program of the Entity, approved by its highest executive body, describing the political objectives and activities of the Entity;
- 9) a Code of Conduct, created by the Commission, duly signed by an officer authorized to do so under the Statute of the Political Entity;

- 10) the names, dates and places of birth, addresses, and signatures or personal marks of no fewer than 500 persons who are eligible to vote [under the applicable Iraqi law] [pursuant to CPA Order No. ____ on the Elections Law][, and who have not signed the application of another Entity]; and
- 11) a refundable application fee of 650,000 Iraqi dinars, [to be refunded upon certification (?)].

Section 7 **Notification and Publication of Applications**

- 1) The Commission shall, as soon as is practicable, notify the public of the receipt of an eligible application for registration and shall make such application available for public inspection for a period of fourteen (14) days from the date of submission of the application. Such notification shall be done by entry in the Official Gazette of Iraq, by newspaper advertisement, by radio announcement, and by notice display at each governorate and regional office of the Commission.
- 5) A Political Entity that has lodged an application for registration shall be deemed to be registered fourteen (14) days after the date of submission of the application if it meets all the criteria laid out in this Order, and if there have been no objections to the application, as set forth in Section 8.

Section 8 **Objections and Deficiencies**

- 1) Any person eligible to vote may lodge an objection to an application with the Administrative Division. The grounds upon which an objection may be lodged are limited to a claim that the items contained in the application are deficient or inaccurate. Objections will not be considered after the fourteen (14) day period for public inspection has expired.
- 2) If the Administrative Division is not satisfied that the criteria set out in this Order are met, it shall, within fourteen (14) days of the date of submission of the application, deny the applications and notify in writing the Political Entity which submitted the application. The notification shall include the reasons for denial. The Entity may cure any deficiency or inaccuracy in the application at any time.
- 3) The Administrative Division shall not deny an application for registration provided that it is reasonably satisfied that a deficiency or inaccuracy in the

items contained in the application would not materially prejudice the purposes of the present Order if the application were accepted.

- 4) If the Administrative Division denies an application for registration, the Administrative Division shall advise the applicant of its right to appeal the decision in accordance with the Commission's dispute resolution mechanism, as described in CPA Order ____.

Section 9

[Certification of Political Entity] – is this step necessary?

[Purpose of certification

- 1) Upon registration of a Political Entity, the Administrative Division shall forward the Political Entity's registration and a recommendation to the Commission for certification.
- 2) The Commission will make a final determination in each case in accordance with criteria set forth in the Commission's procedures, rules and regulations, and will notify the Political Entity and the Administrative Division of its decision in writing.
- 3) If the Commission denies certification, it shall inform the Political Entity of its right to appeal the decision in accordance with the Commission's dispute resolution mechanism, as described in CPA Order ____.]

Section 10

Legal Identity

A Political Entity registered and certified pursuant to this Order shall operate as a distinct legal entity in Iraq. A registered and certified Political Entity shall be capable of owning property, entering into contracts, and of suing and being sued.

Section 11

Equal Treatment

All Political Entities shall be treated equally before the law.

Section 12

Suspension and Dissolution of Certified Political Entities

- 1) The Administrative Division shall suspend a Political Entity if the Entity:

- a. [fails to provide the Administrative Division with notice, in the prescribed form, that it has held a General Assembly within 6 months of its registration or within 12 months of its previous General Assembly;]
 - b. Fails to submit a complete annual financial disclosure report, in accordance with regulations prescribed by the Commission;
 - c. Adopts a Statute or program that does not conform to the requirements of this Order;
 - d. Fails to pay fines imposed by the Administrative Division, the Commission or the [dispute resolution mechanism] within the applicable deadline; or
 - e. Fails to return an impermissible Contribution to the contributor.
- 2) Upon suspension the Administrative Division shall:
- a. Make a note in the Register indicating that the registration of the Political Entity has been suspended; and
 - b. Provide the Political Entity with written notice identifying the steps required to bring its registration back into good standing and advising the Entity of its right to appeal the suspension within fourteen (14) days;
- 3) The suspension of a Political Entity's registration remains in effect pending the outcome of an appeal.
- 4) A Political Entity whose registration is suspended shall not receive any public funding or be certified by the Commission to participate in an election.
- 5) The Administrative Division shall immediately rescind the suspension of the registration of an Entity that has remedied the defects upon which the suspension was based.
- 6) The Commission shall direct the Administrative Division to remove an Entity from the Register if the Entity:
- a. Has not been certified by the Commission to participate in three consecutive elections of any kind;

- b. Has been suspended for 48 consecutive months;
 - c. Has been ordered dissolved by a court of competent jurisdiction; or
 - d. Has voluntarily dissolved itself in accordance with its Statute.
- 7) A Political Entity that is removed from the Register pursuant to this Section is dissolved. [If dissolved, who determines the disposition of its property? Commission regulations? The Entity itself?]

Section 13

Changes and Modifications

A registered and/or certified Political Entity shall notify in writing the Administrative Division within fourteen (14) days of any material change of information contained in its registration submission, as updated pursuant to Section 14.

Section 14

Annual Updates

A registered Political Entity shall complete and submit to the Administrative Division, on or before December 31 each year, an annual update in the form prescribed by the Administrative Division, identifying:

- 1) the current names and addresses of the president of the Entity, the members of its highest executive body, and its financial representative;
- 2) the current addresses of all local branches of the Entity;
- 3) any changes to the Entity's Statute or program made during the previous year; and
- 4) an annual financial report, in accordance with Section 20(5).

Section 15

Internal Governance and Organization of the Entity

- 1) Each Political Entity shall have a presence in Baghdad, [in the form of a representative or a small office].

- 2) Each Political Entity shall democratically adopt a Statute that shall govern the operation of the Entity as a whole, including each of the Entity's branches.
- 3) The Statute of a registered Political Entity shall include the following:
 - a. The procedures by which members of the public may become and cease to be members of the Entity, and the rights and responsibilities associated with membership;
 - b. The procedures to be followed in amending the Statute or program of the Entity;
 - c. The procedures to be followed in order for the Entity to dissolve itself, enter into an electoral coalition or merge with another Entity;
 - d. The procedures to be followed in the election of the president, the members of the highest executive body or any other elected officers of the Entity, including the financial representative;
 - e. The procedures to be followed in the selection of the candidates of the Entity for all elections;
 - f. The creation of a dispute resolution committee to resolve disputes within the Entity relating to the interpretation of the Entity Statute;
 - g. [Provision for the disposition of Assets on the dissolution of the Entity]; and
 - h. The timing of and procedures to be followed at ordinary and extraordinary General Assemblies of the members of the Entity.
- 4) The Statute shall be consistent with this Order. To the extent that a Statute is inconsistent with this Order, the Order shall take precedence.
- 5) Each Political Entity and all of its members, executive bodies and officers shall comply with the Entity Statute and, to the extent that the Statute is inconsistent with this Order, with this Order.
- 6) The Statute of an Entity is a public document. The Entity shall make copies of its Statute available to members of the public upon request. An Entity may charge a fee not to exceed 25 Iraqi dinars per page for copies of its Statute.

- 7) All Political Entities shall hold a General Assembly within 6 months of registration and at least every 12 months thereafter.
- 8) The General Assembly shall elect a president and highest executive body of the Entity in a democratic and transparent manner pursuant to its Statute within 6 months of the Entity's registration and at least every 12 months thereafter.
- 9) Each member of a Political Entity shall, directly or through his or her delegate, have an equal vote in all decisions taken by the General Assembly, including the election of the president and highest executive body of the Entity.
- 10) The president of a Political Entity shall report on the financial situation of the Entity and present the most recent Annual Report to each General Assembly.
- 11) The highest executive body of a Political Entity shall designate one or more individuals who are authorized to enter into agreements and sign financial instruments, including, but not limited to, the financial representative, on behalf of the Entity.
- 12) A Political Entity shall inform the Administrative Division that it has held a General Assembly no later than 30 days after the Assembly by submitting a copy of the minutes of the General Assembly, which minutes shall be certified as accurate by the President of the Entity.
- 13) [Should we include penalty of perjury?]

Section 16 **Political Entity Members**

- 1) An individual must be eligible to vote in Iraq in order to be a member of a Political Entity.
- 2) A Political Entity shall keep and maintain a Register of Members, showing the names, addresses, dates and places of birth, and dates on which they became members.

- 3) A Political Entity may impose membership dues or fees on new or existing members of the Entity in an amount not to exceed [\$20] per member per year.
- 4) The president and all other officers and representatives shall be eligible to vote in Iraq.

Section 17 **Eligibility of Candidates**

- 1) Any person eligible to vote [in Iraq] shall be eligible to be a candidate.
- 2) A candidate for an election as a governorate representative must be a [habitual resident of][resident of the constituency for which he or she is a candidate for at least [three (6) months] prior to an election].
- 3) No person may be a candidate in the election for more than one office simultaneously.

Section 18 **Political Entity Candidates**

- 1) Each Political Entity wishing to participate in an election shall submit with the Administrative Division a candidate list including the name(s) of that Political Entity's candidates for election as governorate, regional or national representative, and indicating the governorate for which each governorate candidate is nominated or a ranked list of candidates in the case of a national office.
- 2) The candidates of a Political Entity for a governorate election shall be selected by the branch or branches of the Entity in that governorate.
- 3) A Political Entity may only nominate a candidate for election if the candidate is affiliated with that Entity.
- 4) No person may be a candidate in an election for more than one Political Entity.

Section 19 **Compliance of Candidate List**

Upon receipt of the candidate list, the Administrative Division shall make a recommendation to the Commission regarding the compliance or non-

compliance of each candidate and candidate list. The Commission may allow or disallow a list or specific candidate, or re-order the candidate list, to achieve compliance with the applicable rules and regulations. The Commission will make a final determination in each case, [guided by its legal and regulatory framework].

Section 20

Campaign Finance Regulations

- 1) A Political Entity shall not accept any Contribution except:
 - a. Contributions from individuals of no more than [\$2000] per calendar year per individual;
 - b. Membership fees or dues from members of the Entity in accordance with its Statute;
 - c. [Funding for and/or technical support and assistance from non-governmental organizations];
 - d. Funding and other support from the Iraqi Interim Government as permitted under Section __;
 - e. [Funding from international donors via the Iraqi Political Parties Fund?]
- 2) A registered Political Entity shall keep a written record of all Contributions, including the full name, address and date and place of birth of individuals making Contributions. An individual shall only make a Contribution to a Political Entity on that individual's own behalf.
- 3) A Political Entity shall not engage in any commercial or for-profit activity.
- 4) The assets of a Political Entity shall be used solely to support the political not-for-profit purposes of the Entity and shall not be used to provide a benefit, directly or indirectly, to any Entity official, member, donor or member of the public. This does not preclude the Payment of reasonable compensation to individuals for work performed for a Political Entity.
- 5) A Political Entity shall file an annual financial report with the Administrative Division, [in accordance with procedures prescribed by the Administrative Division].

- 6) [Under no circumstances may a Political Entity accept donations or contributions from foreign governments, organizations or citizens; state-owned enterprises; religious entities?; trade unions; business corporations; or anonymous sources.]

Section 21
Public Funding

[Rules and regulations to be determined.]

Section 22
Tax exemption

[All Political Entities shall be exempted from all taxes and fees.]

Section 23
Effective Date

The present regulation shall enter into force upon the date of signature.

L. Paul Bremer, Administrator
Coalition Provisional Authority

040406-37

COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY	
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT	
FROM: (b)(6)	DATE: 7-Apr-04

FOR: THE ADMINISTRATOR

ORIGINATOR: Executive Secretary

SUBJECT: Ministry Response to Local Government Authorities Order

Please find attached the summary matrix and text responses from various Ministers on the Local Government Authorities Order, per our tasker for Senior Advisors.

We have highlighted the most significant comments for you.

ATTACHMENTS: Matrix of Ministries' Responses
Text of Ministries' Responses

Drafted By:

(b)(6)

Responses to the Local Government Authorities Order - 6 Apr 04

	Delivered	Received	Reviewed	Reviewing	Comments
Agriculture	Y	Y		Y	
Communications	Y	Y	Y		Y
Culture	Y	Y	Y		N
Displacement and Migration	Y	UNK			N
Defense	Y	Y	Y		Y
Education	Y	N	N		
Electricity	Y	N			
Environment	Y				
Finance	Y	Y		Y	Y
Foreign Affairs	Y	Y	Y		N
Health	Y	Y		Y	
Higher Education	Y	Y	Y		N
Housing & Construction	Y	Y		Y	
Human Rights	Y	Y		Y	
Industry & Minerals	Y	Y	Y		Y
Interior					
Justice	Y	Y		Y	
Labor & Social Affairs	N	N	N		
Municipalities and Public Works	Y	Y	Y		Y
Oil	Y	Y	Y		Y
Planning & Development	Y	Y	N		Y
Science & Technology	Y	Y		UNK	N
Trade/Standards	Y	Y	Y		Y
Transportation	Y	Y	Y		TBD
Water Resources	Y	Y	Y		Y
Youth & Sports					

f Government

Minister and Ministry Comments
On
Local Government Authorities Order
6 Apr 04

Ministry of Agriculture

The Minister of Agriculture has been briefed on the local government order, and is reviewing the Arabic version of the document.

Ministry of Communications (c/o (b)(6))

I have discussed with the Minister the Governing Council Order. He has read it and had one substantive comment at this time. On the cover page and page two (2), it refers to the Kurdistan Regional Government as including Dohuk, Arbil, Sulaimaniya, Kirkuk, Diyala, and Ninevah (Mosul). He said that as of 19 March 2003, the KRG does not include Diyala or Ninevah.

Ministry of Culture (c/o (b)(6))

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Ministry of Youth & Sports

No response.

040406-37

COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT	
FROM: (b)(6)	DATE: 7-Apr-04

\$ 69,000,000

FOR: THE ADMINISTRATOR

ORIGINATOR: Executive Secretary

SUBJECT: Ministry Response to Local Government
Authorities Order

Please find attached the summary matrix and text responses from
various Ministers on the Local Government Authorities Order, per
our tasker for Senior Advisors.

We have highlighted the most significant comments for you.

ATTACHMENTS: Matrix of Ministries' Responses
Text of Ministries' Responses

Drafted By: (b)(6)

Responses to the Local Government Authorities Order - 6 Apr 04

	Delivered	Received	Reviewed	Reviewing	Comments
Agriculture	Y	Y		Y	
Communications	Y	Y	Y		Y
Culture	Y	Y	Y		N
Displacement and Migration	Y	UNK			N
Defense	Y	Y	Y		Y
Education	Y	N	N		
Electricity	Y	N			
Environment	Y				
Finance	Y	Y		Y	Y
Foreign Affairs	Y	Y	Y		N
Health	Y	Y		Y	
Higher Education	Y	Y	Y		N
Housing & Construction	Y	Y		Y	
Human Rights	Y	Y		Y	
Industry & Minerals	Y	Y	Y		Y
Interior					
Justice	Y	Y		Y	
Labor & Social Affairs	N	N	N		
Municipalities and Public Works	Y	Y	Y		Y
Oil	Y	Y	Y		Y
Planning & Development	Y	Y	N		Y
Science & Technology	Y	Y		UNK	N
Trade/Standards	Y	Y	Y		Y
Transportation	Y	Y	Y		TBD
Water Resources	Y	Y	Y		Y
Youth & Sports					

Minister and Ministry Comments
On
Local Government Authorities Order
6 Apr 04

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COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY

BAGHDAD

for government

28 March 2004

FOR: THE ADMINISTRATOR

FROM: (b)(6)

SUBJECT: Making the Most of the Next 95 Days

In 95 days, the Coalition will transfer authority to an Iraqi government and CPA will dissolve. In that short period of time, we will be unable to make irreversible changes or fundamentally alter the sectarian, ethnic, or historical facts that make Iraq a fractious and complicated country. Nevertheless, how we use these next three months will influence Iraq's trajectory and help determine whether the vision of Iraq as a democratic, free country at peace with itself and its neighbors is realized over the medium and long term. A clear strategy and decisive action now can push Iraq over the tipping point before June 30. It can ensure that momentum gathered now carries Iraq through the inevitably precarious transitional period to the time when the country has its own permanent constitution and elected government under it.

At the broadest level, our objective is to prepare the environment for the exercise of good government and the pursuit of economic prosperity. This will involve taking tough policy decisions that the interim government will be too weak or divided to make and clearing obstacles that it will be unable to overcome. It will also involve helping Iraqis acquire the tools and build the institutions they will need to withstand the pressures for sectarian squabbling and violence that will mark – but need not dominate – Iraq's future.

Our focus in the next 95 days must span the security, economic, and political spheres. Our objectives in these areas are necessarily overlapping, as are our prescriptions. This memo seeks to lay out our priorities and how we intend to pursue them in the short time that remains before sovereignty is restored to an Iraqi government.

Improving Security

An improved security environment is the key to progress in every other sector. Several major challenges to security persist: the insurgency fueled by elements of the former regime, terrorist groups supported from outside the country, the persistence of ordinary crime, and the steady rise in militia activity. We need to combat all by building up Iraqi security forces through the aggressive training and equipping of new recruits and their leadership. In-country training, as well as that in Jordan, are geared to ensuring the maximum number of qualified police and army members by June 30. While we need to

leave Iraqis better prepared to confront the threats they face, we will also work on both understanding the threat better (through the establishment of Iraq's first non-political intelligence service) and diminishing it (through better and more strictly enforced border policies). Equally dire is the need to ensure better coordination between ministries whose work impacts the security situation. We have recently established a Ministerial Committee on National Security Council which brings together key ministers to prepare for and react to national security challenges. Finally, we need to quietly build a broader understanding of the status of Coalition forces in Iraq after June 30, perhaps through a public education campaign related to the TAL. Major ambiguities and questions will not go away on their own. Allowing them to linger will only ensure that they will be raised later, when the Coalition has less influence to manage the political reaction.

Another critical element in improving security is addressing the militia problem in Iraq. Since liberation, the numbers of militias have multiplied, rather than dwindled. Their presence is destabilizing and is feeding a climate of intimidation across the country, particularly in the Central South. Militias have been successful in forcing people to join Islamist parties to get jobs, coercing women to veil themselves, and intimidating people – including police officers – to remain silent about crimes and injustices. No militia is more guilty of these offenses than the Jaish al-Mahdi of Muqtada al-Sadr. Postponing action on this criminal and his supporters has only made them stronger. If the Jaish al-Madhi and other such militias are not dismantled or phased out, they will have a pernicious influence on both the environment and the outcome of elections in 2005 to the benefit of radicals and those against democracy.

Tackling the militia challenge means we must choose to take actions that in the short term will be disruptive and could spark unrest. We should continue to pursue agreements with political party militias, such as the *peshmerga* and the Badr Corps, to encourage their members to integrate themselves into Iraq's security forces or to find a civilian job. At the same time, however, we must be prepared to combat with the force those with which we have no political relations or hope for cooperation, as well as political party militias that resist peaceful efforts to phase them out. The two prongs of this approach are in fact complimentary. Demonstrating that a lack of compliance will be met with force will show militias we seek to co-opt that there are costs in trying to avoid demobilization.

Building Better Relations with Iraq's Communities and Promoting Moderate Elements Within and Among Them

Iraq's main communities are struggling to recover from the aftermath of Saddam's rule, grappling with new political realities, and their implications for their place in society and politics. Sunnis are wrestling with their "new" minority status and the Shi'as are struggling to overcome their complex of victimhood. Without Coalition involvement, the chances of these dynamics leading to a peaceful, moderate political landscape in the short term are low.

For this reason, the Coalition will continue its efforts to shape emerging political forces. More specifically, CPA will accelerate its efforts to engage Sunnis outside the current political structure. Disproportionately affected by de-ba'athification and the

dissolution of the armed forces, with slowly emerging leaders acceptable in the new Iraq, Sunnis continue to feel disconnected from and threatened by Iraq's transitional arrangements. CPA will continue to identify and build leadership within the Sunni community and ensure that they secure a more appropriate place in the interim governmental structures. At the same time, it will seek to humanize the detainee policy by improving transparency and accelerating case reviews and to reform the de-ba'athification process so as to minimize its adverse impact on the Sunni community as a whole.

Similarly, the Coalition must intensify efforts to promote moderate secular Shi'a and constrain the political influence of clerics. A key part of this is deftly managing the political role of Sistani. Given his enormous influence among Iraq's Shi'a, we must be careful not to be seen to be disrespectful to him and need to ensure that he is well-informed of political developments. But, particularly in the wake of the TAL signing when Shi'a political leaders courageously challenged both his views on the TAL and his right to dictate their reaction to it, we must be equally careful not to boost Sistani's standing and increase his expectations of a direct role in politics, as our past actions have done. Meanwhile, just as we seek to support and cultivate Sunni parties, we must identify and strengthen Shi'a ones, which on their own will struggle to provide an alternative to Islamist parties such as SCIRI which received funding from Iran. Finally, civic education is another key element in working with the Shi'a and managing their political expectations; our programs seek to explain that democracy does not just involve decision-making by the majority, but also provides guarantees for the protection of minority interests.

The Coalition, however, does not intend to approach Iraqi politics with a strict sectarian focus. While it promotes secular, moderate forces within communities, it will continue to look for ways to bring these groups together across sectarian lines and to strengthen national or other identities that supercede narrow sectarian ones. The crafting and passage of the Transitional Administrative Law demonstrates that Iraqi leaders, if the stakes are high and the incentives are right, can rise above their own narrow interests for the benefit of Iraq as a whole. In Iraq's interim government arrangements, we need to champion mechanisms that promote cross-community cooperation and empower groups and coalitions that have a truly national outlook. The Coalition must also help Iraqis get a head start on resolving its most volatile issues. For instance, we need to help stabilize the current situation in Kirkuk by strengthening its local institutions, penalizing aggressive actions of political parties, combating outside influence, and quelling misinterpretations of the TAL. At the same time, we should help Kirkukis begin to consider the various mechanisms that can be adopted to resolve their disputes. The involvement of an international body or impartial outsiders may be useful in this regard, as will *crisp* progress on the work of the IPCC.

Crafting Solid Transitional Political Institutions

The smoothness and resilience of Iraq's transition to democracy is dependent on the political structures created here in the next 95 days. The most visible and tangible challenge in the months ahead is defining and creating an interim body to govern Iraq in the period between the transfer of sovereignty on 30 June 2004 and the holding of elections by 31 January 2005. Still undecided are the structure and powers of, as well as the selection mechanism for, the interim government. The challenge will be creating a government which

is broadly representative and acceptable to the Iraqi people, while at the same time able to govern Iraq effectively in the interim period. We will need to balance the competing objectives of simplicity on the one hand and inclusiveness of the government and the empowerment of those who participate in it on the other. The creation of the interim government provides an opportunity to assuage the disaffection of Sunnis and other marginalized groups, but only if we are willing to bring them into the fray in a meaningful way. Building consensus around a single option will take time and finesse; we welcome the participation of the United Nations, and Special Representative Lakhdar Brahimi, in this critical process. Our goal is that laid out in the November 15 Agreement: the creation of an interim body by June 1 and the transfer of sovereignty to it by June 30.

Putting in place the infrastructure for Iraq's elections in 2005 will be equally important – and equally contentious. We believe the establishment of an independent elections commission and the passage of an elections law and a political parties law before June 30 are essential if Iraq is to have impartial elections that meet international standard next year. Leaving such politically sensitive items to the interim government would ensure that political parties exercise undue influence over the process and call into question the credibility of the elections from the outset. Achieving these goals – in a political charged environment – will require maximum effort, by CPA and the United Nations elections team that has come to Iraq to assess the country's elections needs. The strategy of the UN, which CPA supports, is to engage in consultations nationwide in order to build consensus around key elements of an elections law and the composition and authorities of a commission.

Shoring Up Iraq's Other Institutions

While the spotlight will be on the process of establishing an interim government, CPA will continue its work with Iraqis to build the institutions that will be Iraq's greatest assurance of sound government administration. Strengthening the capacity of the ministries is a top priority in this category. CPA will, in conjunction with the ministers and Governing Council, appoint competent, qualified deputy ministers to provide depth to the institutions that are responsible for the day-to-day functioning of the bureaucracy. At the same time, CPA will continue to build the capacity of the ministries through training and initiatives such as attaching inspectors general to each entity to combat fraud, waste, and corruption. Over the next three months, CPA will progressively give greater governmental authority to ministries that demonstrate good management, organization, and planning. After June 30, advisors will stay as authorized by the Iraqi Interim Government within those ministries critical to the Coalition. Outside the ministries, the coalition will continue to promote decentralization and local decision making by empowering local bodies and provincial governments. An upcoming legal order will expand and clarify the powers delegated to the provinces, while providing them with additional funds.

CPA will also remain focused on the establishment of a strong and independent Iraqi judiciary as a new separate branch of government. The effort to reform the judiciary by removing judges and prosecutors who were corrupt or had close ties to Saddam Hussein's regime is nearly complete: more than 175 judges and prosecutors have been removed. Training of Iraqi judges and prosecutors in judicial independence and rule of law concepts will continue beyond the transfer of full governmental authority. We will ensure that the

groundwork is laid for new courts, including the independent Supreme Court and the Iraqi Special Tribunal in particular, to serve the Iraqi people by checking abusive exercises of government power and vindicating the individual rights enshrined in the TAL.

We must also use this window of opportunity to establish independent commissions that define and constrain the role of government. Already, an Iraqi Communications and Media Commission have been established and a Commission on Public Integrity will soon follow. This Commission on Public Integrity, in concert with ministry Inspectors General and the Board of Supreme Audit, will establish a world-class system for combating corruption at every level of government. The Iraqi Communications and Media Commission will promote diversity and competition within Iraq's media and communications industries, while guaranteeing the Iraqi people continued access to unbiased reporting on events in Iraq and the world. We recognize that such institutions have little or no precedent in the region and that they will struggle to exercise their mandate. However, if CPA can help them take root and give them sufficient resources, it will have provided an enduring foundation for better and more transparent government in Iraq.

Finally, CPA considers it a priority to respond to the thirst for greater civic education and support for civil society across the country. Non-governmental organizations, small political parties, and women's and youth groups make up the texture of a democratic society. CPA is standing up democracy building programs that will nurture these institutions, through training, grants and infrastructure support. Such programs are intended to long outlast CPA.

Pushing Forward on the Economic Front

Poll after poll suggests that improving economic performance will have a decisive beneficial impact on security. Unemployment is already dropping rapidly and the macroeconomic impact of the implementation of the development projects funded by the budget supplemental promises to be substantial, despite the inflation and corruption that may well accompany it. More jobs and better infrastructure will remain key to economic prosperity and political stability.

A drawback of rapid growth is that it may make it even more difficult to persuade future Iraqi governments of the need for reform. We these facts in mind, the CPA intends to pursue a vigorous campaign of economic reform and institution building in the time remaining to it. Farmers will be allowed to sell their wheat crop at world market prices for the first time in decades, while being asked to pay a greater fraction of the cost of the inputs necessary to grow the wheat. Official prices for gasoline and other petroleum products will slowly rise in the direction of prices actually prevailing in the market place. Steps will continue to be made to improve the intermediation of funds between would be investors and capital-starved Iraqi enterprises. Orders updating Iraqi laws on competition, the protection of intellectual property rights, pensions and money laundering, among others, are already in the works. The Iraqi Stock Exchange will soon be reborn with an independent Securities Exchange Commission to watch over it.

Finally, we will continue to work hard to provide the essential services that Iraqis demand. No service is more valued by the Iraqi people than electricity; we will achieve our

goal to increase electrical generating capacity so as to provide at least 6,000 MW of power by June 30. Meanwhile, the expansion of telephone service, led by the private cell phone licensees, will continue apace. By June 30 the number of telephone subscribers will be at least 30 % above pre-war levels.

Conclusion

The first stage in Iraq's transition is rapidly coming to a close. Ninety-five days remain in which the Coalition will be in charge of the administration of the country. The United States will still maintain extraordinary influence in the interim period, but nothing compared to the authority we exercise today. We must make the most of the next three months, marshalling all our energies and resources to pursue the priorities laid out above. We must also be prepared to make hard choices and possibly even take short term risks if we are to lay the most solid foundation possible. How this phase of Iraq's history closes will determine the prospects and possibilities for the next.

COORDINATION:

(b)(6) Deputy Administrator - ok
(b)(6) - OPO - ok
- Civil Affairs - ok
- MOF - ok
- Governance - ok
- OGC - ok
- ok

3/29/04

of government

Making the Most of the Next 90 Days

Introduction and Overview:

- Not going to change Iraqi human nature, institutions or politics in such a short period
- Must however build momentum and shut as many doors to the past behind us as we can. This means setting sound policies and establishing independent institutions, which will provide lasting checks and balances on the power of the state.
- The more we can do now, the easier it will be for us to put in a caretaker government which will give us the time we need to allow these institutions and policies to mature.
- We must recognize that whatever government we install will be weak and will continue to need our support politically, economically and most of all in the security field.

Improving Security:

- Security remains our biggest challenge and is vital to success in all other areas.
- Frankly, I'm concerned that we've lost momentum in this area during the transition from OIF I to OIF II. Our enemies, which are increasingly foreign, are taking advantage of this. They are now bringing the fight to soft civilian targets, Iraqi and Coalition alike, with deadly effect.
- Their goal is to discredit us in the eyes of the Iraqi people and the international community. We must not allow this to happen.
- In the long run the Iraqis themselves must be responsible for their own security and after some false starts, we are starting to make excellent progress in training the armed forces and civilian security forces, but it will take a year or more before we have begun to really achieve our objectives. In the interim we must avoid playing numbers games. An untrained Iraqi police officer or civil defense corpsman does not equal an American soldier when it comes to providing security.
- Another problem that we must address prior to June 30 is the militias. They fall into two categories: political party militias and criminal militias. We already have a productive dialogue on transition and re-integration into civilian life with most of the former group. We will need to keep up a firm carrot and stick policy to put them irrevocably on the path to dissolution by June 30. The latter group, which is exemplified by Muqtadah al-Sadr's Jaysh al-Mahdi, can not be negotiated with. They must be confronted. Doing so, particularly in the South, would help restore respect for our forces and create a breathing space for the newly formed security forces to establish their authority. It would also ensure that the Iraqi people are able to enjoy the freedoms that liberation promised them and that are embodied in the newly approved Transitional Administrative Law.

-- If we don't act on Muqtadah and his thugs, the security situation in the South will continue to deteriorate, we will lose the support of the people their and political party militias will refuse to give up their arms.

Political Transition:

-- The adoption of the new Transitional Administrative Law was a landmark achievement in the history of democratic development in Iraq and the region. We should be justifiably proud of this accomplishment --so should the Governing Council, which was able to overcome last minute second-guessing by Grand Ayatholla Sistani to preserve the careful balance that they had achieved in the document.

-- However, this is only the beginning. We have our work cut out for us for the next three months. We still must appoint an independent electoral commission, promulgate a political parties' law and an election law, decide on the form of the government that will take place on June 30 and the mechanism that will be used to choose it, and negotiate an annex to the Administrative Law that enshrines these decisions. None of these issues can be deferred until after June 30. The sooner we resolve them, the better positioned we will be for a smooth transition on schedule.

-- Fortunately, we will be ably assisted in these efforts by the United Nations. Its team of elections experts is already on the ground and is working hard in conjunction with CPA, IFES and the Iraqis.

-- Kofi Annan's main troubleshooter, Lakhdar Brahimi, is scheduled to arrive within days. We are optimistic that he will be able to take the pulse of the Iraqi people and begin to make recommendations well before the end of April.

-- Even as we begin our work with the UN, I want you to be aware of several potential pitfalls. The first is security. We are doing everything we can to be responsive to the UN on its security needs, to the extent that I have put a hold on CODEL's and my own senior people are now locked down in the Palace for want of PSD's. However, we can not guarantee that there will not be a security incident of some kind. I don't need to tell you how damaging that would be. If the UN were forced to withdraw, we have no plan B.

-- Another potential pitfall is our sense that popular Iraqi views on the form of the interim government differ significantly from the current thinking within the USG. The closer Brahimi listens to his Iraqi interlocutors the further his recommendations are likely to be from what Washington has been contemplating up to now.

-- Beyond the political decisions that need to be made, we will continue to use the next three months to shore up the capacity of individual ministries and to reach out to the Iraqi people. In this regard, we are finally gaining traction with the suspicious Sunni Arab and tribal communities. One thing that has helped in this regard is greater transparency and responsiveness to popular criticism of our handling of Iraqi civilian detainees.

-- We will also use the time remaining to us to begin implementation of the many programs we are funding under the supplemental to support the development of grass roots democracy and to nurture fledgling political parties. These efforts will of course continue throughout the six months between the handover of sovereignty and elections for a National Assembly.

Pushing forward on the Economic Front

-- Last, but certainly not least, we will make a major push in the next three months on economic reform. As painful as it might be, I am convinced that we can just not wait any longer to do so. Everywhere we look in this former Stalinist centrally-planned economy we see the pernicious effect of misleading price signals. Artificially low prices at the farm gate have depressed agricultural output and made the Arab world's most fertile country dependent on imports of food. Meanwhile, subsidized prices for fuels and agricultural inputs have led to waste and smuggling of precious commodities to neighboring markets. Absent action on our part, fuel subsidies alone will cost the government \$3 billion this year, some 10% of GNP.

-- Other areas that we can't wait to tackle include planning for the fate of State-owned enterprises and the effort to reduce external debt. If unattended, both these problems will impose a continuing burden on future government budgets for years to come. Jim Baker has made an excellent start on solving the latter problem. I have asked Ari Fleischer's brother, Mike, who heads up our office of Private Sector Development, to take his hand at crafting an overall strategy on the State-owned enterprises.

-- We will also take on competition policy, the protection of intellectual property rights, the reform of commercial law and the supply of working capital to Iraqi firms as urgent priorities. Of course, given the short time available to us, we will not accomplish all of this by June 30. Fortunately, the development projects now being launched with



COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY
BAGHDAD

p government

30 March 2004

FOR: THE ADMINISTRATOR
FROM: (b)(6)
SUBJECT: Readahead for March 30 PC Meeting

Sunni strategy is one of the issues on tonight's PC agenda. The paper forwarded is largely sensible and acknowledges earlier comments from CPA's OPO office. Some of the issues you may wish to stress are:

1. **Iraqi Interim Government.** There is discontent among the Sunni population and a sharp feeling of disenfranchisement among their numbers. Overall, the slowly-emerging Sunni leadership is hostile to the Governing Council, resentful that their community is represented by individuals without real standing in core Sunni areas. Perhaps the single most important step we can take in addressing their disillusionment is to ensure that the Iraqi Interim Government (IIG) is a representative body acceptable to all the Iraqi people. This will have implications for the structure, size, and composition of the IIG, as well as its authorities and the mode of selection for it. We must balance our desire to have a simple, streamlined government with the reality that no one, two, or even five Sunnis will make the body representative. Similarly, it may not be enough to create a representative body (a large national conference) that has a limited mandate, such as choosing the prime minister and presidency council. In order for Sunnis to feel part of the new Iraq, they must be able to exercise some element of real authority.
2. **De-Ba'athification.** De-Ba'athification remains a contentious issue, both within and among Sunni and Shi'a communities. Many Sunnis continue to feel that the policy and its implementation is devised to allow Shi'a "to take revenge" on the Sunnis for decades of repression by Saddam. We have recently embarked on an analysis of the de-Ba'athification process since authority for it was transferred to the GC in November 2003. In addition to being heavily politicized, the Supreme Council on De-Ba'athification is seeking to centralize all functions, including appeals, in contravention of the guidelines we agreed to last fall.

We are currently considering our options for addressing these problems. The approaches range from instructing Chalabi to fix specific problems with the de-Ba'ath process in a specified period of time to withdrawing the delegation of authority to the GC and establishing the Commission as a fully independent body. Ultimately, the potential for political exploitation of de-Ba'athification may simply be too great to put directly into the

hands of politicians, particularly those who see it as a tool with which to seize political power and whose incentive to change their ways will only diminish as June 30 approaches.

(Note: We have few reliable figures on the number of teachers in these cities pre- and post-de-Ba'ath. Several cities in Sunni areas had been very heavily affected, however. According to the Director of Education in Kirkuk, 574 teachers were de-ba'athified in Kirkuk. 183 of these were in one area, Hawijah, where implementation of the de-Ba'ath order would have resulted in removing every teacher in the school and the closure of schools in. (Coalition forces hired the teachers back there as janitors to keep the schools from closing.) Likewise, in Tikrit and Samarra, we don't know the number of teachers employed before the de-Ba'athification. We estimate that about 1700 total in Salah ad-Din were dismissed; many are all still on the job, working as volunteers.)

3. **Detainees.** A key part of our effort to normalize the Sunni community involves streamlining our detention policies. Currently, nearly 13,000 people remain in our custody. In the last month, the Coalition has created a standing Review and Appeal Board which meets six days a week to examine the cases. It has thus far reviewed more than 3000 cases and cleared more than 2600 for release. The size of the detainee population is declining and this trend should continue.
4. **Reintegrating Former Military.** At the higher levels of the New Iraqi Army, we are seeking to create a balance that reflects ethnic and religious divisions in Iraq. At lower levels, we are not focused on proportions, though our initial assessments suggest that overall recruiting is resulting in a rough balance that reflects the population as a whole. Former military personnel are eligible to join new Iraqi security services, including the Armed Forces. De-Ba'athification procedures are being applied, although they are most relevant at the senior levels. Approximately 1/3 of the "civilians" in the new MOD are former military. They represent the broad range of religious and ethnic groups of Iraq.
5. **Militias.** We must seek to eliminate or phase out all militias, not only the political party ones stated in the paper. The continued ability of militias – mainly Shi'a ones – to operate freely is not only demoralizing average Iraqis, but sending a message to Sunnis that the Coalition will turn a blind eye to Shi'a vigilantism.
6. **Civic Education.** In the process of promoting and explaining the TAL, we need to stress the message that democracy is not just about majority decision making, but also protection of minorities.
7. **Good Governance.** We will boost the morale of all Sunnis each time we prioritize competence and good government over sectarian affiliations and parties. These principles have guided our efforts to hire and announce people for both the Ministry of Defense and the deputy minister appointments. The perception that Shi'a are gradually taking over the ministries is widespread in the Sunni community. The GC's decision to dole out ministries on a sectarian basis was a mistake, and anything we can do to redress that before June 30 would resonate positively among the Sunnis.



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Administrator's Weekly Report

Governance

March 20 - 26, 2004

HIGHLIGHTS

-- The CPA marked one hundred days until Iraqi sovereignty on March 24 with the announcement of three independent agencies to protect the public interest: 1) a Commission on Public Integrity to enforce Iraq's anti-corruption laws in cooperation with the Board of Supreme Audit and the newly established Inspectors General assigned to every ministry; 2) an Iraq Public Service Broadcaster, which will regulate publicly owned media; and 3) an Iraqi Communications and Media Commission to ensure Iraq's airwaves are administered in the public interest.

I. Support Transition to Iraqi Sovereignty

- The CPA has assisted in briefings and literature distribution to all nine District Advisory Councils in Baghdad on the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL).
- Council members from all ethnic communities gathered to discuss the TAL on March 18 in Kirkuk, where reactions to the TAL have been mixed. Kurds view it as a step towards their aspiration of Kirkuk becoming part of Iraqi Kurdistan. Arabs and Turcoman fear Kurdish domination. Shia are worried that a minority can veto the final Constitution. Sunni, Turcoman, and Chaldo-Assyrian all want to see strong protection for their own rights. Shia Arabs and Turcoman are distributing a petition expressing reservations about the TAL.
- The National Democratic Institute (NDI) continues work on the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) Project by providing assistance with planning for the transition to the National Assembly outlined in the TAL. In addition, NDI is assisting the IGC Secretariat with the development of a website that can serve as a public access point for distribution of information about the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) and the preparations for the establishment of the Interim Government.
- Sub-district selections were held in Qadisiya on March 20 with the remaining three selections in the province to be completed in the next two weeks. The Provincial Council

caucus process is still suspended, but selection of representatives from sector groups that were unable to hold caucuses is being completed.

- The CPA marked one hundred days until Iraqi sovereignty on March 24 with the announcement of three independent agencies to protect the public interest: 1) a Commission on Public Integrity to enforce Iraq's anti-corruption laws in cooperation with the Board of Supreme Audit and the newly established Inspectors General assigned to every ministry; 2) an Iraq Public Service Broadcaster, which will regulate publicly owned media; and 3) an Iraqi Communications and Media Commission to ensure Iraq's airwaves are administered in the public interest.
- Caucus elections were held for nine Dhi Qar Provincial Council seats. A women's caucus composed of 75 women from districts and NGOs elected five representatives. Caucuses to elect representatives were held by four professional unions. A deadlock over representation for Islamic parties on the council was resolved by the suggestion of revolving seats.
- More than 70 applications have been received for the office of Mayor of Baghdad. The quality of the applicants appears to be high, with nearly all appearing to meet the extensive list of requirements established by the City Council. The application period has opened up for Deputy Governor and Governor as well, and search committees have been named. Extensive paid advertisements and announcements at meetings have informed the public of opportunities to apply for these positions.
- The application period opened for the positions of Baghdad Deputy Governor and Governor, and search committees have been named. Extensive paid advertisements and announcements at meetings have informed the public of opportunities to apply for these positions.
- The International Republican Institute (IRI) published two thousand copies of a booklet entitled: "A Citizen-Focused Government", outlining how government agencies at all levels can become more customer-focused and more user-friendly for all citizens. CPA and IRI distributed the publication to ministries, the General Information Center offices and the Governing Council as well as to U.S. agencies that advise ministries.

II. Develop Civic Participation in Governance

Develop indigenous polling capacity; Provide women and youth with the skills necessary to become important participants in the political process; Develop local civil society capacity to conduct advocacy and participate in political life; Develop civic education programs promoting electoral participation and democratic ideals; Build capacity for civil society conflict prevention and mitigation

- Certificates of Appreciation were presented to leaders of the Hindiya Club in a ceremony on March 24 in Baghdad honoring the first open and legitimately competitive elections held for the club's leadership since the 1960s. The Hindiya Club is a 55 year-old

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Prepared by the Information Management Unit

community social club whose membership includes 8,000 families. The CPA assisted the club in formation of an independent, respected Elections Committee and worked with the club through all steps of the election process.

- The CPA Local Governance Program (LGP) and the Columbia University Center for International Conflict Resolution (CICR) conducted a one-day workshop in Kirkuk on March 20 on the subject of civil society organizations.
- The IRI met with women representatives of the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) in Baghdad on March 13 to discuss the political participation of women. They noted that their own party does not offer them enough support and expressed interest in participating in IRI training sessions.
- The CPA LGP has completed a month-long training course for a team of ten Iraqis (six women and four men) who will go on to train the Al Basrah Governorate and local councils in effective governance techniques. The training curriculum included Iraqi public laws, human rights, local budget awareness, motivational skills, presentation skills, note-taking, and the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL). The training also included sessions on the LGP Civic Dialogue Program which engages Iraqis in discussions of democracy, so that the trainers will encourage democracy dialogues in their own training sessions. The team will initially train 40 members of the Governorate Council and will then branch out to train local councils throughout Basrah Governorate.
- The CPA Transition Initiatives Program provided a grant to the Dahuk Women's Rehabilitation Center to conduct training on women's rights awareness. The Women's Rehabilitation Center operates a broad program for improving the quality of women's lives and strengthening civil society through gender equality initiatives. The award will allow the center staff to present a workshop in the Sarsnk District of Dahuk to increase awareness of this issue and encourage all citizens to elevate women's place in society.

III. Support Development of Sustainable Political Parties/Associations

Support development of political associations

- The IRI met with Sadr City branches of the Supreme Committee for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) and the Dawa Party on March 20 in Baghdad to discuss the political environment and their inclusion in future training projects. Both are large, long-standing parties pre-dating liberation which publicly disavow sectarianism or ethnic and religious-based division of the country. Both parties, drawing much of their composition from the Shia population, voiced reservations about the TAL, in particular Article 61 which describes the process for drafting a permanent constitution.
- The IRI attended a meeting of the National Justice and Fraternity Party on March 22 in Baghdad. The Party was established in 1991 by former military officers who fell out of favor with the Hussein regime. During the meeting, an election for the leadership took

place and Amer Shiah Abdullah was elected president by paper ballot. Twenty-two members of its Executive Committee attended.

- CPA and IRI officials met with the Iraqi Democratic Movement, headed by returned expatriate Kasim Daoood, at their headquarters in Baghdad on March 22 to discuss party goals. The Movement has records of approximately 60,000 members belonging to 21 branches across the country. Like other Iraqi political parties with whom IRI is familiar, they espouse support for democratic values, a unified federative state and a flourishing, multi-party system.
- CPA representatives attended the National United Power Convention, which brought together close to a thousand participants from political parties, non-governmental organizations and other civil society groups and movements to discuss such issues as security, re-building the country and, notably, the democratic transition. Those delegates and leaders who spoke expressed broad support for the TAL as a temporary, though some, including a Turcoman representative, expressed grave reservations about it. The National United Power Convention has an organizing committee of various parties and movements including the Iraqi National Gathering and the Iraqi Democratic Movement.

IV. Promote Respect for Human Rights

Educate on human rights issues; Preserve documentation of past atrocities, raise awareness, and promote reconciliation; Strengthen local capacity to investigate and address past atrocities; Iraqi Special Tribunal (IST) for past atrocities; Incorporate human rights into laws; Develop role of independent human rights NGOs and media; Establish a Human Rights Ministry

- The Ministry of Culture in As Sulaymaniyah will use a grant from the CPA Transition Initiatives Program to raise awareness of human rights violations committed by the Ba'athist regime. The funding will be used by the Halabja Museum to print and distribute brochures that describe the chemical attack on the town of Halabja in March 1988, in addition to the widespread repressive actions against the Kurds in the same year, known as the al-Anfal Campaign.

V. Promote Durable Solutions for Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)

Facilitate the return of refugees and IDPs; Build local and national capacity to protect and assist refugees and IDPs; Develop and implement a process to resolve property disputes, through the Iraq Property Claims Commission

- The Ministry of Displacement and Migration moved to its permanent headquarters building in Baghdad, located in the Karkh area near the Al-Jumhuriyah Bridge. The new headquarters has been equipped with a satellite Internet connection and Intranet system with the support of the United Nations High Commission on Refugees (UNHCR), which will allow it to better coordinate its activities in support of IDPs and refugees with international organizations.



COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY
BAGHDAD

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Administrator's Weekly Report

Governance

February 28 – March 5, 2004

HIGHLIGHTS

-- On Monday, March 8, the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) signed the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL). The Iraqi people now have a legal framework for the interim government containing a Bill of Rights that ensures equal treatment under the law for every Iraqi citizen. The TAL is the cornerstone for a permanent democratic government in Iraq.

I. Support Transition to Iraqi Sovereignty

- The March 2, suicide bombings in Baghdad and Karbala prompted the IGC to declare a three-day mourning period for the victims and to reschedule the TAL signing ceremony. The IGC convened on Friday, March 5 for the rescheduled ceremony, but the signing was once again delayed because of disagreements over provisions in the document related to veto power in a permanent constitution.
- In order to test basic understanding of political processes and concepts among Iraqis, the CPA dedicated a portion of a February 23-29, poll to a short "civics test." The poll indicates that Iraqis in general are not well-informed on transition political issues. Fewer than half (42 percent) of survey respondents understand the purpose of the TAL or who writes and approves it. Approximately half as many respondents understood that a constitution is a nation's fundamental law. Approximately one third of respondents correctly identify federalism with the election of local officials, and views diverge widely on concerns about federalism. The survey was conducted in seven cities including Baghdad, Babylon, Dyala, Ramadi, Mosul, Basra and Suleymaniyah.
- In a separate six-city poll (Baghdad, Basra, Mosul, Hilla, Karbala and Ramadi), respondents indicated that the IGC is unacceptable as an interim government and that United Nations (UN) endorsement makes alternative interim governments less popular. The following table provides the results to the question regarding acceptability of specific forms of government. (Results in parentheses represent the results if the UN

recommended specific forms of government.)

Form	Completely Acceptable	Somewhat Acceptable	Somewhat Unacceptable	Completely Unacceptable
Local caucuses select a legislature and the legislature creates and interim government	43.0% (UN: 37.2)	15.3% (UN: 16.4)	5.6% (UN: 6.6)	30.7% (UN: 34.5)
The current Iraqi Governing Council becomes the interim government	11.9% (UN: 11.2)	16.1% (UN: 15.1)	10.7% (UN: 12.6)	56.9% (UN: 55.9)
An expanded form of the current Iraqi Governing Council	12.8% (UN: 13.4)	19.1% (UN: 16.8)	14.3% (UN: 12.6)	48.4% (UN: 55.9)
An alternative unelected board appointed by the UN	11.7%	6.4%	8.4%	67.1%

- A tribal caucus held on March 3 selected seven new members to the Dhi Qar Provincial Council (PC). The refreshment process for the Dhi Qar PC is nearly complete.
- The Baghdad City Advisory Council (CAC) authorized its legal committee to prepare a draft Baghdad City Charter to codify CAC functions under the TAL.

II. Develop Civic Participation in Governance

Develop indigenous polling capacity; Provide women and youth with the skills necessary to become important participants in the political process; Develop local civil society capacity to conduct advocacy and participate in political life; Develop civic education programs promoting electoral participation and democratic ideals; Build capacity for civil society conflict prevention and mitigation

- Basra Governor Wael Abdul Latif convened a governorate conference on federalism and decentralization on February 29. More than 150 participants from across the governorate attended the forum representing political parties, local councils, trade unions, local media, Basra University and governorate departments. The meeting marked the first opportunity for the Governor to talk openly with his constituents on the practical aspects of Federalism.
- Waleed Aumran Hussein Al Janabi, the recently elected Babil Governor, took office on March 1. His first week in office included training through the USAID's Local

Governance Program (LGP) as well as receiving community leaders.

- On February 28 in Arbil, the CPA, in conjunction with the Kurdish Regional Government and Salah ad Din University, hosted the second of six weekly seminars devoted to promoting the economic development of the Arbil governorate. This second seminar focused on infrastructure for a growing economy.
- The CPA visited two elementary schools for girls in Maysan governorate on February 26, in preparation for an Local Governance Program (LGP) Rule of Law Program at schools throughout the governorate. Through the Rule of Law Program, LGP plans to present a five-minute speech at the flag raising ceremonies of elementary, intermediate, and secondary schools throughout the governorate. Weekly messages on a variety of subjects tailored to the age of the students will continue until the end of the year.
- The CPA facilitated a Democracy Dialogue Activity (DDA) workshop in Arbil on March 1. Discussion included networking, effective outreach, and training techniques to promote dialogue.
- The CPA Iraqi Women in Local Government Program (IWLGP) and the Iraq Foundation for Development and Democracy (IFDD) co-sponsored a conference in Baghdad on February 26 on the role of women in the new Iraq. The participants represented a cross section of Iraqi society including lawyers, doctors, engineers, council members, housewives, activists, and governmental organization (NGO) staff. The conference agenda focused on two main issues: 1) the representation of women in the National Transitional Assembly and in government positions; and 2) women's legal rights, including a focus on current laws and how they affect women, and Islamic law.
- The Kurdish Economic Development Organization (KEDO), with the support of the LGP, began a three-day workshop on February 24 in Arbil, to promote the participation of women in the workforce. With approximately 35 to 40 women attending, the workshop featured a film portraying women business owners and discussions about the barriers to the advancement of women's careers. The women also identified their needs for starting small businesses and developed strategies to address these needs.

III. Promote Respect for Human Rights

Educate on Human Rights Issues; Preserve documentation of past atrocities, raise awareness, and promote reconciliation; Strengthen local capacity to investigate and address past atrocities; Iraqi Special Tribunal (IST) for past atrocities and Iraq Property Claims Commission (IPCC) for property disputes; Human Rights Incorporated into Laws; Develop Role of Independent Human Rights NGOs and Media; Establish a Human Rights Ministry

- During the March 2, meeting of the Tripartite Commission on Missing Persons, relating to the first Gulf War in Kuwait, Kuwaitis gave permission for Iraqis to assess two mass graves inside the Kuwaiti border that may contain war casualties and to inspect three

individual graves in a cemetery before exhumation.

IV. Promote Durable Solutions for Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)

Facilitate the Return of Refugees and IDPs; Build Local and National Capacity to Protect and assist Refugees and IDPs; Develop and Implement a Process to Resolve Property Disputes

- The CPA, with support of the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), is planning a convoy of refugees to return from the Rafha camp in Saudi Arabia to various destinations in Iraq on March 7, nearly completing the repatriation of these refugees.

ADDENDUM

The following is an update on the transition to sovereignty (after the close of the reporting period):

- Several hours after the rescheduled TAL signing ceremony on March 5, the IGC adjourned. After reaching an understanding on a few outstanding issues, the IGC reconvened on March 8, and signed the law for the transition period. Despite the delay, the document remained unchanged.
- The Iraqi people now have an interim constitution containing a Bill of Rights that ensures equal treatment under the law for every Iraqi citizen. Among the significant provisions in the TAL are the establishment of a Federalist system, based on geography, not ethnicity; an independent judiciary system; and a military under civilian control.



COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY
BAGHDAD

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28 March 2004

FOR: THE ADMINISTRATOR

FROM:

(b)(6)

SUBJECT: Making the Most of the Next 95 Days

In 95 days, the Coalition will transfer authority to an Iraqi government and CPA will dissolve. In that short period of time, we will be unable to make irreversible changes or fundamentally alter the sectarian, ethnic, or historical facts that make Iraq a fractious and complicated country. Nevertheless, how we use these next three months will influence Iraq's trajectory and help determine whether the vision of Iraq as a democratic, free country at peace with itself and its neighbors is realized over the medium and long term. A clear strategy and decisive action now can push Iraq over the tipping point before June 30. It can ensure that momentum gathered now carries Iraq through the inevitably precarious transitional period to the time when the country has its own permanent constitution and elected government under it.

At the broadest level, our objective is to prepare the environment for the exercise of good government and the pursuit of economic prosperity. This will involve taking tough policy decisions that the interim government will be too weak to make and clearing obstacles that it will be unable to overcome. It will also involve helping Iraqis acquire the tools and build the institutions ^{on divided} they will need to withstand the pressures for sectarian squabbling and violence that will mark ^{they} - but need not dominate - Iraq's future.

Our focus in the next 95 days must span the security, economic, and political spheres. Our objectives in these areas are necessarily overlapping, as are our prescriptions. This memo seeks to lay out our priorities and how we intend to pursue them in the short time that remains before sovereignty is restored to an Iraqi government.

Improving Security

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An improved security environment is the key to progress in every other sector. Two major challenges to security persist: the insurgency fueled by elements of the former regime and terrorist groups supported from outside the country. We need to combat both by building up Iraqi security forces through the aggressive training and equipping of new recruits and their leadership. In-country training, as well as that in Jordan, are geared to ensuring the maximum number of qualified police and army members by June 30. While we

need to leave Iraqis better prepared to confront the threats they face, we will also work on understanding the threat better (through the establishment of Iraq's first non-political intelligence service) and diminishing it (through better and more strictly enforced border policies). Equally dire is the need to ensure better coordination between ministries whose work impacts the security situation. We have recently established a Ministerial National Security Council which brings together key ministers to prepare for and react to national security challenges. Finally, we need to quietly build a broader understanding of the status of Coalition forces in Iraq after June 30, perhaps through public education campaign related to the TAL. Letting major ambiguities and questions ~~linger now~~ will not cause such concerns to go away ~~it~~ just ensured that they will be raised later, when the Coalition has less influence to manage the political reaction.

Another critical element in improving security is addressing the militia problem in Iraq. Since liberation, the numbers of militias have multiplied, rather than dwindled. Their presence is destabilizing and is feeding a climate of intimidation across the country. Militias, particularly in the south, have been successful in coercing women to veil themselves and convincing people to remain silent about crimes and injustices. If such militias are not dismantled or phased out, they will ~~radically~~ influence both the environment and the outcome of elections in 2005 to the favor of radicals and those against democracy.

Tackling the militia challenge means we must choose to take actions that in the short term will be disruptive and could spark unrest. We should continue to pursue agreements with the peshmerga and the Badr Organization, in order to entice them either to integrate join themselves into Iraq's security forces or to find a civilian job. At the same time, however, we must be prepared to combat with the force of law those with which we have no political relations or hope for cooperation. The two prongs of this approach are in fact complimentary. Demonstrating that a lack of compliance will be met with force will demonstrate to the militias we seek to co-opt that there are costs to resisting a respectable demobilization.

Building Better Relations with Iraq's Communities and Promoting Moderate Elements Within and Among Them

Iraq's main communities are struggling to recover from the aftermath of Saddam's rule, grappling with new political realities, and their implications for their place in society and politics. Sunnis are wrestling with their "new" minority status and the Shi'as are struggling to overcome their complex of victimhood. Without Coalition involvement, the chances of these dynamics leading to a peaceful, moderate political landscape in the short term are low.

For this reason, the Coalition will continue its efforts to shape emerging political forces. More specifically, CPA will accelerate its efforts to engage Sunnis outside the current political structure. Disproportionately affected by de-ba'athification and the dissolution of the armed forces, with few recognizable leaders acceptable in the new Iraq, Sunnis continue to feel disconnected from and threatened by Iraq's transitional arrangements.

CPA will continue to identify and build leadership within the Sunni community and ensure that they secure a more appropriate place in the interim governmental structures. At the same time, it will seek to ~~streamline the detainee policy~~ and reform the de-ba'athification process so as to minimize the adverse consequences of these issues on the Sunni community as a whole.

Similarly, the Coalition must intensify efforts to promote moderate secular Shi'a and constrain the political influence of clerics. A key part of this is deftly managing the political role of Sistani. Given his enormous influence among Iraq's Shi'a, we must be careful not to ~~upset him gratuitously~~ and need to ensure that he is well-informed of political developments. But, particularly in the wake of the TAL signing when Shi'a political leaders courageously challenged both his views on the TAL and his right to dictate their reaction to it, we must be equally cautious not to boost Sistani's standing and increase his expectations of a direct role in politics, as our past actions have done. Meanwhile, just as we seek to support and cultivate Sunni parties, we must identify and strengthen Shi'a ones, which on their own will struggle to provide an alternative to Islamist parties such as SCIRI which have resources from abroad. Finally, civic education is another key element in working with the Shi'a and managing their political expectations; our programs seek to explain how democracy does not just involve decision-making by the majority, but also demands protection of minorities' rights.

The Coalition, however, does not intend to approach Iraqi politics with a strict sectarian focus. While it promotes secular, moderate forces within communities, it will continue to look for ways to bring these groups together across sectarian lines. The crafting and passage of the Transitional Administrative Law demonstrates that Iraqi leaders, if the stakes are high and the incentives are right, can move beyond their own narrow interests for the benefit of Iraq as a whole. In Iraq's interim government arrangements, we need to champion mechanisms that promote cross-community cooperation, such as the three-person presidency devised in the TAL. The Coalition must also help Iraqis get a head start on resolving its most volatile issues. For instance, we need to help stabilize the current situation in Kirkuk by strengthening its local institutions, penalizing aggressive actions of political parties, combating outside influence, and quelling misinterpretations of the TAL. At the same time, we should help Kirkukis begin to consider the various mechanisms that can be adopted to resolve their disputes. The involvement of an international body or impartial outsiders may be useful in this regard, as will the prompt adoption of the work of the IPRC.

Crafting Solid Transitional Political Institutions

The smoothness and resilience of Iraq's transition to democracy is dependent on the political structures created here in the next 95 days. The most visible and tangible challenge in the months ahead is defining and creating an interim government to govern Iraq in the period between the transfer of sovereignty on 30 June 2004 and the holding of elections by 31 January 2005. Still undecided are the structure and powers of, as well as the selection mechanism for, the interim government. The challenge will be creating a government which is broadly representative and acceptable to the Iraqi people, while at the same time able to govern Iraq effectively in the interim period. We will need to balance the competing

objectives of simplicity on the one hand and inclusiveness of the government and the empowerment of those who participate in it on the other. Building consensus around a single option will take time and finesse; we welcome the participation of the United Nations, and Special Representative Lakhdar Brahimi, in this critical process. Our goal is that laid out in the November 15 Agreement: the creation of an interim body by June 1 and the ~~passage of~~ sovereignty to it by June 30.

remaining
governmental
outlet

transfer

Putting in place the infrastructure for Iraq's elections in 2005 will be equally important – and equally contentious. We believe the passage of an elections law, a political parties law, and the establishment of an independent elections commission before June 30 is ~~and~~ essential if Iraq is to have impartial elections that meet international standard next year. Leaving such politically sensitive items to the interim government will ensure that political parties exercise undue influence over the process and call into question the credibility of the elections from the outset. Achieving these goals – in a political charged environment – will require maximum effort, by CPA and the United Nations elections team that has come to Iraq to assess the country's elections needs. The strategy of the UN, which CPA supports, is to engage in consultations nationwide in order to build consensus around key elements of an elections law and the composition and authorities of a commission.

would

Shoring Up Iraq's Non-Political Institutions

While the spotlight will be on the process of establishing an interim government, CPA will continue its work with Iraqis to build the non-political institutions that will be Iraq's greatest assurance of sound government. Strengthening the capacity of the ministries is a top priority in this category. CPA will, in conjunction with the ministers and Governing Council, appoint competent, qualified deputy ministers to provide depth to the institutions that are responsible for the day-to-day governance. At the same time, CPA will continue to build the capacity of the ministries through training and initiatives such as attaching inspector generals to each entity to combat fraud, waste, and corruption. Over the next three months, CPA will progressively "graduate" from CPA control ministries which demonstrate good management, organization, and planning. Coalition advice and assistance will not stop to these ministries unless the minister so chooses.

CPA will also remain focused on reforming the old judiciary and consolidating a new one independent from political pressures. Already, more than 400 judges have been examined for corruption or close ties to Saddam Hussein's regime; nearly 140 have been removed. This process – and the efforts to retrain judges in ____ -- will continue beyond the transfer of sovereignty. We will ensure that the groundwork is laid for new courts, the Iraqi Special Tribunal in particular, to serve the Iraqi people and protect the rights laid out for them in the TAL.

Finally, we must use this window of opportunity to establish independent commissions that define and constrain the role of government. Already, a Commission on Public Integrity and a Media Commission have been established. We recognize that such institutions have little or no precedent in the region and that they will struggle to exercise their mandate. However, if CPA can help them take root and give them sufficient resources,

Soon a
Public Service
Board will help
to guarantee continued
access to ~~the~~ individual
reporting on
Iraqi events

be set up to
4 oversee the
work of IJIT to
the Iraq people will have

it will have provided the foundation for better and more transparent government over the transitional period and beyond.

Taking Hard Decisions on the Economic Front

Conclusion

The first stage in Iraq's transition is rapidly coming to a close. Ninety-five days remain in which the Coalition will be in charge of the administration of the country. The United States will still maintain extraordinary influence in the interim period, but nothing compared to the authority we exercise today. We must make the most of the next three months, marshalling all our energies and resources to pursue the priorities laid out above. How this phase of Iraq's history closes will determine the prospects and possibilities for the next.

Price reform
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wheat
reducing subsidies
Institutions
SEC
Stock Exchange
Competition
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Money laundering
Legal base pension funds
unified currency
down intervention
of funds to those
who need them
essential services
electricity
oil
water

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INFO: COS IPC

DISSEMINATION: EXEC /1
CHARGE: PROG

APPROVED: RJONES
DRAFTED: GOVERNANCE/KGRUIZENG
CLEARED: DPITTMAN, JLECROY

MAR 26 2004

4 Governance

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RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0295
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NSC WASHDC 0280
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
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STATE ALSO PASS TO USAID

E.O.12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, KDEM, EAID, IZ
SUBJECT: CPA 0799: Democracy Building Weekly March 13 -
March 20

1. Summary. This is the eleventh installment of a weekly update on democracy-related activities taking place around Iraq. Information has been gathered from several sources including: United States Agency for International Development (USAID), Governorate Coordinator Situation Reports, and members of Coalition Province Authority (CPA)-Governance.

2. USAID completed scopes of work for civil society and media, elections monitoring, and assistance for the transitional government. In coordination with the CPA Governance Team, USAID is soliciting proposals and applications for assistance in domestic elections monitoring and voter education, civil society development, and support of the Iraqi Interim and Transitional governments. Specifically, the programs will support the conduct of successful national elections in Iraq by training and deploying Iraqi monitors to observe and analyze a series of elections, while supporting Iraqi civil society organizations to design and conduct country-wide

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voter education campaigns. The programs will also provide training and assistance to establish sustainable civil society organizations (CSOs) that strengthen citizen participation in governmental decision-making. This will increase transparency and accountability in the allocation and use of public resources, sustain democratic reforms while strengthening the capacity of the legislative branch and executive authority of the Iraqi Interim and Transitional governments as provided by the TAL, and support the process for adoption of an Iraqi constitution that incorporates democratic principles and values. End Summary.

NATIONAL GOVERNMENT SUPPORT

3. Baghdad, March 13: The International Republican Institute (IRI) provided support to a forum conducted by the Iraqi Foundation for the Development of Democracy, on the new Transitional Administrative Law. Larry Diamond, Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institute, was the speaker and the 30 participants provided a wide array of opinions on the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL).

4. Baghdad, March 14: IRI assisted the Iraqi Foundation for the Development of Democracy in a second forum to discuss the TAL. This session added more insights on what the various Iraqi communities thought of the law and what they would like to see changed in it.

5. Baghdad, March 15: IRI conducted a workshop for representatives of the Governing Council Secretariat, several of the Iraqi Ministries and the General Information Centers (GICs). IRI Country Director Ron St. John provided information and led a discussion on public access to government information. Participants were able to share ideas and begin a network of communicators for the government. This was the first in a series of eight workshops designed to improve communication between the Governing Council Secretariat and the various ministries, and improve the outreach skills of the Governing Council Secretariat staff.

6. Mosul, March 19: CPA Baghdad and the Mosul Social Club led a meeting on the TAL. About 60 sheiks attended. A second meeting was held later that day with about 50 students from the university, most of whom were Kurdish. There was an overall favorable reaction to the TAL.

LOCAL GOVERNMENT SELECTION-REFRESH

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7. Baghdad (Rashad district): USAID's Local Government Program (LPG) facilitated a training seminar for the Rashad District Council. Ten members participated, including the Mayor and the representative to the Kirkuk Governorate Council. Rashad is a predominantly Arab area, consisting mainly of members of the Al Assi tribe. The training focused on team building and council procedures, including identification of the principles of decision making, the role of the Chairman, Robert's Rules of Order, and setting priorities for the work of committees.

8. Basrah: The Interim Council has begun weekly meetings and is continuing plans for ration card style elections to refresh all Basrah local councils. The Council intends to complete the elections by mid-April. The Council is considering legislation for all of the council's operating practices.

9. Dhi Qar: Refreshment of the Provincial Council continues with seats to be allocated to tribal representatives, political parties, district councils, women, hauza clerics and professional unions. Each group is being encouraged to select its own members through a caucus.

DECENTRALIZATION

10. Wasit: The Provincial Council discussed the issue of budgets allocated to ministries and to sub-districts this week. This week's meeting saw numerous allegations that the flow of money from Baghdad to provinces and municipalities was haphazard and arbitrary. This session was also devoted in large part to the examination of municipal programs.

11. Diwaniyah, March 15: The Democratic Leadership Conference provided team building training and procedures for conducting meetings to city council members throughout Diwaniyah.

POLITICAL PARTY ASSISTANCE

12. Baghdad: IRI met with Qasim Hadi, General Secretary of the Union of the Unemployed to discuss his organization and its affiliated political party. They discussed his ideas regarding the role of labor unions in a democracy and what training is required during the transition. The Union of the Unemployed has three offices in Baghdad and three outside of Baghdad, with a total membership of 300,000.

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13. Hilla, Baghdad, Tikrit and Kirkuk: The National Democratic Institute (NDI) completed a series of multi-party workshops. In addition to serving as an introduction to NDI, the sessions provided an opportunity to assess the strengths, weaknesses, and potential capacity of more than 45 political parties that participated. The workshops were used to provide party leaders with an overview of the planning and techniques used by political parties around the world - as well as to guide decision-making on their own capacity needs.

14. Baghdad: NDI has arranged for two study missions for delegations of approximately 10 Iraqi political party activists to travel to Canada and Ireland. The activists will be placed within campaigns during the Canadian elections scheduled for April and the Irish Elections scheduled for June. The Iraqi participants will get first hand experience in the organization and management of political campaigns.

CIVIL SOCIETY DEVELOPMENT

15. --Civic Education Update-- Baghdad, March 1-13: Successful democracy workshops were held at the CPA for civil society groups using Local Government Program (LGP) trained democracy facilitators. A variety of issues were discussed including the combination of Islam with democracy; the role of women in Iraqi society; and the impact of the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL).

16. Baghdad, March 15-16: Just Read, an Iraqi NGO, held a National Agenda Dialogue Conference for youth in Baghdad with the support of LGP. More than 200 young adults gathered from all parts of Iraq to discuss the role of youth in Iraq's development. Topics were economics, religion, democracy, media, education and women's issues, as they pertain to Iraqi youth. This conference was one of 10 National Dialogue Conferences being supported by the CPA and USAID under the Civic Dialogue Program.

17. Amara, March 13, and Basra, March 14: Town Hall meetings were held where two IGC members played a key role in promoting the TAL. Interim Councils were briefed and discussions in mosques and political circles are underway.

18. Kirkuk: The Project Coordination Center (PCC) was refurbished through a rapid response grant from the LGP. The center will provide a link for CPA, Coalition forces, the ministry directorates, the Local Iraqi Government, and NGO's to plan, coordinate, track, and prioritize projects

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in the Kirkuk Governorate. The center will be a hub for donors and NGO's to help in rebuilding Kirkuk. The PCC project will also train Iraqi staff on project and service assessments, prioritization based on public needs and enable the local leadership to set priorities and be proactive in seeking funds for the betterment of their community.

19. Kirkuk: LGP supported an establishment conference for the League of Retired Persons of Kirkuk, which took place at the Kirkuk School Activities Hall. The motto of the conference was "Under the Influence of Democracy, the Social Security of Retired People Should Be Considered". Approximately 300 members of the League, as well as a City Council representative, attended with local newspapers and the Kirkuk Television covering the event.

20. -- Economic Development Update -- Dhi Qar, March 20: A large employment/regeneration project was announced by the CPA Dhi Qar Governorate Coordinator. Registrations will be processed over a two weeks at the new job center. As many as 50,000 names and details will be entered into a computer database, linked to a national system. The objective is to overcome allegations of nepotism in employment and produce a fair, efficient, and transparent opportunities. The CPA will launch the center by selecting 5000 unemployed workers by lottery. They will be employed in refurbishing the cities of the province with high-visibility projects - new trees and parks along the main highways and painting and cleaning in the central souk areas.

21. Al Qadisiyah, week of March 16: Training on Business Planning and Marketing was delivered to eight Provincial Council members by LPG.

WOMEN'S PROGRAMS

22. Kirkuk: LPG held a discussion with the Organization for Women's Freedom on areas of possible cooperation, most notably in raising awareness among women and girls about human rights. Issues of priority included the participation of civil society organizations in weekly meetings of the Council and committees, participation in projects to raise public awareness of issues such as corporal punishment in school, and participation in the creation of a safe social and educational space for students outside the classroom. The organization has already done considerable work in schools, with the media, as well as with other civil society organizations on the

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issue of women's rights, including a petition against Resolution 137.

23. Muthanna: LPG celebrated the opening of the Renaissance Women's Association which was attended by women from different districts. Local television aired the ceremony live in As Salman and it was re-run on the nightly governorate news. More than 70 men and women attended from both local and from outside the district. Ten women's leagues are being established throughout Iraq.

Week of March 20 - March 27

24. Kirkuk, March 20: Center for International Conflict Resolution (CICR) will conduct a conflict resolution workshop for Kirkuk civil society organizations. CPA is investigating the potential for CICR to provide training to Iraqi Property Claims Court staff.

25. Arbil, March 20: Salahaddin University will hold a seminar, "Voices of Economic Development -- New Institutions, New Mechanism, New Momentum".

