CONNECTICAT

COMMITTEES

CAN DNISUOH DNINAE BRIATA ARBRU

FOREIGN RELATIONS

HEALTH, EDUCATION, LABOR, AND PENSIONS

RULES AND ADMINISTRATION

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-0702

448 Parstal Senat Overe Buldens (202) 224-2823 TOD (202) 224-5464

STATE OFFICE 100 Great Meadon Fond Wichendreld, CT 06108 (860) 258-6940 TOD (860) 529-7498

How Page Implifidedd senate gov

February 8, 2002

The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld Secretary of Defense Department of Defense The Pentagon, Room 3E880 Washington, DC 20301

Dear Mr Secretary

SA0004171

Secretary of Defense

I am writing to bring your attention to a matter of great importance to Connecticut and the Department of Defense the "buying-out" of the Army's requirement of UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters

As you know, the current multi-year contact for UH-60 helicopters, which runs through fiscal year 2006, calls for the procurement of 80 Black Hawks. This leaves the Army 44 Black Hawks short of its overall requirement of 1,680 aircraft. I respectfully urge you to support the buying-out of this remaining requirement.

Taking into account the U.S. Navy's current contract to procure 89 CH-60S over the same time period, the Department of Defense can achieve a cost avoidance of at least \$213 million or \$1 million per aircraft through this buy-out. It is my understanding that Sikorsky and the Army have already agreed upon a plan to spread out those 44 aircraft across the multi-year contract in order to achieve the maximum economic order quantities. All that is now required to realize this tremendous cost savings is the up-front investment from the Army and the Department of Defense. Any assistance you could provide in this matter would be greatly appreciated.

Thank you for your consideration of this request, and I strongly urge your support. The H-60 helicopter is critical to our national defense.

CHRISTOPHER J DODD

United States Senator

PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER

Congress of the United States Washington, DC 20515

SECTION DATES.

202 JM - 5 M 9: 03

May 6, 2002

Secretary of Defense
SA0010387

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld Secretary of Defense Department of Defense The Pentagon Washington, DC 20301-1155

Dear Secretary Rumsfeld

On behalf of the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on House Administration and the U.S. Senate Committee on Rules and Administration, we would like to invite you to speak at the 2002 Summer Intern Lecture Series

The Summer Intern Lecture Series is held for Congressional interns who attend colleges and universities across the nation and come work in Senate and House offices during the summer months. It is an opportunity for the interns to hear prominent decision makers speak on important issues facing our nation and the world today.

We are currently planning this summer's Series, which will run from June 3rd through the end of July Please contact Melissa McKay at the Committee on House Administration, at (202) 225-8281, or Beth Meagher at the Senate Rules Committee, at (202) 224-6352, for more information or to schedule a date and time for your participation

Thank you for your kind consideration of this invitation

ROBERT W NEY

Chairman

Committee on House Administration

US House of Representatives

Sincerely,

CHRISTOPHER J DODD


Chairman

Committee on Rules and Administration

US Senate

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510



March 6, 2003

The Honorable
Donald H. Rurnsfeld
Secretary of Defense
Department of Defense
1000 Defense Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301-1000

Dear Mr. Secretary:

We write to express our strong concern about the potential use of chemical and biological weapons against American forces during any future war with Iraq and the ability of our military personnel to defend against such an attack. The safety of our men and women in uniform must remain a top priority in any future conflict or deployment. We are concerned that, as thousands of active duty and reserve troops are deployed to the Persian Gulf region each week, training and preparedness for confronting the harrowing threat of chemical and biological warfare lags behind the pace of deployment. We call your attention to the enclosed transcript of a recent report on the news program 60 Minutes that questions whether our troops are adequately prepared for a chemical or biological attack.

As this news report and several government reports demonstrate, many experts argue that our military personnel do not have adequate training or equipment to respond to a chemical or biological attack. A July 2002 report by the Army Audit Agency, which is enclosed for your review, concludes that "soldiers in most units reviewed ... weren't proficient in operating and maintaining chemical and biological defense equipment," primarily as a result of poor training. These soldiers' lack of proficiency in maintaining the equipment resulted in essential equipment, including 38 percent of Chemical-Biological Masks, deteriorating to "non-mission capable" states of repair. In addition, the General Accounting Office reported last October that 250,000 of the more than 778,000 defective Battle Dress Overgarment protective suits that the Department of Defense ordered removed from its inventory in May 2000 remained unaccounted for by the Army. The Defense Logistics Agency confirmed that 80,000 gas masks with the wrong filters had been issued to the Armed Forces, and that about 19,000 of these remain in circulation. Suffice it to say, no family will be cager to hear that their loved one was killed because he or she had been issued a mask with the wrong filter.

Letter to Secretary Rumsfeld, Page 2

We are also deeply concerned about the aftermath of any large-scale deployment to or war with Iraq and the long-term effects that such an operation could have on the health of our military personnel. As you know, more than ten years after the end of the Persian Gulf War, we still don't know why so many veterans of that conflict are experiencing medical problems. Of the nearly 700,000 U.S. military personnel who served in the Persian Gulf War in 1990 and 1991, more than 100,000 have suffered from an array of symptoms that have become known as Gulf War Syndrome. These symptoms include chronic fatigue, muscle and joint pain, memory loss, sleep disorders, depression, and concentration problems, among others.

As you know, many Gulf War veterans were exposed to a host of pharmaceuticals, chemicals, and environmental toxins, blowing dust, smoke from oil well fires, and petroleum fuels and their combustion products. In addition, there was possible exposure to chemical warfare nerve agents and biological warfare agents, pyridostigmine bromide pills to protect against nerve agents, insecticides, vaccinations, infectious diseases, depleted uranium, and psychological and physiological stress. Military personnel who are currently being deployed to the region for a possible second war with Iraq can expect to face many of these same conditions. Moreover, given the chronic funding shortages of the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the increasing demand for VA health care services, we may be asking this new generation of soldiers to return home to a system that cannot accompodate the medical fallout of these conditions.

