

4

Estimates of Returnees

Details	No.	Estimates of 6 months in 2004		No.	Estimates of 2005		Total	Rate of Increase	
Dismissed & Politically Disadvantaged	18000	ID	US\$	20000	ID	US\$	38000	2004	2005
		378000000000	25200000		840000000000	56000000		0.96	0.92
X Party Members	10100	21210000000	14140000	—	—	—	10100	0.97	—
TOTAL	28100	59010000000	39340000	20000	840000000000	56000000	48100	0.94	0.92




02857

Document #4
08-F-0245

Total Textbooks Distributed in Iraq with USAID Funding

* IRAQ EDUCATION PROGRAM YEAR 1
(MAY 03 - MARCH 04)



Total Primary, Secondary Math and Science Textbooks Delivered

Governorate	No. of textbooks
Baghdad	2,868,015
Ninewa	804,194
Basrah	804,995
Diyala	519,423
Missan	233,141
Najaf	277,441
Anbar	459,904
Babil	537,703
Kerbala	323,457
Muthanna	150,302
Tameem	300,664
Thi Qar	537,181
Salah Al -Din	372,207
Qadissiya	261,203
Wasit	280,930
Erbil	28,500
Total	8,759,260

Edited all primary and secondary school math and science textbooks and printed 8,759,260 million textbooks. 70% printed in Iraq and 30% in Amman.

Text Books Distributed

c	28500 - 150500
c	150501 - 372500
c	372501 - 537500
c	537501 - 805000
c	805001 - 2868015

Coalition Provisional Authority

According to the order issued by the general director of the coalition provisional authority dated at 16/May/2003 decided to discharge the individuals mentioned as follow:

1. (b)(6)

2.

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Coalition Provisional Authority

Order Sub.: Exception

We decide to except the gentlemen mentioned underneath from our order dated/ 5/16/ 2003 deals with the exceptions of the (40) officials from their duties in the ministry of education. This order will be valid from the date above mentioned.

No.	Names	Job Title
1.	(b)(6)	
2.		
3.		

Senior advisor in the ministry of education

(b)(6)

Copy to/

- Accounting directorate
- The finance and management affairs directorate
- Vocational educational general directorate
- Monitoring and inspection directorate

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COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY

BAGHDAD

INFO MEMO

September 3, 2003 0936L

FOR: THE ADMINISTRATOR

FROM: (b)(6) Leslye Arsht, Bill Evers, Senior Advisors, Ministry of Education

SUBJECT: De-Ba'athification for Schools

De-Ba'athification has been carried out in an inconsistent way at the school and local level. On 18 August, we interviewed fifteen of the twenty-one directorate generals (DGs) of the governorates, who one-by-one defined the different ways in which they had removed teachers and administrators under the May order. The DGs asked us for clear direction and expressed a preference for completing the removal of educators with Ba'athist ties. At the same time, we have repeatedly heard from commanders two strongly held preferences; (1) they primarily want to keep their soldiers safe, and (2) they want to keep their area stable. They are concerned that the removal of so many educators at once could bring danger and destabilization. It is estimated that as many as 6000 teachers at the prohibited levels remain on the job.

Governorate level personnel and several commanders suggested that local councils should decide the issue of removal. Everyone agrees that the bad actors need to be removed, but the manner in which it is done, and the large number of people affected make the decision a difficult one. The people closest to the schools are in the best position to make the decisions. It is the only way in which individual decisions can be made in a reasonably timely fashion. Time is of the essence because school in most of the country begins on October 1, and any teacher or headmaster who is removed should be replaced before the school year begins. The local councils would be instructed to review in a fair, transparent, and well-documented process every teacher and administrator determined to be a Firqah-level member in order to determine whether that person should be allowed to continue as an educator. Anyone who was higher than a Firqah-level Ba'athist would be automatically excluded from employment as a public sector educator.

Local councils can be formed quickly by having the directorate generals to select five-member boards, with majority vote prevailing. To remove an educator from employment a majority of the council members must determine that the individual by his behavior and practice in the past, as it related to their Ba'ath party membership, placed children at risk either emotionally or academically, and be willing to defend their decisions in a national appellate process. The appellate procedures, while not yet defined, should be in the hands of the Governing Council's De-Ba'athification process. An educator rejected by a local council would of necessity not be allowed to teach in a public school for at least one year. This would allow plenty of time to build the appellate process. If allowed to return upon appeal, the educator would not be allowed to return in a supervisory role.

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COORDINATION: Governance:

(b)(6)

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COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY

BAGHDAD

ACTION MEMO

FOR: THE ADMINISTRATOR

FROM: (b)(6) Director Governance Team

SUBJECT: De-Ba'athification for Schools

The de-Ba'athification policy has been an effective measure to rid the current national government structure of Ba'ath party loyalists. Local communities are now calling for local de-Ba'athification process to address specific sectors, especially the educational system. In the coming month, teachers and school administrators will need to return to school. It would be useful, and in the interests of maintaining a secure environment, to devise ways as soon as possible to reintegrate teachers and school administrators into the school system who are not tied to or advocate Ba'ath party principles. The creation of local community led de-Ba'athification councils provides a viable and sensible model for addressing de-Ba'athification, not only in the educational system, but in for other sectors of Iraqi society. There is support for this concept at the local level. Most recently, **participants** at a **conference** emphasized the immediacy of returning teachers to schools who do not have history of promoting Ba'ath party rhetoric. **Participants** recommended that a local process should be put in place to determine which teachers will return and which teachers will not.

A locally comprised de-Ba'athification system offers the following advantages:

- Local officials who would serve on *Local de-Ba'athification Councils* know their communities best and have incentives to guard their communities through making proper decisions.
- *Local de-Ba'athification Councils* can be formed **quickly**, reaching to the numerous communities facing this issue.
- Local military commanders can assist in the selection of the local councils and monitoring the process to ensure fairness.

The *Local de-Ba'athification Councils* would operate under the following parameters:

- A national procedure will regulate *Local de-Ba'athification Councils*.
- *Local de-Ba'athification Councils* sit as 5 member boards, with majority vote prevailing. The *Appellate de-Ba'athification Councils* would comprise 3 members, with majority vote prevailing.

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- Teachers and Administrators chosen for reintegrating into the educational system would hold 3 month contracts for a two year period. The contracts are automatically renewed, unless the contract is specifically revoked for cause by the *Local de-Ba 'athification Council*.
- Those not reintegrated due to Ba'ath party participation, may appeal this decision. Appellate review will be conducted by *Appellate de-Ba 'athification Councils* based in the communities.
- Teachers and Administration retained, who the community continues to allege were involved in Ba'ath party activities will reviewed by an *Appellate de-Ba 'athification Council*.
- University educators and administrators will be reviewed in the first instance by a separately formed *Local de-Ba 'athification Council for University Level Educators and Administrators*, but reviewed on Appeal by an *Appellate de-Ba 'athification Council*.
- The Governing Council should be encouraged to endorse and take ownership of the local de-Ba'athification process.

- Request establishment of *Local de-Ba 'athification Councils* to select primary through secondary school teachers.

Approve:

Disapprove:

Approve with modification

- Request establishment of *Local de-Ba 'athification Councils for University level Educators and Administrators* to address post-secondary institutions.

Approve:

Disapprove:

Approve with modification

- Request establishment of *Appellate de-Ba 'athification Council* to address all appeals arising from *Local de-Ba 'athification Councils* and *Local de-Ba 'athification Councils for University Level Educators and Administrators*.

Approve:

Disapprove:

Approve with modification

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COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY

BAGHDAD

ACTION MEMO

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(b)(6)
what is the purpose
of these reports?
How does this
fit in our
encouraging GC to
assume responsibility
for de-Ba'athification
S/2

FOR: THE ADMINISTRATOR

FROM: (b)(6) Director Governance Team

SUBJECT: De-Ba'athification for Schools

Background:

The de-Ba'athification policy has been an effective measure to rid the current national government structure of Ba'ath party loyalists. Local communities are now calling for a de-Ba'athification process to address specific sectors, especially the educational system. On 1 October, teachers and school administrators plan to return to school. In order to identify, determine, and notify educators who will and who will not be reintegrated into the school system, a process will need to be put into place, ideally by 6 September. The creation of de-Ba'athification councils with local level participation provides a viable model for addressing de-Ba'athification, not only in the educational system, but for other sectors of Iraqi society.

Ministry of Education:

Ministry of Education would make use of *Local de-Ba'athification Councils* to decide the issue of reintegration. Decisions made by the *Local de-Ba'athification Councils* can be appealed to an *Appellate de-Ba'athification Council*.

Local de-Ba'athification Councils offer the following advantages:

- Local officials who would serve on *Local de-Ba'athification Councils* know their communities best and have incentives to guard their communities through making proper decisions.
- *Local de-Ba'athification Councils* can be formed quickly, reaching to the numerous communities facing this issue.
- Local military commanders can assist in the selection of the local councils and monitoring the process to ensure fairness.

The *Local de-Ba'athification Councils* and *Appellate de-Ba'athification Councils* would operate under the following parameters:

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- The Ministry of Education will make use of Director Generals to form *Local de-Ba'athification Councils* and *Appellate de-Ba'athification Councils*.
A national procedure will regulate the Ministry of Education de-Ba'athification process.
- Sit as 5 member boards, with majority vote prevailing. The *Appellate de-Ba'athification Councils* would comprise 3 members, with majority vote prevailing.
- Educators chosen for reintegrating into the school system would hold 3 month contracts for a two year period. The contracts are automatically renewed, unless the contract is specifically revoked for cause by the *de-Ba'athification Council* making the initial decision.
- Those not reintegrated due to Ba'ath party participation, may appeal this decision. Appellate review will be conducted by *Appellate de-Ba'athification Councils*.
- Educators reintegrated into the school system may not take supervisory roles.
- Those not reintegrated due to Ba'ath party participation, may appeal this decision through a letter of exception drafted by the Ministry of Higher Education.
- Educators who the community continues to allege were involved in Ba'ath party activities will reviewed by an *Appellate de-Ba'athification Council*.

The Ministry of Higher Education:

The Ministry of Higher Education will have a separate national process from the Ministry of Education. Local level referrals will be forwarded to a national level de-Ba'athification Council.

- A national procedure will regulate the Ministry of Higher Education de-Ba'athification process.
- University educators will be reviewed in the first instance by a separately formed *Local de-Ba'athification Council for University Level Educators and Administrators*, but referred to a National de-Ba'athification Council for a final decision.
- The *Local de-Ba'athification Council for University Level Educators and Administrators* will be formed by respective University Presidents and a Ministry of Higher Education representative.
- The *Local de-Ba'athification Council for University Level Educators and Administrators* will comprise five members with a simple majority prevailing.
- The Governing Council will have initial responsibility to form a National de-Ba'athification Council that can address the Ministry of Higher Education's de-Ba'athification process.
- If the Governing Council does not form a national de-Ba'athification Council, then the Senior Advisor for the Ministry of Higher Education will oversee the formation of a National de-Ba'athification Council to make only Ministry of Higher Education de-Ba'athification determinations.
- Educators not reintegrated due to Ba'ath party participation may appeal this decision to the Appellate de-Ba'athification Council.
- Educators reintegrated into the University system may not take supervisory roles.
- Those not reintegrated due to Ba'ath party participation, may appeal this decision through a letter of exception drafted by the Ministry of Higher Education.

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Ministry of Education:

- Request establishment of *Local de-Ba'athification Councils* to select primary through secondary school teachers.

Approve:

Disapprove:

Approve with modification

- Request establishment of *Appellate de-Ba'athification Council* to address all appeals arising from *Local de-Ba'athification Councils*.

Approve:

Disapprove:

Approve with modification

Ministry of Higher Education:

- Request establishment of *Local de-Ba'athification Councils for University level Educators and Administrators* to recommend to a National de-Ba'athification Council on re-integration.

Approve:

Disapprove:

Approve with modification

- Request establishment of *National de-Ba'athification Council* to address referrals from *Local de-Ba'athification Councils for University level Educators and Administrators*.

Approve:

Disapprove:

Approve with modification:

Coordinated:

(b)(6) Ministry of Higher Education
(b)(6) Ministry of Education
(b)(6) Office of General Council

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COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY

BAGHDAD

ACTION MEMO

FOR: THE ADMINISTRATOR

FROM: (b)(6) Director Governance Team

SUBJECT: De-Ba'athification for Schools

Background:

The de-Ba'athification policy has been an effective measure to rid the current national government structure of Ba'ath party loyalists. Local communities are now calling for a de-Ba'athification process to address specific sectors, especially the educational system. On 1 October, teachers and school administrators plan to return to school. In order to identify, determine, and notify educators who will and who will not be reintegrated into the school system, a process will need to be put into place, ideally by 6 September. The creation of de-Ba'athification councils with local level participation provides a viable model for addressing de-Ba'athification, not only in the educational system, but for other sectors of Iraqi society.

Ministry of Education:

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- Those not reintegrated due to Ba'ath party participation, may appeal this decision. Appellate review will be conducted by *Appellate de-Ba'athification Councils*.
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- The *Local de-Ba'athification Council for University Level Educators and Administrators* will comprise five members with a simple majority prevailing.
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- If the Governing Council does not form a national de-Ba'athification Council, then the Senior Advisor for the Ministry of Higher Education will oversee the formation of a National de-Ba'athification Council to make only Ministry of Higher Education de-Ba'athification determinations.

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Ministry of Education:

- Request establishment of *Local de-Ba'athification Councils* to select primary through secondary school teachers.

Approve: Disapprove: Approve with modification

- Request establishment of *Appellate de-Ba'athification Council* to address all appeals arising from *Local de-Ba'athification Councils*.

Approve: Disapprove: Approve with modification

Ministry of Higher Education:

- Request establishment of *Local de-Ba'athification Councils for University level Educators and Administrators* to recommend to a National de-Ba'athification Council on re-integration.

Approve: Disapprove: Approve with modification


- Request establishment of *National de-Ba'athification Council* to address referrals from *Local de-Ba'athification Councils for University level Educators and Administrators*.

Approve: Disapprove: Approve with modification:

Coordinated:

(b)(6) Ministry of Higher Education
(b)(6) Ministry of Education
(b)(6) Office of General Council

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Ministry of Education
Iraq

Dear Employees

Based on instructions of the Iraqi Governing Counsel, the Iraqi Ministry of Education began implementing the Governing Counsel decision dated 16/5/2003 that relates to Ba'ath Party ranks. This decision covers all high-ranking Party members, who obeyed the Ba'ath Party, or who were Party leaders, including those holding more junior ranks such as "Udw (Member)" or Udw'Amil (Active Member).

This directive is directed to you if you were a member of the Party and have not yet been dismissed from employment. This decision will be implemented beginning 1 September 2003. You will receive no salary and have no employee rights after this date. Any work done after 31 August will not help you retain any rights. You should resign immediately, do not continue to go to your office, and to not use your past job title.

Upper level Party members have no right to appeal. For others, the Ministry of Education has developed the administrative steps for an appeal process.

First Step

Within two weeks of receiving this letter, dismissed employees may present documents and evidence that may help regain employment. This evidence will be reviewed in by committees in Directorates of Education.

The committee will review all appeal requests and forward its recommendations to the Ministry of Education. Employees who are approved for rehire will be informed by the Ministry of Education in writing by 1 January 2003. The letter will inform you whether you have a right to rehire and whether you are entitled to back pay from the date you were dismissed to the date of your rehire.

Employees will be required to present the following to the appeals committee:

- **Renouncement of membership in the Ba'ath Party**
- **An explanation of why and how you became a member of the Ba'ath Party and under what conditions did you become a member of a particular rank?**
- **Your employment record and an explanation all your private contacts with Ba'ath party member who worked in communications, security or military agencies.**
- **Answer whether you used the schools for propaganda for the party and to spread its ideology?**
- **State that in the future you will serve as a teacher or an administrator only for education purposes rather than for the benefit of the Ba'ath Party.**
- **Describe any criminal activity in your past?**
- **Explain why you believe your position in education is essential?**

Second Step

If your appeal is denied, you will be informed in writing by 1 January 2003. You will be advised take the next and the final step of the appeal process. Note: if there is any question about where and how to appeal, please contact the DG Office of Education in your Governorate

Minster of Education

Dr Ala'din Alwan

In the name of God the most merciful, the most graceful

**To the DGs of Education in the Governorates
Peace of God on you**

It was decided as follows:

- 1- Two decisions (1) and (2) released by the Governing Council, 14 September 2003, concern Ba'ath Party members (members of Firqah and above), who are employed in the Ministry. These employees are dismissed from employment as of the date of the decisions.**
- 2- The Ministry will form an appeals committee in each governorate to give an opportunity for those employees who have been dismissed as a result of the two decisions.**

The committee will consist of the following people:

- a- DG of Education of the Governorate (has the right to attend and discuss but not to vote)**
 - b- A well known official in the community (e.g., mayor)**
 - c- Representative from the teachers association in the governorate**
 - d- Representative of the students**
 - e- Representative of the parents**
- 3- DGs of Education should send nominations to the committee by 30 September 2003 and should base their nominations on capability and loyalty in order that the committee considers appeals objectively. The Minister of Education retains the right to review the formation of the committee and the decisions that are taken by this committee.**
 - 4- The DG must submit a complete report by 30 September 2003 concerning the number of employees covered by the two decisions so that the Ministry can fill vacancies by transferring or hiring teachers or head masters in preparation of the new academic year.**

We appreciate your efforts and I would like to thank you for your cooperation in fulfilling the Ministry's work.

**With best regards
Dr. Ala'din Alwan
Minster of Education**

24 September 2003

In the name of God the most graceful the most merciful,

To the DGs of the directorates of education in all the governorates:

1. Implement the 9/14/2003 Orders 1 and 2 of the interim Governing Council, concerning the Ministry appointees who are Ba'athist Party members of Firqah level and above. Notify them to leave their jobs from the date of their dismissal.
2. Form an appeals committee in every governorate to give an opportunity to all who have the right to ask for review in their dismissal cases.
 - a. DGs in the governorate have the right to attend and participate in discussion but not to vote.
 - b. An honest, well-known personality from the local society (city mayor)
 - c. A representative of the teachers' union in the governorate
 - d. A representative of the students
 - e. A representative of the parents' committee
3. Forward your committee nominees by 9/30/2003. Your chosen candidates should be persons who are honest, objective, and able to make the right decision at the right time with an open mind. As I'm the Minister of the Ministry of Education, I have the right to veto the selection (of committee members), committee decisions, and committee structure.
4. Transmit a full report by the end of the day of 9/30/2003 regarding the number of those who were covered by the two previous orders. This can help us to employ or transfer teachers or headmasters to fill in the needed vacancies at the beginning of the new school year. We appreciate your efforts in making this happen. Many thanks to you and your staff members for your cooperation in making the ministry's work a success.

Arsht, Leslye A. (SES)

Governorate by
Governorate

From: Ala' Alwan (b)(6) BL
Sent: Monday, December 08, 2003 8:21 AM
To: Evers, Williamson M. (SES)
Cc: Arsht, Leslye A. (SES)
Subject: RE: RE: debating teachers, part 2

We now have the complete figures on those affected by Debath. They are close to 13000. A table with accurate figures by governorate is available in my office (Jaida'). A.

>-----Original Message-----

>From: "Evers, Williamson M. (SES)" (b)(6) BL
>Sent: 11/25/03 - 02:29
>To: "Evers, Williamson M. (SES)" (b)(6) BL
>Subject: RE: RE: debating teachers, part 2

>
>If I call him in Jordan while he is there, I will warn him that I need
>this number when he gets back.

>
>I agree with you that we need to be prepared on this.

>
>The article author's predicted popular surge of pro-Baath teacher
>sentiment has not happened as yet.

>
>_____
>Dr. Bill Evers
>Senior Adviser, Ministry of Education
>Coalition Provisional Authority
>Republican Palace, Rm. S-206
>Baghdad, Iraq

>(b)(6)
>(b)(6) BL
>(b)(6) Attention: Bill Evers, Ministry of Education
>Web site: <<http://www.cpa-iraq.org/ministries/education.html>>

>_____
>U.S. Postal System mailing address:
>Bill Evers
>CPA - Ministry of Education
>APO AE 09335

>
>-----Original Message-----

>From: Kennedy, Patrick Amb
>Sent: Tuesday, November 25, 2003 11:25 AM
>To: Evers, Williamson M. (SES)
>Subject: RE: debating teachers, part 2

>
>Bill

>
>Thanx

>
>In case this story gets legs, could you try to get a number when the
>Minister returns

>
>Might need it for press responses

>
>pat

>
>-----Original Message-----

>From: Evers, Williamson M. (SES)
>Sent: Tuesday, November 25, 2003 11:13 AM

>To: Kennedy, Patrick Amb
>Cc: (b)(6)
>Subject: RE: debating teachers, part 2
>
>(b)(6) in Strategic Communications says that the UPI writer got if
>from an anonymous CIA officer in Iraq. (b)(6) tried to dissuade the
>writer but (b)(6) didn't have an alternative number. I believe Minister
>Dr.
>Ala'din Alwan has some numbers pertaining to the September
>de-Ba'athification firings, but I don't have them. They are
>certainly
>substantially lower than the UPI number. Dr. Alwan is in Jordan for
>work and for Eid vacation with his family.

>
>_____
>Dr. Bill Evers
>Senior Adviser, Ministry of Education
>Coalition Provisional Authority
>Republican Palace, Rm. S-206
>Baghdad, Iraq
>(b)(6)
>(b)(6)
>(b)(6) Attention: Bill Evers, Ministry of Education
>Web site: <<http://www.cpa-iraq.org/ministries/education.html>>
>
>U.S. Postal System mailing address:
>Bill Evers
>CPA - Ministry of Education
>APO AE 09335
>
>

>-----Original Message-----
>From: Kennedy, Patrick Amb
>Sent: Monday, November 24, 2003 10:52 PM
>To: Evers, Williamson M. (SES)
>Subject: FW: debating teachers, part 2
>
>
>

>Bill
>
>Where do you think this piece came from?
>
>

>pat
>
>

>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: (b)(6)
>> Sent: Monday, November 24, 2003 11:28 AM
>> To: (b)(6)
>> Subject: debating teachers, part 2
>>
>>

>> G2K member (b)(6) has written an article for UPI which
>> begins: American's top man in Baghdad, L. Paul Bremer, last
>> week
>> fired 28,000 Iraqi teachers as political punishment for their
>> former
>> membership in the Saddam Hussein-dominated Baath Party, fueling
>> anti-U.S. resistance on the ground, administration officials have
>> told
>>
>> United Press International. A Central Command spokesman, speaking
>> to
>> UPI from Baghdad, acknowledged that the firings had taken place
>> but
>> said the figure of 28,000 "is too high." He was unable,

**Republic of Iraq
Ministry Of Education
Minister's Office**

No. 63

Date: Jan. 25, 2004

**To: Director Generals of Education
Subject: DE-BA'ATHIFICATION OF IRAQI SOCIETY**

Greetings:

Following the Governing Council's orders on de-Ba'athification (Orders No. 1 and 2, dated 14 September 2003) and the Ministry of Education's Announcement No. 3353, dated 25 September 2003, we have received further instructions from the Governing Council.

Ba'ath Party members of in the fourth tier (Group, Firqah) who were removed from their positions have two options:

1. If the employee agrees to retire, the pension will be based on degree, years of service, and the laws pertaining to pension and civil service.
2. If the employee decides to appeal his removal, he renounces his rights to a pension in the event his appeal is denied.

Attached are the procedures for appeal.

Please take the necessary actions to inform your employees.

**Dr. Ala'ldin Alwan
Minister of Education**

Processes for Appeal of Dismissal Under De-Ba'thification

1. Ba'ath Party members in the top three tiers of the organization have no right to appeal.
2. Local committees will be established in all governorates to examine objections to any results of the appeals process.
3. The Director General of Education (DG) in each governorate will be a member of the local committee but will have no right to vote. The DG will appoint qualified candidates for the local committee.
4. The Minister of Education has the right to approve the candidates appointed to the local committee.
5. An individual who was in the Group (Firqah) tier of the Ba'ath Party can appeal to the local committee within two weeks of the dismissal order.
6. The local committee has the right to ask the appellant to appear before the committee.
7. If the employee appeals his dismissal, he will need to present to the local committee evidence that he was not in one of the top three tiers of the Ba'ath Party. The local committee will consider whether the employee has renounced his membership in the Party, the circumstances that led the employee to join the Party, and the circumstances that allowed the employee to rise to the level of Group (Firqah) Member. The local committee will also consider the employee's personnel record and career history; whether the employee had any relationships with the military, or intelligence, or security agencies; whether the employee contributed to the Ba'ath Party's goals or whether the employee has a criminal background. The committee may also consider whether the employee possesses a special skill and could not be easily replaced.

Arsht, Leslye (OTHER)

Commercial - yes

From: (b)(6)

Sent: Wednesday, January 28, 2004 11:43 PM

To: Arsht, Leslye (OTHER); (b)(6)

Cc: (b)(6)

Subject: RE: Microsoft Follow-up

Greetings Leslye,

Thanks for your mail, I will follow your advice and link up tomorrow evening with you after your DB meeting!

Is the web master an employee of MOE? I will send for the MOE a FrontPage Package, just send me his mailing address where to I can DHL a package. I could possibly send it to your address below....

Look forward to talking to you... I have enclosed below my mobile number, call me any time, the line is open for you.

(b)(6)

Thanks for the intro.

