CONFIDENTIAL///DB

From:

Coalition Provisional Authority (DMS)

Sent:

18:14:27 10/22/2003

To:

'SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC'; 'SECDEF WASHINGTON DC'; 'NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL ASHINGTON DC'; AMEMBASSY ANKARA; 'AMEMBASSY KUWAIT'; 'AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS'; 'AMEMBASSY AMMAN';

AMEMBASSY RIYADH'; 'USMISSION US UN NEW YORK NY'

To Precedence:

Immediate

Cc:

'IRAQ COLLECTIVE'

Cc Precedence:

Immediate

Subject:

OIL EXPORTS THROUGH TURKEY Other-Organizational

Message Type:

15:14:00 10/22/2003 (UTC)

Extended Auth:

18:14:00 10/22/2003 (Client/Local)

Security:

This message has been digitally signed and encrypted

-CONFIDENTIAL///DB

MSGID/GENADMIN/HQ CPA/0217//

SUBJ/OIL EXPORTS THROUGH TURKEY//

GENTEXT/REMARKS/10/19/03

DRAFTED: (b)(6)
AUTHORIZED: PBREMER
CLEARED: (b)(6)

RMCKEE, (b)(6)

FROM: HEADQUARTERS COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY

SECSTATE WASHDC SECDEF WASHDC

NSC WASHDC

AMEMBASSY ANKARA AMEMBASSY KUWAIT AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS AMEMBASSY AMMAN AMEMBASSY RIYADH

UU

INFO:

IRAQ COLLECTIVE

DENTIAL HQ CPA 0217

E.O.: 12958: DECLAS: 9/09/13

TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PTER, IZ,

SUBJECT: OIL EXPORTS THROUGH TURKEY

REF: ANKARA 6302

CLASSIFIED BY AMB KENNEDY FOR REASONS 1.5 (B AND D)





- 5. (U) CPA BAGHDAD SUGGESTS THAT EMBASSY ANKARA USE THE FOLLOWING TALKING POINTS WITH GOT:
- CPA AND THE IRAQI MINISTRY OF OIL ARE SURPRISED BY GOT CONCERNS THAT OIL EXPORTS WOULD BE SUSPENDED FOR THE NEXT SIX MONTHS. THE IRAQI MINISTRY OF OIL HAS NOT SUSPENDED EXPORTS THROUGH THE IRAQ/TURKEY PIPELINE FOR THE NEXT SIX MONTHS. THE PIPELINE HAS BEEN SHUT DOWN TEMPORARILY DUE TO SECURITY REASONS AND WILL BE RESUMING EXPORTS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.



-WE ASK THAT THE GOT CONDUCT ALL DISCUSSIONS OF OIL TRADE WITH THE MINISTRY OF OIL, RATHER THAN WITH LOCAL IRAQI OFFICIALS WHO CAN NOT NEGOTIATE OVER OIL THEY DO NOT CONTROL.

-THE CPA WILL ENCOURAGE SOMO TO IMPROVE COMMUNICATION WITH BOTAS IN ORDER TO STRENGTHEN THEIR RELATIONSHIP AND TO ADDRESS IMMEDIATE CONCERNS.

-WE ASK GOT'S ASSISTANCE IN PREVENTING ILLICIT SMUGGLING OF CRUDE OIL OR ANY OIL PRODUCTS FROM IRAQ INTO TURKEY.

-REGARDING THE POTENTIAL SALE OF ELECTRICITY TO IRAQ, THE MINISTRY OF OIL NOTES THAT OFFERS FOR \$20 PER TON OF FUEL OIL ARE HARD TO CONSIDER AS SERIOUS WHEN \$140 PER TON CAN CLEARLY BE REACHED ON THE OPEN MARKET.

(b)(1)

-TO ENSURE EFFECTIVE COMMUNICATION WITH IRAQI AUTHORITIES, WE ENCOURAGE YOU TO COMMUNICATE AS APPROPRIATE WITH THE IRAQI MISSION IN ANKARA OR THE IRAQI MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS IN BAGHDAD.

END TEXT.

KEMER BT 0217 //

-CONFIDENTIAL////DB

CONFIDENTIAL////DB

From:

Coalition Provisional Authority (DMS)

Sent:

21:42:23 02/06/2004

To:

'SECDEF WASHINGTON DC'; 'SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC'; 'NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON DC'; 'AMEMBASSY SOFIA'

To Precedence:

Immediate

'DEPARTMENT OF RESOURCES AND ENERGY'

C Precedence:

Immediate

Subject:

CPA HQ 0560: FORMER REGIME OIL SCANDAL AND BULGARIA

Message Type: Other-Organizational

Extended Auth:

18:36:00 02/06/2004 (UTC)

Security:

21:36:00 02/06/2004 (Client/Local) This message has been digitally signed and encrypted

CONFIDENTIAL///DD

MSGID/GENADMIN/CPA HQ/0560//

SUBJ/CPA HQ 0560 FORMER REGIME OIL SCANDAL AND BULGARIA//

GENTEXT/REMARKS/CONFIDENTIAL

PROG: 5 FEBRUARY 2004

DRAFTER: MFA (b)(6) AUTHORIZED: (b)(6)

CLEARED: (b)(6)

RMCKEE, (b)(6) RDAWES, (b)(6)

FROM: HEADQUARTERS COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY

SECDEF WASHDC TO:

SECSTATE WASHDC NSC WASHDC

EMBASSY SOFIA

INFO: DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

CONFIDENTIAL HQ CPA 0560

E.O.: 12958: 02/05/09

TAGS: PREL, PGOV, ETTC, ENER, IZ

SUMJECT: CPA HQ 0560: FORMER REGIME OIL SCANDAL AND BULGARIA

RErS: (A) SOFIA 228; (B) SOFIA 198

CLASSIFIED BY CPA EXECUTIVE SECRETARY (b)(6) FOR REASONS 1.5 (B AND D)



(U) BEGIN EXISTING CPA PRESS GUIDANCE.

OIL FOR FOOD: AL MADA STORY ON OIL BRIBES BY SADDAM TO INDIVIDUALS AND COMPANIES

- Q: HAS ANYONE AT THE CPA EXAMINED THE DOCUMENTS OBTAINED BY AL MADA TO VALIDATE THEIR AUTHENTICITY? DO YOU ANTICIPATE THAT CPA WILL BE REVIEWING THE DOCUMENTS?
- A: THE CPA HAS ASSISTED THE GOVERNING COUNCIL TO SET UP THE COMMISSION ON PUBLIC INTEGRITY, AN IRAQI-RUN GOVERNMENTAL BODY WHICH WILL EFFECTIVELY ENFORCE EXISTING ANTI-CORRUPTION LAWS, PROPOSE ITIONAL LEGISLATION AS NECESSARY AND HEIGHTEN THE IRAQI PEOPLE'S AND FOR HONEST LEADERSHIP.

THE COMMISSION ON PUBLIC INTEGRITY HAS JURISDICTION TO HEAR CASES OF CORRUPTION DATING BACK TO 1968. WE EXPECT THE COMMISSION TO BE UP AND RUNNING SHORTLY AFTER THE GOVERNING COUNCIL NOMINATES CANDIDATES FOR THE POSITION OF COMMISSIONER.

WE BELIEVE THAT ALLEGATIONS OF OIL BRIBES PAID BY SADDAM HUSSEITOIA 09-826 CPA 000004

WOULD BE A SUITABLE ISSUE TO BE INVESTIGATED BY THE COMMISSION.

Q: BUT ISN'T CPA GOING TO TACKLE THIS ISSUE?

THE ALLEGATION BEING MADE IS THAT SADDAM ENGAGED IN BRIBERY OF INDIVIDUALS IN SEVERAL COUNTRIES. THE AUTHORITIES IN THOSE

'NTRIES WILL BE THE ONES TO DECIDE WHETHER THESE ALLEGATIONS MERIT. LIGHTON AND/OR PROSECUTION UNDER THEIR LAWS. THE CPA OIL FOR FOOD CO-ORDINATION CENTRE HAS NO MANDATE TO INVESTIGATE DIVERSIONS OF OIL FROM THE OLD UN OIL FOR FOOD PROGRAM. ITS ROLE IS TO ADMINISTER EXISTING CONTRACTS FOR IMPORTS OF FOOD AND OTHER GOODS, PAID FOR FROM OIL REVENUES ALREADY COLLECTED BEFORE THE CPA WAS ESTABLISHED.

- Q: WERE THE OIL BRIBES ILLEGAL UNDER THE OIL FOR FOOD PROGRAM?
- A: IF ALLEGATIONS ARE TRUE, SADDAM'S BRIBERY DEPRIVED IRAQ OF OIL REVENUE WHICH SHOULD HAVE BEEN USED TO PAY FOR HUMANITARIAN SUPPLIES FOR THE PEOPLE OF IRAQ.

BACKGROUND

ON 28 JANUARY THE IRAQI NEWSPAPER AL MADA PUBLISHED A LIST OF 270 INDIVIDUALS AND ORGANIZATIONS ALLEGED TO HAVE RECEIVED MILLIONS OF BARRELS OF OIL FROM SADDAM HUSSEIN IN RETURN FOR POLITICAL FAVORS. AL MADA COMPILED THE LIST FROM DOCUMENTS IT SAID WERE RETRIEVED FROM THE IRAQ STATE-OWNED OIL MARKETING ORGANIZATION SHORTLY AFTER THE US-LED COALITION ENTERED IRAQ IN 2003. THE LIST INCLUDES PROMINENT POLITICIANS AND COMPANIES ACROSS THE WORLD, INCLUDING IN THE US, UK, RUSSIA, FRANCE AND THE MIDDLE EAST.

END EXISTING CPA GUIDANCE.

BREMER BT

//

CONFIDENTIAL///DB

From: c=US;a=DMS;p=DMS+GOV+SIPR;o=DTH2;ou1=HEFL21;dda:ACP-PLAD=AMEMBASSY

KUWAIT; dda: msxcx500=c:US, o:U.S. GOVERNMENT, ou:DOD, ou:DMS COMPONENTS(S), ou:MFI, cn:DKMFIHEFLS04

Sent: 12:05:00 12/03/2003

Cc:

COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY (SC)

Cc Precedence:

Priority

(U) IRAQ: KUWAIT WANTS TO INCREASE "HUMANITARIAN

Message Type:

Other-Organizational

Extended Auth: 09:07:00 12/03/2003 (UTC)

12:07:00 12/03/2003 (Client/Local)

Security:

Subject:

This message has been digitally signed and encrypted

PTTCZYUW RUEHKUA5454 3370907-CCCC--RHMFISS. ZNY CCCCC ZZH

P 030907Z DEC 03

FM AMEMBASSY KUWAIT

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC

INFO RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN

RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA

RUCADHQ/USCENTCOM FWD

RUCAACC/USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL

RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC

RUEHAM/USDAO AMMAN JO

RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC

RUEOEGA/COMCFLCC KUWAIT DOHA KU

RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC

RHMFISS/HQ COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTH BAGHDAD

BT

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 02 OF 02 KUWAIT 005454

STATE FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ARP, NEA/NGA, EB/ESC, EB/ESC/IEC STATE FOR EB/ESC/IEC/EPC, EB/TPP/BTA/ANA NSC FOR THEROUX

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/02/2013

TAGS: ETRD, EAID, EPET, PREL, PGOV, MOPS, KU, IZ

SUBJECT: (U) IRAQ: KUWAIT WANTS TO INCREASE "HUMANITARIAN FUEL" DELIVEREIS TO IRAQ, NEEDS DETAILS ON QUANTITIES

THERE IS INSUFFICIENT LOCAL STORAGE SPACE THAT COULD BE USED IF PRODUCTION OUTPACES DELIVERIES. ALTANMIA CAN LIFT UP TO 4 MILLION LITERS/DAY OF BENZENE WITH NO ADDITIONAL INVESTMENT. WITH INVESTMENTS IN CONTAINMENT VESSELS, KUWAIT CAN INCREASE BENZENE SUPPLIES TO 9 MILLION LITERS/DAY (KUWAIT LIFTED UP TO 15 MILLION LITERS/DAY DURING THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR).

-- DIESEL: ALTANMIA CAN PROVIDE 1-1.5 MILLION LITERS/DAY WITHIN 7-10 DAYS (WITH SOME MODIFICATIONS NEEDED, SIMILAR TO THOSE FOR KEROSENE DELIVERIES). THEY CAN RAMP UP TO 4 MILLION LITERS/DAY WITHIN 2-3 WEEKS.

ALTANMIA OFFICIALS STRESSED THAT THEY NEED A CLEARER IDEA OF IRAQ'S LONGER TERM FUEL NEEDS. THEY ASKED WHETHER KUWAIT WOULD SIMPLY BE SURGING TO MEET SHORTER-TERM, SEASONAL SUPPLY SHORTFALLS, OR IF THE PROVISION OF HUMANITARIAN FUEL SUPPLIES WOULD BE A LONGER, CONTINUOUS OPERATION. AL-HUMAIDHI UNDERSCORED THAT THE KUWAITIS ARE WILLING AND ABLE TO DO EITHER. IF THE US SAYS THAT ONLY A SURGE IN PRODUCTION IS NEEDED FOR THE WINTER MONTHS, KUWAIT CAN CAN PROVIDE 5-7 MILLION LITERS/DAY OF MIXED FUELS WITHIN DAYS, INCREASING TO 9 MILLION LITERS/DAY OF MIXED FUELS WITHIN WEEKS. IF, ON THE OTHER HAND, THE US PROJECTS THAT THERE WILL BE A LONGER-TERM NEED, ALTANMIA WILL MAKE SEVERAL INVESTMENTS AT THEIR OWN EXPENSE. AL-HUMAIDHI OUTLINED ALTANMIA'S TENTATIVE PLANS TO REVAMP THE ABANDONED KAZIMA LOADING DEPOT, LOCATED NEAR THE IRAQI BORDER. THE DEPOT WOULD BE LINKED BY PIPELINE TO LARGE-CAPACITY STORAGE BARGES OFFSHORE, WHICH WOULD SOLVE THE CONTAINMENT DILEMMA THAT KUWAIT WOULD FACE AT HIGHER PRODUCTION LEVELS. AL-HUMAIDHI

SAID THAT THE PRIME MINISTER HAS INDICATED THAT FAST-TRACKING APPROVAL OF THE KAZIMA RENOVATION PROJECT WITHIN 48 HOURS COULD POSSIBLY BE UNDERTAKEN ON AN EMERGENCY BASIS, WITH FURTHER DISCUSSION. THE RENOVATION CAN BE COMPLETED WITHIN 45-60 DAYS USING LOCAL CONTRACTORS, OR LESS WITH US MILITARY SUPPORT. AL-HUMAIDHI REITERATED THAT ALTANMIA WOULD MAKE THESE INVESTMENTS AT NO/NO COST TO THE US, AND WITH NO NEED FOR A US COMMITMENT ON QUANTITIES OF FUEL TO BE DELIVERED TO IRAQ. HOWEVER, ALTANMIA WILL NOT UNDERTAKE SUCH A LARGE FINANCIAL COMMITMENT IF IRAQ ONLY NEEDS INCREASED FUEL SUPPLIES FOR THIS WINTER. AGAIN, AL-HUMAIDHI EMPHASIZED THAT THEY SIMPLY NEED A CLEARER PICTURE OF WHAT QUANTITIES AND TYPES OF FUELS ARE NEEDED, SO THAT THEY MAY MAKE THE NECESSARY LOGISTICAL ARRANGEMENTS. HE NOTED THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF KUWAIT SUPPORTS THE US OPERATION IN IRAQ "110 PERCENT." (b)(1)

(b)(1)

- COMMENT. IT IS CLEAR FROM BOTH MEETINGS THAT ALTANMIA IS UNDER FIRM ORDERS FROM THE HIGHEST LEVELS OF THE GOK TO PROVIDE IRAQ WITH WHATEVER FUEL IT NEEDS. ALTHOUGH HTE VOLUMES AND TIME LINES FOR PROVISION OF THE SEVERAL FUELS SHIFT SLIGHTLY FROM ONE SCENARIO TO ANOTHER, THE INTENT IS CLEAR. THE OVERRIDING GOAL OF THE GOK IS TO ENSURE THAT THERE IS NO HYDROCARBON SHORTAGE IN IRAQ, AND THE GOK BELIEVES KUWAIT IS BEST POSITIONED TO EASE IRAQ'S FUEL CRISIS. HOWEVER, ALTANMIA NEEDS TO KNOW WHAT QUANTITIES OF EACH TYPE OF FUEL ARE NEEDED, AND FOR HOW LONG. ALTANMIA HAS ALREADY DEMONSTRATED ITS DETERMINATION TO MAKE THIS WORK --FOR EXAMPLE, ALTANMIA HAS ABSORBED PENALTIES LEVIED BY THE KUWAIT PETROLEUM CORPORATION WHEN KBR DID NOT ORDER THE QUANTITIES OF FUEL IT HAD INDICATED IT WOULD. BUT IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT CPA PROVIDE THE KUWAITIS WITH A CLEAR OUTLINE OF QUANTITIES AND TYPES OF FUEL THAT IRAQ NEEDS, AND AN ESTIMATE OF HOW LONG IRAQ WILL REQUIRE FUEL EXPORTED FROM KUWAITI, SO THAT THE KUWAITIS CAN INCREASE FUEL DELIVERIES. END COMMENT.
- 7. (U) MR. MCKEE DID NOT CLEAR THIS CABLE.
- 8. (U) BAGHDAD MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. URBANCIC BT #5454

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL////DB

c=US; a=DMS; p=DMS+GOV+SIPR; o=DTH2; ou1=HEFL21; dda: ACP-PLAD=AMEMBASSY From:

KUWAIT; dda: msxcx500=c:US,o:U.S. GOVERNMENT,ou:DOD,ou:DMS COMPONENTS(S),ou:MFI,cn:DKMFIHEFLS04

12:05:00 12/03/2003 Sent:

Cc: COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY(SC) Cc Precedence: Priority

Subject: (U) IRAQ: KUWAIT WANTS TO INCREASE "HUMANITARIAN

Message Type: Other-Organizational

Extended Auth: 09:07:00 12/03/2003 (UTC)

12:07:00 12/03/2003 (Client/Local)

This message has been digitally signed and encrypted Security:

PTTCZYUW RUEHKUA5454 3370907-CCCC--RHMFISS.

ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 030907Z DEC 03 FM AMEMBASSY KUWAIT TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC INFO RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA RUCADHQ/USCENTCOM FWD

RUCAACC/USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL

RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC

RUEHAM/USDAO AMMAN JO RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC

RUEOEGA/COMCFLCC KUWAIT DOHA KU RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC

RHMFISS/HQ COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTH BAGHDAD

BT

BENTIAL SECTION 01 OF 02 KUWAIT 005454

STATE FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ARP, NEA/NGA, EB/ESC, EB/ESC/IEC STATE FOR EB/ESC/IEC/EPC, EB/TPP/BTA/ANA


NSC FOR THEROUX

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/02/2013


TAGS: ETRD, EAID, EPET, PREL, PGOV, MOPS, KU, IZ

SUBJECT: (U) IRAQ: KUWAIT WANTS TO INCREASE "HUMANITARIAN FUEL" DELIVEREIS TO IRAQ, NEEDS DETAILS ON QUANTITIES

CLASSIFIED BY: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES FRANK C. URBANCIC, REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)



Oil



NNNN

Page 1 of 3

OAACZYUW RUEOMFO3272 2951529-CCC ZNY CCCCC ZUI RUEOMCE0342 295153 O O 221514Z OCT 03 FM HQ COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTH TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCI RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA RUEHKU/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN RUEHRH/AMEMBASSY RIYADH RUCNDT/USMISSION US UN NEW YORK INFO IRAQ COLLECTIVE	18 H BAGHDAD IL WASHINGTON DC	(b)(6) Ze	10/23
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SUBJ: OIL EXPORTS THROUGH TURKEY CONFIDENTIAL! ///DB	7		
GENTEXT/REMARKS/10/19/03 DRAFTED: (b)(6) AUTHORIZED: PEREMER CLEARED: (b)(6) RMCKEE, (b)(6)	PKENNEDY	Loidelice	
FROM: HEADQUARTERS COALITION PROTO: SECSTATE WASHDC SECDEF WASHDC NSC WASHDC AMEMBASSY ANKARA AMEMBASSY KUWAIT AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS AMEMBASSY AMMAN AMEMBASSY RIYADH USUN INFO: IRAQ COLLECTIVE	OVISIONAL AUTHORITY	between 1 100 / Turay	2 .
CLASSIFIED BY AMB KENNEDY FOR RE	BASONS 1.5 (B AND D)		
(b)(1)			
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*CPA5U429-03*FOIA 09-826 CPA 000010

Page 2 of 3



- 5. (U) CPA BAGHDAD SUGGESTS THAT EMBASSY ANKARA USE THE FOLLOWING TALKING POINTS WITH GOT:
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
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Page 3 of 3

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BREMER

0217

ВT

SECDEF V2

(U)

1

ACTION INFO

CHAIRS(*) CHAIRS TESTBED(*) CHAIRS DA(*)
SECDEF-C(1) SECDEF-C(*) C31-DASD-DCIO(*)
AUTODINC31-DASD-SIO-1IA(*) USDAT:STS(*)
ASD:PA-SMTP(*) ESC-SMTP(*)
+HQ 497IG AMHS
+JCP EMAIL CUSTOMER//CHAIRS//
+USDP:ESC

TOTAL COPIES REQUIRED

#3272

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL////DD

From:

Coalition Provisional Authority (DMS)

Sent:

21:42:23 02/06/2004

To:

'SECDEF WASHINGTON DC'; 'SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC'; 'NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON DC'; 'AMEMBASSY SOFIA'

To Precedence:

Immediate

'DEPARTMENT OF RESOURCES AND ENERGY'

≥recedence:

Immediate

Subject:

CPA HQ 0560: FORMER REGIME OIL SCANDAL AND BULGARIA

Message Type:

Other-Organizational

Extended Auth:

18:36:00 02/06/2004 (UTC)

21:36:00 02/06/2004 (Client/Local)

Security:

This message has been digitally signed and encrypted

CONFIDENTIAL///DD

MSGID/GENADMIN/CPA HQ/0560//

SUBJ/CPA HQ 0560 FORMER REGIME OIL SCANDAL AND BULGARIA//

GENTEXT/REMARKS/CONFIDENTIAL

PROG: 5 FEBRUARY 2004
DRAFTER: MFA (b)(6)
AUTHORIZED: (b)(6)

CLEARED: (b)(6)

RMCKEE, (b)(6)

SECDEF WASHDC TO:

FROM: HEADQUARTERS COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY

SECSTATE WASHDC

NSC WASHDC

EMBASSY SOFIA

INFO: DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

CONFIDENTIAL HQ CPA 0560

E.O.: 12958: 02/05/09

TAGS: PREL, PGOV, ETTC, ENER, IZ

SUBJECT: CPA HQ 0560: FORMER REGIME OIL SCANDAL AND BULGARIA

REFS: (A) SOFIA 228; (B) SOFIA 198

CLASSIFIED BY CPA EXECUTIVE SECRETARY (b)(6) FOR REASONS 1.5 (B AND D)



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OIL FOR FOOD: AL MADA STORY ON OIL BRIBES BY SADDAM TO INDIVIDUALS AND COMPANIES

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WE BELIEVE THAT ALLEGATIONS OF OIL BRIBES PAID BY SADDAM HUSSELDO OIA 09-826 CPA 000013

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END EXISTING CPA GUIDANCE.

BREMER BT

//

LPB HAS SEE.

(b)(6)

From: Bent, Rodney (SES-4)

Saturday, February 21, 2004 6:23 PM Sent:

Executive Secretary To:

(b)(6) Cc: POLICY; McKee, Robert E. (SES) Vogler, Gary, CIV, OSD-

Subject: FW: OMB oil revenue forecast

Ambassador Bremer wanted the latest estimate of oil revenue. The attached table reflects up-dated export projections.

----Original Message---From: (b)(6)
Sent: Saturday, February 21, 2004 5:47 PM
To: (b)(6)
Cc: (b)(6)
Subject: P.F.: OMB all pressure forecast Bent, Rodney (SES-4); (b)(6)

Subject: RE: OMB oil revenue forecast


(b)(6)

Advisor, CPA-Ministry of Finance (S210) US Commercial; (b)(2)

Ceil: (b)(2)

(b)(2)

Mid.C



(b)(6)

From:

(b)(6)

Sent:

Thursday, February 12, 2004 9:59 AM

To:

Subject: FW: Deputy Ministers

(b)(6) please pass this to (b)(6) I can't find him in the directory.

(b)(6)

Executive Assistant, CPA Administrator Head of CPA Executive Secretariat

----Original Message----

From: McKee, Robert E. (SES)

Sent: Thursday, February 12, 2004 9:56 AM

To: (b)(6)

Kellogg Jr, Joseph (SES-6); Jones, Richard (AMB); (b)(6)

Subject: Deputy Ministers

Al-

The following is probably blindingly obvious to each of you, but perhaps the information can be useful to you, at least anecdotally.

The subject is the issue of the Governing Council appointing six Deputy Oil Ministers in the last day or two. As I said in the morning staff meeting yesterday, I have two or three major problems with this action.

- The people themselves are patently unqualified and are apparently being placed in the Ministry for religious, political or personal reasons, all such influence we are trying to eliminate within the oil industry.
- It is incomprehensible why Deputy Ministers have to be named at all because there is nothing for them to do. Also, there is no rationale to naming people to fill an organization before the organizational structure is
- The same people who nated the industry all through Saddam's years and who brought it back to life after the liberation, as well as many trained professionals, are all systematically being pushed to the sidelines. This is just another step in that process. It appears that people with no religious or geographic identification will have no place in the structure.

Besides these major problems, there are other pieces of information that are relevant.

- People in the ministry have only heard of three of the six. Only one of six worked in the oil industry before.
- One nominee.(b)(6) worked as an economist for SOMO in the late '80s. He left in '91, never reached the level of supervisor and was considered "very poor" by people that knew him.
- Another (b)(6) is a Kurd appointed earlier as an Advisor w/o portfolio to the Oil Ministry by GC Member Talibani. He has done nothing since that time.
- Sahib Qotub is currently the Upstream Advisor in the Ministry and has been appointed as the Senior Deputy Minister. He has been retired since the first Gulf War, when he ran Kuwait Petroleum Company for Saddam during the time Kuwait was occupied. He is considered weak.
- Although you have been consistent in saying that we in CPA cannot get involved in backing one person over another, the situation with Thamir Ghadbhan is unique in my mind. When there was no water, no lights, no police, no services, etc, it was Ghadbhan who stepped forward to achieve CPA's oil goals, unified the Oil Ministry and led them back to where they are now. Yesterday's action irritated and demotivated almost all of the current DGs, particularly on Thamir's behalf. They know that since he is being treated that way, their own efforts over the months have been minimized and that those efforts are not valued as much

2/13/2004

as cronyism and religious leanings. I do not have any basis to defend Ghadbhan's character pre-liberation, but if people like Qotub were as close to Saddam as he apparently was, what basis is the GC using to select or eliminate candidates?

• I would question how much of this GC, and how many of the ministers, will be in a permanent government. Why would we let what could be a temporary body put in place something that guarantees connectivity to them and which is patently not even necessary at the present time?

I appreciate that you don't like to have problems presented without recommendations. I don't pretend to know how to solve this one, but all else being equal, we should veto yesterday's nominations and insist that the Minister of Oil restructure his ministry prior to the right people (based on merit) being placed in the resulting organization.

Rob

Johnson, Susan R. (SES)

From: Johnson, Susan R. (SES)

Sent: To:

(b)(6)

Cc: Executive Secretary

Got them – thanks much! No problem, we will use them for discussion tomorrow at our Hajj/Border mtg. Did I copy you on the meeting? SJ

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6)

Sent: Wednesday, November 19, 2003 2:29 PM

To: Johnson, Susan R. (SES) **Cc:** Executive Secretary

Subject: RE: Borders Working Group - Recap and Next Meeting!

Yes, we brought down to you, I think. If not, I will certainly will. Mention to (b)(6) please. The memos didn't come in until last night. My oversight if you didn't get them.

(b)(6)

Executive Assistant, CPA Administrator Head of CPA Executive Secretariat

----Original Message----

From: Johnson, Susan R. (SES)

Sent: Wednesday, November 19, 2003 2:00 PM

To:(b)(6) Trent Darrell (SES-6); Willis Franklin K. (SES)

Subject: RE: Borders Working Group - Recap and Next Meeting!

(b)(6) I need to have copies of these memos – I can't chair these things if the memo's we (which includes me) don't come to me. I will also ask MOT. Thanks Susan

----Original Message----

From: (b)(6)

Sent: Monday, November 17, 2003 11:49 PM

To: Executive Secretary
Cc: Johnson, Susan R. (SES)

Subject: FW: Borders Working Group - Recap and Next Meeting!

Thanks Susan. Let me know if you need me to task anything out – the security assessment request went out formally. I gave them an extra day, as you will notice from the email.

E/S: Will one of the morning group of you get the list from Susan of the CPA Hajj Support Committee. We need it. Peter, please track the security assessment tasker during the day tomorrow..

(b)(6)

Executive Assistant, CPA Administrator Head of CPA Executive Secretariat

----Original Message----

From: Johnson, Susan R. (SES)

Sent: Monday, November 17, 2003 11:24 PM

To: (b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

McKee, Robert E. (SES); (b)(6)

(b)(6)

Subject: Borders Working Group - Recap and Next Meeting!

All,

To recap what we covered at our November 15 meeting:

- <u>Bilateral Relations Papers</u>. The meeting noted that apart from CJTF7's contribution covering security, there had been no responses to (b)(6) note of 6

 November asking for inputs for papers for each of Iraq's neighbours. MFA had been given sight of the skeleton paper and were keen to work up there own version for each country. It was agreed there would be another meeting of the drafting group on Wednesday 19 November, leading to a meeting with Ministry officials soon after Eid. Action: addressees of previous 6 November memo (attached) to provide contributions by close of play 19 November.
- IGC Delegation to Syria, Turkey and Iran. This had been postponed until Monday and may skip Syria. It was agreed that it would be useful to work up a short paper for each of the countries visited to set out Iraq's key points for each neighbor. Action:

 Susan Johnson to ask each Ministry represented on the delegation to submit one or two key points that the Minister would wish to make in each country visited to (b)(6)
- Revision of Order 16. Many comments had been offered and the order was almost ready for submission to Amb Bremer. It was agreed that there would be one final circulation of the draft. Action: CPA MOI to circulate. It was agreed that we would need a plan to explain the order to the IGC (for agreement) and to foreign governments. This would be helped if a short commentary on the main features of the order (and the key changes from the previous version) were drafted. Action: CPA MOI and General Counsel (b)(6)
- The Hajj. There was more or less acceptance that numbers should/would be limited
 to around Iraq's previous quota (24,000) and certainly no more than 30,000. MFA
 Minister Zubari would speak to the GC President Talabani. It was now worth working
 up road and air travel transport plans on this basis.

i propose that the CPA Hajj Support Committee meet on Thursday, Nov 20 at 1430 hours. Let me know if you cannot make it. With the exception of (b)(6) please consider yourselves all action addressees even if your name is on the colling.

Please forward to any addressees that I have missed because we neglected to get an attendance list circulated and let me know. Thanks much!

Susan Johnson

(b)(6)			
From:	(b)(6)		
Sent:	Saturday, December 13, 20	003 11:41 AM	
To:	(b)(6) Williamson M. (SES); (b)(6	Arsht, Leslye A. (SE	ES); Evers,
	(b)(6) James K; Agresto, John T.	Seche, Stephen A. (SES);(b)(6)	Haveman,
	(b)(6)	Casteel, Steven W. (SES-	O6); (b)(6)
	(b)(6)	McKee, Robert	E. (SES);
	(b)(6) (b)(6) Mounzer R. (SES)		Fatfat,

Subject: INSPECTOR-GENERALS - informal draft paper

Colleagues

I had intended to distribute this morning the attached informal draft - which is, as it says, a 'working draft - for senior advisors only'. I suggest that you do not copy further.

As you know, Ambassador Bremer asked about strategies for an 'anti-corruption program (establishment of an Inspector General)' in his letter to all ministers dated November 27. He has received back a good deal of supportive comment from ministers and from senior advisors at their strategic planning interviews. Bremer thought that it would be a good idea to provide some further guidance to senior advisors. Robert Dawes has already given a couple of talks on the subject. Bremer asked me to circulate a note. He has in fact already seen this draft and has asked us to provide a template which would be forwarded to senior advisors for action in consultation with their ministers. We are now working on that.

Pending the issue of a formal paper, you may find it helpful to see the attached draft note. If there are any queries or comments that you would like to raise at this stage, please contact Robert or me.

(b)(6)
Office of Policy Planning and Analysis
(b)(2)

(b)(6)

From:

(b)(2),(b)(6)

Sent:

Thursday, November 13, 2003 6:10 PM

To: Cc: (b)(6)(b)(6)

Subject:

RE: SUPPLEMENTAL BUDGET PROCUREMENT PLAN

A. Witness Protection

The witness protection program is designed to relocate witnesses in high profile terrorism and related cases. The funding for this program contemplates both relocation costs and security arrangements for cases brought before the central criminal court as well as crimes against humanities cases.

In order for the program to be properly executed advice will need to be obtained from the United States Marshal's Service which is responsible for the program in the United States and has provided technical assistance to other countries in establishing a witness protection program.

The funds needed for this program must be handled in such a manner as to both ensure accountability of funds as well as preserve the identity of the protected witness. Expert advice from the Marshal's Service is needed in determining the manner in which the funds should be handled. CPA will contact the Marshal's Service in order to make these arrangements.

B. Other Technical Means

This refers to the use of electronic recording devices and other technical measures to preserve evidence of criminal activity for use in court. This procurement process needs to be executed in close cooperation with the Ministry of Interior (MOI) and United States law Enforcement and other coalition agencies with the needed expertise. According, MOJ will contact those agencies and the MOI in order to determine the appropriate specifications needed to solicit bids from vendors for the equipment and to ensure that the equipment is used for law enforcement purposes.

----Original Message----

From: (b)(2)
Sent: Tuesday, November 11, 2003 1:46 PM

To: (b)(2),(b)(6)

Subject: FW: SUPPLEMENTAL BUDGET PROCUREMENT PLAN

Maybe one of these addresses will work.

----Original Message----

From: (b)(6)

Sent: Tuesday, November 11, 2003 9:36 PM

To: (b)(2)

Subject: FW: SUPPLEMENTAL BUDGET PROCUREMENT PLAN

Let me try this address as the other one did not go through.

nal Message----

From: (b)(6)

Sent: Tuesday, November 11, 2003 9:22 PM

To: (b)(2)

Subject: SUPPLEMENTAL BUDGET PROCUREMENT PLAN

(b)(6)

Here are the materials we spoke of on the telephone. We need your input on the "Witness Protection Program" and the "Other Technical Investigative Methods" by 13 November so we can roll it into our response for the other items.

Thanks.

(b)(6)

```
----Original Message----
From: Nash David (SES)
Sent: Tuesday, November 11, 2003 2:58 PM
To: Casteel, Steven W. (SES-06); (b)(6)
(b)(6) Wilkinson, Molly A. (SES); (b)(6)
(b)(6)
                                                    McKee, Robert E. (SES); (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Trent Darrell (SES-6); (b)(6)
                                                       Willis Franklin K. (SES); (b)(6)
(b)(6)
(b)(6)
                               Arsht, Leslye A. (SES); Evers, Williamson M. (SES); Bent,
Rodney G. (SES); (b)(6)
(b)(6)
                    Vogler, Gary
Cc: (b)(6)
(b)(6)
(b)(6)
                                                                               Crawford Darrell E.
(SES)
Subject:
```

The recent signing of the United States legislation Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for Defense and Reconstruction of Iraq by President Bush brings a much needed infusion of funds to our efforts in CPA. CPA must now deliver a financial plan to Congress to enable the apportionment of the funds. Here is the timeline for accomplishing that:

- * 14 Nov Produce procurement schedule and list of grants
- * 20 Nov Consolidated list of projects with first cut on who the execution agent will be
- 30 Nov Submit draft plan to Bremer
- * 10 Dec Submit plan to OMB DC for apportionment and Congress for notification
- 1 Feb Contract awards

IIRO needs your help to succeed. We must build a procurement and execution plan for both construction and non-construction dollars. This plan must provide descriptions and locations of projects to be performed, estimated costs, when each project is needed (when must it be completed, thus when must it start to meet that deadline), what must be procured and who should procure it, and when the procurement needs to occur. While we're preparing the plan we are authorized to obligate up to 20% of the total, so IIRO, in coordination with the ministries, must also establish priorities within each ministry and across CPA. Your input to the plan is critical to our success.

We have broken non-construction dollars into two categories: things that have to be procured and things that don't, like salaries, grants, etc. Attachment A is our best guess at the breakout of these dollars. The Baker/Stanley Team, supporting the IIRO, has been working with your representatives to determine the detailed requirements for the

construction dollars. I have tasked Darrell Crawford to help CPA OMB do the same thing for non-construction money. Attachment B is what they need from you to accomplish that.

Rodney Bent and I will be setting up a meeting soon to discuss with you our plans and our progress. Hopefully you will be able to join us as we move forward on this daunting but worthwhile task.

Thank you in advance for your cooperation and assistance. We look forward to working with you on this very worthwhile effort.

ATTACHMENTS:

- A Itemization of supplemental
- B Required information

Dave Nash

Director,

Iraq Infrastructure Reconstruction Office



1/16/04 (b)(6) to email of Programming 1 of 2

documents.
Where is the altachmat

(b)(6)

From:

(b)(6)

Sent:

Wednesday, December 24, 2003 3:45 PM

To:

(b)(6)

Subject: FW: Way Ahead on Supplemental - How to get things for your Ministry

FYI

-Original Message-**Free:** (b)(6) Sent: Wednesday, December 24, 2003 3:33 PM To: (b)(6) Agresto, John T. (SES); (b)(6) Arsht, Lesive A. (SES); Bartlett, Joseph T. (SES); (b)(6) Carpenter, Scott CIV Ministry of Governance; Casteel, Steven W. (SES-06); (b)(6) ; Evers, Williamson M. (SES); (b)(6) Fleischer, Michael P. (SES); (b)(6) (b)(6)McKee, Robert E. (SES); (b)(6) (b)(6)(b)(6)Trent Darrell (SES-6); (b)(6) Wethington, Olin L. (b)(6)(SES); Willis Franklin K. (SES) Cc: Smith Jr., William F. SES); (5)(6) (b)(6)

Way Ahead on Supplemental - How to get things for your Ministry

Greetings: Forgive the shotgun approach. A lot of principals are out of the country for Christmas leave and I need to start working the detailed requirements identification and definitization process required to prepare for the arrival of funds. So I'm sending it to a number of people in each office to ensure all who need to know (and help) get the word.

Several weeks ago, you and your staff(s) pulled together the overall program descriptions for the money about to be provided under the supplemental appropriation. This information was forwarded to PMO or Sheets. Darrell Crawford compiled the data, built a spreadsheet and forwarded the package to OMB. Congress will receive this data, along with a report being built by OMB on 5 January. Assuming all goes well, we will receive notice to proceed within a week. The next step is to turn these plans into goods and services that contribute to meeting our objectives in traq. However, the necessary step towards this end is to turn the broad collection of plans and programs embodied in the PPA sheets into a series of procurement packages.

I've taken the data in Darrell's spreadsheets, along with data provided by POCs within the ministries to break down the projects into a series of requirements. This breakdown, along with the projected costs of each requirement is shown in the attached document "Rollup w lineitem detail". Ideally, the totality of these requirements would equal the total of the construction, non-construction procurement, and non-procurement listed alongside the project code. Additionally, the sum of construction costs, urgent, and non-urgent requirements would also balance with the amounts on the project line. At this point, the requirements breakdown as I understand it does not capture all the requirements of each project. Additionally, I do not have complete visibility on which of these requirements are "urgent" and which are non-urgent. My task is to reconcile all these figures such that they add up to \$18.6B. To do this I need your help, and that of your project officers to capture the totality (requirement, cost, delivery (urgent, non-urgent)) of each project in the supplemental.

In any bureaucratic request for information, one should always be able to answer - "What's in it for me?" In this

1/15/2004

case, the answer is easy. PMO has overall program management responsibility for the supplemental. We are the intermediaries between your plans, the contracting agencies, and delivery of the goods and services required to implement your projects. Additionally, Admiral Nash has to be able to report to Ambassador Bremer, OSD, and the Congress on our plans and progress on how we're spending the taxpayer's money. In order to do this, I need this information.

Moving on to the implementation phase, we need to turn these requirements into a series of packages that can be given to a contracting office who in turn will buy exactly what we tell them and send it on to Iraq. There's a lot of work that needs be done to make sure what you want is what is delivered. The everall process is outlined on the work decreased attacked.

There are several activities that are necessary to move forward:

a. Need to fully define the actual requirement. In many cases we'll need to coordinate contract action. We will need to develop sufficient data to allow contractors and suppliers to bid. If the procurement is highly technical, we'll need to identify a source of technical expertise to ensure that what we procure, is what you wanted.

b. Establish key information required to properly manage the acquisition – For instance when do you need the item delivered. This includes identifying submittal information requirements. One category of submittals would be for the design information or catalog sheets needed from suppliers to allow a review prior to the item being fabricated or shipped.

c. Develop a government estimate of expected delivered cost.

d. All procurements using Supplemental funds are required to use "full and open competition". However, if there are reasons for requiring a particular source, we'll need to know that as well.

e. We'll need to understand required delivery dates, as well as locations. In particular, our procurements need to tie in with overall project milestones.

f. we'll receive a lot of scrutiny/auditing in this program. We'll need to understand the metrics of success, and to have a way of showing that the funds expended were utilized for the purpose originally described.

2. The ideal POC is someone who understands the original request, and will be available as a POC for the time it's expected to take to finish the acquisition process. Understanding we have rapid turnover of staff, we'll ask that you identify alternate POC's.

I and my vast staff (myself) are standing by to work this problem and answer questions.

Merry Christmas!

V/R

COL, USAF

CPA/PMO

(b)(2)

Johnson, Susan R. (SES)

From:

Johnson, Susan R. (SES)

Sent:

Wednesday, October 22, 2003 2:27 PM

To:

(b)(6)

Cc:

(b)(6 McKee, Robert E. (SES); Carpenter, Scott CIV Ministry of Governance (b)(6) Keefe, Daniel J. (O-7); (b)(6)

(b)(6) (b)(6)

Kennedy, Patrick Amb; Executive Secretary

Subject:

RE: BORDERS

Sorry - my computer is quicker than I and auto-sends before I can get a word in.

I spoke to Ambassador Bremer about establishing a CPA Borders Working Group and he strongly welcomed the

idea.

Having a first meeting on Friday afternoon would work for me and I propose 2pm and invite feedback. Once we have agreed on a time, I will check on venue and which conference room might be available. At our first meeting we can decide on frequency of meetings and other procedural points.

The Borders Working Group would focus on issues such as the following:

Border/Port of Entry policy 1.

2. Border Security issues

Border agreements or arrangements, formal and informal, with neighboring countries 3.

4. An Iraq Visa regime

MFA is willing to chair the group unless one of the other participants really wants the job.

Participants would include MOI, CJTF-7, MOT, Governance, MFA and possibly Oil and Migration and Refugees. Suggestions as to participants and agenda items are welcome. I would like to develop a participants list and to that end am sending this message to Senior Advisors of the relevant ministries or entities on the list for further input.

Susan R. Johnson

CPA Senior Advisor to the MFA

----Original Message----

From: (b)(6)

Sent: Wednesday, October 22, 2003 12:21 PM

To: Johnson, Susan R. (SES)

Cc: (b)(6)

Keefe, Daniel J. (0-7)

Subject: BORDERS

Susan,

We spoke about borders. Thank you for your initiative on the Borders working group. Both BG Keefe and (b)(6) should attend. BG Keefe's C5 team have identified a number of policy issues that require resolution. These have arisen from their work on border security. It might be helpful if we presented these to the WG. How about Thursday or Friday 23 or 24 Oct afternoon?

(b)(6)DCG(PH) CJTF-7

Johnson, Susan R. (SES)

From:

Johnson, Susan R. (SES)

Sent:

Thursday, October 23, 2003 7:31 AM

To:

(b)(6)

Subject:

RE: BORDERS

Fantastic! Would love to have you! Susan

----Original Message----

From: (b)(6)

Sent: Thursday, October 23, 2003 7:26 AM

To: McKee, Robert E. (SES); Johnson, Susan R. (SES); (b)(6)

(b)(6)

Carpenter, Scott CIV Ministry of Governance

Cc: (b)(6)

Keefe, Daniel J. (O-7); (b)(6)

(b)(6)

Executive Secretary

Subject: RE: BORDERS

Susan, I will also try attend.

Before I was detailed to Treasury, I had accepted a job with Gov Perry of Texas to head the Texas border affairs policy office, and with Bremer, in counter-terrorism, had worked on the EU Schengen accord and the EU Trevi group. I have too many responsibilities with my current job to be an action officer, but I may be able to provide occasional input. If I am not able to attend, I will have a rep from the ExecSec there.

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Volloner

Executive Assistant, CPA Administrator Head of CPA Executive Secretariat

----Original Message----

From: McKee, Robert E. (SES)

Sent: Wednesday, October 22, 2003 4:59 PM

To: Johnson, Susan R. (SES); (b)(6)

(b)(6)

Carpenter, Scott CIV Ministry of Governance Keefe, Daniel J. (O-7); (b)(6)

Cc: (b)(6) (b)(6)

Kennedy, Patrick Amb; Executive Secretary

Subject: RE: BORDERS

Susan-I would like to participate from the Oil perspective, at least until we decide whether it is valueadding for me to continue to do so. Much of the so-called border issues we have are related to political decisions that have to be, or could be, made relative to imports (ie trade with all neighbors instead of just a few). However, good trade might then have favorable implications for border security etc. I'll look forward to attending the first meeting.

Rob McKee

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McKee, Robert E. (SES); Carpenter, Scott CIV Ministry of Governance

Cc: (b)(6)

Keefe, Danie $\mathcal{Y}(0-7)$; (b)(6)

(b)(6)

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1

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Susan R. Johnson CPA Senior Advisor to the MFA (b)(2)

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Cc: (b)(6)

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Keefe, Daniel J. (O-7)

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DCG(PH) CJTF-7

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Wednesday, October 22, 2003 2:27 PM

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(b)(2)

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(b)(6)

DCG(PH) CJTF-7

Johnson, Susan R. (SES)

From:

Johnson, Susan R. (SES)

Sent:

Wednesday, October 22, 2003 6:29 PM

To:

McKee, Robert E. (SES)

Subject:

RE: BORDERS

Great - We will feel our way a bit at the beginning, but we need to gather people with something of a big picture view on this issue. I will let you know what time and place on Friday afternoon as soon as I get a few more responses.

Susan Johnson

-----Original Message----

From: McKee, Robert E. (SES)

Sent: Wednesday, October 22, 2003 4:59 PM

To: Johnson, Susan R. (SES); (b)(6)

(b)(6) Carpenter, Scott CIV Ministry of Governance

Cc:(b)(6) Keefe, Daniel J. (O-7); (b)(6)

(b)(6) Kennedy, Patrick Amb; Executive Secretary

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Sent: Wednesday, October 22, 2003 2:27 PM

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Sorry - my computer is quicker than I and auto-sends before I can get a word in.

I spoke to Ambassador Bremer about establishing a CPA Borders Working Group and he strongly welcomed the idea.

Having a first meeting on Friday afternoon would work for me and I propose 2pm and invite feedback. Once we have agreed on a time, I will check on venue and which conference room might be available. At our first meeting we can decide on frequency of meetings and other procedural points.

The Borders Working Group would focus on issues such as the following:

- 1. Border/Port of Entry policy
- 2. Border Security issues
- Border agreements or arrangements, formal and informal, with neighboring countries
- An Iraq Visa regime

MFA is willing to chair the group unless one of the other participants really wants the job.

Participants would include MOI, CJTF-7, MOT, Governance, MFA and possibly Oil and Migration and Refugees. Suggestions as to participants and agenda items are welcome.

McKee,

would like to develop a participants list and to that end am sending this message to Senior Advisors of the relevant ministries or entities on the list for further input.

Susan R. Johnson CPA Senior Advisor to the MFA (b)(2)

----Original Message-----From: (b)(6)

Sent: Wednesday, October 22, 2003 12:21 PM

To: Johnson, Susan R. (SES)

Cc: (b)(6) Keefe, Daniel J. (0-7)

Subject: BORDERS

We spoke about borders. Thank you for your initiative on the Borders working group. Both BG Keefe and (b)(6) should attend. BG Keefe's C5 team have identified a number of policy issues that require resolution. These have arisen from their work on border security. It might be helpful if we presented these to the WG.

How about Thursday or Friday 23 or 24 Oct afternoon?

(b)(6)DCG(PH) CJTF-7 (b)(6)

From: Runnels, Al (CFO, CPA, Iraq)

Sent: Thursday, November 13, 2003 11:36 PM

To:

Cc:

Kennedy, Patrick Amb; Bent, Rodney G. (SES): (b)(6) (b)(2),(b)(6)

Voaler. Gary; (b)(6) McKee, Robert E. (SES); Crear, Robert

(0-7)

Subject: Economy Act Order - 125M - Oil Imports

All, Signed version of attached Economy Act Order will be scanned and emailed tomorrow. All

Wes, We're putting \$900M in the Supp request for import of oil products. If we get that before we have to pay the invoices on this, I'll want to revise this order to reflect APF source of funding. Al

----Original Message-

From: (b)(6)

Sent: Friday, September 05, 2003 6:58 PM

To: Runnels, Al (CFO, CPA, Iraq)

Cc: (b)(2),(b)(6) (b)(2),(b)(6)

Subject: FW: Emergency Import of Diesel

Importance: High

Al.

We have 20 million left for imports. That leaves us five days remaining. Additionally, KBR needs to close out contracts if they don't have the funds three days prior to running out of money. That means on Sunday KBR starts to cancel contracts. Additionally, (b)(6) email presents a complication. If we can get that Economy Order signed tonight so we can FAX to SWD, we all would appreciate it!

I stand ready to help in any way.

Regards,

(b)(6)

----Original Message-

From: (b)(2),(b)(6)

Sent: Friday, September 05, 2003 5:49 PM

To: (b)(6)

Cc: (b)(2),(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Subject: RE: Emergency Import of Diesel

Importance: High

The need is critical to get this in our hands today because GSA is going to be totally shutting down our operations this weekend - all power to our building will be off this weekend for repairs. So if we do not have it here today to load in our accounting system there will be a delay until Monday. Not sure the contractor will have enough funds to continue until then. ----Original Message----

11/23/2003

From: (b)(2),(b)(6)

Sent: Thursday, September 04, 2003 10:46 AM

To: (b)(2),(b)(6)

Cc:

Subject: RE: Emergency Import of Diesel

(b)(6)

Yes. The Ambassador signed the PRB request today for 245,000,000. We have the draft economy act order for Al Runnels to sign and he is ready to do it, but gone for the night. We will get it signed tomorrow.

Regards,

(b)(6)

-----Original Message----From: (b)(2)

Sent: Thursday, September 04, 2003 6:18 PM

To: (b)(2),(b)(6)

Cc: (b)(2),(b)(6)

(b)(2),(b)(6)

(b)(2)

Vogler, Gary; Crear, Robert (O-7)

Subject: RE: Emergency Import of Diesel

When can we expect to receive the Economy Act Order from CPA? KBR's e-mail indicated that on 2 Sep they had exceeded 90% of the funds currently available for imports.

----Original Message-----

From: (b)(2),(b)(6)

Sent: Tuesday, September 02, 2003 10:32 PM

To: (b)(2)

Cct (b)(2).(b)(6)

(b)(2),(b)(6)

Vogler, Gary; Crear, Robert (0-7)

Subject: Emergency Import of Diesel

(b)(6)

Last night, as a result of a meeting with Gary Vogler and others, the decision was made to direct KBR to immediately commence with the emergency importation of Diesel full into the Musel area. Please direct them today to proceed according to the guidance below. Regarding funding, the PRB approved \$242,000,000 funding for imports on 1 September. An Economy Act Order is in process. Until this order is issued KBR is not authorized to exceed their current NTE amount.

KBR guidance...

KBR is directed to commence as soon as possible with the emergency importation of 2 million liters per day into the Mosul area for a period of 30 days. KBR is to follow-up this action within five calendar days of receipt of this letter. We understand that this may cause a temporary reduction in benzene imports of up to 1 million liters per day for a short period. Please provide daily status reports of the progress or executing this important emergency operation.

Thanks (b)(6)

(b)(6)

11/23/2003

Jon and Barbara,

I noted the last item on the list regarding detainees and it reminded me of the 3 Saudis. Any news on this front?

Thanks,

Susan Johnson

----Original Message--

From: (b)(6)

Sent: Wednesday, December 03, 2003 10:49 PM

To: Carpenter, Scott CIV Ministry of Governance; McKee, Robert E. (SES); Johnson, Susan R.

(SES): (b)(6)

Vogler, Gary; (b)(6)

(b)(6)

Cc: Jones, Richard H. (AMB)

Subject: ESG SVTC Follow-up questions and information requests

Importance: High

All:

During tonight's interagency ESG SVTC (b)(6) asked me to try and provide CPA responses to the following questions and give them feedback at tomorrow's (Thursday 4 Dec) SVTC at 1900 hrs.

- US-UN Cable # 3005 DTG 022326Z Dec 03 ** (Has to do with a UN meeting ref transition review)
 - Is CPA aware of the cable?
 - What are CPA's thoughts on the IGC members participating in a UN meeting to review the transition process? Governance, w/ comments by AMB Jones as desired.
- 2. US-Kuwait Cable 5454 DTG 030907Z Dec 03 ** (Outlines Kuwait's oil imports offer and request for specific information from Iraq)
 - What is CPA's response to Kuwaiti's Oil import offer? Min Oil

- 3. What high ranking Iraqis out of Iraq participants will attend the Iraq orchestra event in DC; such as a Minister of Culture level would? Apparently Dr Rice has discussed this with AMB Bremer and wanted to know what his thoughts are. AMB Jones
- State department asked if CPA wants them to weigh in (State to State) with Damascus, Syria
 regarding their supposed intent to increase tariffs on commerce between two states. Min
 Foreign Affairs; Min of Commerce.
- 5. State relayed that Chinese embassy has contacted them expressing the desire to reopen their embassy. What is CPA's view on this? Min Foreign Affairs

[&]quot;I checked with Front Office/Cable room tonight, neither cable has been received by CPA yet.

6. Additionally, in regards to Detainee status in Iraq, (b)(6) wants to get some insights on how we go about notifying family members of the individuals we detain during operations or other incidents. The idea, are we doing anything to let them know the individual is in our control, etc.? It relates to how we do things as compared to the last regime's methods. CJTF-7; MOI.

Appreciate all help to get a response back to the interagency group during this Thurs' SVTC.

Thanks NB

Gallinetti, Jon A. (O-8)

From:

Johnson, Susan R. (SES)

Sent:

Wednesday, December 03, 2003 11:03 PM

To:

Gallinetti, Jon A. (O-8); Fast, Barbara G. BG CJTF7-C2

Cc:

(b)(6)

Subject:

FW: ESG SVTC Follow-up questions and information requests

Importance: High

Jon and Barbara,

I noted the last item on the list regarding detainees and it reminded me of the 3 Saudis. Any news on this front?

Thanks.

Susan Johnson

----Original Message From: (b)(6)

Contr. Wadnesday, December

Sent: Wednesday, December 03, 2003 10:49 PM

To: Carpenter, Scott CIV Ministry of Governance; McKee, Robert E. (SES); Johnson, Susan R. (SES); (b)(6)

(b)(6)

Vogler, Gary; (b)(6)

(b)(6)

Cc: Jones, Richard H. (AMB)

Subject: ESG SVTC Follow-up questions and information requests

Importance: High

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3. What high ranking Iraqis out of Iraq participants will attend the Iraq orchestra event in DC; such as a Minister of Culture level would? Apparently Dr Rice has discussed this with AMB Bremer and wanted to know what his thoughts are. AMB Jones

12/4/2003

[&]quot;I checked with Front Office/Cable room tonight, neither cable has been received by CPA yet.

Johnson, Susan R. (SES)

From: (b)(6)

Sent: Sunday, December 07, 2003 9:05 AM

To: Johnson, Susan R. (SES); Gallinetti, Jon A. (O-8); Fast, Barbara G. BG CJTF7-C2

Cc: (b)(6)

Subject: RE: ESG SVTC Follow-up questions and information requests

Thank you ma'm.

Was informed by Saudi USEMB Pol Mil officer last night that MOI only received general intelligence info to Saudi...nothing about status of the three Saudis...I would be happy to pass along whatever information we have to them so the Saudi Hospital Commander can complete his mission of accounting for his men.

If I was sure we really knew where these men were, I'd be happy to go see them, pass along information that they're OK, and what our next move is.

(b)(6) USA, Chief Operations Coalition Provisional Authority - MOH (b)(2)

-----Original Message-----

From: Johnson, Susan R. (SES)

Sent: Saturday, December 06, 2003 8:36 PM

To: (b)(6) Gallinetti, Jon A. (O-8); Fast, Barbara G. BG CJTF7-C2

Cc: (b)(6)

Subject: RE: ESG SVTC Follow-up questions and information requests

(b)(6) per our conversation – I am told that contact was made and information passed to Saudi MOI. Of course we need to sensitize people about the need to give some basic info to people within CPA that need to know and take some action.

Using military speak – perhaps an After Action Review would be in order so that we don't collectively have to go through all this next time around. For example, I am told that in fact these fellows are being held at Abu Gharib. This was the information that I first was able to obtain but which was subsequently denied.

Susan Johnson

----Original Message---

From: (b)(6)

Sent: Saturday, December 06, 2003 7:51 PM

To: Johnson, Susan R. (SES); Gallinetti, Jon A. (O-8); Fast, Barbara G. BG CJTF7-C2

Cc: (b)(6)

Subject: RE: ESG SVTC Follow-up questions and information requests

Saudi Field Hospital commanding officer redeployed Friday morning as scheduled, 0600 hrs. and is back in Saudi Arabia, confirmed by USEMB desk officer.

12/7/2003

I failed on last day meeting with him prior to his redeployment to provide him with any information on whereabouts of his three men.

He wasn't very happy, felt he shouldn't leave Iraq without his men, couldn't answer questions from their family members, etc.

(b)(6)
USA, Chief Operations
Coalition Provisional Authority - MOH
(b)(2)

----Original Message----

From: Johnson, Susan R. (SES)

Sent: Friday, December 05, 2003 8:58 PM

To: Gallinetti, Jon A. (O-8); Fast, Barbara G. BG CJTF7-C2

(b)(6)

Subject: RE: ESG SVTC Follow-up questions and information requests

Actually I have not talked with the Saudi Commanding officer. (b)(6) brought in two reps who pleaded with us to help them locate their friends. MOH deals with the Saudi Field Hospital and probably (b)(6) is the real interlocutor, subject to his confirmation. However, I am told that it may be that other agency has informed the Saudi Ministry of Interior and if this is confirmed tomorrow, we can pass this to the Saudis here and let them sort it out with their own MOI....

We ought to find a better way of figuring out how to get information out or ourselves to save everyone a lot of trouble......

Cheers, Susan

----Original Message-----From: Gallinetti, Jon A. (O-8)

Sent: Friday, December 05, 2003 8:49 PM

To: Johnson, Susan R. (SES); Fast, Barbara G. BG CJTF7-C2

Cc: (b)(6)

(b)(6)

Subject: RE: ESG SVTC Follow-up questions and information requests

Susan,

In regards to the Saudi Commanding Officer at the Field Hospital, I believe that should be a CPA decision since he has initiated discussions with you. I will go back and research this latest bit of information...and then we can provide what info we receive to the Commander via our reps through CPA.

Thanks.

JAG.

----Original Message-----

From: Johnson, Susan R. (SES)

Sent: Friday, December 05, 2003 6:04 PM

To: Gallinetti. Jon A. (O-8): Fast. Barbara G. BG CJTF7-C2

Cc: (b)(6)

(b)(6)

Subject: RE: ESG SVTC Follow-up questions and information requests

General G – My OGA folk have promised me the tag numbers but say that they do not detain physically – the military does and has physical custody now. They tend to agree with me that deportation to Saudi Arabia would make sense. They are likely to get harsher treatment there.

Who decides what we can say to the Saudi Commanding Officer of the Field Hospital?

Thanks,

Susan

----Original Message----From: Gallinetti, Jon A. (O-8)

Sent: Friday, December 05, 2003 3:19 PM

To: Johnson, Susan R. (SES); Fast, Barbara G. BG CJTF7-C2

Cc: (b)(6)

Subject: RE: ESG SVTC Follow-up questions and information

requests

Susan,

Wanted to confirm that you received the information on the Saudis. OGA has had them the entire time...that's why we could not find them in our systems. This should close out our involvement on the subject.

v/r,

Jon

----Original Message----

From: Johnson, Susan R. (SES)

Sent: Wednesday, December 03, 2003 11:03 PM

To: Gallinetti, Jon A. (O-8); Fast, Barbara G. BG CJTF7-C2

Cc: (b)(6)

Subject: FW: ESG SVTC Follow-up questions and information

requests

Importance: High

Jon and Barbara,

I noted the last item on the list regarding detainees and it reminded me of the 3 Saudis. Any news on this front?

Thanks,

Susan Johnson

-----Orlginal Message-----

From: (b)(6)

Sent: Wednesday, December 03, 2003 10:49 PM

To: Carpenter, Scott CIV Ministry of Governance; McKee, Robert

E. (SES): Johnson, Susan R. (SES); (b)(6)

(b)(6) Vogler, Gary; (b)(6)

(GBR); (b)(6)

Cc: Jones, Richard H. (AMB)

Subject: ESG SVTC Follow-up questions and information

requests

Importance: High

All:

During tonight's interagency ESG SVTC (b)(6) asked me to try and provide CPA responses to the following questions and give them feedback at tomorrow's (Thursday 4 Dec) SVTC at 1900 hrs.

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 - What is CPA's response to Kuwaiti's Oil import offer?
 Min Oil


"1 checked with Front Office/Cable room tonight, neither cable has been received by CPA yet.

- What high ranking Iraqis out of Iraq participants will attend the Iraq orchestra event in DC; such as a Minister of Culture level would? Apparently Dr Rice has discussed this with AMB Bremer and wanted to know what his thoughts are.
 AMB Jones
- State department asked if CPA wants them to weigh in (State to State) with Damascus, Syria regarding their supposed intent to increase tariffs on commerce between two states. Min Foreign Affairs; Min of Commerce.
- State relayed that Chinese embassy has contacted them expressing the desire to reopen their embassy. What is CPA's view on this? Min Foreign Affairs
- Additionally, in regards to Detainee status in Iraq, Mr Miller wants to get some insights on how we go about notifying family members of the individuals we detain during

operations or other incidents. The idea, are we doing anything to let them know the individual is in our control, etc.? It relates to how we do things as compared to the last regime's methods. CJTF-7; MOI.

Appreciate all help to get a response back to the interagency group during this Thurs' SVTC.

Thanks (b)(6)



Johnson, Susan R. (SES)

From: Johnson, Susan R. (SES)

Thursday, December 04, 2003 9:09 AM Sent:

(b)(6)To:

Cc:

Subject: RE: ESG SVTC Follow-up questions and information requests

I will keep doing what I can. I just received a copy of a memo from (b)(6) to the Chief of Staff of CJTF-7 that says that they have been unable to locate any record of detention for these individuals and are now asking the Iraqi Police to look. This information is not consistent with earlier information that I was given that we did have them and that they were security detainees, so I could not be told any more. I would be glad to give you a copy of the memo.

I will give you a set of all the previous e mail I have on the subject if that might be useful for your files or background.

I will also forward the issue to Amb Jones.

Susan Johnson **Coalition Provisional Authority** Senior Advisor to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

----Original Message----

From: (b)(6)

Sent: Thursday, December 04, 2003 8:06 AM

To: Johnson, Susan R. (SES)

Subject: RE: ESG SVTC Follow-up questions and information requests

Ma'm, you're the only one asking/following up on the Saudi issue. Thank you very much.

I have to go out there again today with nothing to tell them as we try to push them out of Iraq.

It's so frustrating. (b)(6) asking what we're doing different than last regime re apprehension and detention...good questions...CPA can't even find out!

(b)(6)USA, Chief Operations Coalition Provisional Authority - MOH (b)(2)

> ----Original Message----From: Johnson, Susan R. (SES)

Sent: Wednesday, December 03, 2003 11:03 PM

To: Gallinetti, Jon A. (O-8); Fast, Barbara G. BG CJTF7-C2

Cc: (b)(6)

Subject: FW: ESG SVTC Follow-up questions and information requests

Importance: High

12/4/2003

Jon and Barbara.

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Sent: Wednesday, December 03, 2003 10:49 PM

To: Carpenter, Scott CIV Ministry of Governance; McKee, Robert E. (SES); Johnson, Susan R. (SES); (b)(6)

(b)(6)

Vogler, Gary; (b)(6)

Cc: Jones, Richard H. (AMB)

Subject: ESG SVTC Follow-up questions and information requests

Importance: High

ΔII·

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Appreciate all help to get a response back to the interagency group during this Thurs' SVTC.



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Johnson, Susan R. (SES)

Sent:

Wednesday, December 03, 2003 11:03 PM

To:

Gallinetti, Jon A. (O-8); Fast, Barbara G. BG CJTF7-C2

Cc:

(b)(6)

Subject:

FW: ESG SVTC Follow-up questions and information requests

Importance: High

Jon and Barbara,

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Susan Johnson

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Sent: Wednesday, December 03, 2003 10:49 PM

To: Carpenter, Scott CIV Ministry of Governance: McKee, Robert E. (SES); Johnson, Susan R. (SES); (b)(6) Vogler, Gary; (b)(6)

(b)(6)(b)(6)

Cc: Jones, Richard H. (AMB)

Subject: ESG SVTC Follow-up questions and information requests

Importance: High

All:

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12/4/2003

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Appreciate all help to get a response back to the interagency group during this Thurs' SVTC.

Thanks (b)(6)

- Park

(b)(6)(OTHER)

From:

(b)(6)

Sent:

Friday, January 30, 2004 8:48 PM

To:

(b)(6)

Cc:

(b)(6)

(OTHER)

Subject: RE: plan for restructuring of oil company

is now leading on this in OPPA so he can let you know where Rob is in the morning and we can take it from there. Hold off until then

(b)(6)

Office of Policy Planning & Analysis Coalition Provisional Authority - Baghdad

(b)(2)

----Original Message-

From: (b)(2),(b)(6)

Sent: Friday, January 30, 2004 7:49 PM

Subject: RE: plan for restructuring of oil company

I just had a long talk with (b)(6) who does Global Oil Markets at Treasury. He felt CPA was biting off more than it (or I) could chew. I have encountered a real distrust of CPA capabilities here, but was a little taken aback that Austin was so negative about looking at the problem. He argued that one needs 200 consultants from McKinsey, otherwise you can't do anything. I noted that Rob McKee has done this stuff before at Conoco. I explained we were just putting together a scope or work of what needs to be done at which point he was more supportive. The upshot, however, that no one is looking at the problem in Washington. He gave me the name of (b)(6) at the the Department of Energy and (b)(6)NSC. If you would, let me know if you want me to spend some time on this and I will write up another scope of work. I will emphasize explaining what other countries have done (establishing best practice) so that my piece could be used by Iraqis as well as CPA without raising hackles. There is a good piece on the World Bank website on best practice liberalization of the oil industry that I could draw on as well as my East European expertise. Fuel piece add-on

All the best.

(b)(6)

----Original Message---From: (b)(2),(b)(6)

Sent: Friday, January 30, 2004 10:18 AM

To: (b)(6)

(OTHER)

Subject: RE: plan for restructuring of oil company

(b)(6) - good if you can help(b)(6) and McKee on this. Not sure how extensive a piece of work is needed but (b)(6 will meet McKee in the morning to work this through.

(b)(6)

1. Ines Project

2. Coo Brief

3 Plangalate

4. 2004/7 Data

FOIA 09-826 CPA 000047

1/30/2004

Office of Policy Planning & Analysis
Coalition Provisional Authority - Baghdad
(b)(2)

----Original Message----

From: (b)(2),(b)(6)

Sent: Friday, January 30, 2004 5:49 PM

To: (b)(6)

Subject: RE: plan for restructuring of oil company

(b)(6)

I would like to work on the issue very much. I like Rob McKee and would enjoy working with him. I have actually written a number of analyses of the commercialization of oil and gas companies in Eastern Europe (Bulgaria, Hungary, Slovakia, Poland, and looked at some Russian companies). I think the major problem may be coordination and information. I have some knowledge about the current organization of the Iraqi industry, but could use a lot more, especially regarding field location and capacity, pipeline location and capacity (crude and product), refinery location and capacity, terminal location and capacity, the filling station network and the current organizational and financial structure. I know a major problem is the time it takes CPA staff to collect and send information: when one is there, many times it seems like it would be easier to do the whole thing oneself. But I could definitely describe what other countries have done.

Ask Rob if he would be interested in having me work on it and also whether this information is easily available? I have a call in to (b)(6) who does Global Oil Markets at Treasury to find out what information is currently here.

