

Congress of the United States

Washington, DC 20515

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

March 16, 2001

2001 MAR 22 AM 11: 21

The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
Office of the Secretary
The Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301-1155

Dear Secretary Rumsfeld:




We would like to bring a matter of national security to your attention. We respectfully request that the Department of Defense maintain subpart 225.71 of the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFAR) as it pertains to propulsion shafting for the United States Navy. This "Buy American" provision is critical to maintain the U.S. industrial base in this area which is so vital to our national security.

Erie Forge and Steel, which is located in Erie, Pennsylvania, is the sole manufacturer of propulsion shafting in the U.S. If the restriction on foreign procurement is lifted, company officials assured me that they would not be able to compete against European-subsidized propulsion shafting which would force our Navy to depend upon foreign companies to produce a key component of all naval vessels. As Members of Congress, who are committed to protecting America's shores, we find any change to this policy dangerous.

In past correspondence with the Department of Defense, both the Naval Sea Systems Command and the Bureau of Export Administration expressed their disagreement with DOD's past intention to remove the restrictions for this component. After reviewing the relevant documents, we believe that the Department of Defense should continue to prohibit the foreign procurement of naval propulsion shafting.

Thank you for your consideration of this important matter.


Best wishes,

Phil English
Member of Congress

Arlen Specter
U.S. Senator


Rick Santorum
U.S. Senator



Jack Murtha
Member of Congress



Curt Weldon
Member of Congress



Robert Brady
Member of Congress

U05878 / 01

Paul Kanjorski
Member of Congress

Michael Doyle
Member of Congress

William Coyne
Member of Congress

Tim Holden
Member of Congress

James Greenwood
Member of Congress

Melissa Hart
Member of Congress

Frank Mascara
Member of Congress

George Gekas
Member of Congress

Don Sherwood
Member of Congress

Robert Borski
Member of Congress

Joseph Hoeffel
Member of Congress

John Peterson
Member of Congress

Joseph Pitts
Member of Congress

Chaka Fattah
Member of Congress

Todd Platts
Member of Congress

Pat Toomey
Member of Congress

JOHN P. MURTHA
12TH DISTRICT, PENNSYLVANIA

COMMITTEE:
APPROPRIATIONS

Congress of the United States

House of Representatives

Washington, DC 20515-3812

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2001 JUN 22 AM 7:33

June 21, 2001

Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
Washington, D.C. 20301

Dear Mr. Secretary:

As we have discussed, one of the most important issues to be addressed in the fiscal year 2002 budget process will be the size and structure of next year's military pay raise. The upcoming choice will be whether to distribute additional pay raise funds promised by the President as an across the board increase in addition to the 4.6% increase specified by current law, or to limit the total size of the across the board increase and use the savings to pay for special retention bonuses and to correct pay inequities in certain limited military pay grades.

I have talked to military personnel around the world, and when it comes to pay raises, most perceive a substantive difference between an across the board pay raise to reward overall performance and special bonuses or pay table adjustments to correct past mistakes. I think it is imperative that when promises are made to provide the military with a special pay raise, it be applied as a general across the board increase.

I know that some in OMB and other places promote special pays and bonuses over across the board increases because of the opportunity to lower long range budget costs since bonuses and special pays can be eliminated over time and don't factor into retired pay. I strongly urge you to reject this approach and remember the basic bargain this country struck with the military in moving to an all-volunteer force in 1973. Central to the all-volunteer concept was the commitment to pay our service personnel at levels that are fair and equitable compared to their private sector counterparts.

Today, a large across the board pay raise is certainly justified. The entire military is suffering from a pay gap compared to the private sector, and all deserve a substantial raise, not just those who are in specialties or pay grades where there are special problems. It is important to meet the expectations that have been raised and use the promised pay raise money to provide a minimum 7.3 percent across the board increase for all military personnel. This would cut the estimated 10.9% military pay gap by two-thirds, and cost a little more than \$1 billion in fiscal year 2002.


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I acknowledge that last year's targeted pay adjustment passed by Congress created some unintended pay inequities at the senior non-commissioned officer ranks and for certain warrant officers, for which corrective relief is justified. There also is a special problem with mid-grade officers that deserves close attention. While I strongly support corrective adjustments, the cost of these adjustments should not be counted against the fundamental commitment to provide additional funds for a pay raise. These adjustments should be funded in addition to the basic pay raise promised to all.

