

6

"Unofficial Prep Sheet" for 8:30 AM meeting with (b)(6) Sunday Feb 15, 2004

What he said he needed from the senior advisor to the MoE:

figurative "carrots" that he could dangle before militia men to entice them to disarm and join civilian society through job training, placement, and general education for both the men and their families

Militia Transition and Reintegration Strategy
Draft doc. Dated Feb 13, 2004

Highlights that could explain where the Ministry of Education may fit into this program:

- I. "Diplomatic" approaches must be employed as part of a multidimensional strategy to transition armed and independent militia groups into regular people with regular jobs
 - a. many of these groups are hostile to US forces because they felt cheated by the US after the Gulf War when "perceived commitments" by the US to assist them in rebellion against Hussein were not honored
 - b. the "character" of the new gov't is unknown, Coalition forces will not have time to monitor the character development of this new gov't, and the militias really must be disarmed ASAP
 - c. current efforts to register former members of the Iraqi Army continue as over 300,000 former soldiers require some kind of vocational training and job placement assistance

- II. Job creation and coordination (via PMO, et al) will drive militia reintegration along both "macro and micro public information" levels
 - a. screenings to determine job skills, aptitudes, health, etc.
 - b. identify and coordinate FUNDING organizations with IOs, NGOs, IFIs (***(b)(6) will recommend that USAID operate as the organizational body that oversees and directs ongoing efforts) who will takeover TR "once the security situation in the country permits"



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- c. plan and execute efforts with cooperation of local and militia leaders to "diffuse suspicions"

III. What to offer??? This last section of the paper looks like it needs input from "education people" who have a good handle on adult education, vocational training, literacy, etc.... and this is most likely what Mr. (b)(6) is looking for...

Suggestions??

a.

b.

c.

IV. Kurdistan as a peculiar concern (see Annex E Governance report)p. 27

- a. Strategy in this area is to make Transition and Reintegration the best way for Kurds to get what they want ...

"the prospect of an autonomous, well-resourced Kurdistan with its own armies is something the United States will strongly oppose"

- b. Kurds must be convinced TR is the right thing to do (CPA must hold their "guns" before their hearts and minds follow)

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Transition and Reintegration Strategy

13 February 2004

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Introduction:

The security situation in Iraq can be briefly characterized as containing three critical components:

1. Defeat armed enemies;
2. Establish Iraqi military and security services capable of maintaining Iraq's national and domestic security; and
3. Eliminate armed organizations outside of central government control, through negotiations as well as force when needed.

These three elements are intimately linked – a security fabric that will unravel if any one of them fails to succeed. This strategy addresses the third of these elements, taking into account the needs and progress of the other two.

To adequately address militia transition and reintegration challenge, a multidimensional approach is needed. These dimensions are:

- Determine which militia can be reached by political or other diplomatic efforts, (ONSA, Intelligence Community and CJTF-7). To date, we have had significant success in developing political commitments for the need to eliminate armed bodies outside of central government control. The leadership of the KDP, PUK, Badr Organization and INA have all agreed in principle that this is necessary.
- Get TR commitments from the leaders of major militia factions with whom negotiations are possible (CPA Political level leadership)
- Coordinate with CJTF-7 of militia groups with whom negotiations are not possible
- Develop TR roadmaps for militias who agree, according to this strategy, that includes active participation from all involved parties (ONSA will engage the militia leadership to develop the commitments identified in the second bullet into roadmaps for action).

Background:

Security: No state can exist and prosper if it contains armed organizations outside of central government control. They necessarily create alternate power centers that compete with the established government, and pose the constant threat of civil unrest or war, and must be disbanded.

However, in Iraq many of these groups came into being to resist an evil regime that oppressed its citizens, as well as in some cases to provide domestic security services in local communities (e.g., the Peshmergia and Iraqi Hezbollah). They lived and fought on Iraqi soil for the long-haul. Others formed and prospered to some degree both inside and outside of Iraq (e.g., the Badr Corps), while still others were created more recently for other reasons, such as the Iraqi National Congress militia which grew out of the Iraqi Freedom Fighters. While the ideologies of these groups are not all equally palatable to the Coalition and their experiences are not all the same, they all share the not

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insignificant positive characteristic of being the "enemy of my enemy." While that factor is likely to become less compelling as we move further away from the overthrow of the Baathist regime, it remains an important element in the logical and ethical determination of how these groups should be treated in the future Iraq, the ideological foundation of which has not yet been settled.

