

UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

22 August 2007

To: CHAMAN, FNU

Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF CHAMAN, FNU

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
 1. When the detainee was a teenager, the Russians invaded Afghanistan, destroyed his village and forced him to flee to Pakistan, where he lived in a refugee camp. While living in the camp, the detainee joined an Islamic party of a leader.
 2. While the detainee was in the camp, the son of the leader of the Islamic party came to recruit young men to train and fight against the Russians. After training, the detainee went to Hazra, Afghanistan for one or two months at a time to fight the Russians.
 3. For the first few years of the fighting, the detainee was a simple soldier, but after a few years, he became a commander of about fifteen fighters.
 - b. Training
 1. The detainee traveled to Afghanistan and learned to shoot a five-round bolt action rifle.
 2. On 16 February 2003, an important Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin member gave explosives and instructions for their use to the detainee and another Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin member. The two planned to organize attacks on vehicles used by

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foreigners on the road from Kabul, Afghanistan to Jalalabad, Afghanistan.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee stated his involvement with the Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin started in mid-1990 to early 1991. The detainee joined the Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin for six months as a commander. During this period, the Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin was fighting the Northern Alliance.
2. Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin was founded as a faction of the Hezb-e-Islami party in 1977. Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin has long-established ties with Usama bin Laden. In the early 1990s Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin's founder ran several terrorist training camps in Afghanistan. He offered to shelter Usama bin Laden, who had fled Sudan in 1996.
3. The detainee and his cousin, both Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin commanders, escaped to Pakistan during the Taliban regime. While in Pakistan, the founder of Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin ordered them to join him in Iran.
4. The detainee was a personal friend of Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin's founder.
5. The detainee stated the Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin founder's friendship ended when the founder became Vice President of Afghanistan and refused to allow the detainee to become the Governor of Logar Province, Afghanistan. As a result, the detainee stated that he secretly joined forces with the Northern Alliance while still maintaining membership within the Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin.
6. In December 2001, the founder of Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin offered an Islamic leader 100,000 United States Dollars to make sure his commanders, to include the detainee, were appointed to preferential positions to circumvent efforts to appoint United Nations peace keepers to Afghanistan.
7. The detainee was present at a meeting between members of al Qaida, the Taliban and the Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin in Peshawar, Pakistan.
8. Al Qaida, Hizb-e-Islami Gulbuddin and the Taliban held a meeting in Peshawar, Pakistan during February 2003 to discuss future plans on how the three groups could regain power in Afghanistan. During the meeting, many anti-United States and anti-Karzai conversations took place.
9. The detainee was the assistant to the direct subordinate of Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin's founder. The Afghan Minister of Defense indirectly gave money to

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the detainee in exchange for information on Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin's founder. The direct subordinate of Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin's founder was not aware that the detainee was betraying the Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin.

10. Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin and al Qaida were responsible for a suicide car bomb attack in Kabul, Afghanistan, on 7 June 2003 against the United States Embassy, International Security Assistance Forces, the United Nations headquarters, and a shopping area used heavily by foreigners. The leader of the group involved was a Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin commander.
11. The Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin commander in the previous statement was the detainee's assistant.
12. A source stated the detainee was a Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin field general.
13. A source stated he fought with the detainee, an Afghan Taliban member, prior to 11 September 2001.

d. Other Relevant Data

1. The Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin had three of its members, the detainee and two others, working as intelligence collectors. They were operating in Kabul and collecting information about the Afghan government and possibly United States forces. They used vehicles with Kabul Police Department license plates for traveling.
2. The Kabul Chief of Police had strong ties with weapons and drug smuggling activities. The detainee was also a major player in these operations.
3. The detainee and two other Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin members were all well known associates that were heavily involved in the drug trade and other illegal activity. One of these men is responsible for over 1,000 murders as a Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin leader.
4. The detainee intended to place a bomb at Site #1 or Site #3 during the grand opening ceremony for the radio network station at Camp Serenity. The main target for this attack was President Karzai, the United States ambassador to Afghanistan and other high-ranking Afghani officials.
5. Site #1 was the housing and office compound for the Karzai Protection Detail. Site #3 is the Afghanistan communications center.

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6. The field commander for al Qaida terrorists located in Muzaffarabad, Pakistan personally showed the detainee bombs devised by al Qaida terrorists that use a white powdered explosive packed into Pepsi cans. The detainee visited the field commander on numerous occasions.
 7. A source stated an American contracting company in Kabul, Afghanistan hired the detainee and his men to guard shipments of equipment between Herat, Afghanistan and Kabul, Afghanistan.
 8. Reports indicate that the detainee was one of the Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin commanders who terrorized, bombed and destroyed Kabul, Afghanistan during the Civil War.
 9. Indications are that the detainee was a Mujahedin commander against the Russians, a commander for the founder of Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin against the Northern Alliance leader, and also on the council of an individual who was a Taliban leader.
 10. The individual in the previous statement funded the detainee's activities and directed him from the United Kingdom. The individual funded him because the United States froze the financial assets directly belonging to the founder of Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin, but the individual was untouched.
 11. A source stated he had heard that the United States Embassy and Afghanistan government were reluctant to detain the detainee for the fear of starting a civil war in Kabul, Afghanistan since the detainee was a known, high level Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin commander.
4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a. The detainee was accepted into the Northern Alliance in 1991 and was instructed to remain in the Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin in order to report on their activities, movements and operations. The detainee stated he remained loyal to the leader of the Northern Alliance until the leader's assassination in September 2001.
 - b. The detainee stated he commanded a unit of approximately 40 soldiers and held the rank of brigade general during a three-month campaign fought against Taliban and al Qaida forces in Afghanistan during the spring of 2002.
 - c. The detainee stated the Taliban and the Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin founder were his sworn enemies. The detainee stated he liked the United States and he fully supported

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the United States and Karzai government in Afghanistan.

- d. The detainee stated the United States was the reason why he moved back to Afghanistan after 20 years and he hopes the United States stays long enough to stop the tribal wars.
 - e. The detainee stated he was working as a spy on behalf of the government because he opposed the Taliban, wanted peace in Afghanistan and wanted his children to be able to go to school.
 - f. The detainee stated he would not participate in any attacks against United States forces in Afghanistan. The detainee stated he had no anger toward the United States for being detained, but was angry toward the Afghans who put him in jail. The detainee stated he would be happy to work for the Americans in Afghanistan.
5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

20 July 2007

TO: ABDUL KAKAL HAFIZ

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ABDUL KAKAL HAFIZ

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee stated he participated in the jihad that expelled the Soviets from Afghanistan.

2. A source stated the detainee worked for a 40-man militia under a commander of the Taliban.

3. The detainee was the Taliban head of all Madrassas who was responsible for recruiting and sending young men to fight for the Taliban. The detainee was responsible for maintaining contacts for Mullah Mohammad Omar, and maintained weapons caches in Afghanistan.

4. The detainee was found hiding in a room and in possession of a phone. The detainee was attempting to call an individual linked to the murder of an International Committee of the Red Cross worker.

5. The detainee admitted he knew the phone in his possession contained telephone numbers of individuals who were enemies of the United States.

6. A source stated the detainee practiced and preached a very extreme interpretation of Islam on the blocks.

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b. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee was seen at the Taliban Military Headquarters in Kandahar, Afghanistan.
2. The detainee was identified as the friend of a Taliban commander in Afghanistan fighting against United States Forces.
3. The detainee participated in a paramilitary band related to Taliban Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin.
4. Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin is a foreign terrorist organization with long-established ties to Usama bin Laden.
5. The detainee was captured with a satellite phone used to call an individual.
6. The individual mentioned above was identified as a Taliban and al Qaida commander.

c. Other Relevant Information

The detainee was affiliated with the death of two individuals in Kabul, Afghanistan.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
 - a. The detainee stated he never used the satellite phone and he does not know how to use a telephone.
 - b. The detainee denied all knowledge regarding the murder of the Red Cross worker.
 - c. The detainee stated he had never heard of Usama bin Laden or al Qaida until he was captured by United States Forces.
5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

20 September 2007

To: GHAFAR, ABDUL

Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF GHAFAR, ABDUL

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
 1. On 27 March 2003 an attack on a United Nations' and International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) convoy in Shah Wali Kowt district, Kandahar province, resulted in the death of a Swiss ICRC worker. The ambushing force was composed of Taliban and Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin leaders and about 30 to 35 fighters. One of the leaders of the group was Mullah Satar.
 2. A personal phonebook belonging to a suspect in the murder of an International Red Cross worker in Afghanistan contains telephone entries for the detainee's alias and Abdul Satar.
 3. The detainee was suspected of being a driver for Haji Satar.
 4. A list of names and phone numbers was found at a compound in Kandahar Province, Afghanistan. The list contained a telephone entry with the detainee's name.
 - b. Connections/Associations
 1. The detainee stated he works directly for an individual he has known the majority of his life. The detainee stated the individual lived in the village of Nawa,

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Afghanistan, which is approximately 1 hour by foot from detainee's village of Khajor, Afghanistan.

2. The individual in the previous statement is reportedly a former Afghan Militia Forces (AMF) commander. Several sources in Nawa, Afghanistan have stated that the individual is a local sympathizer for al Qaida associated members (AQAM). Several sources further stated the individual lets AQAM into his home and gives them supplies.

c. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee claimed that he was a farmer for the past three to four years. He stated that farming and performing manual labor jobs has been his only source of income in this time span. The detainee's hands were inspected and no calluses or scars were noted, they were very smooth and not consistent with that of a life-long farmer/day laborer. The detainee was not able to provide details of the cultivation of vegetables that he claimed to farm nor was he able to disclose proper use of farming tools.
2. A man with the detainee's alias operated out of a mosque in Quetta, Pakistan and was responsible for providing logistical support to a group of Taliban fighters, including the provision of weapons and ammunition. The group used a small taxi and minibus to bring food and supplies from Pakistan.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

- a. When the detainee was asked if he was a driver for an important person before his capture, he denied the claim. The detainee stated he had never even been in the front seat of a vehicle, much less knew how to drive one.
- b. After the detainee was shown Gut Mullah Satar's photograph, he stated that he has never seen Satar before nor knew his name prior to the Americans telling him in Baghram.
- c. The detainee claimed that he is not a Taliban or al Qaida supporter and knows no one actively involved.
- d. The detainee stated he has heard of Usama bin Laden but has never met him. The detainee stated he does not know of any al Qaida training camps around his village. He stated he knows about Gulbuddin, Hezb-e-Islami (HIG) and the Taliban but is not aware of any of the members living in his village.

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- e. The detainee stated he had heard of but never seen al Qaida or any Arab before being arrested. The detainee stated the murder of the Red Cross worker took place in a village approximately a six hour drive away and he had no involvement or knowledge of it with the exception of what he heard on the radio.
 - f. The detainee stated he had never seen or been to Pakistan.
 - g. The detainee stated he had no military service and was too young to enlist in the military when there was a proper government. He stated he did not serve in the military under the Taliban. He stated the Taliban would not take him for the military because he was the only male in his family. He later stated the Taliban would force people to go to war, and he would hide when he heard the Taliban were coming to his village to recruit soldiers.
 - h. The detainee stated that three or four other men reside in his village or area that are also named Abdul Ghafar. The detainee stated all three or four men live in about a 10 to 20 minute walking distance from his house.
5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

12 September 2007

To: KAMIN, MOHAMMED

Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF KAMIN, MOHAMMED

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee stated he was recruited as an al Qaida fighter by an individual who was a direct associate of an al Qaida facilitator.
2. The individual was involved in a plan to target the United States Embassy or the International Security Assistance Force in Kabul, Afghanistan, for a bomb attack. The individual met with the Taliban Supreme Leader after the war against the Soviets. When the Taliban were removed, the individual sheltered fleeing al Qaida and Taliban personnel.
3. An al Qaida facilitator recruited and trained the detainee to carry out al Qaida operations in the Afghanistan and Pakistan border area of Khowst, Afghanistan. The detainee stated he was an al Qaida operative subordinate to and a field operative for the facilitator.

b. Training

1. The detainee stated he attended the al Qaida Training Camp in Zakar Khel, Pakistan, in February 2003. The detainee stated the course was taught continuously throughout the year and al Qaida members attended the course.

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2. The detainee stated that he was formally trained in military tactics by al Qaida operatives. The detainee spent varying amounts of time at madrassas that taught basic and advanced military skills to persons interested in engaging in jihadist-type behavior.
3. The detainee spent one day's training in Pakistan, where he fired AK-47s, pistols, rockets and PK machine guns.
4. The detainee stated that at a training camp in Multhkhil Village, Pakistan, he was trained on the PK machine gun, rocket propelled grenade, AK-47 and 9MM pistol.
5. The detainee stated he was trained on how to use, operate and detonate remote controlled mines in Quralemsha, Pakistan, two months prior to his capture.
6. The detainee stated an individual taught him how to make anti-tank mines into remote detonated, radio controlled improvised explosive devices. The detainee stated he and the individual successfully tested one of the mines later on the same day.
7. The detainee stated the individual in the previous statement is an al Qaida operative. The individual primarily worked as an explosives instructor who traveled to and from madrassas, al Qaida safe havens and weapons storage sites to train students and collect munitions. The detainee stated that the individual was a close associate to a key al Qaida facilitator, and an al Qaida recruiter and planner.

c. Connections/Associations

The detainee stated he was at an al Qaida facilitator's house for approximately 40 days shortly before the detainees capture.

d. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee stated he worked for and was paid by both the Taliban and al Qaida.
2. The detainee was involved with purchasing and selling weapons for an al Qaida facilitator, burying weapons caches and building improvised explosive devices.
3. The detainee stated he received money from an individual for the procurement, storage and distribution of weapons, explosives and mines.

