

On 17 February 2004, a panel of officers, lead by Major General Antonio Taguba, conducted the following interview Major General Taguba was appointed as an Investigating Officer under the provisions of Army Regulation 15-6, by Lieutenant General David D McKiernan, Commanding General of the Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC), to look into allegations of maltreatment of detainees, detainee escapes and accountability lapses, at Abu Gharib, also known as the Baghdad Central Confinement Facility (BCCF) The panel also inquired into training, standards, employment, command policies, and internal policies, concerning the detainees held at Abu Gharib prison Finally, the panel looked into the command climate and the command and supervisory presence

The following persons were present

MG Antonio M Taguba, [REDACTED] DCG-CFLCC, **Interviewer**
COL [REDACTED] Lackland AFB, TX, **Member**
CPT [REDACTED] CFLCC - SJA, **Member**
SFC [REDACTED] U.S Army MP School, **Member**
LTC [REDACTED] 310th MP Battalion, **Respondent**

The interview is summarized as follows

Lieutenant Colonel [REDACTED] Social Security, [REDACTED] I am the Battalion Commander for the 310th Military Police Battalion Operations I assumed command April of 2002 We did our mobilization at Fort Dix, New Jersey We were there with the 800th MP Brigade part of the time We're an I/R Battalion out of Uniondale, New York We're co-located with the 800th Military Police Brigade, back in New York

We moved to mobilization on 21 January of 2003, and stayed exactly 3 months We had Individual Task Training, collective training, and training with the MRE, while we were there I don't remember the number of the unit, providing us with the MRE, but I believe it was a Training Support Battalion The name of the Colonel in charge was COL [REDACTED] Ullom In addition to that, we did convoy training, and other Military Police training

The MRE was exclusively I/R The one area that we were deficient in the MRE is we did not have any organic Guard Companies or Military Police Companies at all So the MRE was conducted solely with the headquarters element We simulated a lot, as far as the towers and all went, but as far as the actual training, we got some pretty good training We worked with sally port operations, and security We simulated a lot of force protection, and internal security from the guard companies We ran the eight stations that we would normally run in an I/R Battalion Administrative Processing Area We ran our medical section with various scenarios that might come in We ran our S2 section interrogating section As much as we could, we worked with the floor A number of scenarios were put into play, during this 4 day MRE, dealing with I/R Operations, and all of our people were gainfully employed At the end of it, we were singled out as having done the best job on the MRE of anyone that's gone through We developed a training plan, and it was submitted to the Training Battalion

We assumed we were going to be doing I/R Operations. On 21 April we arrived in Kuwait, and stayed at Camp Wolf for 9 days, waiting for our assignment. Finally, we were moved to Camp Arifjan, and didn't move out of there until June. We had no mission. A lot of our soldiers did force protection for the camp. We did do training, a lot of individual training. I employed as many of my people as I could.

We got the first mission from the 800th MP Brigade approximately 1 June. It could have been the middle of May, but we didn't move out 'til June. We were told to set up the Regional Confinement Facility for South Central Iraq. So, we had to go out on our own and find a location for this. We were told there was a location in Diwanayah. There, we found a facility, we were told, Sadaam put 500 people in, but we figured 250 was about the max we could put in there.

So, 1 June we effectively moved out to Diwanayah, and we were co-located, and working with the 1st Marine Division for logistical support. We were working with the 800th MP Brigade, but we had an affiliation with the MEF, being in their AO. As the mission progressed it became more of a dream than reality. Ultimately, we were tasked to come up with a Training Plan and SOP, to train Iraqis in corrections, and have them take over the facility. There were people confined in the facility. Basically, we were to establish the facility, train Iraqis to become Corrections Officers, and ultimately turn it over to them. We did that mission right up until we came here.

Now, the mission was expanded. While we were doing that, we were told to go to Hillah, the place we initially looked at. It had a larger facility, which could hold about 750 people, and there were no prisoners at Hillah. As they were building it up, and bringing it back up to standard, that's when we came in. We were told we had to take over that prison. We were still at Diwanayah.

