22

Draft CG's Initial Guidance
for
The Next 45 Days(v1.1)

& Transition

FULL TEXT (Summary in Point Form Follows)

I need to re-evaluate our current position and the options that are open to me.

I am concerned that the Security line of operation is being isolated – we are doing 'more of the same' in our security ops and yet we face specific challenges in security in the immediate future.

I feel that I am not getting the best from those areas where CF can impact on Governance, the Economy and Essential Services.

I want to regain the initiative. I want to pre-empt the enemy.

I want to look at my situation in terms of what I can do along the four Campaign Plan lines of operation to regain the initiative.

Do not limit yourself to Security because that is our comfort zone.

Perhaps we can act pre-emptively in Governance, the Economy and Essential Services as much or more than we can in Security.

My focus is on the period up to Sovereignty. But whatever we do must fit in to the long term need to ultimately conduct successful elections. But I repeat, my focus is on the period up to Sovereignty. We are examining the medium term (the elections) in a separate planning exercise.

I do not want principles or generalities. I want practical solutions that can be applied in the short term that impact on the next 45 days. Options must be convertible into practical tasks.

Initiatives themselves must be individually Red Teamed, and the overall strategy, once I choose a range of options, must also be Red Teamed.

Security

I want to maintain our current high rate of effort in Security, but I want a range of options that allows me to regain the security initiative.

I am prepared to examine radical options as long as they are practical.

An increased emphasis on the partnership with emerging ISF is mandatory. What form that increased emphasis takes must be considered. Options involving a significant redeployment of CF forces to the ISF training function are to be considered. Also, we must take a position on the integration of Militia into the ICDC. Is the Fallujah Brigade a viable Option and if so, how do we implement it on a wider scale and with what conditions? But they must be Red Teamed, be feasible within acceptable risk, fit into an overall plan and be capable of producing results within the time frame being considered.

Other suggestions such as creating an effective chain of command for the ISF, utilizing IZ LNO, directing more joint patrols, stepping back from certain areas and only providing a QRF, could form part of a menu that I will choose from.

Other options might be to redeploy significant forces to the borders, rationalize our use of LOC, or rationalize our base structure must be considered. Consider everything.

Economy

I want to examine the effect of being able to use funds more freely to take young men off the street, to encourage a sense of local ownership of infrastructure, and to empower local leadership.

Assume that I can obtain funds if required. Tell me what the log jam is, so that I can break it.

Bearpark

I want to free current funds from bureaucratic restrictions on their use and transfer discretion to MSCs. I do not want an option to be: "Provide funds to MSC's". I want it to be in the nature of; "Release $500,000 to each MSC – this can be effected within one week from X Fund and is legal".

?

Governance

There is a vacuum of political guidance. I will continue to attempt to influence the political/UN side on this issue. However, this may not be forthcoming – assume that such guidance will be late, and identify what assumptions we have to make.

We may have to take over certain parts of the Governance support function if it is important to us and the CPA cannot continue to do so. Make recommendations on this.

Consider how we can be best poised to support whatever the Brahimi Plan becomes.

Essential Services

The MSC are currently making a significant contribution to the maintenance of essential services. What are my options for reinforcing that effort in the immediate future? Projects that assist the infrastructure, are related to essential services, provide employment and enhance local leadership are to be a priority. I want specific projects that deliver now. MSC may know these at the local level, but we need to superimpose on their activities with a National perspective.

I know that I must protect infrastructure, especially given recent seemingly coordinated attacks and the promise of more to come. Balance this in priority with what we are doing now, and examine the risk. Answer the question – 'Is the protection of infrastructure more important over the next 45 days than anything we are currently doing?' Identify specific infrastructure and the forces that they may need. Identify what we need to stop doing, and what the risk is.

General Guidance

I want the individual options to be tied into COAs within the Lines of Operations (EG a Security COA) and then tied in to an overall synchronized plan.

I do not expect a long and detailed plan, but I want practical outcomes that can be implemented immediately.

Consider whether I should focus the effects of this plan on one area, such as Baghdad, or on several areas, or across the country.

I am prepared to accept some risk in the use of funds.

Planning must be tied together by IO (this must be a major aspect of what we do, it must be central), there must a plan to synchronize the effects, and the action of the enemy must be considered at each step.

I do not want the planning cycle to be too long. I want to be giving orders to execute in 7 days. Look at how we can use the MSC Commanders when they are in Baghdad on 15 May.

If you discover anything that needs doing within this planning timeframe (7 days), pass the recommendation to C3 Ops for review as immediate action.

Conduct a rapid but formal planning process. Consider this to be Commander's Initial Guidance. I wish to give you Commander's Guidance once you have conducted a Mission Analysis, and then I want to choose individual options within the four lines of operations. Having done that, I then want to choose the overall plan that orchestrates all the effects that delivers me the initiative and pre-empts the enemy in the next 45 days.

SUMMARY OF THE ABOVE (in point form)

Re-evaluate our current position and options open.

Security line of operation is being isolated
- we are doing 'more of the same' in our security ops
- yet we face specific challenges in security in the immediate future.

Not getting the best from those areas where MNF-I can impact on Governance, the Economy and Essential Services.

Regain the initiative. Pre-empt the enemy. Along the four lines.

Act pre-emptively in Governance, the Economy and Essential Services, as much or more than in Security.

Focus on period up to Sovereignty. Fit in to the long term need to ultimately conduct successful elections.

Not want principles or generalities. Want practical solutions that can be applied in the short term that impact on the next 45 days. Options must be convertible into practical tasks.

Red Teamed initiatives and the overall strategy.

Security

Maintain our current high rate of effort in Security, but I want a range of options that allows me to regain the security initiative.

Examine radical options as long as they are practical.

Increased emphasis on the partnership with emerging IZ forces is mandatory.
- Form of increased emphasis must be considered.
- Options involving a significant redeployment of forces to the ISF training function are to be considered.
- Must be Red Teamed, be feasible within acceptable risk, fit into an overall plan and be capable of producing results within the time frame being considered.

Form a menu that I will choose from
- creating an effective chain of command for the ISF,
- utilizing IZ LNO,
- directing more joint patrols,
- stepping back from certain areas and only providing a QRF

Other options:
- to redeploy significant forces to the borders,
- rationalize our use of LOC,
- rationalize our base structure
- etc

Economy

Examine being able to use funds more freely
- to take young men off the street,
- to encourage a sense of local ownership of infrastructure
- to empower local leadership.

Assume that I can obtain funds if required. What the log jam is, I can break it.

Transfer funds discretion to MSCs.
- I do not want an option to be: "Provide funds to MSC's".
- I want it to be in the nature of; "Release $500,000 to each MSC – this can be effected within one week from X fund and is legal".

Governance
Vacuum of political guidance.
- attempt to influence the political/UN side on this issue.
- assume that such guidance will be late, and identify what assumptions

We may have to take over certain parts of the Governance support function if it is important to us and the CPA cannot continue to do so. Make recommendations.

Essential Services

The MSC are currently making a significant contribution to the maintenance of essential services.
- What are my options for reinforcing that effort in the immediate future.
- Projects that assist the infrastructure, are related to essential services, provide employment and enhance local leadership are to be a priority.
- I want specific projects that deliver now.
- MSC may know these at the local level, but we need to superimpose on their activities with a National perspective.

I know that I must protect infrastructure, especially given recent seemingly coordinated attacks and the promise of more to come.
- Balance this in priority with what we are doing now, and examine the risk.
- Answer the question – Is the protection of infrastructure more important over the next 45 days than anything we are currently doing? Identify specific infrastructure and the forces that they may need. Identify what we need to stop doing, and what the risk is.

General Guidance

Individual options to be tied into COAs within the Lines of Operations (EG a Security COA) and then tied in to an overall synchronized plan.

Not expect a long and detailed plan
    I want practical outcomes that can be implemented immediately.

Focus the effects of this plan on one area, such as Baghdad, or on several areas, or across the country.

Prepared to accept some risk in the use of funds.

Planning must be tied together by IO
There must a plan to synchronize the effects
Action of the enemy must be considered at each step.

Planning cycle not too long.
    I want to be giving orders to execute in 7 days.
    Look at how we can use the MSC Commanders when they are in Baghdad on 15 May.

Conduct a rapid but formal planning process.
    Consider this to be Commander's Initial Guidance.
    I wish to give you Commander's Guidance once you have conducted a Mission Analysis, and then I want to choose individual options within the four lines of operations.
    Having done that, I want to then choose the overall plan that orchestrates all the effects, that delivers the initiative and pre-empts the enemy in the next 45 days.

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~ [redacted]

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EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

040514-10

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National Security Presidential Directive/NSPD-36:
United States Government Operations in Iraq

MEMORANDUM FOR:

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

May 11, 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR RECIPIENTS OF NSPD-36

SUBJECT: Distribution of NSPD-36

Attached is your agency's copy of National Security Presidential Directive-36. Although the text of NSPD-36 is unclassified, we ask that the distribution of this document be strictly controlled in order to protect the format (which will be used for subsequent National Security Presidential Directives). Your cooperation is appreciated.

Gregory L. Schulte
Executive Secretary

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 10, 2004

NATIONAL SECURITY PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE/NSPD-36

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
THE SECRETARY OF INTERIOR
THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE
THE SECRETARY OF LABOR
THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES
THE SECRETARY OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT
THE SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION
THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY
THE SECRETARY OF EDUCATION
THE SECRETARY OF VETERAN AFFAIRS
THE SECRETARY OF HOMELAND SECURITY
CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT
DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR ECONOMIC POLICY
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: United States Government Operations in Iraq

We have seen a period of significant advancement in Iraq, as the yoke of Saddam Hussein's tyranny has been thrown off and democracy and economic reform have begun to take root. With the termination of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) not later than June 30, 2004 and the re-establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and a sovereign Iraqi government, our efforts in Iraq will take on new and formidable challenges that must be met successfully.

During these critical times, we must organize to advance these gains and establish and sustain a strong bilateral relationship. When the CPA is terminated, the United States will be represented in Iraq by a Chief of Mission, who on my behalf and under the guidance of the Secretary of State, shall be responsible for the direction, coordination and supervision of all United States Government employees, policies, and activities in country, except those under the command of an area military commander, and employees seconded to an International Organization.

Commander, USCENTCOM, under the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense, shall continue to be responsible for U.S. efforts with respect to security and military operations in Iraq. In all activities, the Chief of Mission and Commander, USCENTCOM shall ensure the closest cooperation and mutual support.

The Secretary of State shall be responsible for the continuous supervision and general direction of all assistance for Iraq. Commander, USCENTCOM, with the policy guidance of the Chief of Mission, shall direct all United States Government efforts and coordinate international efforts in support of organizing, equipping, and training all Iraqi security forces. At the appropriate time, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense shall jointly decide when these functions shall transfer to a security assistance organization and other appropriate organizations under the authority of the Secretary of State and the Chief of Mission that will be staffed in accordance with NSDD-38 of June 2, 1982.

The U.S. Mission in Baghdad and an office in the Department of State will assume from the CPA those authorities and responsibilities that continue after CPA termination.

I establish, in accordance with Title 5, United States Code, section 3161, a temporary organization within the Department of State and, if the Secretary of State so designates, within the U.S. Mission in Baghdad, called the Iraq Reconstruction Management Office (IRMO) to facilitate the transition in Iraq. The IRMO will be headed by a Director selected by the Secretary of State, and its staff may include, as determined by the Secretary: (1) personnel with relevant expertise detailed on a non-reimbursable basis from other United States Government agencies; (2) senior and other technical advisors; (3) personnel from other Coalition partner governments; and (4) such other personnel as the Secretary may direct to support that effort.

The Secretary shall regularly evaluate the staffing requirements of this organization.

I also establish, in accordance with Title 5, United States Code, section 3161, a temporary organization within the Department of Defense to be called the Project and Contracting Office (PCO) to provide acquisition and project management support with respect to activities in Iraq, as requested by the Secretary of State and heads of other Departments and agencies. The Secretary of Defense in consultation with the Secretary of State shall select a Director for PCO. PCO personnel in Iraq shall be permanently or temporarily assigned under Chief of Mission authority. PCO shall provide acquisition and project management support to the Chief of Mission. PCO's services may include engineering, auditing, and other contract-related services.

The effort to build a strong bilateral relationship with the Government of Iraq and support Iraq as it makes the transition to democracy must have the full commitment of all agencies. To accomplish our mission, I direct the heads of U.S. departments and agencies to provide, on a non-reimbursable basis, assistance, services and other support, to include security, medical, logistical and administrative support and details of personnel, with respect to U.S. activities in Iraq. To the maximum extent possible, the Secretary of State shall identify for the heads of relevant departments and agencies the expected requirements for non-reimbursable support for their use in preparing future budget requests. The Director of the Office of Management and Budget shall ensure that future budget submissions request the funding and authorities I determine necessary to support the U.S. Mission in Iraq.

This NSPD shall be effective immediately, shall constitute an Executive order solely for purposes of 5 U.S.C. 3161, and shall not be subject to Executive order 11030 of June 19, 1962, as amended. The CPA shall terminate not later than June 30, 2004. Upon the termination of the CPA, this NSPD supersedes NSPD-24, dated January 20, 2003.

Location	Title	Name	Email	Dep Date
Baghdad	Women's Issues	(b)(6) [redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]
Arbil	Polad	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]
Najaf	Polad	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]
Dhi Qar	Deputy GC	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]
Baghdad	Deputy Director	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]
Al Anbar	Public Affairs Officer	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]
Babil	Coordinator	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]
Salah ad Din	Polad	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]
Babil	Deputy GC	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]
Salah ad Din	Public Affairs Officer	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]
Al Hilliah	Regional Coordinator	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]
Karbala	Polad	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]
Baghdad	USAID Liaison	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]
Baghdad	OMS	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]
Al Qadisiyah	Coordinator	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]
Karbala	Coordinator	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]
Maysan	Coordinator	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]
Maysan	Polad	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]
Baghdad	Coordinator	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]
Baghdad	Governance Advisor	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]
Baghdad	Deputy Director	[redacted]	[redacted]	1-Jul-04
Baghdad	Director	[redacted]	[redacted]	1-Jul-04
Arbil	Public Affairs Officer	[redacted]	[redacted]	1-Jul-04
Dahuk	Coordinator	[redacted]	[redacted]	1-Jul-04
Dahuk	Public Affairs Officer	[redacted]	[redacted]	1-Jul-04
Diyala	Coordinator	[redacted]	[redacted]	1-Jul-04
Diyala	Polad	[redacted]	[redacted]	1-Jul-04
Ninawah	Polad	[redacted]	[redacted]	1-Jul-04
Ninawah	Public Affairs Officer	[redacted]	[redacted]	1-Jul-04
Tamim	Deputy GC	[redacted]	[redacted]	1-Jul-04
Al Qadisiyah	Polad	[redacted]	[redacted]	1-Jul-04
Babil	Polad	[redacted]	[redacted]	1-Jul-04
Najaf	Coordinator	[redacted]	[redacted]	1-Jul-04
Wasit	Deputy GC	[redacted]	[redacted]	1-Jul-04
Al Muthanna	Coordinator	[redacted]	[redacted]	1-Jul-04
Basrah	Polad	[redacted]	[redacted]	4-Jul-04
Sulaymaniyah	Coordinator	[redacted]	[redacted]	5-Jul-04
Salah ad Din	Deputy GC	[redacted]	[redacted]	10-Jul-04
Al Anbar	Polad	[redacted]	[redacted]	12-Jul-04
Al Muthanna	Polad	[redacted]	[redacted]	14-Jul-04
Dahuk	Deputy GC	[redacted]	[redacted]	15-Jul-04

Location	Title	Name	Email	Dep Date
Al Anbar	Coordinator	(b)(6) [redacted]	[redacted]	15-Jul-04
Al Qadisiyah	Deputy GC	[redacted]	[redacted]	15-Jul-04
Baghdad	Deputy CIV ED Coord	[redacted]	[redacted]	18-Jul
Baghdad	TNA Admin Officer	[redacted]	[redacted]	18-Jul-04
Baghdad	Deputy GC	[redacted]	[redacted]	22-Jul-04
Baghdad	GC Liaison	[redacted]	[redacted]	27-Jul-04
Najaf	Public Affairs Officer	[redacted]	[redacted]	27-Jul-04
Al Anbar	Deputy GC	[redacted]	[redacted]	31-Jul-04
Ninawah	Deputy GC	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]
Baghdad	Polad	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]
Baghdad	Transition Policy Officer	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]
Sulaymaniyah	Deputy GC	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]
Sulaymaniyah	Public Affairs Officer	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]
Karbala	Prog. Mgr.	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]
Baghdad	Political/Ministries	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]
Baghdad	OMS	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]
Maysan	Public Affairs Officer	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]
Ninawah	Coordinator	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]
Tamim	Polad	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]
Baghdad	Women/Elections	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]
Baghdad	Fund Manager	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]
Arbil	Coordinator	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]
Babil	Public Affairs Officer	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]
Salah ad Din	Coordinator	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]
Najaf	Deputy GC	[redacted]	[redacted]	
Dhi Qar	Polad	[redacted]	[redacted]	

US Mission Iraq, Country Team



MNF-I Commander

Ambassador

Area Spt Group 80

MNF-I DCG 389

DCMA 20

Resident in Embassy but not under CoM

Deputy Chief of Mission

7 Exec Office

Executive Secretariat 10

MGT* 34

Consular 3

ECON 7

POL 6

POL-MIL 9

14 Provincial Outreach**

Security 43

PAO 7

Strat m*** 28/3

Legal e*** 2/3

Com Pub Integrity 27

Oil for Food 3

Ministry Advisors 155

IRMO 35

ORA 120

EPA 1

DoL 1

DoT 3

Treasury 3

DHS 26

Justice Total: 92

4 ATF

12 OPDAT

15 FBI

4 ICITAP

50 RCAO

7 USM

FAS 2

FCS 3

HHS 4

USAID 98

USAID/ RIG 8

APCO 110

DCAA 18

DIA 43

Legend:

DoS 140

Other DoS Unit 388

DoD 171

Other Agencies 241

* Management : includes CLO, FMO, GSO, HR, IMO, MED, OBO

** Provincial Teams: Baghdad Central-included in DoS Unit total (18); Hilla (8); Kirkuk (8); Basra (8) Mosul (8).

*** DoS/DoD Team: Legal Office: 2 DoS; 3 MNF-I; Strat Comm: 28 DoS; 3 MNF-I

940 Number of US positions under CoM

CPA – U.S. Mission-Baghdad Transition Redeployment Plan

Ambassador John C. Holzman
ITPT Team Leader
April 25, 2004

MISSION

- Define a transition redeployment plan that will contribute to CPA becoming U.S. Mission-Baghdad
  - Includes: DoS, DoD, and other Executive Branch personnel, Military, Contractors and FSNs
  - Transitions personnel "out" as well as "in"

Transition Redeployment Plan Objectives

- Write Redeployment Plan in concert with CPA's Strategic Goals
  - Security
  - Essential Services
  - Economy
  - Governance
  - Strategic Communications
- Focused on…
  - Power Ministries
  - Heightened Security
  - Essential / Non-essential Personnel
  - Taking care of people
    - Transport, checking out, transition to personal life
    - More needed -- Awards, other forms of recognition, CPA farewell celebration for all employees


CPA to US Mission-Baghdad Transition
1600
1400
1200
1000
800
600
400
200
0
Individuals
1,521
1,455
1,377
1,099
868
707
616
781
313
Start
MidMay
EndMay
MidJun
EndJun
MidJul
EndJul
US Mission
Month
■US Mission Deployment ■CPA Redeployment Transition ☐Other US Agencies ■IRMO/HSG



Power Ministries
Redeployment Transition


All Other Ministries
Redeployment Transition
300
250
200
150
100
50
0
Individuals
280
266
246
192
129
104
82
102
102
102
Start
MidMay
EndMay
MidJun
EndJun
MidJul
EndJul
interval
Sum All Other Ministries
All Other Ministries End State


Key CPA Organizations
Redeployment Transition
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350
300
250
200
150
100
50
0
Individuals
359
352
333
294
243
186
149
104
104
104
Key CPA Organizations
StratComm
Provincial Outreach
Governance Team
Baghdad Central
HQ Support Group
Chief Policy Officer
Chief Operating Officer
Executive Secretariat
Start
MidMay
EndMay
MidJun
EndJun
MidJul
EndJul
Interval
Sum Key CPA Orgs
Key CPA Orgs End State

NEXT STEPS

- Early May through June Redeployment
  - Ties personnel movement to mission goals
  - Selected personnel present to the end
- Maintain CPA mission capabilities while redeploying personnel
  - Execute OPLAN
  - ITPT manages and COO executes
- Maintain positive control of process
  - Movement leads identified in each organization
  - Track personnel out and in flow

ISSUES

- Based on a snapshot in time, not perfect resolution
  - Work in progress… continue refinement of personnel data and movement requirements
- IRMO & PMO -- No decisions from Washington
- Governances and Provinces -- No decisions from Washington
- CJTF7 Reorganization -- In process
- Complete elements of the US Mission: NSDD 38 -- In process
- Security -- increasing threat could speed or slow transition redeployment plan

QUESTIONS?

TRANSITION TEAM'S JOB

- April 10: Assumed responsibility for defining the transition plan
  - Surveyed all CPA elements and tenants
  - Established a personnel data base that captures:
    - Current listing of personnel by organization
    - Transition dates
  - Defined transition plans for each current CPA element
  - Developed a written redeployment plan (operations plan) that defines all requirements for movement and out-processing
    - Personnel; Logistics; Finance; Medical; Strategic Communications

Personnel Movement Database Development



1. Data Collection

HRM Database

CPA On-Board Count

Office Surveys

Billeting Database

Badging Database

2. Data Consolidation

3. Data Validation

✓ **Chief Policy Officer**

✓ **Chief of Staff**

✓ **Chief Operating Officer**

Chief Information Officer
Iraq

The office of the CIO is to Consolidate IT requirements and standardize IT procurements at the PMO



Step1
Conduct an inventory of IT requirements for the Ministries

LAN
Ministry CIO
Email
Accounting/GL
WAN
Internet
HR/Payroll
VSAT
Ministry

Step2
Categorize requirements:
- Applications
- Infrastructure & Architecture
- Organization & Operations
- Training

Applications
- Accounting/GL
- Internet
- Email
- HR/Payroll

Infrastructure & Architecture
- LAN
- WAN
- VSAT

Organization & Operations
- Ministry CIO
- Req. Analysts
- Training

Ministry

Step3
Prioritize & Standardize Procurement:
- Short term
- Long term
- Open standard / Microsoft office suite

Short term
- Ministry CIO
- VSAT
- Email
- HR/Payroll
- Data Center
- LAN
- Req. Analysts
- Training

PMO Procurement Standards

Long term
- Internet
- Accounting/GL
- WAN

Ministry

Office of the CIO plan milestones

1. Issue CIO standards for PMO procurement
2. Work with Ministries to :
   a. Inventory IT requirements
   b. Plan Ministry connection to the network
3. Assess Ministry and Ministry-CIO training requirements
4. Develop internet portal for the Iraqi Government
5. Work with PMO to provide oversight over procurement standards
   a. Setup shadow CIO office at PMO
   b. Establish 2 national data centers

Government Connectivity - WBB – Baghdad

- Point-to-point wireless solution for key locations and infrastructure
- Complements/replaces VSAT interim solution



Government and Other Connectivity – Baghdad

- WiMax Overlay (point-to-multipoint) for greater service area coverage



Example Rollout

- 9 Microwave Nodes
- 5 WiMax OFDM Cells
- 40,000+ user initial capability
- End user speeds >1.5mbps
- First links (i.e. ministries) operational within 90 days of funding
- Ubiquitous service capability for metro-Baghdad

MoC/CIO/Ministry Relationships



CIO Function

- Iraqi CIO:
  - Cross functional (IT across ministries)
  - Sets standards; provides guidelines
  - Develops future vision for Iraqi gov't IT
- PMO CIO "Shadow Function"
  - Executes vision
  - Builds to Iraqi CIO Approved Standards
  - Economies of Scale (combine like reqmts)
  - Works across all sectors
  - Coordinates projects with Iraqi CIO
  - For Trans/comm sector: "more of the same"

Item of Discussion for
Executive Board
2 May 04

Amb Jones

NATIONAL SECURITY PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE/NSPD – XX

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
THE SECRETARY OF INTERIOR
THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE
THE SECRETRY OF LABOR
THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES
THE SECRETARY OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT
THE SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION
THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY
THE SECRETARY OF EDUCATION
THE SECRETARY OF VETERAN AFFAIRS
CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT
DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
DIRECTOR OF HOMELAND SECURITY
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR ECONOMIC POLICY
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

SUBJECT: United States Government Operations in Iraq

We have seen a period of significant advancement in Iraq, as the yoke of Saddam Hussein's tyranny has been thrown off and democracy and economic reform have begun to take root. With the dissolution of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) not later than June 30, 2004 and the re-establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and a sovereign Iraqi government, our efforts in Iraq will take on new and formidable challenges that must be met successfully.

During these critical times, we must organize to advance these gains and establish and sustain a strong bilateral relationship. When the CPA dissolves, the United States will be represented in Iraq by a Chief of Mission who on my behalf and under the guidance of the Secretary of State, shall be responsible for the direction, coordination and supervision of all U.S. government employees, policies and activities in country, except those under the command of an area military commander, or employees seconded to an International Organization.

Under the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense Commander, USCENTCOM shall continue to be responsible for U.S. efforts with respect to security and military operations in Iraq. In all activities, the Chief of Mission and Commander, USCENTCOM shall ensure the closest cooperation and mutual support.

The Secretary of State shall be responsible for the continuous supervision and general direction of all assistance for Iraq. Commander, USCENTCOM, with the policy guidance of the Chief of Mission, shall direct all USG efforts and coordinate international efforts in support of organizing, equipping, and training all Iraqi security forces. At the appropriate time, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense shall jointly decide when these functions shall transfer to a security assistance organization and other appropriate organizations under the authority of the Secretary of State and the Chief of Mission that will be staffed in accordance with NSDD 38 of June 2, 1982.

The U.S. Mission in Baghdad and an office in the Department of State will assume those CPA authorities and responsibilities that continue.

I establish, in accordance with Title 5, United States Code, section 3161, a temporary organization within the Department of State and, if the Secretary of State so designates, within the U.S. Mission in Baghdad, called the Iraq Reconstruction Management Office (IRMO) to facilitate the transition in Iraq. The IRMO will be headed by a Director selected by the Secretary of State, and its staff may include, as determined by the Secretary: (1) personnel with relevant expertise detailed on a non-reimbursable basis from other USG agencies; (2) senior and other technical advisors; (3) personnel from other Coalition partner governments; and (4) such other personnel as the Secretary may direct to support that effort. The Secretary shall regularly evaluate the staffing requirements of this organization.

I also establish, in accordance with Title 5, United States Code, section 3161, a temporary organization within the Department of Defense to be called the Project and Contracting Office (PCO) to provide acquisition and project management support with respect to activities in Iraq, as requested by the Secretary of State and heads of other Departments and agencies. The Secretary of Defense in consultation with the Secretary of State shall select a Director for PCO. PCO personnel in Iraq shall be permanently or temporarily assigned under Chief of Mission authority. PCO shall provide acquisition and project management support to the Chief of Mission. PCO's services may include engineering, auditing and other contract-related services.

The effort to build a strong bilateral relationship with the Government of Iraq and support Iraq as it makes the transition to democracy must have the full commitment of all agencies. To accomplish our mission, I direct the heads of US departments and agencies to provide, on a non-reimbursable basis, assistance, services and other support, to include security, medical, logistical and administrative support and details of personnel, with respect to U.S. activities in Iraq. To the maximum extent possible, the Secretary of State shall identify for the heads of relevant departments and agencies the expected requirements for non-reimbursable support for their use in preparing future budget requests. The Director of the Office of Management and Budget shall ensure that future budget submissions request the necessary funding and authorities to support the U.S. Mission in Iraq.

This NSPD shall be effective immediately. The CPA shall dissolve not later than June 30, 2004. Upon the dissolution of the CPA, this NSPD supersedes NSPD-24, dated January 20, 2003.

2603

Action: Transition Time

Laser1:
ACTION: EXEC
INFO: IPC COS

DISSEMINATION: EXEC /1
CHARGE: PROG

APR 24 2004

Jones
Holzman
GSO

VZCZCBGO821
PP RUEHGB
DE RUEHC #1109 1142109
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 232108Z APR 04
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO CPA BAGHDAD PRIORITY 0774
BT
UNCLAS STATE 091109

FROM OBO DIRECTOR (b)(6) TO AMBASSADOR HOLZMAN

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ABLD, AMGT, ASEC
SUBJECT: SPACE PLANNING FOR INTERIM EMBASSY FACILITIES

1. The OBO Space Planning Team will arrive in Kuwait on April 29th and proceed to Baghdad as soon as practical. The team members are:

(b)(6)
OBO/PD/PDD
OBO/PD/PEA
OBO/PE/ADB

2. In conjunction with the space planning effort, team members will also be meeting with staff to refine a statement of work for the next phase on the interim facilities project. That work is intimately related to the space planning and will include access controls, hardlines, and technical security measures.

3. Please have as much of the following information as possible ready for team arrival.

A. Current space assignment information.

B. Listings of organizations and functions that are planned to move to other locations.

C. Listings of organizations and functions that will move into the annex.

4. For initial planning purposes the team will be using the following assumptions:

A. Staff that is not planned to remain in the Annex, see staffing plan, will vacate it in time to allow new embassy staff to occupy it by July 1, 2004.

B. The cafeteria will remain in the Annex in its present location.

C. No one will reside in the Annex.

D. Space will be provided in the Annex, for IRMO coalition advisors, up to 45. (These are in addition to the 155 US ministry advisors included in IRMO.)

E. Staff that will remain in the Annex, e.g., MNFI personnel, will stay in their present locations unless there is a compelling reason to relocate them.

F. Desk space will be provided in the Annex for up to 50 United Nations staff.

G. All US government personnel under the authority of the Chief of Mission will be relocated from the Convention Center to either the interim Chancery or Annex.

H. The interim Chancery is being designed to accommodate 42 desk positions, which will include Consular Affairs.

I. The interim chancery will be an unclassified building.

J. The total planned desk population of the interim Chancery and Annex (palace) is 1,510 including 406 Locally Engaged Staff (LES). Of this total 191 desk positions will be located in the Embassy,s Controlled Access Area (CAA) in the Annex. The remaining 1,319 desk positions will be located outside the Embassy CAA in either the Annex or Chancery.

K. Staff that is not under the authority of the Chief of Mission but located in the Annex will be subject to its own standards for classified operations and the space it occupies will not be considered Embassy CAA.

L. No new furniture will be purchased for the Annex. Existing furnishings will be used. Furniture for the Chancery is being acquired as part of the ongoing construction contract, i.e. 42 workstations, and other furniture shown in the contract documents.

5. We are looking forward to working with you in establishing Post Baghdad.

6. Minimize considered.
POWELL
BT
#1109
NNNN

Proposed Mission Baghdad Staffing 4/23/2004

NOTE: Data reflect known and projected positions to date and are subject to change.

	US		**LES**		**NSDD 38**
AGENCY	**desk**	**non-desk**	**desk**	**non-desk**	**received?**
State (See NOTE 1)	141	0	155	TBD	n/a
Other State units (See NOTE 2)					
Other State unit: Baghdad Central	25	TBD	TBD	TBD	n/a
Other State unit: Com for Public Integrity (Just)	27	TBD	TBD	TBD	n/a
Other State unit: Stratcom (civ & mil)	100	0	35	TBD	n/a
Other State unit: Oil for Food	3	0	0	0	n/a
Other State unit: Ministry Advisors (FINAL)	155	0	0	0	n/a
Other State unit: IRMO Management	35	0	65	0	n/a
Other State unit: Legal Office	1	0	3	0	n/a
Other State unit: ORA	120	TBD	TBD	TBD	n/a
Agriculture/FAS	2	0	3	1	yes
Commerce/FCS	3	0	7	1	yes
Defense/ACOE	39	TBD	TBD	TBD	NO
Defense/DCAA	20	0	0	0	yes
Defense/DIA	43	0	2	6	yes
Defense/OSC	6	0	2	1	yes
Defense/Army/APCO (See NOTE 3)	110	TBD	TBD	TBD	NO
DHS (estimated 12 total)	12				
DHS/BPT	TBD	TBD	TBD	TBD	NO
DHS/CBP	TBD	TBD	TBD	TBD	NO
DHS/ICE	TBD	TBD	TBD	TBD	NO
DHS/TSA	TBD	TBD	TBD	TBD	NO
EPA	1	0	1	0	yes
HHS	4	0	0	0	yes
Justice/ATF	4	0	0	0	yes
Justice/CRIM/OPDAT	9	3	4	0	yes
Justice/FBI	7	0	0	0	yes
Justice/ICITAP	4	0	6	0	yes
Justice/RCAO (See NOTE 4)	50	TBD	TBD	TBD	NO
Justice/US Marshals	4	3	0	0	yes
Labor	1	0	0	0	NO
Transportation	3	0	1	0	NO
Treasury	3	0	1	0	NO
USAID	22	0	126	122	yes
USAID/RIG	8	0	2	0	yes
TOTAL	**962**	**6**	**413**	**131**	

Total US: **968**
Total LES: **544**
Grand Total: **1512**

Proposed Mission Baghdad Staffing

4/23/2004

Not under COM authority but in Embassy		
Defense		
MNF-I in Embassy	389	n/a
MNF-I Area Support Group	80	n/a
MNF-I Legal Office	3	n/a
DCMA	20	n/a
Special Tribunal (Contract)	50-70	n/a

The following agencies have informed State that they will have no permanent Iraq presence

Energy
Interior
Justice/DEA (See NOTE 5)
NASA
Peace Corps
Secret Service
Social Security
Treasury/IRS

Notes

NOTE 1: State phasing FSN: FY04 83 to FY06 155; desk/non-desk not yet identified

NOTE 2: Other State units - all numbers are estimates, except for Ministry Advisors; will phase in and out depending on need, normally 3161 or TDYers. This category includes all functions previously performed by CPA.

NOTE 3: APCO includes 110 DH, 35 contr, 10 Coal

NOTE 4: RCAO = Regime Crimes Advisor's Office

NOTE 5: DEA anticipates using TDY teams.

[redacted]

Action: Transition Team

Laser1:
ACTION: EXEC
INFO: COS IPC

DISSEMINATION: EXEC /1
CHARGE: PROG

VZCZCBGO554
OO RUEHGB
DE RUEHC #9241/01 1130255
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 220252Z APR 04
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO ALL DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR POSTS IMMEDIATE
SPECIAL EMBASSY PROGRAM IMMEDIATE
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE IMMEDIATE 2845
RUEHGB/CPA BAGHDAD IMMEDIATE 0718
BT
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 STATE 089241

APR 22, 2004

Bremer
Jones ✓
Redd
Holzman
Smith
Stratcomm
Governance.
MPA
OPO
CJTF-7

~~SENSITIVE~~

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: AMGT, IZ
SUBJECT: ESTABLISHING US MISSION BAGHDAD

(U) ~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~. PLEASE PROTECT ACCORDINGLY

SUMMARY
----

1. (U) This is an action request. This telegram has been cleared by SEP.

2. ~~(SBU)~~ The State Department is working closely with the Department of Defense and other USG agencies to establish a US Mission in Baghdad on July 1. Our future Mission Baghdad will resemble that of other large US Embassies in countries where we have a broad range of bilateral and multilateral interests and major military and economic assistance programs. Nonetheless, given the complexity of US interests in Iraq and the scale of US resources devoted to them, US Mission Baghdad will have some unique features.

3. ~~(SBU)~~ Mission Baghdad will represent the US Government to the Government of Iraq and assist Iraqis in making their country secure, free and prosperous. We plan to open a US Office in Baghdad in May as a key step toward creating a US Mission to take final charge of US interests

from July 1. Meanwhile, throughout the coming months, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) will complete its work and transition responsibilities. After July 1, we will coordinate with Coalition partners in capitals and through their respective Embassies in Baghdad.

4. ~~(SBU)~~ This cable sets out a snapshot of plans to stand up US Embassy Baghdad. Action request: Posts in the countries that support the Coalition and/or are troop contributing nations (see list in paragraph 17) should brief host governments on our plans, invite their views, and report on their plans for representation in Iraq. Other posts may, at their discretion, do the same. Briefings should emphasize that our plans and preparations are constantly developing, and are subject to adjustment. Department requests reports on the results of the demarches. End Summary.

US MISSION BAGHDAD

5. ~~(SBU)~~ The State Department is working closely with the Department of Defense and other USG agencies to establish US Embassy Baghdad. The Coalition Provisional Authority's role in governing Iraq will terminate and the interim Government of Iraq will assume full governing authority on June 30. The new US Mission will represent all US civilian policy and program interests in Iraq from July 1.

6. ~~(SBU)~~ To manage the transition from CPA to US Mission, State and DoD have created an Interagency Transition Planning Team (ITPT) led by Ambassador Francis J. Ricciardone and Lieutenant General (US Army, Retired) Claude ("Mick") Kicklighter. Ambassador John Holzman directs the ITPT Baghdad unit. In May, the Baghdad transition team will become US Office Baghdad and key personnel will be in place. The US Office will be formally designated a US Embassy at an appropriate time immediately following CPA's closure. After nomination by the President and confirmation by the Senate, a US Ambassador will assume his or her duties in Iraq. On April 19, The President announced his intention to nominate John Negroponte, The United States' current Permanent Representative to the UN, to become the U.S. Ambassador in Iraq.

7. ~~(SBU)~~ As we stand up the US Office, CPA will continue its work. During this period, other organizations such as the Iraqi Governing Council and Iraqi Ministries, the US Office, the US military command, and other Coalition

partner Embassies, may assume some current CPA functions.

8. ~~(SBU)~~ The US Mission will be our largest but its functions and organization will largely mirror those of other US Missions around the world where we have the broadest range of interests and major military and economic assistance programs. The Mission will have all of the traditional Department of State sections, including political, economic, public affairs, consular, management and regional security. In addition, many other USG agencies will have sections in the Mission, operating under Chief of Mission authority. US agencies are now making NSDD-38 requests to the Secretary of State to meet their operational requirements in Baghdad.

9. ~~(SBU)~~ An atypical feature of US Mission Baghdad is likely to be one or more "temporary organizations," dedicated to managing the unprecedently large programs in support of Iraq's political and economic reconstruction. (NB. The President has the discretion to set up "temporary organizations" with special authorities. CPA is a "temporary organization.") The COM would use these organizations to manage technical assistance to the Iraqi government and to manage the implementation of the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF). The USG has not yet taken final decisions regarding the creation of such specialized temporary organization(s).

10. ~~(SBU)~~ In addition to the Mission, a large US and Coalition military presence will remain in Iraq post-June 30. The current Combined Joint Task Force-7 will transition to the Multinational Force - Iraq (MNF-I). A senior general officer will lead the MNF-I. As is the case elsewhere, the US Ambassador and the US force commander will work closely as a single team. The US commander will continue to report formally through his chain of command.

11. ~~(SBU)~~ US Mission Baghdad will temporarily use several properties. An interim Chancery will open in the "green zone" where the Ambassador will have an office and we will have public affairs and consular operations. The majority of Mission Baghdad personnel will continue to work in the former Republican palace as a temporary Embassy annex while a new Mission compound is constructed. Some US agencies may utilize temporary space in other annexes. U.S. Mission employees will occupy temporary housing structures, including some now used by CPA.

12. ~~(SBU)~~ Washington agencies are still in the process of coordinating decisions on the transition. Here are our

current views on three important issues, which may be of interest to Coalition supporting countries. Posts should emphasize that our planning in these areas may change as decisions are made in the coming weeks.

A. Advisors: With the dissolution of CPA, the new Government of Iraq will assume responsibility for their Ministries. Hence, the positions of the current CPA Senior Advisors and their offices will change or, in some cases, come to an end. Nevertheless, the GOI will continue to need substantial foreign assistance. We will continue to offer the new GOI all appropriate advice and support for their key ministries. We will use, as appropriate, individuals now serving in the CPA who wish to stay. The US advisors will be under Chief of Mission authority within one of the temporary organizations mentioned in paragraph 9, above, and will receive policy direction via normal country team channels. The US advisors to Iraqi government agencies would work closely with appropriate Embassy sections. Other governments may also offer technical assistance to the interim Iraqi Government and we would coordinate our assistance programs with theirs, through whatever formal and informal mechanisms that we collectively find effective.

B. Provincial Teams: To provide assistance in the governorates, we believe it may be necessary for US personnel to be located in up to 17 locations outside Baghdad. Building on the US and Coalition experience in CPA and Afghanistan, we are now studying options for the composition of these offices/teams and their locations. We see close coordination with other interested Coalition supporting partners on these offices and their locations. However, at this time we cannot commit to providing logistical support, even on a reimbursable basis, to non-USG personnel in Baghdad or beyond.

C. Public Affairs: The Embassy's new Public Affairs Section, working in close integration with the MNF-I's public affairs officers, will carry forward the work of CPA's "StratComm", that is, it will be responsible for communicating U.S. policy to the Iraqi people and world audiences through mass media and various culture and information outreach programs.

13. ~~(SBU)~~ Finally, the new US Embassy will be an American operation. Although CPA is multinational, Embassies are by definition national missions. Their direct hire personnel are Americans and primarly host national FSNs. There is limited precedent for third-country employment in US Missions as foreign service national personnel, i.e. locally engaged staff. We understand that Coalition

partners with staff in CPA are very interested in our planning. We expect that a number of Coalition partners' current CPA staff will become members of their own national missions on July 1. We would be interested to hear of other states' planning in this regard.

14. ~~(SBU)~~ Both before and after June 30, we will, of course, continue to coordinate very closely with our Coalition supporting partners on the full range of mutual interests. Coalition coordination will continue without interruption in capitals and in Iraq, both within the MNF-I and among our respective national missions.

NEA - IRAQ TRANSITION
----

15. ~~(SBU)~~ To coordinate the transition in Iraq, the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs has established an Iraq Transition team (NEA/IT) headed by Ambassador Ricciardone. As noted above, NEA/IT works in tandem with the ITPT unit at the Department of Defense led by General Kicklighter. The DOD and State teams share staff and work jointly on all transition projects. Amb. John Holzman anchors the ITPT in Baghdad.

16. ~~(SBU)~~ Other officers of NEA/IT include:

-- (b)(6) Deputy Coordinator for the Transition in Iraq
-- (b)(6) Deputy Coordinator for Management
-- (b)(6) Director of the Iraq Transition Management Staff. The Transition Management Staff operates an information, management and organization program on the transition. The staff tracks and reports progress on the transition. The TMS operates an Intranet website accessible to US Missions that provides additional information on the transition, available on OpenNet at (b)(6). Most content on the site is password protected, and users requiring detailed access should (b)(6)
-- The PM Action Team (PMAT) also supports the transition management tracking and reporting effort.

ACTION REQUEST
----

17. ~~(SBU)~~ Posts in the countries listed in the next paragraph should brief host governments on our plans

outlined above and solicit their views and plans for their own representation in Iraq. Other posts may, at their discretion, do the same. Please report results. All cables should be slugged for NEA and PMAT.

18. (U) For USUN and Amman: Please brief appropriate UN personnel. Amman, note that Ricciardone has briefed Acting UN SRSG for Iraq Ross Mountain. You may follow up with him at your decision.

19. ~~(SBU)~~ The list below of 61 countries includes all Coalition supporting partners and troop contributing nations.

Afghanistan
Albania
Angola
Australia
Azerbaijan
Bahrain
Bulgaria
Colombia
Costa Rica
Czech Republic
Denmark
Dominican Republic
Egypt
El Salvador
Eritrea
Estonia
Ethiopia
Georgia
Greece
Honduras
Hungary
Iceland
Italy
Japan
Jordan
Kazakhstan
Korea
Kuwait
Latvia
Lithuania
Macedonia
Marshall Islands
Micronesia
Moldova
Mongolia
Netherlands
New Zealand

Nicaragua
Norway
Oman
Palau
Panama
Philippines
Poland
Portugal
Qatar
Romania
Rwanda
Saudi Arabia
Singapore
Slovakia
Solomon Islands
Spain
Thailand
Tonga
Turkey
UAE
Uganda
UK
Ukraine
Uzbekistan

19. (U) Minimize considered.
POWELL
BT
#9241
NNNN

State NSPD with DoD Compromise language and DoJ Edits - Post the Iraq DC of 040420

NATIONAL SECURITY PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE/NSPD - xx

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE
THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE
THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY
THE SECRETARY OF EDUCATION
DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR ECONOMIC POLICY
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

SUBJECT: United States Government Operations in Iraq

We have seen a period of remarkable advancement in Iraq, as the yoke of Saddam Hussein's tyranny has been thrown off and democracy and economic reform have begun to take root. With the dissolution of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) on June 30, 2004 and the re-establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and a sovereign Iraqi government, our efforts in Iraq will take on new and formidable challenges that must be met successfully.

During these critical times, we must organize to advance these gains and establish and sustain a strong bilateral relationship. When the CPA dissolves, the United States will be represented in Iraq by a Chief of Mission who, on my behalf and under the guidance of the Secretary of State, shall be responsible for the direction, coordination and supervision of all U.S.

government employees in country, except those under the command of an area military commander or secunded to an International Organization. The Secretary of State, under my direction, will be responsible for the overall coordination and supervision of all United States Government activities and operations in Iraq, including the provision of assistance to that country, except that, pending full transition of security responsibility to the Government of Iraq, the Secretary of Defense shall continue to be responsible for security, for military operations, and for provision of military assistance to Iraq. The U.S. Mission in Baghdad and an enlarged Office of Iraqi Affairs in the Department of State will continue CPA's authorities and responsibilities.

Comment: DoD ADD

Comment: DOJ CHANGE: , except that, pending development of security forces needed by the Government of Iraq capable of carrying out its security responsibilities, the Secretary of Defense shall continue to be responsible ...

The Secretary of State shall establish, in accordance with Title 5, United States Code, section 3161, a temporary organization called the Iraq Reconstruction Management Office (IRMO) to facilitate the transition in Iraq. The IRMO will be headed by a Director selected by the Secretary of State, and its staff may include, as determined by the Secretary: (1) personnel with relevant expertise detailed on a non-reimbursable basis from other USG agencies; (2) senior and other technical advisors; (3) personnel from other Coalition partner governments; and (4) such other personnel as the Secretary may direct to support that effort. The Secretary shall regularly evaluate the staffing requirements of this organization.

Comment: DoD ADD

Deleted: 3

The Secretary of Defense shall establish, from forces assigned to USCENTCOM, an Office of Security Transition (OST). The OST shall, in coordination with the Chief of Mission, and under the Commander, USCENTCOM, direct USG efforts, and coordinate international efforts, in support of organizing, equipping, and training all Iraqi military, police, facilities protection, border enforcement, and other security forces. Based upon progress made by the Iraqis in the formation of an Iraqi government under a permanent constitution, and according to a timeline to be determined by the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State, the OST shall transfer functions to a security assistance organization and to other appropriate organizations within the U.S. diplomatic mission that will be staffed in accordance with NSDD 38 of June 2, 1982. Department of Justice and other federal law enforcement experts who provide training to police and other security forces in support of the OST under the agreed program shall be assigned to and under the authority of the Chief of Mission.

Comment: DoD ADD

Deleted: Pursuant to

Comment: DOJ ADD if DoD paragraph approved

In addition, there shall be established, in accordance with Title 5, United States Code, section 3161, a temporary organization in the Department of the Army to be called the Army Project and Contracting Office (APCO) to provide acquisition and project management support with respect to activities in Iraq, as requested by the Secretary of State and heads of other Departments and agencies. The Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense shall select a Director for APCO. Under the direction of the Secretary of State and the COM, the APCO shall provide acquisition and project management support. These services may include engineering, auditing and other contract-related services.

The effort to build a strong bilateral relationship with the Government of Iraq and support Iraq as it makes the transition to democracy must have the full commitment of all agencies. In this regard, I hereby direct the heads of U.S. Government departments and agencies to provide on a non-reimbursable basis such assistance, services and any other support as the Secretary of State may request with respect to U.S. activities in Iraq, including security, medical, logistical and administrative support and details of personnel but, with respect to the provision of DoD support, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense shall make decisions jointly.

Comment: DoD ADD

Deleted: coordinate decisions

This NSPD shall be effective immediately. The CPA shall dissolve on June 30, 2004. Upon the dissolution of the CPA, this NSPD supersedes NSPD-24, dated January 20, 2003.

NSPD-XX "USG OPERATIONS IN IRAQ"

Original State NSPD	DoD Compromise Language	DOJ Language	State comments on edits
The Secretary of State, under my direction, will be responsible for the overall coordination and supervision of all United States Government activities and operations in Iraq, including the provision of assistance to that country.	The Secretary of State ... including the provision of assistance to that country, **(ADD) except that, pending full transition of security responsibility to the Government of Iraq, the Secretary of Defense shall continue to be responsible for security, for military operations, and for provision of military assistance to Iraq.**	**CHANGE: ... except that, pending development of security forces needed by the Government of Iraq capable of carrying out its security responsibilities, the Secretary of Defense shall continue to be responsible for security, for military operations, and for provision of military assistance to Iraq.** The Nov 15 agreement clearly states that full sovereignty transfers on 30 June. With the transfer of full sovereignty passes full governmental responsibilities, including the responsibility of security. Responsibility, however, is clearly different from capacity to carry out that responsibility, but the document as written might be interpreted by some as a partial derogation from the President's assurance that full sovereignty will transfer.	**These changes are unacceptable.** The Secretary of State not the Secretary of Defense is responsible for the provision of all foreign assistance, including military assistance and police training. Under longstanding procedures, DOD implements programs when and if requested by the Secretary of State. DOD's proposed assumption of State Department responsibilities would have profound adverse implications for Iraqi governance and democracy. U.S.G. military assistance has always, as a matter of longstanding policy and law, been controlled by U.S.G. civilian authorities, allowing the U.S.G. to ensure that the civilian leadership of the recipient country accepts and supports the assistance. By encouraging direct military-to-military contacts, we undermine Iraqi civilian control of its military.

NSC DEFPOL post the Iraq DC of 040420

Original State NSPD	DoD Compromise Language	DOJ Language	State comments on edits
			The exception for "military operations" is not necessary, was not needed for previous military operations, including in Afghanistan, Yugoslavia, and Haiti, and implies that DOD will retain sovereign functions in Iraq after the transition. The paragraph 2 exception is also unclear and links functions that are not necessarily on the same schedule.
	ADD: May include staff... (3) personnel from other Coalition partner governments		Coalition partners must be responsible for hiring, paying and housing their own advisors
	ADD: The Secretary of Defense shall establish, from forces assigned to USCENTCOM, an Office of Security Transition (OST). The OST shall, in coordination with the Chief of Mission, and under the Commander, USCENTCOM, direct USG efforts, and coordinate international efforts, in support of organizing, equipping, and training all Iraqi military, police, facilities protection, border enforcement,	**ADD if DoD paragraph is approved: DOJ and other federal law enforcement experts who provide training to police and other security forces in support of the OST under the agreed program shall be assigned to and under the authority of the Chief of Mission.**	**These changes are unacceptable: See above**

Original State NSPD	DoD Compromise Language	DOJ Language	State comments on edits
	and other security forces. Pursuant to progress made by the Iraqis in the formation of an Iraqi government under a permanent constitution, and according to a timeline to be determined by the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State, the OST shall transfer functions to a security assistance organization and to other appropriate organizations within the U.S. diplomatic mission that will be staffed in accordance with NSDD 38 of June 2, 1982		
The effort to build a strong bilateral relationship ... direct heads of USG departments and agencies to provide on a non-reimbursable basis such assistance, services, and any other support as the Secretary of State may request with respect to U.S. activities in Iraq, including security, medical, logistical and administrative support and details of personnel.	The effort to build a strong bilateral relationship ... direct heads of USG departments and agencies to provide on a non-reimbursable basis such assistance, services and any other support as the Secretary of State may request with respect to U.S. activities in Iraq, including security, medical, logistical **(ADD) but, with respect to the provision of DoD support, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense shall make decisions jointly.**		This change is also unacceptable. The State Department must have the resources it needs to ensure a successful transition in Iraq. As used by DOD, "coordinate" means "agree". By forcing State to obtain DOD agreement, we ensure gridlock, bureaucratic delays, and inaction.

	24-29 Apr 04	30-Apr	1-6 May 04	7-May	8-13 May 04	14-May	15-20 May 04	21-May	22-27 May 04	28-May	29 May -3 Jun 04	4-Jun	5-10 Jun 04	11-Jun	12-17 Jun 04	18-Jun	19-24 Jun 04	25-Jun	26-30 Jun 04	
CPA Star Msns (Passengers/week)	300		300		300		300		300		300		300		300		300		200	1200 per month
Draw-down Pax 5XC130		250		250		250		250		250		250		250		250		250		2250 pax total
Comm Contract DC10 (Passengers/aircraft)			275		275		275		275		275		275		275		275		275	
[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	
14 -Day Req Min Lead Time to ETD			*16-Apr*		*23-Apr*		*30-Apr*		*7-May*		*14-May*		*21-May*		*28-May*		*4-Jun*	.	*11-Jun*	
45-Day Req Min Lead for 10% Discount			*Passed*		*Passed*		*Passed*		*Passed*		*20-Apr*		*27-Apr*		*4-May*		*11-May*		*18-May*	
Savings on Discount to BWI											$40K		$40K		$40K		$40K		$40K	$200K
Savings on Discount to ATL											$43K		$43K		$43K		$43K		$43K	$215K

TASK: Transport 1500+ personnel to a main CONUS airline hub

		BENEFIT:
RECOMMENDATIONS:	-Turn in SAAM requests now	Savings to $200,000
	-Use BWI for all flights	Savings to $15,000
	-Use Patriot Express as much as possible (Kuwait & Qatar DEP pts)	Reduce need for more contract commercial airlift
	-Bunch departures on day prior to commercial connenction (up to 5XC130)	Reduce ground time at Kuwait

ISSUES:
Green Zone - BIAP road
Daily flt limitation (5XC130)
2-week minimum lead time for contract msns

Customer Relations Management Business Unit Master List 4/15/2004

Contact	Business Units	Location	End State	Comment	
	AAFES		MNF&I	Indef.	7
[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	NE	5/5	17
38022	Baghdad Central	PP-N110	MINISTRY		231
	AFCIS		PSD		
38013	1AD Governate Support Team	PP-N108	MNF&I		16
[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	NE	5/5	5
	British Office of Baghdad (BOoB)		UK	6/30	
38018	CENTCOM (OPCC?)	PP-M203	MNF&I	MOU	2
21-Jan-04	Chaplain's Office	PP-M	IRMO	(?)	8
38040	CJTF7 - C9*	PP-N Ballroom	MNF&I		
38022	CJTF7 - JOC	PP-M222	MNF&I		46
38011	CMATT (Coalition Assistance Training Team)	PP-N Ballroom	MNF&I	8/15	409
	CPATT		MNF&I / Ministry		
	Coalition Press Information Center		MNF&I		5
[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	NE	DCAA review	
	Vinnell		MNF&I	CMATT	
[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	NE	6/15-6/30	12
14-Mar-04	Communications Support Office (C6)	PP-M231	HSG		145
	Raytheon		HSG		23
	MCI		HSG		23
29-Feb-04	Comptroller	PP-M107	HSG		18
21-Mar-04	Contracting Activity	PP-SW	PMO		27
5-Feb-04	Counterintelligence/OSI (CI)	PP-M237	MNF&I		48
5-Feb-04	CPA Protective Services (USACIDC)	PP-M204A	PSD Redd/Jones	6/30	32
24-Jan-04	Defense Contract Audit Agency	PP-M208	EMBASSY/USMB		21
15-Feb-04	Defense Contract Management Agency	PP-N113	HSG		10
21-Mar-04	Defense Criminal Investigative Service (DCIS)	PP-N100E	EMBASSY/USMB	NSDD-38	5
38008	Defense Energy Support Center	PP-S225	APCO (?)	Mike Kelly	
	Defense Support Agency		OGA?		1
	Demining		EMBASSY/USMB		3
	RONCO				
27-Feb-04	Department for Intl Development - Palace Element	PP-N105D	UK	6/30	
[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	NE	5/15	
[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	NE	6/15-6/30	
28-Jan-04	Deputy Chief of Staff	PP-M110	HSG		9
[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	NE	6/15-6/30	
20-Jan-04	Directorate of Civil Affairs	PP-M117	NE	6/5	3
[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	NE	6/15-6/30	
23-Jan-04	Directorate of Strategic Communications	Green Room	IRMO		137
18-Feb-04	Distinguished Visitors Bureau	PP-Grn Rm	NE	6/30	
11-Feb-04	Executive Secretariat	PP-M122	EMBASSY/USMB		16
14-Mar-04	Facility Management Office	PP-B104	HSG		9
38031	Finance Office - C/126th Finance Bn (208)	PP-B130	MNF&I		
	Front Office Translation Team		EMBASSY/USMB		
8-Feb-04	Governance Office	PP-N105	EMBASSY/USMB		222
11-Mar-04	GSO	PP-N100C	EMBASSY/USMB		
	Logistics (C4)		HSG		7
1-Mar-04	Human Resources Management - CPA	PP-M210	IRMO		
28-Jan-04	Information Management Unit	PP-M101A	IRMO		
16-Mar-04	Inspector General (IG)	PP-M106		9/4	4
	ItalianDelegation			6/30	10
29-Jan-04	Iraqi Forum (Baghdad Convention Center)	Forum	MNF&I		1
2-Feb-04	Iraqi Media Network	Forum	NE	6/30	50
[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	NE	6/30	
	Iraqi Reconstruction Development Council		NE	6/5-6/30	174
	SAIC		NE	6/5-6/30	39
38041	Joint Lessons Learned Team (JLLT)	PP-M201	MNF&I	VICTORY	8
38047	Joint Security Directorate (FWD)	PP-N104A	MNF&I	6/30	
4-Feb-04	Medical Section CJTF7/CPA	PP-S115	MNF&I	Indef.	9
28-Feb-04	Ministry Requirements Coordination Office	PP-S101	HSG		
[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	NE	5/15	
	National Security Defense				75
	Office of Management and Budget		NE	6/15-6/30	9
22-Jan-04	Office of National Security Affairs	PP-N218A	MINISTRY		
[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	NE	5/15-5/30	14
3-Feb-04	Office of Private Sector Development	PP-S107	NE	6/15-6/30	28
1-Feb-04	Office of Provincial Outreach	PP-M102	EMBASSY/USMB		
	Office of Security Coordination		EMBASSY/USMB	OR MNF&I	

	Customer Relations Management Business Unit Master List			4/15/2004	
Contact	**Business Units**	**Location**	End State	Comment	
31-Jan-04	Office of the Administrator	PP-Front Off	NE	6/15-6/30	16
28-Jan-04	Blackwater	PP-N211	NE	6/15-6/30	
	Office of Sepecial Investigations				36
10-Mar-04	Office of the General Counsel (OGC)	PP-M115	PMO/HSG		28
3-Mar-04	Oil for Food Coordination Center	Forum-B108	EMBASSY/USMB	?	3
22-Jan-04	Personnel (C1)	PP-M114	HSG (MIL)		
	RSO		EMBASSY/USMB		
31-Jan-04	Regional Security Coordination Office	PP-N100F	EMBASSY/USMB		16
29-Jan-04	Global Risk Strategies, Ltd (Admin Only)	PP-N208	EMBASSY/USMB		
	Force Protection		HSG		14
	Fleet Anti-Terrorism Support Team		EMBASSY/USMB		
	Escort Services		MNF&I		
[illegible]	Religious Affairs	[illegible]	NE	5/5	
26-Feb-04	Requirements Coordination Office	PP-N118	HSG		149
	S&K Technologies		HSG		
	MPRI		HSG		
	NAID		NE	6/30	
8-Feb-04	Sr Advisor to Ministry of Agriculture	PP-S217	MINISTRY		
5-Mar-04	Sr Advisor to Ministry of Communications	PP-S214	MINISTRY		
30-Jan-04	Sr Advisor to Ministry of Culture	PP-S106	MINISTRY		
	Sr Advisor to the Ministry of Defense		MINISTRY		
	PSD (?)		PSD		
7-Mar-04	Sr Advisor to Ministry of Displacement and Migration	PP-S108	MINISTRY		
31-Jan-04	Sr Advisor to Ministry of Education	PP-S206	MINISTRY		
22-Jan-04	Sr Advisor to Ministry of Electricity	PP-S117	MINISTRY		
22-Jan-04	Sr Advisor to Ministry of Environment	PP-S109	MINISTRY		
3-Mar-04	Sr Advisor to Ministry of Finance/OMB	PP-S210	MINISTRY		
	MZM		NE		
	Central Bank Ministry		MINISTRY		
	Treasury - IRS		EMBASSY/USMB	NSDD-38	
	OCC		NE		
27-Jan-04	Sr Advisor to Ministry of Foreign Affairs	PP-S105	MINISTRY		
22-Jan-04	Sr Advisor to Ministry of Health	PP-S223	MINISTRY		
	PSD (?)		PSD		
23-Jan-04	Sr Advisor to Ministry of Higher Ed & Scientific Rsrch	PP-S220	MINISTRY		
2-Feb-04	Sr Advisor to Ministry of Housing and Construction	PP-S115	MINISTRY		
1-Feb-04	Sr Advisor to Ministry of Human Rights	PP-N106	MINISTRY		
29-Jan-04	Sr Advisor to Ministry of Industry & Minerals	PP-S107	MINISTRY		
2-Feb-04	Sr Advisor to Ministry of Interior	PP-S213	MINISTRY		
	Rand Corp				
	CRG			PSD	
	Meteoric Tactical Solutions			PSD	
15-Mar-04	Sr Advisor to Ministry of Justice	PP-S102	MINISTRY		
	CPI- Public Integrity		EMBASSY/USMB	NSDD-38	
	Special Tribunal		EMBASSY/USMB	NSDD-38	
	FBI		EMBASSY/USMB	NSDD-39	
9-Mar-04	Sr Advisor to Ministry of Labor & Social Affairs	PP-S202	MINISTRY		
22-Jan-04	Sr Advisor to Ministry of Municipalities & Public Works	PP-S221	MINISTRY		
23-Jan-04	Sr Advisor to Ministry of Oil	PP-S110	MINISTRY		
	Erinys			PSD	
	Sr Advisor to MInistry of Planning & Development		MINISTRY		
	Council for International Cooperation				
20-Jan-04	Sr Advisor to Ministry of Science and Technology	PP-S218	MINISTRY		
21-Jan-04	Sr Advisor to Ministry of Trade/Standards	PP-M213	MINISTRY		
3-Feb-04	Sr Advisor to Ministry of Transportation	PP-M216	MINISTRY		
20-Jan-04	Sr Advisor to Ministry of Water Resources	PP-S222	MINISTRY		
14-Feb-04	Sr Advisor to Ministry of Youth & Sport	PP-S219	MINISTRY		
	Task Force/[illegible]		NE	GRD	123
	Task Force/[illegible]	[illegible]	NE	GRD	29
[illegible]	Task Force/[illegible]	[illegible]	MINISTRY	OIL	5
3-Feb-04	UK Administration Office	PP-M211	NE	6/30	44
3-Feb-04	UK Special Representative's Office	PP-Front Off	NE	6/30	
27-Jan-04	UN Assessment Team	PP-1N105A	INDEF		
4-Feb-04	Worldwide Language Resources (Translation Off)	PP-M121	NE		17
14-Feb-04	USAID	PP-M122	USAID		90
28-Jan-04	Bearing Point	PP-M122	USAID		
	General Electric		USAID		
	Olive		USAID		

	Customer Relations Management Business Unit Master List				4/15/2004
Contact	**Business Units**	**Location**	End State	Comment	
	Washington Inc		USAID		
	OTI		USAID		
	Kroll		USAID		
	RTI		USAID		
5-Feb-04	U.S. Consular Office, Baghdad	Forum	EMBASSY/USMB		1
[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	NE	7/15	
	Other				96
	OGA		OTHER		
	United States Postal Service		MNF&I		
1-Mar-04	Program Management Office (PMO)	PP-KBR Wing			171
	DA Contracting				
	USACE	PP-KBR Wing			
	Seabees	PP-KBR Wing			
	AECOM	PP-KBR Wing			
	CH2M Hill/Parsons	PP-KBR Wing			
	Berger/URS	PP-KBR Wing			
	Iraq Power Alliance	PP-KBR Wing			
	Foster Wheeler	PP-KBR Wing			
	CACI	PP-KBR Wing			
	Force Protection	PP-KBR Wing			
	Armored	PP-KBR Wing			
	Stanley Baker	PP-KBR Wing			
	Stanley/Baker/Hill (Army CMS)	PP-KBR Wing			
	Fluor/AMEC	PP-KBR Wing			
	Washington International	PP-KBR Wing			
	Perini Corp.	PP-KBR Wing			
	Washington International & Black & Veatch	PP-KBR Wing			
	Lucent Technologies	PP-KBR Wing			
	Contrack/AICI/OCI/Archirodon JV	PP-KBR Wing			
	Parsons Delaware	PP-KBR Wing			
	Parson Iraq JV	PP-KBR Wing			
	Armor Group				
	KBR	PP-KBR Wing			
	Outside Palace				
Contact	**Business Units**	**Location**	EMBASSY/USMB		
	Regionals				
	Northern Region - Mosul				40
	Arbil				
	Dahuk				
	Baqubah				
	Mosul				
	Tikrit				
	Sulaymaniyah				
	Kirkuk				
	South Central - Al Hillah				
	Ramadi				
	Hillah				
	Karbala				
	Najaf				
	Diwaniyah				
	Kut				
	South - Basrah				
	Basrah				
	Nasariyah				
	Amarah				
	Samawah				

	Customer Relations Management Business Unit Master List				4/15/2004
Contact	**Business Units**	**Location**	End State	Comment	
	Non-CPA Customers				
	234th Signal BN, 22nd Signal BDE		MNF&I		1
	304th Civil Affair Brigade		MNF&I		
	350nd Civil Affairs Command		MNF&I		1
	937th ENGR GP (C)		MNF&I		
	Force Protection (571 MP Co)		MNF&I		
	Force Protection (2ND 82TH)		MNF&I		
	Location Abbreviations				
	Presidential Palace	PP			
	Iraqi Convention Center	Forum			
	Color Codes				
	Contractor after 6/30				2818
	Non Essential redeploy May	▓		Ministry	640
	Redeploy June	░			3458
	Redeploy June/July	■			
	MNF&I	▨		Follow on	
	Right Sized				

Baghdad Central, Strategic Communications, Ministries

Contact	Business Units	Location	End State	Comment	60K → 30K → 12—12 -0
38022	Baghdad Central	PP-N110	MINISTRY	Existing	231
23-Jan-04	Directorate of Strategic Communications	Green Room	IRMO	Existing	137 vs. 115 now
11-Mar-04	Religious Affairs	PP-S104	NE	Existing	
8-Feb-04	Sr Advisor to Ministry of Agriculture	PP-S217	MINISTRY	Existing	
5-Mar-04	Sr Advisor to Ministry of Communications	PP-S214	MINISTRY	Existing	
30-Jan-04	Sr Advisor to Ministry of Culture	PP-S106	MINISTRY	Existing	
	Sr Advisor to the Ministry of Defense		MINISTRY	Existing	
7-Mar-04	Sr Advisor to Ministry of Displacement and Migration	PP-S108	MINISTRY	Existing	
31-Jan-04	Sr Advisor to Ministry of Education	PP-S206	MINISTRY	Existing	
22-Jan-04	Sr Advisor to Ministry of Electricity	PP-S117	MINISTRY	Existing	
22-Jan-04	Sr Advisor to Ministry of Environment	PP-S109	MINISTRY	Existing	
3-Mar-04	Sr Advisor to Ministry of Finance/OMB	PP-S210	MINISTRY	Existing	
	Central Bank Ministry		MINISTRY	Existing	
	OCC			Existing	
27-Jan-04	Sr Advisor to Ministry of Foreign Affairs	PP-S105	MINISTRY	Existing	
22-Jan-04	Sr Advisor to Ministry of Health	PP-S223	MINISTRY	Existing	
23-Jan-04	Sr Advisor to Ministry of Higher Ed & Scientific Rsrch	PP-S220	MINISTRY	Existing	
2-Feb-04	Sr Advisor to Ministry of Housing and Construction	PP-S115	MINISTRY	Existing	
1-Feb-04	Sr Advisor to Ministry of Human Rights	PP-N106	MINISTRY	Existing	
29-Jan-04	Sr Advisor to Ministry of Industry & Minerals	PP-S107	MINISTRY	Existing	
2-Feb-04	Sr Advisor to Ministry of Interior	PP-S213	MINISTRY	Existing	
15-Mar-04	Sr Advisor to Ministry of Justice	PP-S102	MINISTRY	Existing	
9-Mar-04	Sr Advisor to Ministry of Labor & Social Affairs	PP-S202	MINISTRY	Existing	
22-Jan-04	Sr Advisor to Ministry of Municipalities & Public Works	PP-S221	MINISTRY	Existing	
23-Jan-04	Sr Advisor to Ministry of Oil	PP-S110	MINISTRY	Existing	
3-Feb-04	Task Force Shield/MOO Security Office	PP-S226	MINISTRY	Existing	
	Sr Advisor to MInistry of Planning & Development		MINISTRY	Existing	
	Council for International Cooperation			Existing	
20-Jan-04	Sr Advisor to Ministry of Science and Technology	PP-S218	MINISTRY	Existing	
21-Jan-04	Sr Advisor to Ministry of Trade/Standards	PP-M213	MINISTRY	Existing	
3-Feb-04	Sr Advisor to Ministry of Transportation	PP-M216	MINISTRY	Existing	
20-Jan-04	Sr Advisor to Ministry of Water Resources	PP-S222	MINISTRY	Existing	
14-Feb-04	Sr Advisor to Ministry of Youth & Sport	PP-S219	MINISTRY	Existing	

subtotal	705	→ 198
Total	1073	

CJTF-7

Contact	Business Units	Current Location	End State	Comment	
	AAFES		MNF&I	Indef.	7
	AFCIS		MNF&I	PSD	
38013	1AD Governate Support Team	PP-N108	MNF&I		16
38018	CENTCOM (OPCC?)	PP-M203	MNF&I	MOU	2
38040	CJTF7 - C9*	PP-N Ballroor	MNF&I		
38022	CJTF7 - JOC	PP-M222	MNF&I		46
38011	CMATT (Coalition Assistance Training Team)	PP-N Ballroor	MNF&I	8/15	409
	CPATT		MNF&I / Ministry		
	Coalition Press Information Center		MNF&I		5
5-Feb-04	Counterintelligence/OSI (CI)	PP-M237	MNF&I		48
38008	Defense Energy Support Center	PP-S225	MNF&I	Mike Kelly	
38031	Finance Office - C/126th Finance Bn (208)	PP-B130	MNF&I		
29-Jan-04	Iraqi Forum (Baghdad Convention Center)	Forum	MNF&I		1
38041	Joint Lessons Learned Team (JLLT)	PP-M201	MNF&I	VICTORY	8
38047	Joint Security Directorate (FWD)	PP-N104A	MNF&I	6/30	
4-Feb-04	Medical Section CJTF7/CPA	PP-S115	MNF&I	Indef.	9
	Escort Services		MNF&I		
	United States Postal Service		MNF&I		
	Non-CPA Customers				
	234th Signal BN, 22nd Signal BDE		MNF&I		1
	304th Civil Affair Brigade		MNF&I		
	350nd Civil Affairs Command		MNF&I	✓ Gen Davison	1
	937th ENGR GP (C)		MNF&I		
	Force Protection (571 MP Co)		MNF&I		
	Force Protection, (2ND 82TH)		MNF&I		
				Total	553

relocate, outside GZ

They now have 30 bldgs - mostly villas - in "little venice" area of GZ

Strat Reserve Ctr - OP in Convention Center?

⇒ we'd have to meet DS Stds

⇒ great expense & costs need to [illegible] Roof [illegible] to [illegible]

PMO/APCO

Contact	**Business Units**	**Location**	End State	Comment	
1-Mar-04	Program Management Office (PMO)	PP-KBR Wing			171
	DA Contracting				
	USACE	PP-KBR Wing			
	Seabees	PP-KBR Wing			
	AECOM	PP-KBR Wing		Full Support	
	CH2M Hill/Parsons	PP-KBR Wing		Full Support	
	Berger/URS	PP-KBR Wing		Full Support	
	Iraq Power Alliance	PP-KBR Wing		Full Support	
	Foster Wheeler	PP-KBR Wing		Full Support	
	CACI	PP-KBR Wing		Full Support	
	Armor Group	PP-KBR Wing		PSD	
	Stanley Baker	PP-KBR Wing		Full Support	
	Stanley/Baker/Hill (Army CMS)	PP-KBR Wing		GRD	
	Fluor/AMEC	PP-KBR Wing			
	Washington International	PP-KBR Wing			
	Perini Corp.	PP-KBR Wing			
	Washington International & Black & Veatch	PP-KBR Wing			
	Lucent Technologies	PP-KBR Wing			
	Contrack/AICI/OCI/Archirodon JV	PP-KBR Wing			
	Parsons Delaware	PP-KBR Wing			
	Parson Iraq JV	PP-KBR Wing			
				Total	171

Largely expansions but
Need to
factor in
as we plan

Contractors
they had
also impact
G2
on
mitigation

Provinces

Contact	**Business Units**	**Location**	End State	Comment	
	Outside Palace				
Contact	**Business Units**	**Office Location**	EMBASSY/USMB		
	Regional				
	Northern Region - Mosul				40
	Arbil				
	Dahuk				
	Baqubah				
	✓ Mosul				
	Tikrit				
	Sulaymaniyah				
?	✓ Kirkuk				
	South Central - Al Hillah				
	Ramadi				
	✓ Hillah				
	Karbala				
	Najaf				
	Diwaniyah				
	Kut				
	South - Basrah				
	✓ Basrah				
	Nasariyah				
	Amarah				
	Samawah				
				Total	40

USAID

Contact	Business Units	Location	End State	Comment	
14-Feb-04	USAID	PP-M122	USAID		90
28-Jan-04	Bearing Point	PP-M122	USAID		
	General Electric		USAID		
	Olive		USAID		
	Washington Inc		USAID		
	OTI		USAID		
	Kroll		USAID		
	RTI		USAID		
				Total	90

Move
from
Conv. Ctr
to Palace

EMBASSY / USMB

Contact	Business Units	Location	End State	Comment	
11-Feb-04	Executive Secretariat	PP-M122	EMBASSY/USMB		16
11-Mar-04	GSO	PP-N100C	EMBASSY/USMB		
1-Feb-04	Office of Provincial Outreach	PP-M102	EMBASSY/USMB		
	Office of Security Coordination		EMBASSY/USMB	OR MNF&I	
3-Mar-04	Oil for Food Coordination Center	Forum-B108	EMBASSY/USMB		3
	RSO		EMBASSY/USMB		
31-Jan-04	Regional Security Coordination Office	PP-N100F	EMBASSY/USMB		16
	Fleet Anti-Terrorism Support Team		EMBASSY/USMB		
5-Feb-04	U.S. Consular Office, Baghdad	Forum	EMBASSY/USMB		1
	Treasury - IRS		EMBASSY/USMB	NSDD-38	
	CPI- Public Integrity		EMBASSY/USMB	IRMO	
	Special Tribunal		EMBASSY/USMB	IRMO	
	FBI		EMBASSY/USMB	NSDD-38	
8-Feb-04	Governance Office	PP-N105	EMBASSY/USMB		222
	Iraq Property Claims Commission				
				Total	258

HQ Sup. Grp. under MNFI
w. DOD/DOS - MOU telling it to support Embassy

HSG

Contact	Business Units	Location	End State	Comment	
14-Mar-04	Communications Support Office (C6)	PP-M231	HSG		145
29-Feb-04	Comptroller	PP-M107	HSG		18
15-Feb-04	Defense Contract Management Agency	PP-N113	HSG		10
28-Jan-04	Deputy Chief of Staff	PP-M110	HSG		9
14-Mar-04	Facility Management Office	PP-B104	HSG		9
	Logistics (C4)		HSG		7
28-Feb-04	Ministry Requirements Coordination Office	PP-S101	HSG		
10-Mar-04	Office of the General Counsel (OGC)	PP-M115	PMO/HSG		28
22-Jan-04	Personnel (C1)	PP-M114	HSG (MIL)		
	Force Protection		HSG		14
26-Feb-04	Requirements Coordination Office	PP-N118	HSG		149
				Total	389

CPA Other

	Contact	Business Units	Location	End State	Comment	
NSDD38 in	24-Jan-04	Defense Contract Audit Agency	PP-M208			21
	21-Mar-04	Defense Criminal Investigative Service (DCIS)	PP-N100E			5
		Demining				3
MNF-I	18-Jan-04	Topograhic Mapping Team	PP-M202	NE	5/5	17
	25-Jan-04	Forward Engineering Support Team (FEST)	PP-N206	NE	5/5	5
		British Office of Baghdad (BOoB)		UK	6/30	
	21-Jan-04	Chaplain's Office	PP-M	IRMO	(?)	8
		Chief Operating Officer		NE	6/15-6/30	12
		Defense Support Agency		OGA?		1
	17-Jan-04	Department of Economic Policy	PP-S207	NE	5/15	
	27-Jan-04	Deputy Adminstrator & Chief Policy Officer	PP-M103	NE	6/15-6/30	
	27-Jan-04	Director of Administration & Chief of Staff	PP-M104	NE	6/15-6/30	
	20-Jan-04	Directorate of Civil Affairs	PP-M117	NE	6/5	3
	15-Feb-04	Directorate of Operations and Infrastructure	PP-M234	NE	6/15-6/30	
	18-Feb-04	Distinguished Visitors Bureau	PP-Grn Rm	NE	6/30	
	1-Mar-04	Human Resources Management - CPA	PP-M210	IRMO		
	28-Jan-04	Information Management Unit	PP-M101A	IRMO		
	16-Mar-04	Inspector General (IG)	PP-M106		9/4	4
		Italian Delegation			6/30	10
	2-Feb-04	Iraqi Media Network	Forum	NE	6/30	50
Co-staff w/ IRDC Dirge		Iraqi Reconstruction Development Council		NE	6/5-6/30	174
	13-Mar-04	NSC Representative's Office	PP-M235	NE	5/15	
		National Security Defense				75
		Office of Management and Budget		NE	6/15-6/30	9
	22-Jan-04	Office of National Security Affairs	PP-N218A			
	16-Mar-04	Office of Policy Planning and Analysis	PP-M239	NE	5/15-5/30	14
	3-Feb-04	Office of Private Sector Development	PP-S107	NE	6/15-6/30	28
	31-Jan-04	Office of the Administrator	PP-Front Off	NE	6/15-6/30	16
		Office of Sepecial Investigations				36
		Task Force RIE		NE	GRD	123
		Task Force RIO	PP-S225	NE	GRD	29
	3-Feb-04	UK Administration Office	PP-M211	NE	6/30	44
	3-Feb-04	UK Special Representative's Office	PP-Front Off	NE	6/30	
	27-Jan-04	UN Assessment Team	PP-1N105A	INDEF		
	27-Feb-04	Department for Intl Development - Palace Element	PP-N105D	UK	6/30	
		US MISSION	PP-N115A	NE	7/15	
		Front Office Translation Team		NE		
		Other				96
		OGA		OTHER		
					Total	783

Contractors

Contact	**Business Units**	End State	Comment
Trans	Titan Linquist	NE	DCAA review
CMATT	Vinnell	MNF&I	CMATT
CSO	Raytheon	HSG	
CSO	MCI	HSG	
CSO	Orascom/Iraqna		
Demining	RONCO		
Iraq Media Network	Harris Corporation	NE	6/30
IRDC	SAIC	NE	6/5-6/30
PSD	Blackwater	NE	6/15-6/30
Security	Global Risk Strategies, Ltd (Admin Only)	EMBASSY/USMB	
Reg Ops	S&K Technologies	HSG	
Reg Ops	MPRI	HSG	
Reg Ops	NAID	NE	6/30
MOD/Stratcom PSD	MVM ← for MOI two-[illegible] coming in to support [illegible]	PSD ?	
Trans	MZM	NE	
MOH PSD	PSD (?)	PSD	
MOI	Rand Corp		
UK PSD	CRG		PSD
UK PSD	Meteoric Tactical Solutions		PSD
PSD/Security Oil	Erinys		PSD
Trans	Worldwide Language Resources (Translation Off)	NE	
Min/USAID	Bearing Point	USAID	
USAID	General Electric	USAID	
USAID	Olive	USAID	
USAID	Washington Inc	USAID	
USAID	OTI	USAID	
USAID PSD	Kroll	USAID	
USAID	RTI	USAID	
	KBR		

NE = Non-Essential

Prepared by (b)(6) ITPT
Draft Transition Plan
April 10, 2004

Write Transition Plan in concert with AMB Bremer's Strategic Goals

- Security
- Essential Services
- Economy
- Governance
- Strategic Communications

Modified by current filters

- Power Ministries
- Heightened Security
- Transition by 6/30
- Maintain essential Palace support i.e., non DoS IT, communications, medical

Determine US Mission, IRMO and Green Zone Management end state on 7/1 (until final end state is determined, plan with draft organizational documents). The intention is to transition into the follow on organization by upsizing, maintaining, downsizing or eliminating functions that are not required or are to be provided by the US Mission, IRMO, and assigned military units.

Review or develop transition plans for Ministries, Governance Teams, STRATCOM, Baghdad Central (complete), and 17 Governorate Sites (CPA North, Central South and South), PMO/APCO, and CPA Rear (in coordination with Washington), to meet goals prior to 6/30 and start transition on 5/15.

Identify and review all current business units that are not classified above into key support and non essential support, require lead person to develop transition plans. Review current and 7/1 use of contractor personnel.

Determine transition / manning capacity of HR, travel and logistics system (work with and provide requirements to HR, C-4 and DCMA).

Determine transition rate versus transition capacity:

- Achieve 7/1 US Embassy, IRMO and Green Zone organization and manning by 6/30

Develop Draft Plan for approval including final end state of CPA (US Mission, IRMO, Green Zone support, etc.).

Upon approval of Draft Plan populate and implement Transition Plan.

Timeline and discussion:

- Submit Draft Transition Plan to AMB Bremer, AMB Jones, AMB Ricciardone and LTG Kicklighter on 4/15
- Gain approval by 4/20
- Submit populated non essential business unit transition plan on 4/25 (start with non essential business units and personnel, continue with Ministries, Governance Teams, 17 sites and STRATCOM and key operational support business units)
- Submit populated final transition plan on 5/1
- Publish plan and notify initial group of personnel on 5/1
- Allow one week for reallocation of qualified personnel to follow on organization
- Commence transition to follow on organization on 5/07
- Start personnel fly away on 5/15
- Concurrently reduce other support organizations, including KBR
- Assign remobilization of OPCON military forces to CJTF-7 or MNF&I
- Overlay US Mission Baghdad
- Coordinate the internal Palace movement of personnel into temporary / final work space
- Coordinate with continued mobilization of new incoming or follow on personnel

Laser1:
ACTION: EXEC
INFO: COS IPC

DISSEMINATION: EXEC /1
CHARGE: PROG

Transition

APR 06 2004
BREMER
Jones
Redd
Holzman
CoS

VZCZCBGO649
RR RUEHGB
DE RUEHC #5518/01 0962212
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 052211Z APR 04
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO CPA BAGHDAD 0302
BT
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 STATE 075518

FROM OBO DIRECTOR (b)(6) TO AMBASSADOR BREMER

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ABLD, AMGT
SUBJECT: INTERIM EMBASSY FACILITIES

1. I am pleased to inform you that our contract to renovate and improve the DOS interim embassy facilities in Baghdad was awarded within budget and on schedule on April 1, 2004. The successful award of this contract is a significant milestone in the execution of the plan that was briefed to the senior CPA staff during my visit to Baghdad on February 29, 2004.

2. The work is divided into three phases and will be performed at the three interim facilities: the interim embassy compound consisting of the C/1-35 compound, the adjacent site that is being developed as housing by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and the adjoining pool complex; the interim embassy annex consisting of the palace compound, expanded to include the offices and housing of the other government agency; and the interim Chief of Mission Residence (CMR) consisting of the residence occupied by you.

3. Phase 1 work will focus on the interim chancery and will be completed by May 15, 2004. At the conclusion of Phase 1, unclassified office, meeting and limited residential space will be available on the second floor of the chancery for use by the DOS transition staff. Specifically, the scope of work includes the following:

a. Site development to support facilities/improvements being installed under Phase 1;

b. Installation of a chain link fence and gates between the interim chancery building and USAID housing;

c. Installation of concertina wire on and in front of the perimeter security ballistic barrier along the riverfront road and on top of the perimeter wall south of the interim chancery building.

d. Construction of the perimeter wall around the pool complex and installation of vehicle barriers at the entrances to the pool complex;

e. Installation of a vehicle/pedestrian main Compound Access Control (CAC) and the vehicle/pedestrian portion of the service CAC;

f. Installation of shatter-resistant window film (Mylar) on all windows;

g. Installation of approved security grilles on all windows located within 5.0 meters above grade or accessible platform except on windows already equipped with grilles;

h. Installation of compound security lighting;

i. Installation of the infrastructure to support the compound security system;

j. Repairs to the water supply system;

k. Connection to the USAID telephone and computer network;

l. Installation of a sewage collection and pumping system to a contractor-provided holding tank located on the USAID compound; and

m. Installation of a remote fuel fill pipe, piping and temporary tank(s).

4. Phase 2 work will include all three of the interim facilities. The work will be completed by June 15, 2004, in order to permit the interim embassy to be stood up by July 1, 2004. The Phase 2 work, by facility, includes the following:

a. Interim Chancery Compound

1.) Site development to support facilities/improvements being installed under Phase 2;

2.) Installation of a water fill pipe, pumps and temporary tank(s);

3.) Installation of a consular pedestrian CAC;

4.) Completion of the service CAC;

5.) Connection to USAID generators for power/limited electrical distribution;

6.) Installation of a remote water filling station along with necessary storage tanks and pump(s);

7.) Building modifications and upgrades consisting of electrical/mechanical improvements, interior guard posts, lighting, installation of hardline walls, partitions, FEBR doors, etc.;

8.) Installation of a Government-furnished Great Seal and flag pole;

9.) Building HVAC repairs and improvements; and

10.) Building furnishings.

b. Interim Annex Compound

1.) Site development to support facilities/improvements being installed under Phase 2;

2.) Construction of perimeter security walls around the interim annex;

3.) Installation of perimeter security lighting;

4.) Installation of the infrastructure for compound security system; and

5.) Installation of all CAC's at the interim annex.

c. Interim Residence Site

1.) Site development to support facilities/improvements being installed under Phase 2;

2.) Installation of perimeter security walls;

3.) Installation of a vehicle/pedestrian CAC at the main entrance;

4.) Installation of an emergency exit with a remotely-operated vehicle barrier and gate;

5.) Installation of FEBR doors;

6.) Installation of approved security grilles on all windows located within 5.0 meters above grade or accessible platform, except on windows that presently have grilles;

7.) Installation of perimeter security lighting; and

8.) Installation of the infrastructure for the compound security system.

5. Phase 3 includes the residual work at the interim chancery and annex and will be completed by August 15, 2004. It includes the following:

a. Interim Chancery Compound

1.) Completion of any site development including landscaping, seeding, walkways and parking necessary for a fully functional compound;

2.) Completion of the fuel distribution system;

3.) Installation of protection around the compound generators;

4.) Completion of building modifications including installation of fire escapes, hard-wired fire alarms, smoke detectors, fire doors, fire-rate doors, infrastructure for Telephone PBX and wire management; and

5.) Installation of the perimeter wall enclosing the pool complex adjacent to the interim chancery.

b. Interim Annex Compound

1.) Installation of security grilles on all windows located within 5.0 meters above grade or accessible platform, except on windows that presently have grilles;

2.) Installation of shatter-resistant window film on trailer windows; and

3.) Installation of vehicle barriers within the compound.

6. In addition to the work described above, the contract scope of work includes providing 75 residential trailers. The first 20 will be installed and ready for occupancy by May 15, 2004. The remaining 55 will be completed by June 15, 2004. The trailers will be sited on the annex compound. The majority will be located in proximity to the Camp IX Poolside Suites and the balance will be interspersed among the

existing trailers as directed by OBO's Project Director after consultation with CPA. These housing units are being acquired to augment the existing housing units, which are expected to be transferred from CPA to DOS to house the U.S. staff. The goal is to have sufficient housing to accommodate the U.S. personnel under the authority of the Chief of Mission at no more than two staff members per trailer with each staff member having a separate sleeping area with a shared bathroom.

7. The OBO Project Director and Contracting Officer's Representative (COR) for the contract is Mr. (b)(6) who arrived in Baghdad on Friday April 2. The contract documents have been forwarded to him, which he will share with your staff, as appropriate, in order to assure coordination of the contractor's work with ongoing CPA operations.

8. The next phase of work to provide the interim embassy facilities will be the interior improvements to the annex. As briefed during my visit, the goal is to provide secure, safe and functional facilities within the available funding. As a result, the interior improvements to the annex will be limited and will not meet all New Embassy Compound (NEC) standards. I want to emphasize, however, that these improvements will ensure that the facility will function and be safe and secure for operation. Diplomatic Security has been a full participating member of every planning effort for all of these facilities. Hand in hand with finalizing the scope of work for these improvements will be limited space planning for the annex building. This planning will be accomplished by a joint DOS/DOD space planning team. The scope and schedule for this effort will be addressed by Septel.

9. We look forward to executing this "fast-tracked" construction and make ready effort with CPA's support as we move forward in providing the facilities that will be required for the interim embassy in Baghdad.

POWELL
BT
#5518
NNNN

COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY
BAGHDAD

INFORMATION MEMO

DATE April 5, 2004

FOR: THE ADMINISTRATOR, THE DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR

FROM: Andrew Rathmell (OPPA)

SUBJECT: CPA Priorities towards Transition

Summary: Although a great deal remains to be achieved before transition, it will be valuable to keep CPA focused on a small number of vital tasks so as to marshal our resources. To assist in this prioritization, we have undertaken an analysis of the Strategic Plan goals. This process provides a systematic set of recommendations for where the CPA leadership should focus its efforts in the remaining period before TOA.

Our methodology for selecting these priorities is summarised in Tab A. Our analysis led us to select 15 vital objectives for CPA. We refined these into four top vital objectives. Within the four Objectives we have defined as vital for success of transition, our recommendations focus on those tasks that are Amber or Red in the plan and about which something can realistically be done.

The main resources that CPA is able to (re)deploy in the remaining weeks are: i) time and attention of the senior leadership; ii) CPA personnel; iii) funds; iv) CJTF-7 assets. Any redeployment of personnel or assets will of course have to ensure that significant gaps are not thereby created in other programs that may cause unexpected risks.

Top 4 Priorities for Transition

1) Continued emphasis by the Coalition Forces and Iraqi Security Forces on public safety and counter insurgency. **(Objective:- Achieve a Secure and Stable Environment)**
2) Resources and training for Iraqi Security Forces that allow them to effectively provide public safety. **(Objective:- Public Safety: Develop Institutions that are Effective in Protecting Society and Constitutional Order)**
3) Support for development of the caretaker government and the Transition Administrative Law, including civil education programs. **(Objectives:- Develop Civic Participation in Governance & Support Governance with a robust communications campaign)**
4) Increase Iraqi satisfaction with Electricity. **(Objective:- Provide Electricity Services that Meet National Needs)**

1. Continued emphasis by Coalition Forces and Iraqi Security Forces on public safety and counter insurgency. The overwhelming consensus of the participants to this study and the Iraqi polling data is that security is the top priority. In addition to ongoing military operations, probably the most important areas on which to focus are:

- *Militia Transition & Reintegration*; particular steps are:
    - Conclusion of political agreements underpinning proposed militia order; employment and reintegration for demobilized militia (and military) personnel; neutralization of non-compliant militias
- *Border security*; particular steps are:
    - Expedite equipment deliveries; POE refurbishment; recruitment and training of expanded number of border personnel.

2. Resources and training for Iraqi Security Forces that allow them to effectively provide public safety. The police must be resourced properly and trained; the quality of the forces is probably more important than simple numbers. The development of specialist capabilities (e.g. criminal intelligence and organized crime investigative units) is critical if the police are to make real inroads against criminal and terrorist networks. The most important areas related to the Task *Create an Effective and Accountable Police System* are:

- Fully staff and resource OSC/CPATT to enable it to achieve its mission;
- Establish governance framework for internal security, notably, define and implement a national command and control framework for the IPS;
- Acquire and distribute remaining equipment for IPS;
- Develop and transition to Iraqi control Special Police Units – notably intelligence, counter-terrorism and public order
- Fully implement police information campaign (Strategic Communications).

3. Support governmental reform and the Transitional Administrative Law, including the provision of resources to civil education programs. An important CPA focus is, rightly, upon working with the UN to establish a stable caretaker government. However, the governance information campaign and civic education program are absolutely critical to a smooth TOA. Decisions on the form of the caretaker executive must be made and explained to the people of Iraq before the transfer. The local governance order is an important asset in this campaign as it will provide demonstrable benefits at the local levels of government. The key tasks here are:

- Develop civic education programs promoting electoral participation and democratic ideals;
- Develop local civil society capacity to conduct advocacy and participate in political life;
- Support Governance with a robust communications campaign (Strategic Communications).

Given the strength and inherent advantages of anti-CPA information campaigns, ranging from the Sistani anti-TAL effort to the attitudes of some Arab media networks, the provision of resources for the engagement and education of civil society should be reviewed for adequacy. There may be additional steps that CPA can take to bolster these critical information campaigns.

4. Increase Iraqi satisfaction with Electricity. CPA/CJTF-7 planners and Iraqi poll data alike make electricity one of the vital priorities for the next 3 months. Whilst the Ministry of Electricity is focused on the symbolic target of increasing capacity to 6,000MW, the most important measure is *Iraqi satisfaction through a program of managed expectations*. Success in this program will involve improved performance in the critical tasks supporting this objective (all are currently rated as Amber):

- Minimize sabotage and improve security
- Improve generating capacity to 6,000 Megawatts by 1 July 04
    - Requirements are well understood and planned but implementation challenges remain
- Fully implement policy on allocation of electrical power
- Publish draft document of long-term strategy for Iraqi electricity sector
    - A particularly important part of this task will be to implement electricity price reform in a way that generates public support whilst beginning to remove price distortions
- Electricity Information Campaign (Strategic Communications)
    - Full implementation of this campaign, which must involve regular feedback reviews, will be central to building Iraqi satisfaction.

COORDINATION: COO – ok
CJTF-7 - ok

ATTACHMENT: **TAB A: PRIORITY SETTING METHODOLOGY**

TAB A: PRIORITY SETTING METHODOLOGY

To establish the above priorities, we used the following methodology:

Each Strategic Objective and its subordinate Key Tasks were evaluated by the OPPA Lead Planner. They were annotated as Vital, Critical, Important or Needed based on the following definitions:

- *Vital* for those elements that will impact the success of the transition. The implication is that if a Vital element failed, then the transition itself would fail.
- *Critical* was used to identify those elements whose failure would imply serious damage to the transition or would place other tasks and objectives at unacceptable risk.
- *Important* and *Needed* are self explanatory.

The priorities derived from this assessment were modified by the following steps:

i) Analysis of Iraqi poll data to determine the expressed priorities of Iraqi citizens (in broad terms, Iraqis rank CPA's pillars as follows: 1 – Security, 2 – Infrastructure, 3 – Elections/Governance and Employment and 4 – Economy)
ii) Prioritisation of ministry criticality according to CJTF-7 Essential Conditions and infrastructure dependency matrix.
iii) Analysis of COO's top ten priorities in the infrastructure ministries
iv) Brainstorming by OPPA, COO, AID and CJTF-7 to revise the priorities
v) Input from expert sources outside CPA, including the Dobbins RAND report

This process allowed us to select 15 vital objective priorities from the Strategic Plan (table 1).

Table 1: Vital Objective Priorities

Pri.	Iraqi Tier	Ministry	Sect	OBJ	Name
1	1	CJTF 7	SEC	1	Achieve a Secure and Stable Environment
2	1	Interior	SEC	2	Public Safety: Develop Institutions that are Effective in Protecting Society and Constitutional Order
3	1	Strategic Communications	STR	2	Support Security with a robust communications campaign
4	1	Justice	SEC	3	Build Justice
5	2	Electricity	ESS	1	Provide Electricity Services that Meet National Needs
6	3	Governance	GOV	1	Support Role of Governing Council (GC)
7	3	Governance	GOV	2	Develop Civic Participation in Governance
8	3	Governance	GOV	3	Develop Framework and Capacity for Elections
9	3	Governance	GOV	4	Support Development of Sustainable Political Parties/Associations
10	3	Strategic Communications	STR	3	Support Governance with a robust communications campaign
11	3	Health	ESS	5	Improve Quality and Access to Health Care
12	4	Oil	ESS	12	Reconstitute Oil Infrastructure
13	4	Trade	ECO	4	Private Sector Initiatives
14	4	Trade	ECO	9	Lay Foundations for an Open Economy
15	4	Finance	ECO	1	Build Financial Market Structures

POC: TSgt Westberg

CPA/U.S. Mission Staffing

2004-2005



POC: TSgt Westberg

CPA/U.S. Mission Staffing
2004-2005



for Amb Jones.

COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

FROM: (b)(6)	**DATE: 3-Apr-04**

FOR: THE ADMINISTRATOR

ORIGINATOR: Executive Secretariat

RE: Request for Information on Advisors to Iraqi Ministries after June 30

Attached is State's response to our cable (Baghdad 0169/CPA 0833, sent 1 April) on post-transition Advisor requirements. We had simultaneously sent an e-mail to State Ops and several others with accompanying documents, including excel spreadsheets on staffing. We had asked State Ops to transmit these documents to various offices in State, DOD, and the NSC.

Some of the questions in State 74163 touch upon information that was in the e-mail. It appears that there were communication problems in Washington addressees receiving the original e-mail. We have resent it; Ops has confirmed receipt and will transmit the documents.

ATTACHMENTS:

- State 74163
- Baghdad 169/CPA 833
- E-mail documents:
  - Ministry summary
  - Current staffing
  - Ministry summary notes
  - Ministry staffing

APR 01 2004

Laser1:
ACTION: EXEC
INFO: IPC COS

DISSEMINATION: EXEC /1
CHARGE: PROG

APPROVED: LPBREMER
DRAFTED: CIVIL AFFAIRS/GDENHA
CLEARED: (b)(6)

VZCZCBGI089
OO RUEHC RUEKJCS RHEHNSC
DE RUEHGB #0169 0920754
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 010754Z APR 04
FM CPA BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0360
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0350
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0343
BT
UNCLAS BAGHDAD 000169

FOR SECRETARY POWELL FROM AMBASSADOR BREMER

E.O.12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, AMGT, APER, AFIN, IZ
SUBJECT: CPA 833: ADVISORS IN IRAQI MINISTRIES AFTER JUNE 30

REF: BAGHDAD 136

1. As promised, we have completed a thorough review of the current staffing of CPA ministry advisors and arrived at recommendations about the post-June 30 advisor staffing needed by U.S. Mission Baghdad.

2. Overall, we have identified a mission critical need for 19 senior consultants (policy advisors) and 180 technical advisors -- 199 in total -- to be based in the ministries and associated regulatory organizations after June 30. These numbers are projected to fall rapidly over time, to 171 after 6 months, 53 after 12 months and 1 after 24 months. (According to our records today, we have 637 advisors, of which 515 are U.S. civilians. Current CPA numbers are not exactly comparable to future projected needs, as some current activities will be funded out of the supplemental.)

3. Of the 199 positions, we would propose filling 155 with U.S. personnel (including 68 "3161s"), 43 to be filled by

Julia

coalition partners, with the disposition of a remaining position to be determined later. We have assumed that, where the choice is for a post to be filled by a Coalition government or by the USG, we should seek a foreign fill. We have assumed that, where possible, USG-filled positions will be filled by detailees, and only if necessary by contractors or 3161s.

4. I recommend that we agree to work from the above proposed numbers of advisors. Over the remaining 90 days, we will continue to scrub to cut numbers and press coalition partners to do more to fill appropriate slots. UK DfID has already responded positively, and is likely to provide a dozen advisors over and above those shown in the full report on this work.

Other support needs

5. The above number of advisors does not include:

-- Other U.S. positions currently fully funded from the supplemental to at least April 2005. For example, in addition to 600 or so civilian police trainers, there are approximately 107 staff working on development of the Iraqi prison service, and approximately 60 who will be working to reconstruct justice agencies including the Iraqi Special Tribunal and the Commission on Public Integrity;

-- Advisors whom relevant ministers plan to recruit bilaterally from other international agencies, e.g., World Health Organization, and/or which ministers will not seek from any successor organization to CPA. Pending a requested briefing with CPA, the UN has not yet determined advisors it may be able to offer;

-- Any advisors provided by planned aid programs that will be separately funded and resourced. In particular, DfID expects to deploy up to a dozen consultants to undertake cross-cutting Public Administration Reform.

-- Support to Iraqi government institutions that do not yet exist. In particular, it will be necessary to provide advisors to any offices formed to support the Prime Minister and Presidency (e.g., a cabinet office) and the National Legislature. DfID and USAID are considering how they may provide such advice and assistance but programs have not yet been scoped.

6. We are sending by e-mail to the Department a copy of our full report on proposed staffing needs. This report

includes more detail on:

-- The support needed by Ministries and source agencies providing support;

-- Summary data comparing proposed support with current support under CPA,

-- A section for each Ministry providing: a) justification for support by the Ministry; and b) a detailed breakdown of the proposed advisor posts by job description and source.

7. We will also provide Iraq Reconstruction and Management Organization (IRMO) and regional staffing recommendations by separate messages.

BREMER
BT
#0169
NNNN

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6)
Sent: Thursday, April 01, 2004 6:22 PM
To: Rathmell, Andrew (SES1); Oster, Jeffrey W. (O-9); Tappan, Robert A. (SES-4); Jones, Richard (AMB); Haveman, James (SES-7)
Subject: FW: PROGRAM FOR MINISTRY TRANSITIONS

(b)(6)

Please see attached document which [redacted] has asked me to add Ambassador Bremer's comments to in italics.

Regards

(b)(6)

PA/Director of Civil Affairs
CPA Baghdad

DSN: (b)(6)
Civ: (b)(6)

-----Original Message-----
From: (b)(6)
Sent: Thursday, April 01, 2004 5:47 PM
To (b)(6)
Subject: FW: PROGRAM FOR MINISTRY TRANSITIONS

(b)(6)

Director Civil Affairs
Coalition Provisional Authority Baghdad
Room M117
cell: (+) (b)(6)
DSN: (b)(6)
civ: (b)(6)

-----Original Message-----
From: (b)(6))
Sent: Wednesday, March 31, 2004 12:21 PM
To: Executive Secretary
Cc: (b)(6) Oster, Jeffrey W. (O-9); (b)(6) Rathmell, Andrew (SES1); Tappan, Robert A. (SES-4); Haveman, James (SES-7)
Subject: PROGRAM FOR MINISTRY TRANSITIONS

Action memo attached.

(b)(6)

Director Civil Affairs
Coalition Provisional Authority Baghdad
Room M117
cell: (+) (b)(6)
DSN: (b)(6)
civ: (b)(6)

Ministry[1]	CPA Groundwork				Iraqi Engagement and Progress			
	Strategic Plans exist	Goal Oriented Structure	Skills Needs Analysis	Control Systems Planned	Ownership of Strategy	Key Posts filled in Structure	Skills Training Instituted	Control Systems Working
INTERIOR	░	▒	▒	░	▒ ↑	▒ ↑	░ ↑	░ ↑
OIL	▒	░	░	▒	░	▒	▒	▒
ELECTRICITY	▒	░	▒	░	▒	░	░	▓
JUSTICE	▒	▒	▒	░	▒	▒	░	░
DEFENCE	░	▒	░	░	░	░ ↑	░	░
TRADE	░	▓	░	▓	▓	▒	░	▓
FINANCE	░	░	░	░	▓	▓	░	░
TRANSPORTATION	░	▓	░	▓	░	░	▒	░
AGRICULTURE	░	▓	░	▒	▓	░	▓	▒
COMMUNICATIONS[2]	░	▓	░	▓	▓	▓	▓	▓
CENTRAL BANK	▒	▒	▒	▒	▒	▒	▒	░
MUNIC. & PUBLIC WORKS	▒	▒	▒	░	▒	▒ ↑	▒	░
WATER RESOURCES	░	▒	░	▒	▒	▒	░	▒
LABOR AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS	░	░	░	░	▓	░	▓	░
HEALTH	▒	▒	▒	▒	▒	▒	▒	░
HOUSING & CONSTRUCTION	░	░	░	▒	▒	░	░	░
EDUCATION	▒	▒	░	░	▒	▒	░ ↑	░
HIGHER EDUCATION	▒	▒	▒	▒	▒	▒ ↑	░ ↑	▒
DISPLACEMENT & MIGRATION	▒	▒	▒	░	▒	░	░	▒
HUMAN RIGHTS	▒	▒	▒	▒	▒	░	░	░
CULTURE	░	░	▓	░	▓	░	▓	░
ENVIRONMENTAL	░	░	░	▓	░	░	▓	▓
FOREIGN AFFAIRS	▒	▒	▒	▒	▒	▒	░	▒
INDUSTRY & MINERALS	░	░	░	░	▓	░	░	░
PLANNING & DEV. COOP.	▒	░	▓	▒	░	░	▓	░
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY	▒	▒	▒	░	▓	░	▒	░
YOUTH AND SPORTS	▓	░	░	▒	░	▒	▓	░

[1] Order is based on a three-tiered system that reflects the importance of each ministry in ensuring the security and legitimacy of the new government after TOA.

↑ iindicates *improvement since original assessment in mid-February*

April 1, 2004

COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY

BAGHDAD

ACTION MEMO

March 31, 2004

FOR: THE ADMINISTRATOR

FROM: (b)(6) Director Civil Affairs

SUBJECT: Transferring full authority to Ministries – next steps

You asked for advice on the sequencing of the remaining Ministries, following the expected transfer of authority for four this week (Health, Education, Municipalities and Public Works, and Water Resources).

From a Strategic Communications standpoint, the regular transition of these ministries is extremely helpful in communicating the larger picture of incremental, orderly and sustained devolvement of control over to the Iraqis. Inside Iraq, this transition process communicates that we are not abandoning them; for audiences outside Iraq, it communicates peaceful transfer of sovereignty with negligible disruption in continuity.

I think we need to review for each Ministry:

- Whether it satisfies the four tests we have publicly announced – strategy, structure skills, systems. Some of this is a matter of judgment, and therefore flexible, but it would be difficult to justify transitioning a ministry which could not point to a form of written strategy and demonstrate that its management structure reflected this. I would therefore expect these sections (both CPA and Iraqi) to be mostly green on the transition stoplight chart. A copy of the latest version is attached: we will do a further assessment of some Ministries.

- Where the Ministry does not yet satisfy the tests, how soon it will, and what we might do to promote progress in the weakest areas.

√

- What presentational risks we run in publicly announcing that we are giving a Minster and his team full authority. While you remain the ultimate authority until June 30, it would call our judgment in * question if you had later to intervene in such a Ministry, or in the worst case, to dismiss its Minister. Human Rights meets most of the tests, but its Minister still seems to need our attention.

** That's not a concern. He either does well or not. Blair fires ministers.*

- What strategic or political issues we face in transitioning while Ministers are still reporting to the IGC. Even where a Ministry seems relatively competent, its importance to the national economy (as for Oil) or security (as for Interior) may still point to caution.

Conclusion
Based on the stoplight chart, I think we have six further Ministries which are close to being ready for transition - Displacement and Migration, Foreign Affairs, Higher Education, Human Rights, Justice and Oil. We would probably want to discount Human Rights, Oil and Interior, as explained above. **If discussion with Senior Advisors confirms this, we could have four Ministry candidates in April.**

Next down the track seems to be Housing and Construction. Defense is well placed on strategy and structure, but its transition so early in its life would be a risk to security. If Youth and Sports were able to produce a strategy, it might also be a contender before June. So might Planning and Development Co-operation if it addressed skills issues. **We might find three more candidates in May.**

In several other Ministries there is a basic disagreement over strategy between the CPA/Senior Advisor and the Ministry – Agriculture, Labor and Social Affairs, Industry and Minerals and Science and Technology. Unless there is resolved before the end of May, there is little to be gained from delaying transition where the Ministry is otherwise competent eg in the latter two cases. This raises the question of the real impact of transitioning Ministries in the four weeks before sovereignty. **We are likely to struggle to find four credible candidates in June, unless you want to reconsider one of the Ministries discounted earlier.**

On current progress the remaining seven Ministries - Communications, Culture, Environment, Finance, Interior, Trade and Transportation – seem unlikely to be ready for transition ahead of sovereignty. [DCOO believes the MoI self assessment may be overoptimistic.] Many of them also have a long way to go to meet high profile targets in the Strategic Plan.

Possible Timings
If the Senior Advisors and their Ministers agree with something like the schedule above, it would be possible to transition one Ministry a week between now and the end of May. A rough sample schedule is attached. We might continue at this rate through June, if it was thought presentationally desirable.

RECOMMENDATION: I recommend that I (and (b)(6) in my absence) consult the relevant Senior Advisors on these proposals. If they agree, we would ask them to discuss with their Ministers.

Approve:___*4/1*____ Disapprove:________ Approve with modification:______

* *I would like to try to transition at least one per week to June 30. We should set one for the week I am away which (b)(can do.*

ATTACHMENTS: 1. Ministry transition stoplight chart
2. Sample schedule of Ministries to transition

CO-ORDINATION: Andrew Rathmell - ok
LTG (Ret) Oster - ok
Stratcom, (b)(6) - ok

COPY: Amb Jones
Dep Dir Civil Affairs, (b)(6)

SAMPLE SCHEDULE OF MINISTRIES TO TRANSITION

Date	**Ministry**
March 28	**Health**
April 3	Education
April 3	Municipalities and Public Works
April 4	Water Resources
April 11	Foreign Affairs
April 18	Justice
April 25	Higher Education
May 2	Displacement & Migration
May 9	Housing and Construction
May 16	Planning and Development Co-operation
May 23	Youth and Sports
May 30	? Industry and Minerals
June 6	? Science and Technology
June 13	? Agriculture
June 20	? Oil
June 27	? Human Rights

COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY
BAGHDAD

INFO MEMO

PMO

March 17, 2004

FOR: Ambassador Jones

FROM: (b)(6)

SUBJECT: Summary of Immediate PMO Field Requirements

PMO seeks a balanced field organizational approach and presence with equal focus on the essential political process for reconstruction and effective implementation of the $18.4 supplemental in accordance with legislated dictates, overall Coalition expectations as well as Iraqi aspirations. This can only happen through rapid, but sensible planning; hope and memo duels are not feasible options for PMO.

Accordingly, ten out of seventeen major PMO contracts have been awarded in the past week alone. The remaining seven will soon follow. Hundreds of contractor personnel are preparing to deploy into Iraq now. Neither the Administration nor Congress will appreciate delays caused by inadequate planning and preparation.

Here are the immediate needs for what you characterized in the transition planning meeting you chaired today as the "PMO force of nature." We appreciate your support in terms of allowing others to work with us i.e.," Others must plan around you." We humbly agree that this is a sensible way to proceed for now. Immediate decisions and detailed planning are needed for the following.

- A March 13, 2004 from Ambassador Bearpark to Ambassador Bremer recommended that PMO become the "prime owner" and the essential inn-keeper for itself and "blister" organizations who wish to attach themselves for purposes of combined security, economies-of-scale and regular substantive interaction (see attachment). While details must be worked, this approach will: capture sunk taxpayer and other Coalition player costs while saving contract funds by avoiding duplicative facilities; lower overall security costs; allow quicker implementation of PMO and other activities by slimming deployment requirement lists; and, meet Administration needs for rapid implementation. This approach fully respects the need for PMO to interface and integrate contractors with construction management along with a myriad of highly complex logistical priorities.

- With respect to field advisors, it makes sense to polarize activities at the regional level rather than at the governorate levels if only because of economies-of-scale for security and administrative costs. A few governorates will, for various reasons, require a presence.

It is important to decide now what kind, how many and which Coalition partners will continue to provide field advisors generally and, more specifically, which ones can be attached from whichever USG entity or Coalition partner to PMO. There are many fine and capable technical field advisors. We know many of them well. In the South, for example, every one of the UK advisors plans to leave before June 30, if only for lack of DFID or CPA guidance to the contrary. If this happens, then PMO will lose a vast store of technical and political knowledge that oil, water, power, telecommunications and other specialists have developed at great effort. If PMO projects cannot benefit from this knowledge, then it must be created again at great costs in time and money. The value of this intellectual capital cannot be overstated. At a minimum, a policy decision is needed now to keep as many of the qualified and willing field technical advisors for as long as needed. This will vary from person-to-person, place-to-place and Coalition partner-to-partner.

- PMO is insolvent for operating money yet an avalanche of implementation responsibilities are coming over the horizon now. Army and other DoD personnel are staffing a draft MOA that would allow PMO to exist as a separate Army entity in order to access supplemental money for operations as well as retain 3161 capability. State reportedly has issues, but PMO doesn't know what they are. CPA/GC said at today's meeting that the MOA is unnecessary and the Army can access up to ten percent of the supplemental for operating costs now if it wishes to do so. The policymakers and the legal staffs need to resolve this now.

In short, PMO needs:

1. Designation now as the "prime owner" and innkeeper for key field facilities as shown in Bearpark's memo with its attachments.
2. Agreement now that key technical field advisors from the Coalition should be attached to PMO.
3. Agreement now on how and specifically when PMO can receive operating funds.

While you asked for an information piece, we could just as easily prepare a decision memorandum. At your direction, we are prepared to do so. In any event, PMO believes an excellent opportunity arises during the coming high level visit to, among many other things, resolve all the issues raised here.

ATTACHMENTS:	Director of Infrastructure Action Memo PMO Project Maps and Report
COORDINATION:	COO

COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY
BAGHDAD

ACTION MEMO

March 13, 2004

FOR: THE ADMINISTRATOR

FROM: (b)(6)

SUBJECT: Post CPA Field Presence

Planning for post CPA activities continues. An important element is the post CPA field presence and structure All concerned are keen to move ahead quickly with this, but we are hampered by uncertainty over the overall CPA post transition structure, particularly the precise roles of the PMO and IRMA (if it is created). There is also an issue of cost – they are very expensive. Security alone is estimated at in excess of US$300 million per year. Your current guidance is that you want to see all the RT and GT site offices (18) remain open, and with a continuing international flavor. The following model has been discussed widely within CPA and appears to be practicable. I should be grateful for your views.

Regional presence:

Regional offices will be located in Kirkuk, Hillah and Basrah. The regional offices will contain the following elements:

- *US Consulates and in Bhasra and possibly* Kirkuk UK Consulates
- PMO and/or IRMA
- USAID
- Other bi-lateral development agencies

We assume that the financing would come from State, with other non US tenants reimbursing a share.

Governorate presence:

It is suggested that the PMO become ~~the prime “owner”~~ of the Governorate offices located in
8 Dahuk, Arbil, Sulaimaniya, Baqubah (Diyala), Al Kut (Wassit), Al Amarah (Maysan), An Nasiriyah (Dhi Qar) and As Samawah (Muthanna). They are self sustainable with contract security. GT locations in Tikrit (Salah ad Din), Mosul (Ninawa), Ramadi (Al Anbar), Karbala,
6 An Najaf and Diwaniyah (Al Qadisiyah) are within Coalition military compounds. An agreement would have to be reached with CJTF-7 and its successor organization for the utilization of these locations or the sites be relocated “outside the wire” at significant cost.

The Governorate offices will be utilized to provide administrative, site security and life support for PMO prime and subcontractors. PMO would administer the current GT locations. Others who could be allowed access on a reimbursable basis, room permitting could include:

- State Department staff
- USAID and their contractors
- other bi-lateral development agency contractors

They will be allowed access, room permitting.

RECOMMENDATION (1): I recommend you approve the above mentioned concept.

Approve: ________ Disapprove: ________ Approve with modification: ______

COORDINATION:

COO
PMO
OPPA
Comptroller
Director, Civil Affairs

ATTACHMENTS: PMO Project Maps and Report


TURKEY
Dahuk
Dahuk
Tigris R.
Mosul
Irbil
Arbil
Sulaymaniyah
Ninawa
Kirkuk
At Tamim
As Sulaymaniyah
IRAN
SYRIA
Salah ad Din
Tikrit
Euphrates R.
Diyala
qubah
Baghdad
JORDAN
Al Anbar
Ar Ramadi
Wasit
Babil
Al Hillah
Karbala
Karbala
Al Kut
P
An Najaf
Ad Diwaniyah
Al Qadisiyah
Al Am
Maysan
An Nasiriyah
An Najaf
As Samawah
Dhi Qar
Al Muthanna'
SAUDI
ARABIA
KUWAIT

Project Report by Governorate

Report Criteria: Approved Projects
Unspecified Project Code
Unspecified Sector
Unspecified SubSector
Unspecified Ministry
Unspecified Governorate

Governorate Summary: 1 Projects

Anbar Governorate Summary: 198 Projects	***$507,659,520***
Babil Governorate Summary: 69 Projects	***$526,321,786***
Baghdad Governorate Summary: 229 Projects	***$3,054,545,236***
Basrah Governorate Summary: 203 Projects	***$1,779,414,183***
Dahuk Governorate Summary: 37 Projects	***$344,113,113***
Diyala Governorate Summary: 171 Projects	***$478,617,139***
Erbil Governorate Summary: 54 Projects	***$398,139,122***
Karbala Governorate Summary: 38 Projects	***$229,822,573***
Missan Governorate Summary: 161 Projects	***$193,760,900***
Muthanna Governorate Summary: 178 Projects	***$267,004,604***
Najaf Governorate Summary: 38 Projects	***$214,378,331***
Ninewa Governorate Summary: 216 Projects	***$1,039,175,931***
Qadissiya Governorate Summary: 50 Projects	***$283,253,648***
Salah al-Din Governorate Summary: 204 Projects	***$517,239,496***
Sulaymaniyah Governorate Summary: 40 Projects	***$439,076,560***
Kirkuk ***Tameem Governorate Summary: 145 Projects***	***$285,831,792***
Thi-Qar Governorate Summary: 168 Projects	***$797,126,606***
Wassit Governorate Summary: 139 Projects	***$178,551,721***
Nationwide Governorate Summary: 25 Projects	***$1,146,633,439***
Report **2364 Projects**	**$12,680,665,701**

Draft

Regional Governorate Teams Logistics Status

													LOGISTICS STATUS									
Region	Governorate	Center	CP Location Grid	Billet Location Grid	Work location Grid	Mess Location Grid	# Buildings Trailer/Fixed/Tent	# Buildings Office/Residential	Billet Spaces Trailer/Fixed	Mess Capacity Trailer/Fixed	Shower Capacity Trailer Fixed	Latrine Capacity Trailer Fixed	Water Source City/ROWPU/Haul	Electricity Generator/Local	Heat Type/Capacity	A/C Window/fixed Capacity	Vehicles Truck/Car Armored/Soft	Fuei - Type/ Capacity				
Baghdad		Baghdad																				
	Baghdad	Baghdad																				
North		Mosul																				
	Arbil	Arbil	MF24331982	MF24331982	MF2433198	MF24331982	N/A	N/A	N/A	120F	N/A	N/A	C/H	Both	9	9	50/2/48	M-5K; D-5K				
	Dahuk	Dahuk	LF 18218006	LF 18218006	LF 1821800	LF 18218006	2HS	2HS	2HS	N/A	5	5	C/H	Both	62	62	2/0/2	M- 500				
	Diyala	Baqubah	MC 6738341	MC 67383417	MC6738341	MC67383417	65/2/0		65	65F	20	9	All	Both	95/8W	95/8W	15/0/15	M- 500				
	Ninawa	Mosul	LF32062916	LF32062916	LF32062916	LF32062916	74/1/0		66/1	LC	8	8	C/H	Both	Fixed	Fixed	5/0/5	M -2K				
	Salah Ad Din	Tikrit	LD80392954	LD80392954	LD80392954	LD80392954	24/1/0		24/0	LC	10	10	C/H	Both			######	N/A				
	Sulaymaniyah	Sulaymaniyah	TBD	TBD	TBD	TBD																
	Tamim	Kirkuk	ME43392717	ME43392717	ME4378241	ME43392717	#####		80/0	50F	19	24	C/H	Both	65	65	8/0/8	M-5K				
Central South		Hillah	MA469977	MA469977	MA469977	MA469977	47/2/1	1both/·	60/120	205f/0	62/60	48/87	All	Both	Split19:	90W	102/0/all	2Kl TRS(both)				
	Anbar	Ramadi	LC389017	LCLC389017	LB417997	LC389017	14	0	26	0	13	13	R	2	0	26	4	None				
	Babil	Hillah	MA469976	MA469976	MA471950	MA469976																
	Karbala	Karbala	MB078071	MB078071	MB078071	MB078071	16/0	#####	0	250							3-Jan					
	Najaf	Najaf	MA408428	MA 408428	MA 408428	MA404428	14	3	26	300F	13/4	13/2	C	G	BTU	Ampl	1 4 1	M/D				
	Qadisiyah	Diwaniyah	MA 917414	MA 917414	MA 924389	MA917414	1	1	30/22	100/4/	15/4	15/4	C-H	Y/Y	W	W	1 1 3	KBR				
	Wasit	Kut	NA 765957	NA 765957	NA 765957	NA 765957	0 5 0	3-Feb	0/54	0/75	0/57	0/62	C	C/G	Y	Y	5-Apr	KBR				
South		Basrah																				
	Al Basrah	Basrah	QU74047701	QU74357700		QU74347709											120/4	M-9K; D-16K				
	Dhi Qar	Nasariyah																				
	Maysan	Amarah																				
	Muthanna	Samawah																				

As of: 3/17/2004

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Regional Governorate Teams Logistics Status

													LOGISTICS STATUS									
Region	Governorate	Center	CP Location Grid	Billet Location Grid	Work location Grid	Mess Location Grid	# Buildings Trailer/Fixed/Tent	# Buildings Office/Residential	Billet Spaces Trailer/Fixed	Mess Capacity Trailer/Fixed	Shower Capacity Trailer Fixed	Latrine Capacity Trailer Fixed	Water Source City/ROWPU/Haul	Electricity Generator/Local	Heat Type/Capacity	A/C Window/fixed Capacity	Vehicles Truck/Car Amored/Soft	Fuel - Type/ Capacity				
Baghdad		Baghdad																				
	Baghdad	Baghdad																				
North		Mosul																				
	Arbil	Arbil	MF24331982	MF24331982	MF2433198	MF24331982	N/A	N/A	N/A	120F	N/A	N/A	C/H	Both	9	9	50/2/48	M-5K; D-5K				
	Dahuk	Dahuk	LF 18218006	LF 18218006	LF 1821800	LF 18218006	2HS	2HS	2HS	N/A	5	5	C/H	Both	62	62	2/0/2	M- 500				
	Diyala	Baqubah	MC 6738341	MC 67383417	MC6738341	MC67383417	65/2/0		65	65F	20	9	All	Both	95/8W	95/8W	15/0/15	M- 500				
	Ninawa	Mosul	LF32062916	LF32062916	LF3206291	LF32062916	74/1/0		66/1	LC	8	8	C/H	Both	Fixed	Fixed	5/0/5	M -2K				
	Salah Ad Din	Tikrit	LD80392954	LD80392954	LD80392954	LD80392954	24/1/0		24/0	LC	10	10	C/H	Both			######	N/A				
	Sulaymaniyah	Sulaymaniyah	TBD	TBD	TBD	TBD																
	Tamim	Kirkuk	ME43392717	ME43392717	ME4378241	ME43392717	#####		80/0	50F	19	24	C/H	Both	65	65	8/0/8	M-5K				
Central South		Hillah	MA469977	MA469977	MA469977	MA469977	47/2/1	1both/	60/120	205f/0	62/60	48/87	All	Both	Split19;	90W	102/0/all	2KLTRS(both)				
	Anbar	Ramadi	LC389017	LCLC389017	LB417997	LC389017	14	0	26	0	13	13	R	2	0	26	4	None				
	Babil	Hillah	MA469976	MA469976	MA471950	MA469976																
	Karbala	Karbala	MB078071	MB078071	MB078071	MB078071	16/0	#####	0	250							3-Jan					
	Najaf	Najaf	MA408428	MA 408428	MA 408428	MA404428	14	3	26	300F	13/4	13/2	C	G	BTU	Ampl	1 4 1	M/D				
	Qadisiyah	Diwaniyah	MA 917414	MA 917414	MA 924389	MA917414	1	1	30/22	100/4/	15/4	15/4	C-H	Y/Y	W	W	1 1 3	KBR				
	Wasit	Kut	NA 765957	NA 765957	NA 765957	NA 765957	0 5 0	3-Feb	0/54	0/75	0/57	0/62	C	C/G	Y	Y	5-Apr	KBR				
South		Basrah																				
	Al Basrah	Basrah	QU74047701	QU74357700		QU74347709											120/4	M-9K; D-16K				
	Dhi Qar	Nasariyah																				
	Maysan	Amarah																				
	Muthanna	Samawah																				

Policies for Post-Occupation Iraq

RAND

March 2004

Likely Situation Post-June 30

- Interim government likely to be weak, inexperienced, corrupt and perceived as beholden to Coalition
- Groups will maneuver for advantage in writing constitution, preparing for elections
- Violence likely to increase
  - Sophistication of attacks still rising
  - Mass casualty terrorism on upswing
  - Political groups engage in violent conflict
- Economic growth will be strong
- But price controls will result in misallocation of resources, shortages, and lines, with destabilizing effects on security

Sunni Disaffection Most Serious Challenge to Stability

- We recommend:
  - Increasing economic assistance to Sunni regions and neighborhoods, targeted towards moderates
  - Accelerating selective rehabilitation of former Baathists
  - Providing UN mandate to develop truth and reconciliation process
- UN should be given broad responsibility to oversee elections and assist with writing Iraqi constitution

Public Security Must Become Centerpiece of Military Strategy

- Coalition's key task is to make Iraq safer for Iraqis
  - Most important metric in Iraq: Number of civilians killed; not insurgents killed, coalition casualties
  - Coalition also needs to focus on protecting Iraqi leaders, foreigners assisting with reconstruction
  - Counterinsurgency efforts remain important so as to get the "bad guys" out of circulation
- Coalition forces will need to pursue delicate balance
  - In peaceful areas, need to withdraw "over the horizon", Iraqis see Iraqi forces providing security
  - In contentious areas, need "3 block" strategy:
    1. Quick, lethal response to attacks
    2. Humanitarian assistance after violence
    3. Daily help with reconstruction

Security Needs a More Multinational Look

- U.K should take over for the Poles in South-Central Iraq; NATO should replace U.K. in Southeast
- Iraqi Armed Forces (IAF) needs to be truly integrated into Coalition operations
- UN or EU could contribute to training police
  - Police, not Iraqi Civil Defence Corps (ICDC) or NIA, will be on frontlines with insurgents
    - Garner local intelligence
    - Provide local security
- *Improving the quality of police through training by foreign advisors, not expanding numbers, should be the priority*

Iraq's Economy is Growing Strongly, Will Continue to do so in 2005

- **Year-on-year comparisons will be highly favorable in 2004**
  - **Oil output – 0.852 mbd (July 2003); 3.1 mbd (Dec. 2004)**
  - **Electricity – 3,193 MW peak capacity (June 2003); 6,000 MW (June 2004)**
- **U.S. Supplemental appropriation will boost investment, spending on security**
  - **Investment in water, sewage, schools has high domestic component**
  - **Security expenditures will boost incomes**
- **Permissive business environment: low trade barriers, relatively easy to set up a business, few taxes**
- **Other post-conflict economies enjoyed strong growth in first two years: Bosnian, Kosovar economies doubled in size**

Growth May Stop When Supplemental Ends



Sharp fall in external assistance will hit consumption, investment

Growth in oil output will slow

Iraqi tax revenues may be inadequate, budget cuts may have to take place

Iraq extremely vulnerable to fall in the price of oil

Failure to Institute Economic Policy Reforms Will Derail Growth

- Ridiculously low prices for energy resulting in shortages, smuggling; lines for gasoline exacerbate security problems
- Food rationing system highly dysfunctional: deprives Iraqi farmers, manufacturers of domestic market
- Budget totally dependent on oil exports; contingency planning needed in case exports fail to materialize
- Central Bank of Iraq still lacks monetary policy framework
- Civil servants in all ministries and the Central Bank of Iraq need training, better management
- Agricultural subsidies need to be better targeted

Supplemental Skewed Towards Electric Power, Water, Sewage



Supplemental Poorly Allocated to Maximize Economic Growth

- Failure to charge, collect for electricity usage exaggerates estimates of demand
- Power plants better financed using loans, not grants
- 3.2 cents/gallon gasoline prices encouraging overinvestment in refinery capacity
- Road repair, rehabilitation gives most bang for the buck: $240 million allocation low
- Grant money most useful when used to fund projects difficult to fund with loans
    - Training
    - Civil service reform
    - Computerization, streamlining of government operations

Sovereignty Will Dramatically Alter Roles of Foreign Actors

- UN can play role of moderator, goad, and mediator after June 30, but role needs to be well-defined
- New structures for multilateral consultation vital
  - Each embassy will be housed separately, focus on own issues
  - Home governments likely to take greater role in decision-making
  - Integrated policy planning mechanism needed
- Authority for assistance programs needs to be concentrated in one pair of hands
- One senior official at the Assistant or Under Secretary level needs to be assigned with exclusive responsibility for overseeing both policies and programs for Iraq

(b)(6)

Read

From: (b)(6)

Sent: Monday, March 22, 2004 5:43 PM

To: (b)(6)

Cc: Bearpark, Andy Amb. (CIV); (b)(6)
Larry (SES); Nash, David (SES); (b)(6)
(b)(6)
(b)(6) Holly, John (SES-3)

Regional Operations Officers:

Please forward to your respective Regional and Governorate Coordinators and Regional Chiefs of Staff. Please request recipients insure that they provide this info to their teams.

All: FYI/use as appropriate.

Questions – (b)(6)

Thanks

(b)(6)

Deputy, Regional Operations
Directorate of Operations and Infrastructure
(C) (b)(6)
DSN: (b)(6)
COM

JOINT INFORMATION MEMORANDUM FOR GOVERNORATE TEAMS

SUBJECT: POST CPA FIELD PRESENCE

FROM: ANDY BEARPARK AND DAVID NASH

On March 16 Ambassador Bremer signed an Action Memorandum which establishes the Program Management Office (PMO) as the "prime owner" and essential innkeeper for overseeing governorate facilities post June 30. The concept is simple. The PMO will manage the facilities, and in some cases be a significant user of them. But it will also provide a home for State Department officers and others.

The decision applies to those entities who wish to attach themselves to these facilities for purposes of, inter alia, combined security, economies-of-scale and regular substantive interaction. While many details must be worked, this approach will: capture sunk US taxpayer and other Coalition player costs while saving contract and other funds by avoiding duplicative facilities; lower overall COM and other security costs; allow quicker implementation of PMO and other activities by greatly slimming deployment requirement lists; and, meet Administration and Coalition needs for effective implementation of involved activities. The latter also serves the requirements of the Iraqi Government.

Ambassador Bremer's decision must be understood as one that supports both USG and Coalition interests at large. Direct-hire Department of State, USAID and other official USG must locate at these facilities for both living and working purposes. A similar requirement may be levied on some USG contractors. Other official Coalition personnel, bilateral development agencies and their contractors plus multilateral agencies, NGOs and certain others may participate in varying locations in differentiated formats on cost bases determined by official USG formulae.

There are many issues that must be addressed before this decision is made whole. We will be arranging a series of site visits as soon as possible, but will of course seek to minimize the burden on you at all times. Likewise we will need to ask you to send us some data electronically. We will be in touch separately about that.

The POC lead in the Directorate of Operations and Infrastructure is Deputy (b)(6) The POC lead in the Program Management Office is Deputy They are organizing a team now to make the first of several field visits to governorate sites. These visits will be coordinated with the State Department Regional Security Office (RSO), CJTF7 and others.

In advance, we thank all of you for your cooperation and the extreme patience that will be required to make it work.

(b)(6)

Bremer

From: (b)(6)

Sent: Monday, March 29, 2004 10:45 AM

To: Jones, Richard (AMB); (b)(6)

Cc: (b)(6)

Subject: IIG's Power to Enter into International Agreements

Attached please find a memorandum we have drafted regarding the IIG and its capacity to enter into international agreements. I think it will be helpful in assessing the needs in this area. If you have any comments, please let me know. We would like to put it in late tonight or first thing tomorrow morning.

Thanks,
(b)(6)

Bremer

COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY
BAGHDAD

INFO MEMO

March 29, 2004

FOR: THE ADMINISTRATOR

FROM: The Office of the General Counsel

SUBJECT: Iraqi Interim Government's Power to Enter into International Agreements

In discussions regarding the powers and structures of the Iraqi Interim Government (IIG), certain limitations, including to the IIG's ability to enter into treaties and international agreements, are being contemplated so that the government does not act beyond its perceived legitimacy. Nonetheless, upon the transfer of full governmental authority from the CPA to the IIG, the United States and other nations will likely need or want to conclude a number of agreements with the IIG.

Some of the agreements are time-sensitive and should be concluded immediately upon, or very shortly after, the transition. Accordingly, the IIG must have some ability to conclude certain international agreements that endure, preferably beyond its replacement by an elected government, the Iraqi Transitional Government (ITG). If not, such agreements will have to wait until the formation of the ITG in early 2005. This memorandum briefly categorizes and summarizes these potential agreements.

The United States will likely need to conclude the following agreements:

- Diplomatic and Consular Relations. The United States will need to exchange diplomatic notes reestablishing diplomatic and consular relations with Iraq. Such an exchange of notes will constitute an international agreement, will likely occur on June 30th or July 1st, and could provide the appropriate privileges and immunities for U.S. personnel (or portions thereof).

- Embassy Property. The Department of State has set an ambitious schedule to build the new embassy and will accordingly need to have clear title or a long-term lease in place before breaking ground, as scheduled, in _____. In exchange for the new property, such an agreement could release the claim owned by the United States with respect to U.S. diplomatic property expropriated in 1971.

- Economic Assistance. Given the limitations in the existing 1951 Point Four General Agreement for Technical Cooperation, the United States may need to negotiate a bilateral agreement that sets the framework for technical, infrastructure, and commodity assistance. In addition, the agreement could ensure the continued availability of a tax exemption for U.S. Government assistance. Such an exemption currently exists in section 4 of CPA Order No. 49 (Tax Strategy for 2004), but would likely be subject to change by the IIG.

The United States may wish to conclude the following agreements:

- Claims Settlement/Waiver. As was the case in Germany and Japan, the United States may wish to obtain a waiver of all claims of Iraq and its nationals against the United States and its nationals arising out of the war or the occupation or out of actions taken because of the existence of a state of war or the occupation.

- Iraqi Government-owned property. The United States may need to ensure that the property assigned by the CPA to public and private agencies for the use and benefit of the Iraqi people will remain with those groups and not be confiscated by the IIG or the subsequent ITG.

- Status of Forces Agreement. Current thinking in Washington appears to be that U.N. Security Council Resolution 1511 satisfactorily ensures that the multinational force has the protections (privileges, immunities and exemptions) it needs after the end of the occupation. A status of forces agreement would be one means of enhancing these protections. The Transitional Administrative Law implies that the ITG (vice the IIG) should engage in negotiations to conclude binding international agreements regarding the activities of the multinational force operating in Iraq. Nonetheless, the United States may wish to obtain a status of forces agreement from the IIG. (Such an agreement could also authorize operations of the multinational force.)

Coalition partners of the United States may wish to conclude the following agreements:

- Diplomatic and Consular Relations. Our Coalition partners are likely to open diplomatic and consular relations with the IIG using an exchange of notes.

- Status of Forces Agreement. Some Coalition members have indicated that, in the absence of a new U.N. Security Council Resolution, they will seek a status of forces agreement to afford the appropriate protections (privileges, immunities, and exemptions) for their forces and accompanying elements.

- Embassy Property. Our Coalition partners may want to obtain a permanent location for their diplomatic operations through an agreement.

- Claims Settlement/Waiver. Our Coalition partners are likely to want the same waiver as described above.

The United States has a strong interest in Iraq concluding the following agreements:

- International Financial Institutions (IFIs). In order to begin restructuring Iraq's sovereign debt load and participating in future IFI programs, the IIG must be able to assume obligations related to new lending and recognize existing debts, including longer-term (e.g., 30-year) obligations.

- Non-proliferation. The United States favors Iraq's accession to the Chemical Weapons Convention and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Additional Protocol at the earliest time appropriate. Separately, the United States favors Iraq's reaffirmation of its obligations under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, the Iraq/IAEA Safeguards Agreement, the Biological Weapons Convention and the 1925 Geneva Protocol on the Use in War of Poisonous Gases or Bacteriological Methods of Warfare. Iraq could reaffirm its commitment to honor these obligations in a unilateral declaration or an international agreement with the United States.

ATTACHMENTS: NONE

COORDINATION: Deputy Administrator, Amb. Jones –
Governance, (b)(6) –
MFA, (b)(6) –
CJTF-7, (b)(6)
CJTF-7,

(b)(6)

[illegible]

From: Rathmell, Andrew (SES1)
Sent: Monday, March 29, 2004 7:32 AM
To: Jones, Richard (AMB)
Subject: coalition entity

post-CPA slides.ppt
(304 KB)

Dick,

Further to our conversations on the evolution of ABIRD, I wanted to ensure you were aware of the thinking coming from the DoD portion of the ITPT (Wolfowitz is, I believe the driver). You will see they have come up with the concept of a coalition coordination board - tightly linked to the US COM and clearly coalition - not international. I have pushed back on this in line with our discussions and would think that State will resist it.

I understand that Riccardione and Kicklighter are briefing their interim ITPT findings to the White House today so it would be worth trying to obtain a copy of their briefing once it is finalized.

US Mission Baghdad, Country Team



Ambassador

MNF-I Commander

Executive Secretariat

Deputy Chief of Mission

MGT/Chief of Staff

- •CLO
- •FMO
- •GSO
- •HR
- •IMO
- •MED
- •OBO

Embassy/MNF-I Joint Management Council

Consular

ECON

POL

LEG

PAO

POL-MIL

DAO

RSO

INL

Office of Security Cooperation

FCS

DOE

FAS

DOT

DOJ

DEA

FBI

ICE

Construction/ Contract Mgt. Office (1)

Assistance Coordination Staff

US AID

TSA

OGA

Treasury

Contractors/Technical Advisors: report to appropriate Country Team elements

Provincial Teams or Consulates: Coordinate with and/or report to appropriate Country Team Offices, Executive Secretariat, and MNF-I

Footnote:

1. Construction and Contact Mgt Office components TBD. Includes Army Corps of Engineers and Army Contracting Agency; includes civilians, ex-PMO as appropriate.

Note: Most mission offices will coordinate directly with coalition counterparts.

US Mission Action Core Teams

Economic Recovery/Essential Services Core Team

- State Econ (CHAIR)
- DOE
- FAS
- MGMT
- DOT
- FCS
- FCS
- LEG
- PAO
- Treasury
- US AID
- Construction & Contract Mgt. Office
- MNF-I REP
- Ministry Advisors

Law Enforcement/Security Core Team

- POL (CHAIR)
- Consular
- DAO
- DEA
- DOJ
- FBI
- ICE
- INL
- LEG
- OGA
- OSC
- PAO
- POL-MIL
- RSO
- TSA
- Ministry Advisors
- MNF-I REP

Governance/Human Rights/ Democracy Core Team

- POL (CHAIR)
- DAO
- DOJ
- ECON
- INL
- OGA
- LEG
- PAO
- PRM
- Treasury
- US AID
- Ministry Advisors
- MNF-I REP

Public Communications Core Team

- PAO (CHAIR)
- Agency PAOs
- MNF-I Public Affairs
- LEG
- Provincial Team Reps
- MNF-I REP
- Ministry Advisors

Note: Each team includes Ambassador's Executive Secretariat staff officer

COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY

MARCH 2004



Administrator
Amb L. Paul Bremer

CJTF-7
LTG Ricardo Sanchez

Multinational Divisions (MND)

North: 101st AASLT
N-Central: 4ID
West: 82ABN/3ACR
Cen-So: POL Div
SW: GBR Div
BGD: 1st AD, 2/82ABN, 2LCR

Counselors (b)(6)

General Counsel (b)(6)

Secretariat (b)(6)

Info Mgmt Unit (IMU) (b)(6)

Policy Planning & Analysis (b)(6)

OGA (b)(6)

Council for International Cooperation (CIC) (b)(6) (AUS)

Regional Coordinators

(b)(6) (Baghdad)
(Mosul)*
(al Hillah)
(Basrah)

(b)(6) is now Director, Office of Provincial Outreach

Governorate Coordinators

Deputy Administrator & Chief Policy Officer
Amb Richard Jones

Deputy Administrator &Chief Operating Officer
VADM (ret) John Scott Redd

(b)(6)

Director Governance
- Regional Coordinators (Policy)
- Governorate Coordinators (Policy)

Acting-COL (b)(6) (b)(6)
Dr. (b)(6) (b)(6)
(b)(6)

Director Private Sector Development
- Industry & Minerals
- Science & Technology
- Trade
- Oil for Food

Director Civil Affairs
- Culture — Amb Mario Osio (ITA)
- Education (b)(6)
- Health (b)(6)
- Higher Education (b)(6)
- Human Rights (b)(6)
- Justice (b)(6)
- Youth & Sports (b)(6)

Director Foreign Affairs
- Displacement & Migration (b)(6)
- Foreign Affairs (b)(6)

Director National Security Affairs (MoD)

Director Strategic Communications (b)(6)

Director Economic Policy
- Finance/ Planning (b)(6)
- Labor & Social Affairs (b)(6)
- Agriculture (b)(6)
- Econ Pol/ Banking (b)(6)
- Environment (b)(6)

Director Admin & Logistics Chief of Staff
- Dir Headquarters Support Group — Col (b)(6)

Director OIL

Director PMO
- Director OMB (b)(6)

Director Interior
- Director IA (CMATT) — MG Paul Eaton

Director Infrastructure
- Communication (b)(6)
- Construction & Housing — Acting- (b)(6)
- Electricity (b)(6)
- Public Works (b)(6)
- Transport — Amb Darrel Trent
- Water Resources (b)(6)
- Regional Coordinators (Operations)
- Governorate Coordinators (Operations)

Director AID (b)(6)

▨ Coordination

CPA-HRM altered / 10-Mar-04/ JP

where are 1 or 2?

OPTION 3: IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION C2 DESIGN



Builds Formal Coalition

Includes Option #1 with the IRMO Expanded

NSC

Iraqi PM

Coalition Coordinating Executive Board (CCEB)

US Embassy

UK Embassy

Other Coalition Embassies

Ministries

Iraqi Reconstruction and Development Coordinating Group

Executive Director

DCM

DCM

Their option or same as US

- MoD
- MoF
- MoI
- MoJ
- Etc.

Iraq Reconstruction Management Office (IRMO)

Embassy Operations

Senior Advisor

Technical Advisor

Section 1

Section 2

Advisors

APCO

STRATCOM

IMU

Finance-Contracts

Phase to COM ASAP

PRESERVES THE COALITION CONCEPT

POST CPA IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION C2 DESIGN

OPTION #1



President NSC

SECDEF

SECSTATE

Iraq PM

CENTCOM

SEC Army

United States Mission-Baghdad

APCO

COM

DCM

Coalition Coordin[illegible] & [illegible]

Iraq Multi-National Force (IMNF)

Iraq Reconstruction Management Office (IRMO)

- Advisors
- ADMIN SPT
- PGM/Plan & RPT
- Fin MGT

Economy

Political

Consular

Strat Comm/Pub Dip

AID & Other GO's

Off of Prov Outreach

Theater SPT CMD

Iraq Multi-National Command (IMNC)

JIACG

ISG

OSC

CMATT

CPATT

Operational Command

Operational Control

POST-CPA IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION C2 DESIGN

OPTION #2



President
NSC

SECDEF

SECSTATE

Iraq PM

CENTCOM

SEC Army

United States Mission-Baghdad

APCO

COM

DCM

Coalition
Coordin
& E

Iraq Multi-National Force (IMNF)

Iraq Reconstruction Management Office (IRMO)

- Advisors
- ADMIN SPT
- PGM/Plan & RPT
- Fin MGT

Economy

Political

Consular

Strat Comm/Pub Dip

AID & Other GO's

Off of Prov Outreach

Theater SPT CMD

Iraq Multi-National Command (IMNC)

JIACG

ISG

OSC

- CMATT
- CPATT

Operational Command

Operational Control

POST CPA IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION C2 DESIGN

OPTION #3



——— Operational Command

•••••••••••• Operational Control

POST CPA IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION C2 DESIGN

OPTION #4



President
NSC

SECDEF

SECSTATE

Iraq PM

★★★★
CENTCOM

SEC Army

★★★☆
Iraq Multi-National Force (IMNF)

★★
Theater SPT CMD

★★★
Iraq Multi-National Command (IMNC)

JIACG

ISG

United States Mission-Baghdad

APCO

COM

Coalition Coordin & E

OSC

DCM

CMATT

CPATT

Iraq Reconstruction Management Office (IRMO)

- Advisors
- ADMIN SPT
- PGM/Plan & RPT
- Fin MGT

Economy

Political

Consular

Strat Comm/Pub Dip

AID & Other GO's

Off of Prov Outreach

——— Operational Command

············ Operational Control

(b)(6)

From: Holzman, John C. (AMB)
Sent: Monday, March 22, 2004 2:39 PM
To: (b)(6) Jones, Richard (AMB)
Cc: (b)(6)
Subject: RE: Lay down of who stays/who goes...

(b)(6)

We should give this our best shot, even though the results will be far from precise. Caveats will certainly be in order. To the extent that we can give Mick Kicklighter and (b)(6) something to work with the better off they and we will be. As the process proceeds, the numbers will get harder—I hope. (b)(6)

> -----Original Message-----
> **From:** (b)(6)
> **Sent:** Monday, March 22, 2004 7:41 AM
> **To:** Holzman, John C. (AMB); Jones, Richard (AMB)
> (b)(6)
> **Subject:** RE: Lay down of who stays/who goes...
>
> (b)(6)
>
> I was out Sunday, but would like to emphasize that a detailed lay down in two three hours on who stay and who goes would be a very broad brush indeed and so unreliable at this point (since, among other things the precise numbers of ministry advisors/implants is not fixed and the size of CJTF-7 remaining in the Palace are not fixed yet) nor, in my mind is the final size of the State contingent, since State has not acted on the size of our provincial staffing.
>
> I would also like to discuss and clarify how jobs like this are tasked to CPA employees.
>
> Thanks and regards,
>
> (b)(6)
>
> Chief of Staff
> Director of Administration and Logistics
> Coalition Provisional Authority
> Baghdad
>
> DSN: (b)(6)
> Commercial: (b)(6)
>
>> -----Original Message-----
>> **From:** (b)(6)
>> **Sent:** Sunday, March 21, 2004 5:11 PM
>> **To:** (b)(6)
>> **Cc:**
>> **Subject:** Lay down of who stays/who goes...
>> **Importance:** High
>>
>> General Kicklighter would like a detailed lay down of who stays, who goes. Who goes to Embassy; who goes to military; who goes away. Have the "best team" to lay that down.
>>
>> He asks for two-three hours.

I strongly suggest we go as late as possible in their schedule. If they do NOT go north, then we can do that on Tuesday afternoon. I sense that getting a better perspective from the son-of-CPA would be helpful. I know that COO & Strategic Plans are guessing about 200+ experts stay to help with the son-of-CPA. Then we look at whatever is left with the HQ Spt Group.

Please let me know soonest of (1) team and (2) time.

(b)(6)

COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY
BAGHDAD

INFO MEMO

March 26, 2004

FOR: THE ADMINISTRATOR

FROM: (b)(6)

SUBJECT: **Ministry Transition – Final Report of post-sovereignty support plans**

We present our findings on the support which Senior Advisors and Ministers consider is needed to the Baghdad ministries after June 30. This consists of:

- Summary sheets on the support needed by Ministries and their transition status. These cover some key performance indicators and include a breakdown, and summary paragraphs of the concept for each Ministry, as you requested
- Two detailed sheets on each Ministry in case you want more detail

Findings
Overall, our work identified a need for [15] policy advisors and [181] technical advisors – [196] in total - to be based in the Ministries after June 30. These numbers are projected to fall rapidly over time, to [117] after 6 months, [25] after 12 months and [8] after 24 months.

Of the starting total, [116] posts are definitely proposed as US civilian hires, including [78] 3161s, and [27] posts are judged likely to be provided by Coalition partners, though this is probably the lower end of the range eg DfID has not yet decided how many of its current contractors to extend.

The number of advisors presented here excludes:

- Other US posts already fully funded from the supplemental to at least April 2005: apart from civilian police trainers, there are some 107 developing the Iraqi prison service, and another 60 or so staff who will be working to stand up justice agencies including the IST and Commission on Public Integrity
- US embassy staffing – if anything there may be a very small amount of double counting with the assumptions DoS has made for that
- Staff funded through wider aid programs (e.g. USAID and DfID) – typically project based support
- Advisors which the relevant Ministers intend to recruit from other international agencies e.g. WHO, and which they will definitely not be seeking from any successor organization to CPA.

Issues

We think it will be important to draw attention to the relatively short durations proposed for many of the advisor roles – it reflects the need to achieve a smooth transition.

While we have encouraged Senior Advisors to minimize the duration of the support they recommend, we think you may want to probe the assumption that MoI will need support for only 6 months after transition. (b)(6) is not expected to return until 30 March, so we have been unable to pursue this with him.]

If you want to recommend a smaller number of advisors, we suggest you might remove or reduce numbers in the less important Ministries and/or bear down on larger numbers in power Ministries.

For example, it would not be difficult to save 15 posts from the relatively large numbers of advisors proposed for the ministries of Housing, Culture and Youth & Sports, as well as for the Central Bank. The need for senior policy advisers in some of the apparently more capable Ministries could also be challenged. While we don't have specific cuts to propose in the more significant Ministries, we would suggest reviewing the number of advisors proposed for Oil, Transportation and Communications.

Our memo of March 19 promised further advice on the need for continuing support at Regional and Governorate level. COO aims to provide this to you. A key issue will be what happens to Baghdad Central after June 30 - it is a large office currently and the US Embassy in Baghdad is unlikely to assume many of its responsibilities.

Comment: is this the case, or is it Bearpark who will provide it?

We understand that the future staffing of Stratcom is being addressed by the transition team and the NSC in Washington.

Next steps

We stand ready to discuss our finding with you, ADM Redd and Amb Jones. You may also wish to meet individual Senior Advisors for those Ministries where you intend to modify their staffing recommendations.

Once we have your recommendation, Admin and Logistics need to work on support staff numbers, and discuss with relevant CPA staff their availability to remain after June 30.

ATTACHMENTS:
1. Summary matrix on Ministry support needs
2. Summary paragraph of concept for each Ministry's support
3. Overview of Ministry transition status
4. Assessment pack on each Ministry

COORDINATION: Deputy Administrator -
Chief Operating Officer -

COPY: PMO (b)(6)
USAID (b)(6)

DfID, (b)(6)
Dir Inf, (b)(6)
Dir Admin, (b)(6)

					Required Personnel									
Ministry	Criticality of Services	Capability of Ministry	Atitude of Ministry	Risk of Failure w/o support	Sr. Policy Advisors	Technical Advisors	3161	Contractor	Detailee	Foreign	Military	UNK	Total	Max Duration (months)
INTERIOR	[illegible]	[illegible]	Good	[illegible]	1	29	30	-	-	-	-	-	30	6
OIL	[illegible]	Good	Fair	[illegible]	1	13	-	-	-	-	-	14	14	6
ELECTRICITY	[illegible]	Fair	Good	[illegible]	2	8	4	5	-	-	1	-	10	24
JUSTICE	[illegible]	Fair	Fair	[illegible]		5	2	-	3	-	-	-	5	12
DEFENCE	[illegible]	Unknown	Unknown	[illegible]	1	20	5	-	-	16	-	-	21	24
TRADE	[illegible]	Fair	[illegible]	[illegible]	1	6	7	-	-	-	-	-	7	36
FINANCE	[illegible]	Fair	Fair	Medium	1	11	3	2	5	1	1	-	12	12
TRANSPORTATION	Very Important	Fair	Fair	Medium		10	-	-	-	-	-	10	10	6
AGRICULTURE	Very Important	Fair	Fair	Low		9	-	-	-	6	-	3	9	4
COMMUNICATIONS	Very Important	Fair	[illegible]	Medium		14	14	-	-	-	-	-	14	11
CENTRAL BANK	Important	Good	Good	Medium	1	6	-	-	-	-	-	7	7	30
MUNIC. & PUBLIC WORKS	Important	Good	Good	Medium		3	-	-	-	-	-	3	3	12
WATER RESOURCES	Very Important	Good	Good	Medium	1	8	-	1	3	-	1	4	9	12
LABOR AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS	Very Important	Fair	[illegible]	Medium	1	3	-	-	4	-	-	-	4	12
HEALTH	Very Important	Good	Good	Low			-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
HOUSING	Important	Fair	Fair	Low		8	2	4	1	-	1	-	8	18
EDUCATION	Important	Fair	Good	Very Low		2	-	-	-	-	-	2	2	12
HIGHER EDUCATION	Important	Good	Fair	Low		1	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	6
DISPLACEMENT & MIGRATION	Important	Fair	Good	Low	1	2	2	-	-	-	-	1	3	6
HUMAN RIGHTS	Important	Fair	Good	Low	1	1	-	-	-	2	-	-	2	6
CULTURE	Important	[illegible]	Fair	Medium		5	-	-	-	-	-	5	5	24
ENVIRONMENT	Important	[illegible]	Good	[illegible]		3	-	-	-	-	-	3	3	18
FOREIGN AFFAIRS	Important	Fair	Good	Low		4	3	-	-	1	-	-	4	12
INDUSTRY & MINERALS	Important	[illegible]	[illegible]	Low	1	1	-	2	-	-	-	-	2	12
PLANNING & DEV. COOP.	Important	[illegible]	Fair	Low	1	3	1	-	1	1	1	-	4	12
SCIENCE AND TECH.	Important	Fair	[illegible]	Low		2	-	-	1	-	1	-	2	2
YOUTH AND SPORTS	Important	[illegible]	Good	Low	1	4	5	-	-	-	-	-	5	12
TOTAL					**15**	**161**	**78**	**14**	**18**	**27**	**6**	**53**	**196**	

Italicized ministries have not yet submitted details

Total US Personnel (not including unknowns) **116**

Interior
The personnel requirements for the Ministry of Interior after transition are related to the unique nature of the mission with which CPA/MOI has been tasked. The mentoring and advisory oversight of 200,000 active duty security personnel who must be recruited, trained and equipped – while under attack – present significant challenges to the staff responsible. Most of the support personnel for the ministry following transition will come from the CPATT organization.

Justice
The centerpiece of assistance to the justice sector after July 1 will be training to inculcate a culture of judicial independence and rule-of-law norms. A corollary assistance priority will be advising on security to protect the machinery of justice from the predations of terrorists and criminals. The post-transition plan for the Ministry of Justice proper therefore calls for a contingent of 13 training advisors and three U.S. Marshals as security advisors. Of these, 12 training advisors are already funded out of the supplemental, leaving one training supervisor requiring salary and life-support funding, and life support only for the three security advisors, whose salaries are being paid for by DoJ. The one training supervisor is critical to keep on board after the transition because he is currently arranging numerous training programs, both systematic and piece-meal, which will extend beyond July 1. There is also an IPCC advisor currently lodged in the Senior Advisor's, whose advice will likely be needed beyond the transition. Since the post-transition Embassy structure remains unclear, it is uncertain whether a post-transition Senior Advisor (or equivalent) for justice will be necessary. The necessary support for management and training in the prison service and for standing up the Commission on Public Integrity is fully funded by the supplemental – potentially some 130 posts in all.

Trade
From a macroeconomic point of view, Iraq needs to raise prices and wages to the level found in neighboring countries. The challenge for the Ministry of Trade ("MOT") will be to help maintain political stability by maintaining the Public Distribution System—making it more efficient and less costly to the public treasury while leading an all-out effort to develop and create a diverse and wealth-creating private sector.

The MOT can play a key role in stimulating the growth of the private sector in a number of areas. It will have the lead in managing Iraq's process of accession to the WTO. This process will require extensive legislative changes in Iraq in order to create an enabling legal environment conducive to economic growth, driven by entrepreneurship and innovation in the private sector. In tandem with the legal reform being promulgated by the MOT under the guise of the WTO accession, the Ministry will need to create a number of foreign offices in key international business centers (located in New York, Tokyo, London, and Dubai) which will proactively recruit foreign investors in a highly targeted manner. The Ministry will also be creating domestic "Business Centers" which will assist Iraqi businesses by providing classic management consulting advice on finding financing, and providing basic business skills training in such areas as how to respond to requests for proposals and tenders, understanding financial statements, and change management, as well as providing reading areas with directories and "how to" business publications. These business centers can team with local universities and colleges to create business incubators which will help Iraqi entrepreneurs by providing low cost space, free research assistance, and mentoring until the businesses can be graduated because they have become self sustaining. The business centers can also play a key role in the helping to stimulate civil society institutions such as trade associations and economic think tanks and in stimulating international linkages which have proven business dimensions such as the Sister Cities program.

The Ministry may play a key role in dealing with the problem of the State Owned Enterprises by creating a trust to which these enterprises can be transferred. Putting them in a trust with a Board of Trustees to deal with day to day management issues will free the Minister to address policy, trade and investment promotion, and building the private sector. Once in a trust, it will be easier to request targeted technical assistance to restructure, reform and reorganize these SOEs to prepare them for consolidation, privatization, formation of joint ventures, etc. The ultimate aim should always be privatization including via employee stock ownership plans but the method needs to be appropriate to the situation in view of the social and community roles these enterprises have played in Iraqi society.

Transportation
Transportation has identified technical support requirements for both primary and secondary sectors of the Transportation ministry. For Maritime and Port capability, three technicians are required; one form Port of NY/NJ; two former military for security. For railroad support; three technicians are required; passenger rail, cargo rail and rail security. For aviation support; three technicians are required; all FAA personnel. In the secondary sector, one technician is required for surface movements within Iraq. All positions are estimated to be required until 12/31/04.

Agriculture
The Ministry of Agriculture requires ongoing support from three full time advisory staff and project based consultants post July 1. The Minister has indicated that he wishes to retain advisory assistance directly. Further, given the far reaching recommendations of the agricultural sector and ministry transition plan (under preparation by DAI), several advisory staff will be required by the Ministry for some time to come. Their functions will need to include: policy advice and development, the implementation of the transition plan across the agricultural sector and the ministry (note - there is going to be resistance to both the transition of the sector to a market

based system and within the Ministry in its transition from 'central control' to the provision of 'support' for the agriculture sector), donor project co-ordination, and agricultural procurement and contract management.

Water Resources

Ministry of Water Resources requires additional technical assistance post the transition on 6/30/04. Technical support includes; USACE technical support to direct and train the ministry capable workforce in master planning for water infrastructure and river engineering, DOD support to interface with the MNF and the FPS guards placed across the country, and administrative support. This level of support is required to transition from a system 30 years behind the times to one which meets modern standards and the needs of the Iraq Water Resources System.

Health

The Ministry well placed for transition to sovereignty with a clear strategy and supporting management structure, a capable minister and senior advisor team. The Senior Advisor and the Minister agree that the Ministry will need specialized technical support after June 30. The Ministry, in cooperation with the World Bank, USA Health and Human Services, USAID and DfID and donor nations/NGOs, will arrange specific technical assistance agreements. The Ministry does not expect to need advisors from any successor organization to CPA.

Higher Education

The Ministry has become more confident and adept in all its financial and budgetary matters, the presidents are more comfortable working with the Ministry in setting policy and the Minister is comfortable in sharing authority. Concerns about the Ministry's ability to handle scholarship and exchange matters have been allayed by the selection of (b)(6) as one of the deputy ministers. And the appointment of (b)(6 as the second deputy should be excellent for day to day administrative detail. The Senior Adviser does not therefore see a need for support after June 30, except in the IT/VTC/computerization area. An existing DoS person in CPA would be available to deliver this: they also have finance and budgeting skills if needed.

Displacement and Migration

The advisors outlined are needed to help the MoDM develop its staff to adequately address forced migration policy issues. The MoDM has recruited much of its staff relatively recently, (since January 04) and most staff recruited while capable, are not experienced with humanitarian affairs. Therefore, a lead advisor is needed to continue to assist the minister and the ministry with overall policy issues, including working with Iraqi colleagues in Northern Iraq. A technical advisor will work with the director generals to develop the expertise in each department and the Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) Advisor will help the ministry develop expertise on the complex and potentially volatile IDP issues. It will be particularly important to assist the MoDM as the IPCC begins to implement its decisions, which will create a new set of forced migration issues, well beyond July 1.

Human Rights

Human Rights is a new Ministry, though it is staffing up well. Its Minister, while smart, has little background in the area. Whether he stays or goes, the top team will need expert policy advice and some continuing help with specialist training over the transition. The main new initiative – the creation of a network of human rights centers, will need technical support as it rolls out.

Culture

Support for the Ministry of Culture after July needs to focus on the associated national heritage organizations, building on the work done there sp far. The Executive Advisor for Museums, Antiquities, Heritage, and Libraries will continue to coordinate US-source financial and professional resources for the problem of restoring Iraq's cultural sites. This position has proven essential to carrying out the US work to date on these institutions and such projects will continue after July 1. The three Technical Advisor positions are continuations of three very successful IRDC positions in support of the Iraq Museum, the State Board of Antiquities and Heritage, and the National Library and Archives. All of these institutions have a difficult road ahead in returning to full operation, and they have requested that these experts continue to assist with this process. In the Ministry itself, a Financial Advisor is needed now and will continue to be required as the Ministry resumes its varied operations in Culture, Heritage, and Tourism under the financial systems of the new Iraq. Although the Ministry itself stands in need of further support, these are the priorities.

Environment

Ministry of Environment requires Senior Policy Advisor and Technical Advisor post the transition on 6/30/04, including support for strategic planning, coordination with donors and donor funding, procurement of scientific equipment, coordination of international support for priority environmental assessments and projects, development of sound environmental enabling legislation, development of environmental awareness programs, and building the capacity of staff to use new equipment, information technologies, and to facilitate the establishment of national and governorate development assistance centers. This is necessary to stand up an environmental regulatory agency for a country that has been neglected and ignored environmental risk.

The Ministry has become more confident and adept in all its financial and budgetary matters, the presidents are more comfortable working with the Ministry in setting policy and the Minister is comfortable in sharing authority. Concerns about the Ministry's ability to handle scholarship and exchange matters have been allayed by the selection of (b)(6) as one of the deputy ministers. And the appointment of (b)(6 as the second deputy should be excellent for day to day administrative detail. The Senior Adviser does not therefore see a need for support after June 30, except in the IT/VTC/computerization area. An existing DoS person in CPA would be available to deliver this: they also have finance and budgeting skills if needed.

Foreign Affairs
The Ministry is improving. The Senior Adviser sees no need for policy input after 30 June but provision for short term contingency support, if necessary, will be available, together with a limited amount of technical support, which would be useful. This would be:

-- Support for implementation of the Ministry Management Plan now under discussion. This support function would be carried out by one person with UK funding and would likely last no more than two months. It would involve sustained engagement with key ministry staff to ensure the smooth implementation of the plan, but will only be implemented if Minister Zebari agrees to the Management Plan and if there is still a need for support after June.
-- IT support and training. This support would be carried out by two technical experts, probably from the State Department. One would concentrate on upgrading the Ministry's secure communications system, the other would provide IT training to Ministry staff. This support would continue for up to one year
-- Technical support on consular controls. This support would be carried out by one person, probably by a consular officer already assigned to the U.S. embassy. It would be part-time support for the Ministry to assist it in increasing the sophistication of its consular control systems and would continue for about one year.

(b)(6)

From: Redd, John S. (VADM, Ret.)
Sent: Wednesday, March 24, 2004 9:43 AM
To: Redd, John S. (VADM, Ret.); Rathmell, Andrew (SES1); (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Cc: Jones, Richard (AMB (b)(6)
Subject: RE: Draft`

All, here's the latest which includes IMU as well.

(b)(6) has the pen on org diagrams – please pass suggested changes to her.

Scott Redd
Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy (ret.)
Deputy Administrator and Chief Operating Officer (COO)
Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA)
Baghdad, Iraq

> -----Original Message-----
> **From:** Redd, John S. (VADM, Ret.)
> **Sent:** Wednesday, March 24, 2004 8:25 AM
> **To:** Rathmell, Andrew (SES1) (b)(6)
> **Cc:** Jones, Richard (AMB); (b)(6)
> **Subject:** RE: Draft`
>
> Andrew,
>
> It remains in the org chart as do other elements not explicitly noted in the document. Attached is current version
>
> Scott Redd
> Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy (ret.)
> Deputy Administrator and Chief Operating Officer (COO)
> Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA)
> Baghdad, Iraq
>
>> -----Original Message-----
>> **From:** Rathmell, Andrew (SES1)
>> **Sent:** Wednesday, March 24, 2004 7:25 AM
>> **To:** (b)(6) ; Redd, John S. (VADM, Ret.); Oster, Jeffrey W. (O-9)
>> **Cc:** Jones, Richard (AMB); (b)(6)
>> **Subject:** RE: Draft`
>>
>> I'd hope we can ensure the program planning function is instantiated in the IRMA/Embassy org chart even if not mentioned here.
>>
>> Andrew Rathmell
>> Office of Policy Planning & Analysis
>> Coalition Provisional Authority - Baghdad
>> Room M239
>> DSN: (b)(6)
>> civ: (+) (b)(6)
>> cell: (+
>>
>>> -----Original Message-----
>>> **From:** (b)(6)
>>> **Sent:** Wednesday, March 24, 2004 2:55 AM

To: Redd, John S. (VADM, Ret.); Oster, Jeffrey W. (O-9)
Cc: Jones, Richard (AMB); Rathmell, Andrew (SES1); (b)(6)
ASA-I&E
Subject: RE: Draft`
Importance: High

Sir: Here's the final draft, incorporating the target dates and Andrew's recommendation regarding the description of ABIRD as an international, rather than a Coalition advisory board. Best, (b)(6)

> -----Original Message-----
> **From:** Redd, John S. (VADM, Ret.)
> **Sent:** Tuesday, March 23, 2004 7:08 PM
> **To:** (b)(6) (CIV)
> **Subject:** Draft`
>
> (b)(6)
>
> (b)(6) would like to include a target date to establish IRMO/APCO, say 1 May, with a resultant requirement for an NSPD by, say, 24 April.
>
> Idea is to put a bureaucratic forcing function in this.
>
> You're my hero.
>
> Scott Redd
> Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy (ret.)
> Deputy Administrator and Chief Operating Officer (COO)
> Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA)
> Baghdad, Iraq

IRMO'S US MISSION RESPONSIBILITIES



Chief of Mission

IRMO

Iraq Reconstruction Management Organization

Executive Director

TOTAL PAX: 10

EXEC. SEC.; SPECIAL ASSISTANTS/MANAGEMENT STAFF

Admin Support

TOTAL PAX: 20 (FORWARD & REAR)

PERSONNEL; LOGISTICS; FACILITIES; INFO TECH

Program Planning and Reporting, Staff

A small planning staff would help review and manage the strategy, requirements planning, and programming for reprioritization of selected reconstruction programs in response to the situation on the ground. A small reporting staff (current IMU) would lead reporting efforts.

TOTAL PAX: 15

Financial Management

A small management staff including a CFO, Comptroller, and IG function would be required for oversight and control.

TOTAL PAX: 10 CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER: 2; INSPECTOR GENERAL: 8

Senior & Technical Advisors *

(plus supporting staff)

A high level of advisory support, including in some cases day to day operational functions, will be necessary for those ministries that are critical to US objectives.

TOTAL PAX: 204 **

INTERIOR: 30	OIL: 13	ELEC: 10	JUSTICE: 6	DEFENSE: 20
TRADE: 7	FIN: 12	TRANS: 10	COMM: 14	AGRIC: 6
CEN. BANK: 6	WATER: 4	LABOR: 4	HEALTH: 22	HOUSING:8
EDUC: 2	HUM RTS: 2	MIGRATION: 5	CULTURE: 5	ENVIR: 2
FOR AFFAIRS: 3	PLANNING: 4	SCI&TECH: 2	INDUSTRY: 2	
YOUTH&SPORTS: 2		HIGH EDUC. 1	MUNIC.&PUB. WORKS: 3	

Other (3161) Administratively Attached Personnel

- **STRATCOM**
- **REGIONS**
- **SUPPORT TO IRAQI INDEPENDENT COMMISSIONS**
- **OTHERS TBD**

Army Programming and Contracting Office

(APCO)

* Senior and Technical Advisors double-hatted to ABIRD

** Numbers are tentative, pending review by CPA Administrator

040215 - 75

COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

FROM: (b)(6)	DATE: 16-Mar-04

FOR: THE ADMINISTRATOR

ORIGINATOR: Infrastructure& Operations

RE: Ambassador Jones comment

Amb. Jones read the attached memo and noted the following:

> *I agree with the overall concept, but I have some comments:*
>
> *-- No consulates will be opened in the immediate post CPA period (MFA opposes, State Dept. too)*
>
> *-- Costs of offices would be shared according to established Admin (ICASS) rules. State will have fewer people than PMO/AID and others. So its share will be small. Our goal should be to continue using current facilities wherever we can.*

ATTACHMENT: March 13 Memo from (b)(6)
"Post CPA Field Presence"

(Drafted by (b)(6)

Dick /
Northern reps?

(b)(6)

040315-35

COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY

BAGHDAD

ACTION MEMO

March 13, 2004

FOR: THE ADMINISTRATOR

FROM: (b)(6)

SUBJECT: Post CPA Field Presence

Planning for post CPA activities continues. An important element is the post CPA field presence and structure. All concerned are keen to move ahead quickly with this, but we are hampered by uncertainty over the overall CPA post-transition structure, particularly the precise roles of the PMO and IRMA (if it is created). There is also an issue of cost – field offices are very expensive. Security alone is estimated in excess of US$300 million per year. Your current guidance is that you want to see all the RT and GT site offices (18) to remain open with a continuing international flavor. The following model has been discussed widely within CPA and appears to be practicable. I should be grateful for your views.

Regional presence:

Regional offices will be located in Kirkuk, Hillah and Basrah. These regional offices will contain the following elements:

- U.S. Consulates, and UK Consulates in Basrah and possibly Kirkuk
- PMO and/or IRMA
- USAID
- Other bilateral development agencies

We assume that the financing would come from State, with other non-U.S. tenants reimbursing a share.

Governorate presence:

It is suggested that the PMO become prime "owner" of the Governorate offices located in Dahuk, Arbil, Sulaimaniya, Baqubah (Diyala), Al Kut (Wassit), Al Amarah (Maysan), An Nasiriyah (Dhi Qar) and As Samawah (Muthanna). They are self-sustainable with contract security. GT locations in Tikrit (Salah ad Din), Mosul (Ninawa), Ramadi (Al Anbar), Karbala, An Najaf and Diwaniyah (Al Qadisiyah) are within Coalition military compounds. An agreement would have to be reached with CJTF-7 and its successor organization for the utilization of these locations or the sites be relocated "outside the wire" at significant cost.

UNCLASSIFIED

The Governorate offices will be utilized to provide administrative, site security and life support for PMO prime and subcontractors. PMO would administer the current GT locations. Others who could be allowed access on a reimbursable basis, room permitting could include:

- State Department staff
- USAID and their contractors
- other bilateral development agency contractors

They will be allowed access, room permitting.

RECOMMENDATION: That you approve the above mentioned concept.

Approve: ________ Disapprove: ________ Approve with modification: B

Must be coordinated fully w/ State per LPB.

COORDINATION: COO
PMO
OPPA
Comptroller
Director, Civil Affairs

ATTACHMENT: PMO Project Maps and Report

			SITE SECURITY		PSD	VEHICLES		REMARKS
Region	Governorate	Location	Life Support	Work	PSD	Hard Cars - Current	Hard Cars - Future	
Baghdad		Baghdad	Global	Global	OSI	1	2	
	Baghdad	Baghdad	Global	Global	None	0	1	
North		Mosul	SBCT (Mil)	SBCT	CRG/OSI	2	3	Hard Cars actually in Arbil
	Arbil	Arbil	TC (Pesh) (7	TC (Pesh)	TC (18)	1	4	Life Support Shared w/ Region
	Dahuk	Dahuk	BW (TBD)	BW	BW (8)	1	2	Advance in Place - Iraqi Police to Pesh
	Diyala	Baqubah	1st ID (Mil)	1st ID (Mil)	TC (12)	2	4	
	Ninawa	Mosul	SBCT (Mil)	Same	TC (24)	2	4	
	Salah Ad Din	Tikrit	1st ID (Mil)	Same	TC (25)	2	5	
	Sulaymaniyah	Sulaymaniyah	TC (TBD)	TC	TC (24)	0	2	No worksite selected - TC Sched to cover
	Tamin	Kirkuk	TC (40)	TC	CRG	2	3	Downtown site
Central South		Hillah	BW (56)	BW	OSI	1	2	Global Until 1 April
	Anbar	Rimadi	1st MEF	TC	TC (24)	2	5	
	Babil	Hillah	BW	BW (12)	Poles (Mil)	1	3	Life Support Shared w/ Region
	Karbala	Karbala	Bulg (Mil)	BW (36)	BW (14)	1	3	
	Najaf	Najaf	Span (Mil)	Span (Mil)	BW (8)	1	3	Plus Salvadorans
	Qadisiyah	Diwaniyeh	Dom (Mil)	BW (12)	BW (9)	1	3	Site also covers Hillah GT
	Wasit	Kut	TC (50)	TC	CRG	4	5	
South		Basrah	Global (101)	Global	NCIS	25	25	TC (74) takes over 1 April
	Al Basrah	Basrah	Global (101)	Global	CRG			TC (74) takes over 1 April - Shared w/ Region
	Dhi Qar	Nasariyah	Ital (Mil)	Ital (Mil)	CRG	6	7	TC takeover TBD (TCN Fielding)
	Maysan	Amrah	UK (Mil)	UK (Mil)	CRG	4	5	TC takeover TBD (TCN Fielding)
	Muthanna	Samawah	BW (33)	BW	CRG	2	3	

BW - Black Water
CRG - Controlled Risks Group
TC - Triple Canopy

NOTE: Total TC Hard Cars deployed - 62
Does not include inbound DoS assets
PSD for GT Baghdad - reviewing funding

(b)(4)

[redacted]

(b)(6)

Action

From: (b)(6)
Sent: Tuesday, March 23, 2004 6:11 PM
To: Jones, Richard (AMB)
Cc: (b)(6)
Subject: Transition from CPA to Mission

Dick --

Please tell Jerry that I briefed Condi and Steve thoroughly on your transition plan, and they agree ~~with your way forward~~. Armitage will inform us of State's current position on the subject later this week, having digested the results of Powell's visit to Baghdad. I will immediately let you and Jerry know the results of that.

I think we are making progress.

Look forward to seeing you both again in early April.

Best.

(b)(6)

Ministry	Criticality of Services	Capability of Ministry	Atitude of Ministry	Risk of Failure w/o support	Required Personnel Sr. Policy Advisors	Technical Advisors	3161	Contractor	Detailee	Foreign	Military	UNK	Total
INTERIOR					1	29	30	-	-	-	-	-	30
OIL			Fair		1	13	-	-	-	-	-	14	14
ELECTRICITY		Fair			2	8	4	5	-	-	1	-	10
JUSTICE		Fair	Fair			5	2	-	3	-	-	-	5
DEFENCE		Unknown	Unknown		1	20	5	-	-	16	-	-	21
TRADE		Fair			1	6	7	-	-	-	-	-	7
FINANCE		Fair	Fair	Medium	1	11	3	2	5	1	1	-	12
TRANSPORTATION	Very Important	Fair	Fair	Medium		10	-	-	-	-	-	10	10
AGRICULTURE	Very Important	Fair	Fair			9	-	-	-	6	-	3	9
COMMUNICATIONS	Very Important	Fair		Medium		14	14	-	-	-	-	-	14
CENTRAL BANK				Medium	1	6	-	-	-	-	-	7	7
MUNIC. & PUBLIC WORKS				Medium		3	-	-	-	-	-	3	3
WATER RESOURCES	Very Important			Medium	1	8	-	1	3	-	1	4	9
LABOR AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS	Very Important	Fair		Medium	1	3	-	-	4	-	-	-	4
HEALTH	Very Important						-	-	-	-	-	-	-
HOUSING		Fair	Fair			8	2	4	1	-	1	-	8
EDUCATION		Fair				2	-	-	-	-	-	2	2
HIGHER EDUCATION			Fair			1	-	-	-	-	-	1	1
DISPLACEMENT & MIGRATION		Fair			1	2	2	-	-	-	-	1	3
HUMAN RIGHTS		Fair			1	1	-	-	-	2	-	-	2
CULTURE			Fair	Medium		5	-	-	-	-	-	5	5
ENVIRONMENT						3	-	-	-	-	-	3	3
FOREIGN AFFAIRS		Fair				4	3	-	-	1	-	-	4
INDUSTRY & MINERALS					1	1	-	2	-	-	-	-	2
PLANNING & DEV. COOP.			Fair		1	3	1	-	1	1	1	-	4
SCIENCE AND TECH.		Fair				2	-	-	1	-	1	-	2
YOUTH AND SPORTS				Low	1	4	5	-	-	-	-	-	5
TOTAL					15	181	78	14	18	27	6	53	196

Italicized ministries have not yet submitted details

Total US Personnel (not including unknowns) 116

Max Duration (months)
6
6
24
12
24
36
12
6
4
11
30
12
12
12
-
18
12
6
6
6
24
18
12
12
12
2
12

Red

					Required Personnel									
Ministry	Criticality of Services	Capability of Ministry	Atitude of Ministry	Risk of Failure w/o support	Sr. Policy Advisors	Technical Advisors	3161	Contractor	Detailee	Foreign	Military	UNK	Total	Max Duration (months)
INTERIOR	[illegible]	[illegible]	Good	[illegible]	1	29	30	-	-	-	-	-	30	6
OIL	[illegible]	Good	Fair	[illegible]	1	13	-	-	-	-	-	14	14	6
ELECTRICITY	[illegible]	Fair	Good	[illegible]	2	8	4	5	-	-	1	-	10	24
JUSTICE	[illegible]	Fair	Fair	[illegible]		5	2	-	3	-	-	-	5	12
DEFENCE	[illegible]	Unknown	Unknown	[illegible]	1	20	5	-	-	16	-	-	21	24
TRADE	[illegible]	Fair	[illegible]	[illegible]	1	6	7	-	-	-	-	-	7	36
FINANCE	[illegible]	Fair	Fair	Medium	1	11	3	2	5	1	1	-	12	12
TRANSPORTATION	Very Important	Fair	Fair	Medium		10	-	-	-	-	-	10	10	6
AGRICULTURE	Very Important	Fair	Fair	Low		9	-	-	-	6	-	3	9	4
COMMUNICATIONS	Very Important	Fair	[illegible]	Medium		14	14	-	-	-	-	-	14	11
CENTRAL BANK	Important	Good	Good	Medium	1	6	-	-	-	-	-	7	7	30
MUNIC. & PUBLIC WORKS	Important	Good	Good	Medium		3	-	-	-	-	-	3	3	12
WATER RESOURCES	Very Important	Good	Good	Medium	1	8	-	1	3	-	1	4	9	12
LABOR AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS	Very Important	Fair	[illegible]	Medium	1	3	-	-	4	-	-	-	4	12
HEALTH	Very Important	Good	Good	Low			-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
HOUSING	Important	Fair	Fair	Low		8	2	4	1	-	1	-	8	18
EDUCATION	Important	Fair	Good	Very Low		2	-	-	-	-	-	2	2	12
HIGHER EDUCATION	Important	Good	Fair	Low		1	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	6
DISPLACEMENT & MIGRATION	Important	Fair	Good	Low	1	2	2	-	-	-	-	1	3	6
HUMAN RIGHTS	Important	Fair	Good	Low	1	1	-	-	-	2	-	-	2	6
CULTURE	Important	[illegible]	Fair	Medium		5	-	-	-	-	-	5	5	24
ENVIRONMENT	Important	[illegible]	Good	[illegible]		3	-	-	-	-	-	3	3	18
FOREIGN AFFAIRS	Important	Fair	Good	Low		4	3	-	-	1	-	-	4	12
INDUSTRY & MINERALS	Important	[illegible]	[illegible]	Low	1	1	-	2	-	-	-	-	2	12
PLANNING & DEV. COOP.	Important	[illegible]	Fair	Low	1	3	1	-	1	1	1	-	4	12
SCIENCE AND TECH.	Important	Fair	[illegible]	Low		2	-	-	1	-	1	-	2	2
YOUTH AND SPORTS	Important	[illegible]	Good	Low	1	4	5	-	-	-	-	-	5	12
TOTAL					15	181	78	14	18	27	6	53	196	

Italicized ministries have not yet submitted details

Total US Personnel (not including unknowns) 116

green

yellow



TRANSITION TASK FORCE

Chaired by: (b)(6)
(b)(6)

Seams

ADMIN

- BUDGET
- RSO (security)
- IPC (Comms)
- FACILITIES
- GSO (log)
- HR (Pers)

Econ

Political

IRMA

StratCom

Strategic Mission Issues

Each Group has members (as appropriate) from:

- **State (new Embassy)**
- **CPA (new IRMA?)**
- **CJTF-7 (new MNFI/MNCI)**
- **PMO (new PMO)**
- **Coalition**

Regional Presence

-Embassy/Consulate
-IRMA (?)
-PMO
-USAID
-Mil Civil Affairs
-Coalition

- Functions
- Security

Critical Support Issues

Transforming CPA to U.S. Mission Iraq
Baghdad, March 9 2004

Although CPA will disappear on June 30 with the transfer of full governmental authority to an interim Iraqi government, for that government to be viable following the occupation, many of CPA's functions will need to continue to be performed for months if not years after June 30. While some of these functions can and will be taken on by Embassy Baghdad, others require personnel skills and funding far beyond the capabilities of a normal embassy. These include a whole range of capacity building activities in support of Iraqi ministries and security forces as well as many of the activities now being carried out by CPA's Office of Strategic Communications, its CFO and IG.

Transitional functions fall into at least five general categories: (1) advisory and operational support, (2) program planning, (3) project and contract management, (4) strategic communications and (5) oversight and control. In order to utilize available funding support, personnel carrying out these functions will need to be given a new home. We should do this in a way that preserves a clear line of authority for the Chief of Mission, minimizes disruption of their work and the need for additional contracting, interagency agreements or new legislation. We also believe it essential to preserve the unique cooperative culture that has evolved within CPA, both among coalition partners and between CPA's civilian and military sides.

For these reasons, we believe that transitional functions should be performed by temporary organizations that will augment the Embassy's traditional capabilities. For civilian programs we are proposing the establishment of two new temporary government organizations, the Iraq Reconstruction and Management Agency (IRMA) under Department of State (DOS), which will be the successor to CPA and report to the Chief of Mission, and a reconstituted Program Management Office (PMO), which would be a DOD (U.S. Army) entity. We are also proposing the creation of an Office of Security Cooperation for military/security programs.

IRMA/PMO: IRMA will establish overall policy for the reconstruction effort, including the strategic application of the IRRF. While the broad outlines of the effort have been established, there is a requirement to manage the strategy, planning and programming associated with the ongoing reprioritization of selected reconstruction programs in response to the situation on the ground. We envision this process to be directed by a Requirements Review Board (RRB) bringing together key members of IRMA and the Embassy staff. A small RRB staff would reside in IRMA. The RRB would be chaired by the Embassy DCM and would set the overall programmatic direction of the reconstruction effort. A small management staff including a CFO, Comptroller, and IG function would be required for oversight and control.(Organization chart A attached)

Critical contract management and execution functions for IRMA would be undertaken by a newly established PMO. We would establish PMO independently as a temporary organization within DoD/ Department of the Army, allowing it to sustain itself through the 10% contract management fee authorized under the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense and for the Reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan, 2004... The Executive Director of IRMA will provide overall project direction to PMO, as decided by the RRB.

In addition, although diminished somewhat after the transfer of governance authority to the new Iraqi government, strategic communications will continue to be required beyond the normal public affairs capability of an embassy. We envision a small but capable STRATCOM staff, which would be resident in IRMA, interfacing as appropriate with the Chief of Mission's staff, the Embassy's Public Affairs Section, and U.S. Military PAO's. This latter lash-up will be particularly important if we are to maintain successfully the close working relationships that currently exist between CPA and CJTF-7 in this area. This issue is to be dealt with more fully in a subsequent message.

Finally, IRMA also will provide a vehicle for continuing Senior and Technical advisory support for Iraqi government ministries. The required level of this support will depend upon the ability of the ministries to function on their own and the criticality of those ministries to US objectives. A high level of Senior and Technical advisory support, including in some cases involvement in day to day operational functions, will be necessary for those ministries that are critical to US objectives (e.g., the "Power Ministries," as well as essential services ministries such as Electricity). The Senior Advisors and Technical Advisors, which will likely number between 150 and 250 people, as well as their supporting staffs, will be operationally housed within another component of IRMA, which will be known as ABIRD (see below).

IRMA will be funded by the operational funds allocated to CPA or its successor organization, including CPA's remaining operational budget and 1% of the IRRF. IRMA will also be able to rely upon DOD and other agency support without reimbursement responsibility. IRMA will be a founding member of the Embassy's International Cooperative Administrative Support Services (ICASS) Council, which it would likely join as a service provider.

Administratively, the temporary status of both IRMA and PMO would allow for the use of Title 5, U.S. Code, Sec. 3161 hiring and detailing authority. We anticipate IRMA would phase out over a period of 1-2 years as the operational and critical advisory requirements subside and are transferred to normal Embassy bilateral relationships. PMO would remain until the completion of IRRF projects. Both could be established by a National Security Presidential Determination (NSPD), if judged necessary.

ABIRD: US Advisors will be administratively housed in and hired through IRMA. Conceptually, they will be grouped together along with other countries' advisors in the Advisory Board for Iraqi Reconstruction and Development (ABIRD). In our judgment, a structure like ABIRD is essential for the continuing work of American and other countries' advisors in Iraqi ministries to be politically acceptable to Iraqis. We propose that it be billed as an advisory board for the head of the interim Iraqi government that takes office on June 30 (the Prime Minister). The Prime Minister, or his representative, would be the Board's titular head. A senior American, who would report to the

Ambassador (COM) and be a member of the Embassy Country Team, would serve as its Executive Director. The Executive Director could be supported by one or more deputies from major contributors to the Multi-national Force or to the Madrid donor process. Regardless of nationality, the most senior representative of the advisory team for each ministry would report to the Executive Director and serve as a member of the ABIRD, which would probably only meet as a group a few times a year.

A structure of this type would:

-- allow us to exercise COM policy guidance to the advisors without having them tied too closely in the popular mind with the American Embassy;

-- give each ministerial advisory team a direct line to the Prime Minister's office, which would help prevent its recommendations from being ignored by an uncooperative minister and help establish the PM's control over his ministers;

-- provide us greater flexibility to bring in American advisors from other agencies and the private sector without going through a formal NSDD 38 process. Most would be seconded to IRMA on non-reimbursable details from USG agencies or hired under Title 5, U.S. Code, section 3161.

-- allow us to maintain the multilateral character of the policy advice being given to the Iraqi ministries.

Office of Security Cooperation: After June 30, one of America's main objectives will be to continue building Iraqi security forces. We will need to focus on three key areas: (1) the Iraqi Police Service, (2) the Iraqi Armed Forces, and (3) effective civilian control and management of both, all under the policy guidance of the Chief of Mission.

Success will demand cooperation among a number of indispensable actors: sovereign Iraqi government structures (Cabinet Committee for National Security, MOI, MOD, and, as relevant, MFA and MOJ); the U.S. Embassy; the Commander, Iraq Multi-national Force (IMNF), and other Coalition missions. A clear understanding of the respective roles and authorities among these three will be vital. Iraq MOI should take responsibility for developing, managing, supporting and employing the IPS, while Iraq MOD takes the responsibility to develop, manage, and support the IAF, which will be assigned to IMNF for employment.

Meanwhile, under the guidance of the Chief of Mission, the Embassy will take responsibility for U.S. security policies in Iraq and for our bilateral security assistance. It will also provide policy and strategic direction, resource management, and oversee political aspects of military and police capacity-building assistance from the U.S. The Commander, IMNF will oversee the execution of the man, train, and equip portion of both the military and police capacity-building assistance program.

An Office of Security Cooperation (OSC) should manage implementation and coordination of the man, train, and equip programs. All three of the main US actors would connect into and through this single entity. OSC would be responsible to Commander, IMNF for fulfilling his specified execution responsibilities for the military and police development function, under the policy direction of the COM. It will also receive policy guidance through Senior Advisors to the MOI and MOD, who would be supported by robust advisory teams. OSC would have a police division (Civilian Police Advisory Training Team, CPATT) and a military one (Coalition Military Assistance Training Team, CMATT). CPATT will be staffed as far as possible by civilian police experts. In order to facilitate policy direction from the Chief of. Mission, the deputy director of CPATT would also serve as a deputy senior advisor MOI. A deputy director of CMATT would be a deputy senior advisor MOD.

(b)(6)

From: Rathmell, Andrew (SES1)
Sent: Monday, March 22, 2004 5:36 PM
To: Redd, John S. (VADM, Ret.)(b)(6) Oster, Jeffrey W. (O-9)
Cc: (b)(6) Jones, Richard (AMB)
Subject: RE: ABIRD/Donor Coordination Mechanism

(b)(6)

Quite understood. Once (b)(6) is back, it may be worth us sitting down and debating the options and course of action on ABIRD/CIC..

Andrew Rathmell
Office of Policy Planning & Analysis
Coalition Provisional Authority - Baghdad
Room M239
DSN:(b)(6)
civ: (+(b)(6)
cell: (+

-----Original Message-----
From: Redd, John S. (VADM, Ret.)
Sent: Monday, March 22, 2004 12:28 PM
To: Rathmell, Andrew (SES1);(b)(6) Oster, Jeffrey W. (O-9)
Cc: (b)(6)
Jones, Richard (AMB)
Subject: RE: ABIRD/Donor Coordination Mechanism

Andrew et al,

You've been privy to a lot of sausage making in the last few days, much of which, of necessity, has been predominantly an internal USG issue since it deals with US funds. ABIRD, discussed in that context, may have come across too strongly as a USG operation. The overall intent, as was noted, is that ABIRD would be the coalition piece which could, in principle, include significant donors. I would hope that any discussions of alternate models – including a CIC follow on or others -- would not be based on a faulty premise.

(b)(6) will be back tomorrow night and I recommend you discuss with him.

JSR

Scott Redd
Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy (ret.)
Deputy Administrator and Chief Operating Officer (COO)
Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA)
Baghdad, Iraq

-----Original Message-----
From: Rathmell, Andrew (SES1)
Sent: Saturday, March 20, 2004 11:18 PM
To: Redd, John S. (VADM, Ret.);(b)(6); Oster, Jeffrey
(b)(6)
Subject: ABIRD/Donor Coordination Mechanism

Adm Redd,

Further to the discussions today on ABIRD/IRMA and donor/advisor coordination.

You will know that, whilst supporting Amb Jones in developing the IRMA/ABIRD concept, we have also been exploring other models, such as that provided by the CIC which seeks to be more inclusive and internationalist. This model also addresses the UN/WB involvement that we discussed today.

In order to assist in the debate with the ITPT, Neil Hawkins has drafted a new summary, after consultation with major donors, of how this model may work. We did not feel it appropriate to raise this issue in the initial meeting today with the ITPT but I would suggest that it would be important for us to spend some time tomorrow to examine the options for donor coordination before we put a more detailed case back to the ITPT. We realize that we cannot resolve this issue before the return of Amb Jones, but it may be helpful to work through the arguments and implications so that we can provide Amb Jones and Bremer with a view on the way forward that also meets the needs of the ITPT.

Andrew Rathmell
Office of Policy Planning & Analysis
Coalition Provisional Authority - Baghdad
Room M239
DSN:(b)(6)
civ: (+)(b)(6)
cell: (+

-----Original Message-----
From: (b)(6)
Sent: Saturday, March 20, 2004 9:17 PM
To: Rathmell, Andrew (SES1)
Cc: (b)(6) Bent, Rodney (SES-4)
Subject: Donor Coordination Mechanism

Andrew,

As requested, here is a draft on donor coordination mechanisms. This broadly reflects discussions I have had with PMO, USAID, Giles and donors (DFID, Canada, Japan and Poland).

Happy to discuss.

(b)(6)

****
(b)(6)
Director
Development Cooperation
Coalition Provisional Authority
Baghdad
+(b)(6)
E-mail: (b)(6)
****

(b)(6)

From: Rathmell, Andrew (SES1)
Sent: Saturday, March 20, 2004 11:18 PM
To: Redd, John S. (VADM, Ret.) (b)(6) Oster, Jeffrey W. (O-9)
Cc: (b)(6)

[redacted]

Adm Redd,

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Andrew Rathmell
Office of Policy Planning & Analysis
Coalition Provisional Authority - Baghdad
Room M239
DSN: (b)(6)
civ: (+ (b)(6)
cell: (+

-----Original Message-----
From: (b)(6)
Sent: Saturday, March 20, 2004 9:17 PM
To: Rathmell, Andrew (SES1)
Cc (b)(6) Bent, Rodney (SES-4)
Subject: Donor Coordination Mechanism

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(b)(6)
****
Director
Development Cooperation
Coalition Provisional Authority
Baghdad
+ (b)(6)
E-mail: (b)(6)
****

Post-Transition Donor Coordination 20 March


Iraqi PM

Cabinet Sub Committee/Council of Ministers

Iraqi Ministries

CIC Assembly

Donor Core Group

Pool of Bilateral and Multilateral Advisors

DoS

Chief of Mission

Deputy Chief of Mission

U.S. Embassy

Proposed Donor Coordination Mechanisms Post Transition

20 March 2004

1. Aims of the proposed donor coordination mechanisms:

i. Establishes donor coordination under Iraqi leadership
ii. Provides an "international" framework that encourages other donors to join the reconstruction effort
iii. Encourages coordination among the broader group of donors
iv. Establishes a practical forum for regular discussions among large donors
v. Makes use of existing mechanisms requiring minimum change
vi. Recognizes reality

2. Assumptions

i. Most donors will be reluctant to second staff to an organization that comes under US authority in a sovereign country
ii. Most major coalition donors are opening Embassies/offices in the Green Zone where they will base their staff and advisors
iii. As in other situations, countries with a smaller presence will share resources

3. CIC Assembly

i. The CIC Assembly is the main forum for donor discussions (General Assembly). It is currently chaired by the Minister of Planning and Development Cooperation. Such a group generally reports to a Cabinet Sub-Committee or Council of Ministers
ii. Secretariat services could eventually be provided by the United Nations. In the interim, these services could be provided by elements of the CIC secretariat that will be transferred to the MoPDC
iii. The CIC Assembly would meet on a quarterly/or six monthly basis.
iv. All donors would be eligible to attend
v. The Assembly can set up Sectoral Sub-Committees to provide a forum for active donors and the appropriate Ministries to discuss a particular sector or issue

4. Donor Core Group

i. The Donor Core Group will provide a forum for regular donor discussions and practical coordination. It will comprise the major donors in Iraq (currently Canada, EU, Italy, Japan, Kuwait, South Korea, Spain, UAE, UK, USA) and the World Bank, UN and IMF
ii. The World Bank would be invited to provide secretariat support. Until the World Bank has a presence on the ground, one of the donors could provide secretariat services, such as DFID
iii. The Core Group would meet on a fortnightly or monthly basis

5. Advisors

i. Advisors would formally report to their missions/Embassies as in any regular bilateral donor partnership and would be placed in a Ministry
ii. Each country would be responsible for establishing and paying for PSD for their Advisors. This is already the case with coalition partners such as Australia, Canada and Japan

iii. Smaller countries that wish to provide support and advisors but who do not have a presence on the ground could enter into an agreement with KBR to provide trailer accommodation and meals within the confines of the Palace.

TASK FORCE FOR TRANSTION



CPO/COO

(b)(6)

- Security
- Finance
- GSO
  - KBR
- Facilities
- Personnel
- Communications
- IRMA
- OPO
- Strategic Comm

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

ACTION

MAR 14 2004

Subject: FW: BAGHDAD - PROPERTY NEGOTIATION GUIDANCE

P MFA
P [illegible]
Joyce
~~MFA~~
Admin
OGC

OTTUZYUW RUEHCAA6062 0722030-UUUU--RHMFIUU.
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 122024Z MAR 04
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO HQ COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTH BAGHDAD
BT
UNCLAS STATE 056062

FOR AMBASSADOR NEUMANN

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ABLD, AMGT
SUBJECT: BAGHDAD - PROPERTY NEGOTIATION GUIDANCE

1. OBO UNDERSTANDS THAT THERE ARE ADVANTAGES TO THE USG TO BEGIN PROPERTY NEGOTIATIONS NOW AS OPPOSED TO WAITING FOR AN IRAQI SOVEREIGN GOVERNMENT. PRINCIPAL AMONG THESE IS THE GOOD WORKING RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CPA AND THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, WHO WILL BE OUR KEY NEGOTIATING PARTNER. OBO RECOGNIZES THAT PROPERTY NEGOTIATIONS MAY OR MAY NOT BE COMPLETED BY JULY 1.

2. WE AUTHORIZE THE FOLLOWING:

A. TO BEGIN PROPERTY NEGOTIATIONS NOW, SEPARATING THE DIPLOMATIC AND PROPERTY NEGOTIATING TRACKS, IF NECESSARY.

B. TO SEEK "FEE SIMPLE" (FREE HOLD) OWNERSHIP OF THE LAKE FRONT SITE AT NO COST TO THE USG. WE ACKNOWLEDGE THAT IT MAY BE NECESSARY TO ACCEPT A LESSER INTEREST IN THE LAND, BUT THE AMBASSADOR SHOULD ASK FOR THIS MAXIMUM AT THE OUTSET.

C. TO SECURE AN APPROPRIATE AGREEMENT BEFORE THE END OF OCTOBER AND PRIOR TO OBO'S REQUEST FOR SUPPLEMENTAL FUNDS. PLEASE NOTE THAT ANY AGREEMENT REQUIRING PAYMENT MUST INCLUDE AN EXPLICIT "SUBJECT TO THE AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS" CLAUSE, AS ACQUISITION FUNDS HAVE NOT BEEN APPROPRIATED.

D. FOR (b)(6) TO CONTINUE TO WORK WITH AMBASSADOR NEUMANN ON THESE PROPERTY NEGOTIATIONS IN BAGHDAD.

3. PLEASE ENSURE YOU WORK CLOSELY WITH (b)(6) AND (b)(6) BAGHDAD-BASED DEPARTMENT LAWYERS WORKING IN CPA/CG.

4. WE EXPRESS OUR GRATITUDE FOR YOUR EFFORTS AND OUR BEST WISHES FOR SWIFT AND SUCCESSFUL NEGOTIATIONS.
POWELL
BT
#6062

NNNN

POC: TSgt Westberg

CPA/U.S. Mission Staffing

2004-2005



POC: TSgt Westberg

CPA/U.S. Mission Staffing

2004-2005



CPA/U.S. Mission Staffing 2004-2005



AMB. JONES

040313-18

COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY
BAGHDAD

ACTION MEMO

March 13, 2004

FOR: THE ADMINISTRATOR

FROM: (OPPA) Andrew Rathmell

SUBJECT: Transition Planning with Washington

Summary: This memo summarises my latest information on the Iraq Transition Planning Team (ITPT) as of last night Iraq time. It also seeks guidance on how we should engage with ITPT Washington. My sources include (b)(6) and BG Ed Rice (CPA-W).

Bearing Point have been contracted to produce a transition planning process. This is encoded into a matrix that covers 12 functional areas. This has been loaded onto a laptop since it is too large to email; it will be carried here either by BG Ed Rice, who is arriving early in the week or brought by (b)(6) towards the end of the week.

As you know, the ITPT is being formally stood up on Monday and is mandated to produce a report to the Secretaries by 1 April. The intention is to locate approximately 15 of the ITPT staff in Baghdad, starting late next week.

Transition Planning Issues

DepSecDef Wolfowitz was briefed Friday on the process the transition team plans to implement. Five key planning issues arose, which he wants to focus on in preparation for the 1 April plan to the Secretaries:

1. Post-CPA endstate. ITPT wants a decision memo for the Secretaries to give a clear ruling on the best option and details of how this option may work in practice.

2. Governorate representation. Wolfowitz and PMO remain keen on a large number of offices; the DoS preference at present is for 3 large regional offices and a small number of political representatives.

3. Personnel management - Washington wants a gradual drawdown of CPA personnel (not a big bang on June 30) and wants clarity on ministry advisors.

4. Strat Comms - POTUS is concerned about the Stratcomm effort so there will be particular focus on planning for the future Stratcomm effort.

5. CPA operating budget – the ITPT has been mandated to resolve the current problems with the operating budget.

Request for Guidance on Engaging with the ITPT
Washington would like us to share fully the work we are doing on transition planning (e.g. the ministry transition assessment) so that they can operate off the same information basis as us.

My recommendation would be to be as open as we can with the ITPT; this may be the best way in which to ensure we influence and shape the transition planning process and results.

RECOMMENDATION (1): Share our March 11 memo providing an interim assessment of ministry transition readiness with the ITPT.

Approve: L 3/13/04 Disapprove:________ Approve with modification:______

RECOMMENDATION (2): You issue guidance to the CPA-Baghdad transition planning team on how to engage with the ITPT and how extensively to share internal CPA-B work in progress.

Approve:________ Disapprove:________ Approve with modification:______

ATTACHMENTS: March 11 memo Ministry Transition: Post-sovereignty support requirements

This is for Dick Jones to coordinate -
L 3/13

04031-16

COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY
BAGHDAD

INFO MEMO

March 11, 2004

FOR: **THE ADMINISTRATOR**

FROM: (b)(6)

SUBJECT: Ministry Transition: Post-sovereignty support requirements

Summary: The CPA senior advisor teams have been requested to outline their Ministries' requirements for support after July 2004. The intention is to have firm plans in place by the end of March to ensure a seamless transition. This report provides a first cut of the advisor support requirements detailing numbers, source and expected duration. We will continue to refine these assessments and will provide a further update by Friday March 19.

State of Transition Plans

The state of transition plans varies widely amongst advisory teams. A few ministries (e.g. Health) have very detailed transition plans with clearly identified advisory personnel needs and identified sources of support. Others (e.g. the new Ministries of Human Rights and Environment) will not be able to outline their advisor support needs until the end of the month.

Personnel Requirements

We have defined ministry advisors as personnel performing similar functions to those as the current Senior Advisor Teams. They provide policy and technical advice to Iraqi ministries. They are therefore distinct from personnel implementing technical projects – i.e., the bulk of the contractors working on Supplemental construction projects.

Our current best estimate is that Iraq will require approximately 236 Ministry advisors from July 2004. Note that this figure is derived from expressed SA requirements. *We have not yet reviewed this figure against CPA's overall priorities and against available funding.* These advisors will provide technical and (in some cases) policy advice to the Iraqi Ministers and Ministries. In most cases, current plans call for these advisors to stay for approximately a year. However, certain ministries are planning for much longer periods (e.g. out to 2007 for the Ministry of Industry & Minerals).

In addition to the ministry advisors, there will be a requirement for 107 prison advisors to be attached to the Ministry of Justice to assist with management of Iraqi prisons and mentoring of Iraqi Correctional Service Personnel. Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Defense requirements for several hundred police and military trainers are taken care of in the structure of the Office of Security Cooperation.

In addition to the identified ministry requirements, advisors will be required for two additional tasks:

- Public Administration Reform. The current DfID program on Public Administration Reform envisages a number of advisors (to be specified) to undertake generic capacity building tasks across the civil service. These advisors will offer generic training programs to all Iraqi ministries, as well as tailored support to three key ones.
- Support to central executive and legislative branches. It is likely that the Iraqi Presidency, Council of Ministers and Transitional Assembly will require international technical assistance but these requirements cannot be scoped in detail until more detailed planning for these institutions is undertaken.

In addition to these advisors are the following:

- PMO staff
- IRMA management staff

Sources of Personnel
US advisory personnel are expected to be a mixture of government detailees from multiple USG agencies, temporary hires (3161) and contractors. We do not yet have a fine-grained breakdown of the sources of US personnel and US hires. Although the majority of personnel are likely to be US hires, a significant minority will be detailed or hired by other governments. Further work is needed on this with national representatives.

Staff in the regions
In many cases, Senior Advisors (SAs) are focused on building the capacity of the Baghdad ministry, leaving the regional offices and ministry functions to be supported by RCs and GCs. In the South, in particular, there is a large advisory presence supporting many of the ministry DGs and regional offices. Few ministries have actually detailed their requirements for support in the provinces: The SA for the Ministry of Justice has identified a need of from five to 18 regional advisors; other SAs, like the SA for Education, assume GCs will still be available for coordination after Jul. 1st; and the SA for Science and Technology has identified the need for a Nonproliferation Office but has not identified the manning requirements, either national or regional.

Next Steps
We need to work with Senior Advisors and with Regional and Governorate Coordinators to refine the requirements identified here in terms of numbers, sources and nationalities. We will contrast the (often Baghdad-centric) views of the Senior Advisors with the views of GCs and RCs who have been working with ministry DGs and regional offices on the ground.

- We need your advice on the priority areas, as not every request may be affordable
- Where they have not already done so, we should ask SAs to agree their needs assessments with their Ministers
- We will work with each SA to provide a detailed transition plan by March 26

Coordination:
COO (Jeff Oster)
PMO (b)(6)
USAID
DfID

DirInf (b)(6)

ATTACHMENTS: 1: Summary matrix of support requirements
2: Ministry support assessment sheets

Ministry Advisors: Personnel Requirements after Sovereignity (version March 11, 2004)

Ministry	Total Advisors	Others	
INTERIOR	30	*787*	CPATT
OIL	12		
ELECTRICITY	14		
JUSTICE	10	107	prison advisors
DEFENCE	20	*TBC*	OSC
TRADE	8		
FINANCE	12		
TRANSPORTATION	10		
AGRICULTURE	6		
COMMUNICATIONS	*25*		
CENTRAL BANK	*6*		
MUNIC. & PUBLIC WORKS	3		
WATER RESOURCES	4		
LABOR AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS	3		
HEALTH	22		
HOUSING	8		
EDUCATION	2		
HIGHER EDUCATION	2		
DISPLACEMENT & MIGRATION	*5*		
HUMAN RIGHTS	4		
CULTURE	*5*		
ENVIRONMENT	3		
FOREIGN AFFAIRS	4		
INDUSTRY & MINERALS	6		
PLANNING & DEV. COOP.	7		
SCIENCE AND TECH.	2		
YOUTH AND SPORTS	3		
Total	**236**	**894**	
PMO	410		
Regional Ops			

Note 1: Figures in italics are estimates not finally confirmed by the ministry

Ministry	Overview assessment for 1 July	Support specific to Ministry		Support for generic capacity development projects
		Senior Policy advice	Main areas where technical/operational support is required	
INTERIOR	• Criticality of services ESSENTIAL • Capability/attitude of minister and senior team GOOD • Risk of catastrophic failure w/o support HIGH	• YES	• 117 staff embedded in CPATT and admin, 500 Civilian Police, 200 international police trainers • State department will fund embedded staff, Civpol and international trainers. • Likely duration through January 1, 2005	• Once the CPATT resources come on line—all should be well TOTAL: 817
OIL	• Criticality of services ESSENTIAL • Capability/attitude of minister and senior team GOOD • Risk of catastrophic failure w/o support HIGH	• NO	• Oil trading expertise – most likely will be a MoO Employee. • Potential sources – Ministry budget, foreign governments, NGOs etc • Likely duration – up to a year	TOTAL : 12
ELECTRICITY	• Criticality of services ESSENTIAL • Capability/attitude of minister and senior team GOOD • Risk of catastrophic failure w/o support HIGH	• NO	• Level of resource needed 14 MISCELLANEOUS TECHNICAL AREAS • Potential sources – DOD, DONORS • SEPTEMBER 2005	TOTAL: 14

Ministry	Overview assessment for 1 July	Support specific to Ministry		Support for generic capacity development projects
		Senior Policy advice	**Main areas where technical/operational support is required**	
JUSTICE - COURTS	• Criticality of services Both services ESSENTIAL to underpin national security. Judiciary capable and training by 7/1 will strengthen this. Security and witness *protection* crucial • Capability/attitude of minister and senior team Ministry likely to be less able to manage FAIR • *Risk of catastrophic failure* w/o support for Prisons HIGH	• Courts: Not clear, may depend on progress with future organization *of court* services	• Support: ○ Courts: Judicial Council will get support from 5 OPDAT (DoJ) lawyers, a US Army LSO lawyer to be assigned in each Governorate, three to five U.S. Marshals will serve as advisors. ○ Prisons: 107 staff arriving soon, with US funding. Will be based in prisons.	Not yet clear
- PRISONS		• Prisons: Not clear	• Funding : US agencies (DoJ, USArmy) • Duration: unknown	Not yet clear TOTAL: 117
DEFENCE	• Criticality of services ESSENTIAL • Capability/attitude of minister and senior team UNKNOWN • Risk of catastrophic failure w/o support HIGH	• YES	• 8-12 Embedded UK MoD, 6-8 POLMIL US • Funding sources; ministry budged; DOS; foreign governments • In place until June 2005	TOTAL: 20
TRADE	• Criticality of services ESSENTIAL • Capability/ attitude of minister and senior team GOOD • Risk of catastrophic failure w/o support HIGH	• YES	• Six new CPA MOT staff in pipeline to direct major projects • Additional sources: Ministry budget; USAID, foreign • Duration: 31 July 2005	• One additional CPA MOT short term (3 week) staff incoming for Trade Fair. • Corporate sponsors CYPF-7($250m) • 1 Staffer embedded in CPA MOT for budget and financial controls; USG, foreign governments; multilateral development and finance institutions. TOTAL: 8

Ministry	Overview assessment for 1 July	Support specific to Ministry		Support for generic capacity development projects
		Senior Policy advice	Main areas where technical/operational *support is required*	
FINANCE	• Criticality of services ESSENTIAL • Capability/attitude of minister and senior team FAIR • Risk of catastrophic failure w/o support MEDIUM	• YES, Advise required at the policy level & exec levels	• 12 person team, covers budget formulation/policy, execution, compensation, revenue, debt, audit, IT/training, and SOEs • Potential sources – US/UK treasuries, DOS, DOD, DFID, USAID • Likely duration - minimum 2 years, unknown maximum	• Financial Management Information System, Financial management training at all levels • US supplemental, DFI, IMF, World Bank, DFID TOTAL: 12
TRANSPORT	• Criticality of services VERY IMPORTANT • Capability/attitude of minister and senior team GOOD • Risk of catastrophic failure w/o support MEDIUM	• NO	• Tech support 3 per primary sector (Maritime, Railroad, Ports); 1 per secondary sector (surface transport, e.g. buses and trucks) • Potential sources - Ministry budget, foreign governments, NGOs etc. Pursuing USAID funding, World Bank funding, State Dept, funding, and ministy DFI budget. • Likely duration 6 months	• Resources needed for this Ministry: CIVIL AVIATION TRAINING; MANAGEMENT AND TRAINING AT PORT OF UMM QASR; MINISTRY MANAGEMENT • Potential sources: DFI, AND WORLD BANK TOTAL: 10
AGRICULTURE	• Criticality of services VERY IMPORTANT • FAIR on basics, not forward thinking. Minister unlikely to accept long term technical support unless attached to development cash • Risk of catastrophic failure w/o support LOW	• NO, though likely to be USDA counsellor in US Embassy	• If Minister agreed, likely to be roles for 5 or 6 long technical advisers providing 4 month training programmes for 100 Iraqis with long term potential – English language training, generic management skill, agriculture specialization • Funding: AUSAID. World Bank • Duration: 4 months	• Information Management throughout Ministry (DfID?) – training likely to be accepted TOTAL: 6

Ministry	Overview assessment for 1 July	Support specific to Ministry		Support for generic capacity development projects
		Senior Policy advice	Main areas where technical/operational support is required	
COMM	• Criticality of services VERY IMPORTANT • Capability/attitude of minister and senior team FAIR • Risk of catastrophic failure w/o support MEDIUM	• NO	• 6 person commercial development ,12 person tech support • Potential sources – State Department, Ministry and Independent Commission Budget • Likely duration UNDETERMINED	• Finance, management, corporate structures capacity building teams for range of areas will be in place within weeks. • Will follow on with supplemental funds TOTAL : 25
CENTRAL BANK	• Criticality of services-IMPORTANT • Capability/attitude of minister and senior team-GOOD • Risk of catastrophic failure w/o support-MED	• YES	• Monetary economist, bank supervisor, economic research, open market operations, private sector banking, bank restructuring • Potential sources – AMEMB; IMF; DONORS • PHASE-OUT THRU MULTIPLE YEARS DEC 2007	TOTAL: 6
MUNICIPALITIES AND PUBLIC WORKS	• Criticality of services IMPORTANT • Capability/attitude of minister and senior team EXCELLENT • Risk of catastrophic failure w/o support MEDIUM	• NO	• Tech and coordination assistants-3 • Potential sources – DOD; DfID • DECEMBER 2005	TOTAL: 3
WATER RESOURCES	• Criticality of services VERY IMPORTANT • Capability/attitude of minister and senior team EXCELLENT • Risk of catastrophic failure w/o support MEDIUM	• NO	• Tech support 4; 1 military;2 Tech; 1 admin also recommend USCOE Oversight • Potential sources – Ministry budget, foreign governments, NGOs Dept. of State • Likely duration 12 months estimated	TOTAL: 4

Ministry	Overview assessment for 1 July	Support specific to Ministry		Support for generic capacity development projects
		Senior Policy advice	**Main areas where technical/operational support is required**	
LABOR & SOCIAL AFFAIRS	• Criticality of services VERY IMPORTANT • Capability/attitude of minister and senior team POOR • Risk of catastrophic failure w/o support MEDIUM	• NO	• Budget and Financial Assistance 1 each, Audit function for social programs 1 ea., Program Management oversight 1 each • Ministry Budget; USAID, DfID, NGOs • July 05	TOTAL: 3
HEALTH	• Criticality of Ministry services VERY IMPORTANT • Capability/attitude of minister and senior team EXCELLENT • Risk of catastrophic service failure without support LOW	• NO	• 14 Ministerial Consultants, 5 operational level consultants • Potential sources: Ministry Budget, USAID capacity-building contract, World Bank, DFID, other donors, Health and Human Services, WHO • Duration: 6 – 12 months	• Human Resources, Management Practices, and Financial Management System Consultant • Potential sources: World Bank; USAID capacity-building contract; DFID; other donors • Duration: 6-12 months TOTAL: 22
HOUSING	• Criticality of services IMPORTANT • Capability/attitude of minister and senior team GOOD • Risk of catastrophic failure w/o support LOW	• YES, Housing Policy execution	• 5 Housing Policy Tech Asst, 3 Hwy and infrastructure support • Potential sources – USAID;MoH&C BUDGET; COE;OTHERS • Likely duration PHASED REDUCTIONS; LAST PERSONNEL COMPLETE JUN 05	TOTAL: 8

Ministry	Overview assessment for 1 July	Support specific to Ministry		Support for generic capacity development projects
		Senior Policy advice	Main areas where technical/operational support is required	
EDUCATION	• Criticality of Ministry services IMPORTANT • Capability/attitude of minister and senior team - Credible now, getting better FAIR • Risk of catastrophic service failure without support VERY LOW if current Minister stays	• NO. Ready to stand down Senior Adviser within weeks.	• No technical support required	• Procurement, Financial Management, Project Management • Source: World Bank TOTAL: 2 (although detailed assessment notes that support personnel not required)
HIGHER EDUCATION	• Criticality of Ministry services IMPORTANT • Capability/attitude of minister and senior team FAIR on basic, not forward thinking, mixed picture on attitude • Risk of catastrophic service failure without support LOW	• Probably NO though could engage an educational expert to create strategy, fulltime initially. Current Minister not keen	• 1 person for Development of academic/admin IT in universities , 1 Grant writing skills in Ministry • Sources: DoS funded already, USAID for grant writer • Duration: unknown	• Basic IT kit and skills needed in Ministry (USAID for training?) Likely to be acceptable to Ministry TOTAL: 2
DISPLACE. & MIGRATION	• IMPORTANT However the IDP situation in the North has the possibility to create local unrest and instability, if not properly managed. • Mixed capability of minister and senior team but attitudes are positive. • LOW	• YES, will need Minister and DG-level advice and assistance. Needed in Baghdad and likely in four regional offices. Ministry is keen to have continued support to its mission	• staff attached to the ministry, is needed. [5-7 full time equivalents overall.] • Potential sources – UNHCR and IOM ,State Department's, Ministry budget and foreign governments . • Likely duration – Senior Policy advice estimated to be needed through CY2004. Some level of technical support would be needed through FY (September) 05, as coordination structures are established..	• Administration and Finance resources needed for this Ministry – qualified staff and training. • Potential sources – UNHCR, IOM, USG, other governments. • Ministry buy in – Ministry bought in. TOTAL: 5

Ministry	Overview assessment for I July	Support specific to Ministry		Support for generic capacity development projects
		Senior Policy advice	Main areas where technical/operational support is required	
HUMAN RIGHTS	• Criticality of Ministry services IMPORTANT • Capability/attitude of minister and senior team Minister improving from standing start, new team open to support FAIR • Risk of catastrophic service failure without support LOW	• Depends on Ministry progress in coming months.	• Not yet clear, will also depend on progress made. [Potential areas *include continuing* technical support and training on human rights issues, raising awareness across government and mass graves]. Will update at end of March.	• Not yet clear, but unlikely *to be substantial in view* of size of Ministry. TOTAL : 4
CULTURE	• IMPORTANT • Minister not strategic, Ministry not effective, may be receptive to technical support POOR • MEDIUM	• NO, but senior policy advice may be seen as interference.	• At least 4 subject experts needed • Funding sources [NGOs?]. • Duration: Several years	• Strategic and operational planning, Financial Management, Project Management, IT skills • Current base is low, could be heavy users of DfID and USAID programmes, Ministry DGs know they need support TOTAL: 5
ENVIRONMENT	• Criticality of services IMPORTANT • Capability/attitude of minister and senior team- Doubtful capability, receptive to external suppor POOR • Risk of catastrophic failure w/o support - LOW	• NO	• 1 for Equipment procurement and project work, 1 for Communication and consultation • Potential sources – USEPA; Donors • December 2005	TOTAL: 2

Ministry	Overview assessment for 1 July	Support specific to Ministry		Support for generic capacity development projects
		Senior Policy advice	Main areas where technical/operational support is required	
FOREIGN AFFAIRS	• Criticality of services IMPORTANT • FAIR on basic diplomatic functions, and well disposed • Risk of catastrophic failure w/o support LOW	• NO	• Secure IT systems and Consular control systems both need 1-2 people for up to a year, • Source: DoS? • Duration: up to a year	TOTAL: 4
INDUSTRY AND MINERALS	• Criticality of services IMPORTANT • Capability/attitude of minister and senior team POOR • Risk of catastrophic failure w/o support LOW	• NO	• COALITION COORD;TECH ADV TRAINING;TA for IND DEV;FORENSIC ACCT; LEGAL • Potential sources – Ministry budget, foreign governments, NGOs, World Bank, Donor's Development Fund, etc • Up to three years; mostly; 12-18 months	TOTAL: 6
PLANNING AND DEV. COOP.	• Criticality of services IMPORTANT • Capability/attitude of minister and senior team: Minister moderate, senior team WEAK, but receptive to support • Risk of catastrophic failure w/o support LOW	• YES, Senior level advisor	• 6 policy advisors for: - donor coordination; - project identification; - budget integration; - monitoring and follow-up; - Central Statistics Office • Donors may be willing to fund advisors • 12-18 months	• IT databank management • Project management and monitoring At least 30-40 Ministry staff will need training. TOTAL: 7

Ministry	Overview assessment for 1 July	Support specific to Ministry		Support for generic capacity development projects
		Senior Policy Advice	Main areas where technical/operational support is required	
SCIENCE AND TECH	• Criticality of services IMPORTANT • Capability/attitude of minister and senior team POOR • Risk of catastrophic failure w/o support LOW	• NO	• 2 technical advisors (liaisons with Nonproliferation Agency) • Potential sources - Host agencies (Dept. of Defense and Navy) will pay salaries • Likely duration - 2 months (July/Aug 2004)	TOTAL: 2
YOUTH AND SPORTS	• Criticality of Ministry services IMPORTANT • Capability/attitude of minister and senior team POOR but receptive to external help • Risk of catastrophic service failure without support MEDIUM [implication of 60% of population under 25]	• Desirable • 1 person fulltime for one year, based in Ministry, strongly desired by Minister	• 2 people to help Ministry to develop youth and sport programmes respectively. • Funding from ? US Embassy • Duration: one year	• Financial Management, Project Management - at least 50 Ministry staff will need this • Funding from ? DfID programme TOTAL: 3

(b)(6) (O-5)

Sent: Sunday, March 14, 2004 8:39 PM

To: (b)(6)

Cc:

Subject: FW: IMPORTANT! - FW: The next trip

Tracking:

Recipient	Delivery
(b)(6)	Failed: 3/14/2004 8:39 PM
	Failed: 3/14/2004 8:39 PM
	Failed: 3/14/2004 8:39 PM
	Failed: 3/14/2004 8:39 PM

(b)(6)

Their desires are as follows:

March 19 - Arrive

March 19 - 20 work Transition issues with CPA, CJTF7, and DOD/DOS Transition Team

March 21 - fly to Kirkuk and Sulaymaniyah (RON)

March 22 - travel to Irbil and Mosul (RON)

March 23 - return to Baghdad and outbrief

March 24 - depart Baghdad

Desire is to look at potential consulate sites. (b)(6) that is a tertiary objective. At any of these locations, does he have anything else/additional in mind that I should be coordinating? (b)(6) want to meet the senior USG / coalition civs and military in each location. want their views on precise USG / coalition presence, civ+mil, thru transition. (#s / skill sets of people, their missions, support needed, security, etc). second: any appropriate contacts w/ locals (preferably contacts that would help advance their missions, not impose burden; e.g. stroke any locals who crave contact w/ washington VIPs). potential consulate sites (esp kirkuk) a nice-to-do, but not essential.

DS has come on line stating that they are unable to support the visit due to higher priorities. I have asked CID – they have stated that, "We are still awaiting info ref upcoming VIP's that may or may not be arriving about the same time frame. I have requested direct info from CONUS in an attempt to better serve the CPA. I am sorry, I can not give you a more definitive answer at this time. At this time, I can not commit any resources".

Hope this helps in the decision making. A definitive answer as to whether or not we can sponsor this trip would be helpful as they are pressing for details. We are politely stalling I do not want the regions to do a lot of work for nothing. Alternatively, we need to plan and coordinate a different schedule for them if the security assets can not be made available.

Thanks in advance for your help on this.



March | April | May | June | July | August

DOE Max or mini-max

DTRA Rad Source time line

Raytheon contract

IRSRA

CJTF7

Multinational security force (no Tuwaitha security)

MoST security for Tuwaitha

MoST US CPA Technical Advisors on Rad-sources/nonpro issues

CPA Office of Nonproliferation Coordination

US Embassy Nonpro FSO

[redacted]

(b)(6) **(FS-4)**

Action

From: L. Paul Bremer
Sent: Sunday, March 14, 2004 5:49 PM
To: (b)(6) (CIV); Jones, Richard (AMB)
Subject: RE: Update on CPA Budget-Shortfall Eliminated

(b)(6

Well done indeed.
LPB

-----Original Message-----
From: (b)(6) (CIV)
Sent: Sunday, March 14, 2004 4:23 PM
To: Bremer, L Paul CPA; Jones, Richard (AMB)
Subject: Update on CPA Budget-Shortfall Eliminated

I'm pleased to report that we went back to the regional security contracts for updates and learned that the British military will be providing the security for the sites in the South, saving close to $30mm, correspondingly reducing our overall security cost and **eliminating any shortfall,** which is reflected in the attached revised memo to (b)(6 (b)(6) and summary page which we will send out shortly. We also spoke with (b)(6) who suggested we use the same percentage that 3161s currently have to total CPA personnel, which is approx. 25%, or forty-six 3161s for our post July numbers. We felt that was cutting it too close, so we added an additional 50 to our estimate, giving us 100 3161s between senior advisors and others at IRMA, all of which is well within the current budget. Based on what we're seeing in several areas I also think we will find significant other savings which you will be able to use better elsewhere. As you move forward with the transition, we would welcome any opportunity to participate.

If you have a chance, I'd greatly appreciate your thanking (b)(6) the CPA Comptroller who is leaving this week, for his efforts. He was a true wealth of information and he and (b)(6) work tirelessly to get rid of this shortfall. Thank you

(b)(6)
Chief Financial Officer
Coalition Provisional Authority
Republican Palace, Room M107
Baghdad, Iraq
APO AE 09316

E-mail: (b)(6)
Com: (b)(6)
Cell:

Date: 2004-03-14

To: (b)(6) Assistant Secretary/CFO, Department of State

From: (b)(6) CFO, Coalition Provisional Authority

Re: Updated CPA 2004 Operating Budget and Shortfall Resolution Strategy

Attached please find for your review our updated CPA 2004 Operating Budget and shortfall resolution strategy. Hopefully, you will find this financial information helpful in your policy and transition discussions. Lead by (b)(6) Col, USAF, CPA Comptroller, and (b)(6) CPA Deputy Comptroller and Budget Officer, we have conducted extensive due diligence of each of the budget items. These items have also been reviewed with the key members of the CPA Washington financial team, and we are prepared to discuss in depth our methodology, findings and recommendations.

As you will see from the attached, we have revised the estimated shortfall from $421 million (Dec. 2003 est.) down to $68 million. In addition to having three months of actuals and much firmer cost estimates, the material changes to the Budget have been a decline in estimated LOGCAP costs, a continued significant increase in security costs, (from the original $80mm budget to $235mm), and the expected reimbursement by PMO when funding from the Supplemental becomes available.

We've sought to close this shortfall primarily with three actions: 1. transferring the Iraqi Media Network's $96 million expense from the CPA operating budget to a DFI/IRRF capital project funding; 2. properly charging the 2003 IFF budget $68 million for obligations incurred prior to the enactment of the Supplemental on 11/6/03; and 3. constraining personnel, communications and other costs to the minimum (transferring $71 million to security). The net effect of these actions would be to eliminate the previously estimated shortfall.

With respect to personnel expenses, we have projected the number of 3161's peaking in April/May at 350 (currently 256) and declining to 250 in June and then to 100 from July through Sept. remaining well within budget (the est. cost of fifty additional 3161s is $938,000 per month).

Of particular note, we have <u>not</u> factored into the FY 2004 budget <u>any</u> cost allocation either pre or post transition, using our current FY 2003 Operating Budget as a baseline case. We expect that a cost allocation approach will be put into place on July 1, 2004, either utilizing State's ICASS full allocation or some variation of per capita LOGCAP and communication expense allocation.

The net effect to CPA's Operating Budget of a full cost allocation will be significant, reducing CPA/successor organization's operating expenses by an estimated 60-75% in the Q4 of FY 2004 (the current Q4 budget is $265mm) and beyond. The advantage of using a July 1 date is that it provides all participating organizations sufficient notice that going forward they will need to budget for life support services, imposing a financial discipline that will undoubtedly impact headcount.

We have just started an in depth scrub of all expense items, and we expect that we will identify additional savings. We welcome your comments, particularly suggestions where you think savings might be realized, which could be better allocated to the overall CPA mission.

3/13/2004

CPA FY 2004 Operating Fund Budget and Shortfall Resolution Strategy [1, 2]

($ million)

	Approved Budget	Current scrub March 2004	proposed budget adjustments	Resolution Strategy
LOGCAP	**400**	**480**	**80**	**Properly charge '03 IFF with all obligations *prior* to 11/6; covers ~ $68M of LOGCAP. OMB working to establish prior expenses.**
Security	**80**	**235**	**155**	**Scrub requirements; post July 1. State Department requirements unknown, but may be lower, reducing/eliminating shortfall**
Comms/It	**100**	**88**	**-12**	**transfer unused budget to LOGCAP**
Personnel	**126**	**96**	**-30**	**transfer unneeded budget to Security**
Iraqi Media Network	**96**	**0**	**-96**	**transfer unneeded budget to Security**
PMO	**0**	**0**	**0**	**PMO reimburses advances from supplemental funding**
Other	**56**	**27**	**-29**	**transfer unneeded budget to Security**
Grand Totals	**858**	**926**	**68**	
Shortfall	**0**	**68**	**0**	

[1] Base case assumes staff reduction post 1 July transition, but no cost re-allocation for FY. Significantly, after I July, a full ICASS re-allocation could shift 2/3 to 3/4 of CPA's operating expenses to participating organizations. Allocating LOGCAP/Communications expenses only would reduce the operating expenses an estimated one-third.

[2] Carry forward from FY 2003 IFF into FY 2004 totals $106M, and is reflected in the figures above.

[3] December 2003 revised requirement totaled $1,279 million, wth a projected shortfall of $421 million.



TRANSITION TASK FORCE

Chaired by: (b)(6)
(b)(6)

- Chief Management Officer
  - ADMIN
  - RSO
  - IPC
  - FACILITIES
  - GSO
  - HR
  - BUDGET
- Econ
- Political
- IRMA
- StratCom

040313-18

COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY
BAGHDAD

ACTION MEMO

March 13, 2004

FOR: THE ADMINISTRATOR

FROM: (OPPA) (b)(6)

SUBJECT: Transition Planning with Washington

Summary: This memo summarises my latest information on the Iraq Transition Planning Team (ITPT) as of last night Iraq time. It also seeks guidance on how we should engage with ITPT Washington. My sources include (b)(6) and BG Ed Rice (CPA-W).

Bearing Point have been contracted to produce a transition planning process. This is encoded into a matrix that covers 12 functional areas. This has been loaded onto a laptop since it is too large to email; it will be carried here either by BG Ed Rice, who is arriving early in the week or brought by (b)(6) towards the end of the week.

As you know, the ITPT is being formally stood up on Monday and is mandated to produce a report to the Secretaries by 1 April. The intention is to locate approximately 15 of the ITPT staff in Baghdad, starting late next week.

Transition Planning Issues
DepSecDef Wolfowitz was briefed Friday on the process the transition team plans to implement. Five key planning issues arose, which he wants to focus on in preparation for the 1 April plan to the Secretaries:

1. Post-CPA endstate. ITPT wants a decision memo for the Secretaries to give a clear ruling on the best option and details of how this option may work in practice.

2. Governorate representation. Wolfowitz and PMO remain keen on a large number of offices; the DoS preference at present is for 3 large regional offices and a small number of political representatives.

3. Personnel management - Washington wants a gradual drawdown of CPA personnel (not a big bang on June 30) and wants clarity on ministry advisors.

4. Strat Comms - POTUS is concerned about the Stratcomm effort so there will be particular focus on planning for the future Stratcomm effort.

5. CPA operating budget – the ITPT has been mandated to resolve the current problems with the operating budget.

UNCLASSIFIED

Request for Guidance on Engaging with the ITPT
Washington would like us to share fully the work we are doing on transition planning (e.g. the ministry transition assessment) so that they can operate off the same information basis as us.

My recommendation would be to be as open as we can with the ITPT; this may be the best way in which to ensure we influence and shape the transition planning process and results.

RECOMMENDATION (1): Share our March 11 memo providing an interim assessment of ministry transition readiness with the ITPT.

Approve:_______ Disapprove:________ Approve with modification:_____

RECOMMENDATION (2): You issue guidance to the CPA-Baghdad transition planning team on how to engage with the ITPT and how extensively to share internal CPA-B work in progress.

Approve:_______ Disapprove:________ Approve with modification:_____

ATTACHMENTS: March 11 memo Ministry Transition: Post-sovereignty support requirements

040311-16

COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY

BAGHDAD

INFO MEMO

March 11, 2004

FOR: **THE ADMINISTRATOR**

FROM: (b)(6)

SUBJECT: Ministry Transition: Post-sovereignty support requirements

Summary: The CPA senior advisor teams have been requested to outline their Ministries' requirements for support after July 2004. The intention is to have firm plans in place by the end of March to ensure a seamless transition. This report provides a first cut of the advisor support requirements detailing numbers, source and expected duration. We will continue to refine these assessments and will provide a further update by Friday March 19.

State of Transition Plans

The state of transition plans varies widely amongst advisory teams. A few ministries (e.g. Health) have very detailed transition plans with clearly identified advisory personnel needs and identified sources of support. Others (e.g. the new Ministries of Human Rights and Environment) will not be able to outline their advisor support needs until the end of the month.

Personnel Requirements

We have defined ministry advisors as personnel performing similar functions to those as the current Senior Advisor Teams. They provide policy and technical advice to Iraqi ministries. They are therefore distinct from personnel implementing technical projects – i.e., the bulk of the contractors working on Supplemental construction projects.

Our current best estimate is that Iraq will require approximately 236 Ministry advisors from July 2004. Note that this figure is derived from expressed SA requirements. *We have not yet reviewed this figure against CPA's overall priorities and against available funding.* These advisors will provide technical and (in some cases) policy advice to the Iraqi Ministers and Ministries. In most cases, current plans call for these advisors to stay for approximately a year. However, certain ministries are planning for much longer periods (e.g. out to 2007 for the Ministry of Industry & Minerals).

In addition to the ministry advisors, there will be a requirement for 107 prison advisors to be attached to the Ministry of Justice to assist with management of Iraqi prisons and mentoring of Iraqi Correctional Service Personnel. Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Defense requirements for several hundred police and military trainers are taken care of in the structure of the Office of Security Cooperation.

In addition to the identified ministry requirements, advisors will be required for two additional tasks:

- Public Administration Reform. The current DfID program on Public Administration Reform envisages a number of advisors (to be specified) to undertake generic capacity building tasks across the civil service. These advisors will offer generic training programs to all Iraqi ministries, as well as tailored support to three key ones.
- Support to central executive and legislative branches. It is likely that the Iraqi Presidency, Council of Ministers and Transitional Assembly will require international technical assistance but these requirements cannot be scoped in detail until more detailed planning for these institutions is undertaken.

In addition to these advisors are the following:

- PMO staff
- IRMA management staff

Sources of Personnel

US advisory personnel are expected to be a mixture of government detailees from multiple USG agencies, temporary hires (3161) and contractors. We do not yet have a fine-grained breakdown of the sources of US personnel and US hires. Although the majority of personnel are likely to be US hires, a significant minority will be detailed or hired by other governments. Further work is needed on this with national representatives.

Staff in the regions

In many cases, Senior Advisors (SAs) are focused on building the capacity of the Baghdad ministry, leaving the regional offices and ministry functions to be supported by RCs and GCs. In the South, in particular, there is a large advisory presence supporting many of the ministry DGs and regional offices. Few ministries have actually detailed their requirements for support in the provinces: The SA for the Ministry of Justice has identified a need of from five to 18 regional advisors; other SAs, like the SA for Education, assume GCs will still be available for coordination after Jul. 1st; and the SA for Science and Technology has identified the need for a Nonproliferation Office but has not identified the manning requirements, either national or regional.

Next Steps

We need to work with Senior Advisors and with Regional and Governorate Coordinators to refine the requirements identified here in terms of numbers, sources and nationalities. We will contrast the (often Baghdad-centric) views of the Senior Advisors with the views of GCs and RCs who have been working with ministry DGs and regional offices on the ground.

- We need your advice on the priority areas, as not every request may be affordable
- Where they have not already done so, we should ask SAs to agree their needs assessments with their Ministers
- We will work with each SA to provide a detailed transition plan by March 26

Coordination:

COO (Jeff Oster)
PMO (b)(6)
USAID (b)(6)
DfID (b)(6)

DirInf (b)(6)

ATTACHMENTS: 1: Summary matrix of support requirements
2: Ministry support assessment sheets

040313-19

COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY
BAGHDAD

ACTION MEMO

March 13, 2004

FOR: THE ADMINISTRATOR

FROM: (b)(6)

SUBJECT: DRAFT letter to Ministers on Transition Resource requirements

Several of the Senior Advisors in critical ministries and two others have submitted transitional policy and technical assistance requests for substantial support. It has been pointed out by other Senior Advisors that significant requirements for policy and technical support must be driven by the Minister to ensure optimal use of these valuable assets. Equally we do not want to start a bidding exercise with Ministers.

In December of 2003, you requested each Minister to forward you their priorities. The resulting successful interchange of ideas indicates that once more a direct request from the Administrator would be appropriate to determine Iraqi commitment to the continuation of technical assistance in some form. The ministries where the Senior Advisor has submitted requests for substantial numbers of advisors (5 or over) review are: Interior, Oil, Electricity, Justice, Defence, Finance, Communications, Health, Housing, Planning and Development Cooperation, Displacement and Migration, and Culture.

RECOMMENDATION (1): Sign and forward attached letter to the above Ministers for response by 3/21/04

Approve:________ Disapprove:________ Approve with modification:______

ATTACHMENTS: DRAFT letter to Minister

COORDINATION: COO
CPO

UNCLASSIFIED

COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY
BAGHDAD

Mr. Abdul Amir al-Abood
Minister of Agriculture
Baghdad, Iraq

Dear Mr. Minister,

When I met with all Ministers on March 7, I raised the issue of what assistance Ministries might want after a sovereign Iraqi administration takes over on July 1. Both you in the Ministries and we in the Coalition need to make plans. The transition will go much more smoothly if we share a common view of the issues, and the level and type of support you are likely to want from us after July. I am therefore writing today to request your views on any policy and technical assistance your Ministry may require after June 30 .

I look forward to a formal response to this request by 21 March 2004. Your Senior Advisor will work with you on details of this issue. Your response will enable us to work with you to try and meet any assistance needs.

Thank you once again for your dedication to our common effort to ensure a better, democratic future for the Iraqi people.

Sincerely,

L. Paul Bremer III
Administrator

Pending CPA Orders & Regulations (10 March 04)			
Category	**Subject**	**Description**	**Status**
		MISSION CRITICAL	
Political Transition	Election Commission	Establishes a commission that will develop the rules and procedures for conducting fair and free elections.	To be drafted based on TAL. ✓
Political Transition	Political Parties Order	Establishes rules for the establishment, funding and conduct of political parties.	To be drafted based on TAL. ✓
Political Transition	Housekeeping Order	Conforms all other orders and regulations with provision in TAL regarding role of transitional Iraqi government as successor to CPA.	To be drafted based on TAL. ✓
National Security	Order 17	Revise to provide status beyond occupation.	To be drafted. ✓
National Security	Ministry of Defence	Establishes a new Ministry of Defence, which will be wholly separate and distinct from the MoD dissolved under CPA Order Number 2. Transfers the New Iraqi Army established under CPA Order Number 22 to the new MoD and disestablishes the Defense Support Agency created by CPA Order Number 42 (although it does transfer personnel/contractors currently employed/used by DSA to the new MoD). Provides that the interim Minister of Defence will be appointed by the Governing Council with the agreement of the Administrator. Sets out the elements of the MoD and the senior positions.	Draft completed. Coordination underway. ✓
General Governance	Board of Supreme Audit	Reconstitutes the Board of Supreme Audit as an independent public agency empowered to enhance the economy, efficiency, effectiveness and credibility of the Iraqi government.	Draft completed. Coordination underway. ✓
Economic and Commercial Law Reform	Organic Budget Law Order	Promulgates the Organic Budget Law, which provides limits on expenditures, exemptions from such limits, and allocations of contingency funds.	Drafting underway. ✓
Economic and Commercial Law Reform	Public Procurement law	Provides a transparent and competitive regime for government procurement.	To be drafted. ✓
National Security	Establishment of the Iraqi National Intelligence Service	Establishes a new intelligence service for Iraq. Director General will be appointed by the head of government for a set term. INIS will provide strategic intelligence to MoI and MoD. Issue of authority to detain individuals is still under discussion	OGA drafting charter. ✓ ✓

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General Governance	Interim Governmental Powers	Defines respective authorities and responsibilities of Governing Council and interim Ministers, Governors and Deputy Governors, Provincial and Local Councils, Mayors, and Chiefs of Police, and specifically delineates powers that are reserved for centralized execution, and powers that are devolved for localized execution. The order would remain in effect from date of signature until revised or rescinded by the Transitional Administrative Law or legislative enactment of the new Iraqi government.	Draft completed. Pending final coordination with GC. ✓
National Security	Regulation of Armed Forces Within Iraq	Prohibits Armed Forces, to include Resistance Forces (e.g., the Peshmerga and Badr) and private security firms, from operating within Iraq except as provided for in the order. Exceptions include Armed Forces under Coalition control; security firms contracted by Coalition; and private security firms licensed by the MoI with no more than 100 armed employees. Provides that Resistance Forces that propose a transition plan accepted by the CPA by 1 May shall not be deemed to violate the prohibition, if they abide by the plan. Sets forth policies for transitioning Resistance Forces.	Draft under revision. ✓
CPA Administration	Program Management Office	Formally establishes Program Management Office and describes its composition, authorities, and program management, financial management and acquisition functions.	Draft completed. Coordination underway. ✓
		VERY IMPORTANT	
General Governance	Central Government Functions Order	Establishes an office to support the Prime Minister and cabinet in developing and coordinating policy and providing administrative support.	To be drafted. ✓
General Governance	Iraqi Communications and Media Commission	Establishes an independent commission responsible for licensing and regulating telecommunications, broadcasting and other media in Iraq.	Submitted for signature. ✓
General Governance	Public Service Broadcasting	Establishes the Iraqi Broadcasting Network as the public service broadcaster for Iraq.	✓ Submitted for signature.
Economic and Commercial Law Reform	Revisions to Banking law	Revises Banking Law promulgated under Order 40 to facilitate commercial banking operations in support of true market reforms.	Drafting underway. ✓
Economic and Commercial Law Reform	Banking Regulations	Provides detailed guidance implementing Banking Law.	Drafting underway. ✓

✓

✓

✓

Economic and Commercial Law Reform	Company Law (Comprehensive Revision)	Comprehensive revision of Iraqi company law, designed to facilitate infusion of capital, implement Order No. 39, provide for establishment of foreign-owned corporations and remove unnecessary state controls.	Drafting underway. ✓	move down
Economic and Commercial Law Reform	Regulations for Commercial Agency	Implements Order 39 and amendments to Company Law with regard to Commercial Agency.	Drafting underway. ✓	
Economic and Commercial Law Reform	Labor Law	Amends existing law to provide far greater flexibility in job creation, employment conditions and labor mobility, including equal treatment of Iraqis and foreigners.	Coordination underway. Comments due March 16th	?
Economic and Commercial Law Reform	Retail Registration Regulations	Provides procedures for registry of foreign investors intending to engage in retail business in Iraq.	Draft completed. Coordination with Ministry ongoing. ✓	
Economic and Commercial Law Reform	Bankruptcy Law	Amends existing law to modernize dissolution, liquidation and bankruptcy proceedings and creditor rights protection, while preserving aspects of existing law that are functional but unused.	Coordination underway. Interagency comments due March 8th. ✓	
Economic and Commercial Law Reform	Secured Transactions Law	Provides for a registry and set of rules to ensure that property rights are protected.	Coordination underway. Comments due March 12th.	? move down
Economic and Commercial Law Reform	Anti-money laundering law	Provides rules and procedures to prevent and counter money laundering activities.	Drafting underway. ✓	
General Governance	Revision of visa system	Establishes a new system for control of entry into Iraq by non-Iraqis through new categories of entry visas. This will provide better border control and will constitute an integral part of the broader immigration control policy.	To be drafted. ✓	✓ mission critical?
Economic and Commercial Law Reform	Intellectual Property Law	Amends existing law to strengthen protection of patents, trademarks, trade names and copyrights.	Drafting underway. ✓	
National Security	Revision to Order No. 28, Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (ICDC)	CJTF-7 proposes expanding ICDC's counterinsurgency roles. Removes limitation on tasking of ICDC and provides that Coalition Forces will task the ICDC ~~and makes~~ other revisions necessary to reflect possible inclusion within MOD.	Draft completed. Coordination underway. ✓	

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General Governance	Whistle Blower Protection	Protects persons who come forward with evidence of corruption and official wrongdoing by providing civil penalties for retaliatory action and permitting criminal sanctions in egregious cases.	Draft completed. ✓
		IMPORTANT	
National Security	Revision to Order No. 22, New Iraqi Army (NIA)	CJTF-7 proposes using Iraqi Armed Forces (IAF) (formerly NIA) in counter-insurgency roles, requiring elimination of ~~the prohibition~~ in Order 22 against use of the IAF in ~~internal~~ (law enforcement) roles. Draft revision expands internal operational roles for IAF, provides for operations by IAF under the control of the Coalition Forces, extends legal protections for IAF members when conducting operations and retains Administrator's control of IAF employment.	Draft completed. Coordination underway. ? ✓
National Security	Code of Discipline for Iraqi Civil Defense Corps	Establishes a system of discipline for ICDC along the lines of the code for the new Iraqi Army.	Being drafted
Judicial Reform	Omnibus Judiciary Order	An overarching order dealing with the organization of an independent judiciary, judicial salaries, qualifications and appointments, security and administrative support.	To be drafted. move up
Economic and Commercial Law Reform	Reconstruction Levy Instructions	Provides detailed guidance for implementing Reconstruction Levy.	To be submitted to Minister for signature.
Economic and Commercial Law Reform	Insurance law	Provides an insurance regime for Iraq.	Draft expected mid-April
Economic and Commercial Law Reform	Pension Reform Law	Amends existing law to update pension policies and permit private pension funds, deductibility of contributions, and generally updating pension policies.	To be drafted. move up on ✓
Economic and Commercial Law Reform	Social security Law	Establishes comprehensive social security scheme including unemployment compensation and limited welfare support.	To be drafted. ✓

General Governance	Revision to Order No. 45: Non-Government Organizations (NGO)	Although Order No. 45 has been signed into law, CPA is receiving suggested revision designed to enhance the security of Iraq while facilitating the participation of NGO's in Iraq.	Order under review for possible amendment.	?	
Economic and Commercial Law Reform	Disposition of Military Industrial Company assets and personnel	Authorizes reassignment of employees and assets of military industrial companies to other SOE's.	Draft completed. Coordination underway.	✓	
Economic and Commercial Law Reform	Consolidation of State owned enterprises	Provides procedures for consolidation and merger of SOE's into ministries and other SOE's	Coordination underway. Comments due March 9th.	✓	
Economic and Commercial Law Reform	Competition Policy Law	Establishes anti-monopoly policies and sets forth constraints on governments ability to practice price controls.	To be drafted. move up	✓	✓
Economic and Commercial Law Reform	Iraqi Interim Securities Law Order	Builds upon existing Iraqi securities law by applying certain aspects of modern securities law to facilitate transition to a market economy. (An entirely new securities law will subsequently be prepared to complete the legal framework for a market economy).	Coordination with Iraqis ongoing. why do in 2 stages?	?	
Economic and Commercial Law Reform	Public Debt Law	Provides ~~rules and procedures for~~ issuance of government bonds.	Drafting underway. move up	✓	✓
Economic and Commercial Law Reform	Comprehensive Revision Securities Law	Comprehensive revision of securities law to provide the legal framework for a robust and transparent securities market.	Draft being revised by SEC. move up	✓	✓
Economic and Commercial Law Reform	Transportation Customer Funds	Establishes funds that will be financed through the collection of transportation-related fees, such as sea port charges and air over flight fees.	To be drafted. ok	?	
Economic and Commercial Law Reform	National Oil Company Law	Creates the Iraqi National Oil Company	To be drafted. move up	?	✓
Economic and Commercial Law Reform	Commercial leasing law	Provides procedures to ensure retention of property interests in leasing arrangements. Provides for rights of leasers or leases.	To be drafted.	?	
Economic and Commercial Law Reform	Tax Law	Comprehensive revision of Iraqi tax law.	Research underway.	?	

Economic and Commercial Law Reform	Consumer Protection	Provides basic rules for protection of consumers.	Initial draft completed by Iraqi attorneys from University of Baghdad. Under review.	? ✓
Economic and Commercial Law Reform	Funds transfer laws & Regs	Establish rules and procedures including reporting requirements for the transfer of funds into and out of Iraq.	To be drafted.	✓ ?
Economic and Commercial Law Reform	International Trade Negotiation Law	Sets forth procedures for conducting trade talks to include private sector participation.	To be drafted. Ministry of Trade engaged in policy review	? ✓
National Security	Iraqi Radioactive Source Authority	Establishes a regulatory agency, under the Ministry of Science and Technology for administrative purposes only, to implement, monitor and enforce regulations for beneficial uses of ionizing radiation.	Draft complete.	? ✓
National Security	Weapons Registration Policy	Creates Iraq-wide weapons control structure based on weapons badge or card. Addresses all persons who wish to possess weapons in Iraq, including Coalition Forces. Indicates which persons require a badge/card to possess a weapon, which do not, provides for revocation or suspension of the card/badge, and describes effect of revocations.	Draft completed. Coordination underway.	✓
National Security	Iraqi International Center for Science and Industry	US and UK will sign an international agreement forming this inter-governmental organizatrion to provide grants for projects that will employ Iraqi scientists, technicians and engineers formerly associated with WMD projects in projects for medical, commercial or other non-WMD related purposes.	Drafting underway	? ✓
General Governance	Higher Education	Revise existing regulations to streamline and decentralize the appointment and removal policies for university presidents and deans.	To be drafted.	✓ ?
General Governance	Civil Service Law	Establishes a comprehensive civil service structure to include merit management and an oversight commission.	To be drafted.	✓
Judicial Reform	Investigations Order	Authorizes covert investigations under judicial oversight including wiretapping and electronic surveillance. Sets forth standards, procedures and approval authorities.	To be drafted.	?
Judicial Reform	Traffic Code Order	Creates a new traffic code and court system, including licensing and registration procedures.	Drafting underway.	?

combine w anti-money laundering law

State non-pro wants.