The sacrifices of groups that stayed in Iraq and fought Saddam and of those who left the country but returned to join the fight pose significant policy considerations. Oppression that spanned several generations created a situation in which the leaders of these oppressed groups will be very reluctant to rely on the central government or the Coalition to ensure their security. Indeed, for some groups the central government was the most significant, if not the only, enemy they have ever known. At least two major groups suffered mightily when what they perceived as commitments by the U.S. to assist them if they rebelled against Saddam after the Gulf War were not honored. We should be frank in acknowledging these facts, and that

- The character of the new central government will not be known for some time yet, and will not be determinable by the Coalition unless it commits to staying in Iraq for several years to come;
- The Coalition is not likely to remain in Iraq for the amount of time it will take to determine with a high degree of certainty the character of the central government; and
- The ethnic, theological and tribal divisions upon which oppression was historically based, and that could be the root of future oppression or retribution, still exist and will play a significant role in perceptions and actions.

These facts are not lost on local leaders (indeed, some are certainly counting on the opportunity to gain power because of these) and will be foremost in the minds of many of these ethnic and religious communities as we discuss transition and reintegration with them. Counterbalancing these, at least for the short-term, is the fact that the CJTF-7 and evolving Iraqi security organizations are filling a significant part of that security vacuum, and will continue to do more as the Iraqi security services expand and become more effective. Appreciating these perceptions and working with these facts will be necessary for the implementation of any successful transition and reintegration effort.

Yet, despite the perceptions of militia leaders, all of these armed organizations must be disarmed if Iraq is to succeed as a single, prosperous state.

Transition and Reintegration: Many Demilitarization, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) efforts have taken place in various locations around the globe over the past 15 years. These include operations in Africa, Central America, East Timor, Cambodia, and Haiti. Most of these have been undertaken by the UN, other international organizations (IOs), or the World Bank.¹ A general rule of thumb is that they are long-term, *taking at least five years to be effective*. In Iraq, the terms "demilitarization" and "demobilization" have important political implications that are generally negative due to the real need for

¹ A literature search of UN, World Bank and US documents has been conducted in preparation for this effort.

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local leaders to maintain domestic security. Additionally, in the Iraqi security situation many former militiamen will enter one of the new Iraqi security forces and not demilitarize or demobilize in the strictest sense. For these reasons, the Office of National Security Affairs designated this DDR-like effort for the Iraqi militias as "Transition and Reintegration."

In addition to the militia TR efforts, there is the problem of the former Iraqi Army that must be addressed. The demobilization and demilitarization components of the traditional approach were for all intents and purposes handled by the complete destruction of the former Army as a fighting organization by CJTF-7. However, some 300,000+ disaffected former Iraqi soldiers remained to be dealt with. The short-term concerns for how to handle these soldiers has been addressed by the payment of stipends to these soldiers, and MOLSA has hired the International Organization of Migration, an IO, to conduct a piece of the DDR process by registering former soldiers. This effort is proceeding on schedule, with most officers screened and the enlisted ranks beginning the process. Furthermore, for former soldiers who were neither senior members of the Baath party, nor committed atrocities, entry into the IAF is an option for them, as is participation in vocational training and job placement programs being stood up by MOLSA. Nonetheless, it will be necessary in the mid- to long-term to keep an eye on these former soldiers and to consider programs to address their needs. There are no short-term actions required, other than planning which will be conducted over the final months of the CPA's existence.

Efforts to Date: The CPA is not starting from scratch. Most of the militiamen who leave their organizations as part to the TR process will be absorbed by programs already in place. Those entering one of the emerging security services fall into this category, and CJTF-7 and CMATT are contributing mightily to make this happen. Vocational training, technical training, business training and job placement programs for the country are included in the Supplemental, and will soon be in place. While these are designed for the country in general, the TR process can use these programs and the infrastructure they will build to help significantly. Additionally, the PMO will be the engine for job creation in the near- to mid-term in Iraq, and the TR process will work with the PMO to develop opportunities for militiamen who want to rejoin civilian society.

