

UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

15 March 2007

To: GHOLAM RUHANI

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF GHOLAM RUHANI

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee stated when the Taliban captured Kabul, Afghanistan, they conscripted many people. The detainee took a job with the Ministry of Intelligence in Kabul, and was part of a security detail responsible for patrolling the streets of a section of Kabul.

2. The detainee spent the four years before his capture working in the Operations Department of the Ministry of Intelligence in Kabul, Afghanistan for the Taliban. The detainee was in charge of crime scenes and small case investigations.

3. The detainee stated he was the Officer in Charge of the Operations Department in the Ministry of Intelligence. The detainee noted that the Operations Department had fifteen associates.

4. The detainee stated that a Director in the Ministry of Intelligence quickly promoted him. The detainee did not receive any formal training for his new position.

5. The detainee left Kabul, Afghanistan, on the last day that the Taliban still had control. The detainee was able to get a ride from a person who worked for the Minister of Interior Criminal Division. This person was traveling in a Toyota pick up truck with fourteen associates who were armed with two RPG-7's, twenty AK 47's and two PK machine guns.

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b. Connections/Associations

1. A source described the detainee as being the Deputy to the Director of the Counter Terrorism Operations and Terrorism Department of the Taliban Intelligence Service in Kabul, Afghanistan.
2. The detainee's sister is married to a Taliban intelligence officer.
3. The detainee stated he is very close with a senior leader in the Taliban intelligence service.
4. The detainee couriered a letter between the Taliban Chief of Intelligence and a Taliban Military Commander.
5. The detainee attended a meeting with a Military Commander, a senior Taliban intelligence member, two Americans, and the Americans' translator. Shortly after the meeting, the Taliban intelligence member and the detainee were arrested.

c. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee worked with thirteen to fourteen men. The detainee did not have an official title, wore ordinary civilian clothes, and carried a Russian made pistol.
 2. There was no specialized training given to civilian intelligence officers. It was assumed that officers already knew how to use pistols.
 3. The detainee was issued a concealed weapons permit and had the permit on his person at the time of his capture.
 4. The detainee believes he was arrested because he had a pistol on his hip.
4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a. The detainee denies any prior knowledge of the attacks on 11 September 2001 and claims to have no personal knowledge of al Qaida or its operatives.
 - b. The detainee had never heard of al Qaida until the Americans started bombing in Afghanistan. The detainee thinks Usama bin Laden brought war to Afghanistan.
 - c. The detainee claims to be no more than a simple shopkeeper who helped Americans.

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d. The detainee stated that his only wish was to return to Afghanistan and assist his father, who is sick, in operating the family appliance store in Kabul.

e. The detainee explained that when he identified the head of Taliban intelligence as his brother-in-law that it was a lie to shut up the interrogator.

f. The detainee explained that his work in the security office was simply to perform manual labor and drive different people in the office to their destinations.

g. The detainee denied any intelligence collecting activities during his work with the Taliban.

h. The detainee stated that he worked for the people, not the Taliban.

i. The detainee claims that his involvement with the Taliban should not be viewed as synonymous to the Taliban's ideology. It became a matter of political and survival necessity.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

14 August 2007

To: WASIQ, ABDUL HAQ

Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF WASIQ, ABDUL HAQ

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
 1. The detainee stated his duty as Deputy of Taliban Intelligence was to prevent unlawful acts such as robbery, corruption, and fraud from occurring in Kabul, Afghanistan.
 2. The detainee stated that was also responsible for the Logistics Department which purchased products like ovens, firewood, blankets, and window plastics for the Taliban.
 3. The detainee stated he and another deputy chief coordinated operations with three divisions. Each division had ten to twenty personnel. Division Four dealt with bribes and corruption. Division Seven dealt with fraud in real estate and licensing. The Security Division dealt with robberies, burglaries and other crimes.
 4. An individual stated the detainee was the Deputy Director of Civilian Intelligence and all intelligence offices in Kabul, Afghanistan reported to the detainee. The individual stated Civilian Intelligence was a quasi-police organization affiliated with Taliban internal affairs. The individual stated the detainee was in charge of the Kabul office when the head of Civilian Intelligence in Afghanistan was not in town.
 5. A source stated the detainee was the second most senior member of a thirteen to fourteen man Taliban security team in Kabul, Afghanistan. The source stated the main

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duties and responsibilities of the Taliban security team were to locate and arrest thieves, robbers and all individuals who broke Islamic law.

6. A source stated the detainee was an al Qaida intelligence member and the Taliban Deputy Minister of Intelligence.
7. An individual stated that when the detainee interrogated a pair of ethnic Chechen, the detainee learned of the pair's connection with Chechen Fundamentalists. Subsequent to the interrogation, the Taliban leader delivered a briefcase containing 100,000 United States Dollars to the Chechen for the purpose of supporting Chechen Fundamentalists fighting the Russians.
8. An individual stated that the detainee requested he head up a directorate within the Taliban Intelligence to watch Arab Islamists not affiliated with al Qaida. The individual also claimed Taliban Intelligence was watching the individual because it was believed that the extremists intended to harm Usama bin Laden.
9. An individual stated the detainee appointed an individual who was chief in Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) as an Intelligence Officer during the Taliban's reign. As of August 2005, the individual reported United States and Coalition Forces' operations to Taliban groups in an effort to facilitate their escape.
10. The Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin was a major Mujahedin group in the war against the Soviets. The group has long established ties with Usama bin Laden and the group's founder offered to shelter bin Laden after bin Laden fled Sudan in 1996. The group staged small attacks in its attempt to force United States troops to withdraw from Afghanistan, overthrow the Afghan Transitional Administration and establish a fundamentalist state.

b. Connections/Associations

1. A source stated the detainee arranged for an Egyptian al Qaida member to come to Kabul, Afghanistan, to teach personnel in the Taliban Intelligence Service about intelligence
2. The detainee's name was found in a notebook seized an Afghan suspected of arms dealing and having ties with the Taliban. The Afghan stated the detainee left the notebook and other papers with him for safekeeping.

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c. Other Relevant Data

According to the detainee's comments to subordinate commanders, in mid-September 2001, many al Qaida Arabs who were based in Kabul, Afghanistan, were being transferred in response to the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States. Most of the al Qaida Arabs were in the process of transferring to new bases in northern Afghanistan.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

- a. The detainee stated he met a Mujahedin who said the Americans wanted help in locating an individual, Mullah Omar. The detainee stated he contacted the Americans and agreed to help them. The detainee stated that later, he went to meet the Americans and was arrested.
- b. A number of senior Taliban identified an individual, Mullah Mohammad Omar, as the former Taliban Supreme Leader.
- c. The detainee stated he feels he was betrayed by the United States when he was captured. The detainee stated the mission was for him to locate an individual and call the Americans so they could kill or capture the individual. The detainee stated if the Americans had not arrested him, then they might have captured the individual and the detainee's supervisor, the head of Taliban Intelligence.
- d. The detainee stated he was unaware of al Qaida training in Kabul, Afghanistan, because he did not work with al Qaida.
- e. The detainee stated he had not met or worked with anyone in al Qaida and did not have contact with any other radical Islamic groups. The detainee denied having had any involvement with the Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin movement in Afghanistan. The detainee stated he considered al Qaida to be a group of outsiders since it is an Arabic group.
- f. The detainee stated if he was repatriated he did not want to get involved with government work again because working for the government is what landed him in his current situation.
- g. The detainee stated he joined the Taliban under duress because he feared retaliation by the Taliban if he did not join.
- h. The detainee contradicted that the communication's equipment captured with an individual belonged to the detainee.

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5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

27 January 2007

To: NORI, MULLAH NORULLAH A

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF NOORI, MULLAH NORULLAH

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. In September 1995 the detainee fought alongside al Qaida as a Taliban military general, against the Northern Alliance. The detainee was responsible for the line near Murghab, Afghanistan in the vicinity of Herat, Afghanistan.

2. The detainee claimed he joined the Taliban in 1999. He worked for the governor of Jalalabad, Afghanistan until December 1999. In February 2000 the detainee arrived in Mazar-e-Sharif, Afghanistan.

3. The detainee began working for the Taliban government as one of eight assistants to the Governor of Mazar-e-Sharif, Afghanistan.

4. The detainee eventually became the governor of the Balkh Province, Afghanistan as he was one of a very few tribal members who could read and write. The detainee held this position for about eight to ten months. The detainee received the title of Mullah due to his education and political position.

5. The detainee was fighting on the front lines at Mazar-e-Sharif, Afghanistan as a Taliban fighter. As the front lines in Mazar-e-Sharif, Afghanistan fell the detainee moved with a majority of the remaining fighters to Kunduz, Afghanistan to reestablish the front lines.

6. While traveling from Mazar-e-Sharif, Afghanistan to Zabol Province, Afghanistan, the detainee agreed to negotiate with Dotsum's forces regarding surrender of Taliban forces.

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b. Training

The detainee's job required him to stand guard duty, armed with a Kalashnikov, at buildings. The detainee denied ever receiving any training for this position. The detainee stated that he never learned how to take the weapon apart, but he knew how to use it.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee was identified as the Taliban leader in charge of Mazar Bal, Afghanistan.
2. The detainee's name appears on a list of key Taliban personalities.
3. The detainee is a close associate of a high-ranking Taliban leader.
4. The detainee hosted al Qaida commanders.
5. The detainee held a meeting with the head of the Islamic movement of Uzbekistan, who discussed jihad in Uzbekistan.
6. While serving as the governor of Balkh province in Mazar-e Sharif, Afghanistan the detainee met a subordinate of Usama bin Laden to pass a message from the Taliban supreme leader.

d. Intent

1. As of late July 2003, Taliban leaders close to the detainee were leading efforts in Zabol province, Afghanistan to destabilize the Afghan transitional administration.
2. As of early November 2003, while he was the Taliban zone chief, the detainee provided assistance to a friend who was using profits from the sale of narcotics to provide material support to the Taliban and al Qaida. The detainee had given him money and provided him with a money exchange shop.
3. A group of individuals, including a Taliban member, continue to work to support the detainee.

e. Other Relevant Data

The detainee was in charge of about 150 combat troops and one helicopter.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

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a. The detainee does not consider himself an enemy of the United States. The detainee has never believed that the United States is an enemy of Afghanistan. The detainee reiterated that he never fought with or shot a gun at anyone.

b. The detainee advised that he did not know much about Usama bin Laden and had only heard of him on the radio. The detainee has never seen Usama bin Laden.

c. The detainee said that he is not against the United States in any way. If the detainee were allowed to return home, he would attempt to obtain a position in the new government with the hope of being able to provide for his family. The detainee would hold nothing against the United States and would not give support to anyone who was against the United States.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

31 October 2007

To: FAZL, MOHAMMAD A

Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF FAZL, MOHAMMAD A

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
 1. The detainee was born in 1967 in Charcheeno, Afghanistan. The detainee has no higher level education. He attended a mosque in Afghanistan as a child. He received his religious education in Kohata. When the Russians invaded Afghanistan, he and his family moved to Pakistan where he continued his religious studies for 5 to 6 years.
 2. While the detainee and his family were in Pakistan following the Russian invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, his father and older brother stayed behind in Charcheeno, Afghanistan to farm. The family had very little land and was unable to turn a significant profit for sustenance.
 3. The detainee studied in a Madrasa in Quetta, Pakistan. After six years studying in Pakistan, the detainee returned to Afghanistan where he joined the Taliban at the request of the principal and director of the Madrasa.
 4. The detainee traveled to Kandahar, Afghanistan and met two men who were both Taliban and assigned the detainee to his first post as a Taliban soldier in Kandahar, Afghanistan.

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5. The detainee stated he is a member of the Taliban responsible for deployment of military troops to specific front line locations in the Takhar province of Afghanistan. The detainee estimated approximately 3000 troops were assigned to front lines while he held this position during the initial fighting in October 2001.
6. The detainee negotiated the surrender of the Northern Taliban Forces concentrated in Konduz, Afghanistan to opposition force commanders on 28 November 2001.
7. The detainee stated that he held the position of Taliban Army Chief of Staff and surrendered to the Northern Alliance believing that he and his 3000-5000 Taliban troops would be allowed to go home after turning over their weapons.

b. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee stated his direct commanders were the Taliban Defense Minister and a person who was responsible for foreign troop deployment.
2. Information indicates that the military commander of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) is the person the detainee stated was responsible for foreign troop deployment. According to the information, the bulk of funding for IMU comes directly from Usama bin Laden.
3. Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) is designated as a terrorist organization with state support, which has demonstrated both intention and capability to attack U.S. persons or interests.
4. The detainee was identified as a Taliban Army Chief who worked for the Supreme Taliban Commander along with other Taliban Army Commanders.
5. According to a source, a former Taliban supreme leader considered the detainee his top soldier. In the war against the Northern alliance, the detainee was responsible for widespread atrocities against noncombatants.
6. A source stated that at its peak, a specific Taliban army division was composed of 1,100 foreign fighters. This division received all their funding and logistical support from the Taliban Ministry of Defense. The division received its orders from the detainee, who was a senior Taliban commander, and the Taliban Minister of Defense.
7. A source stated the detainee was second in command of the Taliban military until the death of the Chief of Staff by aerial bombardment at which point the detainee

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became the commander of all the Taliban Army. Additionally, the source stated the detainee continues to spread anti-United States messages throughout the camp.

c. Other Relevant Data

The Taliban Supreme leader at the time concurred with a plan proposed by the detainee to send an assassination team to try and kill anti-Taliban Commander. The detainee then recruited 15 individuals and gave each instruction to insinuate himself into close proximity of anti-Taliban Commander and, when the opportunity presented itself, to assassinate him.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

- a. The detainee denied having any prior knowledge of the attacks in the U.S. prior to their execution on September 11, 2001 and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the U.S. or U.S. interests.
- b. The detainee claimed he never met Usama bin Laden or any of the al Qaida leadership or members.
- c. The detainee claimed that the attacks on the United States were not part of the jihad he was fighting, and if he were released, he would not want to go back to Afghanistan. Instead, the detainee would want to go to Saudi Arabia to raise his family. He did not want to be part of any more fighting.
- d. The detainee denied he served in any senior position, to include Chief of Staff, with the Taliban. The detainee claimed he was a commander of 50-100 Taliban troops, after the detainee surrendered the detainee was in charge of 2500-3000 Taliban soldiers.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

14 February 2007

To: ABDHULLAH, MULLAH Y

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ABDHULLAH, MULLAH Y

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee advised that he was called to fight jihad in approximately 1997. The detainee then went to Kabul, Afghanistan to join the Taliban.

