

UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

22 March 2006

TO: RUHANI, GHOLAM

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF RUHANI, GHOLAM

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

When the Taliban captured Kabul, Afghanistan, they conscripted many people. The detainee did not want to go to war so he took a job with the ministry of intelligence in Kabul.

b. Connections/Associations

1. A senior member of civilian intelligence offered the detainee a job because he needed the assistance.

2. A source identified a director of the Taliban Intelligence Service and the detainee as his deputy. They were responsible for counter-terrorism operations and terrorism believed to be connected to organized crime.

3. The detainee stated he was the officer in charge of the operations department in the ministry of intelligence. The detainee noted that the operations department had 15 associates.

4. The detainee's sister is married to a Taliban Intelligence Officer.

5. The detainee stated that he is very close with a senior leader in the Taliban Intelligence Service.

6. The detainee stated that a director in the ministry of intelligence quickly promoted him. The detainee did not receive any formal training for his new position.

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7. The detainee spent the last four years before his capture working in the operations department of the ministry of intelligence in Kabul for the Taliban. The detainee was in charge of crime scenes and small case investigations.

8. The detainee left Kabul on the last day that the Taliban still had control. The detainee was able to get a ride from a person who worked for the minister of interior criminal division. This person was traveling in a Toyota pick up truck with 14 associates who were armed with two rocket-propelled grenades (RPG-7s), 20 Kalashnikov rifles and two PK machine guns.

9. The detainee couriered a letter between the Taliban Chief of Intelligence and a Taliban military commander.

10. The detainee attended a meeting with a military commander, a senior Taliban intelligence member, a couple of Americans, and the Americans' translator. Shortly after the meeting, the Taliban intelligence member and the detainee were arrested.

c. Other Relevant Data

1. There was no specialized training given to civilian intelligence officers. It was assumed that officers already knew how to use pistols.

2. The detainee worked with 13 to 14 men. The detainee did not have an official title, wore ordinary civilian clothes, and carried a Russian made pistol.

3. The detainee was issued a concealed weapons permit and had the permit on his person at the time of his capture.

4. The detainee believes he was arrested because he had a pistol on his hip.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee denies any prior knowledge of the attacks on 11 September 2001 and claims to have no personal knowledge of al Qaida or its operatives.

b. The detainee had never heard of al Qaida until the Americans started bombing in Afghanistan. The detainee thinks Usama bin Laden brought war to Afghanistan.

c. The detainee claims to be no more than a simple shopkeeper who helped Americans.

d. The detainee stated that his only wish was to return to Afghanistan and assist his ailing father with operating the family appliance store in Kabul.

e. The detainee explained that when he identified the head of Taliban Intelligence as his brother-in-law that it was a lie to shut up the interrogator.

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f. The detainee explained that his work in the security office was simply to perform manual labor and drive different people in the office to their destinations.

g. The detainee denied any intelligence collecting activities during his work with the Taliban.

h. The detainee stated that he worked for the people, not the Taliban.

i. The detainee claims his involvement with the Taliban should not be viewed as synonymous to the Taliban's ideology. The detainee claims he joined the Taliban because it was a matter of political and survival necessity.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

24 July 2006

TO: WASIQ, ABDUL HAQ

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF WASIQ, ABDUL HAQ

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee served as Deputy Minister of Intelligence in the Taliban Intelligence Service.

2. The detainee stated that his duty as Deputy of Taliban Intelligence was to prevent unlawful acts such as robbery, corruption and fraud from occurring in Kabul, Afghanistan.

3. The detainee stated that he was also responsible for the Logistics Department which purchased products like ovens, firewood, blankets and window plastics for the Taliban.

4. An individual reported that the detainee was the Deputy Director of Civilian Intelligence. The individual stated all intelligence offices in Kabul, Afghanistan reported to the detainee.

5. An individual stated that the detainee was an al Qaida intelligence member who was the Deputy Minister of Intelligence for Kabul, Afghanistan. The individual stated that the detainee's supervisor reported to Mullah Omar.

6. The detainee stated that he often met with his supervisor's boss because his immediate supervisor often left to take care of the province where he was governor. The detainee stated that his supervisor's boss reported to the leader of the council that reported directly to Mullah Omar.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF WASIQ, ABDUL HAQ

7. An individual who worked for the Taliban under the detainee stated that the individual stored weapons for his Taliban supervisor. The individual also claimed that the communications equipment that the individual was captured with belonged to the detainee.

8. An individual stated that when the detainee interrogated a pair of ethnic Chechens, the detainee learned of the pair's connection to Chechen Fundamentalists. Subsequent to the interrogation, the Supreme Taliban Commander delivered a briefcase containing 100,000 United States dollars to the Chechens for the purpose of supporting Chechen Fundamentalists fighting the Russians.

b. Connections/Associations

1. An individual stated that the detainee arranged for an Egyptian al Qaida member to come to Kabul, Afghanistan to teach personnel in the Taliban Intelligence Service about intelligence.

2. An individual who was employed as a clerk for the Taliban intelligence department and who was detained for suspected involvement with arms smuggling reported that the detainee gave him a high frequency radio for safekeeping.

3. An individual stated that he knew the detainee from operations in Konduz, Afghanistan.

c. Other Relevant Data

An individual stated that the detainee requested that he head up a directorate within the Taliban Intelligence to watch Arab Islamists not affiliated with al Qaida. The individual also claimed that Taliban Intelligence was watching the individual because it was believed that the extremists intended to harm Usama bin Laden.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee stated that he joined the Taliban under duress because he feared retaliation by the Taliban if he did not join.

b. The detainee stated that he was trying to help the Americans kill or capture Mullah Muhammed Omar when the detainee was captured.

c. At the time of his capture, the detainee claims he was attempting to assist the U.S. in capturing Mullah Mohammed Omar. He claims if the Americans had not arrested him, then they might have captured Mullah Mohammed Omar and the detainee's supervisor, Qari Ahmadullah, head of Taliban Intelligence.

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d. The detainee stated that he never met or worked with anyone in al Qaida or in any other radical Islamic group. The detainee stated that he considered al Qaida to be a group of outsiders since it is an Arabic group.

e. The detainee stated that if he is repatriated he did not want to work for the government again because that is what landed him in his current situation.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

19 October 2006

TO: ALAMATRAFI, ABDULLAH

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ALAMATRAFI, ABDULLAH

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee stated that from 1987 to 1989 he was a rifleman in the Mujahedin Army in Jalalabad, Afghanistan.

2. The detainee stated he attended a lunch with Usama bin Laden and Abu Hafs at Usama bin Laden's residence in Matar, Afghanistan to discuss the support the detainee was expected to provide for al Qaida.

3. The detainee stated al Wafa purchased twelve Land Cruiser vehicles for the Taliban.

4. The detainee stated that AK47 and rocket propelled grenade training was conducted at the al Wafa office in Kabul, Afghanistan.

5. A source stated it was common knowledge that al Wafa delivered weapons and supplies to Afghan fighters in Tora Bora, Afghanistan. Al Wafa also provided money of all currencies, including United States Dollars, to those fighters who needed it.

6. Al Wafa began providing financial support directly to al Qaida after the United States attack on Afghanistan.

7. The detainee admitted he took orders from Usama bin Laden.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ALAMATRAFI, ABDULLAH

8. The detainee admitted he was a member of al Qaida. The detainee also stated he is a terrorist, and very proud to be a terrorist.

b. Training

The detainee received AK47 and rocket propelled grenade training in Turkham, Afghanistan.

c. Connections/Associations

1. After the Jaji battle, the detainee was at Sharm Shar in Jalalabad, Afghanistan with several senior al Qaida operatives including Usama bin Laden.

2. The detainee returned to Afghanistan during Ramadan in 2000 to meet with Usama bin Laden to discuss opening al Wafa offices in Afghanistan.

3. The detainee stated that he initially met Abu Hafs in 1989, during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

4. The detainee advised that two months prior to the 11 September 2001 attacks in the United States, he held another meeting with Usama bin Laden. The meeting was held at Usama bin Laden's house in Kandahar, Afghanistan. The detainee stated the purpose of the meeting was to discuss unresolved issues from the first meeting with Usama bin Laden, concerning disagreements between al Wafa and al Qaida.

5. The detainee admitted that he was Director of the al Wafa organization in Afghanistan.

6. The detainee's name is on a list of incarcerated associates found on a computer hard-drive recovered from a suspected al Qaida safe house in Pakistan.

d. Intent

1. The detainee attempted to purchase a computerized laser guided missile system and missiles from a Pakistani arms dealer in Peshawar, Pakistan with assistance from an individual in the Ukraine for 500,000 United States Dollars.

2. The detainee stated he wanted 5,000,000 to 20,000,000 United States Dollars payment for his captivity. The detainee then stated that he would lead his tribe in exacting revenge against the Saudi Arabian and United States governments, and he would kidnap four to five Americans at a time and sever their heads.

3. The detainee stated that I swear to God what you are doing, you will pay. You will experience a greater tragedy than 11 September 2001.

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4. The detainee stated that Not only am I thinking about threatening the American public, but the whole world.

e. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee stated that from 2000 to 2001 he was the National Director for the al Wafa human rights organization in Kabul, Afghanistan.

2. The detainee explained that the budget for the al Wafa organization was approximately 2,000,000 United States Dollars a year in Afghanistan.

3. The detainee noted his escape from Afghanistan began in mid-Ramadan from Kabul, Afghanistan and ended in Lahore, Pakistan where he attempted to board a flight to Saudi Arabia and was arrested.

4. The detainee stated that nothing happened in al Wafa without his knowledge.

5. The detainee stated he was aware of plans to attack a water dam or a nuclear plant in the United States where hundreds of thousands of Americans will be killed. The detainee advised his associates to change their United States Dollars into British Pounds because the United States Dollar will be worthless.

6. The detainee explained that he provided money to purchase twenty-five anti-chemical masks from Peshawar, Pakistan.

7. The detainee advised that al Wafa smuggled individuals into Afghanistan via Iran. Al Wafa worked with an Iranian-based facilitator.

8. Another detainee identified the detainee as the man who paid him to assist in the transporting of both Arabs and Russians from Iran to Afghanistan.

9. The detainee advised that a Kuwaiti group of five to seven people entered Afghanistan via Iran under the cover of the al Wafa relief organization.

10. The detainee stated that he was the founder of al Wafa, a humanitarian, non-governmental organization.

11. The detainee advised that there is no relation between al Qaida and the al Wafa organization.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee stated that he did not fight with the Mujahedin in Afghanistan and did not receive weapons training in Afghanistan.

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b. The detainee stated that he has never supported Usama bin Laden or the Taliban, not even with one dollar, and as head of al Wafa, he has never handled large sums of money.

c. The detainee stated that he has never met Usama bin Laden.

d. The detainee stated al Wafa has no connection with any terrorist organization in any form. The detainee stated that he is not an enemy of the United States, and it is a shame that he is being detained. The detainee stated that he was against the 11 September 2001 bombings of the World Trade Center because those who died in the bombings were innocent civilians.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

31 January 2006

To: NOORI, MULLAH NORULLAH

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF NOORI, MULLAH NORULLAH

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. In September 1995 the detainee fought alongside al Qaida as a Taliban military general against the Northern Alliance. The detainee was responsible for the line near Murghab in the vicinity of Herat, Afghanistan.

2. The detainee claimed he joined the Taliban in 1999. He worked for the governor of Jalalabad, Afghanistan until December 1999. In February 2000 the detainee arrived in Mazar-e-Sharif, Afghanistan.

3. The detainee began working for the Taliban government as one of eight assistants to the governor of Mazar-e-Sharif.

4. The detainee eventually became the governor of Balkh Province, Afghanistan, as he was one of very few tribal members who could read and write. The detainee held this position for about eight to ten months. He received the title of Mullah due to his education and political position.

5. The detainee was fighting on the front lines at Mazar-e-Sharif as a Taliban fighter. As the front lines in Mazar-e-Sharif fell he moved with a majority of the remaining fighters to Kunduz, Afghanistan to reestablish the front lines.

6. While traveling from Mazar-e-Sharif to Zabol Province, Afghanistan, the detainee agreed to negotiate with Dostum's forces regarding the surrender of Taliban forces.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF NOORI, MULLAH NORULLAH

b. Training

The detainee's job required him to stand guard duty, armed with a Kalishnikov, at buildings. He denied ever receiving any training for this position. The detainee stated that he never learned how to take the weapon apart, but he knew how to use it.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee was identified as the Taliban leader in charge of Mazar Bal.
2. The detainee's name appears on a list of key Taliban personalities.
3. The detainee is a close associate of a high-ranking Taliban leader.
4. The detainee hosted al Qaida commanders.
5. The detainee held a meeting with the head of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, who discussed jihad in Uzbekistan.
6. While serving as the governor of Balkh Province in Mazar-e-Sharif the detainee met a subordinate of Usama Bin Laden to pass a message from the Taliban supreme leader.
7. As of late July 2003 Taliban leaders close to the detainee were leading efforts in Zabol Province to destabilize the Afghan Transitional Administration.
8. As of early November 2003, while he was the Taliban Northern Zone Chief, the detainee provided assistance to a friend who was using profits from the sale of narcotics to provide material support to the Taliban and al Qaida. The detainee had given him money and provided him with a money exchange shop.

d. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee was in charge of about 150 combat troops and one helicopter.
2. A group of individuals, including a Taliban member, continue to work to support the detainee.
4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
 - a. The detainee does not consider himself an enemy of the United States. He has never believed that the United States is an enemy of Afghanistan. He reiterated that he never fought with or shot a gun at anyone.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF NOORI, MULLAH NORULLAH

b. The detainee advised that he did not know much about Usama Bin Laden and had only heard of him on the radio. He has never seen Usama Bin Laden.

c. The detainee said that he is not against the United States in any way. If he were allowed to return home, he would attempt to obtain a position in the new government with the hope of being able to provide for his family. The detainee would hold nothing against the United States and would not give support to anyone who was against the United States.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

23 August 2006

TO: FAZL, MOHAMMAD

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF FAZL, MOHAMMAD

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee is approximately thirty-eight years old. The detainee was born in Uruzajan, Afghanistan. The detainee's only son was approximately five years old.

2. The detainee attended the mosque in Afghanistan as a child. The detainee received his religious education in Kohata then his family moved to Pakistan where he continued religious studies.

3. The detainee reported that he was a member of the Taliban who was responsible for the deployment of military troops to specific front line locations in the Takhar Province.

4. According to a source, a former Taliban supreme leader considered the detainee his top soldier. In the war against the Northern Alliance, the detainee was responsible for widespread atrocities against noncombatants.

5. The detainee reported that during the conflict in the northern areas of Afghanistan, he learned of America's involvement and immediately decided to surrender.

6. The detainee reported he held the position of Taliban Army Chief of Staff and surrendered to the Northern Alliance. The detainee believed that he and his 3,000 to 5,000 Taliban troops would be allowed to return home after handing over their weapons.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF FAZL, MOHAMMAD

7. According to a source, the detainee proposed a plan to a former Taliban Supreme Leader to send an assassination team to try to kill Northern Alliance Commander Abdul Rashid Dostum.

b. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee was identified as a Taliban Army Chief who worked for the Supreme Taliban Commander along with other Taliban Army Commanders.

2. Prior to his surrender, the detainee confirmed that he had communications with the Supreme Taliban Commander to request supplies for his troops.

c. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee lost his left, lower leg after stepping on a land mine while walking off a road near Kabul.

2. According to a source affiliated with Mohammed Atta, 500,000 United States Dollars were provided to pay the Northern Alliance for the safe passage of several senior hard line Taliban including the detainee.

3. When the detainee was asked if he knew anything about the Iranian's who were taken hostage from the Iranian Consulate in Mazar-E-Sharif, then were later killed, he said he knew nothing about the incident. The detainee said he did not know how they were killed or who ordered the killing. The detainee claimed he was in the hospital in Kabul when the killings took place.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee claimed he never met Usama bin Laden or any of the al Qaida leadership or members.

b. The detainee claimed that the attacks on the United States were not part of the jihad he was fighting and if he were released, he would not want to go back to Afghanistan. Instead, the detainee would want to go to Saudi Arabia to raise his family.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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**Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba**

15 February 2006

To: RASOUL, ABDULLAH GULAM

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF RASOUL, ABDULLAH GULAM

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee advised that he was called to fight Jihad in approximately 1997; he then went to Kabul to join the Taliban.

2. The detainee stated he felt it would be fine to wage jihad against Americans, Jews, or Israelis if they were invading his country.

3. Prior to the detainee's stay in Kabul, Afghanistan, he stayed at the Kuli Urdu garrison in Kandahar, Afghanistan for ten nights waiting for transportation to Konduz.

4. Taliban Garrison in Kandahar, Afghanistan, Kuli Urdu, also known as Ferqa, was the primary Taliban Military Garrison located in the center of Kandahar, near the main bazaar.

5. The detainee was seriously wounded in a bombing shortly after joining the Taliban. He was hospitalized for eight months. The detainee returned home for approximately two years to recuperate. In 1999, the detainee went to Kandahar to join up with the Taliban once again.

6. In approximately September 2001, the detainee went to Konduz to join up with his Taliban comrades to fight the Northern Alliance.

b. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee was captured while riding in a car with a Taliban leader.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF RASOUL, ABDULLAH GULAM

2. The detainee was identified as being a friend of the man who was in charge of the Taliban military in the Takhar Region.

3. The detainee identified two other Taliban commanders he served under.

4. The detainee along with several high-ranking Taliban members, traveled in the first car of a convoy of Taliban fighters to surrender to General Dostum and the Northern Alliance on approximately December 12, 2001.

5. The detainee explained that he worked directly for another detainee. The detainee did not say what specifically that entailed. The detainee did admit to duties such as driver, bodyguard, and foot soldier.

c. Intent

1. The detainee was given a Kalishnikov rifle by the Taliban.

2. The detainee knew Americans were bombing Afghanistan when he went to Konduz to fight the Northern Alliance.

d. Other Relevant Data

The detainee was captured with two Casio watches of the model that has been used in bombings that have been linked to al Qaida and radical Islamic terrorist improvised explosive devices.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. Detainee was conscripted into the Taliban in 1995

b. Detainee rejoined the Taliban in 1998-1999 to gain better medical attention.

c. The detainee had not heard of al Qaida or Usama bin Laden until after his capture.

d. The detainee looked at pictures of the watches found to be in his possession at the time of his capture. The detainee stated that the two black Casio F-91 series watches were not his but belonged to the man whom he was captured with. The detainee stated that the man told him to carry his things since he had no pockets in his clothing.

e. The detainee never attended any training camps.

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF RASOUL, ABDULLAH GULAM**

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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**Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba**

3 October 2006

To: MOHAMMED, FAHED NASSER

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MOHAMMED, FAHED NASSER

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee stated he was recruited at a mosque in Mecca, Saudi Arabia on or about 26 December 2000. The detainee stated the recruiter told him he could be trained and sent to Palestine to fight in the jihad.

2. The detainee stated he traveled to Jiddah, Saudi Arabia where his recruiter gave him a plane ticket and 3,000 Saudi Riyals. The detainee stated he flew to Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates, then to Karachi, Pakistan and to Quetta, Pakistan where he stayed in a Taliban guest house. The detainee stated that the next day he traveled by taxi to the border with a Pakistani guide, rode a motorcycle around the checkpoint to cross into Afghanistan and continued by taxi to Kandahar, Afghanistan where he stayed at an Arab guest house.

3. The detainee stated he stayed in a Taliban guest house in downtown Kabul, Afghanistan that was approximately thirty minutes from the back lines and was used by Taliban fighters. The detainee stated that he worked in the kitchen and received training on the Kalashnikov rifle, at the Taliban guest house in downtown Kabul.

4. The detainee stated that he rotated from the Taliban guest house in downtown Kabul to another Taliban guest house on the other side of Kabul. The detainee stated that he then began making infrequent trips to the front line of battle to solicit fighters for donations so he could return home.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MOHAMMED, FAHED NASSER

5. The detainee stated that he traveled to Konduz, Afghanistan where he stayed in another Taliban guest house. The detainee stated that he made frequent trips by taxi between two guest houses in Konduz and Takhar, Afghanistan.

b. Training

1. The detainee stated after recovering from malaria, he went through small arms training at al Farouq Training Camp, and was trained on the Kalashnikov, PK, and rocket propelled grenade.

2. The detainee stated Usama bin Laden visited al Farouq Training Camp while he was training there during March or April 2001.

3. The detainee later stated he had not trained at al Farouq Training Camp. The detainee stated that his Afghani captors beat him until he claimed to have trained at al Farouq. The detainee stated that he believes the Afghans wanted him to say this because then he would be more likely to be detained by United States authorities. The detainee stated that he believes the Afghans profited from his transfer to the United States authorities.

4. Another detainee, who is an admitted al Qaida operative, stated that he shared a tent and attended the general principle training with the detainee at al Farouq Training Camp.

c. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee stated that when the Taliban fighters surrendered to the Northern Alliance at Konduz, Afghanistan he was transported with four to five hundred fighters to the Al Janki fortress. The detainee stated a riot occurred at the fortress, and he escaped into Mazur e Sharif. The detainee stated that he was shot in the shoulder, recaptured by the Northern Alliance, and tortured until he admitted to being al Qaida and that he met Usama bin Laden. The detainee stated that he was turned over to the American military in late December 2001, and was transported to the Kandahar, Afghanistan prison.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee stated he has never seen Usama bin Laden and has never sworn allegiance to him.

b. The detainee stated he was never involved in any fighting in Afghanistan.

c. Another detainee stated the detainee is a small fish in the world of jihad.

d. The detainee stated that once he is released he would study mathematics at a local college because he would like to become a math teacher in his hometown. The detainee stated his

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brothers would assist him with the payments. The detainee stated once he is financially settled, he would find a wife and start a family.

e. The detainee stated he has no intentions of participating in another jihad. The detainee stated he feels like people lied to him in order to get him to go to Afghanistan.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

7 November 2006

TO: ABDULLAH, MAJEED

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ABDULLAH, MAJEED

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee stated he was visited approximately one month before Ramadan in 2001 by a person who invited the detainee to come to his office in Mecca, Saudi Arabia and talk about going to Afghanistan to help the humanitarian aid effort.

