

08-F-0811



**THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE**  
3010 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-3010

ACQUISITION,  
TECHNOLOGY  
AND LOGISTICS

JUN 30 2005

The Honorable Barack Obama  
United States Senate  
713 Hart Senate Office Building  
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Senator Obama:

This is in reply to your recent letter to the Secretary regarding the manner in which the department is meeting the requirements of the law governing the transparency of the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) process.

A list of the Department's closure and realignment recommendations was delivered to the Commission and Congress on May 13, 2005, three days in advance of the statutory May 16, 2005 deadline. Additionally, a summary of the selection process that resulted in the recommendations, including a justification for each recommendation, was included in Volume 1 of the Department's BRAC report. This information, required within seven days of delivery of the recommendations, was provided to the Commission and to the Congress and posted on the Department's BRAC website on May 13, 2005.

In accordance with the BRAC statute, the Department is committed to making all information used by the Secretary to prepare the recommendations available to the Commission and Congress. The Department is also committed to ensuring public access to that same information, unless the nature of the information is such that its public release would cause serious damage to national security. To that end, in addition to the Department's initial submission and to further support the Commission's and the public's understanding of the Department's recommendations, the Department has made all information used by the Secretary to prepare the recommendations available to the Commission and Congress, specifically, as follows:

- The classified force structure plan (Volume 2);
- Reports by the Military Departments and the Joint Cross Service Groups (Volumes 3 through 12), including, among other things, capacity and military value analysis;
- Recommendation binders containing the Department's analysis of each final recommendation against all eight selection criteria;



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- Analysis of scenarios or candidate recommendations that did not become final recommendations;
- Cost of Base Realignment Action (COBRA) Model with static data;
- Economic Impact Model, including data;
- Environmental Impact data and analysis;
- Community infrastructure data and analysis;
- Installation imagery of bases to be visited;
- Testimony to the Commission by senior DoD officials;
- Minutes of all deliberations, including attachments of all documents considered;
- Policy memoranda and guidance documents;
- Full volume of data collected (BRAC databases and scenario data calls and responses);
- Assorted internal administrative memoranda regarding preparation of recommendations, including regular status updates; and
- Reports or written assessments received from the Red Team during the preparation of the recommendations.

With the exception of that which is classified (less than 2 percent of all BRAC information), the Department has also made the above information available to the general public through its website ([www.defenselink.mil/brac/](http://www.defenselink.mil/brac/)).

Thank you again for the opportunity to bring you up to date on this matter. A similar response has been sent to all signatories of your letter. Please let me know if I may be of further assistance as we go forward.

Sincerely,



Kenneth J. Krieg



ACQUISITION  
TECHNOLOGY  
AND LOGISTICS

OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
3000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3000

OCT 26 2005

The Honorable Barack Obama  
United States Senate  
713 Hart Senate Office Building  
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Senator Obama:

This is in response of your letter to President George W. Bush regarding the impact of the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) process on Illinois military installations. I am responding on his behalf.

As you know, the Department of Defense conducted a comprehensive review of installation infrastructure within the statutory authority provided by Congress. The Secretary of Defense forwarded his recommendations to the 2005 BRAC Commission on May 13, 2005. Please be assured that the Department's recommendations resulted from a thorough analysis of all military installations in the United States and Territories on an equal footing, with military value as the primary consideration.

The Commission forwarded its report and recommendations to the President on September 8, 2005. On September 15, 2005, the President approved the Commission's recommendations and forwarded its report to Congress. If Congress does not enact a joint resolution disapproving the report before the earlier of 45 days after transmittal (not counting periods when either house is adjourned for more than three days certain), or its adjournment *sine die* for the session, the Department is required to close or realign all installations recommended for closure and realignment. A similar reply has been sent to the other signatories of your letter.

Sincerely,

Philip W. Grone  
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense  
(Installation and Environment)



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ACQUISITION,  
TECHNOLOGY  
AND LOGISTICS

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3010 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3010

SEP 22 2006

413.777

The Honorable Barack Obama  
United States Senate  
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Senator Obama:

This is in response to your letter to Secretary Rumsfeld regarding the Department's response to section 358 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006 (P.L. 109-163).

The Windmill Farm report is at the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for interagency review and coordination. Upon approval from OMB, the report will be submitted to the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives. The report discusses various technologies that could mitigate any adverse effects, that were identified, on military operations.

A similar letter to this is being sent to Senator Durbin.

Sincerely,

*Kenneth J. Krieg*  
Kenneth J. Krieg

(7 Sep 06)



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OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
3000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3000

ACQUISITION,  
TECHNOLOGY  
AND LOGISTICS

OCT 25 2006

The Honorable Barack Obama  
United States Senate  
230 S. Dearborn, Suite 3900  
Chicago, IL 60604

Dear Senator Obama:

This is in response to your letter dated 3 October 2006 concerning your constituent, Mr. Richard Brown of Schreck Wholesale Inc.

Mr. Brown's letter seems to say that his firm has been a subcontractor, but not a prime contractor, to the Federal Government. If so, his company may not be registered on our "centralized contractors registration" (CCR) system. Firms that are not registered cannot receive Department of Defense (DoD) contracts. The CCR ([www.ccr.gov](http://www.ccr.gov)) is the Federal-Wide single point of entry into the Federal procurement process. Mr. Brown should register his company. Additional information on DoD marketing opportunities can be located on our website at [www.acq.osd.mil/osbp](http://www.acq.osd.mil/osbp).

Mr. Brown also states in his letter dated 27 September 2006, that he has been unsuccessful in establishing his company as a direct supplier to the Department of Defense and the General Services Administration (GSA). I suggest that Mr. Brown contact the following military headquarters exchange offices, which purchase resale merchandise that is stocked in post and base exchanges and the GSA Small Business Office listed below.

Army and Air Force Service  
P. O. Box 650455  
Dallas, TX 75265-0455  
PH: 972-277-7103

Navy Exchange Service Command  
Small Business Office  
3280 Virginia Beach Boulevard  
Virginia Beach, VA 23452-5724  
PH: 804-631-3582

GSA Small Bus. Office  
18<sup>th</sup> & F Streets, N.W.  
Room 6029  
Washington, DC 20405  
PH: 202-501-1021

I hope that the above contact information will help your constituent in marketing his services to the Department of Defense.

Sincerely,

Frank Ramos, Director  
Office of Small Business Programs



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15788-06

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LEGISLATIVE  
AFFAIRS

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1300

08-F-0811

SEP 7 2007

The Honorable Barack Obama  
713 Hart Senate Office Building  
United States Senate  
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Senator Obama:

Thank you for your letter to President Bush expressing concern about press reporting that al Qaeda had used the largely ungoverned territory along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border to restore its capabilities to pre-9/11 levels.

In his testimony before the House Armed Services Committee and House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence on July 25, 2007, Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence James Clapper stated we expect Pakistan to become much more active in addressing the security situation along its border with Afghanistan. I believe Secretary Clapper's testimony answers in depth the questions you raised to the President.

I have attached Secretary Clapper's testimony for your review and hope that it is of value to your inquiry.

Sincerely,

Robert L. Wilkie  
Assistant Secretary of Defense  
(Legislative Affairs)

Attachments:  
As stated

*Afghanistan*

(7 Sep 07)

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08-F-0811

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~  
UNTIL RELEASED BY THE  
HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE  
AND  
THE HOUSE PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

Statement by  
The Honorable James R. Clapper, Jr.  
Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence

Before the 110<sup>th</sup> Congress  
Committee on Armed Services  
And  
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence  
United States House of Representatives

July 25, 2007

## INTRODUCTION

Chairman Skelton, Chairman Reyes, Congressman Hunter, Congressman Hoekstra, distinguished members of the Committees: Thank you for your strong support for the brave men and women in uniform of the Department of Defense who so courageously serve the nation. And thank you for the opportunity to meet with you this morning to discuss the implications of the National Intelligence Estimate on the Terrorist Threat to the Homeland.