2. The detainee stated he felt it would be fine to wage jihad against Americans, Jews or Israelis if they were invading his country.

3. Prior to the detainee's stay in Kabul, Afghanistan, he stayed at the Kuli Urdu Garrison in Kandahar, Afghanistan for ten nights waiting for transportation to Konduz, Afghanistan.

4. The Taliban garrison in Kandahar, Afghanistan, also known as Kuli Urdu, was the primary Taliban Military Garrison located in the center of Kandahar near the main bazaar.

5. The detainee stated he was conscripted into the Taliban in 1995. Approximately one month after the detainee's conscription, he was injured in a bombing campaign by the Northern Alliance in Kabul, Afghanistan. The detainee spent the next eight to nine months under medical care in the Chinese hospital located in Kandahar, Afghanistan.

6. The detainee stated after his release from the hospital in Kandahar, Afghanistan, he was released from his conscription obligation and sent home. During 1998-1999, the detainee began having medical problems stemming from his injury. The detainee rejoined the Taliban to gain better medical attention.

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7. The detainee stated that in approximately September 2001, he went to Konduz, Afghanistan to join up with his Taliban comrades to fight the Northern Alliance. There were approximately 5,000 Taliban fighters in the city at that time, all armed with AK-47s. The detainee recalled seeing Arabs at the city with them. The detainee equates Arabs with al Qaida.

b. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee stated he traveled with a Taliban commander and two Taliban soldiers in the first car of a convoy of Taliban fighters that surrendered to General Dostum and the Northern Alliance in December 2001.

2. The detainee explained he worked directly for the Taliban commander listed above. The detainee did not say what specifically that entailed, but did admit to duties such as driver, bodyguard and foot soldier.

3. The detainee identified two other Taliban commanders under whom he served.

c. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee was given a Kalashnikov rifle by the Taliban.

2. The detainee knew Americans were bombing Afghanistan when he went to Konduz, Afghanistan to fight the Northern Alliance.

3. The detainee was captured with two Casio watches of the model that has been used in bombings that have been linked to al Qaida and radical Islamic terrorist improvised explosive devices.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee was conscripted into the Taliban in 1995.

b. The detainee rejoined the Taliban in 1998-1999 to gain better medical attention.

c. The detainee had not heard of al Qaida or Usama bin Laden until after his capture.

d. The detainee looked at pictures of the Casio watches that were in his possession at the time of his capture. The detainee stated that the two watches were not his but belonged to the man with whom he was captured. The detainee stated that the man told the detainee to carry the man's things since the man had no pockets in his clothing.

e. The detainee stated he never attended any training camps and received only familiarization training with the Kalashnikov rifle.

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- f. The detainee denied any desire to confront United States troops.
 - g. The detainee stated he was not a commander.
5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

17 September 2007

To: GHAZI, FAHED ABDULLAH AHMAD

Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF GHAZI, FAHED ABDULLAH AHMAD

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
 1. During interviews conducted in 2002, the detainee stated he wanted to complete a Dawa in Afghanistan before enrolling in a university. The detainee stated he wanted to teach children Arabic and how to properly read the Koran. The detainee stated he flew from Sanaa, Yemen through Dubai, United Arab Emirates, to Karachi, Pakistan then drove to Spin Buldak, Afghanistan.
 2. The detainee stated he heard or read about a fatwa issued by Sheikh Muqbil al Wadi that stated Muslims had a right to train themselves for self defense against enemies. The detainee stated he visited al Wadi during the summer of 2000 for advice concerning the fatwa. The detainee stated the Sheikh advised him to go for training in Afghanistan.
 3. Sheikh Muqbil al Wadia was responsible for the Jihadist movement in the Sadah, Yemen region. The Jihadist movement recognized Usama bin Laden as their leader.
 4. The detainee stated Sheikh Muqbil al Wadi gave the detainee the equivalent of 500 United States Dollars and instructed the detainee to go to the Jamat-al-Tabligh mosque in Sanaa, Yemen where he could obtain a visa and plane ticket

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to Pakistan.

5. Jamat-al-Tabligh is a Pakistan based Islamic missionary organization used as a cover to mask travel and activities of terrorists, including members of al Qaida.
6. The detainee stated al Wadi told him to wait until he graduated secondary school to make travel arrangements to Afghanistan. The detainee stated he waited one year, then went back to the Jamat-al-Tabligh mosque, where he received a visa and a ticket to Pakistan. The detainee stated he flew from Sanaa, Yemen to Karachi, Pakistan via Dubai, United Arab Emirates. He arrived in Karachi, Pakistan on approximately 20 August 2001.
7. The detainee stated he traveled to Quetta, Pakistan and then Kandahar, Afghanistan where he stayed at the al Nabras guest house for four days. The detainee stated his passport and money were taken, and he was instructed not to inquire about names or where people were from.
8. An individual stated that Arabs bound for training at al Farouq would gather at Nabras until about 25 to 30 were in the group. Usama bin Laden would come to Nabras to greet the fighters before they went to training.
9. The detainee stated that after leaving al Farouq he was taken to Kabul, Afghanistan and stayed at the Azzam guesthouse for approximately one month.
10. A source stated the Azzam guesthouse was run by one of Usama bin Laden's most trusted people who reported directly to Usama bin Laden.
11. The detainee stated his group fled to an area near Jalalabad, Afghanistan. He stated the group left this area after one month because of advancing Northern Alliance forces. The detainee stated the group fled towards the Tora Bora region of Afghanistan. He stated most of his group was killed by United States bombing about one month later. The detainee stated he fled toward Pakistan, meeting up with several other small groups along the way. The detainee stated he surrendered to Pakistani forces upon reaching the border.

b. Training

1. The detainee stated he arrived at al Farouq training camp on 1 September 2001. The detainee stated he received training in small arms, including the AK-47 and several types of pistols. The detainee stated his training was cut short by the events of 11 September 2001. The detainee stated he left the camp with five others and a trainer on 12 September 2001.

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Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF GHAZI, FAHED ABDULLAH AHMAD

2. A source stated he trained with the detainee at al Farouq around April 2001. The source stated the detainee was trained on how to shoot the Kalashnikov, explosives, the PK machine gun and the rocket propelled grenade.
3. An individual stated the al Farouq training camp in Afghanistan was funded by al Qaida and was more advanced than other training camps in Afghanistan. The training at al Farouq consists of two week periods of weapons training, a basic commando course, topography, and explosives.
4. A source stated the detainee received additional military training while in Tora Bora, since the group he traveled with had a number of instructors. The source described the detainee as a typical fighter who carried an AK-47 and wore a military style vest.

c. Connections/Associations

1. A source stated he and the detainee saw Usama bin Laden on three separate occasions. The first time was at the Nabras guesthouse in Kandahar, Afghanistan, then at al Farouq, and finally in Tora Bora, Afghanistan, shortly before bin Laden fled the region.
2. The individual stated the detainee's group in Tora Bora consisted mostly of Usama bin Laden's bodyguards.
3. A source stated the detainee was chosen to go to Tora Bora, Afghanistan to be one of Usama bin Laden's bodyguards at the end of April 2001.
4. An individual stated he and the detainee fought together in Tora Bora, Afghanistan. According to the individual, after Usama bin Laden left Tora Bora, the detainee joined a group of thirty individuals who attempted to cross the Pakistan border. Several of these individuals are thought to have been bodyguards for Usama bin Laden.
5. The detainee was captured with a type of watch used in bombings that have been linked to al Qaida and radical Islamic terrorist improvised explosive devices.
6. A source stated he stayed at the Nabras guest house with the detainee in approximately May 2001. The source stated this was a private guest house of Usama bin Laden.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

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- a. The detainee stated he had not performed any military service or received any type of weapons training. The detainee also stated he was not recruited by anyone to go to Afghanistan. The detainee stated during the time he traveled in Yemen, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, he had not heard anyone speak about recruiters for fighting in Afghanistan against the enemies of Islam. The detainee stated he believed there is not currently a jihad.
- b. The detainee originally stated he had heard of Muqbal al Wadiee, but had never spoken to him.
- c. The detainee recanted his original story regarding why he went to Afghanistan. The detainee stated the reason that he had initially lied regarding his travel and subsequent training was because other captives had told the detainee he would be tried and killed if the Americans heard that information.
- d. The detainee stated he was given a questionnaire upon arrival at al Farouq that provided information about the Taliban. He stated he was given the option to join, however he declined.
- e. The detainee stated he would not answer any future calls to jihad and said he has seen enough trouble already. He stated he does not view the United States as his enemy.
- f. The detainee stated he wanted to receive training on the AK-47 and other small arms so that he might defend his home and family from enemies, thieves, and other individuals with hostile intentions. The detainee stated this was his sole reason for traveling to Afghanistan. The detainee denied traveling to Afghanistan for the purpose of participating in combat operations.
- g. The detainee stated he never asked Sheikh Muqbil al Wadi for money. The detainee stated al Wadi never requested the detainee teach the Koran, engage in missionary work, or perform any other service in return for accepting the money.
- h. The detainee stated none of the members in the group he was traveling with carried any types of weapons, including the al Farouq trainer accompanying them. The detainee stated he never wanted a weapon, even for self-protection. The detainee stated he had no desire to fight anyone.
- i. After viewing a video of 11 September 2001, the detainee asked for Allah's mercy on those who died that day. The detainee stated that Usama bin Laden did not have justification for the attacks.
- j. The detainee stated he was not involved with al Qaida or the Taliban. He stated Usama bin Laden is a terrorist and does not represent the true ideology of Islam. The

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detainee stated he was not one of Usama bin Laden's bodyguards.

- k. The detainee stated that if he is released he wants to go home to Yemen and continue his education, get married, and raise a family.
- l. The detainee stated he wasn't sure who operated the al Nabras guest house, but denied that it was controlled by the Taliban or al Qaida.
- m. A source identified several individuals as bodyguards of Usama bin Laden, however, did not identify the detainee as one of Usama bin Laden's bodyguards.
- n. A bodyguard for Usama bin Laden identified several individuals as Usama bin Laden bodyguards, but did not recognize the detainee.
- o. The detainee stated he purchased the Casio watch from a street vender in Yemen.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

14 November 2007

TO: AL RAHIM, UTHMAN H

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL RAHIM, UTHMAN H

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a) Commitment
 - 1) The detainee stated he attended a religious school in Yemen. The detainee stated after three years he had to do what he called a mission or it would be considered a sin. The detainee stated he decided to go to Afghanistan in order to teach the people there the right ways of Islam and that nobody in particular influenced him to go to Afghanistan.
 - 2) The detainee stated he was told to go to Afghanistan by Sheikh Muqbil al Wadi.
 - 3) The detainee stated he located Sheikh Muqbil al Wadi and asked if the fatwa calling for jihad was legitimate. The detainee stated Sheikh Muqbil al Wadi confirmed the legitimacy of the fatwa and gave the detainee 1,000 United States Dollars as funding for his trip.
 - 4) Sheikh Muqbil al Wadi was responsible for the Sa'dah region of the Yemeni Jihadist movement, a group that unanimously agreed upon Usama bin Laden as their leader.
 - 5) The detainee also stated he was encouraged to go to Afghanistan by a different Sheikh, who also gave the detainee 1,000 United States Dollars to travel.
 - 6) The detainee stated in March 2001, he decided to leave for Afghanistan. The detainee flew to Dubai, United Arab Emirates, and after a short layover continued on to Karachi,

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Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL RAHIM, UTHMAN H

- Pakistan. The detainee stated that the money for the trip was given to him by his oldest brother.
- 7) The detainee stated he traveled to Quetta, Pakistan, where he contacted representatives of the Taliban and made final arrangements to go to Afghanistan.
 - 8) The detainee stated he traveled by bus from Karachi, Pakistan to Quetta, Pakistan. Once there the detainee asked various people to direct him to the Taliban house. The detainee stated an Afghan Taliban met him at the house and made arrangements for him to travel to Kandahar, Afghanistan.
 - 9) The detainee stated he departed for Afghanistan by vehicle. The detainee stated he had in his possession a visa, but the Pakistani border guards just waved them across. In Buldak, Afghanistan the driver of the vehicle departed and the detainee continued on in a small van. The detainee stated upon arriving in Kandahar, Afghanistan, he went to a university named Madresa Hakani and stayed at the school for about five days.
 - 10) The detainee stated he met a Pakistani at the mosque and discussed his travel plans. The Pakistani was a student of Sheikh Muqbil al Wadi.
 - 11) The Pakistani in the previous statement was identified as one of Usama bin Laden's bodyguards.
 - 12) The detainee stated the brother of Pakistani in the previous statements stole the detainee's passport while they stayed in the Pakistani's home village.
 - 13) The detainee stated he met up with a group of 31 other Arabs who were guided by three Afghan males. The group traveled by foot arriving in Parchinar, Pakistan, after eight days. The detainee stated he no longer had his passport or any money by this time.
 - 14) The al Qaida operative who designed an escape route for al Qaida Arabs to flee Afghanistan to Pakistan did not allow any Arabs to travel via this route carrying documentation, promising them he would send their documents later.
 - 15) The detainee was identified as being at a Kabul, Afghanistan guest house in early 2001. The source believes that the detainee was fighting on the front lines.
 - 16) The detainee stated he was picked up by Pakistani police while crossing the border with thirty Arabs and taken to a prison in Peshawar, Pakistan.
 - 17) A source, who was traveling in a group of thirty individuals who were arrested crossing the Pakistani border, stated the warden of the Pakistani prison informed the group that the

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best thing they could tell United States Forces when interrogated was they were in Afghanistan to teach the Koran and for a Dawa.