Thanks and have fun

Best regards

(b)(6)

Sincerely

(b)(6)

Business Development Manager, Iraq
Microsoft Middle East

(b)(6)

Time Zone: GMT + 4

Words of wisdom by Osensei Morihei Ueshiba "Masakatsu Agatsu: True Victory is Victory over the self"

From: Arsht, Leslye (OTHER); (b)(6)

Sent: Wednesday, January 28, 2004 9:30 PM

To: (b)(6)

Cc:

Subject: RE: Microsoft Follow-up

Hello, (b)(6) and (b)(6)! I'm still in the office if you want to call tonight; tomorrow is fully booked in the daytime but again I'll be free in the evening... we work all the time here, so don't hesitate to call whenever. Now, that I think of it, I am actually going to a "database" meeting tomorrow afternoon (1:30) so waiting until after that might actually make sense. I'm very much looking forward to following up our conversation.

On another topic, and at the risk of sounding silly, I've just been told that the Ministry of Education Webmaster needs (and doesn't have) MS Frontpage. Is it available in Iraq?

Thanks,

1/29/2004



COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY
BAGHDAD

INFO MEMO

February 10, 2004

TO: Leslye Arsht, Senior Advisor, Ministry of Education
FROM: (b)(6) Deputy Senior Advisor, Ministry of Education
RE: Procedures for Appealing De-Ba'athification

Please find enclosed:

- CPA Order No. 1: De-Ba'athification of Iraqi Society. 16 May 2003
- Memorandum No. 7: Delegation of Authority Under De-Ba'athification Order No. 1
- Procedures for De-Ba'athification of Iraqi Public Sector Personnel—Proposed by the Governing Council's Higher National De-Ba'athification Commission (Ahmad Chalabi), not a Governing Council Regulation. *Establishes appeals procedures.*
- 2003 September letter from Dr. Ala'din Alwan, Minister of Education, directed to Director Generals of Education, establishing conditions for dismissal and procedures for appeal. Attached to letter was a policy directive that Directors General were to distribute to Ministry of Education employees (see below).
- 2003 September Policy Directive from Dr. Ala'din Alwan to Ministry of Education Employees.

Arsht, Leslye (SES)

From: (b)(6)
Sent: Sunday, March 14, 2004 9:53 PM
To: Arsht, Leslye (SES)
Subject: RE: De-Ba'athification and education

For my clarification (many of these issues are still very new to me):

The GC wants the ministry to reconsider granting appeals that were denied or vice versa? The GC asked the ministry to form this committee and now wants to approve the committee's members? The timeline of 30 days is to accomplish what?

I should tell you that we will be likely be recommending that LPB send a letter to the GC on a range of problems related to the De-Ba'ath issue. I will need to work with you to ensure that the issues in the education sector are framed properly.

Thanks, (b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: Arsht, Leslye (SES)
Sent: Sunday, March 14, 2004 9:41 PM
To: (b)(6)
Cc: (b)(6);
(b)(6)
Subject: RE: De-Ba'athification and education

I was able to talk to the Minister of Education about this tonight. First, and importantly, he has been in ongoing communication in recent days with the GC and the De'Bathification Commission about this issue. The GC is not moving fast enough and needs to be encouraged to take systematic action to resolve reinstatements.

The GC asked the Ministry to create a new 10 member committee to reconsider some of the appeals and the MoE has done that. Now, the Minister requests that the GC approve these committee members and allow the committee to do this work. (b)(6) the Minister suggested a timeline of 30 days... any help from Governance will be appreciated.

Leslye

Leslye A. Arsht
Senior Advisor, Education Ministry
Republican Palace Rm S-206
Baghdad, Iraq
e-mail: (b)(6) 36

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6)
Sent: Sunday, March 14, 2004 9:13 PM
To: (b)(6)
Cc: (b)(6); Arsht, Leslye (SES); (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Subject: RE: De-Ba'athification and education

In Kirkuk, the Department of Education established a special committee for de-Baathification back in October, as instructed by the Ministry. The committee consisted of four individuals (from the different ethnicities), selected on the basis of competence and professionalism, and approved by the Governor as well as the Ministry.

Out of the 550+ teachers who were de-Baathed, 400 lodged appeals, and 397 of those appeals were approved. The files were sent down to Baghdad. All this was completed by 6 December, as ordered.

Arsht, Leslye (SES)

From: (b)(6)
Sent: Sunday, March 14, 2004 9:57 PM
To: Arsht, Leslye (SES)
Subject: RE: De-Ba'athification and education

Leslye --

One other question on this issue. Do you know where the question stands of getting those reinstated employees in Kirkuk back on the Ministry payroll? Is that something that the Ministry of Finance needs to do?

Thanks, (b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: Arsht, Leslye (SES)
Sent: Sunday, March 14, 2004 9:41 PM
To: (b)(6)
Cc: (b)(6);
(b)(6)
Subject: RE: De-Ba'athification and education

I was able to talk to the Minister of Education about this tonight. First, and importantly, he has been in ongoing communication in recent days with the GC and the De'Bathification Commission about this issue. The GC is not moving fast enough and needs to be encouraged to take systematic action to resolve reinstatements.

The GC asked the Ministry to create a new 10 member committee to reconsider some of the appeals and the MoE has done that. Now, the Minister requests that the GC approve these committee members and allow the committee to do this work. (b)(6) the Minister suggested a timeline of 30 days... any help from Governance will be appreciated.

Leslye

Leslye A. Arsht
Senior Advisor, Education Ministry
Republican Palace Rm S-206
Baghdad, Iraq
e-mail: (b)(6) 136

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6)
Sent: Sunday, March 14, 2004 9:13 PM
To: (b)(6)
Cc: (b)(6); Arsht, Leslye (SES); (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Subject: RE: De-Ba'athification and education

In Kirkuk, the Department of Education established a special committee for de-Baathification back in October, as instructed by the Ministry. The committee consisted of four individuals (from the different ethnicities), selected on the basis of competence and professionalism, and approved by the Governor as well as the Ministry.

Out of the 550+ teachers who were de-Baathed, 400 lodged appeals, and 397 of those appeals were approved. The files were sent down to Baghdad. All this was completed by 6 December, as ordered.

However, it appears that none of those whose appeals were approved have been put back on the payroll.

Hawija was particularly hard-hit by the process, with all teachers in at least one school being de-Ba'athified. In order to ensure that schools could stay open, the Coalition found means of providing income to those teachers whose appeals were approved. This was conceived as a temporary measure until they were put back on the payroll. It also served to ensure that teachers could support their families and improved relations between the Coalition and the community.

The Governor of Salah al-Din (who has since been removed) issued a statement saying that in consultation with the CPA and CF, all firqa level teachers were forgiven and were to return to work. This letter is often quoted in Kirkuk. However, the Governor had no powers to issue such an order, and the teachers in Salah al-Din are not back on the payroll.

(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6)
Sent: Sunday, March 14, 2004 1:23 PM
To: (b)(6)
Cc: (b)(6); Arsht, Leslye (SES); (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Subject: RE: De-Ba'athification and education

(b)(6)

many thanks. A delegation from Hawijah came to see me today, comprising (b)(6), Hawijah representative on Kirkuk Provincial Council, (b)(6), (b)(6), al-Zaab representative on Kirkuk Provincial Council. Also Lt-Col (b)(6) CO of the CF in Hawijah. They gave me a copy of a letter from the de-Ba'athification Committee in Tikrit instructing the Education Director to continue the employment of former Ba'ath Party members until otherwise instructed. They asked the very reasonable question that if an exemption can be made there, why not in Kirkuk?

(b)(6)

--- (b)(6) >

wrote:

> (b)(6): The Ministry of Education was
> authorized by the GC to
> establish its own De-Ba'athification Committee (see attached). Please
> do not do anything about the situation in Kirkuk until
> Leslye Arsht, senior
> advisor to the Ministry, talks to Minister Ala'din
> Alwan. The Minister
> has consulted frequently with GC members and the
> d-Ba'ath committee.
>
> This is Leslye's and my personal opinion, but we
> like the renouncement
> ceremony as it was done in Mosul and would like to
> see it done
> elsewhere.
>
> BTW, please add Leslye Arsht to your Senior Advisor
> list. I am deputy.
> Also, (b)(6) is no longer with the Senior
> Advisor's office,
> although she might have some input on the issue in
> Kirkuk.
>
> (b)(6)
> Deputy Senior Advisor, Ministry of Education
> Republican Palace S206, Baghdad Iraq
> APO AE 09316

> (b)(6) [REDACTED] B6

> -----Original Message-----

> From: (b)(6) [REDACTED] B6

> Sent: Friday, March 12, 2004 11:53 PM

> To: (b)(6) [REDACTED]

> Cc: (b)(6) [REDACTED]

> (b)(6) [REDACTED]

> Subject: Re: De-Ba'athification

> [REDACTED] (b)(6)

> In Kirkuk, de-Ba'athification is handled by a

> sub-Committee of Kirkuk Provincial Council headed by

> an Assistant Mayor. The staff of this committee are

> paid at the Iraqi government rate using seized

> Ba'ath

> Party assets. Kirkuk suffered particularly from

> policies of the Ba'ath regime, and the committee has

> taken an uncompromising line. This has created some problems.

> In Hawijah, the main Sunni district of Kirkuk

> Province, virtually all the teachers were Ba'ath

> Party

> members at firqah level or above, and were sacked by

> the de-Ba'athification committee. Had this been

> implemented, all the schools would have had to

> close.

> The ethnic tensions in Kirkuk mean that the local

> population would not have accepted Kurdish, Turcoman

> or Shia teachers. Nor would any have been foolish

> enough to accept a transfer. Fearing the prospect

> of

> tens of thousands of irate parents in a community

> already hostile to the Coalition, CF decided to

> re-hire the teachers as janitors (who happen to be

> remarkably good in the classroom). They paid them

> from

> CERP.

> This inventive solution has, of course, caused a

> problem with the de-Ba'athification committee. Also

> with a group of teachers who resigned under Saddam,

> who resent the fact that they receive no pension,

> while "sacked" teachers are being paid by CF. Nor

> is

> it sustainable in the long-term. The only realistic

> solution is to train and/or employ enough Sunni

> teachers who will be acceptable to the community in

> Hawijah.

> The other problem is with ex-military. To defend

> against the Kurds, the former Iraqi Army had a very

> large presence in Kirkuk. There are now tens of

> thousands of ex-military in the Province, many of

> whom

> are unemployed. To enhance their job prospects,

> they

> would like CPA to organise public meetings at which

> they could renounce the Ba'ath Party and swear

> allegiance to the new Iraq (as was done in

> neighbouring Mosul).

> I hope this gives you enough to go on. (b)(6) [REDACTED]

> should be able to tell you more.

> (b)(6)
>
>
>
> --- (b)(6)
> (b)(6) wrote: ↑
> > We met March 8 with (b)(6) Director
> > General of the Supreme
> > National Commission for De-Ba'athification.
> > (b)(6) said the
> > Commission had been up and running since early
> > February. Their work
> > still seems somewhat disorganized and their
> policies
> > inconsistent. We
> > have numerous issues to clarify with (b)(6),
> > including the procedures
> > for establishing local committees in the
> provinces,
> > their role, and
> > their relationship with the Supreme Commission in
> > Baghdad, as well as
> > the Commission's plans for dealing with the
> > education sector and the
> > military. We will be meeting with (b)(6) and
> his
> > colleagues further
> > this week. In the meantime, I know that several
> GCs
> > have sent in
> > e-mails on this issue, particularly in an effort
> to
> > clarify what the
> > Commission's procedures are. We are keen to get a
> > handle on the impact
> > of de-Ba'athification and the work of the De-Ba'athification
> > Commissions, particularly in the provinces. I
> would
> > appreciate your
> > views in a form that I can incorporate into a note
> > for Amb. Bremer along
> > with a set of recommendations for how we should be
> > engaging
> > de-Ba'athification officials over the next few
> > months.
>
>
>
> > Many thanks,
>
>
>
> > (b)(6)
> > CPA/Governance
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> Do you Yahoo!?
> Yahoo! Search - Find what you're looking for faster
> <http://search.yahoo.com>
>

> ATTACHMENT part 2 application/msword
name=debaath3.doc

> ATTACHMENT part 3 application/msword
name=debathification2.doc

Do you Yahoo!?

Yahoo! Mail - More reliable, more storage, less spam <http://mail.yahoo.com>

~~ARSHT, LESLYE (SES)~~

From: (b)(6)
Sent: Saturday, March 13, 2004 3:49 PM
To: (b)(6)
Cc: Arsht, Leslye (SES)
Subject: RE: De-Ba'athification

From what I have seen thus far, the process of filing appeals seems to be proceeding rather chaotically. I have met several times with the DG of the National De-Ba'athification Commission. They are apparently replacing the local review commissions set up in various provinces with committees appointed by the National Commission. All decisions by the local committees are to be reviewed by the national commission. His national commission has only been operating for about a month, and there are already signs that their efforts are designed to make the local commissions set up by various ministry DGs less politically independent.

Amb. Bremer has said that his priority is getting teachers back to work, something that the DG of the national commission says he shares. Still, the appeals have been going slowly, few teachers have returned to work, and the efforts of the national commission to meddle in the make-up of the appeals committees is only slowing things down and engendering ill will.