A new complication since 1991 is the much larger number of employees from private contractors who will be in theater. By some estimates, this number could reach 20,000 personnel, or about 10 times the number involved in Desert Storm. These private-sector employees will be exposed to the same environments and face the same risks as military personnel.

We would appreciate a detailed description of the steps that the Department is taking to protect our dedicated military personnel from a chemical or biological attack, including measures to correct the training inadequacies and equipment deficiencies mentioned above. Please include a discussion of training for military medical personnel on how to recognize and treat symptoms of a chemical or biological attack, efforts to improve detection of chemical and biological agents, and information on the availability and condition of chem-bio protective equipment. We urge you to increase the Department's focus on such training and preparedness, including providing adequate funding for the equipment that our men and women in uniform will need to combat these threats in the Persian Gulf and elsewhere. We also request a description of steps that are being taken to protect private employees of Defense Department contractors.

Letter to Secretary Rumsfeld, Page 3

We also request that the Department develop a plan to ensure that the health of American troops deployed to the Persian Gulf region is protected both in the immediate future and in the long term. We owe it to our men and women and uniform and their families to do all we can to prevent another Gulf War Syndrome and to continue to take steps to ensure that those suffering from this illness are adequately compensated for their service and sacrifice.

Thank you in advance for your timely response to this request.

Sincerely,

Russell D. Feingold United States Senator

2.5

Richard J. Durbin United States Senator

Barbara Boxer

United States Senator

Aristopher J. Dodd Uhited States Senator

Herry Reid

United States Senator

Dianne Feinstein

United States Senator

Barbara A. Mikulski United States Senator Blanche L. Lincoln

United States Senator

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510

April 20, 2004

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld Secretary Department of Defense The Pentagon Washington, D.C. 20301

Dear Secretary Rumsfeld:

We are writing to express our serious concerns about the proposal for a new Department of Defense (DoD) labor relations system that has been distributed to congressional staff and employee groups.

In the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), which was enacted last November, the Department was authorized to modify the procedures for resolving labor-management disputes for the next six years. Congress stated, however, that any new procedures would have to protect fundamental labor rights, such as the right of employees to join unions, the right of unions to bargain collectively, and the duty of unions and management to bargain in good faith. Congress also stated that the current labor relations system could be modified only in order to further the Department's "national security mission."

In hearings that preceded the passage of the NDAA, DoD officials repeatedly stated that they were not trying to eliminate collective bargaining rights.² Ninety-five members of the U.S. Senate voted for this bill after being assured that fundamental labor rights would be protected. Thus, we were very troubled to learn that DoD has submitted a proposal for a new labor relations system that abrogates these rights and goes well heyond what Congress intended in the NDAA.

Under this proposal, good-faith collective bargaining would be virtually eliminated and replaced by "consultation" with unions over proposed personnel changes. DoD could unilaterally decide what personnel changes are "significant" enough to be subject to collective bargaining. If DoD and its unions could not reach agreement, the Department could unilaterally

¹ National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2004 (P.L. 108-136), § 9902(m)(1).

² Testimony of Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz before the House Government Reform Committee (May 6, 2003) ("My understanding is that collective bargaining will still be an essential part of the process"); Testimony of Undersecretary of Defense David Chu before the House Subcommittee on Civil Service and Agency Organization (Apr. 29, 2003) ("And there's no proposal here to – for anyone to lose his or her collective bargaining rights").

implement the personnel changes and cut off all post-implementation negotiations. Moreover, DoD could unilaterally issue regulations to supersede existing collective bargaining agreements negotiated by the Department and its unions.

To the extent that any collective bargaining is permitted under the new labor relations system, labor-management disputes would be resolved by a newly created Defense Labor Relations Board (DLRB). This board would be located within the Department, with its members selected by the Secretary. We do not believe such a system satisfies the NDAA requirement that any labor relations system developed by DoD must provide for "independent third party review of decisions."

The DoD proposal also contains several provisions aimed solely at reducing union membership. Most notably, the proposal prohibits as many as 200,000 DoD employees – including some clerical employees, some professional employees, attorneys, and termappointment employees – from joining unions. DoD has provided no justification for how such changes further the Department's national security mission, as is required by the NDAA.

We strongly urge the Department to withdraw this proposal immediately and submit a new proposal that is consistent with the intent of Congress.

Sincerely,

Senator Frank R. Lautenberg

Senator Joseph R. Biden

Senator Ron Wyo

Senator Patty Murray

³ NDAA at § 9902(m)(6).

⁴ Union-Busting, DoD Style, Federal Times (Feb. 16, 2004).

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld April 20, 2004 Page 3

Schator Edward M. Kennedy	Senator Jack Reed
Senator Jon S. Corzine	Scharor Mary L. Landrieu
Senator Paul S. Sarbanes	Senator Chris Dodd
Senator Charles E. Schumer	Jon Vay Senator Tom Carper
	Brand A. No. Senator Barbara Mikulski
Senator Tim Johnson	Senator Maria Cantwell
Senator John Edwards	Senator Russ Feingold

CHRISTOPHER J. DODD
CONNECTICUT

COMMITTEES BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS

FOREIGN RELATIONS

HEALTH, EDUCATION, LABOR. AND PENSIONS

RULES AND ADMINISTRATION

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-0702

March 9, 2005

WASHINGTON OFFICE:

446 Russell Senate Office Bumping (202) 224-2823 Fax: (202) 224-1083 TDD: (202) 224-5464

STATE OFFICE:

100 GREAT MEANOW ROAD WHITERSFIELD, CT 06109 (860) 258-6540 FAX: 18601 728-6558 TOLUMBET (800) 334 5341 TOLUMBET (800) 529-7498

HOME PAGE: http://dodd.seriete.gov

The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld Secretary of Defense 1000 Defense Pentagon Washington, DC 20301-1000

Dear Secretary Rumsfeld:

Last June, the Senate adopted unanimously an amendment to the FY2005 National Defense Authorization Act, establishing a program to reimburse soldiers for personal and private expenses incurred to provide critical equipment that the Defense Department had failed to provide for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

This amendment was adopted after troubling reports surfaced that our men and women in uniform were digging deep into their own pockets or relying on charitable giving to buy such life-saving gear as bullet proof vests, vehicle armor, and medical supplies. This amendment was modified and adopted in conference as Section 351 of the Defense Authorization Act which was signed by the President into law as Public Law 108-375 on October 28, 2004.

Section 351 requires your office to issue rules on how the Department will expedite the provision of reimbursement to our troops under this section. These rules were required to be issued within 120 days after enactment of this law, or February 25, 2005. To my knowledge, these rules were not promulgated as of February 25th, nor have they been promulgated to date. Accordingly, the office of the Secretary of Defense is apparently not in compliance with this section of the law.

There should be no higher priority for our government than ensuring that American troops are well-equipped, particularly those on the front lines of battle in Iraq and Afghanistan. Given their immense sacrifices, as well as the critical contributions of their families and communities, I hereby request that you immediately inform me as to the status of the Department's action to comply with this statutory requirement.

CHRISTOPHER J. DODD United States Senator

2. 2 VO. 765

205 122 21 21 15 E.

WASHINGTON OFFICE: 446 FUSSEL SONA & OFFICE BLILDING (202) 124-3833

FAC (202) 224-1062 TUD: (202) 224-6454 STATE OFFICE:

100 Great Meadow Road Wernerspeed, CT 00160 (835) 256-8340 Fac (850) 255-8668

TOD: (900) \$34-8341 TOD: (960) 529-7488

Mome Page: http://dodd.canata.gov

United States Senate WASHINGTON, DC 20510-0702

JREAN AFFAIRE FOREIGN RELATIONS

CONNECTICUT

COMMITTEE BANKING, HÖLISING, AND

HEALTH, EDUCATION, LABOR,

AND PENSIONS

RULES AND ADMINISTRATION

March 17, 2005

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld Secretary of Defense 1000 Defense Pentagon Washington, DC 20350

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I am very troubled by the recent decision to award Lockheed Martin Systems Integration (LMSI) a \$1.7 billion cost plus award fee contract for the VXX Matine One Presidential Helicopter, and not merely because of the harm I fear this decision may bring to Sikorksy Aircraft Corporation, based in Stratford, Connecticut, but because of the many troubling issues regarding foreign production of a Presidential helicopter.

It is not immediately clear to me or many of my colleagues how certain aspects of this contract award are consistent with US law and policy, and particularly since this contract award concerns the helicopter our President will use well into the future. How this decision was made, and the extent to which matters of national security were a factor, in addition to those involving the costs associated with its production, are areas in which I require further details, both as a Member of Connecticut's Congressional delegation and a Member of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.

The requirements of US law and policy are strict with respect to international industrial base programs. As a Member of the Committee on Foreign Relations, I will be paying close attention to this matter in furtherance of the Committee's oversight of the Arms Export Control Act (22 USC 2751, et. seq.). I can only hope that very high levels of scrutiny will be applied in all phases of this Presidential contract. Currently 3 Federal committees, 15 processes, 23 agencies and more than 45 offices in the interagency process are involved in all matters pertaining to foreign disclosure and export control requirements manifest in US law.

The original Presidential Helicopter Replacement Program proposed an initial operating capability (IOC) in 2013. The VXX Program was accelerated in 2003 with a new IOC planned for fiscal year 2009. How a decision to award a contract to foreign suppliers is consistent with a decision to build and operate the new Presidential helicopter in a shorter time is not clear to me, particularly since involving so many foreign nationals in a matter pertaining to the President could mean that already stringent controls would need to tighten.

2

In response to this letter, I would appreciate your timely and thoughtful responses to these questions:

- In announcing this contact award, Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and Acquisition John Young stated that "Today's announcement is a significant milestone that caps an exhaustive and deliberative source selection process that carefully followed the Federal Acquisition Regulations." Were other Federal regulatory policies or rules examined in connection with the announcement of this contract, in particular did the Navy take into account the requirements of the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR, 22 CFR-120-130)?
- 2. Will any licenses under this contract require notification to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations under section 36(c) of the Arms Export Control Act (22 USC 2776(c)), and, if so, would any such licenses, prior to their being submitted for congressional review, be referred to the Defense Trade Security Administration (DTSA)? If referred, would DTSA attach any special provisos as a condition of exports made under this contract since it is for a Presidential aircraft?
- 3. Will LMSI make use of sublicensing for this contract? Has LMSI indicated which aspects have been or will be sublicensed? If so, to whom?
- 4. Was the Department of State's Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC), the Department of Defense's DTSA or any other relevant part of the interagency involved in this contract award? Is there currently any requirement that DDTC or DTSA be involved in such decisions, particularly as this is an aircraft to be used by the President?
- 5. Do the Navy, the Department of Defense or LMSI plan to make use of any regulatory exemptions concerning licensed production abroad in furtherance of the VXX Marine One Presidential Helicopter? Will there need to be any exceptions granted to National Disclosure Policy (ENDPs) during any phases of this contract?
- 6. Since the US101 is based largely on European technology, could the Department please specify for me each location associated with the research and development phase of this contract, including the system development and demonstration phase, and where such work will be carried out—including the sites of production lines, ownership and the firms associated with this work?
- 7. At the January 28, 2005 DoD Special Briefing on the Award of the Presidential Helicopter Contract, Thomas Laux, PEO for VXX Marine One, stated in response to a question regarding the ability of LMSI's identified personnel to gain the necessary US security clearances for work on a Presidential aircraft that

The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld Letter on VXX Presidential Helicopter

[W]e're going to do everything we can to facilitate the personnel that [Lockheed] need[s] to get the clearances and get them deployed into the right places. Lockheed....identified the number of personnel in each of the locations, including Italy and the UK and the various US locations. We've identified at each of those places the number of security personnel appropriate to the activity that's going on to make sure that we have the appropriate oversight and the protections that are required for this very sensitive mission.

Given that this decision and contract award reflects the need to "control the risk and cost to the taxpayer," as Assistant Secretary Young has stated, to what extent were the costs of providing for adequate security for this project, including the need to clear foreign nationals, factored into the decision to award this contract? Does the Navy or LMSI have an estimate of such costs? Has LMSI identified all foreign nationals who will be associated with this contract—including the citizenship of all such persons in the United Kingdom and Italy?

- 8. Will foreign nationals be assigned to or need to visit US bases or defense contractor facilities during any phase of this contract? Are all such foreign, and US, personnel aware of the requirements of US law regarding such visits and access?
- 9. Will foreign nationals require access to information systems during any phase of this contract, and, if so, will access approvals have been obtained to avoid any delays in any phase of this contract?
- 10. Will procurement with foreign companies involved in this contract result in the need for US releaseability approvals, and could the Department please stipulate with which such companies or suppliers current contract plans call for such involvement and in which phases of the contract?
- 11. To the extent it is known today, are any offsets required in connection with any production abroad, in all phases, of the VXX Marine One Presidential Helicopter?

Thank you for your attention in this matter. I look forward to your responses.

CHRISTOPHER J. DODD United States Senator

http://www.defenselink.mil/ogi-bin/dlprint.cgi?http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2005/tr20050128-2044.html.

CHRISTOPHER J. DODD CONNECTICUT

COMMITTEES

BANKING, HOUSING, AND
URBAN AFFAIRS

FOREIGN RELATIONS

HEALTH, EDUCATION, LABOR, AND PENSIONS

RULES AND ADMINISTRATION

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-0702

March 30, 2005

WASHINGTON OFFICE:

448 RUSSELL SENATE OFFICE BUILDING (202) 224-2823 FAX: (202) 224-1083 TDD: 1202) 224-5464

STATE OFFICE:

100 GREA1 MEADOW ROAD WETHERSHELD, CT 06109 (860) 258-6940 FAX: (860) 258-6948 TOLL FREE (800) 334-5341 TOD: (860) 529-7498

Howe Page: http://dodd.senate.gov

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld Secretary of Defense 1000 Defense Pentagon Washington, DC 20350

Dear Mr. Secretary:

It has recently come to my attention that the People's Republic of China (PRC) is in the process of developing a state-of-the-art submarine fleet that would challenge the United States' military presence throughout East Asia. Such action has been characterized as an attempt to minimize American capabilities to respond to potential conflicts in the Taiwan Straits, as the United States Navy did in 1996. Given the PRC's recently passed law authorizing the use of force against a seceding Taiwan, it is critically important that the United States retain the capacity to counteract China's expanding naval force both in the short and long term.

For example, the newly uncovered Yuan-class of submarine demonstrates a level of sophistication in China's undersea stealth and weapons technology that leaves little doubt about Beijing's intentions to develop a competing submarine fleet. As unclassified reports have already indicated, this diesel ship could be used throughout Asia to collect intelligence and impede US aircraft carriers access to the South China Sea and other parts of the Pacific Rim. Other Chinese submarines currently under development such as the Type 093, which is armed with intercontinental ballistic missiles, and the 094 attack submarine will be nuclear-powered and allow China to have a significant global naval presence. Armed with long-range cruise missiles, the PRC's naval fleet already possesses significant military capabilities on the high seas as well as in coastal waters throughout Asia.

Maritime superiority is a cornerstone of US defense policy. In addition, our naval dominance has helped preserve peace and security not only within our own nation but in all corners of the globe. China's ambitions with respect to advanced submarine development must not be allowed to occur to the detriment of peace and security.

Just as US submarines have proven indispensable in the war on terrorism, our submarine fleet remains indispensable in developing an American response to an emerging Chinese Navy. Our submarines provide unmatched stealth for intelligence activities, and deadly precision for offensive missile strikes. Every US submarine asset— our submarine bases, the shipbuilding industry, the research labs, the training facilities, and, most important of all, our submariners—is essential for meeting the needs of our military's combatant commanders, particularly those in the United States Central and Pacific Commands.