18) The detainee was identified as traveling with three individuals while fleeing Afghanistan and when they were asked what they were doing in Afghanistan, they each stated they were there to teach the Koran. It was later identified that these stories, including the detainee's, were false.

b) Training

- 1) The detainee was identified as being al Qaida. The detainee was identified as being in Kabul, Afghanistan in 1999, at the al Farouq camp and later in Tora Bora, Afghanistan on the front lines fighting against the Northern Alliance.
- 2) A source stated Al Farouq is a training camp that trains in small arms, physical training, map reading, topography, and explosive devices. Additional training was given on how to locate mines by probing with the bayonet of an AK-47 and how to defuse the mines.
- 3) The detainee's name was found on a document dated March 2001 recovered by United States Forces from an al Qaida house in Kandahar, Afghanistan. The document contained a list of over 150 al Qaida members scheduled for training in tactics, artillery, security, snipers and anti-aircraft training. The detainee was scheduled to attend a tactics class on 25 March 2001.

c) Connections/Associations

- 1) A source identified the detainee as being a Usama bin Laden bodyguard. The source stated the detainee became a bodyguard for bin Laden a couple of months prior to the September 11, 2001 attacks.
- 2) The detainee was identified as being a bodyguard for Usama bin Laden and was seen eating with Usama bin Laden.
- 3) A senior al Qaida operative stated the detainee was a bodyguard in Kandahar, Afghanistan before the 11 September 2001 attacks. This senior al Qaida operative stated the last time he saw the detainee was during the bombing of Tora Bora, Afghanistan in late 2001.
- 4) The detainee was identified as fighting in Tora Bora, Afghanistan, and being Mujahedin for a long time. The detainee was identified as being at a guest house in Kandahar, Afghanistan, at Usama bin Laden's house in Kandahar, and attending advanced training at Tarnak Farms. The detainee was identified as being part of the group of thirty which

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was caught attempting to cross the border into Pakistan. Several of these individuals are thought to have been bodyguards for Usama bin Laden.

- 5) The detainee was identified as being an al Qaida member believed to have been in Afghanistan.
 - 6) The detainee recognized photos of four U.S.S. Cole suspects. Two of the suspects stated that they also knew the detainee well.
 - 7) The detainee stated his sister is married to the cousin of an individual suspected of being involved in the U.S.S. Cole bombing. The detainee stated he and the individual had a pretty close relationship.
 - 8) A source stated the detainee may have been a lower Emir in the Kandahar, Afghanistan guest house.
 - 9) The detainee's name was in a file containing a list of names and associated safety deposit boxes saved to a floppy disk recovered from raids of a suspected al Qaida safe house.
 - 10) The detainee was identified as being on the front lines in Kabul, Afghanistan around 1999.
- d) Other Relevant Data

The detainee stated he was unable to provide the names of any students whom he taught in Khowst, Afghanistan or the name of the village in which he taught for nine months.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a) The detainee stated he did not go to Afghanistan to fight, but to teach the Koran.
 - b) The detainee stated he has never received any kind of training except in the areas of religion and soccer. All of his training occurred in Yemen.
 - c) The detainee denied having a weapon during the foot march to Karachi, Pakistan.
 - d) The detainee denies knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests
 - e) The detainee denied membership in or being affiliated in any way with either the Taliban or al Qaida.

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f) The detainee stated he does not know why others would provide information indicating that he was associated with al Qaida and was a body guard for Usama bin Laden. The detainee opined these people were either mistaken or lying and conspiring against him.

g) The detainee denied being captured, but stated that he and the other members of his group turned themselves in to the Pakistani Police Force in Parchinar, Pakistan.

h) The detainee stated that he spoke to the U.S.S. Cole bombing suspect he was personally close with five to six days before the detainee left for Afghanistan, but that they did not discuss the Cole bombing.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

10 October 2007

To: AL ALAWI, MU'AZHAMZA A

Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL ALAWI, MU'AZHAMZA A

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
 1. The detainee stated that he traveled to Afghanistan in June 2001 due to a fatwa issued by a Sheikh.
 2. The Sheikh in the previous bullet was responsible for the jihadist movement in Yemen. The jihadist movement recognized Usama bin Laden as their leader.
 3. The detainee stated he traveled throughout the neighboring villages surrounding the city of Khowst, Afghanistan for six months, teaching poor and disadvantaged Muslims the Koran, and correcting their perceived errors in the faith and practice of rituals.
 4. After his original statement regarding his travel to Afghanistan, the detainee stated that he was ready to make a complete statement about his actions in Afghanistan. He stated that he lived in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia when he decided to go join the Taliban and fight the Northern Alliance.
 5. The detainee stated that he and his cousin decided to travel to Afghanistan to seek martyrdom fighting for their faith.

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6. The detainee claimed that he went to Yemen to make arrangements and flew from Sanaa, Yemen to Karachi, Pakistan. The detainee then traveled to Quetta, Pakistan, where he stayed for three days in a Taliban guest house. From there, Taliban fighters then took him across the border into Afghanistan. The detainee gave his passport to a guest house operator for safe keeping.
7. The detainee stated that he was issued a Kalashnikov rifle, four magazines and two grenades at the Khalid Center and then transported to Omar Saif Center. At Omar Saif Center, he was assigned to a middle line position. He stayed there five to six months.
8. A source observed the detainee fighting for the overall military leader in the Tora Bora mountains.
9. A source identified that the detainee was a Mujahed for a long time, and stated that the detainee acted as Imam at a Kandahar, Afghanistan guest house. He held this position because he had memorized the Koran and knew it better than others at the guest house.
10. A source identified the detainee by name and stated the detainee was a leader of a guest house in Kandahar, Afghanistan.

b. Training

1. The detainee stated he learned to use the AK-47 when he was 8 or 9 and claims to be a good marksman.
2. The detainee claimed that he was driven in a Taliban vehicle to Khalid Center, near Bagram, Afghanistan. There he received several hours training in the operation and firing of rocket-propelled grenades, RPG. He fired one RPG during the training. He declined training on the Kalashnikov rifle, as he was already familiar from previous experience in Yemen.
3. A source stated that he attended basic training with the detainee at the al Farouq training camp.
4. The al Farouq Training Camp was funded by al Qaida and therefore was more advanced than the other camps in Afghanistan. The training at al Farouq consists of two week periods of weapons training, basic commando course, topography, and explosives.

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5. A Senior al Qaida operative, stated that the detainee had participated in the hand-to-hand combat training at Mes Aynak.
6. A source stated that basic trainees at the Aynak Training Camp, south of Kabul, Afghanistan, received weapons training on Kalashnikov rifles, PK Machine guns, Rocket Propelled Grenades, and Hand grenades. The trainees were taught how to perform maintenance on each weapon.
7. A source stated the detainee attended basic training at the Khalden Training Camp.
8. Khalden's program was a complete course about weapons. An entire six-month program at Khalden consisted of light weapons, heavy weapons, explosives, topography, and a tactical course.

c. Connections/Associations

1. Indications are that the detainee was a member of Usama bin Laden's security detail and the detainee was in Afghanistan for jihad and training.
2. A source claimed that the detainee was a bodyguard for Usama bin Laden, and stated that he personally saw the detainee with Usama bin Laden approximately one month before Ramadan.
3. An al Qaida operative stated that he met the detainee in 1998, in a small training camp in Khowst, Afghanistan, and also stated that the detainee was one of Usama bin Laden's bodyguards.
4. A source observed the detainee standing watch at the entry gate to the Usama bin Laden compound at the Kandahar, Afghanistan airport.
5. The detainee was possibly at the Khaldan Camp in 1999, and knew a senior al Qaida lieutenant well enough to exchange greetings in 2000 and 2001.
6. The detainee claimed that he contacted his uncle, who thereafter contacted an individual to assist the detainee with his travels to Afghanistan.
7. The individual that assisted with the detainee's travels to Afghanistan was the head of the Islah Party and was a major shareholder in Sabaa Bank. The Sabaa bank was the main bank for channeling funds to Islamic Terrorists.

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8. The detainee's name was listed in a document identifying al Qaida Mujahedin and the contents of their trust accounts recovered during raids against al Qaida associated safe houses in Pakistan.
- d. Other Relevant Data
1. A source stated three individuals accompanied Usama bin Laden when he left Tora Bora, Afghanistan and thirty others departed the area afterwards headed for Pakistan. The detainee was among these thirty individuals and was arrested crossing the Pakistan border on 15 December 2001.
 2. A source identified the detainee as a Mujahedin who was captured at Tora Bora, Afghanistan.
4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a. The detainee denied any affiliation with al Qaida and indicated he never saw or was in the presence of Usama bin Laden or any other high ranking al Qaida personnel.
 - b. The detainee denied having any previous knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on September 11th and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States' Interests.
 - c. The detainee denied he served as a body guard for Usama bin Laden.
 - d. The detainee claims never to have been a member of the Taliban, nor fought against the Northern Alliance's forces.
5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

03 November 2007

To: AL ANSI, MOHAMMED A

Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL ANSI, MOHAMMED A

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
 1. The detainee stated he decided to go to Afghanistan to assist in Koranic education of Afghans after hearing a local Imam's sermon. The detainee stated he made arrangements with two other individuals to fly to Pakistan then make their way to Afghanistan to teach Islam.
 2. The Imam in the previous statement expressed support for Usama bin Laden and jihad. He was known to deliver personal, verbal fatwas to those desiring to fight in the jihad.
 3. The detainee stated that he received about 35,000 Yemeni Ryals from the Imam in the previous statements and took a bus from Sanaa, Yemen to Dubai, United Arab Emirates with two other acquaintances. The detainee stated he and the two other men then flew to Karachi, Pakistan.
 4. A source stated he personally facilitated the detainee's travel from Yemen through Karachi, Pakistan to Afghanistan in late 1999. The source fought in Bosnia and traveled to jihads in East Africa and Southeast Asia. The source was an important facilitator responsible for moving money and fighters to and from Afghanistan.

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Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL ANSI, MOHAMMED A

5. The detainee stated he traveled via Yemenia Airlines from Sanaa, Yemen to Dubai, United Arab Emirates, then to Karachi, Pakistan. The detainee then flew to Quetta, Pakistan, where the detainee went to the Taliban office to join up with the Taliban. After two and a half days in Quetta, the detainee headed to Khowst Province, Afghanistan.
6. The detainee stated he and his friends met with the Imam of Khowst, Afghanistan, who collected their passports and sent them to a village to instruct the local population in reading the Koran. The detainee stated he desired to return to Yemen after approximately eight months. The detainee stated he returned to Khowst, Afghanistan to retrieve his passport and visa, but the Imam was away. After waiting several days, the detainee hired a guide and headed for the Pakistani border without his documents.
7. A source stated the warden in a prison in Pakistan told jihadists to say they were in Afghanistan to teach the Koran or for religious studies. The source was captured among thirty individuals thought to be Usama bin Laden bodyguards crossing into Pakistan.
8. A source was taken into custody when he crossed the Pakistan border with twenty-nine to thirty-one individuals including the detainee. When members of the group were asked what they were doing in Afghanistan they replied they were there to teach the Koran. The source stated that his cover story of going to Afghanistan to teach the Koran was false and he believed the other stories were false as well.
9. Individuals who attended the close combat course at Mes Aynak training camp were identified as not having to swear bayyat to Usama bin Laden or al Qaida. If an individual was going on an operation, that individual was identified as swearing his willingness to be killed for Allah. The detainee was identified as swearing bayyat.
10. The detainee was identified as one of the Martyrs who had been readied for the Southeast Asia part of the 11 September 2001 operation. Usama bin Laden was identified as targeting United States' airlines, citizens, and military installations in Seoul, South Korea and Singapore.

b. Training

1. The detainee was identified as participating in an elite training course at Mes Aynak Camp.

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2. The detainee was identified as being trained by the instructor at Mes Aynak who trained Usama bin Laden's bodyguards.
3. A source stated basic trainees at the Mes Aynak training camp received weapons training on Kalashnikov rifles, PK machine guns, rocket propelled grenades, and hand grenades.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee was identified as being a guard for Usama bin Laden. The detainee was identified as being at a guest house where Usama bin Laden was staying in 2001.
2. The detainee was identified as being on the front lines in Kabul, Afghanistan during the fighting against the Northern Alliance. The detainee was identified as receiving training at a camp called Aynak and the detainee was a bodyguard for Usama bin Laden.
3. A source stated the detainee became a bodyguard for Usama bin Laden in late 1999 or early 2000 and remained in that position for approximately one year.
4. A source stated he saw the detainee guarding Usama bin Laden at the Kandahar, Afghanistan Airport in July of 2000.
5. The detainee was identified as being one of Usama bin Laden's bodyguards.
6. The source from the previous statement stated he saw the detainee many times at Usama bin Laden's house.
7. A source stated the detainee was a guard for Usama bin Laden. The source stated he saw the detainee in Tora Bora, Afghanistan with a handgun and a Beka.
8. The detainee's name was found on a document issued by The Office of Mujahedin Affairs listing over 150 al Qaida members scheduled for various forms of training. The detainee's name was on the list for the tactics course.

d. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee stated he was arrested by Pakistani authorities shortly after crossing the border.