I'd be interested in what has happened thus far in the education field. Making things work in education may require some heavy lifting by Bremer with the GC.

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6)
Sent: Saturday, March 13, 2004 3:08 PM
To: (b)(6)
Cc: (b)(6); Arsht, Leslye (SES)
Subject: RE: De-Ba'athification

(b)(6): The Ministry of Education was authorized by the GC to establish its own De-Ba'athification Committee (see attached). Please do not do anything about the situation in Kirkuk until Leslye Arsht, senior advisor to the Ministry, talks to Minister Ala'din Alwan. The Minister has consulted frequently with GC members and the d-Ba'ath committee.

This is Leslye's and my personal opinion, but we like the renouncement ceremony as it was done in Mosul and would like to see it done elsewhere.

BTW, please add Leslye Arsht to your Senior Advisor list. I am deputy. Also, (b)(6) is no longer with the Senior Advisor's office, although she might have some input on the issue in Kirkuk.

(b)(6)
Deputy Senior Advisor, Ministry of Education
Republican Palace S206, Baghdad Iraq
APO AE 09316

(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6)
Sent: Friday, March 12, 2004 11:53 PM
To: (b)(6)
Cc: (b)(6)
Subject: RE: De-Ba'athification

(b)(6),

In Kirkuk, de-Ba'athification is handled by a

[redacted] It handed [redacted] the [redacted] committee [redacted] seized Ba'ath [redacted] particularly from [redacted] and the committee has [redacted] This has created some [redacted]

illegible

In Hawijah, the main Sunni district of Kirkuk Province, virtually all the teachers were Ba'ath Party members at fifth level or above, and were sacked by the de-Ba'athification committee. Had this been implemented, all the schools would have had to close. The ethnic tensions in Kirkuk mean that the local population would not have accepted Kurdish, Turcoman or Shia teachers. Nor would any have been foolish enough to accept a transfer. Fearing the prospect of tens of thousands of irate parents in a community already hostile to the Coalition, CF decided to re-hire the teachers as janitors (who happen to be remarkably good in the classroom). They paid them from OHRF.

This inventive solution has, of course, caused a problem with the de-Ba'athification committee. Also with a group of teachers who resigned under Saddam, who resent the fact that they receive no pension, while "sacked" teachers are being paid by CF. Nor is it sustainable in the long-term. The only realistic solution is to train and/or employ enough Sunni teachers who will be acceptable to the community in Hawijah.

The other problem is with ex-military. To defend against the Kurds, the former Iraqi Army had a very large presence in Kirkuk. There are now tens of thousands of ex-military in the Province, many of whom are unemployed. To enhance their job prospects, they would like CPA to organize public meetings at which they could renounce the Ba'ath Party and swear allegiance to the new Iraq (as was done in neighbouring Mosul).

I hope this gives you enough to go on. [redacted] should be able to tell you more.

[redacted]

[redacted] " [redacted] wrote: [redacted] We met March 8 with [redacted] Director > General of the Supreme > National Commission for De-Ba'athification. > [redacted] said the > Commission had been up and running since early > February. Their work > still seems somewhat disorganized and their policies inconsistent. We > have numerous issues to clarify with [redacted], > including the procedures > for establishing local committees in the provinces, > their role, and > their relationship with the Supreme Commission in > Baghdad, as well as > the Commission's plans for dealing with the > education sector and the

illegible

[redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted] In the meantime, I know that several GCs
[redacted] have been in
[redacted] details on this issue, particularly in an effort to
[redacted] clarify what the
[redacted] Commission's procedures are. We are keen to get a
[redacted] handle on the impact
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[redacted] De-Ba'athification
[redacted] Commissions, particularly in the provinces. I would
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[redacted] for Amb. Bremer along
[redacted] with a set of recommendations for how we should be
[redacted] engaging
[redacted] de-Ba'athification officials over the next few
[redacted] months.
>
>
>
> Many thanks, [redacted]
>
>
>
> (b)(6)
> [redacted]
> CPA/Governance
>
>

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COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY

BAGHDAD

25 April 2004

From Bremer

The Honorable
Dr. Ala'addeen Al Alwan
Minister of Education
Baghdad

Dear Dr. Al Alwan:

Thank you for your assistance in formulating and facilitating the de-Ba'athification initiative I outlined in my April 23 speech. I believe that these steps will go a long way toward ensuring that the de-Ba'athification process is implemented fairly and expeditiously.

We are counting on your efforts in the coming days to ensure that those teachers whose appeals have already been heard and approved are returned to the Ministry of Education payroll, that those who opted for pensions begin receiving their pensions as soon as possible, and that local de-Ba'athification Review Committees are constituted as necessary and appeals from former firqa-level teachers who have not yet made appeals are heard quickly.

As you implement these steps, I would like to request some detailed information that will help us assess the impact of these measures. Specifically, I would like data on the numbers of previously dismissed employees by region and job category that are being returned to the Ministry payroll, your estimate of when that will happen, as well as an estimate of how many of those will be able to return to actual teaching jobs and when they will start teaching. Likewise, we would like figures on the number of dismissed teachers who had opted to retire and receive a pension rather than pursue an appeal. For these cases, you will need to forward the names to the Pension Department at the Ministry of Finance. We have been in contact with the Finance Minister on this issue, and they are prepared to process these cases and begin their pension payments quickly.

In provinces where De-Ba'athification Review Committees were never formed, dismissed Ministry employees had no opportunity to file an appeal. In these provinces, you will need to instruct your Directors General to form De-Ba'athification Review Committees and they should be instructed to hear any remaining appeals from dismissed Ministry of Education employees within 20 days. Some provinces may formerly have had De-Ba'athification Review Committees that are no longer operational, but now need to be reconstituted to hear any residual appeals from dismissed employees. I am attaching a copy of the Iraqi Public Sector De-Ba'athification Procedures which detail the procedures for establishment of these local committees. Our CPA representatives in each province stand ready to assist your Directors General in doing so.

Your cooperation and support on this effort are vital to its success and will have a major impact on the credibility and effectiveness of the entire de-Ba'athification process. I look forward to hearing from you soon on the progress made on the return of eligible

teachers to the Ministry payroll and your thoughts on other ways to increase the fairness and effectiveness of de-Ba'athification.

Sincerely,

L. Paul Bremer III
Administrator

PROCEDURES FOR DE-BA'ATHIFICATION OF THE IRAQI PUBLIC SECTOR

I. Authority

1. On April 16, 2003, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) under CPA Order Number 1 disestablished the Ba'ath Party of Iraq. That order authorized the elimination of the Party's structures and the removal of its leadership from positions of authority.
2. Consistent with CPA Order Number 1 and pursuant to the authority delegated in CPA Memorandum Number 7, the Governing Council hereby establishes the following procedures for use in de-Ba'athification of the Iraqi public sector and delegates authority to the Higher National De-Ba'athification Commission ("the Commission"), to carry out the de-Ba'athification of Iraq's public sector.

II. Scope

1. The de-Ba'athification procedures described below apply to Senior Ba'ath Party members who are employees of the Government of Iraq, including ministries, state-owned enterprises and other government institutions. Senior Ba'ath Party members are defined as any Ba'ath Party members in the top four tiers of the organization: Regional Command (Qutriya), Branch (Fir), Section (Shu'bah), and Group (Firqah).
2. The measures applicable to senior Ba'ath party members are also applicable to individuals holding positions in the three highest administrative tiers if these people are of the rank of Member or Active Member of the Ba'ath party. Therefore, references made in these regulations to senior Ba'ath Party officials also apply to those in the three highest administrative tiers if these people are of the rank of Member or Active Member of the Ba'ath Party.
3. These procedures do not apply to Ba'ath Party members below the rank of Firqah who are not in the top three layers of management in government.

III. Identification

1. The Commission will review available Ba'ath Party files to identify all employees who are senior Ba'ath Party members. The Commission will provide information on senior Ba'ath Party members to Ministers and heads of state-owned entities and other government institutions.
2. Ministers and heads of state-owned enterprises and other government institutions will use material provided to them by the Commission and other relevant information including salary, financial and other relevant documentation to identify Senior Ba'ath Party members.

IV. Procedures for Iraqi Government Ministries

A. Dismissal

1. Ministers shall instruct each governorate and Baghdad district Director General of the Ministry ("Directors General") to identify and immediately remove from their positions all Senior Ba'ath Party members by using information provided by the Commission, the Ministry, or other relevant information available to the Director General.
2. The Directors General must issue each dismissed employee a dated letter stating the reason for dismissal and providing information regarding the appeals process. .
3. The Directors General will send a report on dismissed employees to their relevant Minister with a copy to the Commission.

B. Appeals

1. Employees who are dismissed because they are Ba'ath Party members above the rank of firqah have no rights of appeal.
2. A dismissed employee who is a firqah-level Ba'ath Party member, or who is in the top three layers of management at any Party level, has a right to appeal, and must make a decision between: (a) pursuing an appeal and forfeiting the right to a pension; or (b) accepting a pension and forfeiting the right to appeal. The pension shall be equivalent to that of a similarly situated non-firqah or non-Party employee in the same ministry. If an appeal is granted, the individual will regain their right to a pension, but at a level of a similarly situated non-firqah employee in the same ministry.
3. There are two levels of administrative appeals in ascending order of consideration: (a) a local De-Ba'athification Review Committee (DRC); and, (b) the National Higher De-Ba'athification Commission.
4. Ministers shall instruct Directors General to form local DRCs in his or her governorate or the Baghdad district.
5. Each Director General shall be an ex officio non-voting member of the DRC in his or her governorate or district, and shall appoint persons to serve on the DRC who are respected within the community, have a reputation for fairness, and are willing to consider appeals with an open mind.

(a) The Minister or the Commission may review the appointments to DRCs by Directors General within the Ministry and veto any such appointments.

(b) Employees who are dismissed under the procedures set forth herein and who desire to appeal must present their intention to appeal in writing along with a written letter setting forth the basis of appeal along with any relevant accompanying documentation to the DRC within two weeks of the date of service of the dismissal notice. A Director General may make an exception to this deadline only if warranted by compelling factual circumstances.

(c) Employees who appeal have the right to present evidence in writing. The DRC may request the dismissed employee to appear in person. .

(d) If the employee is appealing to reverse the factual finding that he or she was a senior Ba'ath Party member, the DRC will consider all relevant and appropriate facts and documentary evidence, whether submitted by the employee or independently received.

(e) If the employee has been properly identified as a senior Ba'ath Party member and is appealing to obtain an exception to the de-Ba'athification policy; the DRC can consider, among other things, the following information:

- (1) whether the employee has renounced Ba'ath party membership;
- (2) the circumstances under which the employee became a Ba'ath Party member and attained Firqah-level;
- (3) a full employment history, including links to Ba'athist military, intelligence or security services;
- (4) whether the employee's work was dominated by efforts designed to advance the Ba'athist agenda;
- (5) any criminal activities by the employee; and
- (6) whether the employee performed an indispensable and irreplaceable function within the Ministry organization.

(g) A DRC shall prepare a file on each case considered and issue a written decision within six weeks of presentation of an appeal.

(h) A DRC shall provide the relevant Minister and the Commission with a report of the cases it reviews and shall forward their files to the Commission.

(i) The Minister or the Commission reserves the right to review all decisions made by DRCs.

6. An employee may appeal any adverse decision of the DRC to the Commission. Appeals to the Commission must be presented within two weeks of service of the written decision of the DRC. The Chairman of the Commission may make an exception to this deadline only if warranted by compelling circumstances.

7. The Commission shall hear appeals of decisions of the De-Ba'athification Review Committees within the various Ministries.

(a) Employees who appeal have the right to present evidence in person or in writing. The Commission may request the individual to appear in person.

(b) In deciding appeals, the Commission shall use the same criteria established for the De-Ba'athification Review Committees in these Procedures.

(c) The Commission shall issue a written decision within six weeks of presentation of an appeal.

(d) A panel of two judges nominated by the Council of Judges and approved by the Governing Council or Successor Government to the Governing Council will sit with the Commission for appellate review. One of the two judges must agree on the appellate decision and sign the written decision.

C. Exceptions

1. Exceptions to the de-Ba'athification policy shall be granted: (a) for life; or, (b) on a one-year probationary basis. Exceptions granted on a probationary basis are subject to revocation upon:

(a) a determination by either the DRC or the Commission that an employee provided materially false or misleading information during the appeal process; or

(b) discovery of additional information, not reasonably available at the time the exception was granted that raises reasonable concern that the exception would not have been granted if this information was available at the time the decision for exception was made.

(c) a determination, based on reliable evidence, by the DRC or the Commission that granted the exception that the employee has engaged in Ba'athist activity or criminal conduct during the probationary period.

2. The Ministry whose DRC grants an exception to the de-Ba'athification policy on a probationary basis shall be responsible for monitoring the employee and immediately reporting any information that could serve as a basis for revoking the exception to the attention of the DRC and the Commission.