Some efforts, however, will need to be created or coordinated. In particular, the reintegration component, which seeks to help militiamen rejoin civilian society, currently is not coordinated and will require some assistance. In particular, militiamen who are not joining one of the new Iraqi security services should be screened to determine their skills, aptitudes, health status and other characteristics, and matching them up with job training and placement opportunities needs to be managed. To do this, the efforts of all civilian ministries must be inventoried to identify opportunities for former militiamen to receive training and jobs, and this process should be managed. Finally, this effort should not fall to the U.S. for the mid- to long-term. International organizations and financial organizations that have significant expertise in these tasks must be engaged to help identify funds for reintegration, and take the reigns of this process once the security situation permits their entry into the country.

Comment: Non-concur on this since it has been the lack of any real attempts to reintegrate these personnel that has led to some of the security problems we face. Why not expand the reintegration programs for these personnel?

Comment: Are you confident these will be timely, effective and sufficient?

Stops to teachers?
staff
guards?

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Assumptions:

- The TR effort will initially be a U.S. planned, financed and executed effort, transitioning to IO or IFI, and perhaps Iraqi leadership in the mid-term (late 2005 or 2006);
- The Transitional Administrative Law (TAL) will outlaw armed organizations outside of central government control;
- The Coalition will not remain in being and in Iraq for five or more years, the minimum needed to establish a stable government (based on RAND, UN and WB case studies of post-conflict reconstruction efforts);
- Sovereignty will pass to the Iraqi people on 1 July 2004;
- Individual coalition members, the U.S. and U.K. in particular, will remain engaged for five or more years, though providing a diminished amount of financial and military support; and
- International Organizations (IOs), Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs) and International Financial Institutes (IFIs) will engage in Iraq to fill the vacuum created by the exit of the Coalition, but not until the security situation has stabilized.

Strategy Framework:

Concepts: To achieve the security end articulated at the beginning of this document, two steps are needed.

1. Develop the domestic political consensus needed for transition and reintegration. Realistically, this will require both getting the leaders of the various political bodies that control militias to publicly accept TR in concept, and effectively using this fact to make the implementation of TR possible. Successful implementation will rely heavily on a public information campaign that leverages these political agreements on two levels. The first, the "macro public information" effort, will address the national and international audience, and is designed to create a political situation in which leaders feel bound to fulfill their obligations and foreign nations and international bodies (IOs, IFIs, NGOs) are inclined to be helpful either diplomatically, with resources, or as participants. The second "micro public information" effort is addressed below.²
2. The second step translates political agreement into implementation. This, too, contains two concepts for implementation, both of which require a shift in the way Iraqis think about the respective roles of political leaders and individuals. If successful, these two ways of achieving our goals will create a shift from a society in which leaders make decisions for groups, to one in which individuals make decisions about what is best for themselves and their families. These two concepts are to
 - a. Break the chains of command of the various militias, primarily by shifting the loyalties of individual soldiers to their new employers; and

² See the Public Information Annex for more detailed information on the macro and micro public information efforts.

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- b. Take care of soldiers and their families by providing benefits, services and opportunities for a better life, thus decreasing the chances of them taking up arms in the future.

The "micro public information" effort will be to get the word out to individual soldiers about the opportunities offered by the TR programs.

In conjunction with these efforts, efforts on the part of the CJTF-7 and the emerging Iraqi security organizations will be critical in filling the security vacuum that the dissolution of these militias will cause. Close coordination between ONSA, MoI and CJTF-7 will be needed, and mechanisms are developing to ensure this.

The following sections will articulate components of the strategy. Implementation details are contained in the annexes, and the plans of the implementing organizations which are not reproduced here.

Strategy:

This section will lay out the broad themes upon which the transition and reintegration effort is built. Implementation details of the specific components are contained in annexes or separate plans maintained by other CPA or CJTF-7 organizations, and USAID.