On another matter, I will be briefing Brigadier General Rice and his group at CPA West the plan, planning and economic policy. I am currently working through (b)(6) at State to contact the NSC staff. I will call John Simon again after Tuesday. I think I will learn quite a bit about the state of knowledge by briefing Rice, which will help make the NSC contact more productive.

Yesterday I went to the World Bank press conference on the Trust Fund. The amounts flowing through the Fund are likely to be small: The biggest donation committed to date is from the U.S. for \$10 million. They did mention economic policies like raising fuel prices, but in a very cautious way. I will e-mail (b)(6) today to try to establish contacts with people there.

All the best,

(b)(6)

----Original Message----

From: (b)(2),(b)(6)

Sent: Friday, January 30, 2004 3:37 AM

To: (b)(6)

Subject: FW: plan for restructuring of oil company

Any thoughts?

(b)(6)

Office of Policy Planning & Analysis Coalition Provisional Authority - Baghdad

1/30/2004

(b)(2)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6)

Sent: Friday, January 30, 2004 11:31 AM

To: (b)(6)

Subject: plan for restructuring of oil company

(b)(6)

Rob McKee may have already contacted you on this. Amb Jones would like your shop to assist Rob McKee and the oil team on a draft restructuring proposal for the state oil industry. Together they drafted a structure and Rob or I can provide you with a sketch. He would like Private Sector Development also looped in on this as he believes that fuel price liberalization can be linked.

I would talk to Rob, prepare a plan and then together get on Jones' calendar.

Thanks.

(b)(6)

040221-34 N

(b)(6)

From:

: (b)(6)

Sent: Saturday, February 21, 2004 8:26 PM

LPB HALLSEN

To:

Executive Secretary

Cc:

(b)(6)

Rodnev (SES-4): (h)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Lucke, Lewis; McKee, Robert E. (SES) (b)(6)

(b)(6)

Nash, David (SES);
(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Sudnick, Daniel (SES-6); (b)(6)

(b)(6)

Lt. Gen.

Jeff Oster; (b)(6)

Subject: COO Perstat and absence info

FOR THE ADMINISTRATOR

Agency	AUTH	Assigned	Assigned %	Attached	Present for Duty	PFD %
COO	11	9	82%	1	10	91%
CMATT	259	161	62%	10	155	60%
USAID	121	102	84%	25	85	70%
PMO	110	49	45%	40	87	79%
Interior	79	68	86%	13	81	103%
OMB	55	21	38%	0	19	35%
Infrastructure	21	15	71%	9	23	110%
Water	12	9	75%	1	5	42%
Oil	10	10	100%	0	10	100%
COMMS	33	13	39%	2	14	42%
Housing	16	11	69%	1	11	69%
Electric	32	14	44%	8	22	69%
Public Works	5	5	100%	0	5	100%
Transportation	64	24	38%	0	21	33%
TOTAL	828	511	62%	110	548	66%

COO Sr. Advisors Out of Country

Name	Ministry	Acting Sr Advisor	Estimated Rtn Date
Amb Darrel Trent	Min of Transportation	(b)(6)	26 Feb 04
Amb Andy Bearpark	Min of Infrastructure		3 Mar 04
Michael Mutters	Public Works	******	15 Mar 04
Daniel Sudnick	Min Of Comms		16 Mar 04

P Amman - world hak Page 1 of 2

Trug

Domor Confirmer - need project

descriptors

Krawczel, Timothy 0-5 LNO

From:

(b)(2),(b)(6)

Sent:

مارس، ۲۰۰٤ ۲۳:۵۰ مس 02

To:

Krawczel, Timothy 0-5 LNO

Subject: RE: funding for Iraqi participation in Beirut meeting

Col. Krawczel:

Glad to see you're on the ground safe.

The other matter of importance is to ensure coordination with the World Bank regarding the training course in Amman. I'm told the course will be offered from March 27-31 at the Intercontinental Hotel. I will be flying in to attend the course as an observer. I will also use the opportunity to meet and get to know the Iraql scientists.

As to the upcoming donor conference in Rome March 19-21, both EPA and State Dept. are eagerly awaiting to receive detailed project proposals sometime this week.

Please feel free to call me at (b)(2)

with any questions.

Thank you for your service.

(b)(6)

U.S. EPA

-----"Krawczel, Timothy 0-5 LNO" (b)(2)

wrote: -----

 $T_0: (b)(2),(b)(6)$

From: "Krawczel, Timothy 0-5 LNO" (b)(2)

Date: 03/01/2004 05:14PM

Subject: RE: funding for Iraqi participation in Beirut meeting

(b)(6)

I am in Baghdad.

We will start working on this.

Tim

----Original Message-From: (b)(2),(b)(6)

Sent: 25 YENÇÎN, 2004 07:24 ã

To: (b)(6)

Cc: (b)(2),(b)(6)

Krawczel, Timothy 0-5 LNO; McKee, Robert E. (SES); Vogler, Gary; (b)(6)

Subject: funding for Iraqi participation in Beirut meeting

(b)(6)

We have secured funding on this end for the conf. in Beirut. Please have the MoEN of the UN on travel logistics (contact info below). coordinate with (b)(6) We're still awaiting on word from the Oil Ministry to see if they have decided to send representatives to the conf.

02/03/2004

Bent, Rodney G. (SES)

From: (b)(6)

Sent: Friday, October 31, 2003 8:51 PM

To: (b)(6) Runnels, Al (CFO, CPA, Iraq)

Cc: Vogler Gary: (b)(6) McKee. Robert E. (SES); (b)(6) Bent, Rodney G.

(SES); (b)(6)

Subject: RE: Task from Bremer - KBR Gas Purchase Contract

Thanks. This looks like a complete answer that I can take in tomorrow am. He has left for the evening.

(b)(6)

Executive Assistant, CPA Administrator Head of CPA Executive Secretariat

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6)

Sent: Friday, October 31, 2003 7:08 PM

To: Runnels, Al (CFO, CPA, Iraq);(b)(6)

Cc: Vogler, Gary; (b)(6) McKee, Robert E. (SES); (b)(6) Bent, Rodney G.

(SES); (b)(6)

Subject: RE: Task from Bremer - KBR Gas Purchase Contract

AI:

Your answer to the first question is exactly right. You said it in so many words, but the reason we have not entered into contracts longer than 30 days previously has been because we did not have funding for more than 30 days. We cannot contract for goods or services for which we do not have funds.

How much money can be saved by longer contracts is not exactly known. Suppliers tell us that there can be substantial savings if we sign contracts for 4 months or more. Numbers thrown around have been on the order of 20-25%, but until we actually obtain bids and sign a contract we cannot be certain.

We are currently exploring the possibility of turning the fuel import mission over to the DLA's Defense Energy Support Center. That information is close hold – KBR has not been informed of this situation.

(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: Runnels, Ai (CFO, CPA, Iraq)

Sent: Friday, October 31, 2003 4:52 PM

To: (b)(6)

(b)(6)

Cc: Vogler, Gary; (b)(6)

McKee, Robert E. (SES); (b)(6)

Bent,

Rodney G. (SES)

Subject: RE: Task from Bremer - KBR Gas Purchase Contract

We can go to a longer term contract and that will be done in order to use the supp funds "full and open." PRB voted to only do it 30 days at a time, given the current contract is with KBR. Al

(b)(6) Can you guys answer question b? Also, tell me how we plan to execute the supplemental funding for oil imports, since we can't use it against a currently existing contract. Al

----Original Message----

From: (b)(6)

Sent: Friday, October 31, 2003 8:13 AM

To: Runnels, AI (CFO, CPA, Iraq); McKee, Robert E. (SES); (b)(6)

Cc: Vogler, Gary; (b)(6)

Subject: Task from Bremer - KBR Gas Purchase Contract

Importance: High

See whomever handles the KBR Gas Purchase Contract that answers the following questions:

- a. Why can we not go to a longer term contract, beyond the current 30-day contract for gas purchases?
- b. If we could do this, how much would it save?

Please acknowledge receipt and identify POC. Please let me know when you think you will have the answer ready?

Thank you.

(h)(6)

Executive Assistant, CPA Administrator Head of CPA Executive Secretariat



(b)(6)

Runnels, Al (CFO, CPA, Iraq) From:

Sent:

Saturday, November 01, 2003 8:53 AM

To:

(b)(6)

Vogler_Garv:(b)(6) Cc:

McKee, Robert F. (SES); (b)(6)

Bent, Rodney G.

(SES); (b)(6)

Subject: Task from Bremer - KBR Gas Purchase Contract

Thx (b)(6) Will keep DESC possibility action close hold. Al

Answers from me and TF RIO follow re KBR Gas Purchase Contract. BG Bob Crear concurred this AM. Al

a. Why can we not go to a longer term contract, beyond the current 30-day contract for gas purchases?

Answer: We can, but of course, not against current KBR contract, given "full and open competition" verbiage in the supp Conf Rpt. The PRB limited funding approvals to 30 days requirement because of (1) \$ magnitude of the requirement and pressures, considering other requirements on cash flow, (2) concern of coalition partners on the PRB about additional funding going to KBR, and (3) potential for funding of future purchases with appropriated funds.

b. If we could do this, how much would it save?

Answer: Suppliers tell us there can be substantial savings if we sign contracts for 4 months or more. Numbers thrown around have been on the order of 20-25%, but until we actually obtain bids and sign a contract we cannot be certain TF RIO is exploring the possibility of turning the fuel import mission over to Defense Logistics Agency's Defense Energy Support Center (DESC). KEEP CLOSE HOLD -- KBR has not been informed of this situation. Lastly, RIO advised me KBR has developed a significant and effective control system to help safeguard distribution of oil imports. RIO is concerned about whether DESC and a new contractor will be able to quickly and effectively establish the necessary control system.

ΑI

----Original Message--From: (b)(6)

Sent: Friday, October 31, 2003 7:08 PM

To: Runnels, Al (CFO, CPA, Iraq): (b) (6)

Cc: Vogler, Gary;(6)(6)

McKee. Robert E. (SES); (b)(6)

Bent, Rodney G. (SES);

Subject: RE: Task from Bremer - KBR Gas Purchase Contract

AI:

Your answer to the first question is exactly right. You said it in so many words, but the reason we have not entered into contracts longer than 30 days previously has been because we did not have funding for more than 30 days. We cannot contract for goods or services for which we do not have funds.

How much money can be saved by longer contracts is not exactly known. Suppliers tell us that there can be substantial savings if we sign contracts for 4 months or more. Numbers thrown around have been on the order of 20-25%, but until we actually obtain bids and sign a contract we cannot be certain.

We are currently exploring the possibility of turning the fuel import mission over to the DLA's Defense Energy Support Center. That information is close hold – KBR has not been informed of this situation.

(b)(6)

----Original Message--From: Runnels, Al (CFO, CPA, Irag) **Sent:** Friday, October 31, 2003 4:52 PM **To:** (b)(6) Cc: Vogler, Gary; (b)(6) McKee, Robert E. (SES); (b)(6) Bent, Rodney G. (SES) Subject: RE: Task from Bremer - KBR Gas Purchase Contract We can go to a longer term contract and that will be done in order to use the supp funds "full and open." PRB voted to only do it 30 days at a time, given the current contract is with KBR. ΑI Can you guys answer question b? Also, tell me how we plan to execute the supplemental funding for oil imports, since we can't use it against a currently existing contract. ----Original Message-From: (b)(6) Sent: Friday, October 31, 2003 8:13 AM **To:** Runnels, Al (C<u>FO, CPA, Iraq); M</u>cKee, Robert E. (SES);(b)(6) Cc: Vogler, Gary; (b)(6) Subject: Task from Bremer - KBR Gas Purchase Contract Importance: High

See whomever handles the KBR Gas Purchase Contract that answers the following questions:

- a. Why can we not go to a longer term contract, beyond the current 30-day contract for gas purchases?
- b. If we could do this, how much would it save?

(b)(6)	
From:	Crawford Darrell E. (SES)
Sent:	PM نوفتبر، 2003 03:58 و 12 م
To:	Nash David (SES)
Cc:	Casteel , Steven W. (SES-O6); (b)(6) Wilkinson, Molly A. (SES); (b)(6) (b)(6) McKee, Robert E. (SES); (b)(6) Trent Darrell (SES-O6); (b)(6) (b)(6) Willis Franklin K. (SES); (b)(6) (b)(6) (b)(6) (SES); Evers, Williamson M. (SES); (b)(6) (b)(6) Vogler, Gary; (b)(6) (b)(6) (b)(6) Lucke, Lewis CIV Reconst USAID; (b)(6) (b)(6) Crawford Darrell E. (SES); Leketa, Anthony F. (SES); Ruemmele, Kathleen M. (SES); Bent, Rodney G. (SES); (b)(6) (b)(6) Nash David (SES); (b)(6)

Admiral Nash:

Subject: Soft money update

Here is the list of major non-construction projects by ministry. We have met or are in the process of meeting with representatives of these organizations and are trying to find a POC for the three unknowns.

Our objective remains getting the broad plan (description, cost, schedule) for each of these by Friday so we can put together a non-construction plan for you.

I plan to modify the spreadsheet to list ministry/office responsible and the POC for each project. I will further modify it to add the sub-projects that fall out under these major categories, where appropriate. We will then add description and further refinement of cost.

Ministry or Office		nount (millions) \$ 700
Interior	IP Tng & Equip	\$ 700
	FPS Tng & Equip	¥
,	Border Enforcement Tng & Equip	\$ 40 \$ 50
	Facility Protection, Fire Service, Demining	\$ 50 \$ 100
On as with a Affairm	Public Safety Tng & Facilities	•
Security Affairs	NIA Tng & Equip	\$1,255
	ICDC Tng & Equip	\$_62
Justice	Witness Protection	\$ 75
	Technical Investigative Methods	\$ 10
	Judicial Security & Facilities	\$ 75
	Property Claims Tribunal	\$ 30
Electricity	Elec. Security	\$ 50
Oil	Emergency Supplies of Refined Petroleum	\$ 690
Communications	Iraqi Telecom & Postal Corp.	\$ 50
	Iraqi Communications Operations	\$ 7 5
Health	Equipment Procurement & Modernization	\$ 300
Human Rights	Human Rights	\$ 15
Displacement & Migration	Migration and Refugee Assistance	\$ 105
Labor & Social Affairs	Expanded Network of Employment Center	•
Finance/Central Bank	Banking System Modernization	\$ 25

06/01/2004

100 Private Sector Development Training 45 Micro-Small-Medium Enterprises 75 Investigations of Crimes against Humanity **General Counsel** 30 Education **USAID** United States Institute for Peace 10 Unknown 100 **Democracy Building Activities** 10 Civic Programs

TOTAL \$4,137

(b)(6) will give us information on items to be procured for construction from some of the above ministries plus the following:

Housing & Construction Water Resources Transportation Education Mun. & Public Works

V/r,

Darrell

Darrell Crawford
Acting Chief of Staff
Iraq Infrastructure Reconstruction Office
(b)(2)

(b)(6)

From: Crawford Darrell E. (SES)

Sent: Wednesday, November 12, 2003 3:58 PM

To: Nash David (SES)

Cc: Casteel, Steven W. (SES-06); (b)(6)

Wilkinson, Molly A. (SES); (b)(6) (b)(6)(b)(6)Trent Darrell (SES-McKee, Robert E. (SES): (b)(6) 6); (b)(6) Willis Franklin K. (SES); (b)(6) (b)(6)(b)(6)Arsht, Lesiye A. (SES): Evers, Williamson M. (SES) (b)(6) (b)(6)Vogler, Gary; (b)(6) Lucke, Lewis CIV Reconst USAID; (b)(6) (b)(6)Crawford Darrell E. (b)(6)(SES); Leketa, Anthony F. (SES); Ruemmele, Kathleen M. (SES); Bent, Rodney G. (SES); (b)(6) (b)(6)(b)(6)Nash David

Subject: Soft money update

(SES); (b)(6)

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Ministry or Office		mount (millions)
Interior	IP Tng & Equip	\$ 700
	FPS Tng & Equip	\$ 57
	Border Enforcement Tng & Equip	\$ 40
	Facility Protection, Fire Service, Demining	3 \$ 50
	Public Safety Tng & Facilities	\$ 100
Security Affairs	NIA Tng & Equip	\$1,255
•	ICDC Tng & Equip	\$ 62
Justice	Witness Protection	\$ 75
	Technical Investigative Methods	\$ 10
	Judicial Security & Facilities	\$ 75
	Property Claims Tribunal	\$ 30
Electricity	Elec. Security	\$ 50
Oil	Emergency Supplies of Refined Petroleum	\$ 690
Communications	Iraqi Telecom & Postal Corp.	\$ 50
	Iraqi Communications Operations	\$ 75
Health	Equipment Procurement & Modernization	\$ 300
Human Rights	Human Rights	\$ 15
Displacement & Migration	Migration and Refugee Assistance	\$ 105
Labor & Social Affairs	Expanded Network of Employment Cente	rs \$ 4
Finance/Central Bank	Banking System Modernization	\$ 25
		•

Private Sector Development

Training
Micro-Small-Medium Enterprises

General Counsel
USAID

Training
Micro-Small-Medium Enterprises
Investigations of Crimes against Humanity
Education

\$ 100
\$ 45
75
30

Unknown
United States Institute for Peace
Democracy Building Activities
States Institute for Peace
\$ 100
Civic Programs

TOTAL \$4,137

(b)(6) will give us information on items to be procured for construction from some of the above ministries plus the following:

Housing & Construction Water Resources Transportation Education Mun. & Public Works

V/r,

Darrell

Darrell Crawford
Acting Chief of Staff
Iraq Infrastructure Reconstruction Office
(b)(2)

Powell, Owen C. (SES) (b)(6)From: Sent: Monday, October 27, 2003 2:57 PM To: Agresto, John T. (SES); (b)(6) Arsht. Leslye A. (SES); (b)(6) Bearpark, Andrew (Director of Operations(b)(2) Browning, Stephen E. SES; Carpenter, Scott CIV Ministry of Governance; (b)(6) Fatfat, Mounzer R. (SES); (b)(6) (b)(6)Foley, Thomas C. (CIV): (b)(6) (b)(6)Johnson, Susan R. (SES); (b)(6) Oliver, David R. McKee. Robert E. (SES): (b)(6) Powell, Owen C. (SES): (b)(6) Slocombe, Walt B. (SES); Trent Darrell (SES-6); Vogler, Gary Cc: (b)(2),(b)(6)(b)(6)Wilkinson, Molly A. (SES); (b)(6)(b)(6)Vogler, Gary; (b)(6) (b)(6)Subject: Requirements for cell phones

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Importance: High

You have already been briefed by the Ministry of Communications on the three wireless providers bringing services here very soon. The MCI system that we currently use will be phased out. As such, we need to gather requirements and use this to negotiate a best-price contract with each of the three vendors.

The first attachment provides the cost for these services. The second attachment is a fact sheet that will help you better understand what you need to know to complete the final two attachments. I have high lighted those lines which are pertinent to this task.

Each ministry (Iraqi and Coalition Senior Advisory) needs to articulate their cell phone requirements using the two attached Excel Spreadsheets. Things to note as you go through this:

- Your Iraqi Ministries must pay for this out of their budgets theirs will not be funded/provided by CPA. This also means that Senior Advisors can not obtain CPA purchased phones for their Iraqi ministries. Please ensure they understand this before they articulate their requirements. Costs are at the first attachment.
- Because of the funding differences, we need two matrices from you. Please capture your Iraqi
 Ministry requirements on the first spreadsheet and your CPA staff requirements in the
 second. There is a tab at the bottom of the page for each of the ministries.

- · Please note that this is broken down by region.
- In order to affect the contracting we need to have your BEST ESTIMATE on this no later than Monday, 4 November.

The MRCO point of contact for this is (b)(6) She can be reached at (b)(2)

Thanks in advance for your efforts.

r(b)(6)

(b)(6)

LTC, USA

Ministry Requirements Contact Office

(b)(2)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)(OTHER) From:

Thursday, February 05, 2004 8:38 AM Sent:

(b)(6)To:

Subject: RE: USG Request for Japanese

<u>prosim vyti</u>sknout tento mail . Diky . (b)(6)

-Original Message-

From: (b)(6) (OTHER)

Sent: Wednesday, February 04, 2004 3:46 PM

To:(b)(6) (OTHER)

Subject: RE: USG Request for Japanese

Thank you. Please note that (b)(6) has requested this material be sent in no later than 1500 tomorrow.

Deputy Senior Advisor - Electricity **CPA Electricity Advisory Team** USAID - Power/Electricity (b)(2)

-----Or<u>iginal Message--</u>--

From:(b)(6) (OTHER)

Sent: Wednesday, February 04, 2004 3:45 PM

To:(b)(6) (OTHER)

Subject: RE: USG Request for Japanese

(b)(6)

I will prepare requested compiled information tomorrow, time of meeting is registered in my time schedule.

Best regards

(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) (OTHER)

Sent: Wednesday, February 04, 2004 3:38 PM

To: (b)(6) (OTHER)

Cc: (b)(2)

Subject: FW: USG Request for Japanese

Importance: High

(b)(6)

In an effort to closer integrate your responsibilities with this office as the Donor Programs Coordinator I would like for you to attend this meeting with me tomorrow.

I have attached all of the information I have for the Japanese donations. PLEASE COMPILE THIS INFORMATION INTO ONE LIST WITH A UNIFIED FORMAT. This list should be ready for tomorrow's meeting.

I request that you work with the DG of Planning (b)(6) who is cc'd on this e-mail, on further development of this list and coordination with the Japanese.

Kind regards,

(b)(6)

Deputy Senior Advisor - Electricity CPA Electricity Advisory Team USAID - Power/Electricity

(b)(2)

----Original Message---

From: (b)(6)

Sent: Wednesday, February 04, 2004 12:54 PM

To:(b)(6) McKee, Robert E. (SES); (b)(6)

(b)(6)

Rest, Judy (SES-2): (b)(6) (b)(6)

(b)(6) (b)(6)

(b)(6

Cc: Goledzinowski, Andrew (AUS)
Subject: USG Request for Japanese

Importance: High

To all,

In an effort to address some of the issues surrounding Japanese assistance to Iraq, the USG (DoD, State, Treasury, USAID) has planned for a conference call to discuss ways of facilitating disbursement of the Japanese contribution. The call will be held tomorrow afternoon at 1700 hrs and seeks to address the following issues:

Wilkinson, Molly (SES-1); (b)(6)

- What is the status of your individual Ministry's relationship with the Japanese? Areas of progress and delay? Any agreements that have been formalized? Etc. Four to six bullet points of a sentence or two would be perfect.
- 2) In addition, they have requested that we gather lists of equipment to be discussed during that call. The lists should reflect current and anticipated needs. Lists have already been submitted by a number of Ministries and, if that list is still current, please resubmit those lists bearing in mind the following criteria:
 - The lists should be for equipment only.
 - The lists should be focused toward "big ticket", "high visibility" items (vehicle lists have been particularly wellreceived thus far).
 - No military-related items should be included.
 - Formatting for the lists is open, but should be kept as simplified as possible.

Our apologies for burdening you with another request, but this is a joint USG-CPA effort to mobilize and focus the Japanese in implementing their assistance in your sectors. Please forward your lists to me no later than 1500 hrs tomorrow (Thurs. -2/5) in order to pass then along to Washington for their review prior to the call. Please contact me if you have any questions.

Best Regards,

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Chief of Staff and Advisor for Donor Coordination Council for International Coordination (CIC) CPA – Baghdad, Iraq

(b)(2)

Casteel, Steven W.

(b)(6)

From:

(b)(6)

Sent:

Wednesday, December 31, 2003 1:56 PM

To:

(SES-O6); McKee, Robert E. (SES); (b)(6)

Cc:

(b)(6)

Subject: Expended Amounts Against the Obligations of the 100 Million Dollar Construction Initiative

Below are the amounts that we (MOHC) show on our spreadsheet as having been obligated by your ministries out of the \$100 Million Construction Initiative. We are trying to replace the question marks in the table below will actual numbers. Please check yo records and let me know what the expended amount is for FY03 so that we can report it in the overall spreadsheet.

Please call me at (b)(2) if you have questions.

Ministry	PRB#	Amount Obligated (\$000)	Amount Expended
Electricity	221A7	2,500	? < 500 K They will check
\mathcal{V}_{Health}	221A8	1,750 all off	? Thomiscall back 1,750 402.
✓Industry and Minerals	221A11	170	7 170 K
√ Interior	221A12	1,000	? 866k will see Joe about it
V Oil	221A16	236	? ROSS K sent email to
Planning	221A17	157	→157
	221A19	2,750	? Out vill call

Ministry of Housing and Construction Coalition Provisional Authority, Baghdad

(b)(2)

Saudi Defainces

Johnson, Susan R. (SES)

From: Gallinetti, Jon A. (O-8)

Sent: Monday, December 01, 2003 5:21 PM

To: Johnson, Susan R. (SES); (b)(6)

Jones, Richard H. (AMB)

Cc: (b)(6) (b)(6) Fast, Barbara G. BG CJTF7-C2;

Subject: RE: Borders Working Group - Recap and Next Meeting! PLEASE NOTE NEW TIME! BORDERS AND HAJJ! COME ONE COME ALL!

Susan.

Thanks for your email. I had not forgotten our conversation the other night at the going away party for Pat Kennedy. I have some information on the listed Saudis and we are retrieving more. I have included our (b)(6) and our C-2, BG(P) Fast so they can add to the discussion. I can assure you that the process works, although at times slow and not as fast as we would like. However, the process must be followed to ensure that we don't release anyone, either early or at all, that might be a security risk and/or that we may be able to obtain valuable information to help the entire coalition. As soon as I receive any additional information I will pass it on. Regards.

V/Γ,

Jon

-----Original Message-----

From: Johnson, Susan R. (SES)

Sent: Monday, December 01, 2003 4:45 PM

To: Gallinetti, Jon A. (O-8); (b)(6) Jones, Richard H. (AMB)

Cc: (b)(6)

Subject: FW: Borders Working Group - Recap and Next Meeting! PLEASE NOTE NEW TIME! BORDERS

AND HAJJ! COME ONE COME ALL!



Susan

----Original Message----

From: (b)(6)

Sent: Friday, November 21, 2003 1:59 PM

To: Johnson, Susan R. (SES)

Subject: RE: Borders Working Group - Recap and Next Meeting! PLEASE NOTE NEW TIME! BORDERS

FOIA 09-826_ CPA 000066

AND HAJJ! COME ONE COME ALL!

On another note the Saudis are very anxious to get their three people who are still missing. They called me this moming and asked about them. The name of the three Saudi are:-

(b)(6)

Please help us to get this issue resolved,

(b)(6)

Ministry of Health Ministry of Religous Affairs

----Original Message----

From: Johnson, Susan R. (SES)

Sent: Friday, November 21, 2003 12:29 PM

To: (b)(6)

Subject: RE: Borders Working Group - Recap and Next Meeting! PLEASE NOTE NEW TIME! BORDERS AND HAJJ! COME ONE COME ALL!

(b)(6) have you talked to Transportation about people who think that they are going on the Hajj with the private tour companies independent of whatver Awqaf is doing.... Susan

----Original Message----

From: (b)(6)

Sent: Friday, November 21, 2003 11:51 AM

To: Johnson, Susan R. (SES)

Subject: RE: Borders Working Group - Recap and Next Meeting! PLEASE NOTE NEW TIME! BORDERS AND HAJJ! COME ONE COME ALL!

Thank you. E have a meeting glomorrow at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at 1000 Hours on this issue. Will keep you updated. Regards,

(b)(6)

Ministry of Health

Ministry of Religous Affairs

----Original Message-----

From: Johnson, Susan R. (SES)

Sent: Thursday, November 20, 2003 7:51 PM

To: (b)(6)

Subject: FW: Borders Working Group - Recap and Next Meeting! PLEASE NOTE

NEW TIME! BORDERS AND HAJJ! COME ONE COME ALL!

Importance: High

— we missed you at the Hajj and Borders meeting which was all Hajj! Susan

-----Original Message-----

From: Johnson, Susan R. (SES)

Sent: Wednesday, November 19, 2003 10:57 AM

To: (b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6) Willis Franklin K. (SES);
(b)(6) Trent Darrell (SES-6)

Cc: (b)(6) McKee, Robert E. (SES); (b)(6)
(b)(6)

Subject: RE: Borders Working Group - Recap and Next Meeting! PLEASE NOTE NEW TIME! BORDERS AND HAJJ! COME ONE COME ALL!

Importance: High

All

For various reasons that I will not tire you with here, I have decided to temporarily merge the Borders and Hajj Working Groups so propose that we meet TOMORROW, NOVEMBER 20 at 1530 in the Ministries Conference Room. There will not be a meeting today Nov 19 of the drafting group unless (b)(6) wants to hold one. (b)(6) your call.

Comments and Updates:

- 1. On bilateral relations papers and IGC delegation: We have not been able to get information from ministers or GC members before the trip, so let us re-aim on getting feedback from each Minister and GC members on what they did or agreed to in Iran and Turkey. It appears that Syria declined to receive them this time.
- 2. Revision of Order 16: Can/should we get input from appropriate Ministries on Order 16 by showing them the draft or not? Please comment.
 - 3. The Hajj: This has become the key "border" issue of the moment; hence it seems to make sense to combine meetings for the time being. The Iraqi Hajj Working Group has been meeting and taking decisions at the working level which will be presented to the Ministers. Inter alia they have decided that they want to:

Ask the Saudis for a quota of 60,000 even if it is unlikely that the Saudis will agree;

Print 60,000 special Hajj Passports at the Central Bank, paid for by the Awqaf and issued by MOI; (Note that the MOI rep assured those present that this was no problem)

Use the lottery system of selection;

Offer/Provide air charter transport unless the CPA refuses;

Pursue getting Saudi agreement to receive the Iraqi Hajj delegation by having FM Zebari call his counterpart; (is possibility of Talabani letter to Kind Fahd still a live option?)

4. MOT paper is done and I hope that we can discuss it at the meeting.

Other comments and suggestions are welcome.

Keep on trucking - this too shall pass!

Susan Johnson

----Original Message----From: Johnson, Susan R. (SES)

Sent: Monday, November 17, 2003 11:24 PM

Johnson, Susan R. (SES) From: Johnson, Susan R. (SES) Sent: (b)(6)To: Subjed -- have you talked to Transportation about people who think that they are going on the Hajj with the private tour companies independent of whatver Awgaf is doing.... Susan ----Original Message---From: (b)(6) Sent: Friday, November 21, 2003 11:51 AM To: Johnson, Susan R. (SES) Subject: RE: Borders Working Group - Recap and Next Meeting! PLEASE NOTE NEW TIME! BORDERS AND HAJJ! COME ONE COME ALL! Thank you. E have a meeting gtomorrow at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at 1000 Hours on this issue. Will keep you updated. Regards, (b)(6)Ministry of Health Ministry of Religous Affairs ----Original Message----From: Johnson, Susan R. (SES) Sent: Thursday, November 20, 2003 7:51 PM To: (b)(6) Subject: FW: Borders Working Group - Recap and Next Meeting! PLEASE NOTE NEW TIME! BORDERS AND HAJJ! COME ONE COME ALL! Importance: High - we missed you at the Hajj and Borders meeting which was all Hajj! Susan ----Original Message----From: Johnson, Susan R. (SES) Sent: Wednesday, November 19, 2003 10:57 AM **To:** (b)(6) (b)(6)(b)(6) Willis Franklin K. (SES);(b)(6) Trent Darrell (SES-**Cc:** (b)(6) McKee, Robert E. (SES); (b)(6) (b)(6)Subject: RE: Borders Working Group - Recap and Next Meeting! PLEASE NOTE NEW TIME! BORDERS AND HAJJ! COME ONE COME ALL! Importance: High

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11/21/2003

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Sent: Monday, November 17, 2003 11:24 PM

To: (b)(6)

(b)(6)

Cc:(b)(6)

McKee, Robert E. (SES); (b)(6)

(b)(6)

Subject: Borders Working Group - Recap and Next Meeting!

All,

To recap what we covered at our November 15 meeting:

Bilateral Relations Papers. The meeting noted that apart from CJTF7's contribution covering security, there had been no responses to (b)(6)

November asking for inputs for papers for each of Iraq's neighbours. MFA had been given sight of the skeleton paper and were keen to work up there own version for each country. It was agreed there would be another meeting of the drafting group on Wednesday 19 November, leading to a meeting with Ministry officials soon after Eid. Action: addressees of previous 6 November memo (attached) to provide contributions by close of play 19 November.

- IGC Delegation to Syria, Turkey and Iran. This had been postponed until Monday and may skip Syria. It was agreed that it would be useful to work up a short paper for each of the countries visited to set out Iraq's key points for each neighbor. Action: Susan Johnson to ask each Ministry represented on the delegation to submit one or two key points that the Minister would wish to make in each country visited to (b)(6)
- Revision of Order 16. Many comments had been offered and the order was almost ready for submission to Amb Bremer. It was agreed that there would be one final circulation of the draft. Action: CPA MOI to circulate. It was agreed that we would need a plan to explain the order to the IGC (for agreement) and to foreign governments. This would be helped if a short commentary on the main features of the order (and the key changes from the previous version) were drafted. Action: CPA MOI and General Counsel (Eric Pelofsky) to draft commentary.
- The Hajj. There was more or less acceptance that numbers should/would be limited
 to around Iraq's previous quota (24,000) and certainly no more than 30,000. MFA
 Minister Zubari would speak to the GC President Talabani. It was now worth working
 up road and air travel transport plans on this basis.

I propose that the CPA Hajj Support Committee meet on Thursday, Nov 20 at 1430 hours. Let me know if you cannot make it. With the exception of (b)(6) please consider yourselves all action addressees even if your name is on the coline.

Please forward to any addressees that I have missed because we neglected to get an attendance list circulated and let me know. Thanks much!

Susan Johnson

Krawczel, Timothy SES

From: Krawczel, Timothy 0-5 LNO

ینایر، ۱۰:۱٤ ۲۰۰٤ م 14 Sent:

To: (b)(6)

Cc: (b)(2),(b)(6)

Subject: RE: FPS payment wrap up for 8 Jan

(b)(6)

Thanks for all your hard work on the FPS issues.

I worked as advisor to the Ministry of Environment(MoEN) until my departure from CPA on 09 JAN. I wanted to come by and see you before I left, but my schedule did not permit me time to find you in my final days.

The MoEn was created 23 NOV by CPA order # 44. As a late starter, we didn't have may FPS guards handed down to us by the MSCs, so we are a bit different. Also, as we have developed the Ministry's facilities, we have only recently begun to need FPS. Tim Carney has a good wrap up of the history of FPS and the MoEN. The wrapup is contained as background info in recent Eviction Support Requests prepared to ask for CJTF-7 support for an eviction action at the new Ministry Headquarters on 15 JAN.

Essentially, the MoEN hired 75 FPS guards directly from the Ministry of Interior's FPS training academy, starting 01 DEC. We are paying these FPS out of Ministry funds. We project that we will need a total of 230 FPS guards nationwide, this includes about 150 for the governorates, 10 for each of 15 governorates. The other 80 will be in Baghdad.

I was assured repeatedly by your predecessor, (b)(6) that funds to pay these 230 FPS guards in FY 2004 would be put into the MoEN budget. This promise has been repeated by the staff at the Ministry of Finance, as recently as two weeks ago. I have also been assured that the 230 FPS are not subject to the hiring cap, so that we can hire them.

The MoEN has a good Director of Security, (b)(6) Unfortunately, (b)(6) does not speak English. He is also a Grade 6, which means he makes about \$180 a month. So he is just a good, reliable, Iraqi without a big budget, and you probably will never meet him personally.

What we need help with is uniforms for our FPS, weapons and equipment. We received an initial allocation of 18 AK-47s and 1000 rounds of ammunition. I have asked for 75 more AK-47s, and I have been told they are not available. The Ministry will purchase the weapons if necessary. I am also told there are funds in the supplemental budget to cover the purchase of the weapons. I coordinated my requests with BJ Turner and Tom Giboney. Our needs will remain until these requests are filled.


The point of contact in the Senior Advisor's office for the MoEN is (b)(6) can get information out to the MoEN staff. I have copied him on this message.

Thanks again for your hard work. Let me know if you have any questions about the MoEN FPS situation that I can answer.

06/03/2004

I hope to be back in Baghdad at CPA in mid February. In the meantime, I will monitor my e-mail account, and I am glad to help if I can.

LTC Tim Krawczel




Subject. I'w. I't S payment wrap up for a

Ladies and Gentlemen.

<u>Urgent.</u> 1AD has Transferred Authority to the Ministries. Attached is the spreadsheet used by 1AD that indicates by Ministry, who has been paid and who has not. A great number of FPS guards have not been paid for the month of December. This was discussed at the CAT Brief chaired by MOI and CJTF-7 and again at the TOA brief given 7 Jan to all Ministry Reps. Payments must be made ASAP. If assistance is needed, then the Ministry MUST notify CJTF-7 via MOI so 1 AD can be called back in to assist.

Every effort should be made for each Ministry to pay their own guards vice relying on 1 AD.



06/03/2004

(b)(6)(b)(6)From: Wednesday, November 12, 2003 10:10 AM Sent: (b)(6)To: (b)(6)Agresto, John T. (SES); Alhakim, Mohamed; Arsht, Leslye A. (SES); Castle, Edwin S. (SES-2 General Counsel); Evers, Williamson M. (SES); Fatfat, Mounzer R. (SES); (b)(6) (b)(6)(b)(6)Johnson, Susan R. (SES); (b)(6) (b)(6)McKee, Robert F. (SES):(b)(6) (b)(6)(b)(6)Trent Darrell (SES-6) (b)(6)Cc: Crane, Keith W. (SES); (b)(6) Maxwell. (b)(6)Dayton CIV Reconst USAID; (b)(6)

Subject: Updating the Strategic Plan

As a result of the back briefs to Ambassador Bremer, you can expect to update your sections of the Strategic Plan. When you need to do so please contact me and I will provide write access to those you direct to complete the task,

As a general point, the Ambassador wants to see the Tasking disaggregated across the quarters with sequential elements defined in the preceding timeframe, and he would expect there to be relevant supporting plans that underpin the Tasks.

You will notice that I have made some changes to the forms that you use to update the plan. I have kept the format the same but included some instruction on how to select the relevant task or MOE that needs updating. I have also attached a simple flow diagram that I hope will assist you in both assessing the colour status of each the Tasks and to craft the status narrative (note this narrative should relate to the end-state rather than a snapshot report).

While updating the SP please pay particular attention to the MOE, checking for relevance and quantifying the current criteria. There is mounting interest both within the CPA and in Washington in refining the metrics associated with the Plan and you can expect further work in this area.

Finally, I am working with the IMU to further improve access to the database and will keep you informed, in the interim, please pass any constructive comment you may have to me.

Thank you for your continued assistance.

(b)(6) Wing Commander (OF-5) (b)(2)

From:

(b)(6)

Sent:

Thursday, November 13, 2003 5:05 PM

To:

(b)(6)

Subject: FW: Updating the Strategic Plan

(b)(6)

Here's the instructions for getting into the Strategic Plan.

(b)(6)

Senior Advisor

Ministry of Housing and Construction

(b)(2)

----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6)

Sent: Wednesday, November 12, 2003 1:54 PM

To: (b)(6)

Subject: RE: Updating the Strategic Plan

The path to the plan on the CPA Public Folder is:

'right click' on My Computer and 'left click' Explore

then left click in turn on:

My Network Places

Entire Network

Microsoft Windows Network

Orha

Fserv2

Public

Open 'CPA Strategic Plan as of 1 Nov (read only)' folder and select '1 Nov 03 Strategic Plan'

(b)(6)

Wing Commander (OF-5)

(b)(2)

----Original Message----

From: (b)(6)

Sent: Wednesday, November 12, 2003 1:52 PM

To:(b)(6)

Subject: RE: Updating the Strategic Plan

I need a copy of the strategic plan. Where can I get a copy of it?

Thanks (b)(6)

Senior Advisor

Ministry of Housing and Construction

(b)(2)

11/13/2003

-Original Message-----From: (b)(6) Sent: Wednesday, November 12, 2003 10:10 AM To: (b)(6) (b)(6)Agresto, John T. (SES); (b)(6) Arsht, Lesiye A. (SES); Castle, Edwin S. (SES-2 General Counsel); Evers, Williamson M. (SES); Fatfat, Mounzer R. (SES); (b)(6) (b)(6)Johnson, Susan R. (SES); (b)(6) (b)(6)McKee, Robert E. (SES); (b)(6) (b)(6)(b)(6)Trent Darrell (SES-6) Cc: (b)(6) (b)(6)Crane, Keith W. (SES); (b)(6) Maxwell, Dayton CIV Reconst USAID; (b)(6) Subject: Updating the Strategic Plan

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(b)(6) Wing Commander (OF-5) HQ CPA Rm 239 (b)(2)

(b)(6)	
From:	(b)(6)
Sent:	Sunday, November 23, 2003 7:52 PM
To:	(b)(6) Agresto, John T. (SES); (b)(6) Arsht, Lesiye A. (SES); Castle, Edwin S. (SES-2 General Counsel); Evers, Williamson M. (SES);
	Fatfat. Mounzer R. (SES): (b)(6) (b)(6) Johnson, Susan R. (SES); (b)(6) McKee, Robert E. (SES);
	(b)(6) Trent Darrell (SES-6)
Cc:	(b)(6) Johnson, Susan R. (SES): (b)(6) (b)(6) Thatcher, Gary (SES-2): (b)(6)
	(b)(6) Slocombe, Walt B. (SES);(b)(6) (b)(6) (b)(6)
	12); Maxwell, Dayton CIV Reconst USAID (b)(6)

Subject: Strategic Plan Update

A checklist for the task in hand:

- 1. Complete the revised milestone chart for the ministry example format attached .
- 2. In memo format, we need to have from you the top 2-4 priorities to achieve in the period before transition
- 3. In the same memo, please highlight (paragraph maximum) how you will take forward the CPA's top priorities (anti-corruption; civil service capacity building & training; planning for post-CPA work)
- 4. Please go into the Access database and i) update the status narrative and progress colour code for supporting tasks for the last month; ii) revise the entries for tasks for the last and next quarters

The path to the plan on the CPA Public Folder is:

'right click' on My Computer and 'left click' Explore

then left click in turn on:

My Network Places
Entire Network
Microsoft Windows Network
Orha
Fserv2
Public

To read: Open 'CPA Strategic Plan as of 1 Nov (read only)' folder and select '1 Nov 03 Strategic Plan'

11/28/2003



From: (b)(6)

Sent: Monday, February 09, 2004 10:21 PM

To: MOHC - All Staff

Subject: FW: Weekly SITREPs from Regions and Governorates for 5 Feb 04

---Original Message----From: (b)(6) Sent: Monday. February 09, 2004 10:18 PM To:(b)(6) Draham, Joseph (SES-4); (b)(6) (b)(6)Jackson, James (SES-6);(b)(6) (b)(6)Bearpark, Andy (OTHER); Bent, Rodney (SES 4);(b)(6) Casteel, Steven (SES-6); Gast, (b)(6) Lucke, (b)(6)Lewis; McKee, Robert E. (SES); (b)(6) (b)(6)Sudnick, Daniel (SES-6); Nash, David (SES); (b)(6) (b)(6)

Subject: Weekly SITREPs from Regions and Governorates for 5 Feb 04

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR:

THE ADMINISTRATOR

FROM:

Wm. J. Olson, Information Management Unit (IMU)

SUBJECT: Executive Summary of Governorate Coordinator and Regional Coordinator SITREPs

Activities throughout Iraq were limited this past week because of Eid al Adha celebrations. Below are highlights from the 18 Governorates and 4 Regions in Iraq, for January 30 - February 5, 2004:

NORTH:

- The "refreshing" process for the Diyala Provincial Council is complete. The final council has 30 members, closely reflecting the political and ethnic demographic makeup of Diyala province.
- The most senior KDP official killed in Arbil, Deputy PM Sami 'Abd al-Rahman, was buried in Dahuk on February 2.
- Sharif Ali, cousin of the murdered King Faisal II of Iraq, visited Mosul on January 28.
- Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz visited Ninewa February 1-2, visiting the new Stryker company. He also visited Kirkuk on February 2, meeting a cross-section of local community leaders.

BAGHDAD:

2/10/2004

2004 unfunded requirements for Baghdad Province's new democratic institutions are estimated at \$6.7 million: building renovations (.75); office space and equipment (1.6), civil engineering equipment and facilities (3.9), communications and vehicles (.50).

SOUTH CENTRAL:

In Diwaniyah, the official "seating" of Provincial Council will occur on February 8, and the election of the governor will occur on February 10. The process of refreshing the Provincial Council in Karbala is almost complete. The target date for the election of a new governor is February 15.

SOUTH:

- The new regional coordinator, Ambassador Nixon has arrived in post.
- CPA-Basra is awaiting the details of the results of the recently completed Provincial Council refreshment. In An-Nasiriyah, local leaders are demanding election of the council. In Dhi Qar, Muqtada al Sadr and Fudhala representatives organized a sizeable demonstration on January 28 calling for dissolution of the Provincial Council and new ration card elections instead of the current refreshment process.
- The deputy chief of police was murdered this past week in An-Nasiriyah, possibly in revenge for alleged activities under the old regime.
- Confusion continues regarding the 2004 budget and the rollover of balances from 2003.
- There are still difficulties in meeting the quantities of many PDS commodities in Southern Region Governorates, especially for rice, oil, sugar, and tea in Dhi Qar. A monthly coordination committee meeting with the Southern Region MOT state companies regarding PDS food rations distribution is addressing these problems.

ATTACHMENTS:

TAB A - North - Dahuk GC SITREP

TAB B - North - Diyala GC SITREP

TAB C - North - Nineveh GC SITREP

TAB D - North - Salah Ad Din GC SITREP

TAB E - North - Tamim GC SITREP

TAB F - North - Tamim GC Addendum

TAB G.1 - North - Tamim LGP SITREP

TAB G - Baghdad Regional SITREP

TAB H - South Central - An Najaf GC SITREP

TAB I - South Central - Diwaniyah GC SITREP

TAB J - South Central - Karbala GC SITREP

TAB K - South Central - Wasit GC SITREP

TAB L - South Regional SITREP

TAB M - South - Basra GC SITREP

TAB N - South - Dhi Oar GC SITREP

NB: Missing Reports -6 GC SITREPS (Al Anbar, Arbil, Babil, Al Muthanna, Maysan, and Sulaymaniyah) and two Regional Reports (North, South Central) Missing

COORDINATION: Regional Operations (b)(6)

O.K.

FOR CPA INTERNAL USE ONLY

Luft, Rolf D. (SES-2)

To:

From: (b)(6)Friday, March 12, 2004 5:14 PM Sent: (b)(6)(b)(6) (b)(6) Gianaris, George (SES-6) (h)(6) Wethington, Olin (SES-6) (5)(6) Mistretta, Philip (SES-5), (b)(6) (OTHER); Taecker, Kevin (SES-3); (b)(6) (b)(6)Tozer, Raleigh (SES-5):(b)(6) Belka, Marek (CIV); (b)(6) Kurtz, BRYAN (SES-4) (6)(6) (b)(6)(b)(6) Kirdar, Mustafa (SES-1) (h)(6) (b)(6)McKee, Robert E. (SES); (b)(6) Vogler, Gary; (b)(6) (b)(6)(b)(6)Bent, Rodney (SES-4) (b)(6) (b)(6)(b)(6)Luft. Rolf D. (SES-2):(b)(6) (b)(6)Wethington, Olin (SES-6) Rathmell, Andrew (SES1); (b)(6) Sullivan, Thomas L.

Subject: 040312 - circular re UPDATING THE STRATEGIC PLAN

UPDATING THE STRATEGIC PLAN: CPA'S ECONOMIC WORK

From: (b)(6)

Cc:

Staff working on the economic elements of the CPA Strategic Plan

Date: 12 March 2004

(SE5)

UPDATING THE STRATEGIC PLAN: CPA'S ECONOMIC WORK

Summary

1. CPA works to a strategic plan. What each of you is doing in the economic area is a part of it: it consists of a broad range of different objectives. The plan exists as a single document, and that document is used by Amb. Bremer, the Executive Board and other senior staff as a tool for monitoring our progress. We can all use it too to put our own work into the context of all the other economic work

3/13/2004

Tasks and Deliverables

Task	**************************************	Deliverables
	A company registration process is developed and mented and registration of companies is initiated	
•	An approach and plan for registering companies that will result in broad based registration of businesses in Iraq and introduces a unified taxpayer and business identification number, with links to the central statistics office, is developed	Detailed implementation plan
•	A process for registering companies is developed and fully implemented, including a comprehensive public education and outreach program that encourages businesses to register.	Registration process, trained personnel in MOT, a public education campaign that reaches a majority of the business centers in Iraq
•	Options for automating the registration application process via the web are investigated and implemented,	Web site where businesses can get registration information and submit a registration application are developed
•	A publicly searchable database of registered companies and their profile is developed and made available via the web	Searchable companies database accessible via the MOT website
•	Companies are registered and the process is monitored and reported on	Report on registered companies and recommendations to improve the process
KRA: trade	An office focused on supporting foreign companies wanting to with and/or invest in Iraq is established and operational	
•	A concept of operations for this office with defined roles and responsibilities is defined and agreed to by the MOT, and MOT resources are allocated to the development and operation of this office	Concept of operations, roles and responsibilities
•	Policies and procedures that support the concept of operations are developed and MOT staff is trained.	Policies and procedures, trained MOT staff
	The role of this office is publicized, brochures and other materials that support communication with outside companies are developed and published, and where possible this information is posted on the MOT website	Communications plan, publicity materials and information packages, updated website
	An overseas commercial service focused on promoting orts and attracting investments is established and operational	
	A concept of operations for the overseas commercial service with defined roles and responsibilities is defined and agreed to by the MOT, and MOT resources are allocated to the	Concept of operations, roles and responsibilities, staff
) - T=	ada Bromotion	2

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2

	development and operation of this function	assignments
•	Policies and procedures that support the concept of operations are developed and MOT staff is trained and deployed	Policies and procedures, trained staff
•	The role of this office is publicized, brochures and other materials that support communication with outside companies are developed and published, and where possible this information is posted on the MOT website	Communications plan, publicity materials and information packages, updated website
	- Licensing processes are developed and implemented, and se issuance is started	
•	A transparent and process for licensing companies is developed and fully implemented, including the implementation of a public education campaign encouraging businesses to apply for licenses.	Licensing process, trained personnel in MOT, a public education campaign that reaches a majority of the business centers in Iraq
	Options for initiating and tracking the licensing process via the web are developed and implemented	Web site where businesses can get registration information and submit a registration application are developed
•	The licensing process is monitored and reported on	Report on licenses issued an recommendations to improve the process
	 A trade information bureau is established and the collection dissemination of trade related information is started 	
7	The information that will be collected and disseminated by the trade information bureau is defined and processes to support the same are developed	Information requirements, processes for collection and dissemination
•	Staff are trained in the collection and dissemination of information, and contracts for information that has to be purchased are established; agreements are reached with other government agencies that will provide some of this information (CSO, etc)	Trained staff, agreements, and contracts
•	Trade information is made available on the web	Updated website, plan to keep information updated
Com	 A formal process for convening Industry Sector Advisory mittees as a way to gather public comment on trade issues is blished and the formation of committees is initiated 	
	The process is defined and communicated to the business community through the business centers	Process definition
•	community through the business centers	

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The first round is ISAC meetings are held and feedback is ISAC meetings captured and incorporated into policy proposals

KRA - A web based portal for disseminating information to a domestic and international audience and, and capturing feedback and applications is developed and made operational. LONG TERM: This website will evolve into an electronic storefront for the MOT and support various functions including electronic registration of companies, etc.

Portal strategy

 A near term and long terms strategy for implementing a web portal is developed

Portal with static content

 The near term strategy for the portal is implemented and the portal is stood up

Portal management plan

 A content and application management plan is developed and promulgated

Portal evolution plan

A plan for the long term evolution of the portal is developed

Resources Required

Advisors deployment, activity timing and duration will be coordinated with the responsible CPA Technical Advisor. The total cost of this activity is estimated at USD \$1.8m inclusive of all technical assistance, (international and Iraqi), and all publications, training material and study tours.

AD - Trade Promotion February 18, 2004 Draft Page 5 of 5 5

(b)(6)	
From: (b)(6)	
Sent: Sunday, November 09, 2003 7:58 AM	
To: (b)(6) Cc: (b)(6) McKee, Robert E. (SES); Kennedy, Patrick Amb	
Cc: (b)(6) McKee, Robert E. (SES); Kennedy, Patrick Amb Subject: RE:(b)(6)	
(b)(6) had his own agenda. Spent limited time in the office.	
(b)(6) (b)(2)	
Original Message From: (b)(6) Sent: Friday, November 07, 2003 10:56 AM To: (b)(6) Cc: (b)(6) McKee, Robert E. (SES); Kennedy, Patrick Amb	
Cc:(b)(6) McKee, Robert E. (SES); Kennedy, Patrick Amb Subject: RE:(b)(6)	
(b)(6)	
I am sorry I couldn't recall your name as the person who came into my office with (b)(6) and talked to me about (b)(6). I thought it was Mr. Mckee. In that meeting I have asked for a written confirmation of the verbal massage conveyed to me. I suggested an e-mail. I have been told it will be sent to Pat Kennedy and it should be forwarded to me. I sent an e-mail dated October 17 th asking for that confirmation, below is a copy of that e-mail. After more than two weeks I am still waiting to receive a written evaluation of the person performance and the reason for his dismissal from the Oil Ministry team. I am sorry but we need this written evaluation for his file as well. We have a process and a procedure that we must document.	e w ne
Thanks (b)(6)	
From: (b)(6) Sent: Friday, November 07, 2003 9:54 AM To: (b)(6) Cc: (b)(6) Subject: (b)(6) (b)(6)	
I discussed the issue of (b)(6) and the same and his actions within CPA Oil with you the one of not Mr. McKee. Subsequently, the issue of his presence within CPA Oil was raised to Mr. Kennedy, I believe through your shop. I spoke with Mr. Kennedy at the time and to my knowledge the issue was resolved. As such I do understand what you are requesting. Due to lapse of time from our prior meeting, including not being part of the IRCD, I feel that it would be inappropriate to provide any additional information that has already been conveyed to you verbally. Sincerely,	
(b)(6)	

11/9/2003

(b)(2)

----Original Message From:(b)(6) Sent: Saturday, October 18, 2003 10:45 AM To:(b)(6) Subject: FW:(b)(6)

(b)(6)

This is the e-mail I sent.

(b)(6)

----Original Message-From: (b)(6) Sent: Saturday, October 18, 2003 9:41 AM To: McKee, Robert E. (SES)
Cc: Crear, Robert BG CFLCC/3A-FWD-USACE; (b)(6)
Subject: (b)(6)

Mr. Mckee

Would you please confirm what you told me yesterday about (b)(6)

Thanks (b)(6)

11/9/2003

From: (b)(6)

Sent: Thursday, December 18, 2003 4:39 PM

To:

(b)(6)

Subject: FW: Fuel Lines - talks between CPA, MOO & SUMO

Please pass to Ambassador Bremer before he leaves for the interview. We'll finally making some progress on the fuel issue.

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6)

Sent: Thursday, December 18, 2003 4:01 PM

To: (b)(6)

Cc:

Subject: Fuel Lines - talks between CPA, MOO & SUMO

(b)(6)

You asked to be kept informed of moves either by the CPA Senior Adviser or the Ministry of Oil to inform people about the fuel line issues.

The following was agreed at the meeting today at the Daura Oil Refinery, it involved CPA reps inc Rob Mckee – senior advisor, and Gen Jim Jackson of Gen. Kelloggs office, plus reps of Sumo, the refineries and distribution points, and the Ministry's technical director Mr Samir. I am going to the Ministry on Saturday with a CPA representative to see Mr Samir and the Public Affairs team (fingers crossed) to get approval of the proposed Iraqi press article.

- From Today (Thurs 18 Dec) The Ministry has started limiting amount per customer to 30litres, down from 50litres and implementing a system of odd and even registration numbers.
- They have started a public information campaign, using TV and putting signs up at stations to let people know
- Imports are being increased, with fuel coming from Kuwait, Jordan and Syria.
 Barges are being used and trucks will be escorted not only to the distribution points but also to gas stations to combat balck market sales.
- . Government Gas stations will stay open for longer, some for 24hours

Hope this helps, more to come I hope.

Thanks

(b)(6)

12/18/2003

Bremer, Paul

From: (b)(6)

Saturday, December 20, 2003 1:09 PM

Sent

Bremer, Paul

Cc:

(b)(6) 'Dempsey, Martin BG (P) (1AD CMD GRP CG)'; McKee, Robert E. (SES); Hertling, Mark P. BG (1AD CMD GRP ADC-S); (b)(6)

(b)(2),(b)(6)

Subject: BAGHDAD GASOLINE DISTRIBUTION CRISIS

(b)(6)

The comment in this mornings meeting was not to point out the obvious gasoline problem. It was to record a dissenting view that there is no supply problem in the city and it is only a manageable distribution problem. The problems and the solutions are multi faceted and complex.

Many, many people are working on the supply aspect of this issue. Below are some of the recommended actions at the distribution level of the problem.

AIM:

More effectively manage the constantly changing distribution of the limited supply of gasoline in Baghdad.

RECOMMENDED ACTIONS:

- Ask all parties (IGC, Ministry OF Oil (MoO), CPA, 1st AD) to recognize we will have a
 changing limited supply of gasoline available in Baghdad for at least the next month and we
 must move into a real time crisis mode to manage the distribution of that limited supply.
- Immediately establish a JOINT Fuel Distribution Crises Management Team to operate at the
 Ministry of Oil Headquarters, Refinery and Tank Farms (1ST AD are setting up a crisis
 distribution team to work with the MoO but it will only be available for 48 hours, the Joint Fuel
 Distribution Crises Management Team is required on a permanent basis).
- Members would be:
 - MoO Distribution, Supply, Storage, Production and Imports divisions;
 - o A representative from the Senior Advisors office;
 - o 1st AD representation;
 - o Strategic Communications representation;
 - o TF RIO; and
 - o IPS.
- Assignments
 - Constantly share the changing facts on time, amounts and locations of gasoline and diesel available for distribution in Baghdad.
 - Constantly decide where, when and how to distribute the limited supply based on facts fed in from distribution points and fed back to the distribution points.
 - Communicate the constantly changing distribution routes to the 1st AD to enable
 military escorts of re-supply trucks from tank farm to gas stations, to plug the smuggling
 holes.

12/20/2003

- Dispatch military escorts on the basis of wherever the Crises Management Team decides to send gasoline from a standby pool of escorts.
 - o Continue to provide military presence and patrols by 1st AD at the gas stations.
 - Insist MoO put either its Oil Police or some of its 5000 FPS on the gas station level distribution system to discipline the lines.
 - Strategic Communications jointly develop reoccurring IO/PR campaigns that reflect the constantly changing gas conditions in the city.
- Establish a worst case scenario contingency plan for the crisis to include, in the next 24 hours, an analysis of:
 - A political decision to declare a national emergency, which could entail the military take over of the distribution system if required.
 - o Analysis of the option of closing stations on a rotating basis to provide time to build up enough known stock to help manage the distribution.
 - Deciding when and who will take the political heat to increase the price of gasoline (CPA, IGC, IMF) to allow market forces to dampen hording, smuggling and black-market leaks in the current distribution system.

Regional Coordinator CPA-B

From: (b)(6)

Sunday, December 21, 2003 4:56 AM Sent:

Jones, Richard H. (AMB) To:

Cc: **Executive Secretary**

Subject: End of the Day Emails to Bremer/2 PM Phone Calls/Green Folders

On the items in this morning's Green Folder:

We emailed to Bremer last night only the three Gompert memos. All other items of importance we will save for a comprehensive end-of-the-day ExecSec email he has requested. We will provide you with a copy of these daily emails.

Amb Bremer asked us to send him an end-of-the-day email to supplement your daily 2pm phone calls, which he asked me to sit in on. When you leave, he said he would call me daily. He asked me to look at everything going into (b)(6) during his absence.

ExecSec plans to let you know by noon each day if there are any items we are aware of that you would want to consider raising during your 2pm phone call. Items Bremer mentioned to me for specific follow-up were

-the \$5mil Rodney Bent would make available immediately from seized assets to Rob McKee for energy repairs (done last night)

-the WFP letter from (b)(6) (in the green folder)

-announcement of rewards for the 13, already approved by State.

-Rodney Bent was providing to him a Jan 5 100-page draft paper that OMB is supposed to comment on by Monday, which will list what we will have accomplished by June 30. CPA Rear has a copy of this report. (I came in late to the conversation and didn't get the details.)

ExceSec will put together its usual Welcome Home Book on Saturday and Sunday for transmission to Washington on Sunday for his return plane reading. We will provide you with a copy, and an opportunity to review if you get back in time.

We have a copy for you of the Strategic Plan as of December 20 which Bremer took with him

Please don't hesitate to let us know if there is anything clse you would like us, or me, to do. .(b)(6)

Executive Assistant, CPA Administrator Head of CPA Executive Secretariat

(b)(6)From:

Monday, December 22, 2003 3:45 AM Sent:

Jones, Richard H. (AMB); (b)(6) To:

Cc: **Executive Secretary**

Subject: FW: End of Day Email for December 21 - PRINTED

ExecSec: Please log and file this, but you do not need to copy attachments. Thanks.

----Original Message----

From: (b)(6)
Sent: Monday, December 22, 2003 3:04 AM

To:(b)(2) Bremer, Paul; Bremer, Paul (OSD)

Cc: Executive Secretary

Subject: End of Day Email for December 21

We understand you spoke with Amb Jones during the day and he reviewed with you the NSA and Governance issues. He also briefed you on the Badran meeting re recalling Army border guards, and provided a Hajj update.

The three items you mentioned to me (\$5mil to Rob McKee for energy repairs, your WFP response to (b)(6) and the announcement of the rewards for the 13) have all been attended to.

From last night's and today's read folders, items of note:

- Amb Jones signed out two PRB allocation requests #52: \$5mil emergency fuel response program. #51: \$30.5mil for various projects, to include poultry production OFF contracts, \$16.7mil; ICE, \$10mil; CPA(S) Integrated Security Sector Reform, \$8.5mil; Ag College Abu Ghraib, \$1 mil; Iraqi CT training, \$300k.
- Info Memo from the British on the Civil Service Capacity Building Program. Attached
- Info Memos Weekly Report from SrAdv Transport Ministry and Weekly Oil Revenue Report. Attached above.

We sent to you by separate emails the three Gompert memos and the fuel memo emails that didn't show you as a separate addressee. (b)(6) called in with Strategic Plan instructions for (D)(6) (b)(6)

We are asking CPA Rear to provide you with copies of significant cable traffic (both CPA outgoing and incoming), which are indexed for your review at the end of this email. CPA Rear will pull only those items you indicate you are interested in reading. We are holding for plane reading reporting from the GoyCoordinators and other memos, all of which Amb Jones will have reviewed.

Should you need to reach ExecSec, 24-hour cellphone numbers are (b)(2)

12/22/2003

(b)(2),(b)(6)

Everyone in ExecSec is

on the ready that you could call at any time for a general update. We will have duty officer split shifts 8am-8pm on the 25th and the 26th. The main ExecSec number can most easily be reached through Ops or Cables. We have advised CPA Rear, Defense Cables, State Ops, and WH SitRm of our hours and numbers.

(One final note: I am concerned that if there is no "by-name request" for A-100 class members (b)(6) to work in ExecSec and be registered in the Jan 5-9 DS

class, it may be too late to get them on board. The others -(b)(6)

and (b)(6) can wait for the February/March DS classes. (b)(6)

have both expressed keen interest in having the last three work for them in the Information Management Unit and Provincial Outreach offices and have even drawn up position descriptions for them, which have been forwarded to Reuben, who is on board to try to make this happen.)

CPA Cables Transmitted:

0396 - National Unity Statement

0397 - De-Baathification and Reconciliation

0401 - Preparation for Iraqi Hajj

0403 - CPA Priority Policy Staffing

CPA Cables Awaiting Clearance/Approval (should be transmitted by OOB WashDC time):

0385 - ExecBd Minutes 12/14

0400 - Bremer 12/20 Meeting with Ministers

0402 - Bremer Meeting with IGC Members Khuzai and Chapuk

0404 - Review of Iraqi Political Transition

0405 - Sharif Ali Memcon

Incoming Cables of Possible Interest

Rome 5661 – Italians Seek Support with Bombing Investigation

Manama 2951 - Bremer in Bahrain Mixing Diplomacy and Sports

London 10078 - IGC Del in London

Kiev 47777 - FM Hryshchenko on Iraq: Al Kut, Contracts, Staffing

State 34583 - Transfer of JPRC Funds to DFI

(b)(6)

Executive Assistant, CPA Administrator Head of CPA Executive Secretariat

12/22/2003

From:

Sent:

Monday, February 23, 2004 7:35 AM

To:

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Subject: FW: Accountability of Iraqi Assets

----Original Message----

From: (b)(6)

Sent: Saturday, January 24, 2004 10:29 AM

To: (b)(6)

Subject: FW: Accountability of Iraqi Assets

This should be interesting ...

----Original Message----From: Oates, Michael C. (O-6)

Sent: Sunday, January 11, 2004 12:46 PM

To: Wilkinson, Molly A. (SES); (b)(2),(b)(6) (b)(6) Casteel, Steven W. (SES-O6); (b)(6) (b)(6) Bent, Rodney G. (SES); (b)(6)

McKee, Robert E.

Nash David

(SES); (b)(6) (SES) (b)(6)

(b)(6) **Cc:** (b)(6)

Subject: Accountability of Iraqi Assets

All

has directed me to have all money being held in the senior advisor's or Directors possession accounted for and deposited with the comptroller for storage in the CPA vault **NLT COB 13 Jan**. The storage of any money in the office (other than personal funds) is <u>prohibited</u>. No petty cash accounts are authorized.

Lucke, Lewis; (b)(6)

Please provide all receipts for expenditure of Iraqi assets to the Comptroller by appointment **NLT 31 Jan 2004**. These receipts should cover the period of ORHA creation though present to account for all receipt and expenditure of Iraqi assets as best you can provide.

Please report back when:

- You have cleared all cash with the comptroller
- You have closed receipt account with the comptroller.

Thanks

2/23/2004

(b)(6)		
From:	(b)(6)	
Sent:	Friday, February 27, 2004	4 9:00 PM
То:	(b)(6) (SES6); McKee, Robert E (b)(6)	Bent, Rodney (SES-4); Casteel, Steven Mr. (CIV); Schmults, Edward C. (SES); (b)(6) Carpenter, Scott (SES-2);
Cc:	(b)(6) (b)(6) (b)(6)	Vogler, Gary;(b)(6)
	(O-5); Smith, Frederick (S(b)(6)	SES-6);(b)(6)

Subject: CJTF-7 Draft Assessment

All.

This Sunday (b)(6) and (b)(6) will discuss and update with the Executive Board on their ministry transition status assessment (which they coordinated with you for your Ministry). Your thoughts on this CJTF-7 document will shed further light on the discussion in general. Your awareness of CJTF-7's current thinking, vis-à-vis the transition and post June Iraq, will help you better articulate your discussions with CPA leadership. Any thoughts you provide will help better inform the decisions of CPA and CJTF-7 leadership. Your input will also help clarify and bring to front your concerns and recommendations — so there is ample motivation for you to take an active role.

The attached paper is the CJTF-7 draft view of which services are essential to maintaining a stable Iraq and which ones are most at risk. The services they selected are provided by your ministry. Please review this paper from your perspective and pass us your initial comments by the end of Saturday. We will share these and any further comments you may have with the CJTF-7 planners.