Shortly, I will introduce a revision to my original pay raise bill that will provide a basic 7.3 percent across the board increase for all military personnel effective January 1, 2002 and will also include corrective adjustments to increase E-4 to E-9, W-1 to W-5, and O-3 and O-4 pay rates by up to 3.2 percent over the 7.3 percent across the board increase in my original bill (some individual pay cells will be higher). Such an adjustment package is not only the right thing to do, it is affordable, costing an additional \$200 million in FY 2002. The cost of such pay adjustments could be further reduced to meet any FY 2002 funding constraints by delaying the effective date by a few months if you feel it is absolutely necessary.

The first priority of any pay raise legislation should be to close the pay gap for *all* military personnel and reward all in military service for their excellence and dedication. I urge you to show this commitment in your upcoming Fiscal Year 2002 budget amendment and request a full 7.3 percent across the board military pay raise with additional corrective relief for non-commissioned officers, warrant officers, and mid-grade officers.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "John P. Murtha", with a long horizontal flourish extending to the right.

John P. Murtha
Ranking Democratic Member
Subcommittee on Defense Appropriations

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2001 JUL 31 PM 4:03

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Committee on Appropriations
Washington, DC 20515-6015

July 25, 2001

C. W. BILL YOUNG, FLORIDA, CHAIRMAN
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JAMES E. CLYBURN, SOUTH CAROLINA
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SAM FARR, CALIFORNIA
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CHAKA FATTAH, PENNSYLVANIA
STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, NEW JERSEY

CLERK AND STAFF DIRECTOR
JAMES W. OYER

TELEPHONE:
(202) 225-2771

Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
Washington, D.C. 20301


Dear Mr. Secretary:

I was very pleased that Congress accepted my proposal as part of the FY 2001 Supplemental Appropriations Act to infuse a significant amount of money into the Defense Health program to improve the military direct care system. As expressed in the various committee reports accompanying the bill, Congress has clearly stated its desire to reverse the pattern of disinvestment in our military medical treatment facilities that has been greatly exacerbated by the need to cover the large unanticipated cost growth of TRICARE contracts.

I believe that so-called optimization of the military direct care system is not only the right thing to do for our military personnel, but can serve to draw eligible patients back into the military medical treatment facilities where the cost of care is significantly lower than that provided by TRICARE contractors. An important result of your strategic review should be to emphasize MTF optimization. I strongly urge you to follow up on our initiative and expand upon this optimization effort in your fiscal year 2003 budget proposal.

I would also call the Department's attention to the September 15, 2001 reporting deadline for informing Congress which projects will be funded with Supplemental funds. The Committee will use this report to judge the Department's commitment to MTF optimization and it will be an important factor when we make our funding recommendations for the fiscal year 2002 defense budget. I urge you to make implementation of this effort a priority.

Sincerely,



John P. Murtha
Ranking Member
Subcommittee on Defense Appropriations

cc: Military Service Secretaries
Military Surgeons General

U13192 /01

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2001 JUL 31 PM 4:10

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Committee on Appropriations
Washington, DC 20515-6015

July 25, 2001

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JOHN P. MURTHA, PENNSYLVANIA
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CLERK AND STAFF DIRECTOR
JAMES W. DYER
TELEPHONE:
(202) 226-2771

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DAVID VITTER, LOUISIANA
DON SHERWOOD, PENNSYLVANIA
VIRGIL H. GOODE, JR., VIRGINIA

Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
Washington, D.C. 20301

Dear Mr. Secretary:

As you consider new ship designs and future manning requirements for the DD-21 Land Attack Destroyer and other future Navy vessels, I would call your attention to an important lesson learned from the attack on the USS COLE as well as from past incidents involving the USS STARK in 1986 and the USS SAMUEL B. ROBERTS in 1991. These incidents have all shown that once a ship sustains severe damage from an attack, the size of the crew has been a critical factor to successfully controlling damage and saving the ship.

I am concerned that the current philosophy of designing ships to reduce crew size to absolute minimum numbers in order to save operational costs may not give sufficient attention to the number of crew members needed to meet emergencies or to operate in stressful combat situations.

In particular, I question whether the stated DD-21 objective of reducing manning levels from the current level of more than 300 sailors for a DDG-51-class ship to 95 sailors for a DD-21-class ship will provide enough crewmembers to meet all of this ship's operational and system requirements. By comparison, today one DD-963 class destroyer requires 90 people for damage control alone. It is also evident that members of such a small crew would have to be extremely well trained -- all would need to be specialists in more than one area or weapon system. This will be a major challenge.

U13193 /01

I know that the DD-21 design calls for advanced damage control technology that should reduce manning requirements, but history shows that our best technology in many cases cannot substitute for the actions of sailors who willingly risk their lives to save their shipmates and their ship. This was proved once again by the heroic actions of the USS COLE crewmembers.

I realize that the future of the DD-21 is under study as part of the Quadrennial Review process. A part of this review should include a reassessment of projected DD-21 manning levels against realistic and conservative projections of operational requirements. If this is done, I have little doubt that the DD-21 manning requirement will grow to a more realistic level that will provide a better margin of safety for this ship.

Sincerely,



John P. Murtha
Ranking Member
Subcommittee on Defense Appropriations

cc: Honorable Gordon R. England, Secretary of the Navy
Honorable E.C. "Pete" Aldridge Jr., Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology and Logistics
Honorable John J. Young Jr., Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research,
Development and Acquisition

JOHN P. MURTHA
12TH DISTRICT, PENNSYLVANIA

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

COMMITTEE:
APPROPRIATIONS

2001 AUG 30 AM 7:37

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515-3812

August 29, 2001

Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
Washington, D.C. 20301

Dear Mr. Secretary:

As you move into the decision-making phase of your strategic defense review, I want to register my deep concern about continued media reports that budgetary constraints are forcing you to consider reducing the size of our conventional ground forces by as many as two or three active Army divisions.

Based on many articles, some of your advisors appear to harbor the view that our defense program can be fit into pre-determined budgetary levels by adopting a strategy that rationalizes the substitution of a sizeable portion of our forward-deployed land forces with existing capabilities to deliver long-range precision strikes from "over the horizon" power projection platforms. While this may be an interesting subject for textbooks, I would urge you to exercise extreme caution before trying to implement this as a near-term national security strategy for this country.

The strategic discussions that appear to be going on within the Department are not new. Over the last 60 years there have been many well-intentioned attempts to substitute the war-winning power of conventional land forces with the substantial but limited deterrent effect of long-range air and sea power and strategic nuclear capabilities. Such strategies were instituted to varying degrees in World War II, the Korean Conflict, and in Viet Nam with disastrous results in many cases. More recently, Desert Storm demonstrated vividly how we can still be surprised by the unexpected need to quickly mount a large-scale conventional ground operation. In the Yugoslavia air campaign, I believe the imminent threat of a large-scale NATO ground operation was a decisive factor in Milosevic's final capitulation. Even today, it can be argued that our complete air dominance over Iraq is having only very limited success in achieving our policy goals. The unquestioned capability to decisively and overwhelmingly destroy any adversary on the ground is still our national security "gold standard", and has a deterrent effect much greater than other capabilities for the foreseeable future.

I have noted your recent press statements that you intend to change the current "two major theater war" strategy to what some euphemistically call the "win-repel-win" two-war strategy augmented by more formal plans for homeland defense and for participation in a limited number of small scale contingency operations. You and I have discussed my view that the military services have never been resourced to execute the "two nearly-simultaneous MTW"

U14586 /01

strategy and do not possess that capability. I have no major problem explaining to the American People what capability our defense budget truly will deliver and commend you for saying so. I also think some of the ideas you have raised about standing joint task forces, homeland defense, and military transformation have merit.


But I have yet to be convinced that there is any plausible near-term strategic scenario that would justify reducing what is now the smallest army we have fielded since 1940 and only the eighth largest army in the world by another five to ten percent. Although the transforming war fighting capabilities brought about by information networking, stealth, unmanned vehicles, and precision guidance may someday change this equation, today there is simply too much risk associated with reducing further the size of our conventional ground forces. While there is no doubt that a smaller American Army would still be very powerful, numbers are still essential to sustaining that power over time.

On the strategic level, I am concerned that further reducing the size of our ground forces could tempt a potential adversary to miscalculate that we cannot sustain our global commitments over a protracted period of conflict, and challenge us because of it.