In my view, it is essential that we address China's naval ambitions through at least the following five means:

- 1. Avoid diminishing US Navy submarine infrastructure through the BRAC process. In particular, the Navy must retain Submarine Base New London in its current force structure, given its unique contributions to US national security. Co-located in southeastern Connecticut with General Dynamics Electric Boat, it is playing an essential role in developing, testing and evaluating the world's most advanced submarine technologies. In addition, as the home of the US Submariner School and key maintenance facilities, this military base remains the core of America's attack submarine force and nation's key to counteracting the burgeoning Chinese submarine fleet.
- 2. Retain and continue modernizing Navy submarine bases within the United States. For the United States to effectively meet the Chinese submarine threat it is essential that the Navy continues improving military facilities that are not only responsible for maintaining, enhancing, and stationing our attack submarines but are also places of work, housing and training for the United States Navy's submariners. In addition, to enhance fleet readiness, such improvements will further support Navy retention at a critical time for the US military.
- 3. Direct resources toward developing a next generation of nuclear powered attack submarines. A recent Program Budget Decision document signed by Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz directed the Navy to "design a future undersea superiority system alternative." I understand that there is a proposed \$60 million available in Fiscal Year 2006 that may be applied for such an effort. It is imperative that this funding go towards the research and development of a new class of submarines to follow the VIRGINIA Class, to ensure that United States undersea technology remains ahead of all potential competitors.
- 4. Ramp up naval intelligence gathering capabilities—through signals, imagery, and human assets. Submarines play a critical role in stealthy intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance missions. It is critical that these undersea technologies continue to be modernized, as well as supplemented by other assets deployed by the intelligence community.
- 5. Develop effective countermeasures to the emerging cruise missile threat. The proliferation of long-range cruise missiles for use by sea and land remains one of the most potent and credible challenges facing US forces deployed throughout the world. It is critical that the US military develop effective defenses to such a destructive threat.

As you develop the US armed forces' long-term force structure through BRAC recommendations and the Quadrennial Defense Review, I urge you to consider this burgeoning threat. In light of China's seeming determination to offset US naval superiority, I respectfully request that you inform me of your efforts to address the concerns raised in this letter.

CHRISTOPHER J. DODD United States Senator

CHRISTOPHER J. DODD CONNECTICUT

COMMITTEES: BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS

FOREIGN RELATIONS

HEALTH EDUCATION LABOR, AND PENSIONS

RULES AND ADMINISTRATION

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-0702

February 17, 2006

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld Secretary of Defense 1000 Defense Pentagon Washington, DC 20350

Dear Secretary Rumsfeld:

I have been monitoring the implementation of the Defense Department's equipment reimbursement initiative with great concern. Developed as a result of legislation that I authored in 2004 and 2005, this program was intended to provide compensation to military personnel who purchased critical health and safety equipment that the Department failed to provide for use in support of Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom.

Three conclusions seem evident from implementation of this important initiative. First, the Department of Defense has done an inadequate job in informing troops of the availability of this reimbursement benefit. Merely having an Under Secretary mention the initiative on a military website or to a few select publications is not nearly sufficient. The Pentagon should do all that it can to make certain that our troops thoroughly know how to take advantage of this important initiative. At a minimum, the Department of Defense should institute a plan to have unit commanders debrief service-members on how to file reimbursement claims upon leaving their combat areas of operations.

Second, the Pentagon appears to be discouraging troops from enrolling in this program by requiring that troops turn in their equipment in order to qualify for reinbursement, even when many of these same service-memhers may still need their gear for future deployment. Given the relatively small scope of this program in a \$439.3 billion fiscal year 2007 defense budget, it hardly seems necessary for the Department of Defense to discourage members from using this benefit and actually take possession of their gear.

Finally, and most importantly, according to ongoing news coverage, our troops are still not receiving the protection they need to complete their missions safely and effectively. Unfortunately, as recently reported by The New York Times, the Marine Corps completed a secret study finding that 80 percent of U.S. comhat deaths due to torso injuries could have been avoided if military personnel had been provided with adequate armored protection. While the Army has finally initiated an effort to outfit our troops with additional side-armor, it could take up to a year before all of our soldiers receive the protection they need. For that reason, I introduced, S. 2230, the Service-Member Safety

WASHINGTON OFFICE:

448 RUSSECU SENATE OFFICE BUILDING (202) 224-2823 TDD: (2021 224-5464

STATE OFFICE:

100 GREAT MEADOW ROAD WETHERSHIELD, CT 06109 (860) 258, 6940 TDD: (860) 529-7498

Home Page: http://dodd.senate.gov

Act of 2006. This legislation would require that the Department of Defense provide the most complete personal armored protection to United States military personnel who perform operations in areas designated as areas of "military contingencies" or combat operations. Exceptions for such protection would be made only where field commanders or others in the chain-of-command have certified that the most extensive armored protection would impede a particular service-member's ability to complete a mission or might somehow put the service-member at graver risk of injury or death.

Until the Pentagon complies with this requirement, S. 2230 would further initiate a personal protective equipment allowance program which would provide up to \$1,100 to each individual service-member to purchase appropriate interceptor body armor and other appropriate protective gear from properly certified military suppliers.

As our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines defend our freedom on the battlefields of Iraq and Afghanistan, we owe them no less than the most effective protection possible. I hope you share my concerns, and will report immediately back to me on your efforts to address the Department's inadequate implementation of the equipment reimbursement program.

Thank you for your prompt reply.

Sincerely,

CHRISTOPHER J. DODD

United States Senator

7

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510

January 15, 2007

The Honorable Robert M. Gates Secretary of Defense 1000 Defense Pentagon Washington D.C. 20301-1000

Dear Secretary Gates:

We're writing to express our concern that the proposed troop surge by the President will put 22,500 more U.S. troops in Iraq without the best armor protection available. The President's proposal is intended to secure Baghdad—a notorious site for IED's.

We are enclosing a recent article in the Baltimore Sun, which reports that the two new brigades of troops the President intends to send to Iraq will be deployed without the protection of the most up-to-date armored vehicles. These latest vehicles, which have V-shaped bottoms, enable vehicles to better withstand explosions and provide significantly better protection for our troops. This shortfall is endangering many of our troops already in Iraq, and appears to be yet another in a litany of failures to provide adequate armor to the troops.

We are concerned for many reasons about the President's proposed troop increase, but surely, if we cannot provide adequate protective vehicles to our troops already in Iraq, it makes no sense to send even more of our forces into this danger. Please let us know what are you are doing to rectify the armor shortages for our troops currently in Iraq, and what you will do to provide adequate armor protection if the President's proposal to send more troops is implemented.

