SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF TUKHI, AMINULLAH BARYALAI

c. Intent

The detainee smuggled Al Wafa members into Afghanistan.

- 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a. The detainee was in a student political organization called "Basij", which was not popular in Afghanistan and it was against the Taliban.
  - b. The detainee stated he is not al Qaida or Taliban.
- 5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

## Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

31 MARCH 2005

From:

**Presiding Officer** 

To:

AL OAHTANI, KHALID MALLUH SHAYI // AL JILBA

Via:

**Assisting Military Officer** 

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE

REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF

AL OAHTANI, KHALID MALLUH SHAYI // AL JILBA

- 1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state or to a third state; (2) transfer you to your home state, or a third state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state, or the third state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
  - a. Commitment
- 1. The detainee traveled to Afghanistan in the fall of 2000 to answer the Fatwa issued by Sheik Hamoud.
- 2. Sheikh Hamoud al Uggla is a Saudi Mufti who issued fatwas, including a fatwa calling for jihad in Afghanistan, and encouraged people to fight jihad against the Christians and Jews. Al Uqqla condoned the September 11, 2001 attacks against the United States, and helped raise money for Usama Bin Laden until al Uqqla's death in Saudi Arabia in 2001.
- 3. The detainee stayed at a Taliban safehouse in Quetta, Pakistan, while traveling to Afghanistan.
- 4. The detainee was shot in the arm by a sniper, received medical treatment in Konduz. and surrendered to Northern Alliance forces at Mazar-e-Sharif.
  - b. Training
    - 1. The detainee received weapons training at Pakistani Center #5 for approximately five

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL QAHTANI, KHALID MALLUH SHAYI // AL JILBA

months. He was instructed in the use of RPGs and Kalashnikov rifles and was regularly assigned guard duty while at this camp.

- 2. The detainee's alias was on a document issued by the office of Mujahideen Affairs listing over 150 al Qaida members scheduled for tactics, artillery, security, snipers and anti-aircraft training.
  - 3. The detainee was identified as having attended al Farouq training camp.
  - c. Connections/Associations
- 1. The detainee's name was found on a document listing 324 Arabic names, aliases, and nationalities recovered from safehouse raids associated with suspected al-Qaida in Karachi, Pakistan.
- 2. The detainee's name was found on a document (floppy disk) containing a list of names, safety-deposit boxes and contents recovered from raids of a suspected al Qaida safehouse.
- 3. The detainee's name was found in the pocket litter of an Arab Mujahidin who entered Croatia from Bosnia in 1996.
- 4. The detainee traveled to Tora Bora where he stayed for approximately two days with nine other Mujahadeen fighters in a stone house that was built into the mountain. Approximately two weeks later Usama Bin Laden came and stayed at the stone house.

#### d. Intent

- 1. The detainee was sent to Konduz and spent six months on the Khawaja Ghar front line.
- 2. The detainee guarded sleeping bunkers for Pakistani forces fighting at the front lines in Hawajager, Afghanistan (Khawaja Ghar).

#### e. Detainee Conduct

The detainee has been cited for assault, hostile activity, and harassment of guards on numerous occasions. He was cited on one occasion for making a weapon.

- 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a. The detainee did not fire his weapon at any soldiers or persons. He had no prior knowledge of the attacks on the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001, or against the American people or anywhere else in the United States or the world.
  - b. The detainee stated that he did not go to Afghanistan to fight for the Taliban, but to UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL QAHTANI, KHALID MALLUH SHAYI // AL JILBA

receive weapons training "and stand guard."

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

# Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

29 March 2005

From:

Presiding Officer

To:

BEL BACHA, AHMED BIN SALEH

Via:

**Assisting Military Officer** 

SUBJECT:

UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE

REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF BEL BACHA, AHMED BIN SALEH

- 1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state or to a third state; (2) transfer you to your home state, or a third state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state, or the third state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
  - a. Training
- 1. The detainee stayed at a Jalalabad guesthouse (aka the House of the Algerians), a staging point for Europeans and North Africans traveling to and from training.
- 2. While in Jalalabad, the detainee received training on small arms, the Kalashnikov rifle and Simonov machine gun.
  - 3. The detainee had previous weapons training from his time in the Algerian army.
  - b. Connection/Associations
- 1. The detainee traveled from Algeria to France to obtain a false French passport, which he used to travel to London. Once arriving in London the detainee went directly to the Finsbury Park Mosque.
- 2. The detainee stated that his travel to Afghanistan via false passport was facilitated by the Finsbury Park Mosque.
  - 3. The detainee encountered Usama Bin Laden on two separate occasions.

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DMO Exhibit\_\_\_

Page 1 of Z

Page 1 of 2 UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF BEL BACHA, AHMED BIN SALEH

4. The detainee met and stayed with three al Qaida leaders while in Kabul and Jalalabad.

#### c. Intent

- 1. Detainee went to fight for jihad because he believes that it is every good Muslim's duty.
- 2. Detainee admitted receiving training to become a jihad member around the world.

### d. Other Relevant Data

- 1. The detainee stated that he attended prayer services and lectures conducted by Abu Hamza, Sheik of the Finsbury Park Mosque.
- 2. Abu Hamzah is a fundamentalist who has lectured on "Jihad" and "martyrdom" and raised controversy with his speeches entitled "Call and Combat" after 11 September 2001.
- 3. The detainee fled Jalalabad to the Afghan mountains as the coalition forces approached the city in November 2001.
- 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

The detainee indicated he did not want anything to do with the GIA (Armed Islamic Group) as they were terrorists and very bad people.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

. 001166

# Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

12 April 05

From:

**Presiding Officer** 

To:

AL RUSHAYDAN, ABDALLAH // IBRAHIM

Via:

**Assisting Military Officer** 

SUBJECT:

UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE

REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF

AL RUSHAYDAN, ABDALLAH // IBRAHIM

- 1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state or to a third state; (2) transfer you to your home state, or a third state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state, or the third state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
  - a. Commitment
- 1. The detainee left for a one month vacation in November 2001, to visit Damascus, Tehran and Afghan refugee camps.
- 2. The detainee stated that he never mentioned his true intentions to anyone, including family members.
- 3. The detainee traveled to Chaman, Pakistan, the closest border city to Kandahar, Afghanistan.
- 4. The detainee was captured on 10 December 2001, on the border of Pakistan and Afghanistan.
  - b. Connections/Associations
- 1. Beginning in 1993, the detainee was an employee of Haith Alekath Al Alamiah, or the International Aid Organization. The detainee worked for this organization for two years.

2. The International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO) is also known as Al Hayat Al

DMO Exhibit

Page 1 of 2
UNCLASSIFIED

Page 1 of 2

001167

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE

REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF

AL RUSHAYDAN, ABDALLAH // IBRAHIM

Igatha Al Islamiya Al Aalamiya.

- 3. According to the media in Asia, the Islamic Non-government Organization known as the International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO), which is managed by Osama Bin Laden's brother-in-law, has maintained links with the Abu Sayyaf group (ASG) in the Philippines.
- 4. Executive Order 13224, which blocks property and prohibits transactions with persons who commit, threaten to commit, or support terrorism, designates the Abu Sayyaf Group as a global terrorist entity.
- 5. While traveling to Damascus, Syria, via bus, the detainee met a man known to him as Abd Malik. The two men shared a room during their four days in Damascus. Abd Malik and the detainee then traveled to Tehran, Iran and got a hotel room together.
  - 6. Abdul Malek is a civilian member of the Taliban government.
- 7. Qandahar Police Officers arrested Abdul Malek in connection with a March 2002 rocket attack directed against U.S. Forces at Qandahar Airfield.
  - 8. The detainee may have been at a Kandahar prison.
  - c. Other Relevant Data

During questioning regarding the details and reasons for travel, the detainee stated, "I would tell you the truth, but you would get mad."

- 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a. The detainee stated he is not a member of the Taliban, Jamaat Tablighi, al Qaida or the Mujahadin. He did not go to Pakistan for jihad and never entered Afghanistan. The detainee stated he was not recruited by any terrorist group, individual or organization to travel to Pakistan.
- b. The detainee claims while he was in Pakistan, he never heard anyone talk about joining jihad to fight the Northern Alliance. The detainee denies ever having joined the Muhjadeen or jihad against the Northern Alliance, and claims he was never a member of the Saudi military.
- 5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

- 001168

# Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

27 April 2005

From:

Presiding Officer

To:

KAMEL, ABDULLAH KAMEL // ABDULLAH

Via:

Assisting Military Officer

SUBJECT:

UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE

REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF

KAMEL, ABDULLAH KAMEL // ABDULLAH

- 1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state or to a third state; (2) transfer you to your home state, or a third state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state, or the third state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
  - a. Commitment
- 1. Detainee traveled to Afghanistan, via Iran, after 11 September 2001, with approximately 15,000 U.S. dollars.
- 2. After attempting to flee Afghanistan three times, the detainee paid two men each 100 U.S. dollars to smuggle him across the border into Pakistan. After a couple of days in the vicinity of the Pakistani Border, an unknown Pakistani man took the detainee to a Pakistani prison.
  - b. Training

In 2000, the detainee traveled to Afghanistan and attended a basic training course at a Libyan training camp.

- c. Connections / Associations
  - 1. The detainee has extensive connections to several al Qaida members and an affiliation 001169

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF KAMEL, ABDULLAH KAMEL // ABDULLAH

with the al Wafa organization. (Executive Order 13224 designates al Wafa as a global terrorist entity)

- 2. The detainee's associate encouraged the detainee to travel to Afghanistan on two separate occasions.
- 3. That associate is a leader of a Mujahiden group, Tabligh, in Kuwait who conducted meetings and collected money for Usama Bin Laden through a Sheik at a local mosque. This individual is also described as the legal advisor and close friend to Usama Bin Laden.