On September 20, 2001, the President, in his joint address to Congress and the American people, said, "We will direct every resource at our command -- every means of diplomacy, every tool of intelligence, every instrument of law enforcement, every financial influence, and every necessary weapon of war -- to the disruption and to the defeat of the global terror network... Americans should not expect one battle, but a lengthy campaign, unlike any other we have ever seen. It may include dramatic strikes, visible on TV, and covert operations, secret even in success."

Today, nearly six years later, there hasn't been a successful attack on our homeland. This is not for a lack of will on the part of our enemy. While al Qaeda and those inspired by its extremist ideology have carried out terrorist attacks in more than two dozen nations since 9/11, they have thus far not succeeded in attacking us in spite of their continued plotting. As the NIE states, our countermeasures "have helped disrupt known plots against the United States since 9/11." In addition, our offensive measures have deprived al Qaeda of its comfortable safe haven in Afghanistan in which it could train and indoctrinate large numbers of recruits and plan operations.

However, al Qaeda has, and will continue to, attempt visually dramatic mass casualty attacks here at home, and they will continue to attempt to acquire chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear materials, which they will not



hesitate to use. As the NIE makes clear, we face a resilient and resourceful enemy who will make every effort to protect and regenerate key elements of its capability to attack us and others. There can be no guarantee that he will not from time to time succeed in attacking us; indeed, over the course of a long war the potential is there.

The President's *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism* is clear on the need to fight our terrorist enemies on the battlefield and to promote freedom and human dignity as alternatives to the terrorists' perverse vision of oppression and totalitarian rule. We are applying all elements of our national power and influence -- military, diplomatic, financial, intelligence and law enforcement -- to destroy terrorist networks and confront radical ideology. As the President has said, the best long-term answer to violent extremism is to advance effective democracies.

The National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism spells out DoD's roles and objectives in this war. For the purpose of this hearing, I want to briefly describe implications of the NIE in three broad areas that are encompassed in this plan:

- Fighting the War on Terror;
- Defending the homeland; and
- Preparing to assist civil authorities in the response to a terrorist attack on the homeland.

#### **FIGHTING THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR**

Since al Qaeda attacked America nearly six years ago, the U.S. military has been continuously at war, but fighting a conflict that has many characteristics that are markedly different from wars of the past. In this war, our nation's armed forces have been tasked with removing hostile regimes in Iraq and Afghanistan that were sponsors of terrorism. In Afghanistan, a regime that gave sanctuary and

support to al Qaeda as they planned the 9/11 attacks has come to an end. And in Iraq, we removed a cruel dictator who harbored terrorists, paid the families of Palestinian suicide bombers, invaded his neighbors, defied the UN Security Council, and pursued and used weapons of mass destruction. Initially quick military successes in both countries has led to protracted stability and reconstruction campaigns against brutal and adaptive insurgencies.

In other parts of the war, however, the enemies we face are not nation-states but rather dispersed non-state networks. In many cases, actions must occur on many continents in countries with which the United States is not at war. Unlike the image many have of war, this struggle cannot be won by military force alone, or even principally. And it is a struggle that will likely last for years to come.

In this war, like in any other major conflict, we have to expect that there will be reverses as well as successes. The enemy will react and adapt to what we do and search out new opportunities, tactics, methods and weapons. A war is not an engineering project, in which all the tasks and challenges can be laid out ahead of time and accomplished according to a pre-determined schedule. As the troops say, "the enemy gets a vote."

The NIE highlights one such way in which the enemy has adapted: in response to its loss of Afghanistan: it has reconstituted some of its command and support network in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border.

This is a wild and remote area over which the government of Pakistan (and the British before them) has never fully gained control. President Musharraf has tried various approaches to dealing with this problem, and has lost about 500 personnel in the process of trying to establish law and order in the FATA. Musharraf has also tried political measures to eliminate al Qaeda and the Taliban from the FATA, including making a deal with the local tribal leaders in one of the

agencies under which they prevent the use of their territory as a launching pad for attacks into Afghanistan. This agreement, the North Waziristan Agreement, has not been successful, as the Pakistani government admits. While one could debate the wisdom of trying to conclude such agreements, I don't think it is fair to charge Musharraf with being ignorant of the problem or being unwilling to deal with it. If only because of their various attempts to assassinate him, and the loss of hundreds of his soldiers, he clearly understands the extremist threat.

Because of recent events, we expect President Musharraf to become much more active in addressing this problem. We have taken, and continue to take, a number of steps to help him, including:

- Funding, through the useful vehicle of Coalition Support Funds, much of the operating costs of Pakistani security forces conducting counter-terrorist operations in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and elsewhere on the Pakistani border with Afghanistan,
- Providing 24 Bell helicopters and air assault training to Pakistani security forces so they can operate rapidly and effectively in the FATA and other remote regions,
- Providing key night vision capability, including equipment and training, to enable helicopter pilots of the Pakistani Army to pursue terrorists around the clock,
- Transferring \$110 million to the Department of State to support economic development in the FATA. This effort will help strike at the root causes of terrorism.
- Congress was instrumental in providing support for all of these measures, and its support for the authorization to transfer funds to the State Department was particularly helpful.

The recent Red Mosque crisis has heightened the extremist Islamist threat in Pakistan, and brought the struggle between extremists and the mainstream to the fore. The behavior of the extremists who had been holed up in the mosque highlighted the threat, and extremists based in the border areas have taken both the stepped up Pakistani Army presence in the FATA and along the border as well as the storming of the mosque as a pretext for resuming terrorist attacks on the Pakistani security forces.

At the same time, there are signs of a reaction against the extremists. On April 17, 2007, a convention attended by over 2,000 Pakistani religious figures in Peshawar, the capital of Pakistan's ethnically Pashtun North-West Frontier Province (which includes the FATA), proclaimed that suicide bombings were against Islam and condemned the forcible implementation and enforcement of Shari'a (Islamic Law). Also, internal disputes in Pakistan's tribal agency of South Waziristan recently erupted into conflict between Taliban-allied local tribes and al Qaeda-allied Central Asian groups, mostly Uzbeks. Uzbek forces offended local Pashtun groups by their criminal activity and insensitivity to local tribal customs, resulting in open warfare between locals and Central Asian fighters.

I've noted that the NIE describes a resilient and resourceful enemy who will adapt to circumstances. Yet a full assessment should also look at the enemy's weaknesses and vulnerabilities. At the strategic level, I think his greatest weakness is his tendency to overreach; perhaps not surprisingly, a movement that fosters a cult of violence and death has difficulty restraining itself when violence is not in its best interests.

In Iraq, for example, al Qaeda in Iraq's excessive violence -- directed not only against Shi'a civilians but against fellow Sunnis, including insurgents, who failed to toe the al Qaeda line -- has resulted in a backlash. Iraqis in Anbar province made common cause with U.S. and Iraqi security forces against al Qaeda's attempt to convince Iraq's Sunni Arabs that its objective of an Islamic

State of Iraq (ISI) is the only alternative to the Shia-dominated Iraqi Government. Even insurgent groups such as the Islamic Army in Iraq openly rejected the ISI and criticized them as a foreign terrorist group that has divided Iraqi society. Inspired by successes in the Anbar province, other provinces such as Diyala, northeast of Baghdad, mobilized against the ISI, who by then were on the run in Anbar.

Similarly, in Saudi Arabia, terrorist attacks in May 2003 energized the government, which has cracked down on salafi-jihadis and "deviants" who pervert Islam to preach violence. To confront extremist ideology within the Kingdom, the Saudis have been working with religious leaders to eliminate hatred-filled sermons, have passed new regulations in the charitable sector, increased vigilance in the financial sector, and have joined regional initiatives on anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing. Some wealthy Saudi donors still fund violent extremists around the world, but steps taken by the ruling family to tackle extremism and terrorism are an important success in the global war on terror.

In Jordan, to take another example, the November 2005 attack on a wedding in Amman turned public opinion against Islamist extremists in a dramatic fashion.

These al Qaeda missteps provide us with a strategic opportunity. In the Department of Defense, our main task in this regard is to help foreign governments counter extremist terrorism and to assist, where appropriate, in their efforts to build up their governmental, as well as security, capacity.