2. The detainee stated he would travel to Afghanistan and work for al Wafa during the month of Ramadan in 2001. The detainee stated the person told him to be ready to leave on 17 November 2001, and provided the detainee with a plane ticket and 2,000 United States Dollars for the detainee's travel.

3. The United States has designated al Wafa on the Terrorist Exclusion List. An organization placed on the list has been found to commit or incite to commit, prepare, plan or provide material support to further terrorist activity.

4. The detainee stated he traveled from Mecca, Saudi Arabia to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia and flew from Jeddah to Bahrain. The detainee then flew from Bahrain to Tehran, Iran. The detainee took a taxi to the Iranian and Afghanistan border then onward to Kandahar, Afghanistan.

5. The detainee stated he stayed at the al Wafa building in Kandahar, Afghanistan.

6. The detainee stated he received his first assignments two days after reaching al Wafa. The detainee stated he distributed sugar, flour and other goods to villages on his first assignment and assisted in the delivery of food to another village seven days later.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ABDULLAH, MAJEED

7. The detainee stated he worked distributing food and clothing for al Wafa in Kandahar, Afghanistan.

b. Training

Translation of documents found on the detainee when he was captured suggests he was closely involved with al Qaida and that he was either a trainer or a trainee on an anti-surveillance course.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee stated he was hit by a car and taken to a hospital that was taken over by al Qaida. The detainee stated he told men from al Qaida he was volunteering with al Wafa. The detainee stated the men initially thought he was Mujahedin and was in Afghanistan to fight with the Taliban.

2. When the detainee was captured, translation of documents he carried described three anti-surveillance exercises apparently conducted in the area of Qandahar, Afghanistan. The first page was titled Jihad Group al Qaida Airport Security Course and Anti-Surveillance Program. Other pages consisted of poetry of a violent nature and a farewell note.

3. The detainee's name was on a list of names, aliases and nationalities recovered from a raid of a suspected al Qaida safe house.

e. Other Relevant Data

Handwritten documents found on the detainee when captured discussed jihad, terrorism and martyrdom.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee stated he wants to go home to Makkah, Saudi Arabia, never leave and have a family. The detainee stated he has dreams of expanding the family business selling cloths and fabric.

b. The detainee denied ownership of the al Qaida documents found in his possession.

c. The detainee stated he would like to provide a statement so that the reviewers of his file will understand that he wants to change his life for the better.

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ABDULLAH, MAJEED**

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

31 August 2006

TO: GHAZI, FAHED

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF GHAZI, FAHED

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee stated he chose to teach Arabic and how to read the Koran in Afghanistan because he heard it was a country of ignorance, the people there worshiped the graves of the dead, and there were no people to teach them.

2. The detainee stated he decided to train in Afghanistan after seeking the advice of Sheik Muqbil al Wadi in Sanaa, Yemen. The detainee traveled to Sanaa after he found out about a fatwa which al Wadi issued stating that Muslims had a right to train themselves for self-defense against enemies.

3. Shaykh Muqbil al Wadia had the most direct role and influence in spreading Wahabism in Yemen.

4. Shaykh Muqbil al Wadia was responsible for the jihadist movement in the Sadah, Yemen region. The jihadist movement recognized Usama bin Laden as their leader.

5. Since the detainee did not have money for the trip, Sheik Muqbil al Wadi gave the detainee the Yemen currency equivalent of 500 to 600 United States Dollars. Additionally, al Wadi instructed the detainee to go to the Jamaah al Tabeegh mosque in Sanaa, Yemen where he could obtain a visa and plane ticket to Pakistan.

6. Jamaat Tabligh is a Pakistan-based Islamic missionary organization, which is believed to be used as a cover to mask travel and activities of terrorists, including members of al Qaida.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF GHAZI, FAHED

7. After staying one night in a hotel in Karachi, Pakistan, the detainee claimed he traveled to Quetta, Pakistan, where he stayed for two nights at a hotel. The detainee then crossed the border into Afghanistan using a taxi arranged for by the hotel owner.

8. The detainee stated he traveled to Kandahar, Kabul, Jalalabad, and Boldak, Afghanistan teaching Arabic to children.

9. The detainee stated he began teaching in the villages around Spin Buldak, Afghanistan. The detainee stayed in the region for about one week, using the village mosque as a place to sleep.

10. The detainee claimed he traveled to a village near Kandahar, Afghanistan, where he remained for about one week. The detainee then went by bus to Kabul, Afghanistan, where he stayed at a mosque in a village outside of Kabul for about one week.

11. The detainee stated he went to Jalalabad, Afghanistan, by bus where he taught in a village for about two weeks. From Jalalabad the detainee went to Khost, Afghanistan because he heard that more of the people there spoke Arabic. The detainee stayed in various villages around Khost for about two months.

12. The detainee stated he was told that a war had started between America and Afghanistan while he was teaching in the villages around Khost, Afghanistan. The detainee first learned of the war on 5 December 2001 and left the village on 7 December 2001.

13. The detainee stated he decided to flee Afghanistan and return to Yemen because he was frightened for his safety. The detainee stated he was escorted to a village where an Afghan guide was preparing to escort Arab men across the mountains into Pakistan.

14. The detainee stated he joined a group of 27 to 30 other people headed for the Pakistan border. The detainee walked with the group for eight days. The detainee claims he paid the group's guide about 200 to 300 rupee.

15. The detainee stated that when he crossed the border back into Pakistan, he surrendered to the authorities. The authorities accused the detainee of being a terrorist trying to escape from Afghanistan.

b. Training

1. According to the detainee, he trained at al Farouq for nine days before hearing the news about 11 September 2001.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF GHAZI, FAHED

2. The detainee was identified at the al Farouq training camp on or around April 2001. The source stated the detainee was trained on how to shoot the Kalashnikov, explosives, the PK machine gun and the rocket-propelled grenade.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee stated he stayed at the al Nabras guest house for four days until being sent to the al Farouq camp in Afghanistan.

2. A source stated that Arabs bound for training at al Farouq would gather at Nebras until about 25 to 30 were in the group. Usama bin Laden would come to Nebras to greet the fighters before they went to training.

3. The detainee stated that after leaving al Farouq he was taken to Kabul, Afghanistan, and stayed at the Azzam guest house for approximately 35 days.

4. A source stated the Azzam guest house was run by one of Usama bin Laden's most trusted people who reported directly to Usama bin Laden. The Azzam guest house was used to house all types of people to include newly arrived people, fighters from the front lines, wounded people and Usama bin Laden's associates.

d. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee stated he traveled to Tora Bora, Afghanistan and remained there for 27 days to one month.

2. A source claimed the detainee received additional military training while in Tora Bora, Afghanistan since the group the detainee traveled with had a number of instructors.

3. A source claimed the detainee was chosen to go to Tora Bora, Afghanistan to be one of Usama bin Laden's bodyguards. Additionally, the source claimed to have seen the detainee again at Tora Bora after the attacks of 11 September 2001 and stated that the detainee had been fighting.

4. A source stated he and the detainee fought together in Tora Bora, Afghanistan. According to the source, after bin Laden left Tora Bora, the detainee joined a group of 30 individuals who attempted to cross the Pakistan border. Several of these individuals are thought to have been bodyguards for Usama bin Laden.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee stated that during the time he traveled in Yemen, Pakistan and Afghanistan, he had not heard anyone speak about recruiters for fighting in Afghanistan against the enemies of Islam. The detainee believes that there is not currently a jihad.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF GHAZI, FAHED

- b. The detainee stated he was not recruited by anyone to go to Afghanistan.
 - c. The detainee denied being involved with al Qaida or the Taliban. The detainee denied being one of Usama bin Laden's bodyguards.
 - d. The detainee claimed that prior to 11 September 2001 he had not heard of Usama bin Laden or al Qaida.
 - e. The detainee stated that if he is released he wants to go home to Yemen and continue his education, get married and raise a family.
5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

21 September 2006

TO: AL RAHIM, UTHMAN H

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL RAHIM, UTHMAN H

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee stated that he had to do what he called a mission or it would be considered a sin. The detainee stated that he decided to go to Afghanistan in order to teach the people there the right ways of Islam.

2. The detainee stated that he was told to go to Afghanistan by Shayk Muqbil al Wadia.

3. The detainee stated he located a sheik at a mosque and asked if the fatwa calling for jihad was legitimate. The detainee stated the sheik confirmed the legitimacy of the fatwa and gave the detainee 1,000 United States Dollars as funding for his trip.

4. The detainee also stated that he was encouraged to go to Afghanistan by a different Sheik, who also gave the detainee 1,000 United States Dollars to travel.

5. The detainee stated that in March 2001, he decided to leave for Afghanistan. The detainee flew to Dubai, United Arab Emirates, and after a short layover, continued on to Karachi, Pakistan. The detainee stated that the money for the trip was given to him by his oldest brother.

6. The detainee stated he traveled by bus from Karachi, Pakistan, to Quetta, Pakistan and then was directed by various people to the Taliban house. The detainee stated an Afghan Taliban member met him at the house and made arrangements for him to travel to Kandahar, Afghanistan.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL RAHIM , UTHMAN H

7. The detainee stated that he departed for Afghanistan by vehicle. The detainee stated he had in his possession a visa, but the Pakistani border guards just waved them across. In Buldak, Afghanistan, the driver of the vehicle departed and the detainee continued on in a small van. The detainee stated upon arriving in Kandahar, Afghanistan, he went to a university named Madresa Hakani and stayed at the school for about five days.

8. The detainee also stated that he flew to Kabul, Afghanistan, by airplane where another individual met him at the airport in Kabul.

9. The detainee stated that he and another individual traveled to Kabul, Afghanistan. For the next nine months, the detainee and another individual traveled back and forth between Khowst, Afghanistan, and Kabul, teaching children the Koran. The detainee stated after approximately nine months, this individual told the detainee that he should return home because the war had reached Khowst.

10. The detainee stated he met up with a group of 31 other Arabs who were guided by three Afghan males. The group traveled by foot arriving in Parchinar, Pakistan after eight days. The detainee stated he no longer had his passport nor any money by this time.

11. The detainee stated that the group stopped at one of the member's hometown, a small village outside of Khowst, Afghanistan.

12. The detainee stated that someone stole his passport while he stayed in the village. The detainee stated at the time, he had 100 United States Dollars and a watch.

13. The detainee denied being captured, but stated that he and the other members of his group turned themselves in to the Pakistani Police Force in Parchinar, Pakistan.

14. The detainee also stated that once at the border he and 30 Arabs were picked up by Pakistani police and were eventually handed over to the Americans.

b. Training

1. An al Qaida operative stated the detainee was a member of al Qaida and that he first met him in 1999 in Kabul, Afghanistan at the al Farouq Camp. The operative stated he saw the detainee in Tora Bora, Afghanistan on the front lines fighting against the Northern Alliance.

2. A source stated the al Farouq Training Camp was funded by al Qaida and therefore more advanced than other training camps. They had two weeks of weapons training, two weeks of basic commando course, two weeks of topography and two weeks of explosives. After the eight weeks, students went back to their safe house in Kandahar, Afghanistan, where they were given a choice to sign up for advanced training, go home or go to the front line and fight jihad.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL RAHIM , UTHMAN H

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee stated he knows an individual who was alleged to have been involved in the bombing of the USS Cole.

2. A senior al Qaida operative stated the detainee was a bodyguard in Kandahar, Afghanistan, before the 11 September 2001 attacks. The last time the source saw the detainee was during the bombing of Tora Bora, Afghanistan in late 2001.

3. A source stated that the detainee had been Mujahedin for a long time. The source stated he met the detainee at a guest house and saw him many times in Kandahar.

4. The source also stated he saw the detainee in Kandahar, Afghanistan and that he attended advanced training with the detainee.

5. The source confirmed that the detainee was part of the group of 30 that were caught and stated that several of these individuals are thought to have been bodyguards for Usama bin Laden.

6. Another source stated that the detainee may have been a lower emir in the Kandahar, Afghanistan, guest house.

7. An additional source, who saw the detainee at a Kabul guest house believes that the detainee was fighting on the front lines.

8. The detainee is an associate of two other detainees. The detainee stated he knew them from his school days in Taiz, Yemen. The detainee stated they were all part of the group that was arrested and turned over to the American military personnel.

9. A foreign government has identified the detainee, as well as several other Yemenis, as fleeing Afghanistan and probably affiliated with al Qaida.

10. The detainee's name was on a document containing a list of names, safety deposit boxes and contents found on a floppy disk recovered from raids of a suspected al Qaida safe house.

d. Other Relevant Data

The detainee stated he was unable to provide the name of any students whom he taught while in Khowst, Afghanistan. The detainee also stated he is also unable to provide the name of the village where he taught for nine months.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL RAHIM , UTHMAN H

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a. The detainee stated he did not go to Afghanistan to fight, but to teach the Koran.
 - b. The detainee stated he has never received any kind of training except in the areas of religion and soccer. All of his training occurred in Yemen.
 - c. The detainee denied having a weapon during the foot march from Parchinar to Beshawa to Karachi, Pakistan.
 - d. The detainee stated he never knew any Arabs in Afghanistan until he was detained.
 - e. The detainee stated he was never in contact with any Yemeni citizens while in Afghanistan.
 - f. The detainee denies knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.
 - g. The detainee denied membership in or being affiliated in any way with either the Taliban or al Qaida.
 - h. The detainee stated he does not know why a foreign government has labeled him an al Qaida member.
5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

6 September 2006

TO: AL ALAWI, MUAZHAMZA

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL ALAWI, MUAZHAMZA

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee's initial story was that he decided to travel to Afghanistan in response to a fatwa to teach the Koran to young Afghan children.

2. After his original statement regarding his travel to Afghanistan, the detainee stated that he was ready to make a complete statement about his actions in Afghanistan. The detainee stated that he lived in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia when he decided to go join the Taliban and fight the Northern Alliance.

3. The detainee stated that he and his cousin decided to travel to Afghanistan to seek martyrdom fighting for their faith.

4. The detainee claimed that he went to Yemen to make arrangements and flew from Sanaa, Yemen to Karachi, Pakistan. The detainee then traveled to Quetta, Pakistan where he stayed for three days in a Taliban guest house. From there, Taliban fighters then took the detainee across the border into Afghanistan. The detainee gave his passport to a guest house operator for safe keeping.

5. The detainee stated that he was issued a Kalashnikov rifle, four magazines and two grenades at the Khalid Center and then transported to the Omar Saif Center. At the Omar Saif Center, the detainee was assigned to a middle line position. The detainee stayed there five to six months.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL ALAWI, MUAZHAMZA

6. The detainee stated that he fought north of Konduz at the Tajik border. Following air attacks there, the detainee fled to Khowst, Afghanistan and joined a group led by an individual the detainee identified as one of the most important al Qaida members.

7. A source observed the detainee fighting for the overall military leader in the Tora Bora mountains.

b. Training

1. The detainee claimed that he was trained on the AK-47 at the age of eight by his father. The detainee carried an AK-47 and a Russian pistol while in Yemen.

2. The detainee claimed that he was driven in a Taliban vehicle to the Khalid Center, near Bagram, Afghanistan. There the detainee received several hours of training in the operation and firing of rocket-propelled grenades. The detainee fired one rocket-propelled grenade during the training. The detainee declined training on the Kalashnikov rifle, as he was already familiar from previous experience in Yemen.

3. A source stated that he attended basic training with the detainee at the al Farouq Training Camp.

4. The al Farouq Training Camp was funded by al Qaida and therefore was more advanced than the other camps in Afghanistan. The training at al Farouq consisted of two week periods of weapons training, basic commando course, topography, and explosives.

5. A senior al Qaida operative stated that the detainee had participated in the hand-to-hand combat training at Mes Aynak.

6. A source stated that he observed the detainee attending basic training at the Khalden Training Camp.

7. Khaldan's program was a complete course on weapons. An entire six month program at Khaldan consisted of light weapons, heavy weapons, explosives, topography, and a tactical course.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee claimed that he contacted his uncle, who in turn contacted an individual to assist the detainee with his travels to Afghanistan.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL ALAWI, MUAZHAMZA

2. The individual that assisted with the detainee's travels to Afghanistan was the head of the Islah Party and was a major shareholder in Sabaa Bank. The Sabaa Bank was the main bank for channeling funds to Islamic terrorists.

3. The detainee stated that he believes Usama bin Laden and the head of the Islah Party fought the Russians together, but claims that the head of the Islah Party did not support the Taliban.

4. A source observed the detainee pulling security duty at the Kandahar, Afghanistan airport compound. The source described the security duty as standing watch at the entry gate to the Usama bin Laden compound.

5. A source claimed that the detainee was a bodyguard for Usama bin Laden, and stated that he personally saw the detainee with Usama bin Laden approximately one month before Ramadan.

6. An al Qaida operative stated that he met the detainee in 1998 at a small training camp in Khowst, Afghanistan. The al Qaida operative also stated that the detainee was one of Usama bin Laden's bodyguards.

7. The detainee's name was listed in a document identifying al Qaida Mujahedin and the contents of their trust accounts recovered during raids against al Qaida associated safe houses in Pakistan.

d. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee was arrested in Pakistan for not having a passport and transferred to United States custody.

2. A source identified the detainee as a Mujahedin who was captured at Tora Bora, Afghanistan.

3. A source identified the detainee as a long time Mujahed that acted as an Imam at a Kandahar, Afghanistan guest house. The detainee held this position because he had memorized the Koran and knew it better than others at the guest house.

4. The detainee was one of the 30 individuals in Tora Bora. Three individuals accompanied Usama bin Laden when Usama bin Laden left Tora Bora, Afghanistan and 30 others departed the area afterwards headed for Pakistan. These 30 individuals were arrested crossing the border. Several of these individuals are thought to have been bodyguards for Usama bin Laden.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL ALAWI, MUAZHAMZA

5. During an interview, the detainee refused to answer questions and began chanting and singing prayers. The detainee became angry with the Arabic/English translator and jumped up from his chair in a threatening manner. The detainee told the translator that when he left Camp Delta the first thing the detainee would do is kill him.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee denied any affiliation with al Qaida and indicated he never saw or was in the presence of Usama bin Laden or any other high ranking al Qaida personnel.

b. The detainee denied being a member of al Qaida.

c. The detainee denied that he served as a bodyguard for Usama bin Laden. The detainee denies ever meeting or being in the same room with Usama Bin Laden. The detainee also stated that he had never been a member of the Taliban nor fought against the Northern Alliance Forces.

d. The detainee claimed that if he returned to Yemen, he would spend half his time teaching the Koran and half his time working for his father who owns an auto dealership.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

UNCLASSIFIED

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

21 September 2006

TO: AL ANSI, MOHAMMED A

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL ANSI, MOHAMMED A

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee claimed he decided to go to Afghanistan to assist in the Koranic education of Afghans after hearing a local Imam in Saada, Yemen.

2. The detainee claimed he made arrangements with two acquaintances to fly to Pakistan and make their way to Afghanistan to teach Islam.

3. The detainee claimed he traveled via Yemeni Airlines from Sana, Yemen to Dubai, United Arab Emirates, then to Karachi, Pakistan. The detainee then flew to Quetta, Pakistan where he went to the Taliban office to join up with the Taliban. After two and a half days in Quetta, the detainee headed on to Khowst Province, Afghanistan.

4. The detainee claimed that after arriving in Khowst, Afghanistan, he and his friends met the Imam of the mosque in Khowst that took their passports and visas, and instructed them to go to the village of Gholam Khan, Afghanistan to assist in the Koranic instruction.

5. A senior al Qaida operative claimed that while attending a close combat course at the Mes Aynak training camp, the detainee swore bayat to Usama bin Laden.

b. Training

A senior al Qaida operative claimed that the detainee participated in an elite training course at the Mes Aynak Camp in Afghanistan.

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c. Connections/Associations

1. A senior al Qaida operative stated that the detainee was one of Usama bin Laden's bodyguards beginning in mid-2000. Two months before 11 September 2001 the detainee and four other bodyguards were taken to Karachi, Pakistan to teach them English and American behaviors. All of Usama bin Laden's bodyguards were arrested two weeks before the fall of Kabul, Afghanistan.

2. A source stated that the detainee became a bodyguard for Usama bin Laden in late 1999 or early 2000 and remained in that position for approximately one year.

3. Another source stated he saw the detainee guarding Usama bin Laden at the Kandahar, Afghanistan Airport.

4. A third source stated that the detainee was a guard for Usama bin Laden. The source was certain that he saw the detainee in 2001 at a guest house where Usama bin Laden was staying.

5. A fourth source stated that the detainee was a bodyguard for Usama bin Laden. The source saw the detainee in Tora Bora, Afghanistan with a handgun and a Bika.

6. A source stated that three individuals accompanied Usama bin Laden when he left Tora Bora, Afghanistan and thirty others departed the area afterwards headed for Pakistan. These thirty individuals were arrested crossing the border. Several of these individuals are thought to have been bodyguards for Usama bin Laden.

7. A source claimed that the detainee was a close friend with the personal secretary to Usama bin Laden.

8. A source stated that he met the detainee at the Algati guest house approximately mid-2001.

9. A source stated that he saw the detainee many times at Usama bin Laden's house and at the guest house in Kandahar, Afghanistan.

d. Intent

A senior al Qaida operative identified the detainee as one of the martyrs who had been readied for al Qaida's Southeast Asia hijacking plan of 11 September 2001. The senior al Qaida operative also said Usama bin Laden targeted United States' airlines, citizens and military installations in Seoul, South Korea and Singapore.

e. Other Relevant Data

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL ANSI, MOHAMMED A

1. As Ramadan began, approximately November 2001, the detainee claimed he desired to return to Yemen. The detainee discussed this with village elders and they collected money to assist his travel home.