Tuesday, (b)(6) and the CJTF-7 representatives will bring this document to the Joint Planning Group.

```
V/R
(b)(6)

Military Assistant to
CPA Director of Civil Affairs
(b)(2)

"Inveniam Viam Aut Faciam"

----Original Message----
From: (b)(6)
Sent: Thursday, February 26, 2004 11:49 AM
To: Sullivan, Thomas L. (SE5); (b)(6)
Cc: (b)(6)
Subject:
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Sir,

Enclosed are the two documents we promised you.



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(b)(6)From:

Thursday, January 08, 2004 9:27 PM Sent:

To:

Executive Secretary: (b)(6)

Bent, Rodney G. (SES); McKee, Robert E. (SES)

Cc:

Subject: RE: TASKER FOR AMBASSADOR BREMER: RECOMMENDATION ON SOLE-SOURCING

RAPID PIPELINE REPAIR CAPABILITY

Please see attachment

(b)(6)Oil Advisor

-----Original Message-From: Executive Secretary

Sent: Thursday, January 08, 2004 11:06 AM

To: McKee, Robert E. (SES); Vogler, Gary; (b)(6) Bent, Rodney G. (SES)

Cc: (b)(6) **Executive Secretary**

Subject: TASKER FOR AMBASSADOR BREMER: RECOMMENDATION ON SOLE-SOURCING RAPID

PIPELINE REPAIR CAPABILITY

Gentlemen:

Ambassador Bremer would like a recommendation on whether we should sole-source a rapid pipeline repair capability as an urgent requirement by COB tomorrow.

He would like to know precisely what that would do for us in dollar terms using a few historical examples. In other words, sabotage result in loss of "X" revenues over "X" repair time. With a rapid repair capability, we could have cut repair time to "Y" with lost revenues of "Y." We need to take into account (as best we can) the time to move people and equipment around.

He would also like an estimate on how much sooner we can field this capability if we sole source.

This Tasker needs to be coordinated with Finance.

Thank you in advance,

Executive Secretariat Coalition Provisional Authority

Johnson, Susan R. (SES)

From:

Helmick, Frank G. - BG, DCG 101st ABN

Sent:

Saturday, November 29, 2003 5:32 AM

To:

Johnson, Susan R. (SES)

Cc:

(b)(6)

Subject: RE: Fielding a Delegation to go to Ankara immediately after Eid

Susan --

If the weather holds we can make it to your location at 9AM on Sunday — we may have to come down on Saturday PM — we will see. Do they link directly with you at CPA HQ?

(b)(3):10 USC §130c

(b)(6) Recommend you all come down here early PM approx 1300 since Ministry of Interior is cnx @ Harbur Gate — coordinated for movement to Baghdad around 1800 — depart for an arrival at 2000 or so. Then there should be no issue with link-up or meeting on Sunday.

(b) please schedule a/c.

AASLT! HELMICK ADC (O)

101st AIRBORNE DIVISION (AIR ASSAULT)

----Original Message-----

From: Johnson, Susan R. (SES) [mailto (b)(2) Sent: Friday, November 28, 2003 11:19 PM

To: Helmick, Frank G. - BG, DCG 101st ABN

Cc: (b)(6)

Major General David H. Petraeus

(E-mail); (b)(6)

(CIV); Carpenter, Scott CIV Ministry of Governance

Subject: RE: Fielding a Delegation to go to Ankara immediately after Eid

Frank - thanks for the input.

- 1. We plan to have a meeting Saturday late afternoon for the CPA participants to go over our goals for the visit. I have no problem with the team you suggest. It is likely that we will field a large group for the border meetings which will probably take place on Monday morning.
- 2. I don't have a specific time for Sunday departure but estimate it will be around 9am or so. Can you make that?
 - 3. Thanks for your objectives. Re point 1, these would seem achievable. Re point 2 I am not sure this will fly unless the KDP can come up with some additional gestures of goodwill. Stop flying KDP flag, and maybe some other things that we need to flush out. Re 3 and 4, what steps can be taken to reduce the amount of smuggling?

Susan

From: Helmick, Frank G. - BG, DCG 101st ABN

Sent: Friday, November 28, 2003 9:35 PM

To: Johnson, Susan R. (SES)

Cc:(b)(6)

Petraeus (E-mail); (b)(6)

Subject: RE: Fielding a Delegation to go to Ankara Immediately after Eid

Susan-

Hate to bombard you with e-mails but this dog gone meeting is so important - here is how i recommend we can work this --

Our team 3 pax - (b)(6) In charge of 101st delegation

- he is assigned to Ankara - currently the Army military attaché to

Turkey - speaks fluent Turkish - but works as the 101st LNO as well especially on border issues - trying to hitch a ride back to Ankara since he resides 1/2 the time in Silopi and has a true understanding of the Harbur Gate issues - will be invaluable in the meeting

(b)(6) - legal counsel

Will have the team arrive at CPA HQ on Sunday AM - you name time - we will have them there for link up with you or your rep -

Objectives for the 101st Airborne Division -

Efficient Operation of both sides of Harbur Gate –
 24 hours a day – operation – (our data indicates a juil between 2300-0800 or during shift changes)
 700 fuel trucks per day is the goal



Let me know if any of this is off base and thanks.

AASLT! HELMICK ADC (O) 101st AIRBORNE DIVISION (AIR ASSAULT)

----Original Message---From: Johnson, Susan R. (SES) (b)(2)
Sent: Friday, November 28, 2003 6:19 PM

To: Helmick, Frank G. - BG, DCG 101st ABN
Subject: RE: Fielding a Delegation to go to Ankara immediately after Eld

No, I am off to Bosnía, Brcko to be precise, in January. But first let's get this delegation up to Ankara, well prepared and ready to make real and lasting progress. SJ

----Original Message-----

From: Helmick, Frank G. - BG, DCG 101st ABN Sent: Friday, November 28, 2003 5:19 PM

To: Johnson, Susan R. (SES)

Subject: RE: Fielding a Delegation to go to Ankara immediately after Eid

Susan-

You are awesome – just returned from Harbur gate – have a bunch of things we need to get done at the meeting – will pass to MG Petraeus for approval of priority and then will forward to you for your thoughts as well. Way to go – you will make a little history before you depart – I thought you mentioned you were going to a new billet soon? Am I off base on that?

AASLT! HELMICK ADC (O) 101st AIRBORNE DIVISION (AIR ASSAULT)

-----Original Message-----

From: Johnson, Susan R. (SES) [mailto:(b)(2) Sent: Friday, November 28, 2003 4:47 PM To: Helmick, Frank G. - BG, DCG 101st ABN

Cc: (b)(6)

Subject: RE: Fielding a Delegation to go to Ankara immediately after Eid

Frank – I will forward you and (b)(6) and an email that I just sent out. Looks like departure will slip to Sunday morning as Turks can't get all the players to the table on Sunday after the 9 day Eid holiday.

Cheers,

Susan

p.s. The Iraqis have now agreed to talk about a second border crossing..... let's see the content!

-----Original Message-----

From: Helmick, Frank G. - BG, DCG 101st ABN Sent: Friday, November 28, 2003 9:31 AM

To: Johnson, Susan R. (SES)

Cc: (b)(6)

(b)(6)

Subject: RE: Fielding a Delegation to go to Ankara immediately after Eld

Susan-

MG Petraeus asked if our Colonel Commander responsible for border operations -(b)(6) could be the rep - he is really the most knowledgeable one - MG Petraeus asked him to move his command post to Harbur Gate this past week so he has been living up there for a few days now

- he will be value added to the group to be sure.

I have cc'ed him on this e-mail — and if your team agrees all he will need is a link up time and location — and some background info. If the C-130 can come up to Mosul to pick him up on the way that would be ideal — plus I could at least say howdy to you and tell you thanks personally for getting this moving.

Let me know and we will do what we need so this negotiation will and can be successful.

As always thanks in advance -

AASLT! HELMICK ADC (O) 101st AIRBORNE DIVISION (AIR ASSAULT)

----Original Message----

From: BG Helmick [mailto (b)(2)

Sent: Friday, November 28, 2003 5:41 AM

To: 'Johnson, Susan R. (SES)'

Subject: RE: Fielding a Delegation to go to Ankara

immediately after Eld

Susan~

Have heard about the delegation going, and thankful that you (CPA/Turks/Iraqis) are moving forward on the Issue. Have not seen anything on this trail of e-mails to be sure.

Let me get with my boss on this one - will let you know soonest.

AASLT! HELMICK

ADC (O)

101st AIRBORNE DIVISION (AIR ASSAULT)

----Original Message-----

From: Johnson, Susan R. (SES)

[mailto(b)(2)

Sent: Thursday, November 27, 2003 11:32 PM To: Helmick, Frank G. - BG, DCG 101st ABN

Cc: (b)(6)

Subject: FW: Fielding a Delegation to go to Ankara

immediately after Eid

Frank – I am not sure that anyone has contacted you about this, so I am forwarding the relevant e mails. Wanted to make sure that you had the opportunity to be included or designate an appropriate person.

The object is to sit down with the Turks and work out a plan for decongesting Habur Gate/Ibrahim Khalil on a more permanent basis.

Our Embassy in Ankara recommended that we send up

a delegation. It is mostly Iraqi but we are sending Amb Jones, the new deputy Administrator for Policy.

Can you go? Please advise.

Thanks,

Susan Johnson

----Original Message-----

From: Johnson, Susan R. (SES)

Sent: Thursday, November 27, 2003 11:27 PM

To: Casteel, Steven W. (SES-06); Carpenter, Scott CIV

Ministry of Governance

Cc: Wilkinson, Molly A. (SES); (b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Vogler, Gary; Smith, Stephen T. (AMB)

Subject: FW: Fielding a Delegation to go to Ankara

immediately after Eid

Steve and (b)(6)

This is where we are on the delegation to Ankara. It may travel as soon as Saturday evening, via c-130 from BIAP.

Steve: We need to have an Iraqi MOI, preferably the MOI Chief of Customs and/or Border Guards that went up to Habur last time.

Can you get me the name of an Iraqi MOI rep by Friday morning and let me know if any CPA MOI will go as well or not.

(b)(6) - do you want to send anyone from Governance?

Right now the delegation includes 12 persons:

Ambassador Jones (CPA)

The Deputy Minister of Trade, plus 3, plus (b)(6)

(b)(6)Ambassador Sabah from the MFA;

SOMO deputy DG Fatin H. Fatohi, CPA Oil advisor (b)(6) KBR rep (b)(6)

MOI rep to be identified

General Helmick (101rst)

We still need to confirm with Embassy Ankara that they can get us the right meetings with the Turks on Sunday, Nov 30. (b)(6) can you handle this? Thanks,

Susan Johnson

----Original Message-----

From: Johnson, Susan R. (SES)

Sent: Wednesday, November 26, 2003 10:50 AM

To: McKee, Robert E. (SES); Vogler, Gary; Casteel, Steven W. (SES-O6); Carpenter, Scott CIV Ministry of Governance; Jones,

Richard H. (AMB)

Cc: (b)(6) (b)(6)

Subject: Fielding a Delegation to go to Ankara immediately after Eid

At the 8am meeting this morning we agreed that per Embassy Ankara's recommendation, we would send a team to Ankara immediately after the Eid holidays to talk with the Turks about the Habur gate and the need to ensure that bulk fuel flows smoothly and regularly, especially through the winter months.

- I think that we all agree that this should be an Iraqi heavy delegation, especially following the Talabani delegation that has just returned and our repeated desire that the Turks engage with the Iraqis.
- 2. In order to underscore how seriously we and the Iraqis take this issue and that it is not just a routine border issue, we recommend an Iraqi Minister or at the least, deputy Minister, lead the delegation, and that Ambassador Jones, as Deputy Administrator, represent the CPA side politically.
- 3. The delegation should include appropriate people from the Iraqi Ministries of Oil, Interior and Foreign Affairs. Please contact your Minister/Ministry asap and decide who will travel. This should be on Saturday or Sunday, Nov 29 or 30, if at all possible. On the CPA side, in addition to Ambassador Jones, Oil and Interior should decide who they should send.

Please give me your recommended nominees as soon as you can and no later than Friday morning.

I welcome any other suggestions. Many thanks,

Susan

- 2. I don't have a specific time for Sunday departure but estimate it will be around 9am or so. Can you make that?
 - 3. Thanks for your objectives. Re point 1, these would seem achievable. Re point 2 I am not sure this will fly unless the KDP can come up with some additional gestures of goodwill. Stop flying KDP flag, and maybe some other things that we need to flush out. Re 3 and 4, what steps can be taken to reduce the amount of smuggling?

Susan

-----Original Message----From: Helmick, Frank G. - BG, DCG 101st ABN
Sent: Friday, November 28, 2003 9:35 PM
To: Johnson, Susan R. (SES)
Cc: (b)(6)

Major General
David H. Petraeus (E-mail);(b)(6)
Subject: RE: Fielding a Delegation to go to Ankara immediately after Eid

Susan-

Hate to bombard you with e-mails but this dog gone meeting is so important – here is how I recommend we can work this –

Our team 3 pax - (b)(6) in charge of 101st delegation
- he is assigned to Ankara - currently the Army military
attaché to Turkey - speaks fluent Turkish - but works as the 101st LNO as well especially on border
issues - trying to hitch a ride back to Ankara since he resides 1/2 the time in Silopi and has a true
understanding of the Harbur Gate issues - will be invaluable in the meeting
(b)(6)
- legal counsel

Will have the team arrive at CPA HQ on Sunday AM - you name time - we will have them there for link up with you or your rep -

Objectives for the 101st Airborne Division --

Efficient Operation of both sides of Harbur Gate —
 24 hours a day — operation — (our data indicates a luli between 2300-0800 or during shift changes)

700 fuel trucks per day is the goal



Let me know if any of this is off base and thanks.

AASLT! HELMICK ADC (O) 101st AIRBORNE DIVISION (AIR ASSAULT)

----Original Message----

From: Johnson, Susan R. (SES) [mailto (b)(2) Sent: Friday, November 28, 2003 6:19 PM
To: Helmick, Frank G. - BG, DCG 101st ABN

Subject: RE: Fielding a Delegation to go to Ankara immediately after Eid

No, I am off to Bosnia, Brcko to be precise, in January. But first let's get this delegation up to Ankara, well prepared and ready to make real and lasting progress. SJ

----Original Message----

From: Helmick, Frank G. - BG, DCG 101st ABN Sent: Friday, November 28, 2003 5:19 PM

To: Johnson, Susan R. (SES)

Subject: RE: Fielding a Delegation to go to Ankara immediately after Eid

Susan-

You are awesome – just returned from Harbur gate – have a bunch of things we need to get done at the meeting – will pass to MG Petraeus for approval of priority and then will forward to you for your thoughts as well. Way to go – you will make a little history before you depart – I thought you mentioned you were going to a new billet soon? Am I off base on that?

AASLT! HELMICK ADC (O) 101st AIRBORNE DIVISION (AIR ASSAULT)

----Original Message-----

From: Johnson, Susan R. (SES)

[mailto (b)(2)

Sent: Friday, November 28, 2003 4:47 PM To: Helmick, Frank G. - BG, DCG 101st ABN

Cc: (b)(6)

(b)(6)

Subject: RE: Flelding a Delegation to go to Ankara immediately after Eid

Frank - I will forward you and (b)(6) an email that I just sent out. Looks like departure will slip to Sunday morning as Turks can't get all the players to the table on Sunday after the 9 day Eid holiday.

Cheers,

Susan

p.s. The Iraqis have now agreed to talk about a second border crossing..... let's see the content!

-----Original Message-----

From: Helmick, Frank G. - BG, DCG 101st ABN Sent: Friday, November 28, 2003 9:31 AM

To: Johnson, Susan R. (SES)

Cc: (b)(6)

(b)(6)

Subject: RE: Fielding a Delegation to go to Ankara

immediately after Eid

Susan-

MG Petraeus asked if our Colonel Commander responsible for border operations -(b)(6) could be the rep — he is really the most knowledgeable one — MG Petraeus asked him to move his command post to Harbur Gate this past week so he has been living up there for a few days now — he will be value added to the group to be sure.

I have cc'ed him on this e-mail — and if your team agrees all he will need is a link up time and location — and some background info. If the C-130 can come up to Mosul to pick him up on the way that would be ideal — plus I could at least say howdy to you and tell you thanks personally for getting this moving.

Let me know and we will do what we need so this negotiation will and can be successful.

As always thanks in advance -

AASLTI HELMICK ADC (O) 101st AIRBORNE DIVISION (AIR ASSAULT)

----Original Message----

From: BG Helmick [mailto:(b)(2)

Sent: Friday, November 28, 2003 5:41 AM

To: 'Johnson, Susan R. (SES)'

Subject: RE: Fielding a Delegation to go to Ankara

immediately after Eid

Susan-

Have heard about the delegation going, and thankful that you (CPA/Turks/iraqis) are moving forward on the issue. Have not seen anything on this trail of e-mails to be sure.

Let me get with my boss on this one - will let you know soonest.

AASLT! HELMICK ADC (O) 101st AIRBORNE DIVISION (AIR ASSAULT)

----Original Message----

From: Johnson, Susan R. (SES)

[mailto (b)(2)

Sent: Thursday, November 27, 2003 11:32 PM To: Helmick, Frank G. - BG, DCG 101st ABN

Cc: (b)(6)

Subject: FW: Fielding a Delegation to go to Ankara

immediately after Eid

Frank - I am not sure that anyone has contacted you about this, so I am forwarding the relevant e mails. Wanted to make sure that you had the opportunity to be included or designate an appropriate person.

The object is to sit down with the Turks and work out a plan for decongesting Habur Gate/Ibrahim Khalil on a more permanent basis.

Our Embassy in Ankara recommended that we send up a delegation. It is mostly Iraqi but we are sending Amb Jones, the new deputy Administrator for Policy.

Can you go? Please advise.

Thanks,

Susan Johnson

-----Original Message-----

From: Johnson, Susan R. (SES)

Sent: Thursday, November 27, 2003 11:27 PM

To: Casteel, Steven W. (SES-06); Carpenter, Scott CIV

Ministry of Governance

Cc: Wilkinson, Molly A. (SES);(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Vogler, Gary; Smith, Stephen T. (AMB)

Subject: FW: Fielding a Delegation to go to Ankara

immediately after Eid

Steve and (b)(6)

This is where we are on the delegation to Ankara. It may travel as soon as Saturday evening, via c-130 from BIAP.

Steve: We need to have an Iraqi MOI, preferably the MOI Chief of Custom's and/or Border Guards that went up to Habur last time.

Can you get me the name of an Iraqi MOI rep by Friday morning and let me know if any CPA MOI will go as well or not.

(b)(6)

do you want to send anyone from Governance?

Right now the delegation includes 12 persons:

Ambassador Jones (CPA)

The Deputy Minister of Trade, plus 3, plus (b)(6)

(b)(6)

Ambassador Sabah from the MFA; SOMO deputy DG Fatin H. Fatohi, CPA Oil advisor (b)(6) KBR rep (b)(6)

MOI rep to be identified General Helmick (101rst)

We still need to confirm with Embassy Ankara that they can get us the right meetings with the Turks on Sunday, Nov 30. (b) can you handle this? Thanks,

Susan Johnson

-----Original Message-----

From: Johnson, Susan R. (SES)

Sent: Wednesday, November 26, 2003 10:50 AM

To: McKee, Robert E. (SES); Vogler, Gary; Casteel, Steven W. (SES-O6); Carpenter, Scott CIV Ministry of Governance; Jones, Richard H. (AMB)

Cc:(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Subject: Fielding a Delegation to go to Ankara immediately after Eid

At the 8am meeting this morning we agreed that per Embassy Ankara's recommendation, we would send a team to Ankara immediately after the Eid holidays to talk with the Turks about the Habur gate and the need to ensure that bulk fuel flows smoothly and regularly, especially through the winter months.

- I think that we all agree that this should be an Iraqi heavy delegation, especially following the Talabani delegation that has just returned and our repeated desire that the Turks engage with the Iraqis.
- 2. In order to underscore how seriously we and the Iraqis take this issue and that it is not just a routine border issue, we recommend an Iraqi Minister or at the least, deputy Minister, lead the delegation, and that Ambassador Jones, as Deputy Administrator, represent the CPA side politically.
- 3. The delegation should include appropriate people from the Iraqi Ministries of Oil, Interior and Foreign Affairs. Please contact your Minister/Ministry asap and decide who will travel. This should be on Saturday or Sunday, Nov 29 or 30, if at all possible. On the

CPA side, in addition to Ambassador Jones, Oil and Interior should decide who they should send.

Please give me your recommended nominees as soon as you can and no later than Friday morning.

I welcome any other suggestions. Many thanks,

Susan

(b)(2)

Johnson, Susan R. (SES)

From:

Johnson, Susan R. (SES)

Sent:

Thursday, November 27, 2003 11:36 PM

To:

(b)(6)

Subject: FW: Fielding a Delegation to go to Ankara immediately after Eid

FYI to keep you in the loop. Susan

----Original Message----

From: Johnson, Susan R. (SES)

Sent: Thursday, November 27, 2003 11:27 PM

To: Casteel, Steven W. (SES-O6); Carpenter, Scott CIV Ministry of Governance

Cc: Wilkinson, Molly A. (SES) (b)(6)

(b)(6) T. (AMB) Vogler, Gary; Smith, Stephen

Subject: FW: Fielding a Delegation to go to Ankara immediately after Eid

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This is where we are on the delegation to Ankara. It may travel as soon as Saturday evening, via c-130 from BIAP.

Steve: We need to have an Iraqi MOI, preferably the MOI Chief of Customs and/or Border Guards that went up to Habur last time.

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Scott - do you want to send anyone from Governance?

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KBR rep (b)(6)

MOI rep to be identified General Helmick (101rst)

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Susan Johnson

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From: Johnson, Susan R. (SES)

Sent: Wednesday, November 26, 2003 10:50 AM

To: McKee, Robert E. (SES); Vogler, Gary; Casteel, Steven W. (SES-06); Carpenter, Scott CIV Ministry of

Governance; Jones, Richard H. (AMB)

Cc: (b)(6)

(b)(6)

Subject: Fielding a Delegation to go to Ankara immediately after Eid

11/27/2003

At the 8am meeting this morning we agreed that per Embassy Ankara's recommendation, we would send a team to Ankara immediately after the Eid holidays to talk with the Turks about the Habur gate and the need to ensure that bulk fuel flows smoothly and regularly, especially through the winter months.

- 1. I think that we all agree that this should be an Iraqi heavy delegation, especially following the Talabani delegation that has just returned and our repeated desire that the Turks engage with the Iraqis.
- 2. In order to underscore how seriously we and the Iraqis take this issue and that it is not just a routine border issue, we recommend an Iraqi Minister or at the least, deputy Minister, lead the delegation, and that Ambassador Jones, as Deputy Administrator, represent the CPA side politically.
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Please give me your recommended nominees as soon as you can and no later than Friday morning.

I welcome any other suggestions. Many thanks,

Susan



Johnson, Susan R. (SES)

Vogler, Gary From:

Sent: Wednesday, November 26, 2003 1:46 PM

To: Johnson, Susan R. (SES); McKee, Robert E. (SES); Casteel, Steven W. (SES-O6); Carpenter,

Scott CIV Ministry of Governance; Jones, Richard H. (AMB)

(b)(6)Cc:

Subject: RE: Fielding a Delegation to go to Ankara immediately after Eid

From Oil we will have the following people available:

Fatin H. Fatohi lasham al-Wordi - SOMO

(b)(6)- CPA

KBR (Works out of Turkey)

Gary

----Original Message----

From: Johnson, Susan R. (SES)

Sent: Wednesday, November 26, 2003 10:50 AM

To: McKee, Robert E. (SES); Vogler, Gary; Casteel, Steven W. (SES-06); Carpenter, Scott CIV Ministry of

Governance; Jones, Richard H. (AMB)

Cc: (b)(6)

(b)(6)

Subject: Fielding a Delegation to go to Ankara immediately after Eld

At the 8am meeting this morning we agreed that per Embassy Ankara's recommendation, we would send a team to Ankara immediately after the Eld holidays to talk with the Turks about the Habur gate and the need to ensure that bulk fuel flows smoothly and regularly, especially through the winter months.

- 1. I think that we all agree that this should be an Iragi heavy delegation, especially following the Talabani delegation that has just returned and our repeated desire that the Turks engage with the Iragis.
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Please give me your recommended nominees as soon as you can and no later than Friday morning.

I welcome any other suggestions. Many thanks,


Susan

Johnson, Susan R. (SES) From: (b)(2)Sent: Saturday, November 29, 2003 9:15 AM Helmick, Frank G. - BG, DCG 101st ABN To: (b)(6) Johnson, Susan R. (SES); (b)(6) Cc: (b)(6)Subject: Re: RE: Fielding a Delegation to go to Ankara immediately after Eid Sir, et al: Turkey is a member of NATO, so (b)(6) <u>will not n</u>eed anything other than their military ID cards to enter, IAW with the NATO SOFA. - Original Message -----From: BG Helmick (b)(2) Date: Saturday, November 29, 2003 1:03 am Subject: RE: Fielding a Delegation to go to Ankara immediately after Eid > Please work this with (b)(6) if required for us. > AASLT! > HELMICK > ADC (O) > 101st AIRBORNE DIVISION (AIR ASSAULT) > ----Original Message-> From: (b)(2),(b)(6) > Sent: Saturday, November 29, 2003 7:50 AM > To: Johnson, Susan R. (SES); (b)(6) > (b)(6)> Cc: (b)(6)Helmick, Frank G. - BG, DCG 101st ABN > Subject: RE: Fielding a Delegation to go to Ankara immediately > after Eid > > I am concerned about visas for entry into Turkey for the > delegation from the > 101st. Do the travelers have visas already? > > > We are getting Turkish visas today for the Baghdad elements of the

11/29/2003

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> delegation from their Embassy in Baghdad today.
>
  (b)(6)
> CPA/Ministry of Foreign Affairs
> (b)(2)
>
> ----Original Message----
> From: Johnson, Susan R. (SES)
> Sent: Friday, November 28, 2003 11:19 PM
> To: Helmick, Frank G. - BG, DCG 101st ABN
> Cc:(b)(6)
(b)(6) Major
> General David H. Petraeus (E-mail); (b)(6)
> Carpenter, Scott CIV Ministry of Governance
> Subject: RE: Fielding a Delegation to go to Ankara immediately
> after Eid
>
> Frank - thanks for the input.
>
> 1. We plan to have a meeting Saturday late afternoon for the CPA
> participants to go over our goals for the visit. I have no
> problem with the
> team you suggest. It is likely that we will field a large group
> border meetings which will probably take place on Monday morning.
>
>
> 2. I don't have a specific time for Sunday departure but estimate
> it will be
> around 9am or so. Can you make that?
>
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> 3. Thanks for your objectives. Re point 1, these would seem
> achievable. Re
> point 2 I am not sure this will fly unless the KDP can come up
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> with some
> additional gestures of goodwill. Stop flying KDP flag, and maybe
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> Subject: RE: Fielding a Delegation to go to Ankara immediately
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> Susan--
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> Hate to bombard you with e-mails but this dog gone meeting is so
> important -- here is how I recommend we can work this --
>
> Our team 3 pax -- (b)(6)
                                         -- in charge of 101st delegation
> (b)(6)
                        -- he is
> assigned to
> Ankara -- currently the Army military attaché to Turkey -- speaks
> fluentTurkish -- but works as the 101st LNO as well especially on
> border issues --
> trying to hitch a ride back to Ankara since he resides 1/2 the
> time in
> Silopi and has a true understanding of the Harbur Gate issues --
> will be
> invaluable in the meeting
> (b)(6)
```



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>
> KBR receives payment from contract with government for
> full load
>
>
> Let me know if any of this is off base and thanks.
>
> AASLT!
> HELMICK
> ADC (O)
> 101st AIRBORNE DIVISION (AIR ASSAULT)
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> Cheers,
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> p.s. The Iraqis have now agreed to talk about a second border
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> Subject: RE: Fielding a Delegation to go to Ankara immediately
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11/29/2003

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> To: Casteel, Steven W. (SES-O6); Carpenter, Scott CIV Ministry of
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> Ambassador Sabah from the MFA;
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>(b)(6)
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> To: McKee, Robert E. (SES); Vogler, Gary; Casteel, Steven W. (SES-
> 06); Carpenter, Scott CIV Ministry of Governance; Jones, Richard H.
> (AMB)Cc: (b)(6)
                                         (b)(6)
>(b)(6)
> Subject: Fielding a Delegation to go to Ankara immediately after Eid
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> send.
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> laterthan Friday morning.
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> I welcome any other suggestions. Many thanks,
>
>
> Susan
```

>

Trent Darrell (SES-6)

Clemens, Kristi M. (SES) From:

Sent: Wednesday, January 14, 2004 3:58 PM

Wright, Paul; Agresto, John T. (SES); Bent, Rodney G. (SES); Carpenter, Scott CIV Ministry of To:

Governance; Casteel, Steven W. (SES-O6); Fatfat, Mounzer R. (SES)(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)McKee, Robert E. (SES);(b)(6) (b)(6)Seche,

Stephen A. (SES); (b)(6) (SES-6); (b)(6)

Trent Darrell

Subject: Regional Media

Good afternoon!

As I briefly mentioned during the Senior Advisor meeting this moming, we are beginning a new project involving U.S. local media. The objective is to interview you, your Minister and members of your team. We will then package it with supporting footage and send it to the Pentagon. There they will pitch it to your hometown/homestate TV stations.

We did the first one today - Ministry of Health - and it went very well! The turn around time to send it to the U.S. is within 24 -48 hours. This is a great way to get the incredible work you and your lraqi colleagues are doing back to the states.

But, I need your help. We are looking at completing all of the Ministries within the next 10 days - 2 weeks. I will discuss scheduling at the next 7:30 a.m. Senior Advisor meeting. Rich Galen and I look forward to working with all of you on this project. Thanks in advance for your cooperation.

Kristi M. Clemens

CPA - Strategic Communications

(b)(2)

Johnson, Susan R. (SES)

From: Jones, Richard H. (AMB)

Sent: Friday, November 28, 2003 11:24 PM

To: Johnson, Susan R. (SES)

Cc; (b)(6)

Subject: RE: Delegation to go to ANKARA for talks on the Habur Gate border crossing

Looks like I'm free most of the afternoon. Please check with (b) in the morning for a time. DJ

----Original Message-----

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Sent: Friday, November 28, 2003 8:21 AM

To: Jones, Richard H. (AMB); Carpenter, Scott CIV Ministry of Governance

Cc: McKee, Robert E. (SES):(5)(6)

(b)(6)

Subject: Delegation to go to ANKARA for talks on the Habur Gate border crossing

Dick and Scott,

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The Deputy Minister of Trade, plus 3, and (b)(6)
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SOMO deputy DG Fatin H. Fatohi, CPA Oil advisor (b)(6)

re

(b)(6)

Minister of Interior Badran and/or Chief of Customs and Steve Casteel General Helmick (101rst) tbd

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Susan Johnson MFA

Johnson, Susan R. (SES)

From:

(b)(6)

Sent:

Saturday, November 29, 2003 12:57 PM

To:

Johnson, Susan R. (SES)

Cc:

(b)(6)

Subject: RE: Delegation to go to ANKARA for talks on the Habur Gate border crossing

Let's do it in the ambassador's conference room. I booked it from 5-6.

(b)(6)

----Original Message----

From: Johnson, Susan R. (SES)

Sent: Saturday, November 29, 2003 12:09 PM

To:(b)(6)

Cc:

Subject: RE: Delegation to go to ANKARA for talks on the Habur Gate border crossing

(b)(6) where can we meet on the Turkey Trip? Are there too many to squeeze in Amb Jones' office?

Likely attendees:

Steve Casteel (Interior)

Rob McKee (b)(6)

(b)(6)

(Trade) (b)(6)(UK) Susan Johnson (MFA)

Possibly (b)(6) and/or (b)(6) CJTF-7) (b)(6)(MFA)

We might be able to squeeze in, but please advise us all where the meeting will be.

Susan

--Original Message

From: (b)(6)

Sent: Saturday, November 29, 2003 6:32 AM

To: Johnson, Susan R. (SES)

Subject: RE: Delegation to go to ANKARA for talks on the Habur Gate border crossing

How about 5 pm?

(b)(6)

----Original Message-----

From: Johnson, Susan R. (SES)

Sent: Friday, November 28, 2003 11:26 PM

To: Jones, Richard H. (AMB)

Cc: (b)(6)

Subject: RE: Delegation to go to ANKARA for talks on the Habur Gate border crossing

Will do. Looks like around 4pm might be good (b)(6) please advise. Susan

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Sent: Friday, November 28, 2003 11:24 PM

To: Johnson, Susan R. (SES)

Cc: (b)(6)

Subject: RE: Delegation to go to ANKARA for talks on the Habur Gate border

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Minister of Interior Badran and/or Chief of Customs and Steve Casteel

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Susan Johnson MFA

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ound his

From:

(b)(2),(b)(6)

Sent:

مارس، ۲۰۰۴ ۲۰۱۹ م 29

To: Cc: McKee, Robert E. (SES);(b)(6)

GC: Bubinati Krawczei, Timothy (CIV)

Subject: Najaf refinery

April CEC

Dear Sir:

There is a project of the Ministry of Oil for constructing a refinery in Najaf (the first stone has been installed indeed). I don't have any objection to this. However the chosen location is a crazy idea environmentally speaking. It is close to the cement factory, in an area too close to Najaf. Years ago, this area (cement factory) was far enough of the city, but right now it is almost in the gates of the city. We have right now an environmental problem with this cement factory, so if the refinery is built in the same zone, the situation would be untenable. There are another locations close to the pipe line far away enough of the city where the refinery can be installed. Najaf is situated in the gates of the desert so there are not problems of space, but not in the area currently chosen. Best Regards.

(b)(6)

Najaf GST for envinronment

(b)(6)

Reparaciones, servicios a domicilio, empresas, profesionales... Todo en la quía telefónica de QDQ. http://qdq.msn.es/msn.cfm

Munishy it Encomment appeares location

- no refinen approved in Najot to Oil refusing

- discharge should by 5 km from intoher of domaing who

refinery should by 15 km. for city

PATH Telegram Delivery Wednesday, December 03, 2003 9:28 AM (b)(6) From: Sent: To:

Subject:

(U) IRAQ: KUWAIT WANTS TO INCREASE "HUMANITARIAN FUEL" DELIVEREIS TO IRAQ, NEEDS DETAILS ON QUANTITIES

SUBJECT: (U) IRAQ: KUWAIT WANTS TO INCREASE "HUMANITARIAN FUEL" DELIVEREIS TO IRAQ, NEEDS DETAILS ON QUANTITIES

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Frank C. Urbancic, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

- 1. Jef SUPPLARY. Officials from Altanmia, the Kuwaiti consortium transporting humanitarian fuel to Iraq under contract to KBR, have told CPA and KBR representatives that they are willing and able to deliver more fuel to Iraq, and that the GOK considers this a high priority. Increases in most fuel types can be made immediately up to 4 million liters/day of gasoline and 9 million liters/day total, including diesel and kerosene. Further increases can be made following some technical modifications, all of which would be paid for by Altanmia but would be economical only if demand stays high in the medium term. However, the Kuwaitis need a clear idea of what quantities and types of fuel Iraq requires, and for how long. CPA/KBR did not have specific figures for the Ruwaitis as of December 1, although KBR representative Stoney Cox said that he would obtain them by December 5. CPA Senior Advisor to the Oil Minister Rob McKee stressed the urgency of this operation, with only 2-6 days' worth of stocks in Iraq and winter approaching. apparent that the GOK has told Altanmia to do whatever is necessary to avoid a hydrocarbon shortage in Iraq. Altanmia is awaiting instructions from the US on what fuels are needed and at what volume. If hydrocarbons are needed in Iraq, the GOK is ready to meet the requirement, but somebody has to ask them. END SUMMARY.
- (P) On December 1, CPA's Senior Adviser to the Oil Minister Rob McKee and Kellogg Brown and Root's (RBR) Stoney Cox met in Kuwait with representatives of Altanmia, the Kuwaiti company responsible for transporting humanitarian fuels to Iraq; A/DCM and EconOff (notetaker) sat in. The

meeting followed an earlier visit by McKee and two other CPA officials, who met with Altanmia, GOK officials and the head of Kuwait Petroleum Corporation (KPC) on November 24. At both meetings, the participants discussed Kuwait's provision of humanitarian fuel aid to Iraq and difficulties that have prevented Ruwait from supplying greater quantities. According to Altanmia's Waleed Al-Humaidhi, one of the major obstacles they have faced thus far has been KBR's inability to determine the actual need, which prevents Altanmia from planning to fill it. He also noted that the turnaround time for trucks in Iraq was very inefficient, with trucks waiting for days for convoys to return to Kuwait. He asserted that security was the main bottleneck.

- Me At the December 1 meeting, McKee informed Altanmia that he had been successful in reducing some of the logistical impediments (including securing a commitment to run more convoys each day). He also indicated that the USG would like to take advantage of Kuwait's spare capacity to supply Iraq with a greater volume of fuel. McKee said that Iraq was facing a crisis as winter approached and stocks dwindled to 2-5 days' worth of fuel. However, neither McRee nor Cox provided the Kuwaitis with specific information about the quantity or types of fuel that they were seeking. Cox said that he hoped to have this information by December 5.
- Altanmia told Cox and McKee that ramping up to provide additional fuel would not be a problem. Al-Humaidhi specified the following volumes available for each product:
- -- Kerosene: Kuwait can load 1.7 million liters/day of kerosene within 72 hours. Supply can be further increased if the US military allows Altanmia to use two pipelines that run through air bases used by the US. These pipelines are currently being used by the US military at only 25-30% capacity. If the US military agrees, KPC will pay to install gauges and meters, and establish separate filling pumps for Altanmia. Alternatively, Al-Humaidhi proposed that the US military could use the line at Ali al-Sales airbase, with Altanmia using the other at Ahmed al-Jaber airbase, currently not in use by the US. Cox said he would ask the military if Altanmia can use the 75% of capacity that is going unused.
- -- Mogas (aka benzene, aka gasoline): Altanmia can provide up to 9 million liters/day of mogas, but not immediately. Although there are sufficient vehicles to transport the fuel,

there is insufficient local storage space that could be used if production outpaces deliveries. Altanmia can lift up to 4 million liters/day of benzene with no additional investment. With investments in containment vessels, Kuwait can increase benzene supplies to 9 million liters/day (Kuwait lifted up to 15 million liters/day during the Iran-Iraq war).

- -- Diesel: Altanmia can provide 1-1.5 million liters/day within 7-10 days (with some modifications needed, similar to those for kerosene deliveries). They can ramp up to 4 million liters/day within 2-3 weeks.
- Altanmia officials stressed that they need a clearer idea of Iraq's longer term fuel needs. They asked whether Kuwait would simply be surging to meet shorter-term, seasonal supply shortfalls, or if the provision of humanitarian fuel supplies would be a longer, continuous operation. Al-Humaidhi underscored that the Kuwaitis are willing and able to do either. If the US says that only a surge in production is needed for the winter months, Kuwait can can

provide 5-7 million liters/day of mixed fuels within days, increasing to 9 million liters/day of mixed fuels within weeks. If, on the other hand, the US projects that there will be a longer-term need, Altanmia will make several investments at their own expense. Al-Humaidhi outlined Altanmia's tentative plans to revamp the abandoned Kazima loading depot, located near the Iraqi border. The depot would be linked by pipeline to large-capacity storage barges offshore, which would solve the containment dilemma that Kuwait would face at higher production levels. Al-Humaidhi said that the Prime Minister has indicated that fast-tracking approval of the Kazima renovation project within 48 hours could possibly be undertaken on an emergency basis, with further discussion. The renovation can be completed within 45-60 days using local contractors, or less with US military support. Al-Humaidhi reiterated that Altanmia would make these investments at no/no cost to the US, and with no need for a US commitment on quantities of fuel to be delivered to Iraq. However, Altanmia will not undertake such a large financial commitment if Iraq only needs increased fuel supplies for this winter. Again, Al-Humaidhi emphasized that they simply need a clearer picture of what quantities and types of fuels are needed, so that they may make the necessary logistical arrangements. He noted that the Government of Kuwait supports the US operation in Iraq "110 percent." GOK officials are perplexed that despite the GOK's willingness to do whatever it takes to get supplies into Iraq, the US continues to ignore this Kuwaiti offer, while purchasing fuel supplies from non-producing countries such as Jordan and Turkey.

- COMMENT. It is clear from both meetings that Altanmia is under firm orders from the highest levels of the GOK to provide Iraq with whatever fuel it needs. Although hte volumes and time lines for provision of the several fuels shift slightly from one scenario to another, the intent is clear. The overriding goal of the GOK is to ensure that there is no hydrocarbon shortage in Iraq, and the GOK believes Euwait is best positioned to ease Irag's fuel crisis. However, Altanmia needs to know what quantities of each type of fuel are needed, and for how long. Altanmia has already demonstrated its determination to make this work -for example, Altanmia has absorbed penalties levied by the Ruwait Petroleum Corporation when KBR did not order the quantities of fuel it had indicated it would. But it is imperative that CPA provide the Kuwaitis with a clear outline of quantities and types of fuel that Iraq needs, and an estimate of how long Iraq will require fuel exported from Kuwaiti, so that the Kuwaitis can increase fuel deliveries. END COMMENT.
- 7. (U) Mr. McKee did not clear this cable.
- (U) Baghdad minimize considered. URBANCIC

-GONFIDENTIAL

-PAGE 01 KUWAIT 05454 00 OF 02 0311022

 PINFO:
 CMS(00)
 D(00)
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 PRS(00)
 R(00)

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 SP(00)
 SRPP(00)
 T(00)

 USHW(00)
 USHW(00)

----- 031428Z DEC 03 STePS (TOTAL COPIES:000)

(b)(6)

From:

(b)(2),(b)(6)

Sent:

Thursday, December 11,2003 6:40 PM

To:

cc:

Subject:

ESG 10 Dec 03- PLEASE PASS TO SCOTT CASTLE (THANKS!)

CONFIDENTIAL

Miscellaneous:

1. JCS - IGC (not just Hakim and the Iranians) have determined to evict the MEK. Issues are who to hand them over to and how. State. DoD and CENTCOM have a list of courses of actions. (b)(1)

2. CERP - OMB see no difficulty with CERP monies going to CJTF-7 commanders. to CENTCGM.)

OIL (R. McKee):

- 1. Re Cables 5539 and 5540 McKee indicated this has been an ongoing dispute between KBR and Al Tamea (sp?) over the price of fuel with KBR holding out for a lower price. (Effective cost is \$2.65/ gallon with only \$1.14 of it €or the gas.) different organization (LOGCAP/CENTAF)
- 2. Problems on delivery of Kuwaiti fuel involve security and distribution points. These are being worked with the military. McKee stated that if KBR cannot complete the Ontract, SOMO could be used to buy up the difference. 9 m liters from Kuwait ailable. The money is there, USACE has done
- The contracts, and Al Tamea has the supply.

 3. (b)(6)

 Issues: Bring benzene supply to normal within the next two weeks so there are no lines. Confirm the LPG and kerosene reserves are sufficient. CPA response there is not a shortage of gas supplies just "thin." The gas lines are like a run on the bank. Increased number of cars and electricity problems (which shut the pumps down) contribute to the lines. 4. Ed Burley stated the Min of Interior has the lead on border issues. There is a gate - Rabia Gate (Ibrahim Kabil) (sp?) about 35 miles form the Habur Gate which had approximately 1000 trucks per day in November. Regardless of the number of gates, the roads throughout Iraq are limited.

ELECTRICITY (Robin USAID (?)):

- 1. The power outage resulted from overload on the one power line after the second line was taken out by sabotage. Should be 100% restored by Dec. 12 (was 80% restored as of Dec. 10 evening).
- 2. Sabotage occurring in the South is provincial sabotage and looting of aluminum. South cuts the lines going to Baghdad which results in the South getting better electricity service and for longer hours.
- 3. Energizing the lines and towers makes it more difficult to sabotage but still possible. 4. TF Shield focuses on oil pipelines but TF Shield will now guard the electrical infrastructure when it is colocated or visible. 5. A new overall infrastructure security plan is being developed and will incorporate successes (e.g., tribes).

Derived From: Multiple Sources Declassify On: 12/11/2013

ONFIDENTIAL

Gallinetti, Jon A. (0-8)

From: (b)(6)

Sent:

Saturday, November 29,2003 10:13 PM

To:

(b)(6)

Gallinetti Jon A. (0-8): (b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

McKee, Robert E. (SES);

Carpenter, Scott CIV Ministry of

Vogler, Gary: (b)(6)
Governance (b)(2),(b)(6)

Cc:

(b)(6)

Subject: FW: Questions about tribal engagement - protection of the Infrastructure

For coordination purposes, see information from (b)(6)

----Original Message-

From: (b)(6)

Sent: Saturday, November 29, 2003 5:43 PM

To: (b)(6)

Cc: Executive Secretary

Subject: RE: Questions about tribal engagement - protection of the Infrastructure

(b)(6)

Thank you very much for such a prompt and thorough response and for helping us out on this issue.

Best.

(b)(6)

Executive Secretariat

Coalition Provisional Authority

----Original Message----

From: (b)(6)

Sent: Saturday, November 29, 2003 4:00 PM

To: (b)(6)

Cc: (b)(2),(b)(6)

Bearpark, Andrew (Director of

Operations (b)(2),(b)(6)

Subject: RE: Questions about tribal engagement - protection of the Infrastructure

This is a subject I am working on myself, and I have yet to find either a consistent:

Coalition policy

or

Recollection of how Saddam handled the issue.

But some constants emerge:

Saddam knew how to 'play' the tribes. I do not believe the norm was to pay cash, nor to bribe. More it was the case that Sheikhs who complied (most by the end of l'ancien regime) were rewarded in the grant of free services – oil, etc. Any Sheikh / Tribe / Community which transgressed could expect to suffer interminably. He would not, I think, have indulged in paying Sheikhs not to pull down pylons!

- As for now, there are Ministries that do pay Sheikhs (witnessed one being rewarded today), and Ministries that think they don't but do; I have yet to identify one that doesn't. There must be some rich Sheikhs out there: one organization is alleged to be paying \$60 per pylon per day as reward for not pulling it down. This practice, whatever it says for the morality of the new-lead, must be unsustainable.
- One particular example bears scrutiny: Hart Security has taken out contracts with Sheikhs along the Al Basrah / Al Qut pylon tine which is being restored. It requires each Sheikh who signs up to provide guards (whose salaries he receives) to guarantee the integrity of the line. Theoretically the Sheikhs cannot walk away from such contracts. I see no evidence of them working yet but will get a full brief from Hart on Wednesday.

There is more work for me to do on this subject, and I'll be happy to join forces with anyone who is ahead of me. Essentially, if we are to go down this track — or more importantly if the Iraqis want to — we must deal with Sheikhs on an all-Infrastructure basis (ie power lines, oil pipes, water, rail — not piecemeal) as Saddam did.

Best Regards,

(b)(2),(b)(6)

----Original Message---

From: (b)(6)

Sent: Saturday, November 29,2003 3:01 PM

To: (b)(2),(b)(6)

Cc:

Subject: FW: Questions about tribal engagement

Importance: High

(b)(6)

Do you have a feel for answers to the below --where payments are taking place and for how much?

(b)(6)

Deputy Senior Advisor - Electricity CPA Electricity Advisory Team

USAID - Power/Electricity

(b)(2)

---Original Message----

From: (b)(6)

Sent: Saturday, November 29, 2003 2:57 PM

To:(b)(6)

Cc: Executive Secretary

Subject: Questions about tribal engagement

(b)(6)

To follow up on our conversation, I have attached below the three action items from yesterday's Regional Conference, highlighted in boldface.

Tribal Engagement

Military says that there needs to be MUCH greater liaison between military, regional ops, oil, electricity, etc.

Petreus says people are put at risk because no one has a clear idea of what security ops are happening in the different **AORs**. Potential for miscommunication and friendly fire is high.

Between February and May there will be a totally different group of US forces in the field with NO institutional memory

Need to coordinate:

What are tribes getting paid and by what CPA-related organization? How much are tribes being paid? How are payments to tribes being utilized?

We appreciate your help in tracking down answers to these questions as soon as possible.

Thank you in advance,

(b)(6)

Executive Secretariat Coalition Provisional Authority

(b)(6)

From:

(b)(6)

Sent: To:

Tuesday, November 18, 2003 5:00 PM Executive Secretary; Kennedy, Patrick Amb

biect:

FW: TASKER: Urgent comment request -- UNSCR 1483 implementation report

Importance:

High



110903.1483Updat e.v3.doc (57 K...

----Original Message----

From: (b)(6)

Sent: Tuesday, November 18, 2003 4:59 PM

To: Johnson, Susan R. (SES); (b)(6)

MCO; Carpenter, Scott CIV Ministry of Governance

McKee, Robert E. (SES); Foley, Thomas C. (CIV);

Wethington, Olin L. (SES); Bent, Rodney G. (SES); McKee, Robert E. (SES); Belka, Marek

(POL CIV); (b)(6)

Subject: TASKER: Urgent comment request -- UNSCR 1483 implementation report

Importance: High

Thanks to all you have gotten back to us in response to our earlier request (i.e., e-mail) for comments on the attached UNSCR 1483 implementation report. Washington has just provided us with the attached updated draft of the report. Any further comments would be welcome. Please note the short turnaround time.

Thanks,

(b)(6)

<u>iginal Message-</u>

From: (b)(6)

Sent: Tuesday, November 18, 2003 4:49 PM

To: Executive Secretary

Cc: Kennedy, Patrick Amb; (b)(6)

Subject: FW: Urgent comment request -- UNSCR 1483 implementation report

Importance: High

Folks.

Turns out that this is the version for final clearance.

Please review and provide any comments NLT OOB Wednesday.

Also, pls confirm receipt.

(b)(6)

--Original Message--

From: (b)(6)

Sent: Monday, November 17, 2003 9:12 PM To: CPA ExecSec (ExecSec@orha.centcom.mil)

Cc: Kennedy, Patrick, Amb., CPA

'ubject: FW: Urgent comment request -- UNSCR 1483 implementation report

.mportance: High

Folks,

Note the below. We are reviewing here in the CPA Rep office and will provide comments,

as requested.

We will be sure to provide the final version for your review.

(b)(6)

```
----Original Message----
  rom: (b)(2),(b)(6)
sent: Monday, November 17, 2003 8:49 PM
To: (b)(2)
(b)(2)
Cc: (b)(6)
(b)(6)
```

Subject: RE: Urgent comment request -- UNSCR 1483 implementation report Importance: High

(b)(5)

> From:

Attached is the current U.S. working draft of the UNSCR 1483 report to the UNSC. version includes the NSC's intro chapeau (highlighted) on national political governance, as well as a local governance section (also highlighted). Would appreciate your assistance in particular on local governance issues.

Again, appreciate your comments/clearance on the attached NLT OOB Wednesday (11/19) Washington time. Once we have your clearance, we'll send for urgent interagency clearance before forwarding to USUN/NY. (Our drop-dead timeline for getting the report to NY is COB Wednesday.)

Appreciate your guidance. Again, thank you for your assistance. (b)(6)

```
<<110903.1483Update.v3.doc>>
 ----Original Message---
```

(b)(6)

```
Friday, November 14,
 Sent:
                                 2003 2:15 PM
      (b)(2)
> (b)(2)
> Cc: (b)(6)
> (b)(6)
 Subject: Urgent comment request -- UNSCR 1483 implementation report
> Importance:
                  High
> (b)(6)
> Per UNSCR 1483, the U.S. and UK are required to report to the Security
> Council on 1483 implementation every three months (see attached for
> U.S.-UK division of responsibility). We were supposed to present our
> first report on August 19; it was postponed (and later significantly
> toned
> down) due to the bombing. We are scheduled to deliver the second
> report on November 21.
> This report is our opportunity to highlight for the international
> community the progress made in achieving our objectives in Iraq.
> Ambassadors Negroponte and Jones Parry will read their respective portions
> of the report to the Council; their presentations will be public, on the
> record for the press and open to all member states. We should expect
> heavy press coverage.
> That said, I have attached the current U.S. draft. (*I understand an
> initial UK draft is floating around Baghdad.) Please note that this
> version does not/not include a governance section (UK originally tasked to
> cover governance). Dr. Rice, however, has now requested the U.S. assume
> responsibility for the governance section -- section to be drafted pending
> consultations with the GC.
> Given our time constraint, appreciate if you and other relevant CPA folks

    could review the attached draft and provide comments NLT Monday (11/17)