#### d. Intent

The detainee traveled to Afghanistan the second time sometime after September 11, 2001. The second time he was encouraged to go there to fight. He stayed in guesthouses in Kandahar where he heard a speech given by Usama Bin Laden.

### e. Other Relevant Data

- 1. Detainee was captured with a Casio watch, model F-91W, a common watch used by al Qaida to detonate improvised explosive devices.
- 2. One of the detainee's known aliases was on a list of captured hard drives associated with a senior al Qaida member.
- 3. The detainee's name and photograph is found on a foreign state service product that depicts the relationship between al Qaida elements and Kuwaiti extremists.
- 4. The detainee's name was found on a list of captured al Qaida and Taliban fighters that were captured trying to flee Afghanistan.
- 5. The detainee's name was found on a computer server hard drive recovered during a raid of a suspected al Qaida safehouse in Islamabad, Pakistan.
- 6. The detainee's name was found on a list of 324 Arabic names recovered from safehouse raids associated with suspected al Qaida in Karachi, Pakistan.
- 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a. The detainee stated that he was, "carried away with emotion" when he saw the poor children in Afghanistan, citing this as his reason for travel.
  - b. The detainee denied involvement with the Taliban or al Qaida and having knowledge of

UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT:

UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE

REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF

KAMEL, ABDULLAH KAMEL // ABDULLAH

the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on September 11th. The detainee also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or its interests.)

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

# Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

04 May 2005

From:

**Presiding Officer** 

To:

AL AWDA, FOUZI KHALID ABDULLAH

Via:

Assisting Military Officer

SUBJECT:

UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE

REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF

AL AWDA, FOUZI KHALID ABDULLAH

- 1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state or to a third state; (2) transfer you to your home state, or a third state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state, or the third state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
  - a. Commitment
- 1. The detainee traveled to Dubai, United Arab Emirates; Karachi, Pakistan; Quetta, Pakistan; then drove across the Afghanistan border to Buldak.
- 2. In August or early September 2001, detainee admits traveling through Afghanistan with Taliban members.
- 3. The detainee had approximately 4000 United States dollars, 4000 Saudi Riyals and 400 Deutschmarks when he departed for Afghanistan.
- 4. On November 18, 2001, the detainee was captured by Pakistani authorities attempting to leave Afghanistan through the Tora Bora Mountains. The detainee was armed with an AK-47 at the time of his capture.
- 5. The detainee speculated that the group of men he traveled with through Tora Bora to the Pakistani border may have included members of al Qaida and the Taliban.

DMO Exhibit\_\_\_\_

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE

REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL AWDA, FOUZI KHALID ABDULLAH

## b. Training

- 1. The detainee first went to a camp in Buldak, Afghanistan where the Iman introduced him to a Taliban government representative.
  - 2. Detainee admits firing an AK-47 at a training camp near Kandahar.

## c. Connection/Associations

- 1. The detainee's name was recovered from computer file which lists contact points and telephone numbers for al Qaida Mujahadeen in Pakistan.
- 2. The detainee's name was found on a computer used by suspected al Qaida members containing a list of associates incarcerated in Pakistan.
- 3. The detainee's name and telephone number were on a list of captured mujahidin that was discovered on a computer hard drive associated with a senior al Qaida member.
  - 4. The detainee admitted receiving assistance from the Taliban in locating places to teach.

#### d. Intent

Detainee admitted staying at a guesthouse with fighters armed with AK-47 rifles.

- 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a. The detainee denies attending any training camps and stated he never fought or knew anyone belonging to al Qaida.
- b. The detained denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on September 11th. He also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or its interest.
- c. The detainee stated he was not a soldier and has had no formal military training. He stated he is not a member of the Taliban or al Qaida.
- d. The detainee indicated he has never met Usama Bin Laden and has never fought against coalition forces. He would like to return to Kuwait and attempt to obtain a teaching position, get married and have a family.
- e. The detainee denied going to Afghanistan to fight the jihad, as he stated there were Muslims on both sides of the fight and he could not kill Muslims. He could not kill anyone, as he was a "chicken."

# **UNCLASSIFIED**

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE

REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL AWDA, FOUZI KHALID ABDULLAH

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

001174

# Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

20 April 2005

From:

Presiding Officer

To:

ABD AL AZIZ SAYER UWAIN AL SHAMMERI

Via:

Assisting Military Officer

SUBJECT:

UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE

REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF

ABD AL AZIZ SAYER UWAIN AL SHAMMERI

- 1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state or to a third state; (2) transfer you to your home state, or a third state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state, or the third state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
  - a. Commitment
- 1. The detainee did not tell anyone he was going to Afghanistan. The detainee planned and funded his travel arrangements. The detainee took sick leave from school and began his travel to Afghanistan on approximately 14 October 2001.
- 2. The detainee traveled from Kuwait to Iran and then to Afghanistan soon after 11 September 2001.
- 3. The detainee was arrested by the Pakistani Army while attempting to cross into Pakistan from Afghanistan without identification documents.
  - 4. During confinement, the detainee organized others in non-compliance activity.
  - 5. In confinement, the detainee is considered a very important leader.

001175

b. Training

In 1993, the detainee completed two to three months of basic military training in the

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ABD AL AZIZ SAYER UWAIN AL SHAMMERI

Kuwaiti military, after which he was placed in the Army.

#### c. Connections / Associations

- 1. One of the detainee's known aliases was on a list of captured hard drives associated with a senior al Qaida member.
- 2. The detainee was present at an al Qaida House associated with a non-government organization with links to al Qaida.
- 3. Executive Order 13224, which blocks property and prohibits transactions with persons who commit, threaten to commit or support terrorism, designates al Wafa as a global terrorist entity.
- 4. The al Qaida Media House, which houses the al Qaida Media Committee, was located in Qandahar. Senior members of al Qaida were associated with the Media Committee.

#### d. Intent

- 1. The detainee was a member of the Islamic Court in Afghanistan, which enforced proper behavior.
  - 2. The detainee was present at the prison uprising at Mazar-e-Sharif.
- 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a. The detainee did not participate in fighting in Bosnia or Chechnya. The detainee did not receive any training in Afghanistan and he claims no connection to al Qaida.
- b. The detained denies having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on September 11, and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or its interests.
- 5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

# Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

2 May 2005

From:

Presiding Officer

To:

AL HAMEYDANI, KHALID BIN // ABDULLAH MISHAL THAMER

Via:

Assisting Military Officer

SUBJECT:

UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE

REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF

AL HAMEYDANI, KHALID BIN // ABDULLAH MISHAL THAMER

- 1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state or to a third state; (2) transfer you to your home state, or a third state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state, or the third state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
  - a. Commitment
    - 1. The detainee was assessed by a foreign government service to be a hardcore extremist.
- 2. The detainee decided to go to Afghanistan to build a mosque. He made arrangements to travel to Afghanistan after the September 11 attacks, leaving the return flight date open. The detainee left Kuwait on either 21 or 22 September 2001 carrying \$15,000 in U.S. currency to build his mosque.
- 3. The detainee traveled to Afghanistan from Kuwait City by plane to Meshat, Iran where he hired a car to the Iran/Afghanistan border. The detainee spent one night in Taibot (phonetic), Iran, before crossing the border into Afghanistan. The detainee traveled to Namruz, Afghanistan and from there to Kabul, Afghanistan where he worked with Al Wafa repairing homes and schools for the poor.
- 4. The detainee donated 1,000 U.S. dollars to Al Wafa in Kabul to build a school. In addition to the money donated to Al-Wafa, he gave 2,000 U.S. dollars to assist refugees on the border and \$9,000 to build a mosque. The remaining 3,000 U.S. dollars and his passport were stolen from a house he was staying at outside of Kabul.

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL HAMEYDANI, KHALID BIN // ABDULLAH MISHAL THAMER

5. The nongovernmental organization "Wafa," officially named Al Wafa Al Igatha Al Islamia or Wafa Humanitarian organization and headquartered in Saudi Arabia is believed to have connections to Usama Bin Ladin and Afghan mujahidin.

## b. Training

The detainee received training with the "Lashkar E-Taiba." According to the Global Patterns of Terrorism 2003, the Lashkar-Tayyiba is the armed wing of the Pakistan-based religious organization, a Sunni anti-U.S. missionary organization formed in 1989. The Lashkar-Tayyiba was placed on the U.S. Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Asset Control list which includes organizations that are believed to support terrorist groups.

#### c. Connections

- 1. The detainee's name appears on a computer file used by suspected al Qaida members listing the names of detainees incarcerated in Pakistan. The file was recovered in a suspected al Qaida safe house in Islamabad, Pakistan.
- 2. The detainee's name and telephone number were on a list of captured mujahidin members that was discovered on a computer hard drive associated with a senior al Qaida member.
- 3. The detainee's name, home country and phone number appear on a document containing information regarding the capture of al Qaida and Taliban fighters by Pakistani officials in Nangahar Province, Pakistan who had crossed the border after the 11 September 2001 retaliation.
- 4. Information listing a safety deposit box and passport for the detainee appears on a floppy disk recovered from a suspected al Qaida safehouse in Karachi, Pakistan.
- 5. According to a foreign government service the detainee may be an associate of Abu Gaith.
- 6. Abu Gaith was the Imam of a mosque in Kuwait and later became a spokesman for Bin Laden.

#### d. Other relevant data

- 1. The detainee was captured with no identification papers.
- 2. The detainee's name has been pre-authorized for placement in appropriate government agency watchlists.