More generally, these missteps provide us an opportunity to wage what has been called the "battle of ideas." Most Muslims do not embrace extremist views of an Osama bin Laden, but, for a long time, the debate within the Muslim world was rather one-sided. The challenge to the U.S. government is not to enter this debate directly, but to support mainstream voices within the Muslim world and to

resist the extremists' attempts to intimidate them. This aspect of the overall struggle has just begun.

Despite its resilience, al Qaeda is weaker today than it would have been if we had not taken strong action against them over the last five-and-a-half years. And we ourselves have become stronger and more capable. Because of the President's commitment to our homeland security, we have more and better intelligence, military and law enforcement resources, and the capability to confront an enemy who is weaker now than it would have been absent our aggressive effort to confront and defeat them.

#### **DEFENDING THE HOMELAND**

Here at home, it is the primary mission of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, including stopping terrorists from coming across our borders, coming through our ports, or hijacking aircraft inside or outside the United States. The Attorney General leads our Nation's law enforcement effort to detect, prevent, and investigate terrorist activity within the United States. DoD's responsibility is to employ our warfighting capabilities, subject to constitutional and statutory authority, in a military defense of U.S. lives, property, and individual freedom.

To meet emerging threats to the homeland, the Department of Defense is postured to deter, defend against, and defeat threats to the United States in the air, maritime, and land domains.

In the air domain, DoD defends U.S. airspace and protects the nation's air approaches. The air domain is guarded, patrolled, and monitored by the bi-national U.S.-Canada North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD). Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, more than 42,000 fighter, aerial refueling, and airborne early warning sorties have been flown, while more than 2,000 air patrols have responded to actual incidents and suspicious flight

operations. We also have air defense alert fighters positioned throughout the United States and Canada that are capable of reaching major population centers and high-value infrastructure within minutes. The number of alert fighters can be increased or decreased according to emerging threat levels.

We continually adjust our posture in order to protect the National Capitol Region (NCR), the seat of the U.S. Government. The Department conducts irregular air patrols, maintains a dedicated 24-hours-a-day/7-days-a-week alert fighter response based at Andrews Air Force Base, Maryland, and has a dedicated ground missile defense system located to provide around-the-clock coverage for the National Capitol Region. In addition, in 2005, DoD provided the Visual Warning System (VWS) to warn wayward pilots to contact the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) air traffic controllers immediately and to depart from restricted airspace. We also detailed DoD liaison officers to serve at the Transportation Security Administration-hosted NCR Coordination Center (NCRCC) on a full-time basis and provided key interagency operations centers and the NCRCC access to DoD's classified conferencing capability, which is used for DoD coordination and decision making during the response to hostile domestic air threats.

In addition, DoD has deployed missile interceptors at Fort Greeley, Alaska, and Vandenberg Air Force Base, California, to protect the U.S. homeland from ballistic missile attack even as system development, testing, and fielding continue.

The maritime domain – including international waters, the maritime approaches to the United States, our territorial seas, and other U.S. navigable waters – is guarded by a highly effective partnership between the U.S. Navy and the U.S. Coast Guard. The U.S. Navy defends the sea approaches to the United States and works with the U.S. Coast Guard to patrol international waters and our territorial seas.

Additionally, in multiple theaters in the global war on terror, forward-deployed U.S. Navy assets work with other agencies to identify, track, and intercept threats before they threaten the United States.

On the land domain, in addition to general purpose forces, which can be called upon at any time, DoD has numerous assets ready to directly defend the U.S. homeland and to assist civil authorities:

- Quick Reaction Forces and Rapid Reaction Forces, highly trained U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps units, are postured to respond to a wide range of potential threats to the U.S. homeland, including critical infrastructure protection.
- Joint Force Headquarters National Capital Region, based at Fort McNair in Washington, DC, is responsible for land homeland defense, civil support, and consequence management in the National Capital Region.
- Joint Task Force North (JTF-N), headquartered at Fort Bliss, Texas, supports counterdrug, counterterrorism, and other operations to counter transnational threats.
- Joint Task Force Alaska, based at Elmendorf Air Force Base, Alaska, is responsible for land homeland defense and civil support operations in Alaska, and Joint Task Force Homeland Defense, based at Fort Shafter, Hawaii, has these responsibilities in Hawaii and U.S. territories, possessions, and protectorates in the Pacific.

#### **PREPARING TO ASSIST CIVIL AUTHORITIES IN THE RESPONSE TO A TERRORIST ATTACK**

Despite all of this, we realize that the enemy only has to be right once, while we must be right every day, all the time. The dark talent of the extremists



today is, as President Bush has said, to combine “new technologies and old hatreds.” Their ability to tap into global communications systems turns modern advances against us and turns local conflicts into problems potentially of much wider concern. The interest they have shown in weapons of mass destruction is real and needs to be taken seriously. While the most likely al Qaeda attack method is the use of conventional explosives, intelligence reports and public pronouncements continue to indicate that al Qaeda and other groups are attempting to acquire weapons of mass destruction. And, unlike our enemies during the Cold War, rational nation-states who considered weapons of mass destruction “weapons of last resort,” our terrorist enemy today considers such weapons “weapons of first choice.” Whether al Qaeda or other transnational terrorists develop weapons of mass destruction or acquire them from rogue nation-states, we can be certain that they will use such weapons against the United States at their first opportunity, especially, if they can, on American soil to kill our citizens, destroy our property, disrupt our economy, and attempt to break our national will to resist their extremist objectives.

The first line of defense against a terrorist weapon of mass destruction attack is the War on Terror, which I have already addressed, and international efforts such as the Proliferation Security Initiative, 80 nations working together to stop shipments of materials related to weapons of mass destruction on land, at sea, and in the air.

Still, we must be prepared for the unthinkable even if such an event would be unacceptable.

Here at home, the Department of Homeland Security is responsible for the coordinated U.S. national effort to prepare for, prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from terrorist weapons of mass destruction attacks. If a weapons of mass destruction attack should occur within the United States, the Department of Defense (DoD), at the direction of the President or the Secretary of Defense, as

appropriate and consistent with the law and the imperative to maintain military readiness, will provide critical weapons of mass destruction consequence management support to civil authorities as part of the comprehensive national response to a weapons of mass destruction attack.

With few exceptions, DoD's consequence management capabilities are designed for the wartime protection of DoD's personnel and facilities. With the exception of a dedicated command and control element (Joint Task Force Civil Support) and National Guard Weapons of Mass Destruction-Civil Support Teams, DoD relies on dual-capability forces to support civil authorities in domestic CBRNE consequence management. In accordance with the 2005 Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support, DoD "will be prepared to provide forces and capabilities in support of domestic CBRNE consequence management, with an emphasis on preparing for multiple, simultaneous mass casualty incidents."

Military response forces include:

- National Guard Weapons of Mass Destruction - Civil Support Teams (WMD-CSTs). Consisting of 22 high-skilled, full-time members of the Army and Air National Guard who are federally resourced, trained, and certified, and operate under the command and control of a State governor (Title 32, U.S. Code), the WMD-CSTs support civil authorities at a CBRNE incident site by identifying WMD agents/substances, assessing current and projected consequences, advising on effective response measures, and assisting with appropriate requests for State and Federal support. Section 1403 of the *Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003* (Public Law 107-314) authorized 55 WMD-CSTs and required DoD to ensure that of these 55 teams there is at least one team established in each State and territory. Currently, 52 of the authorized 55 WMD-CSTs have been certified by the Secretary of

Defense. The remaining three teams, in Guam, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands, are expected to be certified in Fiscal Year 2008.

- National Guard Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosive (CBRNE) Enhanced Response Force Packages (CERFPs). The CERFPs are task-organized units with combat support and service support mission essential tasks that, in conjunction with WMD-CSTs, assist local, State, and Federal authorities in CBRNE consequence management (e.g., casualty search and extraction, medical triage, casualty decontamination, and emergency medical treatment). CERFPs are designed to fill the 6-72 hour gap in capabilities between the first response and the Federal response following a CBRNE incident. There are currently 17 CERFPs (California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Texas, Washington, Virginia, and West Virginia), of which 12 are trained and ready to respond to CBRNE incidents in each of the 10 FEMA regions.
- Joint Task Force Civil Support (JTF-CS). JTF-CS, headquartered at Fort Monroe, Virginia, and its components, Joint Task Force Consequence Management East (headquartered at Fort Gillem, Georgia) and Joint Task Force Consequence Management West (headquartered at Fort Sam Houston, Texas), is a deployable, standing task force of 160 assigned military personnel led by a two-star Army National Guard general officer serving on active duty, who is under the command of the U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) commander. The mission of JTF-CS is to deploy, when directed, to a CBRNE incident site to exercise

command and control of assigned Federal military forces to support civil authorities.