I started out with four companies. Two of them were pulled to do law and order missions, and two of them stayed with us, the 157 MP Company, and the 755 MP Company. They were assigned to us, once we got the mission. 755 used to be Combat Support, and they were changed to a Guard Company. The 157, I think, had the same situation.

We were still under the command and control of the 800th, but we had little to do with the 800th. We were more involved with the Marines. I'd have to look at the FRAGO, but we were reporting more to the Marines.

BG Karpinski came down and spoke to us, shortly after she took command. She expressed, in broad terms, what she expected us to do. I don't think there was anything in writing. I believe there was one time she had all the Battalion Commanders in Baghdad, and she was running the meeting. Once we officially fell under the 800th Brigade, my staff was in touch with them pretty regularly.

I had no escapes I had no shootings We had a couple of attempted escapes They were pretty quickly resolved We used tasers to zap them, and we got them back in People we identified as troublemakers, we sent here, and there were no real issues of violence We got Rule of Engagement down from the 800th, but I believe they were from CJTF-7 I do not recall the changes, possibly two

I only heard about the Bucca incident through the Stars and Stripes There was, and I don't know if it was precipitated from that, something that came down, saying, when interacting with prisoners, we should wear our helmets, and something came down, saying be more aware of how you handle prisoners I heard about the riot I don't remember reading anything specific Probably the helmet and kevlar came from that incident

When dealing with the prisoners, the soldiers will be unarmed, but they'll wear their vest and their helmet Outside the facility, surrounding the perimeter, there will be armed guards They will have both lethal and non-lethal

There were Marine hit teams, doing interrogations We really didn't get too involved in that The Commander is ultimately in charge I'm responsible, and I'm in charge We have only the rules, regarding interrogation rules of engagement in our SOP

At least two times a day we do a count An ISN count is done at mealtime Two times they get checked, and we also do a body count They roll them up, they come up to us, and we forward them to Brigade We have one hundred percent count all the time We've not been off our count ever

I wouldn't say I know them well, but I've met most of the Battalion Commanders I've met LTC [REDACTED] during their mobilization Interestingly, they came after us, but left before us I don't know him very well I know he's not an MP

We were told to come over here, and take over for the 724, nothing specific Since we were here, BG Karpinski came down, to speak to LTC [REDACTED] and I for about an hour She wanted to make sure the RIP was going, well I'm sure she mentioned the Geneva Convention and the Rules of Engagement She sent down her JAG twice to discuss it with everyone This was after the 14th of January We're working on a base defense plan The 724th did have a diagram showing where the fighting positions were, but I haven't seen a detailed base defense plan

The 988 is our IRF It's a platoon that does it We have two military working dogs, Army Battalion Operations has command and control of those dogs They patrol the whole facility Periodically, we will have demonstrations We don't use them inside the compound We didn't have any for the last mission

BG Karpinski seems to be a concerned leader, concerned about the troops She did visit us in Diwanayah, and spent the night I think she lets her Battalion Commanders run their Battalions There's not a lot of micro-management, but if anything is going on she wants

to know. I'm not aware that there were any major problems in the Brigade. I know COL Ecke from Uniondale, but I had very limited dealings with him, here. The only thing that I've heard is that he's very hands-on, sometimes to the extent that he micro-manages, but that was not my experience.

I think there are some strong personalities on the Brigade Staff. I think that MAJ [REDACTED] the S3, was probably the catalyst in the Brigade. CSM [REDACTED] I've known for years, 20 some odd years. From my perspective, he's highly visible, outgoing, and loud. I would say he's a proud Command Sergeant Major. I've heard a rumor about him and a female or females. I've never seen him do anything inappropriate, but I do know he's a very hands-on guy.