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2. A source stated the detainee was among thirty individuals captured crossing into Pakistan. Several of these individuals are thought to have been bodyguards for Usama bin Laden.
3. A source stated the detainee was a fighter against the Northern Alliance north of Kabul, Afghanistan.
4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
 - a. The detainee steadfastly denied any involvement in or knowledge of al Qaida activities in Afghanistan or Pakistan. The detainee stated he never saw Usama bin Laden. The detainee stated he has never received any formal or informal military training. The detainee stated he was never issued or carried a weapon while in Afghanistan or Pakistan. The detainee stated he had no enmity towards the United States.
 - b. The detainee stated he did not know of the terrorist acts against the United States in New York. The detainee stated he had merely been homesick and wanted to return to Yemen. The detainee stated he had no formal military training and the only weapon he had ever handled was the family AK-47 which he shot during a wedding celebration in Yemen. The detainee stated no one had attempted to recruit him for the jihad or for any sort of training in Afghanistan.
5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

21 May 2007

TO: AHMED U AL HIKIMI

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AHMED U AL HIKIMI

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee stated he paid an Afghan to walk him across the Pakistan border with Afghanistan.

2. An al Qaida operative stated he first saw the detainee at the al Farouq Training Camp in Afghanistan. The detainee would drive the route from the front line to the mountains once a week with food for the brothers in the mountains and to move brothers back and forth from the front lines to the mountains.

3. The detainee was seen on the Taliban front lines in Kabul, Afghanistan, in late 1999 or early 2000 and identified as a driver.

4. The detainee was identified as a Taliban pick-up truck driver from Tora Bora to Jalalabad, Afghanistan.

5. An individual stated the detainee was a driver who drove personnel back and forth from the front line to the guest house.

6. A source stated he fought with the detainee in Afghanistan for approximately one month and lived with the detainee at a safe house located approximately three kilometers from the front line.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AHMED U AL HIKIMI

7. A source stated the detainee fled Tora Bora, Afghanistan, after the bombing and fought in the al Wady Mahghan region.

8. A source stated he and the detainee were captured with a group of suspected al Qaida members while trying to cross into Pakistan from Afghanistan in December 2001. The group contained several Usama bin Laden bodyguards.

b. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee visited a Sheikh who agreed to finance the detainee's travels to Afghanistan.

2. The Sheikh bore responsibility for the Brotherhood Islamic movement in Sa'dah, Yemen. Usama bin Laden is the leader of the Brotherhood movement.

3. The detainee's name was found on material seized from an alleged al Qaida residence in Pakistan.

c. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee stated he decided to sell his taxi business to get a Yemeni passport and paid a bribe to change his year of birth to make him too old to enlist in the army. The detainee paid a doctor 2,000 Yemeni riyals for a document stating he needed medical treatment so he could obtain a visa to get to Pakistan.

2. The detainee stated he taught the Koran in Afghanistan for eight months in 1999 and returned to Afghanistan to teach the Koran in February 2001.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee stated he is not a member of the Taliban.

b. The detainee advised he is not a member of al Qaida and only heard about them on television. The detainee noted he thinks Usama bin Laden is bad and has never met him.

c. The detainee stated he did not attend any training camps in Afghanistan.

d. The detainee claimed he never handled or fired a weapon in Afghanistan and never fought in Afghanistan.

e. The detainee stated he had no problem with America or Americans.

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AHMED U AL HIKIMI**

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

10 October 2007

To: AHMED, FARUQ A

Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AHMED, FARUQ A

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. A source stated the detainee attended the Furqan Institute in Yemen.
2. The Furqan Institute was a meeting and recruiting ground for jihadists in Yemen. Many Yemeni al Qaida members have links to the institute, specifically a number of the al Qaida members involved in the 12 October 2002 attack on the U.S.S. Cole.
3. A source identified the detainee as someone he saw wearing camouflage and carrying an AK-47 at Usama bin Laden's private airport in Kandahar, Afghanistan.
4. The detainee stated that around March 2001, a Sheikh provided him about 500 United States Dollars and an airline ticket obtained through donations, to support the detainee on a trip to Afghanistan.
5. The detainee stated he traveled from Taiz, Yemen through Dubai, United Arab Emirates, to Karachi, Pakistan. Once in Karachi, Pakistan, he stayed at the Hilltop Hotel for three days before traveling to Quetta, Pakistan. While in Quetta, Pakistan the detainee went to the Taliban office, as instructed by the Sheikh, and met an individual. The individual took him to Kandahar, Afghanistan the next

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Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AHMED, FARUQ A

day. The detainee and the individual stayed in Kandahar, Afghanistan for three days alone at a house and then continued to Kabul, Afghanistan.

6. The detainee stated that once in Kabul, Afghanistan the individual introduced him to a contact at the Wazir Akbar Khan Mosque. While in Kabul, the detainee and the contact lived in a house which was run and occupied by Afghans. The detainee stated the mosque was frequented mostly by Afghans, some of them armed with AK-47s. The detainee taught at the mosque from approximately May 2001 to August 2001.
7. The detainee stated his contact used to work for the Taliban.
8. The detainee claimed the house at which he resided in Kabul, Afghanistan was a house used by Taliban officials to live in while on business in Kabul.
9. The detainee stated that in approximately August 2001 the contact suggested he should teach in Khowst, Afghanistan.
10. The detainee was taken to a village near Khowst, Afghanistan and introduced to the Iman of the Abu al Hanifa Mosque. The detainee lived and taught at the mosque until December 2001, when he was told that it was too dangerous for him in Afghanistan and he should leave.

b. Training

1. A source stated the detainee went to Afghanistan in April 2001 and attended the al Farouq Training Camp.
2. The al Farouq Training Camp in Afghanistan was funded by al Qaida and was more advanced than other training camps in Afghanistan. The training at al Farouq consists of two week periods of weapons training, a basic commando course, topography, and explosives.
3. A source stated he may have seen the detainee at al Farouq.
4. A source stated he saw the detainee going to the al Karga Training Camp for explosives training. This camp was located at the edge of Kabul, Afghanistan in an industrial area surrounded by a forest.
5. A source stated the detainee had a lot of money to train everyday.

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c. Connections/Associations

1. A slain Arab, who was believed to be associated with Usama bin Laden had a list that, when translated included the detainee's name.
2. A document listing 324 Arabic names, aliases, and nationalities was recovered from safe house raids associated with suspected al Qaida in Karachi, Pakistan. This list contained the detainee's name, nationality and that the detainee had possession of a Yemeni passport.
3. A source stated he saw the detainee frequently at a house in Kabul, Afghanistan. There were many Arab fighters and Taliban commanders in the house.

d. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee stated he joined a group, which included three men he recognized, and walked for about eight days to the border town of Barashina, Pakistan. After crossing the border, the detainee surrendered to Pakistani authorities.
2. A source identified the three men, that the detainee recognized in the previous statement, as Usama bin Laden bodyguards.
3. The three men were all former classmates at the Ta'iz Furqan Institute.
4. A source stated the detainee had many cassettes with songs about al Qaida. The detainee was observed getting very excited over a song about the destruction of the Khobar Towers. The song was like an anthem for al Qaida members.
5. The detainee stated he gave his contact his passport for safekeeping while he stayed in Afghanistan. The detainee also stated his contact told him the detainee would be killed if he tried to retrieve the passport before leaving the country.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

- a. The detainee stated he had no military training of any kind.
- b. The detainee stated he has no knowledge of al Qaida or Usama bin Laden.
- c. The detainee denied he was a bodyguard for Usama bin Laden. The detainee has only seen Usama bin Laden in pictures and believes he is a bad man. The detainee stated

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he would not go to any other countries or participate in any further jihads.

- d. An admitted Usama bin Laden bodyguard identified the detainee as someone who came to Afghanistan only two to three weeks before the bombing began. The source stated the detainee is not known as an al Qaida member and spent his time in Afghanistan memorizing the Koran.
 - e. A source stated the detainee was not a bodyguard for Usama bin Laden.
 - f. If released, the detainee stated he would like to play soccer, get married, get his own house, and find a job in Yemen. He does not feel any animosity towards the United States. He feels the people involved with the September 11th attacks should be held accountable for their actions. He would not want to harm any Americans.
5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

2 May 2007

TO: MOHAMMED A AL EDAH

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MOHAMMED A AL EDAH

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee stated he planned to take six months off from work to travel to Pakistan and Afghanistan with his sister who required medical treatment. The detainee was then going to travel to Bahrain and Pakistan in search for a new job.

2. The detainee's brother-in-law made arrangements for the detainee and his sister to travel through Karachi, Pakistan to Afghanistan.

3. A friend of the detainee's brother-in-law provided the detainee with 500 United States Dollars.

4. The detainee estimated that between July and August 2001, he and his sister traveled from Sanaa, Yemen to Karachi, Pakistan.

5. The detainee stated his brother-in-law arranged for a Pakistani to facilitate their travel inside of Pakistan.

6. The detainee, his sister, and the Pakistani traveled by plane to Quetta, Pakistan, and then drove to Kandahar, Afghanistan.

7. The detainee stated he was in Kabul, Afghanistan, during the 11 September 2001 attacks against the United States.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MOHAMMED A AL EDAH

8. The detainee stated when the bombing started he left Kabul, Afghanistan, and headed toward Khowst, Afghanistan. In another car accompanying the detainee were Arabs, some carrying Kalashnikovs.

9. The detainee traveled from Afghanistan toward the Pakistan border in a bus filled with wounded Taliban soldiers.

10. The detainee believes he crossed the Pakistan border somewhere in the Peshawar district of Pakistan when he was arrested by authorities.

b. Training

1. A source reported the detainee was persuaded by other Mujahedin to attend the al Farouq Training Camp. The source stated the detainee was not a dedicated Mujahedin and was uncommitted to training. The detainee was suspected of being a spy and subsequently expelled from the al Farouq Training Camp.

2. The detainee stated he was at al Farouq training camp for one week and then was kicked out for not following orders.

3. The detainee served in the Yemeni Military from 1984 to 1985.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee's sister was a spouse of an active Yemeni al Qaida member.

2. A source reported the detainee was a probable Usama bin Laden bodyguard.

3. The detainee has been identified as a key figure within the al Qaida network.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee stated he had taken no part in the fighting in Afghanistan.

b. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001.

c. The detainee denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.

d. The detainee stated when he gets back to Yemen he would like to buy some property and start a farm.

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MOHAMMED A AL EDAH**

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

23 May 2007

TO: AL KHADR A AL YAFI

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL KHADR A AL YAFI

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. An individual spoke to the detainee about traveling to Afghanistan to spread the word of Islam and thus the detainee decided to travel to Afghanistan to teach Islam.

2. The detainee studied for six months at the al Dimaj institute in Sadah, Yemen, under Sheikh Muqbil al Wadi.

3. Classes are taught on jihad at Dimaj Institute. Students who display a devoted interest are selected and groomed for further individual training. Students are then given military-type training and are sent to fight in Iraq or Afghanistan.

4. The detainee and an individual traveled from Yemen to Afghanistan via Pakistan.

b. Training

The detainee received training on the Kalashnikov, light arms, handguns and shoulder weapons.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee was told that his story of teaching the Koran was not believable because he was not arrested with the Koran, he was identified as having been seen fighting on the front line of Kabul, Afghanistan, and was identified as one of Usama Bin Laden's bodyguards.

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2. The detainee was seen at an Arab compound in Kandahar, Afghanistan, by an individual, who took part in a security detail to escort Usama bin Laden and his family.

3. A senior al Qaida lieutenant stated he recalled possibly seeing the detainee at the al Zubayr Guest House prior to the 11 September 2001 attacks.

4. A senior al Qaida commander recognized the detainee. The commander stated he recognized the detainee's face as a Yemeni he saw in the Kabul guest house, probably in the 1999 to 2000 time frame.

5. The detainee's name was found on a list of Arabic names, aliases and nationalities recovered from raids on suspected al Qaida operatives in Pakistan.

d. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee was identified as a Yemeni Mujahed.

2. The detainee was seen at Tora Bora, Afghanistan.

3. The detainee stated he met a guide and gave him his passport and papers for safe keeping.

4. The detainee stated he joined a group of 31 Arabs guided by three guides to the Afghanistan and Pakistan border where they were arrested by Pakistan border guards.

5. The detainee was captured with 100 United States Dollars given to him by a person known to recruit people to go to Afghanistan.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee stated he was not a bodyguard and did not know Usama bin Laden.

b. The detainee stated he had never fought against the Northern Alliance and has never met Usama bin Laden. The detainee stated he never attended the Dimaj Institute and was never a student of Sheikh Muqbil al Wadi.

c. The detainee stated he did not travel with weapons and never engaged in any action against the military while in Afghanistan.

d. The detainee stated he did not undertake any training before going to Afghanistan for the jihad because he was a trained infantryman.

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL KHADR A AL YAFI**

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

17 April 2007

TO: IDRIS A IDRIS

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF IDRIS A IDRIS

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee stated he decided to go to Afghanistan in April 2001 at the suggestion of the Imam of a Mosque near Sanaa, Yemen. The Imam gave the detainee 100 United States dollars and paid for the detainee's plane ticket from Sanaa, Yemen to Karachi, Pakistan.

2. The detainee stated he traveled from Sanaa, Yemen to Karachi, Pakistan via Dubai, United Arab Emirates, in early 2001.

3. The detainee stated he used his own money to pay for bus transportation from Karachi, Pakistan, to Quetta, Pakistan and for a hotel in Quetta. The detainee traveled from Quetta to the Afghanistan border with Pakistan, entered Afghanistan near Spin Buldak, Afghanistan and continued to Kabul, Afghanistan.