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL HAMEYDANI, KHALID BIN // ABDULLAH MISHAL THAMER

- 3. The detainee is linked to the Takfir Wa'al Hijra (TWH). Those associated with this ideology support the overthrow of governments not based solely on Shari'a.
- 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a. The detainee was unaware the money provided to Al-Wafa was used to support the al Oaida network.
  - b. The detainee denies ever receiving any type of terrorist or military training.
- c. The detainee also denies he ever received any military training or that he participated in any combat. He denied any knowledge regarding the location of training camps in Afghanistan or elsewhere. He denied having ever carried a weapon.
  - d. The detainee claims no knowledge of the Takfir Wa'al Hijra organization.
- 5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

# Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

17 May 2005

From:

**Presiding Officer** 

To:

AMIN, OMAR RAJAB

Via:

**Assisting Military Officer** 

SUBJECT:

UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE

REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AMIN, OMAR RAJAB

- 1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state or to a third state; (2) transfer you to your home state, or a third state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state, or the third state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
  - a. Commitment
    - 1. The detainee testified he raised \$10,000 before he went to Afghanistan.
- 2. The detainee traveled to Iran and Afghanistan unofficially because he knew he would not receive permission to travel to do charitable work for refugees.
- 3. The detainee said on September 28, 2001 he began his travel by air from Kuwait to Dubai, United Arab Emirates, on to Bahrain, then to Meshut, Iran. He then traveled by taxi from Meshut to the Afghanistan border. He crossed through using his Kuwaiti passport then took another taxi to Herat, Afghanistan. He took a plane from Herat to Kabul, Afghanistan.
  - 4. The detainee said he did not travel through Bahrain enroute to Afghanistan.
- 5. The detainee claimed that not one day in his life had he traveled to Afghanistan, Iran or Pakistan.

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<b>DMO</b> Exhibit			

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AMIN, OMAR RAJAB

- 6. The detainee claimed he told his wife, mother and sisters that he was going to Afghanistan. He said he contacted his family from Herat and Kabul.
- 7. The detainee's family said the detainee did not mention that he was going to Afghanistan. He told them he was going to the Pakistan/Afghanistan border and he called them from Pakistan.
- 8. In Kabul the detainee met with a Taliban secretary to arrange a meeting with the official in charge of refugees.
- 9. The detainee said he was in Afghanistan for 30 to 45 days before the bombing began. During that time he gave money to orphans.
- 10. The detainee said he had been in Afghanistan for two days before the bombing began. After about one month he traveled alone and without his passport toward the Pakistan border. He met two Arabs along the way and continued on with them. All three were arrested by Pakistani authorities upon reaching the border.
- 11. The detainee said he paid an Afghani to bring him to the Pakistan border. That Afghani brought the detainee to the Pakistan Army who turned him over to the United States.

### b. Connection/Associations

- 1. After graduating from a college in Nebraska the detainee worked for the Kuwaiti Joint Relief Committee. He accompanied another Kuwaiti Joint Relief Committee official to Zagreb, Croatia.
  - 2. That official facilitated another detainee's travel to Afghanistan.
- 3. The detainee said he was associated with Al Haramayan and it was recognized by the Kuwaiti Ministry of Social Affairs.
- 4. The Kuwaiti Joint Relief Committee and Al Haramayan provided financial support to former Arab Mujahadeen in Bosnia.
  - 5. The detainee was listed as a suspected member of Al-Gama'at al-Islamiyah in Italy.
- 6. According to the United States Department of Homeland Security, Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya is designated as a foreign terrorist organization.
- 7. The detainee's name appeared on a foreign government service list of members of the Mujahadeen Brigade in Bosnia. The document showed he joined the Brigade in 1993.

UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AMIN. OMAR RAJAB

- 8. The detainee said he joined the Mujahadeen Brigade (which required paying money) so he could automatically become a citizen of Bosnia.
- 9. The detainee was seen several times at the home of a Kuwaiti who facilitated other Kuwaitis travel to Afghanistan.
- 10. This Kuwaiti facilitator is a terrorist financier. He traveled to Afghanistan in 1999 and 2001 to meet with Usama bin Laden to give him large amounts of money.
- 11. The detainee's name was on a listing of 324 Arabic names, aliases and nationalities recovered from safe house raids associated with suspected al Qaida in Karachi, Pakistan.
- 12. According to a foreign government service, the detainee is associated with the "official spokesman for al Qaida organization".
- 13. The detainee was seen at the Abu Hamza guesthouse in Kabul, Afghanistan. Others who stayed at this guesthouse had advance knowledge of the September 11 attacks on the United States.

#### c. Intent

The detainee traveled to Afghanistan at the beginning of the war to become a member of the forces of Usama Bin Laden.

#### d. Other Relevant Data

- 1. The detainee was one of three men arrested at the scene for the murder of a fourth man. All four men were former members of El-Mujahid Brigade which fought with Bosnian Muslim forces.
- 2. The detainee said he worked for the Kuwaiti Joint Relief Committee in Zagreb, Croatia from 1993 to 1994. He worked for the same organization in Sarejevo, Bosnia from 1994 until 1999. He then returned to Kuwait and was employed by the Kuwaiti Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor until 2001.
- 3. The detainee said he returned from Zagreb, Croatia in mid 1995 to work for the Kuwaiti government.
- 4. The detainee has provided conflicting information on the dates and locations of his employment.
  - 5. The Kuwaiti government documents that the detainee began to work for them on 18

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AMIN, OMAR RAJAB

March 1996 as an agricultural supervisor in the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor. The Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor delegated the detainee to the Islamic International Charitable Organization on September 9, 1997 for one year.

- 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a. The detainee said if he is released, he just wants to go back to Kuwait and be with his family. He is angry about his situation, but it would not be appropriate for him to go out and express his anger.
  - b. The detainee said he is not Mujahadeen and he never went to Kosovo or Chechnya.
- c. The detainee denied he was armed or involved in any military action or training while in Afghanistan.
- d. The detainee stated he had no plans to fight against United States forces and has never fought against United States forces.
  - e. The detainee denies being an al Qaida and/or Taliban supporter.
- 5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

# Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

22 April 2005

From:

Presiding Officer

To:

AL DAIHANI, MOHAMMED FENAITEL // MOHAMED

Via:

Assisting Military Officer

SUBJECT:

UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE

REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF

AL DAIHANI, MOHAMMED FENAITEL // MOHAMED

- 1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state or to a third state; (2) transfer you to your home state, or a third state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state, or the third state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
  - a. Connections/Associations
- 1 A foreign government service has linked the detainee to the official spokesman for al Qaida.
- 2. After 11 September 2001, the detainee was at the home of an individual who helped facilitate travel to Afghanistan.
- 3. This individual is an extremist who was contacted by a senior al Qaida lieutenant to raise money for operations in Israel. This individual has personally traveled to Afghanistan to deliver a message to Usama Bin Ladin in Qandahar.
- 4. The detainee's name appeared on a hard drive recovered from a suspected al Qaida safe house in Islamabad, Pakistan.
  - b. Intent

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1. The detainee voluntarily traveled from Kuwait to Mecca, Saudi Arabia, on Hajj in 2000, where he met Faisal, an employee of the Sanabal Charitable Committee.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL DAIHANI, MOHAMMED FENAITEL // MOHAMED

- 2. The Sanabal employee and the detainee saw each other every month to every month and a half. The Sanabal employee spoke with the detainee on at least four occasions about going to Afghanistan.
- 3. Sanabil's first priority was providing support to the Jihad activities of the Libyan Islamic fighting Group.
- 4. The detainee admitted donating approximately 2,250 dinars to the Sanabal Charitable Committee.
- 5. The Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) is designated a foreign terrorist organization by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security.
- 6. The detainee voluntarily flew from Kuwait to Karachi, Pakistan, on 9 September 2001, where he joined Faisal and Abdul Hakeem.
  - 7. Abdul Hakeem was identified as an employee of the Sanabal Charitable Committee.
  - 8. Hakeem was also identified as a major recruiter for the LIFG.
- 9. Sometime after 9 September 2001, the detainee, Faisal, and Hakeem traveled to Kandahar, Afghanistan.
- 10. In December 2001, the detainee failed at attempts to be smuggled across the Iranian boarder.
- 11. The detainee traveled between Kandahar, Kabul, Herat and Jalalabad Afghanistan, during November/December 2001, before being smuggled into Pakistan, apprehended by Pakistani authorities, and turned over to US forces.
- 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

According to the detainee, the purpose of his eventual travel to Afghanistan was solely to verify the Sanabal Charitable Committee's work of building wells. Although the detainee had reservations about traveling to Afghanistan, he wanted to ensure that the money he donated, 2,250 dinars, had in fact been used to build five wells.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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# Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

10 March 2005

From:

Presiding Officer

To:

AL FAYFI, JABIR JUBRAN

Via:

Assisting Military Officer

SUBJECT:

UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE

REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL FAYFI, JABIR JUBRAN

- 1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state or to a third state; (2) transfer you to your home state, or a third state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state, or the third state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
  - a. Commitment
- 1. One of detainee's known aliases was on a list of captured al Qaida members that was discovered on a computer hard drive associated with a senior al Qaida member.
  - 2. Detainee fought the Northern Alliance from September through December 2001.
  - b. Training
    - 1. Detainee received two weeks of weapons training on the Kalishnikov rifle.
    - 2. Detained trained at the Al Farouq training camp near Kandahar.
  - c. Connection/Associations
- 1. The detainee stayed at the Arab Center in Bagram, Afghanistan, where Taliban fighters stayed while waiting to go to the line to fight.