- U.S. Marine Corps Chemical-Biological Incident Response Force (CBIRF). The CBIRF, which consists of 117 personnel, 21 vehicles and necessary equipment, and follow-on forces of 200 additional personnel and 22 additional vehicles and equipment, is a deployable force capable of responding to a CBRNE incident in support of local, State, or Federal authorities and designated combatant commanders' consequence management operations by providing capabilities for agent detection and identification; casualty search and rescue; personnel decontamination; emergency medical care; and stabilization of contaminated personnel.
- DoD Explosive Ordnance Disposal Teams, which can provide assistance to detect, identify, render safe, and dispose of unexploded ordnance such as improvised explosive devices and CBRNE weapons.
- U.S. Army Technical Escort Units (TEUs). The TEUs' mission is to provide a worldwide response for escorting, rendering safe, disposing, sampling, verifying, mitigating, and identifying weaponized and non-weaponized chemical, biological, and other hazardous materials. One TEU company supports the National Capital Response Force.
- CBRNE Consequence Management Response Forces (CCMRF). The CCMRF includes elements of all of these capabilities and can be quickly tailored to provide a coordinated response to specific CBRNE incidents. The CCMRF are Title 10, U.S. Code, joint forces capable of responding to a wide range of CBRNE attacks

against the American people with a wide range of services, including decontamination and security of a contaminated site or area; medical triage, treatment, and care; and transportation and logistical support.

DoD's CBRNE consequence management capabilities include specialized agent detection, identification, and dispersion modeling systems as well as casualty extraction and mass decontamination abilities. DoD also can provide emergency medical support such as equipment, mobile hospitals, aeromedical evacuation, medical personnel, engineering support, and mortuary services.

To ensure the readiness of these forces and to identify gaps and potential weaknesses within each agency and across agencies in terrorist attacks, particularly multiple, simultaneous attacks, DoD holds or participates in at least four major interagency exercises per year. These exercises support the DHS National Homeland Security Exercise Program established by Homeland Security Presidential Directive-8 (HSPD-8), "National Preparedness" (December 17, 2003). In the past these have included UNIFIED DEFENSE (2003, 2004), DETERMINED PROMISE (2003, 2004), ARDENT SENTRY (2005, 2006, and 2007), DILIGENT ENDEAVOR (2003), DINGO KING (2005), DILIGENT WARRIOR (2004), NORTHERN EDGE (2003), SCARLET SHIELD (2004), DARK PORTAL (2004), CYBER STORM (2006), and TOP OFFICIALS (TOPOFF) II and III (2003, 2005). All recent scenarios for DoD and interagency exercises have included the challenge of countering and responding to CBRNE threats such as radiological dispersion devices in the northeast and western United States, improvised nuclear device attacks in the western US, nuclear weapon and recovery in the western and mid-western United States, chemical and improvised explosive device attacks on the East Coast, and biological attacks in the Northeast, Midwest, and Pacific Northwest.

## **CONCLUSION**

In conclusion, to those responsible for protecting the homeland from al Qaeda and the threat of terrorism, the information in the National Intelligence Estimate is not new; it reinforces the seriousness of the terrorist threat against the homeland and confirms much of what the President has been saying since 9/11. We are facing a persistent terrorist enemy led by al Qaeda that remains driven and intent on attacking the homeland, and that continues to adapt and improve its capabilities.

Our greatly increased worldwide counterterrorism efforts since 9/11 have constrained the ability of al Qaeda to attack the U.S. again and have led terrorist groups to view the homeland as a harder target to strike than it was on 9/11.

We must remember terrorism is not a threat we face alone. It is a threat faced by our allies around the world -- in London, in Bali, Madrid, Riyadh and Islamabad. We cannot win this war alone; we need our allies to win. They fight the threat just as we do. And just as our heroes on the battlefields around the world are injured and die in the fight, our allies fight and die, as well.

As President Roosevelt stated in his Pearl Harbor Speech on December 8, 1941, "There is no blinking at the fact that our people, our territory and our interests are in grave danger. With confidence in our armed forces - with the unbounding determination of our people - we will gain the inevitable triumph."

08-F-0811



THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
2000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2000

JAN 10 2006

The Honorable Barack Obama  
713 Hart Senate Office Building  
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Senator Obama:

Thank you for conveying your concerns to Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld regarding the use of white phosphorous munitions in combat operations. He has asked me to reply.

As a lawful, non-chemical conventional munition, white phosphorus munitions are used as obscurants (i.e., as smoke screens), for target marking, or to help to flush enemy forces out of protected positions.

U.S. forces always consider target vulnerability and location, available munitions, risk to the civilian population, and risk to friendly forces in determining how a target will be attacked. Suggestions that U.S. forces targeted civilians with these weapons are simply wrong. In comparison, former regime elements, foreign terrorists, and other like-minded criminals operating in Iraq have made a practice of using civilians as human shields and of conducting suicide bomb attacks against Iraqi civilians.

Coalition forces will continue to use the full array of lawful, conventional weapons against legitimate targets, as well as do everything possible to keep civilians out of harm's way.

Sincerely,

  
Eric S. Edelman

370.04

(1 Draft)



R OSD 24153-05 (2)

08-F-0811



ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
2600 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2600

DEC 22 2005

HOMELAND  
DEFENSE

The Honorable Barack Obama  
United States Senate  
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Senator Obama:

I am writing in response to your September 28, 2005, letter to Secretary Rumsfeld regarding the provision of resources and guidance to the States that will ensure that all National Guard and Reserve members deployed to support Hurricanes Katrina and Rita relief efforts receive medical screenings at the conclusion of their deployment.

The Department of Defense (DoD) is committed to ensuring the safety and health of its personnel. To that end, on August 31, 2005, the U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) issued detailed Force Health Protection (FHP) guidance. For all "assigned and attached" personnel, including DoD civilians and contractors employed directly by DoD. The guidance detailed the health risks of deployment to the affected area, and called for FHP measures to be taken before, during, and after deployment.

National Guard personnel deployed in State Active Duty status were not "assigned or attached" to USNORTHCOM, and thus not subject to the USNORTHCOM guidance. Even after the status of National Guard personnel changed from State Active Duty to duty under Title 32, United States Code, they remained under the command and control of the State governors, and not subject to the USNORTHCOM guidance. However, this change in status did make these National Guard personnel eligible for military medical treatment.

Because of the potential health risks to responders, post-deployment prophylactic measures against known risks are essential, and post-deployment health assessments are appropriate and have been undertaken. DoD is making every effort to ensure that persons eligible for military medical treatment who responded to Hurricane Katrina receive appropriate medical care.

I am sending an identical letter to Senators Durbin and Leahy.

Thank you for this opportunity to address your concerns.

Sincerely,

*Peter F. Verga*

Peter F. Verga  
Principal Deputy

①





HOMELAND DEFENSE  
& AMERICAS' SECURITY AFFAIRS

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
2600 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-2600

JUN 7 2007

The Honorable Barack Obama  
United States Senate  
713 Hart Senate Office Building  
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Senator Obama:

This is in response to a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request from your constituents for information on students at the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation (WHINSEC).

The FOIA request that your constituents refer to was granted in part: All information requested was provided except for the names of individuals, which, in accordance with FOIA Exemption 6 (5 USC 552(b) (6)), were redacted to protect the personal privacy of the students. The decision was subsequently appealed by (b)(6) in September 2006, and the appeal was denied on February 1, 2007. The review found that the FOIA request was handled correctly in accordance with applicable law.