4. The detainee stayed in Kabul, Afghanistan teaching the Koran at a local mosque for approximately eight months.

5. The detainee stated he paid for all his own food while teaching at the mosque. The detainee received absolutely nothing in return for spending six days a week for eight months teaching at the mosque.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF IDRIS A IDRIS

6. An al Qaida operative stated he traveled with the detainee from Sanaa, Yemen to Quetta, Pakistan, in October 2000. The detainee and the al Qaida operative stayed at a Taliban guest house for approximately 15 days before traveling to Kandahar, Afghanistan and then to al Farouq Training Camp.

b. Training

An individual stated training at al Farouq Training Camp in Afghanistan was conducted in four phases including small arms, physical conditioning, map reading and explosive devices.

c. Connections/Associations

1. An individual met the detainee at the airport in Karachi, Pakistan. The individual accompanied the detainee from Karachi to Quetta, Pakistan, where they stayed together for two days before the detainee entered Afghanistan.

2. The individual who facilitated the detainee's travel to Afghanistan has been identified by a known al Qaida member as a fund collector and recruiter for al Qaida.

3. The detainee stated an individual arranged for him to stay in Khowst, Afghanistan in a room located within a restaurant. The detainee stayed there for approximately twenty days and during that time the detainee saw the individual several times.

4. The individual who arranged for the detainee's room in Khowst, Afghanistan was identified as a mid-level district Taliban commander.

5. The detainee stated that when the Northern Alliance pushed to Kabul, Afghanistan, the detainee fled to Khowst, Afghanistan and joined a group of 30 Arabs that were apprehended once they reached the border checkpoint at Parachinar, Pakistan.

6. An individual that stated he worked as Usama bin Laden's media coordinator was part of a group of approximately thirty Arab men captured by the Pakistan authorities while attempting to enter Pakistan.

7. The detainee's name and the contents of his safety deposit box were listed on a document seized during the raid of a suspected al Qaida residence in Pakistan.

8. The detainee's name, alias, nationality and the items in his possession were on a list of 324 Arabic names recovered from a safe house raid associated with suspected al Qaida in Pakistan.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF IDRIS A IDRIS

d. Other Relevant Data

A source stated that a prison warden advised the detainee and the group of Usama bin Laden associates he was with, that the best thing they could tell the American forces was that they were in Afghanistan to teach the Koran and for a dawa.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

- a. The detainee denied ever having any membership in or ties with the Taliban or al Qaida.
- b. The detainee denied ever receiving any military or weapons training while in Afghanistan.
- c. The detainee denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.
- d. The detainee stated he hopes to return to his previous job at the Ministry of Agriculture and complete his college degree if allowed to return to Yemen.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

20 August 2007

To: AL YAZIDI, RIDAH BIN SALEH

Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW
BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL YAZIDI, RIDAH BIN SALEH

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
 1. In 1993, the detainee attended the Islamic Cultural Institute in Milan, Italy. One of the leaders of the mosque spoke frequently of the jihad ongoing in Bosnia.
 2. The Italian Islamic Institute, referred to as ICI, was shut down by Italian authorities for housing the Sami Essid Ben Khemais network, which is the core for the Tunisian Combat Group in Italy.
 3. The detainee decided to join the jihad in Afghanistan in 1996.
 4. The detainee states he was imprisoned for 27 days for terrorism. The detainee explained the Italian authorities arrested him before the 1998 World Cup Soccer tournament, which was held in France. The detainee indicated the Italian police accused him of being a member of the Algerian terrorist group, Armed Islamic Group.
 5. In June 1998 the detainee met an individual who helped him go to Afghanistan. The detainee paid 400 Italian Lire for a forged passport and replaced the photograph in the passport with his own.

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Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL YAZIDI, RIDAH BIN SALEH

6. In May 1999, the detainee traveled for training to Islamabad, Pakistan using a fake passport. The detainee then traveled to Khaldan Camp in Afghanistan. A recruiter provided the detainee a letter, which essentially admitted him into training.
7. The detainee stayed at an al Qaida guest house in Khandahar, Afghanistan during Spring 2000 for approximately two weeks.
8. The detainee stated that in March 2001 he went to the front lines at Karabel, which is close to Kabul, Afghanistan. The detainee stated the decision to send him there was made by the Taliban. In June 2001 the detainee moved to the front lines in Khwaja Ghar, Afghanistan but became ill, so he went to Kabul for treatment and then to the Bagram, Afghanistan front lines to stay close to medical treatment.

b. Training

1. The detainee was trained at Khaldan Camp in small arms, Kalashnikov and other assault rifles and machine guns, mortars, rocket propelled grenade launchers, small artillery, SPG-9, explosives, C-3, C-4, dynamite, electronic detonators, Yaesu walkie talkie radios, and mountain and urban warfare tactics.
2. Khaldan Camp was co-managed by a senior al Qaida Lieutenant. An entire six-month program at Khaldan consisted of light weapons, heavy weapons, explosives, topography and a tactical course.
3. The detainee stated he received additional explosives training in Jalalabad, Afghanistan. An individual taught the detainee how to manufacture explosives using fertilizer and ammonium. This training lasted approximately 20 days.
4. The individual in the previous statement, who taught the detainee to manufacture explosives, was an al Qaida explosives trainer who instructed jihadists on improvised explosives devices in Jalalabad and Kabul, Afghanistan.

c. Connections/Associations

1. A foreign government reports the detainee participated in terrorist activities in Bosnia in 1995 alongside members of the Algerian Armed Islamic Group, GIA.
2. The Armed Islamic Group, GIA, is an Islamic extremist group. The GIA aims to overthrow the secular Algerian regime and replace it with an Islamic state. The GIA are connected to frequent attacks against civilians and government workers. Since 1992, the GIA has conducted a terrorist campaign of civilian massacres, sometimes wiping out entire villages in its area of operation. The group uses assassinations and bombings, including car bombs,

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and it is known to favor kidnapping victims and slitting their throats.

3. The detainee was among 30 individuals arrested in Italy in 1997 and 1998 as members of the Armed Islamic Group.
4. A foreign government reports the detainee was a known associate of the Sami Essid network in Milan, Italy, and the detainee later joined up with the Tunisian Combatant Group in Afghanistan in 1998.
5. The Essid Network is active particularly in the falsification of travel documents, the counterfeiting of money, stolen vehicles, and the illicit trafficking of narcotics in coordination with the mafia, to ensure financial support to the terrorist groups. In addition, the network recruits among youth with limited education and sends them to training camps in Afghanistan sponsored by Usama bin Laden.
6. The Tunisian Combatant Group, TCG, also known as the Jama'a Combattante Tunisienne, reportedly is seeking to establish an Islamic regime in Tunisia and targets United States and Western interests. Tunisians associated with the TCG are part of the support network of the broader international jihadist movement. According to European press reports, TCG members or affiliates in the past have engaged in trafficking falsified documents and recruiting for terror training camps in Afghanistan. Some TCG associates are suspected of planning an attack against the United States, Algerian, and Tunisian diplomatic missions in Rome in January 2001. Some members reportedly maintain ties to the Algerian Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat, GSPC.
7. A foreign government reports the detainee is known to have been in the company of Usama bin Laden adherents and later took explosives training in Afghanistan in 1999 with operatives from the Afghan Taliban movement.
8. Indications are that the detainee was the leader of the Tunisian al Qaida faction who worked with Usama bin Laden in Afghanistan.
9. A senior al Qaida Lieutenant stated he was with the detainee in Kabul, Afghanistan on 11 September 2001 at the house for the Khaldan Camp people. The Lieutenant stated they heard about the attacks on the news and immediately celebrated.
10. The detainee's name was found on a list of captured Mujahedin associated with a senior al Qaida lieutenant.
11. The detainee was captured among 30 individuals caught together in Pakistan. A number of them are suspected of being bodyguards for Usama bin Laden.

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Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL YAZIDI, RIDAH BIN SALEH

d. Intent

The detainee stated it did not matter to him who his enemies were because he was fighting for his religion. The detainee stated he would fight against anyone, including his own brother, because the religious reasons were more important than the identity of the enemy.

e. Other Relevant Data

1. In 1988, the detainee began to use and sell heroin, cocaine, and hashish on the street in Milan, Italy. As a result, the Italian authorities arrested and deported him. Sometime later he returned to Italy.
2. On 10 June 1998, as a result of continuing investigation, the detainee was charged with criminal activity finalized in terrorism, distribution of counterfeit banknotes, preparation of false documents, use of falsified Italian and foreign seals and visas, and recycling of documents.
3. The detainee was seen in the Geyer Region of Tora Bora with a group of Tunisian Mujahadeen fighters.
4. In February 2002, the detainee was sentenced by a foreign government to 20 years in prison for being a member of a terrorist organization operating abroad.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

- a. The detainee states he's not a member of the Armed Islamic Group, GIA.
- b. The detainee stated he did not engage in any significant combat during the entire time he was on the front lines.
- c. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks on the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001. He also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

23 August 2007

To: ALI AHMAD MUHAMMAD AL RAHIZI

Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ALI AHMAD MUHAMMAD AL RAHIZI

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
 1. The detainee stated he attended discussion groups in a mosque in Taizz, Yemen, where support for the jihad was spread.
 2. The detainee stated he met a Yemeni in 1997 who spread support for jihad. In 1999, the detainee stated he was approached again by the Yemeni and told that he should go to Afghanistan to teach the Koran.
 3. The detainee stated the Yemeni provided the detainee with a Pakistani visa, 450 United States Dollars, round-trip airline tickets, and an address to a hotel near Karachi, Pakistan.
 4. The detainee stated he traveled from Yemen to Quetta, Pakistan via Karachi, Pakistan. The detainee stated he stayed the night at the Daftar Taliban office in Quetta, Pakistan.
 5. The Daftar Taliban was a Taliban office in Quetta, Pakistan, that helped Arabs cross the border into Afghanistan by coordinating travel and lodging.
 6. A source stated he saw the detainee many times at the Kandahar, Afghanistan guest house.

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Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ALI AHMAD MUHAMMAD AL RAHIZI

b. Training

1. A source stated the detainee attended basic training at al Farouq.
2. The detainee's attendance at basic and advanced training is mentioned in an al Qaida military file.

c. Connections/Associations

The detainee has been identified as an Usama bin Laden bodyguard.

d. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee has been identified as someone who trained at al Farouq at the end of May 2000.
2. The detainee stated he was informed in late 2001 by the Imam of Shoorabndab, Afghanistan of the war in Afghanistan. The detainee stated the Imam suggested that the detainee return to Yemen for the detainee's own safety.
3. The detainee stated he decided to leave Afghanistan when the war with America got too close. He traveled from Shurandam, Afghanistan to Ghazni, Afghanistan. From Ghazni, the detainee stated he then traveled to Khowst, Afghanistan and then traveled by foot for two days to a small town.
4. The detainee stated he joined approximately 30 other Arabs at the small town who had assembled to flee into Pakistan. The group of Arabs traveled for eight days and were finally arrested on the Pakistan border by Pakistan authorities.
5. The detainee was transferred into United States custody on December 26, 2001.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

- a. The detainee stated that he has never received any type of military training and the only weapon he knows how to use is the AK-47 that he learned about when he was young.
- b. The detainee stated he has never been to the al Farouq Training Camp and has never stayed at a guest house in Kandahar, Afghanistan.

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Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ALI AHMAD MUHAMMAD AL RAHIZI

- c. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on September 11, 2001. The detainee denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests. The detainee denied any knowledge or planning of internal uprisings at the Guantanamo Bay detention facility.
- d. The detainee stated he has heard of al Qaida and Usama bin Laden but denied any affiliation with either one.
- e. The detainee stated he taught the Koran to Afghani children at the Abu Bakur al Sadiq Mosque in Shurandam, Afghanistan.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

23 May 2007

TO: SAIF BIN ABDULLAH

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SAIF BIN ABDULLAH

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee stated that in February 2001 at the Via Berret mosque in Turin, Italy, he and an individual listened to tapes about jihad. The detainee stated he decided at that time he would venture to Afghanistan to participate in jihad.

2. The detainee stated he listened to audio tapes of an Egyptian Sheikh advocating going to Afghanistan to fight the jihad.

3. The detainee stated he befriended an individual who talked about the Taliban movement, which increased the detainee's desire to go to Afghanistan. The detainee traveled to Afghanistan with this individual.

4. The detainee stated he went to Afghanistan to carry out jihad with the Taliban.

5. The detainee stated he traveled from Turin, Italy to Herat, Afghanistan via Iran. In Herat, the detainee told the Taliban he was there for jihad.

6. The detainee stated he was stationed at an outpost with four other individuals, with orders to guard the rear lines from Northern Alliance forces. The detainee stated they remained in the camp from July 2001 until approximately November 2001, at which time they received orders to withdraw to Kandahar, Afghanistan.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SAIF BIN ABDULLAH

7. The detainee stated he was deployed to Jabul Sabr, Afghanistan, which was a mountain outpost north of Kabul, Afghanistan.

8. The detainee also stated he went to the front line at Bagram, Afghanistan, where he was to defend the position.

b. Training

1. The detainee stated that during his service in the Tunisian Army, the only weapons training he received was on the Steyr rifle.

2. The detainee stated he was trained on the rocket propelled grenade, the Kalashnikov rifle, and the DSHK heavy machine gun at Jabul Sabr, Afghanistan.

3. The detainee stated he was provided an AK-47 and received training on how to use it by the Taliban in Bagram, Afghanistan.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee stated he went to the Via Bareta and Corso Julio Chess mosques in Turin, Italy, where he met an individual who recruited men to go to Afghanistan for the jihad.

2. Authorities identified an al Qaida cell in Turin, Italy, whose members attended a controversial Iman's mosque. The detainee was identified as a cell member who was captured in Afghanistan.

3. A source stated the detainee was enrolled as a soldier of the jihad by one of al Qaida's most important contacts in Italy with direct contact to one of the heads of the Afghanistan training camps.