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4. The detainee stated that within the six months prior to 12 June 2003, he made seven weapons transactions involving purchasing and selling weapons.
 5. The detainee stored twelve mines at his home for almost a month.
 6. The detainee stated that for a total of 1250 Pakistani Rupees, he delivered to an individual, three weapons shipments, which included a PK machine gun, an AK-47 assault rifle, ammunition, fifty meters of detonation cord and eight missiles. The detainee stated he received 500 Pakistani Rupees for transferring four Russian mines to another individual.
 7. The detainee stated that on approximately March 2003, he and four other individuals associated with an al Qaida facilitator purchased and delivered eight BM-12 Russian made rockets to Landar Village, Afghanistan. The detainee stated he purchased each of the eight rockets for 250 Kaldari, which is the equivalent of five United States Dollars, from an individual in Malan Gan Village, Khowst Province, Afghanistan. The detainee stated that he and three individuals wore women's burqas to smuggle the rockets through a checkpoint before traveling to Landar Village.
 8. The detainee stated the eight BM-12 Russian made rockets would be used against the Coalition Forces compound located at Dabgay, Afghanistan. The detainee stated the rocket attack against the compound did not occur. The detainee stated the rockets were buried by a creek north of Ladhar Village, Afghanistan.
 9. The detainee stated the Dabghay compound, which was located along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border between Khowst, Afghanistan, and Miram Shah, Pakistan, was an outpost for Coalition and Afghani Forces in the Khowst area.
 10. The detainee stated that on the day before his capture, an al Qaida facilitator proposed that the detainee learn how to use missiles, mines and rockets. The detainee stated the facilitator offered him 500 Pakistani Rupees per casualty causing attack using missiles, rockets and mines.
 11. The detainee's pocket litter included a Casio watch model F-91W.
 12. The Casio F-91W watch has been used in bombings that have been linked to al Qaida and radical Islamic terrorist improvised explosive devices.
4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a. The detainee stated the Americans are not as bad as he was led to believe.

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- b. The detainee stated that if he is released, he would go back to teaching the Koran, do some labor jobs taking care of homes and land, and take care of his handicapped father.
 - c. After his capture, the detainee led an Afghan Army Unit to the buried location of the rockets that were originally intended to be used on the attack of a coalition force compound.
 - d. The detainee stated that in Bagram, Afghanistan, and Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, he was surprised at how understanding the United States was to his religion. The detainee stated this had a profound impact on how he viewed the United States such that he realizes he was manipulated by his peers.
5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

14 March 2007

To: AZIMULLAH LNU

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AZIMULLAH LNU

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. In late May 2003, the detainee was a part of a foiled reconnaissance mission coordinated by an al Qaida southern Afghanistan regional commander who is also known as a facilitator.

2. The detainee was a Madrassa student in Afghanistan for most of his life, including the time-frame during the Taliban rule.

3. The detainee was at the Lakan Madrassa located in Lakan, Khowst Province, Afghanistan.

b. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee acted as a guide for a group that had weapons, radios, and surveillance equipment including cameras and binoculars.

2. One of the individuals the detainee was with, as part of this group, used a video camera to take pictures of checkpoints and the airport.

3. The detainee was arrested for aiding personnel in operations against the Salerno fire base in Afghanistan.

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4. The detainee was captured after the group he was traveling with was engaged in a gun fight with the Afghan militia force.

c. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee was deceptive and combative in his answers, while trying to claim he was being honest and cooperative.

2. The detainee changed portions of his story, especially in relation to his capture.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee stated he has never had any military service and was never taught to use the Kalashnikov.

b. The detainee denies ever swearing Bayat to any person or organization. The detainee denies having ever been involved in any jihad. In addition, the detainee stated he does not know of any fatwa's that have ever been issued by any Iman.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

7 June 2007

TO: MAHBUB RAHMAN

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MAHBUB RAHMAN

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee stated he crossed the border from Pakistan to Afghanistan.

2. The detainee was reportedly present at a meeting with an Arab who was responsible for a reconnaissance mission on Salerno base. The source reported the detainee to have been aware that he was helping the Arab with that mission.

3. The Arab who led the reconnaissance mission to Salerno base is a known al Qaida member.

4. The detainee was part of a group that traveled to Khowst, Afghanistan. They carried a video camera, binoculars, walkie talkies, a radio receiver, an AK-47 assault rifle, a vest with bullets, magazines, and hand grenades.

5. The detainee admitted to carrying a weapon while traveling from Pakistan to Afghanistan.

6. According to the detainee's capture documentation, he was seen hiding in a bush, firing at Afghan soldiers, and actually shot one of them. The detainee was captured with a weapon, binoculars, and video equipment.

b. Connections/Associations

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MAHBUB RAHMAN

1. In the group, the detainee traveled with from Pakistan to Khowst, Afghanistan, was a known al Qaida operative.
 2. The known al Qaida operative received instructions directly from an al Qaida facilitator.
 3. The al Qaida facilitator was the al Qaida southern Afghanistan regional commander responsible for operations in the areas of Khowst, Paktia, and Ghanzni provinces, Afghanistan, who specialized in explosive devices and guerilla warfare.
 4. The detainee visited the Madrassa in Shinkay, Afghanistan.
 5. The Madrassa in Shinkay, Afghanistan was a location where anti-Coalition militia and anti-Afghan government training was taking place. Attacks against Afghan government posts were also planned and based from the Madrassa.
4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a. The detainee denied involvement in surveillance operations and claims to have been unaware of any operations aimed at attacking Fire Base Salerno. The detainee denied firing his weapon at Afghan or American forces.
 - b. The detainee claims no affiliation with al Qaida. The detainee claims he supports the new Afghan government, and believes America's presence in Afghanistan is important to achieving peace within his country.
 - c. The detainee stated he would like to return to Afghanistan and finish his high school education. The detainee hopes to one day attend college, learn English and obtain a well paying job.
5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

2 May 2007

TO: JUMMA JAN

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF JUMMA JAN

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee stated he was the driver for Taliban Commander Ghuli in Mazar e Sharif, Afghanistan, for 11 months in 2000 and 2001.

2. A person with access to a senior al Qaida official claims the detainee was tasked to incite internal rebellions in two countries as part of the second phase of the 11 September 2001 attacks.

3. The detainee was identified as the leader of a Taliban compound that housed approximately 100 Taliban soldiers.

4. The detainee fought with the Taliban and had taken his forces to the Takar province in Afghanistan when coalition forces arrived. After the fall of the Taliban, the detainee returned to the Chemtal area of Afghanistan, and lived with several Hezb e Islami Gulbuddin Commanders.

5. The Department of Homeland Security has identified Hezb e Islami Gulbuddin as a foreign terrorist organization.

6. The detainee is reported to be a former Taliban Commander. The detainee was injured twice in battles against the forces of United Islamic front for the salvation of Afghanistan leader Ahmed Shah Masood.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF JUMMA JAN

7. The detainee has been implicated as the leader of an assassination attempt on the life of a high ranking Afghan official. The detainee supervised placement of several 50 kilogram roadside bombs. The detainee has also been involved in the purchase, construction, and storing of mines.

8. An individual stated the detainee acted on the orders of a former commander of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan.

9. The Department of Homeland Security has identified the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan as a foreign terrorist organization.

10. The detainee was identified as one of the main planners for a rocket attack on a logistics compound, hospital, and airport in Mazar e Sharif, Afghanistan, in 2003.

11. The detainee was identified as a Chechen Commander.

b. Training

A source identified the detainee as a high-ranking Taliban member and current Hezb e Islami Gulbuddin commander who was actively training Hezb e Islami Gulbuddin members in the use of explosive devices.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee stated he was associated with a Taliban member who helped him obtain a job with the Taliban.

2. The detainee met with a former Taliban commander in June 2003.

d. Other Relevant Data

The detainee claims that two months prior to his capture he was illegally obtaining opium from poppies.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001, and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.

b. The detainee stated that if the Americans and their coalition forces had not come to Afghanistan, they would not be free.

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
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c. The detainee denied being a member of the Taliban or al Qaida, or being involved in any jihad.

d. The detainee denied ever fighting against or assisting anyone else who fought against United States forces.

e. The detainee stated that the attacks on 11 September 2001 were a terrible thing that happened and many innocent people died.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

13 March 2007

To: MOHOMMAD ZAHIR

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MOHOMMAD ZAHIR

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee provided handwritten lists of names of people involved in Taliban, Anti-Coalition Movement activities and provided descriptions, locations and type of activity information on these people.

2. The detainee worked in the division of logistics building under senior Taliban members. The detainee was originally given a job as a clerk and later he was demoted to working in the office kitchen and cleaning up around the office.

3. During the Ramadan period of 2001, the detainee traveled back to Iran to work in construction. The detainee worked in Iran for about six months before returning to Afghanistan. When the detainee returned from Iran he went back to work at the Ghazni police department.

b. Training

The detainee indicated he had fired a Kalashnikov and shotgun and had fought five to six years in the Mujahedin.

c. (U) Connections/Associations

1. The detainee's duties were to carry rockets for the person who fired the rocket propelled grenade launcher, and provide food and supplies to fellow Mujahedin members.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MOHOMMAD ZAHIR

2. Between 2000 and July 2001, one of the commanders found out the detainee was educated and decided the detainee should be moved over to the Secret Information Office.
3. The detainee admitted he worked for the Assistant of Intelligence for the Ghazni, Afghanistan region. The Assistant of Intelligence worked directly under the Taliban Minister of Intelligence.
4. Qari Ahmedullah is the former Taliban Minister of Intelligence.
5. The Taliban Minister of Intelligence reported directly to a senior ranking Taliban leader.
6. The detainee left Afghanistan shortly after his superior was arrested.
7. The detainee was captured with a fax from a newspaper in Iran. The fax was requesting that Qari Ahmedullah interview Usama bin Laden and included a list of questions related to 11 September 2001.
8. The detainee was captured in July 2003.
9. A search of his property turned up two Kalashnikov magazines, two grenades, a high frequency radio, small amounts of ammunition, a canister with Cyrillic writing on it, suspected to be uranium, and an electronic organizer.
10. The detainee claimed the radio, ammunition, small television like object, calculator like object, guns, binow, Jeep, and heavy can, were left at his home by his superior during the fall of the Taliban.
11. The detainee also had a map of San Manuel, Cuba, phone books with entries of personnel in CJTF-180 targeting cell tracker, business cards, passports, and pictures.
12. The detainee indicated the map of Cuba belonged to his superior.
13. The detainee's superior adamantly denied owning or leaving those items at the detainee's home.

d. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee provided information regarding Taliban weapons caches.
2. The detainee had a list of orphans in his possession. The Taliban set up special military schools and referred to them as orphanages.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MOHOMMAD ZAHIR

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee stated he has not been associated with the Taliban since his conscription first ended.

b. The detainee stated he never plotted against coalition forces, or the new government in Afghanistan.

c. Beginning in the spring of 2003, the detainee taught at a school in Ghazni, Afghanistan for five months before he was arrested.

d. The detainee's pocket litter contained a letter requesting his reinstatement as a teacher.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

04 September 2007

To: RAHIM, MOHAMED

Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF RAHIM, MOHAMED

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee stated he helped the Taliban who coordinated the work of the Mujahedin resistance during the Soviet occupation.
2. The detainee worked at the cooperative logistics company in Kabul, Afghanistan, which was owned by the Taliban government and was closely associated with Taliban Intelligence. The company provided logistical support directly to the Taliban government. The detainee held the title of Chief of Logistics.
3. The detainee worked with an employee of the company who had authority to write checks for the company. This employee also worked directly for the Taliban Intelligence in Kabul, Afghanistan.
4. The detainee was responsible for purchasing items as directed by an individual. The individual would have a list of items to purchase and would present the list to the detainee.
5. The individual in the previous statement was the Divisional Commander of the Logistics Division under the Taliban Ministry of Intelligence.

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Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF RAHIM, MOHAMED

b. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee stated an individual was his commander during the fight against the Soviet army.
2. The individual in the previous statement was the Chief of Courts under the Taliban government who was reported to be stockpiling weapons and possibly distributing weapons to Taliban elements fighting in Afghanistan.
3. The detainee stated he knew the location of the individual and the individual's caches.
4. The detainee was a former companion of Usama bin Laden during the jihad against the Russians and was among a group protecting Usama bin Laden at his last meeting at Tora Bora.
5. The detainee was entrusted by Usama bin Laden to exfiltrate his guard forces from Afghanistan back to their countries of origin. Shortly before Usama bin Laden's departure from Tora Bora on 16 January 2002, Usama bin Laden and his companions spent the night in a house belonging to an Afghan, an acquaintance of the detainee.
6. A source stated that near the end of February 2003, the detainee, referred to as Mullah Mohammad Rahim, and other Taliban leaders held a meeting at a nomad camp site in the mountains of Afghanistan. In the meeting, the detainee stated that leaders from Quetta, Pakistan gave him several satellite phones with long-range capabilities. Three new groups were formed and each group was assigned a commander during the meeting. One group was comprised of 13 Taliban soldiers and was commanded by the detainee. The detainee's group had an unknown number of rocket propelled grenades and AK-47 assault rifles.
7. A source stated the detainee was a former Taliban intelligence officer who was responsible for a large active weapons cache in Shela Habib district, Spin Buldak, Kandahar province, Afghanistan.
8. The detainee attempted to align himself with other Taliban to continue the anti-United States and Coalition and Islamic Transitional Government of Afghanistan campaign.
9. The detainee attempted to export gems from Afghanistan to Germany. The revenue was to be used to finance al Qaida.

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10. An AK-47 was found at the detainee's home along with financial records indicating large money transactions with a group called the Afghan Islamic Movement.
11. The detainee said the records found in his possession, which detailed purchases, acquisitions, distribution of food supplies, and warehouse information and distribution of money were records he kept when he worked for the Taliban as Chief of Cooperative Development. He said he was responsible for these records and took them home after the fall of the Taliban so that he would never be accused of embezzling or mispending money.
12. The detainee stated the documents obtained from his residence were his and that he kept them so that he might one day show the Afghani government what he did when he worked for the Taliban.

c. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee was controlling a large cache located in a nearby school which included two types of rockets, anti-tank and high explosive rounds, artillery rounds, gun rounds, tank rounds, and mortar rounds.
2. The detainee stated that during the time of the Taliban, a weapons cache was located at a local school across from his house and the head of the district had people guarding and living at the school during that time.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

- a. The detainee stated that he has lived his whole life in the same house. Other than one trip to Pakistan during the jihad against Russia, the year of travel unknown, the detainee stated that he has not traveled outside of his village. He stated that he went to Pakistan to have eye surgery.
- b. The detainee stated that he was forced to work for the Taliban government by a mayor from Kandahar, Afghanistan.
- c. The detainee stated his assistance to the Taliban was limited to providing food and supplies.
- d. The detainee stated the building where the cooperative worked was only used for buying food at discount prices and selling it to their customers and that no other operations were conducted at this building.