With regard to your constituents' concerns, a recent letter from the Chairman of the WHINSEC Board of Visitors is enclosed, which addresses similar concerns, and explains the role of the Board in reviewing WHINSEC's programs and activities, and the U.S. Government process for vetting prospective WHINSEC attendees.

Training in human rights, democratic values and respect for civilian control of the military is a central component of WHINSEC's curriculum and training programs. As detailed in the Secretary of Defense's Annual Report to Congress on WHINSEC's activities, WHINSEC supports U.S. human rights and democratization efforts in Latin America by helping to professionalize the military services of partner nations. The House Armed Services Committee unanimously approved language in support of WHINSEC and its mission in the House's annual defense authorization bill for this year.

WHINSEC holds an annual Open House for members of the public in November, and the Institute may be visited by arrangement throughout the year.

Sincerely,

*UHK*  
*Peter F. Verga*

Peter F. Verga  
Acting

Enclosure:  
As stated



(2)



PERSONNEL AND  
READINESS

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000



NOV 21 2007

The Honorable Barack Obama  
United States Senate  
Washington, DC 20301-1000

Dear Senator Obama:

Thank you for your letter of October 17, 2007, in which you asked Secretary of Defense Robert Gates to review the prevalence of cases where members of the National Guard and Reserve have fallen a few days short of serving the required time on active duty to qualify for educational assistance benefits under the Montgomery GI Bill. You further asked that he grant waivers from the service requirement where appropriate. Your letter also indicated that you are particularly interested in learning how many of the affected National Guard and Reserve members reside in Illinois.

The eligibility requirements for educational assistance are set forth in chapter 30 or title 38, United States Code (U.S.C.). The relevant provision provides for educational assistance for an individual "who serves in the Armed Forces and is discharged or released from active duty...for the convenience of the Government, if, in the case of an individual with an obligated period of service of two years, the individual completes not less than 20 months of continuous active duty under that period of obligated service." 38 U.S.C. § 3011(a)(1)(A)(ii)(II). There is no statutory authority to waive this requirement.

This unprecedented situation occurred as a result of the extension on active duty of the 1st of the 34th Brigade Combat Team (1/34 BCT) as part of the surge. The original mobilization orders for the 1/34 BCT specified a period of 545 days. Individual members of the brigade were mobilized on various dates. Based on their dates of mobilization and the projected date the brigade was scheduled to be demobilized, some members' orders were extended to 730 days when the brigade was extended on active duty, and some were extended for a lesser period. This disparity resulted from a desire to retain members involuntarily only as long as necessary. The unfortunate result of this well-intentioned desire is that the members with orders for the lesser period did not satisfy the eligibility requirements for the Montgomery GI Bill authorized in chapter 30 of title 38, United States Code – to have been obligated for a period of service of two years and to have served not less than 20 months of continuous active duty under that obligated period of service.

Secretary of the Army Geren is aggressively pursuing the most expeditious remedy available for all affected members. Because there is no statutory authority to waive the eligibility requirements, the Army will use the Army Board of Correction of




OSD 16323-09 (11)

Military Records (ABCMR) to amend orders of members of the 1/34th as warranted. This approach provides members of the 1/34th with the best available opportunity to have their orders amended to secure their eligibility for MGIB. I am pleased to report that the Army found no members of the National Guard or Army Reserve from Illinois who will require ABCMR action to qualify for MGIB benefits.

The Army has deployed a personnel team to assist members with applications to the ABCMR requesting that the board amend their orders to show an obligated period of active duty not to exceed 730 days. The ABCMR review of each application will be completed within 10 days of receipt. The intent is that all necessary actions will be completed well before the beginning of the January 2008 school term. Senior officials in the Army have met with their Department of Veterans Affairs counterparts to coordinate streamlined and expedited processing of applications across the departments. Additionally, my staff will work with the Army to determine if legislative language should be changed to more clearly define Reserve component qualification for MGIB benefits under contingency operations.

We will do what is necessary to ensure that our dedicated National Guard and Reserve members receive all benefits to which they are entitled. I thank you for your support of our efforts and for your interest in the patriots who serve in our Reserve components.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "David S. C. Chu". The signature is written in a cursive style with a large, looping initial "D".

David S. C. Chu



PERSONNEL AND  
READINESS

**UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE**  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-4000

JAN 16 2008

The Honorable Barack Obama  
United States Senate  
Washington, DC 20510


Dear Senator Obama:

This is in response to your December 14, 2007, joint letter with Senators Christopher Bond, Barbara Boxer, and John Kerry to the Secretary of Defense. You asked if members of the Armed Services are receiving fair and impartial reviews when facing judicial punishment and administrative discharge for engaging in misconduct that could be related to their medical or mental conditions. To illustrate your concerns, your letter cited the December 2, 2007, *Washington Post* article detailing Army First Lieutenant Elizabeth Whiteside's case.

We agree with your view that the judgment of medical practitioners plays a key role in proceedings of this kind, and will be reviewing our procedures to ensure this standard is maintained.

Our preliminary review indicates that the *Post* reporter was unaware of (or chose not to report) other elements of this case that would put matters in a different light. Moreover, as you appreciate, adjudication of some of the issues has proceeded since publication of the December 2<sup>nd</sup> article.

Sincerely,



David S. C. Chu



12



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

PERSONNEL AND  
READINESS

The Honorable Barack Obama  
United States Senate  
Washington, DC 20510

FEB 5 2008

Dear Senator Obama:

Thank you for your letter to the President concerning the establishment of a special discharge review program and a temporary moratorium on the use of personality disorder discharges. The Department of Defense was asked to respond on behalf of the President.

The Department recognizes that the diagnosis of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) and Traumatic Brain Injury (TBI) has improved with advances in medical knowledge of the disorders. Although we do not support a formal special discharge review program for veterans of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM or Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, the Department encourages veterans who may be diagnosed with PTSD or other mitigating disorders to request review of their separations through their respective Military Department Discharge Review Boards and Board for Correction of Military Records based on new or previously undeveloped information pertaining to their specific separation cases. This process has worked well, and we continue to work with the Military Departments and the Department of Veterans Affairs to ensure the behavioral impacts of PTSD and TBI are understood and addressed.

The assertion that the diagnoses of war-related mental illnesses are overlooked in favor of the more convenient personality disorder diagnoses compelled a recent review of policy and practice. Throughout this review, neither discussions with senior DoD medical experts nor the data analyzed suggested that the Department misdiagnosed personality disorder in the face of TBI or PTSD. Although there is no empirical evidence that members are routinely misdiagnosed, the Department acknowledges that errors do occasionally occur. The Department is working to revise policies to require additional psychiatrist or PhD-level psychologist corroboration of diagnoses and assurances that any disabling mental health diagnoses have been ruled out prior to proceeding with a personality disorder separation. The Department separated 3,865 and 4,145 members for personality disorder in 2006 and 2007, respectively, of which 50 percent had less than one year of service and about 20 percent had deployed to a combat zone.

Thank you for your continued support and interest in the dedicated women and men of the Armed Forces who serve our great Nation.

Sincerely,

David S. C. Chu

13



OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

OCT 11 2005

PERSONNEL AND  
READINESS

The Honorable Barack Obama  
United States Senate  
Washington, DC 20510

704

Dear Senator Obama:


Thank you for your letter, dated July 26<sup>th</sup>, concerning the process of assigning casualty assistance officers to the next of kin of fallen Service members. Since the Department of Defense (DoD) policy for casualty assistance falls within my purview, your request was referred to me.

In each case in which a military member is declared deceased or missing, the Military Service concerned appoints a casualty assistance officer to advise and assist the primary next-of-kin. The assistance officer maintains contact with the next-of-kin to keep them informed on all matters related to the case, until the case has been resolved and all entitlements and benefits are received. There is no time limit on how long assistance will be provided. Because this is an open-ended commitment, it may be necessary on some occasions to change the assistance officer during the process. However, when this does happen, the new assistance officer is fully briefed on the requirements of the position as well as particulars of the family. The incoming and outgoing assistance officers will meet with the family together to review the still-remaining assistance requirements. The transfer of casualty assistance duties mostly occurs due to relocation of the next of kin. In these cases, coordination is conducted with the military unit closest to where the family will relocate to provide any necessary follow-on assistance.