4. The detainee stated he spent two nights at the Azzam Guest House in Kabul, Afghanistan.

5. A source stated the Azzam Guest House in Kabul, Afghanistan, was used for fighters coming from and returning to the front lines against the Northern Alliance.

d. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee stated he was escorted to an Afghanistan/Pakistan border checkpoint where he then took a bus to Peshawar, Pakistan, and was then detained and captured.

2. The detainee stated due to his hasty departure, he left his passport, currency, and clothing at the hospital in Kandahar, Afghanistan.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SAIF BIN ABDULLAH

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.

b. The detainee denied being involved in jihad while in Tunisia or Turin, Italy.

c. The detainee stated he does not know anyone in Italy who is responsible for recruiting Mujahedin volunteers or providing counterfeit documents to Mujahedin volunteers.

d. The detainee denied sponsorship or any documentation facilitating his entry in Afghanistan.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

15 May 2007

TO: ABDULLAH K AL HAMAIRI

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ABDULLAH K AL HAMAIRI

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee stated he decided to go to Afghanistan to do jihad with the Taliban.

2. The detainee traveled from Abu Dabi, United Arab Emirates, to Bagram, Afghanistan, after stopping in Karachi and Quetta, Pakistan, crossing the border near Spin Buldak, Afghanistan, and stopping in Kandahar and Kabul, Afghanistan. The detainee stated he paid for his trip to Afghanistan using his inheritance.

3. The detainee stated he traveled to Afghanistan to aid the Taliban government in any way he could.

4. The detainee stated he stayed for two months at a reserve camp in Bagram, Afghanistan, where the detainee worked with the camp doctor. During this period, the detainee purchased two magazines and forty rounds of ammunition.

5. The detainee stated he was at the rear echelon in Bagram, Afghanistan, awaiting a front line assignment when the detainee heard of the attacks of 11 September 2001, which caused general celebration.

6. Approximately two weeks after 11 September 2001, the detainee traveled to the front lines where the detainee dug trenches and manned an observation post in the vicinity of Kabul, Afghanistan. The post consisted of approximately 15 Taliban soldiers and was commanded by a Moroccan.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ABDULLAH K AL HAMAIRI

7. The Moroccan was a Taliban leader of the rear line in Kabul, Afghanistan, where weapons training was conducted on the AK-47 rifle, hand grenades, and the teachings of Islam.

8. The detainee stated he traveled to the front line in Bagram, Afghanistan, in October 2001 where the detainee faced the Northern Alliance for two months while the opposing forces exchanged long distance artillery fire.

9. The detainee stated he was assigned for two months to an observation post with instructions to engage any enemy soldiers the detainee encountered.

10. A source identified the detainee as someone from the United Arab Emirates who fought with him on the front lines in Bagram, Afghanistan.

11. The detainee stated he worked as an assistant to a Taliban combat medic because of the detainee's ability to speak and read English. The doctor was unable to read the English instructions of the medicines he was dispensing.

b. Training

1. The detainee stated in high school he received compulsory military training that included small arms, close order drill, gas mask, and first aid.

2. An individual identified the detainee as someone he had seen at the al Farouq Training Camp in Afghanistan.

3. According to a source, training conducted at al Farouq Training Camp in Afghanistan was conducted in four phases that included small arms, physical conditioning, map reading and topography, and explosive devices.

4. The detainee stated he was assigned to a rear echelon supply center in early August 2001 while waiting for a position to open on the front lines. At the center, he participated in basic military training, which included learning to operate a Kalashnikov rifle and other light weapons.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee stated he attended a mosque run by an Imam who had traveled in Afghanistan and preached jihad.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ABDULLAH K AL HAMAIRI

2. The detainee stated while on the front lines he came in contact with a number of Arabs who were al Qaida members. The detainee also overheard al Qaida members boasting about other unspecified operations planned against the United States.

d. Intent

1. The detainee stated jihad is the duty of all Muslims and if an Imam orders it then he would fight.

2. The detainee made it very clear he would kill Americans if they came against Islam.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks on the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001, and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

20 July 2007

TO: ASIM M AL AASMI

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ASIM M AL AASMI

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee stated that in the summer of 2001, at the al Safa district mosque in Saudi Arabia, an individual spoke to the detainee about a fatwa supporting jihad in Kashmir. The detainee thought he could do a good deed by helping other Muslims fight the jihad.

2. The detainee traveled from Saudi Arabia to Yemen, to the United Arab Emirates, and then to Iran. From Iran, the detainee traveled to Herat, Afghanistan, and then to an Arab Guest House in Kandahar, Afghanistan. The detainee stated everyone at the guest house in Kandahar had a Kalashnikov rifle.

3. The detainee stated that he left his passport at an Arab guest house in Kandahar, Afghanistan and then he left for training.

4. The detainee stated that after two weeks at the al Farouq training camp, the 11 September 2001 attacks occurred, so the leaders at al Farouq dispersed the camp. The detainee stated that he went to Khowst, Afghanistan, where he slept in a tent.

5. The detainee stated that those who stayed in the tent in Khowst, Afghanistan included Taliban fighters coming back and forth from the front lines and people like him waiting for further instructions. The detainee stated that he and the others in the tent were armed with Kalashnikov rifles.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ASIM M AL AASMI

6. The detainee stated that he was convinced to go to Afghanistan by a possible al Qaida recruiter and that he did attend an al Qaida training camp.

b. Training

The detainee stated that while at al Farouq training camp, he trained on the Kalashnikov rifle, rocket-propelled grenade, a handgun, and the Bika rifle.

c. Connections/Associations

The detainee's name and alias, along with his possession of a Saudi Arabian passport and important papers, are listed on a document recovered from safe house raids associated with suspected al Qaida in Karachi, Pakistan.

d. Intent

The detainee stated that he supports the actions of Usama bin Laden and others who carry out acts of terrorism. The detainee stated that he moderately supports the beliefs and actions of the Taliban.

e. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee stated that his homeland is a sacred land and people there felt an adamant duty to defend Palestine. The detainee stated that this duty was both religious and patriotic in nature, and that his soul was in his homeland of Palestine.

2. The detainee stated he was raised to hate the Jewish people, and because the United States openly supports Israel, they have attracted the hate most Muslims feel towards the Jews and Israel.

3. The detainee stated that after approximately three months in Khowst, Afghanistan, he was injured in a hand grenade accident, taken to a clinic in Khowst, and then smuggled across the border to a hospital in Pakistan where a pin was placed in his leg. The detainee stated that he was captured by Pakistani authorities and was eventually taken into United States custody.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee stated that he never engaged in combat while in Afghanistan.

b. The detainee stated that if released, he would go back to Palestine and live with his family. The detainee would get a job and live a normal life with his family.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ASIM M AL AASMI

c. The detainee stated that if released, he would go to Saudi Arabia, work for two years, and then return to Gaza and raise a family. The detainee stated that he does not intend to be involved in terrorism.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

14 February 2007

To: MOHAMMED A ABDULLAH SALEH

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MOHAMMED A ABDULLAH SALEH

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
 1. The detainee obtained a cassette tape by a famous sheikh that stated all Muslims needed to visit Afghanistan because it was perfect for Islam and is the most pure state.
 2. The detainee concluded from the cassette tape that Afghanistan was more of an Islamic society than Yemen.
 3. The detainee made the decision to go to Afghanistan with the idea of exploring the culture and country, and to see if it was a true Islamic state. The detainee met a man in a mosque in Zungbar, Yemen, who paid for the detainee's passport, airline tickets, and also accompanied the detainee on his trip to Afghanistan.
 4. The detainee left home and went to Afghanistan fully intending to fight for the Taliban and die for his God.
 5. The detainee traveled from Yemen around April of 2001. The detainee traveled to Afghanistan from Yemen via air to Dubai, United Arab Emirates. From Dubai the detainee flew to Karachi, Pakistan and then traveled by bus to Quetta, Pakistan and Kandahar, Afghanistan. From Kandahar he then took a taxi to Kabul, Afghanistan.
 6. The detainee rode the bus with a number of Taliban and Jamat al Tabiligh members and stayed in a Jamat al Tabiligh house for two to three days and then stayed at a guest house called the Dafter Taliban house in Quetta, Pakistan.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MOHAMMED A ABDULLAH SALEH

7. Jamat al Tabligh is a Pakistan based Islamic missionary organization used as a cover to mask travel and activities of terrorists, including members of al Qaida.

8. Upon the detainee's arrival in Kabul, Afghanistan, the detainee stayed in another Taliban house called Darol Alaman House, where the detainee became aware that he would be fighting against the Northern Alliance.

9. The detainee was deployed for six months to the Northern front to fight against the Northern Alliance.

b. Training

The detainee stated he was not trained on weapons in Afghanistan because he already knew how operate a Kalashnikov and how to handle hand grenades from when he lived in Yemen.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee admitted to being a member of the 55th Arab Brigade.

2. The 55th Brigade was where Usama bin Laden trained Arab holy warriors and were the Taliban's most dedicated and highly skilled soldiers.

3. A source identified Abdul Hadi al Iraqi as a senior al Qaida member and former commander of the 55th Arab Brigade.

4. The detainee saw Usama bin Laden in Tora Bora, Afghanistan. Usama bin Laden spoke to the detainee's group for three to four minutes.

5. The detainee's name and aliases appear on a document listing 324 Arabic names and nationalities recovered from safe house raids associated with suspected al Qaida in Karachi, Pakistan.

d. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee traveled with a group of 450 in Taliban trucks to Herat, Afghanistan to surrender and discard their weapons in exchange for their safety. The detainee and a total of 5,000 Taliban soldiers surrendered to the Northern Alliance.

2. The detainee was captured with a Kalashnikov.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MOHAMMED A ABDULLAH SALEH

3. The detainee had in his possession 400 United States Dollars when he was captured in Pakistan. The detainee claimed Sa'ed Dayan gave him his wallet before he died. Inside the wallet was 400 United States Dollars and Dayan's will.

4. The detainee readily admitted to having fought with the Taliban, but noted that it was never his intention or desire to fight against the United States.

4. (U) The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. (U) The detainee made the decision to go to Afghanistan with the idea of exploring the culture and country to see if Afghanistan was a true Islamic State and had no intentions of going to Afghanistan to fight.

b. (U) The detainee stated that he has heard of al Farouq Training Camp for Arabs but has never attended the camp and does not know anyone who has trained at the camp.

c. The detainee claimed the Taliban forced him to be a soldier and claimed he did not support the Taliban, but was unable to leave.

d. The detainee stated that he did not take a Bayat or oath.

e. The detainee cleared up a discrepancy in an earlier interview conducted on 3 September and on 12 September 2002 that he saw Usama bin Laden for three to four minutes in Tora Bora, when Usama bin Laden talked to his group. The detainee corrected his previous statements and advised he never saw Usama bin Laden and he had never been to Tora Bora.

f. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001. The detainee also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.

g. The detainee stated that he felt the attack on the World Trade Center was wrong because Islam did not permit the killing of innocent people and it was wrong to declare war on innocent people.

h. When the detainee gets released, he hopes to go back to Yemen and get married. Once married, the detainee intends to go to school to become a history or geography teacher.

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MOHAMMED A ABDULLAH
SALEH**

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

26 February 2007

To: HAJ, WALID M

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF HAJ, WALID M

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee stated he traveled from Saudi Arabia to Pakistan in February or March of 2001. The detainee drove to Quetta, Pakistan and stayed in a house located next to a mosque for about 30 days. Many Afghans in this house had broken arms and legs and various other wounds. The detainee understood this was a recovery house for the Taliban.

2. The detainee stated he traveled to a guest house in Konduz, Afghanistan, where he stayed for one day. Many fighters of different nationalities stayed at the guest house. Vans transported fighters back and forth between the guest house and the front lines.

3. While at Konduz, Afghanistan, a Saudi Arabian man that the detainee met at a mosque in Lahore, Pakistan gave the detainee two choices; stay in Konduz, Afghanistan for dawah or join the Saudi Arabian man and the rest of the group to fight on the front line against the Northern Alliance. The detainee chose to join the Saudi and the others. A truck full of Taliban fighters with weapons picked up the detainee and drove him to a bunker area on the second line. The Taliban fighters went to the front line.

4. The detainee stated he fought on the Khvej Ghar front lines outside of Konduz, Afghanistan. The detainee was with Arabs and guarded underground trenches used for sleeping and storing weapons.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF HAJ, WALID M

b. Training

1. The detainee stated he received approximately a half hour of training on the Kalashnikov rifle. The detainee considered himself a guard of the bunker area, which was about two or three kilometers from the front line.

2. The detainee stated he received training on the AK-47 at Khvej Ghar, Afghanistan. The detainee was able to visually identify the 7.62mm AK-47, 7.62mm PK, 7.62 RP-46, RPG-7 and the 7.62 SKS/Type 56. The detainee stated he had seen them in Afghanistan.

c. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee stated he remained a guard for several months until the American bombing started. The detainee ended up briefly on the front line in the hills until the Taliban people there said it was time to withdraw. The detainee withdrew to Konduz, Afghanistan, where the Taliban gave him and the others a house to stay in.

2. The detainee stated after Konduz, Afghanistan became surrounded, the Taliban said they reached an agreement with General Dostum's forces, allowing the Pakistanis and Arabs to withdraw through Mazar-e-Sharif, Afghanistan. At Mazar-e-Sharif, the detainee and others with him were told by Taliban members to leave their weapons there. The detainee and the others were unarmed, got on a truck and went on their way to Herat, Afghanistan, being led by vehicles from general Dostum's forces.