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Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF RAHIM, MOHAMED

- e. The detainee stated that his office did not have access to telephone lines, and that he was not equipped with radios. The detainee stated that the Taliban used radios, but that his office did not have communications equipment.
 - f. The detainee denies ever working for any aspect of Taliban Intelligence.
 - g. The detainee denies both having served in the military and stockpiling weapons for the Taliban.
 - h. The detainee denied knowing any locations of weapons caches or Taliban or al Qaida personalities.
 - i. The detainee stated he never purchased any weapons for himself or anyone else and no one else has ever forced or ordered him to purchase any weapons.
 - j. The detainee denies having any weapons other than the one Kalishnikov that was seized from his house. The detainee claimed that the Kalishnikov was the property of the government and legally in the possession of his brother from whom it was seized. His brother had the weapon because of his service as a soldier for the city. The Karzai government had said they would give 200 United States Dollars to those in Afghanistan who turned in their weapons to the government and the detainee's brother had planned to turn the Kalashnikov in and collect the 200 United States Dollars.
 - k. The detainee denies that he is a Mullah. The detainee further stated he was called a Mullah while in the Taliban because it was a nice title. The detainee also denies ever studying in a Madrasa to attain the title of Mullah.
 - l. The detainee stated that he does not know anything about al Qaida.
5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

3 April 2007

TO: FNU HAMIDULLAH

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF FNU HAMIDULLAH

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee was a member of the Hezb e Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) for 10 years.

2. A source stated the detainee was reported to be one of the heads of the psychological operations wing of the HIG.

3. A source identified the detainee as a HIG commander who in 2003 controlled a large weapons cache near Kabul, Afghanistan, consisting of Kalashnikov assault rifles, BM-12 rockets, PK machineguns, rocket propelled grenades, and 122mm rockets. The weapons were suspected of being designated for attacks on coalition targets.

4. A source stated in May 2003 a group of men with ties to the Taliban planned an attack on an Afghan National Directorate of Security unit based near Kabul, Afghanistan. The men were armed with rocket propelled grenades, machine guns, and other weapons. The detainee was identified as a commander who led the group.

5. The HIG was one of the major Mujahedin groups in the war against the Soviets and has long established ties to Usama bin Laden. The HIG stages small attacks in its attempt to force United States troops to withdraw from Afghanistan, overthrow the Afghan Transitional Administration and establish a fundamentalist state.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF FNU HAMIDULLAH

b. Connections/Associations

A source stated the detainee was captured in a home owned by an al Qaida and Taliban financier in Kabul, Afghanistan.

d. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee was arrested and jailed by the Taliban due to his affiliation with the HIG. The detainee spent 23 months in jail before escaping to Pakistan.

2. The detainee stated he told the Taliban he would support the Taliban and he no longer worked for the HIG, however they put the detainee in prison anyway.

3. The detainee stated he began working for an individual as a way to reinstate King Zahir back into power, because the detainee did not like the Northern Alliance.

4. The detainee stated he was also arrested while attempting to recruit and organize supporters for King Zahir Shah and the Mahaz e Melli.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee stated the only reason he worked for the HIG was because they would provide food and money for the members and their families.

b. The detainee claimed he is friendly to the United States and turned to the Islamic faith as a reason not to kill.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

27 February 2007

To: ABDUL R SALEH

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ABDUL R SALEH

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee decided to go to Chechnya after hearing a Sheik speak at his mosque about the Chechnyan catastrophes. The Sheik suggested the detainee go to Afghanistan instead.

2. The Sheik mentioned above is a prominent scholar who acts as a religious and legal expert for Usama bin Laden.

3. The detainee stated he spent three or four months at the front lines in Karabak, Afghanistan, then spent six months at Khvajeh Ghar, Afghanistan. The detainee lived in trenches while fighting on the front line.

b. Training

1. The detainee stated before going to the front line in Karabak, Afghanistan, he received training at the Said Center on the Kalashnikov rifle, hand grenades and PIKA machine guns. The Said Center was approximately one and one half miles from the front line. The detainee stated the Emir of the Karabak front line was also a training instructor.

2. A source stated an individual with the same name as the Emir mentioned above was one of four commanders on the front lines under the command of a senior al Qaida operative who worked for the Taliban government.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ABDUL R SALEH

3. A source stated the Said Center Training Camp was located in the vicinity of Khavajeh Ghar, Afghanistan. The Said Center was a Taliban run training camp for Arab recruits en route to fight General Dostum's soldiers to the north of Konduz, Afghanistan. Training consisted of small arms familiarization and range qualification.

c. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee stated when the bombing started in Khvajeh Ghar, Afghanistan, his friends decided to pull back. The detainee and his friends took a cab to Konduz, Afghanistan and stayed at a guest house with ten other people. The detainee stated that they remained at Kunduce, Afghanistan for two weeks.

2. The detainee and his friends left Konduz, Afghanistan and traveled by truck to Mazar-e-Sharif, Afghanistan, where they were immediately captured by General Dostum's troops.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee denied having knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001 and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks in the United States or United States interests.

b. The detainee heard about the attacks of 11 September 2001 on the radio while he was in Khvajeh Ghar, Afghanistan. The detainee stated that he feels the attacks are a poor reflection of Muslims. The detainee never saw Usama bin Laden while in Afghanistan. The detainee was warned by a Sheikh to not be associated with Usama bin Laden and al Qaida while in Afghanistan.

c. The detainee knows of no plans to harm the guards at Camp Delta or of plans to escape. The detainee advised that if he were to be released from United States custody, he would return home to the family farm and get married.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

20 April 2007

TO: MUKHTAR Y ANAJE

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MUKHTAR Y ANAJE

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
 1. The detainee decided, on his own, to travel to Afghanistan and assist the Taliban based on issued fatwas.
 2. The detainee stated he went to Afghanistan to fight with the Taliban against the Northern Alliance.
 3. The detainee stated he heard two fatwas about going to Afghanistan to assist the Taliban against the Northern Alliance. One of the fatwas explained how to travel to Quetta, Pakistan to a large Taliban center where the Taliban would take people to Afghanistan. The detainee departed Yemen about two to four weeks after hearing the fatwas.
 4. The detainee stated that on approximately 25 August 2001, he traveled from Sanaa, Yemen to Karachi, Pakistan via Dubai, United Arab Emirates.
 5. The detainee traveled from Karachi, Pakistan to the Taliban center in Quetta, Pakistan. At the center, the detainee stated he wished to go to Afghanistan to fight the Northern Alliance. From the center, the detainee traveled across the border at Spin Buldak, Afghanistan and then to Kandahar, Kabul and Konduz, Afghanistan. The detainee stated he wanted to go to the northern part of Afghanistan because that was where the Taliban was fighting.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MUKHTAR Y ANAJE

b. Training

1. In Konduz, Afghanistan, the detainee traveled to the Khoja Khar line where he trained on the AK-47 rifle and then moved to the front line to fight against the Northern Alliance.
2. The detainee was trained in basic first aid and worked at a special clinic for Arabs in Konduz, Afghanistan.

c. Connections/Associations

1. A source stated the detainee was a Yemeni al Qaida fighter under Abdul Hadi.
2. Abdul Hadi was in overall command of the Arab fighters north of Kabul, Afghanistan.
3. The detainee's name was found in a document recovered from an al Qaida associated safe house.
4. A source identified the detainee as a Yemeni al Qaida operative in Afghanistan.
5. A source recognized the detainee from the frontlines in Konduz, Afghanistan.
6. A source identified the detainee as someone he knew from the Khoja Khar front line area and from the Shabraghan and Kandahar prisons.
7. A source stated that he and the detainee were at a safe house in al Qunds, Afghanistan.
8. A source stated the detainee served on the front lines and was a resident at the Khana Gulam Betcha Guest House. Many people lived at the guest house, including some who went to training at the al Farouq Training Camp.

d. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee initially denied having any knowledge about the U.S.S. Cole and denied ever discussing the U.S.S. Cole with anyone. The detainee later stated he had heard about the U.S.S. Cole explosion and heard it may be related to Usama bin Laden and al Qaida, but he had no personal knowledge of the incident.
2. The detainee went to Mazar e Sharif, Afghanistan, where he was forced to give up his weapon and was placed in custody at the Qala I Jenki Fortress.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MUKHTAR Y ANAJE

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001 and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.

b. The detainee related he has no problems with Americans and no real opinion of them.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

14 August 2007

To: NASSER, GHALEB

Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF NASSER, GHALEB

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee stated his friend told him about a fatwa issued by a Sheikh. The detainee stated his friend said the fatwa declared it an obligation to go and fight with the Taliban in Afghanistan. The detainee stated he went on jihad in Afghanistan based on this fatwa.
2. The detainee stated he had 1,100 Saudi Arabian Riyals for his trip to Afghanistan. The detainee stated an individual gave him an additional 1,500 Saudi Arabian Riyals and 3,500 Pakistani Rupees for his trip.
3. The detainee stated a facilitator gave him 1,500 Riyals and arranged for his travel from Saudi Arabia to al Farouq.
4. The detainee stated he decided to leave for Afghanistan in May 2001. The detainee stated his brother obtained a visa for him to travel to Pakistan.
5. The detainee stated an individual purchased a plane ticket for him from Karachi to Quetta, Pakistan.
6. The detainee stated an individual took the detainee to cross the border into Afghanistan. They did not cross at a border checkpoint. The individual took the

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Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF NASSER, GHALEB

detainee's passport and money and left the detainee with an Afghani who smuggled the detainee across the border. Once over the border, the detainee met up with the individual again and traveled to Kandahar, Afghanistan.

7. The detainee stated that once he completed training at al Farouq, he traveled to Kabul, Afghanistan. The detainee then traveled to his position on the front line in Khawajagar, Afghanistan where he worked as an assistant cook.

b. Training

1. The detainee stated he conducted weapons training at a makeshift camp in Saudi Arabia. Training lasted seven days and included marksmanship and disassembling the AK-47.
2. The detainee stated he went to the Khalid bin al Walid Camp, a preparation camp for al Farouq, for approximately three days.
3. The detainee stated he attended the al Farouq Training Camp in March 2001 for about three weeks. The weapons the detainee trained on at the camp were the Kalashnikov, Beaker, rocket propelled grenade and hand grenades.
4. An individual stated the detainee was instructed in basic training as well as on the use of the SA-7 and ZSU-23 anti-aircraft weapons.
5. An individual stated the detainee's older brother trained the detainee in building improvised explosive devices, utilizing tank shells, mortars, and land mines. The detainee was also trained in urban warfare.
6. An individual stated the detainee was also trained in urban warfare.
7. The detainee stated he received additional training while he was on the northern lines. The detainee received training on the Doushka machine gun and on all four positions on the Russian Zubiak, an anti-aircraft weapon. The detainee stated he received limited training on the 83mm cannon and 82mm automatic mortar.
8. The detainee stated he became a trainer on the Jukrail 30 caliber machine gun and other various weapons while on the front lines.

c. Connections/Associations

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1. The detainee has five or six brothers who work for Usama bin Laden.
2. A source stated the detainee's older brother reported directly to Usama bin Laden and was a high level Taliban and al Qaida leader that took part in decision making. The detainee's older brother was an al Qaida trainer, explosives expert, advisor, and weapons expert, especially with anti-aircraft, map reading and tactics. The detainee was in charge of the main guest houses in Kabul and Kandahar, Afghanistan.
3. The detainee stated he traveled to the front line in Konduz, Afghanistan via a Taliban-operated airplane. At the front line, the detainee received one Kalashnikov, three empty magazines and one full magazine.
4. The detainee stated the individual that arranged for his transportation was an al Qaida contact.
5. An individual stated he saw the detainee on the front line and in Konduz, Afghanistan.

d. Intent

The detainee considers himself as Mujahedin. The detainee's definition of Mujahedin is someone who fights for the Taliban and is a Muslim who stands for implementing Allah's laws.

e. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee, once in Konduz, Afghanistan entered a guest house for Arabs. The detainee stayed there for two weeks. The detainee's intent was to travel from Konduz, Afghanistan to Mazar-e-Sharif, Afghanistan to Kandahar, Afghanistan and finally to Saudi Arabia.
2. The detainee stated the head Taliban in charge negotiated their surrender to general Dostum's forces. They surrendered their weapons, got onto trucks and were taken to an underground jail in a castle. The next day fighting broke out at the castle and the detainee was wounded in the right, upper arm. After about eight days the detainee and others surrendered to General Dostum's troops again. The detainee was taken to the Shabrakhan jail for about a month.

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4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

- a. The detainee stated he had no knowledge of al Qaida or its members.
- b. The detainee denies ever fighting against Americans.
- c. The detainee stated that he never received any formal military training and was shown how to use a Kalashnikov rifle by his friends in Saudi Arabia. The detainee also states that he never discharged his weapon.
- d. The detainee has stated that if he was released, he would not go back to Saudi Arabia. The detainee would like to go to Sanaa, Yemen and look for his family.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

13 March 2007

To: HADI, SALEM A

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SALEM A HADI

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee flew from Yemen to Karachi, Pakistan, in 1997 with 1,000 United States dollars with the intent of purchasing approximately fifty kilos of honey. The detainee planned on selling the honey from his home in Yemen. The detainee did not buy any honey in Karachi because he met a Pakistani man at a local mosque who influenced the detainee to go to Afghanistan for jihad.

2. Although the detainee was influenced by the Pakistani man, the idea of jihad was already on the detainee's mind. The detainee traveled to Kabul, Afghanistan because Taliban forces, which were at war with Masoud's forces, controlled the area. The detainee received a Kalashnikov rifle from a distribution center one day before he was sent to the front line.