(28) of which 14 = ?

Tchl (56)

[illegible]

For THE 1730

040313 -15

Pending CPA Orders & Regulations (10 March 04)			
Category	**Subject**	**Description**	**Status**
		MISSION CRITICAL	
Political Transition	Election Commission C	Establishes a commission that will develop the rules and procedures for conducting fair and free elections.	To be drafted based on TAL.
Political Transition	Political Parties Order	Establishes rules for the establishment, funding and conduct of political parties.	To be drafted based on TAL.
Political Transition	Housekeeping Order	Conforms all other orders and regulations with provision in TAL regarding role of transitional Iraqi government as successor to CPA.	To be drafted based on TAL.
National Security	Order 17	Revise to provide adequate legal protection to diplomatic, military and contractor personnel beyond occupation.	To be drafted.
National Security	Ministry of Defence	Establishes a new Ministry of Defence, which will be wholly separate and distinct from the MoD dissolved under CPA Order Number 2. Transfers the New Iraqi Army established under CPA Order Number 22 to the new MoD and disestablishes the Defense Support Agency created by CPA Order Number 42 (although it does transfer personnel/contractors currently employed/used by DSA to the new MoD). Provides that the interim Minister of Defence will be appointed by the Governing Council with the agreement of the Administrator. Sets out the elements of the MoD and the senior positions.	Draft completed. Coordination underway.
National Security	Iraqi Security Council	Creates the senior governmental body as well as the decision mechanisms used by that body to establish national security policies and priorities.	To be drafted.
General Governance	Board of Supreme Audit	Reconstitutes the Board of Supreme Audit as an independent public agency empowered to enhance the economy, efficiency, effectiveness and credibility of the Iraqi government.	Draft completed. Coordination underway.
Economic and Commercial Law Reform	Organic Budget Law Order	Promulgates the Organic Budget Law, which provides limits on expenditures, exemptions from such limits, and allocations of contingency funds.	Drafting underway.
Economic and Commercial Law Reform	Public Procurement law	Provides a transparent and competitive regime for government procurement.	To be drafted.

National Security	Establishment of the Iraqi National Intelligence Service	Establishes a new intelligence service for Iraq. Director General will be appointed by the head of government for a set term. INIS will provide strategic intelligence to MoI and MoD. Issue of authority to detain individuals is still under discussion	OGA drafting charter.
General Governance	Interim Governmental Powers	Defines respective authorities and responsibilities of Governing Council and interim Ministers, Governors and Deputy Governors, Provincial and Local Councils, Mayors, and Chiefs of Police, and specifically delineates powers that are reserved for centralized execution, and powers that are devolved for localized execution. The order would remain in effect from date of signature until revised or rescinded by the Transitional Administrative Law or legislative enactment of the new Iraqi government.	Draft completed. Pending final coordination with GC.
National Security	Regulation of Armed Forces Within Iraq	Prohibits Armed Forces, to include Resistance Forces (e.g., the Peshmerga and Badr) and private security firms, from operating within Iraq except as provided for in the order. Exceptions include Armed Forces under Coalition control; security firms contracted by Coalition; and private security firms licensed by the MoI with no more than 100 armed employees. Provides that Resistance Forces that propose a transition plan accepted by the CPA by 1 May shall not be deemed to violate the prohibition, if they abide by the plan. Sets forth policies for transitioning Resistance Forces.	Draft under revision.
CPA Administration	Program Management Office	Formally establishes Program Management Office and describes its composition, authorities, and program management, financial management and acquisition functions.	Draft completed. Coordination underway.
		VERY IMPORTANT	
General Governance	Central Government Functions Order	Establishes an office to support the Prime Minister and cabinet in developing and coordinating policy and providing administrative support.	To be drafted.
General Governance	Iraqi Communications and Media Commission	Establishes an independent commission responsible for licensing and regulating telecommunications, broadcasting and other media in Iraq.	Submitted for signature.
General Governance	Public Service Broadcasting	Establishes the Iraqi Broadcasting Network as the public service broadcaster for Iraq.	Submitted for signature.

Disregard

Economic and Commercial Law Reform	Revisions to Banking law	Revises Banking Law promulgated under Order 40 to facilitate commercial banking operations in support of true market reforms.	Drafting underway.
Economic and Commercial Law Reform	Banking Regulations	Provides detailed guidance implementing Banking Law.	Drafting underway.
Economic and Commercial Law Reform	Company Law (Comprehensive Revision)	Comprehensive revision of Iraqi company law, designed to facilitate infusion of capital, implement Order No. 39, provide for establishment of foreign-owned corporations and remove unnecessary state controls.	Drafting underway.
Economic and Commercial Law Reform	Regulations for Commercial Agency	Implements Order 39 and amendments to Company Law with regard to Commercial Agency.	Drafting underway.
Economic and Commercial Law Reform	Labor Law	Amends existing law to provide far greater flexibility in job creation, employment conditions and labor mobility, including equal treatment of Iraqis and foreigners.	Coordination underway. Comments due March 16th
Economic and Commercial Law Reform	Retail Registration Regulations	Provides procedures for registry of foreign investors intending to engage in retail business in Iraq.	Draft completed. Coordination with Ministry ongoing.
Economic and Commercial Law Reform	Bankruptcy Law	Amends existing law to modernize dissolution, liquidation and bankruptcy proceedings and creditor rights protection, while preserving aspects of existing law that are functional but unused.	Coordination underway. Interagency comments due March 8th.
Economic and Commercial Law Reform	Secured Transactions Law	Provides for a registry and set of rules to ensure that property rights are protected.	Coordination underway. Comments due March 12th.
Economic and Commercial Law Reform	Anti-money laundering law	Provides rules and procedures to prevent and counter money laundering activities.	Drafting underway.
General Governance	Revision of visa system	Establishes a new system for control of entry into Iraq by non-Iraqis through new categories of entry visas. This will provide better border control and will constitute an integral part of the broader immigration control policy.	To be drafted.
Economic and Commercial Law Reform	Intellectual Property Law	Amends existing law to strengthen protection of patents, trademarks, trade names and copyrights.	Drafting underway.

National Security	Revision to Order No. 28, Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (ICDC)	CJTF-7 proposes expanding ICDC's counterinsurgency roles. Removes limitation on tasking of ICDC and provides that Coalition Forces will task the ICDC and makes other revisions necessary to reflect possible inclusion within MOD.	Draft completed. Coordination underway.
General Governance	Whistle Blower Protection	Protects persons who come forward with evidence of corruption and official wrongdoing by providing civil penalties for retaliatory action and permitting criminal sanctions in egregious cases.	Draft completed.
		IMPORTANT	
National Security	Revision to Order No. 22, New Iraqi Army (NIA)	CJTF-7 proposes using Iraqi Armed Forces (IAF) (formerly NIA) in counter-insurgency roles, requiring elimination of the prohibition in Order 22 against use of the IAF in internal (law enforcement) roles. Draft revision expands internal operational roles for IAF, provides for operations by IAF under the control of the Coalition Forces, extends legal protections for IAF members when conducting operations and retains Administrator's control of IAF employment.	Draft completed. Coordination underway.
National Security	Code of Discipline for Iraqi Civil Defense Corps	Establishes a system of discipline for ICDC along the lines of the code for the new Iraqi Army.	Being drafted
Judicial Reform	Omnibus Judiciary Order	An overarching order dealing with the organization of an independent judiciary, judicial salaries, qualifications and appointments, security and administrative support.	To be drafted.
Economic and Commercial Law Reform	Reconstruction Levy Instructions	Provides detailed guidance for implementing Reconstruction Levy.	To be submitted to Minister for signature.
Economic and Commercial Law Reform	Insurance law	Provides an insurance regime for Iraq.	Draft expected mid-April
Economic and Commercial Law Reform	Pension Reform Law	Amends existing law to update pension policies and permit private pension funds, deductibility of contributions, and generally updating pension policies.	To be drafted.

Economic and Commercial Law Reform	Social security Law	Establishes comprehensive social security scheme including unemployment compensation and limited welfare support.	To be drafted.
General Governance	Revision to Order No. 45: Non-Government Organizations (NGO)	Although Order No. 45 has been signed into law, CPA is receiving suggested revision designed to enhance the security of Iraq while facilitating the participation of NGO's in Iraq.	Order under review for possible amendment.
Economic and Commercial Law Reform	Disposition of Military Industrial Company assets and personnel	Authorizes reassignment of employees and assets of military industrial companies to other SOE's.	Draft completed. Coordination underway.
Economic and Commercial Law Reform	Consolidation of State owned enterprises	Provides procedures for consolidation and merger of SOE's into ministries and other SOE's	Coordination underway. Comments due March 9th.
Economic and Commercial Law Reform	Competition Policy Law	Establishes anti-monopoly policies and sets forth constraints on governments ability to practice price controls.	To be drafted.
Economic and Commercial Law Reform	Iraqi Interim Securities Law Order	Builds upon existing Iraqi securities law by applying certain aspects of modern securities law to facilitate transition to a market economy. (An entirely new securities law will subsequently be prepared to complete the legal framework for a market economy).	Coordination with Iraqis ongoing.
Economic and Commercial Law Reform	Public Debt Law	Provides rules and procedures for issuance of government bonds.	Drafting underway.
Economic and Commercial Law Reform	Comprehensive Revision Securities Law	Comprehensive revision of securities law to provide the legal framework for a robust and transparent securities market.	Draft being revised by SEC.
Economic and Commercial Law Reform	Transportation Customer Funds	Establishes funds that will be financed through the collection of transportation-related fees, such as sea port charges and air over flight fees.	To be drafted.
Economic and Commercial Law Reform	National Oil Company Law	Creates the Iraqi National Oil Company	To be drafted.
Economic and Commercial Law Reform	Commercial leasing law	Provides procedures to ensure retention of property interests in leasing arrangements. Provides for rights of leasers or leases.	To be drafted.

Economic and Commercial Law Reform	Tax Law	Comprehensive revision of Iraqi tax law.	Research underway.
Economic and Commercial Law Reform	Consumer Protection	Provides basic rules for protection of consumers.	Initial draft completed by Iraqi attorneys from University of Baghdad. Under review.
Economic and Commercial Law Reform	Funds transfer laws & Regs	Establish rules and procedures including reporting requirements for the transfer of funds into and out of Iraq.	To be drafted.
Economic and Commercial Law Reform	International Trade Negotiation Law	Sets forth procedures for conducting trade talks to include private sector participation.	To be drafted. Ministry of Trade engaged in policy review
National Security	Iraqi Radioactive Source Authority	Establishes a regulatory agency, under the Ministry of Science and Technology for administrative purposes only, to implement, monitor and enforce regulations for beneficial uses of ionizing radiation.	Draft complete.
National Security	Weapons Registration Policy	Creates Iraq-wide weapons control structure based on weapons badge or card. Addresses all persons who wish to possess weapons in Iraq, including Coalition Forces. Indicates which persons require a badge/card to possess a weapon, which do not, provides for revocation or suspension of the card/badge, and describes effect of revocations.	Draft completed. Coordination underway.
National Security	Iraqi International Center for Science and Industry	US and UK will sign an international agreement forming this inter-governmental organizatrion to provide grants for projects that will employ Iraqi scientists, technicians and engineers formerly associated with WMD projects in projects for medical, commercial or other non-WMD related purposes.	Drafting underway
General Governance	Higher Education	Revise existing regulations to streamline and decenmtralize the appointment and removal policies for university presidents and deans.	To be drafted.
General Governance	Civil Service Law	Establishes a comprehensive civil service structure to include merit management and an oversight commission.	To be drafted.
Judicial Reform	Investigations Order	Authorizes covert investigations under judicial oversight including wiretapping and electronic surveillance. Sets forth standards, procedures and approval authorities.	To be drafted.
Judicial Reform	Traffic Code Order	Creates a new traffic code and court system, including licensing and registration procedures.	Drafting underway.

COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY

BAGHDAD

ACTION MEMO

March 13, 2004

FOR: THE ADMINISTRATOR

FROM: (OPPA)(b)(6)

SUBJECT: Transition Planning with Washington

Summary: This memo summarises my latest information on the Iraq Transition Planning Team (ITPT) as of last night Iraq time. It also seeks guidance on how we should engage with ITPT Washington. My sources include (b)(6) and BG Ed Rice (CPA-W).

Bearing Point have been contracted to produce a transition planning process. This is encoded into a matrix that covers 12 functional areas. This has been loaded onto a laptop since it is too large to email; it will be carried here either by BG Ed Rice, who is arriving early in the week or brought by Holzmann towards the end of the week.

As you know, the ITPT is being formally stood up on Monday and is mandated to produce a report to the Secretaries by 1 April. The intention is to locate approximately 15 of the ITPT staff in Baghdad, starting late next week.

Transition Planning Issues

DepSecDef Wolfowitz was briefed Friday on the process the transition team plans to implement. Five key planning issues arose, which he wants to focus on in preparation for the 1 April plan to the Secretaries:

1. Post-CPA endstate. ITPT wants a decision memo for the Secretaries to give a clear ruling on the best option and details of how this option may work in practice.

2. Governorate representation. Wolfowitz and PMO remain keen on a large number of offices; the DoS preference at present is for 3 large regional offices and a small number of political representatives.

3. Personnel management - Washington wants a gradual drawdown of CPA personnel (not a big bang on June 30) and wants clarity on ministry advisors.

4. Strat Comms - POTUS is concerned about the Stratcomm effort so there will be particular focus on planning for the future Stratcomm effort.

5. CPA operating budget – the ITPT has been mandated to resolve the current problems with the operating budget.

Request for Guidance on Engaging with the ITPT

Washington would like us to share fully the work we are doing on transition planning (e.g. the ministry transition assessment) so that they can operate off the same information basis as us.

My recommendation would be to be as open as we can with the ITPT; this may be the best way in which to ensure we influence and shape the transition planning process and results.

RECOMMENDATION (1): Share our March 11 memo providing an interim assessment of ministry transition readiness with the ITPT.

Approve:________ Disapprove:________ Approve with modification:______

RECOMMENDATION (2): You issue guidance to the CPA-Baghdad transition planning team on how to engage with the ITPT and how extensively to share internal CPA-B work in progress.

Approve:________ Disapprove:________ Approve with modification:______

ATTACHMENTS: March 11 memo Ministry Transition: Post-sovereignty support requirements

Draft to Ambassador Bremer (3/13/04)

Summary of Updated CPA 2004 Operating Budget and Shortfall Resolution Strategy

Attached please find for your review and comment our updated CPA 2004 Operating Budget and shortfall resolution strategy, along with breakdowns for the key expense items. Hopefully, you will find this financial information helpful in your policy and transition discussions. Lead by COL. (b)(6) CPA Comptroller, and (b)(6) CPA Deputy Comptroller and Budget Officer, we have conducted extensive due diligence of each of the budget items. These items have also been reviewed with the key members of the CPA Washington financial team, and we are prepared to discuss in depth our methodology, findings and recommendations.

As you will see from the attached, we have revised the estimated shortfall from $421 million (Dec. 2003 est.) down to $97 million. The material changes to the Budget have been a decline in estimated LOGCAP costs, a continued significant increase in security costs, (a 234% increase from the original $80mm budget to $267mm), and the expected reimbursement by PMO when funding from the Supplemental becomes available.

IFF
= 03 Supplemental

We've sought to close this shortfall primarily with three actions: 1. transferring the Iraqi Media Network's $96 million expense from the CPA operating budget to a DFI/IRRF capital project funding; 2. properly charging the 2003 IFF budget $68 million for obligations incurred prior to the enactment of the Supplemental on 11/6/03 and 3. constraining personnel, communications and other costs to the minimum ($74 million). The net effect of these actions would be to reduce the estimated shortfall to $29 million. It should be noted that except for minimal changes to Security post July 1, we have not assumed any delays in the staffing of the security contracts in the regions or any changes by State to post-transition security which may reduce or eliminate the shortfall.

With respect to personnel expenses, we have projected the number of 3161 peaking in April/May at 350 (currently 256) and declining to 250 in June and then to 50 from July through Sept. For transition purposes, we estimate the total cost of fifty additional 3161s at $938,000 per month.

Of particular note, we have not factored into the FY 2004 budget any cost allocation either pre or post transition, using our current FY 2003 Operating Budget as a baseline case. We expect that a cost allocation approach will be put into place on July 1, 2004, either utilizing State's ICASS full allocation or some variation of per capita LOGCAP and communication expense allocation.

The net effect to CPA's Operating Budget of a full cost allocation would be significant, reducing CPA/successor organization's operating expenses by an estimated 60-75% in Q4 and beyond. We see the advantage of using a July 1 date is that it provides all participating organizations sufficient notice that going forward they will need to budget for life support services, imposing a financial discipline that will undoubtedly impact headcount. We will also need the intervening time to set up a system to capture their usage of CPA facilities. We believe that by piggy-backing on the new DOS security ID system we may be able to accomplish this quickly and cost effectively.

We have just started an in depth scrub of all expense items, and we expect that we will identify additional savings. A list of action items that we are pursuing follows at the end of the attached materials. We welcome your comments particularly suggestions where you think additional savings might be realized, which could then be better allocated to the overall CPA mission. We had originally planned to provide this report by bi-weekly, but upon further review, a monthly report, as recommended by the Financial Management Assessment Team, would perhaps be more useful to you.

Draft

3/13/2004

CPA FY 2004 Operating Fund Budget and Shortfall Resolution Strategy [1, 2]

($ million)

	Approved Budget	Revised Requirements December 2003	Current scrub March 2004	proposed budget adjustments	differential	Resolution Strategy
LOGCAP	400	531	480	68	-12	**Properly charge '03 IFF with all obligations prior to 11/6; covers ~ $68M of LOGCAP. OMB working to establish prior expenses.**
Security	80	260	267	170	-17	**Scrub requirements; post July 1. State Department requirements unknown, but may be lower, reducing/eliminating shortfall**
Comms/It	100	122	88	-12	0	**transfer unused budget to Security**
Personnel	126	110	93	-33	0	**transfer unneeded budget to Security**
Iraq Media Network	96	96	0	-96	0	**transfer unneeded budget to Security**
PMO	0	117	0	0	0	**PMO reimburses advances from supplemental funding**
Other	56	43	27	-29	0	**transfer unneeded budget to Security**
Grand Totals	858	1279	955	68	-29	
shortfall	0	421	97			

Footnotes:

[1] Base case assumes staff reduction post 1 July transition, but no cost re-allocation for FY. Significantly, after I July, a full ICASS re-allocation could shift 2/3 to 3/4 of CPA's operating expenses to participating organizations. Allocating LOGCAP/Communications expenses only would reduce the operating expenses an estimated one-third.

[2] Carry forward from FY 2003 IFF into FY 2004 totals $106M, and is reflected in the figures above.

CPA FY 2004 Operating Fund Budget Summary ($M)

Project	Proposed Allocation								Net of Carryover							13-Mar-04
title	Budget	Carryover	1Q Actual	2 QTR	3 QTR	4 QTR	TOTAL	Net of c/o	Mar	Apr	May	June	July	Aug	Sep	TOTAL
PERSONNEL																
Payroll[1]	60.0	6.7	15.0	13.3	17.8	2.8	48.9	42.2	5.6	6.6	6.6	4.7	0.9	0.9	0.9	48.9
Contracted Support	66.0	8.5	21.7	17.0	16.0	4.9	59.7	51.2	5.7	5.7	5.7	4.7	1.6	1.6	1.6	59.7
Subtotal - Personnel	126.0	15.2	36.7	30.3	33.9	7.7	108.6	93.4	11.3	12.2	12.2	9.4	2.6	2.6	2.6	108.6
SECURITY																
Personnel	0.0	73.5	32.6	45.2	77.4	70.3	225.6	152.1	21.4	25.9	25.9	25.6	23.4	23.4	23.4	225.6
Physical	80.0	0.0	0.0	38.5	38.1	38.1	114.7	114.7	12.7	12.7	12.7	12.7	12.7	12.7	12.7	114.7
Subtotal - Personnel	80.0	73.5	32.6	83.7	115.5	108.4	340.3	266.8	34.1	38.6	38.6	38.3	36.1	36.1	36.1	340.3
LOGISTICS																
CPA LOGCAP - Task Order 44	400.0	0.0	63.0	115.0	139.0	130.0	447.0	447.0	45.0	40.0	49.0	50.0	48.0	42.0	40.0	447.0
FDC LOGCAP - Task Order 63	0.0	0.0	0.0	5.0	14.0	14.0	33.0	33.0	3.0	4.0	5.0	5.0	6.0	5.0	3.0	33.0
Subtotal - Logistics	400.0	0.0	63.0	120.0	153.0	144.0	480.0	480.0	48.0	44.0	54.0	55.0	54.0	47.0	43.0	480.0
COMMUNICATIONS/IT																
Communications/IT	100.0	8.5	31.2	35.5	14.8	14.5	96.0	87.5	5.7	5.0	4.9	4.8	4.8	4.8	4.8	96.0
IRAQ MEDIA NETWORK																
Iraq Media Network[2]	96.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	48.0
PMO	0.0	0.0	12.0	7.0	-19.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	4.0	4.5	5.2	5.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	33.9
OTHER ACTIVITIES																
TDY	14.0	0.0	0.0	4.5	3.0	3.0	10.5	10.5	1.5	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	10.5
NIA LOGCAP	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0								0.0
CPA Reachback Office Support	3.0	0.0	0.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.5	0.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.5
Contract Administrative Assistant																
Services (Consultants & Studies)	6.0	0.0	6.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	6.0	6.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	6.0
Baghdad Facilities and Furnishings	8.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Supplies and Equipment	20.0	4.0	2.9	4.0	4.0	4.0	15.0	11.0		4.0			4.0			15.0
Airlift/Air Transportation	5.0	4.8	0.0	0.5	2.0	1.0	3.5	-1.3		1.0		1.0	1.0			3.5
Subtotal - Other	56.0	8.8	9.5	9.0	9.0	8.0	35.5	26.7	1.5	6.0	1.0	2.0	6.0	1.0	1.0	35.5
Grand Totals	**858.0**	**106.0**	**184.9**	**285.6**	**307.2**	**282.6**	**1060.4**	**954.4**	**104.6**	**110.4**	**116.0**	**114.7**	**103.5**	**91.5**	**87.5**	**1142.3**

Footnotes:

[1] Personnel (3161 special hires) reduction in 4th quarter is from high of 350 to 50 after 1 July. Average monthly cost for 50 additional hires would be $938K.

[2] Iraqi Media Network costs of $48M to date are zeroed out to remove their effects.

CPA FY 2004 Security Cost Breakdown ($M)

3/13/04

TITLE	AMOUNT	PREFORMANCE	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	Through 6/30	Fourth Quarter	TOTAL COST
Integrated Security System - funded with carryover	43.341	20 NOV 03 -19 NOV 04	3.612	3.612	3.612	3.612	3.612	3.612	3.612	**25.282**	**10.835**	**36.118**
CMATT Security - funded with carryover	14.994	1 OCT 03 - 30 SEP 04	1.250	1.250	1.250	1.250	1.250	1.250	1.250	**11.250**	**3.750**	**15.000**
Governance Team Security - PSD costs	70.311	through 30 June	11.719	11.719	11.719	11.719	11.719	11.719	11.719	**70.794**	**35.156**	**105.950**
Governance Team Security - non-PSD costs	76.216	through 30 June	12.703	12.703	12.703	12.703	12.703	12.703	12.703	**76.216**	**38.108**	**114.324**
GLOBAL Security - funded with carryover	8.056	1 OCT 03 - 31 MAR 04	1.343							**8.058**	**0.000**	**8.058**
GLOBAL Security Follow-On	36.700	1 APR 03 - 30 SEP 04		6.117	6.117	6.117	6.117	6.117	6.117	**18.350**	**18.350**	**36.700**
MOD/OSA Security Detail - carryover through 3/31	1.800	1 OCT 03 - 31 MAR 04	0.300	0.300	0.300	0.300	0.300	0.300	0.300	**2.700**	**0.900**	**3.600**
M of I Senior Advisor Security Team - carryover through 3/31	0.908	1 OCT 03 - 31 MAR 04	0.151	0.151	0.151	0.151	0.151	0.151	0.151	**1.359**	**0.453**	**1.812**
Force Protection Guards (Villa Security)	0.495	1JAN 04 - 30 APR 04	0.124	0.123	0.124	0.124	0.124	0.124	0.124	**0.743**	**0.372**	**1.115**
Iraq Forum Security	0.110	1 JAN 04 - 30 JUN 04	0.018	0.018	0.018	0.020	0.018	0.018	0.018	**0.110**	**0.054**	**0.164**
Amb. Bremer - PSD and Aerial	6.900	per month - 30 June	1.725	1.725	1.725	1.725				**10.350**	**0.000**	**10.350**
Amb. Bremers Villa Security Detail	3.800	1 JAN 04 -30 SEP 04	0.422	0.422	0.422	0.422	0.000	0.000	0.000	**2.532**	**0.000**	**2.532**
PMO Personal Security Detachment (P/O PMO Checkbook)	3.546	1 FEB 04 - 31 JUL 04	0.591	0.591	0.591	0.591	0.591	0.591	0.591	**2.955**	**1.773**	**4.728**
			-0.591	-0.591	-0.591	-0.591	-0.591	-0.591	-0.591	**-2.955**	**-1.773**	**-4.728**
PSD Strat Comm	0.900	1 JAN 04 - 30 JUN 04	0.150	0.150	0.150	0.150	0.150	0.150	0.150	**0.900**	**0.450**	**1.350**
Body Armor	0.400	04 FEB 04								**0.400**	**0.000**	**0.400**
CPA South Security	1.700	1 JAN 04 - 30 MAY 04	0.340	0.340	0.340					**1.700**	**0.000**	**1.700**
Governance Team Security - NOC	0.750	15 JAN 04 -31 MAR 04	0.220							**0.750**	**0.000**	**0.750**
PMO PSD Suppt (Basra / Mosul / Baghdad)	6.246	1 FEB 04 - 31 JUL 04	1.041	1.041	1.041	1.041	1.041	1.041	1.041	**5.205**	**3.123**	**8.328**
			-1.041	-1.041	-1.041	-1.041	-1.041	-1.041	-1.041	**-5.205**	**-3.123**	**-8.328**
Northern Region Security	0.273	1 OCT 03 - 15 FEB 04								**0.273**	**0.000**	**0.273**
			34.076	**38.629**	**38.630**	**38.292**	**36.143**	**36.143**	**36.143**	**231.767**	**108.428**	**340.195**
		Personnel	**21.373**	**25.926**	**25.927**	**25.589**	**23.440**	**23.440**	**23.440**	**225.471**		
		Physical	**12.703**	**12.703**	**12.703**	**12.703**	**12.703**	**12.703**	**12.703**	**114.724**		

CPA FY 2004 Security Cost Breakdown

Governance Team - Regional Team Security Cost Estimates

3/13/2004

($000)

Site	Current Contract Pricing				Totals	
	PSD		non-PSD			
	six months	annual	six months	annual	six months	annual
Arbil	4,436.8	8,873.7	4,996.2	9,992.3	9,433.0	18,866.0
Babil		0.0	3,044.7	6,089.4	3,044.7	6,089.4
Baqubah	4,988.9	9,977.8	4,988.0	9,976.0	9,976.9	19,953.8
Basrah	4,828.0	9,656.0	4,989.8	9,979.5	9,817.8	19,635.5
Basrah		0.0	4,989.8	9,979.5	4,989.8	9,979.5
Diwaiyeh	2,896.5	5,792.9	4,076.0	8,152.1	6,972.5	13,945.0
Hillah	4,208.1	8,416.1			4,208.1	8,416.1
Karbala	4,015.7	8,031.4	3,986.5	7,973.0	8,002.2	16,004.4
Kirkuk	4,524.9	9,049.7	4,783.4	9,566.9	9,308.3	18,616.6
Mayson	4,878.6	9,757.2	4,623.3	9,246.6	9,501.9	19,003.8
Mosul	4,524.9	9,049.7	4,919.6	9,839.2	9,444.5	18,888.9
Najaf	4,063.2	8,126.3	3,169.2	6,338.3	7,232.3	14,464.6
Nasariyah	4,878.6	9,757.2	4,661.9	9,323.8	9,540.5	19,080.9
Ramdi	4,524.9	9,049.7	4,965.8	9,931.6	9,490.7	18,981.3
Samawah	3,149.6	6,299.2	4,047.6	8,095.3	7,197.2	14,394.4
Sulaymaniyah	4,524.9	9,049.7	4,369.3	8,738.7	8,894.2	17,788.4
Tikrit	4,988.9	9,977.8	4,999.0	9,997.9	9,987.8	19,975.7
Wasit	4,878.6	9,757.2	4,596.4	9,192.8	9,475.0	18,950.0
Totals	**70,310.7**	**140,621.5**	**76,206.5**	**152,413.0**	**146,517.2**	**293,034.5**

CPA FY 2004 Personnel Cost Breakdown ($M)

3/13/04

	Plan	1Q Actual	2 QTR	3 QTR	4 QTR	TOTAL	Apr	May	June	July	Aug	Sep	TOTAL
Personnel													
Payroll	60.0	15.0	13.3	17.8	2.8	48.9	6.6	6.6	4.7	0.9	0.9	0.9	48.9
3161 Hires (detail below)													
Contracted Services	32.0	21.7	17.0	16.0	4.9	59.7	5.7	5.7	4.7	1.6	1.6	1.6	59.7
Linguists/Translators -- FOLLOW-ON				0.0	1.8				0.000	0.597	0.597	0.597	1.8
MPRI Translators		0.1	0.7	0.7	0.0		0.228	0.228	0.228				1.4
MZM Translators		0.3	0.9	0.9	0.0		0.304	0.304	0.304				1.8
SAIC-IRDC SMEs		10.2	9.3	9.3	0.0		3.105	3.105	3.105				18.6
Protocol Expert		0.6	0.1	0.1	0.1		0.035	0.035	0.035	0.035	0.035	0.035	0.3
S&K Admin experts		10.5	6.0	5.0	3.0		2.000	2.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	14.0
FDC CAC Operators		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0		0.010	0.010	0.010	0.010	0.010	0.010	0.1
Totals	92.0	36.7	30.3	33.9	7.7	108.7	12.2	12.2	9.4	2.6	2.6	2.6	108.6

3161 Hires - Census - average cost = $150K for 8 months = $18.75K per month	Apr	May	June	July	Aug	Sep	Apr-Sept
January -- 200 hires @ 18.75							3.750
February -- 210 hires @ 18.75							3.938
March -- 300 hires @ 18.75							5.625
April/May -- 350 hires @ 18.75	6.563	6.563					13.125
June -- 250 hires @ 18.75			4.688				4.688
July-Sep -- 50 hires @ 18.75				0.938	0.938	0.938	2.813
	6.563	6.563	4.688	0.938	0.938	0.938	33.938

Contracted Services	monthly rates over contract period = contract value/number of months covered							
Linguists/Translators-FOLLOW-ON	1.193 6months @7.159M				0.597	0.597	0.597	1.8
MPRI Translators	.911 for four months; 12/24 to 4/24	0.228	0.228	0.228	--	--	--	1.4
MZM Translators	1.214 for four months; 11/22 to 3/22	0.304	0.304	0.304				1.8
SAIC-IRDC SMEs	Freeze at 150 SMEs, at $20.7K each; through 30 June	3.105	3.105	3.105	--	--	--	18.6
Protocol Expert	.211 for six months	0.035	0.035	0.035	0.035	0.035	0.035	0.3
S&K Admin experts	extended from 4/15 through 6/30 (RRB 04-0050)	2.000	2.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	14.0
FDC CAC Operators	8 months @83K	0.010	0.010	0.010	0.010	0.010	0.010	0.1
	subtotals	5.682	5.682	4.682	1.642	1.642	1.642	38.0

CPA FY 2004 Communications / IT Cost Breakdown ($M)

3/13/04

project	Plan	1Q Actual	2 QTR	3 QTR	4 QTR	TOTAL	Mar	Apr	May	June	July	Aug	Sep	TOTAL
COMMUNICATIONS / IT	100.0													
Communications/IT														
CEFMS	0.3	0.3	--	--	--	0.3	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	0.3
CPA IT Package (1,000 computer buy)	1.7	0.9	1.2	0.5	0.0	2.6	0.5	0.3	0.2	--	--	--	--	2.6
CPA Information Systems Network (**)	68.5	21.9	26.8	9.7	9.9	68.3	3.2	3.2	3.2	3.3	3.3	3.3	3.3	68.5
CMATT C2 Requirements	2.9	2.9	--	--	--	2.9	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	2.9
IRIS/IMU Phase II	4.6	1.1	--	--	--	1.1	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	1.1
IT Support/CPA Rosslyn Support Office	0.2	0.2	--	--	--	0.2	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	0.2
Comm Support Office (CSO) Requirements	2.3	0.0	1.5	--	--	1.5	0.5	--	--	--	--	--	--	1.5
International Media Center	0.9	0.0	0.9	--	--	0.9	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	0.9
IT Package (400 computers/115 peripherals)	*(see above; same RRB #)*					0.0	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	0.0
IRIS-TIDES (CH2M)	0.1	0.0	0.1			0.1	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	0.1
Miscellaneous - various	0.0					0.0	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	0.0
CSO Bandwidth & Comm Svcs (detail below)	18.3	3.9	4.8	4.6	4.6	17.9	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	17.9
Totals	**100.0**	**31.2**	**35.4**	**14.8**	**14.5**	**95.8**	**5.7**	**5.0**	**4.9**	**4.8**	**4.8**	**4.8**	**4.8**	**96.0**

CSO Bandwidth & Comm Svcs	Mar	Apr	May	June	July	Aug	Sep	TOTAL
MCI Cellphone - 307/mo	0.307	0.307	0.307	0.307	0.307	0.307	0.307	2.8
Cellhire init/follow-on-INMARSAT - 45/mo	0.045	0.045	0.045	0.045	0.045	0.045	0.045	0.4
RESIDUE: Cellhire (Thuraya)/SATCOM	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	0.1
NETCOM-INMARSAT - 650/mo	0.650	0.650	0.650	0.650	0.650	0.650	0.650	5.9
NETCOM-DSN, SIPR, NIPR, VTC - 12.5/mo	0.013	0.013	0.013	0.013	0.013	0.013	0.013	0.1
JPSD - Iridium - 14/mo	0.014	0.014	0.014	0.014	0.014	0.014	0.014	0.1
JPSD - INMARSAT - 360/mo	0.360	0.360	0.360	0.360	0.360	0.360	0.360	3.2
JPSD - AT&T, Verizon - 110/mo	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	0.1
DISA - circuits & bandwidth - 136/mo	0.136	0.136	0.136	0.136	0.136	0.136	0.136	1.2
Totals	1.525	1.525	1.525	1.525	1.525	1.525	1.525	13.977

Jones, Richard (AMB)

From: (b)(6)
Sent: Saturday, March 13, 2004 7:06 AM
To: Jones, Richard (AMB)(b)(6)
(b)(6)
(b)(6)
Subject: FW: FW: Engaging with the Washington transition effort

FYI

(b)(6)
Chief of Staff
Director of Administration and Logistics
Coalition Provisional Authority
Baghdad

DSN:(b)(6)
Commercial:(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----
From:(b)(6)
Sent: Friday, March 12, 2004 10:31 PM
To:(b)(6)
Cc:(b)(6))
Subject: RE: FW: Engaging with the Washington transition effort

Amb. Holzman - FYI and perhaps you'd care to chime in on your thinking. (b)(6)

> -----Original Message-----
> **From:**(b)(6)
> **Sent:** Friday, March 12, 2004 1:37 PM
> **To:**(b)(6)
> **Cc:**
> **Subject:** RE: FW: Engaging with the Washington transition effort
>
> (b)(6 I listed the management people who I know were working on transition issues anyway; added DIA Ops CO (b)(6)), and AID rep (per their choice - probably admin type), agency rep, and then included (b)(6), and assumed a PD and POL type from the people already there. That was a first draft. Then we assume there will be a gradual assignment of PCSers (very gradual). Also I believe that (b)(6) the RSO may be a part of this along with the 2 DS types who are doing FSN vetting. This was a best guess with a short deadline before I departed. In the meantime, (b)(6 will be attempting to determine whether some pol, econ, PD folks can be assigned soon and deployed between now and May 15.
>
> >From: (b)(6) (FE-MC)"
> >To:(b)(6)
> >CC:(b)(6)
> >Subject: FW: Engaging with the Washington transition effort
> >Date: Fri, 12 Mar 2004 16:07:27 +0300
> >
> (b)(6) 15 people?
> >
> >(b)(6)
> >Chief of Staff

>Director of Administration and Logistics
>Coalition Provisional Authority
>Baghdad
>
>DSN: (b)(6)
>Commercial: (b)(6)
>
>
>
>-----Original Message-----
>From: Rathmell, Andrew (SES1)
>Sent: Friday, March 12, 2004 3:52 PM
>To: Jones, Richard (AMB)
>Cc: (b)(6) (FE-MC)
>Subject: RE: Engaging with the Washington transition effort
>
>(b)(6) at DoD suggests the Baghdad based team may be around 15
>personnel - (b)(6)
>
>Andrew Rathmell
>Office of Policy Planning & Analysis
>Coalition Provisional Authority - Baghdad
>Room M239
>DSN: (b)(6)
>civ: (
>cell: (
>
>
>-----Original Message-----
>From: Jones, Richard (AMB)
>Sent: Friday, March 12, 2004 12:55 PM
>To: Rathmell, Andrew (SES1)
>Subject: RE: Engaging with the Washington transition effort
>
>Thanks for the heads up. Did you get any impression of the size of the
>ITP team? DJ
>
>-----Original Message-----
>From: Rathmell, Andrew (SES1)
>Sent: Friday, March 12, 2004 12:24 PM
>To: Jones, Richard (AMB)
>Cc: (b)(6) (OTHER); Oster, Jeffrey W. (O-9); (b)(6)
>(FE-MC)
>Subject: RE: Engaging with the Washington transition effort
>
>Amb Jones,
>
>Perhaps best to handle this offline but my understanding is that Amb
>Bremer will receive a message from SecState and Defense in a day or so
>mandating the establishment of the Iraq Transition Planning Team (ITPT),
>including ITPT Baghdad. ITPT Baghdad will be headed by John Holzman and
>will have the task of drawing up a detailed, timelined transition plan
>by 1 April. ITPT will report to DoS and keep Amb Bremer "informed".
>ITPT will rapidly take over CPA functions (starting with admin and
>management, ending with policy and spokesman) allowing CPA to

>concentrate on key priorities (eg the political process) and on winding
>up in an orderly manner CPA personnel.
>
>The ITPT will accompany (b)(6) and (b)(6) here late next week.
>
>My sources are pretty reliable - CPA-W and DoS.
>
>(b)(6)
>Office of Policy Planning & Analysis
>Coalition Provisional Authority - Baghdad
>Room M239
>DSN: (b)(6)
>civ: (+(b)(6)
>cell: (+
>
>
>-----Original Message-----
>From: Jones, Richard (AMB)
>Sent: Friday, March 12, 2004 9:33 AM
>To: Rathmell, Andrew (SES1)
>Cc: (b)(6) (OTHER); Oster, Jeffrey W. (O-9); (b)(6)
>(FE-MC); (b)(6) (O-6)
>Subject: RE: Engaging with the Washington transition effort
>
>OK. Do you have any idea how big this forward team is? Have any
>decisions been made on where they will live and work? DJ
>
>-----Original Message-----
>From: Rathmell, Andrew (SES1)
>Sent: Friday, March 12, 2004 12:16 AM
>To: Jones, Richard (AMB)
>Cc: (b)(6) (OTHER); Oster, Jeffrey W. (O-9); (b)(6)
>(FE-MC); (b)(6) (O-6)
>Subject: RE: Engaging with the Washington transition effort
>
>To ensure you are updated on this; having spoken to (b)(6) at CPA-W
>tonight.
>
>The new DoD-DoS transition team will be operational from Monday; their
>mission is to produce a report by 1 April and then to plan and organize
>the detailed transition to an Embassy and Mission.
>
>(b)(6) will be here at the start of the week. (b)(6) and
(b)(6) will accompany the forward part of the team here towards the
>end of next week. This forward team will stay here through July. They
>want to work with our specialists (comms, personnel, etc) to ensure a
>joined up and integrated planning process.
>
>This timeline means that it may be better to wait for their inbrief here
>end of next week rather than putting another paper and a person to
>Washington at the start of the week.
>
(b)(6)
>Office of Policy Planning & Analysis
>Coalition Provisional Authority - Baghdad

>Room M239
>DSN: (b)(6)
>civ: (
>cell: (
>
>
>-----Original Message-----
>From: Jones, Richard (AMB)
>Sent: Thursday, March 11, 2004 9:55 AM
>To: Rathmell, Andrew (SES1)
>Cc: (b)(6) (OTHER); Oster, Jeffrey W. (O-9) (b)(6)
>(FE-MC)
>Subject: RE: Engaging with the Washington transition effort
>
>Andrew: I support your recommendations 1 - 3. With respect to
>recommendation 4, I understand that Washington is already planning to
>request that we second three people from here for their effort. (b)(6)
(b)(6) may have more details. DJ
>
>-----Original Message-----
>From: Rathmell, Andrew (SES1)
>Sent: Thursday, March 11, 2004 7:41 AM
>To: Oster, Jeffrey W. (O-9); Jones, Richard (AMB)
>Cc: (b)(6) (OTHER)
>Subject: Engaging with the Washington transition effort
>
>Jeff passed me details of the new State-DoD transition planning team
>being stood up in DC by 15 March; I have also had informal views on this
>from colleagues in Washington. I am sure you have already worked on
>this but my concern is to ensure that we shape and influence the debates
>of this team proactively since I am not sure that CPA-W is always in a
>good position to promote our views.
>
>Aside from engagement at the senior level by you, (b)(6) and Amb
>Bremer, we may want to think imaginatively how we shape Washington
>thinking at the working level (recognising the limited staff resources
>we have here). See what you think of this proposal:
>
>1. We use LPB's last memo as the basis for a more in-depth paper that
>fleshes out elements such as the relationship with the Iraqi govt and
>the possible transition staffing requirements to prepare a formal input
>to the process.
>
>2. We send someone who knows this subject in depth to ensure the team
>has our views over in the early days of the team (perhaps around 20-25
>March). I may have to do this and think it would be a valuable use of
>my time.
>
>3. We seek to embed in the team for its duration someone who knows CPA-B
>well. One choice may be LTC (b)(6) who helped establish OPPA from
>the ORHA days and served as its deputy director until December. He is
>currently on Army assignment in the Pentagon but could be freed up to
>join the transition team through June. He knows the set-up here well,
>the Washington process and knows well the problems with pre-ORHA
>planning so will ensure that these are not repeated.