At the day-to-day management level, I am concerned about the destructive OPTEMPO impacts on a smaller force, and the ultimate effect this will have on recruiting and retaining the high quality personnel we have today. While your QDR planners may be tempted to make force planning assumptions based on "hoped-for" reductions in peacekeeping missions and our force levels in Europe and even Korea, I am concerned that the demands of the real world and our status as the only world superpower will not allow this to take place. Indeed, there has been no perceptible shift in OPTEMPO during the administration's first eight months in office and significant pressures exist to actually expand our peacekeeping roles in Macedonia and the Middle East. Force reductions in Europe and Korea would have powerful geopolitical ramifications. In short, these force level reductions are much easier to talk about than they are to accomplish. When it comes to force planning, I think conservative assumptions about the change in real world OPTEMPO are the order of the day.

I am concerned that your staff may be tempted to embrace well-meaning but ultimately unworkable assumptions about future Army roles and missions to justify pre-determined personnel and budget levels. If budgetary restrictions force tradeoffs, I believe it is far more important for our national security that we have unquestioned conventional ground superiority, even if this be at the expense of delaying national missile defense systems.

Sincerely,



JOHN P. MURTHA
Member of Congress

Congress of the United States

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515-3812

2002 JUL -3 AM 10:23

July 1, 2002

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
United States of America
1000 Defense Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301

SUBJECT: VERIZON/DYNACOM FEDERAL'S
MENTOR-PROTEGE APPLICATION

Dear Mr. Secretary:

Pursuant to Section 811 of PL 106-65 of the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2000, I am requesting that you exercise the authority Congress vested in your office to authorize a separate contract for the purposes of establishing a Mentor-Protégé relationship between Verizon Federal and Dynacom Industries. Dynacom is unique; they are a small disadvantaged business manufacturer emerging in the telecommunications industry. The fact that they are a manufacturer involved with telecommunications is a very unique factor and satisfies the "unusual circumstances" that justifies the use of a separate contract.

Today, as you are aware, the Department of Defense is attempting to enhance the telecommunications capabilities of the war fighter. The development assistance as well as the enormous contractual support Verizon has offered should insure tremendous benefits to Dynacom and the Department of Defense.

As a result of this mentoring relationship, Verizon intends to enhance significantly the manufacturing capabilities of Dynacom. Verizon is a 61 billion dollar annual revenue enterprise operating in 48 state and 90 countries. It is just the type of company that we need in the Mentor-Protégé Program.

cc'd for assignment/responses as appropriate.


Larry Di Rita

7/2

U10782 / 02

I am asking on you to do whatever you can to ensure their immediate participation in this very important program. I appreciate your interest in the Verizon/Dynacom Mentor-Protégé program. Thanks for your cooperation.

Sincerely,


JOHN P. MURTHA
MEMBER OF CONGRESS

JPM:cs

cc: Mr. Frank Ramos
Mr. George Shultz

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

October 9, 2002

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
Department of Defense
Washington, DC 20301-1000


Dear Mr. Secretary:

The conference agreement on the fiscal year 2003 Department of Defense Appropriations Act provides 19 UH-60 Blackhawk helicopters.


Two of the additional UH-60L aircraft have been provided specifically to complete fielding for Army Reserve units as described in the House Report on the fiscal year 2003 DoD Appropriations Bill (107-532). Two more of the additional UH-60L aircraft are intended for units of the Army National Guard.

It is our intention that three of the additional aircraft be HH-60Ls and that two of these aircraft to be fielded in Army National Guard units within the State of California, and one be fielded with a unit of the West Virginia Army National Guard.


Sincerely,




Daniel K. Inouye
Chairman
Subcommittee on Defense
Senate Appropriations Committee



Jerry Lewis
Chairman
Subcommittee on Defense
House Appropriations Committee



Ted Stevens
Ranking Minority
Subcommittee on Defense
Senate Appropriations Committee



John P. Murtha
Ranking Minority
Subcommittee on Defense
House Appropriations Committee

U18054 / 02

Congress of the United States

Washington, DC 20515

December 12, 2002

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2002 DEC 16 AM 7:34

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
United States Department of Defense
The Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301

Dear Secretary Rumsfeld:

We are writing to express our strong support for layberthing two Large Medium Speed Roll On / Roll Off vessels at the Port of Philadelphia. We believe that the Port of Philadelphia has unique physical, safety, security, and organizational qualities that make it the ideal choice for these ships.