 COB. As I'm sure you can imagine, this is a high priority for Washington.
> I understand you all are busier than can possibly be imagined. That said,
> I appreciate your attention to this.
 << File: 110703.1483Update.Explanation Tasker.doc >> (tasker/US-UK
> division of responsibilities)
> << File: 110903.1483Update.v3.doc >> (draft report)
```

> (b)(6) > U.S. Department of State > IO/UNP, Room 6334 > (b)(2) > (b)(6)

From:

(b)(6)

Sent:

Friday, November 14, 2003 5:09 PM

To:

Executive Secretary

Subject:

FW: Bremer Responds to QFR's - Over to Ettinger to Track

Importance:

High

Follow Up Flag: Follow up

Flag Status:

Flagged

(b)(6)

Executive Assistant, CPA Administrator **Head of CPA Executive Secretariat**

----Original Message----

From: Bent, Rodney G. (SES)

Sent: Friday, November 14, 2003 4:48 PM

To: McKee, Robert E. (SES); Crawford Darrell E. (SES)

Cc: (b)(6)

Subject: FW: Bremer Responds to QFR's

Importance: High

Rob,

(b)(6) sent me this request earlier today, as Dave N. passed his oil import baton to me. However, I think this question belongs in the courts of you and the PMO. Can I turn it over to you guys for a first crack at the answer?

Complete 3

----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6)

Sent: Friday, November 14, 2003 9:41 AM

To: Bent, Rodney G. (SES)

Subject: FW: Bremer Responds to QFR's

Importance: High

I think David asked you if you could take this on.

(b)(6)

Executive Assistant, CPA Administrator Head of CPA Executive Secretariat

----Original Message----

From: (b)(6)

Sent: Friday, November 14, 2003 8:58 AM

Executive Secretary; Kennedy, Patrick Amb; (b)(6) To: (b)(6)

Nash David (SES); (b)(6)

Subject: FW: Bremer Responds to QFR's

Importance: High

(b)(6) ADM Nash

SASC QFR below which refers to Question #19 (Amb. Bremer's question tasked to ADM Nash)

11/14/2003

Hearing Date: September

25, 2003

Comittee: SASC Member: Senator

Levin

Witness: Amb. Paul Bremer

OIL INFRASTRUCTURE CONTRACTS Question #19

Question: Ambassador Bremer, the administration's supplemental request includes \$2.1 billion to rehabilitate Iraq's oil infrastructure. What steps will the administration take to ensure that all of this work is performed on a fully-competitive basis, and that none is awarded on a sole-source basis to Halliburton or any other company?

Answer: Under an acquisition strategy approved in June 2003, the Army Corps of Engineers in conducting a full and open competition which will result in the award of two contracts for the repair and continuity of operations of the Iraqi oil infrastructure – one for the North and one for the South. The Army issued a Request for Proposals (DACA63-03-R-0021) on July 9, 2003. The Army is following formal source selection procedures applicable to major competitive procurements.

On October 29, 2003, the Corps of Engineers announced it has amended the solicitation to increase the maximum value of the two contracts. Award is expected to occur in 30 to 60 days to give offerors an opportunity to revise their proposals and allow the Corps to evaluate the revisions. We anticipate these awards in December.

Written by: Craig Curtis

Coord by: OCLL/SAALT, BG Crear and ADM Nash, CPA-Baghdad

----Original Message---From: (b)(6)

Sent: Thursday, November 13, 2003 8:08 PM
To: (b)(6)

Cc: Executive Secretary; Kennedy, Patrick Amb; Nash David (SES)
Subject: Bremer Responds to QFR's

(b)(6) can you track these down. We are getting emails from the plane.

- -- In response to Question #25 The Amb would like to visit the JCC in Baghdad that was refered to in Matt Waxman's response.
- --- In response to the Question #19 re: Oil Infrstructure Contracts written by Craig Curtis, the Amb

11/14/2003

wrote:

Dave N. can we get this done in early Dec?

-- In response to the Question #5 re: Budget of the Coalition Provisional Authority written by Dave Oliver the Amb wrote:

Pat, when Steve S. arrives please walk him and me through the major headlines of our proposed 2004 budget

(b)(6)

Executive Assistant, CPA Administrator Head of CPA Executive Secretariat

From:

McKee, Robert E. (SES)

Sent:

Wednesday, January 14, 2004 9:10 AM

To:

(b)(6)

Cc:

Subject:

FW: Development Fund for Iraq: Statement of Work

Follow Up Flag: Follow up

Due By:

Wednesday, December 31, 2003 1:00 PM

Flag Status:

Flagged

(b)(6)

is sick today, but he's done this. Is this what you need? Rob

----Original Message----

From: (b)(6)

Sent: Wednesday, January 14, 2004 12:22 AM

To: McKee, Robert E. (SES)

Cc: Vogler, Gary; (b)(6)

Subject: FW: Development Fund for Iraq: Statement of Work

Rob and (b)(6)

Attached is the statement of work for the IAMB audit of the DFI. This was originally submitted and the IAMB requested a section addressing "Oil Export Sales" (see .pdf file). The IAMB terms of reference are also attached.

Below is the standard we are held to (source UNSCR 1483): "20. Decides that all export gales of petroleum, petroleum.

"20. Decides that all export sales of petroleum, petroleum products, and natural gas from Iraq following the date of the adoption of this resolution shall be made consistent with prevailing international market best practices, to be audited by independent public accountants reporting to the International Advisory and Monitoring Board referred to in paragraph 12 above in order to ensure transparency, and decides further that, except as provided in paragraph 21 below, all proceeds from such sales shall be deposited into the Development Fund for Iraq until such time as an internationally recognized, representative government of Iraq is properly constituted:

This is what I have added to the SOW for "Oil Export Sales:"

"Oil export Sales. Oil exports sales are arranged for and conducted by the State Oil Marketing Organization (SOMO), which is the Iraqi Ministry of Oil's marketing and supply organization. Pursuant to paragraph 20 of UNSCR 1483, the CPA oversees these transactions to ensure they are consistent with prevailing international best practices.

SOMO contracts for oil export sales via tenders, spot contracts, and term contracts. For each oil export sale, the buyer first files a letter of credit with the FRBNY, the lift of the contracted quantity occurs, final pricing occurs, and payment to FRBNY is made within 30 days of the lift.

CPA monitors SOMO's clientele, reviews its oil export sales contracts and its official sales prices (OSP), and ensures the correct payment is made to the FRBNY."

I don't think we are living up to UNSCR 1483 since we currently only monitor the clientele and ensure payment is made. I have added additional items but have made it vague enough to give us maneuvering room between now and time of audit.

1/14/2004

Based on (b)(6) recommendations, additional items that we should perform:

- 1) Review targeted contracts (traders, less reputable end-users, and spot check some others) this can be done by (b)(6) remotely.
- 2) Monitor OSPs and market again can be done by (b)(6)
- 3) Get meters installed/calibrated at all terminals (starting with ABOT) for physical accountability. Until meters are available, contract for independent 3rd party surveyor to verify quantities since its now only SOC's and the ship's personnel verifying.
- 4) Contract for independent 3^{rd} party to sample and analyze crude samples for pricing. (b)(6) says it's done by the buyer.)
- I have only addressed crude oil sales I don't know what to do if they consider the barter arrangements as sales and audit them also.

(b)(6)

(b)(6)
CPA Oil Directorate
(b)(2)

----Original Message----From: (b)(6)

Sent: Sunday, January 04, 2004 5:53 PM

To: (b)(6)

Subject: FW: Development Fund for Iraq: Statement of Work

Have you completed the sub-section on "Oil Export Sales" as requested below. I need that information quickly

Thanks

(b)(6)
CPA Comptroller
(b)(2)

From: (b)(6)

Sent: Wednesday, December 31, 2003 8:36 AM

To: (b)(6)

Cc:

Subject: FW: Development Fund for Iraq: Statement of Work

Attached is the note and attachments that I got from the International Advisory & Monitoring Board. They have requested that we add a sub-section on "Oil Export Sales" under Paragraph 1 "Background" in the Statement of Work (SOW). Also please review the remainder of the SOW for Oil related comments. Once I have added your subsection on Oil Exports, I will send it to CG for a legal review and then to Contracting for action. Could I have your input by Sunday.

Also, note that they want a briefing on the various aspects of the DFI to include Oil and Gas activity. This is a hard copy and then later an oil presentation.

1/14/2004

Could I get your input for the briefing by the 7th or 8th of Jan Thanks

(b)(6)
CPA Comptroller
(b)(2)

----Original Message----

From: (b)(2),(b)(6)

Sent: Tuesday, December 30, 2003 9:00 PM

To: (b)(6)

Subject: Development Fund for Iraq: Statement of Work

Dear (b)(6)

I would be grateful if you could transmit the attach files to Ambassador Bremer. They contain (i) a letter from me as Chairman of the International Advisory and Monitoring Board to Amb. Bremer transmitting the IAMB's comment on the proposed Statement of Work and (ii) the comments themselves. I have until now communicated through Ambassador Kennedy but he is currently on a well deserved leave.

Yours sincerely,

(b)(6)

Chairman

International Advisory and Monitoring Board

(See attached file: IAMB-SOW-Letter-AmbBremer.pdf)(See attached file: IAMB-SOW-Final-2003-12-30.doc)

Flugge.

(b)(6)OTHER)

From:

(b)(6)(OTHER)

Sent:

Tuesday, March 02, 2004 4:41 PM

To:

(b)(6)(b)(6)

OTHER): Schmults. Edward C. (SES6); (b)(6)

Trevor Amb. (Contr.); (b)(6) (CIV); McKee, Robert E. (SES); (b)(6)

Cc:

CPA Ministries

Subject:

IG TRAINING SEMINAR - MONDAY MARCH 8

Importance: High

Colleagues

As mentioned at the 7.30 meeting, we plan to hold the first training seminar for IG next Monday, March 8, in the Convention Center (Conference Room No. 1). The event will start at 9 o'clock for 9.30 (coffee/tea to be served) - those entering the Green Zone will need to get to Checkpoint 3 no later than 8.30. We are hoping to arrange lunch in the cafeteria at about 1230.

All IGs now appointed or on the point of being appointed (see list of senior advisors/ main addressees) are invited, and strongly encouraged, to attend.

There will be a full briefing and discussion on the concept of the IG, the responsibilities that are entailed and how the mission might be developed and taken forward. We shall also cover the complementary roles of the Board of Supreme Audit and the new Commission on Public Integrity and how these organizations are being developed.

The event will be interactive and participative: we want to encourage to the maximum learning through an exchange of views among participants. After lunch, we intend to continue discussion in small groups (for which there will be several facilitators) on problems that IG are likely to face in building up their organizations. This session can last as long as people want, up to 4 o'clock.

We have considered whether we should invite senior advisors and/or other officials to accompany the newly appointed IG. While there would be some advantages, we believe that on balance it would be better to keep the group relatively small and focus this initial event on the IG themselves. There will of course need to be follow-up with them, their staff and those with related responsibilities. One of the aims of the seminar will be to help us to plan the future IG staff training and other assistance that will be needed. Partly with that purpose in mind, (b)(6)and (b)(6) of the DFID (ASI) Civil Service Reform project team will also be participating.

We shall provide some further details in the next day or two. There will be a second initial training session for the IG still to be appointed, probably later this month.

Could you please establish whether your ministry's IG will be able to attend and confirm his/ her attendance to me as soon as possible.

(b)(6)

Office of Policy Planning & Analysis, CPA (b)(2)



From:

(b)(6)

Sent:

Saturday, October 18, 2003 12:33 PM

To:

Cc:

Crear, Robert BG CFLCC/3A-FWD-USACE; McKee, Robert E. (SES)

Subject: Re: Mission to Monitor Reconstruction Activities

(b)(6)Director - IRDC/CPA

According to directive of BG Robert Crear, director of Reconstruction of Iraqi Oil infrastructure, before his departure on 10 Oct. 03

I must go in a mission to northern diffields and refineries to monitor the reconstruction activities, problems as well as observing the fuel products

Import traffic problems between Mosul and Turkish boarders and to report to him a comprehensive report, similar to what I did for

Previous missions.

This mission delayed, because the NTV Vehicles request signed by BG Robert Crear to KBR was delayed -because a NTV Vehicle wasn't available, but now it is available.

I'm ready to perform the requested mission, kindly advice

Please to know that I tried to be more and more engaged and to contribute effectively and was very patient to overcome the difficulties, contribution and participation will be much higher when chances will be given to us; I'm as an Iraqi Oil expert; it's my responsibility to work very hard for new freed Iraq.

BR (b)(6)(b)(6)Oil Advisor - IRDC/CP 18 Oct. 2003

CC: BG Robert Crear, Commander TF-RIO: For you kind attention with my regards Mr. Robert Mckee, Senior Oil Advisor - CPA: For you kind attention with my regards

Wood, William B. (SES)

From:	(b)(6)
Sent:	Saturday, January 03, 2004 9:44 AM
To:	(b)(6) Agresto, John T.
	(SES); (b)(6)
	(b)(6 Arsht, Leslye A. (SES);(b)(6)
	(b)(6) McKee, Robert
	E. (SES); (b)(6) Casteel, Steven W. (SES-06); Fatfat, Mounzer R. (SES);
	(b)(6) Seche, Stephen A. (SES);
	(b)(6)
	(b)(6) Goledzinowski, Andrew (AUS); (b)(6)
	(b)(6)
	(b)(6) Wood, William B. (SES); Jones, Richard H. (AMB); (b)(6)
	(b)(6) Bent, Rodney G. (SES); (b)(6)
	(b)(6) Taecker, Kevin R. (SES); Dewald,
	William G. (SES)(b)(6)
	(b)(6) Nash David (SES); (b)(6)
	Carpenter, Scott CIV Ministry of Governance: (b)(6)
	(b)(6)
cc:	(b)(2)
Subject:	CPA Historical Project

At the 0730 meeting today I addressed the CPA historical project. This is an important project and probably the primary means of research for much of the work written about CPA's role in Iraq over the next several decades. All of you have worked hard on your respective projects. You have encountered many difficulties. You know better than anyone else what those difficulties were and how they were overcome. There is significant criticism of ORHA and CPA. There is also a great deal of accomplishment by these organizations. The glass is over half full. You are the key personnel to define just what that entails.

To reinforce what I said this morning, for those present and those that were not, I would like to define this project in detail.

The purpose is to collect the relevant documents from all of the ministries and non-ministry components of CPA and to conduct oral interviews with as many participants as possible.

Most of your documents are in a digital format, thus convenient to save and copy. We have created a historical file on the fserv2 located at:

\\fserv2\rudd historical file

Double click on this cutout and you will go to the historical file. In that file there are 54 folders. The CPA non-ministry components are listed in folders 26-54.

The ministries are all listed sub-folders to the first folder. To reach a particular ministry, double click on the ministry folder, and then go to a specific ministry folder.

If you are working in one of the ministries or non-ministry components of CPA, feel free to create subordinate folders by topic or by name as appropriate.

The type of material to be saved should include:

- Lists of all CPA personnel associated with the specific ministry or non-ministry component, their time with CPA and their function.
- Lists of all Iraqis associated with the specific ministry on non-ministry component
- All relevant documents produced by or otherwise related to that ministry or non-ministry component
- Any paper trail that addresses projects, challenges, and accomplishments
- Any other material deemed relevant by those working in the respective ministry or non-ministry component

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If the material you have to copy to specific folders is sensitive, see the IT office and have access to specific folders restricted to those deemed appropriate to your office.

Hard copy material for which there is no digital copy should be saved in manila folders and will be collected later in the year.

All material will be downloaded or otherwise collected in June, consolidated, copied, and provided to multiple archival sites. At this time this includes:

- The U.S. State Department (these files will at some stage pass to the National Archives);
- The U.S. Army Center of Military History (CMH);
- The Marine Gray Research Center;
- The British Foreign Office (possibly other Australian archival sites);
- The Australian War Memorial (possibly other Australian archival sites);
- To other coalition archival sites as they are identified;
- Eventually to an Iraqi archival depository;
- And to interested university research libraries.

Hard copy material will probably go only to one archival site and in most cases that will be the State Department, then to the National Archives.

If you have classified material, see (b)(6) about how that will be saved.

I have conducted and recorded over 120 oral interviews to date and will conduct more in the future. I am certainly open to suggestions on who should be interviewed. You can contact me by e-mail at (b)(2)

I look forward to hearing from you and capturing the material that will allow others to tell your story.

(b)(6)

ORHA/CPA Historian

McKee, Robert E. (SES)

From: McKee, Robert E. (SES)

Sent: Thursday, November 20, 2003 11:58 AM

To:

(b)(6)

Subject: Message to Bremer, Kennedy

(b)(6) —Once again, I wonder if I could prevail on you to get the following message into the right form and forward it soonest to Ambassadors Bremer and Kennedy. At some point in the distant future, we will get some secretarial/office manager help down here and I can send you a little more professional product. In the meantime, thanks again.

Rob

To: Ambassador L. Paul Bremer

Ambassador Pat Kennedy

Subject: Product Supply

The following summarizes some current issues and information related to supplying product to Iraqi consumers through the coming months.

- A very high level summation of the supply problem is that, in total volumes, we are unable to manufacture
 and import enough product into the country on a day-to-day basis to cover basic consumption, let alone be
 able to build stocks. Therefore, our current days of stock gradually are being decreased. Our current
 mode is by necessity very reactionary, much like the Dutch boy sticking his thumb in the dike; however, it's
 a fact we're running out of short-term solutions. This situation exists because of several things---security of
 convoys, pipelines and repair crews; a buildup of refinery byproducts that are difficult to dispose of; border
 gridlocks; feedstock interruptions to the refineries; erratic electrical grid performance; and significant delays
 in returning some LPG and pipeline infrastructure to service.
- 2. We are working with CJTF7 to improve the security situation. It is apparent that the military and our Task Force Shield efforts need to be synchronized and that aerial surveillance and mobile patrols are critical to this improvement. Generals Gallinetti, Figgures and Davis are being very supportive of this effort and we meet again today to jointly work on the problem. One loose end is that Pat has agreed to talk to our current Task Force Shield Commander's boss in the US about extending here for us. This is critical at this particular stage of standing-up Task Force Shield and integrating/training the Erinys contractor.
- 3. The Turkish border gridlock can continue to be helped by getting assistance from the Turkish government. I would request that you officially ask their government to help us relieve the congestion on both sides of Habur Gate. It is important that we don't have thousands of trucks held up for days just to cross the border in either direction. Although Pat raises good diplomatic and Kurd arguments against opening another route from Turkey through the NE corner of Syria, I believe if that route could be sanctioned by you, the US and Turkey, it would at least help in the short-term.
- 4. At the current time, we prioritize the products in the following order: Kerosene (heating), LPG (eating), Diesel (lighting and other services) and Benzene (personal driving). For kerosene, we have stayed ahead of demand for the last 10 days and have begun to build stocks slightly. The same applies to LPG, and this situation should alleviate further as we get the remainder of the southern LPG manufacturing system up and running. In diesel, about 25% of the daily consumption is going into power plants that were forecast to

11/21/2003

- be running on other fuel at this time, so it remains problematical. And in benzene, our days of stock are being depleted as we concentrate on kerosene and diesel. One significant thing in our favor is that the 14" product and the 14" LPG pipelines from the south are for the moment fully operational and we are able to move kerosene and diesel in one and LPG in the other all the way to Baghdad. This in turn relieves the stress on trucking, which we can then use more efficiently to move benzene and to transport resid away from the refineries. Therefore, what the challenge becomes is to keep the refineries and LPG plants running (security and electrical power are key components), repairing and protecting key product pipelines (security again) and moving even more volumes into the ports and across the borders (money, logistics and security).
- 5. I worry about the supply of benzene in the coming days. Already lines are beginning to form at stations in Baghdad and Mosul as people begin to hoard and the black marketeers begin to stock up. Should we consider raising the price of benzene across the board, or at least raising regular prices a small amount and premium by a lot larger amount? Benzene is not as crucial to survival through the winter and if we could help create a form of rationing by increased pricing, pressure would in turn be relieved on our other more important products.
- 6. Finally, a heads-up on the status of the Defense Energy Support Center (DESC). The DESC had a team here the last few days to review whether or not they would immediately take on the job of buying products and distributing them. As the team departed, they made a couple of points:
 - a) If they take this job on, it's an order of magnitude larger than any individual mission they now undertake
 - b) They will not be briefing the 3-star who leads the DLA (Defense Logistics Agency), under which the DESC resides, until next week. Then, they will brief the Assistant Secretary of the Army two weeks from now. Only after that will a decision be made whether they will take the job.
 - c) KBR did the job well—KBR can do the job as well or better than they could do it—No sense in undoing what's being done so well now (presume they're referring in these comments to logistical management, not actual product purchasing).
 - d) The decision in two weeks could be "Yes to both purchasing and logistics management", or "Yes to purchasing, but No to logistics management", or "No to both".

My concern is that time is flying and that by definition we'll not be able to get converted away from KBR in total or even partially for some time. I would like to see more of a sense of urgency to get them mobilized. However, they say that only the Secretary of Defense or the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs can actually order them to take on this job.

Rob	McKee
-----	-------

CC: Generals Jon Gallinetti, Andrew Figgures, Larry Davis; (b)(6)

0110310-01

----Original Message----From: McKee, Robert E. (SES)

Sent: Tuesday, February 10, 2004 10:49 AM

To: (b)(6)

Cc: Kellogg Jr, Joseph (SES-6)

Subject: Casaline Atlanta

(b)(6) —Per your question, recall that Amb Bremer and I met with the minister last week and discussed gasoline price liberalization, among a number of topics. The minister has appointed a committee to develop pricing recommendations. They have furnished him has report and he has taken it with him to the OPEC meeting in Algiers. He and I meet again on Standay, 15 February, at which time he has promised me that he will give me their (the ministry's) recommendations. I presume that I would then discuss them with Gen Kellogg, Amb Jones and Amb Bremer before giving the minister the go-ahead. My feeling is that they will recommend something like an immediate processe for regular gasoline to 50 dhars (from 20) and for pressum in 100 (from about 30) and then consider some kind of small but regular monthly or quarterly recesses after that. If I'm hearing correctly, they might also make some recommendations on things like table oil, but I haven't heard any specifics yet. Bottom-line, the minister will give his and his team's recommendations to me next Sunday, after which I'll show them to the Ambassadors and Generals for discussion.

Rob

040206-08

From: Sent: McKee, Robert E. (SES)

Friday, February 06, 2004 10:20 AM

To:

(D)(b) FW: State Dopt, Astronomor circulated 2/4/04 Su my comains

for (6) on this

Iraq Action Plan

2-3-04.doc(2... (b)(6) -I need some advice from Ambassadors Bremer and Jones. I wonder if you'd mind getting this request into their hands. Thanks. Rob

(b)(6)
-Note the attached. I was ent this from Reuben's office. It was for information only and there was no request for any action or response. However, it is obvious that there soon will be.

**Department on their population want to keep me out of it until more clarity or should we ignore this early communication and just want for the request to get to us (CPA) in due course? We are of course working on much of what the State Department is proposing. Thanks for your guidance.

Rob McKee

Copy Delivered to AMB JONES.

From:

(b)(6)

Sent:

Thursday, November 06, 2003 12:14 PM

To:

(b)(6)

Cc:

Casteel, Steven W. (SES-O6); Wilkinson, Molly A. (SES)

Subject: RE: SASC QFRS

(b)(6)

Re # 25; In addition to the joint patrois etc, in Baghdad we have established a Joint co-ordinating Centre (JCC). The purpose is to provide situational awareness of military and police deployments as well as information sharing and operational planning. The model, which is based at the HQ of the 1st Armoured Divisionand and is staffed by their staff, USMPs and UK civilian Police, is being assessed for possible roll out to other Areas of Operation. Thanks

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Deputy Chief Constable

Chief Police Advisor, Ministry of the Interior, Iraq

mobile(b)(2)

----Original Message----

From: (b)(6)

Sent: Wednesday, November 05, 2003 5:27 PM

To: Castle, Edwin S. (SES-2 General Counsel); Casteel, Steven W. (SES-O6); Wilkinson, Molly A. (SES); (b)(6)

Slocombe, Walt B. (SES); Vogler, Gary; (b)(6)

McKee, Robert E. (SES); Bent, Rodney G. (SES);

(b)(6)

Runnels, Al (CFO, CPA, Iraq); (b)(6)

(b)(6)

(FS-03); Wolfe, George; Belka, Marek (POL CIV); (b)(6)

 C_{C} : (b)(6)

Subject: FW: SASC QFRS

If you've not had the opportunity to take a look at these, pls do so, as we need to get them turned around. If you review the answer and it's acceptable in its current form, pls advise or go ahead and make the revisions and return via e-mail.

Thanks for your prompt reply.

(b)(6)

----Original Message----

From: (b)(6)

Sent: Tuesday, November 04, 2003 10:44 PM



(b)(6)From:

Ministry of Ind/Minerals

Sent:

Monday, October 13, 2003 10:06 AM

To:

Wolfe, George; Foley, Thomas C. (CIV); Carpenter, Scott CIV

Ministry of Governance; McKee, Robert E. (SES); Trent Darrell (SES-6)

Cc:

(b)(2),(b)(6)

Subject:

Reminder: Briefing for Secretary Evans

Importance: High

A quick reminder!

Please be advised, press will be allowed to sit in.

The Secretary of Commerce, Donald Evans, will lead a delegation from Washington to Baghdad, October 13-15, 2003. We would kindly appreciate your participation in a briefing for his delegation. The focus of your remarks should highlight the progress your agency or ministry has made in advancing specific goals and objectives of the CPA's reconstruction efforts.

If you are not available to attend, please designate a representative who could speak on your behalf.

Thank you.

MONDAY, Oct. 13

Event: CPA Briefing

Location: Ministries Conference Room

Time: 6:00 - 7:00 pm

CPA Participants: Moderator - (b)(6)

USAID - (b)(6)

Economic Directorate - George Wolfe Private Sector Development - Tom Foley

Governance - Scott Carpenter

Transportation and Communication - Darrell Trent

Trade-

Industry - (b)(6)

Oil - Rob McKee

Thank you.

(b)(6)Senior Advisor (Interim)

Ministry of Industry and Minerals

Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA)

(b)(2)

file://cpa-iraq.org www.export.gov/iraq

10/14/2003

LPB HAS SEEN

(b)(6)

Executive Assistant, CPA Administrator Head of CPA Executive Secretariat ----Original Message----From: Olson, William (SES-3)

Sent: Sunday, February 15, 2004 11:53 AM

To:(b)(6) Subject:

Rob McKee's view on the need to keep the Weekly Essential Services Report FOUO

 He is concerned not to put production and pricing numbers out for public consumption because of sensitivities about price-fixing and stock manipulation.

 He agreed to providing data for the report on the understanding that it would remain FOUO.

He prefers that it remain FOUO.

7

LPB HAS SEEN

(b)(6)		03/202
From:	(b)(6)	
Sent:	Tuesday, December 02, 2	003 9:59 PM
To:	(b)(6) (b)(6)	Jones, Richard H. (AMB);
	(b)(6)	Vogler, Gary (b)(6) Smith, rk. Andrew (Director of Operations (b)(2),(b)(6) McKee, Robert E. (SES)
Cc:	Executive Secretary	
Subject:	Oil Spill Near Mosul	
Importance:	High	
Follow Up Flag	g: Follow up	
Flag Status:	Flagged	

(b)(6) reports that Ministry of Water Resources just reported (Deputy Ministry Dr Ali Thijeel) that there is a significant oil refinery spill going into Tigris River at Inezala (sp?), near Mosul. Dams and Lakes Commission is monitoring now and will update. The spill had not reached Samara yet, but is headed there. (b) will also update as more information becomes available.

We need senior advisors from Ministry of Electricity and Public Works to help:

MinElec: need to monitor inflow conditions (oil in water could be dangerous for the turbines - damage or fire.

Public Works: all intakes for potable water below the location should be monitored – will need to shut or treat for removal.

Oil: don't know which plant, just directly from an oil refinery; don't know source of problem.

(b)(6) cellphone number is (b)(2)

(b)(6)

Executive Assistant, CPA Administrator Head of CPA Executive Secretariat

LPB HAS SEEN

031201-20

Belka, Marek (POL CIV); Foley, Thomas C.

(b)(6)

From:

(b)(6)

Sent:

Monday, December 01, 2003 7:35 PM

To:

Executive Secretary; (b)(6)

(b)(6)

(CIV); McKee, Robert E. (SES);(b)(2),(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Johnson, Susan R. (SES); (b)(6)

Subject:

FW: Iraq-Turkey Agreement on Improving Habur Efficiency and other Trade matters



minson.doc (41 KB)

Forwarding the attached from Embassy Ankara. regards, jc

---<u>Original Message----</u>

From: (b)(6)

Sent: Monday, December 01, 2003 7:29 PM To: (b)(6)

(b)(6)

Cc: (b)(6)

Subject: Iraq-Turkey Agreement on Improving Habur Efficiency and other Trade matters

The attached was agreed to today by Iraqi Interior Minister Nuri Bardan and Turkish Istate Minister for Foreign Trade Tuzmen and their accompanying delegations. Will be signed tomorrow by the Deputy Trade Ministers.

please pass to Amb. Edelman and U/S Larson - key point is that we urgently need implementation of the commitments made on going to 24/7at Habur, working toward capacity (goal of 1800 or so trucks each way/day by the end of Dec.) and reducing the lines in order to avert a fuel crisis this winter.

(b)(6) please pass to executive secretariat for distribution. fax signed copy when we have one. Amb. Jones mentioned (b)(6) (b)(6)Rob McKee...

Will send cable with atmospherics and some of the blow-by-blow tomorrow or next day depending on time needed for clearances.

Regards, (b)(6)

<minson.doc>>



(b)(1)

From: (b)(6)

Sent: Friday, October 31, 2003 4:53 PM

To: (b)(6)

Cc: Vogler, Gary: McKee, Robert E. (SES); Crear, Robert (O-7) (b)(6)

(b)(6)

Subject: RE: LPG Inventory Point Paper

(b)(6)

Answers to AMB B's questions on the LPG Inventory paper:

- 10 November date in paragraph 1. "How much confidence do we have in this date? What more can be done to ensure it happens?"
 - 10 Nov date is good pending no further problems in the start-up of the NGL Plant. The South Gas
 Plant (SGP) is ready and is awaiting output from the NGL Plant whose restoration suffered problems.
 The NGL Plant was repaired and was being started up when a pipe ruptured and damaged another
 pipe. The NGL plant was shut down and repairs are complete. It is just started the start-up process.
 Seven days after its start-up, the NGL Plant will send product to the SGP; and four days after
 receiving product, the SGP will produce LPG.
- 2. Regarding the truck availability in paragraph 3. "Can we get more trucks?"
 - Additional trucks are being obtained. 70 Ministry of Oil LPG trailers are undergoing required maintenance in Turkey and being returned 10 per week. There is a provision in the Supplemental for the purchase of 200 LPG trucks and trailers. There have been overtures from a Japanese organization to donate LPG trailers. Also, we are investigating through the Ministry Of Oil and others how additional LPG trailers and trucks can be obtained (contracted, purchased, leased, etc.).
- Regarding the ETR-6November in paragraph 4.1. "Can this be accelerated?"
 - No, it has been accelerated as much as possible.

The original paper is attached.

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

CPA Oil Directorate (b)(2)

-----Original Message-----From: Vogler, Gary

Sent: Wednesday, October 29, 2003 8:08 PM

Subject: FW: LPG Inventory Point Paper

(b)(6)

Please assist.

Gary

-----Original Message-----

10/31/2003

LPG Inventory 28 October

Issue: LPG inventory is not rising despite imports.

Summary: With current system limitations, production and imports are approximately 3500 tons — well below demand. Repair of the pipeline from the South Gas Plant (SGP) to Baghdad, start-up of the SGP, and repair of the LPG pump station at Nasiriyah will increase total available LPG to 6500 tons (Import Plan requirement) and increase stocks of LPG.

Background:

1) Production:

LPG is currently produced at the following locations and quantities:

North Gas Plant	980 tons per day	
Baiji Relinery	300 tons per day	
Daura Refinery	120 tons per day	
Basra Refinery	120 tons per day	
Total	1520 tons per day	

The SGP will produce about 1500 tons per day but is not currently operational (repairs are estimated to be complete and production started by 10 November).

- 2) Import by Truck: Since production is much less than the 4600 tons per day estimated demand, imports are required. KBR imports LPG by truck from Turkey and Kuwait, and SOMO imports by truck from Turkey. Truck imports have been about 1500 tons per day. Two additional contracts have been let to increase truck imports.
- 3) Import by Barge: Due to cycle time, truck capacities (20 tons), truck availability, and truck download capacities, imports by truck cannot fill the deficit between Iraq's production and its demand; therefore, both KBR and SOMO import LPG by barge at the LPG Jetties just north of Umm Qasr port. The barges off-load via pipeline to the SGP bulk storage a few kilometers away. Since the LPG pipeline from the SGP to Baghdad is not operational and the available bulk storage is nearly full, barges offload LPG only as bulk storage space is made available. Currently, this can only be done by loading LPG for distribution into trucks at the SGP. LPG can only be loaded into trucks at 500 tons per day; therefore, the imports from these several thousand ton barges are limited to 500 tons per day.
- 4) LPG Available: With current system limitations, production and imports are approximately 3500 tons well below estimated demand.

Resolution:

1) Repair and fill the LPG pipeline from the SGP to Baghdad. ETR - 06 November. Pipeline adds approximately 1200 tons per day capacity to move LPG from the SGP north. This will add 1200 tons per day in imports by barge.

Total Available LPG = 4700 tons per day

2) Repair the LPG pump station at Nasiriah. ETR - 15 November. This increases capacity of the pipeline from SGP to Baghdad to 3000 tons per day. Combined with the SGP production, this will greatly increase available LPG, meet the Import Plan requirements, and significantly improve inventory.

Total Available LPG = 6500 tons per day

(b)(6)	
From:	(b)(6)
Sent:	Sunday, October 12, 2003 6:13 AM
To:	Bremer, Paul; Crear, Robert (O-7); (b)(2),(b)(6) (b)(6)
	(b)(6) Vogler, Gary; (b)(6) (b)(2),(b)(6) (b)(6) (b)(6) (b)(6) (b)(6)
Cc:	(b)(6)

Subject: 12 Oct Daily Oil Report

Daily report will not be issued today due to lack of data which is received daily from the Ministry of Oil. The Ministry was inaccessible yesterday due to increased threat levels and heightened security.



10/12/2003

LOT MUSCE TH

117-030911-26

Bremer, Paul

From:

(b)(2),(b)(6)

Sent:

To:

Cc:

Wednesday, September 10, 2003 6:54 PM
McManaway, Clayton
Kennedy, Patrick Amb; Bremer, Paul; Caldwell, Bill, MG, OSD; (b)(6)

(b)(6)

Subject:

Rob McKee

Rob Mckee-recently retired senior exec with Conoco has accepted our offer to replace Phil Carroll as the Senior Advisor to the oil ministry, subject to our working out the logistical details (so lets keep this quiet for now). Rob, as you will recall, was Phils no 1 choice. He was in here last week where he met any number of people, including the Deputy Sec, and made a very positive impression.

It would be great if you (LPB especially) could call and welcome him. His number in Houston (b)(2)

We are moving as quickly as possible to expedite his arrival-eta, late september. (b)(6)

Powell, Owen C. (SES)

From:

(b)(6)

Sent:

Sunday, November 23, 2003 9:52 AM

To:

Powell, Owen C. (SES)

Subject: FW: Milestone and Srategic Plan Updates

----Original Message----From: (b)(6) Sent: Friday, November 21, 2003 9:24 PM Agresto, John T. (SES) (b)(6) To:(b)(6) Arsht, Lesiye A. (SES); Castle, Edwin S. (SES-2 General Counsel); Evers, Williamson M. (SES); Fatfat, Mounzer R. (SES); (b)(6) (b)(6)Johnson, Susan R. (SES): (b)(6) McKee, Robert E. (SES); (b)(6) (b)(6)(b)(6)Trent Darrell (SES-6) **Cc:** (b)(6) (b)(6)Maxwell, Dayton CIV Reconst USAID; (b)(6)

I appreciate many of you are currently working the revision of your Milestone Charts and preparing to mirror the changes in the Strategic Plan (SP). When complete, I would be grateful if you would forward electronic copy of your Milestone Charts to me NLT than Sun 23 Nov. Remember you will also need 'write permission' to access the data base, which I can give you.

Further to a previous email – it would be extremely useful if you could send me the name of those within your area who will be responsible for updating the SP.

If you have any questions, please contact me.

Subject: Milestone and Srategic Plan Updates

(b)(6) Wing Commander (OF-5) (b)(2)

From:

(b)(2),(b)(6)

Sent:

Monday, July 28, 2003 2:58 PM

To:

(b)(6)

Subject:

RE: Road ahead for Tuwaitha



Tuwaitha.ppt (50 KB)

Thanks (b)(6) I took the liberty of adding some details that I think will facilitate the site recon tomorrow. Still needs more of the ISTC vision to provide better context. Request that you fill in the blanks

(b)(6) Pls review & edit. Also need the DTRA vision. Most interested in the key tasks for each phase. I threw in dates for the heck of it. May not be able to determine some things until we get on the ground but hope this could provide us a framework to start from

All- I am proposing this as a tool to integrate the ISG (DTRA), CJTF & CPA vision/missions. Could help prepare our respective plans and ensure that they are in synch. Welcome any and all cmts. I will incorporate any cmts received by COB and bring copies to the recon. Thanks in advance

(b)(6)

CJTF-7 C3 Chemical Officer

(b)(2)

----Original Message----

From: (b)(6)

Sent: Monday, July 28, 2003 6:22 PM

To: (b)(6)

Cc: (b)(6)

(b)(6)

Subject: RE: Road ahead for Tuwaitha

(b)(6)

- 1) Thanks for the slides. Will review & give you some feedback. Key thing that is missing is the future of Iraqi ops at Tuwaitha. This must be approved at OSD & will also drive the FP rqmts. Important that we all agree where we're going
- 2) 1AD TOAs are for lower Tier facilities My understanding is that CJTF (1AD) will continue to secure Tuwaitha until we fwd the CPA plan & it is approved by OSD. That plan should include the augmentation of US gds w/ Irqai gds. Once designated rad sources have been removed from Tuwaitha and augmentationw/ Iraqi gds has been successfully conducted, I beliebve a TOA from US to Iraqi custody could be recommended to OSD. Again condition dependant.
- 3) Need info on the missing rad source and a copy of the ITSC inventory w/ what is present and what is missing. DTRA (b)(6) needs this so that he can assume inventory control on Wed when he gets the keys.

4) Would like info and pictures of the rad sources & lightning rods to advise our forces.

(b)(6)CJTF-7 Chemical Officer (b)(2)

----Original Message----

From: (b)(2),(b)(6)

Sent: Monday, July 28, 2003 8:13 AM To: (b)(6) Cc: (b)(6)

Subject: RE: Road ahead for Tuwaitha

We have developed concept/vision(unclass) for force protection at Tuwaitha. Also, is this in concert with 1AD's effort at TOA for Baghdad fixed site security? It appears there a lot of actors involved with this (including the ministries) so please give me a call to discuss.

(b)(6)

CIV

Staff, Iraqi Science and Technology Commission (b)(2)

Message

----Origi From: (b)(6)

Sent: Sunday, July 27, 2003 7:51 AM

To: (b)(6)

Cc:

Subject: Road ahead for Tuwaitha

Gentlemen,

Could you please provide us your road map/vision for Tuwaitha. We are working with our Force protection officer to develop a protection plan for the facility. Need to know what the future of the facility is so he can develop a workable plan that can be transitioned later after Iraqi Atomic Energy Agency takes over the facility. Also need to know what activities are currently going on at the site. Which buildings are being used and what they are being used for (i.e are there any building that have a higher security need than others). That way the FP officer can develop a comprehensive plan for the site.

(b)(6)

OPLAN LOCKBOX (AL TUWAITHA)

Situation: Al Tuwaitha 23,000 acre facility Nuclear Research Center (Tuwaitha B) - 90 bldgs radiological sources Yellowcake Storage Facility (Tuwaitha C) – 3 bldgs radiological sources Iraqi Science & Technology Commission (ISTC formerly the Ministry) of Atomic Energy, ____ employees conduct (describe ops on Tuwaitha) International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)- inspection Jun 03 controls radioactive sources in Tuwaitha C OSD directs transfer of radiological sources to US CPA supervises ISTC Iraq Support Group (ISG) eliminates WMD hazards Contractor (Raytheon) assists with elimination mission CJTF-7 conducts security and stability operations 2-6 IN/2 BCT/1AD provides security for Tuwaitha Iraqi guards trained & certified by 2-6 IN FP team conducts vulnerability assessment of Tuwaitha

	present facility to revery
	1 State of the sta
 Mission: Secure and eliminate dange 	erous radiological sources.
transition Tuwaitha to the Iragi center	of excellence for radiological safety
_and scientific research: Leverage the	peaceful use of radiological sources
to help modernize the Iraqi industrial b	base, to help emerging manufactures
1 And production companie	o, and to showever public privately
•Cdr's Intent fartherships	base, to Alp energing manufathings

- Retain US control & oversight
 - Establish accountability for radiological sources
 - Move dangerous sources to the US
 - •Retain radiological sources for industrial and maked uses.

11. At 1 1 con

- Develop ISTC scientific expertise
 - Purge Baathist influence
 - Nurture new leaders focused on peaceful projects
- Modernize Iraq's industrial base
 - Model for the untapped potential in the Middle East
- Transition Tuwaitha security and operations to Iraqi control
 - Augment US security
 - Transfer control from US to Iraq when conditions are attained

From:

(b)(6)

Sent:

Thursday, July 31, 2003 9:44 AM

To:

(b)(2),(b)(6)

Cc:

(b)(6)

Subject: FP Synch Meeting

(b)(6)

Please pass along to all concerned parties:

MOAE will host an Al Tuwaitha Force Protection Synchronization meeting 1300-1500 in the Ministry Conference Room CPA HQs, Room S111. This meeting will result in a plan ahead for the FP needs of the Al Tuwaitha site. Some suggested agenda items are:

- Results of FP site assessment
- Results of initial rad surveys
- NDT requirements
- MOAE/ISTC site requirements
- V Corps way ahead
 - * Recap current guard force deployment; future needs and constraints
- Way ahead

Any other pertinent agenda items are welcomed.

(b)(6)

CIV

Chief of Staff,

MOAE/Iraqi Science and Technology Commission

(b)(2)



From:

Grayson P Wolfe/GC/EXIMBANK

To:

April Foley/BD/EXIMBANK

Date:

Monday, February 23, 2004 09:48PM

Subject:

Re: Revised Ghadbahn Letter

April,

Here are a few suggestions I am running back to a meeting with Tony Beil and others. This is a bit of a rush job. Hopefully my e-mail is up and running soon. I am having a very difficult time responding to your e-mails. Hope that all is well. I will provide comments on the other letter tonight.

Best Regards, Grayson

DRAFT

February 23, 2004

Mr. Thamir Ghadhban Ministry of Oil Baghdad, Iraq

Dear Thamir:

Thank you for taking the time to meet with us to discuss Ex-Im Bank's proposal for a Medium-Term Well Workover Financing Facility.

I took your advice and shared Ex-Im Bank's proposal with financial and related ministries. Here are the results:

- I had a working session with Minister of Finance Kamel al-Keilani, Trade Bank of Iraq President Hussein al-Uzri, Undersecretary of Finance Fahmi Rabee, and Deputy Minister of Finance Hassan Aziz. During this session:
- O A request was made to see our proposal in writing.
- o We were asked to provide f inancial projections.

Interest was expressed in insuring that a portion of the incremental revenue produced by the project would be available for Iraq's immmediate use, and not just for debt repayment.

- o Some uncertainty was expressed about Iraq's readiness to move forward, due to debt considerations.
- I then met with **Dr**. Ahmad Chalabi of the Governing Council together with all of the above individuals from the working session and Mr. Dhia Khayoon of the Raffidain Bank.
- o I described to Dr. Chalabi what I thought would result if Iraq does not move forward with a medium term well workover project. Project RIO's funds will enable Iraq to restore its oil production to pre-war levels. After those funds are spent, if no further investment is made, oil production levels will begin to fall. It could take Iraq three to five years to reach consensus about its long-term oil strategy and then to identify a project, negotiate financing, complete construction, and finally pump oil. During all this time, oil revenues will decline and government spending will need to be cut back. The people of Iraq are already anxious to share in Iraq's great oil wealth. Iraq cannot afford to retard progress by delaying investment in its oil infrastructure. While the Ex-Im Bank approach is not a long-term solution, it provides an interim step that will contribute positively to Iraq's economic growth and political stability.

https://mail.exim.gov/mail/gwolfe.nsf/(\$Sent)/92D1116A661D920585256E4300675B79/?OpenDocumen... 2/24/2004

- O Dr. Chalabi said he thought it was an excellent idea, and Iraq should move ahead as quickly as possible. He expressed interest in making sure the approach makes good economic sense.
- o I also recommended to Mr. Chalabi that, in the upcoming negotiations with the IMF and Paris Club, Iraq should be sure to negotiate for itself flexibility to make investments to develop its oil infrastructure. The IMF will want to tie Iraq's hands in a way that will prevent it from making the very investments that will improve its economic viability. I also pointed out that the IMF would not be receptive to re-opening the agreement once it is finalized. Iraq has leverage BEFORE it signs the IMF agreement. Dr. Chalabi was receptive to this recommendation.
- I also met with Dr. al-Shabibi of the Central Bank. He thought the medium-term oil financing idea made good sense and indicated that he was strongly supportive.
- I was unable to meet with the Minister of Planning, but I did share our ideas with his Senior Advisor at the CPA, and I asked him to pass on our ideas to the Minister.

Based on the input that I received at these meetings, I would suggest that Ex-Im Bank now take the following actions:

o P repare a legal opinion in response to Radhwan's question about whether the assets involved in such a medium term facility are subject to attachment risk.

Draft a written proposal and disseminate it, as you advise

o P repare financial projections and address your question about interest rates. I would suggest a two-step process: First, we will send you financials from a similar project. Second, if this data is interesting to you, I suggest that you identify a specific potential project, and we will work with Ministry staff to develop appropriate financial models. (One thought -- I see the financial projections as a element of the written proposal. If this is the case you may want to combine these two points or make the linkage more clear)

I believe that these steps will help the idea mature.

After I know that you have received this letter, I will call you to get your thoughts on this approach.

Sincerely,

April Foley

Cc: Rob McKee Gary Vogler Grayson Wolfe From:

April Foley/BD/EXIMBANK

To:

Grayson P Wolfe/GC/EXIMBANK@EXIMBANK

Date:

Monday, February 23, 2004 07:15PM

Subject:

Re: 2 letters

Thanks, I'll make the changes.

Grayson P Wolfe

Grayson P Wolfe

To: April Foley/BD/EXIMBANK

CC: Subject:

Re: 2 letters

02/23/2004 09:51 AM

DRAFT

February 23, 2004

Mr. Thamir Ghadhban Senior Advisor to the Minister of Oil Ministry of Oil Baghdad, Iraq

Dear Thamir:

Thank you for taking the time to meet with us to discuss Ex-Im Bank's proposal for a Medium-Term Well Workover Financing Facility.

I took your advice and shared Ex-Im Bank's proposal with financial and other related ministries. Here are the results:

I had a working session with Minister of Finance Kamel al-Keilani, Trade Bank of Iraq President Hussein al-Uzri, Undersecretary of Finance Fahmi Rabee, and Deputy Minister of Finance Aziz. (Because we met with several people you may not want to state that all of these suggestions came from Undersecretary Rabee).

- o Undersecretary Rabee said he would like to see our proposal in writing.
- o He requested that we include detailed financial projections in the proposal on the cost of the project, expected oil output, the resulting revenue, and the length of time that it would take to complete the project.
- O H e mentioned that Iraq's uncertainty on how to proceed with oil financing stems at least impart out of concern to limit its external debt.

Finally, he indicated that he would only be interested in a medium term project that generates sufficient revenue to both repay a loan and that is able to produce sufficient revenue for other uses.

I then met with members of the Committee on Finance and Planning. All of the individuals that participated in the working session attended this meeting. In addition, Dr. Ahmad Chalabi of the Governing Council and Mr. Dhia Khayoon Chairman of the Rafidain Bank also attended.

o I described to Dr. Chalabi the situation that I thought would result if Iraq does not make a decision to move forward with medium term financing. Project RIO's goal is to restore Iraqi oil production to pre-war production levels. It is a short term project only. After Project RIO ends, if no further investment is made, oil production levels will begin to fall. It could take three to five years for Iraq to reach consensus about a long-

https://mail.exim.gov/mail/gwolfe.nsf/(\$Inbox)/02803B0F8206148585256E4300594E0A/?OpenDocume... 2/24/2004

term oil financing strategy and then to identify a project, negotiate financing, complete construction, and finally pump oil. During all this time, oil revenues will decline and government spending will need to be cut back. The people of Iraq are already anxious to share in Iraq's great oil wealth. Iraq cannot afford to delay investing in its oil infrastructure. While the Ex-Im Bank approach is not a long-term solution, it is a valid interim step that will contribute positively to Iraq's economic and political stability.

o D r. Chalabi said he thought it was an excellent idea, and Iraq should move ahead as quickly as possible. He

expressed interest in making sure the approach makes good economic sense.

o I also recommended to Dr. Chalabi that, in the upcoming negotiations with the IMF and Paris Club, Iraq should be sure to negotiate for itself flexibility to make investments to develop its oil infrastructure. The IMF will want to tie Iraq's hands in a way that will prevent it from making the very investments that will improve its economic viability. I also pointed out that the IMF would not be receptive to re-opening the agreement once it is finalized. Iraq has leverage BEFORE it signs the IMF agreement. Dr. Chalabi indicated that if Iraq could deal with Saddam, it could deal with the IMF. (I think this sentence sounds a little too light hearted).

I also met with Dr. al-Shabibi of the Central Bank. He thought the medium-term oil financing idea made good sense and indicated that he was strongly supportive.

I was unable to meet with the Minister of Planning, but I did share our ideas with his Senior Advisor at the CPA, and I asked him to pass on our ideas to the Minister.

I would suggest the following steps:

- o Ex-Im Bank should prepare a legal opinion in response to Radhwan's question about whether the assets involved in such an investment are subject to attachment risk.
- o Ex-Im Bank should put its proposal into writing and disseminate it, as you advise.
- O Ex-Im Bank should prepare financial projections and address the questions that you raised regading the costs of Ex-Im Bank financing.

I would suggest a two-part process: First, we will send you financial from a similar project. Second, if this is interesting to you, I suggest that you identify a specific potential project, and we work with your people to develop detailed financial models.

I believe that these steps will help the idea mature.

After I know you have received this letter, I will call you to get your thoughts on this approach.

Sincerely,

April Foley

Cc: Rob McKee Gary Vogler Grayson Wolfe

GPW original edits

- incrimental

- lebt concern (to make hoppen) To: Grayson.Wolfe@exim.gov Date: Sunday, February 22, 2004 07:37PM Subject: 2 letters Grayson. Let me know your reaction. Am I missing anything? April DRAFT February 21, 2004 Ministry of Oil 'Senier Advisor to the Min. Hor of (A) Baghdad, Iraq Dear Thamir: Thank you for taking the time to meet with as to discuss Ex-Im Bank's proposal for a Medium-Term Oilfield Workover Financing Facility. I took your advice and shared Ex-Im Bank's proposal with financial and related ministrie. Here are the results: I had a working session with Minister of Finance Kamil al-Kaylani, Trade Bank of Iraq President Hussein al-Uzri, Mr. Fami, and Mr. Aziz. Dear Months of France Sand on the ingrit on second on the ingrit on th He also requested financial projections astel that the proper , include defauld francial projections of the ... 0 And he expressed uncertainty about Iraq's readiness to move forward. I then met with Mr. Ahmad Chalabi of the Governing Council together with all of the above individuals from working session and Mr. Dhia Khayoon of the Raffidair Bank. distalia the working session and Mr. Dhia Khayoon of the Raffidain Bank. adjust and the first and and median for first I described to Dr. Chalabi what I thought would happen to freq if this type of investment was not made. The Project RIO hards enable Iraq's oil production levels to be maintained for the short term only. After these funds are spent, if no further investment is made, oil production levels will begin to fall. It could take three to five years for Iraq to reach consensus about its long-term oil strategy, identify, negotiate financing for and construct a large project, and finally begin to pump oil. During all this time, oil revenues will decline, and government spending will need to be cut back. The people of Iraq are already anxious to share in Iraq's great oil wealth. Iraq cannot afford to delay investing in its oil infrastructure. While the Ex-Im Bank approach is not a long-term solution, it is a valid interim step that will contribute positively to Iraq's economic and political stability. of Mr. Chalabi said he thought it was an excellent idea, and traq should move ahead as quickly as possible. He expressed interest in making sure the approach makes good economic sense. I also recommended to Mr. Chalabi that, in the upcoming negotiations with the IMF and Paris Club, Iraq should be sure to negotiate for itself flexibility to make investments to develop its oil infrastructure. The IMF will want to tie Iraq's hands in a way that will prevent it from making the very investments that will improve its economic viability. I also pointed out that the IMF would not be receptive to re-opening the agreement once it is finalized. Iraq has leverage BEFORE it signs the IMF agreement. Mr. Chalabi indicated that if Iraq could deal with Saddam, it could deal with the IMF. I also met with Dr. al-Shabibi of the Central Bank. He thought the medium-term oil financing idea made good sense and indicated that he was, supportive.

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From:

April Foley/BD/EXIMBANK

Stronly

I was unable to meet with the Minister of Planning, but I did share our ideas with his Senior Advisor at the CPA, and I asked him to pass on our ideas to the Minister.

WEXT I would suggest the following steps:

Ex-Im Bank should prepare a legal opinion in response to Radhwan's question about whether the assets 0 involved in such an investment could be seized. Grate a formal graguest

Ex-Im Bank should put its proposal into writing and disseminate it, as you advise.

Ex-Im Bank should proposal into writing and disseminate it, as you advise.

I would be a should proposal into writing and disseminate it, as you advise. suggest a two-part process: First, we will send you financials from a similar project. Second, if this is interesting to you, I suggest that you identify a specific potential project, and we work with your people to develop financial the reduce term contract for you evaluation. models on this specific potential project.

I believe that these steps will help the idea mature."

After I know you have received this letter, I will call you to get your thoughts on this approach.

Sincerely,

April Foley

Cc: Rob McKee Gary Vogler Grayson Wolfe

DRAFT MEMORANDUM

TO: Gary Edson, Deputy Assistant to the President Richard Karp, Director for International Energy National Security Council Al Larson, Undersecretary of State

FROM: April Foley, First Vice President and Vice Chairman

Export Import Bank of the US

DATE: February 21, 2004

Iraqi Reaction to Ex-Im Bank Proposals RE:

I visited Iraq February 14th to 19th to discuss various Ex-Im Bank-related proposals and issues with the CPA and members of the Iraqi government. Below please find a summary of the relevant meetings:

DEVELOPMENT FUND OF IRAQ

Meeting on 02/18/04 with Member of the Governing Council and Chair of its Finance Committee Dr. Ahmad Chalabi, Minister of Finance al-Kaylani, President of the Trade Bank of Iraq Hussein al-Uzri, President of Raffidain

https://mail.exim.gov/mail/gwolfe.nsf/(\$Inbox)/9A094F8E839060B485256E42005B1182/?OpenDocume... 2/23/2004



From:

Sunday, January 18, 2004 12:25 AM

To: . (0)(2)

Sent:

cc: (L)(2)

Subject: Oil Rehabilitation Financing Facility

Attachment : Iraq-OilRehabilitationFacilityPreliminaryTerms(Word).doc (30 KB)

Dear Mr. Ghadhban,

I am writing on behalf of the Export-Import Bank of the United States ("Ex-Im Bank") to express our strong interest in working with the Iraq Ministry of Oil (the "Ministry") to develop a medium-term financing facility for rapid oil field rehabilitation projects (the "Projects").

the Ministry desires, we could work with you to structure this financing

a general facility to support procurement for multiple projects or initially as a financing for a single project. A single project financing

could serve as a model or be expanded to include additional projects in the

future upon mutual agreement of the parties.

Some preliminary thoughts on potential terms and structure for a single project financing are attached. We would also be interested in working, if

the Ministry chooses, with a select number of export credit agencies from

other nations in providing this financing. Such an approach would allow the Ministry to maximize its procurement options and terms for the Project,

while minimizing any potential political sensitivities by making this a multinational effort.

The attached preliminary terms and structures are indicative and do not represent a commitment on the part of Ex-Im Bank. If you are interested in

further exploring these concepts or would like to discuss other alternatives, I would propose having a small team from Ex-Im Bank meet with

Ministry personnel to develop a more definitive proposal. I will be in London during the second week of February if that would be a convenient time and place to pursue this further. Prior to such meeting and after receiving your comments on the structure, we could provide you with a more

detailed term sheet that would be the focus of the meeting. We look forward to hearing any comments or questions you may have on this matter.



Peter B. Saba Chief Operating Officer & General Counsel Export-Import Bank of the United States

(See attached file: Iraq~OilRehabilitationFacilityPreliminaryTerms(Word).doc)

BO | BO | BO

Notice: Attachments are automatically scanned for viruses using McAfee

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(b)(6)

From:

Sent:

Wednesday December 10, 2003 8:53 PM

To:

(b)(6)Foley, Thomas C. (CIV); Bent, Rodney G. (SES);

Belka, Marek (POL CIV); McKee, Robert E. (SES): (b)(6)

Ind/Minerals; Johnson, Susan R. (SES); (b)(6)

Subject:

RE: WTO reporting memo for Bremer



WTO report.doc (110 KB)

Attached please find the WTO report from (b)(6)

Regards,

(b)(6)

Ministry of Trade

Message----

From: (b)(2),(b)(6)

Sent: Wednesday, December 10, 2003 2:02 PM

To: (b)(6)

Cc: (b)(6)

Subject: WTO reporting memo for Bremer

(b)(6)

Would you please do a quick edit and format of the attached memo for Amb Bremer. If possible could you see that he receives it today, as I had been scheduled to meet with him Monday on the subject. Please resend final memo

Please note it is limited use only -- I believe I capture relevant readers in the cc.

(b)(6) -Please share with (b)(6) for the Weds econ highlights.

(b)(6) -please check with (b)(6) to see if he can assist. If not, please send to ExSec

Thanks

(b)(6)

Wonder if the latest virus has gotten to your computer? Find out. Run the FREE McAfee online computer scan! http://clinic.mcafee.com/clinic/ibuy/campaign.asp?cid=3963

1

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6)

Sent: Sunday, November 23, 2003 2:24 PM

To: Foley, Thomas C. (CIV); (b)(6)

Cc: Belka, Marek (POL CIV); McKee, Robert E. (SES)

Subject: FW: notes from call with Luis Giusti

We thought you'd be interested in the notes

Here's a link to Giusti's bio: http://www.csis.org/sei/event991208bioGiusti.html

-----Original Message-----From: (b)(6)

Sent: Saturday, November 22, 2003 8:16 PM

To: Belka, Marek (POL CIV) Cc: McKee, Robert E. (SES)

Subject: notes from call with Luis Giusti

Rob McKee's notes from call with Luis Giusti on Friday, November 21

Survey: who uses private and who uses public? Volumes in each? An indication of who will be helped

Incentive to public must be paid - don't leave people behind

Cost to refineries must be understood

Minimum

Don't want to charge subsidies against company

Let company turn into a real global player – don't let them have a loss and have a minimal gain staying put – starting point for private business

Separate subsidy from company - manage through a separate entity

Have subsidy isolated - also clear and transparent

Separate national budget provision from subsidy

Must subsidize public transportation: coupons for people, minimize corruption in many ways, design ways to audit what is given to the people, create media campaign so people know they're getting money and where it comes from

If you liberate supply chain – analyze cost structure in segments – debt service of terminal and the chain of distribution

11/23/2003

The keeps NOC as indirect regulator - reference for avoiding speculation

How much natural gas is available? Using it for transportation is much better - 1/10 cost of using gasoline - create incentive to transform gasoline to natural gas - did it effectively in Venezuela and Argentina - if the long-term natural gas cost is low - can be implemented fairly quickly

I/O campaign on subsidies is crucial – let people know why the moves are being made and why

How will this affect the food basket?

Do it gradually!

Start by deregulating some of the products

Lubricants is a good place to start - people don't need to purchase it everyday

Start with those that people don't need everyday of their lives

Set price at cost of product at terminal level – regulate what truckers buy at that price and make a small profit

Give some room to let people make some money along the way

Do it all at once only if you have the money to pay the compensation

Discussion with stakeholders (political) before doing so

Natural gas is free, basically, so this is a key thing to pursue - attractive for trucks, buses

Bent, Rodney (SES-4)

From: (b)(6)

Sent: Wednesday, February 18, 2004 4:30 PM

To: McKee, Robert E. (SES); (b)(6)

Cc: Bent, Rodney (SES-4); (b)(6) Dawes, Robert (SES-2)

Subject: RE: Follow up to briefing

It seems that the information required for the DFI Audit will be available because the highlighted sentence in the paragraph below is what the IAMB auditors would be looking for - that we know the quantity of crude oil being sold and the sales price so the auditors can ensure that those sales prices are appropriate - "consistent with prevailing international market best practices" - and that the total sale price is deposited into the Oil Proceeds Account with 95% then going into the DFI.

The question on the bartering process by SOMO is different. I understand that CPA has been moving SOMO away from those bartering contracts, to the cash sales basis. The question here is getting the data from SOMO on the amount of residual oil that is being bartered, the quantity and type of fuel that is being provided in return, and then the ability to determine the relative values of those two products.

If there isn't a reliable periodic reconciliation of crude production to utilization that IAMB discusses, it may lead to questions for the auditors. From their perspective the question arises on the internal controls in place to ensure that there isn't [large scale] smuggling of crude going on. I don't know enough about the oil business to know if that's possible but that would be the question to answer. Should there be a relationship between the crude produced and the amount of crude sold or are there too many other variables within the refining portion?

Again, from an auditor's perspective, another area to review would be once the product is either refined [or imported], are the controls in place to track quantity produced down to quantity delivered to the end user? Are losses in line with industry standard operations? However, I don't believe this review is within the scope of the audit. Will the SOMO auditors review that area?

R, (b)(6) Deputy CFO, CPA MoF/CFO, Room S203 (b)(2)

----Original Message---From: McKee, Robert E. (SES)

Sent: Wednesday, February 18, 2004 6:40 AM

то: (b)(6)

Cc: Bent, Rodney (SES-4); (b)(6)

Dawes, Robert (SES-2)

Subject: RE: Follow up to briefing

(b)(6) With regard to the metering of crude oil production, this is something that will take months if not years to put in place. This is just the way it has been done for years in Iraq. It's not something any of us like, but it is a fact. Now, the only semi-reliable metering that is done is on the export volumes themselves because they're putting the oil onto a ship for a buyer, and the buyer obviously has to have some way of knowing what they bought. We do our best by using the Iraqis estimates of production, refining feed stocks, shrinkage, reinjection and

exports to try to somewhat reconcile the numbers. I'm sure we all agree there are a lot of loose ends in this system.

Rob McKee

----Original Message----From: (b)(6)

Sent: Tuesday, February 17, 2004 10:02 PM To: McKee, Robert E. (SES); (b)(6)

Cc: Bent, Rodney (SES-4); (b)(6)

Dawes, Robert (SES-2)

Subject: FW: Follow up to briefing

The IAMB has asked some specific questions about Oil, Contracting, and Halliburton purchases.

I would like the Ministry of Oil to address the questions about crude oil.

I would like HCA to respond to the questions on sole source contracts.

I am working on where to send the Halliburton questions but rather than hold this up, I am going to task out that portion out later.

Please provide your response and if applicable, the plan for corrections. I would like the answers by Friday.

Thanks (b)(6)

(b)(6)

CPA Comptroller

(b)(2)

----Original Message----

From: (b)(2),(b)(6)

Sent: Tuesday, February 17, 2004 7:37 PM

To: (b)(6)

Subject: Follow up to briefing

Dear (b)(6)

Thanbk you once again for the useful briefing. I am enclosing a letter regarding a number of issues which are of concern to the Board

Best Regards

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Here are the materials we spoke of on the telephone. We need your input on the "Witness Protection Program" and the "Other Technical Investigative Methods" by 13 November so we can roll it into our response for the other items.

Thanks.

(b)(6)