3. After spending approximately three months on the front line near Kabul, Afghanistan, the detainee and his group were sent north to an area near Konduz, Afghanistan to fight the Northern Alliance. The detainee chose to support the jihad, and was not deceived by anyone. The detainee fought against the Northern Alliance because they were regarded as oppressors, not infidels.

4. A source stated the detainee was his commander. The detainee had been one of two sub-commanders until the original commander was injured in late September 2001. The detainee was the oldest of the group and became the commander.

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b. Training

1. The detainee stated he had not received any training on his AK-47, but he did admit he knew how to fire a PK, as well as a RPG.

2. The detainee's name was on a document issued by the Office of Mujahideen Affairs that lists over 150 al Qaida members scheduled for tactics, artillery, security, sniper, and anti-aircraft training dated March 2001. The detainee's name was listed under artillery class 2.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee stated he fought with the Taliban in Kabul, Afghanistan, from July to December 2001.

2. A source stated the detainee was on the northern front line with Abdul Hadi al Iraqi.

3. A source stated Abdul Hadi al Iraqi was a senior al Qaida member and former commander of the Arab Brigade.

4. The 55th Arab Brigade had a unit north of Kabul, Afghanistan armed with AK-47 assault rifles, hand grenades and different types of machine guns. They defended the front line.

5. A source identified the detainee as having trained at al Farouq Training Camp, and saw him on the front lines with a Kalashnikov.

6. A suspected al Qaida operative possessed two forged passports, one of which was a Yemeni passport in the detainee's name.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee stated he did not receive any formal training at a training camp.

b. The detainee denied assuming a leadership position within the Taliban command structure when his leader was injured on the front lines.

c. A source corroborated the detainee's account indicating the detainee was not the unit commander at Kabul and Kunduz, Afghanistan after his commander was wounded.

d. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001. The detainee also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.

e. The detainee denied knowing Abd Hadi al Iraqi.

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SALEM A HADI**

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

17 September 2007

To: BIN HAMLILI, ADIL HADI AL-JAZA'IRI

Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF BIN HAMLILI, ADIL HADI AL-JAZA'IRI

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
 1. The detainee stated he moved from Algeria to Afghanistan for jihad at the age of eleven with his father and brothers.
 2. After a year in Mali and a month in Burkina Faso, the detainee and his family traveled to Saudi Arabia for Haj and stayed there four to six months. The detainee stated they left Saudi Arabia and traveled to Peshawar, Pakistan to perform jihad.
 3. The detainee stated that after training on the border of Pakistan and Afghanistan he and the rest of the group went to the front line. The detainee stated that at this time he was twelve years old. The detainee stated he spent a total of between six and seven years rotating on the front line from about 1986 to 1991. The detainee stated that while on the front line he did not kill anyone to his knowledge.
 4. The detainee stated he returned to Peshwar, Pakistan in 1991. In 1999, the detainee was arrested for not having the proper papers and spent a year in jail in Pakistan.
 5. Once released from Pakistani prison, the detainee was escorted to the border, released into Afghanistan and told never to return. The detainee stated he went to Jalalabad, Afghanistan where he met various members of the Taliban. The detainee stated they showed favor to him and gave him a place to live in Kabul, Afghanistan

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Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF BIN HAMLILI, ADIL HADI AL-JAZA'IRI

for approximately four months.

6. The detainee stated the Taliban Foreign Minister recommended the detainee for a job as a translator after learning the detainee spoke both Pashtu and Arabic.
7. The detainee stated he worked as a translator at the Taliban Foreign Ministry for approximately four to five months before the United States bombing campaign began. The detainee stated that he then fled Afghanistan and returned to Pakistan with his family.

b. Training

1. The detainee stated that sometime in 1986 he went to the Sadaa Training camp on the border of Pakistan and Afghanistan. The detainee stated the one month training at the camp consisted of anti-aircraft guns and small arms, such as, the Kalashnikov, AK-47, rocket propelled grenades and the Pakistani machine gun. The detainee stated that during the training he fired each of these weapons and then used them on the front line. After three to six months on the front line, the detainee received training on the Stinger missile, but he never fired it.
2. The detainee stated he attended the Sadaa Camp several times between 1986 and 1991. The detainee stated the Sadaa Camp was mandatory for all fighters before entering Afghanistan to fight against the Russians. The detainee further stated the training conducted in the camp was primarily general combat skills, but after serving in Afghanistan you could take specialized training.
3. The detainee stated that he had spent a month at the Khalden Camp in Afghanistan getting ready to return to Algeria for jihad.
4. Khalden Camp was co-managed by a senior al Qaida Lieutenant. An entire six-month program at Khalden consisted of light weapons, heavy weapons, explosives, topography and a tactical course.
5. A source stated he met the detainee in 1991 at the Khalden camp in Afghanistan.
6. The detainee attended a three day training course in Improvised Explosive Devices held in Peshawar, Pakistan, in November 2002. The training was on improvised firing devices. The students learned how to use a digital alarm clock as an improvised firing device and were taught that cordless phones could also be used. The instructor discussed the use of poisons with explosives.
7. At the three day training course, an impromptu discussion took place on methods to attack United States forces stationed at Bagram Air Base, Afghanistan. One of the

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methods would involve poisoning the food destined for the base, while it was in the port of Karachi, Pakistan. The other method involved placing Improvised Explosive Devices on fuel trucks that supplied the bases. The Improvised Explosive Devices would be placed on the trucks while they were in Peshawar, Pakistan before they crossed into Afghanistan. The participants additionally discussed bomb attacks of United States forces in Konar Province, Afghanistan; Jalalabad, Afghanistan; and Nangarhar Province, Afghanistan.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee stated that a charity organization brought them to a guest house. The detainee thought the guest house and or the charity organization that helped them was called the Egyptian Jihad Group and was operated by an individual. The detainee stated the individual was the second in command for al Qaida.
2. Al-Jihad also known as the Egyptian Jihad Group is an Egyptian Islamic extremist group active since the late 1970s. It merged with Usama bin Laden's al-Qaida organization in June 2001, but may retain some capability to conduct independent operations. The primary goals are to overthrow the Egyptian Government and replace it with an Islamic state and to attack the United States and Israeli interests in Egypt and abroad.
3. The detainee stated Usama bin Laden also visited the guest house and indicated he had some contacts with Usama bin Laden at various dinner functions and handled one of Usama bin Laden's weapons. The detainee indicated he did not share a close relationship with Usama bin Laden, but early on as a youth, he observed a relationship between Usama bin Laden and his father.
4. The detainee stated he was a foot soldier for Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin and fought against two individuals after the defeat of the Soviets in Afghanistan. The detainee stated Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin believed these individuals were being backed by the Soviets after the Soviets were defeated.
5. Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin has long-established ties with Usama bin Laden. In the early 1990s, Hikmatyar ran several terrorist training camps in Afghanistan and was a pioneer in sending mercenary fighters to other Islamic conflicts. Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin has staged small attacks in its attempt to force United States troops to withdraw from Afghanistan, overthrow the Afghan Transitional Administration, and establish a fundamentalist state.
6. The detainee stated that in 1999, he was a member of the Armed Islamic Group in Pakistan. The detainee stated the group was training in the Jazuji Camp near Peshawar, Pakistan. Al Qaida sponsored this camp. The Algerian group, Armed

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Islamic, was there to train and then return and conduct jihad against the Algerian government. The detainee claims Usama bin Laden, and two others placed three well-trained al Qaida operatives in this group to enhance their experience level as well as their training. The detainee stated he was not allowed to return to Algeria and conduct jihad due to his language skills being needed in Pakistan and Afghanistan more than they needed fighters in Algeria.

7. The armed Islamic Front, GIA, is an Islamic extremist group that aims to overthrow the secular Algerian regime and replace it with an Islamic state. The Armed Islamic group began its violent activity in 1992 after Algiers voided the victory of the Islamic Salvation Front, the largest Islamic opposition party, in the first round of legislative elections in December 1991.
8. The detainee stated that he met Zarqawi in 2000 or 2001. Zarqawi was in prison with a good friend of the detainee in Pakistan in 2000. Zarqawi was told to go to Kabul, Afghanistan to see the detainee about giving him a place to stay for a while.
9. The detainee was considered dangerous and untrustworthy, despised by many in the Arab community, and was believed to have had some role in the 1996 murder of a Peshawar, Pakistan based al Qaida officer.
10. The detainee was responsible for the 24 December 2002 attack on the Chuwanwali Church in Punjab, Pakistan and the 17 Mar 2002 attack on the Protestant Islamic Church in Islamabad, Pakistan. The detainee had 300,000 Pakistani Rupees (approximately 5,263 United States Dollars) to support the detainee's cell in Punjab, Pakistan and fund an attack against Pakistani President.
11. The detainee stated he had met the al Qaida Operations Chief two months before the fall of the Taliban government in Afghanistan. He recalled only seeing this individual twice in 1987 and then again for a one time event in 1990.
12. The detainee stated he was introduced to the Canadian Foundation in Kabul, Afghanistan. They provided the detainee financial support in return for information on the whereabouts and activities of al Qaida members.
13. A source stated the detainee was a member of Hizb ul-Mujahideen, who resided in the board area of Peshawar, Pakistan.
14. Hizb ul-Mujahidin, the largest Kashmiri militant group, was founded in 1989 and officially supports the liberation of Kashmir and its accession to Pakistan, although some cadres are proindependence. The group is the militant wing of Pakistan's largest Islamic political party, the Jamaat-i-isiami. It currently is focused on Indian security forces and politicians in Kashmir and has conducted operations jointly with

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other Kashmiri militants. It reportedly operated in Afghanistan through the mid-1990s and trained along side the Afghan Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin in Afghanistan until the Taliban takeover.

15. The detainee stated he joined a group called Hillafah to which he was elected as the group's leader because he spoke Pashtu and was able to pass himself off as Afghani. The group was disbanded approximately one year later when the detainee was arrested by Pakistani authorities.
16. The detainee stated he later became a member of a group called Khilafah, not Hillafah, which consisted of approximately 25 members of Arab, Pakistani and Afghani descent. The detainee stated the main mission of Khilafah was to unite all Muslims under one leadership structure.
17. The detainee stated while in Peshawar, Pakistan, he joined the al-Khalafa group, which was dedicated to overthrowing the Pakistani government.
18. The detainee stated he knew the leader of a local al Khalifa group that stayed in his home along with other al Khalifa members. The detainee stated they stayed in the home in Peshawar, Pakistan and he may have had up to twenty men, women and children pass through his house at any given time. Some of these individuals remained in the home up to six months.
19. The detainee was a Taqfiri, which was a group of religious fanatics who were known to purge and kill their own members. The detainee had joined the front line with the Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin leader in 1996.
20. The detainee stated he was a member of Takfer Wael Hagra and al Khalifa, but could not recall if his membership was in 1989 or 1999, but thought it was before he went to prison in Pakistan.
21. A source stated the detainee was a very violent person with little contact except for his close friends and those affiliated with Takfer Wael Hagra. The source stated they have no problem killing others.
22. A source stated the detainee was a member of the Takfir Wal Hijra group operating in Pakistan and was known as a bad man by others living in Pakistan.
23. A source stated the detainee was a member of the Takfir wal Hijra group in Peshawar, Pakistan. The Khawraj Group, of which the Takfir Wal Hijr Group is a branch, sees all people who do not agree with their ideology as infidels. They possess tanks and weapons of their own.

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24. A source stated the detainee believes all Muslims and non-Muslims not in the Tagsiri sect of Islam are infidels, to include Mullah Omar and Usama bin Laden. The source stated Tagsiri is the backbone of the insurgency in Algeria and is a major player in the insurgency in Iraq. Tagsiri is known for its' involvement in sectarian violence against Muslims, but also is responsible for attacks against coalition and government forces.
 25. The detainee was a good contact to have if one needed to stay or pass through the tribal region on the Afghanistan and Pakistan border.
 26. A source stated the detainee would often brag about being an interpreter for the Taliban because he spoke both Pashtu and Arabic.
4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a. The detainee expressed distaste for al Qaida and said he did not like them.
 - b. The detainee stated al Qaida used him and others as test subjects for testing of poisons and toxins. The detainee stated he was telling new arrivals not to trust al Qaida.
 - c. The detainee stated he had no association with Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin.
 - d. The detainee stated that any information taken from him while imprisoned at Bagram, Afghanistan, was taken under duress and was not true.
 - e. The detainee stated he was not involved in the overthrow of the Pakistani government or the assassination attempt on the Pakistani President.
 - f. The detainee stated he never swore bayat to Usama bin Laden.
 - g. When asked if released would he assist any organization to make bad things happen to America, the detainee replied no. The detainee stated he would return to his family in Algeria and not help anyone do anything anymore.
 - h. A source stated, while in prison, the detainee had written several things on the wall cursing Usama bin Laden and al Qaida and then signed his name to it. The source stated he did not believe the detainee was a member of al Qaida because of his Takfiri beliefs.
 - i. A source stated the detainee was a hard core gang member but discounted his association with al Qaida.
 - j. The detainee stated he had never met Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi.

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- k. The detainee stated he believed in al Khalifa, but never was a member and never a leader.
 - l. The detainee denied being a member of Al Khalifa but was sympathetic towards the goals of the organization.
 - m. The detainee denied destroying the churches. The detainee stated he also denied the receipt of financial support from an al Qaida Operations Chief for an attack against the Pakistani President. The detainee stated he had never heard of such a thing.
5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

31 October 2007

To: ALI BIN 'ATTASH, HASSAN MOHAMMED

Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ALI BIN 'ATTASH, HASSAN MOHAMMED

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
 1. The detainee's family had been close to Usama bin Laden and al Qaida since the early 1980s. It was not uncommon for Usama bin Laden to be at the detainee's father's house, and the detainee had often been to the Usama bin Laden family home in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. The detainee's entire family, with the exception of his mother, two sisters, and his youngest brother, has participated in jihad.
 2. The detainee was always eager to join the jihad. The detainee was very involved in al Qaida and first traveled to Afghanistan in 1997.
 3. The detainee stated he first went to Afghanistan for jihad one to two months prior to Ramadan, 1997. The detainee stated he traveled from Jeddah, Saudi Arabia to Peshawar, Pakistan via Yemen and Karachi, Pakistan.
 4. The detainee stated in order to reach Afghanistan, he and one of his brothers traveled to Yemen where they contacted a Mujahedin facilitator. The Mujahedin facilitator contacted an individual and recommended that the detainee and the second brother be accepted for participation in the Afghan jihad.
 5. The detainee stated that he and another brother stayed for only one day at the guest house before traveling to Jalalabad, Afghanistan where a third brother of the

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detainee took them to the Najm al Jihad complex.