26. Najaf, March 20: LGP Transitional Administrative Law Conference at Najaf Human Rights Center.

27. Karbala, 21-22 March: LGP Advocacy Training for the Karbala Women's Center.

28. Baghdad, March 22: IRI communications workshop for government spokespersons.

29. Basra, March 23-24: National Civic Dialogue conference for health care professionals.

30. Baghdad, March 26: Political Participation Discussion for Women featuring Dr. Larry Diamond, Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution and CPA Senior Advisor.

31. Arbil, March 27: Town Hall meeting featuring a moderator and six local leaders including two women, an Assyrian and a Turkoman.

32. Basra, March 28: USAID Decentralization Conference featuring Dr. Larry Diamond who will participate as a speaker and discuss the prospects for decentralization in Iraq. Dr. Diamond also participated in the first decentralization conference last February and was successful in linking decentralization with democratic governance.

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
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(b)(6)

(FS-4)

Letter to Government

From: (b)(6)
Sent: Monday, March 22, 2004 9:50 PM
To: Jones, Richard (AMB)
Cc: Carpenter, Scott (SES-2) (b)(6)
Subject: (b)(6)
Maysan Proposal for Interim Government

Amb Jones - Since he last met with you, (b)(6) has further developed his ideas with me on how to form an interim government via indirect elections. He believes it is an urgent matter, and assumes the absence of progress on this issue is encouraged by the IGC as a means of remaining in power.

Here is his proposal:

- Each province should choose its representatives based on population. He recommends one representative per 100,000 people. To use Maysan as an example would mean the province should choose 9 representatives from a population of approximately 900,000.
- Each province should establish a preparatory committee of 15 members, including one representative from CPA for oversight. (Note: In my view to enhance legitimacy we could dump the CPA rep and use the most senior ranking judge in each province for this purpose.)
- In the absence of electoral laws, CPA in the province (and it would be expected that this would vary according to the conditions in each province) would determine which groups should be represented on the preparatory committee in which numbers, and then the Provincial Council in each province would choose the committee's membership. The Provincial Council could choose the committee's membership from among its membership and from among the general public. In Maysan, for example, we would probably recommend two each from the tribes, political parties, hawza, independent professionals, independent workers, rural areas, and women. The GC, or judge, would be the fifteenth person.
- The committee would have two roles.
- The first role is to invite nominations from the general public for the 9 positions. The committee would be responsible for ensuring adequate notification to the entire province. The committee would also vet the candidates (probably using the TAL qualifications) to ensure no Baathists or undesirables make it to the final list.
- The second role of the committee would be to choose a group of electors (majmua al-muntakhibeen). He recommends 500 per approximately 1 million in population. So again using Maysan as an example we would have a group

of electors numbering 500. The committee would apportion how many seats to each group (e.g., professionals, political parties) and each group would choose its electors under the supervision of the committee, again responsible for adequate notification and vetting of the candidates.

-- Finally, the group of electors would vote for 9 representatives from the candidates list compiled by the committee. Here we would run this election in the local stadium.

The chief advantage to this process is that it places the burden of selection primarily on Iraqi shoulders, thus boosting its legitimacy. In contrast to the 11/15 agreement, there would be no appointment. The only CPA role would be -- as an honest broker -- to set the framework for the preparatory committee. But the committee itself would be chosen by the Provincial Council. (If you're really nervous we could sit on the committee. We could probably get away with a seat here but I don't know what the situation would be in other provinces.) By fixing a relatively large number of electors and holding two elections (for the electors and for the representatives) we create more opportunities for inclusion and thus minimize opposition.

This would work here. **If you think this is viable we should run it by the other GCs to see if it would make sense in their provinces.**

I asked (b)(6) how Sistani would reach. He said pointedly "he has not offered an alternative." We met late this afternoon before I saw the news on the Sistani letter to the UN. I asked him Sistani's views on the TAL. He said Sistani believed the TAL would not have legitimacy until voted on by an elected body. (b)(6) believes an interim government chosen by the method outlined above would be considered an elected body.

He also replayed his arguments on why the IGC is not legitimate but I assume you know all those.

Hope you find this useful.

Best regards, (b)(6)



COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY
BAGHDAD

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Φ Governance

INFO MEMO

March 17, 2004

FOR: DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR JONES
FROM: Irfan Siddiq
THROUGH: (b)(6)
SUBJECT: Governance talking points for regional tour

Attached are talking points for your regional tour, covering the following subjects:

- General Overview
- TAL
- Interim Government
- Elections Process
- UN Role

General Overview

- The political process in Iraq is gaining momentum. The agreement of the TAL, the invitation to the UN, and the prospect of the formation of an Iraqi government with full sovereignty on June 30th are all positive signs.
- We believe that the new Iraqi government will be a government that works first and foremost to serve its people. This will be a radical change from Iraq's past. It will also work to build strong co-operative ties with its neighbors.
- It is therefore vital that the coalition, the international community and Iraq's neighbors do all they can to support the developing political process and the new government once it is formed. This will be in all of our interests. Most importantly it will be in the interests of the new Iraqi state which will have a great deal to contend with in its early days. The support of its neighbors will help Iraq through these testing times and lay the foundation for a successful, peaceful and prosperous Iraq that also works as a force for stability and prosperity in the wider region.

TAL

- The TAL is a great step forward for Iraq. It is a vision of the modern, democratic, federal and united nation that Iraqis and the Coalition share.
- The TAL was produced as the result of an extensive process of negotiation and compromise that saw all of Iraq's communities and interest groups work together to define a blueprint for the state in which they wish to live. This TAL guarantees the interests of all Iraq's communities while retaining the fundamental principles of a united state with a common purpose.
- The TAL defines Iraq as a democratic, federal, republican and pluralistic state. It contains an extensive list of human rights that the state will be charged to protect.
- Islam is the official religion of the state and is a source of legislation. The TAL respects the Islamic identity of the majority of the Iraqi people and ensures that no legislation can be passed that contradicts *thawabit al Islam* or any of the rights delineated in the bill of rights. It also guarantees the full religious rights of all individuals to freedom of religious belief and practice.
- The Iraqi Armed Forces are placed under the civilian control of the Iraqi Government.
- The TAL ensures the separation of power between the three branches of government and contains strong checks and balances on the government. It creates and maintains an independent judiciary.
- The executive will be composed of a President and two Deputy Presidents, who together form a Presidency Council and a Prime Minister. Power will be shared between the Presidency Council and the Prime Minister.
- The TAL sets out a clear and strong vision of federalism that is designed to unite the country and ensure that decision making on local issues happens at the local level. Certain powers are reserved to the central government such as foreign, security, fiscal and monetary policy as well as control over the natural resources of the state. But the regions and governorates are empowered to take on additional power in non-reserved areas.
- In accordance with the TAL, elections will be held to form a new government no later than January 31, 2005. The elected assembly will also be responsible for drafting the permanent constitution. This constitution will be drafted and put to a referendum by the end of 2005. If successful, a government elected under the new constitution will take office by the end of 2005 and the TAL will cease to be in effect.

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Interim Government

- We welcome the Governing Council's recent invitation to the United Nations to re-engage on the political process and to return to Iraq to advise on the creation of an interim government. We look forward to UN Representative Lakhdar Brahimi's visit in the near future as we believe the UN has an important role to play in building consensus among Iraqis.
- An Interim Iraqi Government (IIG) will govern Iraq in the period between 30 June and the formation of an elected government, a period of approximately seven months.
- The IIG will govern in accordance with the TAL and an annex that is to be produced by the Governing Council in consultation with the CPA. This annex will set out the differences in the structure of the government for the interim period, given the absence of elections.
- The decision on how to form the IIG will be taken after a process of wide-scale consultation with the Iraqi people. This process should be conducted jointly by the Governing Council, the United Nations and the CPA.
- No decisions have yet been taken on how the members of the IIG will be selected. Ideas that have been suggested include the holding of a *loya jirga* type national conference, a round table, the appointment of a technocratic caretaker government or the expansion of the GC.
- The CPA has set preferences regarding the process but is committed to seeing that the IIG is as legitimate and representative as possible.

Elections process

- The UN's 23 February report on the feasibility of elections made clear that elections would be possible 8 months after the necessary preparatory steps had been taken. Assuming that the preparatory steps can be taken by May 2004, this means that elections should be possible by December 2004 or January 2005.
- The preparatory steps required by May 2004 include the formation of an independent elections commission and the establishment of the institutional framework for managing elections (opening of offices, recruitment and training of staff, preparation of voter registration lists).
- The formation of the independent commission is vital as the commission will be charged with producing an elections law and political parties' law that will provide the legal and policy framework for the holding of elections. It is important that this is done by an impartial, neutral body and so the process for the appointment of the commission will be designed with this aim in mind.
- We hope that the commission can be formed within the next few weeks.

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UN role

- We welcome the recent IGC invitation to the United Nations to return to Iraq. The UN can make an important contribution to the political process in Iraq, both in terms of preparing for the holding of elections, and in terms of advising in the formation of the IIG.
- The UN has a great deal of experience and expertise in preparing for elections. UN assistance will be invaluable in ensuring that the elections are prepared for and held in the most professional manner and to the highest international standards. The assistance will also be necessary in ensuring that Iraq can meet what is an ambitious timetable.
- The UN's engagement on the political process will also be important in ensuring that the interim government has broad Iraqi and international credibility. The UN will play a real role in facilitating the process of consultation that will guide the decision on how to form the IIG.
- Early UN engagement will also be important in ensuring that the UN builds up the capacity to play a leading role in the reconstruction and rehabilitation of Iraq from June 30 onwards.
- Early engagement of the UN will also be important in securing a new UNSCR.

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COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY
BAGHDAD

INFO MEMO

Government

March 17, 2004

FOR: THE DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR
FROM: Irfan Siddiq
THROUGH: (b)(6)
SUBJECT: Governance talking points for regional tour

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- UN Role

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Elections process


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- The formation of the independent commission is vital as the commission will be charged with producing an elections law and political parties' law that will provide the legal and policy framework for the holding of elections. It is important that this is done by an impartial, neutral body and so the process for the appointment of the commission will be designed with this aim in mind.
- We hope that the commission can be formed within the next few weeks.

UN role

- We welcome the recent GC invitation to the United Nations to return to Iraq. The UN can make an important contribution to the political process in Iraq, both in terms of preparing for the holding of elections, and in terms of advising in the formation of the IIG.
- The UN has a great deal of experience and expertise in preparing for elections. UN assistance will be invaluable in ensuring that the elections are prepared for and held in the most professional manner and to the highest international standards. The assistance will also be necessary in ensuring that Iraq can meet what is an ambitious timetable.
- The UN's engagement on the political process will also be important in ensuring that the interim government has broad Iraqi and international credibility. The UN will play a real role in facilitating the process of consultation that will guide the decision on how to form the IIG.
- Early UN engagement will also be important in ensuring that the UN builds up the capacity to play a leading role in the reconstruction and rehabilitation of Iraq from June 30 onwards.
- Early engagement of the UN will also be important in securing a new UNSCR.

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Frozen Iraqi Assets in Jordan and Lebanon
Talking Points for Amb. Jones

Jordan:

(b)(1)



Lebanon:

(b)(1)





COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY
BAGHDAD


INFO MEMO

March 17, 2004

FOR: DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR JONES
FROM: (b)(6) Office of General Counsel
SUBJECT: Talking Points: Frozen Iraqi Assets in Jordan and Lebanon


Jordan:

(b)(1)



Lebanon:

(b)(1)





COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY
BAGHDAD

INFO MEMO

March 17, 2004

FOR: DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR JONES
FROM: (b)(6) Oil Ministry
SUBJECT: Talking Points - IPSA Pipeline

In addition to the following talking points, our office provided background documents to Ambassador Jones' staff regarding the current situation concerning the IPSA pipeline.

- Technical personnel from the Iraq Ministry of Oil are currently visiting Saudi Arabia. **The question to ask is:**
- **Was there any headway made on opening up the IPSA Pipeline?**

If no, then

- In September 2003, the Saudi royal family appeared to be very interested in opening up the IPSA Pipeline. In March of this year, the Saudis appeared to be very negative to the idea and possibly blamed the US for talking about the issue to the media. **The questions to ask are:**
- **What happened between September and today?**
- **What can be done to remedy the problem?**

If yes, then

- The condition of the pipeline is in bad shape. **The questions to ask are:**
- **Can the Saudis help in any way in facilitating its repair?**
- **How long could it be before it could be restored to operating condition?**



COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY
BAGHDAD

INFO MEMO

March 17, 2004

FOR: DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR JONES
FROM: Irfan Siddiq
THROUGH: (b)(6)
SUBJECT: Governance talking points for regional tour

Attached are talking points for your regional tour, covering the following subjects:

- General Overview
- TAL
- Interim Government
- Elections Process
- UN Role

General Overview

- The political process in Iraq is gaining momentum. The agreement of the TAL, the invitation to the UN and the prospect of the formation of an Iraqi government with full sovereignty on 30 June 2004 are all positive signs.
- We believe that the new Iraqi government will be a government that works first and foremost to serve its people. This will be a radical change from Iraq's past. It will also work to build strong co-operative ties with its neighbors.
- It is therefore vital that the coalition, the international community and Iraq's neighbors do all they can to support the developing political process and the new government once it is formed. This will be in all of our interests. Most importantly it will be in the interests of the new Iraqi state which will have a great deal to contend with in its early days. The support of its neighbors will help Iraq through these testing times and lay the foundation for a successful, peaceful and prosperous Iraq that also works as a force for stability and prosperity in the wider region.

TAL




- The TAL is a great step forward for Iraq. It is a vision of the modern, democratic, federal and united nation that Iraqis and the Coalition share.
- The TAL was produced as the result of an extensive process of negotiation and compromise that saw all of Iraq's communities and interest groups work together to define a blueprint for the state in which they wish to live. This TAL guarantees the interests of all Iraq's communities while retaining the fundamental principles of a united state with a common purpose.
- The TAL defines Iraq as a democratic, federal, republican and pluralistic state. It contains an extensive list of human rights that the state will be charged to protect.
- Islam is the official religion of the state and is a source of legislation. The TAL respects the Islamic identity of the majority of the Iraqi people and ensures that no legislation can be passed that contradicts *thawabit al Islam* or any of the rights delineated in the bill of rights. It also guarantees the full religious rights of all individuals to freedom of religious belief and practice.
- The Iraqi Armed Forces are placed under the civilian control of the Iraqi Government.
- The TAL ensures the separation of power between the three branches of government and contains strong checks and balances on the government. It creates and maintains an independent judiciary.
- The executive will be composed of a President and two Deputy Presidents, who together form a Presidency Council and a Prime Minister. Power will be shared between the Presidency Council and the Prime Minister.
- The TAL sets out a clear and strong vision of federalism that is designed to unite the country and ensure that decision making on local issues happens at the local level. Certain powers are reserved to the central government such as foreign, security, fiscal and monetary policy as well as control over the natural resources of the state. But the regions and governorates are empowered to take on additional power in non-reserved areas.
- In accordance with the TAL, elections will be held to form a new government no later than January 31, 2005. The elected assembly will also be responsible for drafting the permanent constitution. This constitution will be drafted and put to a referendum by the end of 2005. If successful, a government elected under the new constitution will take office by the end of 2005 and the TAL will cease to be in effect.

Interim Government

- We welcome the Governing Council's recent invitation to the United Nations to re-engage on the political process and to return to Iraq to advise on the creation of an interim government. We look forward to UN Representative Lakhdar Brahimi's visit in

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the near future as we believe the UN has an important role to play in building consensus among Iraqis.

- An Interim Iraqi Government (IIG) will govern Iraq in the period between 30 June and the formation of an elected government, a period of approximately seven months.
- The IIG will govern in accordance with the TAL and an annex that is to be produced by the Governing Council in consultation with the CPA. This annex will set out the differences in the structure of the government for the interim period, given the absence of elections.
- The decision on how to form the IIG will be taken after a process of wide-scale consultation with the Iraqi people. This process should be conducted jointly by the Governing Council, the United Nations and the CPA.
- No decisions have yet been taken on how the members of the IIG will be selected. Ideas that have been suggested include the holding of a *loya jirga* type national conference, a round table, the appointment of a technocratic caretaker government or the expansion of the GC.
- The CPA has set preferences regarding the process but is committed to seeing that the IIG is as legitimate and representative as possible.

Elections process


- The UN's 23 February report on the feasibility of elections made clear that elections would be possible 8 months after the necessary preparatory steps had been taken. Assuming that the preparatory steps can be taken by May 2004, this means that elections should be possible by December 2004 or January 2005.
- The preparatory steps required by May 2004 include the formation of an independent elections commission and the establishment of the institutional framework for managing elections (opening of offices, recruitment and training of staff, preparation of voter registration lists).
- The formation of the independent commission is vital as the commission will be charged with producing an elections law and political parties' law that will provide the legal and policy framework for the holding of elections. It is important that this is done by an impartial, neutral body and so the process for the appointment of the commission will be designed with this aim in mind.
- We hope that the commission can be formed within the next few weeks.

UN role

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
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DRAFT WORKING PAPER

18 March 2004 VERSION 3



*Advisory Board for Iraq
Reconstruction & Development

18 March 2004 VERSION 3


DRAFT WORKING PAPER



Chief of Mission

Deputy Chief of Mission

U. S. Mission




Program & Contract Management (PMO)
(U.S. Army Organization)

Other mission elements

DRAFT WORKING PAPER

18 March 2004 VERSION 3





COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY
BAGHDAD

INFO MEMO

March 17, 2004

FOR: DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR JONES
FROM: (b)(6) Senior Advisor, MOI
SUBJECT: Talking Points - Border Update; IPS Training (Egyptian involvement); Jordan Academy

BORDER UPDATE


SUMMARY

- Iraq's northern, western and southern land entry points are primarily commercial while eastern crossings are centers for emigrants/immigrants.
- Permanent visa policies currently being drafted will require travelers to produce passports and pay fees upon entry. Completed entry and exit cards will likely be required as well.
- Collection of the reconstruction levy by customs officials will commence on April 1 at Class A Ports of Entry (POE) throughout Iraq.
- The Iraqi Department of Immigration will be operational as of March 17 and will deploy to the majority of Iraqi border crossings by April 1.
- Major refurbishments of POE and border patrol forts are currently underway with reconstruction of remaining critical locations to be addressed with Supplemental funding. Similarly, vital equipment such as cars, communications, and weapons financed with Supplemental funding is currently in solicitation.

Iran

- All border crossings with the exception of Haj Ormeran (Kurdish region), Muntheria, Zurbatia, and Al Shalamsha are now closed per Ambassador Bremer's recent announcement.
- Fifty immigration officers will be trained by the end of March and will subsequently commence work at Muntheria, Zurbatia, and Al-Shalamsha. Haj Ormeran is already a fully controlled and operational border crossing.

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- Personal Identification Secure and Comparison Evaluation System (PISCES) is currently being installed in Muntheria and will be implemented in Zurbatia and Al-Shalamsha pending reconstruction of facilities (estimated four to six weeks).
- The intent is to limit and control the number of people crossing into Iraq from other nations—Iran in particular. Under normal circumstances the number of permitted border crossings will be dependent upon the existing threat environment and through-put capacity. The capacity for through-put will increase as manpower and equipment become available. Every effort will be made to increase this number during periods of special religious pilgrimage and holiday.
- 3,000 additional border guards will be deployed along the Iranian border in subsequent weeks. 2,000 will have an immediate effect as they have already been trained and currently serving as Iraqi Police.
- While Muntheria is already fully operational, Zurbatia and Al-Shalamsha will be functional by April 1. Long term plans are in place to completely refurbish Zurbatia and Al-Shalamsha over the next four to six months. Additional border police posts are currently being renovated by the Major Subordinate Commands (MSCs).

Saudi Arabia

- The primary POE at Ar Ar is currently closed. Saudi Arabian officials have intimated that they wish to open the POE in the coming months.
- Customs and immigration officials are fully trained and prepared to commence work when refurbishments are complete in approximately four to six months.
- Numerous border police forts are in need of significant repair. However, current structural, resource, and manning deficiencies are less worrisome in this region as Saudi officials maintain strict controls on their side of the border.

Jordan

- Iraqis are investing nearly one million dollars in the primary POE, Al Waleed and Trebil, to make them fully operational.
- There has been substantial private investment in Trebil leading to the construction of warehouses and other storage complexes in the area. [Bulgarian Company – Vassilev Brothers]
- Customs and immigration officials are currently performing their daily functions Al Waleed and Trebil.

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- Numerous border police forts are in need of significant repair. However, current structural, resource, and manning deficiencies are less worrisome in this region as Jordanian officials maintain strict controls on their side of the border.

Syria

- Iraqis are investing approximately \$800,000 in the primary POE, Al Qa'im and Rabea'a, to make them fully operational.
- Customs and immigration officials are currently operating at both facilities. Specifically, over 100 customs officials are working at the Rabea'a facility.
- Border police forts are in need of significant repair as the Syrian border remains porous and susceptible to illegal immigration.

Kuwait

- Safwan, the primary POE, is in need of significant refurbishment which is likely to be completed in four to six months. However, customs and immigration officials are currently operating at the facility.
- MSCs are in the process of renovating border police forts.

IPS TRAINING (EGYPTIAN INVOLVEMENT)

- The Minister of Interior Nouri Badran and Chief Police Advisor (b)(6) (the "party") visited Egypt late February.
- The purpose of the Egypt visit was to seek the support of the Egyptian Government for training Iraqi Police in intelligence and security skills, including a counter terrorist and anti insurgency capability.
- Another purpose was to explore the potential for the supply of suitable vehicles for equipping a Civil Intervention Force that would manage the terrorist and insurgency threat and provide a national mobile support capability for the Iraqi Police Service.
- The party was received by senior representatives of the Egyptian Government (Omar Soliman, his deputy, and the Minister of Interior Habib El-Adli). A demonstration of the facilities and the capabilities of the Central Security Section of the Egyptian police was given, as was a tour of the Police Academy for Officers.
- Agreement was reached in principle to support training of intelligence operatives and on training for the Civil Intervention Force. Management training, and training for an expanded Executive Protection Force was also explored. In a private meeting with the

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Minister of Interior, Badran was told on several occasions not to worry about the cost of training and that 'something would be worked out'.

- The training being offered breaks down into the following categories (provisional at this time):

Category	Days	Personnel	Cost (\$)	Total
Intelligence (Special Branch)	24	8	18	432
Security of Information	4	2	24	96
Surveillance	6	4	24	144
Civil Intervention Capability	8	4	24	192
Executive Protection	20	4	16	320
Middle Management	10	2	24	240


Cost \$ 4.6 million (approx.)

- The party also visited the premises of the Arab Organization for Industrialization, in Nasr City, Cairo, and examined a full display of armored vehicles. The purpose of this visit was to assess the suitability of the vehicles they manufacture for use with the Iraqi Police Civil Intervention Force. Several different vehicles were examined for their capability to transport police into difficult operational environments and allow them to operate effectively and safely.
- A second visit was made to the factory the next day to re-examine three particular types of vehicle. Minister Badran expressed interest in purchasing quantities of three different types of armored vehicle. While it is acknowledged that there is an established procurement process for the acquisition of vehicles using donor funding, the Egyptian Government indicated that they would supply the vehicles at cost price. The Vehicles totaled 86 in all and consisted of 2 armored command vehicles, 4 armored ambulances, 40 6-man armored cars, and 40 10-man armored cars.

Cost \$ 25 million (approx)

- A follow up meeting is currently being planned where (b)(6) of the MOI will meet with their Egyptian counterparts in Cairo from April 9-11.
- (b)(6) can provide additional details if requested by Ambassador Jones. He is currently in London and can be reached on (b)(6)

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JORDAN TRAINING ACADEMY

- Located in Muwaqqar, approximately 65 kilometers from Amman, Jordan, the training academy came online in November 2003.
- Staffing at the Jordan Academy (management and training) will consist of up to 318 international police professionals/instructors.
- Once construction is completed the JIPTC will boast: 72 classrooms, 6 gymnasiums, and 18 skill centers for such classes as driver training, vehicle stops, and other practical training. There will also be three 50 point, 75 meter firing ranges and sufficient space for parade and drill exercises as well as Morale, Welfare and Recreation (MWR) facilities.
- 964 Iraqi Police have graduated thus far and 1962 are currently being trained.
- On 17 July, the class size will increase to 1500 and run 8 weeks with a new class cycling in and out every 4 weeks. 3000 recruits will be trained at any one time.
- There are 238 instructors from 15 countries teaching at the Academy.

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Administrator's Weekly Report

Governance

January 31 – February 6, 2004

HIGHLIGHTS

- To date, 10 Provincial Councils have completed the refreshment process of becoming more representative.
- Local government progress includes the establishment of 78 city councils, 54 district councils, 48 sub-district councils, and 138 neighborhood councils.

I. Support Transition to Iraqi Sovereignty

- More than half of the governorates in Iraq have Provincial Councils that have completed the refreshment process to become more representative of their populations, in terms of gender and ethnicity, than when originally chosen. The council refreshment process is complete in 10 governorates and ongoing in the other governorates. Status of each is contained in the following table (the three Northern governorates are not included):

REFRESHED	IN PROCESS
Qadisiyah	Babil
Wasit	Karbala
Muthanna	Najaf
Maysan	Dhi Qar
Basrah	Baghdad*
Diyala	
Salah Ad Din	
Ninawa	
Tamim	
Anbar	

* Provincial Council is in the process of initial establishment.

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Prepared by the Information Management Unit

II. Develop Civic Participation in Governance

Develop indigenous polling capacity; Provide women and youth with the skills necessary to become important participants in the political process; Develop local civil society capacity to conduct advocacy and participate in political life; Develop civic education programs promoting electoral participation and democratic ideals; Build capacity for civil society conflict prevention and mitigation

- The design of the first public information materials promoting democratic themes is complete. Coalition Forces (CF) and CPA, through the USAID Local Governance Program (LGP), will disseminate this set of 1 million leaflets and 40,000 posters in all 18 governorates. In addition, five non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have received USAID Office of Transition Initiative grants to assist with distribution to critical audiences in Baghdad and throughout the country.
- The long-term plan for achieving indigenous polling capability is proceeding. Two sustainable polling organizations are operating: the Iraqi Center for Research and Strategic Studies (ICRSS) and the Independent Institute for Administration and Society.
- Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz met with female Iraqi leaders in Baghdad on February 1, for a discussion focused on the fair representation of women in emerging democratic structures. They also discussed Resolution 137, which was put forward by the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) stating that Islamic laws are to be applied to marriage-related issues. The meeting included Songul Chappok and Dr Salama Khafaji (IGC members), Maysoon al-Damluji, Deputy Minister for Culture, Mishkat Mumin of the Iraq Foundation, Dr. Lina Abood of Iraqi Women's League, and Shatha Hadi Mohammed Alobiadi of the Baghdad Provincial Council Advisory Committee.
- The Iraqi Women in Local Governance Group has been established in response to the challenge of under-representation of women in political processes across Iraq. In January 2004, women in three governorates - Babil, Al Quadisiyah, and Baghdad - attended women's issues conferences, including a January 29, event featuring U.S. Secretary of Labor Chao. A women's conference is scheduled in Tamim governorate in mid-February.
- The Community Action Program (CAP) established 664 Community Action Groups in 16 governorates to enable and encourage Iraqis to address critical local needs. CPA committed \$44 million for 1,317 community projects across Iraq and provided \$12 million in technical assistance. Participants have completed more than 666 projects. Iraqi communities have contributed approximately 25 percent of total project funding. By region, this progress includes:
 - North: 122 completed projects and 140 in development
 - South Central Region: 122 completed projects and 188 in development
 - Baghdad: 183 completed projects and 142 established community action groups, with a special emphasis on income generation

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Prepared by the Information Management Unit

- South, 239 completed projects through 138 community action groups, which include approximately 40 percent female membership
- Three hundred and seventy youth have signed a pledge to join the Kirkuk Youth Forum in Tamim Governorate, although the activities will not be limited to members only. The multi-ethnic and non-political organization created in November 2003 focuses on youth aged 12-20. Arabs, Kurds and Turkmen comprise the managing committee.

III. Develop Framework and Capacity for Elections

Support creation of National Independent Electoral Commission; Promote Scopes of work and Operational Linkages between national, regional, and local level election administration authorities

- Technical and resource planning continues for the implementation of caucuses or other means, such as direct elections, to establish a Transitional National Assembly (TNA) by July 1. CPA and the Coalition Joint Task Force (CJTF-7) discussed contingency timelines to ensure appropriate allocation of logistical capacities, human resources and security.

IV. Support Development of Sustainable Political Parties / Associations

Support Development of Political Associations

- The National Endowment for Democracy (NED) awarded grants to the International Republican Institute (IRI) and the National Democratic Institute (NDI) to develop a political party building program. The NED will continue to develop their offices, design training programs and plan for other assistance in promoting sustainable political associations.

V. Promote Respect for Human Rights

Educate on Human Rights Issues; Preserve documentation of past atrocities, raise awareness, and promote reconciliation; Strengthen local capacity to investigate and address past atrocities; Iraqi Special Tribunal (IST) for past atrocities and Iraq Property Claims Commission for property disputes; Human Rights Incorporated into Laws; Develop Role of Independent Human Rights NGOs and Media; Establish a Human Rights Ministry

- CPA has collected over 700 summaries of past abuse and developed a database to catalog these documents. CPA completed training for Ministry personnel on documentation and conducting memorials. A documents stakeholder meeting is scheduled for mid-February. The Human Rights Ministry approved and initiated the IST for past atrocities. In addition, the Ministry received two proposals for mass grave memorials.
- The Iraqi Property Claims Commission (IPCC) for property disputes will open its first office, in Baghdad, February 15.
- The Human Rights Ministry has assisted in the development of approximately ten indigenous human rights NGOs. An additional 14 NGOs are expected.

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VI. Develop More Accountable and Responsive Local Government


Support Organization of Citizens' Advisory Councils per CPA models, with follow on training in democratic practices, and/or support for interim representative bodies; Develop more accountable and responsive local government; Work with civic groups to encourage participation in local public affairs; Provide basic training for professional budget preparation and transparent financial management;

- The Local Governance Program (LGP) teamed with ICRSS to conduct a survey from October-November 2003, to solicit Iraqi opinion on issues related to local governance. Among the results in the local governance section is the relatively low percentage of respondents who stated that there were neighborhood councils, district councils, sub-district councils, and governorate councils (see chart below). This survey was conducted to obtain a baseline of opinion in post-Ba'athist Iraq and to set targets for LGP objectives.

Participatory Democratic Local Governance Process (P-IR-1 : P-IR-2)

Councils in your community

Efforts are being made to establish local governments in Iraq. As an initial step, a number of local advisory councils are being setup across the country. Please answer the following questions, to the best of your knowledge, regarding the councils in your community under new initiative.



- LGP organized a workshop on "Management Accounting and Reporting for Efficient and Effective Service Delivery" for 38 section service heads, accountants, and audit staff of three Karbala municipalities and sewerage departments. The workshop leaders presented practical examples of various reports and performance indicators that could be developed and used by these departments.
- Through the implementation of local governance activities in all 18 governorates, more than 19 million Iraqis are engaging in local policy discourse through local government

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Prepared by the Information Management Unit

entities and civil society organizations. In addition, established local councils include 78 city councils, 54 district councils, 48 sub-district councils, and 138 neighborhood councils.

- The first in a series of LGP workshops on development and democracy was held on January 25 in Najaf. Thirty-five representatives from local human rights associations participated in the workshop titled "Constitutional Democracy: Rebuilding Society in a Democratic Age." The participants were interested in learning about types of government, especially those in the United States and United Kingdom, and in possible political alternatives for Iraq.

VII. Promote Durable Solutions for Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)

Facilitate the Return of Refugees and IDPs; Build Local and National Capacity to Protect and assist Refugees and IDPs; Develop and Implement a Process to Resolve Property Disputes

- Refugee returns continue. Returns from Iran average 600 persons per week as interest in organized returns increases. Of the original 6,000 refugees in Saudi Arabia, 600 persons remain in Saudi Arabia, but are expected to return by April.
- Movements of people in the North have stabilized due to colder weather, but the IDP and returnee population to Kirkuk is increasing. One estimate of the current Kirkuk IDP population is 26,000, with new arrivals settling in a haphazard tent location on the outskirts of the city. The most recent arrivals cite the capture of Saddam Hussein as their reason for returning now.
- The Iraq Property Claims Commission (IPCC) will continue to open offices in every governorate in Iraq. A top priority is initiating public information campaigns to educate and manage expectations. In the North where populations were asked to 'stay put' until a property resolution mechanism is in place, expectations are that the IPCC will address a broad range of compensation issues and not simply restitution of property illegally expropriated by the former regime.
- The Ministry of Displacement and Migration and the United Nations High Commission on Refugees will co-host a planning meeting in Amman, Jordan on February 15-16. This meeting will allow leaders in refugee and displaced persons issues in Iraq to create a strategy to address the immediate and long-term issues for the Ministry.

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COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY
BAGHDAD

7

Administrator's Weekly Report

Governance

March 6 - 12, 2004

HIGHLIGHTS

- The Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) signed the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL) on March 8. The TAL will serve as the supreme law of Iraq until a new government is elected, which will occur no later than December 31, 2005. The TAL provides a framework for an Iraqi government that will be republican, federal, democratic, and pluralistic.
- The Iraqi people celebrated International Women's Day on March 8. Among the events marking the celebration was the grand opening of the Mansour Women's Center in Baghdad.

I. Support Transition to Iraqi Sovereignty

- The Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) signed the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL) on March 8. The TAL will serve as the supreme law of Iraq until a new government is elected, which will occur no later than December 31, 2005. The TAL provides a framework for an Iraqi government that will be republican, federal, democratic, and pluralistic. Federalism will be based on geography, history, and the separation of powers, not on ethnicity or sect. Among the significant provisions in the TAL are: 1) Iraq's civilian political leadership will control the Iraqi Armed Forces; 2) Islam will be the official religion of the State and will be considered a source of legislation, not the only source; 3) the Law respects the Islamic identity of the majority of the Iraqi people and guarantees the freedom of religious belief and practice; 4) Arabic and Kurdish are the official languages of Iraq; and 5) Iraqi election law "shall aim to achieve the goal of having women constitute no less than one-quarter of the members of the National Assembly and of having fair representation for all communities in Iraq, including the Turcomans, ChaldoAssyrians, and others."
- Following the loss of several members in recent months, the Ba'qubah Municipal Council conducted new elections in which approximately 5,000 registered voters selected 11 new council members (including the first woman) from a list of 30 candidates.

- The Baghdad City Advisory Council finalized the selection process for Mayor of Baghdad. The mayor will be selected on March 31.
- A Baghdad focus group organized by the International Republican Institute (IRI) found the following: 1) as a whole, the participants wanted a diversely composed election commission comprised of religious leaders, sheikhs, academics, judges, lawyers and the like; 2) the group wanted the United Nations (UN) to oversee the commission, and most participants would like to see the commission independent from the interim government; 3) the group believed that UN involvement would increase trust in the elections; and 4) the men in the group believed that clerics would increase trust by the Iraqi people in the elections.

II. Develop Civic Participation in Governance

Develop indigenous polling capacity; Provide women and youth with the skills necessary to become important participants in the political process; Develop local civil society capacity to conduct advocacy and participate in political life; Develop civic education programs promoting electoral participation and democratic ideals; Build capacity for civil society conflict prevention and mitigation

- A March 8 "People's Convention" in Ba'qubah gathered provincial and local government officials, academics, professionals, tribal leaders, and representatives from various civic action groups to discuss the political future of Iraq and the province of Diyala. The announcement during the meeting that the TAL had just been signed in Baghdad was greeted with enthusiasm and approval.
- The CPA Local Governance Program (LGP) facilitated the third of six forums on March 6, on the Arbil Economic Development Strategy, an initiative sponsored by the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and hosted by Salah ad Din University. The agenda focused on Arbil's potential role in the global economy.
- The CPA LGP held their first democracy training in Najaf at the Said Bin Jubair school hall on March 7. Training topics included the promise and challenge of democracy, democracy's historic origins, and the importance of awareness in the democratic process.
- Approximately 150 women of all ages and ethnic and religious backgrounds attended Mosul's first Women's Day Celebration on March 8, at the newly announced Center for Iraqi Women.
- The Iraqi people celebrated International Women's Day on March 8. Among the events marking the celebration was the grand opening of the Mansour Women's Center in Baghdad. The opening activities included the opening of the computer training center, an art exhibit by Iraqi women artists, and performances by an all-female band that formed after the war. The Center, which will be managed by Women for Women International, will serve as the coordination point to involve women in the dialogue on the transition and participation in the political process.