Of the 30 or so militias in Iraq, three are pivotal owing to their strength and connection to important Iraqi political leaders: PUK, KDP, and Badr Organization. All other militias are either small but politically important and therefore worth engaging for political reasons (primarily those whose leaders are on the Iraqi Governing Council), relatively large but unreachable by political means (e.g., Mahdi's Army, Sadr's militia), or small and politically less important.³ Furthermore, some militias will be dealt with forcefully as they oppose or threaten coalition forces, and some will of their own volition follow the course the three major militias take. The use of force against the three major militias by either coalition or Iraqi security services could lead to large-scale hostilities and possibly unmanageable consequences for Iraq and the region. Therefore, while the leaders of the PUK, KDP, and Badr Organization should have no doubt that the existence of their militias is incompatible with the new Iraq, the threat of force must be muted. And because a muted threat of force will not induce compliance, a broader, 3-track strategy is needed:

1. Attracting militiamen to join one or another of Iraq's national security services by the prospect of better compensation, conditions, and long-term employment. In some cases this may include small unit transfers into the ICDC.
2. Provide the opportunity for individuals whose militia service can be characterized and who would qualify for retirement had they worked for a civil agency to retire with a pension.
3. Reintegrate militia personnel that do not enter Iraq's national security services or retire into civil society through job training and placement programs.

³ See Militia matrix at Annex XXXX

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Reintegration has the clear advantage of resulting in fewer people bearing arms, but it will not be attractive enough to the militiamen or their leaders to obviate the need for the first two tracks. The first two components of this strategy are short-term efforts (should be completed by the end of 2005). The last component is typically a process that takes a minimum of five years.

Track 1 – Transfer into Security Services

Concept: The security situation in many parts of the country is so volatile that local political leaders will want to ensure they can protect their people should the need arise. No efforts of the CPA or CJTF-7 short of open and significant hostilities will cause them to ignore this need, which grew out of the brutality of the previous government's security forces and external threats posed by groups such as Ansar al Islam, al Qaeda, Turkish Special Forces and others. One solution to this security situation, suggested by some local leaders, is to permit them to keep their militias. However, this is not an option if Iraq is to develop into a modern, stable state.

Strategy for Militia Leadership: While the concerns of local political leaders are real and must be addressed, they can be mitigated by two aspects of the transfer of militiamen into the developing security services. The first is to provide a sufficient number of billets in each security force to each major group so that each group's leaders will view the threat from the state as less than it previously was – i.e., through proportional representation.⁴ This is in fact an explicit demand of the leadership of the Badr Organization and others.⁵ This will be most effective with the three large militias, though having most security services populated with local men from each area may be helpful in general. Secondly, the presence of a significant number of local men in the local security forces (i.e., all but the IAF) provides local leaders with a semblance of control over their security, should the community be threatened by the emergence of an oppressive central government in the future, or forces from outside of the country. In a worst case scenario, we need to recognize that local leaders might wrest control of local units away from the central government. However, enlisting local militiamen is not simply legitimizing militia units by moving local men into security services. In these services, local men will be paid by the central government, rely on the systems of the central government for advancement and eventually retirement, and develop as members of professional organizations with all of the implications for loyalty that this entails. Of critical importance, care should be taken to ensure that the chain of command for these security organizations is not that of former militia forces. It may be generations before a complete transfer of loyalty to a central government takes root, but arrangements such as these are the most likely path to lead Iraq to this end.

⁴ Note here that by group we are not specifying whether these groups are militias or communities formed by religious affiliation, tribal membership, ethnicity or some other grouping. The point is the threat to the people is mitigated by proportional representation in the security forces.

⁵ Note that some security forces have already filled all of their quotas, and this may not be possible. Examples include the IPS and ICDC, should more units not be fielded.