We look forward to your responses to these questions and to understanding the ways in which you propose we address these shortfalls.

With respect and appreciation,

Sincerely

marobinet mora

1/16/2007 10:35:39 AM

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510

February 15, 2007

The Honorable Robert M. Gates Secretary of Defense 1000 Defense Pontagon Washington, DC 20301-1000

Dear Mr. Secretary:

We are writing to express our grave concerns about recent reports of inadequate supplies of body armor and force-protection equipment for troops being deployed in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom.

According to a report by the Department of Defense in late 2005, many of the fatalities caused by upper body injuries in Iraq could be prevented if all body annor issued to our troops included side armor plates. In response to this report, many of us in the Senate asked then-Secretary Rumsfeld to ensure that the best available body armor be delivered to our soldiers in harm's way as quickly as possible. We were assured that the Department of Defense would promptly begin procurement and delivery of an additional 230,000 sets of side armor plates.

A January 25, 2007 report from the Inspector General, however, found continued shortages in force-protection equipment for our soldiers. The report found shortages in body armor, uparmored vehicles, communications equipment, and electronic countermeasure devices. We have also heard first-hand accounts that many service members being issued body armor are still not receiving side armor plates. It seems reasonable to surmise that if a service member requires body armor for their joh, the side armor plates would provide extra protection.

These accounts alone are troubling, but the President's plan to send more than 20,000 additional troops to Baghdad raises further questions about our ability to properly equip and protect our men and women in uniform. When asked by *The Washington Post* about the President's surge proposal, Lt. Gen. Stephen Speakes, the Army's deputy chief of staff for force development, said: "We don't have the [armor] kits, and we don't have the trucks." This statement raises grave concerns about our ability to equip and protect not just the soldiers that are currently fighting, but also the new soldiers that the President is planning to send to Baghdad.

In light of these concerns, we respectfully ask that you provide us an update of how many troops currently in Iraq and Afghanistan have not been issued body armor with side armor plates. In addition, we would like to know what percentage of troops currently being mobilized in support of the operations in Iraq and Afghanistan are not being issued complete sets of body armor that include side armor plates. We would also like to know the number and proportion of troops in each of the services, including figures for both the National Guard and the Reserve, receiving this essential protective equipment. Finally, we would like to know what steps the Department

PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER



Let the Robert

2/16/2007 12:41.27 PM

of Defense is taking to implement the recommendations made by the Inspector General in its January 25 report on force-protection equipment shortages among deployed units.

We are sure you agree that our men and women in uniform deserve nothing less than the best protective equipment. If there are indeed shortages of complete body armor sets, or shortages of other force-protection equipment, among our troops in Iraq and Afghanistan, we urge you to take immediate action to correct this grave problem. You can be certain that we stand ready with our colleagues to assist you overcome any shortfall that you identify in the most expeditious way possible.

Thank you in advance for your prompt attention to this urgent matter.

Sincerely,

2022282022

₽\Σ,q

Sulvatrouse Church 5

My Brown Church 5

Ly J. Kung

P.4/4

CHRISTOPHER J. DODD CONNECTICUT

COMMITTEES:

BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS

FOREIGN BELATIONS

HEALTH, FOUCATION LABOR, AND PENSIONS

RULES AND ADMINISTRATION

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-0702

WASHINGTON OFFICE.

449 RUSSELL SENATE CHARCE BLILDING
WASHINGTON, DC 20510
(2021/224-2823
TOD (202) 224-5454

STATE OFFICE: 30 LEARS SIMECT, SUITE 181 HARTFORD, CT 06103 (960) 258-6940 TDD (860) 529-7498

How Past: http://dodd.senete.gov E-MAIL: http://dodd.senete.gov/ambmail

January 29, 2008

The Honorable Robert M. Gates Secretary of Defense The Pentagon Washington, DC 20301-1000

Dear Secretary Gates,

I write to express my strong concern regarding reported efforts to withhold funding for the Multi-Platform Radar Technology Insertion Program (MP-RTIP). The Fiscal Year 2008 Supplemental Appropriations Conference report specified that more than \$85 million was to be devoted to continuing development of this critical technology. Halting this funding would jeopardize the survival of our nation's battlespace management radar industry and deny our military an important upgrade in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities.

I appreciate your stated intent to taper defense spending for projects that do not meet critical mission requirements and hold programs accountable for failing to meet cost and time milestones. The MP-RTIP, however, cannot be categorized as such a program. It has an impeccable record, documented by the Air Force, with no missed milestones to date and no additional deadlines identified outside normal two year research and development appropriations funding rules.

Not only is MP-RTIP's development on-time and on-budget, but it also satisfies an important military requirement called for by the most recent Quadrennial Defense Review, which emphasized the need to establish an "un-blinking" eye over the battlespace, "to integrate global awareness with local precision." MP-RTIP provides overall images of the battlespace like no other radar, ensuring our troops receive the most complete and accurate intelligence possible, from camouflaged insurgent camps and enemy vehicles to incoming cruise missiles.

The Quadrennial Defense Review called for a "robust missile warning capability," which is exactly what the MP-RTIP provides. Eliminating funding for this initiative will jeopardize our national defense and create a vulnerability for our enemies to exploit. In an age where rapidly advancing technology provides our enemies with more accessible means of waging attacks against our nation, it is imperative that we not neglect our basic cornerstones of defense.

Shutting down MP-RTIP will lead to the deterioration of our critical radar industrial base. Once the highly skilled MP-RTIP workforce is made idle, it may be impossible to reconstitute a workforce with the same level of knowledge, experience and technical expertise that is currently developing this technology today. The workers are the backbone of the industry and eliminating the funding for this technology will result in the loss of valuable skills and experience accumulated over the past several years.