6. Nejm al Jihad was an al Qaida housing compound owned by Usama bin Laden that is occupied by al Qaida members and their families.
7. The detainee stated that prior to 11 September 2001, the detainee was privy to information about the plot to attack United States ships in Dubai, United Arab Emirates using explosives and a boat. The detainee stated he remembered meeting about ten Yemeni men who were to be involved in the operation. The detainee stated he would have liked to have been a part of the operation.
8. The detainee stated he traveled from Karachi, Pakistan to Quetta with three to five Sega cartridges made into remote detonators. The detainee stated he delivered the cartridges to two Afghan males.
9. A source identified one of the individuals in the previous statement as the leader of a 10 person Taliban terrorist cell created in March 2002.
10. The detainee stated he joined al Qaida and was treated well within the organization due to his family's close relationship with Usama bin Laden. The detainee also stated he became a trusted al Qaida member and was especially close to a senior al Qaida member.
11. The detainee stated he resided in a safe house with a senior al Qaida facilitator and a senior al Qaida operational coordinator in the Golshin Qabaal area of Karachi, Pakistan.
12. The detainee stated he traveled back and forth to fight in Kabul after he trained at the Jihad Wal Camp.

b. Training

1. The detainee stated that in 1997 he took bomb making classes at the Khalden and Jihad Wahl camps in Khowst, Afghanistan where he was able to observe how bombs were built. The detainee stated that bombs created at the camp in 1997 were created mostly to be used against the Northern Alliance Forces. The detainee stated that after 11 September 2001 the bombs were likely used against United States Forces in Afghanistan.
2. The detainee stated he received basic military-type training in the Khalden camp followed by additional training during which time he resided in Usama bin Laden

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guest houses and camps.

3. The detainee stated he stayed at the Khalden camp for five to six months where he received training on weapons such as the Kalashnikov, Beeka and Deshooka, as well as training in explosive devices such as mines, grenades and mortars. The detainee also stated he did not attend all the training, estimating that he attended less than half of the classes. The detainee speculated that he was given great leniency due to his young age.
4. The detainee stated he attended the Jihad Wal camp between three and five months. The detainee stated the instruction consisted primarily of explosives training.
5. Jihad Wahl camp is located near Khowst, Afghanistan with a training program lasting approximately two months and is concentrated on shooting and self-defense tactics and skills.
6. The detainee stated that in 1999 he attended an Algerian camp called Derunta where he studied how to make explosives. The detainee stated he stayed at the camp for only about a week before he quit to return to Jalalabad. The detainee stated most of the camp's training was conducted in French, which he did not understand.
7. The Derunta training camp near Jalalabad, Afghanistan was one of Usama bin Laden's most important bases in Afghanistan. The camp provided training in the use of explosives and toxic chemical usage. Derunta also contained several secondary bases belonging to Usama bin Laden.
8. The detainee stated an individual had shown him how they made a remote out of a game cartridge. The detainee also stated the remotes were given to him with directions on how to use them. The detainee further stated the directions were printed in both Pashtu and English.
9. A source stated the individual in the previous statement was an al Qaida explosives expert who was a trainer at the al Farouq camp and carried out attacks in Nairobi, Kenya and Yemen against the USS Cole.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee's older brother is a senior al Qaida operational planner.

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Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ALI BIN 'ATTASH, HASSAN MOHAMMED

2. The detainee stated that in March 2001, an individual assigned the detainee to establish a safe house in Karachi, Pakistan for al Qaida members to use when they traveled from Afghanistan to Karachi to plan operations.
3. The individual in the previous statement is a senior al Qaida operational coordinator who has been linked to as many as a dozen plots to attack the United States and western interests since late 2001. The individual masterminded the October 2000 attack against the USS Cole.
4. The detainee stated that in 2001, the detainee followed the individual's orders and traveled back and forth to Kandahar, Afghanistan every two months bringing \$10,000 United States dollars per trip back to Karachi, Pakistan. The detainee stated the money was to be used to pay for a 300 to 400 ton ship to assist in the attacks against United States naval vessels and United States oil tankers in the Straits of Hormuz.
5. The detainee stated that a second individual directed the detainee's activities after the first individual's departure from Karachi, Pakistan in April 2002. The detainee stated that the second individual worked under a senior al Qaida Lieutenant providing timers, remote control devices and explosives to be used in operations against United States personnel.
6. The detainee was arrested in Karachi, Pakistan on 11 September 2002 with another individual.

d. Intent

1. The detainee stated he was raised with Takfiri jihad radical beliefs.
2. Takfir is a movement of ultra hardcore Islamist groups within the worldwide terrorist network. Takfir cells have used assassinations, kidnappings and bombings against state governments, moderate Muslims, Muslim extremists who have a different ideology, and Western interests.
3. The detainee stated that around the end of 2000, his older brother instructed him to leave Afghanistan to go to Karachi, Pakistan because of rumors the detainee was affiliated with Takfiris and their ideology.

e. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee established a number of e-mail accounts to communicate and coordinate with other al Qaida members. The detainee also admitted he sent

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letters to an individual confirming plans to carry out major operations in Yemen including targeting oil tankers in Yemeni ports, which would have completed the plan to attack ships in the Straits of Hormuz.

2. The individual in the previous statement was identified as the lead recruiter of six Yemeni-Americans from a small city five miles from Buffalo, New York who went to al Qaida military training camps in the summer of 2001.
4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
 - a. The detainee stated he did not take an active part in any of the planning or execution of the boat attacks against American vessels.
 - b. The detainee stated he never personally saw how the Sega remote detonators were made and never participated in their manufacture. The detainee stated he did not initially know what the remote detonators would be used for.
5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

16 November 2007

To: SHARQAWI, ABDU ALI AL-HAJI

Subject: **UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SHARQAWI, ABDU ALI AL-HAJI**

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee stated he traveled to Bosnia for jihad and arrived there in February 1995.
2. The detainee stated he went to the front lines after training and was placed as a guard of the front line, which meant he wasn't engaged in fighting; he was just protecting the position. The detainee stated he waited for two months to see if the fighting would resume before he returned to Yemen in February 1996.
3. The detainee stated he heard Muslims were dying in Ogaden, Africa, so in 1996 he traveled to Kenya and stayed there for a week trying to get into Somalia. While in Nairobi, he met a Saudi who warned him against Arabs going to Ogaden, stating it was not safe. The detainee was convinced and went back to Yemen.
4. The detainee stated he stated he traveled to Arakan, Asia in March 1997 because he heard Buddhists were killing Muslims. He was in Bangladesh for a month trying to get into Arakan, now known as Rakhine, but couldn't so he flew back to Yemen.

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Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SHARQAWI, ABDU ALI AL-HAJI

5. The detainee stated he flew to Pakistan on 18 August 2000 with the purpose of receiving training in Afghanistan for jihad in Chechnya. The detainee used a Yemeni passport and went by the name of Rami al Zurqa. Detainee stated he stayed in a hotel in Karachi for 5-7 days before flying to Quetta. The detainee stated he stayed at the Hawli Taliban guesthouse in Quetta for three weeks before he could be smuggled into Afghanistan.
 6. The detainee stated he moved to Pakistan in April or May 2001 to facilitate travel for those trying to get to Afghanistan.
 7. The detainee stated he received money from two wealthy Saudis. The detainee stated he received cash on about 20 occasions between November 2001 and January 2002. In total, the amount he received is about equal to one million American dollars. The detainee stated the money was used to help Mujahedin fleeing Afghanistan.
 8. The detainee was selected by an individual to organize the mechanics and logistics for a planned attack on the American Embassy in Sanaa, Yemen. The detainee obtained small amounts of TNT over several months and stored it at a safe house.
- b. Training
1. The detainee stated once he arrived in Bosnia, he attended training with the Bosnian Army in the Mujahed Battalion for forty days. The detainee stated they taught physical training and weapons, such as the Kalashnikovs and hand grenades and his training ended March or April 1995.
 2. The detainee stated he traveled to Jalalabad, Afghanistan to take a class on electronics. The detainee stated the objective of the class was to learn how to make remote controls for explosives. The class was six months long but the detainee stated he dropped out early.
 3. The detainee stated he attended a training camp where electronics was taught.
- c. Connections/Associations
1. The detainee stated he moved to Sanaa, Yemen in 1994 to study Islamic law at an institute in Dimaj, a district of Sanaa. The detainee stated the founder and director of the institute was Sheikh Muqbil al Wadi.

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Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SHARQAWI, ABDU ALI AL-HAJI

2. A source stated Sheikh Muqbil al Wadi expressed support for Usama bin Laden and jihad. Sheikh al Wadi was known to deliver personal, verbal fatwas to those desiring to fight in the jihad.
3. The detainee stated he fled with Usama bin Laden and his bodyguards to Kandahar, Afghanistan in December 2000.
4. The detainee stated he participated in weekly group luncheons from August 2000 through May 2001 with Usama bin Laden in Kandahar, Afghanistan.
5. The detainee stated while he was in Kabul, Afghanistan he found out Usama bin Laden stayed at the same house that he did called the Bayt Allam. The detainee stated the house belonged to the Egyptian Islamic Jihad.
6. Egyptian Islamic Jihad is an extremist group active since the late 1970s. The group merged with Usama bin Laden's al Qaida organization in June 2001, but may retain some capability to conduct independent operations. Its primary goals are to overthrow the Egyptian Government and replace it with an Islamic state and to attack United States and Israeli interests in Egypt and abroad.
7. Egyptian Islamic Jihad is identified in Executive Order 13224. Executive Order 13224 was created to block property and prohibit transactions with persons who commit, threaten to commit, or support terrorism.
8. The detainee stated he came in contact with Usama bin Laden at a house in Kabul, Afghanistan, the week after the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States.
9. The detainee possibly served briefly as one of Usama bin Laden's bodyguards. The detainee did not serve as a bodyguard very long because the detainee left for Pakistan before the 11 September 2001 attacks.
10. The detainee stated he knew several Usama bin Laden guards from Yemen and had facilitated their travel to Afghanistan.
11. The detainee stated he was a Mujahedin and had facilitated travel for al Qaida members, but he was not al Qaida.
12. The detainee stated he never spoke to Usama bin Laden personally about arranging travel for al Qaida, but he did talk to one of Usama bin Laden's assistants.

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13. A source stated the detainee was a key facilitator of travel to Afghanistan from Pakistan. The source stated the detainee ran operations in Karachi, Pakistan.
14. A source stated the detainee was in charge of one of the houses that he rented. The source admitted he knew that he was renting the house which would be used to hide and house the large influx of Mujahedin fighters fleeing from Afghanistan.
15. The detainee was responsible for the physical storage of al Qaida cash and had authority to distribute funds without prior approval.
16. An individual sent items such as money, passports, and food supplies to members of al Qaida. These items were given to the detainee, who would ensure the items would reach the people in Afghanistan who requested them.
17. The detainee was sent by Usama bin Laden to settle a dispute between an al Qaida military commander and some Yemeni al Qaida members.
18. Usama bin Laden made the detainee a Falcon because he was a key facilitator for the movement of men in and out of Afghanistan. Usama bin Laden was the only authority that could make someone a Falcon. The status of Falcon was based on what types of things an individual could do for the organization.
19. The detainee photo identified ten of the hijackers involved in the 11 September 2001 attack. The detainee provided varying amounts of information on each individual.
20. The detainee saw three of the 11 September 2001 hijackers while with Usama bin Laden in March 2001.
21. The detainee stated he was a friend of one of the suicide bombers involved in the bombing of the U.S.S. Cole

d. Intent

1. The detainee stated joining jihad and dying in the process of helping Muslims was a better way to die.
2. The detainee stated he was confused about what he wanted to do upon his release. He stated there's a part of him that wants to join Zarqawi or Sheik Osama in the fight against the United States. The detainee stated he wanted to kill every American upon his release. However, another part of him wants to go far away so

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he can get away from all of the conflict.

3. The detainee stated that if he is released he will be able to rejoin Usama bin Laden.

e. Other Relevant Data

1. Two airline life vests and a back pack were found at the safe house used by the detainee. Initial testing of these items were positive for explosives. Initial testing of sample swabs taken of the two life vest and backpack tested positive for Pentaerythritol Tetranitrate. This is one of the most powerful and brisant explosives. It is often used as the main charge in blasting caps as well as the core material in some types of detonating cord.
2. The detainee stated the 170,000 United States dollars found at the house when he was captured was originally kept at another house he believed was under surveillance.
3. The detainee stated he always used couriers to bring money from donors in Saudi Arabia to himself in Karachi, Pakistan for extremists and their families.
4. The detainee stated officials were bribed and documents forged in order to get people visas and passports. The detainee was responsible for the Taiz, Yemen area.
5. The detainee stated a Saudi wanted to give him money to facilitate travel for those wanting travel to Afghanistan for training. Another Saudi would give detainee money to facilitate people's travel to Afghanistan.
6. The detainee stated he received three video cameras from a Sheikh to send to Afghanistan. The Sheikh requested video footage of Arabs engaged in combat with Coalition Forces. This video would be used for jihad recruitment in Saudi Arabia.
7. The Sheikh in the previous statement was one of the most prominent Saudi financiers for al Qaida.
8. The detainee stated he was raised to view the United States as an enemy of Islam.
9. The detainee stated he was against swearing Bayat and having allegiance to any organization, including al Qaida, because it limited his personal freedom and

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would prevent him from going to Chechnya to fight.