- The CPA hosted a democracy workshop on March 8, in Basrah to coincide with International Women's Day. Research Triangle Institute (RTI) democracy specialists facilitated the workshop in which women from a variety of background participated in exercises on elections, democratic processes, and the role of women in the future of Iraq. The session included a question and answer session with the CPA Regional Coordinator during which discussion focused on the TAL and the threat of foreign terrorists entering Iraq.
- The CPA LGP provided training in Basrah for Democracy Dialogue Activity (DDA) facilitators, who further disseminate the democracy message to high school teachers and students, university students, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). University students and human rights lawyers attended this first session. Ann Clywd, the Special Envoy to Prime Minister Tony Blair on Human Rights in Iraq, and a member of the British Parliament were also present as the participants presented "Road to Democracy" maps and conducted a variety of interactive exercises on topics including democracy, elections, human rights and accountability and transparency.

III. Support Development of Sustainable Political Parties/Associations

Support development of political associations

- The National Democratic Institute (NDI) held its first political party workshop outside of Baghdad on March 4-6 in Tikrit. The three-day event provided participants the basics of demographic profiles, message development, and winning elections. The participants were interested in building national level political parties and understood the significant work required to build political agendas.
- NDI facilitated a coalition-building workshop for political parties on March 8 and 9 in Hillah. Approximately 25 representatives of parties in the South Central Region participated in the event.
- NDI provided training to the Iraqi National Gathering, a coalition of predominantly Sunni political parties, on March 8-9 in Baghdad. The training consisted of an individual party training sessions for fifty grassroots members in Baghdad and surrounding area.
- The International Republican Institute (IRI) conducted focus groups near Hillah and Ba'qubah on March 6. The IRI believes these efforts are among the first to analyze public opinion among the rural 30 percent of Iraq's population.
- CPA staff and representatives of 13 political parties attended a coordination meeting of major political parties in Mosul on March 7. The event included representatives of the Arab Socialist Party, Al Wifaq Arab Movement, PDK and PUK. Major discussion topics were the inability of the group to find reliable answers from either the Provincial Council or IGC representatives in Baghdad regarding electricity distribution and reasons for the increase in the price of cement in Mosul.

- The CPA co-sponsored a meeting of democracy and human rights activists from the South Central Region on March 9 in Hillah to discuss political party building. At the group's request, the meeting also included discussion of how the upcoming elections might affect the Shi'a community.

IV. Promote Respect for Human Rights

Educate on Human Rights Issues; Preserve documentation of past atrocities, raise awareness, and promote reconciliation; Strengthen local capacity to investigate and address past atrocities; Iraqi Special Tribunal (IST) for past atrocities; Human Rights Incorporated into Laws; Develop Role of Independent Human Rights NGOs and Media; Establish a Human Rights Ministry

- A team of experts from Finland arrived to assess ten reported Iraqi mass grave sites. The team brought ground-penetrating radar for testing, trenching and conducting partial exhumations of the grave sites.
- A team of U.S. officials arrived in Baghdad this week and will assess the need for a Justice Department/Federal Bureau of Investigation team to assist the Human Rights Ministry with past atrocity investigations.

V. Promote Durable Solutions for Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)

Facilitate the Return of Refugees and IDPs; Build Local and National Capacity to Protect and assist Refugees and IDPs; Develop and Implement a Process to Resolve Property Disputes

- Approximately 30 refugees returned to various destinations in Iraq in the 18th convoy from the Rafha camp in Saudi Arabia on March 7. The UN High Commission on Refugees supported this effort, nearly completing the repatriations of Iraqis from the Rafha camp.

(b)(6) (FS-4)

From: McKune, Elizabeth (FS-MC)
Sent: Sunday, March 14, 2004 4:03 PM
To: (b)(6)
Subject: Appointment Request

(b)(6)

I'd like to say hello to Amb. Jones and make an appointment with him (5-10 minutes). I haven't done so since I've arrived and would like to "check-in" so to speak...I also have a few questions. I'm an FE-MC and former Ambassador to Qatar... still in the Foreign Service coming from a detail to the National Defense University.


I've tried an unstructured approach, and dropped by, but he has been very busy...understandably.

When would be a good time?

Thanks.

Liz McKune
Ambassador
Governance – Democratic Initiatives

3/15/2004





Administrator's Weekly Report

Governance


March 13 - 19, 2004

HIGHLIGHTS

- The Iraqi Minister for Human Rights, Abdul Basit Turki, and a delegation of independent human rights non-governmental organizations attended the UN Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) in Geneva on March 15 where a permanent UN Human Rights mission in Iraq was announced.
- The CPA sponsored a senior delegation of Iraqi women to the United Nations Commission on the Status of Women in New York March 1-12. The delegation represented women from the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC), the Iraqi Higher Women's Council, and prominent Iraqi civil society organizations.

I. Support Transition to Iraqi Sovereignty

- A recent Oxford Research International (ORI) poll, commissioned by ABC News and the BBC on March 15, found that
 - 1) Iraqis overwhelmingly (79 percent) want their nation to remain united and centralized. The ORI poll should be considered reliable, but the federalism question was presented without a great deal of context. Other reliable polls show that when federalism is presented in a series of questions asking about local control, Iraqis are much more accepting. The negative reaction in the ORI poll is triggered probably by the perception in much of Iraq that federalism benefits only the Kurds.
 - 2) Nearly half of respondents said the country needed a "single strong leader" for the next 12 months, versus twenty-eight percent who expressed the need for an Iraqi democracy. It is likely that this is in response to security concerns and fears of disunity.
 - 3) Considering the same question but within a 5 year period, respondents expressed more support for democracy than for a single strong Iraqi leader.
 - 4) Concerns related to a need for strong leadership notwithstanding, Iraqis clearly prefer democracy and democratic leaders to any other form of



- government, including a theocracy, which is preferred by no more than approximately 20 percent.
 - 5) Support for political parties is very low. Seventy percent do not identify with any political party.
 - 6) Confirming trends noted in several other polls, trust in the Iraqi police and army is high and increasing.
- The International Republican Institute (IRI) supported a forum conducted in Baghdad on March 13 and 14 by the Iraqi Foundation for the Development of Democracy, hosted by Ghassan Al-Attiah on the new Transitional Administrative Law (TAL).
 - Communications officials from the IGC, Iraqi Ministries, and the General Information Center convened in Baghdad on March 15 to exchange ideas and establish a network of communications professionals for the Iraqi government. The IRI lectured on the basics of government communication and led discussions on the issues related to public information access. This meeting was the first in a series of eight workshops designed to improve external communication by the Iraqi government.
 - The CPA Local Governance Program (LGP) facilitated a training seminar for the Rashad District Council. Ten members participated, including the Mayor and the representative to the Kirkuk Governorate Council. Rashad is a predominantly Arab area, consisting mainly of members of the Al Assi tribe. The training focused on team building and Council procedures.
 - Refreshment of the Dhi Qar Provincial Council continues with seats to be allocated to tribal representatives, political parties, district councils, women, hauza clerics, and professional unions. Each group is being encouraged to select its own members through a caucus.
 - Town Hall meetings were held in Amara and Basra, March 13 and 14, respectively, where IGC members Wael Abdel Latif and Abu Hatem played a key role in promoting the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL). Interim Councils were briefed and discussions in mosques and political circles are underway.

II. Develop Civic Participation in Governance

Develop indigenous polling capacity; Provide women and youth with the skills necessary to become important participants in the political process; Develop local civil society capacity to conduct advocacy and participate in political life; Develop civic education programs promoting electoral participation and democratic ideals; Build capacity for civil society conflict prevention and mitigation

- The CPA, through USAID's Iraq Transition Initiative (OTI), sponsored a senior delegation of Iraqi women to the United Nations Commission on the Status of Women in New York March 1-12. The delegation represented women from the Iraqi Governing Council, the Iraqi Higher Women's Council, and prominent Iraqi civil society

organizations. The delegation, which included IGC member Dr. Rajaa Khuzai, also traveled to Washington, D.C. to meet with senior U.S. government officials including Department of State Undersecretary for Global Affairs Paula Dobriansky, Senior Coordinator for International Women's Issues Charlotte Ponticelli, and USAID Administrator Andrew Natsios. The Iraqi women also attended the President's speech at the White House on progress in global women's rights. During their visit in Washington they held several press briefings for members of the domestic and foreign press and participated in a public event at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. During their visit, the delegation discussed challenges facing women in Iraq, including lack of security and the need for training opportunities to increase women's participation in political and social affairs.

- On March 15 and 16, Just Read, an Iraqi NGO, presented a National Agenda Dialogue Conference for youth in Baghdad with the support of USAID's Local Governance Program (LGP). Just Read is a Baghdad-based NGO that focuses on the needs of young people. More than 200 young adults gathered from all parts of Iraq to discuss the role of youth in Iraq's development. Among the agenda topics were economics, religion, democracy, media, education and women's issues, all as pertaining to Iraqi youth. Participants highlighted that democracy and religion can co-exist and that traditional Islamic principles can still be followed in a democratic society. As a next step, participants suggested the development of a national communication network for youth to exchange information. The participants also emphasized the need to work with the Iraqi Governing Council. Although the LGP funded and facilitated the conference, Just Read independently determined conference content and structure with the goal of generating a genuinely independent dialogue among Iraqi youth. This conference is one of ten National Dialogue Conferences being supported by CPA and USAID under the Civic Dialogue Program.
- The Kirkuk Project Coordination Center (PCC) refurbishment is complete. The center will integrate planning and tracking efforts for Kirkuk reconstruction projects among the CPA, Coalition forces, the ministry directorates, the local Iraqi government, and NGOs. The PCC project will also train Iraqi staff on project and service assessments, and enable local leaders to establish priorities and seek funds for community improvement projects.
- Approximately 300 participants attended a conference to establish the League of Retired Persons of Kirkuk. The focus of the conference was the issue of the social security for retirees in the emerging Iraqi democracy.
- The CPA LGP held a discussion in Kirkuk with the Organization for Women's Freedom on areas of possible cooperation, most notably in raising awareness among women and girls about human rights. In addition to inclusion of the Civil Society Organization (CSO) in the Civic Dialogue Program, other issues of priority included CSO participation in weekly meetings of the Council and committees, participation in projects to raise public awareness of issues such as corporal punishment in school, and participation in the creation of a safe social and educational space for students outside the classroom. The

organization has already done considerable work in schools, with the media, and with other CSOs on the issue of women's rights.

- The CPA LGP celebrated the opening of the Renaissance Women's Association in Muthanna. More than 70 men and women attended the ceremony which was aired live on local television. When the LGP initiated efforts in Muthanna, there was no political platform for women. Today, nearly ten women's leagues have been established across the governorate.

III. Support Development of Sustainable Political Parties/Associations

Support development of political associations

- National Democratic Institute (NDI) completed a series of multi-party workshops in Hillah, Baghdad, Tikrit, and Kirkuk. In addition to serving as an introduction to the NDI, the sessions provided an opportunity to assess the strengths, weaknesses, and potential capacity of more than 45 political parties that participated. The workshops were used to provide party leaders with an overview of the planning and techniques used by political parties around the world.

IV. Promote Respect for Human Rights

Educate on Human Rights Issues; Preserve documentation of past atrocities, raise awareness, and promote reconciliation; Strengthen local capacity to investigate and address past atrocities; Iraqi Special Tribunal (IST) for past atrocities; Human Rights Incorporated into Laws; Develop Role of Independent Human Rights NGOs and Media; Establish a Human Rights Ministry

- The Iraqi Minister for Human Rights Abdul Basit Turki attended the UN Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) in Geneva on March 15. The Commission produces resolutions on human rights in various parts of the world and reports on thematic issues such as the rights of women, children and minorities worldwide. The permanent staffing of the mission in Iraq will be organized through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The arrival of a mission team genuinely dedicated to the improvement of human rights in Iraq, combined with the simultaneous visit to UNCHR of a delegation of independent human rights NGOs from Iraq, is a positive move forward.

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
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COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY
BAGHDAD

8

Administrator's Weekly Report

Essential Services

March 13-19, 2004

HIGHLIGHTS


-- The total number of telephone subscribers in Iraq equals 1,023,395, which is 23 percent greater than the number of active subscribers pre-war.

-- The average crude oil export for the past 30 days is 1.7 million barrels per day (200,000 barrels per day above the CPA target set for April).

I. Provide Electricity Services that Meet National Needs

Improve generating capacity to 6000MW by July 1, 2004; Fully implement policy on allocation of electrical power; Publish draft of long term strategy; Minimize Sabotage and Improve Security

- The seven-day average (March 13-19) of peak electricity production was 4,108 MW, an increase of 2.4 percent over the previous week. On March 18, peak production hit a high for the week at 4,356 MW.




Source: Ministry of Electricity, Power Daily

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
Prepared by the Information Management Unit

- The seven-day average (March 13-19) production of electrical energy was 88,931 MWh per day, an increase of 2.1 percent over the previous week. On March 18, the production of electrical energy peaked for the week at 94,289 MW.



Source: Ministry of Electricity, Power Daily

- The following chart presents the daily electric power consumption broken down among the North, Central (including Baghdad), and South regions. During the reporting period, the North consumed an average of 991 MW per day, 26 percent of total power consumption. Per day, the Central region consumed 2,207 MW, 57 percent of the total, and the South consumed 644 MW, 17 percent of total electricity consumption during the past week.



Source: Ministry of Electricity, Power Daily, March 5, 2004


- As of 19 March, 573 MW (18 generators, 3 steam power and 15 combustion power) of generating capacity was on forced (unplanned) outage, and 1,281 MW (20 generators, 13 for maintenance and 7 for rehabilitation) was on scheduled outage. As of March 19, eight (400 kV) transmission lines and seven (132 kV) transmission lines were out of service.

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
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Average Daily Electrical Power Distribution per Governorate as of March 19, 2004

Note: Improved Hours of Residential Service because of abnormally mild temperatures. Hours of Residential Service will temporarily decrease as more units are taken out of service for maintenance and temperatures increase.



LEGEND:



Greater than 16 hours of average daily power
 8 to 16 hours of average daily power
 Less than 8 hours of average daily power
 No report

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Prepared by the Information Management Unit


- The following table shows the estimated peak industrial power allocation by governorate from the previous week.

NORTH	Peak allocation	South	Peak allocation	South Central	Peak allocation
Dahuk	N/A	Basra	37.0 MW	Anbar	34.0 MW
Ninawa	64.5 MW	Dhi Qar	10.0 MW	Babil	19.3 MW
Arbil	N/A	Maysan	7.0 MW	Karbala	19.5 MW
Tamim	19.0 MW	Muthanna	23.0 MW	Najaf	15.0 MW
Diyala	4.0 MW			Qadisiyah	11.5 MW
Sulaymaniyah	N/A	BAGHDAD		Wasit	0 MW
Salah Ad Din	9.0 MW	Baghdad	51.8 MW		

II. Reconstruct Communications and Postal Systems

Build Iraq's first responder network; Establish independent regulatory agency; Upgrade Iraqi Telephone and Postal Company (ITPC) network for interoperability; Build transmission component data network for Iraq, including international gateways; Restructure ITPC and its business operations; Upgrade and modernize postal systems; Upgrade ITPC outside plant for increased subscriber capacity and use

- Since May 2003, CPA has reinstated landline telephone service for 122,980 subscribers, including 11,430 since last week. CPA continues to make progress in restoring service to customers, especially in Baghdad.
- The following paragraphs delineate the number of landline and cell phone subscribers in Iraq, and compare them to pre-war estimates. The chart below shows the number of active landline subscribers in April 2003, the current number of active landline subscribers, the number of landline subscribers reinstated post-conflict (since May 2003), and the number of formerly active landline subscribers who remain without service (excluding the three Northern governorates).




Source: CPA Senior Advisor to the Minister of Communications
Iraqi Telephone and Postal Company [ITPC]

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
Prepared by the Information Management Unit

- The three new cell phone companies in Iraq (Asia Cell, Iraqna, and Atheer in the North, Central, and South respectively) continue to sign up new cell phone subscribers. Currently, in Mosul, Sulaymaniyah, and Kirkuk there are 138,645 cell phone subscribers. In Baghdad, there are 125,000 cell phone subscribers; and in Basra, Al Kut, Amarah, Samawah, and Nasiriyah there are 40,000 cell phone subscribers. 303K!
- Currently there are 719,750 active landline telephone subscribers in Iraq versus 833,000 pre-war. The total number of telephone subscribers in Iraq, including the 303,645 cell phone subscribers, equals 1,023,395, which is 23 percent greater than the number of active landline subscribers pre-war.
- The penetration rate (the number of active landline telephone subscribers as a percentage of the population) is 2.8 percent (using an estimated population of 25.9 million). The teledensity rate in Iraq (cell and landline subscribers) is 4 percent of the population.
- The following chart shows the percentage of operational telephone subscribers compared to the number of active subscribers in April 2003. The percentage of active subscribers in Baghdad increased by three percent over the last week.



*Source: CPA Senior Advisor to the Minister of Communications
Iraqi Telephone and Postal Company [ITPC]*

- CPA has repaired 18 telephone switches since May 2003 with full supporting service (office space, power, fiber transmission connections to other switches, security). Four switches are still inoperable (out of 203 total). The following chart shows the number of operational, inoperable, and repaired telephone switches in Iraq (excluding the three Northern governorates).



*Source: CPA Senior Advisor to the Minister of Communications
Iraqi Telephone and Postal Company [ITPC]*


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Prepared by the Information Management Unit

III. Provide Food Security for all Iraqis

Enhance capacity of Ministry of Agriculture; Assure supply of inputs; Strengthen research system; Ensure adequate stocks for Public Distribution System (PDS); Monitor food security; Hand over administration of system in the North; Initiate reform of rations basket; Environmental Initiatives

- Iraqi Ministries and CPA advisors are fully cooperating with the United Nations Secretary General's investigation (lead by the Under Secretary General for Internal Oversight Services) into the Oil for Food (OFF) program, stemming from allegations that certain individuals received bribes in connection with their administration of the OFF program.
- The following chart shows the percentage of estimated requirements on hand of stocks for the 12 public distribution goods that Iraqis receive under the PDS until the end of May. The percentage of estimated requirements is broken down into opening stocks (amount on hand), scheduled arrivals under existing contracts from the OFF Program, unconfirmed contracts under the existing OFF program, scheduled arrivals of goods from contracts procured through the Ministry of Trade (MOT), scheduled arrivals of goods from new contracts procured by the World Food Program (WFP), planned arrivals from contracts being arranged by MOT, and planned arrivals from contracts being arranged by WFP. The PDS stocks in the following chart are calculated as a percentage of three months' (March - May) estimated demand, plus a one-month buffer stock (CPA goal by May). Having 100 percent of each commodity will ensure that the food rations are available through May, including at least a one-month buffer stock for each commodity.




Source: CPA Food Security Team

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Prepared by the Information Management Unit

- CPA projects that no shortages will occur in the April and May rations given the new procurements of food basket commodities by both WFP and MOT, including accelerated delivery schedules for the commodities where stocks have been low. The numbers are estimates because MOT faces problems in providing updated, accurate PDS information weekly. These problems stem from difficult communications links between the governorates and Baghdad, as well as the need to upgrade inventory control procedures. CPA is working on these challenges as part of its handover strategy. Pulses are below 100 percent because MOT is moving towards providing tomato paste and cheese in lieu of the pulses rations in the coming months.
- The following chart shows the current PDS stocks and scheduled arrivals as a percentage of total requirements from February until transition on July 1. In addition to the monthly requirements from February through June, requirements for the transition include having the entire month of July on hand, plus an additional three-month buffer stock on hand at the time of transition. Thus, on the chart below, CPA's goal is 100 percent in each commodity category by July 1. Future procurement plans by WFP and MOT will ensure the achievement of these goals.



Source: CPA Food Security Team

IV. Improve Quality and Access to Healthcare

Develop health care organizations, management, and infrastructure; Train health care professionals; Secure system; Public health; Pharmaceuticals logistic support; Strategic communications

- The Public Health Division of the Ministry of Health began a Measles, Mumps, and Rubella (MMR) immunization campaign this week in the Basra area. The program targets school-age children (6-12 years of age). Over the next two weeks, MOH public health workers will

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Prepared by the Information Management Unit

deliver approximately 400,000 doses of MMR vaccines to Iraqi children. MMR vaccinations will also be available following this campaign and a similar campaign will be instituted in governorates across the country. These immunization efforts are in addition to those begun in June 2003.

- The senior advisor to the Ministry of Health and two staff physicians visited Amman this past week. The senior advisor met with King Hussein hospital personnel to collaborate on a pediatric oncology strategy for Iraq, in partnership with the National Cancer Institute in the U.S. He also met with data automation engineers to discuss electronic storage and retrieval of Iraqi medical records. The senior advisor talked with World Bank officials on the status of the donor coordination and the World Bank Trust Fund. In addition, the Senior Advisor met with the Jordanian Minister of Health to work on common issues.

V. Improve Quality and Access to Higher Education

Oversee the basic administrative functions of higher education systems; Reform and reconstruct higher education institutions; Reintegrate the higher education institutions in the North with the rest of the country; Reintegrate Iraqi students, scholars, and scientists into the broader intellectual community; Launch a review and reform of the curriculum in all disciplines; Provide access to essential information

- The Council of University Presidents unanimously adopted a policy of academic freedom at their monthly meeting, held in Arbil this month. The policy guarantees the rights of academicians to teach, research, and publish without fear of repression. In addition, the new policy safeguards the faculty's freedom of thought, inquiry, speech, association, and travel. Moreover, it affirms the non-political and non-sectarian nature of the public universities in Iraq, protects students and faculty from religious and political intimidation, no matter what the source, and requires all university administrators to safeguard these rights on their respective campuses. This is a significant policy advance in higher education in Iraq.
- Plans have begun to establish a private, independent American University of Iraq in Sulaymaniyah, concentrating on IT and Business Administration/Economics. Land has been set aside and over \$6 million has been raised to begin the project.
- On March 13, 2004, the University of Sulaymaniyah in Kurdish Iraq and the Post-Graduate Institute of Informatics in Baghdad signed an agreement of cooperation in computer science and information technology. The Informatics staff will train staff and students of Sulaymaniyah University at its institute in Baghdad, and will open the first center of video conferencing and e-learning at the University of Sulaymaniyah. This bilateral cooperation between these two institutions in higher education continues the integration of the Kurdish universities with the Iraqi universities.
- The Iraqi Foundation of Technical Institutes and Colleges has signed a partnership agreement with the Colorado Community College System. The agreement calls for promoting Democracy and Human Rights through leadership development for administrators and faculty at 36 technical colleges and institutes in Iraq; strengthening technical education in health sciences, business administration, and IT; and rebuilding the administrative structure

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Prepared by the Information Management Unit

of the technical colleges in Iraq. In addition, 16 Iraqi professors will travel to Colorado in June 2004 to commence training in various fields.

VI. Provide Water Supply, Sewerage and Municipal Services


Create viable organization; Restore services to pre-war levels; Municipal Services;

- CPA partner Bechtel continues work on restoring 19 water treatment plants (including 14 plants that are part of the Sweet Water canal system in the South) and 8 sewage plants throughout Iraq. In Baghdad, they have already rehabilitated 70 non-functioning waste pumping stations.

VII. Restore Economically – Strategic Transportation Infrastructure

Enable Iraqi civil aviation to prepare for international commercial aviation and cargo service; Enable Iraqi Port Authority (IPA) to administer a port of call with intermodal capabilities and inland container distribution; Enable Iraqi Railroad Railways (IRR) to provide domestic and international passenger and freight capabilities; Reform Civil Service at Ministry of Transportation

- The average number of aircraft departures per day (civil and military) at all airports in Iraq for the month of March are (the military numbers include fixed wing and rotary)
 - Mosul: 110 military, 0 civil
 - BIAP: 180 military, 14 civil
 - Basra: 25 military, 3 civil



Source: Senior Advisor to the Minister of Transportation & Stevedoring Services of America

- Last week, the North Port at Umm Qasr received a new mobile substation to help supply power to the port as a whole. Once connected to the grid and the port equipment, container lift will increase from 8 lifts per hour to 12-15 lifts per hour.

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
Prepared by the Information Management Unit

- Turkish liquid propane gas (LPG) rail cars traveled from Turkey to Taji this week, just north of Baghdad—the farthest south Turkish LPG cars have traveled since the war. Imports of LPG are important to steady volatile domestic stocks, and a safe, uninterrupted trip that far South on the rail lines is a vital step for improving the stability of the LPG market. The first train from northern Iraq departed Bayji this week carrying fuel oil destined for Syria.
- Since May 2003, the Ministry of Transportation has spent a total of \$224 million rebuilding and enhancing the capabilities of the Mosul, Basra, and Baghdad airports; \$125 million to increase the capacity of the ports; and \$273 million to improve Iraqi Railroad Railways.

VIII. Reconstitute Oil Infrastructure

Production/Exports; Product Supply; Security; Structural Reform

- The graph below shows the daily crude oil production in Iraq over the past nine months. The dashed black line is the current production target goal of 2 million barrels per day (MBPD). For the week of March 13-19, the estimated average total crude oil production was 2.38 MBPD (1.93 MBPD in the south and 0.45 MBPD in the north). The average crude oil export for the past 30 days was 1.71 MBPD (the average crude oil export for March is 1.76 MBPD). The average price received for crude oil exports this year is approximately \$27 per barrel.



Source: CPA Senior Advisor to the Ministry of Oil

- The following table shows the four main fuel sources in Iraq (diesel, kerosene, liquid propane gas [LPG] and gasoline), the estimated total national daily demand for each, and the percentage of fuel supply that is on hand (weekly average) out of total demand. The last

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
Prepared by the Information Management Unit

columns show CPA's target goal for daily fuel production and imports, and the percent of fuel supply on hand out of these targets. The daily production and imports target is higher than the estimated daily demand to allow for the growth of a buffer stock.

FUELS	Estimated Daily demand	% of demand	Daily Production and imports target	% of Target
Diesel	18 million liters (ML)	91%	18 ML	91%
Kerosene	9 ML	181%	18 ML	90%
LPG	5500 metric tons	88%	6000 metric tons	81%
Gasoline	17 ML	112%	18 ML	106%

Source: CPA Senior Advisor to the Ministry of Oil

- The graph below shows the total daily supply (domestic production plus imports) for each of the four refined fuel products as a percentage of estimated domestic demand over the past six months. The spike in kerosene is because of a recent reduction in the assessment of estimated daily demand from 15 ML to 9 ML. This reduction is conceivable because warmer temperatures are reducing the need to heat homes. CPA is striving to achieve 100 percent or greater supply for all 4 fuel products.




Source: CPA Senior Advisor to the Ministry of Oil

- The chart below shows the days of supply on hand as of March 19 for each of the four main fuel products in Iraq. CPA's goal remains to have 15 days of supply (DOS) on hand for each fuel source in every region, although this goal is unattainable for LPG in Baghdad and South Central, and for gasoline in the South and South Central regions because of insufficient storage capacity. This week, LPG in the South meets the 15 DOS target.

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Prepared by the Information Management Unit



Source: CPA Senior Advisor to the Ministry of Oil

IX. Provide Opportunities for Sporting Activities and the Development of Young People
Re-establish the Ministry of Youth & Sport; Re-establish Sports Clubs, Branch Federations, Central Federations and Olympic Committee organizations; Facilitate Resumption of National and International Sporting, Youth and Community Activities; Facilitate Economic Regeneration in relation to Sporting Activities

- On February 27, at a meeting of the International Olympic Committee (IOC) Executive Board in Athens, a unanimous vote was passed to lift Iraq's Olympic suspension. Seven sports in Iraq have the ability to qualify and participate in the Olympic Summer Games in Athens: weightlifting, wrestling, boxing, tae kwan do, swimming, track and field, and football (soccer).

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Prepared by the Information Management Unit



Administrator's Weekly Report

Governance

February 21 – February 27, 2004

HIGHLIGHTS

-- The United Nations (U.N.) completed its assessment of the transition in Iraq. Secretary General Kofi Annan acknowledged that credible direct elections would not be feasible before the planned transfer of sovereignty on July 1.

yes!

-- In the early morning of March 1 (after the period covered by this report), the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) completed the draft Transitional Administrative Law (TAL).

I. Support Transition to Iraqi Sovereignty

- The U.N. officially issued its report, from the recent transition fact-finding mission, to the CPA on February 23. Citing security and organizational issues as impediments, U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan acknowledged that credible direct elections are not feasible before the planned transfer of sovereignty on July 1. The report recommended the establishment of an autonomous and independent Iraqi Electoral Commission as soon as possible.
- The CPA will consider U.N. proposals to develop a credible, secure process to choose a transitional government by July 1.
- The U.N. team recommended combining the constitutional convention and national assembly into one body, with two elections to choose both, rather than two bodies as currently required in the November 15 agreement. The U.N. recommended that the first election choose the national assembly, which would then write the constitution and put it before the people of Iraq for ratification.
- 7. • On February 27, 15 IGC members voted to repeal a religion-based family law proposal, once considered among the most progressive in the Middle East, and place it under Muslim religious jurisdiction. The proposal would have threatened the future political rights of Iraqi women, who comprise more than half of Iraq's population.

DRAFT

- Twelve governorates in Iraq have Provincial Councils that have completed the refreshment process to become more representative of their populations, in terms of gender and ethnicity, than when originally chosen. The status of each Provincial Council is contained in the following table (the three Northern governorates are not included):

REFRESHED	IN PROCESS
Qadisiyah	Baghdad*
Wasit	Najaf
Muthanna	Dhi Qar
Maysan	
Basrah	
Diyala	
Salah Ad Din	
Ninawa	
Tamim	
Anbar	
Karbala	
Babil	

* Establishing Provincial Council

- The Baghdad City Council requests they be given statutory authority in the TAL and continues to advocate for inclusion of their recommendations on home rule.
- The CPA worked with the International Centre for Reconciliation (ICR) to establish a home for the recently launched Iraqi Center for Reconciliation, Dialogue and Peace. ICR organized the first meeting of leading Shia and Sunni Clerics along with representatives of all of Iraq's religious groups on February 24 in Baghdad. Dr Mouwafak al Rabbii and Mr Naseer Chadirchi, members of Iraq's Governing Council, chaired the historic event, which was held in light of increasing tension between Iraq's different tribal and religious groups. The culmination of the meeting was the signing of a ten-point document, known as "The Baghdad Religious Accord". It calls for an end to violence and pledges that Iraqi religious leaders will work together on the process leading to democracy.

II. Develop Civic Participation in Governance

Develop indigenous polling capacity; Provide women and youth with the skills necessary to become important participants in the political process; Develop local civil society capacity to conduct advocacy and participate in political life; Develop civic education programs promoting electoral participation and democratic ideals; Build capacity for civil society conflict prevention and mitigation

- The CPA, the Iraqi Foundation, the American Federation for Teachers, and the Civic Education Center sponsored a successful three-day conference February 21-23 in Baghdad, named "International Experiences in Civic Education". In addition to panels

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Prepared by the Information Management Unit

led by international civic education experts, three members of the IGC and the Minister of Human Rights provided keynote remarks at the event. Among the key topics addressed were the prospect of education in Iraq, the educational system under the former regime, and civic education material in emerging democracies. Approximately 100 Iraqi educators participated in the conference and reached consensus on the following points: 1) the need for an interim framework to teach civics for the 2004-2005 academic year; 2) the need to train K-12 teachers as the highest priority; and 3) the need to establish a committee for civic education within the Ministry of Education.

- The Local Government Program (LGP) in Arbil held the first of a series of seven economic development clinics at Salah ad Din University on February 21. Fifty representatives from the government, the civil society community, the university, and the media debated business regulation, company incorporation, contract law, trade, investment policies, business taxes, insurance requirements, and labor protection. The clinics are part of the Local Governance Partnership formed between LGP and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG).
- Future town hall meetings across Iraq will focus on the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL) and tenets of democracy. There are approximately 7 town hall regions planned in regions which have not had official town hall meetings to discuss the November 15 Agreement and are awaiting release of the TAL in order to use it as a focus of their meetings. Town hall meetings held to date have focused on other topics related to the Agreement and have been held in Basra, Mosul, Baghdad, Ba'quba, Tikrit, Kirkuk, Nasiriyah, and Najaf. 8
- The International Republican Institute (IRI), the Iraqi Foundation for Democracy and Development, and WADI (a non-governmental women's organization working in northern Iraq) co-hosted a women's conference in Baghdad on February 26. More than 200 women from across Iraq, including many Kurdish representatives, participated in the event which focused on the role of women in Iraq's transition to democracy.
- CPA provided assistance to the WADI Association for Crisis Assistance and Development Cooperation to establish these two women's centers in Sulaymaniyah. Women in these previously neglected areas will have the opportunity to learn new skills, participate in literacy classes, and receive other support as they seek to contribute to the well-being of their families and the greater society.
- The Kirkuk Women's Network held a conference on January 19, designed to raise awareness about women's rights and develop recommendations for the Governing Council in drafting the TAL. Representatives of more than 20 women's groups attended the conference and heard keynote remarks from the Governor of Kirkuk and Ms. Ala Talabani of the Iraqi Women's High Council. This event was the first women's conference held in Kirkuk and represents an important collaboration among the very diverse community of women's groups.

III. Promote Respect for Human Rights

Educate on Human Rights Issues; Preserve documentation of past atrocities, raise awareness, and promote reconciliation; Strengthen local capacity to investigate and address past atrocities; Iraqi Special Tribunal (IST) for past atrocities and Iraq Property Claims Commission for property disputes; Human Rights Incorporated into Laws; Develop Role of Independent Human Rights NGOs and Media; Establish a Human Rights Ministry

- A CPA exhumation team will work with the local population in the north to train them in conducting exhumations. The exhumations will be performed for the local population to identify and bury their dead, rather than forensic excavation.
- A representative of the International Commission for Transitional Justice visited Baghdad to meet officials, including the Minister for Human Rights, to assess the possibility of creating a Truth Commission.

IV. Support Development of Sustainable Political Parties / Associations

Support Development of Political Associations

- The International Republican Institute (IRI) provided training on February 25 in Hilla for the Iraqi Democratic Gathering, an organization established by Al Sayid Farad Al-Hussainy Al-Quizwini. The training focused on the basics of political party development and the role of political parties in a democracy. Forty political activists from Nasariyah, Diwaniyah, Hillah, al-Kut, Najaf, and Karbala attended.

ADDENDUM

The following is an update on the transition to sovereignty (after the close of the reporting period):

- In the early morning of March 1 (after the period covered by this report), the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) completed the draft Transitional Administrative Law (TAL). The meeting ended with agreement on each article and marked a historical moment for the Iraqi people. Among the highlights, this interim constitution recognizes Islam as a source, rather than the only source, for legislation; and states that no law will be passed during the transition period that infringes upon the tenets of the Muslim religion or contradicts democratic principles and fundamental rights. The TAL also states that women will hold no less than 25 percent of the seats in the provisional legislature.
- The CPA and the IGC are harmonizing the text for accurate translation. The IGC will to sign the TAL in an official ceremony on Wednesday, March 3, after the end of the Shiite holiday of Ashura.



COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY
BAGHDAD



Administrator's Weekly Report

Governance

February 14 – February 20, 2004

HIGHLIGHTS

- Twelve Provincial Councils have completed the process of becoming more transparent and representative.
- United Nations (UN) Secretary General Kofi Annan acknowledged that direct elections would not be feasible before the planned transfer of sovereignty on June 30.

I. Support Transition to Iraqi Sovereignty

- The UN completed its assessment of the transition in Iraq and is expected to provide a comprehensive report on its recommendations shortly. Secretary General Kofi Annan acknowledged that direct elections would not be feasible before the planned transfer of sovereignty on July 1. Once the Secretary General has made his recommendations, CPA will discuss paths forward with relevant players.
- Administrator L. Paul Bremer and Secretary General Annan firmly restated June 30, 2004 as the date for transfer of sovereignty. Creating an interim Iraqi government to assume sovereignty on July 1 remains a priority for the CPA. Changes in the mechanism for forming an interim government are possible and such options will be considered, including expansion of the Iraqi Governing Council.
- The interim government will be bound by a Transitional Administrative Law (TAL) that protects fundamental rights and provides a stable political structure.
- The CPA Governance office will establish a new coordinating body known as the "Democracy Partners Group". The group will be comprised of members of major international and domestic organizations in Iraq dedicated to the promotion of democracy. The group will discuss democracy building activities based on the political

climate and develop strategies to strengthen democracy after the transition to sovereignty on June 30.