001186

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# Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

07 March 2005

From:

Presiding Officer

To:

TSIRADZHO, POOLAD T

Via:

Assisting Military Officer

SUBJECT:

UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE

REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF TSIRADZHO, POOLAD T

- 1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state or to a third state; (2) transfer you to your home state, or a third state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state, or the third state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
  - a. Commitment
- 1. The detainee voluntarily traveled from Azerbaijan to Afghanistan to look for the Taliban, and admitted to fighting the Americans.
  - 2. The detainee admits to joining the Taliban as a guard, guarding food supplies.
- 3. The detainee admits to being a guard in the Taliban and being issued an AKM-7.62 rifle.
- 4. The detainee surrendered to Northern Alliance Forces near Mazar-E-Sharif in November 2001.
  - b. Training

The detainee trained at the al Farouq training camp.

001188

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UNCLASSIFIED Page 1 of 2

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF TSIRADZHO, POOLAD T

### c. Connections/Associations

- 1. Upon arriving in Herat, Afghanistan, the detainee met with a Taliban officer who sent him to Kandahar to meet a designated individual.
  - 2. The designated individual was the owner of a Taliban safe house.
  - 3. The detainee is associated with Abd Al Iraqi.
  - 4. Abd Al Iraqi is an al Qaida lieutenant and veteran Afghan fighter.

#### d. Intent

- 1. Detainee stated that he saw on television that there was a war in Afghanistan. He then went to Afghanistan to study and look for the Taliban.
  - 2. The detainee was injured during an artillery attack by Northern Alliance Forces.
- 3. The detainee stated, "I was fighting, then I was wounded. I stopped fighting the Americans and went on vacation."
- 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the U.S. prior to their execution on September 11th, and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the U.S. or U.S. interests.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

001189

# Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

9 December 2004

From:

Presiding Officer

To:

SAID, ALI MUHAMMAD NASIR MUHAMMAD

Via:

Assisting Military Officer

SUBJECT:

UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE

REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SAID, ALI MUHAMMAD NASIR

**MUHAMMAD** 

- 1 An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state or to a third state; (2) transfer you to your home state, or a third state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state, or the third state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
  - A. The detainee is a Taliban fighter:
    - 1. The detainee admitted he affiliated himself with the Taliban.
    - 2. The detainee voluntarily traveled from Yemen to Afghanistan in 2001.
    - 3. When the detainee arrived in Afghanistan, he stayed at house used by Taliban fighters.
  - B. The detainee participated in military operations against the coalition.
- 1. The detainee served on the frontlines and as a rear guard in AF, where he carried an AK-47.
  - 2. Following the U.S. bombing campaign in AF, the detainee fled to the Tora Bora Region.

001190

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- 3. The detainee escaped into Pakistan, where he was captured by Pakistani guards.
- C. Based upon a review of recommendations from US Government agencies and classified and unclassified documents, Enemy Combatant is regarded as a threat to United States and it's Allies.
- 1. Detainee's overall behavior has been generally compliant and non-aggressive. However, on 30 July 2004, detainee and several others were singing songs that encouraged resistance to the Joint Task Force (JTF) mission and praising praised Usama Bin Laden for his actions. On 27 February 2003, detainee threw water on guards.
- 2. Detainee stated that during his initial interviews he lied about attending a terrorist training camp because he was not sure who else has trained at the camp and he did not want to be labeled as a terrorist. Detainee now admits that he attended the training camp for approximately 40 to 45 days.
- 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- A. Enemy Combatant in his own oral testimony denied knowledge that the Taliban were fighting the United States. Admitted traveling from Yemen to Afghanistan just to visit and to see what was going on with the brothers fighting the Northern Alliance there.
- 5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

001191

# Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

28 April 2005

From:

**Presiding Officer** 

To:

AL KANDARI, FAIZ MUHAMMAD // AHMED

Via:

**Assisting Military Officer** 

SUBJECT:

UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE

REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF

AL KANDARI, FAIZ MUHAMMAD // AHMED

- 1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state or to a third state; (2) transfer you to your home state, or a third state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state, or the third state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

#### a. Commitment

- 1. While attending an Islamic Institute in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) the detainee recruited a fellow student and another friend to participate in the Jihad in Afghanistan and arranged their travel, as well as his own, from the United Arab Emirates to Pakistan.
- 2. The detainee worked strongly for funding Jihad through fliers, pamphlets and a senior Muslim cleric. The detainee also created and distributed videotapes to support Jihad and specifically encouraged people to go to Afghanistan and Tunisia to fight.
- 3. The detainee was arrested and imprisoned in the United Arab Emerates for encouraging people to go to jihad.
- 4. The detainee was both a religious and military leader within al Qaida and the Taliban. The detainee frequently gave speeches to the recruits at the al Qaida training camps in Afghanistan, and to al Qaida and Taliban fighters in Afghanistan. The speeches were designed to encourage the students and the fighters in pursuing Jihad and to build their confidence and conviction in their mission.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL KANDARI, FAIZ MUHAMMAD // AHMED

5. The detainee provided religious instruction at al Farouq training camp in the September 2001 timeframe.

## b. Training

- 1. The detainee traveled to the Khalden training camp in Afghanistan where he received weapons training on the Kalashnikov, Dusaka (AKA Docka), Grinov, BKC automatic rifles, RPG's, and anti-aircraft guns. Usama Bin Laden provided religious instruction and gave advice and encouragement to the Jihadists.
- 2. The detainee received further training with explosives at al Faruq training camp. The explosives training included instruction on production of bombs, setting of explosives, detonating a series of bombs, production of Molotov cocktails, and the use of grenades and petrol bombs. Usama Bin Laden used to visit the camp and supervise some of the training.

#### c. Connections/Associations

- 1. The detainee was with Usama Bin Laden in the Tora Bora mountain region when the U.S. bombing campaign began.
- 2. In Pakistan, the detainee and the others he had recruited resided at Al-Shaykh Al-Libi's guesthouse in Islamabad.
- 3. Al-Libi helped run the Khaldan camp and taught classes in topography and land and celestial navigation.
- 4. A senior al Qaida member arranged for the detainee to travel to Peshawar. The detainee then traveled from Peshawar to Afghanistan with Saudi Nationals involved in the planning of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks.
- 5. The detainee spent most of his time in Afghanistan with Usama bin Laden as a spiritual advisor and Islamic teacher.
- 6. The detainee is related to one of the al Qaida members responsible for the attack on U.S. Marines on Failak Island, Kuwait on 8 October 2002. This relative is considered by his peers as among the best al Qa'ida cadre. Additionally, the detainee, Salayman Abu Ghayth, and the detainee's relative attended an airport training camp near Qandahar.
  - 7. The detainee is associated with Abu Ghayth.
  - 8. Salayman Abu Ghayth is an al Qaida spokesman.
- 9. The detainee's name appeared on a list of captured mujahidin found on a hard drive which is associated with Khalid Shaykh Muhammad (KSM).

## UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT:

UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF

AL KANDARI, FAIZ MUHAMMAD // AHMED

- 10. The detainee was the leader of a Mujahiden group, Tabligh, in Kuwait. The detainee conducted a lot of meetings with Usama Bin Laden (UBL). The detainee collected money for UBL through a Sheik at a local mosque. The detainee was described as the legal advisor and close friend to UBL.
  - 11. The detainee was associated with the Al Wafa organization.
- 12. According to a foreign government service, as of early August 2002, the non-governmental organization "Wafa," officially named (Al Wafa Igatha Al Islamia) (Wafa Humanitarian Organization) and headquartered in Saudi Arabia, was believed to have had connections to Usama Bin Ladin and Afghan Mujahidin.

#### d. Other Relevant Data

- 1. A foreign government service considers the detainee to be a hardcore extremist, unlikely to respect either law or human life. They consider the detainee a threat to the US and its allies, and believe he has the potential to be a high-level terrorist planner.
- 2. The detainee's overall behavior has been generally non-compliant. Assaults include spitting and throwing fluids on guards. A guard found a crude shank in the detainee's possession. Detainee has been a regular leader of prayer, and continually physically trains in his cell. He teaches martial arts on occasion to other detainees.
- 3. The detainee has encouraged Muslims to cause problems for the guards at GTMO and conduct a strike. He also issued a Fatwa to not eat the chicken and meat at GTMO because Muslim law doesn't permit it.
- 4. The detainee often complains about President Bush and the U.S. Government and stated that his "interrogator and her government are criminals".
- 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a. The detained ever teaching Islam or providing religious instruction, but stated he mentored men in reading and reciting the Koran. The detained also denied ever visiting a training camp in Afghanistan.
  - b. The detainee claims to have been in Afghanistan working for a charitable organization.
- 5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE

REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF

AL KANDARI, FAIZ MUHAMMAD // AHMED

continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

## Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

16 May 2005

From:

Presiding Officer

To:

AL AZMI, SA AD MADHI SA AD // HAWASH

Via:

Assisting Military Officer

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE

REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF (AL AZMI, SA AD MADHI SA AD //

HAWASH

- An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state or to a third state; (2) transfer you to your home state, or a third state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state, or the third state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
  - a. Commitment

The detainee is an Islamic extremist who has participated in extremist activity in Kuwait ? where he was a member of a group known as the Takfir Seven."

b. Training

The detainee attended the al Faruq training camp.

- c. Connections/Associations
  - 1. The detainee lived with and is associated with known members of al Qaida.
- 2. The detainee worked for and was affiliated with the Wafa organization in Kabul, Afghanistan for three months.
  - 3. The Wafa organization, located in the Wazir Akhbar Khan area of Kabul, Afghanistan, is listed on Executive Order 13224 as an entity that commits or poses a significant risk

UNCLASSIFIED

DMO Exhibit Page 1 of 2

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL AZMI, SA AD MADHI SA AD // HAWASH

of committing acts of terrorism.