```
----Original Message----
From: Nash David (SES)
Sent: Tuesday, November 11, 2003 2:58 PM
To: Casteel , Steven W. (SES-06); (b)(6)
 (COL); Wilkinson, Molly A. (SES) (b)(6)
(b)(6)
(b)(6)
                                                McKee, Robert E. (SES); (b)(6)
Trent Darrell (SES-6); (b)(6)
                                                   Willis Franklin K. (SES); (b)(6)
(b)(6)
(b)(6)
                             Arsht, Leslye A. (SES); Evers, Williamson M. (SES); Bent,
Rodney G. (SES); (b)(6)
(b)(6)
                   Vogler, Gary
Cc: (b)(6)
(b)(6)
(b)(6)
                                                                         Crawford Darrell E.
 (SES)
Subject:
```

The recent signing of the United States legislation Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for Defense and Reconstruction of Iraq by President Bush brings a much needed infusion of funds to our efforts in CPA. CPA must now deliver a financial plan to Congress to enable the apportionment of the funds. Here is the timeline for accomplishing that:

- * 14 Nov Produce procurement schedule and list of grants
- * 20 Nov Consolidated list of projects with first cut on who the execution agent will be
- 30 Nov Submit draft plan to Bremer
- * $\,$ 10 Dec Submit plan to OMB DC for apportionment and Congress for notification
- 1 Feb Contract awards

IIRO needs your help to succeed. We must build a procurement and execution plan for both construction and non-construction dollars. This plan must provide descriptions and locations of projects to be performed, estimated costs, when each project is needed (when must it be completed, thus when must it start to meet that deadline), what must be procured and who should procure it, and when the procurement needs to occur. While we're preparing the plan we are authorized to obligate up to 20% of the total, so IIRO, in coordination with the ministries, must also establish priorities within each ministry and across CPA. Your input to the plan is critical to our success.

We have broken non-construction dollars into two categories: things that have to be procured and things that don't, like salaries, grants, etc. Attachment A is our best guess at the breakout of these dollars. The Baker/Stanley Team, supporting the IIRO, has been working with your representatives to determine the detailed requirements for the

PRB No: 597 (PRB Staff to Assign)	Project Name: Emergency Fuel Response Pgm	
Date of Request: 21 Dec 2003	Date Required: 21 Dec. 2003	
Name of Requester: Ambassador Bremer	Signature:	
CPA Office/Unit: CPA- Ministry of Oil	POC/Person Completing Form:	
Robert McKee		
Amount of Request: \$5,000,000	DSN/Cell Phone:	
Project Location:	Email Address:	
1. Project Category (check all that apply):		
Reconstruction Health Salaries Humanitarian Transportation Pensions Food Distribution Economic Programs Budget/Ops. Support Water/Sewer Education Other Public Services Electricity Ministry Social Programs Rule of Law/Govern. Police/ Security Cultural Programs Div. Commanders Brig. Commanders Regional Dir. Fund Fund Fund Construction Initiative		
2. Proposed Funding Source: (PRB Staff Only) Vested Assets Bank Account Details: Name/Title of Iraqi Receiving Disbursement: Appropriated Funds CPA Rep/Unit Responsible for Oversight:		
	ring Oversight Assigned to:	
Name of	Certifying Official:	
4. Clearances: Please indicate you have obtained appropriate clearances, as applicable. (Note: If that coordination cannot be done at the regional level, it will be done by PRC.) Regional Coordinator: Yes No Name: Ministry Senior Advisor: Yes No No X Name: Office Director/Unit Commander: Yes No Name: Reconstruction/USAID: Yes No X Name: International Coordination Council: Yes No X Name: Others: Mr. Scott Castle, General Counsel		
Program Staff Use Only		
Date Request Received: 21 Dec 2003 Form Complete: Yes No		
Disposition:		
Date Request Submitted to Program Review Committee: Disposition:		
Date Request Submitted to Program Review Board: Disposition:		

Date Request Returned to Requester/Submitted to Comptroller: Disposition (including expenditure authorized):

Description of Program or Goods To Be Purchased - Please See Above Instructions

The purpose of this program is to provide for basic, time-critical assistance to the Ministry of Oil to carry out stabilization efforts of the current oil/fuel situation.


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CPA Office/Unit: CPA-Ministry of Oil Robert McKee	POC/Person Completing Form:	
Amount of Request: \$5,000,000	DSN/Cell Phone:	
Project Location:	Email Address:	
Project Category (check all that apply):		
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Appropriated Funds CPA Rep/Unit Responsible for Oversight: Iraqi Development Fund Engineering Oversight Assigned to: Name of Certifying Official:		
4. Clearances: Please indicate you have obtained appropriate clearances, as applicable. (Note: If that coordination cannot be done at the regional level, it will be done by PRC.) Regional Coordinator: Yes No Name: Ministry Senior Advisor: Yes No Name: Office Director/Unit Commander: Yes No Name:		
Reconstruction/USAID: Yes No X Name: International Coordination Council: Yes No X Name: Others: Mr. Scott Castle. General Counsel		
Program Staff Use Only		
Date Request Received: 21 Dec 2003 Form Complete: Yes No Disposition:		
Date Request Submitted to Program Review Committee: Disposition:		
Date Request Submitted to Program Review Board:		

Date Request Returned to Requester/Submitted to Comptroller:

Disposition (including expenditure authorized):

Description of Program or Goods To Be Purchased - Please See Above Instructions

The purpose of this program is to provide for basic, time-critical assistance to the Ministry of Oil to carry out stabilization efforts of the current oil/fuel situation.





Name of Requester: (b)(6) PA Office/Unit: Ministry of Oil POCPerson Compléting Farm: (b)(6) Amount of Request: \$245,000,000.00 DSN/Cell Phone (b)(2) Project Category (check all that apply): Reconstruction Pensions Region) Pensions Pod Distribution Economic Programs Budget/Ops. Support Water/Sewer Education Other Public Services Water/Sewer Pelice/Security Social Programs Distribution Pensions Pensions Programs Cultural Programs Pensions Prund Construction Initiative Prund Construct	PRB No: (PRB Staff to Assign)	Project Name: Oil Infrastructure & Security
Poper Pope	Date of Request: 11/15/2003	Date Require (5)(6)
Amount of Request: \$245,000,000.00 DSN/Cell Phone (D/C) Project Location: Iraq - All Regions Email Address: (D/C) Region) Regions Email Address: (D/C) Reconstruction Health Pensions Pensions		Signature:
Project Location: Iraq - All Regions Email Address: D(2)		POC/Person Completing Farm: (0)(0)
Region) Project Category (check all that apply): Reconstruction		
Project Category (check all that apply): Reconstruction		Email Address: (b)(2)
Reconstruction	Region)	
Reconstruction	The last Control of the last 18 that are below	
Transportation	Project Category (check an that apply):	•
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Education		
Rule of Law/Govern.		
Div. Commanders Brig. Commanders Regional Dir. Fund	Electricity	Social Programs
Sund		
Construction Initiative		
Proposed Funding Source: 3. Funding Data: (PRB Staff Only)		Fund
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FOIA 09-826 CPA 000192

Disposition (including expenditure authorized):

Description of Program or Goods To Be Purchased - Please See Above Instructions

1. Purpose/Objective: PRB #352 authorized Task Force RIO to undertake \$961 million in infrastructure projects. Ambassador Bremer approved this action as PRB Allocation Request #6. To date, \$716 million has been allocated from Appropriated Funds. \$245 million is still required.

Detailed Descriptions:

- a. Air Surveillance. In response to the increasing threat to the oil infrastructure, specifically pipelines, we propose to add aerial surveillance capabilities to the contracted security force. Erinys can provide dedicated support with the Air Scan system, which they have used before in other similar situations. The Air Scan system is a low-light television sensor mounted in a two-engine commercial aircraft. A relay aircraft provides the downlink to the associated ground station. This system can provide the needed imagery with near-real time analysis and dissemination. Estimated Requirement: \$10 Million.
- b. MOO Portion of Workplan projects. The Ministry of Oil agreed to accomplish a significant portion of the Workplan using their own labor, equipment, and contracting/procurement capabilities. However, they do not have the funds required to purchase the necessary equipment and to let contracts for work that cannot be completed with their own labor force, so their portion of the Workplan is not making optimum progress. These funds will complete the immediate funding needs of the Workplan effort. Estimated Requirement: \$193 Million.
- c. Personal Security for Ministry of Oil Director-Generals (DGs). In early November, one of the Ministry of Oil DGs was the subject of an attack where he was wounded in the leg and his son was killed. As terrorists become bolder and increasingly desperate, Oil Executives become more likely targets for violent acts. Services are required to provide personal security for the 8 DGs for a period of 6 months. The Ministry of Oil will be responsible for procuring funding to extend the period of the contract beyond that point. Estimated Requirement: \$1.2 Million.
- d. Other security requirements. The fluid security environment has created many unanticipated security requirements. Some solutions that will be explored using these funds, if necessary, include hiring local tribes to guard infrastructure; selective hardening of particularly vulnerable sites; purchase of equipment to enhance security and communications among security forces; and others. Estimated Requirement: \$5.8 Million.
- e. Small Projects. Several Army units have identified small oil infrastructure projects in their respective sectors that will have an impact on total fuel production and/or have a positive impact on other sectors such as industry or housing and construction. Some examples that have been proposed are restoring a fuel storage depot with a capacity of 10 million liters and completing a Propane Deasphalting Unit at Daura refinery. Numerous other projects related to production and distribution exist throughout the country, and we would like the flexibility to approve these small projects if we determine the work meet our mission of restoring the Iraqi Oil Infratructure. This will be comparable to the Corps of Engineers small projects authority know as the "Continuing Authorities Program." These projects all are very inexpensive, use troop and local Iraqi assets, and build rapport between the various units and the Iraqi people. Estimated Requirement: \$35 Million.
- 2. Justification: The most significant impacts of not providing this funding are:
- a. Continued reduction in refinery output due to pipeline sabotage. For example, Daura refinery was recently reduced to 50% of capacity due to sabotage of the pipelines supplying crude

- oil. The Erinys air surveillance will significantly reduce the frequency and severity of pipeline sabotage incidents.
- b. MOO portion of Phase 1 projects goes on hold. MOO has no money to perform their portion of the Work Plan. This seriously hampers progress across the entire Work Plan. Without this funding the goal of achieving a crude production level of 2.5 million per day will not be attained.
- 3. Coordination: The requirement has been coordinated with the Director of Oil Policy and the Director General of the Iraqi Ministry of Oil.
- 4. Goods and Commodities: Not applicable.
- 5. Project Implementation: All of the projects authorized by this request will be accomplished primarily with the use of small contracts. Some of the funds will be used by the Ministry to purchase critical equipment. Some work will be accomplished by Iraqi Government employees using this equipment. Some work will be contracted out by the Ministry of Oil. Some work will be contracted through the CPA and managed by US Army units.

PRB No: 568 (PRB Staff to Assign)	Project Name: Fuel Imports	
Date of Request: 11/26/2003	Date Requir (b)(6)	
Name of Requester: (b)(6)	Signature:	
CPA Office/Unit: Ministry of Oil POC/Person Completing Form: (b)(6)		
Amount of Request: 425000000.00	DSN/Cell Phone (b)(2)	
Project Location: Iraq-all regions (Region)	Email Address (b)(2)	
1. Project Category (check all that apply):		
Reconstruction Humanitarian Food Distribution Water/Sewer Electricity Rule of Law/Govern. Div. Commanders Fund Construction Initiative Health Transportation Economic Prog Education Ministry Police/ Security Brig. Command	Budget/Ops. Support Other Public Services Social Programs Cultural Programs	
2. Proposed Funding Source: 3. Funding Data: (PRB Staff Only)		
the state of the s	count Details: or	
*************************************	itle of Iraqi Receiving Disbursement: p/Unit Responsible for Oversight:	
	ring Oversight Assigned to:	
i Name of	Certifying Official:	
4. Clearances: Please indicate you have obtained appropriate clearances, as applicable. (Note: If that coordination cannot be done at the regional level, it will be done by PRC.) Regional Coordinator: Yes No Name: Ministry Senior Advisor: Yes No Name: Robert McKee Office Director/Unit Commander: Yes No Name: Reconstruction/USAID: Yes No Name: International Coordination Council: Yes No Name: Others:		
Program Staff Use Only		
Date Request Received: 11/26/03 Form Complete: Yes No Disposition:		
Date Request Submitted to Program Review Committee: 11 27/03 App. DF Disposition:		
Date Request Submitted to Program Review Board: 11/24 Disposition: 4pp 0F/		
Date Request Returned to Requester/Submitted to Comptroller:		
Disposition (including expenditure authorized):		

Description of Program or Goods To Be Purchased - Please See Above Instructions

- 1. Purpose. To fund the emergency import of LPG, Benzene, Kerosene and Diesel.
- 2. Justification. The Iraqi domestic refining capacity has not yet been able to produce enough refined products to meet domestic daily needs for benzene, diesel, kerosene and LPG. Currently domestic production produces appoximately 6.7 million liters per day (lpd) of benzene vs a total daily requirement of 16 million lpd, approximately 10.4 million lpd of diesel vs a total daily requirement of 17 million lpd, approximately 7.5 million lpd of kerosene vs a total daily requirement of 12.0 million lpd and approximately 1072 tons per day (tpd) of LPG vs a total daily requirement of about 5200 tpd (production amounts update from last report to reflect lower values; consumption amounts updated from last request to reflect higher winter demands). The Coalition Forces have been attempting to import the balance through contracts executed by Task Force RIO, and through SOMO on both barter and cash contracts. TF RIO is currently under the operational command of the OCPA, Oil Ministry.

In addition to importing fuel to meet the national demand there is a requirement to build reserves to offset increasing demand for the winter months. This request includes enough imports to build a 15 day supply of LPG, benzene, kerosene, and diesel.

\$100 million is being reserved for SOMO in this request.

- 3. Coordination. The requirement has been coordinated with the Director of Oil Policy, the Director General of the Iraqi Ministry of Oil, the Ministry of Finance, and Ambassador Bremer.
- 4. Goods and Commodities. Benzene, Kerosene, and Diesel are delivered primarily by truck from Kuwait or Turkey. LPG is delivered by truck from Turkey and Kuwait and via barge at the Khor Zubayr terminal. The monthly cost for all fuel deliveries based on forecasted production rates and projected imports by SOMO are as follows:

	Total	RIO	SOMO
DEC Need	\$200,000,000	\$150,000,000	\$ 50,000,000
JAN Need	\$225,000,000	\$175,000,000	\$ 50,000,000
Total Need	\$425,000,000	\$325,000,000	\$100,000,000

Funds for RIO will be allocated through an Economy Act Order to the US Army Corps of Engineers to be obligated against their fuel import contract.

5. Project Implementation. The project manager is the USA Corps of Engineers, Task Force RIO, opconned to the OPCA Ministry of Oil. The RIO imports are executed through the RIO contractor, Kellog, Brown and Root (KBR). Other options, including using existing Defense Energy Support Center (DESC) contracts, are being explored.

Discussions are currently underway to turn the mission over to DESC, so that further imports may be conducted using funds from the Supplemental Appropriation. It will take some time to put appropriate contracts in place in accordance with the Law, as well as to have an orderly transition of the operational supervision of the import mission. It is expected that this transition can be complete no earlier than the end of January. All parties coordinated with have concurred in this recommended course of action.

The current amount allocated to imports through TF RIO by PRB#551 (\$125,000,000) will be exhausted on or about 15 DEC 03. This request will fully fund imports through 31 JAN 04.

It is the intention of the Director, Oil Policy to begin to reduce imports, in conjunction with expected increase of domestic refining capacity. Current projections are to significantly reduce the import of LPG via truck by the end of December 2003 and rely primarily on the imports via barge through the end of March, 2004. The import of benzene will continue through the end of January, 2004, due to the scheduled maintenance shut down of the Bayji Refinery in November through December. Quantities will be reduced, however, as stocks are built up and refinery capacity increases. Diesel and Kerosene imports will continue through the end of March, 2004 but at reduced levels after December, 2003. This schedule, however, has been impacted by repeated oil pipeline breaks and electrical power shortages and by the smuggling of diesel. We continue to monitor the requirement a month at a time.

(b)(6)

Deputy for Program Management Task Force RIO (b)(2)

PRB No: 570 (PRB Staff to Assign)	Project Name: Oil Infrastructure & Security	
Date of Request: 11/29/2003	Date Requir (b)(6) (5/2003	
Name of Requester: (b)(6)	Signature:	
CPA Office/Unit: Ministry of Oil	POC/Person Completing Ferm: (b)(6)	
Amount of Request: \$10,000,000.00	DSN/Cell Phone (b)(2)	
Project Location: Iraq - All Regions	Email Address: (b)(2)	
(Region)		
1. Project Category (check all that apply):	:	
Reconstruction Health Humanitarian Transportation Food Distribution Economic Pro Water/Sewer Education Electricity Ministry Rule of Law/Govern. Police/ Secur Div. Commanders Brig. Comma Fund Fund Construction Initiative	Budget/Ops. Support	
2. Proposed Funding Source: (PRB Staff Only) Vested Assets Seized Assets Appropriated Funds Iraqi Development Fund Bank Account Details: Or Name/Title of Iraqi Receiving Disbursement: CPA Rep/Unit Responsible for Oversight: Engineering Oversight Assigned to: Name of Certifying Official:		
4. Clearances: Please indicate you have obtained appropriate clearances, as applicable. (Note: If that coordination cannot be done at the regional level, it will be done by PRC.) Regional Coordinator: Yes No Name: Ministry Senior Advisor: Yes No Name: Mr. Robert E. McKee Office Director/Unit Commander: Yes No Name: Reconstruction/USAID: Yes No Name: International Coordination Council: Yes No Name: Others:		
Program Staff Use Only		
Date Request Received: For Disposition:	m Complete: Yes No	
Date Request Submitted to Program Review Committee: No Comm; Directed by Rodnuy Disposition: Bent to move forward to the committee of the com		
Date Request Submitted to Program Review Disposition:	Board: 11/29 App-DF1	
Date Request Returned to Requester/Submit	tted to Comptroller:	

Disposition (including expenditure authorized):

Description of Program or Goods To Be Purchased - Please See Above Instructions

1. Purpose/Objective: To fund critical oil infrastructure security requirements.

Detailed Description:

- a. Air Surveillance. In response to the increasing threat to the oil infrastructure, specifically pipelines, we propose to add aerial surveillance capabilities to the contracted security force. Erinys can provide dedicated support with the Air Scan system, which they have used before in other similar situations. The Air Scan system is a low-light television sensor mounted in a two-engine commercial aircraft. A relay aircraft provides the downlink to the associated ground station. This system can provide the needed imagery with near-real time analysis and dissemination. Estimated Requirement: \$10 Million.
- 2. Justification: The most significant impact of not providing this funding is continued reduction in refinery output due to pipeline sabotage. For example, Daura refinery was recently reduced to 50% of capacity due to sabotage of the pipelines supplying crude oil. The Erinys air surveillance will significantly reduce the frequency and soverity of pipeline sabotage incidents.
- 3. Coordination: The requirement has been coordinated with the Director of Oil Policy and the Director General of the Iraqi Ministry of Oil.
- 4. Goods and Commodities: Not applicable.
- 5. Project Implementation: It is our intent to accomplish this by modification of an existing contract.

- 2 aircraft; 4 onews - 8 hours of surveillance - 1 year K - Mof Oil.

PRB No: 5 // (PRB S	Staff to Assign)	Project Name: Oilfield Guard Expansion
Date of Request: 30 Nov 03		Date Required: 15 Dec 03
Name of Requester: (b)(6)		Signature (b)(6)
CPA Office/Unit: Oil/TF Shield		POC/Person Completing Form.(b)(6)
Amount of Request: \$22	2.0M	DSN/Cell Phone: (b)(2)
Project Location:	(Region)	Email Address (b)(2)
1. Project Category (ch	eck all that apply):	
Reconstruction Humanitarian Food Distribution Water/Sewer Electricity Rule of Law/Govern. Div. Commanders Fund Construction Initiative	Health Transportation Economic Prog Education Ministry Police/ Security Brig. Command Fund	Budget/Ops. Support Other Public Services Social Programs Cultural Programs
2. Proposed Funding Source: (PRB Staff Only) Vested Assets Bank Account Details: Or Seized Assets Name/Title of Iraqi Receiving Disbursement: Appropriated Funds Iraqi Development Fund CPA Rep/Unit Responsible for Oversight: Engineering Oversight Assigned to:		
	Name of	Certifying Official:
4. Clearances: Please indicate you have obtained appropriate clearances, as applicable. (Note: If that coordination cannot be done at the regional level, it will be done by PRC.) Regional Coordinator: Yes No Name: Ministry Senior Advisor: Yes No Name: Robert E. McKee Office Director/Unit Commander: Yes No Name: Reconstruction/USAID: Yes No Name: International Coordination Council: Yes No Name: Others:		
Program Staff Use Only		
Date Request Received: Disposition:	Form	Complete: Yes No
Date Request Submitted to Program Review Committee: Disposition:		
Date Request Submitted to Program Review Board: Disposition:		
Date Request Returned to Requester/Submitted to Comptroller: Disposition (including expenditure authorized):		

Description of Program or Goods To Be Purchased - Please See Above Instructions

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Purpose/Objective: Fund two priority requirements. First, \$20.8 Million to provide 7,500 Iraqi guards and US/expatriate management in direct support to Task Force Shield. Second, provide \$1.2 Million to contract Personal Security Details (PSD) for Ministry of Oil Director-Generals.

Justification: Terrorist threats against Iraqi oilfields, pipelines, pumping stations, refineries, oil workers and critical oil nodes have increased, inflicting significant damage to the Iraqi oil infrastructure. The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) through the Iraqi Oil Ministry provided initial funding in September 2003 to stand up an Iraqi Security Program consisting of a primarily Iraqi contract security force of 6,400 personnel.

- a. As a consequence of the expanding insurgency and increased targeting against the oil infrastructure, a significant increase in force levels is required. Detailed analysis by security and intelligence staff indicates that an additional guard force plus up of 7,500 Iraqi guards and support expatriate management staff is required. Without the immediate funding of this requirement, fatalities against Coalition Forces and contract personnel will continue as well as attacks against oil infrastructure. In the last two weeks alone, KBR employees were attacked twice and sustained 1 KIA and 5 WIA. Oil will continue to be the main economic source of income for the government of Iraq. Without the ability of the CPA, Coalition Forces and the Oil Ministry to secure the critical oil infrastructure, production levels will never exceed pre-war levels. Estimated requirement: 20.8 Million.
- b. Personal Security for Ministry of Oil Director-Generals (DGs). In early November, one of the Ministry of Oil DGs was the subject of an attack where he was wounded in the leg and his son killed. As terrorists become bolder and increasingly desperate, Oil Executives become more likely targets for violent acts. Services are required to provide personal security for the 8 DGs for a period of 6 months. The Ministry of Oil will be responsible for procuring funding to extend the period of the contract beyond that point. Estimated Requirement: \$1.2 Million.

This is in addition to the \$10 million already authorized for air surveillance.

Coordination: This requirement has been coordinated with the Senior Advisor to the Ministry of Oil, and with the Director of Studies and Planning for the Ministry of Oil.

Goods and Commodities: None; these are service contracts.

Project Implementation: Contract must be fully implemented within 30 days of being awarded.

PRB No: 582 (PRB Staff to Assign)	Project Name: SOMO AUDIT		
Date of Request: 12/10/2003	Date Required: 12/15/2003		
Name of Requester: (b)(6)	Signature:		
CPA Office/Unit: MINISTRY OF OIL	POC/Person Completing Form: (b)(6)		
Amount of Request: 120000.00	DSN/Cell Phone (b)(2)		
Project Location: BAGHDAD (Region)	Email Address:		
	(b)(2)		
1. Project Category (check all that apply):			
Reconstruction	Salaries		
Humanitarian Transportation	n Pensions		
Food Distribution Economic Pro	grams Budget/Ops. Support		
Water/Sewer Education	Other Public Services		
Electricity Ministry	Social Programs		
Rule of Law/Govern. Police/ Securit	ty Cultural Programs		
Div. Commanders Brig. Comman			
Fund Fund	Fund		
Construction Initiative			
2. Proposed Funding Source: (PRB Staff Only) Vested Assets Bank Account Details: Or Seized Assets Name/Title of Iraqi Receiving Disbursement: Appropriated Funds CPA Rep/Unit Responsible for Oversight; Iraqi Development Fund Engineering Oversight Assigned to: Name of Certifying Official: 4. Clearances: Please indicate you have obtained appropriate clearances, as applicable. (Note: If that coordination cannot be done at the regional level, it will be done by PRC.) Regional Coordinator: Yes No Name: Ministry Senior Advisor: Yes No Name: ROB MCKEE			
Office Director/Unit Commander: Yes No			
Reconstruction/USAID: Yes No Name			
International Coordination Council: Yes N	o Name:		
Others:			
Program Staff Use Only			
Date Request Received: mm/dd/yyyy Form Complete: Yes No			
Disposition:			
Date Request Submitted to Program Review Committee: mm/dd/yyyy Disposition:			
Date Request Submitted to Program Review Board: mm/dd/yyyy Disposition:			
Date Request Returned to Requester Submitte	Date Request Returned to Requester Submitted to Comptroller: mm/dd/yyyy		

Form PRB-61 ver. 6.19.03

Disposition (including expenditure authorized):

Description of Program or Goods To Be Purchased - Please See Above Instructions

- 1. Purpose/Objective: The purpose of the request is to obtain an audit of the State Oil Marketing Organization (SOMO). Specifically, the scope of work for SOMO consists two main issues. First, that an internal audit is conducted by independent public accountants to ensure that export sales of petroleum and petroleum products are consistent with prevailing international market best practices. Second, conduct an internal controls review. This assignment will include reviewing internal control systems, advising on best practices and reviewing measures to help prevent and detect fraud. If weaknesses exist, the audit should identify these issues and present remedies.
- 2. Justification: It is also critical to ensure all oil products are accounted for and recorded properly.
- 3. Coordination: We are coordinating this project with the CPA contracting office.
- 4. Goods and Commodities: The cost estimate provided above is based on industry norms for this type of engagement.
- 5. Project Implementation: We anticipate funding to be provided from the Development Fund for Iraq (DFI). We expect the financial services firm to complete the engagement within 25 working days from the time the auditing firm enters Iraq.

PRB No: 58 (PRB Staff to Assign)	Project Name: DeMining	
Date of Request: 12/9/2003	Date Required: 12/25/2003	
Name of Requester: (b)(6)	Signature:	
CPA Office/Unit: MinofOil	POC/Person Completing Form (b)(6)	
Amount of Request: 20Mil	DSN/Cell Phone (b)(2)	
Project Location: Basrah (Region)	Email Address: (b)(2)	
1. Project Category (check all that apply):		
Reconstruction Humanitarian Food Distribution Water/Sewer Electricity Rule of Law/Govern. Div. Commanders Fund Construction Initiative Health Transportation Economic Prog Education Ministry Police/ Security Brig. Command	Other Public Services Social Programs Cultural Programs	
2. Proposed Funding Source: 3. Fund (PRB Staff Only)	ing Data:	
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	count Details: or	
	tle of Iraqi Receiving Disbursement:	
	o/Unit Responsible for Oversight:	
	ing Oversight Assigned to:	
	Certifying Official:	
Traine of		
4. Clearances: Please indicate you have obtained appropriate clearances, as applicable. (Note: If that coordination cannot be done at the regional level, it will be done by PRC.) Regional Coordinator: Yes No Name: (b)(6) Ministry Senior Advisor: Yes No Name: Mr Mckee Office Director/Unit Commander: Yes No Name: MinofOil Reconstruction/USAID: Yes No Name: TFRIO International Coordination Council: Yes No Name: Others: TF RIO: Col DuBose		
Program Staff Use Only		
Date Request Received: mm/dd/yyyy Form Complete: Yes No		
Disposition:		
Date Request Submitted to Program Review Committee: mm/dd/yyyy Disposition:		
Date Request Submitted to Program Review Board: mm/dd/yyyy		
Disposition:		
h		
Date Request Returned to Requester/Submitted to Comptroller: mm/dd/yyyy Disposition (including expenditure authorized):		

Description of Program or Goods To Be Purchased - Please See Above Instructions

MEMORANDUM

Program Review Board (PRB)

Subject: De-Mining and Unexploded Ordinance (UXO) Removal from the North Al Rumaylah Oil Fields.

Purpose/Objective: To allow the safe access to all areas of the Al Rumaylah North Oil Field to the Iraqi repair workers.

Justification: Current infrastructure repair under the Corp of Engineers (TF RIO) removed only those mines and UXO from around the oil wells that needed immediate emergency repair. This work concentrated on getting the oil fields running and producing crude oil for export to raise the needed capital for Iraqi reconstruction projects. To maximize and improve the flow of oil and thus increase the amount of exported crude, repair and maintenance work will have to be done on the rest of the North Rumaylah fields. The ultimate result will be the increase in crude oil production and an increase in needed capital for Iraqi reconstruction.

Coordination: Coordination with the Iraqi Ministry of Oil and the Corps of Engineers has been done and will be ongoing throughout the life of the project. Coordination and support with the Iraqi Mine Action Center has been done and will be on-going.

Goods and Commodities: The Iraqi Mine Action Center has companies and support infrastructure in place to assist and coordinate the project.

Project Implementation: Via contract. The Iraqi Mine Action Center has contracts within the country now that will be leveraged. The disbursement of funds will be through the Ministry of Oil. The Iraq Southern Oil Company under the direction of the Ministry of Oil will monitor the project. From contract implementation to assessment will take 4 weeks. Actual de-mining and UXO removal will commence 2 weeks after the assessment. Anticipated life of the project is 8 weeks.

Cost Estimate: The requested cost estimate is based on an initial industry standard cost of \$20,000 US to clear (1) acre to a (4) foot depth. Initial surveys estimate the total area requiring clearing to be approximately 1000 acres.

PRB No: 582 A	Project Name: SOMO Audit Ammendment	
Date of Request: 5 February 2004	Date Required: 5 February 2004	
Name of Requester: (b)(6)	Signature:	
CPA Office/Unit: Ministry of Oil POC/Person Completing Form: (b)(6)		
Amount of Request: \$60,000	DSN/Cell Phone (b)(2)	
Project Location: Baghdad	Email Address (b)(2)	
1. Project Category (check all that apply):		
Reconstruction X Health Salaries Humanitarian Pensions Food Distribution Economic Programs Budget/Ops. Support Water/Sewer Education Other Public Services Electricity Ministry Social Programs Rule of Law/Govern. Police/ Security Cultural Programs Div. Commanders Brig. Commanders Regional Dir. Fund Fund Construction Initiative		
, -	ing Data:	
(PRB Staff Only) Vested Assets ■ Bank Account Details: or Seized Assets ■ Name/Title of Iraqi Receiving Disbursement: Appropriated Funds ■ CPA Rep/Unit Responsible for Oversight: Iraqi Development Fund ■ Engineering Oversight Assigned to: Name of Certifying Official:		
4 Clearances: Please indicate you have obts	sined appropriate clearances, as applicable	
4. Clearances: Please indicate you have obtained appropriate clearances, as applicable. (Note: If that coordination cannot be done at the regional level, it will be done by PRC.) Regional Coordinator: Yes No Name: Ministry Senior Advisor: Yes No Name: Rob McKee Office Director/Unit Commander: Yes No Name: Reconstruction/USAID: Yes No Name: International Coordination Council: Yes No Name: Others:		
Program Staff Use Only		
Date Request Received: 5 February 2004 Form Complete: Yes No Disposition:		
Date Request Submitted to Program Review Committee: Disposition:		
Date Request Submitted to Program Review Board: Disposition:		
Date Request Returned to Requester/Submitted to Comptroller: Disposition (including expenditure authorized):		

Description of Program or Goods To Be Purchased - Please See Above Instructions

We are requesting an additional \$60,000 to complete an audit of the State Oil Marketing Organization (SOMO) and conduct a review of their internal controls. The original estimate of \$120,000 provided to the PRB was based on general conversations with potential auditors about the client and the services requested. The Request for Proposal (RFP) included a far more detailed scope of work requirement than was used to obtain preliminary estimates. We made a conscious decision to describe the assignment in general terms to maintain a level playing field for all prospective bidders. The detailed scope of work outlined in the RFP was likely more time consuming than estimated, requiring more hours of work to complete the assignment – now likely to cost \$180,000.

Thank you for your understanding and assistance with this matter.

PRB No: 583 (PRB Staff to Assign)	Project Name: LIFE SUPPO	
Date of Request: 12/10/2003	Date Required: 12/10/2003	
Name of Requester: (b)(6)	Signature:	
CPA Office/Unit: MinofOil POC/Person Completing Form: (b)(6)		
Amount of Request: 86400.00	DSN/Cell Phone(b)(2)	
Project Location: Basrah (Region)	Email Address: (b)(2)	
<u> </u>	<u></u>	
1. Project Category (check all that apply):		
Reconstruction Humanitarian Food Distribution Water/Sewer Electricity Rule of Law/Govern. Div. Commanders Fund Construction Health Transportation Economic Prog Education Ministry Police/ Security Brig. Command Fund Fund Construction Initiative	rams Budget/Ops. Support Other Public Services Social Programs Cultural Programs	
2. Proposed Funding Source: 3. Funding Data: (PRB Staff Only)		
the state of the s	count Details: or itle of Iraqi Receiving Disbursement:	
	p/Unit Responsible for Oversight: MDugan	
, , , ,	ring Oversight Assigned to: NA	
Name of	Certifying Official:	
4. Clearances: Please indicate you have obtained appropriate clearances, as applicable. (Note: If that coordination cannot be done at the regional level, it will be done by PRC.) Regional Coordinator: Yes No Name: Ministry Senior Advisor: Yes No Name: Mr Mckee Office Director/Unit Commander: Yes No Name: MinofOil Reconstruction/USAID: Yes No Name: TFRIO International Coordination Council: Yes No Name: Others:		
Program Staff Use Only		
Date Request Received: 12/10/2003 Form Complete: Yes No Disposition:		
Date Request Submitted to Program Review Committee: mm/dd/yyyy Disposition:		
Date Request Submitted to Program Review Board: mm/dd/yyyy Disposition:		
Date Request Returned to Requester/Submitted to Comptroller: mm/dd/yyyy Disposition (including expenditure authorized):		

<u>Description of Program or Goods To Be Purchased - Please See Above Instructions</u>

MEMORANDUM

Program Review Board (PRB)

Subject: Life Support for the CPA-Fuel Supply Task Force based at the Basrah Airport.

Purpose/Objective: This Task Force is charged with the oversight and coordination of the various coalition efforts working to build the Iraqi oil infrastructure. The primary goal of the Task Force is to increase oil product flow from the ports and refineries in the south to the rest of Iraq. This increase will help to mitigate the shortage of heating, cooking, power and transportation fuel supplies throughout Iraq.

Justification: Currently there is only one contractor with lodging available right now at the Basrah airport. Al-Bahar and Bardawil (B&B) have two trailers available immediately for the (4) Task Force members. Other lodging in Basrah proper is not suitable and/or geographically undesirable. The majority of project work will be south and west of Basra city proper. Due to the security environment and the availabitity of escort services, the Task Force is more effectivel deployed out the Basrah airport grounds.

Coordination: Coordination with the Corps of Engineers, MND/SE and CPA South, has been done and will be ongoing throughout the life of the project.

Goods and Commodities: Requesting sole source contract to B&B lodging at the airport. Justification for sole sourceing is based on the need to move in quickly, get the offices up and running under a short time frame. Because of the winter fuel demands, this Task force cannot wait for the contract process. KBR and other contractors with similar lodging are full and have no room and will not have additional lodging available for several months. B&B has two trailers immediately available in move in condition: Lodging includes (3) meals a day, laundry services and internet connection/office facilities at \$120.00 USD per day per person. This price is cheaper than what TF RIO pays KBR and about the same as what TF RIE is paying their contractor for lodging.

Project Implementation: Via sole source contract. The disbursement of funds will be through the CPA, Ministry of Oil.

Cost Estimate: The requested cost estimate of \$86,400 is based on a four man team at \$120.00USD per day for 180 days. Funds will be dispursed on a monthly basis.

PRB No: 566 (PRB Staff to Assign)	Project Name: OIL SME	
Date of Request: 12/11/2003	Date Required:	
Name of Requester: Rob McKee	Signature:	
CPA Office/Unit: Oil Directorate	POC/Person Completing Form: (b)(6)	
Amount of Request: 42048.00	DSN/Cell Phone (b)(2)	
Project Location: Primarily Baghdad	Email Address:(b)(2)	
(Region)	(/ / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /	
1. Project Category (check all that apply):		
Reconstruction Health	Salaries	
Humanitarian Transportation	Pensions	
Food Distribution		
Water/Sewer	Other Public Services	
Electricity Ministry	Social Programs	
Rule of Law/Govern. Police/ Security		
Div. Commanders Brig. Command		
Fund Fund	Fund	
Construction Initiative		
2. Proposed Funding Source: (PRB Staff Only) Vested Assets Seized Assets Appropriated Funds Iraqi Development Fund CPA Rep/Unit Responsible for Oversight: Oil Directorate Engineering Oversight Assigned to: Name of Certifying Official: Rob McKee 4. Clearances: Please indicate you have obtained appropriate clearances, as applicable. (Note: If that coordination cannot be done at the regional level, it will be done by PRC.) Regional Coordinator: Yes No Name: Ministry Senior Advisor: Yes No Name: Rob McKee Office Director/Unit Commander: Yes No Name:		
Reconstruction/USAID: Yes No Name:		
International Coordination Council: Yes No Name: Others:		
Program Staff Use Only		
Date Request Received: mm/dd/yyyy Form Complete: Yes No		
Disposition:		
Date Request Submitted to Program Review Committee: mm/dd/yyyy Disposition:		
Date Request Submitted to Program Review Board: mm/dd/yyyy Disposition:		
Date Request Returned to Requester/Submitted to Comptroller: mm/dd/yyyy		

Disposition (including expenditure authorized):

Description of Program or Goods To Be Purchased - Please See Above Instructions

Purpose: An expert oil/energy trader who is not currently associated with any company and who preferably is expert with Iraqi oil trading, to go to Baghdad for 4-5 weeks and regularly visit the State Oil Marketing Organization (SOMO) headquarters and assess their trading practices, whether they are up to proper, modern standards that ensure clean practices and transparency. This is a CPA-initiated task at the behest of the Oil Director. The deliverable at the end of the period of performance will be a report sent to the Director.

Detailed Cost Estimate attached as a PDF file.

Justification: The intention is to verify and analyze the business practices of SOMO to ensure proper business ethics and transparency. Since the petroleum sector has been highly scrutinized in the United States, it would be inefficient of us not to monitor SOMO.

Security and living arrangements will be provided to the NAID SME by the Coalition Provisional Authority to the same degree as security and living arrangements are provided to US Government Civilian employees.

Project Implementation: A subject matter expert (SME) meeting the requirements of this request will be provided by the firm "Native American Industrial Distributors" (NAID). Award of a contract to a Native American 8(a) firm is not available for competition.

PRB No: 597 (PRB Staff to Assign)	Project Name: Emergency Fuel Response Pgm		
Date of Request: 21 Dec 2003	Date Required: 21 Dec. 2003		
Name of Requester: Ambassador Bremer	Signature:		
CPA Office/Unit: CPA- Ministry of Oil	POC/Person Completing Form:		
Robert McKee			
Amount of Request: \$5,000,000	DSN/Cell Phone:		
Project Location:	Email Address:		
1. Project Category (check all that apply):			
Reconstruction Humanitarian Food Distribution Water/Sewer Electricity Rule of Law/Govern. Div. Commanders Fund Construction Initiative Health Transportation Economic Prog Education Ministry Police/ Security Brig. Command Fund Fund	Budget/Ops. Support Other Public Services Social Programs Cultural Programs		
2. Proposed Funding Source: (PRB Staff Only) Vested Assets Seized Assets Name/Title of Iraqi Receiving Disbursement:			
Appropriated Funds Iraqi Development Fund CPA Rep/Unit Responsible for Oversight: Engineering Oversight Assigned to: Name of Certifying Official:			
Name of	Courting Official.		
4. Clearances: Please indicate you have obtained appropriate clearances, as applicable. (Note: If that coordination cannot be done at the regional level, it will be done by PRC.) Regional Coordinator: Yes No Name: Ministry Senior Advisor: Yes No Name: Office Director/Unit Commander: Yes No Name: Reconstruction/USAID: Yes No X Name: International Coordination Council: Yes No X Name: Others: Mr. Scott Castle, General Counsel			
Program Staff Use Only			
Date Request Received: 21 Dec 2003 Form Complete: Yes No Disposition:			
Date Request Submitted to Program Review Committee: Disposition:			
Date Request Submitted to Program Review Board: Disposition:			

Date Request Returned to Requester/Submitted to Comptroller: Disposition (including expenditure authorized):

Description of Program or Goods To Be Purchased - Please See Above Instructions

The purpose of this program is to provide for basic, time-critical assistance to the Ministry of Oil to carry out stabilization efforts of the current oil/fuel situation.

622

CPA FUNDING REQUEST

PRB No: 422 (PRB Staff to Assign)	Project Name: F(0)(6)		
Date of Request: 1/17/2004	Date Required: 1		
Name of Requester: (b)(6)	Signature:		
CPA Office/Unit: Ministry of Oil POC/Person Completing Form: (b)(6)			
Amount of Request: 635000000.00	DSN/Cell Phone: (b)(2)		
Project Location: Iraq-all regions (Region)	Email Address:(b)(2)		
	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·		
1. Project Category (check all that apply):			
Reconstruction Health	Salaries		
Food Distribution			
Water/Sewer	Other Public Services		
Electricity	Social Programs		
Rule of Law/Govern. Police/ Security			
Div. Commanders Brig. Command			
Fund Fund	Fund		
Construction Initiative	i		
2. Proposed Funding Source: 3. Fund (PRB Staff Only)	ing Data:		
3 Comments	count Details: or		
Seized Assets Name/Title of Iraqi Receiving Disbursement:			
	/Unit Responsible for Oversight:		
	ing Oversight Assigned to:		
Name of Certifying Official:			
Mana Indiana and have about			
4. Clearances: Please indicate you have obta			
(Note: If that coordination cannot be done as	t the regional level, it will be done by r.k.c.)		
Regional Coordinator: Yes No Name:	Dahamakakan		
Ministry Senior Advisor: Yes ⊠ No ☐ Name			
Office Director/Unit Commander: Yes No Name: (b)(6)			
Reconstruction/USAID: Yes No Name:			
International Coordination Council: Yes No Name:			
Others:			
Program Staff Use Only			
Date Request Received: Form	Complete: Yes No		
Disposition:			
Date Request Submitted to Program Review Co Disposition:	mmittee:		
Date Request Submitted to Program Review Board: Disposition:			
Date Request Returned to Requester/Submitted to Comptroller:			
Disposition (including expenditure authorized):			
Form PRB-01 ver. 6/21/03			

Description of Program or Goods To Be Purchased - Please See Above Instructions

- 1. Purpose. To fund the emergency import of LPG, Benzene, Kerosene and Diesel through 1 May 2004.
- 2. Justification. The Iraqi domestic refining capacity has not yet been able to produce enough refined products to meet domestic daily needs for benzene, diesel, kerosene and LPG. Currently domestic production produces appoximately 8 million liters per day (lpd) of benzene vs a total daily requirement of 16.8 million lpd; approximately 11 million lpd of diesel vs a total daily requirement of 17.5 million lpd; approximately 8 million lpd of kerosene vs a total daily requirement of 18 million lpd (15 million lpd during the spring); and, approximately 2500 tons per day (tpd) of LPG vs a total daily requirement of about 5700 tpd. Coalition Forces have been attempting to import the balance through contracts executed by Task Force RIO, and through the Ministry of Oil (via SOMO) on both barter and cash contracts. TF RIO is currently under the operational command of CPA-Oil.

In addition to importing fuel to meet the national demand, there is a requirement to build reserves to offset increasing demand. This request includes enough imports to continue to build a 15 day supply of LPG, benzene, kerosene, and diesel.

The Defense Energy Support Center (DESC) shall be awarding contracts to deliver fuel to the Iraqi people, commencing performance 1 April 2004. Funding in this request shall be utilized to reimburse costs associated with DESCs contracts during the first month. \$40 million is requested for SOMO to contunue their import attempts.

- 3. Coordination. The requirement has been coordinated with the Director of Oil Policy, the Director General of the Iraqi Ministry of Oil, the Ministry of Finance, and Ambassador Bremer.
- 4. Goods and Commodities. Benzene, Kerosene, and Diesel are delivered primarily by truck from Kuwait, Jordan or Turkey. LPG is delivered by truck from Turkey and Kuwait and via barge at the Khor Zubayr terminal. The monthly cost for all fuel deliveries based on forecasted production rates and projected imports by both RIO and SOMO are as follows:

	Total	RIO	SOMO
FEB Need	\$100,000,000	\$100,000,000	\$ 0
MAR Need	\$265,000,000	\$245,000,000	\$ 20,000,000
APR Need	\$270,000,000	\$250,000,000	\$ 20,000,000
Total Need	\$635,000,000	\$595,000,000	\$40,000,000

Funds for RIO will be allocated through an Economy Act Order to the US Army Corps of Engineers to be obligated against current and competitively bid future fuel import contracts.

5. Project Implementation. The project manager is the USA Corps of Engineers, Task Force RIO, opconned to the PCA Ministry of Oil. The RIO imports are executed through the RIO contractor, Kellog, Brown and Root (KBR). On 1 April 2004, DESC will execute that portion of the import mission currently assigned to KBR. The hand-off is currently underway to ensure a smooth implementation. As SOMO increases their share of the imports, funds will be reallocated from the RIO share of this request into the SOMO share. The total funding required for the import mission shall remain basically the same as we transition from KBR to DESC execution, and then ultimately on to SOMO executing the mission-minus the difference in the efficiencies between SOMO and RIO execution.

PRB No: 640	Project Name: Rapid Pipeline Repair			
Date of Request: 5 Feb 04	Date Required: 02/05/2004			
Name of Requester: (b)(6)	Signature:			
CPA Office/Unit: Ministry of Oil POC/Person Completing Form: (b)(6)				
Amount of Request: \$34,400,000.	DSN/Cell Phone (b)(2)			
Project Location: North & Central	Email Address: (b)(2)			
1. Project Category (check all that apply):	1. Project Category (check all that apply);			
Reconstruction Health	Salaries			
Humanitarian Transportation	Pensions			
Food Distribution				
Water/Sewer Education	Other Public Services			
Electricity Ministry	Social Programs			
Rule of Law/Govern. Police/ Security				
Div. Commanders Brig. Command				
Fund Fund	Fund			
Construction Initiative				
2. Proposed Funding Source: 3. Funding Data: (PRB Staff Only)				
Vested Assets Bank Ac	count Details: or			
Seized Assets Name/Ti	tle of Iraqi Receiving Disbursement:			
	/Unit Responsible for Oversight:			
	ing Oversight Assigned to:			
Name of	Certifying Official:			
A TORRES CA	Court, 1976 Cittotal.			
	4. Clearances: Please indicate you have obtained appropriate clearances, as applicable.			
(Note: If that coordination cannot be done a	t the regional level, it will be done by PKC.)			
Regional Coordinator: Yes No Name:	15 7 1			
Ministry Senior Advisor: Yes No Name				
Office Director/Unit Commander: Yes No				
Reconstruction/USAID: Yes No Name:				
International Coordination Council: Yes No	Name:			
Others:				
Program Staff Use Only				
Date Request Received: 6 February 2004	Form Complete: Yes 🛛 No 🗌			
Disposition:				
Date Request Submitted to Program Review Committee:				
Disposition:				
Date Request Submitted to Program Review Board:				
Disposition:				
Date Request Returned to Requester/Submitted to Comptroller:				
Disposition (including expenditure authorized):				

Description of Program or Goods To Be Purchased - Please See Above Instructions

1. Purpose: Emergency Response Pipeline Repair Operation (ERPRO)

A contract is being awarded to provide the technology, tools, equipment, training, and personnel to implement a suitable ERPRO for quick response and restoration of pipeline service for all pipelines in the Central and Northern regions of Iraq.

The intent is to implement the ERPRO contract on an immediate basis while training local Iraqi technicians and operators to transfer technical capability and responsibilities with minimal foreign ex-patriate supervision or labor within a practical transitional period and contract timeframe. This capability will eventually be transferred to the Ministry of Oil (MOO) under one of the designated operating companies, and funded under the MOO operating budget.

Contract is for two teams, one located near Bayji refinery in the north, and the other in the vicinity of the Oil Pipeline Company yard at the Al Daurah refinery, Baghdad.

The initial cost estimate was for \$25M, but included a significant requirement on the Government's behalf to provide security, heavy airlift transportation, and additional contract services for local equipment and personnel. Under a competitive bid process, the low bidder structured their proposal within this cost estimate but included a number of significant open ended obligations for the Government to pay at a later date. The other bidder's proposal cost was 99M Euros. (\$124.38M at 02/5/04 rate of 0.795945 dollars /euro.)

The contracting activity determined that it could not obligate to an unspecific open ended obligation and requested the contractor define the additional requirements under a firm fixed price environment. The contractor defined these costs which will require additional funds to award.

2. Justification.

Continued reduction in refinery output due to pipeline sabotage. For example, Daurah refinery was recently reduced to 50% of capacity due to sabotage of the pipelines supplying crude oil. Bayji is currently at reduced capacity due to a reduced crude flow and the inability to remove residual fuel oil from the refining process due to a recent sabotage event East of the Al Fatah crossing. Reduction in the length of time pipelines are non-operational will significantly reduce the losses (directly affecting crude exports and volume produced for petroleum product imports). Rapid repair will also make the pipelines a less lucrative target for saboteurs by minimizing the impact of the breaks. Rapid repair capability can also restore current inoperative pipelines and increase the revenue to export, and increase the production of the refineries with a corresponding decrease in refined fuel import costs.

The initial RIO cost estimate was \$25M based on limited market research and order of magnitude pricing data. At the time, security, transportation, life support, and contract support workers was not specifically addressed. When the initial proposals came in, these items were excluded from the proposal but were required to be supplied by the Government.

This PRB request is for the "delta" of \$34.4M that funds the items not included in the original cost estimate and not addressed in the statement of objectives—but is still required for successful execution of the project. The Government could elect to provide contract support, security, air transportation, and work site life support as a separate obligation or with military assets. This request will make the contractor fully responsible for all aspects of the operation and not overburden an already strained set of assets that are needed for combat support.

- 3. Coordination. The requirement has been coordinated with the Director of Oil Policy and the CPA Chief Operating Officer. The initial contract proposal was approved by AMB Bremer.
- 4. Goods and Commodities.. N/A
- 5. Project Implementation. The current contract proposal has gone through a competitive bid process, has been evaluated as the superior technical proposal, and even with the cost growth due to the incorporation of prior Government support items is below the next competitive bid, and can be directly awarded by the CPA contracting office.

The item that stands out in this proposal is the IMMEDIATE mobilization of worldwide personnel, equipment, manpower and support services to directly execute the mission of restoration of the pipeline network and capability to repair any sabotage or attack on the pipeline. Partial capability to execute this mission is attained in weeks after notice to proceed. Full capability is expected in 7 weeks after NTP will complete heavy repair and training capability.

With the contract evaluation and the competitive bid process, this proposal is considered fair and reasonable by the CPA contracting office now, and is evaluated as technically sufficient now.

(b)(6)

Deputy for Program Management \Task Force RIO DSN (b)(2)

PRB No: 664 (PRB Staff to Assign)	Project Name: MoO Capita	
Date of Request: 2/25/2004	Date Required: 3/1/2004	
Name of Requester: Robert E. McKee	Signature:	
CPA Office/Unit: Ministry of Oil	POC/Person Completing Form: (b)(6)	
Amount of Request: 200000000.00	DSN/Cell Phone (b)(2)	
Project Location: Iraq-all regions (Region)	Email Address:(b)(2)	
1. Project Category (check all that apply):		
Reconstruction Humanitarian Food Distribution Water/Sewer Electricity Rule of Law/Govern. Div. Commanders Fund Construction Initiative Health Transportation Economic Prog Ministry Police/ Security Brig. Command	Budget/Ops. Support Other Public Services Social Programs Cultural Programs	
2. Proposed Funding Source: 3. Funding Data: (PRB Staff Only)		
	count Details: or	
) <u></u>	itle of Iraqi Receiving Disbursement:	
	p/Unit Responsible for Oversight:	
Iraqi Development Fund	ring Oversight Assigned to:	
Name of	Certifying Official:	
4. Clearances: Please indicate you have obtained appropriate clearances, as applicable. (Note: If that coordination cannot be done at the regional level, it will be done by PRC.) Regional Coordinator: Yes No Name: Ministry Senior Advisor: Yes No Name: Robert McKee Office Director/Unit Commander: Yes No Name: Name: Reconstruction/USAID: Yes No Name: International Coordination Council: Yes No Name: Others:		
Program Staff Use Only		
Date Request Received: Form	Complete: Yes No	
Disposition:		
Date Request Submitted to Program Review Committee: Disposition:		
Date Request Submitted to Program Review Board: Disposition:		
Date Request Returned to Requester/Submitted to Comptroller: Disposition (including expenditure authorized):		

Description of Program or Goods To Be Purchased - Please See Above Instructions

1. Purpose. Iraq holds more than 112 billion barrels of oil – the world's second largest proven reserves. Iraq also contains 110 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. Overall, only about 2,000 wells reportedly have been drilled in Iraq (of which about 1,500-1,700 are actually capable of producing oil). Iraq's main export crudes come from the country's two largest active fields: Rumaila and Kirkuk. Oil industry experts generally assess Iraq's sustainable production capacity at no higher than about 2.8-2.9 million bbl/d, with net export potential of around 2.3-2.5 million bbl/d. In comparison, Iraq was producing 3.5 million bbl/d in July 1990.

Iraq's southern oil industry was decimated in the Gulf War, with production capacity falling to 75,000 bbl/d in mid-1991. The largest producing oil field in this region is Rumaila. The war resulted in destruction of gathering centers and compression/degassing stations at the Rumaila field. Other problems at Iraqi oil fields include: years of poor oil reservoir management; corrosion problems at various oil facilities; deterioration of water injection facilities; lack of spare parts, materials, equipment, etc.; damage to oil storage and pumping facilities; and more. World economic experts estimate that Iraq could reach production capacity of 4.2 million bbl/d within three years and 4.5-6.0 million bbl/d within seven years.

2. Justification. The South Oil Company's oil production is now close to its pre-war limit. Further oil production increases can be expected after water injection rehabilitation and repairs of existing wells (workover and well completion operations). However, it is not feasible to achieve long term production increase and sustainability without drilling new wells. SOC plans a 60-well drilling campaign to address the long term stability of crude oil production. The drilling program covers wells that can be easily tied to the existing oil infrastructure with negligible cost (South Rumaila, Buzurgan, Jabal Faqui) or with minimum expenditures for expansion of the oil facilities (South Rumaila Mishrif, Majnoon, Nahr Umar, West Qurna).

Further production enhancements can be expected in conjunction with the new drilling program. The South Oil Company plans to execute a well intervention program. For instance, there are 15 wells which are former producers from the Zubair formation in the south that once returned to production would yield 4,000 per well. Similar actions can be taken in the northern fields.

- 3. Coordination. The requirement has been coordinated with the Director of Oil Policy, the Director General of the Iraqi Ministry of Oil, the Ministry of Finance, and Ambassador Bremer.
- 4. Goods and Commodities. A drilling campaign in conjuction with a planned workover program would help substain and actually increase crude oil production from existing oil fields. The return on expenditures would be realized from the replacement of production that has been shutin due to well problems, sabotage, or from natural decline. Additional incremental revenues would be realized as new/repaired Gas Oil Separation Facilities come on line or as new export points become available.
- 5. Project Implementation. The Ministry of Oil has capital improvement projects that have been in the planning stages for the past year pending receipt of funds to continue. In addition to the above, there are currently 3 construction/improvement projects where the Ministry is soliciting tenders for construction. The Ministry would be responsible for gathering and reviewing the tenders and selecting the most responsive bidder. The Ministry will oversee all work. Project includes:
 - a. Development of KHURMALA Dome Projects/Kirkuk Field
 - b. Hamrin Oil Field Development Project
 - c. Additional Development of Subba an Luhais oil Field

(b)(6)

Deputy for Program Management RIO Directorate, Gulf Region Division US Army Corps of Engineers (b)(2)

PRB No: 597 (PRB Staff to Assign)	Project Name: Emergency Fuel Response Pgm	
Date of Request: 21 Dec 2003	Date Required: 21 Dec. 2003	
Name of Requester: Ambassador Bremer	Signature:	
CPA Office/Unit: CPA- Ministry of Oil Robert McKee	POC/Person Completing Form:	
Amount of Request: \$5,000,000	DSN/Cell Phone:	
Project Location:	Email Address:	
1. Project Category (check all that apply):		
Reconstruction		
2. Proposed Funding Source: (PRB Staff Only) Vested Assets Bank Account Details: Name/Title of Iraqi Receiving Disbursement: Appropriated Funds CPA Rep/Unit Responsible for Oversight: Iraqi Development Fund CPA Rep/Unit Responsible for Oversight: Engineering Oversight Assigned to: Name of Certifying Official:		
4. Clearances: Please indicate you have obtained appropriate clearances, as applicable. (Note: If that coordination cannot be done at the regional level, it will be done by PRC.) Regional Coordinator: Yes No Name: Ministry Senior Advisor: Yes No No X Name: Office Director/Unit Commander: Yes No Name: Reconstruction/USAID: Yes No X Name: International Coordination Council: Yes No X Name: Others: Mr. Scott Castle, General Counsel Program Staff Use Only		
Date Request Received: 21 Dec 2003 Form Complete: Yes No		
Disposition:		
Date Request Submitted to Program Review Committee: Disposition:		
Date Request Submitted to Program Review Board: Disposition:		



Date Request Returned to Requester/Submitted to Comptroller: Disposition (including expenditure authorized):

Description of Program or Goods To Be Purchased - Please See Above Instructions

The purpose of this program is to provide for basic, time-critical assistance to the Ministry of Oil to carry out stabilization efforts of the current oil/fuel situation.

PRB No: 586 (PRB Staff to Assign)	Project Name: Oil SME	
Date of Request: 12/11/2003	Date Required:	
Name of Requester: Rob McKee	Signature:	
CPA Office/Unit: Oil Directorate POC/Person Completing Form:(b)(6)		
Amount of Request: 42048.00 DSN/Cell Phone (b)(2)		
Project Location: Primarily Baghdad	Email Address: (b)(2)	
(Region)		
1. Project Category (check all that apply):		
Reconstruction Health Humanitarian Transportation Food Distribution Economic Prog Water/Sewer Education Electricity Ministry Rule of Law/Govern. Police/ Security Div. Commanders Brig. Command Fund Fund Construction Initiative	Other Public Services Social Programs Cultural Programs	
2. Proposed Funding Source: 3. Funding Data:		
(PRB Staff Only) Vested Assets Bank Account Details: or Seized Assets Name/Title of Iraqi Receiving Disbursement: Appropriated Funds CPA Rep/Unit Responsible for Oversight: Oil Directorate Iraqi Development Fund Engineering Oversight Assigned to:		
. Name of	Certifying Official: Rob McKee	
4. Clearances: Please indicate you have obtained appropriate clearances, as applicable. (Note: If that coordination cannot be done at the regional level, it will be done by PRC.) Regional Coordinator: Yes No Name: Ministry Senior Advisor: Yes No Name: Rob McKee Office Director/Unit Commander: Yes No Name: Reconstruction/USAID: Yes No Name: International Coordination Council: Yes No Name: Others:		
Program Staff Use Only		
Date Request Received: mm/dd/yyyy Form Complete: Yes No Disposition:		
Date Request Submitted to Program Review Committee: mm/dd/yyyy Disposition:		
Date Request Submitted to Program Review Board: mm/dd/yyyy Disposition:		
Date Request Returned to Requester/Submitted to Comptroller: mm/dd/yyyy		

Disposition (including expenditure authorized):

Description of Program or Goods To Be Purchased - Please See Above Instructions

Purpose: An expert oil/energy trader who is not currently associated with any company and who preferably is expert with Iraqi oil trading, to go to Baghdad for 4-5 weeks and regularly visit the State Oil Marketing Organization (SOMO) headquarters and assess their trading practices, whether they are up to proper, modern standards that ensure clean practices and transparency. This is a CPA-initiated task at the behest of the Oil Director. The deliverable at the end of the period of performance will be a report sent to the Director.

Detailed Cost Estimate attached as a PDF file.

Justification: The intention is to verify and analyze the business practices of SOMO to ensure proper business ethics and transparency. Since the petroleum sector has been highly scrutinized in the United States, it would be inefficient of us not to monitor SOMO.

Security and living arrangements will be provided to the NAID SME by the Coalition Provisional Authority to the same degree as security and living arrangements are provided to US Government Civilian employees.

Project Implementation: A subject matter expert (SME) meeting the requirements of this request will be provided by the firm "Native American Industrial Distributors" (NAID). Award of a contract to a Native American 8(a) firm is not available for competition.

PRB No: 583 (PRB Staff to Assign)	Project Name: LIFE SUPPO	
Date of Request: 12/10/2003	Date Required: 12/10/2003	
Name of Requester: (b)(6)	Signature:	
CPA Office/Unit: MinofOil	POC/Person Completing Form: (b)(6)	
Amount of Request: 86400.00	DSN/Cell Phone (b)(2)	
Project Location: Basrah (Region)	Email Address: (b)(2)	
1. Project Category (check all that apply):		
Reconstruction	Salaries	
Humanitarian Transportation		
Food Distribution Economic Prog		
Water/Sewer Education	Other Public Services	
Electricity	Social Programs	
Rule of Law/Govern. Police/ Security		
Div. Commanders Brig. Command		
Fund Fund	Fund	
Construction Initiative		
2. Proposed Funding Source: 3. Fund (PRB Staff Only)	ling Data:	
Vested Assets Bank Ac	count Details: or	
Seized Assets Name/T	itle of Iraqi Receiving Disbursement:	
Appropriated Funds CPA Re	p/Unit Responsible for Oversight: MDugan	
Iraqi Development Fund Enginee	ring Oversight Assigned to: NA	
Name of	Certifying Official:	
4. Clearances: Please indicate you have obtained appropriate clearances, as applicable. (Note: If that coordination cannot be done at the regional level, it will be done by PRC.) Regional Coordinator: Yes No Name: Ministry Senior Advisor: Yes No Name: Mr Mckee Office Director/Unit Commander: Yes No Name: MinofOil Reconstruction/USAID: Yes No Name: TFRIO International Coordination Council: Yes No Name: Others:		
Program Staff Use Only		
Date Request Received: 12/10/2003 Form Complete: Yes No		
Disposition:		
Date Request Submitted to Program Review Committee: mm/dd/yyyy Disposition:		
Date Dequat Cubmitted to Degree Paris, Dead		
Date Request Submitted to Program Review Board: mm/dd/yyyy Disposition:		
(A reposition.		
Date Request Returned to Requester/Submitted to Comptroller: mm/dd/yyyy Disposition (including expenditure authorized):		

MEMORANDUM

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Program Review Board (PRB)

Subject: Life Support for the CPA- Fuel Supply Task Force based at the Basrah Airport.

Purpose/Objective: This Task Force is charged with the oversight and coordination of the various coalition efforts working to build the Iraqi oil infrastructure. The primary goal of the Task Force is to increase oil product flow from the ports and refineries in the south to the rest of Iraq. This increase will help to mitigate the shortage of heating, cooking, power and transportation fuel supplies throughout Iraq.

Justification: Currently there is only one contractor with lodging available right now at the Basrah airport. Al-Bahar and Bardawil (B&B) have two trailers available immediately for the (4) Task Force members. Other lodging in Basrah proper is not suitable and/or geographically undesirable. The majority of project work will be south and west of Basra city proper. Due to the security environment and the availability of escort services, the Task Force is more effectivel deployed out the Basrah airport grounds.

Coordination: Coordination with the Corps of Engineers, MND/SE and CPA South, has been done and will be ongoing throughout the life of the project.

Goods and Commodities: Requesting sole source contract to B&B lodging at the airport. Justification for sole sourceing is based on the need to move in quickly, get the offices up and running under a short time frame. Because of the winter fuel demands, this Task force cannot wait for the contract process. KBR and other contractors with similar lodging are full and have no room and will not have additional lodging available for several months. B&B has two trailers immediately available in move in condition: Lodging includes (3) meals a day, laundry services and internet connection/office facilities at \$120.00 USD per day per person. This price is cheaper than what TF RIO pays KBR and about the same as what TF RIE is paying their contractor for lodging.

Project Implementation: Via sole source contract. The disbursement of funds will be through the CPA, Ministry of Oil.

Cost Estimate: The requested cost estimate of \$86,400 is based on a four man team at \$120.00USD per day for 180 days. Funds will be dispursed on a monthly basis.

PRB No: 582 (PRB Staff to Assign)	Project Name: SOMO AUDIT	
Date of Request: 12/10/2003	Date Required: 15 DEC O3	
Name of Requester: (b)(6) Signature:		
CPA Office/Unit: MINISTRY OF OIL POC/Person Completing Form: (b)(6)		
Amount of Request: 120000.00	DSN/Cell Phone (b)(2)	
Project Location: BAGHDAD (Region)	Email Address: (b)(2)	
1. Project Category (check all that apply):		
Reconstruction Humanitarian Food Distribution Water/Sewer Electricity Rule of Law/Govern. Div. Commanders Fund Construction Health Transportation Economic Prog Education Ministry Police/ Security Brig. Commanders Fund Fund Construction Initiative	Budget/Ops. Support Other Public Services Social Programs Cultural Programs	
2. Proposed Funding Source: (PRB Staff Only) Vested Assets Seized Assets Appropriated Funds Iraqi Development Fund Seized Assets Appropriated Funds Appropriated Funds Iraqi Development Fund Seized Assets Appropriated Funds Appropriated Funds Iraqi Development Fund Seized Assets Appropriated Funds Appropriated Funds Iraqi Development Fund Seized Assets Appropriated Funds Appropriated Funds Iraqi Development Fund Seized Assets Name/Title of Iraqi Receiving Disbursement: CPA Rep/Unit Responsible for Oversight: Engineering Oversight Assigned to: Name of Certifying Official:		
4. Clearances: Please indicate you have obtained appropriate clearances, as applicable. (Note: If that coordination cannot be done at the regional level, it will be done by PRC.) Regional Coordinator: Yes No Name: Ministry Senior Advisor: Yes No Name: ROB MCKEE Office Director/Unit Commander: Yes No Name: Reconstruction/USAID: Yes No Name: International Coordination Council: Yes No Name: Others:		
Program Staff Use Only		
Date Request Received: mm/dd/yyyy Form Complete: Yes No Disposition:		
Date Request Submitted to Program Review Committee: mm/dd/yyyy Disposition:		
Date Request Submitted to Program Review Board: mm/dd/yyyy Disposition:		
Date Request Returned to Requester/Submitted to Comptroller: mm/dd/yyyy		

Disposition (including expenditure authorized):

Description of Program or Goods To Be Purchased - Please See Above Instructions

The scope of work for the State Oil Marketing Organization (SOMO) consists of two items:

1. Attest that proceeds are deposited in the Development Fund for Iraq (DFI) account per the requirements of the United Nations. The purpose of the internal audit must satisfy the related requirements set forth in United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1483 (http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_resolutions03.html). Specifically, a section of UNSCR 1483 (paragraph 20):

"Decides that all export sales of petroleum, petroleum products, and natural gas from Iraq following the date of the adoption of this resolution shall be made consistent with prevailing international market best practices to be audited by independent public accountants reporting to the International Advisory and Monitoring Board referred to in paragraph 12 above in order to ensure transparency, and decides further that, except as provided in paragraph 21 below, all proceeds from such sales shall be deposited into the Development Fund for Iraq until such time as an internationally recognized, representative government of Iraq is properly constituted:"

2. Conduct an internal controls review. This assignment will include reviewing internal control systems, advising on best practices and reviewing measures to help prevent and detect fraud. If weaknesses exist, the audit should identify these issues and present remedies.

PRB No: 581 (PRB Staff to Assign)	Project Name: DeMining	
Date of Request: 12/9/2003	Date Required: 12/25/2003	
Name of Requester: (b)(6)	Signature:	
CPA Office/Unit: MinofOil	POC/Person Completing Form: (b)(6)	
Amount of Request: 20Mil	DSN/Cell Phone (b)(2)	
Project Location: Basrah (Region)	Email Address: (b)(2)	
1. Project Category (check all that apply):		
Reconstruction Humanitarian Food Distribution Water/Sewer Electricity Rule of Law/Govern. Div. Commanders Fund Construction Initiative Health Transportation Economic Prog Education Ministry Police/ Security Brig. Command	Budget/Ops. Support Other Public Services Social Programs Cultural Programs	
2. Proposed Funding Source: (PRB Staff Only) Vested Assets Seized Assets Appropriated Funds Iraqi Development Fund Bank Account Details: Or Name/Title of Iraqi Receiving Disbursement: CPA Rep/Unit Responsible for Oversight: Engineering Oversight Assigned to: Name of Certifying Official:		
4. Clearances: Please indicate you have obtained appropriate clearances, as applicable. (Note: If that coordination cannot be done at the regional level, it will be done by PRC.) Regional Coordinator: Yes No Name: (b)(6) Ministry Senior Advisor: Yes No Name: Mr Mckee Office Director/Unit Commander: Yes No Name: MinofOil Reconstruction/USAID: Yes No Name: TFRIO International Coordination Council: Yes No Name: Others: TF RIO: Col DuBose Program Staff Use Only		
Disposition:		
Date Request Submitted to Program Review Committee: mm/dd/yyyy Disposition:		
Date Request Submitted to Program Review Board: mm/dd/yyyy Disposition:		
Date Request Returned to Requester/Submitted to Comptroller: mm/dd/yyyy Disposition (including expenditure authorized):		

Description of Program or Goods To Be Purchased - Please See Above Instructions

MEMORANDUM

Program Review Board (PRB)

Subject: De-Mining and Unexploded Ordinance (UXO) Removal from the North Al Rumaylah Oil Fields.

Purpose/Objective: To allow the safe access to all areas of the Al Rumaylah North Oil Field to the Iraqi repair workers.

Justification: Current infrastructure repair under the Corp of Engineers (TF RIO) removed only those mines and UXO from around the oil wells that needed immediate emergency repair. This work concentrated on getting the oil fields running and producing crude oil for export to raise the needed capital for Iraqi reconstruction projects. To maximize and improve the flow of oil and thus increase the amount of exported crude, repair and maintenance work will have to be done on the rest of the North Rumaylah fields. The ultimate result will be the increase in crude oil production and an increase in needed capital for Iraqi reconstruction.

Coordination: Coordination with the Iraqi Ministry of Oil and the Corps of Engineers has been done and will be ongoing throughout the life of the project. Coordination and support with the Iraqi Mine Action Center has been done and will be on-going.

Goods and Commodities: The Iraqi Mine Action Center has companies and support infrastructure in place to assist and coordinate the project.

Project Implementation: Via contract. The Iraqi Mine Action Center has contracts within the country now that will be leveraged. The disbursement of funds will be through the Ministry of Oil. The Iraq Southern Oil Company under the direction of the Ministry of Oil will monitor the project. From contract implementation to assessment will take 4 weeks. Actual de-mining and UXO removal will commence 2 weeks after the assessment. Anticipated life of the project is 8 weeks.

57/

PRB No: 571 (PRB Staff to Assign)	Project Name: Oilfield Guard Expansion	
Date of Request: 30 Nov 03	Date Requib)(6)	
Name of Requester: (b)(6)	Signature:	
CPA Office/Unit: Oil/TF Shield	POC/Person Completing Form: (b)(6)	
Amount of Request: \$22,000,000	DSN/Cell Phone (b)(2)	
Project Location: (Region)	Email Address:(b)(2)	
1. Project Category (check all that apply): Reconstruction	grams Budget/Ops. Support Other Public Services Social Programs Cultural Programs	
Fund Fund	Fund	
Construction Initiative		
2. Proposed Funding Source: (PRB Staff Only) Vested Assets Seized Assets Appropriated Funds Iraqi Development Fund Bank Account Details: Or Name/Title of Iraqi Receiving Disbursement: CPA Rep/Unit Responsible for Oversight: Engineering Oversight Assigned to: Name of Certifying Official:		
4. Clearances: Please indicate you have obtained appropriate clearances, as applicable. (Note: If that coordination cannot be done at the regional level, it will be done by PRC.) Regional Coordinator: Yes No Name: Ministry Senior Advisor: Yes No Name: Robert E. McKee Office Director/Unit Commander: Yes No Name: Name: Reconstruction/USAID: Yes No Name: International Coordination Council: Yes No Name: Others:		
Program Staff Use Only		
Date Request Received: 1/30/2003 Form Complete: Yes No Disposition:		
Date Request Submitted to Program Review Committee: Disposition:		
Date Request Submitted to Program Review Board: Disposition:		
Date Request Returned to Requester/Submitted to Comptroller: Disposition (including expenditure authorized):		

Description of Program or Goods To Be Purchased - Please See Above Instructions

Purpose/Objective: Expand the current ERINYS International Guard Force contract, and provide personal security for Ministry of Oil Director-Generals.

Justification: Terrorist threats against Iraqi oilfields, pipelines, pumping stations, refineries, oil workers and critical oil nodes have increased, inflicting significant damage to the Iraqi oil infrastructure. The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) through the Iraqi Oil Ministry awarded a contract to ERINYS International in September 2003 to stand up an Iraqi Oil Security Program. This contract mandated that ERINYS International hire, train and equip 6,400 Iraqi guards and 40 roving patrols to protect 175 oil facilities to include critical nodes along the 7,000 kilometer pipeline.

- a. As a consequence of the expanding insurgency and increased targeting against the oil infrastructure, a significant increase in force levels is required. Detailed analysis by security and intelligence staff indicates that an additional guard force of 7,500 Iraqi guards and support expatriate management staff is required. Without the immediate funding of this requirement, fatalities against Coalition Forces and contract personnel will continue as well as attacks against oil infrastructure. In the last two weeks alone, KBR employees were attacked twice and sustained 1 KIA and 5 WIA. Oil will continue to be the main economic source of income for the government of Iraq. Without the ability of the CPA, Coalition Forces and the Oil Ministry to secure the critical oil infrastructure, production levels will never exceed pre-war levels. Estimated Requirement: \$20.8 Million.
- b. Personal Security for Ministry of Oil Director-Generals (DGs). In early November, one of the Ministry of Oil DGs was the subject of an attack where he was wounded in the leg and his son was killed. As terrorists become bolder and increasingly desperate, Oil Executives become more likely targets for violent acts. Services are required to provide personal security for the 8 DGs for a period of 6 months. The Ministry of Oil will be responsible for procuring funding to extend the period of the contract beyond that point. Estimated Requirement: \$1.2 Million.

This is in addition to the \$10 million already authorized for air surveillance.

Coordination: This requirement has been coordinated with the Senior Advisor to the Ministry of Oil, and with the Director of Studies and Planning for the Ministry of Oil.

Goods and Commodities: None; these are service contracts.

Project Implementation: ERINYS International can commence implementation immediately and will have completed implementation within 90 days.

PRB No: 570 (PRB Staff to Assign)	Project Name: Oil Infrastructure & Security	
Date of Request: 11/29/2003	Date Required 12/5/2003	
Name of Requester: (b)(6)	Signature:	
CPA Office/Unit: Ministry of Oil	POC/Person Completing Ferm! (b)(6)	
Amount of Request: \$10,000,000.00	DSN/Cell Phone: (b)(2)	
Project Location: Iraq - All Regions	Email Address: (b)(2)	
(Region)		
1. Project Category (check all that apply): Reconstruction Health Humanitarian Transportation Food Distribution Economic Prog Water/Sewer Education Electricity Ministry		
Rule of Law/Govern. Div. Commanders Fund Construction Initiative Name of	Cultural Programs	
2. Proposed Funding Source: (PRB Staff Only) Vested Assets Bank Account Details: Seized Assets Name/Title of Iraqi Receiving Disbursement: Appropriated Funds CPA Rep/Unit Responsible for Oversight: Iraqi Development Fund Engineering Oversight Assigned to: Name of Certifying Official:		
4. Clearances: Please indicate you have obtained appropriate clearances, as applicable. (Note: If that coordination cannot be done at the regional level, it will be done by PRC.) Regional Coordinator: Yes No Name: Ministry Senior Advisor: Yes No Name: Mr. Robert E. McKee Office Director/Unit Commander: Yes No Name: (b)(6) Reconstruction/USAID: Yes No Name: International Coordination Council: Yes No Name: Others:		
Program Staff Use Only		
Date Request Received: Form Disposition:	Complete: Yes No	
Date Request Submitted to Program Review Committee: Disposition:		
Date Request Submitted to Program Review Board: Disposition:		
Date Request Returned to Requester/Submitte	ed to Comptroller	

Disposition (including expenditure authorized):

Description of Program or Goods To Be Purchased - Please See Above Instructions

1. Purpose/Objective: To fund critical oil infrastructure security requirements.

Detailed Description:

- a. Air Surveillance. In response to the increasing threat to the oil infrastructure, specifically pipelines, we propose to add aerial surveillance capabilities to the contracted security force. Erinys can provide dedicated support with the Air Scan system, which they have used before in other similar situations. The Air Scan system is a low-light television sensor mounted in a two-engine commercial aircraft. A relay aircraft provides the downlink to the associated ground station. This system can provide the needed imagery with near-real time analysis and dissemination. Estimated Requirement: \$10 Million.
- 2. Justification: The most significant impact of not providing this funding is continued reduction in refinery output due to pipeline sabotage. For example, Daura refinery was recently reduced to 50% of capacity due to sabotage of the pipelines supplying crude oil. The Erinys air surveillance will significantly reduce the frequency and severity of pipeline sabotage incidents.
- 3. Coordination: The requirement has been coordinated with the Director of Oil Policy and the Director General of the Iraqi Ministry of Oil.
- 4. Goods and Commodities: Not applicable.
- 5. Project Implementation: It is our intent to accomplish this by modification of an existing contract.

PRB No: 56% (PRB Staff to Assign)	Project Name: Fuel Imports	
Date of Request: 11/26/2003	Date Requir(b)(6)	
Name of Requester: (b)(6)	Signature:	
CPA Office/Unit: Ministry of Oil	POC/Person Completing Form (b)(6)	
Amount of Request: 425000000.00	DSN/Cell Phone (b)(2)	