What needs to be done, now, we're doing. We have to tighten up force protection. We're putting in higher burms, we're trying to get more wire out there, and re-fortifying our ECPs. If I had more manpower, I'd put a few more towers on the perimeter. Coming inside, we're installing 12 foot high fencing, getting better lighting, thermal goggles, and other items which are going to make this that much more secure. What this is leading to is a better climate in the compound. I would also like to put in better sanitation facilities for the detainees.

In addition to having the Geneva Convention posted, I want to have the detainees briefed on their way here. We're also in the process of getting the Geneva Convention translated into Arabic.

We have the Sergeants of the Guard, and OICs, going around quizzing the guards on Rules of Engagement, what they would do in certain situations, SOPs, etc. The companies are required to do guard mount. In addition to that the companies have their individual staff meetings, and training meetings to reinforce what's been said.

The interview complete, MG Taguba reminds LTC [REDACTED] to not discuss or reveal the contents of the interview, and he is released subject to recall.

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45, the proponent agency is ODCSOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY Title 10 USC Section 301, Title 5 USC Section 2951, E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN)
PRINCIPAL PURPOSE To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately
ROUTINE USES Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval
DISCLOSURE Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary

1 LOCATION Camp Bucca, Iraq	2 DATE (YYYYMMDD) 2004/02/19	3 TIME 1700hrs	4 FILE NUMBER
5 LAST NAME FIRST NAME MIDDLE NAME [REDACTED]	6 SSN [REDACTED]	7 GRADE/STATUS O-5	

8 ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
310th Military Police Battalion, Camp Bucca, Iraq APO AE 09375

9 [REDACTED] WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH

On 17 February at approximately 1330 hrs I was interviewed in reference to a 15-6 investigation being conducted by Major General Taguba, CFLCC Deputy Commander. I was interviewed by Major General Taguba. At the conclusion of the interview I was requested to provide the following information:

information pertaining to the units' deployment, our missions and moves we made to include, dates and locations. On 21 January 2003 the 310th Military Police Battalion, a reserve unit out of Unadilla, NY was mobilized in support of Operation Enduring Freedom. On 24 January we arrived at our mobilization station, Fort Dix, NJ. While at Fort Dix the unit completed all mobilization requirements, the SRP, and training. We remained at the mobilization site for three months. On 20 April the unit was called forward and arrived in Kuwait (Camp Wolf) on 21 April 2003. After waiting at Camp Wolf for nine days we were relocated to Camp Arifjan (Kuwait) and remained there until 1 June 2003. During this time we were assigned to the 4th ID but had little or no contact with them. We communicated primarily with the 800th MP Brigade who was located at Camp Arifjan and is our peacetime higher headquarters (however they had no actual control over us at the time). On 6 May we received a Frago assigning the 310th MP Battalion to the First Marine Expeditionary Force. We were given the mission to establish and operate a Regional Confinement Facility (Iraqi on Iraqi crimes) within their AO. After coordination with them and numerous reconns, we located a facility in Ad Diwaniyah, Iraq and on 1 June relocated to Camp Edson, in Ad Diwaniyah with the Marines CSSG 11, who provided all logistical support for the LSA as well as the support for our confinement mission (note although assigned to the 1MEF we had an ancillary relationship with the 800th MP Brigade who oversaw all jail/prison and confinement facilities within the theater). During this period the Marines provided outstanding support to the battalion. Our primary mission was to operate the facility in Ad Diwaniyah. On 15 July we were reassigned to the 800th MP Brigade and our mission was expanded to encompass overseeing jails and prisons in various cities throughout South Central Iraq. Although our primary mission was in Ad Diwaniyah we were now missioned to oversee the facilities Al Hillah, Al Kut, An Najaf and Karbala. During this period the battalion was also tasked to assist and provide MP assets in Mosul and an administrative team to assist the 800th MP Brigade with BAT training in Baghdad. In addition to overseeing these facilities we were tasked to assess the facilities (most were presently being run by Iraqis), develop a curriculum, train guards to become Correction Officers and once trained, turn the facilities back to the Iraqis. During this period the battalion once again had to move because the Marines were going to REFRAD and Camp Edson was going to close. After an extensive search for a 'home' we finally negotiated with the 'Dominicans' (we were now in the MND, AO for they took over from the Marines) and they "allowed us into their camp Camp Santo Domingo. The battalion remained at this location and performed this mission until we were re-missioned and assigned to Camp Bucca to assume command and control of the Camp and the Internment Facility. On 16 December 2003 the battalion arrived at Camp Bucca and shortly after, began our RIP with the 724 MP Battalion. On 14 January the 310th MP Battalion officially assumed command and control of the Camp and Internment Facility and on 1 February we were reassigned to the 16th MP Brigade.