- 4. The detainee was arrested with a known member of al Qaida who owned and ran a Karachi al Qaida safehouse.
- 5. Pakistani police arrested the detainee with other foreign fighters at an al Qaida safehouse in Karachi.
- 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a. When arrested in Karachi, Pakistan, the detained denied he ever saw, possessed or knew of any cell phones, explosive parts or devices present at the house where he stayed for one week.
  - b. The detainee denies being a member of Takfir Wa Al Hijra.
- c. The detainee was a cameraman for al Wafa and videotaped their charitable activities (construction of drinking wells and repair of mosques). He also participated in the distribution of blankets and food to the poor.
- d. The detainee departed Kuwait with six thousand U. S. Dollars. He took the money to purchase honey in Pakistan to ship back to Kuwait before traveling to Afghanistan. He denies wanting to use the honey to disguise a shipment of explosives or weapons.
  - e. The detainee denies receiving any military training.
- 5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

# Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

28 Apr 2005

From:

**Presiding Officer** 

To:

AL RAB IA, FOUAD MAHMOUD // HASAN

Via:

Assisting Military Officer

SUBJECT:

UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE

REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF

AL RAB IA, FOUAD MAHMOUD // HASAN

- 1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state or to a third state; (2) transfer you to your home state, or a third state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state, or the third state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
  - a. Commitment
- 1. On approximately September 18, 2001, an individual asked the detainee if he wanted to go to Afghanistan for jihad. The detainee agreed to go.
- 2. The individual was one of seven people, identified by senior al Qaida personnel, who were to become martyrs for a later operation associated with the 11 September 2001 attacks on the United States.
- 3. The detainee began his travel to Afghanistan in October 2001. The detainee flew from Kuwait to Tehran, Iran via Dubayy. The detainee then flew to Meshaad, Iran and took a car to Herat. The detainee then traveled to Kandahar and Kabul, Afghanistan. The detainee spent two months, with Taliban forces, trying to flee Afghanistan. Upon arriving at a Jalalabad checkpoint, the detainee was captured.
- 4. The detainee is a significant al Qaida member who attended training at the al-Faruq camp in Afghanistan. In February 1992, the detainee was at Gardez supervising the front.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL RAB IA, FOUAD MAHMOUD // HASAN

The detainee attended basic training and spent three months in the Kuwaiti military.

### c. Connections / Associations

- 1. The detainee managed the Summit Health Institute from 1998 to 2000. The Muslim Brotherhood owns the building that housed the Isla Health Institute/Club, of which the detainee is a business partner. The detainee managed the club from 2000 to 2001.
- 2. Hamas originated as a branch of the Muslim Brotherhood (Executive Order 13224 designates Hamas as a global terrorist entity).
  - 3. The Summit Health Club trains young men to prepare them for jihad.
- 4. The detainee traveled to Bosnia and contacted the Islamic Revival Society and the Patients Helping Fund (Executive Order 13224 designates the Revival of Islamic Heritage Society as a global terrorist entity).
- 5. The detainee identified three men who trained at the health club he managed. One of the three men was a recruiter of the jihadist movement. Another man left his job during the summer to fight in Afghanistan. The third man safeguarded possessions of mujahid at his house in Kandahar, Afghanistan.
- 6. The detainee admits that one of the individuals is a member of al Qaida. The detainee alluded to another man being a probable member of al Qaida.
- 7. The detainee collected money from mosques and businessmen in Kuwait City and gave it to a man. This man instructed terrorists to join Jama'at Al Tabligh in order to obtain legitimate cover to travel to Afghanistan to participate in jihad.
- 8. Jama'at al Tabligh, a Pakistan based Islamic missionary organization, is being used as a cover to mask travel and activities of terrorists including members of al Qaida.
  - 9. The detainee met with Usama Bin Laden on four occasions during July 2001.
- 10. The detainee was approached by individuals from the Patients Helping Fund and the International Islamic Relief Organization, about setting up offices in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
- 11. Media reports indicate that the International Islamic Relief Organization is a non-governmental organization (NGO), which has ties to al Qaida and other terrorist organizations, to include the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) in Manilla (Executive Order 13224 designates the Abu Sayyaf Group as a global terrorist entity).
- 12. The detainee was an operator for the Al-Wafa NGO and likely transferred large sums of money through a front company (Executive Order 13224 designates al Wafa as a global

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF

AL RAB IA, FOUAD MAHMOUD // HASAN

terrorist entity).

13. The detainee was present at the al Qaida Media House with individuals associated with the al Wafa Organization and al Qaida.

- 14. The al Qaida Media House, which houses the al Qaida Media Committee, was located in Kandahar, Afghanistan. Senior members of al Qaida were associated with the Media Committee.
- 15. The detainee's name and telephone number were found in an address book recovered from the residence where senior al Qaida operative Khalid Shaykh Muhammad was captured.
- 16. The detainee's telephone number was found in a notebook belonging to a Libyan Islamic extremist in Europe.
- 17. The Libyan Islamic extremist is a representative of the Islamic Relief Agency in Europe, who has contact with the Egyptian Islamic Jihad and Hamas (Executive Order 13224 designates the Egyptian Islamic Jihad and Hamas as global terrorist entities).

#### d. Intent

- 1. On 12 October 2001, the detainee arrived in Kabul, Afghanistan and stayed in a facility which housed 100 people, some of whom were mujahideen fighters.
- 2. The detainee was chief of supply for the Taliban and al Qaida in Jalalabad and Tora Bora. The detainee supplied money, weapons, ammunition and food. The detainee also led a ten to twenty-five man group of fighters.
- 3. The detainee was in Bagram, Afghanistan, at Camp Malik and in Tora Bora, where he was carrying a bag of ammunition.
- 4. The detainee was present at an al Qaida meeting in the Tora Bora mountains in which the topics discussed included the distribution of SAM-7s and other anti-aircraft weapons.

## e. Other Relevant Data

The detainee attended Embry Riddle Aeronautical Institute in Daytona Beach, Florida, where he earned a Masters Degree in Business Administration in aviation management. The detainee previously earned a bachelor's degree in engine and airframe maintenance in Perth, United Kingdom.

- 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
  - 1. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to

SUBJECT:

UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE

REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF

AL RAB IA, FOUAD MAHMOUD // HASAN

their execution on September 11th, and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or its interests.

- 2. The detainee states that he has no knowledge of anyone in a Kuwaiti relief organization being involved in terrorist activity.
- 5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

# Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

10 May 2005

From:

**Presiding Officer** 

To:

AL ZAMEL, ADEL ZAMEL ABD AL // MAHSEN

Via:

Assisting Military Officer

SUBJECT:

UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE

REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF

AL ZAMEL, ADEL ZAMEL ABD AL // MAHSEN

- 1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state or to a third state; (2) transfer you to your home state, or a third state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state, or the third state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
  - a. Commitment
    - 1. Detainee had prior knowledge of the 11 September 2001 attacks on the United States.
- 2. The detainee is considered a Takfiri, but would not be considered a Jihadist as he doesn't have the fortitude to risk his own life for a cause.
- 3. Takfir Wa'al Hijra, or "the society that accuses nominal Muslims of unbelief," originated in Egypt in the 1970s. The group name has been adopted outside of Egypt; those associated with it generally are outlawed because of their radical ideology, including goals supporting the overthrow of governments not based solely on Shari'a.
  - b. Connections/Associations
- 1. The detainee admits to establishing the al-Wafa organization with detainee Abu Abdel Aziz (a.k.a. Abdul Aziz al-Matrafi) and Samar Khand in Kabul, Herat, and Kandahar, Afghanistan. The detainee worked in the Kandahar office.
  - 2. According to a foreign government service, the nongovernmental organization "Wafa" 1202

SUBJECT:

UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF

AL ZAMEL, ADEL ZAMEL ABD AL // MAHSEN

officially named "al Wafa al Igatha al Islamia" (Wafa Humanitarian Organization), headquartered in Saudi Arabia, was believed to have had connections to Usama Bin Ladin and Afghan Mujahidin.

- 3. The detainee was closely associated with Suliman Abu Ghaith and admits that Ghaith was the spokesperson for al Qaida and Usama Bin Laden.
- 4. The detainee accompanied al Qaida Spokesman Sulaiman Abu Ghaith and his family to Karachi in order to assist Abu Ghaith with their safe departure from Pakistan.
  - 5. The detainee stated Faiz Al Kandari stayed in his house for approximately one week.
  - 6. Faiz Al Kandari was the legal advisor for, and close friend to, Usama Bin Laden.
- 7. The detainee was invited to the house of a man involved in the October 2002 attack on U.S. Marines on Faylaka Island, Kuwait.
- 8. The detainee possessed the telephone number of an individual in Kuwait who was shot and killed in October 2002 after he killed a U.S. Marine in Kuwait.
- 9. The detainee has been investigated by Kuwaiti authorities of being involved with the Takfir movement.
  - c. Other relevant data
- 1. The detainee stayed at a safe house for several weeks in Pakistan while waiting to flee the country. He was arrested at the house with sixteen other persons by Pakistani authorities.
  - 2. The detainee had a history of extremist vigilante activity.
  - 3. The detainee is considered a hard core extremist.
- 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a. The detainee denied any knowledge of the al Wafa organization assisting al Qaida or the Taliban government in any way.
  - b. The detainee denies any affiliation to a Kuwaiti opposition party.
  - c. The detainee claimed he was never a member of Takfir-Wa-Hijra.
- 5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE

REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF

AL ZAMEL, ADEL ZAMEL ABD AL // MAHSEN

unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

# Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

28 March 2005

From:

**Presiding Officer** 

To:

SULEYMAN, AHMED HASSAN JAMIL

Via:

Assisting Military Officer

SUBJECT:

UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE

REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SULEYMAN, AHMED HASSAN JAMIL

- 1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state or to a third state; (2) transfer you to your home state, or a third state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state, or the third state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
  - a. Commitment
    - 1. The detainee is a member of the Maktab al-Khidmat.
    - 2. The detainee is associated with Jamaa al Tableegh (JT).
    - 3. Maktab al-Khidmat is a Terrorist Exclusion List designee.
- 4. Jamat al Tabligh, a Pakistani-based Islamic missionary organization, is being used as a cover to mask travel and activites of terrorist including members of al Qaida.
- b. Training
  - 1. The detainee attended a class on the AK-47 rifle in Khowst, Afghanistan.
- 2. The detainee reportedly is a senior commander and trainer of al Qaida, with contacts to Usama Bin Laden, Sheikh Al-Liby, and Abu Zubaida.
  - 3. The detainee was at Khalden Camp between May 1994 and 1999.