As you know, Philadelphia was recently designated a strategic port by the Department of Defense. To support this designation, Pennsylvania has invested in a new collaborative initiative to leverage commercially available technologies. The Pennsylvania Regional Agile Port Intermodal Distribution System - known as RAPID - will promote faster deployment of troops and equipment from the port, through the port, and ultimately into the theater. These new strategies and technologies will enable the Department of Defense to meet current shortfalls in transportation and logistics capacity by utilizing existing capabilities.


Pennsylvania's agencies have further partnered with the Military Traffic Management Command and the Maritime Administration to conduct a national demonstration of the PA RAPID System - moving cargo from Letterkenny Army Depot to the Port of Philadelphia. This is the first systemic demonstration of advanced agile transport and logistics technologies in the United States.

As you also know, the Interim Combat Brigade Team - known as the "Independence Brigade" - is based in Philadelphia under the Pennsylvania National Guard's command. As an integral component of the Army's transformation, the Independence Brigade combines agility with firepower to meet modern war's challenges. Rapid deployment is central to the Brigade's mission, one that is best served by berthing of these ships in Philadelphia.

It is our understanding that this decision will be made within the next three weeks. We believe the Port of Philadelphia is the best choice for layberthing these vessels and strongly encourage your full and fair consideration of its qualities. Thank you for your prompt attention to this matter.

Sincerely,


Robert A. Brady
Member of Congress


John P. Murtha
Member of Congress

PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER

U19614 / 02

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515-3812

SECRET
2003 SEP -5 PM 1:00

August 27, 2003

The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
The Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301

Dear Secretary Rumsfeld:

As you are aware, I recently returned from travel to the Iraq theater of operations during which I met with Ambassador Bremer and our senior military leaders in the region. In a matter of days, the President will receive a letter from me outlining my broad findings, conclusions, and recommendations. In the meantime, however, I want to raise with you several specific items that I believe require your immediate attention. In my discussions with our senior military leaders, I received information about parts and equipment shortages that are adversely affecting our troops ability to conduct their mission and provide adequate protection for themselves and others. These are:

Personnel Protection:

1. **Body armor:** It was reported that some 40,000 troops in theater lack protective Kevlar plates for body armor vests. Many of the troops I've visited in military hospitals who were wounded in Iraq claim that these Kevlar plates saved their lives.
2. **Portable RF jammers:** Experience indicates that remotely controlled radio devices are detonating many of the land mines and bombs being used against our troops. There are several portable radio frequency jammers that have been developed that serve as an effective counter-measure against this threat. Yet, the Army division patrolling the so-called 'Sunni Triangle' has a total of only nine portable jammers, and the 2nd brigade of this division only had one. The division leaders with whom I met reported that these jammers are urgently required for convoy and patrol protection.
3. **Kevlar blankets:** Division leaders reported a shortage of Kevlar blankets for the HMMWVs.

U14851 / 03

Parts Shortages:

1. **Bradley Fighting Vehicles:** Of the 140 Bradleys deployed with the 1st Armored Division in theater, I was told that some 46 of these personnel carriers had been 'dead-lined' due to a lack of vehicle tracks.
2. **HMMWVs:** It was reported to me that roughly 80 of the 1st Armored Division's HMMWV wheeled vehicles had been taken out of service due to a lack of key spare parts. In addition, the Division reported that it is still waiting for 125 'up-armored' HMMWVs.
3. **Parts distribution:** Perhaps the most troubling information I received regarding spare parts was that in-country distribution problems resulted in a zero balance in 46 percent of the spare parts inventory for the HMMWVs and Bradley Fighting Vehicles.

Mr. Secretary, if there is anything the Sub-Committee can do to assist, please have someone contact us.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "John P. Murtha". The signature is fluid and cursive, with a long horizontal stroke at the end.

John P. Murtha
Member of Congress

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2004 NOV -1 AM 11:43

October 28, 2004

Honorable Donald Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
The Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301

Dear Mr. Secretary:

With the completion of congressional action on regular defense appropriations and authorization legislation for fiscal year 2005, we are writing to clarify our intent and reaffirm our support for expeditiously proceeding with an aerial tanker recapitalization program for the Air Force.