As you know, with the support of Congress, the Department of Defense has invested more than \$1 billion to date on development of this advanced radar technology. Doing so has been considered vital to the success and protection of our troops. In past years my colleagues and I have been strongly supportive of your funding requests for the MP-RTIP program, and I am deeply concerned by the apparent lack of urgency within the Department to move forward. Due to this concern, I ask whether the Department of Defense will comply with the Conference Report in fully funding the MP-RTIP technology? I would appreciate any information you might provide on how our military will continue to meet the battlespace management requirements outlined in the most recent Quadrennial Defense Review.

If you have any questions regarding this or any other issue, please do not hesitate to contact myself or Lindsay George at (202) 224-1730. Thank you for your consideration.

Sincerely,

CHRISTOPHER J. DODD United States Senator

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510

May 5, 2009

The Honorable Robert Gates Secretary The Department of Defense 1000 Defense Pentagon Washington, DC 20310-1000

Dear Secretary Gates:

One of the greatest responsibilities entrusted to the Congress is to ensure the security of the American people by providing for a strong national defense. With that responsibility in mind, we question the analytical basis for the decision by the Department of Defense to terminate the procurement of the F-22 Raptor and C-17 Globemaster III. Accordingly, to ensure the military equipment requirements of the nation are identified through a complete and cogent process, we respectfully request you recommend to the President that production of the F-22 and the C-17 continue until the final publication of the next Mobility Capability Study and the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review.

As you well know, in order to maximize the probability of success in military operations the development and execution of strategies must be comprehensive and well thought out. However, recent history has shown major threats to our national security can arise suddenly and in unexpected regions of the world. Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait and the events of September I1, 2001 prove this hypothesis. In addition, the difficulty in determining when and where a threat may arise is also compounded by the uncertainty as to what tactics and strategies our enemies may employ. Accordingly, we fully support and encourage your initiative to re-establish counterinsurgency warfare as a fundamental and widespread capability in our nation's Armed Forces,

However, just as our nation made a strategic error in permitting our ability to successfully prosecute counterinsurgency compaigns to wither and atrophy after the Vietnam War, we must not make a similar mistake and undermine two of the unique foundations of our nation's military strength: hegemony of the air and our unprecedented airlift capability. As you correctly stated this January, "our military must be prepared for a 'full spectrum' of operations, including the type of combat we're facing in Iraq and Afghanistan as well as large scale threats that we face from places like North Korea and Iran." Therefore, we are concerned the termination of production of the F-22 does not appear to be supported by any analytical study commissioned by the Department of Defense or the Air Force. In addition, though the decision to end production of the C-17 was supported by the 2005 Mobility Capability Study, this Study was criticized by the Government Accountability Office for underestimating our nation's future airlift requirements. We are also unaware of any risk assessment that has been performed



The Honorable Robert Gates May 5, 2009 Page Two

based on the Combatant Commanders' requirements as to the decision to cease procurement of the F-22 and C-17.

Regarding the F-22, unclassified extracts of the Air Force's Sustaining Air Dominance Study state "180 F-22s was not enough" and the Department of Defense's TACAIR Optimization Study concluded the procurement of additional Raptors "was the best option." On April 16th, these conclusions were reinforced by the comments made by General Norton A. Schwartz after the F-22 procurement termination was announced. General Schwartz stated that "243 [Raptors] is the military requirement." This appears to conflict with earlier views expressed by the Department of Defense.

We have similar trepidations regarding the cessation of production of the C-17. In early 2002, even before the true scope and requirements of the Global War on Terrorism became known, the then commander of U.S. Transportation Command argued for the procurement of 222 Globemaster IIIs. Today, as the bulk of our deployed forces will be sent to the land-locked nation of Afghanistan, we are mindful of the critical need for airlist to supply our forces and our allies' operations in that nation. This point is emphasized by the recent Taliban attacks on our supply routes through the Kyber Pass region and NATO supply depots in Peshawar. Therefore, we are puzzled as to why C-17 production would be ended even though a new Mobility Capability Study was scheduled to be published next month.

Just as our recent military history points to the need to maintain a "full spectrum" military force to confront a myriad of very different threats, we are also mindful of a point recently made by Michael Korda in his book on the Battle of Britain. He observed that even though the two British Prime Ministers before Winston Churchill adopted a policy of appearement, they also committed their government to develop and procure the three pieces of equipment: the Spitfire fighter, Hurricane fighter and radar, which were to ensure that nation's survival during the Battle of Britain.

Accordingly, we respectfully request you recommend to the President that production of the F-22 Raptor and the C-17 Globemaster III continue until the final publication of the next Mobility Capabilities Study and the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review can be reviewed and studied.

Thank you for your consideration in this matter.

Sincerely,

Party Menan

Alex & ferries

The Honorable Robert Gates May 5, 2009 Page Three

Fley Saily Antolism

Muri Carbica

John Cornyn

DiVI

Jan Mr- Clarkes

Susan Collins

Sarpy Chambein

Anny por

alul W. Buris

QLASSI (1991 9. F. 2014), COMBINET CUIT A COMBINION

TRAUCHPESTY SCALIN DARCHA DAGE SELD SUBJECT ISL ARE GRAND ST. SCHLIGHT ISL AND SCOLE EVAN SATH DEPLACE EVAN SATH DEPLACE FURD ST. BELL SCHLIGHT ISL BAR FECO SERVAN, OHIO DES TOTAL SECONDANA FERRA DE SAND CHESTON ALBERT ST. ST. DE SCHLIGHT ST. ST. AND CHESTON WELLIGHT SELD DESCOL