3. The Commission shall provide two-weeks advance notice, with explanation, to the individual if, after one year, the Commission decides to revoke probationary status.

4. There will be no further appeal for individuals whose probationary status is revoked.

V. Procedures for State-Owned Enterprises and other Government Institutions

The procedures outlined above for Ministries shall also apply to state-owned enterprises and other government institutions (such as hospitals). Each head of a state-owned enterprise and other government institution shall delegate to its appropriate governorate or sub-office the responsibility for dismissal, forming DRCs, issuing denials or exceptions and filing appeals to the Commission, using the procedures established above. Reports should be submitted to the head of the enterprise/institution and the Commission.

VI. Special Provisions for Prisoners of War (POWs)

1. It is the intent of the Commission to ensure that individuals who acquired firqah status merely as a result of being held as a POW in the Iran-Iraq War should retain their employment.
2. An individual seeking an exception as a POW to the de-Ba'athification process outlined herein must submit documentation to the Commission demonstrating that he or she was:
 - (a) held as a POW by Iran during the period September 4, 1980, through June 1, 2003 and/or released and repatriated to Iraq by Iran after being held in that status; and
 - (b) granted firqah status following his or her release and repatriation to Iraq and because of his or her status as a former POW.
3. The Commission will establish (a) the factual status of the applicant and (b) make a determination on a request for an exception based on his or her POW status.
4. There is no right to appeal a factual determination of POW status by the Commission. Individuals ~~denied~~ a special exception as a POW can appeal within two weeks upon service of the decision through the DRC process in his or her Ministry, state-owned enterprise or government institution.
5. The Commission will accept applications for the POW exception beginning ????. Applications should be dated and include full contact information and documentary evidence from the applicant. The Commission will inform the applicant in writing of the Commission's decision within six weeks.

VII. General Provisions

1. If an appeal at any level results in an employee's reinstatement, the employee shall be awarded back pay from the date of dismissal to the date of reinstatement
2. Information gathered at any point during the de-Ba'athification process that indicates possible criminal activity by employees, whether senior Ba'ath Party members or not, shall be provided to the appropriate investigative court. Mere membership in the Ba'ath Party is not grounds for referral to an investigative court.
3. Ministers, governors and concerned officials not under the jurisdiction of a ministry must execute de-Ba'athification orders thirty days after they are issued. Failing that, the ~~commission~~ will undertake the execution of such de-Ba'athification orders. Officials who have failed to comply will be answerable under the law.



COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY
BAGHDAD

April 27, 2004

TO: The Administrator

FROM: (b)(6), Governance

THROUGH: (b)(6), Governance

SUBJECT: Rehiring Teachers Fired for Political Reasons

According to the Ministry of Education, approximately 20,000 teachers were fired by the previous regime for political reasons. The Ministry has a program of rehiring them, and about 9,800 have been put back on the Ministry payroll over the past year. The Ministry of Education accords priority to those who suffered (or whose families' suffered) the most under Saddam. Because many of these teachers have been out of the profession for a long time, they are being given training. Many others had been out of work for 10 years or more, are nearing retirement age, and want to come back on the payroll only briefly to benefit from the higher salaries and thus the higher pensions.

With the exception of some southern provinces, there is currently no real teacher shortage in Iraq, though many teachers badly need training.

In your interviews today and in the future, you might want to take the opportunity to clarify that our de-Ba'ath policy has not changed, but the appeals process for teachers has been accelerated. Regarding teachers who were never in the Ba'ath Party, you might say:

- The Ministry of Education estimates that there are now approximately 20,000 teachers who were fired by Saddam's regime for political reasons, including for rejection the Ba'athist ideology they were forced to teach. In many cases, they were fired not because of what they did themselves, but in retribution for actions allegedly taken by members of their family.
- The Ministry has a program to rehire as many of these teachers as possible. Priority is given to those who suffered most grievously under the previous regime and those whose firing cause their families the greatest hardship.
- Thus far, approximately 9,800 have been returned to the Ministry payroll and the Ministry is doing its best to rehire many more.
- The Coalition recognizes that simply rehiring teachers is not enough. We are working closely with the Ministry of Education to provide modern teacher training and curriculum development that will be vital for Iraq's long-term economic and social development.

QUESTIONS & ANSWERS

Q: What does the "transition" mean to the Iraqi Minister's authority?

A: The Ministry has entered its final stage toward sovereignty. The Iraqi Education Ministry is now virtually autonomous and has been for some time... represented by the Sr. Advisor giving advice as asked rather than giving direction.

In order to reach this stage/milestone the Ministry has developed:

- Short and long-term strategic plans;
- A budget based on that plan;
- The Ministry is reorganized to meet these priorities;
- Fundamental management systems are being put in place e.g. EMIS and,
- A system of checks and balances to deter and root out corruption.

Q: There are many teachers still trying to get back to work what is the Ministry doing about this?

For De'Ba'thification we have an appeals process that has been established by the GC, if employees successfully appeal they are re-instated; those with longer service can retire rather than appeal. The politically-returned teachers are a harder case... there are many more of them than we can re-instate so we have established criteria for considering those who can be returned to fill vacancies.

Q: You had national conference on curriculum reform. Can you tell us what was decided?

A: We started last October with a national dialogue covering the philosophical aspects of the education system; Governors in many of the Governorates held their own meetings around the document developed in the Ministry .. this document has a series of questions for consideration and the discussion and feedback came from many sectors of Iraq... civic, religious and political. At the conference this week, we examined that feedback and also presented a framework and process for undertaking reform of the curriculum. On curriculum reform, we adopted three principles:

- 1) that the process be evidenced-based
- 2) that we consider international experience (we can afford to learn from other country's mistakes); and
- 3) that the process will be completely Iraqi-led.

Q: What did the conference recommend?

A: There are two kinds of recommendations... one that we will follow a series of steps (or process) that are publicly available for people to observe and participate in and ... there are key questions raised around which some consensus is forming and we can start implementing.

Q: How will the curriculum change for next year? How will the Coalition will be treated – as Liberators or Occupiers

A: A Ministry Workshop has decided to work on an interim curriculum for civics, religion, and history. Well, the reality is that they are both and reality is what will be taught.

Q: What is the most important thing the Coalition has done for the Education Ministry?

A: ?

Q: What is the most difficult issue facing the Ministry?

- **A:** There are many difficult issues but things are easier to deal with when you have a plan. We can get 10,000 schools repaired in four years if we have the financial means to do it. We need to provide professional development to our teachers and we have begun that process, now. We will look to partners like the British Council, UNESCO and World Bank to support these efforts. We have to build in incentives for parents to put children back in school and for the system to keep them there.

Q: It is said that the Ministry is administratively top-heavy? Has a shadow workforce? How is that being addressed?

A: We are looking at the entire organization to find people who are underemployed who can do other things. We will continue to do this. We also must look to more structural answers and we are beginning conversations on these subjects inside the Ministry.

Q: What about fraud/corruption in Iraqi Government ministries?

A. For Alwan: This is a subject that is very important to me. The Inspector General of the Ministry of Education Inspector General has just begun to work with us. We expect that he will take a broad look at Ministry programs and policies to ensure that they are being implemented as intended. The objective is to deter and root out future corruption.

- For Bremer: Allegations of misallocation of funds within an Iraqi Government Ministry should be reported to the Iraqi Government's Board of Supreme Audit and also to the Inspector General. We are in the process of appointing these to all Ministries. Their role is to maintain oversight, ensure financial compliance procedures are followed and investigate allegations of corruption.
- The newly established Iraqi Commission on Public Integrity may also investigate allegations of corruption.

Dear Ambassador Bremer

I refer to our telephone conversation yesterday evening.

I have been discussing debathification with people representing various sectors of the Iraqi community over the last few months. The difficulties I have with the debathification process as it is operating now are the following:

- A large number of families rendered without income because of debathification; many of those affected had joined the party for higher salaries and supplemental income and some were forced to join for various reasons
- Some institutions losing a large number of staff with an adverse effect on services (for the education sector this basically applies to just two governorates: Diyala and Salaheddin; no major problems reported from other governorates)
- Voices (inside and outside Iraq) expressing concern about the lack of adequate legal basis for depriving people of their jobs and source of income
- Views that the vast majority of those affected can be safely integrated into the new Iraq and the working force
- An appeal process which is too slow and lacking a systematic approach

No doubt there is an urgent need for a fast track to settle this issue. People should be reassured that their concerns are being seriously addressed. I agree with the approach to reinstate all involved first and then identify those with proven criminal record, corruption, or illegal/immoral acts. However, the only reason for being a little cautious about this approach is the fact that there are groups of people who, for various reasons, have strong opposing views, some of which may be justifiable. Also we do not want people to have the misconception that we are reversing a decision taken before. For this reason, I wonder if it would be wise to propose the following course of action:

- Authorising the Ministers to reinstate Firqa members on an interim basis until the appeal process is completed, provided they denounce the policies and acts of the previous regime.
- Until a final decision is made on the appeal process, those reinstated will not be allowed to take a leadership role and should not be given important positions.
- Firqa members constitute the vast majority of those removed; higher levels like Shu'ba or Fari' represent a small minority and many have already left the country; they could go through the appeal process before reinstatement.
- In all cases, a judge will be appointed to review the appeal process in order to ensure that it is just, objective and legally correct.

Ala' Alwan
18 April 2004

Statement Delivered by
Dr Ala'din Alwan, Iraqi Minister of Education
27 April-2004

“The issue of the teachers and other Ministry of Education staff who were politically removed and those who lost their jobs due to the policies of Saddam’s regime has been one of our major priorities since September 2003. These groups also include relatives of people who were executed, exiled, or imprisoned before March 2003. A large number of applicants also claim that they had to resign or leave their job because of continued pressure to join the party.

The Ministry of Education accords priority to those who suffered (or whose families' suffered) the most under Saddam. Because many of these teachers have been out of the profession for a long time, they are being given training. Many others had been out of work for 10 years or more, are nearing retirement age, and want to come back on the payroll only briefly to benefit from the higher salaries and thus the higher pensions.

The major obstacle has been the lack of financial allocations to cover the large number of applications. However, we took the initiative of re-instating limited groups, the most severely impacted, in certain governorates using the vacancies and limited financial resources available to the Ministry. The first batch was reinstated in November 2003.

The total number of persons reinstated so far is 4644. Most of the returnees' names have been published in newspapers. An additional list of 1100 persons from Baghdad is being examined and double-checked. I expect we could release at least part of it within the next few days.

Additionally on April 1, 2004, I wrote to all Director Generals of Education encouraging them to receive applications for reinstatement from teachers who were dismissed or forced to leave service during the previous regime. In my letter to the, I asked them to process these applications and gave a deadline of May 1, 2004 for receipt of the applications at the Administration and Finance Department in Baghdad.

Regarding the De-Ba'athification policy, the Ministry of Education implemented the Governing Council resolutions issued in September 2003.

Back in September, we issued instructions to all governorates to establish appeal committees composed of representative of Teachers Unions, local councils, and representatives of PTAs. We stressed the fact that members should be objective, with the highest degree of integrity. These committees examined requests for appeals and used the guidelines established by the De-Ba'athification Council. The recommendations of committees from several governorates were sent to the Council for processing. The process is now being accelerated.

So far, a number of Ministry teachers have been reinstated. The Ministry lists containing recommendations of appeal committees in some parts of Baghdad and three other governorates have just been approved. A second batch including lists from six more governorates is expected to be approved within the next few days. Those governorates who have not completed the work have been asked to submit their recommendations within the next three weeks.

Our Ministry will continue to coordinate with the Chairman of the Supreme National De-Ba'athification Commission to ensure that the policy is implemented fairly and efficiently. Again, we will continue to ensure that those teachers who qualify and deserve to be re-hired are in fact re-hired as soon as possible. Thank you."

(b)(6)

From: L. Paul Bremer on behalf of Bremer, Paul
Sent: Sunday, May 09, 2004 6:15 AM
To: 'Ala' Alwan'; Jones, Richard (AMB)
Cc: (b)(6)
Subject: RE: Follow up on debathification and others

Dear Mr. Minister

Thank you for following up so promptly on my request. Your team appears to be doing an excellent job of moving the process along quickly, which is commendable.

In the coming days, I hope to be able to announce the establishment of a Special Commission to recommend how to compensate victims of Saddam's injustices, including ways to compensate those who lost their jobs.

Sincerely
Ambassador Bremer

-----Original Message-----

From: Ala' Alwan ((b)(6))
Sent: Saturday, May 08, 2004 8:08 PM
To: Bremer, Paul
Cc: (b)(6)
Subject: Follow up on debathification and others

Dear Ambassador Bremer

You asked for an update on the debathification process and the reinstatement of teachers fired during Saddam's regime.