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**DMO** Exhibit

Page 1 of 2 UNCLASSIFIED

Page 1 of 2

UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE SUBJECT: REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SULEYMAN, AHMED HASSAN JAMIL

### c. Connection/Associations

- 1. The detainee was arrested carrying a letter with the name of a senior al Oaida member and aide to Usama Bin Laden written at the top.
- 2. The detainee's father-in-law is known as an al Qaeda supporter and former employee of a construction company owned by Usama Bin Ladin.
  - 3. The detainee's father-in-law was able to get him out of jail with guarantee money.
- 4. The detainee occasionally would perform volunteer work with the International Islamic • Relief Organization (IIRO.)
  - 5. The IIRO has connections to terrorist organizations and has channeled funds to Islamic extremists from Afghanistan.
    - 6. The detainee said he traveled to Saudi Arabia several times.

### d. Other relevant data

Detainee has nine documented instances of spitting on guards, interpreters, visiting officers and other detainees; three instances of throwing toilet water and other unknown liquids on guards; and two instances of violent behavior towards guards by slamming the bean hole on guard's hands. On one occasion the detainee threatened to kill the guard, and on two occasions, the detainee sang songs about killing Americans.

- 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a. The detainee said that what happened on September 11 was terrible and he condemned UBL's actions.
  - b. The detainee said that he traveled to Saudi Arabia to visit religious places.
- 5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board: this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

# Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

4 April 2005

From:

**Presiding Officer** 

To:

AL MORGHI, KHALID ABDALLAH // ABDEL RAHMAN

Via:

Assisting Military Officer

SUBJECT:

UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE

REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL MORGHI, KHALID ABDALLAH //

ABDEL RAHMAN

- 1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state or to a third state; (2) transfer you to your home state, or a third state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state, or the third state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
  - a. Commitment
    - 1. The detainee went AWOL from the Royal Saudi Air Defense Forces.
- 2. The detainee went to Afghanistan to support the fatwa issued by Sheik Hamoud Al Shi'lbi.
- 3. Sheik Ibi's Fatwa told Arabs to help the Taliban as it is a religious Islamic state that allies the rule of God. If they did not support the Taliban, the Northern Alliance could win the war. The Fatwa could be supported through financial support, prayer or personal travel to Afghanistan.
  - b. Connection
    - 1. The detainee traveled to Afghanistan to join the Taliban.
    - 2. The detainee stayed in a Taliban safehouse while in Herat, Afghanistan.
    - 3. The detainee paid a man 1,000 U.S. dollars to take him to Pakistan.

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Page 1 of 2
UNCLASSIFIED

Page / of 2

SUBJECT:

UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL MORGHI, KHALID ABDALLAH // ABDEL RAHMAN

- 4. That man is a member of Harakat Al-Mujahidin and has knowledge of moving al Qaida fighters.
  - 5. Harakat Al-Mujahideen is a Kashmiri jihadist group.
  - c. Intent

The detainee, a Saudi Arabian citizen, traveled to Herat, Afghanistan on 29 September 2001 to join the Jihad.

- d. Other Relevant Data
  - 1. The detainee initally lied to American interviewers about his activities in Afghanistan.
- 2. The detainee was apprehended by Pakistani authorities while trying to cross into Pakistan.
- 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a. The detainee is not aware of Usama Bin Laden's Fatwa and if released would not follow any fatwa. He is not familiar with any al Qaida members or training camps, and denied being a member of al Qaida.
- b. The detainee advised he chose to support the Taliban by assisting in relief efforts (helping refugees) and not to engage in combat, stating "I know myself and I am a coward."
- c. Saudi Arabian government representatives believe that the detainee has low intelligence or law enforcement value to the United States and is unlikely to pose a terrorist threat to the U.S. or its interests.
- 5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

# Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

10 May 2005

From:

**Presiding Officer** 

To:

MOHAMMED, KAHLID SAAD

Via:

**Assisting Military Officer** 

SUBJECT:

UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE

REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MOHAMMED, KAHLID SAAD

- 1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state or to a third state; (2) transfer you to your home state, or a third state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state, or the third state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
  - a. Commitment
- 1. The detainee left Saudi Arabia approximately two weeks after the 11 September 2001 attacks on the United States.
- 2. The detainee claimed to have spent 30 days in Tehran, Iran before traveling to Spin Boldak, Afghanistan to help Afghani refugees.
  - b. Connection/Associations
- 1. The detainee was identified by a key al Qaida facilitator as a Saudi national who arrived in Afghanistan after the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks; via Iran and he traveled directly to Kabul, Afghanistan.
  - 2. The detainee was identified as staying at the Abu Hamza al Qaida guesthouse.
- 3. The detainee was identified by a senior al Qaida member as possibly having clerical status amongst Saudi fighters.
  - c. Other Relevant Data

# SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MOHAMMED, KAHLID SAAD

- 1. The detainee was injured in the area of Spin Boldak, Afghanistan while purchasing food and supplies for refugees at a market. While in the market, American forces began bombing the area. The detainee sustained his injuries during his attempt to seek shelter. According to the detainee, various groups of Taliban and al Qaida forces were present in the area resulting in the American attack.
  - 2. The detainee was captured while being treated at a hospital in Quetta, Pakistan.
- 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a. The detainee said he wants to return home, be reunited with his family and work as a rancher raising cattle and sheep.
- b. The detainee said he was not a "Sheik" or "Shayhn", saying those titles belonged to highly educated persons or tribal leaders.
- 5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

# Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

From:

**Presiding Officer** 

To:

AL NASIR. ABD AL AZIZ MUHAMMAD // IBRAHIM

Via:

**Assisting Military Officer** 

SUBJECT:

UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR

ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL NASIR,

ABD AL AZIZ MUHAMMAD // IBRAHIM

- 1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state or to a third state; (2) transfer you to your home state, or a third state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state, or the third state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
  - a. Commitment
- 1. The Detainee voluntarily traveled from Saudi Arabia to Kabul, Afghanistan immediately following the September 11, 2001 attacks.
- 2. Detained traveled to Afghanistan through an indirect route from Saudi Arabia to Syria, Syria to Iran, then walked across the border from Iran to Afghanistan then on to Kabul, Afghanistan.
  - 3. Detainee arrived in Kabul, Afghanistan 55 days after September 11, 2001.
- 4. Detainee stayed in Kabul, then after it was attacked by the Northern Alliance fled to Pakistan.
  - 5. Detainee fought in Tora Bora.
  - b. Associations and Connections

- 1. Detainee admits to working with al Wafa while in Afghanistan.
- 2. Al Wafa is a known terrorist support organization.
- 3. Detainee's name was found on a hard drive file of a known al Qaida operative.
- 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
  - a. Detainee's overall behavior has been non-aggressive.
- 1. Detainee has only one case of harassment of the guard force. His actions mostly involve failure to comply with the rules of the guardforce or the cellblock by performing physical training in his cell and speaking with detainees in other cellblocks.
  - 2. Detainee doesn't know how his name ended up on a file on a computer hard drive.
  - 3. Detainee states he only went to Afghanistan for charity work.
  - 4. Detainee stated he believed al Wafa was only a charity organization.
  - 5. Detainee stated he did not use the alias Abu Khalid.
  - 6. Detainee stated he did not know of the turmoil in Afghanistan until after he was there.
  - 7. Detainee stated he used his own money for the trip to Afghanistan.
  - 8. Detainee denies ever being in Tora Bora.
- 9. Detainee admitted he "turned himself in" when he fled Afghanistan and crossed into Pakistan.
- 5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

Page 2 of 2

# Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

From:

Presiding Officer

28 January 2005

To:

AL WADI, ADIL KAMIL ABDULLAH

Via:

**Assisting Military Officer** 

SUBJECT:

UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE

REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL WADI, ADIL KAMIL ABDULLAH

- 1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state or to a third state; (2) transfer you to your home state, or a third state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state, or the third state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
  - a. Intent
    - 1. The Detainee traveled to Afghanistan via Iran in late September or early October 2001.
  - b. Commitment
    - 1. The Detainee was a fighter at Tora Bora.
    - 2. The detainee has been disruptive and aggressive while in detention.
  - c. Other Relevant Data
    - 1. Detainee was captured by the Pakistani military after leaving Afghanistan.
- 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
  - a. The detainee denies being a member of al Qaida.

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF

# AL WADI, ADIL KAMIL ABDULLAH

- b. The detainee denies fighting in the Tora Bora region.
- c. The detainee cites that he was not captured by the Pakistani authorities; but, he turned himself in.
- 5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

# Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

07 March 2005

From:

**Presiding Officer** 

To:

ALI, WALID MOHAMMAD HAJ // MOHAMMAD

Via:

Assisting Military Officer

SUBJECT:

UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FORADMINISTRATIVE

REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF

ALI, WALID MOHAMMAD HAJ // MOHAMMAD

- 1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state or to a third state; (2) transfer you to your home state, or a third state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state, or the third state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
  - a. Commitment
- 1. The detainee traveled to Konduz, Afghanistan and then rode in a truck with other Taliban fighters to a bunker area on the second line, where he served as a guard for several months.
  - 2. The detainee also spent time in the North, fighting on the front line.
  - 3. The detainee participated in the Mazir-E-Sharif prison riot at the Al Janki Castle.
  - b. Training

The Detainee received training on the Kalishnikov rifle.