HITTARD CHRIST ALMANA ROBERT ERNNET LINEY PREMED CHAPTER ON UNIX PREMED CHAPTER ON UNIX MET MARTINEZ FURITY COD CORKER ERHENNE MET MARTINEZ CHAPTER A BAND OF THE LUMBANA LINE CHARNES MERRASO (AN DARLEY LUMBANA CAN DARLEY LUMBANA

POWER SERVICE PROPERTY OF THE PROPERTY OF THE SERVICE WAS A SERVICE OF THE PROPERTY OF THE PRO

United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6075

February 3, 2010

The Honorable Robert M. Gates Secretary of Defense The Pentagon Washington, DC 20301-1000

Dear Secretary Gates,

As the Congress considers legislation to create a new Consumer Financial Protection Agency, it is important to weigh the potential impact that financial readiness problems have on those serving our nation in the Armed Services as well as their families. Many senior military officials have stated that financial readiness equates to military readiness and with our military currently fighting in two separate overseas contingency operations it is imperative that there be no greater priority than taking care of our troops and their well-being. One of the first steps to doing this is to identify those financial institutions which seek to take advantage of our troops and focus on establishing regulation and oversight of those services.

As you know, in recent correspondence with members of Congress, the Department of Defense has indicated that its young soldiers, sailors. Marines, and airmen are especially plagued by questionable and potentially abusive automobile sales and financing practices. This letter is to request that the Department of Defense identify in writing those financial protection issues which are of the most pressing concern to our military members and their families so that we can work together towards ending these unfortunate practices.

We would appreciate your expeditious attention on this critical matter as the Banking Committee is seeking to mark-up a bill of this nature towards the end of February.

Sincerely,

CHRISTOPHER J. DODD United States Senator

United States Senator

SECDEF DEPSECDEF SPLASST EXECSEC USDP A

USDI NSC COORD CCD CABLE CH EHE

OSD 01819-10

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-2003

March 9, 2010

The Honorable Robert M. Gates Secretary Department of Defense Washington, DC 20301

Dear Secretary Gates:

We are writing to emphasize our continued strong support for the U.S. Family Health Plan (USFHP), a highly successful TRICARE Prime program.

Originally authorized by Congress in 1981 (Pub. L. 97-99) USFHP has become an integral component of DOD's ability to meet its commitment to provide health care to those who serve our nation. USFHP currently provides care to more than 105,000 beneficiaries in 15 states. It enjoys by far the highest level of patient satisfaction in the Military Health System with over 90 percent of enrollees reporting high satisfaction, and it ranks among the highest nationally when compared with commercial managed care plans. DOD can be proud of the U.S. Family Health Plan program and its model - a stable model that effectively aligns the interests of all stakeholders and enables the beneficiaries to receive a level of care befitting their service to our country.

Congress highlighted USFHP as a potential model in this year's National Defense Authorization Act (Section 721, PL. 111-84), while directing DOD to examine opportunities to improve the broader TRICARE program. In addition, just this past year the Director of the TRICARE Management Activity engaged USFHP to assist in educating the rest of the DOD system about its highly successful prevention and disease management programs.

We are aware there have been discussions by DOD representatives in public meetings regarding the future of the US Family Health Plan. We are especially concerned about proposals that would adversely affect those members aged 65 and over while simply shifting costs to Medicare without saving the taxpayer money overall. We are also aware of the recent Medicare Eligible Retiree Health Care Fund (MERHCF) Report to Congress that includes recommendations to review elements of the program.

USFHP is a successful program held in high regard by its beneficiaries. We support this program and want to convey our concerns about any changes that would in any way negatively affect the ability of U.S. Family Health Plan to provide care to beneficiaries, including those aged 65 and over who have earned their health care benefits through their service to our nation.

Susan M. Collins
United States Senator

Barbara A. Mikulski United States Senator

OSD 03590-10

Mari Carbina

Maria Cantwell United States Senator Christopher Dodd United States Senator

ive \

hited States Senator

John Kerry

United States Senator

Patty Murray

United States Senator

Benjamin L. Cardin

United States Senator

Kirsten E. Lillibrand

Kirsten Gillibrand United States Senator CHRISTOPHER J. DODO

CAMATTEES: BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN AFTAIRE

FOREIGN RELATIONS

HEALTH, EDUCATION, LABOR. AND PENSIONS

PLICES AND ADMINISTRATION

United States Senate

Washington Office: Arb Russell Beater Crace Building Washington, DC 2051b 1207 728. 2825 TOC 12021 228. 5464

State office:
30 Lewis Street, Suite 191
Hartpord, CT 95703
1680) 286-6860
TDD (880) 828-7898

House Page: http://dock.comme.gov E-mall::http://dock.comme.gov

April 14, 2010

Ms. Elizabeth King
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs
U.S. Department of Defense
1300 Defense Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301

Dear Ms. King:

I enclose a copy of the correspondence I have just recently received from Mr. James Sonet, the Vice President of Electrified Discounters, Inc. of Hamden, Connecticut, Mr. Sonet, as you can see, has contacted my office about a payment that is due to his company from the Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) in Cleveland.

My constituent feels the DFAS currently owes \$12,921.30 for an August 8, 2008 invoice. Mr. Sonet also informs me he has had considerable problems with the WAWF payment system, but he is hoping the payment – now almost two years old – will be promptly sent to him in full.

So that I may respond to this inquiry to my office, I would greatly appreciate your looking into this matter for my constituent, and your advising if the Department of Defense can help in expediting its processing.

Thank you very much.

CDASTOPHER J. DODD

United States Senator

Enclosures

in reply: Connecticut Office

Attn: Mr. Ed Mann

OSD 64675-19

PRINTED ON MICHELES FAMER