2. The detainee claimed he returned to Khowst, Afghanistan to retrieve his passport and visa but the individual that had it was away. After waiting several days, the detainee hired a guide and left for the Pakistani border without his documents.

3. The detainee stated he was arrested by Pakistani authorities shortly after crossing the border but was not sure of the location. The detainee spent a day in the local jail, and then was transferred to a larger Pakistani facility for four days. The detainee was then turned over to United States authorities.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee steadfastly denied any involvement in or knowledge of al Qaida activities in Afghanistan or Pakistan. When asked if he had ever seen or heard Usama bin Laden, the detainee abruptly returned to his previous story of fleeing the city, denying ever seeing Usama bin Laden.

b. The detainee claimed he has never received any formal or informal military training. The detainee was never issued nor carried a weapon in Afghanistan or Pakistan. The detainee also claimed no enmity towards the United States.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

13 May 2006

TO: AL HIKIMI, AHMED UMAR ABDULLAH

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL HIKIMI, AHMED UMAR
ABDULLAH

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee met a facilitator in 1999 who suggested that the detainee could become a better Muslim by going to a Muslim country to teach children the Koran. He also told the detainee about the Dawa, stating that non-Arabic Muslims should be taught Arabic so they could read the Koran.

2. The facilitator told the detainee to see a sheikh who was a well-known Muslim scholar from Yemen.

3. The detainee sold his taxi business for money to obtain a Yemeni passport. The detainee bribed a government office to change the birthdate on his passport so he would appear too old for Yemeni military conscription.

4. The detainee went to a Pakistani embassy in Yemen to obtain a travel visa but was unsuccessful because he lacked the proper medical or working papers.

5. The detainee bribed a doctor to provide a document stating that the detainee needed treatment for a nasal problem. The detainee then fulfilled other bureaucratic requirements and finally obtained a Pakistani visa.

6. The detainee purchased an airplane ticket to Karachi, Pakistan.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL HIKIMI, AHMED UMAR ABDULLAH

7. The detainee traveled to Khowst, Afghanistan, via Karachi, Pakistan, and Peshawar, Pakistan.

8. The detainee met a student at the local market in Khowst, Afghanistan. The detainee stayed overnight at the student's house, and the next day, the student showed the detainee around the town and villages. The two then decided that they would teach together in and around Khowst and Kabul, Afghanistan.

9. The detainee and the student taught together for about eight months in 1999.

10. The detainee returned to Yemen, taking the same route as when he entered Afghanistan. He remained in Yemen for about one year and worked odd jobs to save money to return to Afghanistan and continue teaching the Koran.

11. The detainee returned to Afghanistan in February 2001, traveling the same route and obtaining the necessary travel documents in a similar manner as before.

12. When the detainee arrived in Khowst, Afghanistan, he went to the student's house. As before, they planned to travel to villages near Khowst and Kabul, Afghanistan to teach the Koran.

13. The detainee and the student taught near Kabul, Afghanistan, until the student heard on the radio that General Dostum's forces had taken Mazar-e-Sharif, Afghanistan. The student suggested that they go to Khowst, Afghanistan since the Taliban in Kabul were fleeing.

14. Three days later the detainee and the student heard that General Dostum's forces had taken Kabul, Afghanistan. The detainee was advised to leave because General Dostum's forces were killing Arabs.

15. As the detainee and the student were fleeing to Khowst, Afghanistan, the student took the detainee's passport and threw it out the taxi window. The student explained that without his passport, the detainee could not be positively identified as an Arab.

16. One week after the detainee and the student arrived, Khowst fell to the opposition forces. The student advised the detainee to return to Pakistan.

17. The detainee was captured on 15 December 2001 with 30 suspected al Qaida members while trying to cross into Pakistan from Afghanistan.

18. The detainee was transferred from Pakistan to United States custody on 26 December 2001.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL HIKIMI, AHMED UMAR ABDULLAH

b. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee visited a sheikh who agreed to finance the detainee's travels to Afghanistan to teach the Koran.
2. The sheikh bore responsibility for the Brotherhood Islamic movement in Sa'dah, Yemen. Usama bin Laden is the leader of the Brotherhood movement.
3. Several of the individuals with whom the detainee was captured are thought to have been bodyguards for Usama bin Laden.
4. The detainee was identified as an associate of the Kandahar Airport Group.
5. An al Qaida operative first saw the detainee in Kabul, Afghanistan at the al Farouq camp in 1999. The operative stated that the detainee would drive from the front line to the mountains once a week to supply food to the brothers. The operative also saw the detainee later at a guest house in Kandahar, Afghanistan.
6. An escort for Usama bin Laden and his family saw the detainee on the front lines in northern Afghanistan fighting for the Taliban against the Northern Alliance.
7. The detainee's name was found on an electronic document seized from an alleged al Qaida residence in Karachi, Pakistan.
8. A senior al Qaida operative saw the detainee in Afghanistan prior to the 11 September 2001 attacks and identified him as a Yemeni national known to frequent the Bayt Al Salama guest house.
9. The Bayt Al Salama lodging house in Kandahar, Afghanistan was run by al Qaida for its members and distinguished visitors.

c. Intent

1. The detainee was identified as a Taliban pick-up truck driver from Tora Bora to Jalalabad.
2. The detainee was seen on the Taliban front lines in Kabul, Afghanistan in late 1999 or early 2000 and identified as a driver.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL HIKIMI, AHMED UMAR ABDULLAH

3. The detainee lived in a guest house approximately three kilometers from the front line. His duties were to transport clothing and supplies from Jalalabad to Tora Bora.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee advised that he has not heard of any future attacks on the United States and does not know anyone who has knowledge or was involved in past attacks on the United States.

b. The detainee stated that he is not a member of the Taliban.

c. The detainee advised that he is not a member of al Qaida and only heard about them on television. He noted that he thinks Usama bin Laden is bad and has never met him.

d. The detainee stated that he did not attend any training camps in Afghanistan and never felt the need to pick up a weapon to fight.

e. The detainee advised that he feels bad about the attacks on the U.S. and thinks they were wrong.

f. The detainee stated that he had no problem with America or Americans.

g. The detainee claimed that he never handled or fired a weapon in Afghanistan and never fought in Afghanistan.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

24 September 2006

TO: AL MUJAHID, MAHMUD A

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL MUJAHID, MAHMUD A

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
 1. An al Qaida operative identified the detainee as the emir of a guest house at the airport village in Kandahar, Afghanistan.
 2. An individual who has sat with Usama bin Laden more than ten times stated that the detainee was a bodyguard and claimed that the bodyguards were given specialized training at al Farouq.
 3. The detainee's name was listed on a roster recovered from the military committee of the al Mujahideen office. The detainee was included on list that contained sixteen students that had graduated on September 10, 2000 from al Qaida basics course.
 4. A source stated that the detainee became a bodyguard shortly after the USS Cole bombing and remained a guard for one year until they all withdrew to Tora Bora, Afghanistan. A source stated that the detainee's older brother, who was a veteran bodyguard, brought the detainee to the Usama bin Laden guard force.
 5. A source identified the detainee as a member of Usama bin Laden's guard force.
 6. A source stated he saw the detainee several times with Usama bin Laden between 23 October 2001 and 12 November 2001 in Kabul, Afghanistan, Khowst, Afghanistan and Jalalabad, Afghanistan.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL MUJAHID, MAHMUD A

7. A third source identified the detainee as one of Usama bin Laden's bodyguards.

8. An individual who has sat with Usama bin Laden more than ten times stated that the detainee was always with Usama bin Laden in Kabul, Afghanistan, Kandahar, Afghanistan, and al Farouq and described him as a good fighter. The detainee carried a Kalashnikov rifle.

9. An al Qaida facilitator stated that the detainee followed his brother into al Qaida. The al Qaida facilitator stated that the detainee's brother facilitated his recruitment as a bodyguard for Usama bin Laden.

10. A source claimed that he saw the detainee with Usama bin Laden on three different occasions between April 2001 and November 2001. The source believes that the detainee was one of Usama bin Laden's closest bodyguards due to the fact that every time he saw Usama bin Laden the detainee was close by.

b. Training

1. A source stated he first saw the detainee at al Farouq in May or June of 2000, and later heard that the detainee became a guard for Usama bin Laden.

2. A source stated that when the detainee was training at al Farouq, he was not convinced of fighting against the Northern Alliance and was hesitant. The source stated that the detainee did not know whether to go to the Islamic Institute in Kandahar, Afghanistan or to go to the front lines to fight.

3. A senior al Qaida operative stated that al Farouq training camp took 45 days and was a basic training course that covered all types of topics, such as weapons, topography, field guns, first aid, and explosives.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee stated that he studied religion under a sheikh from Yemen for a period of three months.

2. According to a Yemeni national, the same sheikh from Yemen was recruiting Yemeni youth from small villages. The Yemeni youth were being indoctrinated into the radical salafi sect of Islam, and instilled with a profound hatred toward the west.

3. A source stated that the detainee was facilitated to Afghanistan in late 1999 or early 2000. The source also stated that he facilitated the detainee's brother's trip to Afghanistan circa 1997-1998.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL MUJAHID, MAHMUD A

4. A driver for Usama bin Laden identified the detainee as one of the individuals from the group that was apprehended at the Pakistan boarder. The driver stated that the detainee was a bodyguard for Usama bin Laden.

5. A source stated that he saw the detainee at the Nibras guest house, Kabul, Afghanistan, Tora Bora, Afghanistan and in the al Farouq training camp. The source stated that the detainee moved with Usama bin Laden when he departed.

6. A source identified two guest houses in Kandahar, Afghanistan. One was for the common people and other one was called the al Nibras guest house which was for the special people, that included those en-route to the al Farouq training camp and Usama bin Laden.

d. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee stated that he then attended the Islamic institute in Mareb, Yemen where he had been told that he should go to Afghanistan to teach the Koran.

2. The detainee stated that he and another individual arrived in Karachi, Pakistan and were met by a Yemeni individual. After five days the three of them boarded a bus and traveled to Quetta, Pakistan.

3. The detainee claimed that he was driven in a public car to the border of Afghanistan and Pakistan. When the detainee arrived at the border, he got out of the car and crossed the border on foot into Buldak, Afghanistan.

4. A source stated that he saw Usama bin Laden in the Tora Bora region of Afghanistan. After Usama bin Laden left Tora Bora, the source left with 30 individuals who attempted to cross the border into Pakistan. The source identified the detainee as one of the 30 individuals he was captured with while attempting to cross the border into Pakistan. Several of these individuals are thought to have been bodyguards for Usama bin Laden.

5. A source who was part of the thirty individuals captured near Parachinar, Pakistan while fleeing Afghanistan, claimed that the Pakistani warden told the group that the best thing they could tell the United States forces when interrogated was that they were in Afghanistan to teach the Koran and for religious studies.