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Strategy for Individuals: In addition the above reasons for leaders to encourage militiamen to go into security services, there are also economic incentives that will affect individuals without regard to their political leaders. The current compensation structure for Iraqi soldiers and police may attract some recruits, especially if the benefits of joining a legitimate state security service are well advertised (the micro-public information campaign). Work in one of the security services is currently one of the few paying jobs in the country. While these economic incentives will be helpful in many instances, these incentives will not be uniformly effective. Our information suggests that the Badr Corps pays some of its members as much as twice what the IAF pays, while PUK and KDP militiamen receive only a small fraction of government pay.⁶ However, the effort must be made and the results carefully tracked to refine our analysis and recruitment effort. Also working against this aspect of the strategy, is the fact that strong non-economic forces hold individuals to the Pesh Merga, while the Badr Organization's ties to Iran are problematic and their pay could be hard to match.

Small Unit Transfers: While individual recruitment into state security services is optimal, it may become necessary in the course of political discussions to permit a limited number of small unit transfers. An important assumption of this aspect of the strategy is that the ICDC will eventually become the reserve component of the IAF, making it well-suited as the state security service to absorb small militia units if necessary. While the ICDC is envisioned to assist in providing domestic security in the near term, its eventual status as an IAF reserve would not permit militia units that transfer into it a permanent, active role in Iraq's internal security or external defense – playing long-term important roles only under emergency conditions when activated by the national government. Under such conditions, the reserves would function in support of regular forces and under strict control of the national command authority (per the principles we will be advising the Iraqis to set in their interim constitution). At the same time, IAF reserves would remain mostly in their region and close to their ethnic base, though as a matter of principle they must be available for active service anywhere in the country (whether to deal with internal or external security).⁷

While allegiance to former leaders and causes (reconstitution risks) would persist, several measures can be taken to mitigate this effect: (is it worth also encouraging MoD to plan for temporary deployments – eg for training – in other parts of the country of ICDC units?)

1. Transfers should be in small units (not larger than companies);
2. Reserve units should be structurally aligned with IAF regular units;
3. Transfers should be supplemented by selection and integration of militia

Comment: In practice above the Green Line, we shall end up with 2-3 KDP bns, 2-3 PUK bns and a ?? bde HQ – we should be realistic about this

⁶ The Badr personnel who undertake targets of opportunity for the Iranian Government receive between \$300-400 USD a month. Not all Badr are on paid this well.

⁷ Small-unit that wish to transfers to any of the state security services other than the ICDC should be dissolved and dispersed as individuals throughout the force. The ICDC, of all the services, has the advantage of moving former militia units into a reserve status and under tight central government control. As it becomes obvious to former militiamen in ICDC units that they will be moving to a reserve status, they will need to find full-time employment, and will be motivated to go through tracks 2 and 3.

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- individual officers into the national security services.
4. Because, in principle, individuals and units could be reassigned anywhere in the country, the militias could over time melt into a national service under national political and command authority, as part of a larger structure dominated by the regular army, and in any case with roles, capabilities and political significance limited by their reserve status.

Comment: And perhaps make it career enhancing for officers and NCOs to spend some time with units in other parts of the country

Another important aspect of this approach is the fact that the TAL will make armed organizations outside of government control illegal. If political leaders know that their militias cannot survive in their current form, they may be anxious to secure them a place in the ICDC. However, if it becomes clear to them that the goal is elimination through absorption into a relatively passive service, their cooperation cannot be assumed. Without some inducement other than threat of force, they are likely to resist or to insist on large-unit transfers, local control, and no rotation out of their region. Taken together, these actions would amount to retaining militias in a different form. In particular, plans must be in place to reintegrate ICDC members into civil society after these units revert to reserve status (see track three description below).

Implementation: A serious obstacle to implementing this track is our own success at standing up these security services. Recruiting for the MoI managed security services and the ICDC is all but complete, and short of an increase in the number of units in each, there is little or no room for militiamen in these services. This aspect of the strategy will be examined in the section on finances.

Comment: DBE may have space; not clear how many IPS will be retired and need to be replaced ...

Key risk to this program is political decision by militia leaders NOT to allow their men to be integrated as they want to hold onto them for the power struggles; do we have an IC assessment on their intentions and the likelihood that they may pay lip-service but not really abide by the TAL?

Policy planning issue for CPA is who will enforce the TAL provision banning militias? Will it be CJTF-7 or IPS?