001214

DMO Exhibit Page of 3

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ALI, WALID MOHAMMAD HAJ // MOHAMMAD

### c. Connection / Association

- 1. While in Quetta, Pakistan, the detainee stayed 25 to 30 days in a Taliban guesthouse that was also used by recovering, injured Taliban fighters.
  - 2. The detainee was identified as a Sudanese who spent a long time in Afghanistan.
  - 3. The detainee was a special friend to a known Taliban leader.
- 4. This Taliban leader was in charge of all the Arabs on the front lines in the northern area of Afghanistan near Konduz and Marzar e Sharif.
  - 5. This Taliban leader reported directly to an al Qaida commander.
- 6. The al Qaida commander was in charge of al Qaida fighters in the Afghani northern front.

### d. Intent

- 1. The detainee traveled from Saudi Arabia, through Pakistan, then into Afghanistan.
- 2. The detainee said that if he were in a combat situation, he would attack Americans to defend his country and/or family and he would fight again for the sake of his religion or his family.
- 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
  - a. The detainee stated, "I did not fight against the United States or her allies."
- b. The detainee stated, "I did not see an American or fight against an American or any American allies."
- c. The detainee said that his intention was to go to Pakistan for four months to teach religion in accordance with a Da'wa.
  - d. The detainee said that he was going to the Raywan mosque in Lahore Pakistan to teach.

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE

REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF

ALI, WALID MOHAMMAD HAJ // MOHAMMAD

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

# Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

From:

Presiding Officer

24 January 2005

To:

JAHDARI, ZIAD SAID FARG

Via:

Assisting Military Officer

SUBJECT:

UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE

REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF JAHDARI, ZIAD SAID FARG

- 1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state or to a third state; (2) transfer you to your home state, or a third state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state, or the third state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
  - a. Commitment
- 1. Detainee traveled to Afghanistan and stayed in a place called the Afghan Center, 20 kilometers from Kabul. Detainee served as a guard and his responsibility was to watch for the enemy. The Afghan Center was run by the Taliban.
- 2. The detainee has been designated as a high priority target and placed on a government watch list.
- 3. Detained departed Saudi Arabia in the Spring 2001, spent two nights in Karachi, Pakistan, then flew on to Quetta, PK. The detained spent 6 hours in Quetta, PK, then left for Afghanistan. The detained traveled by car to Kandahar, AF, where he stayed in a house with both Afghanis and Arabs. The detained stayed there for approximately three weeks before traveling to Kabul, AF. The detained stayed in Kabul for approximately three weeks before leaving for a village where he trained on the Kalashnikov. The detained spent two and a half months in the village.

001217

b. Training

Exhibit DMo-1

# SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF JAHDARI, ZIAD SAID FARG

- 1. The detainee received one day of training with the Kalishnikov rifle before standing guard duty.
- 2. The detained was unable to provide the name of the group which he trained under; the name of the individual who trained him in the operation of the Kalishnikov rifle; the names of the individuals who sent him to the front lines; or the name of the commander he was under.
  - c. Intent
    - 1. The detainee was advised to fight with the Taliban if it is needed.
- 2. The detainee was recruited to fight the Northern Alliance and was financed for his trip to Afghanistan from Jessah, Saudi Arabia by a Taliban member.
  - 3. The detainee fired his weapon in the direction of what he believed was the enemy.
- 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
  - a. Other Relevant Data
- 1. The detainee advised if given the opportunity to return to his home of Jetta, Saudi Arabia, he would get married, obtain a job, and live with his mother and father.
  - 2. The detainee advised he does not hold any hostility or hatred toward the United States.
- 3. The detainee was provided misinformation in the local mosque which he was attending in Saudi Arabia. It was there he was told the aggressors in Afghanistan were not Muslims.
- 5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

# Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

From:

**Presiding Officer** 

24 January 2005

To:

ABDULLAH, UMAR

Via:

**Assisting Military Officer** 

SUBJECT:

UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE

REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ABDULLAH, UMAR

- 1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state or to a third state; (2) transfer you to your home state, or a third state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state, or the third state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

### a. Commitment

- 1. After Jalalabad fell to Northern Alliance forces, Detainee admits to fleeing to the Tora Bora region with another known al Qaida figure where he sought refuge in a cave for approximately one month and was armed with a Kalishnikov rifle.
- 2. While in Tora Bora, the detainee carried a rocket-propelled grenade and was assigned the responsibility for preparing mortars for use as directed by the cave commander.
- 3. The detainee and others were led out of the Tora Bora region by the leader of the Khalden Training Camp, who has been linked to Usama Bin Laden, Abu Zubaydah and several other major al Qaida leaders.
- 4. While some people left their weapons behind as they were fleeing Tora Bora, the detainee chose to continue to carry his, along with three additional magazines.
- 5. Following his flight from Tora Bora, Detainee was captured along with a number of other armed Arab men by Pakistani military forces after crossing the border from Afghanistan.

# SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ABDULLAH, UMAR

# b. Training

- 1. The detainee attended a terrorist training camp.
- 2. The detainee attended urban warfare training at a training camp in the city of Murad Beek.

### c. Connections/Associations

- 1. The detainee was identified as a fighter for the Taliban against the Northern Alliance.
- 2. The detainee was separately identified as fighting along with the Taliban and other Arab fighters aligned with Usama Bin Laden.
- 3. The detainee was seen at various guesthouses in and around Kabul in the summer of 2001.
- 4. Detainee admits to traveling with armed Taliban forces to the Tora Bora region to escape U.S. bombings.
- 5. The detainee traveled from Saudi Arabia to Afghanistan along a route commonly used by al Qaida recruits: by air from Jeddah, Saudi Arabia to Bahrain to Doha, Qatar to Karachi, Pakistan; and by ground from Karachi, Pakistan to Peshawar, Pakistan to Jalalabad, Afghanistan.
- 6. The detainee admits to staying at the residence of a known al Qaida facilitator in Jalalabad, Afghanistan.
  - 7. The detainee admitted that some of the people staying at this guesthouse had weapons.

### d. Intent

- 1. The detainee repeatedly expressed a desire to kill a military guard.
- 2. The detainee stated that he really wanted to be let free so he could kill "bad" Americans.
- 3. The detainee stated that while he has never had ill feelings for Americans prior to his detention, he has now developed particular contempt and disgust for America as a result of his detention and treatment while in custody.

# SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ABDULLAH, UMAR

### e. CSRT

1. The detainee admitted he had a Kalishnikov while staying in the cave in Tora Bora.

### f. Other Relevant Data

- 1. The detainee threw water on a guard protesting the treatment of another detainee.
- 2. The detainee struck a guard while being unshackled.
- 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

### a. CSRT

1. The detainee stated he did not know the people he fled to Tora Bora with were members of al Qaida or Taliban.

## b. Exculpatory

- 1. The detainee stated that he went to Afghanistan to visit his family, not to fight.
- 2. The detainee stated that he did not fight with al Oaida or the Taliban.
- 3. The detainee stated that he was never recruited into the Taliban or al Qaida by anyone.
- 4. The detained denied that the names and phone numbers found on him when he was captured were those of al Qaida members; instead, they were of his brothers and friends.

### c. Other Relevant Data

- 1. The detainee stated he has an uncle who is a friend of General Dostum and is a supporter of the Northern Alliance.
- 2. The detainee stated that if he were released he would simply return home and would not harm anyone unless they were the aggressor.
- 5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

001221

PAGE 3 OF 3

# Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

07 March 2005

From:

**Presiding Officer** 

To:

AL KURASH, MUHAMMAD ABD AL // RAHMAN

Via:

**Assisting Military Officer** 

SUBJECT:

UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE

REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF

**LL KURASH, MUHAMMAD ABD AL // RAHMAN** 

- 1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state or to a third state; (2) transfer you to your home state, or a third state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state, or the third state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
  - a. Commitment
- 1. The detainee traveled from Taif, Saudi Arabia to fight with the Taliban in the Jihad, after his high school graduation in May 2001.
- 2. The detained at the Moasqr Kari Bilal Camp in Afghanistan where he received weapons training. Moasqr Kari Bilal was a facility used to train and house Taliban soldiers who fought on the Bagram front lines.
  - 3. Behavior while incarcerated
    - a. Detainee has struck guard force personnel on multiple occasions.
    - b. Detainee threatened Block NCO by stating, "I will cut your throat."
- c. Detainee has encouraged other detainees to harass guard force. Detainee incites disturbance and also has past incidents of "failure to comply".

001222

DMO Exhibit\_\_\_ Page\_\_l\_\_of\_\_2\_

UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT:

UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF

AL KURASH, MUHAMMAD ABD AL // RAHMAN

# b. Training

At the Moasqr Kari Bilal camp, the detainee learned to use the Kalishnikov rifle, PK machine gun, and rocket propelled grenades.

- c. Connections/Associations
- 1. The detainee stated that he chose to fight with the Taliban against the Northern Alliance because he wanted to support their cause.
- 2. The detainee's name was found on an undated letter which listed probable al Qaida members incarcerated in Pakistan, along with materials linked to al Qaida.
  - d. Intent

The detainee was identified as having trained at a second terrorist training camp.