6. An source with information regarding future attacks planned against the United States, claims the detainee knows about future operations.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee claimed that he heard from various Yemeni religious leaders of the religious ignorance in Afghanistan and was motivated to travel to Afghanistan to teach the Quran.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL MUJAHID, MAHMUD A

b. The detainee denied participating in any fighting or receiving any weapons training either before or during his trip to Afghanistan. The detainee denied knowing the locations of any terrorist training camps.

c. The detainee stated that his brother, Riyadh, had never been to Afghanistan, and was not affiliated with al Qaida or the Taliban.

d. The detainee denied attending al Farouq Training Camp and denied ever participating in any military training while in Afghanistan.

e. The detainee denied being an Usama Bin Laden bodyguard, denied swearing bayat to Usama bin Laden, and claimed he never saw anyone swear bayat to Usama bin Laden.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

13 September 2006

TO: AHMED, FARUQ A

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AHMED, FARUQ A

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. Around February 2001, the detainee received aid to get into Afghanistan.

2. The detainee was provided with about 500 United States Dollars and an airline ticket, obtained through donations, to support his trip to Afghanistan.

3. The detainee received instructions to go to Quetta, Pakistan, and he asked a taxi to take him to the Taliban office.

4. The detainee stated he traveled by plane from Taiz through Dubayy, United Arab Emirates to Karachi, Pakistan.

5. Once in Karachi, Pakistan, the detainee stated he stayed at a hotel for three days before traveling by bus to Quetta, Pakistan.

6. Quetta, Pakistan is used as a location to hide and then smuggle individuals into Kandahar, Afghanistan.

7. Once in Quetta, Pakistan the detainee went to the Taliban office to meet his contact.

8. The following day the detainee was taken to Kandahar, Afghanistan by his contact.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AHMED, FARUQ A

9. The detainee stayed in Kandahar, Afghanistan for three days and then departed for Kabul, Afghanistan.

10. Once in Kabul, Afghanistan, the detainee stayed at the Wazir Akbar Khan Mosque from approximately May 2001 to August 2001.

11. The mosque was frequented mostly by Afghans, some of them armed with Kalashnikov rifles.

12. Once at the mosque the detainee was introduced to another contact.

13. The detainee's contact worked for the Taliban.

14. The detainee gave his contact at the mosque his passport for safekeeping while he stayed in Afghanistan and at his contact's suggestion, he did not retrieve it before departing for Pakistan.

15. In approximately August 2001, the detainee was taken to a village near Khowst, Afghanistan and introduced to the Imam of the Abu al Hanifa Mosque. The detainee lived and taught at the mosque until December 2001, when he was told that it was too dangerous for him in Afghanistan and he should leave.

16. The detainee was taken to the Pakistani border, where the detainee recognized a group of Yemen men that visited his high school classes in Tirez and asked to be left with that group.

17. The detainee's group walked for about eight days to the border town of Barashina, Pakistan. After crossing the border, the detainee surrendered to Pakistani authorities.

18. The detainee has been identified as being detained while trying to cross into Pakistan from Afghanistan on 15 December 2001 with 30 suspected al Qaida members.

19. The detainee was transferred from Pakistani control in Peshawar to United States custody on 26 December 2001.

b. Training

1. The detainee was identified as having attended the al Farouq Training Camp.

2. The detainee has been identified as being at al Farouq under the name of Hamza Shammali.

3. The al Farouq Training Camp was funded by al Qaida and was more advanced than other camps in Afghanistan.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AHMED, FARUQ A

4. The al Farouq Training Camp trained individuals in the use of the Kalashnikov rifle, Uzi, Makrov handgun, Russian-made breaker machine gun and rocket-propelled grenades. Additionally, some were trained for Amliate or suicide missions.

5. The detainee was seen as going to the al Karga Training Camp for explosives training. This camp was located at the edge of Kabul in an industrial area surrounded by a forest.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The Furqan Institute was a meeting and recruiting ground for jihadists in Yemen. Many Yemen al Qaida members have links to the institute.

2. The detainee stated while at the mosque he taught the Koran to children aged seven to nine years old from approximately May to August 2001.

3. The detainee lived in a house run and occupied by Afghans approximately 30 minutes walking distance from the mosque.

4. The detainee's residence in Kabul, Afghanistan, was a house used by Taliban officials to live in while on business in Kabul.

5. The detainee met three Yemenis while enroute to Pakistan. The detainee originally met all of them while they were all in their third year of high school when the detainee was in his first year of high school.

6. The detainee and the three Yemenis were all former classmates at the Ta'iz Furqan Institute.

7. The three Yemenis are all detainees identified as Usama bin Laden bodyguards.

8. An admitted Usama bin Laden bodyguard identified one of the Yemeni companions that the detainee knew from high school as a bodyguard very close to Usama bin Laden who introduced Usama bin Laden to his fourth wife. This source also identified one of the other of those traveling with the detainee as a Yemeni he heard was a Usama bin Laden bodyguard for 20 to 30 days, and fought on the front lines in Kabul, Afghanistan. The source also identified another Yemeni as a bodyguard who was with Usama bin Laden before he disappeared in Tora Bora, as well as fought on the Kabul front lines in January 2001.

9. The detainee was identified as a Mujahed who was captured at Tora Bora.

10. The detainee was identified as wearing camouflage and carrying an Kalashnikov rifle at Usama bin Laden's private airport in Kandahar, Afghanistan.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AHMED, FARUQ A

11. The detainee was captured with the group of 30 Arab Mujahedin and suspected al Qaida members, who were in Tora Bora with Usama bin Laden when the American bombing started.

12. A detainee stated Yemenis in al Qaida were identified as having a reputation of being uneducated and just wanting to fight.

13. A document listing 324 Arabic names, aliases and nationalities was recovered from safe house raids associated with suspected al Qaida in Karachi, Pakistan. This list contains the detainee's name, nationality and personal items, one item being a passport.

14. The detainee's name was on a laminated card found in the pocket of a slain Arab outside of a checkpoint in Afghanistan.

15. The detainee was noted by others as having had a lot of money to train everyday.

16. The detainee was seen carrying many cassettes with al Qaida and anti-American songs about the destruction of the Khobar Towers.

17. The detainee was seen getting very excited over the song about the destruction of the Khobar Towers.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee stated that he had no military training of any kind.

b. An admitted Usama bin Laden bodyguard identified the detainee as someone who came to Afghanistan only two to three weeks before the bombing began. The source said the detainee is not known as an al Qaida member and spent his time in Afghanistan memorizing the Koran.

c. If released, the detainee would like to play soccer, get married, get his own house and find a job in Yemen. The detainee does not feel any animosity towards the United States. The detainee feels the people involved with the 11 September 2001 attacks should be held accountable for their actions. The detainee stated he would not want to harm any Americans.

d. The detainee denied he was a bodyguard for Usama bin Laden. The detainee has only seen Usama bin Laden in pictures and believes he is a bad man.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

14 April 2006

TO: AL EDAH, MOHAMMED AHMAD SAID

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL EDAH, MOHAMMED AHMAD
SAID

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee traveled to Pakistan to accompany his sister who required medical attention due to chronic back pain. While in Pakistan, the detainee and his sister were supposed to meet the detainee's sister's husband; however, he had moved to Kandahar, Afghanistan.

2. The detainee states that his brother-in-law, had assisted in making arrangements for the detainee and his sister to travel to Afghanistan. Specifically, he delivered their passports to Sanaa, Yemen in order to get visas and tickets.

3. The detainee took 15,000 Riyals with him on the trip.

4. The detainee and his sister traveled from Sanaa, Yemen via Dubai, United Arab Emirates and finally to Karachi, Pakistan.

5. When the detainee and his sister arrived in Karachi, Pakistan they were informed that the sister's husband was not in Karachi.

6. The detainee stated that his brother-in-law arranged for a Pakistani to facilitate their travel inside of Pakistan.

7. The detainee, his sister, and the Pakistani traveled to Quetta, Pakistan to look for the sister's husband. When they arrived in Quetta, they went to Kandahar, Afghanistan.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL EDAH, MOHAMMED AHMAD SAID

8. The detainee and his sister met her husband in Kandahar, Afghanistan.
9. From Kandahar, Afghanistan the detainee's sister and her husband went back to Pakistan while the detainee stayed at the brother-in-law's guest house.
10. The detainee remained in Kandahar, Afghanistan and then departed for Kabul, Afghanistan.
11. The detainee decided to take a month vacation and traveled from Kabul, Afghanistan to Khowst, Afghanistan.
12. According to the detainee, upon arrival at Khowst he took residence in the Omar mosque.
13. The detainee then traveled from Khowst to Kandahar, Afghanistan to visit his sister and brother-in-law.
14. The detainee learned that his brother-in-law had been killed and his sister had fled to Pakistan.
15. The detainee remained in Kandahar due to the bombing raids. From there, he attempted to drive his brother-in-law's motorcycle out of town. This is when the detainee fell from the motorcycle and injured himself. The detainee was treated at the El Sim hospital, released after two days and returned to Khowst. From there, he traveled to Miram Shah, Pakistan where the Pakistani Army arrested him with others.
16. The detainee stayed in two prisons before being transferred to United States custody.
17. The detainee was transferred from Peshawar, Pakistan to United States custody on 26 December 2001.

b. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee's sister was one of three spouses of active Yemeni al Qaida members; the spouses were deported to Yemen by Pakistani authorities.
2. According to the detainee's sister, she traveled to Afghanistan accompanied by her brother the detainee, who is among the jihadists from Taiz, Yemen.
3. Another sister of the detainee was one of three spouses of active Yemeni al Qaida members who had been residents in Kandahar, Afghanistan.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL EDIH, MOHAMMED AHMAD SAID

c. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee has been identified as being a key figure within the al Qaida network.
2. The detainee has been identified as somebody who stayed at a guest house in Kandahar, Afghanistan and as someone who attended the al Farouq training camp.
3. A source has identified the detainee as somebody he saw while he was imprisoned in an underground room near the Kandahar airport after he had been accused of being a spy, and tortured. The detainee entered the room with a few other armed men.
4. The detainee did several security checks at the Nibras guest house in Kandahar, Afghanistan during the summer of 2001 prior to a Usama bin Laden visit. The detainee would arrive at the guest house accompanied by four personal bodyguards.
4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
 - a. The detainee claims no knowledge of terrorist plans, Usama bin Laden, or al Qaida.
 - b. The detainee has denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001.
 - c. The detainee has denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.
 - d. The detainee has denied any knowledge or planning of internal uprisings at the Guantanamo Bay, Cuba detention facility.
5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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**Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba**

19 May 2006

TO: AL YAFI, AL KHADR ABDALLAH MUHAMMED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF
AL YAFI, AL KHADR ABDALLAH MUHAMMED**

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee attended a mosque in Yemen and at various times listened to sermons urging Muslims to seek a better life for themselves. On one occasion the detainee listened to a sermon given by Sheikh Muqbil al Wadi.

2. The detainee said it was a tough decision but he decided to return home and sell his sheep so that he could travel to Afghanistan to teach.

b. Training

1. The detainee attended army basic training in Aden, Yemen.

2. The detainee served two and a half years in the Yemeni army.

3. The detainee received training on the Kalashnikov (rifle), light arms, handguns and shoulder-fired weapons.

4. The detainee studied for six months at the al Dimaj Institute in Sadah, Yemen under Sheik Muqbil al Wadi.

5. The al Dimaj Institute (Training Center) was often used for indoctrination and recruiting grounds for foreign extremists/terrorists seeking entry into other paramilitary or jihad organizations.

