



COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY
BAGHDAD

ACTION MEMO

June 9, 2004

FOR: THE ADMINISTRATOR **DRAFT**
FROM: Andrew Morison, Governance Coordinator, Baghdad
THRU: Cap Dean, Regional Coordinator, Baghdad
SUBJECT: (b)(1)

The focus group for Sadr City is seeing significant progress in infrastructure development, police reconstitution, and reconvening the District and Neighborhood Councils in the district. In addition, 1st Brigade Combat Team (1st BCT) of the 1st Cavalry Division continues to decimate the ranks of the enemy militia in Sadr City.

(b)(1)

RECOMMENDATION: Release the attached cable to CENTCOM Commander requesting allocation of SOF or civilian intelligence assets to Sadr City.

Approve: _____ Disapprove: _____ Approve with modification: _____

ATTACHMENTS: Cable: (b)(1)

COORDINATION: Chief Operating Officer – Jeff Oster –
1st Cavalry Division (b)(3); 10 USC §130b, (b)(6) ok
Office of Provincial Outreach – Ambassador Ross –
Deputy Regional Coordinator – Cap Dean -

DRAFTED (b)(3); 10 USC §130c, (b)(6) COO

~~SECRET~~

PROG: 06/08/2004

AUTHORIZED: LPBREMER

DRAFTED: (b)(3):10 USC §130b,(b)(6)

CLEARED: AMORRISON, CDEAN, CROSS, OSTERJ

CPA BAGHDAD
CENTCOM

INFO SECDEF WASHDC
SECSTATE WASHDC
WHITE HOUSE NSC WASHDC
CIA WASHDC
IRAQ COLLECTIVE

~~SECRET~~

~~E.O. 12958, DECL. 06/09/2011~~

DRAFT

TAGS:

SUBJECT: CPA: Intelligence Assets for Sadr City

REF: CPA Cable – Turning the Tide in Sadr City

~~Classified by Ambassador Jones for reasons 1.5 (b) and (d)~~

1. (U) This is an action request. Please see paragraph 7.

(b)(1)



4. (S) The population density, history, and demographics of Sadr City make it unique among the problem areas of Iraq. Nearly all of the population are Shia, mostly drawn from across all the areas of southern Iraq to which they still maintain strong tribal ties. They have been mixed together in a milieu of poverty and chronic unemployment. (b)(1)

(b)(1)

(b)(1)

6. (S) We cannot over-emphasize the superb work of the 1CD, 1BCT, and 2-5 CAV – the battalion doing the lion’s share of the work in Sadr City. These soldiers and officers have performed magnificently and prove themselves again everyday. The issue here is not of performance. (b)(1)

(b)(1)

040609-07
TICK

PB HAS SEEN

LPB:

Subject: Detailed Comments on TOR for Partnership Consultations

Overall, this is a good approach, based on the analysis and recommendations we have made. I have the following specific comments:

- In order to guide the partnership's efforts, it is important to get right the formulation of the shared overarching security goal. It should not be simply to defeat the enemies of free Iraq or to protect Iraq and its people. Rather, it should be to create a security environment in which Iraq may continue its progress toward irreversible democracy, unity, and prosperity. The latter is more meaningful and realistic.

● (b)(1)


- I wish it were clearer in the TOR that the MCNS should not become the venue for overseeing the MNFI. We should be clear with the Iraqis on this. As you know, we have favored a partnership policy group (contact group) and a commander's council (for high-level coordination). The team can, I'm sure, thrash this out with the Iraqis, as long as we do not lose sight of the design principles.
- The approach on detainment looks right. However, we should be prepared to broaden the discussion to cover all policy and operational issues that could infringe on the Iraqi Bill of Rights. Policies and decisions that affect individual freedoms and rights should not be seen as coming from a foreign-led MNFI but rather from the partnership itself. In this general area, we must avoid (a) daylight between the partners and (b) the appearance that the IIG has no authority while the MNFI may do as it pleases under "all necessary measures."
- The "redlines" are now fine, with three provisos:
 - we should display unreserved willingness to reach joint decisions on the initiation of sensitive offensive operations;
 - we should not attempt to define them in advance;
 - we should tell Allawi that "regular diplomatic channels" includes a communication line between him and the White House.

● (b)(5)



DCG

Cc Scott Castle, Scott Carpenter, Jim Jeffrey, Dick Jones, Fred Smith