List guidance provided by the 800th Military Police Brigade. Through various Frago's and electronic communications the brigade would provide assistance and guidance. On a regular basis the battalion staff would interact with and receive guidance and direction from the 800th Brigade staff. Direct guidance was received regarding administrative reporting, prison operations and logistics reporting procedures. Additionally they provided training and guidance in ROE.

Tell about your Military Working Dog program. After assuming control of the Camp Bucca Internment Facility we determined that Military Working Dogs (MWD) would greatly increase security at the facility. On 27 January, two teams (2 dogs) arrived. The goal of the program is to provide a deterrent and assist in the prevention of escapes and identify contraband within the facility. This is done by providing patrols and demonstrations by the teams. The teams are deployed with one team patrolling from 2000hrs - 0400hrs and the other an eight hour shift at random times throughout the day. The dogs patrol the outer perimeter, not inside the compounds. The SOP indicates Handler will not release the dog if it could harm Coalition Forces, MWD will not go inside the individual compounds unless there is a riot and then it will be the local commanders call, Handler will not release dogs unless the prisoner is outside the fence line?

How has MI worked into your mission. When the battalion had the regional confinement mission in Ad Diwaniyah our

10 EXHIBIT	11 INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [REDACTED]	PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES
------------	--	-------------------

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT" TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE BE INDICATED

STATEMENT OF [REDACTED]

TAKEN AT Camp Bucca, Iraq

DATED 2004/02/19

9 STATEMENT (Continued)

Any escape attempts? While at Ad Diwaniyah there were no attempted escapes (one time the prisoners from one cell broke through a cell door and got into the court yard, but did not escape nor try to escape) While at Camp Bucca, in the early morning of 24 January and during an extremely dense fog (one could not see 5' feet in front of them), four detainees escaped through the rear of one of the compounds. Although recently having taken over the mission of the Internment Facility, we knew of the extreme fog that would periodically roll in and had practiced the "fog plan" that was developed by the 724th MP Bn, who we replaced. On this particular morning we quickly implemented the plan, performed a detainee count and secured them in accordance with the plan. As the fog lifted and another count was done, it was discovered that four detainees were missing. After a comprehensive search, to no avail, the battalion and company leadership held an AAR of the escape. All factors were taken into consideration and plans to tighten security were developed. Long range plans and projects were also begun. There were no other escapes or known attempts.

Any 15-6 investigations in your battalion (command inquiries)? There have been two 15-6 investigations within the battalion. The first one was performed by the First Marine Expeditionary Force in reference to one of my soldiers from the 755th Military Police Company who was killed in an ambush in An Najaf while performing a Law and Order mission on 26 June 2003. No negligence was found. The second was also performed by the First Marine Expeditionary Force in reference to a soldier from the HHC 310th Military Police Battalion who was killed while working a TCP at Camp Edson. A truck traveling along ASR Jackson lost control and ran through the Hesco barriers protecting the point, pinning and killing the soldier on 13 July 2003. No negligence was found. There have been two commanders inquiries performed. The first one was directed when the ICRC, during an out brief after an inspection on 10 February, mentioned that there was an allegation of possible abuse of a detainee by a soldier. A commander's inquiry was initiated and there was evidence of abuse. The soldier was identified and UCMJ action was administered. The second was initiated when a female enlisted soldier (977 MP Co) alleged an NCO (977 MP Co) had been harassing, intimidating and touching her without her consent over a period of months. This situation came to my attention on 16 February 2004. I have been in touch with the 16th MP Brigade JAG and as of this writing there is no disposition.