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ISN 034

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL YAFI, AL KHADR ABDALLAH MUHAMMED

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee met a Pakistani who spoke of traveling to Afghanistan to spread the word of Islam.

2. The detainee and the Pakistani flew to Pakistan through Dubai, United Arab Emirates. Upon arrival in Karachi, Pakistan they rested at a place similar to a hotel for several days with other people the detainee did not know. After approximately one week in Karachi, they traveled by bus to Quetta, Pakistan. They rented a taxi with other passengers and traveled to Afghanistan.

3. The detainee and the Pakistani traveled together for two years in Afghanistan.

4. A senior al Qaida lieutenant stated he recalled possibly seeing the detainee at the al Zubayr guest house prior to the 11 September 2001 attacks.

5. A senior al Qaida commander recognized the detainee. He stated he recognized the detainee's face as a Yemeni he saw in the Kabul guest house, probably in the 1999-2000 time frame.

6. A bodyguard of Usama bin Laden stated he saw the detainee (circa 1999) at an Arab compound in Kandahar, Afghanistan.

7. The detainee's name was found on a list of 324 Arabic names, aliases and nationalities recovered from a safe house connected with suspected al Qaida in Pakistan.

d. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee fled Afghanistan in early December 2001. He joined a group of thirty-one Arabs guided by three guides to the Afghan/Pakistani border. He was arrested by Pakistani border guards.

2. The detainee said he traveled with a group of individuals through the mountains and valleys for many days.

3. The detainee was seen at Tora Bora.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee stated his military service was compulsory.

b. The detainee stated he went to Afghanistan to spread the word of Islam.

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF
AL YAFI, AL KHADR ABDALLAH MUHAMMED**

c. The detainee said during his time in Afghanistan he never met Usama bin Laden, never heard him speak, and was not aware that Usama bin Laden was in any area the detainee visited.

d. The detainee said he fled Afghanistan for his safety.

e. The detainee stated he never fought against the Northern Alliance, has never met Usama bin Laden and never attended the al Dimaj Institute.

f. The detainee denied he ever stayed or trained at any training camps while in Afghanistan.

g. The detainee stated that the people responsible for the attacks of 11 September 2001 should all be killed because this goes against the teachings of the Koran.

h. The detainee denies any knowledge about past or future attacks on the United States and its interests.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

7 April 2006

TO: IDRIS AHMED ABDU QADER IDRIS

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF IDRIS AHMED ABDU QADER IDRIS

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee decided to go to Afghanistan in April 2001 at the suggestion of Mohammad al Qadi, imam of the al Khair Mosque.

2. The detainee stayed in Kabul, Afghanistan teaching the Koran at a local mosque for approximately eight months.

3. The detainee stated he paid for all of his own food while teaching at the mosque. The detainee received absolutely nothing in return for spending six days a week for eight months teaching at the mosque.

b. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee's travel to Afghanistan was facilitated by an individual who prayed at the Khair Mosque and arranged for other detainees' trips.

2. The individual who facilitated the detainee's travel to Afghanistan has been identified by a known al Qaida member as a fund collector and recruiter for al Qaida.

3. An individual from the detainee's mosque, al Qadi, gave the detainee approximately 100 United States Dollars for the detainee's trip and paid for the detainee's plane ticket.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF IDRIS AHMED ABDO QADER IDRIS

4. Prior to departure, al Qadi told the detainee that a man identified as Abdul Razzaq Mohammad would meet the detainee at the airport in Karachi.

5. The detainee said an individual arranged for him to stay in Khowst, Afghanistan in a room located within a restaurant. The detainee stayed there for approximately twenty days, and during that time the detainee saw the individual several times.

6. The individual who arranged for the detainee's room in Khowst has been identified by intelligence sources as Mullah Rosi Khan, a mid-level district Taliban commander.

7. Information gathered in November 2003 stated that the former Taliban area commander in Kabul, Afghanistan had formed a new hit-and-run group in the Zabul Province of Afghanistan. One of the Taliban commanders in that group was Mullah Rosi Khan.

8. The detainee joined a group of thirty Arabs that was being organized by Mohammad Annas. Annas promised to help the detainee and others raise funds to permit their return to Yemen once the party reached Pakistan. They were all apprehended once they reached the Parachinar border checkpoint.

9. Mohammed Annas is a known alias for Ali Hamza Ismail, media coordinator for Usama bin Laden. Ismail was captured along with 29 other Arabs by Pakistan authorities.

c. Other Relevant Data

The detainee said that he never traveled outside of Yemen before he went to Afghanistan.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee denied going to fight or train in Afghanistan and said he has never fired a weapon of any kind. The detainee continues to say he went to Afghanistan to teach the Koran.

b. The detainee denied contact with any European or United States businessmen or government employees.

c. The detainee denied ever receiving any military or weapons training while in Afghanistan.

d. The detainee denied ever having any membership in or ties with the Taliban or al Qaida.

e. The detainee was queried regarding any knowledge or planning of internal uprisings at the Guantanamo detention facility with negative results.

f. The detainee denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or its interests.

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF IDRIS AHMED ABDU QADER IDRIS**

g. The detainee stated he has fulfilled his obligation to teach the Koran and has no intention of pursuing any further Koranic teaching opportunities.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

2 October 2006

TO: IDRIS, MAHMUD A

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF IDRIS, MAHMUD A

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee stated he stayed for approximately four months in Khowst, Afghanistan. The detainee stated that an individual who worked as a senior member of the al Wafa Relief Organization sent him to villages in Khowst, Afghanistan to teach.

2. The detainee stated he went to the front lines at Bagram, Afghanistan where he spent two years fighting prior to the start of the United States bombing of Afghanistan. The detainee stated he received military training at the al Farouq Camp.

3. A source stated the al Farouq Training Camp was funded by al Qaida and therefore more advanced than other training camps. After eight weeks of training, students go back to their safe house in Kandahar, Afghanistan. At the safe house, the students can sign up for advanced training or go to the front lines and fight jihad.

4. The detainee admitted to being the clinical doctor at al Farouq Camp in Afghanistan.

5. A source stated he saw the detainee at the al Farouq clinic treating people.

6. The detainee was identified as a respected camp leader who had his own weapon. This source stated the detainee had the authority to attend meetings with the leadership of the camp.

7. The detainee was identified as a doctor and a fighter in Afghanistan. The source stated the detainee provided medical care to trainees who would get injured at al Farouq.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF IDRIS, MAHMUD A

8. A source stated that the detainee was a medical doctor that traveled between unidentified training camps in Afghanistan. The source also stated that the detainee's home was in Kandahar, Afghanistan.

9. A source identified the detainee as the doctor at the al Farouq Camp. The source observed the detainee carrying an AK-47 around al Farouq Camp and on one occasion the detainee treated him with first aid.

10. The detainee stated his treatment of patients consisted of treating mostly cold and flu symptoms and minor injuries sustained during training.

11. The detainee stated he could not remember the year, but spent six months at al Farouq Camp. The detainee stated he lived in a house that was also the clinic near the mosque at al Farouq Camp.

12. The detainee stated that for the two years in Afghanistan, prior to the start of the United States bombing, he fought with the Taliban against the Northern Alliance. The detainee stated he has killed people in battle while attacking or being attacked by the Northern Alliance.

b. Training

The detainee stated he trained on the Kalashnikov rifle, Beka machine gun and mortars.

c. Connections/Associations

1. A senior al Qaida operative stated the detainee had been a member of al Qaida since the early 1990's and was known to have some medical expertise.

2. The same senior al Qaida operative stated the detainee worked for al Qaida as a doctor. The al Qaida operative saw the detainee on the front lines in Afghanistan attending to the injured and also in an al Qaida camp in 1993.

3. Two additional senior al Qaida operatives recognized the detainee. One recognized the detainee as a fighter on the front lines of Qandahar or Kabul, Afghanistan. The other operative believed the detainee was a nurse serving on the front lines in Afghanistan.

4. A suspected al Qaida member stated the detainee was a field doctor who served on the front lines while fighting in Tora Bora, Afghanistan. The al Qaida member stated the detainee was a Mujahedin fighter he met while training at the al Farouq Camp.

5. The detainee was identified as a very experienced doctor on the Taliban front. The source stated the detainee was overseeing all wounded from the fighting with Northern Alliance Forces.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF IDRIS, MAHMUD A

6. The detainee was identified as a Sudanese who taught first aid at al Farouq.
7. A source stated the detainee used to work at al Farouq as a pharmacist and medic, and dispensed first aid to students.
8. A suspected senior al Qaida facilitator stated the detainee was on the front lines fighting against the Northern Alliance in Kabul, Afghanistan in 1999. The source stated the detainee was a field doctor.
9. An al Qaida operative stated he met the detainee on the front lines in Kabul, Afghanistan, during battles with the Northern Alliance. The operative stated that the detainee trained in the camps in Qandahar, Afghanistan, and was with Usama bin Laden during Tora Bora, Afghanistan in late 2001.
10. A source stated the detainee was in charge of the medical clinic at the al Farouq Training Camp.
11. The detainee was identified as an interrogator who worked for the Taliban and for al Qaida in Afghanistan.
12. A source stated he saw the detainee on the Taliban front lines. The source stated the detainee was a doctor on the Taliban front lines and was also in charge of a house there.
13. A source stated the detainee was known as the doctor for the Arabs.

d. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee stated he arrived in Afghanistan in October 2001 carrying 5,000 United States Dollars.
2. The detainee claimed Yemeni citizenship but later admitted he was in fact Sudanese.
3. The detainee stated that he never traveled to Afghanistan and that any and all information from other persons indicating that he was in Afghanistan are lies.
4. The detainee denied being at al Farouq Camp, Afghanistan and serving as the camp doctor.
5. The detainee denied ever meeting Usama bin Laden as well as membership in al Qaida.
6. The detainee denied involvement in the Mujahedin and the fight with the Soviet Union in Afghanistan.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF IDRIS, MAHMUD A

7. The detainee insisted that he was never a doctor and knew nothing about medicine.
 8. The detainee denied being a member of al Qaida and having any nicknames.
 9. The detainee stated he was in Bagram, Afghanistan when the United States started bombing.
 10. A source stated he met the detainee in the Tora Bora, Afghanistan area. The source also stated he was there two months before the detainee arrived with nine trucks full of fighters.
 11. The detainee was captured with a group of thirty individuals. Several of these individuals are thought to have been bodyguards for Usama bin Laden.
 12. A source stated that the detainee tells other detainees not to talk and not to collaborate with the interrogators.
4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a. The detainee now understands how serious an act it was to attend al Farouq Training Camp because he is being detained due to his presence there.
 - b. The detainee denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.
5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

10 August 2006

TO: AL YAZIDI, RIDA

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL YAZIDI, RIDA

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee attended the Islamic Cultural Institute in Milan, Italy. One of the leaders of the mosque spoke frequently of the jihad ongoing in Bosnia. The leader went on jihad to Bosnia and was killed.

2. The Italian Islamic Cultural Institute, referred to as ICI, was shut down by Italian authorities for housing the Sami Essid Ben Khemais network, which is the core for the Tunisian Combat Group in Italy.