10. It was believed the detainee swore bayat to Usama bin Laden.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

- a. The detainee stated he did not accept Usama bin Laden's claim that American civilians were legitimate targets because they paid taxes and supported the American government.
- b. The detainee stated Usama bin Laden and al Qaida are against the United States, but his support of al Qaida did not put him in opposition of the United States. The detainee also stated he never pledged bayat.
- c. The detainee stated he has never received explosives training.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

10 October 2007

To: AL HILAL, ABDUL AL-SALAM

Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL HILAL, ABDUL AL-SALAM

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
 1. The detainee stated he was selected to join the Yemeni Political Security Organization in the mid nineties.
 2. The detainee stated he participated in a Yemeni government deportation operation from approximately 1995 to 1999.
 3. The detainee stated that since 1996, he was involved in aiding al Qaida and other extremists through the provision of false passports and by giving them safe haven out of the country under the guise of deportation.
 4. The detainee stated he traveled to Germany three times each year since 1996 to procure passports. On each trip the detainee received new and used Portuguese passports.
 5. The detainee stated he was directed to use the cover of deportation to facilitate the transfer of Yemeni extremists to Pakistan and Afghanistan. These deportees were to deploy with al Qaida networks to receive training and to prepare for onward assignments.

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Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL HILAL, ABDUL AL-SALAM

6. In 1997 the detainee helped an al Qaida and Egyptian Islamic Jihad operative travel from Yemen to Sudan to meet with senior al Qaida members by giving the operative air tickets and money.
7. Egyptian Islamic Jihad is an extremist group that has been active since the late 1970s. Egyptian Islamic Jihad merged with Usama bin Laden's al Qaida organization in June 2001, but may retain some capability to conduct independent operations. The primary goals of Egyptian Islamic Jihad are to overthrow the Egyptian Government and replace it with an Islamic state, and to attack United States and Israeli interests in Egypt and abroad.
8. The detainee arranged to cancel the deportation of an individual who was arrested for counterfeiting documents and passports for the Mujahedin in Yemen. The detainee had provided the individual with a forged Iraqi passport. The individual was a terrorist facilitator and a known explosives specialist.
9. The detainee was responsible for the confiscation of Libyan and Algerian students' passports as a member of the Yemen Political Security Organization. The extremist stated the detainee then provided the confiscated passports to certain persons whom he wanted to send to Europe from Yemen.
10. The detainee stated that in approximately 1997 or 1998, he traveled to Milan, Italy, where he prayed at the Islamic Cultural Institute and met the director.
11. A source stated the Islamic Cultural Institute was shut down by Italian authorities for housing a network, which was the core for the Tunisian Combat Group in Italy.
12. The Tunisian Combatant Group is seeking to establish an Islamic regime in Tunisia and targets United States and Western interests. The loosely organized Group has come to be associated with al Qaida and other North African extremist networks that have been implicated in terrorist plots.
13. In July 1999, the detainee met with the director of the nongovernmental organization al Haramayn in Zenica, Bosnia.
14. A source stated the al Haramain Saudi Arabian Foundation's main mission is to implement and teach true Wahhabism religious doctrine worldwide. Al Haramain has connections with al Qaida. A former head of the al Haramain has been accused of controlling the financial, material and logistic support to al Qaida and other terrorist organizations. Al Haramain is suspected of involvement in weapons smuggling to Algeria and the transfer of radical fundamentalists to

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Bosnia during the war in the former Yugoslavia.

b. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee was an extremist facilitator in Yemen and was in contact with the chief document forger for the Egyptian Islamic Jihad.
2. In August 2000, the detainee traveled from Yemen to Europe and met with an Attaché for the Islamic Cultural Institute who is also an alleged member of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad.
3. The detainee met with the alleged chief of the Egyptian network, during the summer of 2000 when the Islamic Institute in Milan, Italy, organized a camp for Islamic fundamentalists. Wire taps by Italian Police link the alleged Milan al Qaida cell to the 11 September 2001 massacres in the United States. During the wiretaps the detainee said: "Well, I am studying airplanes! If it is God's will, I hope to bring you a window or a piece of a plane next time I see you... We are focusing on the air alone... It is something terrifying, something that moves from south to north and from east to west: the man who devised the program is a lunatic, but he is a genius. It will leave them stunned... we can fight any force using candles and planes. They will not be able to halt us, not even with their heaviest weapons. We just have to strike them, and hold our heads high. Remember, the danger at the airports. If it comes off, it will be reported in all the world's papers. The Americans have come into Europe to weaken us, but our target is now the sky."

c. Other Relevant Data

1. A source stated that the detainee's brother had been extremely close to the USS Cole bomber and the failed USS Sullivans bomber.
2. As of November 2001, the detainee was an al Qaida member who traveled from Yemen to Afghanistan.
3. The detainee stated that in April or May 2002, he had received funds from families of extremists held in prison in Yemen in exchange for their release.
4. Indications are that the detainee gave forged passports to foreign fighters that were in Yemen hiding after the Russian jihad in Afghanistan.
5. The detainee provided security, protection and refuge to extremists. The detainee secured the release of some extremist elements from prison. The detainee

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Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL HILAL, ABDUL AL-SALAM

facilitated the movement of some of the extremist elements outside of Yemen and provided them with passports. The detainee also traveled with some of these extremists to their destination countries in order to completely fulfill certain unspecified requirements.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

- a. The detainee stated he had no prior knowledge of the 11 September 2001 attacks and had no desire to participate in or plan any terrorist activity because one day he may be the victim.
- b. The detainee stated he never acted in any capacity as a travel facilitator for al Qaida or Egyptian Islamic Jihad.
- c. The detainee stated he did not work for the Yemeni Political Security Organization.
- d. Detainee stated he never participated in any terrorist action and had nothing but loathing for terrorism as a whole.
- e. The detainee was a Political Security Organization (PSO) agent under PSO orders to report on Egyptian Islamic Jihad and al Qaida activities in Yemen. The detainee was following Political Security Organization orders allowing the Political Security Organization to control the Egyptian Islamic Jihad and al Qaida networks in Yemen.
- f. The detainee denied having any knowledge of extremist document forgery operations in Europe.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention; nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

2 May 2007

TO: ADIL MABROUK BIN HAMIDA
SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ADIL MABROUK BIN HAMIDA

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee sold hashish and other narcotics in Italy between 1989 and 1995, and was imprisoned in Italy in 1989, 1992, and 1998 for narcotics trafficking. After the detainee started attending a mosque, he decided to reform completely and gave up selling drugs.

2. An individual facilitated the detainee's travel to Afghanistan by providing directions to the Algerian House in Jalalabad, Afghanistan and by taking the detainee to a travel agency to purchase plane tickets and obtain a visa for Iran.

3. The Algerian House in Jalalabad, Afghanistan was a safe house associated with the North African terrorist network that facilitated travel for Mujahedin recruits.

4. The detainee stayed at the House of the Algerians in Jalalabad, Afghanistan for approximately 29 days.

5. The detainee left the Kabul guest house for fear of being captured by the Northern Alliance. The detainee fled to the Pakistan border and was promptly arrested.

b. Training

While staying in the guest house in Jalalabad, Afghanistan, the detainee was taught assembly and disassembly of the Kalashnikov rifle.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ADIL MABROUK BIN HAMIDA

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee was identified as being associated with the suspected al Takfir Wa Al Hijra cell in Bologna, Italy.

2. Al Takfir Wa Hijra is a transnational movement of several loosely networked Islamist sects who believe they are obligated to cleanse Muslim society, through violence if necessary, and replace it with a pure Muslim religious, political, and social structure. The puritanical member's primary goal is to destroy Islamic regimes and to rebuild them with a pure form of Islam.

3. A member of the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat cell of Bologna, Italy, used a phone card owned by the detainee.

4. The Algerian Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat recruited fighters throughout Europe, trained them in Afghanistan and sent them to fight in Chechnya, Algeria and Bosnia.

5. As of late 2002, the detainee's brother was suspected by Italian authorities to be planning to commit an unknown type of terrorist attack against an unknown target during Ramadan.

6. In early 2005, the detainee's brother was indicted under charges of international terrorism in Italy for collecting money and recruiting combatants for the group formerly known as Hasm, the Moroccan Fighting Islamic Group, which became Jaamaa Islamica Mujahida Maghribia. Authorities also believed the group had planned to attack subway stations and churches.

d. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee was captured with a Casio model F-91W watch. This watch model was in the property of several detainees and has been used in bombings linked to al Qaida and radical Islamic terrorist improvised explosive devices.

2. The detainee was sentenced in Tunisia to 20 years in prison and five years administrative arrest for being a member of a terrorist organization operating abroad.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee stated he did not attend a training camp in Afghanistan and did not receive training. The detainee also stated he never heard any discussions about al Qaida at the mosque he attended in Kabul, Afghanistan. The detainee stated he had no interaction with the Taliban while in Afghanistan, and never attended any political meetings in Afghanistan.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ADIL MABROUK BIN HAMIDA

b. The detainee stated he was not involved in a logistical cell nor was he a member of a terrorist organization while in Italy.

c. The detainee stated he was not in Afghanistan for military training but purely there for religious purposes.

d. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001, and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

7 March 2007

TO: AL KHALAQL, ASIM THAHIT ABDULLAH

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ASIM THAHIT ABDULLAH AL
KHALAQL**

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

The detainee traveled to Yemen for a month and a half to obtain a Yemeni passport. The detainee's brother, a citizen of Saudi Arabia, refused to sponsor the detainee to travel to Pakistan from Saudi Arabia. Less than a month later, the detainee bribed one of the clerks in the office to obtain a six month visa.

b. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee stated his traveling partner was associated with the group Jamat al Tabiligh. The detainee met friends from the group while they were in Karachi, Pakistan.
2. The Jamat al Tabiligh is a legitimate Pakistan based Islamic missionary organization believed to be used as a cover for action by Islamic extremists.
3. A fighter with the Taliban identified the detainee as a person from Saudi Arabia who was very talkative, liked to recite poetry very loud and was slightly older than the others. The detainee was identified as arriving at the front lines in Bagram, Afghanistan.
4. The detainee's alias was found on a 79-page document from an internet site. The document contained information regarding the capture of Taliban and al Qaida fighters who had crossed the border into Pakistan from the Nangarhar province of Afghanistan.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ASIM THAHIT ABDULLAH AL KHALAQI

5. The detainee's alias was found in a letter that lists 68 probable al Qaida members incarcerated in Pakistan.

6. In September 2002, a raid on a suspected al Qaida safe house yielded a list of 324 Arabic names, aliases, nationalities and items in their possession. The detainee's name, alias and nationality were listed, along with a note that the detainee had possession of a Yemeni passport and ticket.

7. The detainee's alias and nationality were on a chart listing the names of captured mujahedin found on a computer hard drive associated with a senior al Qaida operative seized during a raid in early 2003.

c. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee confirmed he used an alias. The detainee stated he was told by another person to change his name and was not sure if he used the name in Pakistan or Afghanistan. The detainee did not know the purpose of changing his name and stated he just followed the other person's instructions without question.

2. The detainee stated he lost his passport in Jalalabad, Afghanistan or in the mountains while he was fleeing Afghanistan.

3. The detainee was transferred to United States custody on 30 December 2001 from Kohat, Pakistan.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee denies ever participating or being asked to participate in any military training in either Pakistan or Afghanistan.

b. The detainee stated he was never on the front lines anywhere, nor has he ever fought with any military.

c. The detainee denied any terrorist or Taliban affiliations.

d. The detainee stated he was simply part of the Jamat al Tabligh organization performing humanitarian assistance to the Afghan people.

e. The detainee stated he would return to Saudi Arabia if released because his family is there. The detainee would get married and find a job.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ASIM THAHIT ABDULLAH AL KHALAQI

f. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks on the United States prior to 11 September 2001, and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.

g. The detainee appeared disturbed after viewing a video of the 11 September 2001 attacks and expressed anger, stating he hoped that Usama bin Laden is found soon before more attacks occur.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

07 September 2007

To: SULEIMAN, FAYIZ AHMAD YAHIA

Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SULEIMAN, FAYIZ AHMAD YAHIA

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. A source described the detainee as being an Islamic fighter and an extremist.
2. The detainee identified himself as a trained Imam in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.
3. The detainee claimed he traveled to Afghanistan to find a bride because they would be inexpensive and easy to obtain.
4. The detainee began his travels with 5,000 Saudi Riyals. The detainee planned on spending approximately twenty days in Afghanistan. The detainee did not tell anyone about his intent because he did not want word of his travel to get back to his sick mother.
5. The detainee traveled from Jeddah, Saudi Arabia to Sana, Yemen to Dubai, United Arab Emirates to Karachi, Pakistan to Quetta, Pakistan to Kabul, Afghanistan to Jalalabad, Afghanistan.
6. The detainee stated that some Sheiks would frequent his facility to solicit money for other countries and to address jihad. The detainee stated that the majority of the Sheiks' talks focused on Chechnya.

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Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SULEIMAN, FAYIZ AHMAD YAHIA

7. The detainee was identified as a nurse at Talaquon, Afghanistan while fighting the Northern Alliance and was at Tora Bora, Afghanistan before being arrested trying to cross the Afghanistan border into Pakistan.

b. Training

1. Indications are that the detainee was identified as a poison expert who received special training at the Kandahar Airport in Afghanistan to make poisons.
2. A source stated the detainee had good knowledge of big guns, such as the Halwin-82 and the Karine-39, and carried a Kalashnikov. The detainee was often seen carrying instruction books on guns and books on how to build explosives.

c. Connections/Associations

1. A source stated the detainee spoke about personally meeting Usama bin Laden in Tora Bora, Afghanistan.
2. The detainee's name, alias, nationality, and passport information were on a document listing Arabic names, aliases and nationalities recovered from safe house raids associated with suspected al Qaida members in Karachi, Pakistan.
3. The detainee lived with an individual.
4. The individual in the previous statement worked on a project to create a CD-ROM containing the encyclopedia of jihad, a training manual of sorts of explosives, tactics and so forth. The goal of this project was to create a single, easily portable disk that mujahidin could carry with them from Afghanistan to their home countries, all without attracting the scrutiny from security.

d. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee claims that during his two-month journey to Pakistan, an unknown Afghan man robbed the detainee and took his passport and money.
2. The detainee crossed the border with 10 to 15 other Arabs who were turned in to the Pakistan authorities by the chief of the Pakistani village they entered.
3. Fighters heading to the al Farouq Training Camp either chose or were given a kunya, or alias, which they would use from that point forward.
4. The detainee's kunya is Idris.