3. The detainee stated he and the others arrived at a castle call al-Janki, where General Dostum's forces searched them and took their valuables. The detainee spent the night in the basement of the castle. The following morning, after the detainee was taken out into the yard, an explosion took place in the building. The guards at the castle started randomly shooting and many prisoners were killed. The detainee ran away from the building but was shot in the back.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee did not attend any formal training camp and has no knowledge of specific training with explosives or chemical, biological and nuclear materials.

b. The detainee denied having any knowledge of attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001 and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.

c. The detainee began providing guidance on Islam approximately five years prior to June 2002 and traveled to Pakistan to guide Pakistani Muslims on how to pray, to fast and to pray at a cemetery.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF HAJ, WALID M

d. The detainee never met Usama bin Laden or any high-ranking members of the Taliban or al Qaida. The detainee never heard of any fatwa against America. The detainee does not know of anyone that trained for or was asked to participate in a martyrdom mission.

e. The detainee believes Islam is not a religion of fighting.

f. In August 2005, the detainee advised he felt like he was being punished for being honest. The detainee advised he told the first Administrative Review Board that he would kill Americans if they invaded his country. The detainee stated he believes this statement is what is keeping him incarcerated at Guantanamo Bay. The detainee stated if released, he would not go to Iraq to kill Americans and his only desire is to return to Sudan, marry and start a family. After his experience in Afghanistan, the detainee stated he would never return there.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

27 April 2007

TO: MAGAS M ALI

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MAGAS M ALI

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. An individual at the Ibn Algam Mosque, located in Alburaikeh, Yemen persuaded the detainee to go to Afghanistan and receive training.

2. The detainee arrived in Afghanistan in mid-September 2001.

3. The detainee stated he went to Afghanistan to become a fighter.

4. The detainee was among ten suspected al Qaida personnel traveling together from Kandahar, Afghanistan who were involved in an automobile accident while attempting to elude coalition and United States air strikes. The surviving members including the detainee were evacuated to a hospital in Kandahar, Afghanistan where they were armed and using the hospital as a safe haven.

5. The detainee stated he was on the first floor of the hospital in Kandahar, Afghanistan and that he was later moved to the second floor of the hospital where there were other Arabs he did not know.

6. A source stated the detainee was one of the seven al Qaida members injured during an American bombing raid. All these individuals stayed in the same room at the hospital in Kandahar, Afghanistan.

7. The detainee stated he was captured in a hospital in Afghanistan.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MAGAS MALI

b. Training

1. The detainee stated that he went to Afghanistan to receive weapons training.
2. The detainee stated he was experienced with the Kalishnikov rifle.
3. The detainee's name appeared in a list of names, possibly of al Qaida trainees, found among a collection of papers recovered at the al Qaida facility at Tarnak Farms Training Camp in Afghanistan.
4. The Tarnak Farms facility in Afghanistan housed an al Qaida poison and explosive training laboratory and an advanced operational training camp. No one was allowed to train at Tarnak Farms without first passing through basic training at the al Farouq Camp. The Tarnak Farms Camp was considered the most important al Qaida training camp in Afghanistan since it was where al Qaida operatives received advanced operational training including urban assault and other tactics.

c. Connections/Associations

The detainee's name, and the fact that one of his legs was amputated, were found in a letter between suspected members of al Qaida. The letter discussed the status of some of the brothers who were either killed in Tora Bora, Afghanistan were captured or successfully left the country.

d. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee was captured in November 2001 when he was injured near the airport in Kandahar, Afghanistan.
2. The detainee called all Americans evil.
3. The detainee stated he prays to God every night that the interviewers get tongue and throat cancer so they can no longer interview detainees.
4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
 - a. The detainee denied any prior knowledge of the 11 September 2001 attacks on the United States. The detainee further denied having any knowledge of rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.
 - b. The detainee admitted it was a mistake traveling to Afghanistan for training.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MAGAS M ALI

c. The detainee stated that the persons who committed the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks ruined the reputation of Islam.

d. The detainee denies all knowledge of any combat activities in Afghanistan.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

14 May 2007

To: **POOLAD T TSIRADZHO**

SUBJECT: **UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF POOLAD T TSIRADZHO**

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the *United States and your home state*; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. After serving a year and a half in the Azerbaijani Army, the detainee left for Afghanistan to learn Arabic, study the Koran and find the Taliban. The detainee believed the Taliban had law and order, and stated he went to Afghanistan in 2000.

2. The detainee stated he saw on television that there was a war in Afghanistan. The detainee then went to Afghanistan to study and look for the Taliban. Upon arriving in Herat, Afghanistan, the detainee met with a Taliban officer who sent him to Kandahar, Afghanistan, to see an individual. After meeting the individual, the detainee ended up on the front line in Kandahar.

3. The detainee stated he was in Khojahar, Afghanistan, in August 2001, when he met members of the Taliban at a food market. The detainee then joined the Taliban as a guard, guarding food supplies.

4. The detainee admitted to attending the Lezgi Mashid mosque in Baku, Azerbaijan, regularly.

5. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the subsequent influx into Azerbaijan of Wahabist missionary groups, the Lezgi Mosque in Baku, Azerbaijan, became known as one of the more extremist mosques where radicals congregated.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF POOLAD T TSIRADZHO

b. Training

1. In 1998, the detainee joined the Azerbaijani Army. In the army, the detainee was taught how to kill with a Kalashnikov rifle.

2. A source stated the detainee attended basic training at al Farouq Training Camp in Afghanistan, which included a topography course.

3. A source recognized the detainee as somebody who trained with him at al Farouq Training Camp.

c. Connections and Associations

1. In 2001, the detainee came into contact with the leader of an al Qaida affiliated terrorist group in Kandahar and Kabul, Afghanistan.

2. In early 2001, in the Makhad Madrassa in Khandahar, Afghanistan, the leader of an al Qaida affiliated terrorist group was tasked to screen the detainee.

3. The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan is designated as a foreign terrorist organization which fights those it perceives as fighting Islam. This Islamic Movement has been involved in taking United States hostages and was believed to have been involved in car bombings. Militants from this movement were known to be fighting with Taliban in Afghanistan.

4. The leader of an al Qaida affiliated terrorist group had spoken with the detainee and learned that the detainee traveled from Azerbaijan to Afghanistan via Iran in 2001. The detainee crossed the border of Iran into Afghanistan with the assistance of local ethnic Uzbeks. The detainee attempted to contact the leader of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, at which time the detainee was brought to the Makhad Madrassa in Kandahar, Afghanistan. The leader of an al Qaida affiliated terrorist group became convinced of the detainee's reliability and after two to three days, escorted the detainee to Kabul, Afghanistan.

5. In 2001, an al Qaida leader brought the detainee from Kandahar to Kabul, Afghanistan, where the detainee met with the leader of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. The al Qaida leader was the deputy of military affairs for Usama bin Laden.

6. In Kabul, Afghanistan, housing was arranged for the detainee where individuals associated with the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan were living, including a senior al Qaida operative.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF POOLAD T TSIRADZHO

7. Shortly after the detainee's arrival in Kabul, Afghanistan, the al Qaida leader introduced the detainee to the leader of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. A month after the meeting with the leader of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, the detainee was sent to al Farouq training camp.

8. A source stated the detainee served on the Northern front lines with a senior al Qaida operative.

d. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee stated while in Khojahar, Afghanistan, he received an injury to his right arm during an attack by Northern Alliance forces. The detainee then went to Konduz, Afghanistan, in September 2001 and remained there until November 2001, when he surrendered to General Dostum.

2. The detainee's name was on a list recovered during a raid on a safe house in Pakistan. This safe house was suspected of being associated with al Qaida.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001. The detainee also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests. The detainee denied any knowledge or planning of internal uprisings at the Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, detention facility.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

14 February 2007

TO: AL SALEH, ABDEL

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL SALEH, ABDEL

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee stated, after his separation from the Yemeni National Police, he saw the fatwa issued by Sheikh Abdullah bin Gibreel calling for a jihad against the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan. After reading the fatwa, the detainee decided to go to Afghanistan. The detainee gave 53,000 Saudi Arabian Riyals to Mohammed Omar Askar for the detainee's plane ticket to Karachi, Pakistan.

2. The detainee did not tell his family that he was going to fight jihad. The detainee asked his father how he would feel if the detainee went to fight jihad. The detainee's father told him that the detainee would not receive any inheritance, which means that the detainee would be disowned as a son.

3. The detainee stated he did not receive any funding from anyone for his trip to Afghanistan. The detainee stated he sold his Kalashnikov rifle for 45,000 Yemeni Riyals to help pay for his trip.

4. In a May 2003 interview, the detainee stated he went to fight jihad because of a fatwa he heard in Yemen to fight in Chechnya.

5. The detainee traveled to Karachi, Pakistan and the next day traveled by bus to Quetta, Pakistan.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL SALEH, ABDEL

6. The detainee told a Taliban representative that the detainee wanted to fight in the jihad in Afghanistan. The next day the detainee left the guest house with five Afghanistan nationals and traveled by taxi for three days to the jihad school in Kandahar, Afghanistan.

7. Following the detainee's arrival at the jihad school, he informed an individual that the detainee had been in the military in Yemen and was ready to fight in the jihad.

8. On the third day at the jihad school, the detainee was informed there was an emergency in northern Afghanistan and the detainee volunteered to go with a group of fifty Taliban to fight the Northern Alliance. The detainee and the group were driven to the airport, loaded on a plane and flown to Konduz, Afghanistan. The detainee and the group were then loaded onto trucks and driven to the front lines at Ghosh Ghar, Afghanistan where the detainee was issued a Chinese Kalashnikov rifle on arrival.

9. The detainee stated his unit would basically fight against the Northern Alliance across the Khogajar, Afghanistan front line. The detainee stated his unit would shoot one or two magazines per engagement. No ambushes or such activity occurred.

10. The detainee admitted he was a Taliban fighter and had fought on the line at Khogajar, Afghanistan.

11. A source reported the detainee is suspected to be associated with al Qaida.

b. Training

1. A source identified the detainee as a Yemeni who trained at the al Farouq Training Camp in Kandahar, Afghanistan with the Arab group that traveled between the camp and Kabul, Afghanistan.

2. The detainee served in the Yemeni National Police until 2001 and his weapons training was limited to firing six rounds with the Kalashnikov rifle.

3. The detainee stated he did not need training because he was already a soldier.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee stated he was a guard in the Taliban who spent approximately five months on the front line at Khojagar, Afghanistan.

2. The detainee admitted that he was a fighter with the Taliban.

3. A foreign government service provided a list of al Qaida members who they believed to be in Afghanistan. The detainee's name was on this list.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL SALEH, ABDEL

4. A list was recovered in an alleged al Qaida residence in Karachi, Pakistan. The detainee's name was found on this document.

5. The detainee stated the men the detainee fought with were issued Kalashnikov rifles, rocket propelled grenades, PK machine guns and hand grenades.

d. Intent

The detainee stated he went to fight jihad because of a fatwa the detainee heard in Yemen to fight in Chechnya.

e. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee surrendered at Mazar-e-Sharif, Afghanistan.

2. The detainee stated he was wounded and spent most of the time prior to his capture in the basement of Janke Castle, Afghanistan.

3. The detainee was arrested by American forces at Janke Castle, Afghanistan.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee denied knowing any al Qaida. The detainee said he never fought against any Americans and had no knowledge of any plans for an uprising in Camp X Ray, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.

b. When the detainee leaves Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, he plans to go back to Yemen and get married. The detainee will disregard anyone who suggests that he fight jihad. The detainee feels that it was a stupid idea to follow the fatwa.

c. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001, and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

2 July 2007

TO: HAFIZULLAH SHABAZ KHAUL

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF HAFIZULLAH SHABAZ KHAUL

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
 1. The detainee stated he fought for 22 years in jihad.
 2. A source stated that the detainee was directed to obtain a position in the Karzai government in order to call a meeting with high ranking officials and then kill all the attendees. The detainee provided the source with a plan to kill a key government official at the detainee's house.
 3. In February 2002, al Qaida fighters in the Paktia province of Afghanistan were providing payments of 3,000 United States Dollars to the detainee. The payments were intended to ensure that the detainee provided support to al Qaida and facilitate the departure of al Qaida family members from Afghanistan.
 4. The detainee was identified as a military commander that led a 12-man unit of former Taliban and al Qaida members who were planning to attack United States and Afghan Transitional Administration facilities using guerilla warfare techniques in September 2002.
 5. A source reported the detainee offered to double the salary of any man who killed an American. The detainee was a major supplier of weapons for an anti-coalition militia group.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF HAFIZULLAH SHABAZ KHAUL

b. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee's brother was identified as a senior lieutenant for a former Taliban Commander.
2. The detainee's brother has a well known car dealership in Zornat, Afghanistan where he also keeps an arsenal including Kalashnikov rifles, rocket-propelled grenades and improvised explosive devices.
3. The detainee has been identified as an al Qaida and Taliban facilitator.
4. The detainee's telephone number and name were associated with a Taliban cell.
5. The detainee confirmed the names of individuals affiliated with al Qaida and the Taliban.
6. The detainee held a meeting at his residence in Zornat, Afghanistan with an extremist cell leader.
7. A source stated the detainee was a commander of approximately 120 to 130 men and worked for a Taliban commander.
8. A source stated the detainee was actively involved in raising money and distributing Taliban funds to local anti-coalition commanders.
9. A source stated the detainee was a well known Taliban associate who used to carry out Taliban punishments when the Taliban were in power.

c. Other Relevant Data

The detainee stated he was appointed the District Manager of Zornat, Afghanistan for approximately six months and was responsible for maintaining the law in the area.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
 - a. The detainee stated he does not know why Americans detained him and that he had helped them in the past by giving them information about al Qaida.
 - b. The detainee stated he was a victim of revenge for reporting the corruption within the security forces.
 - c. The detainee stated that he was not with al Qaida and was not anti-American.