Debathification:

1. Lists already prepared by the local appeal committees have been approved. The first list containing 788 Firqa members recommended for reinstatement by appeal committees in Baghdad, Salahedine, Babil, and Muthanna were subsequently endorsed by the Debathification Council. I am instructing the Directorates of Education concerned to reinstate them with immediate effect. Another list of recommended reinstatements from Anbar (914) and Baghdad Karkh 387) has also been completely processed and they are being reinstated with immediate effect. As a rule those reinstated are informed that the MOE reserves the right to reconsider its decision if their conduct proves to be inconsistent with the values and interest of the new education system.

2. A large list from Salahedine (of more than 1000) is being processed. My staff assured me they will be completed tomorrow.

3. Last week I met with DGs from all governorates and asked them to expedite the work of the local committees. I gave them a deadline of two weeks to submit their recommendations to me. A central task force is working in my office to follow up the work of these governorates. Diyala was one of the governorates that we specifically wanted to give priority. However, the work of the local committee did not meet the standards set and I met with the Director General a few days ago. He and the committee are working to finalise their recommendations for submission this week.

Reinstating teachers fired during Saddam's regime:

1. As indicated before, MOE has already re-hired about 6000. We still have thousands of requests but they need to be carefully screened because many of the applicants resigned voluntarily for economic rather than political reasons. During the last week, we screened a large number and we reinstated about 450 from Basra and Baghdad in three separate lists. We expect to process another list by the end of the week. One of the lists has been published during the last two days by major daily newspapers. We are sending the other two lists to the media tomorrow.

2. On April 1, 2004, I requested DGs to process applications in their governorates according to the guidelines followed by the central committees. In my meeting with them last week, we followed up the progress of work and we decided to form a separate structure in the central office in Baghdad to receive and process completed and prioritised files from governorates. We are therefore currently asking applicants to apply direct to the DG of Education in their governorates. We estimate that we will need about 20,000 places to cover political returnees and freshly graduating teachers needed by MOE institutions.

Please let me know if you have any advice or if you feel we should modify our response in these two areas.

Thank you.

Ala' Alwan
Minister of Education

(b)(6)

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Please let me know if you have any advice or if you feel we should modify our response in these two areas.

Thank you.

Ala' Alwan
Minister of Education

De-Ba'athification Issues from the Education Directorate Generals

Deleted: Directorate

1. Wassit---claimed they had dismissed 860 party members. No indication of whether they are still being paid.
2. Kerbala---430 have been recognized. They are still working and still on salary.
3. Najaf---350 recognized. They were paid until July 1, but no longer.
4. Anbar---430 were dismissed early on, 350 more were on salary until July 1. Another 59 came back after the military said it was ok, but not in their old jobs.
5. Ninewa---there are 1051 and they have waited until the exams were done at the end of July. They are now preparing a list, but the coalition forces said they could come back this fall.
6. Missan---They have dismissed 350. No indication of whether or not they are being paid.
7. Diyala---More than 1000 have not been dismissed. They say they have a letter from the coalition forces telling them they can wait until the end of the school year (I assume he means the national exams which ended at the end of July). They did change the head people in the department.
8. Thi-Qar---850 have been dismissed.
9. Rasafa 1 (Baghdad)---350 still working and getting paid because of the exams.
10. Rasafa 2 (Baghdad)---300 some of whom are gone, and some are not. All still getting paid.
11. Karkh 1 (Baghdad)---300 have been dismissed, but still getting paid.
12. Karkh 2 (Baghdad)---328 still working and getting paid.
13. Salah al-Din---1400 apparently fit the profile. Governor said to only fire those who were section members. They are still being paid. Said Amb. Bremer was there recently and said this was ok. But a few days ago, the governor asked them to prepare a list so they could be dismissed.
14. Tameem---450 are still working and getting paid. A committee has been formed to interview them. This started on August 1.
15. Babylon---860 were identified. Stopped working and not getting paid. Heard that some of the other governates were still working them, so prepared a list of 669 who can ask the coalition to return. Now waiting.

Deleted: there

(b)(6)

From: Ala' Alwan (b)(6) 86
Sent: Sunday, May 09, 2004 5:42 PM
To: (b)(6)
Cc: Bremer, Paul
Subject: Falluja, Kerbala, and Najaf

This is a short report on the situation in Anbar, Kerbala and Najaf:

1. Anbar including Falluja

Except for Falluja town, school attendance was not significantly affected during the last month. Final examinations start tomorrow in the whole country including Anbar. The situation has also been reported normal in the outskirts of Falluja (279 schools). In the town of Falluja (95 schools), school attendance was disrupted during the events, but the situation is now gradually normalising. The Director General of Education and the Falluja Director of Education are assessing the situation in the field but they reported to me today that they can conduct the examinations on the previously set dates (starting tomorrow) in most schools. During the events, school children of families who left Falluja enrolled in schools in Baghdad. Some of them went back to Falluja but others decided to stay and we are therefore allowing children to have their examinations in Baghdad.

Senior officials of the central MOE (including the DG of Examinations) are visiting Falluja on Tuesday and Wednesday to monitor the situation and support the Department of Education there.

2. Kerbala

The DG of Education reports that schools are closed in these districts of Kerbala, namely Al Kiswiniya, Al Saadiya and Mukhayam. Examinations will have to be postponed in these areas. Examinations will be conducted as scheduled in other parts of Kerbala.

3. Najaf

The Director of Education reports no major disruption although there have been episodes of poor attendance in some areas. I met with the new Governor today and we agreed on several action points. Senior officials from the Ministry in Baghdad will be visiting as soon as the situation allows.

Minister of Education

(b)(6)

From: Jones, Richard (AMB)
Sent: Thursday, May 13, 2004 9:43 PM
To: (b)(6)
Cc: (b)(6)
Subject: RE: Teachers not being re-hired

(b)(6) Thanks for getting on this so promptly. The sooner you can get with Strat Com as you outlined below, the better it will be. Regarding the Minister's question, I agree that we should be as transparent as possible regarding the process while being circumspect regarding the publication of actual names. I doubt that we would publicize such a list in the US, at least not without a waiver, because of privacy issues alone. One possibility would be to ask individual teachers involved for permission to list their names. Other possibilities might be to publish summary statistics only or to publish first names and last initials together with summary descriptions of the grounds for reinstatement. DJ

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6)
Sent: Thursday, May 13, 2004 9:00 PM
To: Jones, Richard (AMB)
Subject: RE: Teachers not being re-hired

I was able to reach the Minister in Amman.

- We are arranging to get copies of all the Orders to Rehire, sent to date to the directorates of
 through the appeals process,
 re completed the process
 e directorates). These
 e rehired. I should be able to

- 199
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- it mean that the teachers
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Foreign Language

Foreign Language

Republican Palace S-206
Baghdad Iraq APO AE 09316

(b)(6) (an American exchange, dial "1" before area code if calling from U.S.)

-----Original Message-----

From: Jones, Richard (AMB)

Sent: Thursday, May 13, 2004 2:46 PM

To: (b)(6)

Cc: (b)(6); Neumann, Ronald E. (AMB)

Subject: RE: Teachers not being re-hired

(b)(6) Per LPB's instruction, please follow up on this as soon as possible and report.
Thanks. DJ

-----Original Message-----

From: Neumann, Ronald E. (AMB)

Sent: Wednesday, May 12, 2004 10:03 PM

To: Jones, Richard (AMB)

Cc: (b)(6)

Subject: FW: Teachers not being re-hired

Dick, I think this might better come from you. If you want me to do it, who is the senior advisor?

-----Original Message-----

From: L. Paul Bremer

Sent: Wednesday, May 12, 2004 9:55 PM

To: Neumann, Ronald E. (AMB)

Cc: Jones, Richard (AMB); (b)(6)

(b)(6)

Subject: RE: Teachers not being re-hired

Get in touch with the Senior Advisor and have the Minister go on the record.

L:PB

-----Original Message-----

From: Neumann, Ronald E. (AMB)

Sent: Wednesday, May 12, 2004 9:49 PM

To: L. Paul Bremer

Cc: Jones, Richard (AMB); (b)(6)

(b)(6)

Subject: Teachers not being re-hired

When I was at the transition for the MFA today a Fox News reporter told me they were doing a story on teachers being rehired after our policy change. Looking for someone to interview, he said he had not been able to find a single teacher who has actually been rehired. He is hearing that at some level in the Ministry of Education the policy implementation is being blocked. I don't know who in Education Ministry would be the right person to check this out, or whether it is true. If not true (b)(6) was with me and could probably find the journalist and put him in touch with some rehired teachers if we can find them.

5/15/2004

(b)(6)

From: [Leslye Arsht (b)(6)]**Sent:** Wednesday, May 19, 2004 1:23 AM**To:** (b)(6)**Subject:** FW: Michael Rubin on Bush Doctrine/democratization/de-Ba'athification/Libya/Iran

(b)(6): if the LA Times is really working on this.. you need to discuss it with the Minister and MAKE SURE THAT HE'S NOT FIRING ANYONE... I WOULD BE SHOCKED IF HE IS!!!! But, you might also want to be sure that Finance isn't aware of any body else hiring/firing teachers....like the military... who did do that before. IF he's certain of the situation, he might want to get out in front of the rumor.

One thing that Rubin has WRONG is that we were somehow "changing" an Iraqi process.. Iraqis of all sorts were trying to get the local appeal decisions implemented... and the GC was refusing to act. I don't remember why Bremer vetoed the independent De Ba'athification committee... it was before my time... but even if he was wrong then... the process that was put in place later seemed to meet the needs of most Iraqis and THAT PROCESS was being undermined by Chalibi's committee.

By the way, I talked to (b)(6) earlier and felt it necessary to tell him about your Ed merger rumor.. he may ask you about it.. or you might volunteer that you got it from (b)(6) I didn't tell him who mentioned it to you.

Finally, I've copied you on e-mails about the USAID "article"... might have been called the 'big lie' about EMIS... because he thought his e-mail might be down tomorrow and he wanted to be able to send someone over to the Palace to pick up a printed copy. There are two... e-mails following this.

Leslye A. Arsht

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) BL**Date:** Tue, 18 May 2004 23:37:20 +0400**To:** "Leslye Arsht" (b)(6) BL**Subject:** FW: FW: Michael Rubin on Bush Doctrine/democratization/de-Ba'athification/Libya/Iran

Thought you would be interested. In a way I agree with him. There were some teachers who refused. But I also believe in reconciliation. It is the only way Iraqi society is going to survive. I hope that the appeals committees had access to information about which teachers "made notations about" ... children.² And, I only wish the MOE would fire some teachers!

(b)(6)

Senior Consultant, Ministry of Education

Republican Palace S-206

Baghdad Iraq APO AE 09316

(b)(6)

(an American exchange, dial "1" before area code if calling from U.S.)

-----Original Message-----

From: Michael Rubin (b)(6)**Sent:** Tuesday, May 18, 2004 9:57 PM**To:** (b)(6)**Cc:** (b)(6)**Subject:** Re: FW: Michael Rubin on Bush Doctrine/democratization/de-Ba'athification/Libya/Iran

Firstly, I am not going to betray my sources.

Secondly, I am in touch with several teachers there.

Thirdly, if I'm not mistaken, the LA Times reporters have also been working on this; it's an issue talked about widely outside the Green Zone.

And, as you are also aware, Bremer was the person who vetoed an independent de-Baathification commission outside the GC last May. But, I'd also push back that it's a mistake to undercut Iraqi governance at all by second-guessing their process and regulations. We don't need to go into a lengthy discourse on the structure of the Baath Party since I am sure you are aware of how many steps it takes to become a *firqa*-level; teachers did not get promoted to *firqa* to keep their jobs. Less than 3 percent of party members were of that level.

Have you looked through the registrars formerly in the Ministry of Education whereby the *firqa* level Baathist teachers made notations on the political biases of secondary school children?

Are you saying officially that the Ministry of Education HAS NOT AND WILL NOT lay off any teachers displaced by re-hired Baathists? Be careful in making this assertion.

>>> (b)(6) 5/18/2004 1:00:48 PM >>>

Michael, what is your source for the statement that teachers are being fired by the MOE (see your article comments in bold below)? I know of no teachers being fired. In fact, the MOE has re-hired thousands of teachers who were fired by the previous regime. The only "Ba'athist" teachers being rehired are those who won an appeal heard by their peers at the local level. I do agree with you that the teachers who refused to join are a moral cut above those who didn't. But, as one teacher put it when asked whether rehiring these teachers (Firqah members) was fair, she said "Iraq is big enough for all Iraqis. We worked with these teachers. We know who did wrong and who didn't." The appeals process was created as part of the original order (Order #1) signed by Ambassador Bremer last May dealing with members of the Ba'athist party. That order differentiated between Firqah members (those who had the right to appeal) and the three layers above Firqah (who have no right to appeal).

(b)(6)

Senior Consultant, Ministry of Education

Republican Palace S-206

Baghdad Iraq APO AE 09316

(b)(6)

(an American exchange, dial "1" before area code if calling from U.S.)

-----Original Message-----

From: Williamson Evers (b)(6)**Sent:** Tuesday, May 18, 2004 12:09 AM**Subject:** Michael Rubin on Bush Doctrine/democratization/dc-Ba'athification/Libya/Iran

Prevailing Principles

5/19/2004

By Michael Rubin Posted: Monday, May 17, 2004

ARTICLES National Review Online Publication Date: May 17, 2004

On April 28, 2004, dozens of retired Foreign Office diplomats published an open letter berating Prime Minister Tony Blair for "abandonment of principle . . . at a time when, rightly or wrongly, we are portrayed throughout the Arab and Muslim world as partners in an illegal and brutal occupation in Iraq." Several American diplomats followed suit. The diplomats are right: London and Washington have abandoned their principles. But the principles abandoned have less to do with the moral equivalency held dear by Foreign Office Arabists than with the freedom, liberty, and human rights so emphasized by President Bush.

Commemorating the first anniversary of the war to liberate Iraq, Bush was unapologetic about U.S. policy: "We have set out to encourage reform and democracy in the greater Middle East as the alternatives to fanaticism, resentment, and terror." Good words, but Washington appears to be reversing the presidential policy. Perhaps with media pressure building, the White House has decided to trade long-term progress for short-term expediency. Or perhaps distracted by the campaign, National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice is deferring responsibility to career diplomats to pursue their worst instincts. Regardless of the reason, the White House policy--and 10 Downing Street's acquiescence to the flip-flop--threatens to undermine the foundations of nascent democracy movements across the Middle East.

Fanaticism, resentment, and terror threaten to return to Iraq. On May 17, 2004, a suicide bomber murdered the president of Iraq's Governing Council. Less than a month ago, Coalition Provisional Authority Administrator L. Paul Bremer, in deference to U.N. Special Envoy Lakhdar Brahimi, announced the abandonment of de-Baathification efforts. But Brahimi's claim that "thousands upon thousands of teachers, university professors, medical doctors and hospital staffs, engineers and other professionals who are sorely needed in the country have been dismissed within the de-Baathification process" falls flat among Iraqis. De-Baathification affected less than 1 percent of party members. Iraqis recognize that Iraqi society functions better without the Baathist elite. Saddam's government promoted technocrats not on merit, but rather for political loyalty. **The Iraqi Education Ministry is now forced to fire teachers hired in the wake of liberation.** Popular sentiment is reflected in the hand-painted banners that hang in Najaf and Karbala in Iraq's Shiite heartland, saying, "Death to the Baath Party." As one Iraqi put it, "Saddam's mass graves did not fill themselves." These teachers had refused to join the Baath under Saddam; they lived hand-to-mouth as they sold off property or worked menial jobs to feed their families. When faced with a choice, they made the right moral decision. **Now Coalition policy punishes them for it, instead rewarding their tormenters.** It is not only in Iraq that Washington and London appear to have abandoned principle. American and British politicians have cheered the rapprochement with Libya. On March 12, Bush declared, "We stand with courageous reformers." He praised the Libyan government for releasing Fathi El-Jahmi, a political prisoner jailed in 2002 after speaking out for democracy. "It's an encouraging step toward reform in Libya," Bush said. Unfortunately, two days after Assistant Secretary of State Bill Burns

dined with the Libyan dictator, and one day after Prime Minister Tony Blair's visit to Libya, Libyan security agents arrested El-Jahmi; he has not been seen since. If El-Jahmi has access to a television, he will not see U.S. or British diplomats invoking his name. Rather, he will see Blair and Burns sitting with Khaddafi and European diplomats toasting the Libyan strongman in Brussels. The White House remains silent. Libyans visiting Washington say Khaddafi's arrest of El-Jahmi is meant as a direct slap in the face of President Bush.

And nowhere has the Bush doctrine's reversal hit harder than in Iran. In 1953 and 1979, Washington and London supported an autocratic leader over the wishes of the Iranian people. In recent years, though, the Iranians have again rallied for reform. In 1999, I arrived in Tehran as riot police and students clashed. Tear gas wafted through the air. In his January 29, 2002, State of the Union address, Bush threw down a gauntlet, declaring Iran part of "an axis of evil." Many Europeans found Bush's rhetoric simplistic, but it was Bush's moral clarity--and not Europe's critical engagement--that emboldened Iranian students, factory workers, and teachers to again take to the streets. It has not escaped Iranians' notice that while the European Union doubled its trade with Iran, the Islamic Republic doubled its application of capital punishment.

On May 9, 2004, three months to the day since Britain's Crown Prince visited the Islamic Republic, an Iranian court confirmed the death penalty against Hashem Aghajari, a University of Tehran history professor who had criticized theocracy. Shortly after an Iranian court first sentenced Aghajari to die, Bush spoke on U.S.-funded Persian-language radio. "We continue to stand with the people of Iran in your quest for freedom, prosperity, honest and effective government, judicial due process and the rule of law," the president said. According to the Iranian newspaper *Aftab-i Yazd*, on May 11, 2004, Aghajari threw down the gauntlet. "Either free me unconditionally or carry out the death sentence." The Iranian people expect silence from 10 Downing Street, but not from the White House. If the Bush administration is serious about freedom and democracy, now is the time to speak. Silence sends a different message.

The ripple effects of the Bush doctrine's abandonment spread far. On May 16, 2004, Secretary of State Colin Powell criticized Israel for razing homes used to facilitate weapons-smuggling. The previous day, the Bush administration remained silent when Palestinian chairman Yasser Arafat said on Palestinian television that Palestinians should "terrorize your enemy." That Powell would criticize a democracy, and that Bush-administration principals would engage with members of Arafat's government, is troubling.

Britain's effete diplomats are wrong. Their belief that Muslim countries should not be held to basic human-rights standards is racist. One in six Iraqis fled his country under Baath-party rule; Iraqis who settle in the West thrive because of the rule of law. There are no cultural impediments to democracy; when Bush and Blair hold governments accountable for their actions, progress ensues. Rather than fete Khaddafi, the president and prime minister should receive prisoners of conscience like El-Jahmi and Aghajari. Across the Middle East, people look to the West to match its rhetoric with action. We should not abandon dissidents, even if career diplomats, both British and American, demand it. The policy reversals of today will undermine democracy in the Middle East for years to come.

Michael Rubin is a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute.

To Mr. (b)(6)

Best regard

We are sending you the update for the procedure execution of re-employment orders of previous baath divisions members.

1-Minstry order has been issued to re- employ (3130) teachers and employee to there position through the period of the last week and this week .

2-These lists includes the nominated people in the governorates of (Baghdad and its all directorates , AL anbar , Salah addine ,Kirkuk, Al Muthana, Babil, Karbala, Neinaawa, ALqadissya, Annajaff).

3-All DG,s in Baghdad and other governorates in Iraq must conduct the ministry order to re-employ them , some already starts there positions.

4-The general directorate for management and finance must follow up the execution of this orders as soon as possible.

5-The ministry is preparing the re –employment list for dialah governorates and there will be another ministry orders issuance.

6-The ministry is following up to issue another list as soon as possible for all other governorates.

(b)(6)

5/14/04

le Ba'athism

In the name of Allah the most merciful and
Compassionate

Mr. (b)(6)
Dear sir:-

Below the renew of the executive procedures to implement the decisions of return the previous divisions members to their positions ;-

- 1- Ministerial orders has been issued to return (3130) primary teachers and secondary teachers and employees to their positions with in a period of time between the last week and the current one.
- 2- These lists include those who are comprised in ministerial orders in the provinces (Baghdad, and all its directorates , Unbar , salahalddin , Karkuk, Muthanna, Babylon , Karbala , Ninawa, Qadisia and najaf).
- 3- The general directorates of education in Baghdad and other provinces will do what is necessary to implement ministerial orders to return previous divisions members to their positions , who some of them have returned to their positions.
- 4- The general directorate of financial and management affairs will follow up this matter to complete implementation of these decisions as fast as it could.
- 5- MOE currently is checking recommencement committees lists of Diyala province and will issue a ministerial order in it these days.
- 6- MOE currently is following up recommencement committees in provinces that didn't complete recommencement processes in order to complete this matter as fast as it could.

Very Respectively

Signature

(b)(6)

On Behalf Of
Minister Of Education
May 14, 2004

IN THE NAME OF GAD

Republic of Iraq
Ministry of Iraq
Minister office
No/ 353
Date/ 5/14/2004

MINISTRY ORDER

It's above to the high community decision for De. Baath fiction including to accept The order of terminate division members. We decided to return the names in the list Follows to their position and up to the director general of education coordination With conditions for one years may be refuse when the personal who's Re-employed To his job if he did the mistake like: fuels information , un legal activeness ,wide Spared for the previous regime ideas and his behaviors or his believers led to Obstructed the educational movement and the teaching schedule as well as ensuring That they will never take place any high position with in the ministry of education.

1. D.G of karak(2)the first list start with no(1) name (b)(6)
(b)(6) the end of the list with no(100)name (b)(6)
(b)(6).
2. D.G of kurkook the first list start with no(1) name (b)(6)
(b)(6) the end of the list is with no(9)
name (b)(6).
3. D.G of Anbar just one Name is (b)(6)
4. D.G Of Slah Al-Deen The First List Start With No(1)Name
(b)(6) And The End Of List(500)Name (b)(6)
(b)(6)

Dr.Alla'a Al-Deen Alwan
Minister Of Education
may.2004

(b)(6)

In absentia of

Copy for:

Minister's office.
Director General Of Administrative Affairs And Financial.
Director General Of Karak (2).
Director General of Karkook Educational.
Director general of Anbar.
Director general of Salah Al-Deen.

IN THE NAME OF G. D.

Republic of Iraq
Ministry of Iraq
Minister office
No/ ~~353~~ 354
Date/ 5/14/2004

MINISTRY ORDER

It's above to the high community decision for De. Baath fiction including to accept The order of terminate division members. We decided to return the names in the list Follows to their position and up to the director general of education coordination With conditions for one years may be refuse when the personal who's Re-employed To his job if he did the mistake like: ~~fuels~~ *falsely* information , un legal activeness ,wide Spared for the previous regime ideas and his behaviors or his believers led to Obstructed the educational movement and the teaching schedule as well as ensuring That they will never take place any high position with in the ministry of education.

1. D.G of Karak (1) have tow list the first one start from (1. (b)(6) (b)(6)) and the end of list (136. (b)(6)) and the second list start with (1 (b)(6)) the end name is (241 (b)(6))
2. D.G of Anbar the list start from (1. (b)(6)) end of the list (914. (b)(6)).

Dr. Alla'a Al-Deen Alwan
Minister Of Education
may.2004

(b)(6)

In absentia of Minister of Education

Copy for:

Minister's office.

Director general of administrative affairs and financial.

Director general of Karak (1).

Director general of Anbar.

241
136
377

(b)(6)

From: Al' Awan (b)(6) 86
Sent: Friday, May 21, 2004 7:02 PM
To: (b)(6)
Cc: Barrer, Paul
Subject: Update on debathification

700
4688
5388

This is an update on the debathification process:

1. Number of Firqa members reinstated so far: 4,688. All were screened by the local appeal committees and recommended for reinstatement. They belong to the following governorates: Baghdad, Kirkuk, Anbar, Salaheldine, Mithana (Samarra), Diyala, Kerbala, Babil, and Nineva (Mosul).

2. We have just received additional lists from some governorates. They are being processed by the central debath committee and we expect to issue a ministerial decree to reinstate some 700 more in the next two days.

3. We are urging other governorates to finish the work and to send us the recommendations of their local committees as soon as possible. However, the DDs Education in some governorates like Dawaia, Wasit, Najaf, and Nassiriya are informing us they are facing great difficulties in their work. The local councils, political groups and communities are refusing to reinstate Baathists and education directorates are not able to convince the local committee members to work. Our advice to them has been to coordinate with the Governors but in some places the message we get is that the governors (or governing councils) also seem to share the same view that it is too early to take action on reinstatement.

Al' Awan
Minister of Education

4121
1267
5388

4688
4121
567

567
700
1267

(b)(6)

From: Ala' Alwan (b)(6)
Sent: Friday, May 21, 2004 7:25 PM
To: (b)(6)
Cc: Bremer, Paul
Subject: Teachers rehiring

Update on the reinstatement of teachers who were fired or lost their jobs for political reasons during the previous regime:

1. Number reinstated (in batches) since November 2003 is over 6000.
2. Those reinstated during the last two weeks: 1290 (from Baghdad, Najaf, and Basrah).
3. DG Msul has been authorised to reinstate up to 1000 teachers.
3. We have now received a very large number of applications (thousands) processed by the Directorates of Education in governorates. The MOE is now double-checking these applications, using the same standard guidelines.

Ala' Alwan
Minister of Education

(b)(6)

From: Williamson Evers (b)(6)
Sent: Saturday, May 29, 2004 2:08 AM
Subject: De-Ba'thification of Iraq - Pros and Cons

MEMRI
Inquiry & Analysis - Iraq
May 28, 2004
No. 176

The De-Ba'thification of Iraq - Pros and Cons
By Dr. (b)(6)

Introduction

On April 18, 2003, shortly after the start of the occupation of Iraq, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) issued order No. 1 to uproot the former ruling Ba'th Party from positions of authority. The order, commonly referred to as the de-Ba'thification of Iraq, was patterned after a similar program, known as the de-Nazification of Germany, introduced by the allied forces upon the defeat of the Nazis in 1945.

In Iraq, de-Ba'thification has meant the dismissal hundred of thousands - of civil servants, teachers, army officers, and other bureaucrats or professionals who served the Saddam Hussein regime. The one enormous difference between de-Nazification and de-Ba'thification is that, unlike the members of the Nazi party who, after the unconditional surrender of Germany, were largely unarmed, the members of the Iraqi Ba'th party were armed and have used their weapons to render the orderly transition to democracy all but impossible. Therefore, it is not surprising that efforts are under way to co-opt some of the Ba'thists into the evolving system of government for the post-Saddam era.

The De-Ba'thification Process

Order No. 1 issued by the CPA on de-Ba'thification was subsequently incorporated into a law for the purging (ijjtithath) of the Ba'th Party issued by Iraq's Governing Council (IGC) in January 2004. The law established the procedures by which senior members of the Ba'th Party and those implicated in criminal activities were to be identified and dismissed. The rules did not apply to Ba'th members who worked in the private sector. (1) A Committee for the Purging of the Ba'th was established by the IGC and chaired by Dr. Ahmad Al-Chalabi. Additionally, each ministry established a similar committee. The committees were responsible for evaluating approximately 30,000 Ba'th leaders at low, medium, and senior levels to determine the degree of their complicity in the crimes of the previous regime.

Iraqi officials like to emphasize that the law was meant to uproot the Ba'th as a political entity but not the Ba'thists - certainly not those who had been forced to join the party to protect their meager livelihood and had not been engaged in criminal activities. As might be expected, the hostility toward some members of the Ba'th Party was such that the committees for de-Ba'thification may have inadvertently sacrificed what, in jurisprudence, is referred to as due process. According to the Minister of Health, Dr. Khudeir Fadhil Abbas, the many errors which the de-Ba'thification committees have committed with regard to innocent individuals have led a number of ministers to call for the abolition of the committees. (2) Nevertheless, shortly after the law for the purging of the Ba'th Party was issued, hundreds of former senior officers in the army and the intelligence lined up outside a police station in the city of Mosul, one of the leading Sunni cities in Iraq and a hotbed of

Ba'thism, to sign a document terminating their membership in the party and denouncing its ideology. (3)

Signs of Change

As security in Iraq has become increasingly problematic, the CPA has sought ways to reintegrate elements of the Ba'th party into the emerging army and ministries. According to Iraqi sources, the United Nations special envoy Al-Akhthar Al-Ibrahimi raised with the civilian governor of Iraq, Ambassador L. Paul Bremer, the issue of purging thousands of teachers, university professors, doctors, and engineers from employment. Al-Ibrahimi is reported to have told Bremer that the purging decision was arbitrary and it would impede the transfer of authority to the Iraqis on June 30. The first sign of change of attitude toward the Ba'th Party members came in a statement by Dan Senor, the spokesman for the CPA, that while the Ba'th ideology is not suitable for the new Iraq, the process of investigation of those implicated in crimes is moving too slowly and needs to be reformed. (4)

A column in the London daily Al-Sharq Al-Awsat by Fuad Matar refers to the use of the Ba'th to restructure the balances of power. Matar suggests that the return of the Ba'th in a new configuration will serve the CPA in two ways: first, it will stem the rising Islamic tide in Iraq, particularly that which is stirred by the Shi'a cleric Muqtada Al-Sadr and, second, it will remind the Ba'th supporters that their party was not carried back to power by popular will. Matar also suggests that the return of the Ba'th will reflect a recognition by Ambassador Bremer that behind the resistance movement are "humiliated Ba'thist generals, angry young officers, displaced soldiers, and dispersed intellectuals, academicians, and specialists" and that their reinstating will deprive the resistance movement many of its leaders and active members. (5)

The Reintegration of Ba'thists

A major step toward reintegration of former Ba'thists into the government came in a statement by Ambassador Bremer that a large number of officers who served in Saddam's army will be recalled to rebuild the new Iraqi army. At the same time, Mr. Bremer announced the release of 2,500 prisoners following the review of their cases by a special review body appointed two months earlier. He further announced that thousands of teachers and hundreds of university professors who were removed from their posts will soon be able to return to work and that "thousands of others will soon begin to receive their pensions." (6) The reinstatement of the 10,000 Ba'thist teachers who were dismissed a year ago brings them an enormous economic bonus. Teachers' salaries under occupation are \$300 per month, compared with about \$5 per month under the Saddam regime. (7) This was followed by a decision by the Ministry of Electricity to return all former Ba'th members, who were purged earlier, to return to their jobs and participate in the reconstruction of their country. (8)

While the vast majority of the members of the IGC were opposed to the new policy, the CPA seemed to be determined to include some Ba'th personalities in the government configurations being put together in consultation with Al-Akhthar Al-Ibrahimi. The new policy was also motivated by a desire to create a new balance between the rising tide of Shi'a religious orthodoxy and the secular elements of the previous regime, even if these elements were politically tainted. (9)

Meeting with Senior Army Officers

Shortly after Bremer's statement on the reintegration of old Iraqi army officers into the new army, the Iraqi minister of defense, Ali Abd Al-Amir Al-Alawi, met with more than fifty former senior army officers at the rank of brigadier-general or higher. They discussed the structure of the new army which will comprise three divisions of light infantry supported by 500 men in the air force and another 400 in the navy. The compulsory service will be abolished and the military will be volunteers. (10)

Support from Arab States

Two Middle East leaders added their voice for reintegrating former elements of the Ba'th into the evolving post-Saddam government of Iraq, including the Foreign Minister of Qatar, Al-Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim bin Jaber Aal-Thani, a member of the ruling family who urged the U.S. administration to permit former Ba'th Party members to take part in the administration of the country.(11) King Abdallah of Jordan warned against civil war and urged dramatic steps to reconsider the policy of "de-Ba'thification."(12)

Opposition to the Ba'th Reintegration

The measures taken to reintegrate elements of the former Ba'thist regime did not go well, particularly with the Shi'a and Kurdish ethnic groups which suffered the most under the former regime. Leading the assault was the daily Al-Mu'tamar which belongs to the Iraqi National Congress, led by Dr. Ahmad Al-Chalabi. In an editorial by Akram Al-Hamdani, the newspaper reluctantly agreed to the exemption from punishment of those Ba'th party members who were forced in Saddam's time to join the party to keep their jobs, retain their food ration coupons, or avoid losing their electricity. Al-Mu'tamar's editorial wrath was heaped on the profiteers and on those responsible for the repressive instruments of the regime, for Halabja (where chemical weapons were used), and for the mass graves.(13)

Reciting the same catalog of crimes by the Ba'th Party, the Islamic Da'wa Party issued a public statement that the return of the Ba'thists has created doubts about the credibility of the slogans about democracy propagated by the occupation authorities, and leaves the Da'wa Party no choice except to oppose the re-Ba'thification decision in order to avoid returning to the circle of violence and counter violence.(14)

The return of Ba'thist officers to the army was the subject of what was reported as "a stormy meeting" between three unidentified leading Shi'a members of the IGC and Ambassador Bremer and General Ricardo Sanchez, the commander of the coalition forces. The consternation of the members of the IGC was particularly great following the decision by the coalition forces to establish a special army brigade (the Fallujah Brigade) under the command of the Ba'thist Maj.-General Jassim Muhammad Saleh Al-Muhammadi, from the disbanded Republican Guard. To assuage their concerns, the coalition forces brought the following day retired Maj.-General Muhammad Latif as the commanding officer of the Fallujah Brigade. General Latif studied at a British military academy and spent years in Saddam's prison.(15) The Fallujah Brigade was assigned the responsibility of maintaining peace and order in Fallujah which, for weeks, was the center of armed clashes between elements of what was described as t

he resistance movement and the U.S. army.(16) For Al-Chalabi, this arrangement remains abhorrent. He was to complain that while the allies of the United States are not able to protect themselves, "the terrorists in Fallujah are enjoying themselves, sending one car bomb after another."(17)

There were also demonstrations in Baghdad organized by the Supreme Council of Islamic Revolution in Iraq, which is led by Abd Al-Aziz Al-Hakim, another member of the IGC.(18)

But exceeding all the opponents of re-Ba'thification is the young cleric rebel Muqtada Al-Sadr. In his Friday sermon in the Kufa Mosque, he said that the Americans are trying to restore the Ba'thists to govern the state. "I shall not allow this," he thundered, "and their end will come in the hands of the believers." The decision by the CPA to reinstate Ba'thist army officers suggests "American hatred of the Iraqi people and a reward to the Ba'thists for the gift they presented to the occupier, which is Iraq."(19)

Ironically, in response to the efforts to reintegrate its members, the Ba'th Party issued a statement confirming the success of the resistance in its confrontation with the coalition forces, promising "painful strikes" in the months to come to bring an end to the occupation of Iraq.(20)

Conclusion

Violence and acts of terrorism may cripple the process of transfer of power by June 30. Under the circumstances, reinstating elements of the Ba'th party into the army, the civil service, and the teaching professions seems to the CPA inevitable in terms of realpolitik in the hope that it will prevent Iraq from plunging even further into the abyss of violence and dislocation.

* Dr. (b)(6) is Senior Analyst of MEMRI's Middle East Economic Studies Program.

Endnotes:

- (1) Al-Mada (Baghdad), January 11, 2004.
- (2) An interview with the Minister of Health in Al-Hayat (London), May 11, 2004.
- (3) Al-Hayat (London), January 27, 2004.
- (4) Al-Zaman (Iraq), April 23, 2004.
- (5) Al-Sharq Al-Awsat (London), May 1, 2004.
- (6) Al-Sharq Al-Awsat (London), April 24, 2004.
- (7) Al-Sharq Al-Awsat (London), May 17, 2004.
- (8) Al-Sharq Al-Awsat (London), May 20, 2004.
- (9) Al-Sharq Al-Awsat (London), April 25, 2004.
- (10) Al-Sharq Al-Awsat (London), April 30, 2004.
- (11) Al-Zaman (Iraq), May 4, 2004.
- (12) Al-Hayat (London), May 18, 2004. Also, a member of the IGC, Mrs. (b)(6) a Turkmen with connections to Turkey, said that the "de-Ba'thification" has been a source of many problems. Al-Hayat (London), April 25, 2004.
- (13) Al-Mu'tamar (Baghdad), April 28, 2004.
- (14) Al-Bayan (Baghdad), April 29, 2004.
- (15) Al-Sharq Al-Awsat (London), May 2, 2004.
- (16) Al-Sharq Al-Awsat (London), May 2, 2004.
- (17) Al-Mu'tamar (Iraq), May 19, 2004.
- (18) Al-Zaman (Iraq), May 9, 2004.
- (19) Al-Quds Al-Arabi (London), April 30, 2004.
- (20) Al-Quds Al-Arabi (London), May 3, 2004.



Coalition Provisional Authority

June 3, 2004

The Honorable Mohamed Ali Al-Hassani
Governor of Al-Muthanna Province
Samawah, Al-Muthanna

Mr. Governor:

The Coalition Provisional Authority has the honour of recognizing your letter of May 20 to Ambassador Bremer and would like to make the following observations concerning the return of former Baath Party members to teacher positions in Al-Muthanna.

1. The Ministry of Education's directive 336 of 9 May reinstating Firqa members was based on the procedures established by CPA and the Supreme De-Bathification Council of the Governing Council.
2. The reinstatement of the 199 teachers was based on the recommendations of the local appeal committee and was endorsed by the Director General of Education in Samawah.
3. The recommendations of the appeal committee on the Al-Muthanna cases were also sent to the De-Bathification Committee of the Iraqi Governing Council and were checked by the Council and endorsed by the chairman.
4. The Ministry of Education has reinstated 812 teachers in Al-Muthanna who were victims of the previous regime. This number is at least four times higher than the number of former Baathists who have been rehired.

The CPA looks forward to your favourable consideration of these points.

With highest regards,

Sincerely yours,

(b)(6)

Governorate Coordinator

Cc:Secretary of the Provincial Council
The Department of Education in Al-Muthanna

To : (b)(6)
From (b)(6)

Subject :debathesfication list from MOE

Salah aldin	500
Babil	113
Karkh 1	377
Anbbar	915
Karkh 2	238 + 100 ?
Kirkuk	9
Resaffa 1	136
Muthana	199

List from supreme national committee of debathesfication

Karbala	60
Dewaneya (qadiseya)	7
Najef	2
Theeqar (nasireya)	1
Missan (emarah)	2
Kirkuk	14

781

Amaleh
Digole 776
Kusofa 2-0
Basra -0
wasit -0

2573
1357
4130
North

781
776
1557

Dahuk ✓
Erbil ✓
Sule y namiyah

