

On 15 February 2004, a panel of officers, directed by Major General Antonio Taguba, conducted the following interview. Major General Taguba was appointed as an Investigating Officer under the provisions of Army Regulation 15-6, by Lieutenant General David D. McKiernan, Commanding General of the Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC), to look into allegations of maltreatment of detainees, detainee escapes and accountability lapses, at Abu Ghraib, also known as the Baghdad Central Confinement Facility (BCCF). The panel also inquired into training, standards, employment, command policies, and internal policies, concerning the detainees held at Abu Ghraib prison. Finally, the panel looked into the command climate and the command and supervisory presence.

The following persons were present:

COL [REDACTED] MP, CFLCC – PMO, Interviewer
LTC [REDACTED] 705th MP Battalion, Interviewer
CPT [REDACTED] 265th Engineer Group – SJA, Interviewer
MAJ [REDACTED] 800th MP Brigade, Respondent

The interview is summarized as follows:

My full name is [REDACTED]. The [REDACTED] is for [REDACTED] Rank - Major.. My status is Reserve, but I'm AGR, Active Guard Reserve. I'm assigned to the 800th MP Brigade out of Uniondale, New York. I'm attached there from St. Louis, AR PERSCOM, as the S1, Personnel Officer. My Social Security Number is [REDACTED].

I'm primarily responsible for all the Personnel functions, OERs, NCOERs, pay, personnel numbers. I've been in this position, since October of 1999. I've been on active for 16 years. I went straight from Active component one day, to AGR status the next day. BG Hill had just taken over the Brigade, the summer before I arrived there.

I deal with the Battalion S1s. I provide support, through them, to the companies. I try keeping people in their own lane, so everyone can do their jobs. Communication has been important from day one. As they processed through Arifjan, at the beginning of the war, I met with all the S1s, and explained to them the PERSTAT reporting requirements. A lot of the initial stuff was covered in the FRAGO that was written, when we first got here. One of the big roles, initially, was the PERSTAT, enforcing personnel accountability, and timely submission. A lot of the communication with the Battalions, after they left Arifjan, was primarily through e-mail, NIPR, and SIPR.

We strive for a hundred percent accuracy, so we constantly work with the Battalions, to refine their numbers. We have pretty good accuracy. When we did the initial scrub of the Joint Theater Personnel Roster with 3rd PERSCOM, we had over ninety-percent accuracy, and that included some attachments on their roster that didn't belong to us. I think some of the Battalions, initially, had problems getting reports from their companies. A lot of the Battalions had companies not physically with them, and depended on communications to get their information, which wasn't always reliable.

Our philosophy was always one hundred percent accuracy on the PERSTAT, and that was put out as our goal in the FRAGO, and BG Karpinski did not say anything to change that. She is my rater. I think she rates seventy to eighty, total. Initially, after our XO left, due to REFRAD, there was a lot of turbulence in our XO and Deputy positions for a while. There wasn't a whole lot of continuity, there. The only continuity was, really, the General. I recommended to the General, and she approved it, that she be the Rater and Senior Rater for a lot of the primary staff officers in the Brigade Headquarters. Of the personnel in those positions, COL [REDACTED] had the longest stay, as the Deputy, from the October to December.

As far as I understand, BG Karpinski never suspend LTC [REDACTED] in writing, or relieved him. She said that he needed a break. I guess things were pretty stressful for him. He didn't want to take leave at that point. He'd already been home on emergency leave. It was after a meeting at Baghdad Central. I think General Sanchez or MG Wojdakowski was there for a briefing, and the briefing didn't go that well. I think she felt that she needed to give LTC [REDACTED] a break. That's the way it was phrased. He spent two weeks, roughly, at the Brigade headquarters. LTC [REDACTED] took over in the interim. I think the 320th MP Bn should have Assumption of Command Orders.

LTC [REDACTED] got a Center of Mass. He's probably near the bottom of the Battalion Commanders. Personally, I wouldn't have put him back in command. He's a nice man, a very smart individual, and he's very concerned about his soldiers, but he did not have the strength in leadership or experience, it seems like, and the responsibilities were huge at that facility. MAJ [REDACTED], the Operations Officer, seemed to be the person that most of the staff had to deal with, to get things done.

I thought we provided pretty good support. I believe the company, who had their awards lost, was from the 320th MP Battalion. We tried our best to track them. I don't recall that we ever received them at Brigade level. With the 320th, there were multiple times that we returned awards for corrections. If mistakes were minor, we tried to correct them ourselves. There are quite a few Bronze Stars. Most of the Battalion Commanders were submitted for Bronze Stars. LTC [REDACTED] wasn't one of them. I couldn't tell you the number of company commanders. There were a lot of people, who did a lot of hard work.

I have an electronic file of stuff I've worked on with the SJA, in terms of letters of reprimand, or relief. I don't have a spreadsheet per se, but I have an electronic file of people who were relieved of command.