Contrary to certain assertions, congressional action on this program directly supports and facilitates the ability of the Department of Defense to proceed with an aerial tanker replacement program as rapidly as possible during fiscal year 2005. Both the defense appropriations and authorization conferences recognized and respected the need for the Department to complete the various reviews you mandated in the wake of the serious allegations associated with the previous contract negotiations. We believe that the Department must continue to fully investigate and prosecute, where appropriate, any instance of impropriety, but also move this program beyond the current state of suspended animation in order to initiate the lengthy process of recapitalizing the Air Force's aging tanker fleet.

Section 8132 of the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2005 (Public Law 108-287), provides the Department with a \$100 million tanker replacement fund available for the acquisition of an aerial refueling tanker program. Further, the conference report strongly urges the Department of Defense to "thoroughly consider the effects on the U.S. aircraft industrial base of any and all tanker replacement program alternatives."

In turn, the Conference Report on H.R. 4200, the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, as recently passed by the House and the Senate, builds on the appropriations provision. Section 133 of this legislation simply modifies the authority established in section 135 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 (Public Law 108-136), by converting the previous program profile of 20 lease/80 procurement aircraft to a 100 aircraft multi-year procurement program.

OSD 17295-04


However, it is equally important to clarify what section 133 does not do. Other than modifying the 20/80 profile to a 100 aircraft multi-year authority, this section does not alter the program of record or impose on the Department any additional or new requirements for the acquisition of the aircraft itself. With regard to the specific assertion that this legislation will require the Department to conduct a new "full and open competition" for tanker replacement aircraft, it is important to note that the conference addressed this question directly where there was agreement and remained silent where there was not. For instance, section 855 of the defense authorization conference report would require the Secretary of the Air Force to conduct a series of analyses as well as specifically abide by the applicable provisions of the Competition in Contracting Act as it pertains to the provision of integrated support for aerial tankers. However, there is purposefully no similar companion provision or requirement for competition in the conference report as it relates to the acquisition of the actual aircraft.

Mr. Secretary, as outlined above, Congress has provided the Department with all the necessary fiscal and legal resources necessary to proceed with the acquisition of aerial tanker replacement program as rapidly as possible once you complete the previously established internal reviews next month. We strongly believe that we should not allow the unfortunate actions of a few to continue to derail the need to fulfill this critical warfighting capability in the most expeditious and effective fashion possible. We urge you take the actions necessary to put this program back on track by taking full advantage of the resources and authorities provided to you for this purpose.


Sincerely,




Duncan Hunter
Chairman
House Armed Services Committee



Ike Skelton
Ranking Member
House Armed Services Committee



Jerry Lewis
Chairman
House Appropriations
Subcommittee on Defense



John P. Murtha
Ranking Member
House Appropriations
Subcommittee on Defense

Congress of the United States

Washington, DC 20515

SECRET

2004 NOV 22 PM 2:15

November 18, 2004

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
Washington, DC

Dear Mr. Secretary:

We are committed to ensuring that our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines have the best equipment and the highest force protection possible to execute the Global War on Terror. The Army and Marine Corps recently identified emergent equipment needs for U.S. troops fighting the Global War on Terrorism that must be addressed quickly. We believe that Congress has provided the Department of Defense the financial resources to meet the most urgent of these requirements, but we understand that it may be necessary to reprogram funds between accounts to do so. Accordingly, we urge you to provide the necessary reprogramming requests within the next several days to the congressional defense committees.

We are also deeply concerned about a matter Chairman Bill Young has brought to our attention regarding the retention of United States Special Operations Forces. Retention of our military personnel is becoming a significant challenge for the Department as the Global War on Terrorism continues its high pace of personnel and operational tempo, and we share Chairman Young's particular concern. We understand that USSOCOM is working closely with the Department on a strategy to retain many of these operators through a package of special pays and bonuses, and that this proposal is awaiting approval by you and the military services. Any delay in implementing this plan will result in the loss of critical personnel, and we strongly urge you to begin this program as soon as possible, but not later than January 1, 2005.