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5. A possible al Qaida operative provided the detainee with employment at a pharmaceutical company.
 6. A source identified the detainee as a medic trained by a doctor who used anesthesia.
 7. The detainee stated that he worked as a prayer leader for a pharmaceutical company.
4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a. The detainee stated he had no military service and he had no desire to serve in such a capacity.
 - b. The detainee denied any connection with al Qaida or the Taliban.
 - c. The detainee claims he was never trained on the use of weapons.
 - d. The detainee claims he planned to go to Afghanistan and to return as soon as he found his bride.
 - e. The detainee stated he did not go to the al Farouq Camp in Kandahar, Afghanistan.
 - f. The detainee was aware of the fatwa related to the jihad in Chechnya, but denied ever going on a jihad.
 - g. The detainee stated that he has never been in any type of trouble and that he has never been arrested or imprisoned.
 - h. The detainee had no knowledge of persons being ordered or requesting to fight.
 - i. The detainee has denied having any knowledge of the attacks on the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001. The detainee has denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests. The detainee denied any knowledge or planning of internal uprisings at the Guantanamo Bay Detention Facility.
5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

7 February 2007

To: ABD AL RAHMAN ABD, ALLAL AB ALJALLIL

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ABD AL RAHMAN ABD, ALLAL AB
ALJALLIL

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee stated he met a man in Yemen who talked about jihad and Afghanistan. The man convinced the detainee to go to Afghanistan.

2. The detainee stated he departed his home in August 2001 to Sanaa, Yemen, by car, and on to Karachi, Pakistan by air. The detainee then took a taxi to Quetta, Pakistan and on to Kandahar, Afghanistan, where he went to the grand mosque to meet the man he met in Yemen. The detainee then stayed at the home of the man for three days.

b. Training

1. The detainee stated the man from Yemen took him to the Taliban, who gave him weapons training and put him on the front line North of Kabul, Afghanistan. The detainee remained there, under the command of an Afghan leader, Abu Fazl, until Taliban troops retreated and Kabul, Afghanistan fell.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee was identified as a member of Usama bin Laden's security detail.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ABD AL-RAHMAN ABD, ALLAL AB-ALJALLIL

2. The detainee's name appears on a list of al Qaida Mujahedin and the contents of their trust accounts found on files recovered from various computer media seized during raids against al Qaida associated safe houses in late 2002 and early 2003.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee stated he had never been to or knows of anyone who worked at al Qaida camps.

b. The detainee stated he had never seen or heard of Usama bin Laden.

c. The detainee stated he did not agree with the 11 September 2001 attacks on America.

d. The detainee stated he saw a lot of people killed during the bombings, but never fired a shot.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

22 March 2007

TO: KHALID ABD JAL JABBAR MUHAMMAD AL QADASI

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF KHALID ABD JAL JABBAR
MUHAMMAD AL QADASI

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee traveled to Kandahar, Afghanistan, in July 2001 via Dubai, United Arab Emirates, Karachi, Pakistan and Quetta, Pakistan.

2. The detainee stated he met an individual in Karachi, Pakistan who suggested the detainee join him in traveling to Afghanistan for the jihad.

3. The individual mentioned above was identified as a possible al Qaida recruiter.

4. The detainee was identified as a Mujahedin fighter who came to Tora Bora, Afghanistan.

b. Training

The detainee served in the Yemeni military from 1988 to 1989.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee spent time in a Taliban guest house in Quetta, Pakistan.

2. The detainee stated he stayed in the Arab guest house in Kandahar, Afghanistan.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF KHALID ABD JAL JABBAR MUHAMMAD AL QADASI

3. A source stated the Arab guest house in Kandahar, Afghanistan was a place where most Mujahedin headed to when they passed through Kandahar.

4. The detainee stated he spent two and one half months in Kabul, Afghanistan and stayed at an Arab guest house owned by Hamza al Ghamdi.

5. A source stated Hamza al Ghamdi was in charge of a guest house in Kabul, Afghanistan used to house all types of people, including fighters from the front lines and associates of Usama bin Laden.

6. The detainee's name was found on a document listing 324 Arabic names, aliases and nationalities recovered from safe house raids.

7. The detainee's name was found on a document listing al Qaida Mujahedin which was recovered during raids against al Qaida associated safe houses.

d. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee stated he and others in the Arabian guest house in Jalalabad, Afghanistan were transported via truck to Tora Bora, Afghanistan. The detainee claimed others in the truck had weapons, but the detainee did not because he was ill.

2. The detainee stated he is willing to spend the rest of his life in prison and has emphatically stated he would rather die than answer questions.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

- a. The detainee stated he left Yemen for Pakistan to obtain medical treatment.
- b. The detainee stated he never possessed any weapons in Afghanistan, as the detainee was unable to fight due to his bad back.
- c. The detainee stated he had not participated in any fighting in Afghanistan.
- d. The detainee stated that he was not a member of the al Qaida organization.
- e. The detainee stated he never heard or saw anything related to Usama bin Laden at the Hamza al Ghamdi safe house.
- f. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001.

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF KHALID ABD JAL JABBAR
MUHAMMAD AL QADASI**

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

12 April 2007

TO: SHARAF AHMAD MUHAMMAD MASUD

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SHARAF AHMAD
MUHAMMAD MASUD

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee stated, after hearing about Afghanistan on the radio he decided to travel there. The detainee did not consider the situation in Afghanistan to be a true jihad because it was Muslim versus Muslim.

2. About a week prior to leaving in July 2001, the detainee paid 100 United States Dollars to the Pakistan embassy in Sanaa, Yemen for a visa. The detainee stated he took about 400 United States Dollars with him on his trip. The detainee traveled from Sanaa, Yemen to Karachi, Pakistan via the United Arab Emirates.

3. The detainee traveled from Karachi, Pakistan to Quetta, Pakistan, and then to Kandahar, Afghanistan.

4. The detainee traveled to Afghanistan because he heard the Afghan leader led by Islamic ways. The detainee knew the leader of Afghanistan was Taliban and the detainee supported the Taliban.

5. The detainee stated he went to Afghanistan because it was governed according to Sharia, which is Islamic law in accordance to the Koran. The detainee wanted to visit a true Islamic state.

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b. Connections/Associations

1. An individual the detainee met at the al Mutawakil Mosque made arrangements for the detainee to meet a person named Riyadh in Karachi, Pakistan. After arriving in Karachi, the detainee gave Riyadh about 50 United States Dollars to purchase a plane ticket for him to fly from Karachi to Quetta, Pakistan.
2. An individual referred to as, Riyadh the facilitator, was in charge of making travel arrangements for al Qaida members going to Afghanistan.
3. The detainee's name was found in a document listing the names of captured Mujahedin linked to a senior al Qaida person.
4. The detainee's name was found in a document listing 324 Arabic names, aliases, and nationalities recovered from an al Qaida safe house.

c. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee stated he obtained a passport in either 1996 or 1997 for identification purposes and never traveled outside of Sanaa, Yemen prior to traveling to Pakistan and Afghanistan in 2001. When the detainee was questioned about a visa for another country maintained in his file he denied it was his, and denied any other travel.
2. During detention, the detainee has harassed the guards and failed to comply with orders. The detainee told the guards they would burn in hell because they were Christians and preached to them about the superiority of Islam.
3. In Kandahar, Kabul and Jalalabad, Afghanistan, the detainee stayed at Arab houses.
4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
 - a. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001, and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.
 - b. The detainee stated he would not perform jihad against the United States or anyone else.
 - c. The detainee heard about the attack in New York and considered it an aggression against innocent people.

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SHARAF AHMAD MUHAMMAD
MASUD**

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

21 March 2007

To: ABU BAKR IBN ALI MUHAMMAD ALAHDAL

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ABU BAKR IBN ALI MUHAMMAD
ALAHDAL

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
 1. The detainee stated he was a member of the Yemeni political Islah party.
 2. The detainee became interested in going to Afghanistan when he heard the Taliban had destroyed the idolatrous Buddhist statues in Bamiyam, Afghanistan. The detainee felt the statues were an affront to Islam and needed to be destroyed. The detainee respected the Taliban for what they did.
 3. The detainee approached an individual at the Othman mosque in Hudaydah, Yemen, to inquire about how to get to Afghanistan.
 4. The detainee was recruited by a fellow Yemeni. This individual was a jihadist who was well known in the areas of Hudaydah and Beit al-Ahdal, Yemen.
 5. The detainee gave the individual who recruited him 1,000 United States Dollars so the individual could acquire a passport and roundtrip airline tickets for the detainee.

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6. The detainee gave the individual who recruited the detainee pictures of himself, a completed passport form, and an unknown sum of Yemeni money. In return, the detainee received a new Yemeni passport, plane tickets to Karachi, Pakistan on Yemeni Airlines and 150 United States Dollars. The recruiter advised him to whenever possible only use United States Dollars and the detainee took 650 United States Dollars with him. The detainee stated the passport appeared to be genuine.

7. The detainee traveled from Sanaa, Yemen to Karachi, Pakistan via Dubai, United Arab Emirates.

8. From Karachi, Pakistan the detainee took a taxi to Quetta, Pakistan and was dropped off near the Daftar Taliban office.

9. In Quetta, Pakistan the detainee approached the Taliban office declaring that he wanted to live in a truly Islamic country. The detainee asked the office to arrange entry and volunteered to fight with the Taliban.

10. The detainee's application to join the jihad was put on hold, but an Afghan facilitator assisted the detainee. The detainee was now able to travel to Kandahar, Afghanistan, where he stayed at the Taliban guest house for four days.

11. The detainee then went on to Kabul, Afghanistan.

12. After one week in Kabul, Afghanistan the detainee visited Jalalabad, Afghanistan for two weeks, touring the market and mosque, and was assigned a room at the guest house by a North African man.

13. The detainee then proceeded to Bagram, Afghanistan.

14. The detainee served as a fighter for the Taliban Arab forces.

15. The detainee contracted malaria and some other unidentified illness and was sent to the hospital in Kabul, Afghanistan.

16. After the detainee was recuperating for nearly two months, the aerial bombardment started. The explosions were concentrated in areas inhabited by the Arabs so the detainee decided that if he was going to die, he should return to the front and die in the service of Allah in battle.

17. The detainee and three companions left the Bagram line area for Jalalabad, Afghanistan.

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18. After departing the front lines, the detainee went to Kabul, Afghanistan and then to Jalalabad, Afghanistan where he stayed for approximately three days before the fall of Kabul. He wanted to be recalled to the front lines of the Taliban, and then withdrew to a village on the outskirts of Jalalabad.

19. From Jalalabad, Afghanistan, the detainee went to the Najim Jihad area, and from there into the mountains toward Pakistan.

20. The detainee then made his way to a village in Pakistan. The village occupants of turned the detainee into the Pakistan authorities.

b. Training

1. After re-familiarizing himself with operating a Kalashnikov rifle, the detainee was assigned to a guard position on the front.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee presented himself to the Taliban commander in Bagram, Afghanistan.

2. The detainee's Taliban leader gave him a document. Listed on this document were addresses and meeting locations.

3. An individual wrote a will and gave it to the detainee at the Kart Barwan guest house in Kabul, Afghanistan.

d. Intent

The detainee readily agreed that he was a willing terrorist against the United States for its hostile position against the Palestinian Muslims and other Arab populations.

e. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee had a handheld radio when he was captured, and claims that it was used to communicate only with another Taliban fighter.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ABU BAKR IBN ALI MUHAMMAD ALAHDAL

2. The detainee is familiar with communications equipment and receivers commonly found in Afghanistan or used by the Taliban. The detainee acknowledged that the Motorola GP300 VHF radio and the IC-H16 VHF radio are similar to the radios used by Taliban commanders in Afghanistan. The detainee used a radio on a few occasions. The detainee described basic procedures for using a push-to-talk radio.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee claims to have no special interest or expertise in electronics. The detainee explained that he had a band receiver while in Afghanistan so he could listen to a radio, and he had a calculator so he could determine exchange rates for the currencies of the various countries he was visiting.

b. The detainee denies having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001, and also denies knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

21 June 2007

TO: AHMAD MUHAMMAD 'JUMR AL-MASA'UDI

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AHMAD MUHAMMAD 'JUMR AL-
MASA'UDI

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
 1. The detainee stated he met an individual while attending a mosque in Belgium.
 2. The individual sent the detainee a counterfeit Belgian passport and advised him to travel to England to meet another individual. The new individual welcomed the detainee at the airport in London and, in May 2000, he accompanied the detainee to the airport to fly to Pakistan.
 3. This individual was the leader of the Tunisian Combatant Group in Great Britain.
 4. The Tunisian Combatant Group is seeking to establish an Islamic regime in Tunisia and targets United States and Western interests. The loosely organized group has come to be associated with al Qaida and other North African extremist networks implicated in recent terrorist plots.
 5. The detainee stated there were only two reasons to come to Afghanistan, to fight with the Taliban or to learn religion.
 6. The detainee stated he crossed the border into Afghanistan and he was housed in a guest house in Jalalabad, Afghanistan.
 7. The guest house in Jalalabad, Afghanistan, was supervised by a Tunisian terrorist.

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8. The detainee was involved in a meeting of the Tunisian Combatant Group at a guest house in Jalalabad, Afghanistan. The leader of the group later met with Usama bin Laden, who advised him to fight against the United States and Israel by means of suicidal operations.

9. The detainee was arrested in December 2001 while trying to flee Afghanistan. The detainee was using a false name.

b. Training

The detainee stated he observed the Derunta Training Camp near Jalalabad, Afghanistan to be a very military-looking place, and that some of those who went to train at Derunta went on to fight with the Taliban.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee was arrested with an address book which listed the names of several radical Islamists in Europe.

2. The detainee's cousin was arrested in Belgium in connection with the case of an assassination of a former Afghan Northern Alliance commander.

d. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee stated he was jailed for 62 days in Belgium for using a car with false license plates and because he had no papers.

2. The detainee stated he started stealing clothing and reselling them to gather approximately 1,000 United States Dollars to pay his way to Afghanistan.