- 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer: N/A
- 5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

# Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

28 February 2005

From:

**Presiding Officer** 

To:

SAID KUMAN, AHMED YASLAM

Via:

Assisting Military Officer

SUBJECT:

UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE

REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SAID KUMAN, AHMED YASLAM

- 1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state or to a third state; (2) transfer you to your home state, or a third state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state, or the third state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

#### a. Commitment

- 1. The detainee answered a fatwa for Jihad issued by Sheikh Hamoud al Aqla, of Yemen against the infidels, General Masoud and the Northern Alliance.
- 2. Sheikh Hamoud al Aqla is a Saudi Mufti who issued fatwahs and encouraged people to fight Jihad against Christians and Jews. Al Aqla condoned the 11 Sep 01, attacks against the United States. In addition he helped raise money for Usama Bin Laden until his death in Saudi Arabia in 2001.
- 3. The detainee traveled from Yemen to Afghanistan to fight the jihad, attended multiple training camps in once there, was present during the United States bombing campaign, and was captured on the 29th day of Ramadan by the Northern Alliance.

## b. Training

1. The detainee attended training at al Farouq, participating in Advanced Commando training in Kandahar, Afghanistan. Training consisted of rappelling, sniper training, kidnapping assassinations, poisons and explosives.

DMO Exhibit\_\_\_

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SAID KUMAN, AHMED YASLAM

#### c. Connection

- 1. A senior al Qaida lieutenant confirmed the detainee's presence at the frontlines in Kabul and Oandahar.
- 2. The detainee's name was found on a computer file seized during a raid on al Qaida associated safe houses in Rawalpindi on 1 March 2003. According to the file, the individuals listed were mujahidin who had come to Afghanistan in December 2001 but had not completed training and therefore were not ready to fight in the war.
- 3. The detainee's name was found on a document listing al Qaida mujahidin and the contents of their "trust" accounts recovered during raids against al Qaida associated safe houses in Rawalpindi and Karachi.
  - 4. The detainee's pocket litter/property included a Casio watch (Model F-91W).
- 5. The Casio Watch (Model F-91W) has been used in bombings linked to al Qaida and radical Islamic terrorist improvised explosive devices.

### d. Intent

- 1. The detainee served on the front line and was assumed to be a bodyguard for Usama Bin Laden.
- 2. The detainee was a fighter in Tora Bora and had the following weapons with him: the Kalashnikov rifle, the PK machine gun and the rocket propelled grenade (RPG).
- 3. The detainee participated in military operations against the United States coalition in Bagram and in Tora Bora.
- 4. The detainee stated that he didn't believe Usama Bin Laden (UBL) before, but now that he has been in custody for nearly two years, he has been convinced by others that UBL is correct.
- 5. During an interrogation, the detainee related that the actions of the guards had convinced him all Americans are bad. He stated "America would soon pay the price for its actions."
- 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

The detainee stated that he knows of no information about al Qaida and did not fight against the United States.

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SAID KUMAN, AHMED YASLAM

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

# Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

22 November 2004

From:

**Presiding Officer** 

To:

MAHDI, FAWAZ NAMAN HAMOUD ABDULLAH

Via:

**Assisting Military Officer** 

SUBJECT:

UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE

REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MAHDI, FAWAZ NAMAN HAMOUD

ABDULLAH

- 1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state or to a third state; (2) transfer you to your home state, or a third state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state, or the third state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
  - a. Madhi is a member of Al-Qaida.
    - 1. Madhi signed an oath of loyalty to Usama Bin Laden.
    - 2. Madhi trained at the al-Farouq training camp.
  - b. Madhi engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners.
    - 1. Madhi admitted that he went to Afghanistan to fight in the Jihad.
    - 2. Madhi was assigned to the Abu Hassan Group of fighters. This group was responsible for a 50M by 100M sector on the front.
    - 3. Madhi was captured in 2001 three days before Ramadan by Northern Alliance forces near the village of Mulla Qoli. 001227

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Page \ of \(^2\)

- c. Madhi stated that he has had a mental illness, which he called a "magic illness", for several years. Mahdi claimed that this "magic illness" caused "bad thoughts" and made him feel as though someone was inside him, controlling his thoughts and actions.
- d. Based upon a review of recommendations from U.S. agencies and classified and unclassified documents, Mahdi is regarded as a continued threat to the United States and its Allies.
- 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
  - a. Mahdi stated during the CSRT he did not sign an oath of loyalty to Usama Bin Laden. He accused himself in front of his interrogators of many things to hasten assumed execution rather than going to prison.
  - b. Mahdi is severely, psychiatrically ill. Since his arrival in June 2002, he has been seen over 70 times by psychiatric professionals. As a part of his psychiatric care, he has been treated and evaluated by three different psychiatrists. Each doctor concluded that Mahdi is seriously mentally ill. Each doctor concluded Mahdi has a psychotic disorder.
- 5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

# Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

From:

Presiding Officer

To:

AL QURASHI, MAJID IDHA MUHAMMAD AL SUBA I

Via:

Assisting Military Officer

SUBJECT:

UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE

REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL QURASHI, MAJID IDHA

MUHAMMAD AL SUBA I

- 1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state or to a third state; (2) transfer you to your home state, or a third state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state, or the third state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
  - A. Detainee is associated with al-Qaida.
    - 1. The detainee admits traveling to Afghanistan to fight in the Jihad to atone for sins.
    - 2. Detainee received weapons training in Afghanistan.
  - B. Detainee engaged in hostilities against the US or its coalition partners.
    - 1. Detainee admits serving as a guard while in Afghanistan.
    - 2. Pakistani forces captured detainee as he was fleeing Afghanistan.
- C. Based upon a review of recommendations from US Government agencies and classified and unclassified documents, Enemy Combatant is regarded as a threat to United States and it's Allies.

- 1. Detainee feels that participation in jihad is a means of Atoning for sins as well as providing for the needy and fighting the Oppressors of Islam. Detainee feels that it is the duty of Muslims to answer the call to jihad when it is issued by valid religious authority.
  - 2. Approximately one week after 9/11/01, AL-Qurayshi left Saudi Arabia to fight in Afghanistan.
- 3. Al-Qurayshi was identified on a list of names recovered from a safehouse raid of suspected al Qaida in Karachi, Pakistan.
- 4. Detainee has admitted that he traveled with 100,000 Saudi Riyals (SIC) (approximately \$25,000 USD) to start an orphanage.
- 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
  - A. Enemy Combatant in his own oral testimony denied active involvement in the fighting in Afghanistan.
- 5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

# Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

From:

**Presiding Officer** 

25 January 2005

To:

AL WARAFI, MUKTAR YAHYA NAJEE

Via:

**Assisting Military Officer** 

SUBJECT:

UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR

ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF

AL WARAFI, MUKTAR YAHYA NAJEE

- 1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state or to a third state; (2) transfer you to your home state, or a third state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state, or the third state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
  - a. Commitment
- 1. The detainee admitted he decided, on his own, to travel to Afghanistan and assist the Taliban based on the fatwas that were issued.
- 2. The detainee used primary travel routes to get to Afghanistan Sa'naa, YM; Karachi, PK; Dubai, UAE; Quetta, PK; Kandahar, AF; Kabul, AF; and Konduz, AF.
- 3. The detainee said he would be the first one to sign up for a jihad against Israel and would consider a jihad against America if the reasons were right.
  - b. Training
- 1. Once in Konduz, the detainee traveled to Khoja Khar, AF. He trained on the AK-47 about one week and then moved onto the front line to fight against the Northern Alliance.

EXHIBIT DMO-

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL WARAFI, MUKTAR YAHYA NAJEE

2. The detainee was trained in first aid and later assisted treating wounded Taliban soldiers at the Al-Ansar Clinic in Konduz, Afghanistan.

### c. Intent

- 1. The detainee related he went to Afghanistan to fight with the Taliban against the mistaken people (Northern Alliance).
- 2. The detainee felt America was not a good country and their support of Israel over the Palestinians was proof.
- 3. The detainee was adamant in his opinion that the only solution to the Israeli/Palestinian conflict was through "the blood shed of the Jews."
- 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
  - a. Other Relevant Data
    - 1. The detainee related he has no problems with Americans and no real opinion of them.
- 5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

# Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

From:

Presiding Officer

To:

KIYEMBA, ANTHONY

Via:

Assisting Military Officer

SUBJECT:

UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR

ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF

KIYEMBA, ANTHONY

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state or to a third state; (2) transfer you to your home state, or a third state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state, or the third state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
  - a. Commitment
- 1. Detainee stated that any system like a democracy, which tries to end Sharia law, is worthy of a Jihad against it.
- 2. The detainee knew that Afghanistan (AF) lived under Sharia law before September 11, 2001.
- 3. After September 11, 2001, the detainee traveled from England to Iran then to Pakistan in an attempt to travel to Afghanistan in order to fight in the Jihad.
  - b. Training
- 1. While waiting in Pakistan on his way to AF, the detainee received weapons training on the AK-47. The detainee learned how to shoot, assemble and disassemble the weapon.

SUBJECT:

UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR

ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF

KIYEMBA, ANTHONY

### c. Intent

- 1. Detainee stated that he traveled to Afghanistan to try to stop the aggression against the innocent.
- 2. While attempting to travel from Pakistan to Afghanistan in order to fight in the Jihad, the detainee was arrested at the border.
  - 3. Detainee stated that if he had a weapon, he might attack Camp Delta guards.
  - 4. Detainee stated that he would go fight Jihad in the future if he found a way.
- 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
  - a. Detainee has stated that he would never be a threat.
- b. Detainee stated that September 11, 2001 was a terrorist attack against women and children, which is never warranted.
  - c. Detainee stated that he does not support what happened on September 11, 2001.
- d. Detainee has stated that he has never been a part of an organization or laundered any money.
- 5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.