- The Babil and Karbala Provincial Councils completed refreshment on February 14 and 15, respectively. Twelve governorates in Iraq have Provincial Councils that have completed the refreshment process to become more representative of their populations, in terms of gender and ethnicity, than when originally chosen. The status of each Provincial Council is contained in the following table (the three Northern governorates are not included):

<u>REFRESHED</u>	<u>IN PROCESS</u>
Qadisiyah	Baghdad*
Wasit	Najaf
Muthanna	Dhi Qar
Maysan	
Basrah	
Diyala	
Salah Ad Din	
Ninawa	
Tamim	
Anbar	
Karbala	
Babil	

* Establishing Provincial Council

- While the IGC has some popularity in relatively tranquil areas such as Diwaniyah and Hillah (IRI Poll Dec 11-18), the same poll shows a majority (53 percent) favor dissolution after 30 June (see chart below).

After 30 June Governing Council Should...



2

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Prepared by the Information Management Unit

- Analysis of several polls conducted over the past six months suggest high popularity for *shari'a* and, by extension, religious extremism and theocracy. However, deeper reading of the polls suggests that Iraqis do not want a strict Islamic government. Rather, they want a democracy that respects religion and takes religious belief into account, but they do not want clerics in power.
- Polling data indicates there is little reason to believe that Iraqis would be inclined to vote a hard-line Islamist government to power (see table below).

Agreement with the following phrases

Iraqis must have the right to criticize the government	95.4%
Any law passed in Iraq must not contradict Islam	94.6%
Iraq's government should vigilantly protect the right of religious and ethnic minorities	92.7%
Iraq's government must not have influence on how people practice their religion	85.6%
Islamic <i>shari'a</i> should be the principal source of legislation in Iraq	75.1%
Iraq's government must acknowledge the role of religion in society, but must not be subordinate to religious leaders	64.9%
Islamic <i>shari'a</i> should be one of several sources of legislation in Iraq	62.0%

Source: IIACSS January 04

II. Develop Civic Participation in Governance

Develop indigenous polling capacity; Provide women and youth with the skills necessary to become important participants in the political process; Develop local civil society capacity to conduct advocacy and participate in political life; Develop civic education programs promoting electoral participation and democratic ideals; Build capacity for civil society conflict prevention and mitigation

- The CPA Civic Education Program hosted three successful town-hall meetings this week, including meetings in Nasiriyah, Najaf, and Kirkuk. The Kirkuk event on February 15 was particularly successful, given that it is one of the most diverse and contentious cities in Iraq. Over 200 members of Kirkuk's ethnically and religiously mixed community attended the gathering where discussion focused on the upcoming Transitional Administrative Law (TAL) and the November 15 Agreement. The question and answer session covered women's rights, federalism, civil rights and liberties, equal protection under the law, and the process for creating a permanent government.
- The Zainab al-Hawraa Center for Women's Rights opened in Karbala on February 16. This center and 12 other women's centers being set up throughout the country are part of the CPA strategy to organize civil society groups, with \$1.2 million provided to date for the establishment of these women's centers, and additional activities in the planning

stages. These centers will offer a variety of programs, including vocational training, workshops explaining women's rights and responsibilities in a democracy, health awareness and physical fitness instruction, computer courses and micro-financing opportunities. With these skills and training, Iraqi women will be better prepared to contribute to the well-being of their families and to take part in the decision making processes of government.

- In a meeting with Ambassador Bremer, representatives of the Iraqi Women's Higher Council and the Advisory Committee on Women's Affairs presented the CPA their concerns regarding the future role of women in Iraq. The main issues remain Resolution 137, which changes Iraqi family law to Islamic Shari'a, and the proposed 40 percent quota for women's representation in government. The women emphasized their wish that the TAL include not just a bill of rights for the Iraqi people, but an explicit adherence to the UN Convention on Human Rights.
- On February 20, the CPA hosted a meeting of 11 international scholars invited to Baghdad for a 3-day Iraq civic education conference entitled "International Experiences in Civic Education". The meeting participants prepared for the conference through discussion of the current situation in Iraq. The CPA presented its goals and description of activities in the areas of civic education, governance, human rights, justice, and anti-corruption.

III. Develop Framework and Capacity for Elections

Support creation of National Independent Electoral Commission; Promote Scopes of work and Operational Linkages between national, regional, and local level election administration authorities

- The International Foundation for Election Systems (IFES) team is preparing to assess the accuracy of the food distribution system as a potential form of personal identification for voter registration.

IV. Promote Respect for Human Rights

Educate on Human Rights Issues; Preserve documentation of past atrocities, raise awareness, and promote reconciliation; Strengthen local capacity to investigate and address past atrocities; Iraqi Special Tribunal (IST) for past atrocities and Iraq Property Claims Commission for property disputes; Human Rights Incorporated into Laws; Develop Role of Independent Human Rights NGOs and Media; Establish a Human Rights Ministry

- The Ministry of Human Rights officially dedicated its new building on February 14 with a ceremony before an invited audience.
- The CPA hosted a stakeholder meeting on February 15 to develop recommendations for future work on documentation of past atrocities.

- NGO's delivered more than one million pages of atrocity-related documents to the Ministry of Human Rights. These documents were discovered in the Revolutionary Command Council Court files and may be used in Iraqi Special Tribunal (IST) investigations. A series of CPA briefings given to NGOs in relation to the IST resulted in this large amount of recovered documentation.

V. Promote Durable Solutions for Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)

Facilitate the Return of Refugees and IDPs; Build Local and National Capacity to Protect and assist Refugees and IDPs; Develop and Implement a Process to Resolve Property Disputes

- The CPA co-hosted a Strategic Planning Meeting in Amman with the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR). Representatives of various Iraqi ministries attended, as well as representatives of NGOs working in Iraq and with the UN. Participants agreed upon priorities for the Ministry of Displacement and Migration, which include 1) building expertise and capacity to assist, protect and find durable solutions for its population of concern; 2) developing a clear definition of its population of concern; and 3) assisting IDPs in the North.



COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY
BAGHDAD

governance

Administrator's Weekly Report

Governance

February 7 – February 13, 2004

HIGHLIGHTS

- Recent CPA polls indicate passive Iraqi public support for the transfer of sovereignty and the transitional administrative law.
- CPA sponsored the production of the documentary film "Mass Graves", which documents and underscores the human atrocities committed by Saddam Hussein's regime.

I. Support Transition to Iraqi Sovereignty

- According to CPA-sponsored surveys across Iraq, a majority of Iraqis support steps that emphasize quick transfer.
- Results from polls conducted in Baghdad, Basrah, Mosul, Ramadi, Samara, and Karbala indicate that two-thirds of Iraqis agree that caucuses would be acceptable, although elections are still the most popular choice. They also indicate that Iraqis support individual rights and democracy in a religious context, but without favoring clerics in government.
- CPA began an assessment of the Iraqi Public Distribution System database to verify its potential as a basis for a voter list for elections in late 2004/early 2005. This assessment will include data testing at the local and national levels. The data available includes 15 of the 18 governorates, with the 3 northern governorates still expected.
- The Karbala Provincial Council plans to complete refreshment by February 15. Refreshment processes in all governorates should be complete by early March. Ten governorates in Iraq have Provincial Councils that have completed the refreshment process to become more representative of their populations, in terms of gender and ethnicity, than when originally chosen. The status of each Provincial Council is contained in the following table (the three Northern governorates are not included):

REFRESHED	IN PROCESS
Qadisiyah Wasit Muthanna Maysan Basrah Diyala Salah Ad Din Ninawa Tamim Anbar	Babil Karbala Najaf Dhi Qar Baghdad* * Establishing Provincial Council

II. Develop Civic Participation in Governance

Develop indigenous polling capacity; Provide women and youth with the skills necessary to become important participants in the political process; Develop local civil society capacity to conduct advocacy and participate in political life; Develop civic education programs promoting electoral participation and democratic ideals; Build capacity for civil society conflict prevention and mitigation

- The CPA Civic Education Campaign continued the "Training the Trainers" program in Al Hillah, focusing on the fundamentals of democracy. The program also instructs participants how to maximize use of the democracy toolkit that has been developed to assist those implementing democracy dialogue. After training is complete, the trainers will plan and conduct seminars, workshops, and public meetings to discuss democracy in Iraq.
- The CPA facilitated seven selection procedures in Al Anbar Governorate Council through the Local Governance Program (LGP). Approximately 250 individuals participated in each selection process, which was filmed by the media.
- The Baghdad Women's Center Initiative will establish a center in Baghdad's Al Mansour district to increase the participation of women in the social, economic, and political life of the community. A USAID grant will assist the center by providing office equipment and supplies. CPA is rehabilitating and equipping women's centers throughout Iraq and providing women with training in subjects ranging from information technology to political participation. To date, CPA has provided this assistance to Women's Centers in nine major cities -- Baghdad, Sulaymaniyah, Mosul, Al Kut, Diwaniyah, Hillah, Karbala, Basrah, Najaf, and are working on centers in Aghra, Halabja, Tawela, and Biara. Nine additional Women's Centers are planned for Baghdad. The goal is to have at least one modern, fully equipped, and staffed Women's Center in each of Iraq's 18 Governorates, and additional ones where need is greatest.

- CPA will distribute 500,000 pamphlets on the Transitional Administrative Law throughout the country in order to educate the Iraqi people. Coalition regional channels, the Iraq Reconstruction and Development Council, civil society organizations, ministries, and the local press will participate in the distribution.
- CPA supported the establishment of the Iraq Foundation for Development and Democracy (IFDD), a think tank fostering political dialogue in Iraq through the sponsorship of meetings to discuss the transition to democracy.
- Iraqi non-governmental organizations (NGO's) that participated in this month's World Movement for Democracy Conference in South Africa, established the Iraqi Civic Society Empowerment Network (ICEN). ICEN will work to build a network of NGOs that will promote civil society and democratic values in Iraq.
- More than 650 women, mostly conservative shi'ites, attended the 1000 Women's Conference at Baghdad University on February 12. Resolutions from the conference include 1) that women participate in the drafting of the constitution; 2) that women have a minimum representation of 20 percent in the different ministries; and 3) that a Ministry for Women be created. Once drafted, these resolutions will go formally to the IGC.
- Parween Shawqat Kawther, a school teacher and member of the Salah Ad Din Provincial Council, is the first Iraqi to arrive in the U.S. as a participant in the U. S. State Department's International Visitor Program. Parween will join others from the Near East and North Africa in a program for teaching English as a second language that will explore pedagogical methods, curricula, assessment techniques, and educational resource management.
- CPA attended the opening of the new home of the Free Women Association (FWA) in Al Muthanna. FWA is one of the first official Iraqi women's organizations to be recognized after the collapse of the Ba'ath regime.

III. Develop Framework and Capacity for Elections

Support creation of National Independent Electoral Commission; Promote Scopes of work and Operational Linkages between national, regional, and local level election administration authorities

- Technical and resource planning continues for the implementation of caucuses or other means, such as direct elections, to establish a Transitional National Assembly (TNA) by July 1. CPA and the Coalition Joint Task Force (CJTF-7) discussed contingency timelines to ensure appropriate allocation of logistical capacities, human resources and security.

IV. Support Development of Sustainable Political Parties / Associations

Support Development of Political Associations

- The International Republican Institute (IRI) is producing a database of political parties in Iraq. It will include party characteristics, such as regions in which the parties operate, existence of women in leadership positions, and estimated membership. IRI and the National Democratic Institute (NDI) will use the database to initiate political party training and other work with the parties.

V. Promote Respect for Human Rights

Educate on Human Rights Issues; Preserve documentation of past atrocities, raise awareness, and promote reconciliation; Strengthen local capacity to investigate and address past atrocities; Iraqi Special Tribunal (IST) for past atrocities and Iraq Property Claims Commission for property disputes; Human Rights Incorporated into Laws; Develop Role of Independent Human Rights NGOs and Media; Establish a Human Rights Ministry

- CPA sponsored the production of the documentary film "Mass Graves", which underscores the enormity of the crimes committed against the Iraqi people for the past two decades. The film also emphasizes the effect that atrocities by Saddam's regime had on every individual living in Iraq – whether they were Arab, Kurdish, Turkmen, or Christian. The release date for "Mass Graves", which will be aired on the al Iraqiyah television network, is yet to be determined.
- Work continues on the Secure Evidence Storage Facility for documentation storage and analysis of past atrocities. A second building is needed to serve as the investigations base. A stakeholder meeting is scheduled for February 15, to develop recommendations for future work on documentation.
- The Ministry of Human Rights officially opens its new building on February 14 before an invited audience.
- CPA monitored the exhumation work carried out by a Kuwaiti team on grave sites near Karbala. This work is part of the Tripartite Agreement

VI. Promote Durable Solutions for Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)

Facilitate the Return of Refugees and IDPs; Build Local and National Capacity to Protect and assist Refugees and IDPs; Develop and Implement a Process to Resolve Property Disputes

- The Iraq Property Claims Commission (IPCC) is scheduled to start opening offices and accepting claims by the end of this month. The Baghdad offices are scheduled to open February 23, followed by offices in Erbil, Sulamaniyyah, Kirkuk and Mosul. A State Department legal expert is assisting the IGC legal committee in drafting IPCC guidelines that will clarify aspects of the law.

(b)(6) (FS-4)

J. performance

From: (b)(6)
 Sent: Thursday, February 12, 2004 10:20 AM
 To: (b)(6)
 Cc: Jones, Richard (AMB); Carpenter, Scott (SES-2); (b)(6)
 (b)(6)
 Subject: RE: Deputy Ministers

PS. For those of you who were not at the 8:30 and still don't have your packet of bios, please see the Executive Secretariat.

Thank you.

(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6)
 Sent: Thursday, February 12, 2004 10:16 AM
 To: CPA Ministries; (b)(6)
 Cc: Jones, Richard H. (AMB); Carpenter, Scott (SES-2); (b)(6)

(b)(6)

Subject: Deputy Ministers

All,

Following on our conversations at the last two 7:30 am ministers meeting, I am attaching the list of deputy ministers nominated by the GC. Let me clarify that these people have been put forward by the GC for "deputy minister" slots, not undersecretaries.

We understand the concerns about many of these appointments. We have received from the GC the CVs of the nominees where the GC has this information available. In other cases, some of the individuals will be known to you. Where you have no information on a person and cannot derive any from your minister, please let us know and we will press the GC to get more information.

Please give your reactions to the names and those of your minister to George Khelfa. Ideally, we'd like your initial thoughts by COB today; if you need more time, we will accept additional reactions on Friday. The reason for the short turnaround is that the GC is eager to finalize/make public the final nature of the appointments, and the issue will get more and more politicized as time goes by. Please address whether these people appear to be qualified, will help the minister and you do your work, whether the numbers can be absorbed, if you will need to let go important people as a result, and any other factors you feel are important. If you have a specific recommendation to make as to how we should proceed, please include it. We will pass all of your reactions to Amb Bremer, but would like to be able to look at them as a whole before submitting an overall recommendation to him.

Please channel your questions to (b)(6) ccing me and (b)(6) Many thanks for your cooperation,

2/12/2004

Meghan

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

1. Dr. Hamed Al-Bayati
2. Mr. Aly Al-Adeeb
3. Mrs. Saifa Al-Soheil
4. Mr. Labid Majid Abawi

Ministry of the Interior

1. Mr. Aras Habib
2. Brigadier General Ahmad Khafajy
3. Mr. Adnan Hadi Al-Asadi
4. Dr. Abdul-Jabar Youssef
5. Mr. Hussein Ali Kamal (incumbent?)
6. Mrs Hala Shaker Mostafa (incumbent)

Minister of Transportation

1. Mr. Sami Hussein Al-Awady
2. Dr. (Mrs) Mitha Hassan Al-Lami
3. Mr. Mohammed Sadoun Al-Abady
4. Mrs. Beman Khadr

Ministry of the Environment

1. Mr. Manar Ismael Alwan
2. Mr. Saif Al Din Farouk
3. Mr. Hamid Mirza

Ministry of Immigration Displaced Persons

1. Mrs. Hamida Ahmad Najaf
2. Mr. Dhia Hussein Ali Al-Faylee

Ministry of Science and Technology

1. Dr. Asmaa Al-Shibout
2. Dr. Adil Abdul-Rahim Al-Amir

Ministry of Education

1. Mr. Mahmoud Mulla Ezzat
2. Dr. Wamidh Ramzi Al-Amri
3. Dr. (Mrs.) Naba Al-Barak
4. Mr Andreos Yohanna Georgis
5. Dr. Sami al Muzzafar

Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research

1. Dr. Tariq Najm Abdullah

2/12/2004



2. Dr. Mohammed Sadiq al Adnani
3. Dr. Idris Hadi
4. Dr. (Mrs) Amal Hamid Mamalji

Ministry of Municipalities and Public Works

1. Mr. Sharwan Kamal Sibti Al-Waili
2. Mr. Kamal Nasir Al-Chaderchi
3. Jassem Mohammed Ja'far

Ministry of Water Resources

1. Dr. Hazam Al-Hasoon
2. Mr. Jasim Mohamed Doweij
3. Mr. Frederick John
4. Dr Hassan al Najafi

Ministry of Agriculture

1. Mr. Subhi Jamil
2. Mr. Mohamed Ridha
3. Mr. Daoud Mohammed Sharif al Azzawi

Ministry of Industry and Minerals

1. Mr. Samy Ra'ouf Al-'Arjy
2. Mrs. Saida Al-Khafajy
3. Dr. Azam Abdul-Aziz Al-Qasab

Ministry of Culture

1. Mr. Jaber Mohamed Al-Jaabery
2. Mrs. Maysoon Salim Al-Damloujy
3. Mr. Sarbsit Omar Hassan Bamrany

Ministry of Finance

1. Mr Abbas Khadr al Rowdan
2. Mr Othman Ismail

Ministry of Youth and Sport

1. Mr Haydar al Mussawi
2. Mr Mohammed Ali Ihsan


Ministry of Trade

1. Mr. Mosab Mohie
2. Abdul Amir al Aryan

Ministry of Health

1. Dr. Samir Mohammed Khadr al Sa'adoun

2/12/2004



2. Dr. Faiq Hamah Said
3. Dr. Sabah Ghanem al Dabbagh
4. Dr. Ahmed Hardan Ismail

Ministry of Oil

1. Mr. Ezzat Abu Al Timn
2. Mr. Basil Rashid Najy
3. Mr. Abdul-Saaheb Qutb
4. Mr. Shehrzad Bahjat
5. Mr. Mo'tasim Kareem
6. Mr. Arshad Mohammed Ismail

Ministry of Construction and Housing

1. Mr. Minam Saleh Al-Sob'e
2. Mr. Ali Abdul-Al-Hussein Majbil Al-Tamimi
3. Mr. Biyan Ismael Dize'i
4. Dr. Adnan Bashir Ibrahim

Ministry of Electricity

1. Mr. Walid Ali Hamza Al-Sha'fei
2. Mr. Adil Nasser Haman

Ministry of Justice

1. Mr. Abdul-Wahhab Mohamed Al-Khazrajy
2. Mr. Youshou Ibrahim Dize'i

Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs

1. Dr. Koler Amr Ismail
2. Mrs. Souriya Hanna Ishou
3. Ala al Din Hassan al Zubaidi
4. Dr. (Mrs) Bushra Berto

Ministry of Communications

1. Dr Hamid al Aqrawi

Ministry of Human Rights

1. Mr. Kamal Qeitoluli
2. Mr Hadi Kadhim al Areeda


Ministry of Planning

No appointments

Baghdad Municipality

1. Mr. Jouwad Kadhim Al-Boulani (Dep Mayor)

2/12/2004




Tourism Commission

1. Mr. Kadhim Turki

Supreme Audit Board

1. Mr. Adnan Suleyman Daoud (President of the Supreme Audit Board)
2. Mr. Shakir Jawad Latif
3. Muhsen Ibrahim Ahmad

2/12/2004





COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY
BAGHDAD

040116-07
copy OGC

3

INFO MEMO

January 16, 2004

FOR: THE ACTING ADMINISTRATOR

FROM:

(b)(6)

THROUGH

SUBJECT: Lebanese Capture of Iraqi Dinars

Ahmed Chalabi called me this morning to say that he had received word that the Lebanese customs service had discovered and seized a prop plane carrying \$19.5 billion new Iraqi dinars in Beirut. A number of individuals were on board the plane, including the son-in-law of a former Lebanese president; a Lebanese money exchange dealer; and a Mohammed Abi-Daweesh (sp?), an Iraqi who Chalabi claims holds a CPA contract for providing security at Baghdad International Airport.

Chalabi emphasized the importance of getting the seized funds back to Iraq, noting that the chief of the Central Bank had recently warned him of currency shortages that might create difficulties in meeting payroll. He suggested that CPA help facilitate the dispatch of Central Bank financial investigators to Beirut to track down the facts and help reclaim the money.

Evan
FBI
OSA
should all
get this

Chalabi asked that I communicate this information to you as soon as possible. He is available if CPA needs further details.

In addition to Chalabi's suggested approach, you may want to consider proposing that the United States approach the Lebanese government for details on this matter, perhaps through our embassy in Beirut.

James



COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY
BAGHDAD

040111-04
S. Jones

INFO MEMO

January 11, 2004

FOR: Ambassador Richard Jones
FROM: (b)(6) Director of Governance
SUBJECT: Welcome Home

The pace for Governance has accelerated over the past few weeks as new initiatives from Washington related to the role of the UN have emerged and negotiations on the Transitional Administration Law (TAL) have intensified. Many of the challenges remain the same: how to get the Kurds to give up their maximalist positions regarding the TAL; how to get the GC to implement their commitments under the November 15th agreement; how to mitigate the so-called "Sistani Problem." Others are new. What are the possible implications of a new UN role for the implementation of the November 15th agreement?

Of the numerous papers and cables Governance has written during your absence, I've pulled together the most important to get you up to speed quickly on where we are. In addition to these, we hope to have two papers prepared by this morning (Sunday), one assessing the impact of a UN political team arriving in early February and the other providing a broader, bird's eye view of our thoughts as to how we get from here to July 1. Although we are prepared to brief you more fully, here is a quick summary of where we are in key areas:

Federalism and the Kurds (CPA 451). Ambassador Bremer has been intensively engaged with the Kurds on their "demands" related to the TAL. Although newspaper reports indicate that decisions have been made or are nearly finalized, some hard slogging appears yet to be done. Ambassador Bremer's most recent meeting was productive in identifying issues for future resolution and confidence building that basic redlines with the Kurds would be observed but no final agreements have been reached.

The TAL (CPA 452). There is a new version of the TAL that was submitted to us earlier this week. Although an integrated whole, the draft still does not address certain key issues in significant detail. A comprehensive analysis of the latest version is currently being worked on by Dr. Larry Diamond, the editor of the Journal for Democracy and the newest addition to the Governance team. In the meantime, the attached cable provides a short analysis and the text itself. The GC hopes to have a public draft available shortly after the UN meeting on the 19th.

Provincial Refreshment: We received the Governing Council's list of names for their promised 3-person teams only last night. It's unclear, however, if the list has the blessing of the full GC. As we heard at Thursday's Regional Coordinator's conference, waiting much longer in certain

areas to move forward on the refreshment process may cause problems with our various GCs' and MSCs' preparations and ties up a lot assets that could be used doing other things. Moving forward without the GC has certain inherent risks. For most provinces, the GCs would like to move out without GC participation but the situation is complicated in places like Najaf where our GC has indicated a refreshing of the council there cannot take place until there is Governing Council buy-in otherwise the Hawza won't accept the process.

Caucuses: Together with IFES, we have drafted a paper outlining how technically the caucuses procedure will work. This paper goes into some detail on the process from the establishment of the Organizing Committee, to nomination procedures, to how the actual caucus will run.

Although there are one or two outstanding issues, we intend to meet today (Sunday) with troika deputies to introduce the outlines of the process.

4:06 PM
mkg

De-Ba'ath (CPA 449): Dr. Chalabi publicly releases the new guidelines for the implementation of de-Ba'athification today (Sunday) at 13:00. The procedures are consistent with the delegation of authority and are an improvement on the earlier ones in so far as they provide for a more transparent process and open avenues for reconciliation. The announcement should build nicely on the decision to conditionally release detainees, though I remain concerned that we're not doing enough on the justice front which explains, in part, the uptick in reprisal killings.

Role of the UN (CPA 446): In preparation for the January 19th trilateral meeting with the UN, there has been a lot of discussion about whether and how to get the UN to come back to Iraq. At present it seems that Kofi is ready to accept the Nov 15th agreement though he insists that the caucus procedure be as transparent and inclusive as possible -- something we, too, clearly support. CPA's position is that while we welcome the UN's return, we do not want a prospective role of a new Special Representative to stall the process now. We also remain concerned that the UN's desire for a "more inclusive process" may extend to the very folks that Sistani, the Shia and the majority of the GC are most concerned about, i.e., Ba'athists and insurgents, thereby exchanging one large political headache for another.

The "Sistani Problem": Dr. Pachachi heads down to see Sistani this morning with Kofi's letter in hand in hopes of convincing the Ayatollah that 1) elections are not feasible and 2) even if he doesn't agree, he should not issue a fatwa prior to the meeting on the 19th. We wish him well but believe he is underestimating the depth of Sistani's opposition to the current political plan. In fact, reporting makes clear that Sistani's opposition has stiffened following Sir Jeremy's rather unhelpful comments from earlier in the week. A fresh printing of the posters from two weeks ago have appeared around Najaf and Kerbela though this time we have confirmed with Sistani's office that the views expressed are authoritative and represent his views.

Attachments: CPA Cables 446, 449, 451, 452; Governance paper on the Caucuses

Coordination: None

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

POPULAR SELECTION OF THE TRANSITIONAL NATIONAL ASSEMBLY

The November 15 Agreement sets broad outlines for choosing a Transitional National Assembly. In order to make this process as transparent and representative as possible, the mechanics described in the agreement should be further elaborated and defined as discussed in the following sections.

The Organizing Committee

There are three stages related to the work of the Organizing Committees (OC):

- Formation of the OC.
- Solicitation and collection of nominations.
- Analysis of nominations and decisions on membership of the caucus.

a) Formation of the OC

Selection should be aimed at:

- ensuring that the OC has a connection and understanding of the Governorate;
- ensuring that OC members are representative of the community and that no group dominates the OC.

The first objective will be best met by appointing people who have a knowledge and understanding of the Governorate and the respective weight of interests in it. Persons selected should have a demonstrable link to the Governorate through, for example, a family background in the Governorate or current residence in the Governorate. It may also help to appoint individuals who have served in some public position or have held some other influential position in the Governorate.

To achieve the proper political balance within the OC, the selection process should be coordinated among the established nominating bodies (Governing Council, Provincial Council and the five largest localities). Since the OC will be selected by these different bodies, the selection process should be structured to provide the opportunity for ensuring the OC includes a balanced representation from the key groups in each province. A method for accomplishing this would be to sequence OC appointments as follows: first city councils appoint one member each, then PCs appoint their five members and, finally, the GC appoints their five. As the most authoritative body, the Governing Council will have the final say on the composition of the OC as it will be aware of the previous appointments and can use its appointments to address any imbalances that exist.

In order to help build acceptance and credibility for the OC members, the respective Councils should hold town hall meetings and other local consultation sessions as part

of the selection process. These public soundings will help inform the OC as to what sort of individual should be appointed.

Certain guidelines should be set to ensure there is a balanced representation on the OC. Such criteria should include:

- A reasonable distribution between organized political forces.
- At least 3 women on the OC.
- A reasonable balance between the main ethnic/religious groups.
- At least one representative from significant minority communities present in the Governorate (e.g. Christian, Turkomen).

The aim would be to ensure that the OC is not monopolized by any one group and is a close reflection of the make-up of the Province.

Another means of ensuring that only good quality candidates are put forward by the respective councils would be a stipulation that each appointee/ slate of nominees to the OC gather an absolute or a qualified majority of votes from his/her respective nominating council. Within a city council, a 50% vote would be needed to be elected, whereas in the Provincial Council and Governing Council, the five members should be voted for as a slate and require the votes of a qualified majority (i.e., a majority set at more than 50%). (GC will probably not like this, as they will prefer to let individual GC members have their say in their areas closest to home. I do however think we should push for it).

↳ To avoid conflicts of interest members of the OC should be barred from membership of the Caucus and the TNA.

b) Solicitation and collection of nominations

Once established the OC should ensure that the Caucus selection process is well understood in the Province and conducted in the most transparent and open manner. OCs should organize town hall meetings, consultations with key interest groups in the province and undertake a media campaign to ensure the broadest participation in the selection process. **The OC should specifically request nominations from all major groups in society.**

Applications for membership of the Caucus should be open to all members of the public who meet the criteria laid down in the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL). Candidates should complete an application form, collect 100 signatures of support and pay a small registration fee to show the seriousness of their intent. The application forms should be readily available and should be easily submitted. Use of the Public Food Distribution network may be a useful mechanism for ensuring wide-scale accessibility of the applications and collection of completed nominations.

The application form should require that each candidate put forward a personal statement of his/her political platform. In addition to the candidate's beliefs and goals, it should clearly identify any sponsoring group or organization that supports the candidacy as well as any relevant endorsements from specific groups. This will offer important information in the decision making process as the OC evaluates which candidates will provide the appropriate balance for each province.

Why? These people are electors not candidates - A CV should be sufficient

To facilitate this process, the OC should actively engage and interact with different influential societal actors to encourage the nominations and do so in a manner that channels the weight of each group behind a small number of candidates, hence increasing their chances of success.

c) Analysis of nominations and decisions on membership of caucuses

The OC, through the procedures described below, will determine which applications are accepted and who participates in the caucuses. However, individuals whose applicants are excluded by the OC are not necessarily excluded from the process and still have an opportunity to become members of the TNA. As described in the following section, the caucus can elect to the TNA candidates from outside the caucus as well as selecting those from within.

The key requirement in the decision making process is transparency. As long as there is confidence in the basis upon which decisions have been made and the decisions can be justified, complaints from those who have not made it into the caucus will be minimized.

This is exactly why the application process should be "open" political

Criteria for establishing the make-up of each provincial caucus will depend on the make-up of that province. The OC should at the outset establish broad parameters for the representation of each of the identified groups within the province. This should be done as generally and simply as possible, so as not to complicate the process, but help in the final justification of the decisions taken. For example, depending on the Province, an OC may seek to include representatives from the major religious groups, certain represented political parties, and other persons who represent significant constituencies within the Province. Criteria recommended for OC membership (noted above) provide a useful guideline. The OC should also set targets for including women and relevant minorities in the caucus. We would recommend that at least 20% of the caucus be women.

The OC should also outline publicly the actual decision-making mechanism within the OC. The following mechanism is recommended:

- Begin by narrowing the list of nominees through informal (not final) OC votes (basically, a process of narrowing the list of potential caucus members to a number that roughly reflects the caucus's size as established by the OC.)

- The names should be reviewed and adjusted in order to achieve the desired balance among provincial groups/organizations.
- From these names, a final list is compiled that would be put up for a vote. If this list receives an 11/15 majority, the Caucus would be set; if not, OC members would have to revise the list until it could gain the necessary 11/15 majority.

Caucus Size

The rough size of the caucus should be determined before selection begins. A uniformed size for each caucus (e.g. 350) could be set in the TAL or alternatively each OC could determine the appropriate size for its province. OC's should have flexibility in determining the ultimate size of the caucus. Caucuses be no larger than 500 and no smaller than 100 (higher?). The caucus should be large enough, however, to allow a balanced representation of the provinces, but small enough to ensure the process is manageable.

I'd say at least 200-
That would allow you to represent even relatively small groups (1/2 of pop.)

Baghdad

Baghdad, because of its size, should be treated as a special case. More than one caucus should be established. A combination of the nine districts into three (representing approximately two million people each) would be an appropriate method.

shouldn't that determination be up to the org (com-?)
why choose arbitrary limits beforehand?

Kurdish region

Caucuses should be formed in each of the three Governorates of the Kurdish region, as in the other parts of Iraq.

Management of the process

The whole process will need to be managed professionally to ensure that the work of the OC is facilitated to a successful conclusion. The OC should select a secretariat to manage the collection of nominations and carrying out of the caucus process. The International Foundation for Electoral Services (IFES) would be available to assist in training the secretariat and providing technical advice to the OC.

Does IFES have a template of best practices already?

Selection of the Transitional National Assembly

The TAL will establish the size of the Assembly, the breakdown of seats by Governorate and criteria for an individual's election. A suggested size for the TNA would be to have 1 delegate for every 100,000 Iraqi citizens. This would produce a TNA of about 260 delegates.

or one for every 65K would produce 400

The caucus will elect delegates to the TNA. The caucus may choose to nominate delegates from within the caucus. All caucus members are eligible to present themselves as candidates for the TNA. The caucus may also choose to nominate persons outside of the caucus for the TNA. Candidates outside the caucus would have to meet the same basic criteria required for membership of the caucus and in addition should obtain the sponsorship of at least 5 caucus members to be considered for election.

Once a Caucus is established, a chair or chair committee should be elected. The OC may choose to name a temporary chair or committee to oversee the election of a permanent chair.

There are a number of methods for electing TNA representatives that could be used. Listed below are three possible options:

1. Open Proportional List System (recommended by IFES): Within the Caucus members would form alliances to nominate lists of persons to be considered. The list could be of any size, but no larger than the total number of TNA seats to be filled plus two (to allow for alternates as necessary). **Requirements for nominating women to the lists should be defined. For example, it could be required that among the first three candidates on a list, at least one should be a woman, and among the top six candidates at least two should be women, and so on.**

Once lists are established, Caucus members would each choose one list to support. In addition, Caucus members would be able to cast their votes for any number of candidates within the list they chose. The distribution of mandates to each list would be based on a proportional system according to the share of votes each list received. The individuals selected from the list to fill the assigned mandates would be determined by the number of votes each received. For example, if a list receives two mandates, the persons receiving the first and second largest vote would be given those mandates. In cases of ties, the order of the list would prevail (e.g., if the first and second listed persons on the list receive the same amount of votes, the person listed first would be given the mandate.) In order to assure that open list voting does not eliminate women candidates from eligibility, the following rule could apply: when allocating candidates from a list, at least one of the first three elected members should be of a different gender, at least two should meet this criterion from the first six, and so on. The Caucus should also seek to ensure that minorities are also represented.

2. Single NonTransferable Vote (SNTV) (recommended by (b)(6)): This is the simplest and most transparent method, and has the advantage that it will allow minority groups and interests to win representation. It is reasonably proportional in its outcomes, but not as much so as PR or STV. (It does, however, require that parties and groups be somewhat disciplined in distributing their votes among several candidates, because excess votes for particular candidates are not transferable). Each voter casts only one vote for a nominated candidate. If the

governorate has ten seats in the TNA, then the top ten vote-getters are elected. The system is now used in Jordan and Taiwan. Certain quotas would need to be set to ensure proper representation of women. In addition, there might be some desire to provide for a run-off election if some of the top vote-getters do not pass a minimum threshold of votes in the caucus (say, 2 or 3 percent); although this provision would tend to reduce the proportionality of the outcome.

3. Single Transferable Vote (STV). A group of at least five caucus members may nominate a candidate. The candidate's name should be followed by the name of the nominators as well as the association/group the candidate represents, if appropriate. The names on the ballot are usually arranged in alphabetical order. Once all of the candidates have been nominated, each caucus member casts a vote for his/her first choice, as well as subsequent subsidiary preferences. This is done simply by writing 1, 2, 3, etc. beside the name of each candidate. Once voting is complete, counting is done by a mathematical formula that distributes all ballots according to their first preference. A quota for winning mandates is determined, and the candidates who get more first preference votes than the quota is elected. Ballots are then redistributed according to the next preference, in line with formula defined in the TAL. In this round, candidates receiving more than the established quota are elected. This process is continued until all mandates are filled. The counting procedures are slightly complicated, but are used in many countries. A computer software program has been devised to process the counting and could be available to each Caucus.