Specific approaches to negotiating with the three major militias is contained in the subsequent section on "*Specific Approaches.*"

Details on the implementation of this track are contained in Annex A – E.

Track 2 – Retirements:

During the long, often losing fight against Saddam Hussein, many of these militias fought for their lives and the lives of their families every day for years. In the end, those who survived were on the right side of history – the Coalition came to their assistance and Saddam and his henchmen were deposed. Some of these militias trained and fought as military units, observed recognized rules of combat, and can truly be called allies.

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Others fall along a spectrum that includes groups trained, equipped and paid for by the mullahs of Iran, fundamentalist zealots, and criminal and terrorist organizations.

As such, some militiamen should rightly be viewed as soldiers who fought for their county against a brutal oppressor, and so have access to the benefits that come from loyal service. Others, sought and seek only to impose another repressive regime on the people of Iraq and should not be viewed as such.

From the perspective of simple justice, then, it is right to recognize that those who took up arms for the cause of freedom and against Saddam served not only their own families and people, but the right and true interests of the Iraqi nation. As such, members of armed factions outside of central government control that fought the government of Saddam Hussein and who personally, and as members of armed bodies that were and are,

1. Not engaged in terrorist or criminal activities;
2. Not in the employment of a foreign states or organizations; and
3. That come into compliance with the TAL, STIPULATE THE PROPER PARA AND LINE NUMBER by 15 May 2004 by committing to a process of transition and reintegration for their members with definitive milestones that are accepted by the Coalition Provisional Authority,

should be recognized as soldiers, and have a right to all the same rights and privileges of soldiers, to include pensions and benefits, if eligible according to the policies established for soldiers; and preferences available to soldiers under any government program or contract.

Their eligibility should be based on the same criteria as all soldiers, as determined by the characterization of their service in these resistance groups, according to the records supplied by the leadership of these groups and verified by the CPA and/or Ministry of Defense or Interior.⁸ This includes benefits for the widows and orphans of resistance fighters whose status can be verified by the government.

Lump sum payments to militia organizations so that they can pay pensions should not be considered under any circumstance. It is critical that all armed factions, to include retirees from them, fall under central government oversight. Lump sum payments to militia leaders are more likely to perpetuate these organizations than to eliminate them.

All armed organizations that do not come into compliance with the TAL by signing a formal agreement to transition and reintegrate their members, with clearly defined milestones for completion of this process, should be designated an illegal organization and considered a threat to the security of the Iraqi people and the central government. Any Iraqi citizens affiliated with the armed organizations not in conformance with the TAL, as designated above, will forfeit the benefits outlined above. In addition, those

Comment: I do not see how this is implementable. The criteria here are very subjective and would be met by few, if any, of the militias in question. Any example I can think of risks falling foul or 1 or 2; do these criteria apply to the organization or individual? If we want to offer pensions, we will have to be less restrictive - perhaps only screening out those we/MOI can identify as terrorists (as with MEK).

⁸ There will be significant issues associated with getting these records. First, other than the Pesh Merga, it is unlikely that good records have been kept by these militias. It is also highly unlikely that militia leaders will willingly share them. It may be necessary to take the word of some militias leaders on characterization of service of some militiamen, but this should be done on a case by case basis, according to a procedure to be developed.

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determined to be eligible for these benefits or who are receiving these benefits and who are subsequently convicted of being active members of outlawed armed groups should forfeit these benefits.

Implementation: Pension programs are attractive to many militia leaders, as some understand that their militia should be made smaller even if they do not want them to be eliminated, and out of concern for their older members. The policy advocated above requires securing the documentation needed to characterize the service of individuals, and this will be difficult and in some cases impossible. Some of these groups will not have kept such documentation, and all will be reluctant to share it. Militias that refuse to help characterize the service of their members will necessarily cause their members to be ineligible, as a process without some fiscal controls could and most likely will spin out of control and end up paying pensions to anyone old enough to have spent a specified number of years in a militia. See track three for the structure of a registration and screening process that would also apply to those applying for pensions.