OSD 18736-04


The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld
November 18, 2004
Page Two

We also expect that any supplemental request will include any additional funding required to continue this initiative through the balance of the fiscal year.

Sincerely,




Ted Stevens
Chairman
Defense Subcommittee
Senate Appropriations Committee



Jerry Lewis
Chairman
Defense Subcommittee
House Appropriations Committee



Daniel K. Inouye
Ranking Minority Member
Defense Subcommittee
Senate Appropriations Committee



John P. Murtha
Ranking Minority Member
Defense Subcommittee
House Appropriations Committee

cc: The Honorable Joshua B. Bolten
Director
Office of Management and Budget

JOHN P. MURTHA
12TH DISTRICT, PENNSYLVANIA

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
COMMITTEE:
APPROPRIATIONS

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515-3812

2004 DEC 20 AM 6:51

December 17, 2004

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld
The Secretary of Defense
United States of America
The Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301-1000

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I continue to visit our wounded troops at Walter Reed and Bethesda on a weekly basis. During each of my visits, when I ask the troops if they need anything, they have consistently responded "we need armor". Just last week at Walter Reed I was visiting with a West Point Officer who was shot in the neck and unable to talk. His mother said he was frustrated because he was unable to communicate; but when I asked if they needed anything, he grabbed a pen and a piece of paper and scribbled, "I was in a Stryker Unit. A lot of Humvees need up-armor. All soldiers need protection (groin, etc). The infantry is always squared away, but non-combat arms are hurting for protective gear".

Based on conversations with senior military leaders and reports I recently received, I continue to believe that the Army is struggling to maintain current deployment levels and sustain military readiness across the force. I am particularly concerned with shortfalls in life saving equipment and our inability to get this equipment fielded with the sense of urgency that it deserves. As you know Mr. Secretary, I brought some of these issues to the forefront over a year ago, yet progress remains slow.

The anticipated supplemental funding request to support operations in Iraq and Afghanistan presents the Administration and Congress with an opportunity to forthrightly address this issue and to pay for the needs of our warfighters now. I strongly urge you to consider and fully address the following findings as you prepare the Department's request for supplemental funding.

OSD 20310-04

Immediate Needs:

Requirements for the following items should be fully funded in the supplemental request in order to address immediate needs in the Iraq and Afghanistan theaters of operation:

- Armor: As you are well aware, the need for additional up-armored Humvees and add-on armor kits for other wheeled vehicles continues to grow. Some reports have lauded the fact that almost three-quarters of the full requirement for up-armored Humvees needed in Iraq have been met. What this really means is that one-quarter of the units in Iraq are still left more vulnerable to deadly attacks by insurgents. Reports I received from the Department indicate that we are still short about 2,200 of the up-armored Humvees required in theater. It has recently been reported that the manufacturer of the up-armored Humvees is not operating at full capacity.

In addition, only 10% of our requirement for armored medium tactical vehicles, and 15 % for armored heavy vehicles in Iraq is currently being met. Full rate order and production of these vehicles should be achieved now.

- Equipment shortages: The 3rd Infantry Division is deploying soon, but without certain critical equipment. In fact, because of this equipment shortage, the unit has received the lowest combat readiness rating achievable. Though the Army leadership and Division command contend that these shortages are only temporary, the fact remains that the Army is experiencing some systemic equipment shortfalls. These include: battlefield radios; M-4 rifles; crew-served weapons and .50 caliber machine guns; ring mounts; and, tracking and IFF systems. The full Army requirement for these items should be filled and fielded.
- Personnel: The Army continues to experience shortfalls in critical occupation categories, including military intelligence specialists, transportation personnel, military police, and civil affairs units. I have been repeatedly told that a restructuring study is under way to address this issue, and to ultimately arrive at a total force number. I believe this concept has been too long in the making. I strongly recommend the Department include in its supplemental request a plan to fully address these shortfalls in both the short-term and for the future.

Near-term Future Needs:

It appears that the Army is currently experiencing a readiness "bath tub" effect similar to that experienced by the Navy in the mid-90's. Once a unit returns from deployment, its military readiness rating falls to the lowest level, which is to be expected as personnel changes are made, block leave is granted, and repair and overhaul of equipment, vehicles and aircraft are achieved. Due to systemic equipment, training device, and personnel shortfalls, this period of low readiness