Tell your recommendations on what should be done for the IR mission. Although the battalion is in the process of preparing their AAR I will try and provide some of my recommendations.

* Administration. Each IR battalion should have organic to them, JAG officer, two Lieutenants to be assigned as Battle Captains, an additional SFC in the communications section. Lessons learned from this operation justify the need for this increase in personnel. Because of mission requirements, there should be a minimum of two MP Guard Companies and one Escort Guard Company assigned to each IR Battalion.

* Logistics. Because of the way we fought this war with no real "rear" our logistical requirements have changed. I believe that the majority of the HMMWVs within the IR Battalion should be "Up-Armored" (M1114). In addition, because of the increased transportation requirements two additional 5 1/2 Ton trucks are necessary. MTS Systems should be installed in all vehicles. A complete package of BAT systems (three-four per battalion) as well as a total NDRS package should be TO&E items. Additional communication capabilities to include fifty handheld radios (with repeater), spotlights, thermal and night vision goggles, non-lethal package, public address system, megaphones, metal detectors etc. need to be added as TO&E items. Line/Guard companies should have 50cals, organic to them for force protection. Sign making capabilities (in the language of the enemy) should be made available to the battalion. Maximum utilization of local contractors should be funded to assist in the building and fortification of the Internment Facility.

* Operations. A top down Battalion Standard Operating Procedure System (SOP) should be developed for all IR battalions. Standardized forms should be included and all areas of the operation to include separate (pull-out and post) SOPs should be included. Some of the specific SOPs that should be included are: standard ROE (this will change as requirements change), detainee rights, Geneva Convention, camp procedures, uniform and weapons policies, interrogation procedures, property accountability procedures etc. It should be a detailed yet simple to understand and disseminate document. This will standardize all relevant SOPs. All SOPs should be distributed, read and understood by all personnel and should be readily available for reference and inspection. All soldiers prior to deployment should be taught and understand at a minimum, AR 190-8, FM 3-19-40, ROE and the articles of the Geneva Convention. I believe the key to a successful operation is the continuous communication written (Frago) oral and face to face, Coordination, and Cooperation of all units and elements concerned.

* Training. The entire Military Police Corps needs to be reevaluated. Operation Iraqi Freedom proves that the Corps must be increased. The curriculum at the MP School needs to be revamped, increasing and emphasizing IR operations. Every MP should be able to perform IR operations. Standardizing MP company logistics and equipment should be explored. This would allow, if needed, easy cross leveling of units. There should be established at one or more Army installations a fully set up "training" Internment Facility to include four compounds (enough to train two battalions at one time, two compounds each), an exterior perimeter to include towers, interior towers and appropriate concertina and fortification, lights, an in processing area to include medical and supply areas) enough tentage, latrines, shower areas etc for a compound of 500 detainees (doctrine) etc. This would allow Active, Reserve and National Guard units to begin their IR training with out taking up valuable training time building a facility. Having one (or more) already established would keep the training consistent and standard and would maximize training time.

This answers all questions posed to me. NOTHING FOLLOWS.

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

9 STATEMENT (Continued)

[REDACTED]

AFFIDAVIT

I, [REDACTED] HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1 AND ENDS ON PAGE 2 I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME THE STATEMENT IS TRUE I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT

WITNESSES, [REDACTED]

5101 MI 610
Camp Bucca, Iraq
ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

[REDACTED] (Signature of Person Making Statement)

Subscribed and sworn to before me a person authorized by law to administer oaths this 19 day of February 2004 at Camp Bucca, Iraq

[REDACTED] (Signature of Person Administering Oath)

[REDACTED] (Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

[REDACTED] (Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [Handwritten Initials]