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF HAFIZULLAH SHABAZ KHAUL**

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

10 April 2007

TO: ABDUL MATEEN

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ABDUL MATEEN

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
 1. In the fall of 1998, the detainee traveled from Mansehra, Pakistan to Sheberghan, Afghanistan.
 2. The detainee was asked to write items such as letters and receipts in an unofficial capacity for the Taliban.
 3. The detainee led the Office of Intelligence in Mazar e Sharif, Afghanistan during the initial years of the Taliban.
 4. The detainee was sent to prison in Kabul, Afghanistan by the original director of intelligence.
 5. The detainee was paid 100,000 Afghan Rupees a month, the equivalent of 21 United States Dollars, by the director of intelligence for the Taliban while staying as a guest.
 6. During the spring of 2002, the detainee was on a trip from Pakistan via Kabul, Afghanistan to Mazar e Sharif, Afghanistan. The detainee was injured by an explosion at a bazaar in Mazar e Sharif.
 7. Following the explosion at Mazar-e-Sharif, Afghanistan the injured detainee was taken to Kabul, Afghanistan. In Kabul, a friend drove the detainee to a Taliban intelligence office and the detainee was turned over to the police.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ABDUL MATEEN

8. The detainee was transferred from a prison in Kabul, Afghanistan to a prison in Sheberghan, Afghanistan.

9. The detainee's second jail term lasted over one year.

b. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee's name was part of a list of names of Sheberghan, Afghanistan prisoners affiliated with the Taliban and al Qaida and was deemed a continuing threat to the Coalition forces.

2. A source has identified the detainee as the Deputy Chief of the Taliban Intelligence Directorate in Mazar-e-Sharif, Afghanistan.

3. When captured the detainee had a Casio F-91W watch on his person.

4. The Casio model F-91W watch has been used in bombings that have been linked to al Qaida and radical Islamic terrorist improvised explosive devices.

5. The detainee met an old associate that led to him getting involved with the Taliban.

c. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee's family's land and property was taken when the Soviets occupied Afghanistan. Once the Taliban regime was removed, the detainee's family's land and property was redistributed back to the people.

2. The detainee has stated that he graduated from high school in 1992 and then became a teacher and taught school in the Masehra, Pakistan area.

3. The detainee was imprisoned after being accused of taking bribes from the Northern Alliance.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee claims he was not involved in anyway with the Taliban.

b. The detainee stated he does not hate Americans, and just wishes to be released.

c. During an interview at the Sheberghan, Afghanistan prison, the detainee denied being the deputy of the director of intelligence for the Taliban.

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ABDUL MATEEN**

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

27 August 2007

To: BHAZADA, MOHAMMED MUSTAFA SOHAIL

Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF BHAZADA, MOHAMMED MUSTAFA SOHAIL

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee stated that he met an individual one to two weeks after being hired by a United States and British company in Kabul, Afghanistan in October 2002.
2. The individual in the previous statement was a high level commander with the Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) terrorist organization.
3. The detainee stated that in October 2002, he gave a suspected HIG member a list containing the names of security personnel assigned to the Karzai Protection Detail in Kabul, Afghanistan and the serial numbers of the weapons they used. The detainee did not report the security breach to anyone.
4. The HIG has staged small attacks in its attempt to force United States troops to withdraw from Afghanistan. The HIG has long established ties with Usama bin Laden.
5. The detainee stated a suspected HIG member reviewed some photographs that were taken by the detainee in December 2002 during the opening of an American camp in Kabul, Afghanistan and the person kept some of the photographs.

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Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF BAHAZADA, MOHAMMED MUSTAFA SOHAIL

6. The detainee stated that in February 2003, he met with a believed to be a HIG member and provided him with a computer disk containing the digital images of fifteen Turks and four American personnel involved with security at an American camp in Kabul, Afghanistan. The detainee also provided a template of the security access badges used at the camp.
7. The detainee stated that on 3 April 2003 three Afghan men came to the camp to disclose information about the Taliban. The detainee disclosed to an individual the reason the three men had come to the camp. When confronted about his disclosure the detainee panicked and left the compound without permission taking his company laptop computer with him. The detainee went home and copied information and various forms which he planned to give to the believed to be HIG member.
8. The detainee stated the information he translated for the three men who met the American was about current Taliban movements from Pakistan into Afghanistan, target selection and attack plans.

b. Connections/Associations

Three men identified the detainee as an active source for the HIG terrorist organization.

c. Intent

A source stated the detainee had planned to assist in making security badges for attackers to gain access to a site as part of a plan to assassinate the Afghan President and the United States Ambassador to Afghanistan, where both men would be during an upcoming opening ceremony.

d. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee stated a HIG member threatened his family should the detainee fail to provide him with the information he requested.
2. The detainee attempted to obtain United States travel visas using several different names.
3. The detainee's resume stated the detainee was a student at a computer college in Peshawar, Pakistan from 1999-2002 and had work experience as a computer technical advisor and instructor from April 1998 to December 2001.

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Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF BAHAZADA, MOHAMMED MUSTAFA SOHAIL

4. The detainee stated most of the work experience the detainee listed on his resume was false or embellished, and he stated he never earned a computer degree in Peshawar, Pakistan. The detainee stated he made up the information about earning a degree in computers from Peshawar because at that time you could not get a degree in computers in Afghanistan.
 5. The detainee stated the Taliban shut down his computer business in the middle of 2000 and all of his computers were seized because he was accused of running a movie rental shop, which was illegal. The detainee denied the allegations, but was put in jail for twelve days by the Taliban.
 6. A source stated the detainee's laptop contained security information he admitted providing to an individual, as well as evidence he had been sending multiple emails to Pakistan.
 7. The detainee's resume listed driving motor bike and small vehicles and usage of HF and VHF radio as other skills.
 8. The detainee admitted to operating a scheme to overcharge his employer by 500 United States Dollars per car, per month for each rental he arranged. The detainee arranged approximately 4-6 car rentals monthly.
 9. The detainee stated he had sex with prostitutes about twice a week and always paid 100 United States dollars for the night. The detainee had also bought his own SUV, TV, DVD player, designer clothes, mobile phone, and went out drinking on a regular basis.
4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a. The detainee stated he was accused of providing classified information to anti-coalition members. According to the detainee, his subsequent confession is not only false, but coerced. The detainee stated in order to make his admissions more believable, he needed to provide as much detailed information as possible.
 - b. The detainee stated if he is released and sent back to Afghanistan he will be in danger.
 - c. The detainee stated he didn't know where to obtain weapons or explosives in Jalalabad, Kabul, or Peshawar, Pakistan.
5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available

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**Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF BAHAZADA, MOHAMMED MUSTAFA SOHAIL**

unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

27 July 2007

TO: BARYALAI AMINULLAH TUKHI

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF BARYALAI AMINULLAH TUKHI

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. While the detainee was living in Meshad, Iran, a friend asked the detainee to help two individuals enter Afghanistan. The detainee rented an automobile and drove the two men to the Iran-Afghan border town of Tiabet, Iran.

2. From the fall of 2000 through the fall of 2001, the National Director of al Wafa contracted the detainee to transport Arabs and Russians from the town of Mashad, Iran to the town of Zabol, Iran located on the Afghanistan border.

3. The detainee stated that he transported a total of 16 Arabs and 14 Russians during the year he worked for the National Director of al Wafa. The detainee dropped the individuals off in Zabol, Iran where they met an Afghan who smuggled them across the border into Afghanistan.

4. The detainee stated that he was arrested in Meshad, Iran by Iranian authorities at an Iranian security checkpoint one day after his Afghan refugee card expired.

5. The detainee was forging documents to facilitate the escape of al Qaida members during the Taliban era.

b. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee knew the individuals he smuggled were al Wafa members.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF BARYALAI AMINULLAH TUKHI

2. The Non-Governmental Organization al Wafa was believed to have had connections to Usama bin Laden and Afghan Mujahedin.

3. At the University of Herat, the detainee was in a student political organization called Basij. The Basij group was created to fight against the Taliban.

c. Other Relevant Data

The detainee denied ever helping Arabs or Russians obtain false or fraudulent documents to cross the Afghanistan border. The detainee stated that every person sent to him had the necessary documents to cross the border.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee admitted that the smuggling was a mistake he committed only because of greed. The detainee stated that he is not al Qaida or Taliban, and in fact he fled his country to escape the Taliban.

b. If released, the detainee claims he will return to Herat, Afghanistan to resume working in his pharmacy. The detainee plans on supporting his family financially by working at the family pharmacy in Herat.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

6 April 2007

To: SALEM HUSSEIN MOHAMMED
SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SALEM HUSSEIN MOHAMMED

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
 1. The detainee wanted to leave Yemen and go to Europe because he sought a western society where there would be more opportunity and tolerance. He did not have an exact destination in mind.
 2. The detainee hoped to be granted political asylum when he arrived in Europe.
 3. The detainee planned to go to Europe via Pakistan because it would be easier to get a visa in Pakistan rather than Yemen.
 4. The detainee stated he did not join the Tabligh, but planned to claim Tabligh membership in order to receive the same discounts they received.
 5. Jamaat-al-Tabligh is a Pakistan based Islamic missionary organization used as a cover to mask travel and activities of terrorists, including members of al Qaida.
 6. The detainee traveled to Sanaa, Yemen, bribed a guard at the embassy, and obtained a visa to Pakistan. The detainee identified himself as Tabligh. Also while in Sanaa, Yemen the detainee obtained a passport, went to a travel agency, and bought a round trip ticket, again claiming that he was Tabligh.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SALEM HUSSEIN MOHAMMED

7. The detainee traveled from Sanaa, Yemen, to Karachi, Pakistan, by himself. The detainee spent four days in Karachi then took a train from Karachi to Lahore, Pakistan, to get to the Tabligh headquarters.

8. At the Tabligh center the detainee met a facilitator who recommended the detainee stay in Pakistan and travel to Europe with the Tabligh on a missionary journey because it would be cheaper.

9. The detainee stayed at the Tabligh center for two and a half months waiting for the Tabligh to go to Europe, but did not go on any missionary journeys with the Tabligh.

10. A facilitator told the detainee that Arabs had been blocked from travel to Europe following the 11 September 2001 attacks, but that he could smuggle people to Europe. The facilitator said they would travel through Iran to Turkey and then to Greece.

11. The facilitator took the detainee to the Pakistan border with Iran. Once there, the facilitator arranged the detainee's travel into Iran.

12. The detainee and the facilitator crossed the border into Iran. They ultimately arrived in Mashhad, Iran, stopping in Tehran, Iran, along the way.

13. The facilitator rented a house in Mashhad, Iran, where he and the detainee stayed for approximately one and a half months. The detainee felt that the facilitator might be fooling him after the detainee had paid him to travel to Europe. The detainee told the facilitator he was going to go back to Pakistan and then Yemen. The facilitator then said they would leave the next day for Europe by going back to Tebran, Iran first.

14. The facilitator took the detainee to Tehran, Iran. While there, two Iranian policemen approached them. The facilitator told the police he was Iranian, but the detainee did not speak Farsi, so the facilitator told the detainee the policemen wanted to see his passport. The detainee was arrested and taken to a police station in Tehran.

15. The detainee was eventually turned over to American custody in Kabul, Afghanistan.

b. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee met some Tabligh members who told him to come to the Tabligh headquarters in Pakistan.

2. The detainee was among ten al Qaida and Taliban associated individuals that Iran transferred to Afghanistan in 2002. All of them lived in Afghanistan during the Taliban era. Iran returned some of them to their country of origin. However, the detainee remained in Afghan custody.

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3. The detainee assisted the son of a senior al Qaida leader in acquiring a falsified Yemeni passport.

c. (U) Other Relevant Data

1. (U) The detainee was unable to provide any plausible explanation for why he was in possession of over 1,000 United States Dollars.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee stated that he has never been involved with anything criminal and this could be verified with his government. He denied being involved with al Qaida in any way.

b. The detainee called Usama bin Laden a big problem.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

12 June 2007

TO: OMAR MOHAMMED ALI AL-RAMMAH

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF OMAR MOHAMMED ALI
AL-RAMMAH

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee traveled to Azerbaijan at the suggestion of his uncle to deliver 10,000 United States Dollars, cash, to the uncle's point of contact.

2. The detainee decided he wanted to go to Chechnya and fight against the Russians after watching a film that depicted Muslims in Chechnya being killed by Russian troops.

3. The detainee was identified as a member of al Qaida.

4. The detainee was listed as a member of al Qaida on an undated computer diskette recovered from the home of a suspected al Qaida member.

b. Training

1. The detainee stated he received rudimentary military training in the Pankisi Gorge region of Georgia and used the alias Zakaria while in Georgia, and the alias Isa while in Yemen.

2. The detainee received weapons training at al Khair Camp, a private training camp in Qargha, Afghanistan.

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AL-RAMMAH**

3. The detainee trained in al Qaida camps in Afghanistan and was fighting in Chechnya prior to 11 September 2001.

4. The detainee was a trainer at al Farouq in early 2001.

5. A senior al Qaida operative identified the detainee as a member of the al Qaida training sub-committee and a trainer on weapons and explosives.

c. Connections/Associations

The detainee was identified as a member of a suicide paratrooper unit that was known as a Kamikaze unit.

d. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee was captured in a violent road ambush by Georgia Security Forces in Duisi, Georgia on 28 April 2002.

2. The detainee was captured with two explosives detonators in his possession.

3. The detainee was arrested in the company of a member of the Zarqawi Network.

4. The al Zarqawi Network was added to the list of organizations identified under Executive Order 13224, blocking property and prohibiting transactions with persons who commit, threaten to commit, or support terrorism on 15 October 2004.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee insists he never heard the word terrorism and never heard of al Qaida before his arrest.

b. The detainee stated he is not a terrorist and has never received any type of terrorist training.

c. The detainee denied having traveled to Georgia to fight jihad in the Chechen resistance movement against the Russians.

d. The detainee stated he had nothing against the Americans.

e. The detainee denied ever being in Afghanistan or ever hearing of al Qaida until he was a prisoner.

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
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AL-RAMMAH**

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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