That said, this policy must be implemented wisely, with the full understanding that requiring comprehensive documentation before any pensions are granted will defeat the program, and that some fraud is unavoidable. A process will need to be developed to vet pension applications, and a policy and process developed to determine how to translate militia service into government service. Paying some pensions that have not been earned may be the price for retiring a significant number of militiamen.

The current policy for pensions for Iraqi government employees, to include soldiers, is at Annex G.

Track 3 - Reintegration:

Those militiamen not destined for one of the new security services through track 1, or to receive pensions through track 2, should be offered a reintegration program designed to help them back into civil society. This program should contain the following elements:

- Screening and registration process (not yet established, but in place for the old Iraqi Army and paid for by MOLSA – applies to Track 2 applicants as well)
- Medical screening and determination of needs and benefits if available (Track 2 as well)
- Education on basic human rights and responsibilities (Track 2 as well)
- Identification of skills and aptitude for training and job placement
- Screening of each militiaman and family to determine other needs (e.g., education needs of, and opportunities for, wife and children)
- Job training and placement if needed
- A limited stipend program to get militiamen through retraining (contained in some retraining programs)

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- A tracking mechanism tied to the provision of benefits⁹

Implementation: Because of the great differences in culture, outlook and expectations in the various sectors of the country, a regional approach to implementation will be necessary. These efforts should be planned and executed in conjunction with local and militia leaders to defuse suspicions on the part of these leaders, and to ensure that the various programs run as smoothly as possible. However, local leaders should not be permitted to participate in the execution of these programs. Programs must be targeted at the individual, and militia leadership involvement in execution will hurt that individual focus and potentially intimidate participants.

Large components of this effort are already in place under the various ministries and the PMO.¹⁰ The successful leveraging of these ongoing programs by the TR effort will depend on active development of opportunities and coordination on the part of the operational office that directs the reintegration efforts (TBD (b)(6) will recommend that this be USAID). The existence of these programs and opportunities, usually provided for the general population rather than just the militias, will not in and of itself be helpful unless this operational office actively facilitates connecting militiamen with these opportunities, and actively works with the PMO and the ministries to identify and develop opportunities.

To make this happen, reintegration councils should be established by the operating office that contains CPA, PMO, ministry and militia representatives. There should be one council for each major militia group, and one for all remaining smaller militias. These councils should have a very narrow focus -- to establish processes by which militiamen who want to be reintegrated into civilian life can access appropriate services, training and opportunities. These activities themselves should be carried out by the operating agency as it sees fit (i.e., either with internal resources or by contracting components out), and later by an IO, IFI or contractor.

In general, it appears that there is sufficient funding in the short-term to provide these opportunities, less the functions of a coordinating office and a screening and placement capability. In particular,

- MOLSA is in the process of standing up a \$95M vocational training and placement program for FY 04-05. This program is for the country in general, but contains preferences for former soldiers. Under the policy presented in Track 2, if adopted, former militiamen from qualifying groups would qualify for these preferences.
- MOLSA is in the process of standing up a banking and business skills training program. Once again, this is for the population in general, but some participation on the part of former militia is possible, and options for expanding this program

⁹ It is essential that all in the reintegration process understand that a relapse into militia activity will cause them and their families to forfeit their benefits. Families should be briefed on this as well.

¹⁰ Note that these programs are primarily for FY 04, and most militia members will only just be starting the reintegration process this year. Continuing efforts to link into these and similar programs will be necessary.

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should be considered (see section on funding WORK OUT DETAILS WITH MOLSA)

- Office of Private Sector Development has established a Micro and Small Business Enterprise Lending program that militia can have access to.
- PMO is committed to assisting in the identification of skills that will be needed as part of the rebuilding process. This information needs to be linked to the vocational and higher level skills programs.
- PMO is looking into the possibility of writing preferences for contractors who hire former militiamen into their contracts.

Timeline:

Implementation timelines will depend on the agreements made with each militia.