The Department continues to explore ways to assist surviving family members whenever needed. One such change will require the Services, as part of the assistance process, to provide all family members a contact number at the Service Headquarters casualty office. By doing so, families will know that regardless of the day, week, month or year, they will always have someone to call for information or assistance.

I trust that this information proves useful to you.

Sincerely,

  
John M. Molino  
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense  
(Military Community and Family Policy)

(26 J6105)

R  
DSD 16809-05  
0122241

08-F-0811



RESERVE AFFAIRS

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1500 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1500

JUN 19 2007

The Honorable Barack Obama  
United States Senate  
Washington, D.C. 20510-2003

Dear Senator Obama:

Thank you for your May 8, 2007, letter to President Bush concerning National Guard equipment in the state of Illinois as well as the rest of the Nation. I want to assure you that the issues you raised are being addressed by the Department.

We work continuously with the leadership of the National Governor's Association on the whole range of issues affecting military personnel and equipment, including Guard matters and budgetary considerations. We will ensure that dialogue is continued.

Secretary Gates has recently directed the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, in coordination with the Department of Homeland Security, and in conjunction with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Military Departments, the Commander, U.S. Northern Command, and the Chief, National Guard Bureau to provide him recommendations regarding Department policy on programming and budgeting for civil support capabilities. Under Executive Order, a Council of Governors will be established to advise him and the Secretary of Homeland Security on homeland security issues, matters involving the National Guard of the various states, and other matters of mutual interest.

Reserve component equipping needs received very substantial funding in the President's FY 2008 budget request. We will review those needs again in the context of the FY 2009 request, reviewing and validating the states' equipment needs to ensure that they have access to the needed equipment to perform both overseas missions and respond to homeland requirements.

Sincerely,

T.F. Hall



①



SECRETARY OF THE ARMY  
WASHINGTON

FEB 23 2008

The Honorable Barack Obama  
United States Senate  
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Senator Obama:

I have been asked to respond on behalf of Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates to your February 11, 2008 letter regarding media reports citing an independent assessment being prepared for the Army by the RAND Arroyo Center on prewar planning and occupation of Iraq.

You requested that the Department of Defense provide a copy of the unclassified report to Congress. We will provide the report to both the House and Senate Armed Services Committees.

You expressed concerns over the allegations that Army officials suppressed the report. I also find the allegations troubling and I am carefully reviewing the matter. So far, I have found no evidence to support the allegations.

This multiyear effort is rapidly nearing completion, the findings of which will be published in eight separate reports totaling over 3,000 pages. Six of the eight reports will be classified, including a classified executive summary that has not yet been written. We will provide all reports to Congressional defense committees as they are completed.

Sincerely,

Pete Geren

*Scop*

(1/17 Feb 08)

(1)

R 01968-08





REPLY TO  
ATTENTION OF

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF LEGISLATIVE LIAISON  
1600 ARMY PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON DC 20310-1600

February 28, 2006

The Honorable Barack Obama  
United States Senate  
230 South Dearborn Street, Suite 3900  
Chicago, Illinois 60604

Dear Senator Obama:

I am acknowledging receipt of your letter on behalf of [REDACTED] concerning  
ATK Lake City Army Ammunition Plant's ammunition production.

Inquiry into this matter has been initiated. You will be further advised as soon as  
information becomes available. If you have any questions about this inquiry, please  
contact [REDACTED] at [REDACTED] and refer to the following case  
number: 60211642.

Sincerely,

Michelle Y. Cronwell  
Chief, Special Actions Branch  
Congressional Inquiry Division

IR

02041-06

(4)



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF LEGISLATIVE LIAISON  
1600 ARMY PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON DC 20310-1800

March 30, 2005

2005 APR -1 AM 10:45

OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

The Honorable Barack Obama  
United States Senator  
230 S. Dearborn, Suite 3900  
Chicago, Illinois 60604

Dear Senator Obama:

Thank you for your letter on behalf of (b)(6) concerning the Defense of Department requesting that he repay a portion of his enlistment bonus.

The Defense Finance and Accounting Service has jurisdiction over matters pertaining to military pay, finance and accounting policy, and system support. As a courtesy, I have forwarded your inquiry to the Director, Defense Finance and Accounting Service, Attention: DFAS-HQ/CE, 1931 Jefferson Davis Highway, Crystal Mall #3, Room 416, Arlington, Virginia 22240-5291, for appropriate action. In the meantime, if assistance is needed, please contact the Congressional Section at (703) 607-5121.

(b)(6)

Congressional Actions Coordinator  
Congressional Inquiry Division

205525-05

1



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF LEGISLATIVE LIAISON  
1600 ARMY PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON DC 20310-1700

April 7, 2005

2005 APR 12 AM 6:02

OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

325

The Honorable Barack Obama  
United States Senate  
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Senator Obama:

Thank you for your letter to the Honorable Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, regarding the deployment of the 131<sup>st</sup> and 178<sup>th</sup> National Guard Units.

An inquiry into this matter has been initiated. You will be further advised as soon as the information is available. In the meantime, if you have further questions, please have your staff contact (b)(6) at (b)(2). Please refer to case number 50005338.

Sincerely,

Michelle Y. Cromwell  
Chief, Special Actions Branch  
Congressional Inquiry Division

(3/11/05)

IR 06116-05



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF LEGISLATIVE LIAISON  
1600 ARMY PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON DC 20310-1600

August 8, 2005

The Honorable Barack Obama  
United States Senator  
230 S. Dearborn, Suite 3900  
Chicago, Illinois 60604

Dear Senator Obama:

This is in reply to your inquiry on behalf of (b)(6) concerning the new policy at Rock Island Arsenal prohibiting treatment of TRICARE Standard patients at the medical clinic.

The primary mission of the Rock Island Arsenal Medical Clinic is to provide medical care to enrolled Active Duty TRICARE members. Additionally, the clinic has the responsibility of providing the Occupational Health Services in support of the military and civilian government workforce. Medical care for all other military beneficiaries is on a space available basis only, as the available services in this clinic are limited.

While TRICARE Standard patients can be seen by the one physician in the clinic, access is limited due to other mission requirements. Therefore, to ensure continuity of care, it is advised that patients establish a relationship with a network provider. Beneficiaries have the option of obtaining a TRICARE affiliated physician in the community for their medical needs. It is more beneficial for (b)(6) to find and establish a relationship with a network provider in her area for herself and her family for continuity of care. The Rock Island Arsenal Medical Clinic will continue to have an available pharmacy for all TRICARE beneficiaries.

I trust this information is responsive to your concerns.

Sincerely,

(b)(6)

Congressional Coordinator  
Congressional Inquiry Division

R 14454-05

(12)



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF LEGISLATIVE LIAISON  
1600 ARMY PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON DC 20310-1600

November 1, 2005

The Honorable Barack Obama  
United States Senate  
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Senator Obama:

This is to acknowledge receipt of your letter to the Honorable Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, concerning the full funding of the Common Remotely Operated Weapons Station (CROWS) program.

Inquiry into this matter has been initiated. You will be further advised as soon as information becomes available. If you have any questions about this inquiry, please contact [REDACTED] at [REDACTED] and refer to the following case number: 51110107.

Sincerely,

Michelle Y. Cromwell  
Chief, Special Actions Branch  
Congressional Inquiry Division



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
OFFICE OF THE  
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF G-3  
400 ARMY PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON DC 20310-0400

2005 APR 26 PM 1:40

OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

325

April 19, 2005

The Honorable Barack Obama  
United States Senate  
713 Hart Senate Office Building  
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Senator Obama,

Thank you for your recent inquiry on behalf of your constituents assigned to the 1<sup>st</sup> Battalion, 131<sup>st</sup> Infantry Regiment (1/131 IN), and 1<sup>st</sup> Battalion, 178<sup>th</sup> Infantry Regiment (1/178 IN), Illinois Army National Guard (IL ARNG). As you are aware, our Armed Forces are fully engaged around the world in the fight against terrorism and, although we have made tremendous progress, much work still remains in the Middle East. Your constituents' concerns over deployment predictability, tour lengths, the projected location of their unit, along with training and equipment quality afforded the Army Reserves and Army National Guard, collectively known as the Reserve Components, is appreciated.