3. The detainee was arrested in Islamabad, Pakistan, in October 2000, for possession of a fraudulent passport. The detainee stated that, while the police were checking his passport, he escaped from the police station and made his way back to the Tunisian house in Jalalabad, Afghanistan.

4. The detainee has arrest warrants in Italy for ties to Islamic extremists in Bologna, Italy.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AHMAD MUHAMMAD 'JUMR AL-MASA'UDI

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001, and also denied knowledge or rumors of any plans of future attacks on the United States or its interests.

b. The detainee stated he came to regret his travel into Afghanistan.

c. The detainee stated he never went to the Derunta training camp in Afghanistan.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

19 March 2007

To: HASSAN MUJAMMA RABA'I SA'ID

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF HASSAN MUJAMMA RABA'I SA'ID

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee stated he left Algeria on 19 August 2000 to travel to Afghanistan. The detainee had to stop in Damascus, Syria for ten months before having enough money to continue his travels to Afghanistan. The detainee traveled to Zahedan, Iran via Tehran, Qam, and Mashad, Iran.

2. The detainee indicated he was helped into Pakistan by a group of smugglers he met through the Jamat al Tabiligh office in Zahedan, Iran. The detainee was then taken to Quetta, Pakistan.

3. Jamat al Tabiligh is a Pakistan based Islamic missionary organization believed to be used as a cover to mask travel and activities of terrorists, including members of al Qaida.

4. The detainee departed Quetta, Pakistan for Jalalabad, Afghanistan stopping in Kandahar and Kabul, Afghanistan along the way.

5. The detainee was identified as a member of a group that moved to Tora Bora, Afghanistan, on Osama bin Laden's orders. The detainee was in charge of weapons inventory at Tora Bora. The detainee's duties also included handing out ammunition.

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6. The detainee was identified as working in one of the supply caves in Tora Bora, Afghanistan loading and unloading supplies for other Mujahedin.

7. The detainee left Jalalabad, Afghanistan in November 2001 when the city fell, and stayed in the mountains for approximately one month. An Afghan guide led the detainee and about twenty other Arabs to Pakistan, where the detainee was captured.

b. Training

1. The detainee was identified as a Mujahedin fighter at the al Farouq Training Camp in Afghanistan, which belonged to Usama bin Laden.

2. The detainee was also identified as a trainee at the al Farouq Training Camp.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee was identified as having been chosen to be a bodyguard for Usama bin Laden.

2. The detainee's name was on a list of al Qaida members found on a hard drive recovered during the arrest of an al Qaida operative.

3. The detainee's name was found on various computers listing suspected al Qaida Mujahedin during raids against al Qaida associated safe houses in Pakistan.

d. Other Relevant Data

1. In September 2004, the detainee admitted to using a false name since his arrival at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.

2. The detainee told interviewers and a linguist that since they were unbelievers, they were his enemy.

3. The detainee claimed he did not participate in jihad activities. However, the detainee felt that political motivation and a properly declared fatwa are legitimate reasons for participating in jihad.

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4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
 - a. The detainee stated he had no contact with the Taliban while in Afghanistan.
 - b. The detainee stated he could not fight jihad and martyr himself because he had not sought the permission of his parents.
 - c. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001 and the detainee denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests. The detainee stated the attacks were not condoned by Islam, and that they were a crime.
5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

14 March 2007

TO: TARIQ ALI ABDALLAH AHMAD BA'AWDHA

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF TARIQ ALI ABDALLAH AHMAD
BA'AWDHA

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee stated he noticed videos being sold in a market that portrayed the jihad struggle in Chechnya and Bosnia. The detainee bought the videos and watched them alone. After watching the videos, the detainee got the idea to go to Afghanistan.

2. The detainee stated that in June 2001, after watching the videos about jihad, he asked his parents for their permission to go to Afghanistan, but the detainee's parents refused. The detainee decided to go anyway. The detainee's plan was to go to Afghanistan and get training to be ready and become prepared to join the jihad.

3. The detainee stated his main goal was to be trained to fight the jihad and the detainee would not be able to do that if he joined the Saudi or Yemeni Army.

4. In the middle of 2001, the detainee stated he decided to go to Afghanistan. The detainee told his parents he was going to Jordan with the al Dawa group and the detainee parents agreed. The detainee left Jeddah, Saudi Arabia and traveled to Amman, Jordan. The detainee stayed in Amman, Jordan and then went to a nearby city called al Zarqa, Jordan where he met up with the al Dawa group.

5. The detainee stated he went to Amman, Jordan to export Wahabi Islam via the Jamat al Tabiligh, to a village near al Zarqa, Jordan. The detainee had decided, based on having read fatwas of extremist Saudis, the detainee would go to Afghanistan for jihad.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF TARIQ ALI ABDALLAH AHMAD BA'AWDHA

6. Jamat al Tabligh is a Pakistan based Islamic missionary organization used as a cover to mask travel and activities of terrorists, including members of al Qaida.

7. The detainee stated the al Dawa in Jordan told him what to do in Pakistan, how to get there, and what to do with his money. Once the detainee arrived in Karachi, Pakistan, he took a taxi to a nearby hotel, and remained there for two weeks. The detainee stated that although he told the al Dawa people he was traveling to Pakistan for al Dawa, he never went to the local al Dawa center because the detainee primary reason for travel was for jihad.

8. The detainee stated he traveled from Karachi, Pakistan to Quetta, Pakistan where he met a Mujahed from Saudi Arabia. The Saudi told the detainee to get an alias name and to never use the detainee's real name. The Saudi and the detainee traveled to a restaurant in Spin Buldak, Afghanistan. The detainee noticed other Arabs at the restaurant who talked about obtaining training at the training camps and about how the Taliban was going to enforce Islamic laws.

9. The detainee stated a Saudi national living in Karachi, Pakistan assisted jihadists from Yemen and elsewhere in their attempts to make their way from Pakistan into al Qaida training camps in Afghanistan. The Saudi introduced prospective fighters to Arab members of al Qaida at a restaurant in Spin Buldak, Afghanistan.

10. The detainee stated he traveled with the Mujahed from Saudi Arabia to a guest house in Kandahar, Afghanistan. After about one to two weeks at the guest house the detainee and others traveled to the al Farouq training camp near Kandahar, Afghanistan.

b. Training

1. The detainee stated he attended the al Farouq training camp near Kandahar, Afghanistan, during August 2001. The detainee described his training as including target practice with the AK-47, physical training and a weapons course. The training routine lasted about one month.

2. The detainee stated he received one day of familiarization training with a pistol of unknown type while at the al Farouq training camp.

3. A source stated the detainee has knowledge in the use of anti-aircraft weaponry and 120MM Howitzers.

c. Connections/Associations

A source stated the detainee was an important man and was very loyal to Usama bin Laden, who the detainee had met with on numerous times.

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d. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee stated that after one month of training everyone at the al Farouq training camp near Kandahar, Afghanistan was told the training was being stopped and they were all sent back to a guest house. After the detainee left the al Farouq guest house he traveled to Kabul, Afghanistan.

2. The detainee stated he was sent to the front lines at Bagram, Afghanistan but remained in reserve in the rear, in the third line of trenches from the front. The detainee remained there for two weeks, before retreating to Tora Bora, Afghanistan.

3. The detainee was identified as someone who was at Tora Bora and at Bagram, Afghanistan.

4. When the detainee and others crossed the Afghanistan/Pakistan border, the Pakistan Army was waiting there to arrest them. The detainee was taken to a prison.

5. The detainee was detained with a group of Arabs while crossing into Pakistan in late December 2001. Several admitted to having been al Qaida fighters. Several others admitted to fighting on behalf of the Taliban.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee stated the people found guilty of the 11 September 2001 attacks in the United States should be killed.

b. The detainee denied being a member of al Qaida.

c. The detainee stated if he were released, he would return to his home and attempt to find a wife, get a job, live with his parents and continue to study Islam.

d. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001.

e. The detainee denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF TARIQ ALI ABDALLAH AHMAD
BA'AWDHA**

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

25 April 2007

TO: ABD AL-RAHMAN 'JUWAYIDH AL-JU'AYD

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ABD AL-RAHMAN 'JUWAYIDH
AL-JU'AYD

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee stated he donated money to the al Haramain charitable organization in Saudi Arabia.

2. Foreign government service officials believe al Haramain might be a cover organization for Usama bin Laden's al Qaida network. Saudi Mujahedin are known to work in al Haramain regional offices around the world.

3. The detainee stated he read a fatwa from a Sheikh which influenced him to go to Afghanistan and fight alongside the Taliban.

4. The detainee arrived in Kandahar, Afghanistan in June or July 2001 via Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Karachi, Pakistan, Quetta, Pakistan and Spin Buldak, Afghanistan.

5. The detainee was recognized as one of the individuals seen at the Abu Hamza Guest House in Kabul, Afghanistan.

6. The detainee stated he was assigned to Kabul, Afghanistan, on the northern front. The detainee remained in the rear lines for approximately three months until approximately November 2001 when the Taliban withdrew from Kabul under heavy bombardment.

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7. The detainee stated he and a small group of Arabs headed from the collapsed Kabul front to Tora Bora, Afghanistan, where he stayed for two weeks.

8. The detainee stated there were several hundred fighters in Tora Bora, Afghanistan most of whom dispersed into small groups and headed for the border with Pakistan. The detainee claimed he arrived at the border on or about 20 December 2001 in a group of ten Arabs.

b. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee admits he likely ran across members of al Qaida during his departure from Afghanistan.

2. The detainee's name, alias, and country of origin were found on a list of Arabs incarcerated in Pakistan obtained on a hard drive recovered from a suspected al Qaida safe house in Pakistan.

3. The detainee's name, alias, country of origin, and family's phone number were found on an internet site containing information regarding the capture of Taliban and al Qaida fighters who had crossed into Pakistan in late 2001.

c. Other relevant data

The detainee stated he collected approximately 10,000 Saudi Riyals from a mosque in Saudi Arabia for Muslims in Afghanistan.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee stated he has never been involved in any radical Islamic movements in Saudi Arabia.

b. The detainee stated he was not in Afghanistan to fight and never trained at any training camp with any weapons in Afghanistan.

c. The detainee claims no knowledge of Usama bin Laden or al Qaida.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

12 September 2007

To: ALJJ-SAQQAF, RAFDAT MUHAMMAD FAQI

Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ALJJ-SAQQAF, RAFDAT MUHAMMAD FAQI

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. An individual helped the detainee obtain a visa to Pakistan in 1992. The detainee then traveled to Islamabad, Pakistan and then onto Peshawar, Pakistan staying at the Lihyan Guest House.
2. Fearing talks between the Libyan and Pakistan Governments to deport all Libyan residents from Pakistan to Libya in 1993, the detainee went to refugee camps in Talokan, Afghanistan and Konduz, Afghanistan.
3. The detainee stated he stayed at the Bayt al Shuhada guest house in Peshawar, Pakistan for 6 months.
4. The detainee was seen at the Bayt al Shuhada guest house.
5. The Bayt al Shuhada guest house was directly connected to Usama bin Laden.
6. The detainee stayed at the House of Arabs guest house in Peshawar, Pakistan in 1995 and then moved to a refugee camp just outside of Peshawar, Pakistan where he stayed until 1997.

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Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ALJJ-SAQQAF, RAFDA'T MUHAMMAD FAQI

7. In 1999 the detainee moved to Kabul, Afghanistan where he taught in a Taliban school.
8. After the events of 11 September 2001, the detainee sent his family to Pakistan and he returned to the Jalalabad Mountains onward to the Tora Bora Mountains of Afghanistan where the detainee was arrested.

b. Training

1. The detainee was not in the military for active duty, but had military training one hour per day for an unspecified amount of time.
2. The detainee attended the Jihad Wah1 Camp near Khowst, Afghanistan in 1996.
3. Al Qaida selected the most promising trainees from the basic course for more advanced training and specialized coursework at the Jihadwal Training Camp. The advanced courses in explosives, topography and advanced weapons and tactics were usually reserved for sworn al Qaida members.
4. The detainee may have received some terrorist training.
5. The detainee was trained at the Khalden Camp and participated in the Tajik war.
6. The Khalden Camp was co-managed by a senior al Qaida lieutenant. An entire six-month program at Khalden consisted of light weapons, heavy weapons, explosives, topography and a tactical course.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee was identified as a member of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group by a senior al Qaida member.
2. The Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, also known as Jamat al Islami al Mukatilah, emerged in 1995 among Libyans who had fought against Soviet forces in Afghanistan. The Libyan Islamic Fighting Group declared the government of Libyan leader Muammar Qadhafi un-Islamic and pledged to overthrow it. Some members maintain a strictly anti-Qadhafi focus and organize against Libyan Government interests but others are aligned with Usama bin Ladin's al Qaida organization or are active in the international Mujahedin network.

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Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ALJJ-SAQQAF, RAFDA'T MUHAMMAD FAQI

3. The detainee was trained on weapons, participated in the fighting in Tajikistan, and was a member of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group.
 4. A Libyan Islamic Fighting Group member identified the detainee as part of a group who had returned to Pakistan from fighting the Russians in Tajikistan.
 5. The member in the previous statement was a senior al Qaida operative.
 6. The detainee and several other Libyans established a Libyan guest house at Wazir Ak Bar Khan in Kabul, Afghanistan.
 7. A source stated the area of Wazir Akhbar Khan, in Kabul, Afghanistan was an al Qaida enclave.
 8. An individual detailed an explosives accident in which the detainee was involved and the detainee's fingers were blown off and he was blinded.
 9. A source stated the detainee and a senior al Qaida member were both Arabs with two distinct groups, al Qaida and Libyans. The source stated the detainee and the senior al Qaida member often spoke to each other and sometimes their troops fought with one another.
4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a. The detainee denied any knowledge of the 11 September 2001 attacks prior to their occurrence.
 - b. A senior al Qaida operative stated that the detainee did not go to any training camps in Afghanistan.
 - c. The detainee was believed to not fight for the Taliban in the war against the Northern Alliance.
 - d. The detainee was believed to not be a member of al Qaida.
5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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