Transparency

To allow the greatest transparency and to the extent possible, the deliberations of the OC and the Caucuses should be open to the public and the media.

Role of the CPA

The CPA's supervisory role should be confined to providing logistical, administrative and security support either directly or through contracted elections experts. The CPA should facilitate the work of the OC but not engage in any of the substance. This will be ensured by guaranteeing that the CPA:

- Will not appoint members of the OC, the Caucus or the TNA.
- Will not influence the decisions of the OC or the Caucus in any way.
- Will not favor any particular group or individual in the process.
- Will respect the decisions of the Iraqi bodies charged with these tasks.

The CPA is available to arbitrate any matters, should the OC or Caucuses so request.

~~UNCLASSIFIED//~~

From: Coalition Provisional Authority (DMS)
Sent: 23:46:55 01/08/2004
To: 'SECDEF WASHINGTON DC'; 'SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC'; 'NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL'
WASHINGTON DC'
To Precedence: Immediate
Cc: 'IRAQ COLLECTIVE'
Cc Precedence: Immediate
Subject: LATEST DRAFT OF TRANSITIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
Message Type: Other-Organizational
Extended Auth: 20:43:00 01/08/2004 (UTC)
23:43:00 01/08/2004 (Client/Local)
Security: This message has been digitally signed and encrypted

~~UNCLASSIFIED//~~

MSGID/GENADMIN/CPA HQ/0452//
SUBJ/LATEST DRAFT OF TRANSITIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW//
GENTEXT/REMARKS/~~UNCLASSIFIED~~
PROG: 8 JANUARY 2004
DRAFTER: ~~(b)(6)~~ GOVERNANCE
AUTHORIZED: LBREMER
CLEARED: ~~(b)(6)~~

FROM: HEADQUARTERS COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY
TO: SECDEF WASHDC
SECSTATE WASHDC
NSC WASHDC
INFO: RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE

~~SENSITIVE~~

UNCLASSIFIED HQ CPA 452
E.O. 12958 DECL: 12/29/2003
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, IZ

SUBJECT: LATEST DRAFT OF TRANSITIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

~~(S)~~ SUMMARY. EARLIER THIS WEEK, THE GOVERNING COUNCIL'S COMMITTEE ON THE TRANSITIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW PASSED TO THE CPA ITS LATEST DRAFT. WHILE AN IMPROVEMENT OVER PAST EFFORTS, THE DRAFT STILL DOES NOT ADDRESS CERTAIN KEY ISSUES IN SIGNIFICANT DETAIL. END SUMMARY.

2. ~~(S)~~ THIS MONDAY, GC PRESIDENT ADNAN PACHACHI GAVE THE CPA THE LATEST DRAFT VERSION OF THE TRANSITIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW.

~~(b)(6)~~ NOTED THAT THIS DRAFT REFLECTED MANY OF THE DISCUSSIONS ON THE LAW THAT OCCURRED THROUGHOUT FEBRUARY. IN ITS BROAD OUTLINES, THE DRAFT LAW IS ACCEPTABLE. IT CONTAINS COMPROMISE LANGUAGE ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ISLAM AND THE STATE, RETAINS EXISTING ARRANGEMENTS IN KURDISTAN, INCLUDES BASIC GUARANTEES OF HUMAN RIGHTS, ESTABLISHES THREE INDEPENDENT BRANCHES OF GOVERNMENT (INCLUDING A 3-MAN PRESIDENCY), SETS FORTH A PROCESS FOR SELECTING THE TRANSITIONAL NATIONAL ASSEMBLY (TNA), AND PRESENTS A TIMETABLE FOR THE DRAFTING OF A PERMANENT CONSTITUTION.

3. ~~(S)~~ THAT SAID, THE LAW IS DEFICIENT IN A NUMBER OF CRITICAL AREAS. MOST IMPORTANTLY, IT FAILS TO DEFINE WITH GREATER PRECISION WHAT IT MEANS BY RETAINING THE "CURRENT STATUS" OF THE KURDISTAN REGION. BY NOT EXPLICITLY DELINEATING WHICH POWERS REMAIN SUBJECT TO CENTRAL AUTHORITY, IT WOULD THEREFORE ALLOW THE KURDS TO RETAIN A MAXIMALIST CONCEPTION OF THE "CURRENT STATUS" THAT COULD PROVIDE THE BASIS FOR SEPARATISM DOWN THE ROAD. THE LAW IS ALSO NOT SPECIFIC WITH REGARD TO THE OPERATION OF THE PRESIDENCY, THE BALANCE OF POWER BETWEEN THE LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE BRANCHES, THE PROCEDURES FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW, AND THE ELECTORAL SYSTEMS TO BE USED IN ELECTING THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION.

~~(S)~~ THE ENTIRE TEXT OF THE DRAFT TRANSITIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE

~~UNCLASSIFIED//~~

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

LAW CAN BE FOUND AT THE END OF THIS CABLE. HIGHLIGHTS OF THE LAW ARE BRIEFLY SUMMARIZED HERE BELOW:

-- ON KURDISTAN: "THE KURDISTAN REGION SHALL RETAIN ITS CURRENT STATUS DURING THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD."

-- ON RELIGION: "ISLAM IS THE OFFICIAL RELIGION OF THE STATE, AND SHALL BE CONSIDERED A "FUNDAMENTAL" SOURCE OF LEGISLATION. THIS LAW RESPECTS THE MUSLIM IDENTITY, OF THE MAJORITY OF THE PEOPLE OF IRAQ) COMPLETELY GUARANTEES FREEDOM OF OTHER RELIGIONS AS WELL AS THE) ACTICE OF THEIR RITUALS.

-- NO MENTION OF IRAQ'S NATIONAL IDENTITY.

-- ARABIC AS THE OFFICIAL LANGUAGE, "WITH CONSIDERATION FOR THE SPECIAL CURRENT STATUS OF THE REGION OF KURDISTAN."

-- EXPLICIT MENTION OF THE SECURITY AGREEMENT, WITH PROVISION FOR IT TO BE RATIFIED BY THE TRANSITIONAL NATIONAL ASSEMBLY DURING JUNE 2004.

-- INCLUSION OF THE CAUCUS PROCEDURES SPECIFIED IN THE NOVEMBER 15 AGREEMENT. HOWEVER, THE ORGANIZING COMMITTEE IN EACH GOVERNORATE "SHALL BE MONITORED BY REPRESENTATIVES OF THE U.N. WHENEVER) POSSIBLE."

-- REQUIREMENTS FOR MEMBERSHIP IN THE TNA, INCLUDING A BAN ON FORMER MEMBERS OF THE BA'ATH PARTY (LEVEL UNSPECIFIED) AND A REQUIREMENT THAT ALL CANDIDATES HOLD "AN ACADEMIC CERTIFICATE."

-- EXPLICIT MENTION THAT THE WORK OF THE GOVERNING COUNCIL "SHALL END" ON JUNE 30, 2004.)

-- INCLUSION OF GENERAL CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES (FEDERALISM, DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, SEPARATION OF POWERS, DECENTRALIZATION,) WOMEN'S RIGHTS) TO GUIDE THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION.

5. ~~(SEN)~~ COMMENT. THIS DRAFT SHOWS THAT THE GC HAS MADE SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS IN DRAFTING THE TRANSITIONAL LAW. NONETHELESS, THERE IS A) OF WORK THAT REMAINS - PARTICULARLY IN FLESHING OUT ESSENTIAL) DETAILS WHICH ARE CURRENTLY UNSPECIFIED. OUR ONGOING DISCUSSIONS WITH THE KURDS WILL ULTIMATELY PROVIDE A MORE DETAILED FRAMEWORK FOR DEALING WITH FEDERALISM IN THE INTERIM PERIOD. IN THE WEEKS AHEAD, WE WILL ALSO ENGAGE WITH THE GC ON THE HOST OF OTHER INSUFFICIENTLY DEFINED ISSUES NOTED ABOVE. END COMMENT.

DRAFT TRANSITIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

PART I: GENERAL PROVISIONS

6. ~~(SEN)~~ ARTICLE 1: THIS LAW IS ENTITLED "THE LAW FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE IRAQI STATE DURING THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD". THE PHRASE "THIS LAW" SHALL MEAN WHEREVER IT APPEARS WITHIN THIS LEGISLATION "THE LAW FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE IRAQI STATE DURING THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD."

7. ~~(SEN)~~ ARTICLE 2: THIS LAW IS APPLICABLE TO ALL IRAQI GOVERNORATES, AND SHALL NOT BE AMENDED DURING THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD.

8. ~~(SEN)~~ ARTICLE 3: IRAQ IS AN INDEPENDENT AND FULLY SOVEREIGN COUNTRY, WITH BAGHDAD AS ITS CAPITAL, WITH A DEMOCRATIC, PARLIAMENTARIAN, PLURALISTIC AND FEDERAL FROM OF GOVERNMENT. THE KURDISTAN REGION SHALL RETAIN ITS CURRENT STATUS DURING THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD.

~~(SEN)~~ ARTICLE 4: ISLAM IS THE OFFICIAL RELIGION OF THE STATE,) D SHALL BE CONSIDERED A "FUNDAMENTAL" SOURCE OF LEGISLATION. THIS

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~//

LAW RESPECTS THE MUSLIM IDENTITY, OF THE MAJORITY OF THE PEOPLE OF IRAQ, AND COMPLETELY GUARANTEES, FREEDOM OF OTHER RELIGIONS AS WELL AS THE PRACTICE OF THEIR RITUALS.

10. ~~(SBU)~~ ARTICLE 5: THE FLAG OF THE STATE AND THE STATE'S SYMBOL SHALL BE SPECIFIED BY LAW.

11. ~~(SBU)~~ ARTICLE 6: PRESENTLY ARABIC IS THE OFFICIAL LANGUAGE OF THE COUNTRY, WITH CONSIDERATION FOR THE SPECIAL CURRENT STATUS OF REGION OF KURDISTAN.

PART II: THE BASIC PRINCIPLES

12. ~~(SBU)~~ ARTICLE 7: THE PEOPLE ARE THE SOURCE OF ALL POWERS.

13. ~~(SBU)~~ ARTICLE 8: IRAQI CITIZENSHIP IS THE FOUNDATION OF THE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE HOMELAND.

14. ~~(SBU)~~ ARTICLE 9: IRAQIS ARE EQUAL IN RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES REGARDLESS OF GENDER, NATIONAL ORIGIN, SECT AND ETHNICITY, AND ALL SHALL BE EQUAL BEFORE THE LAW.

15. ~~(SBU)~~ ARTICLE 10: PUBLIC AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOMS ARE PROTECTED. THE PEOPLE SHALL HAVE THE RIGHT TO FREE EXPRESSION, ORGANIZING, ASSEMBLY, MOVEMENT AND PUBLISHING. THEY SHALL ALSO HAVE THE RIGHT TO DEMONSTRATE AND STRIKE ACCORDING TO THE LAW.

16. ~~(SBU)~~ ARTICLE 11: THE INDIVIDUAL SHALL HAVE THE RIGHT TO EDUCATION, HEALTH, WELFARE, WORK AND SECURITY, AND SHALL HAVE THE RIGHT FOR A FAIR PUBLIC HEARING.

17. ~~(SBU)~~ ARTICLE 12: THE VARIOUS ETHNICITIES ARE FRATERNIZED IN THE SERVICE OF THE HOMELAND, WITHIN A FEDERAL AND UNIFIED IRAQ.

18. ~~(SBU)~~ ARTICLE 13: THE JUDICIARY IS INDEPENDENT OF BOTH THE LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE, POWERS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PRINCIPLE OF SEPARATION POWERS.

19. ~~(SBU)~~ ARTICLE 14: PRIVATE PROPERTY IS PRESERVED AND SHALL NOT EXPROPRIATED FROM ITS OWNER EXCEPT FOR THE PUBLIC GOOD, IN RETURN FOR A FAIR AND PROMPT COMPENSATION. SUCH EXPROPRIATION SHALL BE REGULATED BY A LAW. IRAQI CITIZENS SHALL HAVE THE RIGHT TO OWN, PROPERTY IN ALL PARTS OF IRAQ.

20. ~~(SBU)~~ ARTICLE 15: THE PRIMARY MISSION OF THE ARMED FORCES SHALL BE THE SAFEGUARDING OF THE INTEGRITY OF THE COUNTRY'S TERRITORIES, AND SHALL NOT BE PERMITTED TO ENGAGE IN POLITICS.

21. ~~(SBU)~~ ARTICLE 16: THE BEARING OF ARMS FOR SELF-DEFENSE SHALL NOT BE PERMITTED, UNLESS A LICENSE IS ISSUED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE LAW.

22. ~~(SBU)~~ ARTICLE 17: NO TAX, NO CRIME NOR PUNISHMENT WITHOUT A LAW.

23. ~~(SBU)~~ ARTICLE 18: A) IRAQI CITIZENS SHALL NOT BE DEPRIVED OF THEIR IRAQI CITIZENSHIP; B) POLITICAL REFUGEES SHALL NOT BE EXTRADITED; C) PHYSICAL OR PSYCHOLOGICAL TORTURE OF ANY INDIVIDUALS SUSPECTED OF A VIOLATION, A MISDEMEANOR OR CRIME, SHALL NOT BE PERMITTED.

24. ~~(SBU)~~ A SEPARATE ARTICLE: SECURITY ARRANGEMENT. ACCORDING TO THE ARTICLE OF THE AGREEMENT SIGNED ON NOV.15,2003 BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT OF THE GOVERNING COUNCIL AND THE ADMINISTRATOR OF THE COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY, SECURITY AGREEMENTS SHALL BE REACHED BETWEEN THE GOVERNING COUNCIL AND THE COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY, ON THE CONDITION THAT SAID AGREEMENTS ARE TO BE SIGNED BEFORE THE END OF MARCH, 2004. THESE AGREEMENTS SHALL BE SUBMITTED TO THE TRANSITIONAL NATIONAL ASSEMBLY FOR RATIFICATION, DURING THE MONTH OF JUNE 2004.

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~//

PART III: THE TRANSITIONAL LEGISLATIVE POWER

25. ~~(SNU)~~ ARTICLE 19: THE STATE OF IRAQ, DURING THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD SHALL HAVE, A TRANSITIONAL LEGISLATIVE POWER NAMED "THE TRANSITIONAL NATIONAL ASSEMBLY". AMONG ITS PRIMARY FUNCTION IS THE LEGISLATION OF LAWS, AND THE OVERSIGHT OF THE WORK OF THE EXECUTIVE POWER.

26. ~~(SNU)~~ ARTICLE 20: THE TRANSITIONAL NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SHALL BE MPRISED OF A NUMBER OF MEMBERS, REPRESENTING ALL IRAQI GOVERNORATES WHEREBY EACH MEMBER REPRESENTS, ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND CITIZENS ACCORDING TO THE GENERAL CENSUS.

27. ~~(SNU)~~ ARTICLE 21:

-- A) A COMMITTEE CALLED "THE ORGANIZING COMMITTEE" SHALL BE FORMED IMMEDIATELY IN EACH OF THE IRAQI GOVERNORATES. THIS COMMITTEE SHALL BE COMPOSED OF FIFTEEN (15) MEMBERS, FIVE OF WHOM SHALL BE APPOINTED BY THE GOVERNING COUNCIL AND FIVE SHALL BE APPOINTED BY THE GOVERNORATE COUNCIL, AND FIVE SHALL BE APPOINTED BY THE LOCAL COUNCILS OF THE FIVE LARGEST CITIES IN EACH GOVERNORATE, ONE MEMBER FOR EVERY ONE OF THESE COUNCILS.

-- B) IN THIS COMMITTEE DECISIONS SHALL BE ADOPTED BY A MAJORITY VOTE OF AT LEAST ELEVEN (11) VOTES.

-- C) MEMBERS OF THIS COMMITTEE SHALL NOT BE PERMITTED TO BE CANDIDATES TO THE TRANSITIONAL NATIONAL ASSEMBLY.

28. ~~(SNU)~~ ARTICLE 22: AT A SPECIFIED AND ANNOUNCED DATE, THE ORGANIZING COMMITTEE SHALL RECEIVE APPLICATIONS FOR CANDIDACY TO THE TRANSITIONAL NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, FROM POLITICAL PARTIES, INSTITUTIONS OF CIVIL SOCIETY, SUCH AS FEDERATIONS, VOCATIONAL AND CIVIL UNIONS, UNIVERSITY FACULTIES, TRIBAL AND RELIGIOUS GROUPS, AS WELL AS FROM INDEPENDENCE. MEMBERS OF THE GOVERNING COUNCIL MAY ALSO DECLARE THEIR CANDIDACY TO THE TRANSITIONAL NATIONAL ASSEMBLY.

29. ~~(SNU)~~ ARTICLE 23: A CANDIDATE FOR THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SHALL MEET THE FOLLOWING CONDITIONS:

- 1. BE AT LEAST 30 YEARS OF AGE;
- 2. HAS NOT BEEN A MEMBER OF THE DISSOLVED BAA'TH PARTY OR THE FORMER OPPRESSIVE APPARATUS OR FROM THOSE WHO PARTICIPATED IN THE REPRESSION OF THE CITIZENS.
- 3. HAS NOT ACCUMULATED WEALTH ILLEGALLY AT THE EXPENSE OF THE PEOPLE AND THE PUBLIC FUNDS.
- 4. HAS NOT BEEN CONVICTED OF A CRIME OF HONOR AND SHOULD HAVE A GOOD REPUTATION.
- 5. HOLDS AN ACADEMIC CERTIFICATE.

30. ~~(SNU)~~ ARTICLE 24: THE ORGANIZING COMMITTEE, IN COOPERATION WITH THE COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY, SHALL LOOK INTO THE CANDIDATES ELIGIBILITY AS SET FORTH IN ARTICLE TWENTY THREE ABOVE, IN ORDER TO AUTHENTICATE THEIR ELIGIBILITY FOR CANDIDACY. THE COMMITTEE SHALL PROVIDE THE OPPORTUNITY FOR APPEAL ACCORDING TO REGULATIONS SET SPECIFICALLY FOR THIS REASON.

31. ~~(SNU)~~ ARTICLE 25: THE WORK OF THE ORGANIZING COMMITTEE SHALL BE UNDER JUDICIAL OVERSIGHT AND SHALL BE MONITORED BY REPRESENTATIVES OF THE U.N. WHENEVER POSSIBLE.

32. ~~(SNU)~~ ARTICLE 26: THE ORGANIZING COMMITTEE SHALL WORK TO LIMIT THE NUMBER OF CANDIDATES TO A REASONABLE LEVEL ACCORDING TO SPECIFIC STANDARDS SET BY THE COMMITTEE FOR THIS PURPOSE. AMONG THESE STANDARDS ARE THE ELIGIBILITY CONDITIONS FOR NOMINATION AS SPECIFIED IN ARTICLE TWENTY-THREE ABOVE. IN ADDITION THE COMMITTEE SHALL WORK

TO ACHIEVE A BALANCE BETWEEN THE VARIOUS GROUPS.

33. ~~(SBU)~~ ARTICLE 27: THE ORGANIZING COMMITTEE SHALL CALL THE ELIGIBLE CANDIDATES TO A CAUCUS; TO BE HELD AT THE GOVERNORATES CENTER, ON A DATE SPECIFIED AND ANNOUNCE BY THE COMMITTEE. AT THIS CAUCUS THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE GOVERNORATE FOR THE TRANSITIONAL NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SHALL BE SELECTED, UNDER THE OVERSIGHT OF THE COMMITTEE ITSELF, AND THOSE ASSISTING FROM AMONG IRAQI JURISTS AND DELEGATES OF THE COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY AND MONITORS FROM THE UNITED NATIONS. THE NUMBER OF THESE REPRESENTATIVES SHALL BE IN ACCORDANCE WITH WHAT WAS STATED IN ARTICLE TWENTY.

34. ~~(SBU)~~ ARTICLE 28: THE TRANSITIONAL NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, AS COMPRISED OF THE REPRESENTATIVES SELECTED ACCORDING TO ARTICLE TWENTY-SEVEN ABOVE, SHALL CONVENE ITS FIRST SESSION, NO LATER THAN MAY 31, 2004.

35. ~~(SBU)~~ ARTICLE 29: THE TRANSITIONAL NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SHALL SET UP ITS OWN BYLAWS, AND ITS SESSIONS SHALL BE PUBLIC, EXCEPT WHEN REQUIRED BY NECESSITY, AND ACCORDING TO THE ARTICLES OF ITS BY-LAWS.

36. ~~(SBU)~~ ARTICLE 30:

-- A) THE TRANSITIONAL NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SHALL ELECT FROM AMONG ITS MEMBERS A COUNCIL OF PRESIDENCY COMPOSED OF THREE MEMBERS TO UNDERTAKE THE SUPREME AFFAIRS OF THE COUNTRY. THIS COUNCIL SHALL OVERSEE THE WORK OF THE MINISTRIES.

-- B) THE TRANSITIONAL NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SHALL RATIFY DRAFT LAWS INCLUDING THE LAW OF THE BUDGET, AS SUBMITTED BY THE CABINET AFTER THE ENDORSEMENT OF THE COUNCIL OF PRESIDENCY.

-- C) LAWS SHALL BE DECREED IN THE NAME OF THE COUNCIL OF PRESIDENCY.

37. ~~(SBU)~~ ARTICLE 31: MEMBERS OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SHALL NOT BE QUESTIONED REGARDING OPINIONS THEY EXPRESS WHILE EXERCISING THEIR OFFICIAL DUTIES DURING THE SESSION, AND MAY NOT BE LEGALLY PROSECUTED, ALSO THEY MAY NOT BE ARRESTED DURING THE SESSION OF THE ASSEMBLY WITHOUT ITS PERMISSION EXCEPT WHEN CAUGHT IN THE ACT OF COMMITTING A CRIME. WHEN THE ASSEMBLY IS NOT IN SESSION, A MEMBER MAY NOT BE ARRESTED WITHOUT THE PERMISSION OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE ASSEMBLY EXCEPT WHEN CAUGHT IN THE ACT.

PART IV: THE TRANSITIONAL EXECUTIVE POWER

38. ~~(SBU)~~ ARTICLE 32: THE COUNCIL OF PRESIDENCY SHALL APPOINT A PRIME MINISTER. IT SHALL ALSO APPOINT MINISTERS ACCORDING TO THE RECOMMENDATION OF THE PRIME MINISTER. THE CABINET IS REQUIRED TO WIN THE VOTE OF CONFIDENCE OF THE TRANSITIONAL NATIONAL ASSEMBLY BEFORE TAKING OFFICE.

39. ~~(SBU)~~ ARTICLE 33: THE CABINET SHALL TAKE OFFICE, AS THE EXECUTIVE POWER, NO LATER THAN JUNE 30, 2004. THE CABINET AND THE TRANSITIONAL NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SHALL CONSTITUTE A TRANSITIONAL IRAQI GOVERNMENT THAT ENJOYS FULL SOVEREIGNTY AND QUALIFIES FOR INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION.

40. ~~(SBU)~~ ARTICLE 34: ON THE DATE MENTIONED IN ARTICLE THIRTY THREE ABOVE, ALL THE POWERS OF THE COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY SHALL BE TRANSFERRED TO THE TRANSITIONAL IRAQI GOVERNMENT. WITH THIS TRANSFER THE COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY SHALL BE DISSOLVED AND THE WORK OF THE GOVERNING COUNCIL SHALL END.

41. ~~(SBU)~~ ARTICLE 35: THE CABINET AS COMPOSED OF THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE MINISTERS SHALL BE ACCOUNTABLE TO THE TRANSITIONAL NATIONAL ASSEMBLY. THIS ASSEMBLY SHALL HAVE THE RIGHT TO WITHDRAW CONFIDENCE FROM THE CABINET OR ANY OF ITS MEMBERS.

42. ~~(SBU)~~ ARTICLE 36: THE CABINET'S RESPONSIBILITY IS A JOINT

RESPONSIBILITY.

43. ~~(SBU)~~ ARTICLE 37: THE CABINET SHALL DRAFT FOR ITS WORK A SET OF BY-LAWS, AND IT SHALL UNDERTAKE THE ISSUANCE OF NECESSARY PROCEDURES FOR IMPLEMENTING EXISTING LAWS. IT MAY SUBMIT TO THE TRANSITIONAL NATIONAL ASSEMBLY DRAFT LAWS FOR LEGISLATION AFTER THE APPROVAL OF THE COUNCIL OF PRESIDENCY. AS TO THE APPOINTMENT OF OFFICIALS OF SPECIAL RANK AND THE APPOINTMENT OF DEPUTY MINISTERS AND AMBASSADORS, IT SHALL BE ACHIEVED THROUGH NOMINATIONS OF THE CONCERNED MINISTRY AND THE APPROVAL OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTRIES AND THE RATIFICATION OF THE COUNCIL OF PRESIDENCY. IN ALL CASES, DECISIONS OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS MUST HAVE ENDORSEMENT OF THE COUNCIL OF PRESIDENCY.

PART V: JUDICIAL POWER

44. ~~(SBU)~~ ARTICLE 38: THE JUDICIARY IS INDEPENDENT AND NO POWER SHALL BE ABOVE IT EXCEPT BY LAW.

45. ~~(SBU)~~ ARTICLE 39: THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM SHALL BE ORGANIZED BY LAW.

46. ~~(SBU)~~ ARTICLE 40: A JUDGE MAY NOT BE DISMISSED EXCEPT THROUGH A DECISION OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS AND THE ENDORSEMENT OF THE COUNCIL OF PRESIDENCY ACCORDING TO A RECOMMENDATION FROM THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL.

47. ~~(SBU)~~ ARTICLE 41: A COURT SHALL BE FORMED UNDER THE NAME: "THE SUPREME COURT" IN ACCORDANCE WITH A LAW ISSUED FOR THIS PURPOSE TO LOOK INTO THE COMPLIANCE OF LAWS AND REGULATIONS WITH THE ARTICLES OF THIS LAW.

PART VI: THE PERMANENT PHASE

48. ~~(SBU)~~ ARTICLE 42: THE TRANSITIONAL NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SHALL ESTABLISH AN ELECTIONS LAW AND A LAW FOR THE PRESS AND A LAW FOR GATHERING IN ADDITION TO OTHER LAWS.

49. ~~(SBU)~~ ARTICLE 43: ELECTIONS SHALL PROCEED ACCORDING TO AN ELECTIONS LAW ESTABLISHED BY THE TRANSITIONAL NATIONAL ASSEMBLY FOR THE PURPOSE OF FORMING THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE WHICH WILL BE COMMISSIONED TO DRAFT A PERMANENT CONSTITUTION ON THE CONDITION THAT SUCH ELECTIONS SHALL BE HELD NO LATER THAN MARCH 15, 2005. SUCH DRAFT SHALL INCLUDE THE GENERAL BASIC PRINCIPLES AND PROVISIONS STATED IN PART I AND II OF THIS LAW IN ADDITION TO THE FOLLOWING:

- 1. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A DEMOCRATIC PLURALISTIC FEDERAL SYSTEM WITHIN A UNIFIED IRAQ THAT ORGANIZES THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE KURDISTAN REGION AND THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT.
- 2. GUARANTEEING THE FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS, PUBLIC OR PRIVATE.
- 3. SAFEGUARDING THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS OF THE HUMAN BEING.
- 4. TO ESTABLISH THE PRINCIPLE OF SEPARATION OF THE THREE POWERS, THE LEGISLATIVE, THE EXECUTIVE AND THE JUDICIAL POWERS.
- 5. TO DEFINE THE DECENTRALIZED AUTHORITIES FOR THE GOVERNORATES NOT INCLUDED IN THE FEDERAL SYSTEM.
- 6. TO GUARANTEE WOMEN'S RIGHTS IN POLITICAL PARTICIPATION AND OTHER AREAS IN WAYS THAT EQUALS THE RIGHTS OF MEN WITHIN THE ENTIRE SOCIETY.

50. ~~(SBU)~~ ARTICLE 44: THE DRAFT OF THE PERMANENT CONSTITUTION SHALL BE PUBLISHED FOR THE PURPOSE OF CONDUCTING GENERAL NATIONAL DEBATE. ITS FINAL TEXT SHALL BE SUBMITTED FOR RATIFICATION THROUGH A POPULAR REFERENDUM.

~~(SBU)~~ ARTICLE 45: AFTER THE ADOPTION OF THE PERMANENT CONSTITUTION, DIRECT GENERAL ELECTIONS FOR THE LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

SHALL BE HELD ACCORDING TO THAT CONSTITUTION NO LATER THAN DECEMBER 31, 2005.

52. ~~(SBN)~~ ARTICLE 46: THIS ELECTED LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY AT THE ABOVE MENTIONED DATE SHALL APPOINT THE NEW IRAQI GOVERNMENT THAT SHALL ASSUME POWER.

53. ~~(SBN)~~ ARTICLE 47: AT SUCH TIME, THIS LAW FOR THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD SHALL CEASE TO APPLY.

BREMER

//

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

Φ Gov.

Tashed to Gov.
on 25 Nov

In Name of Allah Most Merciful, Most Compassionate.

Date: November 21st, 2003

No : 122

Your Excellency Mr. Bremer, President of the Civilian Authority in Iraq
Warm Greetings:

We represent the Central Council of Iraqi and Arab Tribes Sheikhs that was established in Baghdad, Iraq in 2002, 6 months before the war. The main objective of the Council is to unify the position of the Iraqi and Arab tribes to better serve the people of Iraq. The Council kept growing until its membership reached 1500 tribal leaders and Sheikhs which is more than 80% of the Iraqi people with all its sects, Kurd and Arab National minorities as well as ethnic groups and other religious groups. The Council has branches in all governorates of Iraq and it has worked since the end of the war on April 9th, 2003 towards the stability of Iraq and towards the cooperation to rebuild a Free, democratic Iraq.

Mr. Bremer,

We seek your approval to meet with a delegation from our Council and to listen of our views, our opinions and our suggestions that are aimed to serve all of us in order to achieve freedom and Independence for Iraq.

Assalam Alei-Kum

Seal of the Council of
Iraqi and Arab tribes
sheikhs

Sheikh Ali Ibrahim Faris Hamad Al Mhanna
Secretary General

The Iftar was attended by

1. Sheikh Saheb Ali Hammood
Secretary general of Central Euphrates Sheikhs Council
2. Sheikh Dr. Ali Khlalifa Mohamed
Assistant Secretary General
3. Sheikh Jamal Shihab Hamad
Director of relations.
4. Sheikh Faysal Ghazi (illegible)
Director of Public Relations
5. Sheikh Munadel (illegible)

Sheikh Dr. Ali Khlalifa Mohamed phone # : (5561520) (5565142)

On the back side of the document are handwritten notes of Amb.
Bremer's speech

of Governance - others

Polling in Iraq

December 2003
Through
15 June 2003

Schedule

- Polls from INR/R and IRI this month
 - INR/R within the week
 - IRI results about 26 December
- Results twice-monthly January-June
- 16-city Gallup results end of January
- National survey from Oxford early spring
- New question results 13 January
- Last results available to CPA 15 June

Content

- 11 Polls of 20 QQ each not yet written
- 8 political QQ (perhaps 4 trend line)
- 7 security QQ (perhaps 3 trend line)
 - Trend line QQ perhaps every other poll
- 5 for other issues

Constraints

- No rapid reaction capacity
- Absorbs identified polling capacity in Iraq
 - Limits ability to measure IMN audiences
 - Some questions will go unanswered
- Communications a problem
 - 4 additional MCI phones useful

Resource Requirement

- 8 polls from IACSS @ \$35K = \$280K
- 3 polls from ICRSS @ \$45K = 135K

Sub-Total future polls

\$415K

Remaining from current effort

~240K

*With approved concept will approach OTI
Misc. Software, phones, etc. for INR/R*

Organizational Requirements

- INR/R present as required
- QQ deadlines are absolute
- Need translation support here
- Senior level determinations on QQ:
 - Roman Martinez for governance
 - Who decides on security QQ?
 - Who decides on remaining QQ?
- Comms support for researchers useful



Total Population: ca. 25.9 million

(Source: UN/WFP, January 2003)

Sample Population (15+): ca. 14.5 million

(Source: UN/WFP, January 2003 and 1997 Census)

3,244 Completed Interviews
(face-to-face in respondent's home)

4 Team Leaders

7 Supervisors

35 Interviewers


129 Sampling Points

Fieldwork: October-November 2003

of government - other

Q1 – Life Areas

‘For each of the following, please indicate if they are very important, somewhat important, somewhat important, not very important, or not at all important in your life’



Oxford Research International, National Survey of Iraq 2003
N=3,244


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IR03q1.HCX

Q9 – Trust in Other People

‘Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you have to be very careful in dealing with people?’

Most people can be trusted
11%



You have to be very careful in dealing with people
89%




Oxford Research International, National Survey of Iraq 2003
Valid N=3,102

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IR03q9.HCX

Q21 – Groups

'Most people say they feel close to one or more groups in society, other than their own family. Some people feel close to their local community, others to a religious or ethnic group or to the nation from where they come. How about you? Which groups, if any, do you feel close to? You may tell me up to three groups.'




Oxford Research International, National Survey of Iraq 2003
Valid N=2,267

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IR03Q21.HCX

Q18 – Trust in Organisations

'I am going to name a number of organisations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or none at all?'




Oxford Research International, National Survey of Iraq 2003
N=3,244

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IR0318.HCX

Q18 – Trust in Organisations – Mean Scores

'I am going to name a number of organisations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or none at all?'




Oxford Research International, National Survey of Iraq 2003
N=3,244

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IR03q/8m.HCY

Q3 – Best Thing in the Past 12 Months

*-Open-Ended Question/Free Response-
‘Thinking back over the past 12 months, what was the best thing which happened to you?’*



Oxford Research International, National Survey of Iraq 2003
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
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Q4 – Worst Thing in the Past 12 Months

-Open-Ended Question/Free Response-

'And what was the worst thing which happened to you in the past 12 months?'




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Q5 – Best Thing in the Next 12 Months

*-Open-Ended Question/Free Response-
‘Thinking ahead to the next 12 months, what would be the best thing which could happen to you?’*




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IR03q5.HCX

Q6 – Worst Thing in the Next 12 Months

*-Open-Ended Question/Free Response-
‘What would be the worst thing that could happen to you in the next 12 months?’*




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IR03q6.HCX

Q17A – Priorities in the Next 12 Months

'I am going to read some ideas about priorities for the next 12 months. Please tell me which one is your first priority, your second priority and your third priority.'



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Valid N=3,213

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IR03q17a HCX

Q19 – Interest in Politics – By Gender

‘How interested would you say you are in politics?’

- Very interested
- Somewhat interested
- Not very interested
- Not at all interested



Men

Mean Score=2.4
Min=1, Max=4
Std. Deviation=1.07

Women

Mean Score=2.0
Min=1, Max=4
Std. Deviation=1.00




Oxford Research International, National Survey of Iraq 2003
Valid N=3,123

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IR03q19g.HCX

Q15 – Political Action

'Now I'd like you to look at this card. I'm going to read out some different forms of political action that people can take, and I'd like you to tell me, for each one, whether you have actually done any of these things, whether you might do it or would never, under any circumstances, do it.'




Oxford Research International, National Survey of Iraq 2003
N=3,244

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IR03q15.HCX

Q12 – Inclusive Government

‘How important or unimportant is it for you that the people who govern Iraq represent all the main groups in Iraqi society?’



Mean Score=3.5
Min=1, Max=4
Std. Deviation=0.86




Oxford Research International, National Survey of Iraq 2003
Valid N=3,012

IR05q12.HCX

Q11A – Forms of Government

‘People have different ideas about what Iraq needs at this time. How about you? How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements?’