Project Location: Iraq-all regions (Region)	Email Address (b)(2)	
1. Project Category (check all that apply):		
Reconstruction Health	Salaries	
Humanitarian	Pensions	
Food Distribution		
Water/Sewer	Other Public Services	
Electricity	Social Programs	
Rule of Law/Govern. Police/ Security		
Div. Commanders Brig. Command	lers Regional Dir.	
Fund Fund	Fund	
Construction Initiative		
2. Proposed Funding Source: 3. Fund (PRB Staff Only)	ing Data:	
` -	count Details: or	
Seized Assets Name/Ti	tle of Iraqi Receiving Disbursement:	
	/Unit Responsible for Oversight:	
	ing Oversight Assigned to:	
	Certifying Official:	
4. Clearances: Please indicate you have obtained appropriate clearances, as applicable. (Note: If that coordination cannot be done at the regional level, it will be done by PRC.) Regional Coordinator: Yes No Name: Ministry Senior Advisor: Yes No Name: Robert McKee		
Office Director/Unit Commander: Yes 🛛 No	Name:(b)(6)	
Reconstruction/USAID: Yes No Name:		
International Coordination Council: Yes No Name:		
Others:		
Program Staff Use Only		
Date Request Received: 11/26/03 Form Complete: Yes No		
Disposition:		
Date Peguest Submitted to Program Perions Committee		
Date Request Submitted to Program Review Committee: Disposition:		
AF AV P W W T T T T T T T T T T T T T T T T T		
Date Request Submitted to Program Review Board:		
Disposition:		
Date Request Returned to Requester/Submitted to Comptroller: Disposition (including expenditure authorized):		

Description of Program or Goods To Be Purchased - Please See Above Instructions

- 1. Purpose. To fund the emergency import of LPG, Benzene, Kerosene and Diesel.
- 2. Justification. The Iraqi domestic refining capacity has not yet been able to produce enough refined products to meet domestic daily needs for benzene, diesel, kerosene and LPG. Currently domestic production produces appoximately 6.7 million liters per day (lpd) of benzene vs a total daily requirement of 16 million lpd, approximately 10.4 million lpd of diesel vs a total daily requirement of 17 million lpd, approximately 7.5 million lpd of kerosene vs a total daily requirement of 12.0 million lpd and approximately 1072 tons per day (tpd) of LPG vs a total daily requirement of about 5200 tpd (production amounts update from last report to reflect lower values; consumption amounts updated from last request to reflect higher winter demands). The Coalition Forces have been attempting to import the balance through contracts executed by Task Force RIO, and through SOMO on both barter and cash contracts. TF RIO is currently under the operational command of the OCPA, Oil Ministry.

In addition to importing fuel to meet the national demand there is a requirement to build reserves to offset increasing demand for the winter months. This request includes enough imports to build a 15 day supply of LPG, benzene, kerosene, and diesel.

\$100 million is being reserved for SOMO in this request.

- 3. Coordination. The requirement has been coordinated with the Director of Oil Policy, the Director General of the Iraqi Ministry of Oil, the Ministry of Finance, and Ambassador Bremer.
- 4. Goods and Commodities. Benzene, Kerosene, and Diesel are delivered primarily by truck from Kuwait or Turkey. LPG is delivered by truck from Turkey and Kuwait and via barge at the Khor Zubayr terminal. The monthly cost for all fuel deliveries based on forecasted production rates and projected imports by SOMO are as follows:

DEC Need	Total \$200,000,000	RIO \$150,000,000	SOMO \$ 50,000,000
JAN Need	\$225,000,000	\$175,000,000	\$ 50,000,000
Total Need	\$425,000,000	\$325,000,000	\$100,000,000

Funds for RIO will be allocated through an Economy Act Order to the US Army Corps of Engineers to be obligated against their fuel import contract.

5. Project Implementation. The project manager is the USA Corps of Engineers, Task Force RIO, opconned to the OPCA Ministry of Oil. The RIO imports are executed through the RIO contractor, Kellog, Brown and Root (KBR). Other options, including using existing Defense Energy Support Center (DESC) contracts, are being explored.

Discussions are currently underway to turn the mission over to DESC, so that further imports may be conducted using funds from the Supplemental Appropriation. It will take some time to put appropriate contracts in place in accordance with the Law, as well as to have an orderly transition of the operational supervision of the import mission. It is expected that this transition can be complete no earlier than the end of January. All parties coordinated with have concurred in this recommended course of action.

The current amount allocated to imports through TF RIO by PRB#551 (\$125,000,000) will be exhausted on or about 15 DEC 03. This request will fully fund imports through 31 JAN 04.

It is the intention of the Director, Oil Policy to begin to reduce imports, in conjunction with expected increase of domestic refining capacity. Current projections are to significantly reduce the import of LPG via truck by the end of December 2003 and rely primarily on the imports via barge through the end of March, 2004. The import of benzene will continue through the end of January, 2004, due to the scheduled maintenance shut down of the Bayji Refinery in November through December. Quantities will be reduced, however, as stocks are built up and refinery capacity increases. Diesel and Kerosene imports will continue through the end of March, 2004 but at reduced levels after December, 2003. This schedule, however, has been impacted by repeated oil pipeline breaks and electrical power shortages and by the smuggling of diesel. We continue to monitor the requirement a month at a time.

(b)(6)

Deputy for Program Management Task Force RIO (b)(2)

	Project Name: Emergency Fuel Response rgm	
	Date Required: 21 Dec. 2003	
	Signature:	
CPA Office/Unit: CPA- Ministry of Oil Robert McKee	POC/Person Completing Form:	
Amount of Request: \$5,000,000	DSN/Cell Phone:	
Project Location:	Email Address:	
1. Project Category (check all that apply):		
Reconstruction Health Humanitarian Transportation Food Distribution Economic Progra Water/Sewer Education Electricity Ministry Rule of Law/Govern. Police/ Security Div. Commanders Brig. Commander Fund Fund Construction Initiative	Other Public Services Social Programs Cultural Programs	
2. Proposed Funding Source: (PRB Staff Only) Vested Assets Bank Account Details: Name/Title of Iraqi Receiving Disbursement: Appropriated Funds Iraqi Development Fund CPA Rep/Unit Responsible for Oversight: Engineering Oversight Assigned to: Name of Certifying Official:		
4. Clearances: Please indicate you have obtained appropriate clearances, as applicable. (Note: If that coordination cannot be done at the regional level, it will be done by PRC.) Regional Coordinator: Yes No Name: Ministry Senior Advisor: Yes No Name: Office Director/Unit Commander: Yes No Name: Reconstruction/USAID: Yes No No Name: International Coordination Council: Yes No X Name: Others: Mr. Scott Castle, General Counsel Program Staff Use Only		
Date Request Received: 21 Dec 2003 Form Complete: Yes No		
Disposition:		
Date Request Submitted to Program Review Committee: Disposition:		
Date Request Submitted to Program Review Board: Disposition:		

PRB No: 586 (PRB Staff to Assign)	Project Name: Oil SME	
Date of Request: 12/11/2003	Date Required:	
Name of Requester: Rob McKee	Signature:	
CPA Office/Unit: Oil Directorate	POC/Person Completing Form:(b)(6)	
Amount of Request: 42048.00	DSN/Cell Phone (b)(2)	
Project Location: Primarily Baghdad	Email Address:(b)(2)	
(Region)	-	
1. Project Category (check all that apply):		
Reconstruction Health	Salaries	
Humanitarian Transportation	Pensions	
Food Distribution	rams Budget/Ops. Support	
Water/Sewer Education	Other Public Services	
Electricity Ministry	Social Programs	
Rule of Law/Govern. Police/ Security	Cultural Programs	
Div. Commanders Brig. Command	lers Regional Dir.	
Fund Fund	Fund	
Construction Initiative		
2. Proposed Funding Source: 3. Funding Data: (PRB Staff Only)		
	count Details: or	
	tle of Iraqi Receiving Disbursement:	
	O/Unit Responsible for Oversight: Oil Directorate	
	ring Oversight Assigned to:	
Name of	Certifying Official: Rob McKee	
,		
4. Clearances: Please indicate you have obtained. (Note: If that coordination cannot be done a		
Regional Coordinator: Yes No Name:	B 1 1 4 Tr	
Ministry Senior Advisor: Yes No Name		
Office Director/Unit Commander: Yes No Name:		
Reconstruction/USAID: Yes No Name:		
International Coordination Council: Yes No Name:		
Others:		
Program Staff Use Only		
Date Request Received: mm/dd/yyyy Form Complete: Yes No		
Disposition:		
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Date Request Submitted to Program Review Committee: mm/dd/yyyy		
Disposition:		
Date Request Submitted to Program Review Board: mm/dd/yyyy		
Disposition:		
Date Request Returned to Requester/Submitted to Comptroller: mm/dd/yyyy		

PRB No: 583 (PRB Staff to Assign)	Project Name: LIFE SUPPO		
Date of Request: 12/10/2003	Date Required: 12/10/2003		
Name of Requester: (b)(6)	Signature:		
CPA Office/Unit: MinofOil	POC/Person Completing Form:(b)(6)		
Amount of Request: 86400.00	DSN/Cell Phone (b)(2)		
Project Location: Basrah (Region)	Email Address:(b)(2)		
1. Project Category (check all that apply):			
Reconstruction			
2. Proposed Funding Source: 3. Fund (PRB Staff Only)	ing Data:		
	count Details: or		
	tle of Iraqi Receiving Disbursement:		
Appropriated Funds CPA Re	b/Unit Responsible for Oversight: (b)(6)		
	ing Oversight Assigned to: NA		
Name of	Certifying Official:		
<u> </u>			
4. Clearances: Please indicate you have obtained appropriate clearances, as applicable. (Note: If that coordination cannot be done at the regional level, it will be done by PRC.) Regional Coordinator: Yes No Name: Ministry Senior Advisor: Yes No Name: Mr Mckee Office Director/Unit Commander: Yes No Name: MinofOil Reconstruction/USAID: Yes No Name: TFRIO International Coordination Council: Yes No Name: Others:			
Program	n Staff Use Only		
Date Request Received: 12/10/2003 Form Complete: Yes No Disposition:			
Date Request Submitted to Program Review Committee: mm/dd/yyyy Disposition:			
Date Request Submitted to Program Review Board: mm/dd/yyyy			
Disposition:			
Date Request Returned to Requester/Submitted to Comptroller: mm/dd/yyyy Disposition (including expenditure authorized):			

PRB No: 582 (PRB Staff to Assign) Project	t Name: SOMO AUDIT		
	equired: 15 DEC O3		
	Signature:		
	erson Completing Form: (b)(6)		
	ell Phone (b)(2)		
	Address:		
(b)(2)			
1. Project Category (check all that apply):			
Reconstruction	Salaries		
Humanitarian Transportation	Pensions		
Food Distribution Economic Programs	Budget/Ops. Support		
Water/Sewer Education	Other Public Services		
Electricity Ministry	Social Programs		
Rule of Law/Govern. Police/ Security	Cultural Programs		
Div. Commanders Brig. Commanders	Regional Dir.		
Fund Fund	Fund		
Construction Initiative	I dild		
2. Proposed Funding Source: (PRB Staff Only) Vested Assets Seized Assets Name/Title of Iraqi Receiving Disbursement: Appropriated Funds Iraqi Development Fund Engineering Oversight Assigned to: Name of Certifying Official: 4. Clearances: Please indicate you have obtained appropriate clearances, as applicable. (Note: If that coordination cannot be done at the regional level, it will be done by PRC.)			
Regional Coordinator: Yes No Name:	ACKEE		
Ministry Senior Advisor: Yes No Name: ROB MCKEE Office Director/Unit Commander: Yes No Name:			
Reconstruction/USAID: Yes No Name:	ijo.		
International Coordination Council: Yes No Name:	ne'		
Others:			
Program Staff Use Only			
Date Request Received: mm/dd/yyyy Form C	omplete: Yes 🔲 No 🗍		
Disposition:			
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Date Request Submitted to Program Review Committee: mm/dd/yyyy			
Disposition:			
1 APPOINTMENT			
Date Request Submitted to Program Review Board: mm/dd/yyyy			
Disposition:			
Date Request Returned to Requester/Submitted to Cor	nptroller: mm/dd/yyyy		

PRB No: 581 (PRB Staff to Assign)	Project Name: DeMining		
Date of Request: 12/9/2003	Date Required: 12/25/2003		
Name of Requester: (b)(6)	Signature:		
CPA Office/Unit: MinofOil	POC/Person Completing Form: (b)(6)		
Amount of Request: 20Mil	DSN/Cell Phone (b)(2)		
Project Location: Basrah (Region)	Email Address: (b)(2)		

1. Project Category (check all that apply):			
Reconstruction Health	⊠ Salaries □		
Humanitarian Transportation			
Food Distribution Economic Prog			
Water/Sewer Education	Other Public Services		
Electricity	Social Programs		
Rule of Law/Govern. Dolice/ Security			
Div. Commanders Brig. Comman	ders Regional Dir.		
Fund Fund	Fund		
Construction Initiative			
2. Proposed Funding Source: 3. Fund (PRB Staff Only)	ling Data:		
	ccount Details: or		
Seized Assets Name/T	itle of Iraqi Receiving Disbursement:		
	p/Unit Responsible for Oversight:		
, · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	ring Oversight Assigned to:		
— .	f Certifying Official:		
Traine O.	i Comynig Official.		
4. Clearances: Please indicate you have obt	ained appropriate clearances, as applicable.		
	at the regional level, it will be done by PRC.)		
Regional Coordinator: Yes No Name:			
Ministry Senior Advisor: Yes No Nam	e Mr Mckee		
Office Director/Unit Commander: Yes No	Name: MinofOil		
Reconstruction/USAID: Yes No Name	· TFRIO		
International Coordination Council: Yes No			
Others: TF RIO: Col DuBose			
Program Staff Use Only			
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	Form Complete: Yes No		
Disposition:			
Data Paguest Submitted to Program Deview C	omnittae: mm/dd/sugu		
Date Request Submitted to Program Review Committee: mm/dd/yyyy Disposition:			
Lisposition.			
Date Request Submitted to Program Review B	oard: mm/dd/yyyyy		
Disposition:			
Date Request Returned to Requester/Submitte	ed to Comptroller: mm/dd/vvvv		
Disposition (including expenditure authorized):			

57/

PPR No. 5 71 (PPR S	taff to Assign)	Project Name: Oilfield Guard Expansion		
PRB No: 571 (PRB Staff to Assign)				
Date of Request: 30 Nov 03		Date Requ (b)(6)		
Name of Requester: (b)(6)		Signature:		
CPA Office/Unit: Oil/TF Shield		POC/Person Completing Form: (b)(6) DSN/Cell Phone: DSN (b)(2)		
Amount of Request: \$22				
Project Location:	(Region)	Email Address:(b)(2)		
1. Project Category (ch	eck all that apply):			
Reconstruction	Health	Salaries		
Humanitarian	Transportation	Pensions		
Food Distribution	☐ Economic Prog			
Water/Sewer	Education	Other Public Services		
Electricity	☐ Ministry	Social Programs		
Rule of Law/Govern.	Police/ Security	Cultural Programs		
Div. Commanders	Brig. Command			
Fund	Fund	Fund		
Construction Initiative				
2. Proposed Funding So (PRB Staff Only)	ource: 3. Fund	ing Data:		
Vested Assets	Bank Ac	count Details: or		
Seized Assets	Name/Ti	tle of Iraqi Receiving Disbursement:		
Appropriated Funds	CPA Rep	o/Unit Responsible for Oversight:		
Iraqi Development Fund	Engineer	ing Oversight Assigned to:		
		Certifying Official:		
	1 Agric OT	Catalying Official.		
4. Clearances: Please indicate you have obtained appropriate clearances, as applicable. (Note: If that coordination cannot be done at the regional level, it will be done by PRC.) Regional Coordinator: Yes No Name: Ministry Senior Advisor: Yes No Name: Robert E. McKee Office Director/Unit Commander: Yes No Name: (b)(6)				
Reconstruction/USAID: Y				
International Coordination				
Others:				
	Drogray	n Staff Use Only		
Date Request Received: 1/30/2003 Form Complete: Yes No Disposition:				
	Date Request Submitted to Program Review Committee:			
Disposition:				
Date Request Submitted t	o Program Review Bo	oard:		
Disposition:	-			
Date Request Returned t	o Requester/Submitte	d to Comptroller:		
Disposition (including e				

Description of Program or Goods To Be Purchased - Please See Above Instructions

PRB No: 570 (PRB Staff to Assign)	Project Name: Oil Infrastructure & Security		
Date of Request: 11/29/2003	Date Requi(b)(6)		
Name of Requester: (b)(6)	Signature:		
CPA Office/Unit: Ministry of Oil	POC/Person Completing Form (b)(6)		
Amount of Request: \$10,000,000.00	DSN/Cell Phone (b)(2)		
Project Location: Iraq - All Regions	Email Address:(b)(2)		
(Region)			
1. Project Category (check all that apply):			
Reconstruction Health	Salaries		
Humanitarian Transportation	Pensions		
Food Distribution	rams 🔲 Budget/Ops. Support 🔲		
Water/Sewer Education	Other Public Services		
Electricity Ministry	Social Programs		
Rule of Law/Govern. Police/ Security	Cultural Programs		
Div. Commanders Brig. Command	·		
Fund Fund	Fund		
Construction Initiative			
Vested Assets Bank Account Details: or Seized Assets Name/Title of Iraqi Receiving Disbursement: Appropriated Funds CPA Rep/Unit Responsible for Oversight: Iraqi Development Fund Engineering Oversight Assigned to: Name of Certifying Official: 4. Clearances: Please indicate you have obtained appropriate clearances, as applicable. (Note: If that coordination cannot be done at the regional level, it will be done by PRC.) Regional Coordinator: Yes No Name: Ministry Senior Advisor: Yes No Name: Mr. Robert E. McKee Office Director/Unit Commander: Yes No Name: International Coordination Council: Yes No Name:			
Others: Program Staff Use Only			
Date Request Received: Form	Complete: Yes No		
Disposition:			
Date Request Submitted to Program Review Consistion:	ommittee:		
Date Request Submitted to Program Review Bo Disposition:	oard:		
Date Request Returned to Requester/Submitte	ed to Comptroller:		

PRB No: 568 (PRB Staff to Assign)	Project Name: Fuel Imports		
Date of Request: 11/26/2003	Date Requir (b)(6)		
Name of Requester: (b)(6)	Signature:		
CPA Office/Unit: Ministry of Oil	POC/Person Completing Form: (b)(6)		
Amount of Request: 425000000.00	DSN/Cell Phone (D)(2)		
Project Location: Iraq-all regions (Region)	Email Address (b)(2)		
1. Project Category (check all that apply):			
Reconstruction Humanitarian Food Distribution Water/Sewer Electricity Rule of Law/Govern. Div. Commanders Fund Construction Initiative Health Transportation Economic Program Education Ministry Police/ Security Brig. Command Fund Fund	Other Public Services Social Programs Cultural Programs		
(PRB Staff Only)	ing Data:		
	count Details: or		
·	tle of Iraqi Receiving Disbursement: /Unit Responsible for Oversight:		
	ing Oversight Assigned to:		
	·		
Name of	Certifying Official:		
4. Clearances: Please indicate you have obtained appropriate clearances, as applicable. (Note: If that coordination cannot be done at the regional level, it will be done by PRC.) Regional Coordinator: Yes No Name: Ministry Senior Advisor: Yes No Name: Robert McKee Office Director/Unit Commander: Yes No Name: Reconstruction/USAID: Yes No Name: International Coordination Council: Yes No Name: Others:			
Program	Staff Use Only		
Date Request Received: 11/26/03 Form Complete: Yes No			
Disposition:			
Date Request Submitted to Program Review Committee: Disposition:			
Date Request Submitted to Program Review Bo	ard:		
Disposition:			
Date Request Returned to Requester/Submittee Disposition (including expenditure authorized)			

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CPA FUNDING REQUEST

PRB No: - 22 (PRB Staff to Assign)	Project Name: (b)(6)		
Date of Request: 1/17/2004	Date Required:		
Name of Requester: (b)(6)	Signature:		
CPA Office/Unit: Ministry of Oil	POC/Person Completing Form (b)(6)		
Amount of Request: 635000000.00	DSN/Cell Phone (b) (2)		
	Email Address (b)(2)		
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Water/Sewer Education	Other Public Services		
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Rule of Law/Govern. Police/ Security	Culturai Programs		
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2. Proposed Funding Source: 3. Fundi	ng Data:		
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(Note: If that coordination cannot be done at	the regional level, it will be done by PRC.)		
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Ministry Senior Advisor: Yes No Name	Name: (b)(6)		
Office Director/Unit Commander: Yes No	Nanc. (b)(b)		
Reconstruction/USAID: Yes No Name: International Coordination Council: Yes No Name:			
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FOIA 09-826 CPA 000247

بشيب بالفالغ المخالية بسين

جمهورية العراق

وزارة النفط

المعالوة الإدارية والقانونية

Republic of Iraq

MINISTRY OF OIL

Date

١٠٠٣ / ار در خياطا - 1272 / /

> M. R. MCKEE السيد To:

م/ مصيانة____

يرجى التفضل بالموافقة على صرف المستحقات المثبتة ادناه لمنتسبي الوزارة والتي تحققست لهسم وفسق مستحقسات رواتسب السوزارة وكمسا موضسح ازاء كسسل

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
المعام مسمع المعامل ا for the oil sector employees due on Oct. 2003.

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صورة منه الى / قسم المحاسبة

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And I

Amb Bremer,

For your meeting with the Oil Minister this morning you asked for a note on the agenda items.

You should know that none of the remaining staff is thoroughly read into the issues. Phil Carroll, I understand has talked to you and Robert McKee, the new senior advisor about the meeting.

I believe among the agenda items will be

<u>Iran</u>

Saudi Arabia - email background attached

Restructuring the Oil company – the last paper we have on file is attached. Most of these papers were done "not for the system." I have asked Olivia for whatever she typed up for Phil.

I am attaching one email of misc items just received this morning from Gary Vogler, who is on R&R.



(b)(6)

Executive Assistant, CPA Administrator Head of CPA Executive Secretariat



سلطة الانتلاف المؤقتة Coalition Provisional Authority

November 17, 2003

Dr. Ibrahim Bahr al-Uloum Minister of Oil Government of Iraq Baghdad, Iraq

Dear Minister al-Uloum,

On December 1-2 the Coalition Provisional Authority and the Provincial Council and Government of Al Anbar Province are jointly hosting a Business Development Conference in Ramadi. The conference will bring together professionals from around the province to meet with government officials and investors to discuss the business climate in Al Anbar province and to seek ways to improve the region's economic development. Al Anbar has some of the greatest potential in Iraq for private sector growth and development, with a highly educated populace, strong entrepreneurial spirit, rich agricultural land, and a commercial tradition. Over the course of these two days we hope to energize the business community in the province, and to showcase some of the opportunities here for investors.

We would be pleased if you could find time to join us on the opening morning of the conference, December 1st, which we will dedicate to hearing from ministers and other government officials. We would appreciate it if you could spend 20 minutes discussing with the participants the strategic vision of your ministry and some of the specific initiatives which will help improve business development in the Anbar province. We will also give the participants about 10 minutes for questions and answers.

A preliminary schedule is attached. We hope to have between 100-200 business leaders from the province in attendance, from all segments of the economy—transportation, communications, importing, construction, and agro-export. The conference will be held at in the Provincial Council building in Ar Ramadi. If you have any questions you may call Governance Coordinator (b)(6) at (b)(2)

Sincerely,

cc: Senior CPA Advisor, Robert McKee

(b)(6)

Governance Coordinator
Al Anbar Province

FROM: OFFICE OF THE ADVISOR FOR THE MINISTER OF OIL ABDUL-SAHIB AL-QUTUB

ATTENTION: MR. ROBERT MCKEE SENIOR OIL ADVISOR CPA

SUBJECT: ASPHALT PRODUCT VALUE

DEAR SIR,

PLEASE BE INFORMED THAT THE COMMAND OF COALITION FORCES IN MOSUL GOVERNORATE HAS TAKEN THE ACTION OF SELLING AQUATITY OF ASPHALT PRODUCT STOCKED AT GIARHA REFINERY AT ATOTAL PRICE VALUE (24000) TWENTY FOUR THOUSAND US. DOLLARS. THIS AMOUNT OF MONEY WAS KEPT WITH THE COALITION FORCES COMMAND AND NOT TRANSFERRED TO OUR ACCOUNTS, AS USUALLY DONE IN SIMILAR CASES.

BEST REGARDS.

ABDUL-SAHIB S. AL-QUTUB ADVISOR FOR

THE MINISTER OF OIL



COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY BAGHDAD

October 10, 2003

Kyle E. McSlarrow Deputy Secretary of Energy U. S. Department of Energy 1000 Independence Ave., S. W. Washington, DC 20585

Dear Mr. McSlarrow:

I am advised that, per Secretary Rumsfield's 23 September 2003 memo to Secretary Abraham, that DOE is beginning to recruit additional manpower for CPA/Oil Ministry in Iraq, among others. We appreciate this effort on our behalf.

To ensure we stay coordinated, I would ask for you to concentrate for the time being on recruiting two experienced Petroleum Engineers (each with oilfield experience) and two experienced Process Engineers (each with oil refining and/or natural gas plant experience). These are urgent and important jobs, so time is of the essence. Please forward resumes by email (b)(2) to my office for review prior to offers being made to facilitate a good skill fit.

We are currently assessing our remaining CPA oil manpower needs and will correspond further with you and CPA-Pentagon when those needs are further defined.

Again, thanks for your help.

Sincerely,

R. E. McKee Senior Oil Advisor

CC: (b)(6)

Pat Kennedy



COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY BAGHDAD

October 4, 2003

Dear Mr. Bremer:

As we have previously discussed, I must now officially step down from my role as the Director of the CPA Office of Oil Policy and the Senior Advisor to the Iraqi Oil Ministry. I believe the wheels are in motion for Iraqi to become again a great oil power. I have complete confidence that my successor Mr. Robert McKee will be able to provide you with the necessary support to continue the mission here in Iraq. Further Minister Ibrahim Bahr al-Uloum and Mr. Thamir al-Ghadhban will provide excellent leadership and help guide the Iraqi Oil Industry and their nation toward the goal of a free Iraq.

It has been an honor and a pleasure to work under your leadership. I know that you will succeed in your mission and as an American, I thank you for your effort and sacrifice. If I may ever be of service to you or the cause of creating a new Iraq, I hope you will call on me

Thank you for both your support and friendship.

Philip Carroll

LPB HAS SEEN

1 March 2004

Ambassador L. Paul Bremer

Dear Jerry,

I absolutely regret not being able to see you before I departed from Baghdad this morning, but I understand exactly what important work on the Transitional Law you are trying to accomplish. I hope you are soon successful on this effort.

I wanted to reiterate what I've said to you in the past and that is how much I was honored to be a part of your team. You are of course making history here and I feel that, when the dust finally settles, Iraq and the world will be better off by what you've done. So please accept my congratulations for a job well done.

I've attached a couple of things. The first is today's RIO SitRep. I've had four or five major objectives that you and I agreed on when I came as follows:

• Production and exports were about 1.8 and 1.1 million barrels a day respectively when 1 arrived back in September and today they set new highs of 2.54 and probably 1.9 million barrels a day. Both of these are near or at pre-war levels, and while the numbers are probably not completely accurate due to the lack of metering in the country, they are still indicative of a continually upward trend. They also fulfil two important April 1st milestones for CPA.

Two of my most pursued goals were to get the IT line back in operation and to get the Khor al Amaya terminal open again. Both of those, at least today, are open and are key to continuing the upward trend in production and exports.

Through a magnificent effort that doesn't get near the credit it deserves, Iraqis
made it through the winter in better shape, relative to fuel products, than they've
enjoyed in a long, long time and it was done without any civil disobedience to
speak of. You should, when you have the time, pause to reflect on the great
humanitarian effort you authorized and directed.

Our major effort now has to be to make SOMO and the rest of the Oil Ministry capable of continuing this effort post-June 30th. And this training is well-organized and underway. SOMO's import performance is already improving, if you judge the SitReps recently.

 We basically have an effective oil security force in place and they will continue to get better. I feel strongly that it is at least in part because of this increased capability that attacks on our infrastructure are down and we have finally gotten a few weeks of oil being put in the IT pipeline.

nis security force is sustained pass

Again, one of our main jobs is to ensure that this security force is sustained pass June 30th and that the oil ministry is truly capable of assuming the command. This effort is also well-organized and underway.

• We have made progress in getting the ministry restructured and operating under very high standards of conduct. But if I have a disappointment, it is that this effort is not further along. I feel strongly that, among all your other priorities, you need to help Mike Stinson and the team get over the hump here, even if it means taking some unilateral actions such as imposing a structure on the minister or getting directly involved in personnel actions. You certainly don't need me to point this out, but if we get this right, it will be one of the key building blocks in achieving the Coalition's goals in this country.

Note that I have started the PRB paperwork, in consultation with Rodney Bent, to procure \$200 million for the Oil Ministry's capital budget. You and I have discussed this many times and you will recall that we agreed we would provide this money to them when they began to make significant progress towards reform. While they are not there yet, I wanted to have this taken care of so that it would be available when you and Mike Stinson agree on the exact timing for providing it to them.

I didn't mean to get this long-winded, but wanted to say again how much I appreciated your faith in me by asking me to take this job on. I will always remember it as a highlight of my life and oil industry career.

Finally, I'll end on a lighter note. I've attached a picture of you that appeared in the Houston Chronicle in mid-September, just days after I accepted the Sr Advisor position and as I was packing for Baghdad. It was the first time I'd ever seen your face. At the time, I thought that the camera angle made it look like you were kissing some guy with a white beard and a turban, so I was going to bring the picture to tease you a little bit (assuming I got to know you well enough to do so). Of course, among all the other things I've learned since I've been here, I found out you really WERF kissing the guy. Go figure!

Anyway, Jerry, I wish you good luck and safe passages. You deserve a medal for what you've done and are continuing to do. I hope our paths cross once again. If you ever peed to get in touch with me, my Houston email address is (b)(2)

my home address is (b)(2) is (b)(2)

and my home phone number

All the very best.

Regards,



FOUO RIO DAILY SITREP



Corps of Engineers

REPORT PERIOD: 1800(Z) 26 February 04 thru 1800(Z) 27 February 04

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



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



United States Congress, US State Department, USA(D), US Senute and several other public and private organizations in USA are investigating Halliburton Corporation, its subsidianes and other American companies operating from Kuwait and Iraq for compilion and hibbery charges. Any one with any information leading to the arrest, fine or both shall be paid a reward of \$10,000. This award may increase to ten fold depending on the evidence. All information will be dealt with full confidentiality. Any US difference regardless if he/she is a government employee, or work for any American Companies, its US and non-US employees, agents. sub-agents, contractors, sub-contractors, brokers and any type of direct or indirect entities engaged on contracts by any of the US owned or partnered companies are subject to strict anti-corruption. a di-bribery and anti-influence pedidling laws. Solid your ig.hotline@usaid.gov.. eigwebmaster@state.gov., allardi.senate.gov/confactine, senator@biden.senate.gov. boxer senate gov/contact. byrd senate gowbyrd email.html. clinton senate gov/email form html, craig senate gov/web/orm.html, daschle.senate.gov/webform.html. dodd.senate.gov/webmail/. domenici, senate gov/resources/contactform.cfm, feinstein senate.gov/email.html, hagel.senate.gov/Email/contact.html, hutchison senate.gov/e-mail.htm, senator@kennedy.senate.gov, kerry.senate.gov/bandwidth/contact/email.html, mccain senate gov/index.cfm? fuseaction=Contact.Home, or write to: Ed Melik. Chairman, Arab Democracy Institute (www.ArabDin.Org) at ADIO8@USA.Com or send comments to: http://www.legitgov.org/

fairness@whistleblowers.org. http://www.respondanet.com, http://www.nobribes.org/, http://www.transparency.org, http://www.trustfortheamericas.org/, http://www.witness.org/.









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Powell lauds rebuilding effort in Iraq

'Deeply impressed' by progress seen on visit

By RAJIV CHANDRASEKARAN Weshington Post

BAGHDAD Iraq — Secretary of State Colin Powell said Sunday that he was "deeply impressed" by the progress of the U.S.-led effort to reconstruct Iraq and guide the country toward self-rule despite continuing attacks on American forces and critical infrastructure.

Powell, the highest-ranking American to visit Iraq since Saddam Hussein's government was toppled in April, arrived aboard a C-30 military transport and spent the day meeting with US, military commanders, reconstruction officials and members of Iraq's Governing Council He also attended a session of the Baghdad City Council and had lanch with Iraq's newly appointed foreign minister.

Although Powell spent the day in a high-security bubble and not only with Iraqis who had been vetted by the U.S. occupation authority, he expressed satisfaction with the pace of the American reconstruction effort, which has been criticized as fee slow by many ordinary tracis.

"There's a vibrancy to this effort, a vibrancy I attribute to the winds of freedom



Associated Press

Secretary of State Coth Powell, lest, lestes on as L. Paul Bremer, the U.S. civillan administrator for Iraq, greets Husselh Sedr, an influential Shifte cleric in Baghdad.

blowing through the said," he said at a news conference with the top U.S. ciril administrator, L. Paul Fremer.

Fowell praised the Goerning Council's recent selection of calibrat mulisters and Foreign Minister Hocker. Zuber's successful quest to claim they's seat at the Arab League. "There it is sease of hope here even in this time of hifficulty." Pessell said. "Those who are to critical of the administration might that to hold their

ne a bit.

"I was deeply impressed by what I saw," he said. "I saw people hard at work rebuilding a nation."

As Powell conducted his meetings, U.S. salitary officials amounced one soldier from the Army's 82nd Airborne Division was killed and three were wounded by a rundaide bomb near the restive city of Fallujah, where U.S. troops mistakenly killed 10 kradi security officers Friday. Bremer

called Friday's incident "very reg table" and said the U.S. governs would consider making compense payments to the victims' families after conclusion of an investigation. During boisterous functals for eig

During boisterous funerals for eig the police officers Saturday, resid vowed to avenge the deaths with a round of attacks against U.S. forces Powell traveled to Baghdad after n ings in Geneva with the foreign mini-

Powell traveled to Baghdad after n ings in Geneva with the foreign minit of the four other permanent member the U.N. Security Council to discurs solution about the future governanting. The Bush administration wants port for a resolution that would entitle creation of a multinational force der U.S. command.

The French government has ins the resolution also authorize the elishment of an interim government part to the Security Council Powel other administration officials have the United States would not be will reliaquish control over the country's administration.

A senior U.S. official said that after Geneva meeting it appeared that e the Franch chose not to support the latter, it probably would not veto it

in Begndad, Powell dined with Hi Bedr, an influential Shilte Muslim . Powell is scheduled to travel tod other parts of Iraq before returni Washington.

FOIA 09-826 CPA 000264

Cleaning up after deadly typhoon





Killing of Arafat an 'optio



THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 2000 DEFENSE PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2000

SECRET/NOFORN ACTION MEMO

January 16, 2003, 3:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE	DepSec Action

FROM: Douglas J. Feith, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

SUBJECT: Enabling Execution of Contingency Plans for Iraqi Oil Infrastructure (2)

- 18 The OSD-led interagency group dealing with Iraqi oil issues recommends that you designate the Army as Executive Agent for this program. You directed CENTCOM and my office to develop contingency plans for continuity of oil production and sales. If these plans are to be executed there needs to be an overall executive agent that will be responsible for planning, coordinating and administering the execution. If you approve the recommendation, General Franks will retain overall responsibility to develop and execute plans in the context of a US military occupation of Iraq. The Army will have responsibility for planning, coordination and execution of the operation for the Iraq oil industry including but not limited to the following tasks:
 - Establish and coordinate program requirements with the Joint Staff and USD(P);
 - Budget for program execution in coordination with USD (Comptroller);
 - Establish a program office as soon as possible;
 - Coordinate acquisition strategy with USD(AT&L);
 - Negotiate, but not award, a contract for execution with the developer of the plan that can be awarded as soon as the Army receives direction to execute the plan;
 - Coordinate policy matters with USD(P); and

My office cleared this memo with Mike Delong at Centron. Don't Feith

Derived: Multiple Sources Declassify on: January 16, 2013



- Plan for competition for the execution effort at the earliest reasonable opportunity consistent with the needs of the mission.
- (8) The plan assumes that any execution would be immediately after hostilities, during a U.S. military occupation under the control of the Central Command.
- 18 The OSD-led interagency group is now refining a draft Contingency Support Plan for repairing and operating the Iraqi petroleum industry. We expect the plan will be ready for your review by mid-January 2003. To be poised to execute the plan immediately if directed to do so, we need to engage the right organizations to budget for and manage the execution phase of the plan. As a new program, this effort has no owner and no funding. Best to worst case estimates for the execution phase range from \$0.8 billion to more than \$3.5 billion.

RECOMMENDATION: program.	SecDef designates the Arm	y as Executive Agent for this
Approve	Disapprove	Other
COORDINATION: USD	(AT&L), Joint Staff, OGC	(Tab B)
Attachments: Tab A is the previous dra Tab B is the coordination	oft of X00154/03, changes manages manages manages.	ade on 1/16/03.
Prepared by: (b)(2),(b)(6)		





bold we the mindents some?

PLANNING FOR THE IRAQI PETROLEUM **INFRASTRUCTURE:**

Briefing for the Secretary of Defense

11 January 2003

Prepared by Energy Infrastructure Planning Group



Outline of Presentation


- Guiding Principles
- Public Diplomacy
- Contingency Planning for Repair, Production and Sales
- Legal Considerations
- Organization and Management (Issue for Decision: Chairman/CEO Appointment, Reporting, Removal
- Use of Petroleum Proceeds
- Funding Enhancement: Borrow Against Future Oil Revenues?
- Production Targets
- Existing and New Contracts
- Iraq-Syria Pipeline



Guiding Principles

Certain principles should guide any temporary US/coalition administration of Iraqi petroleum resources, including:

- Iraq's oil resources are an asset that belongs to all the Iraqi people.
- Any temporary administration of Iraqi oil production and marketing:
 - Will seek to minimize disruptions and promote confidence and stability in world markets;
 - Should involve existing Iraqi personnel and organizations whenever possible to ease future transition;
 - Should work with the international community to build support for our policies;
 - Will respect Iraqi contracts previously approved by the United Nations (NB: Just service contracts, no development contracts);
 - Will be conducted transparently and accountably, in accordance with applicable legal norms and prudent industry practices, for the benefit of the Iraqi people;
 - Will prepare for the return of production and marketing responsibility to a stable Iraqi authority as soon as practicable.
- The initial goal should be to bring Iraqi petroleum production up to pre-hostility capacity of about 3.1 million barrels/day, consistent with sound business considerations.
- Any increase in production levels and capacity should serve the interest of maximizing revenues for the people of Iraq.



Public Diplomacy--Main Themes

- Iraqi petroleum resources are a national asset of all the Iraqi people, i.e., the nation as a whole, and not of any regional entity.
- We want to work with the Iraqis themselves and the international community in administering petroleum proceeds for the benefit of the Iraqi people.
- Interim administration decisions will be based on prudent, accountable, best practices to prepare for the return of the sector and its management to responsible Iraqi authorities.
- We will act, through our administration, so as not to prejudice Iraq's future decisions regarding:
 - Its oil development policies.
 - Its relations with international organizations.
 - The future ownership structure of the its oil industry.
- US/Coalition will fulfill its responsibility to the Iraqi people to create conditions of stability and well-being for the people of Iraq, but we will not administer oil assets on a long-term basis.
- Petroleum proceeds will be handled transparently and used for the benefit of the Iraqi people.
- We will respect the legitimate interests of all countries in the reconstruction period.
- We will respect Iraqi contracts previously approved by the United Nations.

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Contingency Plans for Repair

- OUSD(P)/Energy Infrastructure Planning Group ("EIPG") manages planning.
- EIPG guidance to the Army contractor:
 - Plan for full range of damage scenarios: Little or no damage, to major disabling damage by Iraqi forces to key choke points (e.g., gas and oil separation plants, marine terminals, pumping stations).
 - Fight over 1,000 well fires, if necessary.
 - Repair priorities:
 - First, restore current *production* of about 2.4 million barrels per day as soon as conditions permit.
 - Second, restore current *capacity* of about 3.1 million barrels per day.
- Plan (draft) calls for modular components for major facilities (e.g., gas-oil separators, pumping stations) wherever needed, to restore production ASAP.
- "Best case" = No infrastructure damage, just safety repairs needed.
 - 6 mos. to 2.4 million b/d, 9 mos. to 3.1 million b/d.
 - Cost: appro. \$0.8 Billion.
- "Worst case" = Major, disabling damage throughout infrastructure.
 - 20 mos. to 2.4, 30+ mos. to 3.1.
 - Cost: \$7 to \$8 Billion (oil only). Refineries and gas plants add **another** \$4-\$5 Billion.



Contingency Plans for Production and Sale


- Production priorities:
 - First, crude oil.
 - Second, natural gas to support electrical grid.
 - Third, refined products (import during interim if necessary).
- Build on "modular" approach.
 - Pre-conflict: Profile all fields and facilities.
 - Post-conflict:
 - Rapidly assess production level achievable with whatever still works.
 - Assemble building-blocks of a functioning system with whatever still works.
 - Use all functioning production facilities to extent safe and cost effective.
- Produce first where damage is least, to maximize early output.
- Sales: * Had in face in more with the board to be a common their
 - New USG-created organization to manage Iraqi oil assets (acronym: "IOTA") uses personnel from Iraq's State Oil Marketing Organization (SOMO) to extent available and reliable -- supplement with other nationals as needed.
 - IOTA approves terms and conditions of sales, within policies set by higher authority.
 - "Good Title": SOMO and Iraqi Central Bank currently co-sign all oil sales contracts.
 - Standard terms include warranty of title.
 - Suggests need to maintain existence and operations of Iraqi Central Bank and SOMO.
 - Would continue to warrant good title to buyers.
 - Would help reassure markets, reduce likelihood of later disputes about validity of sales.



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Organization and Management

- Deputies agreed to recommend establishing an organization dedicated solely to managing Iraqi petroleum industry.
 - Corporate organizational model ("Iraqi Oil Temporary Administration" -- "IOTA") drawing on current Iraqi Oil Ministry structure.
- To "internationalize," appoint:
 - Chairman
 - American.
 - · Current or former statesman.
 - Chief Executive Officer.
 - British or other international.
 - Former chairman or CEO of oil company.
 - Vice Presidents for each functional sector within current Ministry.
 - · Preferably Iraqis.
 - Board of Advisors.
 - Advisory only, non-binding on management.
 - Half composed of Iraqis, the rest could be international figures.

Issues for Decision: Appointment, Reporting, Removal of Chairman, CEO.

- Candidates vetted by PCC will go to Deputies/Principals for consideration (see Back Up Slide).
- Chairman, CEO will recommend to USG the candidates for Board of Advisors.
- Recommend: SecDef appoints and removes Chairman, CEO (with White House coordination).
- Recommend: Chairman reports to top civil administrator; CEO reports to Chairman.

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Petroleum Proceeds: Possible Uses and Availability

- Figures below exclude high end range of humanitarian needs and unaddressed Gulf War claims. When possible, (average) annual numbers are provided.
- Humanitarian aid, military campaign and occupation costs -- about 1 year; others vary from about 2 to 10 years or more.

• **Bottom Line:** Demands on petroleum revenue will likely exceed available funds for foreseeable future.

and the same of th		
RANGE OF POTENTIAL FINANCIAL DEMANDS (in \$ billions)	ally	
la contraction de la contracti	Low Low	<u>High</u>
Humanitarian Aid (minimum) Humanitarian Planning Group	16 مراسل	16
Reconstruction of War-Damaged Eco. (annual avg) CIA	3	4
Restore prewar oil production capacity (initial) CIA/Industry	1	8
Expand oil capacity to 3.6 million bld (additional) CIA/Industry	3	5
Expand oil capacity to 5-8 million b/d (annual avg) CIA/Industry	1	4
Foreign Debt Payment (annual) CIA	7[15
Gulf War Claims (annual) CIA/State	5	7
Costs of Occupation (annual) CBO	48	48
Costs of Military Campaign (total) CBO/House Budget Comm., Dem sta	aff 30	60
TOTAL DEMAND	114	167
TOTAL ANNUAL PETROLEUM PRODUCTION REVENUE*	16	25
BALANCE	-98	-142
* Based on 2.4 million b/d of oil production and an \$18-28/bbl average price		

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Funding Enhancement: Borrow Against Future Oil Revenues?

(b)(1)

Major issues:

- Recent Iraqi oil revenues may not support major loans (i.e., billions of dollars) without new development contracts in place to back them up.
- Who would borrower be during temporary administration? Iraqi Central Bank? Would it still exist and function?
- New lender(s) likely to demand subordination of pre-existing debt and third-party guarantors (other governments?).
- Likely to require rescheduling Iraq's existing foreign debt (about \$82 billion at end 2002 assuming 6% interest rate).
- Iraq also owes \$27 billion in unpaid claims awarded by UN Compensation Commission for Gulf War damages.

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Iraqi Production Goals: Initial Objective

Bring production up to prewar capacity level of about 3.1 million barrels/day (b/d).

We have contingency plans to do this (see Slides 5 and 6).

- Current actual *production*: 2.4 million b/d.
 - Annual revenue with \$18-28/barrel average price range: \$16-25 B.
- Current production *capacity*: 3.1 million b/d (CIA).
 - Some in private sector say sustainable capacity closer to 2.8 million barrels/day (b/d), with significant rehabilitation needed to reach 3.1.
 - Investment needed to sustain: \$1-8 B over 6-20 months, depending on damage level (based on CIA and industry estimate).
- Iraq a member of OPEC but has not been in quota system since Gulf War.



Iraqi Production: Mid-Term Objective

Enable Iraq to regain its historical capacity.

- 3.6 million b/d.
 - Likely to require high repair, maintenance and upgrade of existing fields,
 possible development of new fields.
 - Reachable about one year <u>after</u> obtaining 3.1 million b/d.
 - Cost: additional \$3-5 billion over 3.1 million b/d level (industry estimate).





Iraqi Production: Long-Term Objective

Allow Iraq to achieve economically reasonable increase in capacity.

- Would exceed 5 million b/d.
 - Requires development of new fields.
 - About 5 million b/d reachable within 3-5 years with investments of around \$30 B
 (CIA and industry estimate).



Increasing Iraqi Production: Considerations

Advantages

- Speeds Iraqi rehabilitation and stability.
- Supported by many in Iraqi opposition.
- Puts long-term downward pressure on price.
- Helps consumers.
- Diversifies/increases global oil supply and spare production capacity in long-term, if no price war.
 - Strengthens global economic security.
 - Only 3.7 million b/d of global spare capacity (CIA), or 5% of demand.
 - Saudis have 2/3 of global spare capacity.

Disadvantages

- Politically controversial, especially if new fields are developed.
- Might trigger a price war, which would likely decrease Iraqi oil revenues and could drive out higher-cost producers, thus reducing diversity of supply.
- Some would argue that new Iraqi government should decide.






Contract Policy

due regard

- Existing deals: IOTA should observe contracts previously approved by UN. Query whether should observe those made in hopes sanctions eventually would be lifted?
 - Four "fee-for-service" maintenance contracts (three Russian companies, one Turkish) currently approved by UN under OFF. (See Back Up Slide).
 - Iraq has signed about four capacity expansion contracts (Chinese CNPC, Petro Vietnam, Tunisian ETAP, maybe Syrian Oil Co.), which await lifting of UN sanctions.
 - French Total Fina Elf initialed but reportedly not yet signed.
 - Iraq recently abrogated Russia's Lukoil contract.
 - Over 60 foreign companies pursued various stages of oil negotiations since sanctions were imposed.
 - Iraqi opposition opposed to honoring deals made by Saddam unless clearly in Iraqi interests.
 - Better to defer these for new Iraqi government to decide.
 - US and British companies were not allowed to do this.
- New deals: As a rule, should be based only on economic return, open competition, and sound business practices.
 - IOTA will likely need to contract with foreign companies -- whether to expand production capacity or to maintain existing capacity.
 - Repairs from war damage, safety upgrades, normal operations and maintenance.
 - Should be governed by sound business decisions unless compelling reasons otherwise.
 - Generally let IOTA management run it like a business.



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
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Next Steps


Brief DC next week, PC soon thereafter.



- Promptly appoint management of IOTA.
- Proposal early next week that you appoint Army as Executive Agent.
- Proposal to you next week for pre-positioning assessment teams, fire-fighting and other critical equipment.
- Within 2 weeks present final draft of detailed continuity-of-oil operations plans for your review.




Back Up



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Prep Task: Pre-position Contractor Equipment and Personnel, Sustain Planning

Costs of Prep Task


ltem	\$ Millions
Firefighting (4 sets) & Well Testing Equipment	23.3
Planning Sustainment/Advance Party	3.3
Assessment Teams (Hire, Train & Move)	4.1
Firefighting Teams Movement	0.4
Firefighting & Oil Spill LNO's with CENTCOM	0.6
Engineering of long lead items (GOSP's & pipeline pumps)	2.0
Freight/Insurance	3.8
Total	37.5


- Pre-position firefighting and well testing equipment.
- Rapid damage assessment from maritime and river oil spills and remediation plan development.
- Rapid deployment of facility assessment teams.
- Rapid deployment of wellhead assessment equipment.
- Sustain ongoing planning effort.
- Pre-position personnel and equipment to support rapid deployment.



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
Iraq's Share of OPEC Production









OPEC Production





	TON 2002 vs 1990 (to or and Gabon, which				
	Output Oct. '02	Output Jul '90	02/°90 Dif		
Algeria	1,000	760	240		
Indonesia	1,100	1,280	(180		
Iran	3,600	3,000	600		
Kuwait	2,000	1,900	100		
Libya	1,400	1,250	150		
Nigeria	2,000	1,750	250		
Qatar	700	370	330		
Saudi Arabia	8,500	5,610	2,890		
UAE	2,000	1,950	50		
Venezuela	3,100	1,950	1,150		
OPEC-10 Total	25,400	19,820			
Iraq	2,400	3,500	(1,100)		
OPEC Total	27.800	23 320	4.980		





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Awarded Contracts

Country/ Company	Oilfield(s) (potential production)	Type of Contract	Status	Details	Voidable
Russia					
Lukoit Consortum	West Qurnah Phase 2 (600,000 b/d)	Production Shaning	Signed in 1997; Lifellaterally calicalled by Iraq on 02 Dec	Consortium includes Lukoll (majority) holder), Mashinoimpoit, ahd Zarubezhneft	Voleted
Tanefi	Bay Hassan (96,900 b/d)	Service Contract	Approved by UN	Service contract to drill wells; employees on the ground as of October 2002	Difficult
	Saddem (300,000 b/d)	Service Contract	Approved by UN	Service contract to drill wells; amployees on the ground as of October 2002	Difficult
	South of Basian'	Service Contract	Unclear if submitted te UN	Service contract to drill 15 wells signed could be referring to Az Zubayr or possibly West Qurnah	Unqlear
Zarubezhneft	Karkuk - Khurmala Dome (126,900 b/d)	Selvice Contract	Unclear if submitted to UN	Service centract to drill 45 wells signed.	Unclean
Zangas	West Qurnan Phase in (306,000 bid)	Service Contract	Approved by UN	Service contract for water injection	Difficult
China					
China National Petroleum Corp (CNPO)	Andab (90,000 b/d)	Production Straing	Signed in 1998; No Indication of Work is progress	A.E.	



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Awarded Contracts (cont.)

Syria					
Syrian Petroleum Company	Noor (50,000 b/d)	Development Contract	Linclear, Conflicting reports In late 2001	Initial contract cancelled by Iraq, according to Sept. 2001 Humint reports: new contract drafted, set to be notarized, according to Sep./Dec. 2001 Humint reports	Unclear
Tunisia]			
ETAP (Enterprise Tunisterase Activite Petroleum)	Kig (40,600 b/J)	Development Contract	Contract signes, according to tragi media	NFI	Undear
Turkey					
TPAO	Karkuk – Khurmala Dome: (120,000 b/d)	Servide Contract	Approved by UN	Sérvice contract to drill 22 wells	Difficult
Vietnam					
PetroVietnam	Amara (80,000 b/d)	Development Contract	Contract signed, according to Iragi:media		Unclear
France	·				
Total Fina Elf	Nahir Umr (440,600, b/d)	Development Contract	Contract reportedly initialed but not signed	Reports: Terms not competitive, TEF would get unusually high rate of return	Unclear

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Tab B: Coordination Page

Under Secretary of Defense (AT&L) Mr. E.C. Aldridge

General Counsel

Vice Director, Joint Staff


Mr. W.J. Haynes II

Maj Gen J.A.

Hawkins, USAF

January 8, 2003 January 10, 2003

January 18, 2003



It would be inadvisable to hire (b)(6)

- As current manager of external affairs for ConocoPhillips and former chief DC lobbyist for Conoco, his hiring would raise questions about conflicts of interest and raise other suspicions about the purpose of our management of Iraqi oil.
- Also, if McKee takes the position of Senior Advisor, as seems likely, both the oil slots would be filled by people who worked at ConocoPhillips, and this too would cause an uproar in the industry and press.
- (b)(6)recommended by Gary Vogler, also would not be suitable.
 - In his email to Reuben Jeffrey that (b)(6) showed me, Vogler seemed to misunderstand (b)(6) view of (b)(6) thought he might possibly make a contribution to the team, but not as Deputy.
 - A review of (b)(6) resume suggests that he does not have the requisite background or stature that is most suitable for this position.
 - It might also create optic problems for (b)(6) to instigate the appointment of his own successor if, as seems likely, (b)(6) soon joins a company with business dealings with Iraqi oil.
- (b)(6)a DOE detailee in Baghdad who has been suggested as a candidate, would also not be suitable.
 - Does not have the background or stature for the position.

- Instead, (b)(6) the senior retired BP executive whom the British recently sent to Baghdad, would make an excellent Deputy Senior Advisor and satisfy British demands for more say in the oil matters.
 - (b)(6) thinks particularly highly of (b)(6) and recommended him to Bremer.
- (b)(6) is wary of having any more than two oil positions and would prefer the team comprise only McKee and (b)(6)
- However, I can see advantages to hiring a second deputy if one of them were also drawn from the list (b) put forward to Bremer-(b)(6) or (b)(6)
 - (b)(6) and former foreign service officer in Kuwait, would add some policy and diplomatic expertise.
 - (b)(6) and a current consultant to the CIA, is highly regarded in the market and is a leading expert on Iraqi oil.

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

The Military Assistant

9 September 2003 - 1555 Hours

MEMORANDUM FOR:

LTG CASEY, DIRECTOR, JOINT STAFF

SUBJECT:

Specialist Jeffrey Wershow - Soldier Killed in Baghdad:

Status of Perpetrators

Sir:

The Deputy Secretary would like information concerning the status of the perpetrators: have they been arrested?

Specialist Wershow was a member of the Florida National Guard and was killed in a Baghdad cafeteria in July of this year.

Very respectfully,

Mark R. Hagerott

Commander, USN

Military Assistant to the

Deputy Secretary of Defense

Suspense:

Friday, 12 September 2003

Copy to:

(b)(6)

CPA 00093-03

7 October 2003

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

From: Paul Wolfowitz

SUBJECT: Hillman Paper

- You asked (Tab A) for my view of Jerry's Hillman's proposal for an oil deal involving the Iraqi Pipeline in Saudi Arabia (IPSA). IPSA is:
 - An Iraqi asset built during the Iran-Iraq war to ship 1.1 million barrels/day
 from southern Iraq to the Red Sea via Saudi Arabia. Besides
 pipeline/terminal, several pump stations exist along with ten 1 million
 barrel storage tanks.
 - Pipeline displacement approximately 11.1 million barrels. At current prices approximately \$275 million.
 - It has not been used since 1990; estimated time to restore pipeline/terminal unknown. Iraqi Oil Ministry concerned about possible radioactivity at pump station ISPA2A. Pump station was reported destroyed during Desert Storm by spent uranium rounds.
 - Saudis expropriated the part on Saudi territory in June 2001.
- Hillman proposed a swap whereby a Saudi-led consortium would pay upfront (perhaps \$2.25 B) for Iraqi oil that will be delivered via IPSA at some later date.
- IPSA could serve as a backup to current Iraqi export routes.
- However, it might take time to resolve the Iraqi-Saudi legal dispute over the pipeline, and Hillman's swap could add to Iraqi debt.
- On October 7th, Paul Bremer discussed the issue of reopening the IPSA pipeline with Mr. Ibrahim Bahr al-Uloum, the Iraqi Oil Minister and Robert McKee, the new CPA Oil Advisor. Mr. Ibrahim Bahr al-Uloum was asked to take a first look at the issue and then discuss with Robert.

Recommendation

Do nothing at this time. Wait and see what action plan develops out of CPA
 Oil and the Iraqi Oil Ministry before making any decision.



COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY BAGHDAD

ACTION MEMO

October 20, 2003

FOR: THE ADMINISTRATOR

FROM: Tom Foley, George Wolfe, David Oliver, (b)(6)

(b)(6) Rob McKee

SUBJECT: Recommendations for Comprehensive Subsidy Reform

You have asked us to combine our efforts and prepare for you a plan for comprehensive subsidy reform. We have met and discussed this issue at length and we have considered and incorporated the earlier contributions of Phil Carroll's group including (b)(6) and (b)(6) and others, and the opinions of several subsidy policy experts including (b)(6) (b)(6) and (b)(6) of the World Bank and (b)(6) of the Center for Strategic and International Studies. These are our recommendations:

Separation of Certain Reforms

Four broad areas of reforms should be addressed separately. They are:

- The Food Basket A reform policy for the food basket has already been determined and
 is in the process of being implemented making it difficult to incorporate into other
 subsidy policy reform.
- <u>Emergy</u> Energy subsidies in the form of below market fuel and electricity prices are a large and critical area requiring near term reform. These subsidies are interconnected and require a comprehensive policy.
- Agriculture Agricultural subsidies are significant, but create less critical distortions in
 the economy than the food basket and energy subsidies. The agricultural sector will be
 significantly affected by the monetization of the food basket and energy subsidy reform.
 We recommend agricultural subsidy reform be treated separately and be left for later
 consideration when the impact of other reforms on the agricultural sector are known and
 the political effects of agricultural subsidy reform are better understood.
- Other Subsidies There are other subsidies of a less critical nature on isolated goods and services which we recommend be addressed separately and not be included as part of a more comprehensive policy.

As a result of this separation of subsidy reform, we are only addressing energy policy at this time as the food basket is decided and underway, agricultural reform should wait, and other subsidies can and should be treated individually.

Energy Subsidy Reform Recommendations

We agree on the following recommendations to you:

- Energy subsidies should be reformed all at once and not in a series of small steps. Most energy subsidy reforms have been implemented in small steps because governments rarely have the political confidence to implement reforms in one move. However, most experts believe that if the political will exists, the political cost and risk associated with reform is less if the reforms are implemented in one move. These experts say at the same time, however, that single step reform should not be a sneak attack. It must be well communicated and publicly debated in advance. A second reason for recommending a one time move is that in a discussion with the Governing Council we may be forced into a compromise including implementation in several steps. If we start with a proposal for a single move we can go to two or more steps, but it would probably not be possible to go from several steps to a single move.
- A single step liberalization of energy prices must include a concurrent compensatory payment of cash to cover the increased cost of fuels. Liberalization of energy prices will increase the costs of energy to consumers. This burden will fall disproportionately on lower income Iraqi's. To be fair and politically acceptable, a compensating payment should be made to everyone in an amount as yet undetermined, but it should be no less than the amount by which the typical lower income Iraqi's fuel costs rise.
- A cash compensation payment to ease the burden of increased energy prices should be structured to be temporary. The cash compensation payment should be fixed in amount, not indexed, and should contain other features to assure it does not become a permanent subsidy.
- Fuel subsidy reform should be implemented by having the Ministry of Finance impose a fee at the refinery equal to the regional parity price of crude oil plus appropriate delivery costs. All operations would be required to operate without any financial subsidy and would be required to earn and remit a return on capital, thereby forcing them to price all oil related products at or near market prices.
- Electricity subsidy reform should be implemented by raising electricity prices to
 regional free market rates. Rates for all consumers of electricity should be raised at the
 same time as fuel prices, but enforcing payment by residential customers at the new rates
 should be introduced gradually taking into account political factors and changes in
 demand on the electrical grid resulting from increased fuel costs.
- Two interdepartmental task teams should be staffed with fulltime people to implement the food basket monetization program and energy subsidy reforms. Properly implementing both subsidy reform programs will be challenging. We believe it will best be done by two dedicated teams. The food basket team would take-on responsibility for implementing the monetization payment system for both subsidy

reform programs. The food basket monetization team would report to OMB. The energy subsidy reform team would report jointly to the Directors of Economic Policy, Private Sector Development, and OMB, with OMB serving as the primary report on implementation matters.

- A number of implementation challenges should be addressed soon and aggressively.
 To ensure successful reform implementation a number of challenges with long lead times must be addressed soon. The most important of them are:
 - Determine the details of the energy reform proposal including the implementation date, the amount of the compensatory payment, and other requirements for its implementation.
 - Begin consultation with the Governing Council in November and, as soon as possible thereafter, announce the plan for public comment.
 - Develop a means for making a compensatory payment by the implementation date.
 - Begin working with the Ministry of Oil, Electricity Commission and others to prepare for the impact of subsidy reform. For example, developing stockpiles in anticipation of demand fluctuations, ensuring that opening of new retail outlets for fuel is unrestricted, developing means for addressing the lack of volume measuring equipment at many retail outlets, and managing the significant influx of cash revenues and changes to many Ministry budgets that will result.
 - Initiate study of legal/regulatory impediments that constrain competition in refined oil markets – wholesale, retail, and import markets – in order to improve competition and influence scope for consumer price increases.

An open issue we have decided to leave for you to consider is the timing of energy subsidy reform. We believe the feasible options are to implement it March 1 or concurrently with the monetization of the food basket on July 1. We have identified pros and cons for each, but as a group had no strong opinion either way. The advantages of each as we see them are the following:

Advantages of a March 1 Implementation:

- Earlier implementation eliminates market distortions four months sooner.
- Not implementing at the same time as the food basket will result in less potential for too
 much happening all at once and the risk of resulting implementation problems.
- Cooler weather in March presents less external irritation than July weather and provides
 4-8 weeks of milder weather during which adverse political reactions can be addressed.

Advantages of a July 1 Implementation:

- Doing everything at once may consume the least long term political capital.
- Allows four additional months to prepare for energy subsidy reform including implementing the compensatory payment system.

If you have a strong preference for either date, that will determine it. If not, our group will come-up with a firm recommendation for you as to the better implementation date.

We propose the following action steps:

- 1. Immediately form and staff the two task teams described above.
- 2. Have the energy subsidy reform team prepare by November 15 a detailed plan for your approval reflecting the terms outlined above, but including more detail, the amount of the compensatory payment, and detailed implementation steps.

Approve	Disapprove	Approve with Modification_	
COORDINATION: Not	ne		
ATTACHMENTS: Non	ie		



COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY BAGHDAD

INFO MEMO

October 28, 2003

FOR:

THE ADMINISTRATOR

FROM:

Keith Crane

SUBJECT:

Comments on Tom Foley's and Peter McPherson's Proposals for Oil Trust Funds

PURPOSE & SUMMARY: The purpose of this memo is to evaluate the proposals for oil funds made by Tom Foley and Peter McPherson, respectively, in terms of the ability of the proposed policies to achieve the goals stipulated in the memos. On the revenue side, both memos provide cogently argued rationales for collecting monies from oil sales in separate funds. On the expenditure side, both memos advocate unduly restrictive policies, especially in light of current and prospective budgetary needs. If CPA's goal is to leave the next Iraqi government with an enduring institution that will collect oil monies in a transparent fashion and limit the ability of future Iraqi governments to use these funds for purposes other than direct redistribution to Iraqi citizens, the two current proposals need to be modified. In their current form, I am certain that a future Iraqi government would change the expenditure allocations. I have provided some suggestions on how the proposals might be modified below.

The Purpose of an Oil Fund

Both memos provide good arguments for collecting oil monies in separate funds. To recapitulate, if properly designed and managed, an oil fund could:

- 1. Help control diversion of funds at the collection stage;
- 2. Provide transparency in expenditure as well as collection;
- 3. More quickly call government attention to unexpected shifts in oil revenue flows;
- 4. Can be used to sequester funds for future or special purposes;
- 5. May dampen economic fluctuations by adding or withdrawing funds from a stabilization fund;
- 6. May cap the amount of oil income directly available to the government, causing the government to resort to other, broader-based taxes to obtain revenues.

Of these goals, those pertaining to revenue collection are the least controversial. Many countries and states establish separate funds for the collection of resource taxes: Iraq operated a

Development Fund based on oil revenues in the 1950s. An oil fund would put funds outside the control of the Ministry of Finance, permitting more automatic, timelier payouts for items that are on a regular payment schedule. The Iraqi Ministry of Finance has an institutional culture of multiple approvals and a very bureaucratic, autocratic disbursement system that is subject to individual decisions and whims.

Funds may have stipulations on the investment and allocation of monies. The Iraqi Development Fund, set up under the tutelage of the World Bank, mandated investment in infrastructure. Tom Foley's proposal restricts the share of the fund revenues that can be used for general revenues. Both proposals mandate investment in a capital fund and a "dividend" payment to each Iraqi citizen. Peter McPherson's proposal also calls for a stabilization account.

If this proposal is to last, the mandated allocation of funds has to provide incentives for future governments to adhere to the mandates; otherwise, once elected they will change the operation of the funds. The dividend payment is the easiest to make permanent because once households begin receiving it, they will not give it back. We have already introduced an "oil dividend" program: the monetization of the food basket and monetary compensation for increased energy prices. No other developing country of which I am aware could afford to provide monetary compensation for either food of fuel. Iraq's oil wealth makes this possible. Going through the accounts, I do not foresee any additional monies becoming available for another "dividend". To illustrate, a \$15 a month per capita payment for food and another \$5 a month payment for fuel generates an annual expenditure of \$6,480 million annually. The 2006 budget assumes 2.5 mbd of oil exports and an oil price of \$21 per barrel, resulting in annual gross oil revenues of \$19,300 million. Assuming an additional 1 mbd in sales to domestic refiners that would also be sold at this price, total gross oil revenues would be \$26,800, this one program would take a quarter of gross oil revenues and a substantially higher share of net oil revenues. In light of other demands on oil revenues, the monetization and energy compensation program leave little or no room for an additional dividend payment.

There are two other arguments against making a dividend payment separate from the monetary compensation programs. One, transaction (distribution) costs are very expensive in these programs. I have been working with Danilo Roseano on the costs of distributing the monetization payments. We do not yet know what the costs are, but they could easily run as high as \$1 per transaction plus set up costs and set up costs will run in the millions of dollars. Setting up a dividend program separate from the monetization program seems very wasteful in this regard and would absorb a substantial share of the distributed funds. Two, the size of a separate dividend would probably be considered laughable by most Iraqis. I had thought about advertising the monetization of the food basket as an "oil dividend," but the amounts available are the minimal amounts necessary to keep a poor family fed. My guess is that Iraqis perceive substantial dividend payouts. Advertising monetization as an oil dividend would probably result in a popular outcry because most people do not realize how limited funds are.

I do not think that CPA would be well-advised to expend political capital on trying to push through these mandates only to see them immediately overturned. Thus, any CPA-inspired mandates need to survive a new Iraqi government. I am unconvinced by some of the proposed mandates. Both memos argue for capital funds in which oil revenues would be collected for future generations. Tom Foley caveats this mandate by stipulating that for the next five years, oil funds should be used infrastructure development for the next five years. I concur with Tom that monies should be channeled into infrastructure for the time being; I am skeptical that five years

will be enough time. The argument that funds should be set aside for portfolio investment, much of it abroad, would make sense if Iraq were at a mature or declining stage in oil production like Norway or Kuwait. However, the best thing that Iraq can do at this point in time would be to develop its oil resources so that future generations will be able to benefit from increased oil output. Politically, it would be very difficult to argue that the fund should invest abroad while foreign oil companies are being encouraged to invest in Iraq. My guess is that rates of return on funds invested in Iraqi oil in the coming few years will be high. Investing in infrastructure, if conducted sensibly, could also generate very high rates of return, however, measured. Investment in education should also generate high rates of return. In short, an infrastructure/education mandate would be much more palatable (and sensible) than a classic investment fund. Once the Supplemental runs out, I really see no other alternative. In light of Iraq's very young population and infrastructure needs, a classic fund that makes portfolio investments, many abroad, is a political non-starter and also not a good use of resources at this point in time. Those funds are more suitable for aging populations with fewer needs for infrastructure and education.

Another argument against national funds is their poor investment track record. If the government believes that oil revenues should be used to pay for future pensions, the most efficient solution is to provide a benefit to individuals and have them invest the benefit themselves in an accredited fund. Pension systems under which wage earners are compelled to invest a set share of income in privately managed savings accounts have been surprisingly popular and successful as alternatives to strictly state-run programs in emerging markets. In my view, it makes more sense to provide money through the oil for cash program and then tax back (show the amount taxed) a share for investment in individual retirement accounts than to have a national fund invest retirement savings and leave the government with the pension obligation. Under these systems, the government places strict conditions on funds eligible to participate in these programs. Everyone in the country monitors the performance of these funds because it is their money.

The track record of national funds, including the U.S.-East European enterprise funds has often been mediocre to abysmal. In particular, the idea that creating boards of directors formed of the great and the good will result in solid returns is often mistaken. Many corporate boards, including Enron's, are stacked with such people. A very good friend of mine was on the Hungarian Enterprise Board and, unfortunately, participated in some very bad decisions. These people usually like to be liked. They are very busy. Moreover, the money involved is not their own. Thus, they do not perform the oversight functions or challenge decisions the way they would if they were investing their own money. I would focus on disbursing funds to the government budget and individuals, not trying to have the funds invest it themselves.

The stabilization fund argument makes some sense, but is probably irrelevant for CPA as the likelihood that the Iraqi government will enjoy a surfeit of oil revenues in the medium term is very low. Good finance ministries do create set aside accounts and try to constrain spending in times of boom. This said, stabilization funds for countries or cartels (coffee, nickel, tin, etc.) have had a checkered history. I believe all of the commodity funds have gone bankrupt. The empirical evidence shows that no one can forecast long-term market trends. Thus, governments and cartels tend to spend too quickly and save too little. If CPA advocates a stabilization fund, it should be just that. It only makes sense to put money into these funds when commodity prices exceed a certain level (e.g., \$32 a barrel) and only permit withdrawals when the price falls below

a certain level (e.g., \$12 a barrel). I see no sense in putting money into such a fund when oil prices are "normal" and especially during a period like now when the Iraqi government has such limited revenue options. The Iraqi government would be better off setting up contingent lines of credit in the future or looking at other rainy day options than sticking a large share of resources into a fund.

I disagreed with the mandate that only 10 percent of oil tax revenues be used for general government revenue. It is not enforceable and is fairly arbitrary. It also puts the cart before the horse. A substantial number of oil economies have become successful or semi-successful: China, Malaysia, Mexico, Russia, some of the Gulf states, not to mention Texas, California, Great Britain and Norway. As these economies have developed, the share of oil revenues to total government revenues declines, not because of oil tax policies, but because the importance of the oil sector declines as a share of GDP because of economic growth, making it possible to tap other sources of tax revenues. Oil taxes can actually have one of the least distortionary effects on an economy. In Middle Eastern societies, other taxes have much more pernicious effects because they put power in the hands of tax collectors, a profession that has been reviled since Biblical times. Customs, sales, excise, VAT, property, and income taxes are all much more arbitrary in these economies and potentially much more detrimental to economic growth than taxes on oil. Iraq should use its oil wealth to build up a head of steam for growth and then introduce other taxes.

Iraq also lacks the resources to become a classic Persian Gulf oil economy. If production hits 7.5 mbd, roughly Saudi production levels, Iraqi output is likely to have a depressing effect on world market oil prices. However, even assuming that it does not, gross Iraqi oil revenues at \$20 per barrel would still only be \$2,000 per capita, not enough to make Iraqis wealthy.

Fund Mechanics: Revenue

Both memos stated that net oil revenues rather than oil tax revenues should be used as revenues for the fund. Tom Foley's memo argues that all upstream assets should become the property of the fund. I think both proposals are major mistakes. The fund should only draw on oil tax revenues; the national oil companies need to operate on a commercial basis, not as revenue sources.

Currently, the oil industry, despite the nominal existence of "companies," is run by the Ministry of Oil as a budgetary institution, not as a set of independent units. Robert McKee notes that the best state-owned oil companies are those that are most independent from the Ministry of Finance and the worst run state-owned oil companies are those that are run by financial authorities. If Iraq is to have a strong oil industry, the industry needs to be run on a commercial basis and face as much competition as possible. To elicit the proper supply responses and to create a tax framework in which independent units can operate, the operating units need to be restructured into a set of independent profit centers with an eye to increasing competition in refined oil products markets. Each link in the state-owned supply chain needs to be operated as an independent profit center, making it possible to introduce competition at each stage. This will involve creating balance sheets, cash flow, and profit and loss statements. This financial information can then be used to make better operating decisions and provide proper incentives for management to compete for market share, control costs, and run their operations in a profitable manner. Creating proper incentives and inventory and financial controls is crucial,

because some managers will lose substantial sums of money because of reduced opportunities for graft.

The fiscal instruments used to tax the industry need to be consistent with multiple, independent producers. These include royalties, profit taxes, and dividends paid to the state. Royalties can be set as a percentage of world market prices or export prices. Profit taxes should be designed to leave enough retained earnings to enable the company to operate in a commercial fashion. The board of directors, which would consist of government appointees, would make decisions on dividend payments to the treasury. Eventually, excise taxes on motor vehicle fuels may also be levied. In this structure, taxes are levied at discrete stages of the production process. For example, percentage royalties are levied at the production stage and excise taxes on refined products at the wholesale or terminal stage. Such a tax system can be applied uniformly to all future participants in the oil sector, including foreign investors. A clear, transparent energy tax code will ensure both that the fund or funds will only draw on a clearly defined set of tax revenues from the oil sector and that state-owned oil companies will be able to retain sufficient funds to conduct their own operations efficiently. In this system, tax revenues from oil will be constrained by the international oil market and Iraqi oil companies' financial performance. The Iraqi government will not be able to treat the industry as a revenue source rather than a business.

For these reasons, I do not support giving an oil fund all oil assets. The treasury or state property holding company should hold the equity. The fund should benefit from taxes on the industry as a whole. It should not be involved in owning and managing operating companies.

Financial Implications

Table 1 shows summary data for the Iraqi budget for 2004-2006.

Table 1: Oil Revenues and the Iraqi Budget			
Mil	lion Dollars		
	2004	2005	2006
(1) Production mbd	12,000	18,500	19,300
(1) Gross Oil Revenues (exports only)	12,000	18,500	19,300
(2) Total Revenues	13,839.2	19,183.2	19,763.4
(3) Percent	86.7	96.4	97.7
(4) Gross Oil Revenues			
(4) Oil Tax Revenues assuming \$5/barrel production costs			
(5) Household Compensation Payments	6,480		
(6) Government Operating Budget			

(4) – (5) – (6)		



COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY BAGHDAD

LPB HAS SEEN

INFO MEMO

October 29, 2003

FOR:

THE ADMINISTRATOR

From:

Robert McKee, Director for Oil Policy

Subject:

Ministry of Oil Update

Please find attached the following requested information:

- Pipeline Sabotage: There has an increased sabotage to the oil pipeline (seven attacks since 11 October) which is disrupting oil exports, fuel for electricity production and fuel distribution. We expect a higher level of protection with the full implementation of Task Force Shield. (attached)
