

UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

9 September 2005

TO: SLITI, HISHAM BIN ALI BIN AMOR

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SLITI, HISHAM BIN ALI BIN AMOR

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee has arrest warrants for ties to Islamic extremists in Italy.
2. The detainee acquired a false passport from an individual he met at a Mosque.
3. The detainee was housed in the Tunisian guesthouse in Jalalabad, Afghanistan.
4. The detainee was arrested in Rawalpindi, Pakistan in October 2000 in possession of a forged Belgian passport. He escaped from the police and returned to Afghanistan.

b. Training

The detainee was part of a group recruited in Italy. These individuals were approached in the Islamic Cultural Center in Milan, Italy. They were eventually indoctrinated and mobilized for the so-called "Defense of the Islamic cause in Bosnia, Chechnya and Afghanistan". The majority of the detainees were taken to Afghanistan via Pakistan and furnished with false passports and false visas. These detainees received training on the use of light arms in the Derunta camp in Jalalabad and in the Khaladan camp.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee had in his possession an address book, which had telephone numbers of several radical Islamists, some of whom had been arrested in Belgium and Europe. Some of these phone numbers were coded, but authorities broke the code.

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2. The detainee's cousin, Amor Sliti, was arrested in Belgium in connection with the case of the assassination of a former Afghan Northern Alliance commander.

3. The detainee stated he received permission from Abu Qa'Qa (aka Nizar Trabelsi) to sleep at the Abdullah Azzam Mosque in Jalalabad.

4. Nizar Trabelsi was arrested in Brussels and confessed in court that he was planning a suicide attack on the American Embassy in Paris.

5. Halim Amal Trabelsi, wife of Nizar Trabelsi, confirmed during questioning that as of June 2001, while living in Jalalabad, Afghanistan, Nizar Trabelsi had been given the order to carry out a suicide operation in Europe. She further stated that an Algerian pro-Taliban al Qaida member provided her husband with training on the handling of explosives.

d. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee was stopped at the Belgian/French border because he had false license plates, and arrested because he had no papers. The detainee claimed he assumed the identity of one of his companions living in Italy and was jailed for 62 days at St. Gilles prison in Brussels. After being released the detainee claimed he returned to using drugs.

2. The detainee was arrested in December 2001 while trying to flee Afghanistan, and was turned over to U.S. authorities on 30 December 2001. He was using a false name.

3. The detainee has repeatedly assaulted and harassed military police and interrogators and he has incited multiple disturbances within his cellblock at Guantanamo Bay.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee stated that he never went to the Derunta Camp itself, just to the fish market outside of it.

b. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on September 11, 2001, and he also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the U.S. or U.S. interests.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

5 July 2005

TO: AL JUTAYLI, FAHD SALIH SULAYMAN

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL JUTAYLI, FAHD SALIH
SULAYMAN

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee received a fatwa from Sheik Ha Al-Uqla at the Immam Muhammad Bin Saud College in Burayda, Saudi Arabia to participate in ongoing conflicts in either Kashmir, Pakistan or Chechnya.

2. The detainee's travel was also facilitated by Al-Uqla.

3. Sheikh Hamud Al Uqla was a Saudi Arabian Mufti who issued fatwahs and encouraged people to fight jihad against Christians and Jews. Al Uqla condoned the 11 September 2001 attacks against the United States and helped raise money for Usama Bin Laden.

4. The detainee traveled to Mecca and Jeddah, Saudi Arabia; Doha, Qatar; Karachi, Pakistan; Quetta, Pakistan; Qandahar, Afghanistan; Kabul, Afghanistan and finally to Jalalabad, Afghanistan.

5. The detainee was identified by a senior al Qaida operative as a fighter belonging to the Khallad Bin Attash group at Tora Bora in late 2001. He was described as a new mujahidin.

b. Training

1. The detainee trained at al Farouq training camp in Afghanistan during September 2001.

2. The detainee was trained on the Kalashnikov rifle, PK machine gun, and a Russian

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL JUTAYLI, FAHD SALIH SULAYMAN

pistol at the al Farouq training camp.

3. The detainee was trained by Al-Muhajir, believed to be a member of al Qaida.

4. Al-Muhajir has been identified as the most experienced person within al Qaida on the use of explosives.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee was identified at the Nebras Arab guesthouse. This guesthouse was used by fighters heading to the al Farouq training camp and by Usama Bin Laden.

2. The detainee's name was found on a computer used by suspected al Qaida members, listing associates incarcerated in Pakistan.

3. The detainee's name was found on a list recovered from safehouse raids associated with suspected al Qaida in Karachi, Pakistan.

4. A Foreign Government Service listed the detainee as a high priority Saudi.

5. The detainee's name was found on a hard drive associated with a senior al Qaida operative seized during raids on 1 March 2003 in Pakistan.

6. The detainee's name was on a list for al Qaida Mujahidin who were scheduled to fight in Afghanistan, but who were arrested by Pakistani Authorities.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee stated he would not participate in another Jihad if he were released.

b. The detainee advised he was not aware that camp al Farouq was conducted by al Qaida.

c. The detainee denied having any prior knowledge of the September 11th attacks or any future attacks against the United States and its interests.

d. The detainee also stated that he had not heard of any plans of escape or any plans of attack on the Military Police at Camp X-ray.

e. The detainee denied having ever met Usama Bin Laden during any of his travels.

f. The detainee was identified by a foreign government service as being of low intelligence or law enforcement value to the United States. He was also unlikely to pose a terrorist threat to the United States or its interests.

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL JUTAYLI, FAHD SALIH
SULAYMAN**

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
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21 June 2005

TO: BAADA, TAREQ ALI ABDULLAH AHMED

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF BAADA, TAREQ ALI ABDULLAH
AHMED

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee went back to Yemen for one month to preach with members of Al Dawa, an Islamic preaching group and traveled to Al Hudaydah, Taizz, Aden, Sana'a, and Shabwa.

2. The detainee got the idea to go to Afghanistan from watching videos about the jihad in Bosnia.

3. The detainee decided, based on having read fatwa of extremist Saudis that he would go to Afghanistan or Chechnya for jihad. He drove to Amman to export Wahabi Islam via the Jama'at al-Tabligh, to a village near al-Zarqa.

4. The detainee decided to go to Afghanistan in June 2001.

5. The detainee traveled from Yemen to Kandahar, Afghanistan, via Karachi and Quetta, Pakistan, with the assistance of a Saudi al'Qaida member.

6. The detainee and Hamman Al Tayiffi took a taxi to Kandahar, Afghanistan and when they arrived the taxi driver took them to a guesthouse, possibly named Nibras or Ansar.

7. The Nebras Arab guesthouse in Kandahar was used by fighters heading to the al Farouq training camp and by Usama Bin Laden (UBL). At Nebras, passports, money, tickets and other important documents were taken from each person.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF BAADA, TAREQ ALI ABDULLAH AHMED

8. Al-Tayfe is a Saudi national living in Karachi, Pakistan who acted as a guide for Arabs arriving in Karachi on their way to al Qaida training camps in Afghanistan.

9. At Tora Bora the detainee obtained an AK-47 from a ditch, which was left there from the previous people, and he took turns working guard duty; however, he never fired the weapon.

10. The detainee and his group were positioned about 4 km south of the front line in a place called Omar Saif, which was the third line area.

b. Training

1. The detainee spent one month at the al Farouq camp training on light weapons and exercising. He was sent to the front lines at Bagram, but remained in the rear, in the third line of trenches from the front, in reserve.

2. The detainee was identified as an important fighter with knowledge in the use of anti aircraft weaponry and 120MM Howitzers.

c. Connections/Associations

1. When the detainee arrived in Quetta, he got off the bus and met Hamman Al-Tayiffi, a Mujahideen from Taif, Saudi Arabia.

2. The detainee was close to Bin Attash, and received money and supplies from him in order to travel to Afghanistan.

3. Tawfiq bin Attash is a high level facilitator for the al Qaida terrorist organization.

4. The detainee met with Bin Laden numerous times (NFI).

5. The detainee was sent to the front lines at Bagram, he remained there for two weeks, then retreated.

6. The detainee met Abu Mahjan al-Taifi while in Jalalabad and followed him to Tora Bora.

7. The commanders at Tora Bora were Ali Mahmud (NFI), Mahjan al-Taifi, and Abu Yahya al-Masri.

8. Abu Yahia al-Musri was an al Qaida leader from Egypt. He was in charge of 18-30 fighters in the Tora Bora region of Afghanistan.

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d. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee's behavior is consistent with a notation in his file that he has been less and less forthcoming during the course of his imprisonment, and, over time, has recanted some of his earlier admissions.

2. The detainee stated he had been arrested on two different occasions in Jeddah. The first time he spent about four days in jail for hitting the son of his unknown school director at his school. The second time he spent one day in jail for running a red light.

3. The detainee was arrested by the Pakistani Army as he and others crossed the Pakistani border.

4. The detainee had U.S. \$ 100 given to him by Muhammad 'Abdallah (NFI).

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee has no prior military experience and no prior weapons training.

b. The detainee advised that if he were released, he would return to his home and attempt to find a wife, get a job, live with his parents and continue to study Islam. He does not feel he wants to be ready for Jihad anymore because he feels if the scholars do not go for Jihad then he should not have to go.

c. The detainee heard on the radio about the attacks in the U.S. (September 11, 2001) and heard the U.S. was blaming UBL. He felt the attacks were not Jihad because it was not done to Muslims in a Muslim country. He also felt that the people found guilty for the attack should be killed.

d. The detainee denied being a member of al Qaida.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

20 September 2005

TO: AL JUAID, ABDUL RAHMAN OWAID MOHAMMAD

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL JUAID, ABDUL RAHMAN OWAID
MOHAMMAD

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
 1. During the spring of 2001, the detainee heard a half hour lecture from Sheik Abdullah Asiri regarding the hardships that Muslims were enduring in Afghanistan and how other Muslims could help them out.
 2. Prior to this lecture, the detainee had donated money to a charitable organization known as Al Haramayn in Taif, Saudi Arabia.
 3. Foreign Government Services officials believe that Al Haramain might be a cover organization for Osama Bin Laden's al Qaida network. Saudi mujahedin are known to work in Al Haramain regional offices around the world.
 4. The detainee applied and paid for a Saudi passport in Taif. He also went to the Pakistani Embassy in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia and received a one-year visa for Pakistan. He left Saudi Arabia with 3,000 Saudi Riyals of his own money.
 5. The detainee arrived in Kandahar in June or July 2001 by the following route: Taif to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia; to Bahrain; to Karachi and Quetta, Pakistan; to Spin Buldak, Afghanistan then finally on to Kandahar, Afghanistan.
 6. The detainee and a small group of Arabs headed from the collapsed Kabul front to Tora Bora, where he stayed for two weeks under Commander Ali Mahmud.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL JUAID, ABDUL RAHMAN OWAID MOHAMMAD

7. The detainee stayed at Abdul Rahim's house in Jalalabad, Afghanistan and once that city fell, the detainee headed towards the Pakistani border.

8. Upon reaching the Pakistani border, the detainee entered into Pakistan and went to an unknown village. Upon arrival, the detainee says he surrendered to the Pakistani Police.

b. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee was recognized as one of the individuals seen at the Abu Hamza guesthouse in Kabul, Afghanistan.

2. The detainee's uncle is connected to individuals who are involved in falsifying passports, supporting organizations such as Al Wafa and the mujahidin.

3. According to Foreign Government Service, the Non-Governmental Organization "Wafa" was believed to have had connections to Usama Bin Ladin and Afghan mujahidin.

4. In January 2002 a jihadist website published the detainee's name on a list of mujahidin captured as a result of the United States led military action in Afghanistan.

5. The detainee's name was found on a computer server hard drive, recovered by Allied personnel in a suspected al Qaida safe house in Islamabad, Pakistan. The data appears to have been recorded sometime between 31 March 2001 and 22 January 2002.

6. The detainee admits that he likely ran across members of al Qaida during his departure from Afghanistan.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee stated that he has never been involved in any radical Islamic movements in Saudi Arabia.

b. The detainee stated that he was not in Afghanistan to fight and never trained at any training camp with any weapons in Afghanistan.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

11 July 2005

TO: AL JAYFI, ISSAM HAMID ALI BIN

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL JAYFI, ISSAM HAMID ALI BIN

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee's travel to Afghanistan was facilitated and paid for by Sami Ahmed, also known as Ahmad Al-Sharjib, who suggested they travel to Afghanistan.

2. The detainee joined the Taliban Forces for a month prior to the Northern Alliance seizing Kabul.

b. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee stayed at a guesthouse in Kabul for approximately seven weeks. The guesthouse was operated by Abdul Rahman.

2. Abdul Rahman is a Harakat Al-Mujahadin Operative based in Islamabad. He is responsible for transporting foreign Arabs to and from Kashmir.

3. The radical Islamic group, Harakat Al-Mujahadin is based in Jalalabad and has extensive ties to the al Qaida terrorist organization and is known to help Arabs escape Afghanistan.

4. The detainee stayed at the Tunisian guesthouse in Jalalabad, Afghanistan.

5. The Tunisian guesthouse is a meeting place, supply storage area, and hospital facility for Afghan and Arab fighters.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL JAYFI, ISSAM HAMID ALI BIN

6. The detainee has family ties to an individual who was scheduled to travel to San Francisco, California with associates of the 11 September hijackers Khalid Al-Midhar and Nawaf Al-Hazmi.

c. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee passed through the Pakistani cities of Karachi and Quetta, and proceeded through Kandahar, Afghanistan, before ultimately arriving in Kabul, Afghanistan.

2. Sharjabi recommended that the detainee go to Afghanistan in order to experience a truly Islamic and beautiful country. The promise of beautiful women and adventure were other incentives.

3. Sharjabi did not mention jihad to the detainee until after they were in Afghanistan.

4. The detainee may have carried an AK-47 for protection while fleeing Afghanistan.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee stated that he did not go to Afghanistan to fight the Northern Alliance.

b. The detainee denied that he had a Kalashnikov rifle that was seized from his person when he was detained in Pakistan.

c. The detainee maintains that he is innocent and advises that he was "anything but" a pious Muslim due to his penchant for "chasing women" and partying.

d. The detainee denies stating that he joined the Taliban.

e. The detainee was unable to explain what his plans would be if released, but stated that he does not want to return to Yemen. He does not feel safe in Yemen with tribal rivalry and asked the Red Cross (ICRC) about political asylum.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

20 September 2005

TO: AL OMAIRAH, OTHMAN AHMED OTHMAN

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL OMAIRAH, OTHMAN AHMED
OTHMAN

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. In early 2000, the detainee traveled to Kandahar where he stayed for a total of about six months. The first two months he traveled back and forth between Kandahar and Quetta facilitating the travel of various mujahadin.

2. After training, the detainee waited about six weeks at a guesthouse before being assigned to the front lines north of Kabul against the Northern Alliance where he spent the remaining estimated 15 months.

3. The detainee was identified by another detainee as a Saudi mujahadin that was going to Chechnya.

4. The detainee stated that he wanted to fight alongside the Muslims in Chechnya because he did not want to see his "brothers and sisters" killed and butchered. The detainee never made it to Chechnya.

5. He added that he "dwells in his beliefs". The detainee stated that he never harmed any Muslims. The detainee believes all fatwas state that Americans should not be in the Arabian Peninsula. The detainee blames Americans for everything bad that has happened in Afghanistan and other Muslim countries. He hates America.

b. Training

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL OMAIRAH, OTHMAN AHMED OTHMAN

1. The detainee served in the Saudi military as a soldier and received training on military tactics.

2. The detainee received light arms training for about six weeks at the al Farouq camp while in Kandahar.

3. While at al Farouq, the detainee only handled weapons during weapons training periods. Weapons training lasted only one week. Each day the trainees only fired 8-10 rounds. The detainee received training on the Kalashnikov, the PK machine gun, and the Makarov pistol.

c. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee originally provided the interrogation team with a false name and false citizenship information.

2. The detainee requested to leave the military, but because he had not repaid money that he was overpaid, the military did not permit him to leave. Therefore, the detainee deserted the military.

3. The detainee changed his story and appeared evasive at times. Initially, he said the idea to fight in jihad against the Russians was his idea alone. Later, he provided the name of a friend who gave him information about the fighting in Chechnya and Taliban training in Afghanistan.

4. Because he was a deserter, the detainee was unable to leave Saudi Arabia with his real passport. The detainee met a taxi driver named Al Noufait who told the detainee about the fatwa and how he could obtain a fake passport. Al Noufait paid the passport expenses.

5. Upon obtaining his passport, the detainee attempted to travel to Chechnya. Because the borders to Georgia were closed and the travel was more dangerous, the detainee decided to go through Afghanistan.

6. The detainee stayed at the front north of Kabul for well over a year and then participated in the withdrawal out of Kabul in November 2001.

7. Over the next several weeks he stayed in a number of small villages near Jalalabad and then went to the Tora Bora Mountains upon hearing of Arabs gathering there.

8. The detainee arrived in Tora Bora to find large numbers of Arabs leaving Tora Bora for the Pakistani borders. He joined one such group.

9. The detainee and one companion were arrested at a checkpoint two days later, which was approximately 23 December 2001.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL OMAIRAH, OTHMAN AHMED OTHMAN

10. The detainee was transferred from Kohat, Pakistan to United States custody on 31 December 2001 and flown to Kandahar, Afghanistan.

11. The detainee stated that he has issues back in Saudi Arabia, and will either end up in civilian prison because of using a fraudulent passport, or go to military prison for deserting the Saudi Army.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee stated that he was once given a weapon to carry, but he returned it because he wanted nothing to do with it. He added that the only time he fired a weapon was during a wedding celebration and that he only fired it in the air.

b. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on September 11th, and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.

c. While the detainee readily admitted his mujahadin status rather proudly, he claimed to have no knowledge of Usama Bin Laden or al Qaida.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

9 September 2005

TO: TURKI MASH AWI ZAYID AL ASIRI

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF TURKI MASH AWI ZAYID AL ASIRI

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee read a fatwa issued by Sheikh Hamoud Alaugla. He sold his car for money to be able to travel to Afghanistan and received an additional 3,000 Saudi Riyals from a facilitator.

2. Sheikh Hamoud Alaugla is a Saudi mufti, a specialist in Islamic law authorized to issue a fatwa. Alaugla issued a fatwa calling for jihad in Afghanistan. He also condoned the 11 September 2001 attacks against the United States and helped raise money for Usama Bin Laden until Alaugla's death in Saudi Arabia in 2001.

3. The detainee decided to go to Afghanistan to preach the Koran and to participate in the jihad.

4. The detainee stated that he stayed at a Taliban guesthouse in Jalalabad for about one week.

5. The detainee stated he stayed in Tora Bora from September until late December 2001. He fled to the Pakistan border with other Arabs and surrendered himself to the Pakistani authorities.

b. Training

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF TURKI MASH AWI ZAYID AL ASIRI

1. The detainee stated that while at the Farouq camp he trained on the Makarov and the Kalashnikov and also ran, marched and read the Koran. He stated that after one month of training he got sick (asthma related), forcing him to leave the training early.

2. The al Farouq training camp was located near Kandahar, Afghanistan. Training consisted of physical fitness and weapons training, primarily on the AK-47, AKM, and PK machine gun. All trainees received indoctrination on the importance of joining with Afghanistan to fight the jihad. On several occasions, Usama Bin Laden visited the camp and spoke to the trainees.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The Al-Rajhi Foundation in Saudi Arabia employed the detainee in passing out Korans and working in an orphanage.

2. The SAAR network (named for Sulaiman Abdul Aziz Rajhi, the patriarch of the Saudi al-Rajhi family that funded it) gives to charities, invests in companies and sponsors research to foster the growth of Islam. The SAAR network includes more than 100 Muslim think tanks, charities and companies. The al-Rajhi family utilized SAAR to fund Islamic extremist organizations and has ties to al Qaida. The SAAR Foundation officially dissolved in December 2000.

3. The detainee stated he came to Afghanistan with Abu Bakr al Jazairi for jihad training.

4. Abu Bakr al Jazairi is a Jordanian citizen who is an alleged fundraiser for widows and orphans of al Qaida members, and he served as Usama Bin Laden's representative in Jalalabad.

5. When the detainee arrived in Karachi, he met three Arabs from Saudi Arabia also traveling to Kandahar. The three men told the detainee that they were traveling for the Jama at Tablique and wanted to preach the Koran. The detainee and the three Arabs traveled together to Quetta, Pakistan, stayed together at the Kandahar guesthouse, trained together at the al Farouq camp, and fled together to Tora Bora from Jalalabad.

6. The Tablighi Jamaat is an Islamic missionary organization founded to spread Islam and recruit followers. Islamic extremists had been known to exploit the organization to enhance their ability to fight the perceived enemies of Islam.

7. The detainee was captured with an address book containing names and phone numbers in Arabic.

8. Coalition forces seized a satellite telephone in Khowst Province, Afghanistan, on 7 October 2002. One of the phone numbers in the satellite phone's electronic address book

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matches a number found in the detainee's address book. The satellite phone's entry was listed under the name Hamid Karzai.

9. Coalition forces captured a small booklet containing telephone numbers that was located inside an ammunition crate in Khost Province, Afghanistan. The crate contained grenades, mines, fuses and chemicals used to make explosives. One of the phone numbers in the booklet matches a number found in the detainee's address book. The captured booklet lists this entry for Khan Agha.

10. Documents belonging to an Afghanistan Military Force (AMF) commander were confiscated in Khowst, Afghanistan, on 1 January 2003. Five phone numbers are contained on one scrap of paper in the documents. The AMF commander stated these numbers were for Pacha Khan Zadran and Wazir Khan. One of the phone numbers on this scrap of paper matches a number found in the detainee's address book. The confiscated scrap paper lists this entry under "Gardez."

11. Pacha Khan Zadran maintained illegal checkpoints and raids on houses to raise money and supplies, recruited soldiers, and made statements on the radio saying that he did not accept the Karzai government.

12. Wazir Khan Zadran is the younger brother of Pacha Khan Zadran.

13. An address book was found in the possession of a suspected al Qaida operative detained on 1 July 2002 near Shkin, Afghanistan, by United States military forces. One of the phone numbers in this captured address book matches a number found in the detainee's address book. The captured address book lists this entry as a mobile number for Amanullah in Zakhel District, Paktika Province, Afghanistan.

14. In January 2003, Pacha Khan Zadran was recruiting personnel to attack Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan (TISA) forces and officials around Khowst, Afghanistan. His commanders included Wazir Khan and Amanullah, who were also involved in recruitment for Pacha Khan Zadran.

15. A document listing 324 Arabic names, aliases, and nationalities was recovered from safe house raids associated with suspected al Qaida in Karachi, Pakistan. This list contains the detainee's name, alias and personal items, passport and ATM card.

16. The Pakistani government published a list of 84 captured mujahidin fighters that crossed the border in Nangarhar Province on 14 December 2001. This list contains the detainee's name, alias, and family contact number.

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17. A list of Arabs incarcerated in Pakistan was found on computer media seized by allied personnel at a suspected al Qaida safe house in Islamabad, Pakistan. This list contains the detainee's name, alias, and home country of Saudi Arabia.

18. On 11 September 2002, a foreign government service conducted a raid on an alleged al Qaida residence in Karachi, Pakistan. Found among the material were several floppy disks, one of which contained a file with a list of names, nationalities, safety-deposit box numbers, contents, and comments. This list contains the detainee's name, alias, safety-deposit box number, and list of contents (passport and bank card).

19. An Arabic-language computer file was seized during joint raids conducted with a foreign government service against al Qaida-associated safe houses in Rawalpindi, Pakistan, on 1 March 2003. The captured file lists contact points and telephone numbers for al Qaida mujahidin in Pakistan. This list contains the detainee's name, alias, and family contact information.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee did not swear an allegiance to Usama Bin Laden or al Qaida.

b. The detainee denies ownership of the address book found in his possession when he was captured, insisting that Foreign Government Service authorities planted it on him.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

27 May 2005

To: BALKHAIR, RASHED AWAD KHALAF

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF BALKHAIR, RASHED AWAD
KHALAF

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee attended King Khalid University in Abha, Saudi Arabia for one and a half years, where he studied the laws of Islam.

2. The detainee left Saudi Arabia with his passport and Pakistani visa approximately September 2000. The detainee flew from Riyadh, Saudi Arabia to Bahrain and from Bahrain to Karachi. The detainee traveled to Jalalabad, Afghanistan on approximately September 15, 2001.

b. Connections/Associations

1. Detainee worked for Al-Ighatha Al-Islamiya, International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO).

2. According to open press sources, the International Islamic Relief Organization is a non-governmental organization, which has ties to Usama Bin Laden and the Abu Sayyaf Group.

3. The detainee spent nine months traveling throughout Pakistan with two members of Jamaat al Tabligh.

4. Jama'at Al Tablighi, a Pakistan based Islamic missionary organization, is being used as a cover to mask travel and activities of terrorists including members of al Qaida.

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5. Detainee paid a known Taliban recruiter six to ten thousand Pakistani Rubis to flee from Jalalabad to the Afghanistan/Pakistan border.
6. Detainee stayed approximately three months in a Taliban guesthouse in Jalalabad, Afghanistan.
7. Detainee's name was listed on a computer hard drive associated with a known terrorist.
8. The detainee's aliases also appeared on a list detailing mujahideen "trust" accounts found at an al Qaida safe house in Pakistan. The list indicated that detainee's wallet and passport were being held in the "trust" account.
9. The detainee's name was found on a list of al Qaida mujahidin who were in Afghanistan but were arrested by Pakistani authorities.
10. The detainee's name was found on a document listing 324 Arabic names, aliases, and nationalities recovered from safehouse raids associated with suspected al Qaida in Karachi, Pakistan.

c. Other Relevant Data

1. Detainee was captured with a Casio wristwatch typically used as a timing device to initiate an explosive charge.
2. The detainee was arrested in Peshawar, Pakistan. The detainee stated that he was arrested because he did not have a passport or any other form of identification, due to the fact that his money, documents and passport were stolen while in Afghanistan.
4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
 - a. The detainee stated that he was not involved with al Qaida and did not believe Usama Bin Laden was a good Muslim. The detainee stated that he went to Afghanistan to provide humanitarian aid to Afghani refugees and turned himself into Pakistani officials near Peshawar, Pakistan, when the Northern Alliance began to overrun the Taliban forces. The detainee was then taken to a prison, possibly near Quetta, Pakistan.
 - b. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on September 11th, and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or its interests.
5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF BALKHAIR, RASHED AWAD KHALAF**

unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

23 September 2005

TO: GHEREBY, SALEM ABDUL SALEM

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF GHEREBY, SALEM ABDUL SALEM

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

In 1989, the detainee traveled to Kabul, Afghanistan, after fighting the Russians in Tajikistan.

b. Training

1. The detainee had not been in the active duty military in Libya, but did have military training one hour per day for an unspecified amount of time.
2. One of the detainee's aliases appeared on a list of individuals who reportedly trained at an al Qaida training camp at Jihad Wahl, Afghanistan in 1996.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee was identified as a member of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG).
2. Two senior al Qaida operatives identified the detainee.
3. The detainee was an associate of a terrorist wanted by the United States.

d. Other Relevant Data

Pakistani forces captured the detainee in November 2001.

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF GHEREBY, SALEM ABDUL
SALEM**

4. The following primary factor favors release or transfer:

The detainee denied any knowledge of the September 11th, 2001 attacks prior to their occurrence.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

5 October 2005

TO: AL MISHAD, SHARIF FATI ALI

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL MISHAD, SHARIF FATI ALI

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee met Abu Saad at the Al Merkez Islamia Majed, Islamic Center Mosque in Rome, Italy in April 2001. The detainee and Saad talked about religion, charity, Dawaa in Rome and charity in Afghanistan.

2. Abu Saad explained he lived in Kabul, Afghanistan where he passed out donations to help the Afghani people. Abu Saad invited the detainee to Afghanistan to help him with this endeavor.

3. The detainee met an Arab at the Islamic Institute in Milan, Italy in 2001 that had fought with the Taliban. The detainee was impressed by the stories of Afghanistan, the Taliban, training and easy living and so he decided to travel to Afghanistan.

4. The detainee and two traveling companions told the Taliban official at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Herat, Afghanistan that they wanted to go to the front lines.

5. The Taliban gave the detainee an AK-47 and bullets at the Dar al Aman safe house. All the safe house guests were flown to Konduz, Afghanistan and transported to Khaj Ghar, Afghanistan via a truck to get to the front lines.

6. The detainee went to Khowst, Afghanistan to train others in urban warfare.

b. Connections/Associations

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL MISHAD, SHARIF FATI ALI

1. The detainee was seen at the Gulam Bad Shah (the King's servants house) at the same time as Abu Hafs al Arab, Abdul Kahar and Abu Musab al Yemeni.

2. A senior al Qaida operative recognized the detainee and stated that he was new in Afghanistan and had arrived near 11 September 2001. The senior al Qaida operative met the detainee when moving from Tora Bora to Pakistan.

c. Other Relevant Data

1. A former al Qaida trainee explained that when he was taken to Kandahar, Afghanistan in early 2000 to be interrogated by al Qaida, the detainee participated in torturing him through beatings and electric shocks.

2. Approximately two months after the attacks, Abu Saad, the detainee and the four other residents began planning to leave Afghanistan due to the impending attacks by the United States.

3. The detainee and others intended to cross the Iran/Afghanistan border near Tayebat, Iran. The crossing was closed so they diverted their travel to a small village outside of Jalalabad, Afghanistan.

4. The detainee and the group arrived outside of Jalalabad at the beginning of Ramadan in mid November 2001, waiting for safe passage to Pakistan. After hearing many planes flying over and being told by the Afghans that Arabs were being hunted in the area, the group decided to leave in an effort to reach Pakistan.

5. After the detainee and his group arrived in the small Pakistani village, the Pakistani Army detained them. The following day, the Army took them to a prison in Peshawar, Pakistan. The detainee spent three weeks at this prison and approximately five months in a prison in Kandahar, Afghanistan.

6. The detainee was transferred to Kandahar on 01 January 2002 by the United States Forces.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001.

b. While listening to the radio in Abu Saad's house, Abu Saad, Abu Amr, a Kuwaiti that lived in the house and the detainee heard about the attacks. They were all sorrowful and no one was happy.

c. The detainee denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL MISHAD, SHARIF FATI ALI

d. A senior al Qaida operative stated that he was certain that the detainee was not a member of al Qaida and believed he had not joined any other group, owing that to the newness of his presence in Afghanistan.

e. The detainee stated he had not heard of a jihad against the west. The detainee never heard of any such thing as being directed by a cleric to kill.

f. The detainee does not hate Americans. The detainee stated he had no desire to fight Americans or even see them again.

g. The detainee stated he only wants to return to Italy to his light construction business, his apartment, his automobile and his former life before his trip to Afghanistan.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

8 September 2005

TO: JAID AL KHATHAMI, SALEH ALI

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF JAID AL KHATHAMI, SALEH ALI

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee was persuaded by a Sheikh Abdullah Abdah Rahman Jabrin and a former Chechnya fighter to leave Saudi Arabia to train in Afghanistan and contact a Chechnya facilitator in Jalalabad.

2. Sheikh Abdullah Abdah Rahman Jabrin is from the detainee's hometown.

3. The detainee was in the Ibin Taymia Mosque in Al-Jubay, Saudi Arabia when the Sheikh told him to go to Afghanistan through Karachi, Pakistan to meet with other Arabs to get his training.

4. The detainee went to Afghanistan in order to train and fight.

5. The detainee stayed for one week in a known safehouse in Jalalabad, Afghanistan.

6. The detainee then became ill with Jaundice like symptoms and went to a house called Nejim Al-Jihad for rest.

7. The Nejim Al-Jihad is an al Qaida terrorist organization housing compound owned by Usama Bin Laden that is located 15 kilometers west of Jalalabad, Afghanistan. Al Qaida members and their families occupy this compound.

8. The detainee's name was listed on a document as one of seventy-six that were fighting with the Taliban against the Northern Alliance.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF JAID AL KHATHAMI, SALEH ALI

b. Training

1. The detainee gave his money and Saudi passport to Abu Khalid in Kandahar in return for training at Camp Farouq. For two weeks the detainee received AK-47 Assault Rifle Training.

2. The al Farouq Camp was located approximately on a four to five hour drive south of Kandahar, Afghanistan.

3. The detainee also had training on the PK Machine Gun.

c. Other Relevant Data

1. On 14 December 2001, the detainee with 83 other mujahideen fighters was captured in the Nangarhar Province by the Pakistani Government.

2. The detainee was captured with one bullet, 1,500 Pakistani rupees, a cassette player and two batteries.

3. Allied personnel raided a suspected al Qaida safehouse in Islamabad, Pakistan and recovered a computer hard drive that was used by suspected al Qaida members. The detainee's name was on the hard drive.

4. The detainee's name and phone number were found on a 20 Giga-byte hard drive that listed the names of captured mujahideen. The hard drive was associated with a senior al Qaida member.

5. The detainee's name was on a translated document listing 324 Arabic names, aliases and nationalities recovered from a safehouse raid associated with suspected al Qaida in Karachi, Pakistan.

6. The detainee's name was on an undated letter list of 68 probable al Qaida members incarcerated in Pakistan.

7. The detainee states that he spent about four months in Afghanistan teaching the Koran and went to Afghanistan three months prior to the 9/11 attacks.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee changed his story about why he was in Afghanistan after he talked to the Saudi Delegation. The detainee now states that he traveled to Afghanistan to teach the Koran and did not go to fight with the Taliban as he previously stated.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF JAID AL KHATHAMI, SALEH ALI

b. The detainee denies having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on September 11 and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.

c. The detainee stated if he returned to Saudi Arabia, he would live with his family and immediately seek a wife and then look for a job.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

11 July 2005

TO: MUHAMMAD ABD ALLAH MANSUR AL FUTURI

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MUHAMMAD ABD ALLAH MANSUR
AL FUTURI

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. Sources say the detainee was in Afghanistan in approximately 1991.

2. A senior al Qaida operative identified the detainee as a member of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG).

3. The LIFG is an Islamic terrorist group dedicated to the violent overthrow of the Qadhafi regime. The LIFG have links with Usama Bin Ladin, the Armed Islamic Group and the Egyptian Islamic Jihad.

4. During 1991 the detainee joined LIFG and might have been supporting the military committee.

5. The detainee fled Libya to Egypt in 1999 after he learned that Libyan intelligence officials wanted to question him.

6. The detainee stated that he left Libya with 7,000 U.S.dollars.

7. The detainee said he was smuggled into Egypt through border points al-Durnah/Usfurah with \$1,000 U.S. in his pocket.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MUHAMMAD ABD ALLAH MANSUR AL FUTURI

8. The detainee traveled from Alexandria, Egypt to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. After an 'Umrah (mini hajj) to Mecca, he traveled from Jeddah to Karachi, Pakistan and then Jalalabad, Afghanistan.

9. The detainee based his decision to go to Afghanistan on television and radio news reports as well as a fatwa issued by Sheik Mahmoud al Oukla.

10. The detainee lived in Jalalabad, Afghanistan, but traveled frequently to Kabul, Afghanistan and Pakistan as a member of the Jama'at al Tablighi. The detainee received support from the Jama'at al Tablighi for two years.

11. Jama'at al Tablighi has been supporting Islamic terrorist groups in south and southeast Asia under the cover of conducting religious activities. The group is closely aligned with other Pakistani terrorist organizations and the al Qaida network.

12. A senior al Qaida operative said that the detainee was arrested with him in Tora Bora in December 2001.

13. When the detainee was arrested he had \$1,800.00 U.S. Currency, 1,500 Saudi Ryals, and an unknown amount of Afghani and Pakistani money in his possession.

b. Training

1. The detainee had military training at the al-Farouq and Salman al Farisi camps. He participated in several Afghan battles, including Lukar and Qardiz, but mostly in the battle of Jalalabad.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee flew from Jeddah to Karachi, Pakistan with a friend, Ibrihim Kahlan.

2. According to the detainee, al Kahlan joined the Taliban forces and he overheard that the Northern Alliance forces had killed al Kahlan. The detainee could not provide any details about his friend's death.

3. In Peshawar, the detainee met another Libyan named Zuhair al-Libi. The detainee and Zuhair became good friends and moved in together in a house, where they stayed for one year.

4. When the detainee was asked about the whereabouts of Zuhair al-Libi, he said that Zuhair was killed in northern Afghanistan while fighting with the Taliban against the Northern Alliance.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MUHAMMAD ABD ALLAH MANSUR AL FUTURI

5. Zuhair al-Libi's name appears on a list of names of al Qaida martyrs under the heading "26th of Sha'aban martyrs of the north".

d. Intent

1. An al Qaida and LIFG facilitator was certain the detainee left the LIFG. He said he believed the detainee had a jihadist philosophy and wanted to die a martyr's death.

e. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee is in the possession of a Casio model F-91W watch. This model has been used in bombings that have been linked to al Qaida and radical Islamic terrorist improvised explosive devices.

2. The Casio digital watch was commonly given to al Farouq attendees.

3. The detainee stated that he does not want to go back to Libya due to his association to the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee advised that he originally lied about his true name and nationality because he was afraid of being sent back to Libya. He knows that religious Muslims have been and continue to be persecuted under the Qaddafi regime.

b. The detainee stated he did not participate in activity with the Taliban or have any governmental ties.

c. A senior al Qaida operative said the detainee was handicapped due to a childhood illness, and as such, he was of no benefit to any of the fighting groups in Afghanistan. He lived off the charity of others and had no relationship with al Qaida or the LIFG.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

26 October 2005

TO: AL SHUMRANI, MOHAMMAD AL RAHMAN

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL SHUMRANI, MOHAMMAD AL
RAHMAN

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee advised he had traveled on vacation to Syria and Turkey during the summer of 2000. He also traveled to the United Arab Emirates in 1999 to shop. He traveled to Afghanistan, via Bahrain and Pakistan, in August 2001.

2. The detainee attended two mosques in Saudi Arabia. The first mosque was the Mohamed Ibn Ibrahim Mosque located in Khalidea, Saudi Arabia. The second mosque was the Majid Hadem Al Hareman Al Sherefen mosque. The second mosque talked about Jihad in Bosnia, Indonesia, and Chechnya.

3. The detainee was recruited in Nejram City, Saudi Arabia.

4. The detainee spoke with a recruiter who told him to go to Afghanistan. By going to Afghanistan, the detainee was told he would be defending his Muslim faith, supporting the Taliban fight against infidels, and helping to stop the killing of young Muslims.

5. In August 2001, the detainee left Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. He traveled alone to Bahrain, paying with his own money. He stayed one day in Bahrain, then traveled to Karachi, Pakistan. He then traveled to Quetta, Pakistan.

6. The detainee traveled to Kandahar, Afghanistan, going to the "House of the Arabs", in the Haje Habash Village.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL SHUMRANI, MOHAMMAD AL RAHMAN

7. The detainee stayed at the House of the Arabs for one week. After one week he traveled to Kabul, Afghanistan. He stayed at the "House of the Dar Al Aman" for one week. This house was a waiting area or guesthouse before personnel would go for Jihad. All the people at this house were there for Jihad with the Taliban.

8. The detainee received weapons training on the AK-47. The detainee fought on the front line. He wanted to die in a bunker.

9. The detainee said he traveled to Afghanistan twice. He said he lied on these issues and that Muslims have certain things they must keep secret. The detainee said he went to Afghanistan the first time in April 2000.

10. A foreign government reported the detainee was under surveillance for working as a recruiter of high school students, enticing them to join the Jihad, and into hating their government.

11. The detainee went to Internet websites that contained information pertaining to Jihads/Islamic links. The detainee denied ever posting a message.

b. Training

1. The detainee had one month of military training in the Saudi Arabian Army about 13 years ago during the Gulf War. He received weapons training on the G3, 9mm handguns, and grenades.

2. The detainee trained at Khaldan Camp in Afghanistan. He was trained on basic things like the AK 47, Rocket Propelled Grenades, BK, and Doska. After that he trained on mortars and artillery including the SPG-9, Type 75 artillery and four or five others he cannot remember.

3. The detainee went to al Farouq, after Khalden, for training. At al-Farouq he studied mines, TNT, how to insert metal fuses into TNT, how to strip wires, and use matches to detonate explosives. The detainee used his original passport while in Afghanistan.

c. Connections/Associations

1. A senior al Qaida operative recalled that the detainee was a Saudi National and a teacher by profession. The operative sent the detainee to the Khalden Camp for training in 1998.

2. The detainee's name was found on a recovered packet of Arabic language documents discovered in a private residence in Northeast Kandahar, Afghanistan. The packet had handwritten Arabic text on its exterior, which read "Al Faruq Camp, Kabul, Operations Course/Cycle Report".

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL SHUMRANI, MOHAMMAD AL RAHMAN

3. A computer was recovered by allied personnel in a suspected al Qaida safe house in Islamabad, Pakistan. It appears to have been recorded between 31 March 2001 and 22 January 2002. The detainee's name appears on this hard drive.

4. A computer associated with a senior al Qaida operative was seized during joint raids with personnel from another foreign Government service. The hard drive contained names of captured mujahidin. The detainee's name shows up on this list.

d. Intent

1. The detainee, like all Muslims, loved Usama Bin Laden. The detainee would only die for Usama Bin Laden if the cause were consistent with Islamic teaching.

2. The detainee said he went to Afghanistan to assist brother Muslims, and would have fought against anyone on the other side, including Americans.

3. The detainee stated he was prepared to fight Americans and the Northern Alliance and, if the Americans had closed in on him, he would have been the first to fight. The detainee explained that it was a matter of defending Islam when it came to fighting the Americans in Afghanistan, an Islamic country.

4. The detainee advised if released, he would participate in Jihad again if Muslims were threatened and would fight Americans if he had the opportunity.

e. Detainee Actions and Statements

1. The detainee admitted he fought with the Taliban and stated he knows he is liable for his actions.

2. The detainee admitted meeting a senior al Qaida operative in Pakistan. He stayed with him for three to five days, until he was able to go to Afghanistan.

f. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee spent about five months on the front lines. He operated a small, handheld multichannel radio called an ICOM.

2. The detainee withdrew from Bagram, Afghanistan when fighting became intense (two days before Ramadan), and arrived at Tora Bora the tenth day of Ramadan. When he withdrew from Tora Bora he headed for Pakistan. The detainee was arrested inside the Pakistani border and taken to a nearby prison. When the detainee left Tora Bora, he surrendered his weapon to the local tribes.

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3. The detainee had prior knowledge of the 9/11 attacks.
 4. The detainee stated that while in Afghanistan fighting, he tried to see Usama Bin Laden.
 5. The detainee did admit, if al Qaida offered to train him, he would accept the training.
 6. The detainee is Muslim and has gone on the Haj ten times.
4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a. The detainee denied being a member of al Qaida or ever wanting to join al Qaida.
 - b. The detainee stated that September 11 was not true Islam.
 - c. The detainee stated he did not have a passport in January 2000, therefore he could not get a visa nor could he have come to the United States during that period. The detainee stated he never lost his passport and has never permitted anyone to use his identity for any reason. He has never been to the United States.
5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

26 October 2005

TO: SHOKURI, YUNIS ABDURRAHMAN

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SHOKURI, YUNIS ABDURRAHMAN

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

The detainee was involved with the "Saudi Charity Committee" and was in charge of the belongings and valuables for the Commission for Orphans of Former Mujahidin.

b. Training

The detainee stated there was a Moroccan fighting group training with weapons in Afghanistan.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee bribed a Taliban official to obtain AK-47 rifles and a mortar for the Moroccan group.
2. The detainee was a part of a small group of leaders who formed the Groupe Islamiste Combatant Du Maroc organization in 1995.
3. The detainee managed a guesthouse and was a recruiter for the Groupe Islamiste Combatant Du Maroc.
4. The detainee is a Military Commander.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SHOKURI, YUNIS ABDURRAHMAN

5. The goals of the Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group reportedly included establishing an Islamic state in Morocco and supported al Qaida's jihad against the West.

6. The detainee went to Jalalabad, Afghanistan and convinced the leaders of Hizbi E Islami Gulbuddin to give them an apartment to erect a Moroccan guesthouse.

7. The detainee rented a house in Hayatabad, which served as a welcome center for Groupe Islamiste Combatant Du Maroc volunteers traveling to Afghanistan.

8. The detainee and several of his personnel met with Usama Bin Laden, who aided their group financially.

9. The detainee had participated in the Afghan war and witnessed the United States invasion of Afghanistan.

d. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee left Jalalabad, Afghanistan when the city fell in 2001. The detainee was arrested at the Pakistan border by the Pakistan police.

2. The detainee was first involved in Jamaat al Tablighi when he decided to travel to Afghanistan in 1990 to participate in jihad.

3. The Libyan Islamic Fighting Group provided recruiting, logistics support and paramilitary training to the Groupe Islamiste Combatant Du Maroc.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee traveled to the border of Afghanistan to do relief work.

b. The detainee was a relief worker for several organizations in Pakistan.

c. The detainee was queried regarding any knowledge or planning of internal uprisings at the Guantanamo detention facility with negative results.

d. The detainee denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.

e. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to the execution on 11 September 2001.

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ABDURRAHMAN**

f. The detainee denies any involvement with al Qaida and states he would never swear bayat to Usama Bin Laden.

g. The detainee claims no connection to the Moroccan Islamic group.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

6 October 2005

TO: AL AMRI, ABDUL RAHMAN MA ATH THAFIR

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF
AL AMRI, ABDUL RAHMAN MA ATH THAFIR

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. A person who met the detainee at a guesthouse in Karachi, Pakistan states that the detainee's job entailed being in charge of the media in Kandahar, Afghanistan. This person believes the detainee worked for Usama Bin Laden because, if important people were around, the detainee would be with them. The same source recalls seeing the detainee in Tora Bora during the time period that America was bombing that area.

2. The detainee stated his loyalties while in Afghanistan belonged to Abd Ess Alam al Tabuqui, because Tabuqui was his leader at the time. The detainee claimed presently that his loyalties belong exclusively to Allah, God Almighty.

b. Training

1. The detainee was in the Saudi Army for 6 years and received training from U.S. military personnel on the Dragon missile system shortly after Operation Desert Storm.

2. The detainee's occupation prior to going on Jihad was a soldier with the equivalent U.S. Army rank of Corporal. The detainee was a crewmember of the TOW missile, anti-tank artillery.

c. Connections/Associations

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL AMRI, ABDUL RAHMAN MA ATH THAFIR

1. The detainee's brother served in the Saudi Army for the last 20 years as an aviation supply officer.

2. A senior al Qaida commander said he saw the detainee at the Kabul, Afghanistan guesthouse in 2000. This source saw the detainee again in 2000 in the Kandahar, Afghanistan guesthouse and claimed that the detainee appeared to be a new Mujahideen member who was in Afghanistan for training.

3. The detainee had knowledge of the 9/11 attacks in the U.S. prior to their execution and had limited hearsay information of a future attack on the U.S., which was planned to occur on 12 Feb 2002.

4. The detainee stated that no one knew the nature of the upcoming 9/11 attacks. The detainee heard that Abu Hafs al Moritani had a disagreement with Usama Bin Laden regarding upcoming attacks on the U.S., but the detainee did not know the nature of the attacks.

5. The detainee encountered Usama Bin Laden on two separate occasions while in Tora Bora.

d. Intent

1. The detainee used to be a heavy hashish and heroin user. The detainee became tired of this life and felt there was some higher purpose, so in the late 1990's, he quit using drugs and decided on his own to go on the Hajj. During the Hajj, the detainee learned that the life he led was not the correct path and he decided to turn his life around. The detainee's friends were amazed at his life change.

2. After going to the Hajj in 2000, the detainee decided to leave the Army. The detainee returned to his Muslim faith and frequented a mosque in Tabuk, Saudi Arabia where he met a scholar who advised him to go to Afghanistan.

3. The detainee initially wanted to participate in the Arab-Israeli conflict, but he was not allowed to enter the country (country not specified in document). Instead, he went to Afghanistan to fight with the Taliban. The detainee fought with the Taliban for eleven months.

4. The detainee was motivated to go on Jihad by the death of a Palestinian youth killed by Israeli soldiers. A Saudi Arabian national at a mosque in Tabuk recruited the detainee. The detainee stated that he joined Jihad for religious reasons, motivation by the media, Allah's promise of 72 virgins and paradise in heaven.

e. Detainee Actions and Statements

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL AMRI, ABDUL RAHMAN MA ATH THAFIR

1. The detainee traveled from Tabuk, Saudi Arabia to Jordan by taxi and remained there for two days. He continued travel to Damascus, Syria by land, and then traveled by plane to Tehran, Iran. He was instructed to cross into Afghanistan by telling the Afghani border guards that he wanted to assist the Taliban in Jihad. The detainee met with an Afghani Taliban leader who sent the detainee to a Jihad school in Kandahar, where the detainee was interrogated to ensure that he was not a spy. The detainee was then sent to the Kart Barwan guesthouse where he gave his passport and 7000 Saudi Riyals (approximately \$1900 USD) to the Amir of the guesthouse.

2. The detainee admits he carried an AK-47 while he and others were destined for Jalalabad, Afghanistan where he hoped to avoid being captured or killed.

3. The detainee stated his occupation at time of capture was a Mujahideen soldier in Afghanistan. The detainee had held this occupation for approximately 10 months.

f. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee attended al Mahad al Almi Institute of Science and was expelled during his third year.

2. Pakistani police captured the detainee.

3. The detainee was transferred from Kohat, Pakistan to United States custody on 31 Dec 2001.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. When asked about the events on 11 September 2001 and the devastation that the World Trade Center attacks caused, the detainee was very upset that so many civilians were killed. The detainee believes that as a fighter it is unfair to kill civilians. If someone came at the detainee with a weapon then he would fight but he would not kill any civilians or unarmed individuals. The detainee went to fight for Jihad because it is every good Muslim's duty.

b. The detainee provided the interrogator with whatever information he or she asked for. The detainee has been interviewed many times and fears that everyone will think he is helping the Americans. Other detainees constantly ask detainee what is going on.

c. The detainee never gave bayat to Usama Bin Laden explaining that he only wanted to be a fighter. By giving bayat to Usama Bin Laden, the detainee might be pulled off the front line for other duties.

d. The detainee is very cooperative and tries to give an explanation with every answer.

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF
AL AMRI, ABDUL RAHMAN MA ATH THAFIR**

e. In response to allegations that the detainee is responsible for providing a movie detailing the USS Cole and 9/11 attacks, the detainee believes it is another individual with the same name as the detainee's who made the movies.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

1 July 2005

TO: QAHTANI, SAID MUHAMMAD HUSYAN

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF QAHTANI, SAID MUHAMMAD
HUSYAN

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee began to believe that jihad was an important Muslim responsibility when he was 19 or 20. The detainee initially desired to go to Chechnya for jihad, but was told he would need military training, which he could obtain in Kashmir, Pakistan.

2. One of the religious leaders that influenced the detainee was Sheikh Hamood Al Uqla.

3. Sheikh Hamud Al-Uqqla was a Saudi Arabian mufti who issued fatwahs and encouraged people to fight jihad against Christians and Jews.

4. The detainee was issued a fatwah providing a religious justification to join the jihad in Afghanistan.

5. Detainee made three trips from Saudi Arabia to Pakistan and/or Afghanistan.

6. During his second trip in June 2000, the detainee joined the Taliban against the Northern Alliance. The detainee spent much of his time on the front lines.

7. During his third trip in May 2001, the detainee returned to Kabul and rejoined the Taliban forces. He was assigned guard duty on the front line.

8. A senior al Qaida lieutenant stated he believes that the detainee joined al Qaida after giving al-bay'ah to Bin Laden.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF QAHTANI, SAID MUHAMMAD HUSYAN

9. Bayat or oath of allegiance is a spiritually binding commitment to obey a leader and his organization.

10. According to a senior al Qaida lieutenant, the detainee assisted Abu Ubayda at the front lines in Kabul and was usually by his side.

11. Abu 'Ubayda Al-Masri was in charge of the front lines or inner perimeter in Kabul, Afghanistan.

b. Training

1. During his first trip, the detainee traveled in February 2000 to a Taliban-run training camp called "Quba," in Pakistan. The detainee received basic weapons orientation, land navigation, and physical exercise.

2. The detainee returned to Camp Quba in June 2000 for approximately one week.

3. The detainee arrived at Khalden Training Camp during May 2000 and trained for approximately 7 weeks.

4. The detainee trained in small arms weapons, large caliber weapons, mortars, and combat tactics at Camp Khalden.

5. The detainee received two weeks training on the T-54, T-55, and BMP-1 Soviet tanks at a Taliban Armory in Kwest before proceeding to the front lines north of Kabul.

6. A senior al Qaida lieutenant saw the detainee at the Rawalpendi House in approximately 1998-1999 while the detainee was traveling to Camp Khalden for training.

c. Connections/Associations

1. In May 2000, the detainee met Abu Zubayda and spent 7-10 days with him in a safehouse while waiting to travel to Afghanistan.

2. Abu Zubayda is the logistics manager for al Qaida and a close associate of Usama bin Laden.

3. The detainee met two of the 9/11 hijackers. The detainee met Saeed al Ghamdi in a religious class at a mosque in 1999. The detainee played soccer with Ahmed Alnami on one occasion while visiting his aunt in the city of Wadi Abu Al Harjah, Saudi Arabia.

4. The detainee stayed at the Raywan Center while waiting to travel to Camp Quba, Pakistan.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF QAHTANI, SAID MUHAMMAD HUSYAN

5. The Raywan Center in the suburbs of Lahore, Pakistan, was the nucleus of the Jama'at al Tabligh (JT) in Pakistan and throughout the world.

6. Jama'at Al Tablighi is a Pakistan-based Islamic missionary organization used as a cover to mask travel and activities of terrorists, including members of al Qaida.

7. The detainee's name was on a document recovered during a raid of an al Qaida safehouse in Pakistan on 11 September 2002. The document indicated the detainee had a Saudi passport and a bankcard.

d. Intent

According to a senior al Qaida lieutenant, the detainee volunteered to be a suicide bomber and was ready to martyr himself for jihad.

e. Other Relevant Data

1. In September 2001, when the US began bombing Taliban positions, the Taliban fighters began to retreat. The detainee and a small group of Arabs headed towards the Pakistani border.

2. The detainee was captured by the Northern Alliance in late December 2001.

3. The detainee escaped from Kabul to Tora Bora with Abu Ubaydah.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

The detainee stated that he would never be involved with an organization, militia, or otherwise, whose purpose was to commit terrorist acts.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

11 August 2005

TO: TOURSON, AHMAD

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF TOURSON, AHMAD

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee traveled from the Xinjiang Province of China to Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, then on to Karachi, Pakistan, to Islamabad, Pakistan, and finally Kabul, Afghanistan. He arrived there sometime between late September and early October of 2000.

2. While in Kabul, the detainee stayed at a guesthouse run by the East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM).

3. The Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) is a small Islamic extremist group based in China's western Xinjiang Province. It is one of the most militant of the ethnic Uighur separatist groups pursuing an independent "Eastern Turkistan," which would include Turkey, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Xinjiang.

4. ETIM, reportedly with financial support and direction from Usama Bin Laden, recruits within remote areas of eastern China and ships recruits to training camps in Afghanistan. These recruits then return to China to conduct terrorist activities and extend their influence. Training has included religious extremist theory, terrorism, explosives and assassination. Some training camps also include the manufacturing of weapons, ammunition and explosive devices.

5. The detainee admitted to working for ETIM from September 2000 – October 2001. ETIM has Taliban-sanctioned guesthouses in Kabul, housing Uighur refugees.

6. The detainee was paid about \$30 USD a month by ETIM to work as a typist. His duties included writing and printing propaganda in books and magazines.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF TOURSON, AHMAD

7. Abdullah, a fellow Uighur, convinced the detainee to travel with him to Konduz, Afghanistan, to see the war. Once in Konduz, the two arrived at a safe house where armed Uzbeks were staying. They said they were members of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU).

8. The Secretary of State has designated the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO). The IMU is a coalition of Islamic militants from Uzbekistan and other Central Asian states opposed to Uzbekistani President Islom Karimov's secular regime. Although the IMU's primary goal remains to overthrow Karimov and establish an Islamic state in Uzbekistan, IMU political and ideological leader Tohir Yoldashev is working to rebuild the organization and appears to have widened the IMU's targets to include all those he perceives as fighting Islam.

9. From Konduz, Afghanistan, the detainee and approximately 20 male soldiers traveled to the Mazar-E Sharif area to fight General Dostum.

b. Training

Once the bombing campaign began Abdullah provided the detainee an AK-47-style weapon and trained him for approximately two days on the use of the weapon.

c. Connections/Associations

1. While in Pakistan, the detainee became involved with Sharq East Turkistan Islamic Partiyisa (STIP).

2. STIP is one of several extremist Islamic organizations operating in the eastern region of China. These organizations attempt to unite all Turkic-speaking Muslims and form a political-religious state in China's Xinjiang Province.

3. The detainee said the Taliban was aware of the STIP organization located at the facility and that they would often visit the facility. He worked there for 10 months.

d. Other Relevant Data

The detainee was captured near Mazar-E Sharif, Afghanistan by General Dostum's troops, taken to the Qalai Janghi Prison and later turned over to United States forces.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

The detainee stated he did not wish to fight, however, he did want to work.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF TOURSON, AHMAD**

Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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**Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba**

8 Jun 2005

To: BIN ATEF, MAHMMOUD OMAR MOHAMMED

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF BIN ATEF, MAHMMOUD OMAR
MOHAMMED

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee was influenced by everyday events, videos about Jihad, people talking. He stated, "The thought was in my head."

2. The detainee went to Afghanistan to fight in the jihad.

3. The detainee funded the trip to Afghanistan with his own funds.

4. The detainee arrived in Afghanistan in June 2001 from Saudi Arabia via Pakistan.

5. The detainee traveled from Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, to Bahrain; from there he went to Karachi, Pakistan. Once in Karachi he traveled by bus to Quetta, Pakistan, then Afghanistan, and stayed at a guesthouse.

6. The detainee stated that his enemies were the Northern Alliance.

7. Even though the detainee is an Arab he considered himself a Taliban, because he fought for them, and alongside them.

8. The detainee was engaged in the conflict on the Konduz line.

9. The detainee was engaged in the conflict at the Koshaghar line.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF BIN ATEF, MAHMMOUD OMAR MOHAMMED

b. Training

1. The detainee completed military training at al Farouq.
2. The detainee received weapons training on the Kalashnikov rifle, rocket-propelled grenade launcher, and pistols.

c. Connections/Associations

The detainee met Usama Bin Laden.

d. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee knew of a fatwa about fighting Jews and Christians and expelling them from the Arabian Peninsula.
 2. The detainee was present at the al Janki uprising at Mazur-e-Sharif.
4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a. The detainee was asked to take an oath to Usama Bin Laden but stated that he did not take one.
 - b. The detainee never trained with explosives, chemicals, biological agents or nuclear material.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

14 October 2005

TO: AL ZAHRANI, SAID IBRAHIM RAMZI

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL ZAHRANI, SAID IBRAHIM RAMZI

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
 1. Around 25 April 2001, the detainee decided on his own to travel to Afghanistan to fight against the Northern Alliance.
 2. The detainee left Saudi Arabia with about four thousand five hundred Riyals. He got the address, phone numbers and point of contacts from a guy in Taif, Saudi Arabia by the name of al Sufaira.
 3. The detainee flew from Taif through Jeddah to Qatar, then on to Karachi, Pakistan. He then traveled by bus to Quetta, Pakistan. The detainee said that he resided in a Taliban House named Daftar Taliban while he stayed in Quetta.
 4. The detainee said that from Quetta he was taken to Kandahar in a small car (taxi). He advised that he completed the entire trip alone.
 5. In early 2001, the detainee and another individual traveled to Manama, Bahrain where Customs Officers temporarily detained them.
 6. The Bahraini customs officer confiscated a videotape of a speech from Usama bin Laden calling for jihad and an Arabic booklet entitled "An Open Letter to King Fahd on the Occasion of the Ministerial Appointments." This letter criticized the Saudi Regime.

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7. The detainee spent two days at the Muaz house in Kabul and then took a truck to the front lines. He was given a Kalashnikov with four magazines and two hand grenades. The detainee then was sent to a bunker facing the Northern Alliance in a position called the Bilal Position.

8. The Bilal unit is part of the 55th Arab Brigade.

9. The al Qaida Force, or 55th Arab Brigade, is Usama bin Laden's primary formation supporting Taliban objectives. Information indicates that the ideology of those in the 55th Arab Brigade includes willingness to give their lives for tactical objectives as declared by Usama bin Laden and the Taliban.

10. The detainee's name appears on a translation of a document listing 324 Arabic names, aliases, and nationalities recovered from safe house raids associated with suspected al Qaida in Karachi, Pakistan.

11. The detainee's name appears on a list of al Qaida Mujahidin and the contents of their "trust" accounts found on computer media recovered during raids against al Qaida associated safe houses in Rawalpindi and Karachi.

b. Training

1. The detainee said he went to al Farouq Camp for one month then on to Kabul. He did not finish the training because he just wanted to leave.

2. The detainee said that while at the al Farouq Camp he trained for only a short period of time because every time he started to train he would get sick and have to stop. He related that he only trained at the al Farouq Camp for a total of two to three weeks.

3. The detainee said that he received no explosives training. He advised that he was at the camp for three to four weeks. He trained on the Kalashnikov, RPG and learned tactical skills and sign language.

4. The al Farouq training camp was funded by al Qaida and therefore was more advanced than other training camps in Afghanistan.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee said that Bin Laden spoke at the al Farouq Camp mosque while he was there.

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2. The detainee claims that he has met Usama bin Laden in Kandahar, at an unknown mosque located at an unidentified training camp.

3. On the front lines, the detainee was placed with an individual named Hassan Al Ashmawi (possibly a Saudi) who was responsible for distributing the troops around the area.

4. Hassan Al Ashmawi's name appears on a list of names of al Qaida martyrs and those who are missing from Mazar-e-Sharif, Jangi Fort.

d. Other Relevant Data

1. While at al Farouq training camp, the detainee says he received an injection for treatment of nerves, shaking and fainting spells. He does not know the name of the illness and cannot recall the type of medication.

2. When the U.S. air strikes started, the detainee and approximately 130 Arabs surrendered to Dostom of the Northern Alliance. The Northern Alliance took them into custody and brought them to the castle (Mazar-e-Sharif).

3. At Mazar-e-Sharif, the detainee was shot in the leg. He could not get away because he was tied up.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

The detainee stated that he has no intentions of ever joining a jihad that is outside of Saudi Arabia.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

31 October 2005

TO: AL SHARIF, FAHD UMR ABD AL MAJID

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL SHARIF, FAHD UMR ABD AL MAJID

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee told others that he was going to Afghanistan for the purpose of Jihad, specifically to fight with the Taliban against the Northern Alliance.

2. The detainee stated, the reasons for joining Jihad were: his high interests in military training, his desire to serve God and to remove foreigners from his county and other countries in the Middle East.

3. The detainee traveled to Afghanistan in late 2000 for the purpose of fighting Jihad.

4. The detainee voluntarily joined the Taliban to participate in Jihad.

5. The detainee advised that infantry training was his favorite training evolution because those in infantry would be on the front lines where the possibility of dying is greater. Dying on the battlefield would make him a martyr.

b. Training

1. The detainee trained at the Khaldan Camp.

2. The Khaldan Camp was a six-month course consisting of light weapons training, heavy weapons training, explosives training, topography and tactics.

3. The detainee acknowledged that he was sent to the training camp and that he knew whom it was that sent him there.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL SHARIF, FAHD UMR ABD AL MAJID

4. The detainee received training at al Farouq.
5. The training at al Farouq was conducted in four phases: small arms, physical training, map reading and topography and explosive device training.
6. During an interview, the detainee verbally confirmed the types of weapons that he used, possessed or trained on, while he was in Afghanistan.

c. Detainee Actions

1. While the detainee was in Afghanistan, he was at the front lines. He fought at Mowtin Gharband.
2. The detainee fought on the front line for approximately nine months and fired his weapon at Northern Alliance Forces.
3. The detainee manned anti-aircraft weaponry during combat.
4. The detainee said that when United States planes flew overhead, his group would not shoot at them. The aircraft flew too fast and too high. The detainee said that the group did fire at United States helicopters and airplanes with the Kalashnikov rifles; however, the aircraft flew too fast and too high.
5. The detainee stated that the most important thing is that he fired his weapon at the enemy during Jihad and for that, Allah now looks favorably upon him. The detainee now feels that his duty for fulfilling Jihad is complete.
6. The detainee and his unit fought against only the Northern Alliance. His group was Mujahideen fighters, who were aligned with the Taliban. The detainee said that his unit supported the Taliban, but that he was not a member of the Taliban.

d. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee met with and received money from Usama bin Laden.
2. The detainee's name was on a list of probable al Qaida operatives.
3. The detainee was present at Tora Bora during the United States Air Campaign.
4. The detainee's name was found on a computer that was associated with al Qaida and was seized during joint raids with other foreign agency services.
5. A senior al Qaida operative recognized the detainee as someone who provided administrative assistance at the guesthouse in Kandahar.

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6. The detainee acknowledged the hierarchy at the guesthouses that he visited.

e. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee worked for two years as a police officer in Mecca, Saudi Arabia and for one year in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.

2. The detainee confirmed that he was a police officer in Saudi Arabia.

3. The detainee and two friends were traveling in Afghanistan, going from village to village teaching Islam, when they were pressed into service by the Taliban.

4. The detainee was with a large group of Taliban that surrendered to Northern Alliance Forces.

5. The detainee's pocket litter included a Casio Watch, Model F-91W.

6. The Casio Watch, Model F-91W, has been used in bombings that have been linked to al Qaida and radical Islamic terrorist improvised explosive devices.

7. The detainee was described as a well-respected and competent fighter. Other fighters looked up to him because he attended the tactical training.

8. The detainee said that the Mujahideen destroyed Russia and Russia is bigger, stronger than the Americans. The detainee continued by saying the Muslims would still hate Americans even if there was no fighting, because Allah and Mohammed said it should be so and that Americans have business with Christians and Jews.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee reported that he had no connection with al Qaida.

b. The detainee admitted that he said, he was a member of al Qaida because he thought that was what they wanted to hear.

c. The detainee said that he heard of the al Farouq Training Camp near Kandahar, Afghanistan, but he never entered Kandahar itself.

d. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on September 11th.

e. The detainee denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
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f. The detainee was queried regarding any knowledge or planning of internal uprisings at the Guantanamo Detention Facility, with negative results.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

13 October 2005

TO: AL KABI, JAMIL ALI

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL KABI, JAMIL ALI

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee traveled to Afghanistan from Saudi Arabia via Indonesia, Malaysia and Pakistan.

2. The detainee claims he traveled to Afghanistan for the Da'wa and claims that he has been on a Da'wa once before in 1999 in Lahore. The Da'wa is similar to a mission conducted by other religions.

b. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee admitted living and working with Luqman in Indonesia.

2. Luqman is an al Qaida Senior Facilitator who was arrested on 04 October 2002. Luqman had been the number one target inside of Saudi Arabia for several months and had been the subject of a massive manhunt.

3. One of the variants of the detainee's name was recovered from computer floppy disks obtained during a raid on a suspected al Qaida-associated safe house in Pakistan.

4. One of the variants of the detainee's name and the contents of his trust account was recovered from computer media obtained during a raid on an al Qaida associated safe house in Pakistan.

c. Other Relevant Data

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL KABI, JAMIL ALI

1. While in Kabul, Afghanistan, the detainee was told that the Northern Alliance Forces were advancing and would be soon arriving in Kabul. The detainee and his companions decided to leave. They moved to a village outside of Jalalabad and after a month's time, paid a guide to take them over the border into Pakistan.

2. The detainee turned himself into the Pakistan Police and was turned over to United States Forces.

3. The detainee was captured with seven passport size photographs.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee appeared truthful when he claimed that he believed that the Pakistan Police would help him find the Saudi Arabian Embassy in Pakistan.

b. The detainee claimed to have had no contact with the Taliban or al Qaida and denied membership in either organization.

c. The detainee stated that he was never recruited to fight with the Taliban or al Qaida and has never heard of a fatwa issued in Saudi Arabia or anywhere else against the United States or its citizens.

d. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on September 11th 2001 and denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or it's interests.

e. The detainee states if he was to be released, he would return to his home.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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**Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba**

24 October 2005

To: QADIR, ABDAL RAZAK

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF QADIR, ABDAL RAZAK

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee was told that many Uzbeks migrated to Afghanistan where business opportunities might be available in Mazar-e-Sharif. The detainee traveled to Jalalabad, Kabul and Mazar-e-Sharif, Afghanistan seeking business opportunities.

2. The detainee met an unidentified Uzbek/Afghan who informed him that a Uighur named Hassan Makhsum was running a political organization to protect Uighurs' rights. The detainee was told that Makhsum and/or members of his organization could be found in Kartisi, a neighborhood of Kabul, Afghanistan.

3. The detainee sought out and joined the East Turkistan Organization.

4. The detainee was taken to the East Turkistan Organization camp in the Tora Bora Mountains.

5. The detainee bought supplies in Jalabat, Afghanistan for the East Turkistan Organization training camp in the Tora Bora Mountains.

6. The detainee was given a machine gun to defend himself and the East Turkistan Organization safe house in Jalabat, Afghanistan.

7. When the bombing of the East Turkistan Organization camp began, the detainee traveled with other Uighurs toward Pakistan and arrived at the border with a group of about twenty to thirty refugees.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF QADIR, ABDAL RAZAK

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee never heard of al Qaida until after his capture in 2001. The detainee does not believe that East Turkistan Organization has any connection to al Qaida.

b. The detainee has requested political asylum in the United States. If United States asylum is not possible, he will seek asylum in any country that will not force him to return to China.

c. Repayment of his \$30,000 debt is the detainee's primary goal after his release.

d. The detainee stated he does not belong to any extremist group or party and has never harbored any ill feelings towards the United States.

e. Chinese oppression and systematic violation of the civil rights of the Uighur people motivated the detainee to become involved in the East Turkistan Organization.

f. The detainee was unaware of the East Turkistan Organization being referred to as the Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement.

g. The detainee stated he was unaware of the Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

20 July 2005

TO: MUHAMMAD, ABD AL RAHMAN ABDULLAH ALI

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MUHAMMAD, ABD AL RAHMAN
ABDULLAH ALI

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee visited the Taliban Office in Quetta, Pakistan seeking a teaching job in Afghanistan.

2. The detainee was sent by car to a known Taliban house, run by Kari Bilal, 10 to 15 minutes west of Kabul. There were typically 5-20 personnel armed with AK-47s at the house.

3. Kari Bilal has been identified as the manager of the Said House in Kabul, Afghanistan. Afghan men would stay at this house before moving on to the front lines in Bagram, Afghanistan.

4. Kari Bilal was the commander of the Moasqr Kari Bilal Training Camp, responsible for training Taliban soldiers for the frontline in Bagram, Afghanistan. Kari Bilal was also the commander of approximately 15 fighters along the Bagram front.

b. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee's father is a member of Jamat al Tabligh and the Al-Islah political party in Yemen. One of his father's friends, Hatim Moutawakel, is also a member of Tablique Jammata and helped the organization build a mosque in Al-Akroa, Yemen.

2. The detainee borrowed 40,000 Yemeni riyals from Hatim Moutawakel. The detainee knew Moutawakel owned several businesses in surrounding cities, but the detainee claimed no

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MUHAMMAD, ABD AL RAHMAN ABDULLAH ALI

knowledge of their type or location. The detainee was to pay the money back to Moutawakel upon his return to Yemen.

3. Jamat al Tabligh, a Pakistani-based Islamic missionary organization, is being used as a cover to mask travel and activities of terrorists including members of al Qaida.

4. The detainee's name and variant was located on a computer file consisting of a list of contact numbers for captured al Qaida mujahideen scheduled to fight in Afghanistan. Pakistani authorities seized this computer media during a joint raid conducted against al Qaida associated safehouses in Rawalpindi on 1 March 2003.

5. A variant of the detainee's name was on a list of captured mujahideen located on a hard drive associated with a senior al Qaida operative.

6. The detainee's name and variant of his alias was found on a document listing 324 Arabic names, aliases, and nationalities recovered from safehouse raids associated with suspected al Qaida in Karachi, Pakistan. According to the document, the detainee was in possession of several items, including a Saudi passport, ticket, and ID cards.

7. On 14 December 2001, Pakistani authorities captured 84 mujahideen fighters fleeing Afghanistan. The detainee's name is located on a document published on the Internet in July 2002 containing information regarding the capture of these Taliban and al Qaida fighters who had crossed the border in Nangarhar Province, Afghanistan.

8. The detainee's name is on a letter listing 68 probable al Qaida members incarcerated in Pakistan. An undated handwritten letter was recovered, along with materials linked to al Qaida, by allied personnel. The letter provided a list of names of incarcerated Arabs with their aliases and countries of origin, along with encouragement to incite the people against the Pakistani government.

c. Intent

The detainee has assaulted the guards and remains uncooperative and disruptive, spits on the guard force, and incites disturbances. Detainee has great disdain for the guard personnel, as well as Americans, and has threatened to kill or harm members of the guard force on several occasions.

d. Other Relevant Data

The detainee was assessed as not particularly forthcoming in interviews and, in addition to having a bad attitude, to holding back on information regarding extremist and al Qaida activities in Afghanistan and Yemen.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MUHAMMAD, ABD AL RAHMAN ABDULLAH ALI

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the U.S. prior to their execution on September 11th.

b. The detainee denied receiving any weapons during his one-month stay in Kabul, Afghanistan.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

10 June 2005

To: AL SHULAN, HANI ABDUL MUSLIH

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL SHULAN, HANI ABDUL MUSLIH

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee traveled to Afghanistan in response to a fatwa for the purpose of fighting coalition forces.

2. The detainee arrived in Afghanistan in approximately July 2001 from Yemen via Pakistan.

3. The detainee spent two months at a Taliban camp. The detainee stated that his job was to prepare food that was later transported to soldiers fighting on the front lines.

4. The detainee was present in the Tora Bora region during the U.S. air campaign.

5. The detainee was armed with an AK-47 rifle.

b. Training

The detainee denied receiving any military training while in Kabul. According to the detainee, Taliban officials asked him if he wished to undergo firearms training. The detainee declined because he already considered himself proficient with a Kalashnikov rifle.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee's travel to Afghanistan was facilitated by a Yemeni national known to have recruited Yemeni men to fight the Jihad against the Russians in Chechnya.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL SHULAN, HANI ABDUL MUSLIH

2. The detainee resided in Taliban safehouses during his travel to and within Afghanistan.

d. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee had in his possession at capture a Casio watch, model # A159W, which has been used in bombings linked to al Qaida.

2. The detainee was captured in Pakistan near the Afghanistan border by Pakistani forces.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee stated that he didn't mind "working" for the Taliban, but didn't want to fight.

b. The detainee stated that he had planned to go to Afghanistan to find work with the Taliban and earn money. He had planned on staying for six or seven months and then return home.

c. When asked, the detainee stated that if the fatwa that Sheik Mohamed al-Imam issued had included fighting Americans, he would not have gone to Afghanistan.

d. The detainee claimed that he did not say during the interrogation that he traveled to Afghanistan in response to a fatwa for the purpose of fighting coalition forces. There are other people that went for the purpose of fatwa but he did not go there for that purpose.

e. The detainee stated that he knew Usama Bin Laden was in Afghanistan, but did not know he was associated with the Taliban. The detainee stated that he does not know anyone that supports or is associated with Usama Bin Laden, nor would he fight against the Americans.

f. The detainee had learned about the East African US embassy bombings, and the bombing of the USS Cole from the news. The detainee stated that he does not know anyone associated with these attacks.

g. The detainee stated that he believed that the United States would not attack Afghanistan without a reason.

h. The detainee noted that, if released, he would like to return to study at the university and subsequently become a teacher.

i. The detainee stated he has never heard the term Bayout, or swearing of allegiance, to Usama Bin Laden. The detainee further denied any association to Al Qaida, and added that the first time he ever heard the group, was after arriving in Cuba. The detainee also said he knows of UBL only through what he has heard from the media.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL SHULAN, HANI ABDUL MUSLIH

j. The detainee denied having prior knowledge of the attacks, and further criticized the fact they took place. The detainee continued to state that if two countries can't resolve their differences peacefully, then it is a matter for armies to settle, and not terrorists. The detainee stated he believes terrorism is a bad thing because many innocent people lose their lives at the hands of the terrorists.

k. The detainee stated that prior to leaving Kabul, he was issued an AK-47 assault rifle. He advised that this was the first time he had carried a rifle while in Afghanistan.

l. The detainee states that everyone uses a Kalashnikov rifle. He denied that he had the weapon for any enemy activities or to fire at the coalition.

m. The detainee claimed that he was not at Tora Bora during the U.S. air campaign. He stated that was the only way to leave Afghanistan.

n. The detainee claims the Pakistani forces did not capture him but that he turned himself over to them so he could exit.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

11 October 2005

TO: AL NUR, ANWAR HAMDAN MUHAMMED

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL NUR, ANWAR HAMDAN
MUHAMMED

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee claimed he was on an unpaid vacation from the university, yet he received a paycheck from the university via direct-deposit to the Rajeh Banking Institution in Jouf, Saudi Arabia.

2. The detainee had asked for a six-month leave of absence, which was not granted. When the detainee stopped showing up for work, he was terminated as a teacher in al-Jawf.

3. Approximately 15 October 2001, the detainee and others traveled from al Qurayat, Saudi Arabia to Damascus, Syria, to Tehran, Iran to Mashhad, to the Afghanistan boarder and then onto Herat. The detainee continued on to Kabul and Khowst, where he stayed for approximately one month.

b. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee claimed he was working unofficially for the Islamic Relief Organization based in Saudi Arabia.

2. In late December 2001, several individuals admitted to having been fighters in Afghanistan, but none to being associated with Usama Bin Laden. The detainee's name and phone number were found in the notebook of one of the individuals.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL NUR, ANWAR HAMDAN MUHAMMED

3. The detainee's name was found on a document listing 324 Arabic names, aliases and nationalities recovered from safehouse raids associated with suspected al Qaida.

4. The detainee's name was discovered as part of information that was recovered from hard drives, which were seized from the suspected al Qaida cell that attacked the United States Marines on Faylaka Island in October 2002.

5. The detainee's name was found on a chart listing the names of captured Mujahidin, seized during joint raids in March 2003.

6. The detainee was captured with a list of ten phone numbers and names. Among them, a contact in Ceuta, in North Africa, a territory of Spain known for its illicit drug, weapons and human trade.

7. The detainee stated he used to cooperate with the Islamic Relief Organization, in al Jawf, Saudi Arabia.

c. Other Relevant Data

1. On approximately 1 November 2001, the detainee left Khowst, Afghanistan because it had become too dangerous to work there any longer. The detainee and eight others departed and passed near Jalalabad, Afghanistan crossed the Afghan-Pakistan border. The detainee and others gave themselves up to a Pakistani Army Unit. The detainee was then turned over to the Pakistani Police, who took them to a prison in Peshawar, Pakistan. The detainee was turned over to the United States authorities.

2. The detainee denies speaking any English but answered many questions without the use of an interpreter.

3. The detainee made the comment, "If you find that I am al Qaida, then execute me."

4. An individual provided information, which is similar to that provided by the detainee, regarding illegally obtained Iranian Travel Visas in Madrid, Spain. Both individuals have a matching address and telephone number.

5. The detainee blamed the Americans for treating Muslims badly and that the attacks on 11 September 2001 were the Americans' responsibility because of their treatment of Muslims. The detainee feels strongly that the United States is in a war against Islam.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on September 11th, 2001.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL NUR, ANWAR HAMDAN MUHAMMED

b. The detainee also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.

c. The detainee was queried regarding any knowledge or planning of internal uprisings at the Guantanamo Detention Facility, with negative results.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

2 November 2005

TO: HUMUD DAKHIL HUMUD SA ID AL JAD AN

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF HUMUD DAKHIL HUMUD SA ID AL
JAD AN

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
 1. The detainee received fatwas issued by two sheiks. Both fatwas called for assistance in the persecution of Moslems in the Chechnyan region.
 2. The detainee entered Chechnya in the fall of 1988.
 3. The detainee flew to Tablees Airport and then traveled to Dewees village where he was taken to a guesthouse. The detainee purchased an AK-47 for \$1,000 USD and was given a backpack and a Chechnyan uniform.
 4. The detainee left Chechnya in 1999 via Dagestan, Azerbaijan, Dubai, United Arab Emirates and Sanaa, Yemen. He then left Sanaa and went to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.
 5. A man from a mosque in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, convinced the detainee to go and fight in Afghanistan.
 6. The detainee traveled to Afghanistan two times. The first time was 1999-2000.
 7. The detainee claims the first trip to Afghanistan only lasted three months because he became sick and returned to Jeddah via Pakistan. During this first trip he gave himself the name Taloot.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF HUMUD DAKHIL HUMUD SA ID AL JAD AN

8. Between 2000-2001, the detainee returned to Afghanistan for the second time, again in accordance with a fatwa. The detainee went to Kandahar where he stayed in a guesthouse. Upon arriving at this guesthouse, the detainee filled out a form that included family histories, knowledge of religious studies, and past employments. In this questionnaire, the detainee mentioned that he once worked at Saudi Airlines out of Riyadh.

9. The detainee traveled to Afghanistan flying from Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, to Lahore, Pakistan where the detainee stayed in a guesthouse before continuing on to Quetta, Pakistan, and then to Afghanistan.

10. The detainee visited two camps in Afghanistan, including al Farouq and another that was located inside an airport complex.

11. After leaving al Farouq, the detainee went to a camp called either Saber or Malik near Bagram.

12. From Bagram, the detainee was sent to the secondary line that was the artillery line. The detainee was given an AK-47 with four magazines and two defensive type grenades. The detainee asked to go to the front line on several occasions but the Commander would not send him. The detainee and an acquaintance drove to Tora Bora.

13. After the primary leader at a location for Mujahideen fighters in Tora Bora was killed the detainee took over that position.

14. The detainee was identified as leader of a camp in Tora Bora and he had contact with Usama Bin Laden.

15. The detainee's neighbor in Saudi Arabia talked to him about various opportunities in Chechnya and Afghanistan. The neighbor also spoke to the detainee about fatwas.

16. The detainee is on a foreign government watch and arrest list for his trip to Chechnya.

b. Training

1. The detainee received training on mortars, anti-tank weapons, tactics and physical fitness at a camp in the city of Surjinyurt, Chechnya.

2. The detainee was trained in Chechnya on map reading, the AK-47, hand grenades, machine guns, anti-aircraft weapons and landmines.

3. The detainee also learned how to extract the explosive element from landmines in order to make other explosive devices.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF HUMUD DAKHIL HUMUD SA ID AL JAD AN

4. The detainee has detailed knowledge of constructing several types of improvised explosive devices and improvised anti-aircraft rounds.

5. The detainee was noted for being adept at putting weapons together.

6. At the camp named either Saber or Malik near Bagram, the detainee received training on an 82mm mortar, M-50, Zokiak, which is a small anti-aircraft weapon, and a Shalaka, which is a large anti-aircraft weapon mounted on a truck.

7. The detainee identified the SA-7 as a weapon that he trained with.

8. The detainee instructed others in the use of anti-aircraft weapons, specifically the SA-7 and ZSU-23, in a bunker on top of the Saber mountains.

9. The detainee was identified as the one in charge of a group at Taloqan, and he claimed to be an explosives expert. The detainee described using watches, two-way radios or any electronic device as a detonator for explosives.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee is on a list of al Qaida Mujahideen and the contents of their trust accounts found on files recovered from various computer files seized during raids against al Qaida associated safehouses.

2. The detainee's alias was on an Afghanistan based military training camp application recovered from a raided Arab office in Kandahar, Afghanistan.

3. The detainee was present when several al Qaida members met at an Usama Bin Laden guest house in Kandahar, Afghanistan in 2000.

4. The detainee identified and claimed to personally know several other al Qaida operatives.

5. The detainee knows people who swore allegiance to Usama Bin Laden and people who killed Americans. The detainee also knows a leader of al Qaida in Saudi Arabia.

d. Intent

1. While the detainee realizes that the Americans are in Afghanistan looking for bombers and terrorists, the detainee stated that if the Muslim people were still fighting, he would go fight with them even if it meant fighting against the Americans.

2. The detainee was identified as the leader of the Arabs in his cellblock.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF HUMUD DAKHIL HUMUD SA ID AL JAD AN

e. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee stated that after the Americans began attacking, he decided to leave Tora Bora and go to Pakistan until matters settled. The detainee and an Afghani farmer walked for a day until reaching a small Pakistani village. As the detainee and the farmer were about to enter the village, the Pakistani Military surrounded them. Without being asked any questions the detainee was placed in a jail with several other Arabs.

2. The detainee was in possession of a Casio watch at the time of his capture. This model has been used in bombings that have been linked to al Qaida and radical Islamic terrorist improvised explosive devices.

3. The only travel that the detainee claims to have conducted in the name of jihad is to the Russian republic of Georgia, in an attempt to go to Chechnya and to Afghanistan.

4. The detainee attended a training camp that was funded by Usama Bin Laden but claims he was not loyal to Bin Laden. The detainee claims he did not receive orders from Usama Bin Laden or from anyone who said that they were speaking on Bin Laden's behalf. The detainee claims to have seen Usama Bin Laden on only three occasions and claims he never spoke to Bin Laden.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee claims he did not fight against the Northern Alliance.

b. The detainee stated that he was not fully aware of Usama Bin Laden and al Qaida until he left camp Farouk and went back to Kandahar.

c. The detainee feels that al Qaida is against all Muslim beliefs.

d. The detainee insisted that he has never fought Americans while in Afghanistan.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

30 September 2005

TO: AL SHARAKH, ABDULHADI ABDALLAH IBRAHIM

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF
AL SHARAKH, ABDULHADI ABDALLAH IBRAHIM

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee departed Riyadh, Saudi Arabia in July 2001 with a friend named Abdallah Muhammad al Hamed and flew to Karachi, Pakistan. The detainee left with 14,000 U.S. dollars he received from his father. The detainee stayed a week in Karachi then he and al Hamed traveled to a village in Kandahar, Afghanistan.

2. The detainee and al Hamed left Afghanistan after two days and returned to Karachi then departed for Cairo, Egypt. In Cairo, they stayed with al Hamed's friend, Mohammed Ibrahim for eight or nine months.

3. Following their stay in Cairo, the two men then left for Tehran, Iran where they stayed for two days. The detainee and al Hamed went back to Herat, Afghanistan and then to Kabul. The detainee and al Hamed spent a total of three months in Afghanistan.

4. After approximately three months in Afghanistan, the detainee left Kabul for Jalalabad, Afghanistan and was detained by Pakistani authorities in a Pakistan village.

5. The detainee acknowledged his participation in Jihad with the Taliban and admitted that he was a committed member of the regime.

b. Training

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF
AL SHARAKH, ABDULHADI ABDALLAH IBRAHIM**

1. The detainee stated that he did attend the Taliban training camp named al Farouq located outside Kabul, Afghanistan. While there the detainee received weapons training on the Kalashnikov, the RPG and the Russian PK.

2. The detainee took a one-week urban warfare course run by the Libyans. The detainee received training on how to fire, break down and reassemble AK-47s, PK machine guns and rocket propelled grenade launchers.

3. The detainee stated he resided at a safe house for one month prior and while training at al Farouq training camp. The training lasted for a total of two months.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee surrendered his passport to Abu Khulud. After two days, Khulud gave it back and the detainee noted that forged stamps had been placed in it. The detainee said that Khulud, who resided at a safe house in Pakistan, forged stamps for the detainee's travel to Oman, Egypt and Pakistan.

2. The detainee stated that Khulud ran the safe house in Kandahar and it housed individuals from many nations awaiting training at al Farouq.

3. A senior al Qaida operative said he met the detainee and his brother in 2001 when they paid for specialized instruction from a former Khaldan instructor. The operative said that the detainee and his brother received instruction on conducting attacks from motorcycles and cars.

4. A senior al Qaida operative said the detainee and his brothers were involved in fighting with the Arab Mujahidin and that he was close to Khalid al Hubayshi.

d. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee stated the jihad was for a good cause and that he and al Hamed should help the Taliban in the name of Allah.

2. The detainee and other Taliban members fled to Jalalabad. The detainee stated that he was engaged in battle while in Kabul and that he decided to flee from Jalalabad to Tora Bora, Afghanistan. The detainee left with a Kalashnikov and a Bandelaro containing ammunition. The overall plan was to flee from Afghanistan into Pakistan.

3. The detainee stated that he, four Yemen's and five Pakistani's waited in the caves in Tora Bora. The detainee also recalled that when he fled from Kabul he was accompanied by the Taliban leader, Saznook.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL SHARAKH, ABDULHADI ABDALLAH IBRAHIM

4. The detainee quoted a El Hojerat verse, Sunnah chapters 8, 9, 10 as references for his obligation to participate in Jihad and also to justify killing others in the name of Allah. The detainee noted that he would still fight today if the reason were justified.

5. The detainee emphasized that he wanted to attend and participate in jihad in Afghanistan, because according to him the Northern Alliance was not practicing the correct form of Islam.

6. The detainee stated that any Northern Alliance soldier who failed to convert to the Taliban's version of Islam could be killed. The detainee said he would be rewarded for killing any Northern Alliance soldier who did not convert.

7. A possible al Qaida recruiter named Anjasha visited the detainee's home approximately ten times and spoke about the jihad and how it was the duty of Muslims to join Jihads.

8. The detainee's brother is also being detained at Guantanamo Bay.

9. The detainee was witnessed in the trenches of Bagram.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on September 11th, 2001, and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.

b. The detainee reiterated that he never engaged in fighting while hiding in Tora Bora.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

23 June 2005

TO: SALIH, ABDUL AL RAZZAQ MUHAMMAD

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SALIH, ABDUL AL RAZZAQ
MUHAMMAD

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
 1. The detainee is a Yemeni citizen who traveled to Afghanistan prior to 11 September 2001 via Dubai, United Arab Emirates, and Karachi, Pakistan.
 2. The detainee stated he felt compelled to go to Afghanistan to teach the Koran to the Afghans. He stated that he was not formally trained in the Koran, but wanted to go just recite what he could.
 3. The detainee traveled to Afghanistan with a falsified passport which was issued in Ta'iz, Yemen in 2001.
 4. The detainee was identified as a jihadist who worked at the Talut Center in Tora Bora. He carried or operated a Bika weapon.
 5. The detainee was identified as one of the individuals who fought on the front lines in Bosnia.
 - b. Training
 1. The detainee trained at Al Farouq.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SALIH, ABDUL AL RAZZAQ MUHAMMAD

2. Al Farouq was an Al Qaida training camp that trained all non-Afghanis to fight for the Taliban as well as other jihads. The training encompassed eight to ten weeks of intense instruction covering weapons familiarization, commando tactics, topography and explosives.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee was identified as Al Qa'Qa Al Yemeni.
2. The name Al Qi'Qa Al Yemeni was found on a set of Al Qaida training camp applications.

d. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee was captured while crossing the Pakistan border from Afghanistan.
2. While detained at GTMO, the detainee has initiated over forty assaults against guards, and he has repeatedly threatened to kill GTMO personnel. The detainee has threatened to kill "all Americans" and "infidels in the U.S." He has also tried to incite disturbances in the cellblocks by jumping and banging on the cell and singing songs about Usama Bin Laden and encouraging the rest of the block to join him.
4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
 - a. The detainee stated that he doesn't like violence and was not fighting in Afghanistan, but was seeking a job teaching in a mosque.
 - b. The detainee denied any knowledge of the 9/11 attack on the World Trade Center (WTC) or of perpetrators of the bombing of the USS Cole. The detainee also stated that the perpetrators in the 9/11 WTC attack are the biggest criminals.
 - c. The detainee stated that he was never approached by anyone from the Taliban Government to fight.
 - d. The detainee denied having any knowledge relating to the conflict in Afghanistan, the Taliban, or any terrorist organizations.
5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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**Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba**

21 September 2005

TO: AL ZAHARNI, KHALID MOHAMMED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL ZAHARNI, KHALID MOHAMMED**

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee is a Saudi Arabian national who volunteered to travel to Afghanistan to fight against the Northern Alliance in May of 2001.

2. The detainee stated that he began hearing people talk more and more about jihad. He then began going to a small audiotape store where he met Abu Hassan. The detainee listened to audiotapes containing information about jihad, which were mainly inspirational recordings.

3. The detainee began planning for jihad, which included talking to Sheiks Bin Gebreen and Bin Augla, to receive advice on travel routes. While on vacation with his family, the detainee left and met with Abu Hassan.

4. The detainee was on the front line in an area called Kut Kalif in Kabul, Afghanistan.

5. The detainee was in a fighting position in the Tora Bora mountain region from 23 November 2001 until 18 December 2001.

b. Training

The detainee traveled to Kut Bakram training camp in Kabul, Afghanistan, where he received training on the AK-47 and rocket-propelled grenades.

c. Connections/Associations

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL ZAHARNI, KHALID MOHAMMED

1. The detainee's name and phone number were found in a computer file, which was associated with a senior al Qaida lieutenant. It was seized during joint raids with a foreign government service.

2. According to a foreign government service, the detainee was listed among reported members of al Qaida.

3. The detainee's name was on a document listing 324 Arabic names, aliases and nationalities recovered from safe house raids associated with suspected al Qaida in Karachi, Pakistan. The list identified the detainee by name, nationality and noted he had a Saudi passport in his possession.

4. The detainee's name was also found on several floppy disks recovered during a raid on an alleged al Qaida residence in Karachi, Pakistan. The file revealed an Arabic-language document titled "al jawazat.doc" which translates to "passports.doc". This document contains tables labeled: name, nationality, safety-deposit box number, contents and comments.

5. A reference to the detainee was recovered from two partitioned hard drives seized from a suspected al Qaida cell that attacked the U.S. Forces in October 2002. On the hard drive was a chat session from 2 September 2002 which contained the following entry: "Khalid bin Muhammad bin 'Ali al-Zahrani Abu al-Jarah from al Kharg-al Jazirah which is his parents."

6. The detainee's name was on a list recovered from computer media of al Qaida mujahideen and the contents of their "trust" accounts during raids against al Qaida associated safe houses in Rawalpindi and Karachi between 11 September 2002 and 1 March 2003.

7. The name of the detainee was found on an Arabic-language computer file, which lists contact points and telephone numbers for al Qaida mujahideen in Pakistan. According to the file these mujahideen were among a group who had come to Afghanistan in December 2001 but who had not completed their training and therefore were not ready to fight in the war.

8. The detainee was also listed in a computer file recovered from a suspected al Qaida safe house in Islamabad, Pakistan. The file lists 78 associates incarcerated in Pakistan and appears to be an updated/corrected copy of an earlier list.

9. The detainee's name was on an undated letter that listed 68 probable al Qaida members incarcerated in Pakistan. The purpose of the document was to incite the people against the Pakistani government.

d. Other Relevant Data

The detainee was in possession of a Casio watch and the model is linked to bombings committed by al Qaida and other radical Islamic terrorists.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL ZAHARNI, KHALID MOHAMMED

4. The following primary factor favors release or transfer:

The detainee stated that he did not have prior knowledge of the attacks on 11 September 2001 and he is not affiliated with al Qaida.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

UNCLASSIFIED

Numbers not used

UNCLASSIFIED

**Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba**

6 July 2005

TO: HADJARAB, NABIL

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF HADJARAB, NABIL

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. While living in France, the detainee purchased a French passport, then traveled from Paris to the UK at the end of November 2000.

2. The detainee primarily attended three mosques in London; Finsbury Park, Baker Street, and Stamford Hill. Finsbury Park was the mosque he attended most often for both prayers and lectures.

3. Sheik Abu Hamza, the spiritual leader of Finsbury Park Mosque, supported the killing of civilians by the Algerian GIA (Group Islamic Algerian). He also facilitated travel to Afghanistan and access to Usama Bin Laden's training commanders.

4. The GIA (Armed Islamic Group) is identified by the Department of Homeland Security as an Islamic extremist group.

5. The detainee has been identified as the London associate of an individual who is implicated in a plot to detonate an improvised radiological device in the United States.

6. Omar, who the detainee met in London, financed and arranged the detainee's travel from the UK to Pakistan, and on to Afghanistan in March 2001.

7. Hassan Ibn Omar served as Sheik Abu Hamza's immediate subordinate at the Finsbury Park Mosque.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF HADJARAB, NABIL

8. Once in Jalalabad, the detainee stayed at a house owned by an individual named Zacharia. Three other individuals were staying at the house, all of whom spoke Arabic with a North African dialect.

b. Training

1. The detainee was trained on an AK-47 by Zacharia, who gave him the AK-47 for use in self-defense.

2. In November 2001, the detainee fled Jalalabad. He joined a group of eight others, led by Abu Thabit, and went up into the mountains, where he shared a trench with the group.

3. Thabit commanded Camp Thabit, which was located in the Tora Bora region south of Jalalabad. The camp was one of a series of camps that were set up to support and defend retreating Taliban and al Qaida terrorist forces.

4. The detainee's trench was equipped with an AK-47 and a few hand grenades.

c. Other Relevant Data

1. In mid December 2001, the detainee was injured during a helicopter attack as he was heading toward the Pakistan border.

2. The detainee said he surrendered on the outskirts of a village in Afghanistan, to armed Afghanis, who then turned him over to U.S. Forces.

3. The detainee said he was brought to a hospital where he was treated for his wounds. He was then sent by bus to Kabul and turned over to the Northern Alliance, who released the detainee to American troops.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee stated that he is truly sorry about what happened on September 11, 2001. He stated that from the beginning, he has been sincere with investigators and has told everything.

b. The detainee said he did not know any al Qaida members.

c. The detainee stated he had never been at al Farouq or received any military/weapons training. He also denied that he had been a combatant in Afghanistan.

d. The detainee said he did not know Afghanistan was a haven for terrorists.

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF HADJARAB, NABIL**

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

25 October 2005

TO: AMI, SHAKIR ABDURAHIM MOHAMED

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AMI, SHAKIR ABDURAHIM MOHAMED

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
 1. The detainee would be happy to be a martyr for his religion.
 2. According to a senior al Qaida operative, the detainee first traveled to Afghanistan in 1993.
 3. In 1994, the detainee traveled to Bosnia.
 4. The detainee taught Arabs how to fight during the Bosnian-Serb War.
 5. In 1998, the detainee visited al Qaida cells in New York City and upstate New York.
 6. Also in 1998, the detainee traveled to Afghanistan, where he stayed in the al Ansar guesthouse.
 7. The detainee visited the Khaldan Camp.
 8. The detainee went to Afghanistan again around 1999.
 9. The detainee went to Afghanistan again in 2000 specifically to be with the Mujahidin on the front lines. He ate, slept and carried a gun with the troops on the front line.
 10. The detainee was a fighter in Tora Bora and Bagram Afghanistan.
 11. The detainee was in charge of a group of men at Tora Bora.

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12. The detainee was seen armed with a 82mm mortar and a M43 120mm mortar, which he was taking to the front line.

b. Training

1. The detainee received training on basic explosives and booby traps.

2. The detainee fought against the Serbians and was trained on the use of the AK-47 and rocket propelled grenades.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee is associated with another known terrorist with ties to al Qaida.

2. The detainee is associated with numerous other al Qaida operatives and terrorist supporters.

3. The detainee has links to al Qaida as a recruiter.

4. The detainee was identified as a member of the London al Qaida cell.

5. The detainee used an associate to gain entry to Afghanistan.

6. This associate is a known al Qaida facilitator.

7. The detainee received assistance from non-governmental organizations known to support al Qaida.

8. The detainee was identified as a member of al Qaida who was present in the Tora Bora region late in 2001.

9. The detainee knew a former representative of Usama bin Laden in the United Kingdom.

10. The detainee was an advisor to Usama bin Laden and organizer at Tora Bora, Kandahar and Kabul.

11. The detainee was very close to Usama bin Laden and would ask him for advice.

12. The detainee acted as a special interpreter for Usama bin Laden.

13. The detainee received money from Usama bin Laden.

d. Intent

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1. The detainee harbors a great hatred for both the governments of Saudi Arabia and of the United States.
2. The detainee referred to himself as a terrorist and stated that the United States would and should fall because it has become an unjust nation.
3. The detainee was described as an al Qaida operative with a strong American dialect who loves to work inside the United States.

e. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee entered the United States in 1989 and worked in Atlanta, Georgia and Gaithersburg, Maryland.
 2. Around 1995, the detainee traveled to Turkey and Holland and from there to England.
 3. The detainee took another trip to the United States around 2000 and then traveled to London.
 4. The detainee has traveled to Romania where he was introduced to humanitarian organizations including the Islamic Heritage Revival and the Islamic Relief Organization.
 5. The detainee appeared to know about a major al Qaida operation prior to its execution.
 6. The detainee said he stole a passport and also admitted he bought a forged Belgium passport.
4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a. The detainee said the lifestyle he led while living in Britain would not allow him to have been involved in organizations associated with terrorism. He is a Mujahidin serving his religion but for good reasons.
 - b. The detainee said he was never recruited by anyone and did not play a role with people involved with terrorist acts.
 - c. The detainee said he had never heard of al Qaida until 2000 but knew about Usama bin Laden.
 - d. The detainee said he never met Usama bin Laden. The detainee said he did not know of Usama bin Laden receiving contributions from various organizations. The detainee did not know of anybody preaching about Usama bin Laden in Britain.
 - e. The detainee said he never saw any training taking place at the Khaldan camp but saw the caves where the mosque and storage areas were.

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f. The detainee stated that while he was on the front lines in Afghanistan he never fired a shot and that the fighting was not very bad when he was there.

g. The detainee stated he never served with the Arab Brigade 3rd Corps in Zenitsa, Bosnia. The detainee did admit he delivered food and aid to the 3rd Corps troops.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

27 September 2005

TO: AL UTAYBI, ABDULLAH ALI

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL UTAYBI, ABDULLAH ALI

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
 1. The detainee traveled from Mecca, Saudi Arabia to Quetta, Pakistan by traveling through Medina, Saudi Arabia; Syria; Turkey; Dubai, United Arab Emirates; Lahore, Pakistan, and Karachi, Pakistan.
 2. The detainee was the head of the al Wafa office in Herat, Afghanistan.
 3. The Non-Governmental Organization al Wafa reportedly was believed to be a terrorist organization and may have had connections with Usama Bin Laden and Afghan mujahideen.
 4. Al Wafa was known to deliver weapons, money and supplies to Afghan fighters in Tora Bora.
 5. The Office of al Wafa at Herat was a key location in al Qaida's support network and the detainee was the linchpin in the al Wafa and al Qaida efforts to recruit, train, and infiltrate fighters into Afghanistan.
 6. The detainee closed the Herat al Wafa office and was transferred to run the Kandahar al Wafa office after September 2001.
 - b. Training

A senior al Qaida lieutenant believes the detainee may be a possible Saudi national who trained at the Khaldan Camp and may have worked for the al Wafa organization.

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c. Connections/Associations

The detainee was in close contact with Abu Bakar. In Afghanistan, Abu Bakar was known to help direct one of the camps in Kabul, in which he trained ethnic Chechens.

d. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee's name was on a foreign government watch list for travel to Pakistan.
2. The detainee was arrested by Pakistani Police in possession of the equivalent of approximately \$27, 000.00 United States dollars in different currencies.
3. One of the detainee's known aliases, Bandar Aid al Utaybi, was on a list of al Qaida mujahideen and the contents of their trust accounts. The list was recovered from computer media that was seized during raids against al Qaida associated safehouses in Pakistan.
4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
 - a. During Ramadan (2001) the detainee traveled to Quetta, Pakistan and offered both his assistance and cash to the Red Crescent Society.
 - b. The detainee denies traveling to Pakistan in response to a fatwa or receiving instructions from anyone regarding his travel to Syria, Turkey and Pakistan.
 - c. The detainee denies having any knowledge of the following: Usama Bin Laden, the existence of training camps, attacks against the U.S., bombing of the U.S.S. Cole in Yemen, American targets in Africa or Saudi Arabia; or U.S. military bases in Turkey.
 - d. If returned to Saudi Arabia, the detainee intends to check on his wife and then start a new life. The detainee would not travel to Pakistan and/or Afghanistan to help refugees for any reason.
 - e. The detainee denied that he intended to fight with the Taliban and/or al Qaida or that he transported cash for either group.
5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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