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N=3,244

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IR03q11a.HCX

of guidance - other

[illegible]

January 2004

January 2004							February 2004						
S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S
4	5	6	7	8	9	10	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
11	12	13	14	15	16	17	8	9	10	11	12	13	14
18	19	20	21	22	23	24	15	16	17	18	19	20	21
25	26	27	28	29	30	31	22	23	24	25	26	27	28

Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday	Sat/Sun
			January 1, 2004		
5	6	7	8	9	10
	INR SENDS QUESTIONS FOR FEB		**CPA SENDS COMMENTS TO INR FOR FEB 4 IACSS POLL QUESTI		
12	13	14	15	16	17
	IACSS JANUARY 13 Poll Results	Final Arabic translation of Februar			
19	20	21	22	23	24
	INR SENDS QQ TO CPA FOR FEB26 ICRSS POLL			***CPA SENDS COMMENTS TO INR FOR FEB 26 ICRSS POLL	
26	27	28	29	30	31
	Current ICRSS Poll Results Due		Final Arabic QQ to ICRSS FOR Feb		

February 2004

February 2004							March 2004						
S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
8	9	10	11	12	13	14	8	9	10	11	12	13	14
15	16	17	18	19	20	21	15	16	17	18	19	20	21
22	23	24	25	26	27	28	22	23	24	25	26	27	28
29							29	30	31				

Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday	Sat/Sun
					February
2	3	4	5	6	
		IACSS-FEBRUARY 4 Poll Results		INR SENDS QQ FOR MARCH 1 PQ	
9	10	11	12	13	
16	17	18	19	20	
Final Arabic Translation for March	INR SENDS QQ FOR MARCH 21 P		***CPA COMMENTS TO INR ON IACSS MARCH 21 POLL QUESTION		
23	24	25	26	27	
			IACSS Feb 26 Poll Results Due	Final Arabic Questionnaire due for IACSS March 21 poll	

March 2004

March 2004

March 2004						
S	M	T	W	T	F	S
1	2	3	4	5	6	7
8	9	10	11	12	13	14
15	16	17	18	19	20	21
22	23	24	25	26	27	28
29	30	31				

Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday	Sat/Sun
1 IACSS MARCH 1 Poll Results Due	2	3	4	5	6
8 INR SENDS QQ FOR APRIL 8 IAC	9	10	11 ***CPA COMMENTS TO INR ON IACSS APRIL 8 POLL QUESTIONS	12	13
15	16	17	18 Final Arabic Translation for IACSS April 8 Poll QQ INR SENDS QQ FOR APR 27 ICSS	19	20
22 ***CPA COMMENTS TO INR ON I	23	24	25	26	27
29	30	31			28 FINAL ARABIC TRANSLATION IC

[illegible]

May 2004

May 2004							June 2004						
S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S
2	3	4	5	6	7	8	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
9	10	11	12	13	14	15	8	9	10	11	12	13	14
16	17	18	19	20	21	22	15	16	17	18	19	20	21
23	24	25	26	27	28	29	22	23	24	25	26	27	28
30	31						29	30	31				

Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday	Sat/Sun
					May 1
3	4	5	6	7	8
Final Arabic Translation for IACSS May 24 poll AND ICRSS June 1					
IACSS May 3 Poll Results Due					9
10	11	12	13	14	15
					16
17	18	19	20	21	22
INR SENDS JUNE 15 QQ TO CPA		***CPA COMMENTS TO INR ON JUNE 15 QQ			
					23
24	25	26	27	28	29
IACSS-May 24 Poll Results Due Final Arabic QQ to IACSS June 1					
					30
31					

June 2004

June 2004							July 2004						
S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S
6	7	8	9	10	11	12	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
13	14	15	16	17	18	19	11	12	13	14	15	16	17
20	21	22	23	24	25	26	18	19	20	21	22	23	24
27	28	29	30				25	26	27	28	29	30	31

Monday		Tuesday		Wednesday		Thursday		Friday		Sat/Sun	
		June 1 ICRSS June 1 Poll Results Due									
7		8		9		10		11		12	
14		15 BACSS June 15 Poll Results Due		16		17		18		19	
21		22		23		24		25		26	
28		29		30							

STRENGTHENING FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT IN THE IRAQI PUBLIC SECTOR

*of government
other*

Public sector resources are ultimately the property of a nation's citizens. For too many years, the Iraqi people suffered while their nation's wealth was squandered by a dictator and his ruling clique. The transition to a sovereign, democratic Iraq offers the opportunity and obligation to ensure that Iraqi public sector resources are used for the benefit of the Iraqi people.

Appropriate and efficient use of public sector resources requires more than leaders of good will. It requires the introduction of strong governmental financial management systems as well as staff capacity to operate these systems.

Early next year, we will introduce a new accounting reporting system – the Financial Management Information System (FMIS). FMIS will allow Iraqi ministries to keep track of their revenues and expenditures throughout the country. The Financial Management Information System will increase the transparency and credibility of the budget by introducing economic and functional classifications in line with international standards. When installation is complete, FMIS will enable ministries to provide budgetary information by organizational function, functional classification, economic classification and source of financing at the line agency and municipal level.

FMIS is an automated networked accounting and budget execution system with on-line access and real-time updated centralized database for all Treasury offices and Ministries (i.e., spending organizations) in Iraq. It is based on: (1) all monies paid into or out of Treasury Bank Accounts and (2) all payments and revenues recorded in the Treasury System. FMIS will enable Iraq to establish strong fiscal controls as well as improved cash and debt management.

Incorporating international accounting standards, FMIS will record payment and revenue transactions input by spending organizations. The FMIS will print checks in Baghdad and Governorates on behalf of ministries. The FMIS will provide instant information to on-line users, and timely and varied budget and Accounting financial reports.

The FMIS system will first be introduced at the Ministry of Finance in Baghdad and then be expanded to all government ministries and governorates. By the fall, FMIS will allow the government to keep track of how it spends its revenue throughout the country. FMIS will also allow government offices outside of Baghdad to convey their resource needs in an organized way to ministry headquarters.

We will provide training for the staffs of Iraqi ministries in the operation and management of the FMIS system. This will be a key component in a broader training effort to foster civil service development. We are also working with the World Bank to provide procurement training. We will work with USAID and the UK's Department for International Development to further develop staff capacity in financial management.

In a related effort, CPA is sponsoring a project that will set up an Iraqi Chart of Accounts. This will establish internationally-accepted, IMF-endorsed accounting standards for the Iraqi public sector. The adoption of these standards will facilitate sustained donor support, including that of International Financial Institutions. It should also fuel broad-based growth by encouraging increased private sector investment, including foreign direct investment.



COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY
BAGHDAD

governance

INFO MEMO

December 20, 2003

FOR: THE ADMINISTRATOR

FROM: (b)(6)

SUBJECT: Increasing the Participation of Women in Ministries

When the GC appointed the ministers, they acknowledged that having only one woman in the cabinet was insufficient. They promised at that time to appoint women in the role of deputy ministers. Now is the time to make that happen. You should remind the ministers:

- Women are severely under-represented in the Cabinet.
- Women bring a unique perspective to public policy. They too suffered under Saddam but in different ways than men. They have creative solutions to offer to Iraq's problems.
- Iraq has many well-educated and articulate women who can serve. Under a meritocracy, there would be more women in senior positions.
- In many ministries, the majority of the staff are women but they have not been rewarded for service with promotions to senior positions.
- Ministers should nominate women to be their deputies and encourage the Governing Council to approve these nominations.

(b)(6)

From: Kennedy, Patrick F (USUN) [kennedyPF@state.gov]
Sent: Tuesday, January 20, 2004 4:18 PM
To: Executive Secretary
Cc: (b)(6)
Subject: FW: Press Conference with Ambassador Bremer and Ambassador Greenstock (1/19/2004)



USUN PR 008.doc
(34 KB)

Handwritten: & Governance
1/19 UN mtg.

> -----Original Message-----
> From: USUN, PRESS
> Sent: Monday, January 19, 2004 7:11 PM
> Subject: Press Conference with Ambassador Bremer and Ambassador
> Greenstock (1/19/2004)
>
> United States Mission to the United Nations
> Office of Press and Public Affairs
> 799 United Nations Plaza
> New York, NY 10017
> (212) 415-4050
> All USUN Press Releases are available via our website at
> <http://www.un.int/usa/>
>
> <<USUN PR 008.doc>>
> USUN PRESS RELEASE #08 (04) January 19,
> 2004
> FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
>
> Press Conference with Ambassador L. Paul Bremer, Administrator for the
> Coalition Provisional Authority, and Ambassador Jeremy Greenstock,
> Special Envoy to Iraq for the United Kingdom, after their Meeting with
> the Secretary General, January 19, 2004
>
> Ambassador Bremer: First of all I'd like to thank the Secretary
> General for taking the initiative in calling this meeting today.
> We've had a very good, open and candid exchange. All of the members
> of the Governing Council participated in the very free flowing
> discussion. And we had an opportunity in the Governing Council, in
> particular, to review the significant progress in Iraq in the area of
> security, in the area of the economy, which is now showing growth, and
> of course on the political process, where the Governing Council
> described the work that's being done to write the basic law, which Dr.
> Pachachi just referred to. And of course we discussed the
> implementation of the November 15 agreement, which provides for the
> prospectus for a freely elected democratic government in Iraq by the
> end of 2005. We had, I think, broad agreement on the importance of
> the UN resuming its role in Iraq. And we talked about the need to
> reestablish a partnership with the Iraqis in the political process by which Iraqis will
> regain their full sovereignty by June 30 this year.
>
> The Secretary General noted that he is anxious to resume that role,
> and has established what he calls a beachhead with his acting Special
> Representative, who will be based in Cyprus and available to work in
> Baghdad. Together with the Governing Council, we in the CPA
> reiterated our offer to give all possible support to ensure the
> security of UN personnel when they return to Iraq. And I might say
> here that members of the Iraqi Governing Council expressed genuine
> pride when they described the role that Iraqi security forces are already playing in

security.

>
> As you've heard this morning, the Governing Council and the Coalition
> encouraged the Secretary General to send a technical team to Iraq to
> examine the process of implementing the November 15 agreement,
> specifically the question of the feasibility of elections. The
> Secretary General has agreed, seriously and with urgency, to consider
> this request, and as he mentioned there will be further technical
> consultations that will begin already this afternoon. We look forward
> to the Secretary General's early decision on that request from the
> Governing Council and, as Dr. Pachachi has just told you, the
> Governing Council and the CPA hope the UN will return to play a role
> in Iraq, and we hope that happens soon. Jeremy.

>
> Ambassador Greenstock: As the UK partner in the Coalition Provisional
> Authority, we too are very pleased, as CPA, to be back in direct
> dialogue with the United Nations, whom we have missed very much since
> the tragic events of August. As a former UN practitioner, you can
> expect me to be very well aware of the experience and expertise that
> the United Nations can bring to a transition of this kind that Iraq is
> going through. We in the CPA want the UN role to be a very full and
> independent one for the transitional period; and we want the UN team
> to be up and running by the 1st of July to play that role. We were
> glad to hear the positive tone from the Secretary General during this
> morning's discussions when we looked at this prospect because the
> United Nations can play an impartial, objective, overseeing role for
> the whole transitional process through 2005, including two sets of
> elections during that year. As far as the short term is concerned, the
> UK and the US share the view of the Iraqi Governing Council that it
> would be a positive move for the UN team to come and give advice and
> guidance of the possibilities for the process in the immediate future.
> We had a constructive discussion about that. We believe that momentum
> was added to that prospect by this morning's discussions and that
> everybody recognized the need to move as urgently as possible under
> the terms and the deadlines of the 15 November agreement. Thank you.

>
> Reporter: Ambassador Bremer, I'd like to ask you, if I may, the same
> question I asked the Secretary General, which is I'm sure you're
> aware, there's a lot of speculation in the press that what you're
> trying to do here is to persuade the United Nations to help pull your
> chestnuts out of the fire, and this process you've set up for July 1st
> isn't going so well because of Ayatollah Sistani digging in his heels.
> And therefore you're hoping the UN will bring some pressure to bear on
> him and will be able to do something to make this process more
> legitimate. I wonder if you'd like to comment.

>
> Ambassador Bremer: The Secretary General answered that rather well
> earlier. He took the initiative and called this meeting some time ago
> in response to a letter he got from the then President of the
> Governing Council, who raised the question which, Dr. Pachachi has
> noted, has been asked by a number of people in Iraq: is it possible to
> have direct national elections in the timeframe established by the
> November 15 agreement, that is to say to return sovereignty to the
> Iraqi people by June 30th? We think that that is a legitimate question
> and one where the UN, with its expertise in elections, can offer a
> perspective. And that is really the intention now of the discussions
> we had this morning. And I said earlier, we are pleased that the
> Secretary General agreed with all seriousness and with all urgency to
> examine that question. We will begin our technical exchange of
> information with his officials this afternoon.

>
> Reporter: (inaudible) I was just wondering, can you do for us as you
> did for the people of Afghanistan?

>
> Ambassador Bremer: I'm sorry I didn't understand the question, or I
> didn't hear it.

> Reporter: There are lots of known terrorists in the UK, we're quite
> scared, is there anything you can do for us, along the lines of what
> you've been doing for the people of Afghanistan?

>
> Ambassador Bremer: If I understand the question, my answer would be
> that there are probably no two governments in the world that cooperate
> as closely as the American and British governments on terrorism. We
> have had intense cooperation between our two governments on fighting
> terrorism, it goes back more than 20 years to my personal knowledge,
> since I've been involved in this for more than 20 years. I don't
> know, I'm sure that there are ways for us to improve that cooperation
> and we'd be happy to do so.

>
> Reporter: This is a question for Ambassador Bremer. If there is indeed
> a change to the caucus system before the turning over of sovereignty,
> do you expect that change to be uniform throughout Iraq that no matter
> where you go there is the same kind of change in the caucus system? Or
> do you think that it will be only in certain areas, in terms of a
> change in the caucus system? Will that alleviate the concerns of the
> Grand Ayatollah Sistani in his areas? Thank you.

>
> Ambassador Bremer: We have said repeatedly, and I mentioned this
> again on Friday, that we are open to clarifications or elaborations on
> the technique by which the National Assembly will be selected as
> provided in the November 15 agreement. I would be remiss if I tried
> to estimate what kind of clarifications would come out of it. I'm not
> an elections expert that's one of the reasons that there will be these
> technical discussions taking place this afternoon, and I suggest we
> simply wait until we figure out some of those discussions.

>
> Reporter: (inaudible) There have been reports of divisions between the
> Coalition and Governing Council, and the CPA and United Nations. What
> is
> (inaudible) of division?

>
> Ambassador Bremer: I think the meetings this morning were
> characterized by an extraordinary degree of agreement between the
> Governing Council and the CPA. I think, indeed being it a private
> meeting, Dr. Pachachi at one point said that there was a unanimous
> view between the two of us on moving forward with implementing the
> November 15 agreement, and in requesting the UN to resume its role in
> Iraq both in the longer term and in the immediate term. So I don't
> know what divisions that would be, but there were certainly none evident today.

>
> Ambassador Greenstock: I think there's an important step to add in
> this context, that we're all agreed on the package for 2005 in which
> two sets of direct elections will be held. We are all agreed that the
> period of the transition should be a period of an Iraqi sovereign
> government, namely a transitional government because the elections
> will produce a fully-fledged, directly elected government at the end
> of 2005. And we are all agreed that the process for finding that
> transitional Iraqi government should be as fully representative,
> transparent and inclusive as possible, with the participation of the
> Iraqi people. All that is left is to decide on the best method to do
> that within the timeframe, and that is the subject of further
> technical discussions. And we hope the methods behind that will be
> part of the discussions today.

>
> Reporter: Could you explain how the CPA will work with the team that
> will be coming from the United Nations to determine if elections would
> be feasible before the June 30 deadline? And if they come to the
> determination that indeed elections would be possible, how would that
> sit with the CPA? How would you reconcile differences on that score?

>
> Ambassador Bremer: Well, first of all, I don't want to prejudge the
> Secretary General's prerogative to make his decision. If he decides
> to send a team, which we have asked him to do, the Governing Council

> and we will work as closely as we can with them, providing them,
> obviously, with technical assistance, with security and arranging for
> him to meet people if that's what he needs to do, whatever assistance
> they may need. We haven't discussed that level of detail to date.
> Let us wait and see, a) what they decide before I make statements
> about what I think about their conclusions. Let's wait and see what
> their conclusions are, and then we can move from there. But I think
> it's a bit premature for you to ask me what I might think of their
> conclusions might be when we don't even have the preliminary yet.
>
> Reporter: Ambassador, this morning more than 100,000 people were on
> the streets demanding elections. What makes you think that sending a
> UN team, or any of these discussions here are going to be able to stop
> the momentum there, which seems to be moving for elections now or in
> the shortest possible time. Why do you think that Ayatollah Sistani
> would listen to the UN team? Can this momentum be slowed in demanding
> those elections now?
>
> Ambassador Bremer: First of all, let me make a comment about the
> demonstrations. One of the reasons we sent our troops to Iraq was to
> free them, and to allow them to participate in democracy. And one of
> the beauties of democracy is freedom of assembly and freedom of
> speech. The demonstrations are actually a healthy sign, they're
> peaceful demonstrations. And there are something like 200 newspapers
> that have been formed in Iraq since liberation. There are television
> stations, radio stations. There are demonstrations all the time.
> Some of them not always very friendly to the Coalition, I might add,
> but just the same, we welcome them. Let us see what happens. The
> interesting thing one sees in the polls is that the Iraqi people do
> want to have sovereignty back, and they understand that the November
> 15 arrangement is for sovereignty to return by June 30. And so the
> question is: how do we get to a, as Jeremy said, transparent process
> by which a legislature is chosen, over to whom we can hand
> sovereignty? And I think the encouraging news from today was that the
> Secretary General agreed to consider this request very seriously. I
> think you will see how and when that team comes and what they report,
> at that point we'll be able to make a judgment on the way forward.
> But I think we should all be encouraged by the openness with which the Secretary General
received this request today.
>
> Reporter: (inaudible) And my question goes to the CPA, why are you so
> adamant to have an agreement on security with the Governing Council,
> and that's according to the November 15 agreement that security
> arrangements were to be concluded in agreement with the Governing
> Council, and that should govern your forces in Iraq after the first of
> July. Why don't you wait for a sovereign government on the first of
> July and give the decision to an elected government rather than an
> appointed body?
>
> Ambassador Bremer: We will cooperate with the United Nations as it
> begins this process of reengaging in Iraq. I suspect that will go
> through several phases in between now and the 30th of June. Of
> course, the CPA will dissolve as soon as sovereignty is transferred
> back to the Iraqi people. So it won't be a question of ceding
> authority to the UN. It will just be a question of what the UN role
> is with that sovereign government. In terms of the security
> arrangements, it is the view of the Coalition that it would be helpful
> to have an agreement on how security matters will be arranged after
> the sovereignty is returned; and you need to reach that agreement for
> purely military planning terms before sovereignty is returned.
> Obviously there will be a government in Iraq after that, and we will
> obey the wishes of that government. We anticipate that after July 1
> the Iraqi security forces will not be sufficient to provide security
> for Iraq on their own, and they will want to invite concerned
> countries, maybe members of the present coalition, to help them with
> their security needs in preparation for that before we get to that

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> date. Thank you.
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(b)(6)

From: Kennedy, Patrick F (USUN) [kennedyPF@state.gov]
Sent: Monday, January 19, 2004 11:41 PM
To: Executive Secretary
Cc: (b)(6)
Subject: FW: HIGHLIGHTS FROM A NEWS CONFERENCE (1/19/2004)

> HIGHLIGHTS FROM A NEWS CONFERENCE
>
> BY KOFI ANNAN
> SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS
>
> UN HEADQUARTERS, NEW YORK
>
> Monday, January 19, 2004
> The following item substitutes for the daily noon briefing, which will
> resume Tuesday. OPENING REMARKS BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
> "Good Morning [Afternoon], Ladies and Gentlemen.
> As you know, I have just been meeting with senior representatives of the
> Iraqi Governing Council and the Coalition Provisional Authority.
> I wanted to hear the assessment of the Governing Council on how the
> process in Iraq was evolving and what Iraq expects of the UN by way of
> assistance. We covered a wide spectrum of issues, including the
> transitional political process, humanitarian relief, security and the
> recovery and reconstruction of Iraq.
> In my view, this meeting has been an important opportunity for all of us
> to get a clearer understanding of each other's positions.
> I believe we did that. We would all agree that it was a very frank and
> open exchange of views, which we will aim to continue and broaden in the
> near future.
> For my part, I would want the UN to concentrate on areas where we have a
> clear comparative advantage, and which all Iraqis consider vital. Further
> details and discussion are needed to clarify exactly how the UN can best
> help in the various fields where we have been asked to assist.
> Meanwhile, both the Governing Council and the CPA representatives have
> expressed a strong wish that the UN should quickly send a technical
> mission to Iraq to advise on the feasibility of elections within the next
> few months and, if not, what alternatives might be possible.
> I think we all agree that elections are going to be necessary, indeed
> there is provision for two sets of elections in 2005. The issue now is
> whether the technical, political or security conditions exist for general
> direct elections to take place as early as May this year.
> Other subjects discussed included the process of drafting and finalizing
> the fundamental law, future appointment of a Special Representative of the
> Secretary-General, and the question of security agreements to be concluded
> between the Governing Council and the CPA, as provided for in the 15
> November agreement.
> Obviously, the scope for operational UN activities inside Iraq will
> continue to be constrained by the security situation for some time to
> come. The CPA and the Governing Council offered undertakings that the
> coalition and the Governing Council would provide full security for UN
> international personnel in Iraq.
> Let me state once again that the UN's sole objective is to help the Iraqi
> people. We would like to see as broad a consensus as possible develop
> among Iraqis on what needs to be done to bring about an Iraq at peace with
> itself and with its neighbours - and on the role that the UN can play in
> this.
> I believe that there is widespread agreement among us that the UN will
> have an important role to play in working with the Iraqi provisional
> Government from July onwards on key constitutional and electoral issues.
> We agreed that partnership would be necessary and we are also going to be

> active in recovery, reconstruction and in the humanitarian and human rights fields.

> Meanwhile, as regards a possible role between now and the end of June for the UN, we have agreed that further discussions should take place at the technical level, which would be focused on the most immediate electoral and security issues. On the basis of those discussions, I would be in a better position to take decisions about what the UN can do to help, particularly regarding the possible dispatch of a mission to Iraq to advise on elections.

> Thank you very much. I will now take your questions."

> SUMMARY OF QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

> In response to questions about what had been decided upon at today's meeting, the Secretary-General said that the focus had been on the possibility of sending a technical team to assess, on the ground, whether elections are possible between now and May.

> That team would be in addition to a four-man security team the UN intends to send, which, the Secretary-General said, has received the cooperation of the Coalition Provisional Authority to go about its work.

> Asked about his own views about the likelihood of elections, the Secretary-General said he does not believe that there is enough time between now and May to hold elections, although any team that looks into that issue would report back to him on whether that is the case.

> Asked whether the elections plan could be restructured, he said the United Nations needs more details, and will discuss the matter at the technical level. All stakeholders, he said, are open to refinements of the plan now on the table.

> Asked why the United Nations should be involved in the current US efforts in Iraq, the Secretary-General stressed, "The stability of Iraq should be everyone's business." If we get it wrong at this stage, he warned, we may not even be able to move to the next stage.

> Asked about the Sunday bomb attack in Baghdad, he said that, given concerns about security, what happened "was not reassuring." He noted that the Coalition Provisional Authority has some ideas about how to improve security conditions for the UN. At the same time, he told another questioner, he does not foresee a "massive return" of the UN until a new government is in place in Iraq.

> At the same time, he said, he wishes to have the UN begin work not only on planning for Iraq but also in ensuring that it can work with the new government.

> Asked about communications with Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, the Secretary-General said he had not communicated directly with him, but that the late Special Representative for Iraq, Sergio Vieira de Mello, and adviser Ghassan Salameh had both previously had contacts with al-Sistani and members of his entourage. The United Nations continues to have contacts with his advisers and entourage.

> Asked about whether UN Special Adviser Lakhdar Brahimi would have a role in dealing with Iraq, the Secretary-General said he has not taken a decision on that matter.

> He said that he would make the judgment as to who leads his team. It shouldn't be very long before he does so, he added.

>

> OTHER DEVELOPMENTS CONCERNING IRAQ

> SECURITY COUNCIL TO MEET WITH GOVERNING COUNCIL AT 5 P.M.: The Security Council is scheduled to hold a private meeting starting 5 p.m. today with Adnan Pachachi, the chairman of the Iraqi Governing Council. The Secretary-General is scheduled to attend the session.

> UNITED NATIONS CARRIES OUT HUMANITARIAN WORK IN IRAQ: Within the limitations imposed by the security situation, UN agencies and programmes are continuing to carry out a wide range of assistance through their national staff and Iraqi contractors, with the support of several hundred international staff in the region. These activities

> <<http://www.un.org/News/dh/iraq/humanitarian-work-iraq19jan04.htm>>include

> cross-border deliveries, rehabilitation projects and capacity building.

> OTHER DEVELOPMENTS IN THE UNITED NATIONS TODAY

> AGREEMENT REACHED ON LIBYAN NUCLEAR INSPECTIONS: International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Mohamed ElBaradei met today with

> U.S. Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and Nuclear Proliferation, John Bolton and his British counterpart, William Ehrman, to coordinate their respective efforts in implementing Libya's decision to abandon any nuclear weapons related program and activities. ElBaradei indicated that the sides had "reached agreement on what needs to be done."

> SECURITY COUNCIL HOLDS MEETING ON SMALL ARMS: Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs Nobuyasu Abe today told the Security Council that the Secretary-General is encouraged by the Council's continued efforts to address the challenge posed by illicit small arms and light weapons. Addressing an open debate of the Council on small arms

> <<http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2004/sc7984.p2.doc.htm>>, Abe presented the Secretary-General's recent report

> <<http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/sgrep03.html>> on that topic, which highlights progress made in dealing with the trade of illicit small arms, but notes as challenges the imposition of coercive measures against Member States that deliberately violate arms embargoes and restrictions on the supply of ammunition.

> AUSTRALIAN ELECTED AS CHAIR OF HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION: Today in Geneva, Ambassador Mike Smith of Australia was elected by consensus as the chairman of the 60th session of the Commission on Human Rights, succeeding Ambassador Najat al-Hajaji of Libya. Acting High Commissioner for Human Rights Bertrand Ramcharan today called the opening of the 60th session "historic" and urged the Commission to take action against the trafficking of women and children.

> UN HELICOPTER COMES UNDER ATTACK IN DR CONGO: The head of the UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo, William Swing, has described the attack against a UN helicopter on 16 January as "very serious and unacceptable". The helicopter was on its way to a town near Bunia, following an attack on a camp by the Nationalist Integrationist Front (FNI) militia, when it was fired upon five times. While the firing caused no casualties, Swing condemned the attack in which the FNI is believed to have been involved. He said that the United Nations would use all means necessary to protect the civilian population, and UN helicopters and troops.

> PEACE PROCESS IN ABKHAZIA, GEORGIA "REMAINS PAINFULLY SLOW": In his report on the situation in Abkhazia, Georgia, which was made available today, the Secretary-General said that while some progress has been made in the peace process there, the progress has "remained painfully slow." Nevertheless, the Secretary-General encouraged both sides in the dispute to continue implementing recommended peace-building initiatives, such as the opening of a human rights office in the Gali district as well as resolution of the dispute over language teaching in the area. He added that he recommends a further extension of the mandate of the UN Mission in Georgia for six months, up until 31 July this year.

> UN ENVOY VISITS TROUBLED GALI REGION: The Secretary-General's Special Representative for Georgia, Heidi Tagliavini, traveled to Gali today to chair the second meeting between the sides on security in the Gali district, a conflict-afflicted region near Abkhazia's border with the rest of Georgia. The meeting involved discussion of ways to improve the effectiveness of security mechanisms in the zone of conflict and related questions.

> MORE THAN 420,000 AFGHANS REGISTER TO VOTE: The UN Mission in Afghanistan <<http://www.un.org/apps/news/infocusRel.asp?infocusID=16&Body=Afghanistan&Body1=>>, in its Sunday briefing, noted that Afghan President Hamid Karzai registered as a voter that day in Kabul. So far, more than 420,000 Afghans have registered to vote.

> AID REACHES FLOOD VICTIMS IN WESTERN AFGHANISTAN: In response to intense rainfall in Afghanistan's Herat province, which caused extensive flooding in the most heavily populated areas of the region, a UN team visited the affected villages on Saturday, and today, food and non-food items are being supplied to the affected families.

> SUDANESE REFUGEES RELOCATED IN CHAD: After months of living on the edge, hundreds of Sudanese refugees have reached safety after being moved from the insecure Chad-Sudan border to an inland site in eastern Chad. The UN refugee agency

> <<http://www.unhcr.ch/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/news/+BwwBmezJ2KCwwwAwwwwwwwFqnN0bItFqnDni5zFqnN0bIAFqnN0bIDzmxwwwwww1FqnN0bI/opendoc.htm>> and the local

> Chadian authorities are continuing their search for new sites in eastern
 > Chad to relocate more Sudanese refugees before May, when the rainy season
 > will render the sandy roads impassable for heavy trucks.
 > GABON AND EQUATORIAL GUINEA DISCUSS TERRITORIAL DISPUTE: The Foreign
 > Ministers of Gabon and Equatorial Guinea are meeting today at UN
 > headquarters with UN mediator Yves Fortier to discuss their territorial
 > dispute.
 > DEPUTY SECRETARY-GENERAL REFLECTS ON NEW OBSTACLES TO WORLD PEACE: Deputy
 > Secretary-General, Louise Frechette spoke today about new obstacles to
 > world peace and the need for collective responses to the challenges posed
 > by international terrorism and genocide. In her keynote address to the
 > Canadian Club in Montreal, Frechette also called on the international
 > community to uphold the Millennium Development Goals
 > <<http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/>> to reduce poverty and to address
 > HIV/AIDS, the deadliest epidemic in human history.
 > AGREEMENT REACHED ON DRAFT TEXT ON RIGHTS OF PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES:
 > The Working Group on Disability Convention has adopted a draft text of an
 > international convention on the rights of persons with disabilities. The
 > draft text incorporates the goal of removing barriers in society to ensure
 > the full participation of people with disabilities in social and economic
 > life.
 > EXPERTS MEET ON CONVENTION AGAINST DOPING IN SPORT: Around 300 experts in
 > law and sport, particularly those specializing in the fight against
 > doping, are expected to attend UNESCO's first intergovernmental meeting on
 > the Preliminary Draft of the International Convention Against Doping in
 > Sport, which began in Geneva today.
 > ANNAN TO LEAVE NEW YORK FOR EUROPE: In the evening, the Secretary-General
 > will leave New York to begin a 12-day, seven-city trip to Europe.
 > GUEST AT NOON BRIEFING TUESDAY: Under-Secretary-General Anwarul K.
 > Chowdhury, Secretary-General of the Barbados +10 Conference on Small
 > Islands, will brief on a preparatory meeting to be held in Nassau, Bahamas
 > from 26-30 January.
 > Office of the Spokesman for the Secretary-General
 > United Nations, S-378
 > New York, NY 10017
 > Tel. 212-963-7162 - press/media only
 > Fax. 212-963-7055
 > All other inquiries to be addressed to (212) 963-4475 or by e-mail to:
 > inquiries@un.org
 >



COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY
BAGHDAD

INFO MEMO

DATE: Jan. 19, 2004

FOR: THE ADMINISTRATOR

FROM: (b)(6) Salah ad Din Governorate Coordinator

SUBJECT: Weekly GC Update – Salah ad Din

Key Events: Political Refreshment

- CPA Tikrit has obtained resignations for five Provincial Council members who were former senior Baa'thists, some of whom were also involved in graft. It was done in private meetings, and the resignations were handled gracefully. The sixth and final such meeting is Wednesday with Council Chairman (former firqah member) Sheikh Naji Jabbara al-Jibbouri. He will be asked to focus on his role in Sheikh's Council of Salah ad Din.
- I feel like a **"management consultant"** whom, employees discover belatedly, has the real job of firing a layer of management.
- Anyway, it is going well. Our supporters are happy, and those who resigned understand. We are setting stage for removing **Governor Hussein Jabbara al-Jibbouri** (former firqah member and Rep Guards Div Commander involved in **massacring Shi'ites in 1991**). This will take place after he returns from the hajj/fund raising in Saudi Arabia, o/a Feb. 7, and will improve the general environment in Salah ad Din.
- We are also asking the Qada (county) Councils to fill the vacant Prov Council positions (total of 12, since we are adding 6 to reach 40 total seats). These Councils are holding a series of elections in each Qada Council beginning this week. We are vetting the candidates closely to ensure a much better team in the refreshed Provincial Council.

Theme: Sistani's Call for Direct Elections

- Arab Sunnis here repeatedly "warn" us against going down the direct election road: they claim untold numbers of Iranians have infiltrated into Iraq, under guise of returned Iraqi exiles. They want to wait for census, voter registration, etc.
- Based on my experience here, I see no way we can hold anything resembling direct elections given our timeframe. We need time and a reduction in security tensions that would allow NGOs and Iraqi organizations to begin solid institutional building.
- Most important, **Iraqis tell me they want good government much more than direct elections**. If they get a good, clean government out of the caucus system, then they will be prepared to vote in a future direct election (they say) for Shi'ites, Kurds or whomever is providing the good services. At present, that pragmatic mindset doesn't prevail. .

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

Jones, Richard H. (AMB)

From: (b)(6) Ministry of Governance

Sent: Monday, January 12, 2004 9:09 AM

To: (b)(6) Jones, Richard H. (AMB); (b)(6)

Subject: FW: Chalabi

FYI.

 (b)(6)
 Director of the Governance Group
 Coalition Provisional Authority
 Baghdad, Iraq
 Tel: (b)(6)
 Cell: (b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) Ministry of Governance

Sent: Monday, January 12, 2004 3:00 AM

To: Bremer, Paul

Subject: Chalabi

Sir:

Met with Chalabi tonight and covered a lot of ground. On the issue before us, I asked if he had heard from Pachachi, he said he had and then I stressed our concern that Sistani was forcing us toward a showdown and not us only. If Sistani was prepared to put into question the November 15th framework then we would truly be facing a crisis. He said he had no idea what I was talking about so I shared Pachachi's read-out, the substance of which he had not heard. He said Pachachi had led him to believe that it went well enough but AC mentioned that P looked a bit rattled by the encounter.

AC's view was that a fatwa was not in the offing. Sistani is a patient man, he explained, and would not lightly upset the delicate status quo. Sistani's message to Pachachi was more than likely a shot across the bows. He has not altered his position that something other than the caucus process was required to create a transparent, inclusive process. The fact that he had offered his own compromise was an indication that he was still looking for a way out. He told me that he had been contacted tonight by Sistani's office asking if he could receive the Ayatollah's emissary tomorrow night. He thought this was a good sign and added that Sistani owed the Shia members of the Council something for approaching the UN on his behalf and the least he would do would be to consult them on the way ahead prior to the 19th.

When I noted that Sistani was not exactly welcoming of the UN in his meeting with Sistani, Chalabi expressed mild concern but again played down the comments' significance. Pachachi had probably offended the Ayatollah by showing up with such a large audience (likely calling attention to the number Shia he had with him as well, one of which, Mehdi, is a former Communist). Pachachi could show remarkable tactical obtuseness, Chalabis said, and probably revealed this particular knack in spades during the meeting. He was forever overreaching, Chalabi said.

I then probed him on what would happen IF a fatwa was delivered by Sistani, either before or after the

1/12/2004

NY meeting. He again said it would never happen but then acknowledged there would be a real crisis. Of most interest was his conclusion that all Shia would leave the GC and that we would have great difficulty replacing them. When I asked why all shia would leave, he said that not one Shiite on the Council could afford to cross Sistani. He was the unquestionable head of the Shia community and any one who stood up to him would have no political future. If the Coalition sought to replace them with secular Shia they might find a few to serve but they would be of little use and would be perceived as true quislings. This was a political reality, he said, which was why we needed to find some way to accommodate Sistani's desire to have a UN team come out here and find a different process if one was available.

I explained, however, that if a fatwa were issued we could not afford to capitulate. Iraq was a complex country with numerous communities and to allow one to set the rules and the pace for all the others would be untenable, especially since one fatwa would likely lead to another. With an air of frustration, Chalabi said that we should not overreact. Nothing would happen before the 19th. He really believed that. There would not be a fatwa and we would not face this type of crisis. He would see what the emissary had to say and would seek to calm the situation. In the meantime, we should continue to explore ways to make the process work.