The Army is committed to supporting the Combatant Commander's critical mission requirements in the Middle East. The Army Senior Leadership shares your concerns over providing a predictable environment for our Soldiers, as this is a factor that directly impacts recruiting and retention. Our Senior Leadership has been working with the Department of Defense to address this issue, and has come up with some solutions. The Army Reserve, for example, is developing plans for a mobilization and deployment cycle. Each unit in the Army Reserve will be placed in a cycle and will be notified that a specific year is designated as its "deployment" year, providing predictability for the Army Reservist. The Army National Guard is working on similar plans. The Active Component is presently engaged in Transformation, which is converting much of our force structure to modularized, self-contained units. This effort increases the number of Brigades readily available for deployment and allows greater predictability for the Active Component, while the inclusion of support forces in the Brigade structure reduces our reliance on the Reserve Components. The Reserve Components will soon follow in this initiative.

With respect to the length and location of current deployments, many of the mixed signals, I suspect, are coming from unofficial sources. Officially, current Army policy for the length of unit deployments in support of the Global War on Terror is 12 months "boots on the ground." To meet this goal, Reserve Component units are being mobilized for 18 months to allow sufficient time for train-up, in-processing, demobilization and use of accrued leave. As for deployment location, the overwhelming majority of unit commanders know the theater and area to which they are deploying. Occasionally, because of changing circumstances and requirements in theater, the exact location will shift, but not the theater or geographic area.

As for training and equipping Army forces, the Army has one standard regardless of status: Active, or Reserve Component. All deployed Army units are mutually dependent on security, and an imbalance of either equipment or training quality could place every Army unit at risk. The Senior Army Leadership realizes that any unit could be assigned to



(3M:205)

10

R 06116-05

(2)

theater, and therefore, all Army personnel must be trained and equipped to the same standard to perform well as a team. Uniform training standards and standardized equipment allow different units within the Army to function as one massed fighting force, which is one of the keys contributing to the success of the American Soldier and the Army over the last several conflicts. Additionally, the Army Senior Leadership relies on the judgment of unit commanders, who determine equipment and training needs based upon an analysis of their assigned missions. Once communicated through the chain-of-command, Headquarters, Department of the Army monitors the requests on a daily basis to ensure all requirements are satisfied well before the unit deploys.

Our Nation asks its military personnel and their families to make enormous sacrifices in time of need, and your constituents' situations are clear examples. You may be assured their concerns and comments are fully understood. We also appreciate the contributions made by your constituents in support of Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom. We are also grateful for your continued support of the Global War on Terrorism.

Sincerely,  
(b)(6)

Colonel, United States Army  
Operations and Contingency  
Plans Division



REPLY TO  
ATTENTION OFF

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
LAKE CITY ARMY AMMUNITION PLANT  
INDEPENDENCE, MO 64081-1000

March 8, 2006

SJMLC-CO

Honorable Barack Obama  
United States Senator  
ATTN: Ms. Jennifer Mason  
230 Dearborn Street  
Suite 3900  
Chicago, Illinois 60604

Honorable Senator Barack Obama,

This is in reference to your letter, December 15, 2005, with regard to an inquiry from your constituent, (b)(6)

In his letter to your office, (b)(6) indicates that he was unable to identify a contact for potential ammunition procurements at Lake City Army Ammunition Plant. Alliant Techsystems, Incorporated (ATK) is the plant's operating contractor. Inquiries regarding potential subcontracting opportunities need to be made with them directly. Questions regarding subcontracting opportunities may be directed to Mr. Larry Smith, e-mail: [larry.smith@atk.com](mailto:larry.smith@atk.com) or, 816-796-7221.

(b)(6) also indicated a concern that ATK may be obtaining material from a foreign source over a proven domestic source. The Army contract with ATK requires compliance with the Buy American Act.

If you need more information contact (b)(6) U.S. Army Field Support Command, Congressional Liaison, email: (b)(2) or, (b)(6)

Sincerely,

Thomas S. Schorr, Jr.  
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army  
Commanding

R 02041-06 (5)





REPLY TO  
ATTENTION OF

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
THIRD ARMY  
UNITED STATES ARMY CENTRAL  
1801 HARDEE AVE SW  
FORT MCPHERSON, GA 30830-1084

June 25, 2007

Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1

The Honorable Barack Obama  
United States Senator  
607 East Adams Street, Suite 1520  
Springfield, Illinois 62701

Dear Senator Obama:

Thank you for your recent letter to the Department of Defense on behalf of your constituent's concerns.

Captain (CPT) (b)(3):10 C-1 Battle CPT, Multi-National Corps-Iraq, stated Camp Victory and subordinate command post's were experiencing food shortages for a short time, however at no time was it down to half rations or passing out MRE's.

Thank you for your inquiry into this matter. This command stands ready to provide any further assistance required by your office.

Sincerely,

(b)(6)

Major, General Staff  
Deputy Adjutant General

R 09820-07

11



ATTENTION OF

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
COALITION FORCES LAND COMPONENT COMMAND  
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES CENTRAL COMMAND  
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY  
APO AE 09304

March 27, 2006

Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1

The Honorable Barack Obama  
United States Senator  
715 Hart Senate Office Building  
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Senator Obama:

Thank you for your recent letter to Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld concerning calling cards and the availability of drinks in the dining facility for your constituents serving in Iraq.

[REDACTED] Chief Programs, CJ1, Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I), stated Segovia, Inc. entered a two-year contract with Space and Naval Warfare Systems (SPAWAR) to provide long distance Voice Over Internet Protocol (VOIP) calling cards to personnel deployed in Iraq on September 19, 2003; the contract expired on September 30, 2005. The new contract was awarded to M.C. Dean, Inc (OPENBAND), which agreed to honor Segovia calling cards through December 31, 2005. Beginning on September 19, 2005, SPAWAR conducted a robust information campaign notified Segovia customers of the pending change and recommended that the customers disable the automatic recharge feature on their Segovia accounts no later than October 01, 2005. Despite a no refund clause, Segovia, Inc. has offered to exchange the current calling card held by Senator Obama's constituent for a stateside card, credited with the remaining balance. The point of contact for Segovia is Mr. Allen Hintz, (703) 621-6434.

The Government controls the placement of 50 AT&T owned Call Centers with over 1,200 phones throughout Iraq; these Call Centers receive no Government subsidies. Individual users are responsible for costs incurred during phone connections from these Call Centers. The most common means of payment is via AT&T Calling Cards. Fees can vary based upon the cost per unit on the card; the Army and Air Force Exchange Service (AAFES) has negotiated the lowest average cost per minute with AT&T for calling cards in theater (currently, \$0.19 per minute with a 500 unit phone card to phones in the United States). These cards are available for purchase online and at most AAFES facilities in Iraq. Morale Welfare & Recreation (MWR) has also distributed over 100,000 donated AT&T calling cards in the last eight months. Additionally, the Government provides a link through the Defense Switching Network (DSN) telephonic lines for calls to US toll-free phone numbers. With this link, personnel can call from any DSN phone to a switch in Chicago, link to the AT&T Calling Card access number, and complete their call to any stateside location. The only charge the user incurs is from Chicago to the phoned location at stateside calling rates.

R 04483-06

6

Dining facilities in Iraq are typically operated by Kellogg-Brown and Root (KBR). The Government negotiates an annual Statement of Work (SOW) that identifies contract specifications and services. Name-brand drinks are commonly available in all dining facilities run by KBR and the cost is charged against the Government contract— not the Soldier. In the instance at FOB Sykes in north-west Iraq, there is no evidence that dining facility services were inappropriately curtailed in order to bolster AAFES sales or improperly deny personnel name-brand drinks. Soldiers are asked, on an honor system, to limit their personal consumption of these drinks to two per meal; it is fairly common for individuals to take considerably more than this, especially during periods of increased temperature.

Forward Operating Base Sykes is a remote location in north-western Iraq. Since Iraq is still a combat zone and travel can be hazardous, it is not uncommon for ground transportation to be delayed. These delays often affect the availability of convenience and sundry items, which are moved at a lower priority than mission essential material.