>
>4. We may consider in addition detaching a CPA-B staff member with an
\>overview of the issues for 1-2 months (the crucial period it seems to me
\>is March 15-mid-May) to the team in Washington. Possible candidates
\>would be (b)(6) or COL (b)(6) (from OPPA - he has led some
\>of our work on field transition and is also engaged in the analysis of
\>advisory personnel requirements).
>
\>Andrew Rathmell
\>Office of Policy Planning & Analysis
\>Coalition Provisional Authority - Baghdad
\>Room M239
\>DSN: (b)(6)
\>civ:
\>cell:
>
>


Transition Task Force
Co-Chairs: Jones & Redd
Exec. Dir.
C1: Personnel
CPA/IRMA
CJTF-7
STATE
COALITION
PMO
C3: Operations
CPA/IRMA
CJTF-7
STATE
COALITION
PMO
C5: Policy
CPA/IRMA
CJTF-7
STATE
COALITION
PMO
C8: Budget
CPA/IRMA
CJTF-7
STATE
COALITION
PMO
C2: Security
CPA/IRMA
CJTF-7
STATE
COALITION
PMO
C4: Logistics / Facilities
CPA/IRMA
CJTF-7
STATE
COALITION
PMO
C6: Comms
CPA/IRMA
CJTF-7
STATE
COALITION
PMO
C9: Civil Affairs / Regions
CPA/IRMA
CJTF-7
STATE
COALITION
PMO



Embassy Baghdad
Facilities Path Forward

March 2004

DOS Baghdad Facilities Path Forward



- Facilities Strategy
- Population to be served
- Funding Strategy
- Execution Plan

Planning Strategy

- Provide interim facilities within presently available funding of $59.9 million
- Provide limited unclassified facilities for the DoS Transition Team May by 15th and stand up new mission on July 1, 2004
- No new housing will be provided as part of the interim facilities, except "extremely modest" living space for the DoS Senior Transition Officer in the interim chancery
- Acquire land for permanent combined embassy/housing compound
- Construct permanent facilities within 24 months after Congressional approval

Assumptions

- Work required to provide facilities at neighboring posts to support Post Baghdad and to provide facilities for posts elsewhere in Iraq will require additional funding
- Buildings for interim embassy and site for permanent embassy compound will be acquired at no cost through bilateral negotiations
- The only furniture that will be acquired as part of the interim facilities will be for the interim chancery compound (C/1-35) and the interim CMR. No furniture will be provided for the Annex compound.
- Because of the limited funding for the interim facilities they will not meet new compound standards
- No permits or approvals required for planned improvements to the interim facilities
- Work is not included in any ongoing contracts
- Work cannot be added to any ongoing contracts
- All operating costs associated with the interim facilities, beginning on May 15, 2004, for the Chancery compound and July 1, 2004, for the remaining facilities shall be borne by the Bureau
- Existing support facilities, e.g., warehouses and dining facilities, shall remain available for the duration while the interim facilities are in use
- VE studies will be waived for interim facilities

Funding Priorities for Interim Facilities



"Secure, safe, functional facilities"



Available Funding

$ 59,896,000 from Iraq Supplemental

Interim Facilities



- Chancery Compound [Villa (1,115 GSM) occupied by C/1-35 Armor and adjoining USAID residential compound]
- Annex Compound [Palace (34, 918 GSM) occupied by CPA]
- Chief of Mission Residence (Current Bremer residence)

Chancery Compound - Facilities



- Chancery Building
  - Phase I - Provide unclassified offices for the DoS Senior Transition Officer, Deputy Transition Officer and an OMS, an unclassified meeting room for between 60 and 80, and "extremely modest" living quarters for the Senior Transition Officer by May 15, 2004
  - Phase II - Provide unclassified office facilities for other COM functions, up to 40 desks, by July 1, 2004
- GSO/Motor Pool
- USAID Warehouses (shared with DoS)
- Dinning and recreation facility (part of USAID housing compound)
- Utility Plant (shared by USAID and DoS)

C/1-35 Site That DOS has Reserved


INTERIM EMBASSY SITE
AREA: 47,576 SM (11.75 AC)
ANTI-RAM PERIMETER: 675 M
INTERIM EMBASSY - BAGHDAD
SITE SELECTION - 28 JANUARY 2004
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
OVERSEAS BUILDINGS OPERATIONS

C/1-35 Villa



Adjoining USAID Residential Compound



Chancery Compound - Phase I Improvements



- Anti-ram perimeter walls enclosing compound
- Anti-ballistic barrier along shorefront road
- Main and service CACs with anti-ram "delta" barriers
- Great seal and flag pole
- Remote fill pipe for water supply
- Remote sewage connection, piping and pump
- Remote fill pipe for fuel
- Bollards
- Protection of generators
- FE grills on required windows
- Mylar film on all windows

Chancery Compound - Phase I Improvements (cont..)

- Security lighting
- Connection to USAID generators for power/limited electrical distribution
- Connection to USAID computer network
- Office furniture (local purchase or existing stock)
- Fire extinguishers, battery-powered smoke detectors, alarms and emergency lighting
- Walk-through metal detectors, x-ray machines, CCTV system and explosive detection system
- “Extremely modest” living space in the interim chancery for the DoS Senior Transition Officer

Chancery Compound - Phase I Perimeter



Chancery Compound - Phase II - Improvements



- Consular CAC
- Anti-climb fence along shoreline
- Hardline with teller windows
- Interior partitions, doors & specialties
- Elevator testing/refurbishment
- Electrical/mechanical improvements
- Fire alarms, smoke detectors, emergency lights
- Technical security system
- Additional security lighting
- Additional furnishings
- Carpeting
- Water storage tanks
- Interior guard posts
- PAC
- Fire escapes
- Fire-rated doors
- FEBR exterior doors
- Telephone PBX
- Wire Management
- Plumbing system upgrades

Chancery Compound - Cost Estimate



Phase 1	
Exterior/Interior Improvements	$ 3.3 Million
Phase II	
Exterior Improvements	$ 2.2 Million
Interior Improvements	$ 4.6 Million
SubTotal	$ 6.8 Million
Total	**$10.1 Million**

Chancery Compound Acquisition Strategy

- Design-Build
- US Contractor and/or local contractor(s)
- Local subcontractors, labor and materials to the maximum extent possible
- Firm Fixed Price

Chancery Compound Phasing/Schedule

- Start Phase I ASAP with Phase II as quickly thereafter as possible
- Occupancy by DoS Senior Transition Officer and staff on or before May 15, 2004



Annex (Palace) Compound

Annex Compound - Area Reserved by DOS (180 Acres)



INTERIM EMBASSY ANNEX - BAGHDAD

SITE SELECTION - 20 JANUARY 2004

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

OVERSEAS BUILDINGS OPERATIONS

Annex Compound - Exterior Improvements



- Perimeter walls
- CACs
- Anti-Ram Vehicle barrier - palace access
- Security Lighting
- Generator building (60 min)
- Water supply
- Generators (1.4 MW w/switchgear)
- Signage

Annex Compound - Interior Renovations



- FEBR doors/fire doors
- FE Grilles (198 windows x 6 m2)
- Interior Guard Posts
- PACs (50 m2 @ $4,500/m2)
- Hardline retrofit
- Mechanical, electrical, communications upgrades for North Wing

Annex Compound - Cost Estimates



Exterior Improvements	$24.2 Million
Interior Renovations	$24.2 Million
Total	$48.4 Million

Annex Compound - Phasing



- Start exterior work ASAP
- Start interior work when available (July 1st?)

Annex Compound - Acquisition Strategy



- Exterior
  - Design-Build
  - US Contractor and/or local contractor(s)
  - Local subcontractors, labor, and materials to the maximum extent possible
  - Firm Fixed Price
- CAA
  - Design-Build
  - US Contractor
  - Cleared US Labor
  - Firm Fixed Price

Chief of Mission Residence



CMR - Improvements and Renovations



- Modular CAC
- Anti-ram vehicle barriers
- FEBR doors
- FE grilles on required windows

Cost Estimate for CMR



$1,400,000

CMR - Acquisition Strategy



- Design - Build
- US contractor and/or local contractor(s)
- Local subcontractors, labor, and materials to the maximum extent possible
- Firm Fixed Price



Interim Facilities - Cost Summary

Chancery Compound	
Phase I	$ 3.3 Million
Phase II	$ 6.8 Million
SubTotal	$ 10.1 Million
Annex (Palace) Compound	$ 48.4 Million
Chief of Mission Residence	$ 1.4 Million
Total	$59.9 Million*

* To the extent DoS housing requirements are identified, the budget will have to be reallocated to accommodate these needs.

Bilateral Negotiations to Secure Property Interests

- **Interim** - Secure acknowledgement of the right to use C/1-35, Palace and CMR until permanent facilities are completed and staff relocated.
- Permanent - Acquire fee simple title to an appropriately-sized tract of land on which to construct the permanent diplomatic compound. As a claims settlement, exchange USG-owned diplomatic properties in Baghdad for the new diplomatic compound.
- Iraq Government holding the USG harmless in case of property claims.

Timing of Bilateral Negotiations



- Should be concluded prior to July 1, 2004, and should be binding on the successor Iraqi governments.
- OBO prepared to assist with negotiations.

Permanent Facilities - Possible Sites



- Lakefront Site (103 acres)
- Diwan Site (82.5 acres)

Permanent Facilities - Possible Sites



Diwan Site
334,070 SM
82.5 ACRES

Lakefront Site
417,086 SM
103 ACRES

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
OVERSEAS BUILDINGS OPERATIONS

NEW EMBASSY COMPOUND - BAGHDAD
SITE SELECTION - [illegible] JANUARY 2004

Lakefront Site
(103 Acres)


LAKEFRONT SITE
417,046 SM
103 ACRES
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
OVERSEAS BUILDINGS OPERATIONS
NEW EMBASSY COMPOUND - BAGHDAD
SITE SELECTION - 28 JANUARY 2004
OBO

Lakefront Site
(103 Acres)



Diwan Site
(82.5 Acres)



Diwan Site



Permanent Facilities

- Office space to accommodate 3,000 desk positions (1,000 US/2,000 FSN) in:
  - Classified Space (20,214 m^2)
  - Unclassified Space (43,358 m^2)
  - Support Space, i.e., GSO shops, motorpool, etc. (5,375 m^2)
- Warehouse (3,400 m^2)
- MSGQ (3,300 m^2)
- Housing for 1,088 US Personnel
  - CMR (1,400 m^2)
  - DCMR (700 m^2)
  - Apartments (1086 units/197,305 m^2)

Permanent Facilities Continued



- School, postal facility, service station, fire station, commissary, exchange, recreational and athletic facilities
- Utility infrastructure

Program Studies for Two Sites

- 45 Acre Solutions
- Phased Solutions
    - Phase 1—Full Program
        - 1000 US / 2000 FSN Desks
        - Housing for 1000 US + Family
    - Phase 2—50% Reduction
        - 500 US/1000 FSN Desks Remain
        - Housing for 500 US + Family
    - Phase 3—Second 50% Reduction
        - 250 US / 500 FSN Desks Remain
        - Housing for 250 US + Family

45 Acre Plan - Lakefront Site





45 Acre Plan - Diwan Site



45 Acre Notes



- Office Buildings at 14 stories
- Apartments at 11 stories
- Elementary Schools and Preschool combined into single building
- Limited recreational facilities
- FSN / Visitor Parking in 3 level deck
- Office / Official Vehicles in 3 level deck
- Apartment Parking in 2 level deck under buildings

45 Acre Mass Model - Lakefront Site



Phased Solution - Lakefront Site Plan



Phased Solution - Diwan Site Plan



Phased Solution Notes



5 Story Office and Apartment Buildings

Assumes All Surface Parking

Apartment Parking Under Buildings

Phased Mass Model - Lakefront Site



45 Acre Mass Model—Lakefront Site



Phased Mass Model—Lakefront Site

Summary



Program will fit on either site on 45 acres using high-rise construction and parking structures

Phased solution will work on either reserved site



The Execution Plan

1. Employ Multiple General Contractors
   - Infrastructure (utilities, perimeter, etc.) Package
   - Diplomatic Buildings Package
   - Housing Package
   - Miscellaneous Buildings Package
2. Maximum use of SEDS
3. Fast track with double shifts

OBO Facilities Construction Supervision

(on site)



Senior Project Director

Project Director

Housing Package

Project Director

Infrastructure Package

Project Director

Misc. Buildings Package

Project Director

NEC Diplomatic Buildings Package

Project Director

Interim Facilities Package

Permanent Facilities - Schedule and Cost



- Schedule: Construction within 24 months after Congressional approval of funding
- Estimated Cost: $1.12 billion to construct NEC

3/12/04
Bfg. for CPA ptners

CPA Transition

- CPA dissolves on 30 June
- Coalition partners establish national embassies

Iraqi Ministries

Work to address

- Readiness for transition on 1 July
- Relative importance of Ministries
- Risk areas to address now
- Support needs after 1 July
- Priorities for effort

Ministry status assessment (1)

Senior Advisor judgments under five headings:

- Strategy
- Structure
- Skills
- Systems
- Support needs

Ministry status assessment (2)

Each heading assessed against two categories:

- CPA Groundwork
- Iraqi Engagement and Progress

Types of support Ministries may need/want

- Senior Policy Advice
- Technical/Operational Support specific to Ministry role
- Support for generic capacity building across Ministries

Planning support after 1 July

- Discuss with Iraqis and revise
- Identify potential funding and personnel sources
- Consider co-ordination mechanisms between provider nations
- Invite expressions of intent to support particular areas



TRANSITION TASK FORCE

Chaired by: (b)(6)
(b)(6)

Seams

ADMIN

- BUDGET
- RSO (security)
- IPC (Comms)
- FACILITIES
- GSO (log)
- HR (Pers)

Econ

Political

IRMA

StratCom

Strategic Mission Issues

Each Group has members (as appropriate) from:

- **State (new Embassy)**
- **CPA (new IRMA?)**
- **CJTF-7 (new MNFI/MNCI)**
- **PMO (new PMO)**
- **Coalition**

Regional Presence

-Embassy/Consulate
-IRMA (?)
-PMO
-USAID
-Mil Civil Affairs
-Coalition

- Functions
- Security

Critical Support Issues



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

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
DoS
DoD
Chief of Mission
MNFI
US Mission
MNCI
OSC
CPATT
CMATT

Φ Transition

Transforming CPA to U.S. Mission Iraq
Baghdad, March 9 2004

Although CPA will disappear on June 30 with the transfer of full governmental authority to an interim Iraqi government, for that government to be viable following the occupation, many of CPA's functions will need to continue to be performed for months if not years after June 30. While some of these functions can and will be taken on by Embassy Baghdad, others require personnel skills and funding far beyond the capabilities of a normal embassy. These include a whole range of capacity building activities in support of Iraqi ministries and security forces as well as many of the activities now being carried out by CPA's Office of Strategic Communications, its CFO and IG.

Transitional functions fall into at least five general categories: (1) advisory and operational support, (2) program planning, (3) project and contract management, (4) strategic communications and (5) oversight and control. In order to utilize available funding support, personnel carrying out these functions will need to be given a new home. We should do this in a way that preserves a clear line of authority for the Chief of Mission, minimizes disruption of their work and the need for additional contracting, interagency agreements or new legislation. We also believe it essential to preserve the unique cooperative culture that has evolved within CPA, both among coalition partners and between CPA's civilian and military sides.

For these reasons, we believe that transitional functions should be performed by temporary organizations that will augment the Embassy's traditional capabilities. For civilian programs we are proposing the establishment of two new temporary government organizations, the Iraq Reconstruction and Management Agency (IRMA) under Department of State (DOS), which will be the successor to CPA and report to the Chief of Mission, and a reconstituted Program Management Office (PMO), which would be a DOD (U.S. Army) entity. We are also proposing the creation of an Office of Security Cooperation for military/security programs.

IRMA/PMO: IRMA will establish overall policy for the reconstruction effort, including the strategic application of the IRRF. While the broad outlines of the effort have been established, there is a requirement to manage the strategy, planning and programming associated with the ongoing reprioritization of selected reconstruction programs in response to the situation on the ground. We envision this process to be directed by a Requirements Review Board (RRB) bringing together key members of IRMA and the Embassy staff. A small RRB staff would reside in IRMA. The RRB would be chaired by the Embassy DCM and would set the overall programmatic direction of the reconstruction effort. A small management staff including a CFO, Comptroller, and IG function would be required for oversight and control.(Organization chart A attached)

Critical contract management and execution functions for IRMA would be undertaken by a newly established PMO. We would establish PMO independently as a temporary organization within DoD/ Department of the Army, allowing it to sustain itself through the 10% contract management fee authorized under the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense and for the Reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan, 2004... The Executive Director of IRMA will provide overall project direction to PMO, as decided by the RRB.

In addition, although diminished somewhat after the transfer of governance authority to the new Iraqi government, strategic communications will continue to be required beyond the normal public affairs capability of an embassy. We envision a small but capable STRATCOM staff, which would be resident in IRMA, interfacing as appropriate with the Chief of Mission's staff, the Embassy's Public Affairs Section, and U.S. Military PAO's. This latter lash-up will be particularly important if we are to maintain successfully the close working relationships that currently exist between CPA and CJTF-7 in this area. This issue is to be dealt with more fully in a subsequent message.

Finally, IRMA also will provide a vehicle for continuing Senior and Technical advisory support for Iraqi government ministries. The required level of this support will depend upon the ability of the ministries to function on their own and the criticality of those ministries to US objectives. A high level of Senior and Technical advisory support, including in some cases involvement in day to day operational functions, will be necessary for those ministries that are critical to US objectives (e.g., the "Power Ministries," as well as essential services ministries such as Electricity). The Senior Advisors and Technical Advisors, which will likely number between 150 and 250 people, as well as their supporting staffs, will be operationally housed within another component of IRMA, which will be known as ABIRD (see below).

IRMA will be funded by the operational funds allocated to CPA or its successor organization, including CPA's remaining operational budget and 1% of the IRRF. IRMA will also be able to rely upon DOD and other agency support without reimbursement responsibility. IRMA will be a founding member of the Embassy's International Cooperative Administrative Support Services (ICASS) Council, which it would likely join as a service provider.

Administratively, the temporary status of both IRMA and PMO would allow for the use of Title 5, U.S. Code, Sec. 3161 hiring and detailing authority. We anticipate IRMA would phase out over a period of 1-2 years as the operational and critical advisory requirements subside and are transferred to normal Embassy bilateral relationships. PMO would remain until the completion of IRRF projects. Both could be established by a National Security Presidential Determination (NSPD), if judged necessary.

ABIRD: US Advisors will be administratively housed in and hired through IRMA. Conceptually, they will be grouped together along with other countries' advisors in the Advisory Board for Iraqi Reconstruction and Development (ABIRD). In our judgment, a structure like ABIRD is essential for the continuing work of American and other countries' advisors in Iraqi ministries to be politically acceptable to Iraqis. We propose that it be billed as an advisory board for the head of the interim Iraqi government that takes office on June 30 (the Prime Minister). The Prime Minister, or his representative, would be the Board's titular head. A senior American, who would report to the

Ambassador (COM) and be a member of the Embassy Country Team, would serve as its Executive Director. The Executive Director could be supported by one or more deputies from major contributors to the Multi-national Force or to the Madrid donor process. Regardless of nationality, the most senior representative of the advisory team for each ministry would report to the Executive Director and serve as a member of the ABIRD, which would probably only meet as a group a few times a year.

A structure of this type would:

-- allow us to exercise COM policy guidance to the advisors without having them tied too closely in the popular mind with the American Embassy;

-- give each ministerial advisory team a direct line to the Prime Minister's office, which would help prevent its recommendations from being ignored by an uncooperative minister and help establish the PM's control over his ministers;

-- provide us greater flexibility to bring in American advisors from other agencies and the private sector without going through a formal NSDD 38 process. Most would be seconded to IRMA on non-reimbursable details from USG agencies or hired under Title 5, U.S. Code, section 3161.

-- allow us to maintain the multilateral character of the policy advice being given to the Iraqi ministries.

Office of Security Cooperation: After June 30, one of America's main objectives will be to continue building Iraqi security forces. We will need to focus on three key areas: (1) the Iraqi Police Service, (2) the Iraqi Armed Forces, and (3) effective civilian control and management of both, all under the policy guidance of the Chief of Mission.

Success will demand cooperation among a number of indispensable actors: sovereign Iraqi government structures (Cabinet Committee for National Security, MOI, MOD, and, as relevant, MFA and MOJ); the U.S. Embassy; the Commander, Iraq Multi-national Force (IMNF), and other Coalition missions. A clear understanding of the respective roles and authorities among these three will be vital. Iraq MOI should take responsibility for developing, managing, supporting and employing the IPS, while Iraq MOD takes the responsibility to develop, manage, and support the IAF, which will be assigned to IMNF for employment.

Meanwhile, under the guidance of the Chief of Mission, the Embassy will take responsibility for U.S. security policies in Iraq and for our bilateral security assistance. It will also provide policy and strategic direction, resource management, and oversee political aspects of military and police capacity-building assistance from the U.S. The Commander, IMNF will oversee the execution of the man, train, and equip portion of both the military and police capacity-building assistance program.

An Office of Security Cooperation (OSC) should manage implementation and coordination of the man, train, and equip programs. All three of the main US actors would connect into and through this single entity. OSC would be responsible to Commander, IMNF for fulfilling his specified execution responsibilities for the military and police development function, under the policy direction of the COM. It will also receive policy guidance through Senior Advisors to the MOI and MOD, who would be supported by robust advisory teams. OSC would have a police division (Civilian Police Advisory Training Team, CPATT) and a military one (Coalition Military Assistance Training Team, CMATT). CPATT will be staffed as far as possible by civilian police experts. In order to facilitate policy direction from the Chief of. Mission, the deputy director of CPATT would also serve as a deputy senior advisor MOI. A deputy director of CMATT would be a deputy senior advisor MOD.

POC: TSgt Westberg

CPA/U.S. Mission Staffing

2004-2005



POC: TSgt Westberg

CPA/U.S. Mission Staffing
2004-2005



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CPA/U.S. Mission Staffing

2004-2005



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CPA/U.S. Mission Staffing

2004-2005



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CPA/U.S. Mission Staffing

2004-2005



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CPA/U.S. Mission Staffing

2004-2005





Iraqi PM

DoS

DoD

ABIRD

Chief of Mission

MNFI

U. S. Mission Iraq

MNCI

Iraqi Ministries



Iraqi PM

DoS

Chief of Mission

Deputy Chief of Mission

ABIRD*

Iraqi Ministries

IRMA
Iraq Reconstruction Management Agency

PMO

Econ

Political

Consular

Admin

Office of Provincial Outreach

Strat. Comm & Pub. Dipl.

AID & other Govt. Agencies

OSC

*Advisory Board for Iraq Reconstruction & Development

18 March 2004 VERSION 3

DRAFT WORKING PAPER



DoS

Chief of Mission

Deputy Chief of Mission

U. S. Mission

Other mission elements

IRMA

Iraq Reconstruction Management Agency

ABIRD Advisory Staff

Program Planning Staff

Financial Mgt

Program & Contract Management (PMO)

(U.S. Army Organization)



DoS

DoD

Chief of Mission

MNFI

MNCI

US Mission

OSC

CPATT

CMATT

040315-35

COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

FROM: (b)(6)	**DATE: 16-Mar-04**

FOR: THE ADMINISTRATOR

ORIGINATOR: Infrastructure& Operations

RE: Ambassador Jones comment

Amb. Jones read the attached memo and noted the following:

> ***I agree with the overall concept, but I have some comments:***
>
> ***-- No consulates will be opened in the immediate post CPA period (MFA opposes, State Dept. too)***
>
> ***-- Costs of offices would be shared according to established Admin (ICASS) rules. State will have fewer people than PMO/AID and others. So its share will be small. Our goal should be to continue using current facilities wherever we can.***

Sir, 3/17

A note from Amb Bremer.

180.

"Northern posts"

ATTACHMENT: March 13 Memo from Andy Bearpark,
"Post CPA Field Presence"

(Drafted by (b)(6))

Dick
Northern posts?

040315-35

COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY

BAGHDAD

ACTION MEMO

March 13, 2004

FOR: THE ADMINISTRATOR

FROM: (b)(6)

SUBJECT: Post CPA Field Presence

Planning for post CPA activities continues. An important element is the post CPA field presence and structure. All concerned are keen to move ahead quickly with this, but we are hampered by uncertainty over the overall CPA post-transition structure, particularly the precise roles of the PMO and IRMA (if it is created). There is also an issue of cost – field offices are very expensive. Security alone is estimated in excess of US$300 million per year. Your current guidance is that you want to see all the RT and GT site offices (18) to remain open with a continuing international flavor. The following model has been discussed widely within CPA and appears to be practicable. I should be grateful for your views.

Regional presence:

Regional offices will be located in Kirkuk, Hillah and Basrah. These regional offices will contain the following elements:

- U.S. Consulates, and UK Consulates in Basrah and possibly Kirkuk
- PMO and/or IRMA
- USAID
- Other bilateral development agencies

We assume that the financing would come from State, with other non-U.S. tenants reimbursing a share.

Governorate presence:

It is suggested that the PMO become prime "owner" of the Governorate offices located in Dahuk, Arbil, Sulaimaniya, Baqubah (Diyala), Al Kut (Wassit), Al Amarah (Maysan), An Nasiriyah (Dhi Qar) and As Samawah (Muthanna). They are self-sustainable with contract security. GT locations in Tikrit (Salah ad Din), Mosul (Ninawa), Ramadi (Al Anbar), Karbala, An Najaf and Diwaniyah (Al Qadisiyah) are within Coalition military compounds. An agreement would have to be reached with CJTF-7 and its successor organization for the utilization of these locations or the sites be relocated "outside the wire" at significant cost.

The Governorate offices will be utilized to provide administrative, site security and life support for PMO prime and subcontractors. PMO would administer the current GT locations. Others who could be allowed access on a reimbursable basis, room permitting could include:

- State Department staff
- USAID and their contractors
- other bilateral development agency contractors

They will be allowed access, room permitting.

RECOMMENDATION: That you approve the above mentioned concept.

Approve: ________ Disapprove: ________ Approve with modification: ________

Must be coordinated
fully w State per
LPB.

COORDINATION: COO
PMO
OPPA
Comptroller
Director, Civil Affairs

ATTACHMENT: PMO Project Maps and Report



TRANSITION TASK FORCE

Chaired by: (b)(6)
(b)(6)

Seams

ADMIN

- BUDGET
- RSO (security)
- IPC (Comms)
- FACILITIES
- GSO (log)
- HR (Pers)

Econ

Political

IRMA

StratCom

Strategic Mission Issues

Each Group has members (as appropriate) from:

- **State (new Embassy)**
- **CPA (new IRMA?)**
- **CJTF-7 (new MNFI/MNCI)**
- **PMO (new PMO)**
- **Coalition**

Regional Presence

-Embassy/Consulate
-IRMA (?)
-PMO
-USAID
-Mil Civil Affairs
-Coalition

- Functions
- Security

Critical Support Issues

Proposed CPA Field Presence



Size Is Based On Number Projects And Total Cost

Proposed CPA Field Presence



Size Is Based On Projects Cost

Strategic Communications (StratComm) Transition Issues

CURRENT MANNING SCHEME

There are currently about 100 StratComm members within Iraq

- 82 staff in Baghdad
- 18 staff in field

Type of Employees

- 33 DoD (3161 Hires)
- 17 DoS
- 27 US Military
- 10 Coalition/UK
- 1 USAID
- 12 Contractors (Translators and IMN/Harris)

Current Functions of StratComm

- **Press Office** – 12 Press Officers work with Spokesman to coordinate media campaigns
- **Planning & Projects** – Design and implement Information Operation (IO) Campaigns
- **Military Information Support Team (MIST)/PSYOPS** – Graphic design and distribution of materials (i.e. handbills, posters, leaflets) in support of IO campaigns
- **Arabic Media Unit (AMU)** – core unit that will form the public affairs section of future US Mission (including such things as International Visitors Exchanges, Fulbright Scholarships and other related Public Diplomacy activities); Arabic Media Monitoring, Analysis and Outreach
- **Regional Media Operations** –Produces video packages for outreach to domestic US regional radio and TV outlets (includes Broadcast Operations Detachment (BOD))
- **Iraqi Media Network (IMN)** – TV, radio and newspaper communications operation that disseminates programs and information throughout Iraq
- **International Press Filing Center** – Operates 24/7 press filing center for Iraqi and International media; responsible for management of Press Briefing Center and related operations
- **Advance and Event Management** –Provides event planning and support for Administrator and key CPA Principals

All units coordinate with their counterparts in CJTF-7

FUTURE MANNING SCHEME (Post June 30th)

While the AMU will constitute the core element of the public affairs section for the US Mission, it is critical that we maintain a cohesive Strategic Communications capability that resides inside the Mission, given the huge military presence and over 150 news outlets that consider Iraq a "beat."

Key Recommendations

- Aim is to keep StratComm in Baghdad at current staffing levels and increase regional presence; Recommend that our PAO presence in the governorates is increased (Keep in mind that the UK component of StratComm will disappear after June 30th)
- In approaching the manning considerations for the communications section for the US Mission in Baghdad, we must recognize that this situation defies traditional Embassy staffing patterns
- **There will be a critical need to continue 3161 hires post June 30th.** (Use IRMA as a contracting vehicle?)
- Retain the joint military-civilian coordination function. Given the large military presence in country, it is vital that the military-civilian collaboration remain tightly latched together


Iraqi PM
DoS
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U. S. Mission Iraq
MNCI
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

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Iraq Reconstruction Management Agency

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Office of Provincial Outreach

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OSC

Iraqi Ministries

*Advisory Board for Iraq Reconstruction & Development

19 March 2004 VERSION 3

DRAFT WORKING PAPER



DoS

Chief of Mission

Deputy Chief of Mission

U. S. Mission

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Iraq Reconstruction Management Agency

- ABIRD Advisory Staff
- Program Planning Staff
- Financial Mgt

Program & Contract Management (PMO)
(U.S. Army Organization)


DoS
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

TRANSITION TASK FORCE

Chaired by: (b)(6)
(b)(6

Each Group has members (as appropriate) from:
- **State (new Embassy)**
- **CPA (new IRMA?)**
- **CJTF-7 (new MNFI/MNCI)**
- **PMO (new PMO)**
- **Coalition**

Regional Presence

-Embassy/Consulate
-IRMA (?)
-PMO
-USAID
-Mil Civil Affairs
-Coalition

- Functions
- Security

Critical Support Issues

[redacted]

Transforming CPA to U.S. Mission Iraq
Baghdad, March 9 2004

Although CPA will disappear on June 30 with the transfer of full governmental authority to an interim Iraqi government, for that government to be viable following the occupation, many of CPA's functions will need to continue to be performed for months if not years after June 30. While some of these functions can and will be taken on by Embassy Baghdad, others require personnel skills and funding far beyond the capabilities of a normal embassy. These include a whole range of capacity building activities in support of Iraqi ministries and security forces as well as many of the activities now being carried out by CPA's Office of Strategic Communications, its CFO and IG.

Transitional functions fall into at least five general categories: (1) advisory and operational support, (2) program planning, (3) project and contract management, (4) strategic communications and (5) oversight and control. In order to utilize available funding support, personnel carrying out these functions will need to be given a new home. We should do this in a way that preserves a clear line of authority for the Chief of Mission, minimizes disruption of their work and the need for additional contracting, interagency agreements or new legislation. We also believe it essential to preserve the unique cooperative culture that has evolved within CPA, both among coalition partners and between CPA's civilian and military sides.

For these reasons, we believe that transitional functions should be performed by temporary organizations that will augment the Embassy's traditional capabilities. For civilian programs we are proposing the establishment of two new temporary government organizations, the Iraq Reconstruction and Management Agency (IRMA) under Department of State (DOS), which will be the successor to CPA and report to the Chief of Mission, and a reconstituted Program Management Office (PMO), which would be a DOD (U.S. Army) entity. We are also proposing the creation of an Office of Security Cooperation for military/security programs.(see Slide one for overview)

IRMA/PMO: IRMA will establish overall policy for the reconstruction effort, including the strategic application of the IRRF. While the broad outlines of the effort have been established, there is a requirement to manage the strategy, planning and programming associated with the ongoing reprioritization of selected reconstruction programs in response to the situation on the ground. We envision this process to be directed by a Requirements Review Board (RRB) bringing together key members of IRMA and the Embassy staff. A small RRB staff would reside in IRMA. The RRB would be chaired by the Embassy DCM and would set the overall programmatic direction of the reconstruction effort. A small management staff including a CFO, Comptroller, and IG function would be required for oversight and control.(Slide two)

Critical contract management and execution functions for IRMA would be undertaken by a newly established ...PMO. We would establish PMO independently as a temporary organization within within DoD/ Department of the Army, allowing it to sustain itself through the 10% contract management fee authorized under the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense and for the Reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan, 2004... The Executive Director of IRMA will provide overall project direction to PMO, as decided by the RRB.

In addition, although diminished somewhat after the transfer of governance authority to the new Iraqi government, strategic communications will continue to be required beyond the normal public affairs capability of an embassy. We envision a small but capable STRATCOM staff, which would be resident in IRMA, interfacing as appropriate with the Chief of Mission's staff, the Embassy's Public Affairs Section, and U.S. Military PAO's. This latter lash-up will be particularly important if we are to maintain successfully the close working relationships that currently exist between CPA and CJTF-7 in this area. This issue is to be dealt with more fully in a subsequent message.

Finally, IRMA also will provide a vehicle for continuing Senior and Technical advisory support for Iraqi government ministries. The required level of this support will depend upon the ability of the ministries to function on their own and the criticality of those ministries to US objectives. A high level of Senior and Technical advisory support, including in some cases involvement in day to day operational functions, will be necessary for those ministries that are critical to US objectives (e.g., the "Power Ministries," as well as essential services ministries such as Electricity). The Senior Advisors and Technical Advisors, which will likely number between 150 and 250 people, as well as their supporting staffs, will be operationally housed within another component of IRMA, which will be known as ABIRD (see below).

IRMA will be funded by the operational funds allocated to CPA or its successor organization, including CPA's remaining operational budget and 1% of the IRRF. IRMA will also be able to rely upon DOD and other agency support without reimbursement responsibility. IRMA will be a founding member of the Embassy's International Cooperative Administrative Support Services (ICASS) Council, which it would likely join as a service provider.

Administratively, the temporary status of both IRMA and PMO would allow for the use of Title 5, U.S. Code, Sec. 3161 hiring and detailing authority. We anticipate IRMA would phase out over a period of 1-2 years as the operational and critical advisory requirements subside and are transferred to normal Embassy bilateral relationships. PMO would remain until the completion of IRRF projects. Both could be established by a National Security Presidential Determination (NSPD), if judged necessary.

<u>ABIRD</u>: US Advisors will be administratively housed in and hired through IRMA. Conceptually, they will be grouped together along with other countries' advisors in the Advisory Board for Iraqi Reconstruction and Development (ABIRD). In our judgment, a structure like ABIRD is essential for the continuing work of American and other countries' advisors in Iraqi ministries to be politically acceptable to Iraqis. We propose that it be billed as an advisory board for the head of the interim Iraqi government that takes office on June 30 (the Prime Minister). The Prime Minister, or his representative, would be the Board's titular head. A senior American, who would report to the

Ambassador (COM) and be a member of the Embassy Country Team, would serve as its Executive Director. The Executive Director could be supported by one or more deputies from major contributors to the Multi-national Force or to the Madrid donor process. Regardless of nationality, the most senior representative of the advisory team for each ministry would report to the Executive Director and serve as a member of the ABIRD, which would probably only meet as a group a few times a year.

A structure of this type would:

-- allow us to exercise COM policy guidance to the advisors without having them tied too closely in the popular mind with the American Embassy;

-- give each ministerial advisory team a direct line to the Prime Minister's office, which would help prevent its recommendations from being ignored by an uncooperative minister and help establish the PM's control over his ministers;

-- provide us greater flexibility to bring in American advisors from other agencies and the private sector without going through a formal NSDD 38 process. Most would be seconded to IRMA on non-reimbursable details from USG agencies or hired under Title 5, U.S. Code, section 3161.

-- allow us to maintain the multilateral character of the policy advice being given to the Iraqi ministries.

Office of Security Cooperation: After June 30, one of America's main objectives will be to continue building Iraqi security forces. We will need to focus on three key areas: (1) the Iraqi Police Service, (2) the Iraqi Armed Forces, and (3) effective civilian control and management of both, all under the policy guidance of the Chief of Mission.

Success will demand cooperation among a number of indispensable actors: sovereign Iraqi government structures (Cabinet Committee for National Security, MOI, MOD, and, as relevant, MFA and MOJ); the U.S. Embassy; the Commander, Iraq Multi-national Force (IMNF), and other Coalition missions. A clear understanding of the respective roles and authorities among these three will be vital. Iraq MOI should take responsibility for developing, managing, supporting and employing the IPS, while Iraq MOD takes the responsibility to develop, manage, and support the IAF, which will be assigned to IMNF for employment. (see slide three)

Meanwhile, under the guidance of the Chief of Mission, the Embassy will take responsibility for U.S. security policies in Iraq and for our bilateral security assistance. It will also provide policy and strategic direction, resource management, and oversee political aspects of military and police capacity-building assistance from the U.S. The Commander, IMNF will oversee the execution of the man, train, and equip portion of both the military and police capacity-building assistance program.

An Office of Security Cooperation (OSC) should manage implementation and coordination of the man, train, and equip programs. All three of the main US actors would connect into and through this single entity. OSC would be responsible to Commander, IMNF for fulfilling his specified execution responsibilities for the military and police development function, under the policy direction of the COM. It will also receive policy guidance through Senior Advisors to the MOI and MOD, who would be supported by robust advisory teams. OSC would have a police division (Civilian Police Advisory Training Team, CPATT) and a military one (Coalition Military Assistance Training Team, CMATT). CPATT will be staffed as far as possible by civilian police experts. In order to facilitate policy direction from the Chief of. Mission, the deputy director of CPATT would also serve as a deputy senior advisor MOI. A deputy director of CMATT would be a deputy senior advisor MOD.

Al-Arabiyah demands inquiry into cameraman death

Text of report by Dubai-based news channel Al-Arabiya TV on 18 March

Al-Arabiya has issued the following statement:

The team of Al-Arabiya channel in Iraq has been exposed to a heinous crime by the US forces. While the team, which comprises Al-Arabiya correspondent Ali al-Khatib, cameraman Ali Abd-al-Aziz, a driver and an engineer, was heading with the live transmission car for the Burj Al-Hayat Hotel to cover the incident of firing anti-armour shells on the building, the team noticed that US forces had cordoned off the area.

The incidents began when a white Volvo collided with a US armoured vehicle. The team, which was approaching the US forces, was afraid that the car might be booby-trapped. So the driver chose to move away from the US forces, which began to fire indiscriminately. The driver drove his car on a side road. However, the US forces pursued the car and opened fire on it from the machine gun of one of the armoured vehicles and hit it directly from the back. As a result of the incident, the cameraman Ali Abd-al-Aziz received a direct bullet in the head from the back and he died. Meanwhile, correspondent Ali al-Khatib received a direct serious hit in the head also. The driver was not hurt and drove away from the area. The two were evacuated to Ibn-al-Nafis Hospital, where the cameraman Ali Abd-al-Aziz was declared dead. Doctors do not expect that correspondent Ali al-Khatib will survive because of his serious injuries.

While it announces with deep pain the death of its cameraman Ali Abd-al-Aziz and beseeches God to rescue its correspondent Ali al-Khatib - both of whom are considered some of the most competent reporters working in Iraq - Al-Arabiya Television demands that the occupation authority and the transitional Governing Council open an immediate inquiry to establish the details of this incident and determine the responsibility for this ugly crime, which is considered yet another attack in a series of many attacks against journalists in Iraq. It also demands protection for journalists while they are trying to perform their mission to faithfully and sincerely convey to the world what is happening in Iraq at this time.

Source: Al-Arabiya TV, Dubai, in Arabic 2205 gmt 18 Mar 04

BBC Monitoring – March 19, 2004