Incidentally, AC was very much opposed to approaching the UN. He felt that only heartburn and delay would come of it. Heartburn because it would cause a lot of unnecessary tension and delay because all that tension would take a lot of time to build and resolve. He also felt that once the timeline began to slip – if it began to slip – it would add pressure to the process which might make it slip further and faster leading to a vicious cycle. That said, I thought his concern was much more related to a cheapening of GC currency with the advent of the UN in a more aggressive political role.

Comment: Chalabi seemed calmer than when the issue of a Sistani fatwa first reared its head related to elections a month or so ago (!). He seemed a bit bemused by the hapless Pachachi out for his Sunday outing to see the "Great Man of Najaf" only to encounter a curmudgeon bent on humbling him. Still, I think he was more disturbed than he let on. Also, there were a number of other topics covered: de-ba'ath; the IST, the IPCC and Dara, Dave Gompert and MOD, and the Iraqi National Intelligence Service. He also expressed wearied frustration and resignation over our training of troops in Jordan and the new al Iraqiya contract. Finally, he said that thanks to the Trade Bank President, the GC had stopped "hundreds" of former ba'athists and their cronies within the ministries from farming out lines of credit to former regime businesses.

.....
 (b)(6)
 Director of the Governance Group
 Coalition Provisional Authority
 Baghdad, Iraq
 Tel: (b)(6)
 Cell: (b)(6)

1/12/2004

Draft Jan 1 [REDACTED] 1 PM

*Rich & Governance -
reworked Dave's
drafts 1/12*


Your Eminence:

Allow me first extend to you my best wishes, and those of my colleagues, for a happy New Year. I pray that our efforts in 2004 will bring happiness, peace and democracy to the Iraqi people who have suffered so much over the centuries.

It is now nine months since the Coalition came to liberate all Iraqis from a brutal and oppressive dictator who deprived Iraqis of their civil, political and religious rights. We achieved this noble objective at the cost of our sons and daughters as well as your own. Now, working with the Iraqi people, the Coalition seeks to restore those rights to all Iraqis. We hope for the support of all sectors of Iraqi society, including yours, for this endeavor.

To that end, the Governing Council and the Coalition have worked to create a new and democratic future for Iraq, a future full of hope for all her citizens. On the 15th of November, the Governing Council and the Coalition concluded an historic agreement that lays the foundation for democracy and majority rule in Iraq. We agreed that this should be done on the basis of a constitution written by elected representatives of all Iraqi people for the benefit of all those people.

But the Governing council and we understood that it will take time to establish lasting institutions that




guarantee the rights of all Iraqis. And we understood that Iraqis want to recover their dignity and sovereignty as soon as possible by achieving an early end to occupation. That is our objective, too. We have no higher interest than to restore full sovereignty to the Iraqi people.

We understand your desire for elections. But we, the United Nations, and qualified third party organizations concluded that it would not be possible to conduct elections in the time frame agreed to in November.

Thus, the Governing Council and we had to find a way to respond to the need to respond to the public demand to restore Iraq's dignity quickly and the need to find a legitimate and transparent means to select a national government. So we arrived at the system for selecting a Transitional Government established in the November 15 agreement. We made that selection system as representative and legitimate as possible. We have told the UN that the Coalition would welcome the UN's independent appraisal of these procedures and their recommendations on how they could be improved.

Your eminence, we do not seek dominion in Iraq. We came to liberate her. We do not seek a confrontation with any Iraqi community. On the contrary, where there are problems, we want to solve them through dialogue and negotiation.



But we firmly believe that the November 15 agreement provides an appropriate framework for achieving our mutual goal of a free and democratic Iraq, where government reflects the will of the majority with respect for the rights of all. After so much suffering, the Iraqi people deserve nothing less. To those who would disrupt this process, we ask "why deny the Iraqis their aspirations and legitimate right to rule themselves?"

Your Eminence, this is a critical moment for the future of Iraq. We both bear, you and I, a heavy responsibility for that future. I believe that disrupting the November 15 process would not advance the interests of the community you serve, but rather would damage the interests of all Iraqis. Political turmoil and sectarian division cannot be the basis on which to build a stable and democratic Iraq.

I am grateful for your taking the time to receive my friend and colleague and I welcome your thoughts on the future of our efforts to bring Iraq a legitimate and democratic government.

With respect,

etc





COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY
BAGHDAD

MEMO FOR: Secretary Rumsfeld
Secretary Powell
National Security Advisor Rice

FROM: Paul Bremer

SUBJECT: Federalism in Iraq

As the Governing Council moves forward with drafting the Transitional Administrative Law, it will increasingly be necessary to think through our own position on Iraqi federalism more fully. The ultimate resolution of the federalism question will of course be left to Iraq's constitutional convention. Nonetheless, the Transitional Administrative Law will determine how Iraq is to be governed at least through the end of 2005. The precedents it sets will create facts on the ground that will be difficult for the constitutional convention to ignore. It makes sense, therefore, to develop our current position in greater detail, with full knowledge that our stance on federalism over the next few months may have a lasting impact on Iraq's political development ~~over the next few years.~~

Our current stated policy is to support a federal solution for Iraq, but to oppose the variants of "ethnic federalism" currently espoused by the two Kurdish parties. We have advocated federalism for all of Iraq for sound reasons ~~of political science - federalism~~ ^{by} ~~will divide and separate political power, and help prevent the re-emergence of a~~ tyrannical central government. We have advocated "geographical federalism" based on the existing 18 governorates, essentially reversing the USG's prior support for the creation of a unified administration in Iraqi Kurdistan. ^{National security} ~~separatist~~

As many months of discussion with the Kurdish parties have made clear, however, ~~governorates-based federalism~~ is unlikely to triumph without a serious political fight. Neither the PUK nor the KDP appears ready to accept any federal solution that breaks up the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), as governorates-based federalism would require, or that limits the autonomy exercised in Iraqi Kurdistan beyond what the KRG has enjoyed since 1991 (or beyond that which was granted to Kurdistan by the Ba'athist regime in 1970). One option, of course, would be to treat governorates-based federalism as a Coalition "redline" in our negotiations over the transitional law. This approach, however, may have significant drawbacks. As PUK Prime Minister Barham Salih told us recently, it may create political problems where none currently exists. Ensuring our

^{ing} ^{ing} ^{based on the existing governorates}

^{will help promote a stable moderate Iraq while avoiding the dangers.}

^{fragmentation}

→ Governance

Please see my comments

10

being seen as according
On the other hand ~~extending~~ special treatment to the Kurds
could ~~create~~ create difficulty with other constituent groups.

preferred outcome will likely require the expenditure of significant political capital on our part – capital that might be sorely needed on other key issues. It will also surely upset the political stability we have enjoyed thus far in northern Iraq.

we would most like to see

It would be prudent, then, to consider more fully our own position on the type of federalism ~~we are willing to accept~~ in Iraq. We should examine alternate fallback positions, identify key pressure points through which we might exercise leverage in the negotiations, and agree upon "redlines" beyond which we are unwilling to go in our discussions with the Kurdish parties. ~~We should also further develop our position on how federalism should be implemented outside of the Kurdish north.~~

trade offs and

Any elaboration of our position on the federalism question should take stock of the following key issues:

- **Transitional Administrative Law: Maximal vs. Minimal?** The drafting process for the transitional law will take place when the Coalition retains ~~the maximum~~ *a considerable* amount of political leverage over the ultimate outcome. This argues for seeking as comprehensive a solution at this stage as possible – while acknowledging, of course, that anything in the transitional law may ultimately be overruled by Iraq's permanent constitution. An alternate view, advanced by some GC members, is that the transitional law should retain the status quo with regard to federalism for the transitional period, passing the question off for a comprehensive settlement by the constitutional convention. CPA's current thinking is that the federalism question cannot simply be put off, even in this transitional period. Any solution – or non-solution – codified in the transitional law will bias the ultimate settlement of the question. Therefore, it makes sense to seek a transitional law which addresses the federal question on a basis that accords with our long-term objectives.

Moreover, there is no reason to believe that parties unable to reach agreement now will be more able to do so 50 years from now without it

• **Asymmetrical vs. Symmetrical Federalism:** Ideally, federalism in Iraq would be symmetrical (as in the United States), with each of the 18 governorates exercising the same broad powers across the country. The problem with symmetrical federalism in Iraq is that it would require massive adjustments in the way Iraqi governing institutions currently function. In southern and central Iraq, it would require a massive decentralization of power. In northern Iraq, meanwhile, it would require recentralizing power. Only by creating enormous dislocations in both areas would it be possible to create an even, symmetrical federal structure for the whole country. Asymmetrical federalism, however, also has its disadvantages, namely that it would treat northern Iraq differently from the rest of the country. This might encourage the division of Iraq along ethnic lines, despite our best intentions to the contrary.

I disagree common Rules can be developed that give room for different outcomes

- **Fate of Kurdistan:** Any federal solution for Iraq will have to deal with the current governing structures in Kurdistan. What should happen to the KRG? How should

50 years from now without it

*eg. Nebraska to cut 100,000
Varies other US states*

the Kurdistan region's ministries plug in to the central ministries in Baghdad – especially given the fact that as a whole, the Baghdad ministries are highly dysfunctional relative to their counterparts in Kurdistan? A critical related question concerns the status of Iraq's current administrative boundaries and the ultimate fate of Kirkuk. Our preference, of course, will be keep all current administrative boundaries as they stand, but this approach has not gained much traction with our Iraqi interlocutors. Some have proposed reverting to Iraq's pre-1968 system of 14 governorates; others prefer allowing individual governorates to aggregate on the basis of referenda. The Kurds favor this latter option, and indeed have proposed allowing various districts – below the governorate level – voluntarily choose their affiliation on a case-by-case basis.

we could do both

why should they have to? US State Dept's don't plug in to our Fed and agencies

we could also go for a limited system with partial devolution

good idea - it would save a lot of money and probably reduce the advantage for organized groups.

- **Local Governance Authorities:** Regardless of how the Kurdistan question is settled, it will be necessary for the Transitional Administrative Law to define the powers to be exercised at the national and provincial levels, respectively. Some of the powers that must remain at the national level are easy to identify – national security, foreign policy, monetary policy, etc. Others, such as management of Iraq's natural resources and the way in which tax and oil revenues are distributed to the governorates are more challenging. In theory, many powers now exercised at the national level (health, education, agriculture, housing and construction, etc.) could be devolved to local authorities. The difficulty will come in developing – on extremely short notice – the necessary civil infrastructure and mechanisms of political oversight to ensure the efficient administration of services.
- **Local Governance Structures:** Currently, nearly all of the governorates have provincial councils and governors that have been chosen in a variety of ways, none involving direct, general elections. The Transitional Administrative Law will need to determine the status of these interim structures throughout the transitional period and beyond. Will each governorate need to adopt a uniform system? Will each governorate need its own constitution, or can the transitional law set forth broad guidelines that apply in all the governorates. A related question concerns the timing of local elections. One idea worth considering is holding elections for a provincial council in each governorate on the same ballot as elections for the constitutional convention are held in March 2005. This will encourage the development of grassroots political parties, and accustom the Iraqi population to democratic political participation before elections are held under the permanent constitution in late 2005. It will also remove the taint of illegitimacy that currently surrounds the existing councils, many of which were appointed by military commanders shortly following Iraq's liberation. New governors for the provinces could be chosen either by these same elections, or subsequently by the newly-chosen provincial councils.

yes but how precisely our own const is such vague on powers of states

Why not both as in the U.S.?

- **Residual Powers:** A related question concerns the Transitional Administrative Law's treatment of residual powers – should the balance lean towards keeping power at the center, or in the governorates? The Tenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution reserves all powers not explicitly delegated to the federal government to the states. Constitutional experts have pointed out this may not be feasible in Iraq, however, given that there is no strong tradition of local self-government. This is, of course, precisely the opposite situation that existed in the United States at the time our own constitution was drafted.

I would argue that the lack was due to the application of federal force and not a result of a lack of intention

- **Budgeting Process:** A key question in determining how Iraqi federalism will work in practice concerns the budgeting process. Without independent sources of revenue, it will be difficult for provincial and local governments to assert their independence and govern themselves without direction from the center. Iraq does not have a history of effective or meaningful local taxation, however, since the vast majority of the Iraqi budget derives from oil revenues. Creating mechanisms by which provincial government is guaranteed a share of oil revenue, perhaps as a sort of "block grant," might solve part of the problem. Other solutions might involve creative adjustments to budgeting procedures within the Ministry of Finance. The "special status" of Kurdistan looms large here again, since the current Iraqi operating budget essentially gives block grants to the Kurdistan ministries while controlling local ministry funds in other governorates from the center.

*you
good idea
??*

- **Geopolitical Factors:** Given Turkish concerns over the extent of Iraqi federalism – and, in particular, over the status of Iraqi Kurdistan – it is worth considering the extent to which Turkey's legitimate interests will be affected by arrangements set forth in the Transitional Administrative Law. What, in fact, are the key Turkish "redlines"? How can we assuage their concerns while at the same time maintaining our own and the Iraqis' commitment to a federal, unified Iraq?

*rest thing
we could
do is
implement PKK*

As we move forward with the drafting of the Transitional Administrative Law, these and other questions will become especially ripe for consideration. We at CPA have already been thinking through many of them, but we would welcome any input or suggestions you and your respective departments may have on the subject.

can be viewed as too soft on a mixed system

*second best thing is decan
Peshmerga-*

The compromise solution could be to bring national ministry office to Kurdistan and give block grants to other

Government
federalism

- The system of government in Iraq shall be federal, democratic and pluralistic, and power shall be divided between the central government and the regions, governorates, and municipalities. The federal governmental system shall be based upon the principles of geography, good governance, and separation of powers, and not upon the basis of origin, ethnicity, nationality, or confession.
- The Kurdistan Regional Government is recognized as the official government of those territories in the governorates of Nineveh, Dohuk, Arbil, Kirkuk, Sulaimaniya, and Diyala that were administered by that government as of 19 March 2003.
- A resolution of disputed areas, including Kirkuk, shall be deferred until such time as the permanent constitution shall either determine their status or establish mechanisms through which their status will be determined. The boundaries of the 18 governorates shall remain without change throughout the transitional period. Governorates may, however, agree by a two-thirds vote of the respective governorate councils, with the approval of the Transitional National Assembly by a two-thirds margin, to form blocs of common interest, and to co-operate in promoting issues of regional significance.
- Each governorate shall have a Governorate Council and Governor. No Governor, members of any Governorate Council, or member of the Kurdistan Regional Government may be appointed or dismissed by the central government or any official thereof. No Governor, members of any Governorate Council, or member of the Kurdistan Regional Government may be under the control of the central government.
- Functions currently performed by the Kurdistan Regional Government shall continue to be exercised throughout the transitional period, except over those issues which fall within the exclusive competence of the central government as specified in this Law.
- Where practicable, the central government shall take affirmative measures to devolve additional authorities to local, provincial, and regional governments, in an orderly manner. Regional and governorate governmental units, including the Kurdistan Regional Government, shall be organized based upon the principle of de-centralization, devolving power to municipal and local governments.
- Governors and members of each Governorate Council, and members of the Kurdistan Regional Government, who hold office as of 1 July 2004 shall remain in place until such time as full, free, and contested elections, conducted pursuant to law, are held. Such elections for governorate councils throughout Iraq, and for the Kurdistan National Assembly shall be held no later than 15 March 2005.

- The Iraqi transitional government shall take active steps to correct past injustices which arose because of forced migration in Iraq brought about in order to vindicate political ends. Such steps shall include, but are not limited to, the establishment of the Iraqi Property Claims Commission.
- Arabic is the official language throughout the country, while safeguarding the special status of the Kurdish region.
- The Iraqi Provisional Government shall have exclusive competence with respect to the following matters:
 - Formulating foreign policy and diplomatic representation, negotiating, signing, and ratifying international treaties and agreements, formulating foreign economic and trade policy, and incurring sovereign debt;
 - Formulating defense and national security policy, including securing and controlling the borders;
 - Declarations of war and concluding peace;
 - Formulating fiscal policy, issuing currency, regulating customs, formulating a national budget, and formulating monetary policy, and establishing and maintaining a central bank;
 - Regulating weights and measures, and formulating a general policy on wages;
 - Control over natural resources, on condition that revenues resulting therefrom be spent on the needs of the various regions, based upon their relative populations, and the degree of development, and other such considerations;
 - Regulating Iraqi citizenship, immigration, and asylum;
 - Regulating telecommunications policy;
 - A unified national court system.
- The national judiciary shall be integrated, including the judges appointed by the Kurdistan Regional Government.
 - All judges sitting in their respective courts as of 30 June 2004 will continue in office thereafter.

- The judicial branch shall be established by law, including courts of first instance, an intermediate Court of Appeals, and a Court of Cassation, which shall be the court of last resort except as provided in Section XLIV.
- Any members of courts of first instance, the Court of Appeals, and the Court of Cassation who are serving in that capacity on 1 July 2004 shall continue in office. Members of the Courts of Cassation in Arbil and Sulaimaniya as of 1 July 2004 will become members of the Iraqi Court of Cassation on that date, and there shall be one such court for the central government. The Iraqi court of Cassation shall meet in the central capital.

POPULAR SELECTION OF THE TRANSITIONAL NATIONAL ASSEMBLY

The November 15 Agreement sets broad outlines for choosing a Transitional National Assembly. In order to make this process as transparent and representative as possible, the mechanics agreement should be further elaborated and defined as discussed in the following sections.

The Organizing Committee

There are three stages related to the work of the Organizing Committees (OC):

- Formation of the OC.
- Solicitation and collection of nominations.
- Analysis of nominations and decisions on membership of the caucus.

a) Formation of the OC

Selection should be aimed at:

- ensuring that the OC has a connection and understanding of the Governorate;
- ensuring that OC members are representative of the community and that no group dominates the OC.

The first objective will be best met by appointing people who have a knowledge and understanding of the Governorate and the respective weight of interests in it. Persons selected should have a demonstrable link to the Governorate through, for example, a family background in the Governorate or current residence in the Governorate. It may also help to appoint individuals who have served in some public position or have held some other influential position in the Governorate.

To achieve the proper political balance within the OC, the selection process should be coordinated among the established nominating bodies (Governing Council, Provincial Council and the five largest localities). Since the OC will be selected by these different bodies, the selection process should be structured to provide the opportunity for ensuring the OC includes a balanced representation from the key groups in each province. A method for accomplishing this would be to sequence OC appointments as follows: first city councils appoint one member each, then PCs appoint their five members and, finally, the GC appoints their five. As the most authoritative body, the Governing Council will have the final say on the composition of the OC as it will be aware of the previous appointments and can use its appointments to address any imbalances that exist.

In order to help build acceptance and credibility for the OC members, the respective Councils should hold town hall meetings and other local consultation sessions as part

of the selection process. These public soundings will help inform the OC as to what sort of individual should be appointed.

Certain guidelines should be set to ensure there is a balanced representation on the OC. Such criteria should include:

- A reasonable distribution between organized political forces.
- At least 3 women on the OC.
- A reasonable balance between the main ethnic/religious groups.
- At least one representative from significant minority communities present in the Governorate (e.g. Christian, Turkomen).

The aim would be to ensure that the OC is not monopolized by any one group and is a close reflection of the make-up of the Province.

Another means of ensuring that only good quality candidates are put forward by the respective councils would be a stipulation that each appointee/ slate of nominees to the OC gather an absolute or a qualified majority of votes from his/her respective nominating council. Within a city council, a 50% vote would be needed to be elected, whereas in the Provincial Council and Governing Council, the five members should be voted for as a slate and require the votes of a qualified majority (i.e., a majority set at more than 50%).

To avoid conflicts of interest members of the OC should be barred from membership of the Caucus and the TNA.

b) Solicitation and collection of nominations

Once established the OC should ensure that the Caucus selection process is well understood in the Province and conducted in the most transparent and open manner. OCs should organize town hall meetings, consultations with key interest groups in the province and undertake a media campaign to ensure the broadest participation in the selection process. The OC should specifically request nominations from all major civil society groups.

Applications for membership of the Caucus should be open to all members of the public who meet the criteria laid down in the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL). Candidates should complete an application form, collect 100 signatures of support and pay a small registration fee to show the seriousness of their intent. The application forms should be readily available and should be easily submitted. Use of the Public Food Distribution network may be a useful mechanism for ensuring wide-scale accessibility of the applications and collection of completed nominations.

The application form should require that each candidate put forward a personal statement of his/her political platform. In addition to the candidate's beliefs and

goals, it should clearly identify any sponsoring group or organization that supports the candidacy as well as any relevant endorsements from specific groups. This will offer important information in the decision making process as the OC evaluates which candidates will provide the appropriate balance for each province.

To facilitate this process, the OC should actively engage and interact with different influential societal actors to encourage the nominations and do so in a manner that channels the weight of each group behind a small number of candidates, hence increasing their chances of success.

c) Analysis of nominations and decisions on membership of caucuses


The key requirement in the decision making process is transparency. As long as there is confidence in the basis upon which decisions have been made and the decisions can be justified, complaints from those who have not made it into the caucus will be minimized.

Criteria for establishing the make-up of each provincial caucus will depend on the make-up of that province. The OC should at the outset establish broad parameters for the representation of each of the identified groups within the province. This should be done as generally and simply as possible, so as not to complicate the process, but help in the final justification of the decisions taken. For example, depending on the Province, an OC may seek to include representatives from the major religious groups, certain represented political parties, and other persons who represent significant constituencies within the Province. Criteria recommended for OC membership (noted above) provide a useful guideline. The OC should also set targets for including women and relevant minorities in the caucus. We would recommend that at least 20% of the caucus be women.

The OC should also outline publicly the actual decision-making mechanism within the OC. The following mechanism is recommended:

- Begin by narrowing the list of nominees through informal (not final) OC votes (basically, a process of narrowing the list of potential caucus members to a number that roughly reflects the caucus's size as established by the OC.)
- The names should be reviewed and adjusted in order to achieve the desired balance among provincial groups/organizations.
- From these names, a final list is compiled that would be put up for a vote. If this list receives an 11/15 majority, the Caucus would be set; if not, OC members would have to revise the list until it could gain the necessary 11/15 majority.

Caucus Size



The rough size of the caucus should be determined before selection begins. A uniformed size for each caucus (e.g. 350) could be set in the TAL or alternatively each OC could determine the appropriate size for its province. OC's should have flexibility in determining the ultimate size of the caucus. It is recommended that caucuses be no larger than 500 and no smaller than 100. The caucus should be large enough, however, to allow a balanced representation of the provinces, but small enough to ensure the process is manageable.

Baghdad

Baghdad, because of its size, should be treated as a special case. More than one caucus should be established. A combination of the nine districts into three (representing approximately two million people each) would be an appropriate method.

Kurdish region

Caucuses should be formed in each of the three Governorates of the Kurdish region, as in the other parts of Iraq.

Management of the process

The whole process will need to be managed professionally to ensure that the work of the OC is facilitated to a successful conclusion. The OC should select a secretariat to manage the collection of nominations and carrying out of the caucus process. The International Foundation for Electoral Services (IFES) would be available to assist in training the secretariat and providing technical advice to the OC.

Selection of the Transitional National Assembly

The TAL will establish the size of the Assembly, the breakdown of seats by Governorate and criteria for an individual's election. A suggested size for the TNA would be to have 1 delegate for every 100,000 Iraqi citizens. This would produce a TNA of about 260 delegates.

The caucus will elect delegates to the TNA. The caucus may choose to nominate delegates from within the caucus. The caucus may also choose to nominate persons outside of the caucus. Candidates outside the caucus would have to meet the same basic criteria required for membership of the caucus and in addition should obtain the sponsorship of at least 5 caucus members to be considered for election.

Once a Caucus is established, a chair or chair committee should be elected. The OC may choose to name a temporary chair or committee to oversee the election of a permanent chair.


There are a number of methods for electing TNA representatives that could be used. Listed below are two options:

1. Open Proportional List System: Within the Caucus members would form alliances to nominate lists of persons to be considered. The list could be of any size, but no larger than the total number of TNA seats to be filled plus two (to allow for alternates as necessary). Requirements for nominating women to the lists should be defined. For example, it could be required that among the first three candidates on a list, at least one should be a woman, and among the top six candidates at least two should be women, and so on.

Once lists are established, Caucus members would each choose one list to support. In addition, Caucus members would be able to cast their votes for any number of candidates within the list they chose. The distribution of mandates to each list would be based on a proportional system according to the share of votes each list received. The individuals selected from the list to fill the assigned mandates would be determined by the number of votes each received. For example, if a list receives two mandates, the persons receiving the first and second largest vote would be given those mandates. In cases of ties, the order of the list would prevail (e.g., if the first and second listed persons on the list receive the same amount of votes, the person listed first would be given the mandate.) In order to assure that open list voting does not eliminate women candidates from eligibility, the following rule could apply: when allocating candidates from a list, at least one of the first three elected members should be of a different gender, at least two should meet this criterion from the first six, and so on. The Caucus should also seek to ensure that minorities are also represented.

2. Single Transferable Vote (SVT). A group of at least five caucus members may nominate a candidate. The candidate's name should be followed by the name of the nominators as well as the association/group the candidate represents, if appropriate. The names on the ballot are usually arranged in alphabetical order. Once all of the candidates have been nominated, each caucus member casts a vote for his/her first choice, as well as subsequent subsidiary preferences. This is done simply by writing 1, 2, 3, etc. beside the name of each candidate. Once voting is complete, counting is done by a mathematical formula that distributes all ballots according to their first preference. A quota for winning mandates is determined, and the candidates who get more first preference votes than the quota is elected. Ballots are then redistributed according to the next preference, in line with formula defined in the TAL. In this round, candidates receiving more than the established quota are elected. This process is continued until all mandates are filled. The counting procedures are slightly complicated, but are used in many countries. A computer software program has been devised to process the counting and could be available to each Caucus.

Transparency




To allow the greatest transparency and to the extent possible, the deliberations of the OC and the Caucuses should be open to the public and the media.

Role of the CPA

The CPA's supervisory role should be confined to providing logistical, administrative and security support either directly or through contracted elections experts. The CPA should facilitate the work of the OC but not engage in any of the substance. This will be ensured by guaranteeing that the CPA:

- Will not appoint members of the OC, the Caucus or the TNA.
- Will not influence the decisions of the OC or the Caucus in any way.
- Will not favor any particular group or individual in the process.
- Will respect the decisions of the Iraqi bodies charged with these tasks.

The CPA is available to arbitrate any matters, should the OC or Caucuses so request.



*to Governance
General -*

Questions and Answers Regarding the November 15 Agreement

1. Does this new agreement mean the Coalition is "cutting and running" from Iraq?

- No. The agreement is consistent with what has always been the Coalition's fundamental political objective in Iraq – to restore sovereignty and political authority to a representative Iraqi government as soon as possible, under a legal framework ensuring basic freedom and equality, while helping Iraqis draft a permanent constitution embracing federalism, the separation of powers, democracy, and human rights.
- Even after a sovereign Iraqi government is recognized by the end of June 2004, Coalition forces will remain in Iraq at the invitation of that government to help ensure the safety and security of the Iraqi people. We will not leave until our mission is complete.

2. Why did the Coalition change its original seven-step plan to Iraqi sovereignty?

- Our original plan called for the recognition of a sovereign Iraqi government after the drafting of a permanent constitution and the conduct of free, direct elections. After extensive consultations with their fellow citizens, the Governing Council made clear to us that the Iraqi people felt strongly that the drafters of Iraq's permanent constitution should be directly elected by the people.
- Since these elections will take many months to prepare, we agreed with the Governing Council's suggestion that a representative Iraqi government be chosen through a series of caucuses in each governorate, and that this government be given sovereign powers before the drafting of a new constitution is complete. Under the new plan, direct elections will be held by early 2005 for an Iraqi constitutional convention. This new plan ensures a speedy restoration of Iraq's sovereignty in addition to a fully legitimate and democratic constitutional process.

3. How will security be maintained in Iraq after the CPA dissolves?

- In the coming months, the Coalition will work with the Governing Council to write a Security Agreement. This agreement will change the status of Coalition forces from the "occupying power" to an "invited presence."

- For as long as the transitional government deems necessary, Coalition forces will remain in Iraq, working closely with Iraq's security forces to ensure the safety of all citizens.

4. What will be the form of the new government?

- Ultimately, the form of Iraq's government will be settled by Iraq's constitutional convention. This convention will be directly elected by the Iraqi people, and will write a new and permanent constitution in 2005.
- In the period before the constitutional process is completed, Iraq will be governed by a Transitional Administrative Law, to be drafted by the Governing Council in consultation with the CPA. This law will respect the basic freedom and equality of all Iraqis, and will respect the Islamic identity of the majority of the Iraqi people. It will establish a transitional national assembly, an executive branch with a president and/or prime minister and various cabinet ministers, and an independent judiciary. The government will be organized along the principles of federalism and the separation of powers, and it will allow for the devolution of significant authorities to local government. It will also establish civilian control over Iraq's security services.

5. What will be the fate of Iraqi Kurdistan?

- The Transitional Administrative Law will set forth the relationship between central and local governing institutions throughout the country. It will take into account the unique status of the Kurdistan region, while at the same time establishing a unified, federal, and democratic Iraq.

6. How will the Transitional Administrative Law approach the role of Islam?

- The Transitional Administrative Law will respect the Islamic identity of the majority of the Iraqi people, while guaranteeing complete freedom of worship for all Iraqis.

7. Will women have the right to participate in the political process?

- Yes. Women will have full rights to participate, including the right to participate in caucuses on the same basis as men, the right to organize political parties, and the right to serve in the Iraqi transitional government and constitutional convention.

8. How will the caucuses to select representatives for the transitional national assembly be organized?

- Each caucus will be convened by an Organizing Committee of distinguished citizens in each governorate. The caucus will be convened on the basis of nominations collected from throughout the governorate. All civic organizations, political parties, unions, university faculties, women's groups, and local councils will be encouraged to hold meetings to nominate their preferred candidates to the Organizing Committee. Each caucus will be broadly representative of the diversity of the governorate, and will include representatives from all major segments of Iraqi society.
- Once the caucus convenes, it will select delegates to serve in the transitional national assembly. Each governorate will be allocated delegates proportional to its population. All voting in the caucus will be conducted democratically.
- The Transitional Administrative Law will establish the precise mechanisms for organizing the caucuses in each governorate. The CPA will have a role in supervising the caucus procedure, but will not play a part in choosing candidates.

9. How will it be possible to ensure that the Organizing Committee and governorate caucus fairly represent the governorate?

- The Organizing Committee will be composed of appointees of the Governing Council, provincial councils and local councils. In the coming months, the CPA will be working with the Governing Council to ensure that Iraq's local governing bodies fairly represent the diversity of each governorate. In some cases, this will require re-selection of local and provincial councils. In other areas, individuals may be added or removed from these councils. Through this process, it will be possible to ensure that the Organizing Committee – and hence the caucus – in each governorate fairly represents the demographic composition of the local population.

10. How many representatives will each governorate have in the transitional national assembly?

- The Transitional Administrative Law will determine the overall size of the transitional national assembly. Representatives to this assembly will be apportioned among the 18 governorates according to population.

11. What will happen to the Governing Council after the transitional government is recognized in June 2004?

- As noted in the November 15 agreement, the Governing Council will dissolve once the new sovereign transitional government is recognized. Some of its members – though not necessarily all – will likely have won places in the new government.
- This peaceful transfer of power will mark an important historical milestone in Iraq's political transformation from dictatorship to democracy. The Governing Council should be saluted for its work on behalf of the country, and its efforts to ensure that a fully sovereign and fully representative Iraqi transitional government takes power as soon as possible.

12. When will Iraq have democratic elections?

- The Coalition and Governing Council have already begun work to organize elections in Iraq. They will be held as soon as possible – but no later than March 2005 – to choose members of Iraq's constitutional convention. After the permanent constitution is drafted and ratified by the Iraqi people, a second set of elections will be held to choose members of the new government under that permanent constitution. These elections will take place by the end of 2005.



COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY
BAGHDAD

Government

Draft

ACTION MEMO

June 16, 2004

FOR: THE ADMINISTRATOR
FROM: (b)(6) Governance
THROUGH: (b)(6) Governance
SUBJECT: Kirkuk Foundation

Steady progress is being made in setting up the Kirkuk Foundation. Consultants are currently working on the Foundation's by-laws, where to incorporate the Foundation, and in which bank to keep the funds.

We are currently in the process of establishing a Board for the Foundation, consisting of leading Iraqi personalities (eg Adnan Pachachi, Abbas al-Bayati, Yonadam Kanna) chosen for their integrity, and perhaps a couple of international figures. In order to take this forward, we need an Iraqi counterpart to work with and around whom to build the Board.

Attached is a memo to Prime Minister Allawi and President Yawer which describes the Kirkuk Foundation; attached to the memo are suggestions of individuals to serve on the Board and in the Steering Committee

RECOMMENDATION (1): You approve the attached memo to Prime Minister Allawi and President Yawer.

Approve: _____ Disapprove: _____ Approve with modification: _____

RECOMMENDATION (2): You visit Kirkuk with Prime Minister Allawi or President Yawer to announce the Kirkuk Foundation

Approve: _____ Disapprove: _____ Approve with modification: _____

ATTACHMENTS: Memo to Prime Minister Allawi and President Yawer on the Kirkuk Foundation

COORDINATION: General Counsel, (b)(6)
Ministry of Trade, (b)(6)
CPA-N, (b)(6)

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COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY
BAGHDAD

June 10, 2004

FOR: Prime Minister Allawi and President al-Yawar
FROM: Ambassador Bremer
RE: Kirkuk Foundation

We all are aware that Kirkuk is one of the most politically complex issues in Iraq and a number of articles in the TAL make specific mention to it. The potential for conflict in Kirkuk should not be underestimated.

Over the last few months there have been discussions with a number of Iraqis about the establishment of a Kirkuk Foundation to ensure long-term peace and prosperity in the Province of Kirkuk. The Foundation will help to facilitate inter-communal relations, to support community development, and to promote reconciliation. The Foundation will have an endowment of \$100m (\$50m from KRG Oil for Food funds and \$50m from DFI).

The objectives of the Foundation are:

- To facilitate the development of a common vision for the Province of Kirkuk
- To assist with the reintegration of internally displaced people s back into the communities
- To develop an enabling environment for economic development
- To strengthen the professionalism of the security services
- To promote reconciliation, equality and rights
- To develop the capacity of civil society to prevent and resolve conflict

The Foundation will have a Board of highly respected Iraqis, who are not members of the Interim Government (for reasons of attachment of funds). It has also been proposed that a couple of international figures might sit on the Board, contributing comparative experience and expertise. There will also be a Steering Committee comprised of recognized political and community leaders in Kirkuk.

A Project Management Unit – selected by the Board through an international procurement exercise – will manage the dispersal of grants and services, provide expert financial management, and ensure that activities contribute to the overall objectives of the Foundation.

As President and Prime Minister, it might be appropriate for you to identify suitable individuals for the Board and Steering Committee. Attached are suggestions of potential candidates.

ATTACHMENTS: Potential Candidates for the Board and Steering Committee

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COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY
BAGHDAD

The Board of Kirkuk Foundation

Leading Iraqi personalities (who are not part of the Interim Government), chosen for their integrity: eg

- Yonadam Kanna (Assyrian)
- Adnan Pachachi (Arab Sunni)
- Abbas al-Bayati (Turkmen Shia)

To be determined: international figures, eg President of the International Crisis Group, Director of the Jordanian Hashemite Fund for Development, Representative of US Ambassador, Representative of UK Ambassador

Role of Board

- Contribution of policy recommendations on Kirkuk issues, in accordance with the provisions set out in the Transitional Administrative Law
- Appointment of Steering Committee
- Selection of the Project Management Unit
- Setting of by-laws for Foundation
- Final grant-making body: reviews process for project selection and the recommendations of the PMU, and makes final assignment of funding

The Steering Committee of the Kirkuk Foundation

Influential political and community leaders of the Province, committed to co-existence

Non-voting member: Director of the PMU

Approved by the Board

Meets fortnightly

Role of the Steering Committee

- Development of vision for Kirkuk
- Setting priorities for project funding
- Approval of projects to be funded
- Monitoring of project activity

Potential Steering Committee members

Muzaffer Arslan

Saad al-Din Amin

Tahseen Ali

Sheikh Anwar al-Assi

Rokan Ali

Louis Sako

Feridun Abdul Kader

Sayyid Muhsin al-Batat

Sargon Lazar

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