Since the hottest part of the year in Iraq coincides with normal year end budget constraints, it not unreasonable to expect that the availability of some high-cost, dining facility items are curtailed to preclude financial loss. AAFES, on the other hand, is not impacted by year end budget constraints. They are able to provide name-brand drinks year round and the cost is charged to the end user.

Lastly, (b)(3):10 USC states, the command finds no merit in the constituent's complaint that US companies are taking advantage of deployed personnel. Every effort is being made to provide quality products and services at a reasonable price under austere conditions.

Thank you for your inquiry into this matter. This command stands ready to provide any further assistance required by your office.

Sincerely,

(b)(6)

Lieutenant Colonel, General Staff  
Adjutant General

**DEFENSE CONTRACT MANAGEMENT AGENCY**6350 WALKER LANE, SUITE 300  
ALEXANDRIA, VA 22310-3241IN REPLY  
REFER TO

DCMA-DSA

OCT 13 2006

Honorable Barack Obama  
United States Senator  
607 East Adams Street  
Suite 1520  
Springfield, IL 62701

Dear Senator Obama:

This is in response to your recent letter to the Department of Defense (DoD) on behalf of Mr. Levcester Husband of Husband Manufacturing Company in Chicago. In his correspondence to your office, Mr. Husband writes that his company "has been removed from the process of bidding on items purchased by the Federal Government which we produce." Your inquiry was forwarded to the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) headquarters for direct reply to you.

In researching Mr. Husband's query, we contacted the DCMA Contract Integrity Center (CIC), which maintains a repository of information of past and present DoD contractors, for information on the performance history and status of Husband Manufacturing. The CIC found that neither Mr. Husband nor Husband Manufacturing is on the General Services Administration's *Excluded Parties List*, which identifies individuals and companies currently ineligible to compete for Federal contracts. As such, it does not appear that Husband Manufacturing has been formally barred or suspended from doing business with the Federal Government.

Looking into the matter further, (b)(6) of my staff contacted the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), the DoD procurement activity most likely to purchase the kinds of products offered by Husband Manufacturing. As with the DCMA Contract Integrity Center, DLA officials reported that Husband Manufacturing was not on any current or archival listing of firms excluded from competing for Federal or DoD contracts.


In the absence of more comprehensive information from Mr. Husband, we can only surmise that Mr. Husband's assertion about his company's exclusion from a contract-bidding competition stems from what may have been a local decision related to a local or installation-level contracting action. However, if Mr. Husband can provide additional information and a few details regarding the situation, including the contract solicitation he was responding to and the name of the procuring agency, we would be happy to investigate the matter further.

R 15279-06

①

Although unable to provide an immediately favorable reply at this time, we trust this information will be helpful to you in responding to your constituent as he seeks clarification on his standing to compete for Federal contracts.

Sincerely,



ARTHUR C. FORSTER, Jr.  
Director  
Congressional and Public Affairs



DEFENSE INFORMATION SYSTEMS AGENCY

P. O. BOX 4812  
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22204-4809

13 MAR 2006

Honorable Barack Obama  
United States Senate  
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Senator Obama,

This letter is in reply to your inquiry dated 23 February 2006, regarding the United States Air Force.

DISA-CONUS has no plans to relocate any of its current employees from their current facilities on Scott Air Force Base to St. Louis, MO. DISA-CONUS is planning to relocate approximately 50 employees to another facility, on Scott AFB, to improve the quality of life for the workforce. This relocation effort may be the source of misinformation and confusion, which led (b)(6) a DISA-CONUS government employee, to contact your office.

I hope this assists your constituent.

Sincerely,

*1/2*  
*Charlie Croom*

CHARLES E. CROOM, JR.  
Lieutenant General  
Director

Copy to:  
607 East Adams St.  
Suite 1520  
Springfield, IL 62701

R 04073-06

11



TRICARE  
MANAGEMENT  
ACTIVITY

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
HEALTH AFFAIRS  
SKYLINE FIVE, SUITE 810, 5111 LEESBURG PIKE  
FALLS CHURCH, VIRGINIA 22041-3206

JUL 17 3:30

The Honorable Barack Obama  
United States Senate  
607 East Adams Street, Suite 1520  
Springfield, IL 62701

Dear Senator Obama:

Thank you for your inquiry, received in my office on June 2, on behalf of Party 1  
Officer Second Class (PO2) [REDACTED] USNR regarding TRICARE coverage  
for his wife, [REDACTED] from when [REDACTED] was an active duty service  
member.

As stated in my earlier letter of June 23, in accordance with the Privacy Act of 1974 and the Health Insurance Portability & Accountability Act (HIPAA) of 1996, we cannot provide [REDACTED] private medical information to you or [REDACTED] without a signed Authorization for Disclosure of Medical or Dental Information form—commonly known as the HIPAA release form. While you did forward a privacy release, the Department is required to use an updated form as mandated by HIPAA. For your convenience, I have enclosed another copy of the updated form. The HIPAA release form is also available online at [www.tricare.osd.mil/planning/congress](http://www.tricare.osd.mil/planning/congress). For all future inquiries, please have your constituents sign a copy of the HIPAA release form for submission with questions regarding TRICARE. Nevertheless, we are pleased to inform you that we have written separate replies to [REDACTED] informing him of the need for a HIPAA release, and to [REDACTED] addressing the issues surrounding her case. In addition, my staff contacted the [REDACTED] to provide them with the necessary information.

Please address any future inquiries to the TRICARE Management Activity to the address indicated above. Thank you for your interest in the Military Health System and its beneficiaries.

Sincerely,

*[Handwritten signature]*  
Elder Granger  
Major General, MC, USA  
Deputy Director

Enclosure:  
As stated

R

OSD 09599-06  
①



OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
HEALTH AFFAIRS

SKYLINE FIVE, SUITE 810, 3111 LEESBURG PIKE  
FALLS CHURCH, VIRGINIA 22041-3206

TRICARE  
MANAGEMENT  
ACTIVITY

AUG 28 2006

The Honorable Barack Obama  
United States Senate  
607 East Adams Street  
Suite 1520  
Springfield, IL 62701

Dear Senator Obama:

Thank you for your inquiry of July 6 on behalf of [REDACTED]  
USMC (Ret) regarding the availability of TRICARE Prime to military retirees in Illinois.

As stated in my previous letter of July 27, in accordance with the Privacy Act of 1974 and the Health Insurance Portability & Accountability Act (HIPAA) of 1996, we cannot provide you a beneficiary's private medical information without a signed Authorization for Disclosure of Medical or Dental Information form—commonly known as the HIPAA release form. While you did forward a signed privacy release, the Department is required to use an updated form as mandated by HIPAA protocols. For your convenience, I have enclosed another copy of the updated form. The HIPAA release form is also available on-line at [www.tricare.osd.mil/planning/congress](http://www.tricare.osd.mil/planning/congress).

For all future inquiries, please have your constituents sign a copy of the HIPAA release form for submission with questions regarding TRICARE. In the absence of a HIPAA release form, we are pleased to inform you that we have written a separate reply directly to [REDACTED] addressing the issues surrounding his case. However, in so far as the inquiry involves matters of program policy as opposed to private medical information, we are permitted to respond directly to you.


TRICARE Prime is the Health Maintenance Organization (HMO) option under TRICARE, authorized by 10 U.S.C. 1097-1099. An HMO like option is designed to provide a managed care option. In order to justify the requirement to develop a provider network, there must be a sufficient concentration of beneficiaries. As a result, TRICARE Prime is available only in Prime Service Areas (PSAs) comprising areas surrounding a military treatment facility (MTF); areas surrounding former Base Realignment and Closure sites; and certain zip code clusters that have been designated as PSAs because there are dense concentrations of TRICARE Prime-eligible beneficiaries and because the contractor can guarantee an adequate network of both primary care and specialty

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Please address any future inquiries to the TRICARE Management Activity at the address indicated above. Thank you for your interest in the Military Health System and its beneficiaries.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Elder Granger", with a long horizontal flourish extending to the right.

Elder Granger  
Major General, MC, USA  
Deputy Director

Enclosures:  
As stated