- Task Force Shield (Oil Infrastructure Security Force with Erinys): On 15 October, Task Force Shield has begun the implementation phase of its force roll-out in close coordination with CJTF-7. At the end state of this phase, phase on 30 November, we will have a trained, supervised guard force into one command and controlled organization supported by the combat power of CJTF-7. Amb McManaway is receiving a briefing on the current status shortly. (attached)
- Congressman Waxman's Request for Audit of KBR: In a non-related issue to the above, Congressmen Henry A. Waxman and John D. Dingell, in a letter to LTG Robert Flowers, the USACE Commander, allege that KBR (the US Army Corps of Engineers has contracted KBR to import gasoline to Iraq) has overcharged the US Government. If there is proof of overcharging, they request that reimbursements be initiated and that punitive measures be taken against the contractor.(attached)

Attachments: As Stated

Congressman Waxman Request for Audit of Fuel Prices Paid by KBR Task Order No. 5 Contract No. DACA63-03-D-0005

- 1. KBR was contracted by the US Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) to import gasoline to Iraq. Congressmen Henry A. Waxman and John D. Dingell, in a letter to LTG Robert Flowers, the USACE Commander, allege that KBR has overcharged the US Government and have requested that the US Army Corps of Engineers conduct a joint investigation with the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) and other federal agencies to determine how much KBR is paying for gas, the cost to transport the gas, and an explanation as to why the costs are high. If there is proof of overcharging, they request that reimbursements be initiated and that punitive measures be taken against the contractor (Encl 1).
- 2. A USACE assisted DCAA audit is currently underway. The preliminary assessment does not indicate any criminal wrong-doing on the part of the contractor. The current audit action is focused on the purchase of gasoline from the Altamia Company, a licensed fuel marketer in Kuwait, since fuels purchased from other sources in Turkey were less expensive. The cost for the Kuwaiti fuel and the cost for transportation to Iraq from Kuwait have been determined to be \$1.13/gallon and \$1.14/gallon, respectively (Enci 2).
- 3. USACE and the DCAA auditors are continuing to evaluate KBR purchase records. The next steps will be to evaluate KBR's purchasing process to determine if they followed proper procedures and then to determine if they exercised due diligence in seeking responsible, low-cost bids for these purchases in accordance with the terms and conditions of the contract.

4.	POC: (b)(6)	DSN (b)(2)	
₩.	POC. WAS	D314.	

2 Enclosures:

- 1. Email from (b)(6) Defense Contracting Audit Agency, Baghdad, Subject: Kuwait Gas Pricing, Contract No. DACA63-03-D-0005/Task Order #5
- 2. Congressional request from Rep Waxman

Original Message From: (b)(2),(b)(6)
Sent: Monday, October 27, 2003 3:51 PM
To: (b)(6)
Cc: (b)(6)
(b)(6) Subjects Knowledge Contract No. DACACA 03 D 0005 Track Order #5
Subject: Kuwalt Gas Pricing, Contract No. DACA63-03-D-0005/Task Order #5 Importance: High Sensitivity: Confidential
TO: (b)(6) US Army Corps of Engineers
RIO Program, Baghdad
DATE: 10/27/2003
SUBJECT: Kuwait Gas Pricing, Contract No. DACA63-03-D-0005/Task Order #5
(b)(6)
RE: Your conversation with (b)(6) DCAA Regional Audit Manager and (b)(6) Supervisor Auditor, on 10/26/03, Baghdad, Iraq.
At your request, attached please find our preliminary assessment of the Kuwait fuel (gasoline) prices as purchased by KBR under Contract No. DACA63-

At your request, attached please find our preliminary assessment of the Kuwait fuel (gasoline) prices as purchased by KBR under Contract No. DACA63-03-D-0005, Task Order # 5 only. Please be advised that as of this date the attached information is a compilation of cost that is represented in KBR files, and is not audited, and as such, we express no opinion on the attached. Our audit of these costs is incomplete at this time, and our audit is still in-process; accordingly the information is marked "unaudited." The purpose of the information provided is for your discussions with CPA officials.

Please contact me or the following individuals who are located in room M208 of the Presidential Palace in Baghdad if you have any questions relative to the attachment.

(b)(6) Supervisory Auditor (b)(6) Supervisory Auditor

(b)(6)

Acting Branch Manager Tel. No. to Kuwait (b)(2)

Enclosure 1

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY and UNAUDITED

Contract No. DACA63-03-D-0005/Task Order #5

Kuwait Gasoline Costs
Period Covered: 5/7/03 to 9/30/03

Gasoline Purchased under the following Purchase Orders

KBR Purchase			
Order No.	Liters	Currency	(KD = Kuwait Dinar)
311	41,010,000	3,774,179.940	KD
341	38,712,000	3,511,200.000	KD
402	<u>134,657,010</u>	<u>12.119,130.900</u>	KD
Total	214,379,010	19,404,510.840	KD
Liter to Gallon Conversion 1 gallon = 3. 7854118 litters	3.7854118		
Total Gallons Purchased (5/7 to 9/30) (214,379,010 / 3.7854118)	56,632,943		
Kuwait Currency to US Dollars Conversion For this exercise 1Kuwait Dinar (KD) = \$3.30	• '	\$3.30	
Total Gasoline Purchased in US Dollars	'	\$64,034,886	
(19,404,510.840 KD x \$3.30)			
		\	
Fuel Tanker Costs		\	
Fuel Tankers leased from inceptio	n thru 9/30/03 +	64,638,845	USD
Total Cost per Gallon (from 5/7/03 to 9	/30/03)	\	
TOTAL GASOLINE AND FUI (\$64,034,886 + \$64,638,849		\$ \$128,673,731	
Total GALLONS		56,632,943	
PRICE PER GALLON (\$128,673,731 / 56,632,943	gais.)	\$2.27	(Kuwait Only)
Cost of Gasoline per Gal. (\$64,0 Cost of Fuel Tankers per Gal. (\$			

Kuwait Gasoline Purchases (Task Order #5) Only

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY and UNAUDITED

FAX COVER

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM

DEMOCRATIC STAFF OFFICE

HON. HENRY A. WAXMAN

RANKING MINORITY MEMBER B350A RAYBURN HOUSE BUILDING PHONE (202) 225-8081 FAX (202) 225-4784, 8185

DATE: October 21, 2003
TO: Lt. Gen. Robert Flowers
FAX: (202) 761-8843
FROM: Rep. Henry A. Waxman
SUBJECT:
NO. OF PAGES: 8 (INCLUDING COVER SHEET)
COMMENT:

IF THERE IS A PROBLEM WITH THIS TRANSMITTAL, PLEASE CALL OFFICE A.S.A.P.

Enclosure 2

Congress of the United States House of Representatives

Mashington, D.C. 20515

October 21, 2003

Lt. Geu. Robert B. Flowers ATTN: Directorate of Military Programs U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 441 G Street, NW Washington, DC 20314

Dear General Flowers:

On October 15, 2003, we wrote to Joshua Boltan, Director of the Office of Management and Budget, to express our concern about indications that Halliburton has been overcharging the taxpayer for importing gasoline into Iraq. Since then, we have received significant new evidence of overcharging by Halliburton. We are writing to urge you to investigate and take appropriate action.

Our letter to OMB Director Bolten was based on a comparison between the prices Halliburton has charged to import gasoline and the prices independent experts told us would be reasonable. The Congressional Research Service informed us that Mideast gasoline costs about 71 cents per gallon. Other experts told us transportation costs should be no more than 25 cents per gallon, bringing a reasonable total cost to around 96 cents per gallon. Our letter pointed out that Halliburton has been charging an average price of at least \$1.59 per gallon to import gasoline into Iraq, far more than the experts said was reasonable.

Halliburton's response was to dispute that gasoline could be imported into Iraq for as little as 96 cents. According to Davie Lesar, the CEO of Halliburton, the prices Halliburton charges are "fair and competitive."

We now have concrete evidence that Halliburton is wrong and that gasoline can be—and indeed has been — imported into Iraq for under \$1.00 per gallon. We contacted Iraq's state-owned oil company, the State Oil Marketing Organization (SOMO), to determine what prices it pays to import gasoline into Iraq. We learned that SOMO pays between 90 and 98 cents per gallon to import gasoline into Iraq, almost exactly what the expensive told us would be reasonable. In comparison, the price Halliburton is charging is at least 65% — and as much as 88% — more expensive than SOMO's prices.

We have also confirmed from the Coalition Provisional Authority that SOMO buys its gasoline from the same countries as Halliburton, transports its gasoline into Iraq by truck just like Halliburton, and delivers its gasoline to the same central depots as Halliburton.

¹ Halliburton's Mission, Wall Street Journal (Oct. 17, 2003).

Lt. Gen. Robert B. Flowers October 21, 2003 Page 2

Finally, we have learned that some of the funds paid to Halliburton are coming from the humanizarian funds transferred from the U.N. Oil for Food Program. This raises serious questions about our relationship with the United Nations and our allies. Under the terms of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1483, an independent board called the International Advisory and Monitoring Board was supposed to ensure that the U.N. Oil for Food funds were spent for the benefit of the Iraqi people. Not only has this board not been created, it now appears that part of the \$1 billion transferred from the U.N. Oil for Food Program has been squandered by paying inflated prices to Halliburton.

Based on these concerns, we urge you to take three specific actions: (1) investigate overcharging by Halliburton that already may have occurred; (2) seek reimbursements for any inflated amounts paid to Halliburton; and (3) if you confirm that Halliburton has been overcharging for gasoline, disqualify Halliburton from receiving either of the two new oil reconstruction contracts that the Corps is close to awarding.

The rest of this letter explains these concerns in more detail.

Evidence of Halliburton's Overcharges

As you know, a significant component of Halliburton's work under the sole-source oil contract has been to import gasoline and other petroleum products, such as LPG and kerosene, into Iraq. According to data provided by your staff, as of September 18, Halliburton had received task orders worth \$378,931,314 to import these products into Iraq. Of this amount, Halliburton was paid \$304,436,577 to import 191,965,150 gallons of gasoline. On a per-gallon basis, Halliburton charged the U.S. government \$1.59.

This amount does not include Halliburton's "profits," which are calculated separately.⁴ Because the Administration agreed to a "cost-plus" contract, the government reimburses

² E-mail from U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to Minority Staff, Committee on Government Reform (Sept. 23, 2003).

³ Id. According to the e-mail, 727,140,721 liters of gasoline had been delivered as of September 18, 2003. At a conversion rate of 0.264 gallons per liter (or 3.785 liters per gallon), the total number of gallons is 191,965,150. The cost of \$304,486,577 was calculated by assuming a conversion rate of 1,500 lraqi dinars per U.S. dollar.

⁴ U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Frequently Askad Questions: Engineer Support to Operation Iraqi Freedom (Oct. 3, 2003) (online at www.hq.usace.gmy.mil/cepa/iraq/faq.htm) ("It is an Indefinite Delivery/Indefinite Quantity, cost-plus type contract. The government

Lt. Gen. Robert B. Flowers October 21, 2003 Page 3

Halliburton for its costs and then provides an additional award of between 2% and 7%. When this additional award is taken into account, the cost to the taxpayer increases to between \$1.62 and \$1.70 per gallon. Although Halliburton claims its profits are included in the \$1.59 per gallon price. your staff confirmed for us last week that this is not the case.

Numerous experts told us Halliburton's prices were "outrageously high," that they were potentially "a huge ripoff" to taxpayers, and that Halliburton could be guilty of "price gouging." They estimated a more reasonable cost of about 96 cents per gallon. According to the Congressional Research Service, the average price for "Arab Gulf" gasoline in the Middle East was about 71 cents per gallon between April and September, not including the cost to transport the gasoline into Iraq. One expert said that under ordinary conditions, it should be possible to transport gasoline into Iraq for costs ranging from 15 to 25 cents per gallon. Another expert said it might be possible to transport gasoline into Iraq for as little as 10 cents per gallon. Even assuming the most expensive transportation estimate, Halliburton's total per-gallon costs should not exceed 96 cents.

⁵ Id. ("The contractor is guaranteed a fee of two percent and can make a maximum of seven percent, depending on performance").

⁶ Press Release: Halliburton Refuses Statements Made about Fuel Procurement and Delivery in Iraq (Oct. 17, 2003) (claiming the \$1:59 figure includes the company's profits).

⁷ Telephone conversation between Janice Rasgus, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and Minority Staff, Committee on Government Reform (Oct. 17, 2003).

Telephone conversation between Philip K. Verleger, Jr., President, PKVerleger LLC, and Principal, Battle Group, and Minority Staff, Committee on Government Reform (Oct. 10, 2003). Other experts, including individuals with detailed knowledge of Iraq's oil markets, expressed similar views, although they saked that their identities not be revealed. One said: "There is no way on earth Halliburton should be buying gas for 80 cents and selling it for \$1.70—that's highway robbery."

⁹ Congressional Research Service, Average of Recent Gasoline Prices in the Persian Gulf (Oct. 14, 2003) (surveying Platts Global Energy's Ollgram Price Report for the average sales price of "Arab Gulf" gasoline between the fall of Baghdad on April 9, 2003, and the last date for which the Army Corps of Engineers provided information, September 18, 2003).

¹⁰ Telephone conversation between Gordon Schremp, Senior Fuels Specialist, California Energy Commission, and Minority Staff, Committee on Government Reform (Oct. 14, 2003) (assuming 400 miles between Kuwait and Baghdad).

¹¹ Telephone conversation with Philip K. Verleger, supra note 8.

Lt. Gen. Robert B. Flowers October 21, 2003 Page 4

The New Information from SOMO

When Halliburton contested the views of the experts we consulted, we sought information directly from SOMO, the Iraqi state-owned oil company, about what it costs to import gasoline into Iraq. We learned that SOMO has been importing gasoline into Iraq from the same countries as Halliburton and doing so at a fraction of the cost that Halliburton has been charging.

The minority staff of the Government Reform Committee contacted Mohammed M. Al-Jibouri, the General Manager of SOMO. Although Mr. Al-Jibouri would not comment on whether Halliburton was inflating its prices, he provided our staff with the prices SOMO pays to import gasoline. According to Mr. Al-Jibouri, SOMO pays between \$324 to \$347 per metric ton of gasoline imported into Iraq. ¹² Converted to dollars per gallon, the price paid by SOMO is between 90 and 98 cents per gallon. ¹³

According to Mr, Al-Jibouri, the specific price paid by SOMO depends on the source of the imported gasoline and its destination inside Iraq. The most expensive gasoline purchased by SOMO is the gasoline imported from Turkey and delivered to Baghdad. According to Mr. Al-Jibouri, "gasoline price from Turkey oost USD 347 per m. ton delivered to Baghdad which is about USD 0.98 per gallon." ¹⁴ The least expensive gasoline is gasoline imported from Kuwait and delivered to Basrah, which costs just 90 cents per gallon. Gasoline imported from Kuwait and delivered to Basrah, which costs yet gallon.

The enormous difference between the prices charged by Halliburton and the prices at which SOMO can import gasoline is not explained by differences in source countries, mode of transport, or delivery locations. In comparing the Halliburton imports to SOMO imports, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) confirmed that "[b]oth KBR and SOMO are bringing in

¹² Letter from Mohammed M. Al-Jibouri, General Manager, State Oil Marketing Organization, to Minority Staff, Committee on Government Reform (Oct. 16, 2003). Because SOMO does not have each to make these purchases, they enter into barter transactions to trade fuel oil for gasoline.

¹³ According to the Congressional Research Service, metric tons of gasoline can be converted into gallons by multiplying the number of metric tons by 8.53 to get the number of U.S. barrels and then multiplying this number by 42 to get the number of gallons. Memo from Lawrence Kumins, Congressional Research Service, to Minority Staff, Committee on Government Reform (Oct. 16, 2003).

¹⁴ Letter from Mohammed M. Al-Jibouri, supra note 12.

Lt. Gen. Robert B. Flowers October 21, 2003 Page 5

imports from Turkey and Kuwait." The CPA also confirmed that "KBR and SOMO fuel imports are generally being delivered to the same depots and distribution systems."

Although Halliburton has raised security concerns as a possible explanation for its higher prices, the CPA also confirmed that "[f]uel truck convoys are required to be escorted by coalition military forces regardless of ownership." Since the U.S. armed forces provide security for fuel convoys traveling through Iraq, this cost is being bome largely by the military, not Halliburton or SOMO.

Halliburton's actions are not simply a matter of past overcharging. The Administration has requested an additional \$2.1 billion in oil reconstruction funds for Iraq. The largest component of this supplemental is a request for \$900 million to import petroleum products. If Halliburton's overcharging for gasoline is not halted, between \$286 and \$339 million of this \$900 million could be needlessly wasted.¹⁷

The Use of U.N. Off for Food Funds

We have recently learned that a significant portion of the funds used to pay Halliburton's inflated prices for importing gasoline comes from the Development Fund for Iraq, which is the successor fund of the United Nations' humanitarian Oil for Food Program.

The Oil for Food Program was created to provide for the basic needs of Iraqis while U.N. sanctions were in effect against Iraq. After the end of the war, U.N. Security Council Resolution 1483 formally transferred control of the assets in the Oil for Food Program to the CPA and placed these assets in the Development Fund for Iraq. On May 28, 2003, the Development Fund received \$1 billion in assets from the Oil for Food Program.

¹⁵ E-mail from Office of Secretary of Defense to Minority Staff, Committee on Government Reform (Oct. 16, 2003) (attributing responses to Larry Rogers, Deputy for Program Management, Task Force RIO).

¹⁶ Td

¹⁷ The low-end figure presumes that Halliburton obtains the gasoline at the highest price available to SOMO and receives the minimal 2% fee on top of its reimbursed costs. The high end figure presumes that Halliburton obtains the gasoline at the lowest price available to SOMO and receives the maximum 7% fee.

¹⁸ Open Society Institute, Keeping Secrets: America and Iraq's Public Finances (Oct. 2003).

Lt. Gen. Robert B. Flowers October 21, 2003 Page 6

According to the Corps's website, \$600 million from the Development Fund has been used to pay Halliburton for importing fuel into Iraq through October 16. This raises significant issues about how the CPA is administering these funds. Money from the Development Fund was supposed to be used "in a transparent manner to meet the humanistrian needs of the Iraqi people ... and for other purposes benefiting the people of Iraq," not to enrich Halliburton. Misuse of these funds threatens to undermine U.S. afforts to convince our allies to help fund Iraqi reconstruction and likely will increase mistrust of the Administration among Iraqis.

Security Council Resolution 1483 also mandated the creation of an International Advisory and Monitoring Board (IAMB) to oversee Development Fund disbursements. The Board was to be comprised of four members representing the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the Arab Fund for Social and Economic Development. The IAMB was intended as "the primary vehicle for guaranteeing the transparency of the DFI and for ensuring that DFI funds are used properly." Five months later, however, the CPA has yet to establish the IAMB. Without an operational IAMB, there is no international auditor to ensure that Development Fund monies are being spent properly. Not surprisingly, potential donor countries are dissatisfied with the resulting lack of transparency and international involvement.

Although it initially appeared that Halliburton was gouging only American taxpayers, it now seems that the company is overcharging the humanitarian Oil for Food Program and the Iraqi people as well. This significantly compounds the implications of Halliburton's actions.

Requested Actions

In light of the evidence of Halliburton's overcharging outlined above, we request that the Army Corps of Engineers take three specific actions. First, we request that you conduct a joint investigation with the Defense Contract Audit Agency, the Defense Finance and Accounting Service, and the Defense Department Inspector General to determine what amounts Halliburton is paying for gasoline, what amounts it is paying for transportation, and why these amounts are so high.

¹⁹ U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, supra note 4.

²⁰ United Nations Security Council Resolution 1483 (May 22, 2003); Coalition Provisional Authority Regulation Number 2 (June 15, 2003).

²¹ United Nations Security Council Resolution 1483 (May 22, 2003).

²² Open Society Institute, supra note 18.

Lt. Gen. Robert B. Flowers October 21, 2003 Page 7

Second, if the results of this investigation confirm overcharging, we request that you seek reimbursements or refunds for any inflated amounts paid to Halliburton, including amounts overpaid by both U.S. taxpayers and the United Nations.

Third, if the results of the investigation confirm overcharging, we request that the Corps disqualify Halliburton from future oil reconstruction contracts in Iraq. The Corps has sought to address concerns about the manner in which Halliburton was awarded the no-bid oil infrastructure contract by splitting the contract into two competitively bid oil reconstruction contracts — one for northern Iraq and one for southern Iraq. According to estatements from the Corps, these new contracts could be awarded later this month. Halliburton should not be rewarded with either of the two new contracts if overcharging has in fact occurred.

We urge you to give this matter the high priority that it deserves.

Sincerely

Ranking Minority Member Committee on Government Reform

Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Energy and Commerce



COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY BAGHDAD

INFO MEMO

October 29, 2003

FOR:

THE ADMINISTRATOR

FROM:

Tom Foley - Director, Private Sector Development George Wolfe - Director, Economic Development

SUBJECT:

Iraqi Oil Trust

Several areas within CPA have considered and produced preliminary proposals for an Iraqi Oil Trust. We propose that these efforts be consolidated into a task team formed for that purpose. The task team would have the following responsibilities:

- By November 15 provide for your approval a rationale for an Oil Trust and a list
 of basic principals and objectives the Trust should satisfy. Following your
 approval these would be presented to the Governing Council for initial
 discussions.
- 2. By December 1 provide for your approval a final proposal for an Iraqi Oil Trust fulfilling the basic principals and objectives agreed to by you and including an order forming the trust and setting forth its structure, governance, and other critical features. Following your approval, the Trust and order would be presented to the Economic Committee of the Governing Council.
- 3. Be available after December 1 to respond to requests for information and other tasks associated with obtaining Governing Council and other interested party approval during the first quarter of 2004.

We propose the task team include at least the following people:



Rodney Bent Designee of Rob McKee

We propose the task team seek the input of the US Treasury and private sector experts. We propose the task team report jointly to the two of us and Marek Belka.



COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY BAGHDAD

ACTION MEMORANDUM

October 29, 2003

TO:

Administrator, CPA

FROM:

David R. Oliver

Program Review Board

SUBJECT: PI

PRB Allocation Request #37

The Program Review Board met on October 28, 2003 and voted on funding requests for programs in support of the CPA mission priorities. These requests were thoroughly vetted by the Program Review Committee prior to presentation to the Board. The Board recommends a total allocation of \$17,480,400 for the projects described below.

Summary of Proposed Allocation:

#541 - UN Oil for Food Authentication - \$8,800.000

Requestor: Ministry of Trade

The request is to fund the continuation of the authentication contract with Cotecna. UN Resolution 1483 mandated the transition of the Oil for Food program from the UN to the CPA on November 21, 2203 with the CPA appointing a third party to authenticate the arrival of OFF goods to Iraq. All suppliers of OFF goods are paid from escrow accounts created by Iraqi oil sales controlled by the UN in accordance of UNSCR 986. UNSCR 986 requires authentication to be performed by an independent Contractor that is approved by the UN Secretary General.

#539 – UN Oil for Food Shipment Security - \$7,680,400

Requestor: Ministry of Trade

The request is to fund a contract to provide convoy security of the UN Oil for Food shipments coming into Iraq for the next six months. Hijacking and theft from fraud during shipments from the borders into the country cities have been increasing. Presently CJTF-7 does not have sufficient resources to support additional security requirements beyond shipments for electricity and oil needs.

#540 - Emergency Spending Authority for CPA Chief of Staff - \$1,000,000 Requestor: CPA - Comptroller

The request authorizes the Chief of Staff of CPA to request funding directly from the Comptroller's office to support emergency needs for cash in support of CPA. No individual request shall exceed \$100K without PRB approval. The Chief of Staff will provide supporting documentation to the Comptroller for retention and documentation.

2 November 2003

Memorandum of Conversation

TO:

FILE

FROM:

L. Paul Bremer III

SUBJECT:

Meeting with Yukio Okamoto

Summary. Met with Yukio Okamoto, Special Advisor to Japanese PM Koizumi. Discussion focused on Japanese economic aid to Iraq, in particular the \$1.5B allocated for 2004 that must be spent by March 31, 2004 – the end of the Japanese fiscal year. Urged Mr. Okamoto to work directly with the Iraqi Minister of Electricity on a \$400M purchase of turbines for adding 1200 mgw by next summer. End Summary.

Economic Aid. Okamoto reviewed the Japanese aid package recently announced in Madrid. He confirmed that it will contain \$1.5B in the form of grants for 2004 (which must be spent by March 31). A "sizable portion" would go to the trust fund but a good deal would also become Japanese bilateral assistance. I mentioned that the trust fund would be set up by December but it would be slow and bureaucratic, making it impossible to spend Japanese funds by March 31. Okamoto stated that Japan would like to give money directly to the GC or the ministries. I strongly advised against giving the money directly to the GC as they have no capacity for managing expenditures. I emphasized that we are working to set up an Iraqi mechanism for coordinating inflows that will allow for political oversight by the GC, but no direct access to funds. It would most likely be housed in the Ministry of Planning (soon to be renamed "Ministry of Development Cooperation") and would be staffed with CPA personnel—which could include Japanese. I encouraged them to see Amb Belka and CIC staff on the details of the mechanism.


Power. Okamoto indicated that the Japanese plan to allocate \$400M of the package to the power sector. I briefed Okamoto on the Minister of Electricity's plan to purchase gas turbines costing roughly the same amount which would bring 1200 additional megawatts online in time for next summer. Given the urgency of power generation and the Japanese urgency to spend money by March 31, I urged Okamoto to see the Minister of Electricity during his visit and called the minister to pre-brief him. Okamoto agreed in principle, indicating only that it would have to be a Japanese producer of turbines.

Other sectors. On health, Okamoto indicated a willingness to spend about \$10M each on refurbishing two dozen Japanese hospitals in Iraq. I urged him to see the senior advisor for health immediately to organize needs assessments for the hospitals. On oil, I advised that \$1.2B would be allocated from the supplemental but that an additional \$800M would be needed to repair existing infrastructure in 2004 and that he should see Sr. Advisor Rob McKee during his visit. Okamoto also expressed Japanese interest in the cement (provision of industry advisors) and automobile sectors (for police cars and ambulances).

Self Defense Forces. Okamoto informed that 500-600 SDF would be deployed in early December to Muthanna Governorate for participation in a water purification project. Additionally the Japanese will proved C-130s to assist coalition air operations.







COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY BAGHDAD

INFO MEMO

November 3, 2003

FOR:

THE ADMINISTRATOR

FROM:

Tom Fole Director, Private Sector Development George Wolfe - Director, Economic Development

SUBJECT:

Iraqi Oil Trust

Several areas within CPA have considered and produced preliminary proposals for an Iraqi Oil Trust. We propose that these efforts be consolidated into a task team formed for that purpose. The task team would have the following responsibilities:

- By November 15 provide for your approval a rationale for an Oil Trust and a list
 of basic principals and objectives the Trust should satisfy. Following your
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- 3. Be available after December 1 to respond to requests for information and other tasks associated with obtaining Governing Council and other interested party approval during the first quarter of 2004.

We propose the task team include at least the following people:



Rodney Bent Designee of Rob McKee

We propose the task team seek the input of the US Treasury and private sector experts. We propose the task team report jointly to the two of us and Marek Belka.



I FO MEMO

November 11, 2003

FOR:

THE ADMINISTRATOR

FROM:

Ministry of Oil

THROUGH: Robert McKee

SUBJECT:

Providing Fuel Production for the Iraqi People

The Ministry of Oil, CPA Oil Directorate, and TF RIO face a daunting challenge to supply the Iraqi people's fuel needs (benzene, kerosene, diesel, and LPG). Benzene is used mainly for automobiles; kerosene for heating; diesel for commercial transport, agriculture, and power generation; and LPG for cooking and heating. Production from Iraq's refineries and imports must supply these fuels. Meeting demand is not the only goal, but another is building strategic inventories to combat shortages in the event of poor weather, reduced production, etc. The planned demand, production, and imports levels are shown below for the winter.

	Winter Demand	Planned Production	Planned Imports
Benzene	16	10.5	7
Kerosene	18	9	9
Diesel	17	13.5	4
LPG	5500	3000	3300

Note: Quantities listed are millions of liters per day, except for LPG which is tons per

Road Blocks: Anything reducing production or imports will hamper success; however, the major items are:

- 1. Pipeline operation: Sporadic pipeline operation due to sabotage, looting, and equipment failure has impacted refinery production. First, the crude supply to refineries has been affected by pipeline sabotage. This has reduced production of refined products especially at Daura refinery in Baghdad. Daura is remote from large oil fields and its crude supply is piped from the Kirkuk and Basra oil fields. Second, fuel oil and naphtha, other products of the refining process, are normally transported away from refineries via pipeline. With the pipelines damaged, the fuel oil and naphtha can only be trucked away, which is very inefficient and unresponsive. Supplies of fuel oil and naphtha at refineries have reached near maximum levels; therefore, production of these and all products has been reduced to match the rate the fuel oil and naphtha can be hauled away.
- 2. <u>Inefficient processing Dilapidated refineries</u>: Iraqi refineries suffer from decades of lack of needed investment and produce about 1/3 less of "light products" (benzene, kerosene, and diesel) from the same barrel of oil at an up-to-date refinery. Also, the Iraqi refineries are in need of a shut down to perform

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production capacity, and the pipeline capacity will be doubled when the Nasiryah pump station becomes operational.

- 3) Import Levels: Imports have just been increased and not yet had time to ramp up to the new levels.
- 4) <u>Port Efficiency/Capacity</u>: As the product and LPG pipelines become operational; the bottleneck for imports will shift to the port area. Efforts are focused to ensure the product availability via ship and the products will be efficiently moved from ship into pipeline and then north for distribution or storage.
- 5) <u>Security</u>: TF RIO is working with CJTF-7 to improve truck security in the North and increase the number of escorts in the South.
- 6) Import Sources: Imports come from Turkey and the south (ports and overland from Kuwait). Expanding the source of imports will expand the import capacity and reduce the impact of a problem with one source. There are limited imports from Jordan but since Jordan is petroleum poor, any exports to Iraq are imports into Jordan. CPA and Ministry of Oil are investigating imports from Iraq's other neighbors.
- 7) Enforce allocation and reduce consumption: To prevent over-consumption and build stocks, we are developing an IO campaign and are working to ensure that daily distributions to retail outlets are not exceeded.

ATTACHMENTS: NONE

COORDINATION: N/A

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COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY BAGHDAD

INFO MEMO

December 12, 2003 1100

FOR:

THE ADMINISTRATOR

FROM:

Rob McKee, CPA Oil Senior Advisor

VIA:

Keith Kellogg, Chief Operating Officer

SUBJECT:

Status of Fuel Contracts (KBR and DESC)

- 1) KBR negotiations with Al Tanmia for increasing the fuel imports from Kuwait are close to an impasse, which we are monitoring closely. The status of the negotiations is:
 - According to US Embassy Kuwait, Al Tanmia is the only authorized "sole source" for fuel from Kuwait. Al Tanmia is not experienced with contracts that must comply with US Federal Acquisition Regulations and this is particularly an issue in view of the recent KBR publicity.
 - The fuel price is competitive; however, the transportation cost is uncompetitive and is approximately 65% greater than other companies. (SOMO has recently entered negotiations with Al Tanmia and has encountered a similar price differential for fuel delivered to Baghdad as compared to its current suppliers from the Gulf. SOMO continues to be our best alternative for near-term supplies.)
 - KBR has requested a best and final offer which is needed if a sole source contract can be utilized. Al Tanmia requested and was given a letter of intent to purchase.
 - Al Tanmia has NOT responded with an offer.
 - Additional recent publicity, apparently inaccurate, surrounding the DCAA audit, has
 made the situation more problematical for KBR and has contributed to their conservative
 approach to the negotiations.
- DESC is moving to take over fuel contracts. However, DESC will probably not be rapid enough to have a significant impact and will also use limited competition contracts for a short period.
 - DESC previously:
 - 1) Sent a team to evaluate the current fuel contracts with KBR,
 - 2) Sent a single individual to observe the CJTF-7/TF RIO Fuel Distribution Team.
 - DESC currently has a single individual in Baghdad to make logistics preparations for a team to arrive in mid-January.

The DESC team arriving in mid-January plans to use 60-90 day sole source or limited competition bridge contracts until full and open source contracts are in place in mid-April. Mid-April fuel import requirements will be less than half of current requirements.

Note that CPA Oil and TF RIO are reviewing methods to gradually transfer all import purchasing and delivery to SOMO with a goal of having this complete end-April.

Mr. Ambassalan

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List



November 16, 2003

MEMORANDUM

To: Mr. Nabil Lamousa, Director General of Planning, Ministry of Oil

Through: Robert McKee

SUBJECT: Assisting the Ministry of Electricity with Fuel Planning

Dear Mr. Lamousa,

I would like to thank you and your associates at the Ministry of Oil for your assistance in our efforts to restore the power to Iraq to a stable, pre-war level. This pre-war goal has been achieved, but only meets about half of the country's actual electricity needs. As you know, we are now in a major effort to increase the level of power to provide the Iraqi citizens, businesses and industries with sufficient power to meet the needs of a growing economy over the coming years.

The first stage to increase power involves the work of USAID through their contractor Bechtel, and the US Army's Task Force Restore Iraqi Electricity (TF RIE). These entities have been interacting extensively with you in coordination with the Ministry of Electricity (ME) through the Fuel Task Force. I understand there has been some confusion as to points of contact, and in response Mr. Randy Richardson prepared the attached memo to Dr. Aiham Al-Sammarei, who agreed with the proposal contained therein.

The second stage involves \$5.56 Billion of funding for this sector, nearly \$3 billion of which will go to new generation. We recognize that MOO does not have the budget to build the fuel transmission infrastructure to the level needed to support this generation. Therefore, per my verbal request of a week ago, I kindly request that you assist us in the planning effort for this additional electrical capacity. The matrices attached are only slightly improved from those I gave you and your team last week. The questions I pose are the following, for each site or for multiple sites if they can be addressed with a single project: what is the fuel infrastructure for transmission and processing that would be needed to make the project possible, and approximately how much would that work cost?

Unfortunately, as with many things in this post-war reconstruction effort, we are on a highly accelerated timeframe. We need to have a rough idea on needs and costs by November 20th. The input you provide can certainly be very rough; the principle goal here is for us to convey the need to the US Congress and build in justifiable project components as early as possible. Once these projects are submitted, our Bearing Point consultants will be embarking on a Master Planning effort, and would very much enjoy a closer and high quality interaction with you as we move forward in this sector.

While Mr. Randy Richardson, the CPA Senior Advisor for Electricity is out of town, I will be the sole point of contact for the effort described above.

Kindest regards,




Deputy Senior Advisor - Electricity

Attachments:

- 1. Memorandum to the Minister of Electricity
- 2. Matrices on fuel needs for combustion turbines and steam power plants.

CC: Dr. Aiham Al-Sammarei, Minister of Electricity
Mr. Randall B Richardson, CPA Senior Advisor for Electricity
(b)(6)
TF RIO
Dr. Eymad Hussein Ali, Deputy to the Minister of Electricity
(b)(6)
TF RIO
(b)(6)
TF RIO



ACTION MEMO

DATE: 18 November 2003

FOR:

THE ADMINISTRATOR

FROM:

Rodney G. Bent, OMB

SUBJECT:

Supplemental Decisions

We need your guidance on several issues with respect to the supplemental. I've attached the latest version of our table, along with draft copies of the justification material we propose to send to CPA/Washington following your approval. This material would serve as the basis for seeking OMB apportionment of funding to CPA and subsequent notification to Congress.

Issue # 1: Move \$124 million in supplemental funding from the New Iraqi Army to the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps. The additional funding for the ICDC would enable it to stand up 36 battalions with 10 brigade headquarters. This number of battalions is double the original proposal in the supplemental, which had one battalion in each of the 18 governates. Our recommendation would decrease NIA funding from \$2.0 billion to \$1.876 billion and increase funding for the ICDC from \$76 million to \$200 million. We are working with CJTF to identify how we would revise the NIA requirements.

 Recommend moving \$124 million from the NIA to the ICDC to enable it to double its size to 36 battalions.

Approve:

Disapprove:

Approve with modification:

Issue #2: Move \$189 million in funding from the purchase of emergency supplies of refined petroleum products to (1) increase spending by \$168 million on democracy building activities and (2) increase spending by \$31 million on private sector development and banking system modernization. Given the proposed transfer of sovereignty by July 2004, we believe it important to spend additional funds on governance and other activities that will improve the odds of successful political and economic transition. At the moment, we are planning on spending \$550 million of DFI on refined petroleum imports, which should fill estimated requirements through the end of January. From February forward, the current estimate of additional needs for these imported products is approximately \$420 million through the end of the spring, by which time we hope domestic refining capacity will be available. As the supplemental includes \$690 million for purchases of these products, we may have more funding

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than needed. The supplemental specifies that we can only take 10% from any functional category, so we can only moved \$189 million from the \$1,890 million for oil infrastructure.

 Recommend moving \$189 million from emergency oil imports to increase spending on governance activities.

Approve:

Disapprove:

Approve with modification

Issue #3: Move \$10 million from the witness protection program and \$5 million from technical investigative methods to the reconstruction of detention facilities.

 Move \$15 million from the witness protection program and technical investigative methods to the reconstruction of detention facilities.

Approve:

Disapprove:

Approve with modification:

There are two issues of which you should be aware. First, AID is sending you a memo under separate cover in which it lays out what it believes are its spending requirements. Some of these requirements may possibly be accommodated within the increased amounts above for governance issues. Other spending requests would require us to create new categories with offsets from existing categories.

Second, there are some explicit spending requirements within the supplemental that will have to be accommodated within broad spending categories. As an example, "not less than" \$6 million shall be made available for administrative expenses of the Department of State Bureau of International Narcotics Control.

ATTACHMENTS: Table of FY 04 Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund Proposal

Program fact sheets

COORDINATION: Rob McKee, Senior Advisor to the Ministry of Oil

Scott Castle, Senior Advisor for Governance

Jerry Thompson, Senior Advisor to the Ministry of Security Affairs

Steve Casteel, Senior Advisor to the Ministry of the Interior Larry Rubini, Senior Advisor to the Ministry of Justice

Lewis Lucke, AID Mission Director

(b)(6) Congressional Affairs

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18 November 2003

H. E. Dr Ibrahim Bahr al-Uloum Minister of Oil

Subject: Capital Investment Budget for 2004

Thamir Ghadhban submitted a letter to CPA dated 9 November 2003 requesting the status of the Oil Ministry capital budget for 2004. Because of the importance of this subject, it is more appropriate that our response be directed to you.

Presently, the Ministry has no capital budget allocated for its sole control in 2004. As such, I want to take the time to explain to you just how we should proceed over the next couple of months.

The Supplemental that was signed by the President includes funding of \$1.2 billion for oil infrastructure projects and \$690 million for the purchase of petroleum products. These are US government appropriated funds, so they will be administered by the US Army Corps of Engineers or similar organization of the US government. The \$1.2 billion will be used to complete the remaining projects of the work plan agreed to last July as well as the new projects that have been identified for the USACE to administer, under the name of Task Force RIO.

In addition, there will be a need for additional oil infrastructure capital for the Ministry. How do we attain and manage this capital?

We had hoped that completion of a national petroleum regime and transition to the INOC structure would be further along by now, allowing for an efficiently-managed capital investment program among other things. Therefore, it is important to reiterate that I cannot support any additional funding until 1) a national petroleum regime is defined and published and 2) a national oil company is established and we are satisfied the appropriate management processes and financial controls are defined. Per our previous discussions, I know that you are supportive of these very important undertakings and intend to implement them this coming January, after consultation and guidance from CPA and the Governing Council.

If money is required prior to either of these two conditions being satisfied, all requests will have to be justified and presented to my office for review, and only emergency funding will be considered. If I agree, we would then seek approval from the Program

Review Board for each project. My feeling is that you and your Ministry would not be at all happy with this process.

However, when the two conditions ARE satisfied I intend to work with Ambassador Bremer to provide a capital budget which will be solely controlled and administered through INOC, without any day-to-day oversight by CPA. This is a significant step in our being able to return the oil business completely to Iraqi direction and control.

I would recommend you continue your planning such that the Ministry is prepared to submit a detailed capital budget for 2004 to CPA in January. Meanwhile, Task Force RIO will be working to complete its approved work program and mission separately from the capital budget discussed above.

Sincerely,

R.E. McKee Senior Advisor Iraqi Oil Ministry

Cc: Amb L. Paul Bremer



ho d

INFO MEMO

November 20, 2003

FOR:

THE ADMINISTRATOR

FROM:

Robert McKee, Senior Advisor, Ministry of Oil

SUBJECT:

Product Supply

The following summarizes some current issues and information related to supplying product to Iraqi consumers through the coming months.

A very high level summation of the supply problem is that, in total volumes, we are unable to manufacture and import enough products into the country on a day-to-day basis to cover basic consumption, let alone be able to build stocks. Therefore, our current days of stock gradually are being decreased. Our current mode is by necessity very reactionary, much like the Dutch boy sticking his thumb in the dike; however, it's a fact we're running out of short-term solutions. This situation exists because of several things – security of convoys, pipelines and repair crews; a buildup of refinery byproducts that are difficult to dispose of; border gridlocks; feedstock interruptions to the refineries; erratic electrical grid performance; and significant delays in returning some LPG and pipeline infrastructure to service.

We are working with CJTF7 to improve the security situation. It is apparent that the military and our Task Force Shield efforts need to be synchronized and that aerial surveillance and mobile patrols are critical to this improvement. Generals Gallinetti, Figgures and Davis are being very supportive of this effort and we meet again today to jointly work on the problem. One loose end is that Ambassador Kennedy has agreed to talk to our current Task Force Shield Commander's boss in the U.S. about extending here for us. This is critical at this particular stage of standing-up Task Force Shield and integrating/training the Erinys contractor.

The Turkish border gridlock can continue to be helped by getting assistance from the Turkish government. I would request that you officially ask their government to help us relieve the congestion on both sides of Habur Gate. It is important that we don't have thousands of trucks held up for days just to cross the border in either direction. Although Ambassador Kennedy raises good diplomatic and Kurd arguments against opening another route from Turkey through the NE corner of Syria, I believe if that route could be sanctioned by you, the U.S. and Turkey, it would at least help in the short-term.

At the current time, we prioritize the products in the following order: Kerosene (heating), LPG (heating), Diesel (lighting and other services) and Benzene (personal driving). For kerosene, we have stayed ahead of demand for the last 10 days and have begun to build stocks slightly. The same applies to LPG, and this situation should alleviate further as we get the

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remainder of the southern LPG manufacturing system up and running. In diesel, about 25% of the daily consumption is going into power plants that were forecast to be running on other fuel at this time, so it remains problematical. And in benzene, our days of stock are being depleted as we concentrate on kerosene and diesel. One significant thing in our favor is that the 14" product and the 14" LPG pipelines from the south are for the moment fully operational and we are able to move kerosene and diesel in one and LPG in the other all the way to Baghdad. This in turn relieves the stress on trucking, which we can then use more efficiently to move benzene and to transport residue away from the refineries. Therefore, what the challenge becomes is to keep the refineries and LPG plants running (security and electrical power are key components), repairing and protecting key product pipelines (security again) and moving even more volumes into the ports and across the borders (money, logistics and security).

I worry about the supply of benzene in the coming days. Already lines are beginning to form at stations in Baghdad and Mosul as people begin to hoard and the black marketeers begin to stock up. Should we consider raising the price of benzene across the board, or at least raising regular prices a small amount and premium by a lot larger amount? Benzene is not as crucial to survival through the winter and if we could help create a form of rationing by increased pricing, pressure would in turn be relieved on our other more important products.

Finally, a heads-up on the status of the Defense Energy Support Center (DESC). The DESC had a team here the last few days to review whether or not they would immediately take on the job of buying products and distributing them. As the team departed, they made a couple of points:

- If they take this job on, it's an order of magnitude larger than any individual mission they
 now undertake.
- They will not be briefing the 3-star who leads the DLA (Defense Logistics Agency), under which the DESC resides, until next week. Then, they will brief the Assistant Secretary of the Army two weeks from now. Only after that will a decision be made whether they will take the job.
- KBR did the job well KBR can do the job as well or better than they could do it no sense in undoing what's being done so well now (presume they're referring in these comments to logistical management, not actual product purchasing).
- The decision in two weeks could be, "Yes to both purchasing and logistics management," or "Yes to purchasing, but No to logistics management," or "No to both".

My concern is that time is flying and that by definition we'll not be able to get converted away from KBR in total or even partially for some time. I would like to see more of a sense of urgency to get them mobilized. However, they say that only the Secretary of Defense or the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs can actually order them to take on this job.

CC: Generals Jon Gallinetti, Andrew Figgures, Larry Davis; (b)(6)
Gary Vogler

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COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY						
	(b)(6)	XECUTIVE SECRETARIAT				
FROM:		DATE: 26-Nov-03				
FOR:	I	THE ADMINISTRATOR				
ORIGIN	ATOR:	Oil & Transport				
RE:		Responses to your two questions				

The questions you posed this morning on the 24 NOV 2003 memo, "Ministry of Transportation Issues Update" are answered in the following attachments from Rob McKee and Gordon Mott.

ATTACHMENTS:
Info Memo from (b)(6)

Railroad Advisor

Email Response from Rob McKee

Ministry of Transportation Issues Update with your notations

(Drafted by)



LPB HAS SEEN

INFO MEMO

November 26, 2003

FOR:

THE ADMINISTRATOR

FROM:

Gordon Mott, Principal Railroad Advisor

SUBJECT:

Italian Army Railway Battalion Support

Background: You asked for more information on the following entry from our weekly report:

Italian Railway Battalion: This specialized battalion is willing to provide support to the Railways in Iraq. They need to operate out of Nasiriyah, where the Italian Forces in Iraq are based. Correspondence took place to define the needs and what the Italians might be willing to offer, particularly after the Nasiriyah bombing on November 12, 2003.

Additional Information:

- The Italian Army's Railway Battalion has told us of its possible offer of support in performing emergency railway track repair work at An Nasiriyah.
- We are working with the Italian military to assess the offer and are currently awaiting further information from the Italians regarding their exact capabilities and the resources that they propose to deploy. Specific items requiring clarification include:
 - Personnel. How many troops are available for deployment? Would they be supervisors only or would they include people such as specialized equipment operators? For how long would they be deployed?
 - Equipment. Would they bring their own tools and equipment or would they require that the railway supply such? If equipment is to be leased, who would be expected to pay for it? If it is to be supplied by the railway, is it available?
 - Materials. Exactly what work would the Italian battalion do? What materials would be required? Is it available and who would pay for it?
 - Security Concerns. The Italians have stated that the work would need to be in the An Nasiriyah area, but at the same time that the work must be executed in "non-troubled spots." Does An Nasiriyah currently satisfy their security requirements?
- When additional information is received, we will make a recommendation as to whether the
 offer should be accepted.

COORDINATION: CJTF-7 (b)(6) — concurs (b)(6) CPA MOT – concurs

ATTACHMENTS: NONE

(b)(6)

Subject: Start Date: Why Would Iraq Export LPG to Turkey

Start Date: Due Date: Wednesday, November 26, 2003 Wednesday, November 26, 2003

Priority:

High

Status: Percent Complete: Not Started

Tatal Wards

0%

Total Work: Actual Work: 0 hours 0 hours

Owner:

McKee, Robert E. (SES)

Jerry-I don't know from where this report emanated. There are no plans to export any LPG out of Iraq. Rob McKee

Ambassador Bremer has a follow- question regarding your memo of 24 NOV 2003

The memo states that Turky will provide rail cars to support the export of LPG from Taji, Iraq to Turkey.

Bremer questions, "Why would we export LPG??"

If there is a brief response, please reply with an email to ExecSec that we can print out and highlight for the Ambassador.

If you want to serid a more detailed memo, the templates are available on the intranet.

Thanks - (b)(6)

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COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY

BAGHDAD

INFO MEMO

November 24, 2003 126

FOR:

THE ADMINISTRATOR

FROM:

John Gaughan, Acting Senior Advisor to the Iraqi Ministry of Transportation

SUBJECT:

Ministry of Transportation Issues Update

I. RAILROADS

Railroad Security. The IRR has been negotiating several security contracts with the
sheiks whose territory includes railroad lines. About ninety percent of the contracts have
been negotiated. Additionally improvements have been seen with citizens giving early
warnings and detecting IEDs in the Islandariyah area. Unfortunately, the Sheik from this
area was assassinated.

- Railroad Service Update. Two stant engines (switch engines) will arrive from Turkey
 by December 2, 2003 and this will be the first of six. The engines were purchased under
 an Oil for Food Protocol between Turkey and Iraq. Two Russian mainline locomotives
 are due to arrive in Iraq by the end of this year. This will be the first of thirty purchased
 under the UN Oil for Food Program.
- Iraq-Syria Rail Link. On November 22 the first passenger service train from Syria, originating at Allepo, arrived in Mosul and will run once a week.
- Baghdad Central Station Update. Work continues on the cleaning and minor refurbishing of the Central Railway Station in Baghdad which will greatly improve its appearance to the public. The station continues to process daily passenger trains to Basrah in the south and Al Qaim in the west.
- Fuel Trains for Northern Iraq. A delegation from the Turkish railroad and TPIC (Turkish Petroleum International Company) met with the IRR senior management in reference to shipping LPG from Taji, Iraq to Turkey. The outcome was positive and progress was made to support Iraq's reconstruction. Turkey will provide 39 LPG rail tank cars to support this operation and will gross the IRR \$12,000 per train and additionally provide revenue to the Ministry of Oil.

II. AVIATION

DHL Airbus Attack. The latest reports indicate that the DHL Airbus plane was fired on
by two surface to air missiles (SAM's) during the planes takeoff. One missile allegedly
struck the left wing, and caused a fire. The crew brought the plane in for an emergency
landing. The CPA Ministry of Transportation has persuaded the air companies from
abruptly deciding to cease operations and pull out of Iraq. Currently maintaining constant

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contact with the civil air carriers to make sure that they are informed. We expect the DHL plane will be moved to a proper location by the end of Tuesday.

- Source Selection Board for the Air Navigation System (ANS). The selection process has been completed. The results will be announced after final review. The Air Navigation System will allow for the expansion of civil aviation in Iraq.
- Commercial Cargo Operations at BIAP. The CPA aviation team, along with Skyline, has developed a readiness plan for increasing commercial cargo operations at BIAP. Additionally, CPA Ministry of Transportation personnel traveled to Amman for preliminary discussions with several carriers for the purpose of expanding commercial air cargo capability to Iraq. Initial discussions were focused around the availability of appropriate afteraft and optimal security. Follow up discussions are scheduled for Nov. 26th.in Amman. The demand for cargo service is expected to grow exponentially in the coming months due to the goods and equipment coming into Iraq as a result of the U.S. supplemental budget, in addition to shipping requirements as a result of the Madrid Donor's Conference. Plans are to provide an additional 3 cargo flights a day for a total of up to 21 possible flights per week. These flights are in addition to the current government contracted operations with DHL and FedEx.
- Hajj Flights. The CPA Ministry of Transportation, in coordination with CJTF-7 and the Ministry of Interior, will be conducting an assessment of several airports to assess the viability of conducting Hajj flights from Iraq to Mecca. The assessment will take into consideration the technical, logistic, political and security considerations. Several carriers are currently being evaluated to conduct the Hajj flights including Royal Jordanian who is already following protocols for passenger flights into BIAP and Boeing who could wet lease planes for the Hajj (includes flight crews) as well as a third regional carrier. The anticipated demand for air service for the Hajj is expected to be 6,000 to 10,000 passengers or 50 flights. The report will be completed on November 28, 2003.

III. MARITIME

- Routine Port Operations Update. The operating conditions continue to improve in the
 port. Humanitarian cargoes continue to be off loaded, most recently rice and sugar. The
 ferries from Dubai continue their regular port calls. The container vessel BELUGA
 INSPIRATION is currently unable to unload due to a failure to pay port charges. Her
 cargo contains many OFF shipments. This delay is sure to be raised by officials as an
 indication of problems within the port but is a commercial dispute that will be resolved
 between the parties.
- Clearing Wrecks from the Umm Qasr Port and the surrounding waterways. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) salvage contract has been 'turned over' to CPA with the expiration on the UN mandated Oil for Food program. The practical consequences of this are being investigated. There continues to be friction between the UNDP team and the IPA over the terms of the salvage contract.
- New Grain Silo Operational. The M/V DISCO VOLANTE is currently moored at the silo and is unloading. There continues to be concerns expressed by them over the lack of fuel for the generators to power the silo. This second offload is behind schedule due to the

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overly optimistic sailing schedule put in place by the UN. The third vessel originally scheduled for the silo has been diverted to Aqaba due to the over-scheduling.

- Customs Service at Umm Qasr Port. The CPA MOT maritime team met with the CPA
 MOI customs officials to discuss the 'way ahead' in Umm Qasr. CPA MOI indicates that
 they plan to locate the Regional Customs Office in Umm Qasr and that will provide
 uniforms, equipment and weapons for the new Iraqi customs agents assigned to Umm
 Qasr.
- Port Security. The SSA contracted Gurkha guard force is deployed to both the new and old port areas. The port badging system is in operation to control access to the port. All vehicles and trucks are inspected upon entry and exit from the port complex. Intruders are routinely arrested and turned over to the local Iraqi police officials. There is concern that with the re-location of the UK Forces National Support Element (NSE) from Umm Qasr in late December/early January there will be a decrease in the 'military deterrence' presence in the region. SSA is discussing the situation with UK forces locally. CMATT is discussing a security contract for their personnel being assigned to Umm Qasr to oversee the construction of the new Iraq Coastal Defense Force base at Berth 1 in the Old Port {subject to a final, national level, decision of the use of the berth for the ICDF rather than OFF shipments or other uses}.
- Military Rail Service at the Port. The U.S. military continues to transfer cargo
 containers from trucks to empty railroad flat cars for routing throughout Iraq. This
 process is commonly referred to as 'building' military sustainer rail container unit
 trains.[Nothing new to report]
- Oil for Food (OFF) Shipments to the Port. With the withdrawal of United Nations representatives from Iraq, the UN's port authentication contractor (COTECNA) has also withdrawn its operations to Dubai. As a result, verification of OFF shipment arrivals is being done by CPA officials in the port. Approximately 1,500 OFF shipments are expected to pass through the port. The CPA MOT maritime team has verified/certified all OFF shipments for which it has complete documentation. The team certified the off load of the 52,500 MTs of Australian wheat from the M/V BANASTAR (done by draught survey). CPA is currently monitoring the offload of the M/V DISCO VOLANTE.

IV. ITALIAN MASTER PLAN

- Ministry of Transport On November 19th the Italian team had a meeting with the
 Minister Behnam in which they discussed the National transport situation outlining
 possible development scenarios and priorities. Specific details have been faced
 concerning the railway situation and project priorities.
- Danish Component: Denmark has pledged 350,000 €. It was agreed that the Danish component will complement the main Master Plan ongoing with Italian funding and that it will deal with: a) the Master Plan of Marine Ports; b) the Feasibility Study on the resumption of river navigation; c) a Road Pavement Management System. A second version of the Terms of Reference has been received during the period. A revised version has been sent back and all comments were judged relevant by the Danish authorities.

Italian Railway Battalion: this specialized battalion is willing to provide support to the Railways in Iraq. They need to operate out of Nasiriyah, where the Italian Forces in Iraq

unclassified,

are based. Correspondence took place to define the needs and what the Italians might be willing to offer, particularly after the Nasiriyah bombing on November 12, 2003.

Meteorology: Italy has indicated interest to provide funding for an emergency re-start of
the sector with state-of-the-art equipment. Two packages have been identified, valued
respectively: a) 1.47 m€ and b) 6.6 m€. Negotiations are ongoing in Rome on the total
amount which might be assigned to meteorology versus other sectors.

V. SURFACE

The Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA) has offered to provide the Iraqi
Ministry of Transportation with multiple 45-person passenger busses worth an estimated
\$3 million. The offer will be discussed with the Ministry of Transportation in the coming
weeks.

VI. SECURITY

- CPA Badges. In an effort to ensure that the CPA Ministry of Transportation tightly
 controls the approval of CPA badges, our staff is reviewing the list of individuals (i.e.,
 government, military personnel, contractors and Iraqi personnel) who have been issued
 CPA badges.
- Better Vetting System Needed. The Ministry of Transportation vetting system for Iraqi
 personnel is currently assessed as inadequate. Improvements, such as the use of a
 National Crime Information System (NCIC) are currently under consideration. Vetting
 software, training and other vetting related issues will be coordinated with Ministry of
 Interior and military representatives as appropriate.

ATTACHMENTS: NONE

COORDINATION: Department Heads

Drafted: (b)(6) (b)(2)

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031210-41 366 Action

INFO MEMO

December 10, 2003

FOR:

THE ADMINISTRATOR

FROM:

(b)(6)

CPA Senior Advisor for Trade

SUBJECT: Update on Iraqi delegation's discussion with WTO officials

An Iraqi delegation led by Fakhrldin Rashan, Deputy Minister of Trade, visited with the World Trade Organization's (WTO) Director General Supachia and other WTO officials in Geneva on December 4th and 5th. The focus of the meetings was Iraq's interest in applying for WTO observer status. Other issues addressed included potential challenges with Iraq's application and technical assistance. The overall view of most officials was extremely positive and supportive of Iraq's interest (with the slight exception of the EU.)

The officials agreed with Iraq's plans to submit a letter of application for WTO observer status in early January (then proceed with preparing for application for WTO accession sometime after July 2004.) This would permit the issue to be included as an agenda item for the mid-February General Council meeting. Most officials indicated that Iraq's success at obtaining observer status depended upon Iraq's efforts to lay the groundwork for WTO member support prior to the issue being raised at a WTO General Council Committee meeting. If that work is done, most officials predicted a successful outcome for Iraq at the February meeting. The groundwork would include confirming the support of key WTO members including Arab neighbors and the EU via visits in Geneva and relevant capitols. Some of these members may try to use Iraq's application as leverage to boost support for other entities that have not been able to obtain observer status including Iran, Syria, and Libya and of less concern-the Arab League.

As a signator to the Havana Convention in 1947, Iraq had previously been an observer to the WTO's predecessor, the GATT. This should enhance Irag's efforts to gain observer status now.

Highlights from Select Meetings

Director General Supachai expressed his full support and admiration for Iraq's interest in applying for WTO observer status. He indicated that Iraq's application should be approved without incident unless a member tried to use Iraq to promote other interests, like Iran. Supachai stressed the important role the Arab Group played in the WTO and urged the Iraqis to meet with the Group and individual Arab countries. He also stressed the importance of technical assistance from reputable organizations like the WTO and the Arab IMF.

WTO Accessions Division Director Arif Hussein enthusiastically supported Iraq's interest in WTO observership, stressing the importance of strategically calibrating the application as politics at times interfered with the trade function of the organization. Technically the process is simple, an application letter and supportive paper on Iraq's trade regime, economic development plan, WTO observership expectations and Iraq's presence in Geneva is submitted to the Director General. The Chairman of the General Council then consults with member countries and determines if the application should be placed on the agenda for the next General Council meeting. If cleared the issue is raised at the meeting and a senior representative for the country (in this case most likely Minister Allawi) would be there to accept the approval for WTO observer status. Hussein stressed the importance of meeting with member countries, ensuring WTO compliant laws and regulations, a strong diplomatic presence in Geneva and participating in technical assistance programs (note: Hussein and others were critical of UNCTAD's WTO related programs, though some other programs particularly those focused on investment are reputable.)

Jordan Ambassador expressed strong support for Iraq's interest in the WTO and offered to provide advocacy support with other Arab countries, advisory assistance and technical assistance. The Ambassador hosted a luncheon meeting for the Iraqi delegation and the Arab Group on Saturday, December 6th.

A Japanese Ambassador Oshima offered Iraq Japan's full support including technical assistance (note: Oshima is rumored to become Chairman of the WTO General Council in February.)

<u>UK Minister Neil McMillan</u> offered Iraq Britain's full support including assistance with the process. He suggested that the two work together throughout the WTO observership application process and beyond to ensure that any potential roadblocks (i.e. Iran, the Arab League or the EU) are addressed.

EU Deputy Chief of Delegation Peter Thompson queried the delegation on the views of other WTO officials regarding Iraq's interest in WTO observership. He was particularly interested in the delegation's discussions with other Arab countries and the Secretariat. Thompson indicated he was not in a position to offer the EU's support until member countries are consulted. He indicated that before providing support, the EU would need answers on Iraq's governance (prospects for democracy) and trade regime (including IPR, standards.) He also expressed the EU's potential concerns with other entities interest in participating in the WTO including Irah (the EU has supported Iran's application and some members have economic ties with the country) Syria, and Libya (not concerned with the Arab League.)

Next Steps

To support Iraq's interest in participating in the WTO I recommend that the following steps be implemented as soon as possible.

1. Enhance Iraq's presence in Geneva by January 15th. Ensure that officials linked to the previous regime are removed from office. Increase the number and rank of staff. A high-level, seasoned trade diplomat (someone of Rashan's caliber) should be appointed as Iraq's Ambassador to Geneva. In addition, at least one other trade official should be placed in Geneva. Consider refurbishing Iraq's Mission in Geneva as it is small, dirty

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- and dated. There is an Ambassador's residence there which reportedly is on the lake and impressive.
- 2. Continue to gain the support of WTO members, particularly Arab countries and the EU, by encouraging high-level Iraqi visits to these countries over the next month. Rashan plans to accept invitations to meet with officials and business groups in Germany and France as well as meet with the EU in Brussels.
- 3. Create inter-ministerial cabinet and deputy-minister level groups by January 5th. I recommend that the cabinet level group be chaired by Trade Minister Allawi. Other members should include Foreign Affairs, Interior, Finance, Industry, Agriculture, Oil, Planning and Standards. The CPA advisors should support the Iraqi led effort.
- 4. Complete draft "Overview of the Economic Policy and Foreign Trade Regime of the Republic of Iraq" by January 10th. (b)(6) can assist Rashan with this effort.
- 5. Develop and implement multi and bi-lateral technical assistance programs. This should include sending promising Iraqi staff to Geneva for WTO sponsored training programs, participating in Arab IMF programs, and developing Iraq specific programs with reputable sponsors (i.e. WTO, US, UK, Australia, and Japan.)
- 6. Send an Iraqi delegation to Geneva to submit the letter of application for WTO observer status from Minister Allawi to DG Supachai by January 15th. Then if the application is accepted as expected, the issue would be raised at the General Council meeting in mid-February and Minister Allawi should be present to accept.

Other meetings included US Ambassador Linnet Deily, Australian Ambassador Spencer, Polish Ambassador Jakubowsk, WTO Deputy Director Rufus Yerxa, and the UN Conference on Trade and Development (separate report to follow.) The Iraqi delegation also met with the Ambassadors for Kuwait and Egypt as well as the Arab Group.

Delegation Members

Ministry of Trade: Deputy Minister Fakhrldin Rashan, DG for Private Sector Development Abdul Hadi Abid, Director Abdul Salma Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Ahmed Jewad CPA Senior Advisor for Trade (b)(6)

cc: Amb Greenstock
Amb Jones
Tom Foley
Rodney Bent
Marek Belka
Rob McKee
(b)(6)

Steve Casteel

(b)(6)



- ADMINISTRATOR

 ADMINISTRATOR

 December 12, 2003 1100

 Anny from I work to the process of the process of the negotiations with Al Tanmia is not experienced with contracts that mount us Federal Acquisition Regulations and this is particularly an KBR publicity.

 The fuel price is competitive; however approximately 65% greater the negotiations with Al Tanmia is not experienced with a particularly and the process of the negotiations with Al Tanmia is particularly and the process of the negotiations with Al Tanmia is particularly and the fuel price is competitive; however approximately 65% greater the negotiations with Al Tanmia is the only authorized to Process of the negotiations with Al Tanmia is particularly and the fuel price is competitive; however approximately 65% greater the negotiations with Al Tanmia is the only authorized to Process of the negotiations with Al Tanmia is particularly and the process of the negotiations with Al Tanmia is the only authorized the process of the negotiations with Al Tanmia is particularly and the process of the negotiations with Al Tanmia is the only authorized "sole sour fuel price is competitive; however approximately 65% greater the negotiations with Al Tanmia is the only authorized "sole sour fuel price is competitive; however approximately 65% greater the negotiations with Al Tanmia is the only authorized "sole sour fuel price is competitive; however approximately 65% greater the negotiations with Al Tanmia is the only authorized the process of the negotiation and the process of the negotiat continues to be our best alternative for near-term supplies.)
 - KBR has requested a best and final offer which is needed if a sole source contract can be utilized. Al Tanmia requested and was given a letter of intent to purchase.
 - Al Tanmia has NOT responded with an offer.
 - Additional recent publicity, apparently inaccurate, surrounding the DCAA audit, has made the situation more problematical for KBR and has contributed to their conservative approach to the negotiations.
 - DESC is moving to take over fuel contracts. However, DESC will probably not be rapid enough to have a significant impact and will also use limited competition contracts for a short period.
 - DESC previously:
 - 1) Sent a team to evaluate the current fuel contracts with KBR,
 - 2) Sent a single individual to observe the CJTF-7/TF RIO Fuel Distribution Team.
 - DESC currently has a single individual in Baghdad to make logistics preparations for a team to arrive in mid-January.

 The DESC team arriving in mid-January plans to use 60-90 day sole source or limited competition bridge contracts until full and open source contracts are in place in mid-April. Mid-April fuel import requirements will be less than half of current requirements.

Note that CPA Oil and TF RIO are reviewing methods to gradually transfer all import purchasing and delivery to SOMO with a goal of having this complete end-April.

Mr. Ambasiana Peconiment you come sendet and say a Mr. January annual is to lare. Annual of Mr. January annual is to lare. Annual of Some of January for min January bridge Continuing - or, I premise, exclin.



LPR HAS SEEN

December 17, 2003

To:

The Administrator


From:

Ministry of Oil (Erik Nelson)

Subject:

Main Report Submission for Oil

Oil Infrastructure



Project Code 50000: Infrastructure (Robert McKee)

The Iraqi Oil Infrastructure was damaged in the beginning of the war and extensively looted soon afterwards. Oil is the most abundant natural resource in Iraq, and thus the mainstay of the Iraqi economy. It is extremely important that the capabilities of this sector be restored quickly to sustainable levels of production. Oil Infrastructure Restoration is unique in that it is the only sector in which every dollar invested, either directly or indirectly, provides a growing return on investment in the tangible form of direct revenue to the Iraqi people for future reconstruction.

The coalition has assisted the Iraq Ministry of Oil in making progress towards reestablishing pre-war production levels. However, more must be done to lay the foundation for the national economic recovery, and to ensure that Iraq has the revenue for a self-sustaining government. Factors that must be addressed include continued repair of war damage and repair of looting damage. At the same time, continued terrorist sabotage activity is hampering progress. The funds requested will be used to repair the infrastructure, counter the terrorist threat to protect the current investments, and to compensate for the losses that are a direct result of previous successful terrorist attacks. Once production has stabilized, funds will then be used to continue to improve the Iraqi petroleum production systems with the ultimate goal of restoring pre-war production levels.

FUNDS (US Fiscal Year)	1 st Quarter	2 nd Quarter	3 rd Quarter	4 ^{fa} Quarter
Appropriated	\$373M	\$827M	0	0

2003	2004	2005	
\$222M	0	0	
\$78M	0	0	
	\$222M	\$222M 0	

Category	Projected Spending	Projected Start Date	
Construction			
Initial Mobilization	\$50M	December, 2003	
Actual Construction	\$759M	February, 2004	
Procurement	\$323M	December, 2003	
Security	\$68M	February, 2004	
Total	\$1,200M	•	

NOTE: See attached project descriptions for details.

Oil Infrastructure Restoration projects fall generally into three categories: Construction, Procurement, and Security. All three categories, while distinct, complement and support each other in order to meet the goals of Public Law (PL) 108-106, to provide "security, relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction in Iraq[.]"

Security, one of the specific purposes stated in PL 108-106, is required to protect the current infrastructure, provide a safe working environment, and preserve the gains that are made in the restoration. This will be accomplished through the use of mainly Iraqi guard forces throughout the nation at key infrastructure locations.

Procurement of equipment will enable the Iraqi Ministry of Oil and its subordinate operating companies to rehabilitate the currently operational infrastructure, and to begin

reconstruction of that which was damaged or destroyed. Procurement also includes petroleum product imports intended to avert a humanitarian crisis while the production infrastructure is brought to the point where it can keep pace with national consumption. To use the terms in PL 108-106, this will provide "relief" to the Iraqi people.

Given a secure environment to work in, the confidence that the work done will not be undone by criminal acts, and the tools to actually do the work, the final piece—
Construction—will be the part which can mostly easily be shown to be a direct investment in the future of Iraq. Rehabilitation and restoration of the oil production and oil products production infrastructure is the only portion of the entire American investment that can be shown to have a direct, quantifiable rate of return, serving to restore to prewar conditions the main marketable resource on which the Iraqi economy is based.

The plurality of the supplemental funding will go towards procurement, both for equipment and for humanitarian fuel imports (next sub-section) that are necessary until the petroleum product production infrastructure is able to keep up with domestic demand. Construction makes up the second-largest component and security the third, although these expenditures are closely related. A more secure environment will reduce costs associated with construction, and at the same time, higher-than-normal construction costs which are due to the expense of operating in the environment as it exists today, are likely to be reduced.

o The US Army Corps of Engineers is the executive agency for these projects

The next step in this project is to procure equipment required by the Ministry of Oil and its subordinate companies for the efficient operation, maintenance, and repair of the Iraqi Oil Infrastructure. Most equipment was rendered inoperable by looting (or was stolen) during or after the war. What little equipment that was recovered required significant repairs and has a severely limited remaining operating life. This list has been extensively coordinated with the Ministry of Oil, and detailed equipment specifications are completed and awaiting funding.

First quarter funds will also be used to award two follow-on construction contracts to allow contractors to mobilize and begin other initial preparations.

It is important to note that the funds in this supplemental are being used not to start new programs, but to continue the ongoing mission to Restore the Iraqi Oil infrastructure. Ongoing projects are being closely managed to ensure efficient use of funds. This process causes fluctuations in the scope of future projects, as progress brings new needs to light, and causes other requirements to drop in priority. As such, we require flexibility in making final adjustments to the projects undertaken with these funds.

Oil is the most abundant natural resource in Iraq, and thus the mainstay of the Iraqi economy. Speedy recovery of the oil infrastructure will provide the means for a speedy recover of all other Iraqi infrastructure and will allow the Iraqi economy to sustain itself without outside assistance. Success will be measured by increased exports of crude by at least 20%, and decreased petroleum product imports by at least 10%. With weekly income from crude exports topping \$200 million, and weekly outlay for imports averaging \$40 million, income will increase by \$40 million, and outlays will decrease by \$4 million, for a net of \$44 million weekly. Bottom line: this investment will pay for itself in approximately six months, reinforcing the statement that expenditures in this sector are a measurable investment in the future of Iraq.

Project Code 51000 Emergency Supplies of refined petroleum (Robert McKee)

War damage, looting, poor maintenance, and sabotage have cause interruptions to the flow of crude to the refineries. Difficulties due to outdated technology and poor maintenance at the refineries themselves, and interruptions to the flow of refined product to the cities, have created the need to import more petroleum products than originally projected. The main products required are Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG), used for cooking; kerosene, used for heating in the winter months; benzene, for auto fuel; and diesel, to fuel larger equipment and power generation. Failure to provide any of these will directly affect the quality of life of the average Iraqi citizen.