My relationship with BG Karpinski is not as close as the relationship I had with BG Hill. I feel more like a clerk – do this, do that, get it done. With BG Hill, I could give advice. I felt there was more respect for my position, and what I did. I would go to her to get stuff signed, or ask a question, if I needed information, but I didn't sit down and talk to her everyday. There was one-way communication for the most part. She makes up her mind, and that's pretty much it. As a Commander, I think helps to have an open mind, to

talk to your staff, and to your commanders. She seems to depend on a smaller group of people than BG Hill did; mostly the S3 section, MAJ [REDACTED], the S3, CPT [REDACTED] who is the Operations Officer, and SGM [REDACTED] who came in as the Operation Sergeant Major from active duty, while we were in Baghdad

I know there are allegations of detainee abuse at Camp Bucca, and BCCF. I believe the soldiers involved at Bucca were all discharged, and a few of them got Article 15s

I had very little involvement with detainee operations. I would brief the detainee numbers, as part of our daily update to the Commander. Early on, under BG Hill, MAJ [REDACTED] was made the DRS Officer, responsible for reporting detainee numbers. She did not work for me. I did not rate her. She was, essentially, made a separate staff officer. I think, early on, there were some problems with detainee numbers, because they decided to incorporate the British database into our database, and there were problems with the British database. One, I think there were some compatibility problems, but they managed to convert it over to our database. I don't think the British had a solid hold of accountability – they had escapes, they didn't know who escaped.. The incorporation of the database resulted in multiple entries, which had to be worked through.

There were several emails from BG Karpinski to LTC [REDACTED] telling him to fix the problems with accountability, at Baghdad Central. At one point, we sent some expert processing people from the 310th MP Battalion, to assist the 320th, and I think there were some processing people from the 324th MP Battalion. I recommended, because Baghdad Central had five companies, that they use the admin personnel in these companies, and integrate them into processing, and they said these people were already tapped out, doing guard duty, and force protection, in addition to their company administrative duties.

In response to detainee abuses, I think the Brigade came out with additional policies. I think there were reiterations of the Rules of Engagement, as well. I think the S3 or JAG may be providing these documents. I think BG Karpinski's emotional response was one of shock, kind of a "I can't believe people actually did this," type of thing. She took the situation seriously.

From what I understand, I don't know how you would stop people who would do that from doing something like that. You could give additional classes, and policy letters, but, if they actually did that, they wouldn't have the morals.. From what I understand, there's not a lot of visibility in the area this took place. That probably aided the fact that this could happen.

Personally, it was kind of rough, going from being looked at to re-deploy, to getting another mission to build another internment facility. It was like starting all over again. I think it was tough from a morale standpoint. You had to restart that drive all over again.

Finished with their discussion, the panel gave MAJ [REDACTED] a list of items, to be addressed, and brought back on a Sworn Statement.

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is ODCSOP6

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY This 10 USC Section 301; This 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN)
PRINCIPAL PURPOSE To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately
ROUTINE USES Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and
DISCLOSURE Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION CAMP DOHA, KUWAIT
2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) 20040215
3. TIME 1330
4. FILE NUMBER
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME
6. SSN
7. GRADE/STATUS MAJ/AGR

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
800TH MILITARY POLICE BRIGADE

9. I, [REDACTED], WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH
DURING THE EARLY STAGES OF THE WAR WHEN THE 800TH MP BDE WAS STILL UNDER THE COMMAND OF BG HILL, WE EXPERIENCED INITIAL PROBLEMS WITH THE PRISONER DATABASE DUE A DECISION BY COL [REDACTED] (DEPUTY CDR) TO INCORPORATE THE BRITISH DATABASE INTO OURS IN ORDER TO SPEED UP THE U.S. TAKEOVER OF THE U.K. HOLDING AREA, NAMED FREDDY. I DON'T BELIEVE THE BRITISH HAD A FIRM ACCOUNTABILITY OF THEIR PRISONERS DUE TO FREQUENT ESCAPES THE INCORPORATION OF THE BRITISH DATABASE ALSO CAUSED MULTIPLE ENTRIES ON THE SAME PERSON IN OUR DRS DATABASE. THIS ISSUE WAS RESOLVED FIRST BY GETTING A PHYSICAL HEADCOUNT OF THE PRISONERS, AND THEN BY RE-PROCESSING THE PRISONERS IN DRS WHEN THEY WERE REMOVED FROM FREDDY INTO COMPLETED COMPOUNDS IN THE THEATER INTERNMENT FACILITY (TIF), NAMED CAMP BUCCA. WE DID NOT TO MY KNOWLEDGE HAVE ANY ACCOUNTABILITY PROBLEMS WITH DETAINEES UNDER CJTF-7. IF WE WERE PROVIDED AN ISN OR CAPTURE TAG NUMBER, WE COULD FIND A DETAINEE IN THE DATABASE AND THEREBY REFERENCE HIS STATUS, CRIME AND CAMP LOCATION. IN ORDER TO ACCOMPLISH THIS, WE HAD TO USE

10 EXHIBIT
11 INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT
PAGE 1 OF 4 PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT TAKEN AT DATED
THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED

STATEMENT OF [REDACTED]

TAKEN AT CAMP DHADATED 20040215

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

THREE DIFFERENT DATABASES - NDRC, CRIMINAL DATABASE & BATS, WHICH WERE CONSOLIDATED INTO ONE ROSTER BY MAJ GARRITY AND POSTED ON THE CJTF-7 WEBSITE. IF A DETAINEE INQUIRY, EITHER FROM A MILITARY UNIT OR FAMILY MEMBER, DID NOT HAVE A CAPTURE TAG # OR ISN, IT WAS DIFFICULT TO LOCATE A DETAINEE BASED ON MULTIPLE SPELLINGS OF ARABIC NAMES OR EVEN DECEPTION ON THE PART OF THE DETAINEE TO HIS REAL NAME. IN A BRIEFING FOR LTG SANCHEZ, THE BRIGADE RECOMMENDED THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN ARABIC VERSION OF BATS FOR THE IRAQI PRISON SYSTEM WITH COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY (CPA) TAKING THE LEAD FOR A CONTRACTOR/DEVELOPER. THE SHORT TERM SOLUTION FOR FAMILY INQUIRIES WERE LNO'S AT CPA ([REDACTED] & CPT [REDACTED]), ~~AND~~ ~~THE~~ DISTRIBUTING THE CJTF-7 ROSTER TO CIVIL AFFAIRS UNITS, AND HAVING THE PRISONERS FILL OUT NEW CAPTURE CARDS UPON CHANGE OF LOCATION TO PROVIDE TO THE ICRC.

THE NDRC IN THE PENTAGON HAD ISSUES WITH GAPS OR BLANK DATA FIELDS IN THE NDRC DATABASE COMING FROM BAGHDAD CENTRAL. BG KARPINSKI REINFORCED FIXING THIS IN AT LEAST TWO EMAILS TO THE BATTALION COMMANDER, LTC [REDACTED], AND THRU ME TO THE BATTALION ON AT LEAST TWO OCCASIONS. THE BATTALION COMMANDERS RESPONDED TO ME VIA EMAIL THAT FORCE PROTECTION TOOK PRIORITY OVER FILLING OUT THE DATABASE. THE 320TH MP BATTALION WAS PROVIDED ADMINISTRATIVE PERSONNEL FROM OTHER BATTALIONS ON A TEMPORARY BASIS IN ORDER TO WORK ON FILLING THE GAPS IN THE DATABASE. MAJ [REDACTED] SENT THE 320TH A RECOMMENDATION

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [REDACTED]

PAGE 2 OF 4 PAGES

STATEMENT OF [REDACTED]

TAKEN AT CAMP DohaDATED 20040215

9 STATEMENT (Continued)

TO CAPTURE THE MISSING INFORMATION WHEN OUTPROCESSING THE PRISONERS AND TO SEND A TEAM WITH AN INTERPRETOR INTO THE COMPOUNDS; SHE ALSO PROVIDED A COUPLE OF CHECKLISTS IN ORDER TO DO THIS. I SUGGESTED TO THE BATTALION TO AUGMENT THEIR DETAINEE PROCESSING LINE WITH ADMIN PERSONNEL FROM THEIR 5 COMPANIES. THE RESPONSE BACK WAS THAT THE COMPANY ADMIN PERSONNEL WERE TAPPED OUT DOING TOWER & ECP DUTY FOR FORCE PROTECTION AND THEIR COMPANY ADMINISTRATIVE FUNCTIONS

REFERENCE THE QUESTION ON MY RELATIONSHIP WITH BG KARPINSKI AS THE COMMANDER IN COMPARISON TO THE FORMER COMMANDER, BG HILL, IT IS NOT AS CLOSE UNDER BG HILL, I FELT MORE AS A CLOSE & TRUSTED ADVISOR THAN UNDER BG KARPINSKI OF COURSE, THE RELATIONSHIP WITH BG HILL WAS DEVELOPED OVER A 4+ YEAR PERIOD AND NOT IN THE MIDDLE OF A DEPLOYMENT THERE WAS MORE TWO WAY COMMUNICATION WITH BG HILL, AND I FEEL MY RECOMMENDATIONS AND OPINIONS WERE MORE SOUGHT OUT AND VALUED/CONSIDERED THE MAJORITY OF MY DEALINGS WITH BG KARPINSKI ARE TO GET VARIOUS ITEMS SIGNED OR ASK SPECIFIC QUESTIONS TO GET ANSWERS I NEED. I FELT MORE LIKE A CLERK THAN A STAFF OFFICER


END OF STATEMENT

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

PAGE 3 OF 4 PAGES

9 STATEMENT (Continued)

END OF STATEMENT



AFFIDAVIT

I, [REDACTED], HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 9. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

[REDACTED]
(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law administer oaths, 15 day of FEBRUARY, 2004 at CD DOHA, KUWAIT

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

[REDACTED]
(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

[REDACTED]
(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)
NET 1366B L.C.M.J.
(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT