

# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

21 November 2005

TO: NASIR, ABDUL LATIF

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF NASIR, ABDUL LATIF

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee learned of the Russians invading Afghanistan from television and newspapers when he was young. It was during this time, that he first wanted to go fight jihad.

2. The detainee stated he was a member of the Islamic fundamentalist group Jamaat Adl Wa al Ihssan in Morocco.

3. The detainee held a lower leadership position in his neighborhood Jamaat al Adl Wa al Ihssan Chapter in Morocco. In the summer of 1990, the detainee was put on house arrest after he and the leader of Jamaat al Adl Wa al Ihssan attended a peaceful sit-in protest.

4. While selling goods in Sudan, the detainee was recruited for jihad.

5. The detainee joined the Jamaat Tablighi group in Sudan.

6. The detainee watched a training video in Sudan that focused on the glory of fighting jihad and the reasons why an individual should go to Afghanistan to fight for Islam. The film footage was very moving and reinforced his feelings about going to jihad.

7. At the end of 1997, the detainee arranged to go to Afghanistan and train on military weapons and tactics.

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8. The detainee claimed emphatically that he went to Afghanistan to fight for Islam and that his initial desire was to fight for Islam in Chechnya.

9. The detainee was identified as the leader of the Suhail Center, two-three miles east of the Bagram, Afghanistan airport and approximately 700 meters from the front lines.

10. The detainee considers himself a Taliban Fighter rather than al Qaida.

11. The detainee stated that if the Islamic leadership of Afghanistan declared a fatwa, he will be against the United States.

### b. Training

1. The detainee went to the Derunta training camp and completed two weeks training on the PK and Klashnikov.

2. The detainee then moved to the Farouq guesthouse near Khowst, Afghanistan and trained three months at the Farouq training camp. He received basic skills training on the Kalishnikov rifle, map reading, camouflage, artillery, and mountain tactics.

3. The detainee received training on 7.62mm, 7.65mm and 12.7mm firearms, 30mm auto grenade launcher, rocket propelled grenade launcher, hand grenades and anti-personnel grenades at Farouq training camp, in the field and on the front lines of battle.

4. In between rotations on the front and rear lines, the detainee helped train new fighters on the Kalishnikov rifle.

5. The detainee was identified as a Taliban leader of the rear line in Kabul where weapons training was conducted. Training was conducted on AK-47 rifles and hand grenades, as well as the teachings of Islam.

6. The detainee trained in explosives in the Farouq Camp and was a trainer.

7. The detainee was identified as a trainer at al Farouq.

8. The detainee was identified as an instructor at al Farouq who provided explosives training and assisted with supply issues.

9. The detainee was identified as one of the trainers for a week-long course on how to take measures against air attack at the 'Ainak training camp.

10. The detainee was identified as a Moroccan who used to work in Afghanistan as a heavy artillery trainer.

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF NASIR, ABDUL LATIF**

### c. Connections/Associations

1. While in Sudan, the detainee worked as a production overseer in a company owned by Usama bin Laden for approximately two years. During this time, he frequently saw Usama bin Laden running the day-to-day operations of his business.

2. The detainee left Sudan for Yemen where he used a contact number and address given to him by his recruiter. His recruiter was part of a group of fighters from Libya called the Islamic Fighting Group.

3. The detainee stayed at a Libyan guesthouse in Jalalabad while the Taliban approved his travel papers.

4. The detainee clarified that the Libyan guesthouse was an al Qaida-sponsored guesthouse in Jalalabad and that he stayed there while transiting to the Farouq training camp.

5. The detainee stayed in a Libyan guesthouse in Kabul and rotated between the front and rear lines. When not fighting, the detainee and his fellow fighters usually stayed in a Libyan encampment at the rear line, near Kabul.

6. After the fall of Kabul and Jalalabad, Afghanistan, the detainee's unit retreated to the Tora Bora Mountains. They stopped in a small area called the Talut Center where Usama bin Laden spoke to the detainee and his group.

7. The detainee accompanied Ibn Sheikh al Libi to a meeting with Usama bin Laden at Tora Bora.

8. In February 2001, the detainee attended the wedding of Mohammed bin Laden, Usama bin Laden's son, in Kandahar, Afghanistan.

9. The detainee stayed at an al Qaida guesthouse in Kandahar, which provided food and shelter to mujahidin fighters, while he attended the wedding of Usama bin Laden's son.

10. The detainee was listed as an al Qaida member on a document recovered by United States Coalition Forces from a residence in Kandahar, Afghanistan.

11. The detainee was included on a by-rank listing of al Qaida members.

12. The detainee was a member of the al Qaida Shura Council and its military committee for weapon purchasing and the training subcommittee.

13. The detainee confirmed that he was a member of the al Qaida explosives committee and was an explosives trainer in Afghanistan.

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### d. Intent

1. The detainee stated his goal was to get as much experience with military weapons as he could, so he could travel to Chechnya and fight jihad there.

2. The detainee decided he wanted to go to the front lines to fight the Northern Alliance. He went to Kabul, stayed for a week at a madafat in the Wakir Akbar Khan neighborhood, and got a Klashnikov rifle, two grenades, and Battle Dress Uniforms from the Afghani who ran the madafat.

### e. Detainee Actions and Statements

1. The detainee made the decision to be in charge of the front lines that defended Tora Bora. The detainee stated, "I wanted be the first in the line if there was a confrontation." He stated he also took charge of the center, which was part of the front line.

2. The detainee stated that while he was on the line, he was in charge of artillery. His responsibilities included determining where the artillery was directed, mapping the topography of the targets and maintaining the book (a log of target coordinates and proper artillery positioning).

3. The detainee stated that while on the line any decision concerning artillery, such as which direction it should be aimed, came from him. If he was not there to personally handle the artillery, the detainee stated others would contact him to get permission and guidance regarding the artillery. The detainee stated he was not chosen to be a trainer, nor paid by al Qaida.

4. The detainee admitted that when asked how to use certain weapons he would provide training to other trainees at Farouq and Jihad Wal. The detainee further stated he taught the men on the front and artillery line how to use the weapons and explosives when they did not know or have the proper skill.

5. The detainee spent approximately three years with the Taliban forces fighting the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan. He spent two years fighting on the northern line and the Kabul line and spent almost one year fighting on the Bagram line.

6. When questioned about anti-United States sentiments, the detainee replied he hated the Russians, the Serbs and the Jews; the United States was always helping the Russians, Serbs and Jews and therefore while he had nothing directly against the United States, he indirectly hated them.

7. The detainee admitted that he is the highest-ranking defender of Tora Bora detained at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.

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f. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee was identified as one of the individuals involved in the destruction of the mountainside Buddha statues in Afghanistan. The detainee was specifically indicated as placing mines in the statues and blowing them up.

2. After the Northern Alliance broke through the lines protecting Kabul, the detainee was chosen to be the emir of travel and led a group of men from the front lines to Kabul. The detainee stated they got lost along the way and went to Jalalabad instead. Once Jalalabad fell to the Northern Alliance, he led his men to Tora Bora, Afghanistan

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. When questioned whether he ever had the opportunity to swear bayat to Usama bin Laden, the detainee replied he had the opportunity but chose against it. The detainee stated he still respected Usama bin Laden but disagreed with what Usama bin Laden and al Qaida were doing outside of Afghanistan. The detainee advised he did not think Usama bin Laden was in a position to issue a fatwa because he was not a religious scholar. The detainee stated this was especially true if the fatwa ordered something that would cause harm to others since this goes against Islamic law.

b. The detainee did not agree with the attack on September 11, 2001 on the United States. He further thought the people killed on September 11th were innocent and it was wrong to attack them. The detainee explained it was against Islamic principles to attack innocent people and that Usama bin Ladin is wrong to justify attacking Americans because they are "unbelievers", when Islamic law teaches that Christians and Jews are not unbelievers. He also stated it is wrong to attack people simply because they are unbelievers and that Muslim and Christians are the same.

c. The detainee stated if he were released he would go to Morocco and would see his family and go back to work buying and selling merchandise.

d. The detainee provided information on the Abu Khabab Training Camp.

e. The detainee denied seeing the Derunta camp facilities.

f. The detainee denied training anyone on anything. When asked why someone had identified him as a trainer named Taha at the Khalden Training Camp, he said he would like to see his accuser face-to-face and confront him.

g. When questioned about his statement, "in America's eyes, I am a terrorist," the detainee denied making that statement and claimed, "my hands are tainted with no innocent blood".

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h. When questioned about being on al Qaida's explosive committee, the detainee denied he was currently or ever previously on the committee. The detainee stated, "I'm too simple to have such a position".

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

27 September 2005

TO: AL SILM HAJI HAJJAJ AWWAD AL HAJJAJI

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL SILM HAJI HAJJAJ AWWAD AL  
HAJJAJI

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
  - a. Commitment
    1. The detainee left Saudi Arabia to join the Taliban in Afghanistan.
    2. The detainee claimed he was told it was the duty of all Muslims to help the Taliban.
    3. The detainee was recruited by a friend who passed him on to two other parties in the Jiddah/Mecca area.
    4. The detainee traveled from Jiddah, Saudi Arabia to a safe house in Kandahar via: Doha, Qatar, Lahore, Pakistan and Quetta, Pakistan.
  - b. Training
    1. The detainee spent approximately nine months in Afghanistan training with the Taliban.
    2. The detainee trained at al Farouq on weapons, land navigation, maneuvering and general military skills.
    3. The detainee claimed he received only one week of training and sat around doing nothing for months on end. The detainee claimed he had only one day of map-type training.

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL SILM HAJI HAJJAJ AWWAD AL HAJJAJI**

**c. Connections/Associations**

1. On 11 September 2002 a joint raid was conducted on an alleged al Qaida residence in Karachi, Pakistan. A document was recovered with a name that is similar to one of the detainee's known aliases.

2. The detainee's alias was found on a translated list of al Qaida mujahideen that was recovered during raids on al Qaida associated safe houses.

3. The detainee's alias was on a translated document that was found on a hard drive associated with a senior al Qaida lieutenant. The document lists captured Mujahideen.

**d. Other Relevant Data**

The detainee was captured without any identification.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee emphatically stated that he is content with the current conditions of his detention and is prepared to be a detainee for a billion years.

b. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on September 11, 2001.

c. The detainee denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.

d. The detainee was queried regarding any knowledge or planning of internal uprisings at the Guantanamo Detention Facility with negative results.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

29 July 2005

TO: AL KHALIFA, SHEIKH SALMAN EBRAHIM MOHAMED ALI

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL KHALIFA, SHEIKH SALMAN  
EBRAHIM MOHAMED ALI

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee traveled to Afghanistan after watching a television program encouraging Muslims to go and live there as true believers. He traveled on a special Royal Bahrain passport issued in December 2000.

2. The Crown Prince of Bahrain gave him a new passport to facilitate his travel all around the Gulf and Middle East.

3. He departed Bahrain on 4 January 2001 for Karachi and Islamabad, Pakistan where he stayed for eight days.

4. The detainee then traveled to Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia where he stayed for seven weeks at the Concord Hotel from 14 January 2001 to 6 March 2001.

5. The Concord Hotel is a known al Qaida meeting place.

6. The detainee traveled to Cairo, Egypt and stayed at the Cairo Intercontinental Hotel from 7 March 2001 to 27 May 2001. His father wired him \$5,000 USD.

7. On 28 May 2001, the detainee traveled from Cairo to Islamabad and he went to the Taliban Embassy. He gave a Taliban official \$500 USD in \$100 dollar bills.

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL KHALIFA, SHEIKH SALMAN EBRAHIM MOHAMED ALI**

8. On 29 May 2001, he and his guide Muhammad Rusal left Islamabad for Quetta, Pakistan and went to a Taliban guesthouse.

9. On 30 May 2001, both men left Quetta, Pakistan for Qandahar, Afghanistan and stayed at a Taliban guesthouse. They met a man named Muhammad Yu'qub who continued traveling with the detainee while Rusal departed.

10. The two men continued onto Qandahar, Afghanistan and stayed in a Taliban guesthouse before departing for Kabul, Afghanistan. The detainee purchased a \$150 USD AK-47 rifle for protection.

11. The detainee was captured by Pakistan Army forces in the village of Chaman next to the Pakistan/Afghanistan border.

12. The detainee arrived in Pakistan with around \$7,000 USD. He gave \$5,000 USD to a man in the Taliban embassy in Pakistan.

### b. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee has admitted to a past association with Al-Gama'at Al-Islamiya.

2. The Al-Gama'at Al-Islamiya is Egypt's largest militant group. The Egyptian Government believes that Iran, Bin Ladin, and Afghan militant groups support the organization. It also may obtain some funding through various Islamic nongovernmental organizations.

3. Muhammad Yu'qub met and traveled with the detainee when his previous guide departed.

4. Mohamed Yacoub is a native Afghan Taliban fighter who acted as a guide for foreign fighters.

5. The detainee says he spent about five months in Kabul, Afghanistan studying Islam under Abu Al-Walid. He stayed at Al-Walid's house in the Wazir Akbar Khan District.

6. Abu Waleed managed the house that Foreign Taliban fighters often used as a rest and transit point as they moved to and from unidentified front lines.

7. Abu Waleed was well known in Kabul as a teacher of Islam as well as a fighter who participated in the jihad against the Russians.

8. Abu Waleed has been on the front lines near Bagram. He has asked the fighters to be steadfast and has taken Arab fighters to the front lines and left them there.

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL KHALIFA, SHEIKH SALMAN EBRAHIM MOHAMED ALI**

9. On a document that lists the names of al Qaida martyrs who were assigned to various positions and units, Abu Al-Waleed is listed as part of the explosives team.

10. Other reporting states that an al Qaida operative with the same name as Al-Walid was a commander of the Dar Wanta Training Camp and a group commander for Usama Bin Laden.

11. The detainee is associated with Abu Hafz Al-Mauritani, leader of the Jamaat Lughat Al-Arabiya, a school run by the Taliban near Kandahar, Afghanistan.

12. The detainee was given a place to stay by the Taliban leader of Khowst, Afghanistan, Jalaluddeen Haggani. Haggani gave all Arabs fleeing the fighting a place to stay.

13. The detainee has been identified as being related to an admitted jihadist who went to Afghanistan to become a martyr.

### c. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee's passport raises doubt as to its authenticity. The seal on the picture and the identification page may not exactly match.

2. It was noted that an unidentified member of the Bahrain Royal Family was one of the foreign fighters that transitioned through the transit house.

3. At least one of the foreign fighters paid \$5,000 USD to have unlimited use of the transit house and access to the front line.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee claims to bear no grudge against the United States or its Allies, and doesn't want his situation to negatively impact the relationship between Bahrain and the United States.

b. The detainee says he never heard anything derogatory about the United States at political meetings he attended.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

26 September 2005

TO: AL HAMIRI, MOHAMMED ABDULLAH

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL HAMIRI, MOHAMMED  
ABDULLAH

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. Circa August 2001, the detainee traveled to Kandahar via Pakistan and stayed there for one month.

2. The detainee went to Kabul and stayed for about two months in the home of a person the detainee felt may have been associated with the Taliban.

b. Training

The detainee participated in military training at the al Farouq camp in Kandahar, Afghanistan, at some time between 26 July and 18 September 2001.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee was identified as being at the Nebras guesthouse, where he spoke with Usama Bin Laden.

2. The detainee found a group of Arab fighters to accompany as he attempted to escape and cross the border into Pakistan.

d. Other Relevant Data

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## UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL HAMIRI, MOHAMMED ABDULLAH**

1. A wealthy British resident from Yemen named Mussab escorted and fully funded the detainee's trip to Afghanistan and offered to fund his medical treatment in a Pakistan hospital.

2. The detainee never visited a hospital during his visit to Islamabad, Pakistan and could not provide details on locations visited.

3. The Pakistani Police captured the detainee at the border on or about 16 December 2001. United States forces took custody of the detainee on 4 January 2002.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on September 11th and having knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States interests.

b. The detainee denied knowledge of Mussab's affiliation with any organizations.

c. The detainee claims he left Yemen for Pakistan for medical treatment and was tricked by Mussab into going into Afghanistan where he did nothing for six months.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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**Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba**

17 May 2005

**From:** Presiding Officer  
**To:** BIN SALEM, MUHAMMAD SAID  
**Via:** Assisting Military Officer  
**SUBJECT:** UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF BIN SALEM, MUHAMMAD SAID

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state or to a third state; (2) transfer you to your home state, or a third state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state, or the third state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
  - a. Commitment
    1. After talking with another Yemeni about how it is the duty of every Muslim to go for Jihad, the detainee traveled to Afghanistan.
    2. The detainee traveled from Yemen to Afghanistan in July 2001.
    3. The detainee retreated from Bagram, Afghanistan to Pakistan where he was captured by Pakistani forces in December 2001.
  - b. Training

The detainee received training in the use of the Kalishnikov rifle, the rocket propelled grenade (RPG) and the PK rifle at al Farouq training camp near Kandahar, Afghanistan.
  - c. Connection / Association

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## UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF BIN SALEM, MUHAMMAD SAID

The detainee supported al Qaida and Taliban forces by serving as a cook at a rest and relaxation facility for frontline troops at Bagram, Afghanistan.

d. Intent

The detainee stated that he would fight in a Jihad if he believed in the cause.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee stated that camp Farouq cadre and trainees were not Taliban or al-Qaida, but were just a group of regular people.

b. The detainee denied having advance knowledge of the September 11 attacks on the United States. He also denied knowledge of future attacks on the United States or its interests.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

11 October 2005

TO: BASARDAH, YASIM MUHAMMED

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF BASARDAH, YASIM MUHAMMED

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee answered a fatwa issued by Sheikh Hamud ((Al Uqqla)) and traveled to Afghanistan for the Jihad.

2. The detainee served on the front lines at Toloqan where he was injured.

3. The detainee stayed at the Nebras Arab Guesthouse which was used by fighters headed to training at Al Farouq, , and by Usama Bin Laden.

4. The detainee was recruited by Jamat Tabligh, an extremist religious group that recruits young and often troubled men for Jihad in Afghanistan.

5. The detainee attended meetings sponsored by Jamat Tabligh for two months.

6. The detainee has a history of drug use.

7. The detainee traveled from Yemen, to the United Arab Emirates, through Pakistan and on to Afghanistan.

b. Training

1. The detainee attended the al Qaed- run Al Farouq training camp in Afghanistan.

c. Connections/Associations

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF BASARDAH, YASIM MUHAMMED**

1. The detainee received \$100 USD from the son of a senior al Qaeda operative who came to visit all the Arabs in the prison near Parachinarin.

2. The detainee met and listened to Usama Bin Laden speak words of encouragement and enthusiasm to the fighters at the Nebras Guesthouse.

#### d. Intent

1. The detainee attended the Institute of Islamic Studies in Kandahar which supported the fatawa issued by Sheikh Abu Hamoud Al Aqla that called for the Brothers to fight in Afghanistan against General Masoud and the Northern Alliance.

2. While in the prison near Parachinarin, the detainee conspired to lie about fighting in Afghanistan and to develop a cover story about teaching the Koran, teaching orphans, finding a wife, and helping the poor.

#### e. Detainee Actions and Statements

1. After two weeks of recovery at a guesthouse, the detainee went to Kabul for further treatment of his injury, and then returned to the front lines at Taloqan.

2. The detainee obeyed the order from Usama Bin Laden that all Arab fighters should go to Tora Bora.

#### f. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee is cooperative and states that he is being honest to his interviewers because he realizes that only by being truthful can he hope to go home.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee states that he surrendered to the Pakistani Army after crossing over the border.

b. The detainee states that he had no knowledge of plans to kill General Massoud of the Northern Alliance just before the 9/11 attacks.

c. The detainee states he had no prior knowledge of plans to attack the USS Cole, New York City on 9/11, or of any current or future plans for attack on the United States.

d. If released, the detainee states that he would return to his wife in Yemen and would not fight Jihad because he has already fulfilled his one time obligation.

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF BASARDAH, YASIM MUHAMMED**

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

12 July 2005

TO: AL ANSARI, FARIS MUSLIM

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL ANSARI, FARIS MUSLIM

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

The detainee fought in Afghanistan periodically since the mid-1990s. He was arrested by Turkish authorities on an unknown date while trying to cross into Turkey on his way to fight in Chechnya, was turned over to Saudi officials, and eventually made his way back to Afghanistan to fight.

b. Training

The detainee was a heavy weapons specialist who attended training at Khalden camp in 1995.

c. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee carried the Kalashnikov rifle and the RPG-7 and fired the weapons when attacked by Afghani soldiers.
2. The detainee served as a helper at various guesthouses in Afghanistan and operated an anti-aircraft gun in Tora Bora.
3. Regarding the money found in his possession upon capture, the detainee related he received 100 US Dollars from his father and 500 Saudi Riyals from a neighbor traveling with him.
4. The detainee denied ever being in the Tora Bora Mountains.

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# UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL ANSARI, FARIS MUSLIM**

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on September 11th, and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

**UNCLASSIFIED**

# UNCLASSIFIED

**Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba**

25 May 2005

To: HATIM, SAID MUHAMMED SALIH

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF HATIM, SAID MUHAMMED SALIH

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee stated he was familiar with the Jama'at Tabligh Organization, having met some members while he was in Yemen. The detainee did not have a high opinion of JT.

2. Jama'at Al-Tabligh is a Pakistani based Islamic missionary organization used as a cover to mask travel and activities of terrorists, including members of al Qaida.

3. The detainee stated he became interested in Russia's war in Chechnya because he witnessed the "oppression" on the television. He decided to travel there to fight Jihad alongside his Muslim brothers.

4. The detainee took a Yemeni Airways flight from Sa'naa, Yemen, to Karachi, Pakistan. He traveled from Karachi, Pakistan, to Quetta, Pakistan, by bus and then to Buldak, Afghanistan, by car (taxi).

5. The detainee admitted to being part of Said Central Station, which he described as a group of fifteen Arabs positioned on the Kabul line.

6. The detainee went to work for Wafa and identified the following Wafa employees: Abu Mu'az Al-Kuwaiti (known Wafa personality whose true name is Adil Al-Zamil), Abu Dujana and Abu Abd Al-Ilah. He remained at Wafa until Wafa's offices were bombed.

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## UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF HATIM, SAID MUHAMMED SALIH**

7. According to a foreign government service, as of early August 2002, the nongovernmental organization (NGO) "Wafa" (officially named Al Wafa Al Igatha Al Islamia) (Wafa Humanitarian Organization) headquartered in Saudi Arabia was believed to have had connections to Usama Bin Ladin and Afghan Mujahidin.

### b. Training

1. The detainee received military training while serving in the Yemeni National Service (National Guard) at the Elem Military Camp as a military policeman from 1994-1995.

2. The detainee received training at al Farouq. He arrived by bus with six others and surrendered his passport and money to a man at the camp. He stayed at the camp for approximately three weeks, but did not realize it was an al Qaida camp until close to the end of his time.

3. Detainee heard rumors that Usama Bin Laden may be visiting the camp at Al Farouq and considered it a "red flag" for him to leave the camp.

### c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee stayed at the "Taliban House" in Quetta for approximately 1-2 days. The detainee recalled this was a special place for students, but received no briefings about Jihad and did not see any weapons at the house.

2. The detainee stayed at Haji-Habash Arab house for approximately two days while in Kandahar.

3. The Daftare Taliban office in Quetta, Pakistan recommends the Hagi Habash house to travelers in Kandahar, Afghanistan.

4. From June or July 2001 to early November 2001, the detainee mentioned that he stayed at the Hamza al Gatee guesthouse in the Wazir Akbar Khan area of Kabul.

5. The detainee stated he got money from anonymous friends. He would not elaborate where the money came from; he simply stated that he would find money on his bed from time to time.

6. The detainee's name and information concerning his passport were on a list of names recovered from safehouse raids associated with suspected al Qaida in Karachi, Pakistan.

7. The detainee's name and contents of his "trust" account were found on different files recovered from various computer media seized during raids against al Qaida associated safehouses in Rawalpindi and Karachi, Pakistan.

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF HATIM, SAID MUHAMMED SALIH**

8. The detainee's story has morphed/evolved in the past two years, which consequently casts a shadow on detainee's truthfulness.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee said he stayed at the Said Central Station approximately three weeks playing soccer, reading and riding horses. He stressed that he did not deliver food to the front lines.

b. The detainee said that he was not given any responsibility while he was in Kabul. When asked how he could be evaluated if he was given no responsibility, he had no answer. In addition, he had no answer to why he would be paid for doing nothing.

c. When discussing religion, detainee expresses liberal views saying that each person must decide for themselves which path to take.

d. The detainee admitted to not approving of the way the US handles business regarding Israel. He also stated after this ordeal he looks at Americans in a different light because Americans use justice and have diversity when it comes to ethnicities working for the government.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

1 September 2005

TO: ABDULAYEV, OMAR HAMZAYAVICH

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ABDULAYEV, OMAR HAMZAYAVICH

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee was captured carrying handwritten notebooks that included material on chemical and conventional weapons.

2. One of the detainee's notebooks that he was captured with has extensive drawings and references to chemistry, explosives, and poisons.

3. One of the notebooks contained names of mujahedin fighters with weapon serial numbers corresponding to the names. Lists of amounts of food supplies were recorded next to the numbers of fighters.

4. One page in the notebooks seized from the detainee recorded the transfer of eight Kalashnikovs, ten grenades, clothing, canteens and 850 rounds of ammunition.

5. The journals in the detainee's possession had training topics that included:

- How to prepare a terrorist cell using counterintelligence techniques
- How to meet clandestinely with another person and communicate securely using radios and telephones
- How to put a Special Group (apparently saboteurs or fighters) in the rear area of the enemy
- How to travel to an unknown area and blend in to the local population
- How to sabotage electrical and water systems
- Organizing a clandestine signal system and codes
- Applying good personal and operational security practices

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ABDULAYEV, OMAR HAMZAYAVICH**

- Assessing the enemy's weapons, strength, quality of troops, and intelligence capability
- How to interrogate people and conduct an investigation
- How to poison a village water system and blow up petroleum tanks
- A table showing a code system for placing explosive, using colors and shapes for standardizing practices

### b. Training

1. The detainee was a student at a paramilitary or terrorist training camp in Afghanistan or Pakistan. It appears likely that he was being prepared to participate in a terrorist cell on behalf of an Islamic extremist group, possibly the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU).

2. The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) is a known foreign terrorist organization, whose primary goal is to overthrow the Uzbekistani president. IMU's political and ideological leader is Tohir Yoldashev is working to rebuild the organization and appears to have widened the IMU's targets to include all those he perceives as fighting Islam. In Operation Enduring Freedom, the counterterrorism coalition has captured, killed, and dispersed many of the IMU's militants who were fighting with the Taliban in Afghanistan. IMU's military leader Juma Namangani was killed during an air strike in Afghanistan in November 2001.

### c. Intent

The detainee stated he did not understand the technical information contained in the manuals but kept them because of his growing interest in military organizations.

### d. Other Relevant Data

The detainee was found to have sharpened the handle of his toothbrush into a shank while at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

- a. The detainee denied that he obtained books containing information on how to build bombs for any reason other than curiosity and wanting to be a soldier someday.
- b. The detainee further related he had nothing against America.
- c. The detainee claims a friend gave him the books and manuals he was captured with.
- d. The detainee denied being associated with or being a member of the Taliban or al Qaida.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ABDULAYEV, OMAR HAMZAYAVICH**

Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

25 May 2005

To: HINTIF, FADIL HUSAYN SALIH

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF HINTIF, FADIL HUSAYN SALIH

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. *Commitment*

1. The detainee heard of various fatwas and decided to go to Afghanistan for Jihad.
2. Detainee likes the Taliban and feels that they were a good government.
3. The detainee arrived in Afghanistan from Yemen via Pakistan.

4. Prior to crossing the border into Pakistan, the detainee gave his Saudi Riyals and Yemeni passport to his Koran instructor in order to ensure the detainee could not be identified as an Arab. He stopped at an Afghan village that had been harboring other Arabs crossing the border before he crossed into Pakistan. The Detainee crossed the border into Pakistan at night.

5. The detainee was captured near the border of Pakistan while crossing from Afghanistan.

b. *Training*

1. The detainee found out about his Koran instructor while attending a gathering with his cousins. His experiences with the instructor got him interested in going to Afghanistan.

2. In Afghanistan, the detainee's Koran instructor called the detainee by both his name and nickname.

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### SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF HINTIF, FADIL HUSAYN SALIH

3. The detainee's nickname "MANSOUR" appears on a roster for the al Qaida Tactics Course Number One at Al Farouq.

4. The detainee is proficient with an AK-47.

#### c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee stayed at several Taliban safe houses.

2. The detainee's name appears on a list recovered from an al Qaida safe house.

3. The name of the detainee's travel associate appears on a list of al Qaida members that was discovered on a computer hard drive seized during raids on al Qaida safehouses in Pakistan.

4. The detainee's Koran instructor was listed to attend the Tactics Course Number Two on an al Qaida document.

5. The detainee's Koran instructor was identified as a position leader at Tora Bora.

6. The detainee claims to have worked as an assistant on a medical team distributing medicines for the Taliban.

7. The detainee stayed at an Arab house in Kandahar, Afghanistan, operated by Abu Khulud.

8. Kazimi stated there were two people in charge of the Kandahar guesthouse: Abu Yassir Al Jazairi and Abu Kholud Al Yemini, both Al Qaida.

#### d. Intent

The detainee was captured while in possession of a Casio watch model that has been used in bombings linked to al Qaida and radical Islamic terrorist groups with improvised explosive devices.

#### e. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee was asked to go to Syria by his cousin. The detainee traveled from Damascus, Syria to Iran with a man he had just met and eventually attended the Maqan Imam Al Rida Mosque.

2. The detainee could not explain why he, as a Sunni Muslim, would go on a Shia religious pilgrimage.

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### **SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF HINTIF, FADIL HUSAYN SALIH**

3. The detainee claims that there are no detainees in Guantanamo that he knew prior to his arrest by Pakistani authorities. He became agitated by the implication that other detainees knew who he was; he inquired which detainees stated that they knew him.

4. The detainee claims to be a Red Crescent volunteer, but cannot provide much information on city layout or known associates.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. Detainee denied suggestions that his motivation could have stemmed from a desire to follow in the path of many other Arab Mujahadeen who had fought and trained in Afghanistan. Detainee's interest in Afghanistan was strictly humanitarian.

b. He denied carrying a weapon, receiving any kind of training while in Afghanistan, or participating in any armed conflicts.

c. The detainee stated that he learned to shoot a rifle at the age of twelve or thirteen. It is natural for families to keep firearms in Yemen due to the tribal conflicts that are common. The detainee claims that neither he nor his family ever participated directly in tribal combat.

d. The detainee denied having any prior knowledge of the September 11th attacks or any future attacks against the United States and its interests. The detainee stated he has not heard of any plans of escape or any plans of attacks on the Military Police at Camp X-ray. He has never traveled to the United States and has no friends, relatives or contacts in the United States. The detainee denied ever having met or seen Usama bin Laden during any of his travels to and through Afghanistan.

e. The detainee views the United States as a technologically advanced country. He claims that the United States is known for coming to the assistance of countries in trouble. He claims that his opinion of the United States was good and that nothing happened to change his opinion about the United States up until the time he left for Afghanistan.

f. From what he sees in the pictures, the detainee believes the Americans are trying to help in Afghanistan and he thinks this is good because there has been a lot of fighting there.

g. When asked his opinion of al Qaida, he stated he didn't know much about them, but he does know that they have a problem with the United States. However, he would not blindly follow a fatwa issued by them because he thinks some people use religion to their benefit.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF HINTIF, FADIL HUSAYN SALIH**

continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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**000004**

# UNCLASSIFIED

**Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba**

26 September 2005

**TO: AL DOSARI, JUMA MOHAMMED ABDUL LATIF**

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF  
AL DOSARI, JUMA MOHAMMED ABDUL LATIF**

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. In October 2001, the detainee says he traveled to Afghanistan to inspect seven mosques in Kabul, Afghanistan. He says he was asked to go to Afghanistan by his local Iman, in Deman, Saudi Arabia, named Muhammad Agelan.

2. The detainee stated Agelan provided him \$3,000 United States Dollars and instructed him to meet a man named Muhammad Gul in Meshed, Iran. The detainee first traveled to Bahrain where he obtained a Bahraini passport and subsequently traveled to Meshed, Iran.

3. Once in Meshed, Iran, the detainee purchased a room at the Atlas Hotel. The next morning, Gul arrived at the Atlas Hotel and they both traveled, via taxi, into Afghanistan.

4. The detainee and Gul crossed the border into Afghanistan near the city of Herat, Afghanistan and continued on to Kabul, Afghanistan. Once in Kabul, they both stayed at a house owned by Gul.

5. The detainee and Gul stayed in Kabul for approximately three weeks before traveling to another house, owned by Gul, in Jalalabad, Afghanistan.

6. After leaving Jalalabad, the detainee walked to the Pakistani border where he was arrested and detained by the Pakistani authorities. He did not have his passport in his possession when he was taken into custody, because he said Gul had taken his passport while they were in Jalalabad.

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# UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL DOSARI, JUMA MOHAMMED ABDUL LATIF**

7. The detainee stated that when he arrived in Afghanistan he gave Gul his passport, over 20,000 United States Dollars and his notebook.

8. The detainee was witnessed as the cook in Tora Bora.

9. The detainee said that he was in Bosnia during the war with Serbia and spent time in Saudi prisons. He said that he was imprisoned for being a member of Al Motoaien, a.k.a. Al Mujahadeen, and for participating in the Cole bombing.

10. Al Motoaien is a network in Saudi Arabia involved in document forgery, weapons and poisons smuggling.

## b. Training

1. The detainee also traveled from Islamabad to Peshawar, Pakistan and stayed in an Arab guesthouse called Beit Al-Ansar. The leader of this house was an ex-Mujahid from Saudi Arabia. While at the house the detainee was told about two military camps for training in Afghanistan.

2. The detainee attended the Al-Siddeek camp. The Al-Siddeek camp was located near Khowst, Afghanistan and the detainee received physical exercise and training on the Kalashnikov.

## c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee stated that Sheik Mohammed Al-Shiha from Dammam, Saudi Arabia offered to pay his rent and provided him with 7,000 to 10,000 Saudi Riyals if he would agree to journey to Bosnia to fight. He did so in 1995.

2. An al Qaida operative said that Al-Shiha might have supported the Wafa Al-Igatha Al-Islamia, a.k.a., Wafa Organization, during the Chechnyan conflict. He also stated that Al-Shiha was a supporter of the Mujahidin.

3. The detainee traveled to Mecca and met a man named Abu Abass Al-Emiraitii.

4. The detainee was invited to Chechnya to fight, but he told Abu Abass he had no money for the trip so Abu Abass gave him with 3,000 to 4,000 Saudi Riyals in addition to travel expenses.

5. The detainee traveled to Bahrain, went to the United States embassy and received a five-year tourism visa. His father gave him 19,000 Saudi Riyals for his trip to the United States and he flew from Bahrain to Istanbul, Turkey to Chicago, Illinois to Indianapolis, Indiana and was picked up at the airport and taken to Terre Haute, Indiana. The detainee was there for approximately two months before returning to Saudi Arabia to visit his sick father. After eight months in Saudi Arabia, the detainee returned to the United States and made side trips to Michigan and Buffalo, New York.

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF  
AL DOSARI, JUMA MOHAMMED ABDUL LATIF**

6. The detainee said that he traveled to Lackawana, New York from Indiana after speaking with a man at a local area mosque.

7. The detainee worked as an imam at the Buffalo area mosque.

8. The detainee stated that he was shocked to learn that his acquaintance is involved with al Qaida or any jihadist activity. He also said that it seemed illogical that this acquaintance and Jamaat Tabligh could be so involved.

**d. Other Relevant Data**

1. The detainee decided to return to Saudi Arabia so he flew to Bahrain and was arrested by Saudi Intelligence under suspicion stemming from the Khobar Towers bombing and his foreign travel. The Saudi government held him for approximately three months, but his passport was revoked for one and a half years.

2. The detainee spent time in prison in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. He was eventually released and returned to Dammam, but his passport was revoked for five years.

3. The detainee's name is found listed as number 49 on a computer media listing of mujahideen that was seized during safe house raids against al Qaida associated safe houses. The list identifies each individual's trust account and the detainee is noted as having a passport and identification card.

4. A United States psychologist obtained a copy of a translated suicide letter drafted by the detainee that said, "All that was going to ruin my reputation abroad, and that my family would learn that their son is a terrorist and has taken innocent lives."

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee denied ever participating in any armed conflict while in Afghanistan.

b. The detainee says that he is not a radical fundamentalist Muslim and claimed he has never taken part in or encouraged anti-American activities.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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**Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba**

18 May 2005

**From:** Presiding Officer  
**To:** AL WAFI, ABDULLAH ABD AL MUN  
**Via:** Assisting Military Officer  
**SUBJECT:** UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL WAFI, ABDULLAH ABD AL MUN

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state or to a third state; (2) transfer you to your home state or a third state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state or the third state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
  - a. Commitment
    1. Detainee traveled from Saudi Arabia to Afghanistan a few weeks after the 11 Sep 01 attacks to work with Al-Wafa. Executive Order 13224 designates al Wafa as a global terrorist entity.
    2. The detainee was well known by Clerics and Imams in Saudi Arabia as a recruiter and fundraiser for jihad.
    3. The detainee fled Tora Bora for Pakistan in late November 2001 where he was captured and imprisoned.
  - b. Training
    1. The detainee attended a terrorist training camp where he received training in small arms and rocket propelled grenades (RPGs).
    2. Senior al Qaida members managed the Khaldan training camp. The training program at Khaldan was six months long and included instruction in light weapons, heavy weapons,

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF  
AL WAFI, ABDULLAH ABD AL MUIN**

explosives, topography and tactics.

**c. Connections / Associations**

1. The detainee was a member of the Mecca Group. The Mecca Group dined with Usama Bin Laden in Tora Bora, Afghanistan.

2. The detainee's passport indicates he may have had contact with senior al Qaida officials. Passports with similar characteristics have been found on senior members of al Qaida, the head of al Wafa in Afghanistan, at least two of the hijackers involved with the September 11, 2001 attacks, and suspects implicated in the 1993 World Trade Center attack and East Africa bombings.

3. Several of the 911 terrorists stayed at the detainee's house during Haj (possibly 1999). The detainee claimed that he did not know of their plans while they were at his house, but was proud they stayed with him and felt they were martyrs in heaven.

**d. Other Relevant Data**

1. The detainee's name, country of origin, and phone number were found on a hard drive associated with a senior al Qaida lieutenant.

2. The detainee's name and country of origin were part of a list of names found on a hard drive recovered from a suspected al Qaida safe house in Islamabad, Pakistan.

3. The detainee's name, country of origin, and family phone number were found on a list of mujahadin fighters captured in Pakistan.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee stated he traveled from Saudi Arabia to Afghanistan in order to provide humanitarian aid to the poor. He did not go to fight a Jihad, or to provide assistance to the Taliban or al Qaida groups. The detainee claimed he had no idea a war was being fought in Afghanistan. The detainee insists that he was not recruited, nor was he advised to go to Afghanistan. He paid all of his own expenses and made all his own arrangements.

b. The detainee said that he had never heard of al Wafa prior to arriving in Afghanistan, nor did he know the group was affiliated with any terrorist organization, with the Taliban, or al Qaida.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against

**UNCLASSIFIED**

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF  
AL WAFI, ABDULLAH ABD AL MUIN**

continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

8 August 2005

TO: SULTAN, ASHRAF SALIM ABD AL SALAM

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF  
SULTAN, ASHRAF SALIM ABD AL SALAM

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. An unidentified family member provided detainee with a passport and visa to leave the country legally.

2. The detainee's father provided him with \$500 USD.

3. The detainee traveled extensively throughout the Middle East to Afghanistan from 1994 to 2001.

4. The detainee received financial support from Muslims totaling approximately 7000 Saudi Riyals (\$1,868 USD).

5. After a short stay in Peshawar the detainee went to Islamabad, Pakistan, then to Jalalabad, Afghanistan.

b. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee has family members associated with the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group.

2. The Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) is designated by the Secretary of State as a terrorist organization, some of whose members are aligned with Usama bin Laden's al Qaida organization, or are active in the international mujahidin network.

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## UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SULTAN, ASHRAF SALIM ABD AL SALAM**

3. The detainee has associates in the Wafa Humanitarian Organization.

4. The Wafa Humanitarian Organization, Al-Wafa al-Igatha al-Islamia, is listed on DHS Terrorist Exclusion List, which facilitates the ability of the United States to exclude aliens associated with entities on the list from entering the United States, due to the entities' participation in terrorist activities.

5. The detainee has been identified by another detainee as being a former member of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group.

### c. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee's employment history consisted of being a self-employed merchant in Peshawar, Pakistan, selling diapers, honey and household goods.

2. The detainee was stopped by Saudi authorities to check his passport and documentation. His visa had expired and the detainee was arrested.

3. The detainee requested to be sent back to Syria rather than Libya due to fearing for his life and the well being of his family. He was sent back to Syria in July or August 1995, and remained until June or August 1996.

4. The detainee sent his wife, child, and wife's family to Pakistan, and he went to Jalalabad, Afghanistan after the United States bombing began in Kabul, Afghanistan in 2001.

5. Upon arrival to Pakistan, the detainee was arrested and taken to a temporary prison before being turned over to the American Forces.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee was looking for a place to finish his education and to build a life.

b. The detainee initially went to the United Nations in Pakistan for help.

c. The detainee was a teacher of Arabic, Islamic studies, and geography for children.

d. The detainee has been identified by another detainee by his true name, several aliases, and as not being a member of the LIFG.

e. The detainee denies having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on September 11th; including knowledge of rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF  
SULTAN, ASHRAF SALIM ABD AL SALAM**

f. The detainee claims to have no knowledge of the planning of internal uprisings at the Guantanamo Detention Facility.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

**UNCLASSIFIED**

# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

19 July 2005

TO: AL BADDAH, ABDUL AZIZ ABDUL RAHMAN ABDUL AZIZ

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF  
AL BADDAH, ABDUL AZIZ ABDUL RAHMAN ABDUL AZIZ

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee was identified as an individual who collected 4.5 million Saudi Riyals (\$1,199,876 USD) for al Wafa in Mecca, Saudi Arabia. The money was collected under the cover of al Haramayn, and the detainee's two cousins assisted him with the money collection.

2. Hasem al Balushi sent the money, which was collected by the detainee, to Pakistan through an unknown hawala. The detainee was with al Balushi on two or three occasions when al Balushi sent the money. Approximately 100,000 Saudi Riyals (\$26,664 USD) were sent on each occasion.

3. Ramadan Abdul Walid al-Balucci al-Sindi, a possible al Qaida financier and courier, withdrew the money from a bank in Pakistan and took it to al-Wafa in Kabul. Al-Balucci gave the money to Abdul Aziz al-Metrafi, and/or al-Somali.

4. Abu Mohammed al-Somali (FNU) and Abdullah Aziz al-Metrafi lived in Mecca, Saudi Arabia close to holy places (NFI). The detainee saw al-Somali with al-Metrafi before going to Afghanistan.

5. A man named al-Jarbi, who claimed he worked for a relief agency, urged the detainee to travel to Afghanistan and fulfill the charity obligation of Islam.

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## UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL BADDAH, ABDUL AZIZ ABDUL RAHMAN ABDUL AZIZ**

6. Al-Jarbi facilitated the travel to Afghanistan of the detainee and his two cousins. They left Saudi Arabia on October 12, 2001 and traveled through Damascus, Syria to Tehran, Iran. They crossed into Afghanistan from Zabul, Iran.

7. The detainee, his acquaintances, and fellow al-Wafa employees were guided from Iran to Afghanistan by an Iranian who routinely smuggled personnel across the border.

8. Once in Kabul, the detainee, his cousins and Al Jarbi, stayed at the Al Wafa office. They met Abdul-Aziz, the man in charge of the office. The detainee gave his passport and money to Abdul-Aziz for safekeeping.

9. Al-Matrafi used al-Wafa to provide employment opportunities and cover for individuals connected to the UBL network. Some of the cover jobs were based in Kabul.

10. While in Kabul, the detainee observed Sulayman Abu Ghaith, an engineering advisor to Metrafi and a spokesman for al-Qaida, Hammoud (FNU) and Metrafi plan the daily missions of al Wafa within the community.

11. Due to the U.S bombing of Kabul, Abdul-Aziz, the detainee, and his two cousins left Kabul and traveled to Logar, Afghanistan. They all stayed in Logar at an Al Wafa house for seven to eight days. They attempted to return to Kabul to retrieve their passports, but it had fallen to the Northern Alliance.

12. The detainee, his cousins, and Abdul Aziz traveled through Khost and Jalalabad, Afghanistan. They traveled on foot across the border into Pakistan, where according to the detainee, they turned themselves over to the police.

13. The detainee's and his cousins' names were identified as part of a group Taliban and al Qaida fighters who were captured at the border in Nangarhar Province by Pakistani forces. During the capture, one of the prisoners disarmed a guard and a breakout ensued. Ten prisoners and six Pakistani guards were killed.

### b. Training

1. Al-Matrafi also provided military training for newly arrived recruits in anticipation of the American attack. The training was conducted in al-Wafa's offices in Kabul, Afghanistan, and consisted of familiarization with light weapons such as the AK-47 and rocket propelled grenades.

2. The detainee observed Abdul-Aziz, as well as other Saudis and Afghans, carry rifles into and out of the Al Wafa office.

### c. Connections/Associations

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL BADDAH, ABDUL AZIZ ABDUL RAHMAN ABDUL AZIZ**

1. The detainee and his cousins were also listed in an Arabic-language document associated with the London based Islamic Observation Center. The document states "(h)ere are the names of the seventy-six Muslim brothers, including thirty-five Saudis, who were fighting with Taliban against the Northern Alliance".

2. The names of the detainee and both his cousins were found on a computer file, a chart in Arabic listing the names of captured mujahidin. The information was found on a hard drive, which was associated with Khalid Shaykh Muhammad

3. The detainee and his cousins were also listed in a computer file recovered from a suspected al Qaida safehouse in Islamabad, Pakistan, listing 78 associates incarcerated in Pakistan.

4. The names of the detainee and both his cousins were found on an Arabic-language computer file listing them as mujahidin who had come to Afghanistan in December 2001, but who had not completed their training and therefore were not ready to fight in the war.

#### d. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee said he was encouraged to go help the poor in Afghanistan by Wali Jaber, an employee at the detainee's father's furniture store. The detainee said he left Saudi Arabia in June 2001.

2. Fulfilling a religious obligation to help the poor, especially in connection with the Al Wafa charity, is a common cover story for detainees.

3. Al Wafa and Al-Harmain are Specially Designated Global Terrorist Entities as per Executive Order 13224.

4. The detainee stated that the \$100 USD bills he had in his possession at the time of his capture were brought with him to Afghanistan from Saudi Arabia.

5. The detainee hand carried the equivalent of \$25,000 USD to Afghanistan.

6. The detainee has traveled to Syria, United Arab Emirates and Turkey.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee stated that prior to arriving in Afghanistan, he had not heard of Al Wafa.

b. The detainee denied ever working for al Wafa. He stated he traveled to Afghanistan with his own money, which he distributed to Afghani refugees at their homes. The detainee said he did not carry a weapon.

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## UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL BADDAH, ABDUL AZIZ ABDUL RAHMAN ABDUL AZIZ**

c. The detainee stated that he and his two cousins worked as volunteers for Al Wafa, bringing items such as milk, sugar, rice and clothes to the people living in villages near Kabul.

d. The detainee denied visiting any military training camps in Afghanistan or receiving any military training. The detainee denied going to Afghanistan to participate in a Jihad against the Northern Alliance or the United States.

e. The detainee has heard of Usama Bin Laden and al Qaida and does not agree with their methods or radical ideology.

f. The detainee denied being present during a firefight that resulted in the death of 16 prisoners and a Pakistani guard.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

UNCLASSIFIED

# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

22 September 2005

TO: ABDALLAH MUHAMMAD SALIH AL GHANIMI

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ABDALLAH MUHAMMAD SALIH AL  
GHANIMI

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

The detainee has become uncommunicative during interrogations and recites the Koran rather than answers questions.

b. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee obtained promotional materials from al Wafa.
2. Al Wafa is a terrorist exclusion list designee.
3. The detainee's name was found on a list of probable al Qaida members incarcerated in Pakistan.
4. The detainee's name was found on a suspected al Qaida computer in Islamabad.
5. The detainee's name was on a list of men from whose safety deposit boxes money was taken and added to an al Qaida budget.
6. The detainee's name was on a list of al Qaida Mujahadeen fighters.

c. Intent

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## UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ABDALLAH MUHAMMAD SALIH AL GHANIMI**

The detainee was captured with a group of Mujahadeen when crossing the Pakistani border in December 2001.

d. Other Relevant Data

The detainee was identified by a foreign government service that identified his true name.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee claims that he did not answer any fatwas and was not persuaded by any religious leader to go to Afghanistan. He only wanted to perform charity work in the names of his brothers as repayment for the times they loaned him money.

b. The detainee claims to have traveled to Kabul simply to do something good before his upcoming marriage.

c. The detainee claims not to know the al Wafa organization is connected to al Qaida. The detainee did not work for the organization but only obtained promotional materials from it.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

27 September 2005

TO: MUHAMMAD HAMID AL QARANI

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MUHAMMAD HAMID AL QARANI

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. On approximately June 13, 2001, the detainee departed Medina, Saudi Arabia, where his family lived and traveled to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia and then to Karachi, Pakistan.

2. The detainee paid 500 Saudi Riyals for a fraudulent passport with a false date of birth. The name on the passport is Yousef Abkir Saleh. This passport was supposed to allow the detainee to stay in Pakistan for five to six months.

3. The detainee was seen in the al Ansar guesthouse in Kandahar, Afghanistan.

4. The detainee traveled with a large group of people from al Farouq to Kandahar, Afghanistan.

5. The detainee was given a forged document that indicated that he had finished training at al Farouq. This document enabled the detainee to accompany a group to Towr Khom.

6. The detainee was in Tora Bora for two and a half months. Prior to his capture there, the detainee created a cover story that he was a humanitarian relief worker.

7. The detainee was arrested with a specific model Casio watch that is given to graduates of al Farouq.

b. Training

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# UNCLASSIFIED

## SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MUHAMMAD HAMID AL QARANI

The detainee received only very basic training, mostly learning how to use the AK-47.

### c. Connections/Associations

1. After arriving in Pakistan, the detainee took a taxi to the nearest hotel and met two men who introduced themselves to the detainee after they heard him speaking Arabic in the lobby. The men's names were Mu'ath, from Pakistan, and al Habre, from Saudi Arabia. The detainee shared a room at the hotel with these two men.

2. The detainee's name was found on an Arabic-language computer file that listed contact points and telephone numbers for al Qaida Mujahadeen in Pakistan. According to the file, these Mujahadeen were among a group who had come to Afghanistan in December 2001 but who had not completed their training and therefore were not ready to fight in the war.

3. The detainee's name and phone number were found on a computer file named "asra.doc." The information on this file was associated with a senior al Qaida member.

4. On 20 July 2002, the detainee's name was identified on the Alneda Internet site as part of a group of Taliban and al Qaida fighters who were captured by Pakistani forces.

5. The detainee's name was on an e-mailed copy of a list of Arabs incarcerated in Pakistan.

6. The detainee's name and phone number were found on material in the pockets of two Saudi citizens detained by a foreign government service on 26 June 2001 at the Bahrain International Airport. The two Saudis admitted they were al Qaida trained and traveling on behalf of Usama bin Laden to carry out suicide missions in Saudi Arabia.

7. The detainee was identified as belonging to a London, United Kingdom cell led by Abu Qatada al Masri, circa 1998.

### d. Other Relevant Data

1. Approximately five months after arriving in Pakistan, the detainee lost his passport. The detainee said the passport and some money fell out of his pants pocket.

2. The detainee accused a foreign government service of electrically shocking him and he accused U.S. troops of beating him. The detainee was then shown a photograph of himself taken by American troops in Kandahar and asked to identify any bruises or evidence of beating. The detainee then admitted to lying about the beatings.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MUHAMMAD HAMID AL QARANI**

- a. The detainee denied attending any training camp, receiving any weapons training or receiving any other training.
  - b. The detainee stated that he never entered Afghanistan.
5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

**UNCLASSIFIED**



# UNCLASSIFIED

**Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba**

5 November 2005

**TO: AL NASIR, IBRAHIM MUHAMMED IBRAHIM**

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL NASIR, IBRAHIM MUHAMMED  
IBRAHIM**

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

**a. Commitment**

1. The detainee, his brother and his cousin met a man at the family's furniture store in Mecca, Saudi Arabia. After the detainee's cousin met this man several times, the detainee, his brother and his cousin decided to travel to Afghanistan.

2. In October 2001, the detainee traveled with his brother and their cousin to Kabul, Afghanistan through Iran.

3. The detainee, his brother, his cousin and another al Wafa member fled from Kabul, Afghanistan to Pakistan due to American bombing.

**b. Connections/Associations**

1. At the Kabul al Wafa office, the detainee met with a man who worked for al Wafa.

2. The detainee's recruiter worked for al Haramayne.

3. The same man the detainee met at the detainee's family's furniture store paid the detainee 2500-2700 Saudi Riyals for the detainee's trip to Afghanistan.

4. A senior al Wafa advisor identified the detainee as a former employee or associate of al Wafa and said the detainee came to the Kabul al Wafa office to visit the director in 2001.

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# UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL NASIR, IBRAHIM MUHAMMED IBRAHIM**

5. The detainee's name was found on a computer file listing contact points and telephone numbers for al Qaida Mujahidin in Pakistan.

6. The detainee was identified in a document listing people who fought with the Taliban against the Northern Alliance and were captured in Pakistan.

7. The detainee's name was found in a computer file recovered from a suspected al Qaida safehouse in Islamabad, Pakistan.

8. The detainee's name was found on a computer file listing the names of captured Mujahidin.

9. The detainee's name was found on an Internet site containing information regarding the capture of Taliban and al Qaida fighters.

10. The detainee's name was found on a letter recovered along with materials linked to al Qaida.

## c. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee turned himself in to Pakistani police in December 2001.

2. The detainee was turned over to U.S. custody in Kohar, Pakistan on 3 January 2002 and flown to Kandahar, Afghanistan.

3. The detainee helped transport a large amount of money for al Haramayne, which was then diverted to al Wafa in Pakistan and Afghanistan.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001, and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.

b. The detainee stated he had no responsibilities while he stayed in Kabul other than to assist in distributing sugar and milk to the poor and to read the Koran.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

UNCLASSIFIED

# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

23 August 2005

TO: MAHNUT, BAHTIYAR

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MAHNUT, BAHTIYAR

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee stayed in a Uighur guesthouse in Jalalabad, Afghanistan.

2. The detainee, along with a group of Uighurs and Arabs, fled Afghanistan when the United States began bombing the Tora Bora Mountain area.

b. Training

The detainee received military training on the Kalishnikov rifle at a Uighur training camp in the Tora Bora Mountains of Afghanistan.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee attended a camp run by the Eastern Turkestan Organization (ETO).

2. Hassan Mashum, the leader of the Eastern Turkistan Islamic Party, visited the detainee's training camp in Afghanistan while the detainee was there. While at the camp, Mashum led prayer and gave a speech about the condition of the Uighurs in China and the lack of funding at the training camp.

3. Maksud aligned his organization with Usama Bin Laden (UBL) and it is now considered part of al Qaida. Since 2000, its core has been located at an al Qaida camp near Tora Bora. The fighters, under the authority of UBL, are considered a combat sub-unit of the Taliban.

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## UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MAHNUT, BAHTIYAR**

4. The Secretary of State has designated The Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO). ETIM is a small Islamic extremist group based in China's western Xinjiang Province. ETIM is one of the most militant of the ethnic Uighur separatist groups pursuing an independent "Eastern Turkistan." ETIM is suspected of having received training and financial assistance from al Qaida.

5. ETIM reportedly has financial support and direction from Usama Bin Laden, recruiting within Eastern China and shipping recruits to training camps in Afghanistan. These recruits then return to China to conduct terrorist activities and extend their influence. Training includes religious extremist theory, terrorism, explosives, and assassination. Some training camps also include the manufacturing of weapons, ammunitions, and explosive devices.

### d. Other Relevant Data

1. Pakistani authorities apprehended the detainee in late December 2001. At that time, he identified himself as an Afghan named Sadir Sabit, born in 1975 in Mazar-e Sharif. He was detained with a Kalishnikov and 1,000 Pakistani rupees. He was serving with the Taliban in Mazar-e Sharif until forced out by the Northern Alliance. He fled to Kabul, then Jalalabad, then Tora Bora, and finally Pakistan.

2. The detainee is wanted by the Chinese police.

3. The detainee has requested political asylum in the United States, and is certain that if returned to China, or any country influenced by China, he will be tortured and most likely executed.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee stated he never fired a weapon at any person or aircraft while at the Tora Bora training camp.

b. According to the detainee, the Uighurs consider themselves an Ally of the United States, and would not associate with terrorist organizations, especially those that target the United States.

c. The detainee asserted that ETO has no financial, logistical, operational, or philosophical connection to al Qaida, the Taliban, or any other Muslim extremist group.

d. The detainee stated that he had never heard of al Qaida until he heard of it from the Americans.

e. The detainee has no plans to return to Afghanistan or China to reunite with groups involved in fighting or to commit terrorist acts. He added that he has never fought against the United States and has no plans to fight against the United States in the future.

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## **UNCLASSIFIED**

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MAHNUT, BAHTIYAR**

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

**UNCLASSIFIED**

# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

31 August 2005

TO: MAMUT, ABDUL HELIL

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MAMUT, ABDUL HELIL

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

In 1998, the detainee traveled to Lahore, Pakistan, to study. After his third year, the detainee realized that schooling was not going to help him help his people fight the oppression back in China. He met with a Uighur fighter to talk about training in Afghanistan. In June 2001, he left Pakistan to attend weapons training in Afghanistan.

b. Training

1. The detainee traveled to Jalalabad, Afghanistan, to a Uighur house, and then to a training camp in the Tora Bora mountains. The detainee received training on the Kalishnakov.
2. The detainee was at the camp until it was bombed in October 2001.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) operated a training camp in Tora Bora, Afghanistan, and a guesthouse in Jalalabad, Afghanistan.
2. The Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM), a small Islamic extremist group based in China's western Xinjiang Province, is one of the most militant of the ethnic Uighur separatist groups pursuing an independent Eastern Turkistan, which would include Turkey, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Xinjiang. ETIM and other overlapping militant Uighur groups are linked to the international mujahidin movement beginning with the

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## UNCLASSIFIED

### **SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MAMUT, ABDUL HELIL**

participation of ethnic Uighur mujahidin in the Soviet and Afghan war and to a limited degree al Qaida

3. The ETIM also garnered support from the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU).

4. The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) is a coalition of Islamic militants from Uzbekistan and other Central Asian states opposed to Uzbekistani President Islom Karimov's secular regime. Although the IMU's primary goal remains to overthrow Karimov and establish an Islamic state in Uzbekistan, IMU political and ideological leader Tohir Yoldashev is working to rebuild the organization and appears to have widened the IMU's targets to include all those he perceives as fighting Islam. The IMU generally has been unable to operate in Uzbekistan and thus has been more active in Kyrgystan and Tajikistan.

#### d. Detainee Actions and Statements

1. When the camp was bombed, everyone fled to the mountains to take refuge. They saw a group of Arabs walking by and they followed the Arabs who were escaping to Pakistan.

2. The detainee and the other Uighurs walked for two days to a village in Pakistan where they were captured by Pakistani police.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee stated he has never fought or engaged the United States Forces and stated he never had any intention of fighting for the Taliban. The detainee stated his sole purpose was to receive training to prepare him for the time where the Uighur people would fight the Chinese for their independence.

b. The Uighurs believe that the United States is the only country attempting to help the Uighur's cause under Chinese oppression. The detainee stated that the Uighurs stand ready to support the United States in any future conflict the United States may have with China.

c. The detainee claims he never saw the Taliban on the mountain, nor did he see any Arabs, until after the camp was bombed and they retreated to the mountains.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

31 August 2005

TO: FEGHOUL, ABDULLI

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF FEGHOUL, ABDULLI

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee claims to have traveled to Afghanistan to escape the temptation to use drugs and live a more peaceful life than what he was experiencing in Germany.

2. In Germany the detainee met a man named Abu Umar and obtained a false passport from non-Algerian criminal contacts in Frankfurt, Germany. Umar then had a false Pakistani visa put in it.

3. Abu Umar persuaded the detainee that the best way to give up drugs was to emigrate to Afghanistan. He bought his own ticket for a flight from Frankfurt to Islamabad, Pakistan and he traveled with 6,000 DMS.

4. The detainee went to Afghanistan in the summer of 2000. A man named Muhammed directed him to an Algerian guesthouse where he stayed for two months with lots of other families.

b. Training

1. The detainee claims to have spent only 18 days at the Darunta training camp undergoing rudimentary Kalashnikov training. He claims to have gone there in April of 2001, where he learned to assemble, disassemble and fire the AK-47 rifle. He says he bought 700 rounds of ammunition at the camp.

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### SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF FEGHOUL, ABDULLI

2. The Derunta camp is the primary camp for al Qaida in Afghanistan. This is where training on assassinations and chemical weapons were taught.

3. The detainee underwent jihad or military training at the Khaldan camp in 2000. The Khaldan camp was used to train mujahideen and consisted of tunnels used to house soldiers and supplies. Students at the camp underwent small arms training.

#### c. Connections/Associations

1. While in the Algerian guest house the detainee met a man named Jaffar whom he believed was Algerian based on his accent, but claims he did not talk to him much.

2. Abu Jaffar was in charge of the "Algerians' House" in Darunta. The complex comprised training centers and chemical weapons laboratories near Jalalabad. Abu Jaffar and Abu Zubayda were in charge of al Qaida's foreign department.

3. The Taliban operated a series of transit houses to provide temporary accommodation for Arab jihad volunteers and for immigrants. One facility is located in Jalalabad and operated by two men, one of who is Jaafir Al-Jazaher. Volunteers would stay at the house for one or two days before traveling to training sites or the Taliban front.

4. The detainee was seen often in the Taliban transit house.

5. A senior al Qaida detainee recognized the detainee as Abu Ali. Abu Ali was staying in a large compound in Jalalabad that was known for intelligence work and housing mujahadin.

6. Abu Ali was the explosives instructor at the Darunta camp.

#### d. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee admits to the use and sale of drugs while he was in Germany. He broke into parked cars and stole items to sell. He was arrested numerous times and spent time in prison.

2. A known Peshawar-based extremist was given money to distribute to about 40 Arab families in Peshawar. The extremist stated that one of those he supported was the detainee's wife.

3. The detainee says that when the Arabs left Jalalabad, Afghanistan, he stayed behind with the families to organize their exfiltration to Peshawar, Pakistan. In mid-Ramadan he himself traveled to Peshawar where he was captured by Pakistani authorities.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF FEGHOUL, ABDULLI**

a. The detainee claims that he did not leave Germany to fight; and did not leave Germany to prepare for weapons, explosives or military training.

b. The detainee says that he never worked for, or was involved in, any Non-Governmental Organizations.

c. The detainee denies any involvement or connection with any terrorist organizations anywhere in the world.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

26 September 2005

TO: KHANTUMANI, ABD AL NASIR MUHAMMAD ABD AL QADIR  
SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF  
KHANTUMANI, ABD AL NASIR MUHAMMAD ABD AL QADIR

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Training

1. The detainee was trained to use the Kalashnikov.
2. A foreign intelligence service described the detainee as a radical terrorist who received several military courses at al Qaida camps.
3. The detainee is commonly known as an explosives expert.
4. The detainee admits to being trained in martial arts.

b. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee was named as a member of the Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi group.
2. The detainee housed one trainee from al Farouq training camp and seven Saudis in Jalalabad, Afghanistan.
3. The detainee's name was included in a hand written list of suspected al Qaida members.
4. The detainee's name was included in a computer file used by a suspected al Qaida member.

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF KHANTUMANI, ABD AL NASIR MUHAMMAD ABD AL QADIR**

5. The detainee owned a house next door to a known al Qaida/Taliban guesthouse and worked in said guesthouse.

6. The detainee was reported to have been in Tora Bora and to be good with rocket propelled grenade weapons.

c. Detainee Actions and Statements

1. The detainee led a revolt against a Pakistani police force.

2. The detainee has been named as a camp leader and member of the Islamic court at Guantanamo Bay.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee stated he has never supported or been affiliated with the mujahadeen.

b. The detainee stated he was never required to join the Taliban.

c. The detainee stated he never joined the Taliban.

d. The detainee stated he was never approached by or was part of al Qaida.

e. The detainee denied being a long time mujahadeen fighter and helping the Palestinians in fighting and explosives.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

27 September 2005

TO: AL NUSAYRI, ADIL UQLA HASSAN

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL NUSAYRI, ADIL UQLA HASSAN

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. In mid 2001, the detainee saw a televised news story in Saudi Arabia about the Jihad in Afghanistan. The detainee felt inspired by the Jihad and considered going to Afghanistan to perform his Muslim duties.

2. The detainee felt Allah was calling him for martyrdom in the holy war against the Northern Alliance. The detainee claimed he was not recruited, and that his motivation for Jihad came from within.

b. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee came to Afghanistan to see Shari'a law correctly applied. He traveled to Karachi where he was directed to the Tabligh Al-Da'wa. Tabligh Al-Da'wa sent him to Quetta and on to Jalalabad.

2. The detainee met Khalid, a Kuwaiti when he arrived in Pakistan. Khalid hired the taxi that took the detainee from Pakistan to Afghanistan. The detainee later heard Khalid was a member of the Taliban.

3. The detainee was held by the Taliban at what he believed was a bean farm. The detainee claimed that Abo Khalid was in charge of the bean farm. Abo Khalid is described as being a Taliban member from Kuwait.

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL NUSAYRI, ADIL UQLA HASSAN**

4. The detainee was sent to the prepared trenches at Tora Bora, where he was assigned to the Muthana Sector for five to six days. Abu Yahia Al-Masri commanded the Muthana Sector.

5. The detainee's alias, Abu Al-Shahid, shows up on the list of captured mujahadin found on a hard drive associated with a senior al Qaida lieutenant.

6. The detainee was identified by a senior al Qaida lieutenant.

### c. Intent

The detainee admitted his purpose for traveling to Afghanistan was to join the Taliban and fight the jihad.

### d. Detainee Actions and Statements

1. Before traveling to join the Jihad, detainee packed one bag of clothing, personal effects, and 5000 Saudi riyals. In September 2001, detainee traveled from Saudi Arabia, Manama, Bahrain, and finally traveled to Karachi, Pakistan.

2. The detainee traveled from Karachi, Pakistan to Kabul, Afghanistan, where he stopped at a Taliban guesthouse. The detainee told the Taliban individuals at the guesthouse he had come from Saudi Arabia to fight for the Taliban in the Jihad.

3. The detainee fled Kabul in November 2001 after the start of the United States bombardment. He and other Afghans fled to Jalalabad, Afghanistan. The detainee was placed in a Taliban jail in Jalalabad.

4. The detainee and other armed Afghans fled Jalalabad, Afghanistan in December 2001 and went to the Tora Bora region, seeking a safe haven.

5. After one week in Tora Bora, detainee and other Afghans escaped eastward on foot, to the Pakistan border. Pakistani police captured the detainee shortly after crossing into Pakistan.

6. The detainee admitted that if all the Sheikhs in Saudi Arabia approved a Fatwah pronouncing a Jihad against the United States, he would fulfill his religious duties and join the Jihad.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee stated he was forced to say he was a member of al Qaida. He stated he decided to go to Afghanistan to observe the Taliban situation. He also wanted to go to Pakistan to get eye surgery.

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL NUSAYRI, ADIL UQLA HASSAN**

- b. The detainee reported he wanted to take a short trip to Afghanistan to teach the Qur'an and see how the Taliban practiced Islamic law.
  - c. The detainee denied that he went to Afghanistan to fight Jihad or join the Taliban. He also denied that he heard discussion about Jihad in the mosques in Saudi Arabia.
  - d. The detainee denied that he ever stated he wanted to join the jihad and die in martyrdom.
  - e. The Taliban asked the detainee to join the jihad against the Northern Alliance. He told the Taliban he was just visiting and was going to return to Saudi Arabia. Because of his response, the Taliban refused to let him leave because they suspected him of being a spy. After two months, he was taken unwillingly to a Taliban farm, which he described as a prison.
  - f. The detainee claims to have received no training in weapons or tactics while in Kabul, Afghanistan.
  - g. The detainee stated he had no plans to fight or become involved in wars. He had no intention of joining the Taliban. The detainee had no opinion about the United States. He also stated Usama Bin Laden was a criminal.
  - h. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on September 11. He also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.
  - i. The detainee did not agree with the loss of life that occurred on September 11.
5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

9 August 2005

TO: ABD AL SATTAR, MUIEEN A DEEN JAMAL A DEEN ABD AL FUSAL

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ABD AL SATTAR, MUIEEN A DEEN  
JAMAL A DEEN ABD AL FUSAL

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee was identified by a senior al Qaida member as an old mujahidin with at least ten years of experience as well as a long-time member of al Qaida, who would facilitate mujahidin moving in and out of Afghanistan/Pakistan.

2. The detainee was a fighter in Tora Bora who moved around encouraging people to fight and be religious. People listened to the detainee, because he was educated in Saudi Arabia by Sheikh Muhammad Al Shingeti at the Islamic University in Medina.

3. The detainee claims to have participated in the Dawa in Afghanistan.

4. The detainee was captured on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border.

5. The detainee was captured with 2,000 Afghanistan dinars, 1,000 United States dollars, and 1,000 Saudi Riyals.

b. Training

1. The detainee was identified as a trainer at the al Farouq training camp in Afghanistan. He was trying to become a Kuwadir, a more specialized trainer.

2. Only the most trusted students in camp were Kuwadirs and they sat closest to Usama Bin Laden. None of the regular students were allowed to touch Bin Laden, but the Kuwadirs

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ABD AL SATTAR, MUIEEN A DEEN JAMAL A DEEN ABD AL FUSAL**

were. The Kuwadirs had the personal trust of Bin Laden and had a good deal of personal contact with him. He also chose his bodyguards from the Kuwadirs.

3. Al-Farouq provided a general program providing trainees with fundamental military skills in light and heavy weaponry, field guns, warheads, topography, explosives and so forth.

4. Training in United States money counterfeiting, specifically 100 dollar bills, occurs at Al-Farouq camp. There is a one-year suicide mission-training program that occurs at Al-Farouq.

5. The detainee was identified as Omar Al Farouq who was in Towr Khom for one month then moved to Tora Bora. It is known that Usama Bin Laden visited for one or two days.

6. When the detainee went to Tora Bora, he was in the Abdul Qadus Al Bahraini Camp, which was later taken over by Ibn Sheikh Al Libi.

### c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee met a man named Muaz in an unidentified restaurant in Karachi, Pakistan. They lived together for approximately two weeks before they left for Afghanistan, via Quetta to teach the Koran.

2. Al Moaz had the detainee's passport.

3. The detainee was given a Kalashnikov rifle from Juheina for his personal safety because the Northern Alliance was attacking the valley.

4. Juhayna taught weapons at al Faruq.

5. Juhayna was identified as an al Qaida member who was in frequent contact, via handheld radios, with senior al Qaida units.

6. The detainee's name is listed on a letter written to Shaikh Abd Al-Aziz Vice Amir of al-Qaida Organization, in charge of the military system, Chief of the Jihadi Staff and director of the construction and distribution organization. The letter is to inform him of the youth who have completed the security course.

### d. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee has a Pakistani passport and claims to have originally gone to Pakistan on vacation in September 2001.

2. In a separate statement, the detainee said he arrived in Pakistan circa June 2001.

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ABD AL SATTAR, MUIEEN A DEEN JAMAL A DEEN ABD AL FUSAL**

3. The detainee said he traveled to Pakistan to visit the country from which his passport was issued.

4. In a separate statement, the detainee said that his father got him the passport, because it was the easiest and cheapest way for the detainee to get a passport.

5. The detainee provided elaborate, evasive answers to most questions. He appeared to be fabricating a story at times, and he may not have been completely truthful.

6. The detainee was with a group for about three days when they were bombed and he was rendered unconscious.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee denies having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on September 11th, also denied knowledge of any rumors of plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.

b. The detainee stated he had no knowledge of al Qaida and had never heard of them.

c. The detainee indicated he was never in the Tora Bora area, just in the valley area and said that if he had known Abdul Moaz and Joheina were al Qaida he would have left right away.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

28 September 2005

TO: KHANTUMANI, MUHAMMAD ABD AL NASIR MUHAMMAD

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF  
KHANTUMANI, MUHAMMAD ABD AL NASIR MUHAMMAD

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Training

1. The detainee was sighted at the al Farouq training camp.

2. The detainee was trained in the use of AK-47, pistols, light weapons, grenades, Bica weapon systems and timed diesel explosives.

b. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee's name was included in a handwritten letter recovered along with materials linked to al Qaida. The letter included a list of Arabs incarcerated in Pakistan.

2. The detainee's name was included in a file found on a computer used by suspected al Qaida members.

c. Detainee Actions and Statements

1. The detainee stated that he hates Americans.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee was aware of the Taliban and its problems before leaving Syria but said that it had nothing to do with him.

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## **UNCLASSIFIED**

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF  
KHANTUMANI, MUHAMMAD ABD AL NASIR MUHAMMAD**

b. The detainee stated he did not travel to Afghanistan to fight in the jihad but simply to visit his father. The detainee stated he wants to return to Syria to continue his education and complete his mandatory military service.

c. The detainee has stated that his father was happy in Afghanistan but he wants to go back to Syria.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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# UNCLASSIFIED

**Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba**

19 September 2005

TO: DOKHAN, MOAMMAR BADAWI

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF DOKHAN, MOAMMAR BADAWI

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee traveled from Saudi Arabia to Afghanistan with the stated intention of joining the Taliban.

2. The detainee traveled from Riyadh to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, then to Karachi and Quetta Pakistan. The detainee entered Afghanistan in July 2001, and spent 17 days in Kabul. The detainee then traveled to Bagram for 1 1/2 months.

3. In Afghanistan, the detainee met a Taliban recruiter, who told him he would provide him training on a Kalashnikov rifle so he could go to the front lines. Thereafter, the detainee was assigned to a Taliban commander, who was the leader of 10-20 men.

4. The detainee served as a rear echelon guard and manned an observation post in the area of Bagram, Afghanistan.

5. The detainee carried a rifle while on duty at the observation post.

6. For his egress from Afghanistan, the detainee traveled to Kabul and spent 1 month there before traveling to Jalalabad, Afghanistan where he crossed the Pakistan border and was captured.

b. Connections/Associations

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## UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF DOKHAN, MOAMMAR BADAWI**

1. The detainee's name was contained on a list of incarcerated associates found on a computer used by suspected al Qaida members in Pakistan in early 2002.
2. The detainee's name was contained on a list of captured mujahidin found in Pakistan on a hard drive associated with a high-ranking al Qaida operative.
3. The detainee's name was on a document listing 324 Arabic names, aliases, and nationalities recovered from safe house raids associated with suspected al Qaida in Karachi, Pakistan. The list identified the detainee by name, nationality, and noted he had a Syrian passport and a wallet in his possession.
4. The detainee was listed on an undated letter that listed 68 probable al Qaida members incarcerated in Pakistan. The purpose of the document was to incite the people against the Pakistani government.
4. The following primary factor favors release or transfer:  

The detainee denies ever having been in Afghanistan.
5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

19 August 2005

TO: AL TAIBI, RAMI BIN SAID

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL TAIBI, RAMI BIN SAID

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee began learning about the jihad in Chechnya and the Taliban in Afghanistan. He had seen numerous videos being sold depicting the jihad in Chechnya. Although an only son, he had convinced his father to let him go to train for that jihad.

2. The detainee was provided with the phone number of a person in Jeddah, who encouraged the travel and promised to ensure that someone would meet and assist him at the Karachi airport.

3. The detainee departed for Afghanistan in late August 2001. He traveled from Karachi, to Quetta, Pakistan and then on to a guesthouse in Kandahar, Afghanistan.

4. After coalition bombing began, the detainee moved from Kandahar to a guesthouse in Kabul, where he stayed for four days. During his stay, he was told the guesthouse leader in Kabul could help him get to Pakistan. The detainee went and stayed with the leader in Jalalabad and then traveled to Pakistan in a car.

5. The detainee was captured by the Pakistanis after crossing the border. He was on a bus where the prisoners overpowered their guards and tried to escape. The resulting firefight left a number of guards and prisoners dead. The detainee claims he ran off and hid until arrested some 12 hours later.

6. A foreign government service designated the detainee as being a high priority target. The detainee was identified by the foreign government service as having traveled to Chechnya.

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## UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL TAIBI, RAMI BIN SAID**

**b. Training**

The detainee was identified as having trained at the al Farouq camp.

**c. Connections/Associations**

1. The detainee's name was found on a computer file associated with a senior al Qaida leader listing of captured al Qaida members.

2. The detainee's name was found on an Arabic-language computer file recovered from an al Qaida safehouse raid, which lists contact points and telephone numbers for al Qaida mujahadin in Pakistan. The list described the members as not having completed their training for jihad.

3. The detainee's name was listed in a translation of an Arabic-language document, listing mujahideen who were fighting with Taliban against the Northern Alliance.

4. The detainee's name was also found on several floppy disks recovered during a raid on an alleged al Qaida residence in Karachi, Pakistan. The file listed name, nationality, safety-deposit box number, contents, and comments.

5. The detainee's name was listed in an e-mailed copy of a list of Arabs incarcerated in Pakistan, found on a computer server hard drive recovered by allied personnel in a suspected al Qaida safe house in Islamabad, Pakistan. The data appears to have been recorded some time between 31 March 2001 and 22 January 2002.

**d. Intent**

1. The detainee told an Arabic translator that the interviewers are pigs and animals, and that the Arabic translator is his enemy and if given the opportunity he would kill him.

2. The detainee stated that Afghanistan would rise again and be Muslim along with the entire world. The detainee stated that the Taliban would return to power in Afghanistan.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

The detainee claims that he had nothing to do with the bus incident and similarly denies any affiliation with bin Laden and al Qaida.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against

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# UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL TAIBI, RAMI BIN SAID**

continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

1 September 2005

TO: SEBAI, MOHAMMED JAYED

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SEBAI, MOHAMMED JAYED

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
  - a. Commitment
    1. After hearing a fatwa issued by Sheikh Abdullah Bin Jibrin regarding support to the Taliban, the detainee decided to go to Afghanistan. A facilitator provided the detainee a passport, 5,000 Riyals, and an airplane ticket to Karachi, Pakistan.
    2. The detainee and his facilitator stayed in a Taliban guesthouse in Karachi.
    3. The detainee and his facilitator traveled to Kandahar, Afghanistan, where they stayed one week at another Taliban guesthouse.
    4. After completing training, the detainee and his facilitator moved to Kabul. Soon after learning about the attack on the World Trade Center, they both were moved to the front lines to fight the Northern Alliance.
    5. The detainee and his facilitator retreated to Kabul. From there, the detainee took a bus with 30 people to Jalalabad where he stayed for three weeks at a guesthouse supervised by an Afghani.
    6. After three weeks in Jalalabad, the detainee and the others with him were ordered to head to the Tora Bora Mountains, where he stayed for one to two months. While in the mountains they were bombed from aircraft. The detainee claims he left his money and passport in a bunker that was destroyed by the bombs.

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## UNCLASSIFIED

### SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SEBAL, MOHAMMED JAYED

7. After two weeks in bunkers at an Arab camp in the mountains, the detainee and approximately one hundred other Arabs walked for about six days to the Pakistan border. Once there, a group of Pakistanis claiming to be taking them to a better place instead led them to a jail. His group was taken the next morning to another jail in Peshawar.

#### b. Training

1. The detainee attended a training camp approximately one hour from Kandahar that was run by an Afghani named Abdel Qudos. There were about 200 people training and living at this camp while the detainee was there. The detainee was trained on the PK and Kalashnikov rifles, but no other weapons.

2. Abdul Qudos was an al Qaida leader who had over 500 al Qaida fighters under his command in the Tora Bora region as of 15 December 2001.

#### c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee's name and family's contact number are on a list of 84 al Qaida and Taliban fighters captured when they crossed the border into Pakistan from Nangarhar Province, Afghanistan, on 14 December 2001.

2. A name similar to the detainee's was found on a chart listing the names of captured Mujahidin. The name was listed with the telephone number 96654127255. The information was found on a hard drive associated with a senior al Qaida member, and was seized during joint raids in Pakistan.

3. The detainee's name, alias, and family contact information (including the contact telephone number) were found on a computer file recovered during joint raids against al Qaida-associated safe houses. According to the file, these Mujahidin were among a group who had come to Afghanistan in December 2001 but who had not completed their training and therefore were not ready to fight in the war.

4. The detainee's name and alias was found on a document listing 324 Arabic names, aliases and nationalities recovered from safe house raids associated with suspected al Qaida in Karachi, Pakistan. He was listed in possession of a Saudi passport.

#### d. Intent

1. The detainee stated that acts of terrorism are a legitimate way for a Muslim to wage jihad against the United States, even if innocent women and children are killed. He stated that he believes that Muslim jihadists will wipe out the government of the United States within the next 20 years.

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SEBAI, MOHAMMED JAYED**

2. The detainee said all non-Muslims are infidels and the victims of the terrorist attacks on September 11th are collateral damage of a war initiated by the United States.

3. The detainee was unable to guarantee that he would not participate in future jihads. He stated that he would certainly go to jihad to protect his family, homeland and religion. He also stated that there are some fatwas that require the participation of all Muslims.

e. Other Relevant Data

As part of a caravan of busses, the detainee overheard people on the back of the bus talking about attacking the Pakistani guards. He then heard shouting and everyone hid under their seats, just before the bus rolled over and gunfire erupted. After the commotion ended, they were taken to a jail in Kohad. The detainee was eventually turned over to the Americans at an unknown airport.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

In early July 2002, a foreign government identified the detainee as being of low law enforcement and low intelligence value.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

20 September 2005

TO: AL BARAKAT, KHALID HASSAN HUSAYN

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL BARAKAT, KHALID HASSAN  
HUSAYN

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee went to train at the al Siddiq Camp west of Khost, Afghanistan in 1990. He was inspired by the mosque sermons and felt it was his duty to go and train to fight so he could defend Muslims from the Soviet Union.

2. During the summer break of 2001, the detainee traveled to Mecca to complete 5 pillars of Islam. He met an Afghani who asked the detainee what he thought about visiting Afghanistan. The detainee thought about going to Pakistan for the Dawa to teach others the true meaning of Islam.

3. The detainee left his home in Mecca, Saudi Arabia in June of 2001 to work for the al Wafa organization in Afghanistan to provide food and blankets to the Afghan refugees.

4. According to a foreign government service, as of early August 2002, the nongovernmental organization "Wafa" was believed to have had connections to Usama bin Laden and Afghan mujahidin.

5. The detainee traveled with 3,000 U.S. dollars, 5,000 riyals and his Saudi passport. He said that donating money is a major part of the Dawa.

6. The detainee traveled from Jiddah to Qatar by airplane. From Qatar he went to Doha and then to Lahore, Pakistan.

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## UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL BARAKAT, KHALID HASSAN HUSAYN**

7. The detainee stated he landed in the Lahore Airport and was welcomed by Jama'at al Tabligh (JT) members who transported him and others to the JT center.

8. Some al Qaida members have joined the al Dawa al Tabligh that is identifiable with the Jama'at al Tabligh; a legitimate Islamic missionary organization based in Pakistan and believed to be used as a cover for action by Islamic extremists.

9. The detainee received a ride to the Markez al Dableg (Center of the Dawa) and stayed there 3 days. He contacted an Afghani and they traveled to a mosque in a city called Gougren Wal. They met up with a Pakistani, and all three of them traveled into Afghanistan by taxi to Jalalabad.

10. When they arrived in Afghanistan, the detainee paid the Pakistani for traveling with them.

11. From Jalalabad the detainee and the Afghani traveled to Kabul by taxi and rented a house. The detainee paid for everything.

### b. Training

1. The detainee went to Khowst and trained on the Kalashnikov at the al Siddiq training camp approximately 10 years ago. He could not recall any names of trainers at the camp.

2. The detainee received fighter training at al Farouq and Kandahar, Afghanistan. The detainee stayed in Kandahar during the withdrawal and then went to Talaquan.

3. The al Farouq training camp was funded by al Qaida and therefore was more advanced than other training camps in Afghanistan.

### c. Connections/Associations

1. When traveling to the Gougren Wal mosque, the detainee and the Afghani met a Pakistani named Abdel Rahim.

2. Abdul Rahim was in charge of the Gujranwala branch of the Center for Dawa.

3. In Tora Bora the detainee was second in command of his group to Abdul Haziz al Qureshi. He was responsible for supplying the group. The detainee attended meetings with leaders of the other groups and has met Usama bin Laden (UBL).

4. A file found on a computer used by suspected al Qaida members contains a list of 78 associates incarcerated in Pakistan. This information was found on a computer server hard drive

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL BARAKAT, KHALID HASSAN HUSAYN**

recovered by Allied personnel in a suspected al Qaida safe house in Islamabad, Pakistan. The detainee's name appears on this list.

5. The detainee's name appears on a computer file found during a raid against an al Qaida associated safehouse in Rawalpindi by a foreign government service.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee denied that he ever joined al Wafa.

b. The detainee denied having any association with the Taliban or al Qaida. He did not serve in the military and denied having used any weapons during his travels.

c. The detainee denied having ever seen Usama bin Laden during his travels through Afghanistan. He has never traveled to the United States and has no friends, relatives or contacts in the United States.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

31 October 2005

TO: AL SABRI, MASHUR ABDALLAH MUQBIL AHMED

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF  
AL SABRI, MASHUR ABDALLAH MUQBIL AHMED

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

The detainee was influenced by a fatwa issued by Hammoud al Aqla of Quaseem, Saudi Arabia and Sheik Abdulla al Jibreen. The fatwa was encouraging men to go to Afghanistan to assist the Taliban. In the summer of 2000, the detainee decided to travel to Afghanistan.

b. Training

The detainee's uncle taught him to fire an AK-47 and a pistol.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee lived with Hassan al Khamari in Yemen.
2. Hassan al Khamari was one of the bombers killed in the USS Cole attack.
3. An acquaintance suggested the detainee go to Afghanistan. The acquaintance fought with the Taliban for two years and was a member of the Jamaat al Tablighi.
4. The acquaintance helped the detainee get to Afghanistan by providing contacts, a plan and a route.
5. In Karachi, the detainee went to the "Taliban House."

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## UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL SABRI, MASHUR ABDALLAH MUQBIL AHMED**

6. The detainee stayed in the Habi Habbash guesthouse in Kandahar for fourteen to fifteen days before departing for Kabul, Afghanistan.

7. During the two days the detainee was in Kabul, Afghanistan, he stayed in an al Qaida safe house run by an al Qaida member.

8. The detainee eventually arrived in Jalalabad, Afghanistan, where he lived with a man who was recommended to him by the acquaintance who suggested he go to Afghanistan.

9. The detainee stayed at the guesthouse owned by a man who had been a Taliban fighter and who had been in charge of a defensive fighting line outside Bagram.

10. The detainee was reported to be at the Bin Laden compound and living in the al Qaida guesthouse in Kandahar.

11. The detainee was reported to be living in the Al Ansar guesthouse in Kandahar.

12. The detainee was said to work for Usama Bin Laden. The detainee was observed doing administrative and organizational duties, signing in new recruits and facilitating their moves to the front lines. The detainee was observed wearing a traditional Afghan uniform.

13. The detainee was believed to be a member of al Qaida because he was following Usama Bin Laden's orders to keep the Kandahar guesthouse up and running.

14. The detainee was said to facilitate the transfer of weapons and other supplies to the frontlines.

15. The detainee was believed to have transferred approximately \$20,000 in United States currency to the Kandahar airport around September 2001.

16. The detainee was believed to have sworn bayat to Usama Bin Laden because he and the people around him knew Usama Bin Laden's travel dates and routes.

17. The detainee was reported to be involved in the transport of large sums of money around Afghanistan. He was reportedly on his way to deliver money to Usama bin Laden, but was unable because the war had started.

18. The detainee was reported to return from Tora Bora to the Hajji Habbash guesthouse with Usama Bin Laden.

19. The detainee's name is included in a list of Arabic names, aliases and nationalities recovered from safe house raids associated with suspected al Qaida in Karachi, Pakistan.

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL SABRI, MASHUR ABDALLAH MUQBIL AHMED**

20. The detainee's name is included in a list of individuals from whom money was taken from their safety deposit boxes and added to the budget outlined in a document obtained from an alleged al Qaida residence in Karachi, Pakistan.

21. The detainee was reported to have worked at the Hajji Habbash guesthouse.

22. The detainee was reported to be working at the Nibras guesthouse around May 2001. The detainee was said to help new arrivals (fighters) travel from the Hajji Habbash guesthouse to the airport or to Kabul, Afghanistan and facilitate local travel by helping find a cab.

23. The detainee was reported to assist fighters at the Nibras guesthouse by making reservations for auto or air transportation and identifying weapons and weapons dealers for those interested in purchasing them.

24. The detainee was observed at the Nibras house, carrying messages and moving people around town.

25. The detainee was said to have his own room at the Nibras guesthouse and reportedly was able to travel anywhere without papers.

#### d. Detainee Actions and Statements

1. The detainee began traveling to Bagram to assist Taliban fighters in their efforts against Northern Alliance fighters. The detainee spent a week on the fighting line.

2. The detainee was observed in Tora Bora around September 2001 wearing a commonly issued military vest and carrying an AK-47.

3. When asked about the USS Cole, the detainee initially made a statement to the effect of "what about it" and attempted to rationalize that the individuals involved did nothing wrong.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee stated he would like to get married when he leaves Guantanamo Bay. He stated he is willing to go back to Yemen or any other country upon release.

b. The detainee denied receiving terrorist training or attending a terrorist training camp.

c. The detainee denied any involvement or connection with al Qaida or terrorist activities.

d. When asked why he went to fight in Afghanistan, the detainee stated that he did not fight anyone in Afghanistan. He went to Afghanistan to see what it was all about. He had heard a lot about the purely Islamic government there, and the safety of Afghanistan.

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## UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL SABRI, MASHUR ABDALLAH MUQBIL AHMED**

e. The detainee stated he did not know who the Northern Alliance was, and did not care to know. He swore that he did not know them and has heard of them since he has been in prison.

f. The detainee stated he went to Afghanistan to find a wife and denied going to escape any involvement with the planning of the attack on the USS Cole.

g. With regard to the USS Cole, the detainee stated that he was not involved in that attack or any other terrorist attack.

h. The detainee stated he was shocked when he heard the news regarding Hassan al Khamari's involvement in the USS Cole bombing. The detainee stated he thought it was wrong for al Khamari to bomb the USS Cole.

i. The detainee stated he did not know anybody involved in terrorist activities against the United States.

j. The detainee was approached about joining al Qaida but he refused the offer because he does not believe in jihad.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

20 September 2005

TO: AJAM, AHMED ADNAN MUHAMMAD

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AJAM, AHMED ADNAN MUHAMMAD

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee went to Afghanistan to see how the Taliban implemented Islamic law.

b. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee stayed at a legal college in Kandahar owned by Usama bin Laden.

2. The detainee worked for al-Wafa in the Wazir Akbar Khan neighborhood.

3. The detainee's name was included on an al Qaida tactics course attendee list.

c. Detainee Actions and Statements

1. The detainee fled from Kabul to Jalalabad, Afghanistan when the fighting neared Kabul.

2. As fighting neared Jalalabad, the detainee fled to the Pakistani border in the Tora Bora Mountains.

3. The detainee crossed the Afghanistan-Pakistan border in the Tora Bora Mountain region.

d. Other Relevant Data

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## UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AJAM, AHMED ADNAN MUHAMMAD**

1. The detainee lived in a Syrian guesthouse in Kabul for 13 months.
2. The detainee was arrested by Pakistani police after crossing the Afghan border without identification.
3. The detainee surrendered his passport when he moved into the Syrian guesthouse in Kabul.
4. The detainee was regularly provided money during his stay in the Kabul Syrian guesthouse.
4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
  - a. The detainee explicitly denied engaging in combat in Tora Bora.
  - b. The detainee denies being Mujahadeen.
5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

8 September 2005

TO: SHAABAN, ALI HUSEIN MUHAMMAD

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SHAABAN, ALI HUSEIN  
MUHAMMAD

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
  - a. Commitment
    1. The detainee stated he went to Afghanistan to follow Islam and thought that that country would be a place where Islam is observed the way it was supposed to be.
    2. The detainee indicated that Sheik Mahmoud Alukla is one of the religious leaders he listened to.
    3. On July 3, 2000 the detainee left Damascus to travel to Afghanistan. He traveled by bus to Tehran, Iran.
    4. From Tehran, the detainee traveled to Zahedan, Iran with three other Syrians. The detainee and his companions went by taxi from Zahedan to Kandahar, Afghanistan. The trip took ten days.
    5. It cost 1,500 Syrian Lira to get smuggled into Afghanistan from the Iranian border. The detainee claims the smuggling was not pre-arranged.
    6. After arriving in Kandahar, the detainee told the driver to take them to a house where the Arabs live. They stayed at the Hajji Habash guesthouse for three months.
    7. Hajji Habash was for everyone, new, old, coming to, or leaving Afghanistan; everyone stayed at the guesthouse.

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## UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SHAABAN, ALI HUSEIN MUHAMMAD**

8. The detainee went to Kabul, Afghanistan and lived in a Syrian guesthouse for thirteen months. The house was in the Wazir Akbar Khan region.

9. The Syrian house was reportedly located in the al Qaida enclave area of Wazir Akhbar Khan.

10. Every two or three months the detainee received an envelope with his name on it, which contained money.

### b. Training

1. The detainee received a week of Kalashnikov training in the Syrian house in Wazir Akhbar Khan District. He claims it cost nothing and no other training took place.

2. The detainee stated that the time he was in the safe house in Kabul he received weapons training by an Arab named Khalid.

3. After completing al Farouq, the detainee fought on the front lines near Bagram, Afghanistan.

4. The al Farouq training camp, funded by al Qaida, was more advanced than other training camps in Afghanistan.

### c. Connections/Associations

1. While at the guesthouse in Kabul the detainee and others would refer to Sheik Issa if they had questions.

2. Reporting indicates Sheik Issa would provide a two-week training school at his residence in Kabul for Syrians and other Arabs who trained at the Usama Bin Laden camps. He would teach the rules of jihad, that Americans were non-believers, and it was justified to kill them.

3. While in Tora Bora, Afghanistan, the detainee and a group of fighters shared the same commander.

4. The commander was an al Qaida instructor from Aden, Yemen.

5. The detainee said he knew Ousma al Hashimi al Yemeni, also known as Osaid al Hashimi al Yemeni, and saw him in the trenches in Tora Bora.

### d. Other Relevant Data

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## UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SHAABAN, ALI HUSEIN MUHAMMAD**

1. The detainee denied ever saying that an American pilot was held in Syria for two years and that he was treated well. The detainee said he did not have any first hand evidence concerning Syrian or Islamic treatment of westerners.

2. The detainee admitted that he made the comment and explained he heard about the American pilot and the circumstances surrounding treatment and release of the pilot from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) during an ICRC mail delivery.

3. The detainee shows the greatest level of deception when asked questions concerning whether he had formal security/intelligence training.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

- a. The detainee claims that he is not affiliated with al Qaida or any terrorist network.
- b. The detainee said he never received flight lessons.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

21 June 2005

TO: MOHAMED, AHMED

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MOHAMED, AHMED

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
  - a. Commitment
    1. The detainee expressed a desire to become a soldier.
    2. The detainee was identified as Abdul Jabar, an al Qaida member with the Islamic Movement of Turkistan (IMT).
    3. Abdul Jabhar was identified as a trainer at a Tora Bora camp who conducted training on the DSHK heavy machine gun and an unidentified shoulder launched rocket.
    4. During the U.S. bombing campaign, the detainee and surviving Uighurs were resupplied on a regular basis while in Tora Bora, until the bombing became too heavy.
    5. The detainee and other Uighurs arrived in Pakistan by mid-November 2001.
  - b. Training
    1. The detainee was exposed to the Kalashnikov, a handgun, and a long barreled rifle.
    2. The detainee spent approximately 10 months at the Uighur training camp near Tora Bora.
    3. The Uighur training camp near Tora Bora was named Eastern Turkistan Uighur Party.
  - c. Connections/Associations

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## UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MOHAMED, AHMED**

1. The detainee believed the Taliban helped finance the Uighur training camp near Tora Bora.

2. The detainee was recruited in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan.

3. The detainee was identified as a visitor to known al Qaida guesthouses in Kabul and Shakardara, Afghanistan.

d. Intent

The detainee was preparing to fight the Chinese government in case of a future conflict with the Uighur, not to fight in Afghanistan.

e. Other Relevant Data

1. Upon fleeing from Tora Bora to Pakistan, the detainee and other Uighur fighters were turned over to Pakistani authorities and then transferred to U.S. custody.

2. The detainee left Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan with \$3000 United States currency.

3. The detainee stated: "If there was ever an uprising against Uighurs, I would go inside China and fight."

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee denied any knowledge of the Islamic Movement of Turkistan (IMT).

b. The detainee claims his identification, as Abdul Jabar was a mistake.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

12 October 2005

TO: FARAJ, ABD AL HADIO OMAR MAHMOUD

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF FARAJ, ABD AL HADIO OMAR  
MAHMOUD

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Training

A foreign intelligence organization has provided information that indicates that the detainee joined an al Qaida training camp upon arriving in Afghanistan.

b. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee stayed in a house reserved for Syrians, which was located in Kabul, Afghanistan.

2. The Syrian house was located in the al Qaida enclave area of Wazir Akhbar Khan in Kabul, Afghanistan.

3. The Syrian group guesthouse was associated with al Qaida and was used for money and document forgery operations.

4. The detainee's name or alias appears on a document recovered from safe house raids on suspected al Qaida.

5. The detainee attended training from Sheikh Issa while residing at the Syrian guesthouse in Kabul.

6. Shaykh Isa, an Egyptian, was an Amir in the Egyptian Jihad Organization and was the chief Mufti of al Qaida.

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## UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF FARAJ, ABD AL HADIO OMAR MAHMOUD**

7. Al-Jihad, a.k.a. Egyptian Islamic Jihad, merged with Usama Bin Laden's al Qaida organization in June 2001, but may retain some capability to conduct independent operations. Its primary goals are to overthrow the Egyptian Government and replace it with an Islamic state and to attack US and Israeli interests in Egypt and abroad.

**c. Other Relevant Data**

1. Originally from Syria, the detainee arrived in Afghanistan in 2000 after spending several months in Iran.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee did not receive any weapons training and did not own any weapons while living in Syria.

b. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on September 11th, and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the US or US interests.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

1 September 2005

TO: MOUHAMMAD, MAASOUM ABDAH

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MOUHAMMAD, MAASOUM ABDAH

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee is a Syrian who trained in al Qaida camps in Afghanistan and was believed to be fighting with-or on behalf of Usama bin Laden as of early December 2001.

2. The detainee was a fighter in the Tora Bora region of Afghanistan. He also received advanced explosives training at an al Qaida training camp in Afghanistan was very well connected with a number of powerful Syrian groups in Afghanistan.

b. Training

1. In 1993, the detainee went to the Harrasta Police Training Facility in Damascus, Syria, where he trained for two years. His training at the school was mostly physical fitness and the use of the AK-47 and a handgun.

2. The detainee performed crowd control and riot control duties while at the Harrasta Police Training Facility. He spent the last six months of his service with the police force in Dair al Zoor region of Syria where he performed crowd control for soccer games and traffic duties.

c. Connections/Associations

1. A senior al Qaida leader identified the subject detainee's photo as someone he met prior to 11 September 2001 in a Syrian guesthouse, in Kabul, Afghanistan.

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# UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MOUHAMMAD, MAASOUM ABDAH**

2. The detainee attended religious training from Shaykh Issa while residing at the Syrian guesthouse in Kabul from December 2000 until January 2002.

3. Shaykh Issa, an Egyptian, was an Amir in the Egyptian Jihad Organization and was the chief Mufti of al Qaida.

4. Al-Jihad, a.k.a. Egyptian Islamic Jihad, merged with Usama Bin Laden's al Qaida organization in June 2001, but may retain some capability to conduct independent operations. Its primary goals are to overthrow the Egyptian Government and replace it with an Islamic state and to attack US and Israeli interests in Egypt and abroad.

5. The detainee stayed at a Syrian guesthouse in Kabul.

6. The Syrian house was located in the al Qaida enclave area of Wazir Akhbar Khan in Kabul, Afghanistan.

d. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee stated that in June 2000 his roommate advised him to travel to Afghanistan to find a wife.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on September 11th, and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the US or US interests.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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**Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba**

15 November 2005

**TO: AL SHURFA, AYMAN MOHAMMED AHMED**

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL SHURFA, AYMAN MOHAMMED  
AHMED**

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. While living in Gaza, the detainee was influenced by Hamas to become committed to jihad.

2. The detainee traveled to Saudi Arabia where he was influenced by a Saudi national to go to Afghanistan to receive military training and to be prepared for jihad.

3. The detainee responded to a fatwa issued by a Saudi sheikh.

4. The detainee maintained his interest in jihad through conversations with a sheikh, reading the sheikh's book, and a jihad Internet website.

5. The detainee received a letter and 2,000 Saudi Arabian Riyals from a sheikh. The letter gave the detainee instructions to fly to Karachi, Pakistan and to call a contact when he arrived.

6. The detainee traveled to Afghanistan to receive training in preparation for jihad.

7. The detainee traveled to Afghanistan through Karachi and Quetta, Pakistan.

8. Around July 2001 the detainee arrived in Kandahar, Afghanistan and stayed at a guesthouse.

9. The detainee evacuated the al Farouq training camp after 11 September 2001.

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## UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL SHURFA, AYMAN MOHAMMED AHMED**

10. The detainee traveled to a guesthouse in Khowst, Afghanistan, where he joined a group of 15 Arabs who were going to the Pakistan border.

11. The detainee stated they moved to the mountains and stayed in caves. When the bombing started, they moved to higher mountains in the Tora Bora region.

12. The detainee walked to the Pakistan border, where he was arrested.

### b. Training

1. The detainee attended the al Farouq training camp where he stayed for approximately two months.

2. The detainee received training with the AK-47 at al Farouq.

### c. Intent

The detainee claimed he received military training at al Farouq with the hope of conducting a suicide operation in the Palestinian territories.

### d. Other Relevant Data

The detainee admitted to not telling the whole truth about why he went to Afghanistan.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee stated he was not a member of the Taliban or al Qaida. He said he now realizes that the two are associated, but when he responded to the fatwa, he was not aware of that fact. The detainee decided to join the jihad of his own free will, but did not realize at the time these groups may be associated with terrorism.

b. The detainee feels the 11 September 2001 attacks were against what his faith believes, and many innocent people were killed. The people involved in the attacks should be punished.

c. The detainee would not be interested in any fatwa to fight against the United States. The detainee has no hostility against the United States.

d. If the detainee were released, he would like to live a normal life and have a family. The detainee's main concern is to join his family in Saudi Arabia.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL SHURFA, AYMAN  
MOHAMMED AHMED**

Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

5 July 2005

TO: AL HARBI, MOHAMED ATIQ AWAYD

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL HARBI, MOHAMED ATIQ AWAYD

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
  - a. Commitment
    1. The detainee traveled to Mecca to participate in the pilgrimage and it was at this time he decided to travel to Pakistan and provide assistance to the Afghani refugees that were residing at camps on Pakistani soil.
    2. The detainee says that on about the eighth day of Ramadan (November 24, 2001), he traveled to Karachi, Pakistan from Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.
    3. The detainee received his assignment, via the "Servant of the Convent," and traveled to Quetta, Pakistan, then onto a small Pakistani village approximately 45 minutes to the west of Quetta.
    4. The detainee was arrested by Pakistani police and was in possession of 8,000 United States dollars and 12,000 Saudi riyals.
  - b. Connections/Associations
    1. The detainee was identified as being a fighter in Kandahar, Afghanistan, a member of Al-Wafa and the Jama'at Al-Tabligh.
    2. The detainee was identified as being in the Tora Bora Mountains.
    3. Al-Wafa claims to be a charitable organization, but it was common knowledge that Al-Wafa delivered weapons and supplies to Afghanistan fighters in Tora Bora.

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## UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL HARBI, MOHAMED ATIQ AWAYD**

4. Al-Wafa provided money of all currencies, including United States dollars, to those fighters who needed it. The detainee was one of approximately 400 Arabs who claimed to be members of a subset of Al-Wafa called Irata. However they were actually Mujahadin fighters in Afghanistan.

5. The Jama'at Al-Tabligh is a legitimate Islamic missionary organization based in Pakistan and believed to be used as a cover for action by Islamic extremists.

6. The detainee's name was found on a document that was recovered by United States coalition forces from the former residence of Usama Bin Laden in Kandahar, Afghanistan on or about 12 December 2001.

c. Other Relevant Data

The detainee has traveled to several other countries within the past two and a half to three years. The countries are Kuwait, Turkey, Georgia and Pakistan.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee says he loves Americans and advised he was against the killing of any innocent people. In fact, he would be willing to work for the American authorities once he was back in Saudi Arabia.

b. The detainee says he hears nothing of terrorist plots or terrorist activities from other detainees.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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