FUNDS (US Fiscal Year)	1 st Quarter	2 nd Quarter	3 rd Quarter	4 th Quarter
Appropriated	0	400	190	100

FUNDS	2003	2004	2005
Development Fund for Iraq	803	325	0

Funds will be used to cover the difference between Iraqi demand and refinery production, and to establish and maintain a 30-day reserve in all major products to ensure no interruptions in basic services due to future terrorist activity. \$400 million will be needed in the first quarter to compensate for the large difference between demand and production, and to build the 30-day reserve. \$290 million will be required for the remainder of the fiscal year to compensate for continued production shortfalls while maintaining the reserve.

o Defense Energy Support Center is assuming responsibility for this mission from the current executor, the US Army Corps of Engineers.

The aim of this project is to cover the difference between Iraqi demand and refinery production, and to establish and maintain a 30-day reserve in all major products to ensure no interruptions in basic services due to future terrorist activity. Success will be measured by the achievement and maintenance of a 30-day reserve of refined petroleum products.



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ACTION MEMORANDUM

December 30, 2003

FOR:

THE ADMINISTRATOR

FROM:

(b)(6)

SUBJECT:

PRB Allocation Request #50 Correction

Correction: PRB#588 - Police Equipment for the City of Samarra - \$1,150,732 was approved by the Board. However, the PRB Allocation Request indicated that it was part of Rapid Regional Response Program instead of a stand alone PRB.

The Program Review Board met on December 14, 2003 and voted on funding requests for programs in support of the CPA mission priorities. The requests were thoroughly vetted by the Program Review Committee prior to presentation to the Board. The Board recommends a total allocation of \$118,669,192 for the projects described below.

Summary of Proposed Allocation:

#585 - Rapid Regional Response Program Replenishment - \$80,000,000 Requestor: (b)(6) CPA- Regional Program Manager

The request is to replenish the Rapid Regional Response Program

#581 - DeMining - \$20.000,000

Requestor: (b)(6) CPA- Ministry of Oil

This request is to fund the removal of mines in the Al Rumaylah North Oil Field. Task Force RIO removed mines around the oil wells that needed immediate emergency repair. Additional mines have to be removed for repair and maintenance work will have to be done on the rest areas in the oil field.

#579 – Pilot Agricultural Credit Scheme - \$10,000,000 Requestor: (b)(6) CPA – South

This request is to the provide funds for an agricultural credit scheme that will be affordable and accessible to the farming and agricultural trade sectors. It is planned that the facilitation of the funds to the farmers and other borrowers will be done by the banks, for a small management fee retained from the interest charge on loans. Monies will be retained by CPA -South in a dedicated bank account. Farmers and traders will be expected to repay their loans on crop harvest or delivery of outputs to the market. Expected recovery rate will be 90-96%.

#584 - Al Muthanna Cement Factory - \$4,500,000

Requestor: (b)(6) CPA - South

This request is to fund the purchase of heavy excavating and transport equipment needed to operate the limestone and clay quarries near the cement plant. The plant is currently using the materials from the quarries that were excavated prior to the war. The Board recommends that this request be approved as a loan guarantee.

#566 - Micro/SME Loan in Sunni Region - \$2,250,000

Requestor: Thomas C Foley, CPA - Private Sector Development Office

This request is to provide funds for the immediate loan funding for micro and small to medium enterprises in Al-Anbar, Diyala, and Salah ad-Din. This program will advance the creation of jobs, improvement of economic infrastructure and generate good will.

#588— Police Equipment for the City of Samarra - \$1,150,732 Requestor: (b)(6) CPA - North

This request is to fund necessary equipment for the new police force being formed in Samarra. A new force is being reformed because persistent problems in the city. The new equipment will allow the police to communicate and travel to trouble spots. Radios, vehicles and uniforms will be purchase with these funds.

#573 - Ministry of Water Resources Facility Protection Services - \$503,412 Requestor: (b)(6) Ministry of Water Resources

This request is to fund the salaries for the Facility Protection Service for the last two months of 2003 and provide uniforms and jackets. The salaries for the prior months were paid from the ministry's Goods and Services account. The ministry's account been depleted.

#582 – SOMO Audit - \$120,000 Requestor:(b)(6) Ministry of Oil

This request is to fund an audit of the State Oil Marketing Organization (SOMO). An audit will be conducted by an independent public accounting firm to ensure that export sales of petroleum and petroleum products are consistent with prevailing international market best practices. The SOW will include reviewing internal controls systems, advising on best practices and reviewing measures to help detect fraud

#589 – Indemnity Benefit - \$100,000 Requestor: (b)(6) CPA - Baghdad

This request is to provide the family of the Vice Mayor of Baghdad, Faris Abduk Razzaq Khattar al-Asan, who was assassinated in October, 2003. In recognition of his service to the cause of freedom in Iraq and his courage and leadership with the Coalition

#586 - Oil SME - \$42,048

Requestor: Robert McKee, Ministry of Oil

This is to fund a contract with Native American Industrial Distributors to provide a Subject Material Expert (SME) who is an expert with Iraqi oil trading. The SME will

visit the SOMO headquarters and assess their trading practices, whether they are up to proper, modern standards that ensure clean practices and transparency.

#587 - Government of Iraq - \$3,000

Requestor: (b)(6) CPA – Facility Manager

This Request is for additional funds to the contract approved and funded with PRB#562. The funds will pay for the needed power outlets for the computer rooms that were not included in PRB#562.

Under the authority you have delegated to the Board under the Rapid Regional Response Program, on December 14, the Board approved two projects (Attachment 2).

#561 - Public Safety Equipment - \$6,900,700

Requestor: (b)(6) CPA – South Central

This request is to fund the purchase of equipment (Police cars, Border Patrol pickup trucks, Riot Gear and Dispatch Center) to the police and border patrol in the CPA — South Central region. This project will allow the police force to be more mobile to respond to calls for service.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

The Administrator approves the attached Allocation Request #50 by signing Attachment 1 at the tab.

ATTACHMENTS: One Spreadsheet

Allocation Req # 50 Correction PRB

15-Dec-03

PRB Name	Governorate	CPA Office	Funding Src	Program	Amt Romd In	Budget
585 Rapid Regional Response Program Replenishmen	Various	Program Review Board	DFI	_	\$80,000,000	No
581 Demining	Various	Ministry of Oil	DFI		\$20,000,000	No
579 Pilot Agricultural Credit Scheme	Al Basrah	CPA South	DFI		\$10,000,000	No
584 Al Muthanna Cement Factory	Al Muthanna	CPA South	DFI (Loan Guarantee)	1	\$4,500, 000	No
566 Micro/SME Loans in Sunni Region	Al anbar	Private Section Development	DFI		\$2,250,000	No
588 Police Equipment for the City of Samarra	Salah Ad Din	CPA North	DFI		\$1,150,732	No
573 Ministry of Water Resources FPS	Various	Ministry of Water Resources	DFI		\$503 ,412	No
582 SOMO Audit	Baghdad	Ministry of Oil	DFI		\$120,000	No
589 Indemnity Benefit	Baghdad	Baghdad Central	Vested		\$100,000	No
586 Oil SME	Various	Ministry of Oil	DFI		\$42,048	No
587 Government of Iraq Building	Baghdad	Facility Management	DFI		\$3,000	No

Total Amt

Rcmd \$118,669,192

Annroyed:

V. PAUL BREMER CPA Administrator

Allocation Req # 50 Correction PRB Rapid Regional Response Program 15-Dec-03

PRB Name	Governorate	CPA Office	Funding SRC	Program	Authority Approved	In Budget
561 Public Safety Equipment	Various	CPA South Central	DFI	R3P	\$6,900,700	Yes
				Total Authority Approved	\$6,900,700	1

Man (213010)



INFO MEMO

January 29, 2004

FOR:

THE ADMINISTRATOR

FROM:

Thomas C. Foley, Director, Private Sector Development

SUBJECT:

Update for Meeting with Minister of Oil

In preparation for your upcoming Meeting with the Minister of Oil, we offer the following update and suggested discussion points:

Background: Tom Foley and (b)(6) met with Minister Al-Uloum on Thursday, January 15, 2004 to discuss fuel price adjustments. Minister Al-Uloum said he had a task force that was preparing a comprehensive recommendation on energy subsidy reform that would be completed within three weeks (Thursday, February 5). Tom and (b)(6) asked if they could contribute to the task force's effort, but the Minister declined saying that CPA input would be more appropriate after receiving the task force's recommendation. Tom and (b)(6) said they would provide to him, for the task force's use, a set of energy subsidy reform recommendations that were put together by an outside source. These recommendations were the product of the CPA energy subsidy reform task force, but have been recast so as not to appear as a CPA recommendation. This document was given to Rob McKee to give to the Minister at your upcoming meeting.

where ?

As an aside at the close of the meeting two weeks ago, Tom and (b)(6) brought up the idea of an oil trust. The Minister seemed supportive of the concept, but was not in favor of the Heritage Trust proposal he had seen last fall because the assets were being used for pensions which he said people do not care about. He said he was receptive to learning about the other ideas for a trust, particularly if they provided a dividend. Tom and (b)(6) offered to pull something together on this topic. This material (a memo and presentation) was prepared and sent to the Minister for his review.

<u>Primary Objective:</u> We are becoming increasingly more convinced of the importance and urgency of addressing <u>fuel price liberalization</u> as soon as possible, and certainly prior to the transfer of sovereignty to the Government of Iraq. Our primary objective from this meeting would be:

 To have the Minister meet the deadline for the recommendation from his task force and to agree to a subsequent deadline for a decision and start date for implementing a plan for adjusting fuel prices.

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<u>Points of leverage</u>: We have some, but not much leverage over the Minister. In increasing order of aggressiveness, they are:

- If he fails to act, future problems with lines at gas stations will be a political embarrassment to him.
- This is the second time Iraq and the Ministry have been faced with the gasoline shortage.
 If no action is taken, and gas lines develop in the future, the CPA may not provide U.S.
 Army personnel to provide security at the gas stations or convoys to escort tankers to the appropriate distribution points.
- CPA is currently withholding most of the money allocated to the Ministry for oil sector capital projects. If the Minister is anxious to have this money (not known to us), continuing to withhold it may represent leverage.
- CPA may be providing the Minister's personal protection which could be withdrawn (though this may worsen the issue of his frequent absence from the country).
- The Minister has not been receptive to CPA initiatives and continues to be a bottleneck in addressing areas of significant concern for the Iraqi people and the Coalition military who must deal with the ramifications of his inaction. This is due to a lack of decision-making ability and frequent absence from his post in Iraq. Unless there is a sudden shift in attitude and initiative from the Minister, there is likely to be no alleviation of the ongoing problems in the oil sector. Termination from his position and installation of a new Minister may be the most effective way of ensuring that these issues get addressed.

Suggested talking points:

Energy subsidy reforms:

- Mention January 15 meeting with Tom and (b)(6) and expectation of task force recommendations on energy subsidy reforms on February 5.
- Emphasize need for fuel price adjustments to avoid future problems with gas lines.
 Mention risk of political backlash against Ministry and potential loss of Coalition lives.
- Mention cost that subsidy and smuggling place on the Treasury which will be a burden to the future government.
- Weave in comments, as appropriate, related to points of leverage listed above.

Iraqi Oil Trust:

• Gauge response to materials on the Trust.

ATTACHMENTS: NONE

COORDINATION:

(b)(6) Private Sector Development Rob McKee, CPA Senior Advisor, Ministry of Oil

UNCLASSIFIED

McKee, Robert E. (SES)

From: McKee, Robert E. (SES)

Sent: Wednesday, January 28, 2004 11:31 AM

To: Bremer, Paul

Cc: Kellogg Jr, Joseph (SES-6) (b)(6)

McKee, Robert E.

(SES)

Subject: Meeting with Minister of Oil-29 January-

Jerry—As we discussed in passing a couple of days ago, I recommend you use the general theme of "transition" as the basis for our discussion with Ibrahim on Saturday 31January at 1100. This will allow all of the most current issues to be raised. One possible way to proceed is as follows:

- After the hellos are done, spend a little time reviewing what happened at the UN, current administration thinking, progress on the supplemental funding, etc. Enquire about his trip to <u>Day</u>os.
- Compliment him on the Ministry's performance and leadership through the Baghdad benzene shortages in December. Thank him for being responsive to your request to name a candidate for his IG position. Thank him for continuing to work with Rob's office on all of the challenges the oil sector has.
- 3. Introduce "transition" planning as very important over the coming days and weeks.
- Indicate it's important enough that you expect certain things to get done quickly and certain standards
 to be set. If not, there will be certain implications (whatever you're prepared to tell him here).
- "Transition" is problematical in the oil sector unless the following specific things are accomplished.
 - a. Ibrahim must state his intentions for the kind of ministry he will run, and do it quickly. (I attach a short speech I wrote for him that would accomplish this) It is imperative that his employees, the GC, Iraqi people in general, and the world at large know Iraq's intentions soon. Offer to help him with the GC.
 - b. He must expedite the detailed work on a <u>Code of Conduct</u> for the ministry and oil industry—contracting, procurement, HSE, budgeting, financial controls, ethics, etc. You know that work has begun here but it must have the highest priority.
 - c. He must restructure the Ministry and establish an efficiently managed national oil company that operates the sector. (If I can ride with you to the Ministry, I'll share with you my ideas during the trip for this restructuring, which I have also discussed with him.) Since he's totally incommunicado now, it will be almost impossible to get him to present you with some of his own ideas for restructuring during the meeting, as you requested. In the end, his problem is that his organizational ideas are based on accommodating personalities, not on creating a structure that is best suited to carrying out his strategy.
 - d. SOMO must be audited (auditors are being contracted now by CPA) and they must be prepared to take over the importing of all fuels by this summer, as well as carrying on with the important task of selling Iraqi oil that is exported.
 - The Erinys guard force must be placed within the ministry by this summer and the ministry
 must be prepared to manage their efforts in an efficient way through 2004 at least.
- 6. 5a, 5b and 5c must be accomplished within the next month or so. I (Amb Bremer) am prepared to release some capital money to you (Minister of Oil) from the DFI account if you do these things.
 Otherwise, I cannot (this is the response to his recent letter to you requesting that his capital budget be released immediately). Be advised that he is extremely "exercised" about this issue. He almost refuses to believe his budget has always been zero, and that somehow we have made it zero to punish them. Of course, since it is zero, I have been trying to tell him that you would make available some money to him if he made considerable progress on the whole restructuring/petroleum regime issue. It's important, in my mind at least, that you emphasize this message and that we stay the course.
- 7. Corruption is a major concern of yours. Entities at all levels of Iraqi society, including within the Oil

1/28/2004

- Ministry, have to basically decide that lawlessness will not be tolerated and will in fact be punished. You know that corruption exists in the ministry and you are concerned that not enough is being done to root it out. You would like him to use his new IG to begin to get at this problem.
- 8. You would like to begin the process of price <u>liberalization</u> and the formation of an oil trust. What does he think of these and how should we proceed?
- 9. One concern that I (Rob) would like you to voice, if you agree, is that you have heard concerns expressed that the <u>career technocrats at the Ministry are slowly but surely being pushed aside</u>. You don't want all of the expertise and experience, particularly those that saw the industry through it's bad days and through the beginning of the reconstruction effort, to be sacrificed.
- 10. To summarize, you want him to actively get involved in "transition" planning and accomplishing some of the important tasks outlined above, with a great sense of urgency—Rob and I work-together every day to help get the oil industry back to its pre-war levels and that Rob does not act unilaterally (It is important to say something like this, because he's beginning to get the trea that he can simply go directly to you on some issues. You should actually remind him to work with you through the oil office on all matters.).
- 11. Bottom-line, we have much to do in the coming months and a lot of progress needs to be made soon. You and the ministry have done well, but much more remains. This is one of the two or three most important institutions in the country and you need to lead the way.

I would be glad to discuss any of this with you prior to the meeting. Thanks.

Rob

1/28/2004

Minister:

The following is a draft proposal of a message that we believe you could and should make to your employees at the Ministry of Oil, your fellow Ministers, the Governing Council, the Iraqi public and to the world-at-large. It allows the Ministry of Oil (the most important of all of them) to take the first, public stance towards a model of what Iraq will become under the current and future leadership. Just as important, it establishes you firmly as a progressive and aggressive leader who is determined to move Iraq's oil industry forward. It provides a framework in which all of your various stakeholders can begin to pattern their own behavior, planning and actions. Our prediction is that it will be well-received by all the various audiences.

We have arrived at yet another historic day. Since the liberation, we in the Oil Ministry have worked closely with the Coalition to restore our great Iraqi oil industry. At this point, we are producing well over two million barrels of oil per day and exporting over 1.5 million barrels a day, all for the benefit of Iraq. We have worked in cooperation with our neighbors, our contractors and the Coalition to provide adequate fuel products to all of you for your driving, cooking, heating and lighting needs. We are continuing to make improvements to our oil industry to ensure that the future will be bright for it and all Iraqis. Our people are to be commended for their great progress in the oil sector as our country is reborn.

It is now important for me to tell you some important things that will define the Oil Ministry and Iraq's oil industry for the coming years. Our country has one of the world's largest petroleum reserves and it has almost unlimited potential to benefit us. Every day, the Oil Ministry will be guided by this knowledge and our purpose will be to ensure these, principles are fulfilled.

hadatarit our

- Our country's oil and gas will be owned by the people of Iraq on a national basis, protected under Iraqi constitutional law. Our mission in the Ministry will be to manage, protect and preserve these resources in a way that benefits Iraq now and in the future and in a way that creates a secure, stable and independent economy.
- Our goal will be to accomplish the <u>objectives</u> assigned to us by our new government relative to oil production, use of our abundant natural gas resources, and the supply of domestic fuel products for our population.

Deleted: goals

3) We will accomplish these goals through the leadership of a strong and visionary Ministry of Oil. We will re-create a modern national oil company to carry out petroleum operations. We will ensure that this national oil company is run for the benefit of the Iraqi people and is divorced from the political process to the extent required. Thus, our Ministry will have a distinct separation of duties within it—from actual petroleum operations to policy planning to compliance monitoring.

- 4) Our Ministry will implement a Code of Conduct that allows Iraqi oil to operate competitively in the worldwide petroleum industry. This Code will be based on nondiscrimination; ethics; lawfulness; international best practices for contracting and accounting transparency; and good corporate governance. It will be in every way compatible with our country's various faiths. We will endeavor that our people and contractors are not hurt or killed on our properties and that we have a regard for our environment.
- 5) We will implement strong standards to ensure that managers or employees do not have conflicts-of-interest that would work contrary to the Ministry's stated goals. We also will ensure there are strong behavioral standards for all Ministry employees and managers.
- 6) We have a large job to do, which will take a large amount of investment to accomplish properly. We thus will welcome outside investors to our country, in a way that satisfies our Code of Conduct, protects our rights to our petroleum resources, and enhances our own internal needs. This is very possible and has been accomplished successfully in various other countries around the world (including some of our closest neighbors).

We have the opportunity to become one of the most important participants in the world's petroleum industry, and to do it in a way that provides significant added benefits to the Iraqi people. We in the Ministry of Oil are laying this foundation and I will keep you informed as progress is made.

Dr. Ibrahim M. Bahar Al-Oloum Minister of Oil

Rob McKee Sr. Oil Advisor



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS GULF REGION DIVISION RESTORE IRAQI OIL DIRECTORATE BAGHDAD, IRAQ

CEGRD-RIO-DESC

12 February 2004

Memorandum for Mr. Robert McKee, Senior Advisor, CPA-Oil

Subject: Ministry of Oil (MoO) Fuel Importation Mission Responsibilities

- 1. The Defense Energy Support Center (DESC) is currently positioned to provide the necessary expertise and support to the Restore Iraqi Oil (RIO) Directorate mission for the importation and distribution of identified petroleum products (benzene, diesel, liquefied petroleum gas [LPG], and kerosene) in support of the Iraqi civilian populace.
- 2. DESC is currently working on a seamless transition with the US Army Corps of Engineers to award new contracts through competitive procedures for petroleum products that will include the movement of products to specific wholesale distribution depots within Iraq as well as the mechanisms to perform the necessary management and oversight controls for the mission. DESC is reimbursed for all costs incurred for work performed in support of the RIO mission by the CPA or suitably recognized governing entity via our Defense Working Capital Fund. DESC contracts will begin 1 April 2004 and are scheduled to end 30 June 2004.
- 3. Chief among all other concerns is that the newly elected Iraqi Government will be required to take over the complete responsibility for importing and distributing all petroleum products within Iraq beginning 1 July 2004 unless an international agreement is negotiated and concluded between the two governments. This international agreement would include the process by which DESC and a post-CPA recognized entity will ensure continuous fuel supply and reimbursement of funds.
- 4. As background, DESC has received obligation authority for fuel importation costs through 30 June 2004, and since DESC operates from a Working Capital Fund, products sold in execution of a program must have a corresponding credit paid into the fund for reimbursement. Further, in order to conduct these procurements beyond 30 June 2004, DESC must have a designated customer to charge for the fuel sales.
- 5. Under the Defense Working Capital Fund, DESC cannot provide fuel under its contracts to customers without an agreement from the customer to pay for the fuel with appropriate procedures to transfer funds to DESC. It is important to note that DESC does not have the statutory authority to provide fuel without reimbursement. Any deviation from the reimbursement requirements of the Defense Working Capital Fund could limit DESC's ability to procure fuel for its military customers and might result in an Anti-Deficiency Act violation, which is a punishable felony in American statutory law.
- 6. In order for DESC to continue its contracts to import and distribute petroleum products into Iraq, DESC must receive adequate written assurances, from the responsible entity after the CPA dissolves 30 June 2004, that any future fuel importation requirement is valid (by each petroleum product) and that funding will be made available to reimburse DESC for its procurement purchases. Short of this commitment, funding and performance by DESC under the supply contracts will end 30 June 2004.

Subject: Ministry of Oil Fuel Importation Mission Responsibilities

7. DESC recommends that the MoO and Ministry of Finance confirm its understanding, in writing to the undersigned, that unless the critical path milestone referenced below is completed, the MoO will become solely responsible to procure petroleum product imports and to distribute those products to the Iraqi civilian populace beginning 1 July 2004.

CRITICAL MILESTONE	REQUIREMENTS	DUEDATE	PROGRAM RESULT	
Decide on MoO need for continued DESC Fuel Importation and wholesale distribution support	If yes, then need the following: - Funding Mechanism - International Agreement		DESC Fuel Importation Contract Support will continue for duration of the funding and international agreement	
	If no, then the following will take place: - DESC will notify MoO in writing that the following result will take place	31 May 2004	DESC Fuel Importation Contract Support will complete on June 30, 2004.	

Through:

By:

(b)(6)

COL, EN
Director, RIO
(b)(6)

Team Chief

Defense Energy Support Center - IRAQ

cc: Ministry of Electricity Ministry of Finance



COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY **BAGHDAD**

ACTION MEMO

	February 15, 2004
FOR:	THE ADMINISTRATOR 15/2
FROM:	Joseph K. Kellogg, Jr., Deputy Administrator and Chief Operating Officer
SUBJECT: Public Servic	Nominations for the Office of the Secretary of Defense Medal for Exceptional
	five requests for approval for the award of the Office of the Secretary of Defense cceptional Public Service:
	ewis W. Lucke for his actions as the Mission Director for the United States Agenc onal Development.
of Planning &	odney Bent for his actions as the Senior Advisor to the Ministry of Finance, Minis & Development Cooperation, and to the Iraqi Supreme Board of Audit; and as the or and Director of the Office of Management & Budget.
3. Ro	obert McKee for his actions as the Senior Advisor to the Ministry of Oil.
4. Ma	ajor General (Retired) James T. Jackson for his actions as my Deputy.
5. (b)	for his actions as my Counselor and Senior Advisor.
Since I becan direct impact outstanding e	me your Chief Operating Officer, these gentlemen have made an immediate and to for our organization and this recognition would best depict our gratitude for their efforts.
RECOMME	ENDATION: Approve the award requests.
Appro	ove: Disapprove: Approve with modification:
ATTACHME	ENTS: 5 x Award Packets
COORDINA	TION: None

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COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY BAGHDAD

ACTION MEMO

February 15, 2004

FOR:	THE AI	OMINISTRATOR .	
FROM:	Joseph K. Kellogg, Jr., Deputy Administrator and Chief Operating Officer		
SUBJECT: Public Service		tion for the Office of the Secretary of I	Defense Medal for Exceptional
of the Office o	f the Sec	D Administrative Instruction 29, we ar retary of Defense Medal for Exception this award and the citation are provided	nal Public Service to Robert
Name:		Robert McKee	
Title and Grad	Fitle and Grade: Senior Advisor to the Ministry of Oil for the Coalition Provisional Authority – Baghdad; SES-6 equivalent		
Organization A Location:	And Coalition Provisional Authority, Baghdad, Iraq, APO AE 09335		ıdad, Iraq,
Length of Tim Organization:	e With	October 2003 to March 2004	
Significant Prior None. No other award for this individual is pending and no other awards Received: previous award had been made for service described herein.			
Basis for Award: See attached narrative			
RECOMMEN	NDATIC	N: Approve the award request.	
Approv	ve:	Disapprove:	Approve with modification:
ATTACHME	NTS: Na	urrative and Citation	
COORDINAT	ION: No	one	

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NARRATIVE FOR OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE MEDAL FOR EXCEPTIONAL PUBLIC SERVICE AWARD FOR Robert McKee

Robert McKee distinguished himself by exceptional meritorious service and devotion to duty while serving as the Senior Advisor to the Ministry of Oil for the Coalition Provisional Authority - Baghdad, from October, 2003 to March, 2004. He was responsible for supervising the largest oilfield reconstruction effort ever attempted while located within the second most oil rich nation in the world. Robert McKee forged a strong partnership built on trust and confidence with the Iraqi Minister of Oil as well as other senior members in the ministry. These relationships are providing the catalyst for Iraq's oil industry, responsible for nearly its entire gross domestic product, and serving as the true engine to drive and sustain Iraq's economy and reconstruction for decades to come. Additionally, Robert McKee's acumen within the contracting and financial areas of the ministry, are building the foundation to facilitate Iraq's emergence as a world class, oil producing nation and provide the leverage for success at the international level. This success will improve domestic growth, thus reducing the requirements for financial support and have a direct bearing on all economies, worldwide. Robert McKee also played an integral part in resurrecting the Iraqi-Turkey fuel pipeline in order to further maximize the capacity to exploit Iraq's vast oil reserves. He clearly established himself as the subject matter expert throughout the Coalition Provisional Authority on the intricacies involved with oil production. Robert McKee took great pleasure educating everyone within the Coalition on oil matters, providing the awareness needed to make proper decisions pertaining to one of its most vital national assets. All of these actions are critical components towards Iraq's stabilization and transition to a free market economy which is going to result in enjoyed prosperity that will be shared by all of its citizens.

CITATION

TO ACCOMPANY THE AWARD OF

THE OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

MEDAL FOR EXCEPTIONAL PUBLIC SERVICE

TO

Robert McKee

For exceptional meritorious service and devotion to duty while serving as the Senior Advisor to the Ministry of Oil for the Coalition Provisional Authority – Baghdad, from October, 2003 to March, 2004. Robert McKee was responsible for supervising the largest oilfield reconstruction effort ever attempted while located within the second most oil rich nation in the world. His expertise is responsible for building the foundation to facilitate Iraq's emergence as a world class, oil producing nation and provide the leverage for success at the international level. The distinctive accomplishments of Robert McKee reflect credit upon himself, the Coalition Provisional Authority, and the Department of Defense.



COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY **BAGHDAD**

ACTION MEMO

February 17, 2004

FOR:

THE ADMINISTRATOR

FROM:

David Kirk, OPPA

COPIES TO: Ambassador Jones, Lt Gen (Rtd) Kellogg

SUBJECT:

Appointment of First Inspectors General

Attached are the letters, in Arabic, to the three nominated Inspectors General and their respective Ministers. (English versions accompany). These came up as part of a larger package on February 14.

We expect to recommend further appointments, with similar draft letters in the next few days.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the attached	letters to the	nominated	Inspectors	General	and respective	Ministers
• •	.•		•			

Disapprove: ____ Approve with modification: _

ATTACHMENTS: Six letters in Arabic to IG nominees and their respective Ministers.

- 1. Oil-Appointee: Mr. Ali Muhsin Ismail Al-Allaq
- 2. Oil-Minister: Dr. Ibrahim Bahar al-Uloum
- 3. Labor & Social Affairs-Appointee: Ms. Zakia Hakki
- 4. Labor & Social Affairs-Minister: Mr. Sami Azara al-Ma'jun
- 5. Municipalities & Public Works-Appointee: Mr. Musa Farage Radhi
- 6. Municipalities & Public Works-Minister: Mrs. Nasreen Mustafa Sadiq Barwari

COORDINATION: Giles Denham

Robert Dawes, CPA IG Scott Castle, OGC Mike Mutter, MMPW Jim Otwell, MOLSA Rob McKee, Ministry of Oil

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COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY BAGHDAD

FOR: THE ADMINISTRATOR

FROM: Robert McKee, Senior Adviser, CPA Oil

SUBJECT: Bartering of Petroleum Products

Your agreement is sought to allow the Iraqi Ministry of Oil to access funds From the Development Fund for Iraq (DFI) up to a limit of the revenues generated from the export of petroleum products (e.g. fuel oil, but excluding crude oil).

The State Oil Marketing Organization (SOMO) has sole authority for the export of petroleum from Iraq. SOMO currently facilitates the export of crude oil under normal commercial terms and fuel oil under barter arrangements. Current fuel oil barter contracts are worth about \$350 million and SOMO has contracted to receive about 900 million liters of gasoline, diesel and kerosene.

Barter sales of petroleum products are rare in international markets. They are an inefficient means for trading most products. They typically involve higher costs, less flexibility, and a smaller range of potential buyers/sellers compared with normal commercial sales. They may also result in lower financial benefits to Iraq. SOMO is experiencing difficulties with its barter contractors and would prefer to be able to operate under normal commercial terms.

The UNSCR requires all sales contracts to be 'made consistent with prevailing international market best practices". The proposed arrangements are fully consistent with this requirement.

I recommend you allow the IMO to access funds from the DFI up to a limit of the revenues generated by SOMO from the export of petroleum products, with the necessary reporting and monitoring arrangements to be negotiated between the IMO, Ministry of Finance and CPA.

Approve:

Disapprove:

Approve with modification:

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Program Review Board (PRB) Minutes – Nov. 29, 2003

Attendees:

- *Sherri Kraham Acting Chair/Program Review Board, Director
- *Frederick C. Smith Acting Senior Advisor for the Office of Security Affairs
- *COL Mike Kirsch Representative of Office of Operations & Infrastructure (Designee)
- *Judy Van Rest Representative of Governance (Designee)
- *LTC Terry Ross Coalition Joint Task Force -7, Deputy Comptroller
- *Heidi Venamore Representative of the Australian Government
- *Andrew Golednizowski Council of International Coordination (Designee)
- *Yusaf Samiullah Representative of the United Kingdom

Greg Buckley CPA - General Counsel

COL James Behring CPA Comptroller

COL Tony Bell CPA – Head of Contracting Activities

Patricia Hatcher Representative of CPA Management Liaison Cell

Don Fithian Program Management Office - Comptroller

Mary Beal Program Management Office - Budget Officer

Jesse Pruett Program Review Board, Regional Programs Manager

Bob McKee CPA – Senior Advisor Ministry of Oil

Larry Rogers Task Force Restore Iraqi Oil

MAJ Erik Nelson Task Force Restore Iraqi Oil

Jeff Haberman CPA - South Central

COL Tom O'Donnell Task Force - Shield

CPT Jacyn Dembrosky CPA - Comptroller Office

*Voting Members

The November 22, 2003 minutes were approved with small modifications*

The following Funding Requests were considered by the Board for recommendation to the Administrator:

#568 – Fuel Imports - \$425,000,000 – Funds were approved for the emergency import of LPG, Benzene, Kerosene and Diesel to help meet the domestic daily needs of these fuels. This request is to fund fuel import requirements through the end of January 2004. Task Force Restore Iraqi Oil (TF RIO) is working with Defense Energy Support Center (DESC) and SOMO (Southern Oil Marketing Organization) to fulfill the Iraqis fuel imports requirements until a new contract could be competitively awarded. DESC was out to Iraq to study the requirements and will get back with TF RIO shortly on their procurement capabilities. SOMO will likely purchase up to \$100 M.


#570 – Oil Infrastructure & Security - † Funds were approved for the contracting of air surveillance security of the oil pipelines in Iraq. The contractor will provide two aircrafts with the Air Scan system for night patrolling of the pipelines. The equipment will be link with a ground station in order to provide a quick reaction to any threat identified by the low-light television sensors mounted on the craft.

#456 – Replenishment of Rapid Regional Response Program - \$10,000,000 – Funds were approved to provide \$10M more to CPA – South Central's Rapid Regional Response Program as was committed to them by Ambassador Bremer earlier.

#417— CPA Rewards - \$310,200 — Funds were approved to pay for the printing of poster-sized stickers, handbill and small (bumper) stickers listing rewards being offer by CPA for information and the capture of Saddam and his sons, soliciting of info on anti-Coalition activities, and soliciting info on damaging of Iraqi infrastructure. The materials were contracted for in August but the bill was never paid.

The Board was informed in regard to PRB#559 & PRB#560 that the ministries will be able to sustain the operating & recurring costs on the trucks. The Board was also informed that the Regional Program Manager was still waiting for an answer from one of the donors' representatives on whether or not these trucks can be part of their donor program.

† Where the publication of approved funding levels may prejudice the competitive contracting processes, these amounts will be redacted.



Attended five meetings on the 10th and 11th of March where the issue of Production Sharing Agreements in the Northern area of Iraq came up in the meetings.

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MARCH MOSTINGS IN TUREY

Meeting one, morning of the 10th. Alev Kilic, Turkish Deputy Under Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, discussed this in the opening meeting with the CPA and Iraqi Trade delegations. During this meeting I emphasized that nether CPA, nor could the current Iraqi Governing Council enter into Production Sharing Agreements and that only a legitimate Iraqi Government could. Any Agreements signed prior to the war with the past Iraqi Government would have to be addressed when a legitimate Government was in place. CPA encouraged all companies having a claim to stay in touch with the current Iraqi Ministry of Oil.

Meeting two, afternoon of the 10th. Met with members of the Turkish National Oil Company, U.S. Embassy Turkey, and members of the Turkish Government Foreign Affairs Department. I was questioned on the validity of the Production Sharing Agreements. I answered as noted above. I had the distinct feeling that the National Oil Company was party to the existing agreements in one form or another and possibly looking at fields for its self. Some of the various groups within the National Oil Company do both surface and subsurface work as well as transport oil products. Mr. Hakki Akil, Deputy Director General for Energy, Water, and Environment - Ministry of Foreign Affairs, said he would like me to meet with the companies who had Production Sharing Agreements with the Kurdish Government the following day. I accepted.

Meeting three, morning of the 11th. Met with Mr. Murat Yazici of Yazici Law Offices, Mr. Hakki Akil, and a member of his staff. Mr. Yazici was representing Genel Enerji A.S..

Genel Enerji A.S. had entered into a Production sharing Agreement with the Kurdistan Regional Government, January 19, 2004 for the Tac Tac field. Mr. Yazici stated that he had worked with Mr. Peter Galbraith (believe he is a lawyer in Wash. D.C.) and Johnathon Morrow (believe he is out of the United Kingdom, may be in Afghanistan at this time). A hard copy of this Agreement was supplied at the end of our meeting.

Mr. Yazici repeatedly brought up Mr. Talabani's name. Mr Yazici said that Mr. Talabani was going to address the Production Sharing Agreement with the Governing Council in the next several weeks. Mr Yazici said the U.S. Government was aware of this Agreement, indicating the U.S. was briefed by the Turkish Prime Minister during his recent visit. Mr. Akil confirmed this. Mr. Yazici said that the U.S. Government had agreed in the past with the Kurdish Government that they had certain rights which included the development of minerals. (I believe this is the Agreement dated Sept. 17, 1998 cited in the Production Sharing Agreement. I have requested a copy of this Agreement from Mr. Yazici by email March 13th). Mr. Yazici said the Kurdish Regional Government did not require the authority of the CPA or Central Government to enter into such Agreements.

I told him that other companies such as Parker Drilling and BHP have come forward claiming to have agreements with the Kurdish Government, He said that he had heard of such claims, but Genel Enerji A.S. was the only one with the rights to Tac Tac. He offered no more in this area. Mr. Yazici told me that Mr. Adel Qazaz, Director General Northern Oil Company was aware of the contract between Genel Enerji A.S. and the Kurdish Regional Government. No other names were offered.

From what Mr. Yazici indicated, he was planning along with members of Genel Enerji A.S. to be traveling to Baghdad in the forth coming weeks to discuss their claims with the Governing Council along with Mr. Talabani. I requested that he and the others postpone their trip until CPA has had a chance to review their claims.

Meeting four, morning of the 11th. Following the before mentioned meeting, Mr. Guntekin Koksal, Principal of Pet Holding and Dr. M. Ali Ak, General Manager of Petoil joined myself, Mr. Hakki Akil, and his staff assistant. Petoil has entered into a similar (terms) Production Sharing Agreement with the Regional Kurdish Government. This agreement covered a much larger area than the previous Agreement. It covers the Pulkhana (Kifri), Anfal (Kormor), Chemchemal, and Chia Surkh fields. The later of the fields straddles the Iranian border. A copy of the Agreement was brought to the hotel I was staying in, later that day.

Petoil made similar claims as Genel Enerji A.S. that the U.S. Government recognized the Kurdish Government as having the power to enter into Production Sharing Agreements. They told me that Mr. Colin Powell was made aware of their Production Sharing Agreement in August 2003 during a visit with the Turkish Government. Mr. Hakki Akil acknowledged this point. They also mentioned the recent visit to the U.S. by the Turkish Prime Minister. I learned at this time that Mr. Murat Yazici also represented their company in negotiations with the Regional Kurdish Government. When asked if anyone in the Iraqi Ministry of Oil was aware of this Agreement, they replied that Mr. Adel Qazaz, knew unofficially. Mr. Talabani's name was continually mentioned throughout the meeting.

They said that several weeks ago that Prime Natural Resources, a U.S. based company entered into a 50% share basis with them after talking to Mr. Robert McKee; past Sr. Advisor for CPA Oil. Petoil interpreted this as a positive sign that the subject Agreement was valid in the eyes of the U.S.. I asked them if they knew of any other companies that were entering into Agreements. Outside BHP and Genel Enerji A.S. they were not aware of any serious companies. I asked if they had heard of any Israeli companies being involved. They said that Prime Natural Resources had asked the same question. They indicated that they had heard that Genel Enerji A.S was possibly connected with an Israeli company. Rob McKee had taken several phone calls from an Israeli company interested in developing fields in the Northern area of Iraq.

Petoil told me they had a good number of individuals already in Iraq and was planning to start physical work in the near future. Geological and Reservoir engineering work had already started.

Ministry of Oil



Interview with Joel Berwick, Rob McKee conducted by OPPA, 2004 FEB 9



Strand	Category	Issue	Comments	Status	
Strategy	Strategy	Strategy for implementing prioritized list of short-term (1 year) and long-term(2-5) years goals	Milestone chart outlines one year strategy in detail; Senior advisor anticipates continued growth along the projections for the five year period. The limiting factor to growth will be capital to finance. Oil is an existing operational ministry and will only be limited by its ability to adapt to free market conditions.	G	
		Ownership of strategy down through the Ministry	There are some cultural limitations of adapting the free market process in the oil Ministry. However, in many aspects of the business; there is a seasoned and well-developed operational team.	A	
	01	Ministry structure and staffing levels designed which support organizational goals	Transition to new generation of managers and operators is required; this will require ongoing training and management commitment. Organization Chart in place.	A	
1	Structure	Progress in making appointments at DG level and tiers below, including Inspector General	Well downstream and on target with Inspector General:Deputy Ministers appointed and in place	G	
Ì		Analysis of training/capacity needs completed	Transition to new generation of managers and operators is required; this will require ongoing training and management commitment. Organization Chart in place.	A	1
managemen	Roll out in Ministry of consequent management training programmes down through senior and mid-level staff	Trained Iraqis are in place in at senior and mid levels; de Ba'athification had minimal impact in the Oil ministry.	G		
Readiness for Transition		Principles of coordination and communication with governates clear b. Financial control and budgeting systems developed c. Existence of personnel policies d. Adequate security plans	The primary activities in the Governates for the Oil ministry are modernization of refineries, reducing imports and a nationwide gas distribution system.; Financial controls are in place; personnel policies are in place and the ultimate plan for Security is contractor based and adequate.	•	7
	Systems	a. Basic Connectivity (phones, email) in place for key regional Ministry staff b. Consistent capability to pay staff salaries, get money to governates and transparently execute competitive contracts c. Proportion/level of Ministry staff with agreed job descriptions d. Ministry payment of FPS staff in agreed numbers and locations	Connectivity in Oil ministry is minimal as in the rest of the country; however progress is expected as the Communications road map is executed. Payment of staff; job descriptions are previously noted and the ultimate contracting of all security for the ministry is in progress.	•	
	Support	Outline areas where support will be needed by Ministry after 1 Jul or when minister stands down; identification of source of support	Support post CPA will be minimal. There will be significant oversight via the PMO projects throughout the ministry. There may be a short term requirement for trading expertise support as the New Iraq enters the world oil market.	G	
Jappon		Level of agreement down through ministry	There are some cultural limitations of adapting the free market process in the oil Ministry. However, in many aspects of the business; there is a seasoned and well-developed operational team.	A	

RJfile: People-General

CURRENT CPA STAFF PERSONNEL WITH POST-IRAO SERVICE POTENTIAL FOR DOD

1. James Haveman, Senior Advisor to the Ministry of Health



- His ministry is the first to be ready on April 1st for turnover to Iraqi control
- Ran the State health system in Michigan for 12 years under John Engler
- Service under secretary potential

2. Thomas Foley, Director of Private Sector Development

Former McKinsey consultant

(b)(5)

Service secretary potential

3. Rob McKee, Senior Advisor to the Oil Ministry

• Former Chief Operating Officer of Conoco

(b)(5)

- His ministry is surpassing expectations
- Service secretary potential

4. Daniel Sudnick, Senior Advisor to the Ministry of Communications

- Superb technical expertise
- Excellent management skills
- Managed a huge, complicated communications portfolio almost single handedly
- Service under secretary potential

5. Leslie Arsht, Senior Advisor to the Ministry of Education (b)(5)

(b)(5)

- Former White House staffer from early Nixon days
- Consummate educational professional
- Service assistant secretary potential

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(b)(5)

6. Molly Wilkerson, Chief of Staff, Ministry of Interior

(b)(5)

- Lawyer with substantial high-level state government service in New York (b)(5)
- Service assistant secretary potential
- * Ask her about her location and rescue of the missing \$64 million dollars for her ministry.

7. Mounzer Fatfat, Senior Advisor Youth & Sports

• Specialized executive (b)(5)

- Deputy assistant secretary of defense potential
- * Will have Iraqi Olympic wrestling team standing by to meet you, if your schedule permits.
- 8. Steve Casteel, Senior Advisor to the Ministry of the Interior

(b)(5)

• Former No. 2 in the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA)

Service assistant secretary or OSD deputy assistant secretary potential

al (b)(5)

(b)(5)

9. Victoria Wayne (Vici) Deputy Senior Advisor, Ministry of Transportation

• Splendid success in organizing one of the most diverse advisory operations (b)(5)

- Successful former executive search professional
- Service assistant secretary potential

10. Olin Wethington, Senior Advisor to the Iraqi Central Bank (b)(5)

- Highly accomplished financier
- Former successful Treasury official
- Expert in the management of financial portfolios
- Service assistant secretary potential

Summary of Conclusions for Meeting of the Iraq Stabilization Group Economic Cell February 26, 2003, 3:30 - 5:00 P.M. Room 208, Eisenhower Building

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair

Gary Edson

State

Tony Wayne

Treasury

Randy Quarles

Anne Wallwork

Karen Mathiasen

Defense

Dov Zakheim

David Norquist

Cassie Strom

Commerce

Bill Lash

Susan Hamrock

OMB

Lea Bouzis

Jackee Strasser

Vice President

Steve Claeys

CEA

Therese Scharlemann

CIA (b)(3):50 USC §403 (g) Section 6

OPIC

Alan Villabroza

USAID

Gordon West

Leslie Curtain

CPA

Joseph Benkert

Chris Spear

Dayna Hutchings

Olin Wethington (via phone)

Michael Fleischer (via phone)

Rodney Bent (via phone)

NSC

John Simon

Rick Karp

Jonathan Dworken

Gary Peters

Cathy Taylor

Summary of Conclusions

I. Create sound Fiscal, Monetary, and Exchange Rate Policies

Data Issues

• CPA (B) still needs two people to assist with the real economy statistics. CPA (B) will decide whether to use two people from Booz-Allen or one person from Bearing Point and one

Classified by: John Simon Reasons: 1.5 (b)(d) (e) Declassify on: 2/26/14

person from Treasury. CPA (B) will inform the Econ Cell if additional assistance is required. (Action: CPA (B). Timing: February 27)

11. Repatriate Assets



- State will follow-up with the Minister to ensure Jordan provides the information on Iraqi counterparties. (Action: State. Timing: March 2)
- CPA (B) will provide a date certain for the Iraqi team to travel to Amman. (Action: CPA (B). Timing: March 3)
- <u>Kuwait</u>: State and Treasury will discuss legal issues related to the Kuwaiti transfer of \$85 million to the DFI. (Action: State, Treasury. Timing: March 2)



111. Mobilize External Financing and Reintegrate into the World Economy

Abu Dhabi Donor Meeting

• The most important point of the Donor Meeting is that it signifies the U.N. and World Bank are open for business in Iraq. NSC will work with the Communications Cell to fashion this point as the main public message emanating from the event. (Action: NSC. Timing: February 27)

CECRET

IV. Establish Framework to Facilitate Job Creation and Free Market Economy

Fuel Price Liberalization

- CPA (B), with assistance from the Econ Cell as necessary, will determine the potential revenue that can be raised from both a gradual and a sudden increase in fuel prices to regional benchmarks. (Action: CPA (B). Timing: March 3)
- Rodney Bent will report on the outcome of the Finance Committee discussion of the Chalabi/ Gailani plan for pension increases funded by fuel price increases and/or a reduction in imports of refined product. (Action: CPA (B). Timing: March 1)
- CPA (B) will determine the amount pensioners received before the war. (Action: CPA (B). Timing: March 2)
- Rick Karp and Chris Spear will work with Rodney Bent and Rob McKee to assess the dynamics, risks, and opportunities of the proposal to fund pension increases with fuel price increases/import reductions and send a report to the Econ Cell.

 (Action: CPA (B & W), NSC. Timing: March 3)
- V. Enable Iraqis to Manage their Oil Revenue for the Greatest Benefit of All Citizens

Ex-Im Proposals

- The Export Import Bank will attend the next Econ Cell to discuss their Oilfield Workover Financing Facility proposal, as well as their Subcontractor Equipment Financing Facility proposal and the potential for providing export credits through the Trade Bank of Iraq. (Action: EXIM. Timing: March 4)
- NSC, State, and OMB will review the Ex-Im proposals prior to the Econ Cell meeting. (Action: NSC, State, OMB with EXIM. Timing: March 2)
- VI. Restore and Improve Essential Services

Oil-for-Food Transition

• The Coordination Center will prioritize the 250 most important non-food contracts. (Action: CPA (B). Timing: March 1)

-SECRET

- CPA (B) will work with Bearing Point to fill four positions in the Coordination Center. (Action: CPA (B). Timing: March 2)
- CPA (W) will discuss with Ex-Im the possibility that Ex-Im can provide people with the necessary expertise in contracting and Letters of Credit to the Coordination Center in Baghdad.

 (Action: CPA (W). Timing: March 2)
- CPA (W) will explore with State the possibility of sending people to the U.N. to assist in scanning documents to transport to Baghdad. (Action: CPA (W), State. Timing: March 2)
- State has learned that rehabilitation of the four evacuators at Um Qasr will not provide enough capacity to meet the 12,000 metric ton per day target by April 1. The Ministry of Trade is soliciting proposals to lease a to be determined number of portable evacuators. State will determine how many evacuators can realistically be leased and when they could be operational. (Action: State. Timing: March 3)
- State will determine: 1) the necessary capacity at Um Qasr for the Public Distribution System, 2) the expected capacity once existing evacuators are rehabilitated and additional evacuators are leased, 3) the timeline for achieving the expected capacity, 4) the options for bridging any gap in capacity that remains. (Action: State. Timing: March 3)

COO Daily Summary Report - 25 Feb 04

Office of the Chief Operating Officer ~ LTG Kellogg and MG Jackson departed Iraq today. VADM Redd and LtGen Oster assumed duties as COO and D/COO respectively. VADM Redd participated in the ribbon cutting ceremony for the start of a new generator at the Baiji Power Plant.

Interior - Senior Advisor: Mr. Casteel met with a Japanese Delegation concerning equipment donations for Internal Security. He also met with the Internal Security Assessment team to discuss the new construct for MOI and CJTF7. CENTCOM SVTC is scheduled to discuss the ways the command can work with MOI to enhance internal security operations. Fire: Program Managers from Fire are meeting with COL Davis on providing our vehicle distribution plan by percentage delivered as well as meeting with Civil Affairs Unit on how they can help MOI Fire Civil Defense Directorate in Baghdad area. Program Managers continued development of the training needs, timelines, and plan for Iraq. Also made progress on the Fire Prevention and Public Safety needs plan for Iraq; and worked on planning a National Conference of the Civil Defense Directorate leadership to be held in Baghdad on 22 Mar. Fire Division staff members are working to complete the Motorola antenna project for Baghdad Civil Defense stations as well as completing the strategic plan. C-MIAT: C-MIAT has prepared package for the Program Review Board, PRB, to request funding for the Logistics Distribution and Operations Concept. A meeting is scheduled with the Iraqi Police Chief on Thursday, 26 Feb 04. Policy: Policy team members will present a briefing on the Joint Coordination Command structure. The Policy Team also continues analyzing the strategic plan of the Fire division.

<u>IAF - CMATT</u> - 40 RFF personnel arrived at BIAP today from Kuwait. 1st Bn today continued operations in the Freedom Bn AO while 4th Bn rehearsed fro their graduation on 26 Feb. The 3rd company, 2nd Bn remains on leave while the remainder of the Bn continues training at TMBT. 3rd Bn remains at Tal'Afar.

<u>OMB</u> - Attended the Iraqi Strategic Review Board (ISRB). The ISRB continues to refine the list of projects for donor consideration. At this time they have a list of \$4.1B worth of projects to take to the donor coordination meeting in Abu Dhabi on the 28th of Feb.

<u>OIL</u> – Mr. Mike Stinson has arrived on site. He will be replacing Mr. Rob McKee as the Sr. Advisor for the CPA Oil group. The Bayji refinery is experiencing electricity problems. Fuel production has been affected. Bad weather at the Turkish border is slowing imports. Right now there is a 35KM line waiting to cross thru Harbur Gate. An estimated 33Million Liters of light fuels (Diesel, Benzene, Kerosene) and 5900 MT of LPG is waiting in the line. The border is open, but slow. Current stocks in the north are sufficient to meet demands while weather improves.

Regional Operations - Briefing with the new COO, Admiral Redd was postponed – look forward to the opportunity to meet him. Four new personnel arrived for Regional and Governorate staff – after in processing they will move to their posts in the Regions. Another very quiet day in the CPA Regions and Governorates sites.

<u>Communications</u> - Senior Advisor staff met with Minister of Communications to discuss Facilities Protection Service. MoC finance staff met with ITPC finances and

budgeting. Staff reviewed the customer care contract for dedicated resources for ministries and private business – seeking to develop human resources for engagement. Staff also met with head of ITPC Microwave team to discuss microwave tender. MoC staff developing accelerated timelines for Force Responder Capabilities.

<u>Construction and Housing</u> – Senior Advisor, Mr. Michael Karem, has meeting with Minister of Housing and Construction and German AMB at request of German AMB. Still working MoHC presence at Abu Dhabi.

Electricity – For 25 Feb, the daily system peak was 4292Mw, the estimated daily system demand was 6174Mw (4292 Actual Generation, + 1600 Load Shed, + 282 Corrected Frequency, = 6174), and imported power from Syria (60Mw) and Turkey (53Mw) included in System Peak.

<u>Transportation</u> – **BIAP Bullding Transition.** MoT staff met with Iraqi Airways' Technical Assistant Director-General Mr. Al-Aris to receive the list of buildings which are occupied by the 1AD and other units, and the number of Iraqi personnel required to secure each building by the transition date. **BIAP Nortel Switch.** MoT staff is working with Iraqi technicians and Bechtel to ensure all parties understand the telecommunications' installation blueprint, for turning over to CPA and Iraqi technicians. Technicians have been unable to program the switch to install fiber-optic remotes at other buildings, and phones at BIAP's terminal C. While Bechtel needs to close out work orders, MoT staff is ensuring the system is ready for turnover. **VSAT Installation.** Trucks were loaded for the Ar Rutbah installation of the Very Small Aperture Terminal (VSAT) system to improve voice and data linkage between air traffic control and aircraft. Drivers and installation crew are briefed, and ready to depart Feb. 25. Installation should be completed by March 1 to meet the strategic plan timeline.

<u>Water Resources</u> – Ministry of Water Resources is working hard with the delegation from Italy to establish proper feasibility and environmental studies for dams in Iraq. In the past feasibility studies in Iraq did not include environmental impact statements or detailed economic analyses. Future of proper cooperation and allocation of water resources in Iraq is dependant on the knowledge of properly doing these analyses.

<u>USAID</u> - Agriculture and Income Generation. The agricultural team from USAID's Community Action Program (CAP) partner ACDI/VOCA is traveling throughout northern Iraq, talking to farmers and community experts and developing project ideas. The team is helping to set up co-operative enterprises that will help farmers acquire inputs like seeds, develop farmers' skills, and generate additional farm income. One important income generation program is the improvement of livestock productivity. Faster growing, disease resistant animals can be produced through artificial insemination. **Providing Clean Water to Baghdad Residents.** The Kerkh wastewater treatment plant, one of three Baghdad plants being rehabilitated by USAID partner Bechtel, is expected to be brought back online March 1, greatly improving water quality and fisheries in the area.

PMO - no report received

Municipalities and Public Works - no report received

5. Preparing a spread sheet comparing the results of the evaluation process.

6. Making a recommendation for awarding the contract to the best bidder.

7. The recommendation once approved by the director general of the company is presented to the Minister of Oil for approval prior to signiture of a contract.

B. The technical committee which is headed by the design office top manager includes the managers of the various design departments.

The committee carries out a complete evaluation of the technical offers and prepare a list of notes on each offer. These notes are transmitted to the bidders to receive their clarifications and to iron-out any ambiguities or misconceptions. Meetings may be held if deemed necessary.

At the end of its work, the committee prepare a spread sheet outlining the status of the technical parts of the offers. The spread sheet is sent to the main committee.

COO Dally Summary Report 5 1 Jan 04

040131-32 1193 HAS SEEN

Office of the Chief Operating Officer — The COO met with AMB Bremer and reviewed the CPA Transition Plan. The COO met with AMB Ricciardoni and LTG(Ret) Kicklighter. BG Vines visited al Najaf with Douglas Brand in Mol to assess the situation on the ground — later reported observations to AMB Bremer. Lastly COO efforts helped solve the al Najaf fuel problems through self-healing pipelines (a non-problem).

Interior — Mr. Doug Brand, Senior Advisor to the Iraqi Police, flew to NAJAF to review the security situation; report pending. IP Division met with project officer for the upcoming visit by dignitary to determine suitable site for review. CoS is arranging static site security for Adnan Palace to replace the departing MP Battalion. Policy division prepared briefing for the Riccardone/Kicklighter visit on Sunday. The brief centers on the "security landscape" for MOI. Policy Division has also developed Strategic Review Plan for the COO. CoS met w/MOJ to discuss private security contracting. New draft being prepared based on their guidance. DBE and Iraqi customs have agreed on the documentation to allow the levy to be collected. \$2.6M for reconstruction of border points has been secured.

PMO - Acquisition Assessment team arrived from Washington D.C. Finance. PMO released tasking to the Department of Army and Army Corps of Engineers for \$248 Million for work in the electrical sector. Army is to request apportionment of these dollars immediately against the \$6.6 Billion notification sent to the Office of Management Budget (OMB) on Tuesday, 27 Jan 04. Construction. Team visited Victory Base with representatives of the Gulf Region Division to secure Thuraya telephones, lap top computers, and printers for use in construction field offices. While at Victory they toured the Joint Operations Center construction project. Construction is by a Kuwaiti contractor. The project was designed by the Corps of Engineers. Finishes are being installed including modular office furniture. Non-Construction. Staff held meeting to redistribute work load following completion of several acquisition packages; continued metrics development; created graphs and charts to illustrate acquisition progress. Programming. Buildings and Health Sector. Staff incorporated PMO review comments on the draft Task Order for design of the Basrah Hospital and submitted it to the CPA Ministry of Health for review. Staff met with Contracting and CPA Ministry of Health to discuss approach for the equipment funds. Staff moved into Room 106A, Justice Sector, Staff met with the Ministry of Justice financial person to start to work out budgetary figures for the revised prison projects. Staff met with the engineer for the Ministry of Justice who will be helping to provide information for the Task Orders. Staff met with John Armstrong to start review of new PIF's; made site visit to Rasafa Prison Complex.

<u>IA – CMATT</u> - 1st Bn has secured their operational schedule today until 8 Feb 04 for a training holiday. 2nd Bn continues their training schedule with CJTF-7 forces which today included basic land navigation. 3rd Bn and 1st CDF regiment remain on leave in Tadji while 4th Bn continues with qualification training at KMTB.

OIL – Meeting on Jan. 31, with the Finance Manager for the Ministry of Oil to prevent the walkout of South Distribution and Pipeline company's employees. Employees contend that the management of the South Oil and Refinery paid their employees more money than what was allowed under the new 11 tier system, therefore they want equivalent salaries. Khor Az Zhubayr Port workers on strike due to new pay scale. Strike prevents the unloading of fuel, potentially causing a fuel shortage within the country. The 40" IT pipeline between Kirkuk and Bayji was sabotaged. Pipeline will be assessed once fire is put out. Deliveries of crude to Bayji will be impacted. Working with the U.S. Treasury Department to recover Iraqi assets in foreign countries. Sr. Advisor Rob McKee and Ambassador Bremer visited the Minister of Oil Ibrahim Bahr al-Uloum.

Regional Operations - Welcomed Mr. Bill Grant, GC, Sulaminiyah; Mr. Kevin Brady (vice George Farag), PAO, Najaf; and Diane Sovreign, PAO, Ninewa. Will follow in processing and briefing agenda and then move forward. Tracking car bomb in Mosul – awaiting accountability report from GC, Ninawa. SAT in Basra today, will visit Erbil and Mosul starting tomorrow – no issues. Working with CJTF7 to coordinate security (FRAGO directed) to be provided by MND (CS) upon withdrawal of MPs. Current conditions in Najaf – stable. Coordinating support for visit of Amb Ricciardoni to MND (CS) to visit Filipino soldiers. Awarded contract for body armor iso GT/RT.

<u>Communications</u> - Senior Advisor met with Ministry of Oil to discuss potential participation in the First Responder Network. MoC staff continues to verify data requirements for each of the private banks. In meeting with Director of the ITPC Savings Branch, senior advisor staff was apprised of a problem involving the downward adjustment of savings rates for Iraqi pensioners from 10 percent to 6 percent because of a decision by the Central Bank of Iraq. They ITPC savings staff related that this decision has resulted in some unrest in the South. MoC staff has raised this issue with Ministry of Finance.

Electricity — For 30 Jan, the daily system peak was 4306Mw, the estimated daily system demand was 5,990Mw (4306 Actual Generation, + 1400 Load Shed, + 284 Corrected Frequency, = 5990), and the imported power from Syria (60Mw) and Turkey (80Mw), included in system peak. Countrywide, Iraq's electrical output continues to be constrained by damaged transmission and distribution lines. The lines have come down due to sabotage and bad weather. Downed transmission lines increase the probability for complete nationwide blackout by reducing system contingency and causing mechanical damage at power plants. This may cause further temporary blackouts, which have already directly resulted in 1) impacted refineries causing reduced fuel flow to power plants and a subsequent reduction in power supply, and 2) damages in the power plants due to undercurrent causing units to come off-line for unscheduled maintenance. Conclusion: The Ministry of Electricity continues to make necessary repairs and conduct required maintenance on generation and transmission equipment.

<u>Transportation</u> – Airport Property During Transition. The MoT aviation team is evaluating the effect of CPA Order 9 (ruling on management and use of Iraq public property) on airport transition to civilian control, and US military movement out of airport facilities. **Meteorological Services**Building. The MoT aviation team is continuing to supervise work on restoring meteorological facilities located in one building, which was previously looted, for aviation transition. **Port Task**Force trip to Basrah. Certain members of the Port Task force, including Ambassador Trent, visited the port of Umm Qasr to oversee the creation of a Port Operations Center, establish a new Iraqi executive committee to help organize reconstruction efforts, and ensure that all parties concerned (SSA, USAID, MoT) had communicated their concerns and consolidated reconstruction efforts and goals.

<u>Water Resources</u> – The Senior Advisor is in the process of completely redoing the Ministry's strategic plan and milestone chart to fit with the new reorganization of the Ministry.

<u>USAID</u> - USAID's Community Action Program will expand its activities into the traditionally conflictive, non-permissive Al Anbar Governorate this month. Under CAP, ACDI/VOCA has been implementing projects in Salah ad Din, Diyala', As Sulaymaniyah, At Tamim, Ninawa', Arbil, and Dahuk Governorates that focus on conflict mitigation. ACDI/VOCA also seeks to establish community groups in neglected areas or regions with rising ethnic tensions, especially Mosul, Kirkuk, and Iran-Iraq border towns. Over 100 women gathered on January 27 for a discussion entitled, "Iraqi Women: The Law and Constitution," which featured three female scholars talking about the impact of law on women's lives in Iraq. The discussions, organized by USAID's Local Governance Program (LGP), centered around the idea of using civilian courts for personal issues such as marriage and divorce, rather than relying only on religious institutions. LGP facilitates a women's panel discussion every two weeks in the convention center in Baghdad.

<u>Construction and Housing</u> – Minister submitted CV for IG candidate. Accepted contract for ONSA Building, and received restart order for Scooby Building SOE's submitted draft business plans. 5 contracts of the 13 Housing projects under review, (100 million) are in the preliminary renegotiation stage.

<u>Municipalities and Public Works</u> – The Senior Advisor updated his Strategic Plan and is prepared to brief the COO tornorrow.

OMB - no report received

Meeting of 3 November 2003 Ambassador Bremer and Ibrahim Bahr al Uloom

Objectives of the Meeting

1. Continue discussions from our last meeting together---re-emphasize how important it is for us to separate the Ministry and the oil company and to ensure the company side, including personnel decisions, is de-politicized.

2. Get commitment that the end-state organization includes INOC--re-emphasize

how important it is to get this done as soon as possible.

3. Inform him that McKee and his office are doing much work that will be most helpful to, and the backbone of, coming decisions regarding petroleum policy and oil company functionality---emphasize the need for the Ministry to consult with CPA Oil before ALL decisions impacting these areas are made.

4. Reiterate our request made last meeting to develop plans around possible approaches to Iran, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia for product importation and/or crude

exportation.

Questions for Amb Bremer to Ask

1. What do you see as your major challenges as Minister over themext 90 days?

2. How will the proposed organization change assist you with addressing these challenges?

3. What is your selection process for identifying your senior advisors? How have they been vetted?

4. Achieving adequate supplies of kerosene for the winter months is a major problem. How will an organization change now impact the efforts being made to address the kerosene issue?


5. Why not have a single point of contact for oil operations?

6. How do you see an **INOC** structure being different from the existing structure?

7. When do you see the establishment of an INOC?


- 8. Allegations of improprieties at SOMO in a recent issue of an INC publication are very serious. Can you share with me what you have done and what you learned?
- 9. You have been able to meet dignitaries from foreign countries and I understand you are planning a trip to Russia. What messages are you delivering concerning business relationships with Iraq?
- 10. Relative to the Governing Council, how do you see the process for going forward with INOC?
- 11. Enquire whether he has formulated plans to approach Saudi Arabia, Kuwait or Iran regarding product/crude importation/exportation.

Coalition Provisional Authority





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
Coalition Provisional Authority



COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY JANUARY 2004 CJTF-7 Counselors Council for International Cooperation (CIC) **Administrator** Donald Hamilton Andrew Goledzinowski (AUS) LTG Ricardo Sanchez L. Paul Bremer General Counsel **Edwin Castle** Secretariat Governorate Regional **Multinational** Jessica LeCrov Coordinators Coordinators **Divisions** Info Mgmt Unit (IMU) (MND) Bill Wood Morse (Baghdad) Policy Planning & Analysis Schlicker (Mosul) North: 101st AASLT N-Central: 4ID Andy Rathmell Mike Gfoeller (al Hillah) West: 82ABN/3ACR Sir Hilary Synnott (Basrah) Cen-So: POL Div Intel SW: GBR Div Jane Green BGD: 1st AD, 2/82ABN, 2LCR **Chief Operating Officer** Deputy Administrator & **Chief Policy Officer** LTG (ret) Keith Kellogg **Amb Jones** Robert McKee David Gompert Amb Belka Steve Smith David Nash Steven Casteel Amb Andrew Bearpark Lewis Lucke Scott Carpenter Tom Foley Susan Thompson Diffector National Director Director Director Governance Economic CHI Security Affairs OIL. Policy Communication Agriculture CO-Directors Culture Daniel Sudnick Trevor Flugge Mario Osio (ITA) Education Banking Olin Wethington Industry & CHATTLE Construction & Housing E. (Rick) Manaf Ali Mike Karen Anthony McDonald **Minerals** Ortiz MG Paul Eaton Health **Environment** Gary Thatcher Rodney Bent James Haveman Director Allen Irish Electricity Regional Higher Regional Randy Richardson Anthony McDonaid Khidhir Science & Education Coordinators Coordinators Labor & Social Hamza John Agresto E Technology **Public Works** (Operations) (Policy) Affairs James Otwell Displacement Michael Mutter Sandra Hodgkinson Susan Justice Migration Lawrence Bartlett Transport Governorate Governorate Daniel L. Rubini Hamrock **Darrel Trent** Coordinators Trade Coordinators Youth & Foreign (Operations) (Policy) Water Resources **Sports** Susan Johnson Jerry Webb Mounzer R. Fatfat









Summary of non-CA support to CPA for OIF 2

- There are 24 positions identified to be filled by non-CA military personnel
- These personnel fills may be selected from incoming forces or may be requested by a special RFF

13 Dec 2003

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CPA OIF 2 REQUIREMENTS

The original listing of positions from CPA for CA forces identified 72 positions. A review of those positions by the C9 and the CPA civilian personnel director resulted in the changes reflected below.

Agriculture

Talked to (b)(6) senior advisor, about TOA requirements for his ministry. He was not aware of the three billets proposed on the requirements sheet. He further advised he did not need the three slots county extension officer, legal agriculture officer and agricultural advisor. He did say he needed an LNO to facilitate interaction between the military, CPA, the ministry and the advisor.

Agriculture	County ext agriculture officer	No requirement
Agriculture	Legal agriculture officer	No requiremente
Agriculture	Agriculture advisor	No requirement
Agriculture	Military LNO	1 Ω-3 Branch immateri

Agriculture Military LNO 1 O-3 Branch immaterial

Communication

Talked to (b)(6) senior advisor, about TOA requirements for this ministry. He also seemed unaware of these requirements. He advised he need four personnel to do spectrum management.

Commo	Commo Advisor		1 O-4 Signal
Commo	Commo Advisor		1 E-8 Signal
Commo	Commo Advisor		1 E-6 Signal
Commo	Commo Advisor	ADDITIONAL REQ	1 E-5 Signal

Culture

Talked to the deputy senior advisor, (b)(6) about TOA. He provided a paper which provides a brief job description. Based on his general job description, the following billet recommendations are provided.

Culture	Advisor	O-3 CA
Culture	Advisor	Will hire civilians
Culture	Advisor	Will hire civilians
Culture	Advisor	Will hire civilians
Culture	Advisor	Will hire civilians

Education

Talked to (b)(6) one of three senior advisors (?) about TOA for her ministry.

She was aware of the issue and requirement on the staffing sheet. She advised she needed the two positions requested.

Education

Admin Assistant

Will hire civilians

Education

School Infastructure

1 O-3 CA

Electricity

Talked to (b)(6) COS, about TOA for his ministry. He advised that he has advised CPA personnel that these personnel don't need to be CA. The COS is a project coordinator and the other two positions are contract expediters.

Electricity

Executive Officer

1 O-5 Branch Immaterial

Electricity Electricity UNDP Contract Coord

Materials/UNDP expeditor

1 O-4 Logistics

1 Will hire civilians

Higher Ed

Talked to senior advisor, (b)(6) about TOA for his ministry. He advised he needs help now. He advised he requires a legal or education background. The project, in addition to doing operations functions, will work a criminal justice curriculum for the Iraqi higher education system.

Higher ED

Advisor

1 O-4 CA

Housing

Housing

Deputy Sr. Advisor

10-5 CA

Housing

Prog Mangr road/bridge

1 O-4 EN

Indust/Minrls

Indust/minrls Advisor

CA O-3 w/finance exp

Indust/minrls Advisor

CA O-3 w/finance exp

Indust/minrls State owned enterprise

CA O-4 w/finance-bussiness

exp

Public works

Talked to (b)(6) about TOA for his ministry. (b)(6) has requested extension in this slot. Recommend he remain in the billet for institutional memory.

Public Works Civil military Liaison

Extended

1 O-5 CA

Water & Irragation

Talked to (b)(6) about TOA for his ministry. The senior advisor and deputy are out of town. To the best of (b)(6) understanding, they require an engineer/LNO billet.

Water/Irrigat Reconstruction

1 O-4 Engineer officer

Justice

Talked to (b)(6) deputy senior advisor, about TOA for his ministry. He advised he needs people to set up and monitor the judicial systems in the provences. His need is for JA personnel or people with judicial experience. Talked to (b)(6) senior advisor, for prisons about TOA for his ministry. He advised he has an augmentation of about 7 MP's and had three CA personnel. He is unsure why the CPA list has only three personnel. He advised one MP officer and two CA soldiers would be the best mix of three soldiers.

Justice	Justice advisor	1 O3-5 JA
Justice	Justice advisor	1 O3-5 JA
Justice	Justice advisor	1 O3-5 JA
Prisons	Prison advisor	1 O-3 MP
Prisons	Prison advisor	1 E-7 CA w/some training exp
Prisons	Prison advisor	1 E-7 CA w/some
		admin/budget exp
Prisons	Prison advisor	O-5 CA Prison experience
Prisons	Prison advisor	O-3 CA
Prison	Prison advisor	O-2 CA

National Security

Talked to (b)(6) senior advisor, about TOA for his ministry. He advised this position has been filled by (b)(6) who just arrived.

Nat Sec

COS/Mil Asst-def ministry

Not required

Oil

Talked to Rob Mckee, senior advisor, about TOA for his ministry. He advised he needed a finance/payroll guy and a COS.

Oil	Task Force Shield	O-4 CA
Oil	Military asst. oil	O-4 Finance
Oil	Military asst. oil	O-5 COS Branch Immaterial

Trade

Talked to (b)(6) acting senior advisor, about TOA for his ministry. He advised that a couple of these positions were civilianized.

Trade

Asst III Corp LNO

1 O-3 Branch Immaterial

Trade

Database manage 0ff

Civilianized Civilianized

Trade

OFF contracts

Trade

Standards

Position moved

Transportation

Talked to (b)(6)

COS, about TOA for his ministry.

Trans

Airport Admin

Will hire civilian

Trans

CFACC

Air Force Billet,

replacement projected

Trans

Ports

O-4 QM O-4 TC

Trans Trans Security adv Transcom Aviation

Air Force Billet, replacement

projected

Youth Sports

Talked to (b)(6) military LNO in the orffice. The minister, Dr Mounzer Fatfat, is out of town. (b)(6) advised that (b)(6) is also working in the office and has requested extension till 1 July 04.

Youth Sports Military LNO

Extended

1 O-4 CA

Finance

Talked to (b)(6) new executive assistant (senior advisor and deputy were unavailable), about TOA in his ministry.

Finance

Budget analyst

1 O-5 FI

Finance

Mil assist Econ Policy HQ

1 O-5 CA w/econ exp

Finance

Dev/Bur of supreme audit

1 O-4 FI

Finance

Dev/Bur of supreme audit

1 O-4 FI

Finance

Stock market analyst

1 O-4 CA w/ stock

market exp

Health

Unable to link up with health ministry. Anticipate the following

Health

Disease surveillance

O-3 CA w/ med exp

Interior

Interior

Fire & rescue Adv

O-3 CA w/ firefighting

exp

Interior Interior Sr policy Adv border enforcement Sr policy adv police O-3 CA w/border exp

O-3 CA w law enforcement

exp

Labor & social services

Senior advisor and deputy were both unavailable. Discussed the position with two employees. Position has ops element and much interaction with civilians

Labor

Ops & log interim adv

0-4 CA

Program Manager Office

Talked to (b)(6) about his organization. He advised that this position has been resolved in that someone is on the way to fill the position.

Pro mang off IT manager

Not required

Regional Offices

Per information provided by Regional personnel.

Regn off

Regn CA advisor

O-5 CA Ops off/ COS

Baghdad

O-4 CA Proj manage off

Extended

O-4 CA Ops off

Regn off North Regn CA advisor

O-5 CA Ops off/COS O-4 CA Proj manage off

O-4 CA Ops off

Regn off Central South Regn CA advisor

Not required

Regn off

Regn CA advisor

O-5 CA Ops off/COS

South

O-4 CA Proj manage off

O-4 CA Ops off

Science & Technology

Talked to (b)(6) COS, about TOA for his ministry. He felt he does not need two positions. He requested an O-4/5 operations officer. This job would do some contracting, FPS coordination, PDS coordination for the minister.

Scie/Tech

Advisor

O4 Branch Immaterial

Scie/Tech

Advisor

Not required

CPA Baghdad Talked to (b)(6) government coordinator, about TOA for his organization. He needs CA personnel with government experience. These personnel are in addition to the three in one of the Regional teams above due to the 1 CAV not having a BDE headquarters.

CPA Bagh CA asst CA asst CPA Bagh CPA Bagh CA asst CA asst CPA Bagh CA asst CPA Bagh CPA Bagh Ops

O-5 CA 0-4 CA 0-2 CA **O-2 CA** E-5 CA

CPA Bahg Ops O-4 branch immaterial E-6 branch immaterial

CPA North

Per the CPA Personnel Office, additional CPA North support beyond the regional office personnel listed above.

CPA North CA asst CA asst CPA North CPA North CA asst **CPA North** CA asst

Soldiers required per the above paper:

64 = 40 CA + 24 Other US Army

0-4 CA

O-3 CA

E-7 CA

E-5 CA