However, the following timelines are matters of policy or at the discretion of the CPA:

- 28 Feb 2004: TAL goes into effect
- 28 Feb 2004: Order on TR process issued by CPA
- 1 May 2004: Reintegration operating agency completes plan for Reintegration Coordination.
- 15 May 2004: All militia not in compliance with CPA Order become illegal and subject to sanctions

In addition to these close-in timelines, it is clear that the American taxpayer will not be willing to bear the burden of reintegration alone for the long-term. ONSA will work with the CIC, as well as directly with IOs, IFIs and other potential donors to develop a plan to hand off responsibility for the reintegration component of this plan.

Funding:

Develop funding deltas for multiple variables. Present three representative options. If these don't make sense, fix the ones that do for your programs in the annexes – I'll use them to fix this up. Variables will include:

- # Additional ICDC Bns, from 0 to 9 (0,4,9) (\$5.9M per ICDC Bn) Need to include ?? Bde HQs?
- # Additional Border Guards, MOI will help develop meaningful numbers when possible
- Level of R support provided in terms of
 - Level of staffing of the operational activity (\$4M in FY04, \$6M in FY05)
 - Additional job training, placement activities- work with MOLSA to determine programmatics
 - Job creation activities – work with PMO, Private Sector Dev, MoOil. (Numbers range from 0 to ?).
 - Stipends – Yes or No for 50K for 6 month in FY04 and 6 months in FY05

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Annex D: Militia Status Need IC help to update, verify, modify, etc.

	Political Affiliation/Leader	Approx #	IAF	ICDC	IPS	Border Police	Retire	Civ
KDP	Barsani	31,000	7,000	0	0	0	11,000	4,000
PUK	Talibani	13,000		0	0	0		
Badr Corps	SCIRI/Hakim (IGC)	12,000		850	0	0		
Mahdi's Army	Shiite/Sadr – anti coalition	2,000	0	0	0	0	0	0
Da'wa	Dr. al Jafri/Shiite (IGC)	500+		0	0	0		
INA	Dr. Iyad Alawi (IGC)	200+		0	0	0		
INC	Challabi – personal group, hired bodyguards	250+		0	0	0		
Iraqi Islamic Party	Mohsen Abdal Hamid (IGC)			0	0	0		
Iraqi Hizbullah	Abdul Karim Muhamadawai, Abu Hatem (IGC) (Marsh Arabs)	250+		0	0	0		
Iraqi Comm Party	Hamid Majid Musa	200+		0	0	0		
15th Shaban	Local group WHERE??	200+		0	0	0		
Iraqi Turko Front	Turkish sponsored	200+		0	0	0		
Ansar al Islam			0	0	0	0	0	0
MEK			0	0	0	0	0	0
KADEK			0	0	0	0	0	0

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Red = terrorist or enemy of the coalition organizations
Blue = the ability to offer this many slots to militia

Arsht, Leslye (OTHER)

From: (b)(6)
Sent: Sunday, January 25, 2004 7:33 AM
To: Arsht, Leslye (OTHER)
Cc: (b)(6) Agresto, John (SES-1)
Subject: Secondary Education cooperative with new Iraqi Armed Forces

Ms. Arsht:

Appreciate any follow-up information you could provide regarding our discussion yesterday. We are interested in any cooperation between the Ministry of Education and Ministry of Defense regarding:

- Literacy testing for recruits to determine need for:
 - o Arab as second language training (primarily for Kurds)
 - o Basic literacy training for any requiring it
 - o Also, any general literacy data that might exist, understanding recent widespread records loss
- Continuing education opportunities for soldiers to advance them to 12th grade equivalency
 - o Particularly on-post / in-barracks classes
- We will investigate background of, and possibilities of, military-sponsored "prep schools", understanding potential negative connotations

We have also discussed higher education opportunities with John Agresto of Ministry of Higher Education. We have as yet not talked to Ministry of Social Welfare and Labor.

Thank-you your time and attention on this matter. While a previously contentious aspect of the social fabric of Iraq, the military is perhaps one of the key opportunities for an ethnically and religiously diverse, unifying national institution. Education is critical to that goal.

V/R,

(b)(6)

Foreign Language

Lt Col (b)(6) **USAF**

CMATT/C5

(b)(6) *B6*

problems

1/25/2004