3. The detainee decided to join the Jihad in Afghanistan in 1996. Two people at the mosque influenced him in his decision. Once he made this decision, the detainee began saving money and intensifying his religious studies.

4. In May 1999, the detainee traveled for training to Islamabad, Pakistan using a fake passport. He then traveled to Khaldan Camp in Afghanistan. A recruiter provided him a letter, which essentially admitted him into training.

b. Training

1. The detainee was trained at Khaldan Camp in small arms, Kalishnikov and other assault rifles and machine guns, mortars, rocket propelled grenade launchers, small artillery, SPG-9, explosives, C-3, C-4, dynamite, electronic detonators, Yaesu walkie talkie radios and had mountain and urban warfare tactics training.

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ISN 038

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL YAZIDI, RIDA

2. The detainee stated he received additional explosives training in Jalalabad, Afghanistan. He was taught how to manufacture explosives using fertilizer and ammonium, and this training lasted approximately 20 days.

c. Connections/Associations

1. A foreign government reports the detainee participated in terrorist activities in Bosnia in 1995 alongside members of the Algerian Armed Islamic Group, GIA.

2. The detainee states he was imprisoned for 27 days for terrorism. He explained the Italian authorities arrested him before the 1998 World Cup Soccer tournament, which was held in France. He indicated the Italian police accused him of being a member of the Algerian terrorist group, Armed Islamic Group.

3. The detainee was among 30 individuals arrested in Italy in 1997 and 1998 as members of the Armed Islamic Group.

4. The Armed Islamic Group, GIA, is an Islamic extremist group. The GIA aims to overthrow the secular Algerian regime and replace it with an Islamic state. They are connected to frequent attacks against civilians and government workers. Since 1992, the GIA has conducted a terrorist campaign of civilian massacres, sometimes wiping out entire villages in its area of operation. The group uses assassinations and bombings, including car bombs, and it is known to favor kidnapping victims and slitting their throats.

5. A foreign government reports the detainee was a known associate of the Sami Essid network in Milan, Italy, and later joined up with the Tunisian Combatant Group in Afghanistan in 1998.

6. The Essid Network is active particularly in the falsification of travel documents, the counterfeiting of money, stolen vehicles, and the illicit trafficking of narcotics in coordination with the mafia, to ensure financial support to the terrorist groups. In addition, the network recruits among youth with limited education and sends them to training camps in Afghanistan sponsored by Usama bin Laden.

7. The Tunisian Combatant Group, TCG, also known as the Jama'a Combattante Tunisienne, reportedly is seeking to establish an Islamic regime in Tunisia and targets United States and Western interests. Tunisians associated with the TCG are part of the support network of the broader international jihadist movement. According to European press reports, TCG members or affiliates in the past have engaged in trafficking falsified documents and recruiting for terror training camps in Afghanistan. Some TCG associates are suspected of planning an attack against the United States, Algerian, and Tunisian diplomatic missions in Rome in January 2001. Some members reportedly maintain ties to the Algerian Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat, GSPC.

UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL YAZIDI, RIDA

8. A foreign government reports the detainee is known to have been in the company of Usama bin Laden adherents and later took explosives training in Afghanistan in 1999 with operatives from the Afghan Taliban Movement.

9. The detainee was captured among 30 individuals known as the Dirty 30. All thirty of these individuals were caught together in Pakistan and a number of them are suspected of being bodyguards for Usama bin Laden.

d. Other Relevant Data

1. In 1988, the detainee began to use and sell heroin, cocaine, and hashish on the street in Milan, Italy. As a result, the Italian authorities arrested him and thereafter deported him. Sometime after that he returned to Italy.

2. The detainee advised he continued his lifestyle using and selling drugs in Milan, Italy until 1991.

3. In 1995, Italian immigration authorities again deported the detainee.

4. On 10 June 1998, as a result of continuing investigation, the detainee was charged with criminal activity finalized in terrorism, distribution of counterfeit banknotes, preparation of false documents, use of falsified Italian and foreign seals and visas, recycling of documents and stolen automobiles.

5. Reportedly, the detainee was seen in the Geyer Region of Tora Bora with a group of Tunisian Mujahadeen fighters.

6. In February 2002, the detainee was sentenced by a foreign government to 20 years in prison for being a member of a terrorist organization operating abroad.

7. The detainee stayed at an al Qaida guesthouse in Khandahar, Afghanistan during Spring 2000 for approximately 2 weeks.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

The detainee states he is not a member of the Armed Islamic Group, GIA.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

26 September 2006

TO: AL MUDHAFFARI, ABDELQADIR H

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL MUDHAFFARI, ABDELQADIR H

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
 1. The detainee stated that he wanted a struggle or jihad and chose to travel to Afghanistan rather than Palestine.
 2. The detainee stated that he told the Taliban Office he wanted to enter Afghanistan to teach the Koran.
 3. The detainee was identified as going to Afghanistan in late 1999 or early 2000.
 4. The detainee was observed at al Farouq Training Camp in Afghanistan and was identified as a trainer at al Farouq.
 5. A source stated the detainee taught topography and weapons use to all the classes at the advance training camp.
 - b. Training

A source believed the detainee went to al Farouq as soon as he arrived in Afghanistan.
 - c. Connections/Associations
 1. The detainee stated that Sheik Muqbil al Wadi was one of his instructors in Sanaa, Yemen.

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ISN 040

UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL MUDHAFFARI, ABDELQADIR H

2. Sheik Muqbil al Wadi was identified as a supporter of the Taliban and jihad.
 3. The detainee has been identified as being a friend of Usama bin Laden's personal secretary.
 4. A source stated that Usama bin Laden's personal secretary and the detainee knew each other in Yemen.
 5. The same source, an al Qaida operative, stated that he became involved in jihad activities in Afghanistan and assisted Mujahedin with travel to Afghanistan.
 6. A source identified the detainee as having been a guard of Usama bin Laden since August 2001.
 7. The detainee was identified as an Usama bin Laden security guard.
 8. The detainee was identified as being at a Taliban Supreme Leader's compound.
4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a. The detainee stated the he felt that the attacks on the World Trade Center and the other attacks in America that day were wrong. The detainee stated that Islam did not permit people to kill innocent people and it was wrong to declare war on them.
 - b. The detainee stated that he never fought in the Afghan war against anyone.
 - c. The detainee stated that the Taliban did not recruit him to fight in the war against America.
 - d. The detainee denied any association with the Taliban or al Qaida forces. The detainee denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.
 - e. A source stated that he did not think that the detainee ever fought with the Taliban because he was against the Taliban.
5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

UNCLASSIFIED

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

26 September 2006

TO: ABDU AHMED, MAJID M

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ABDU AHMED, MAJID M

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee said he first learned of jihad in Afghanistan at the Fargan Institute in Taizz, Yemen and then wanted to fight along with the Taliban. The detainee also heard about jihad from the mosque where he prayed and fell in love with the idea of dying for the sake of God.

2. The detainee said that towards the end of 1999 he decided to go to Afghanistan after three years of study at the Mabir Center. The detainee felt it was his duty to teach people.

3. The detainee said he needed a fatwa before going to Afghanistan so he telephoned a sheik. The sheik told the detainee it was a good thing for Muslims to go fight jihad. The detainee said he received his fatwa and then decided on jihad in Afghanistan.

4. The detainee said he fought for the Taliban the two years he was in Kabul, Afghanistan.

b. Training

1. The detainee said that he left Yemen in 1999 to fight in Afghanistan. The detainee received rifle training in Yemen and knew how to fire and field strip the weapon. The detainee did not receive grenade training until he reached the front lines with the Taliban.

2. A source said he saw the detainee receiving basic training in Afghanistan at the al Farouq Camp in Khowst, Afghanistan in 1999.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ABDU AHMED, MAJID M

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee was detained while trying to cross into Pakistan with 30 suspected al Qaida members.

2. The detainee said that he studied the Koran in Yemen with a person he knew that studied under Sheik Moqbel al Wadi.

3. Moqbel, the sheik who is said to have had ideological links with Usama bin Laden, taught several hundred disciples from the Arab world as well as the west.

d. Other Relevant Data

1. A source said he had seen the detainee at the madafa in Kandahar, Afghanistan.

2. A source said that Usama bin Laden usually chose men from Saudi Arabia or Yemen to be bodyguards.

3. A source identified the detainee and heard the detainee was with the group of bodyguards that were with Usama bin Laden before he disappeared in Tora Bora. The source said that the first time he ever saw the detainee was in January 2001 on the Kabul front lines.

4. A source alleged that the detainee became a guard for Usama bin Laden approximately one month before 11 September 2001.

5. A source stated the detainee joined the guard force in August 2001 and had been to al Farouq. The source thought the detainee went to Tora Bora.

6. A second source stated he saw the detainee in Kandahar, Afghanistan before September 2001 when the detainee was serving as one of Usama bin Laden's bodyguards. The detainee was present in his capacity as Usama bin Laden's bodyguard both at the guest house and Usama bin Laden's house in Kandahar, Afghanistan. The detainee was at Usama bin Laden's compound in Kandahar, Afghanistan before 11 September 2001.

7. A source stated that the detainee was an Usama bin Laden bodyguard and was usually by his side.

8. A source said that the detainee was possibly with an Usama bin Laden bodyguard at the Kandahar, Afghanistan airport in October 2001.

9. A source identified the detainee as someone he had seen with other Usama bin Laden security guards. The source said the detainee was not a known security guard.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ABDU AHMED, MAJID M

10. A senior al Qaida operative stated that he first met the detainee when he became a bodyguard, just before September 2001. The last time he saw the detainee was in Tora Bora, Afghanistan before the withdrawal from Kabul, Afghanistan started.

11. A source said that the detainee spent time at the Hamza al Qaeti guest house when the detainee arrived in Afghanistan.

12. Before the fall of Kabul, Afghanistan, the detainee was part of Usama bin Laden's guard force while in the Tora Bora region of Nangarhar Province in Afghanistan.

13. As of 15 December 2001, the detainee was an al Qaida member believed to be in Afghanistan.

14. The detainee said that Usama bin Laden is a sheik and commander of all Muslims and that Usama bin Laden is a good Muslim and fights against the unbelievers. The detainee said that he has never met or spoken with Usama bin Laden, but he would be honored to meet him.

15. The detainee said that the attack on the United States on 11 September 2001 was very small in scale, and he wishes for greater destruction and torture to fall upon Americans. The detainee said he hates Americans because they are all infidels and corrupt.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee said he heard of Usama bin Laden's fatwa against the United States in the news, but he never met Usama bin Laden. The detainee said he had no association with al Qaida and never attended any training camps.

b. The detainee said he never stayed at the Madafa House in Kabul, Afghanistan.

c. The detainee said that he was not a bodyguard for Usama bin Laden and denied he has ever seen him.

d. The detainee felt the attack on the World Trade Center was wrong because Islam did not permit people to kill innocent people, and it was wrong to declare war on innocent people.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

2 November 2006

TO: SHALABI, ABDUL R

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SHALABI, ABDUL R

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee stated he left college without obtaining a degree after being urged by several of the instructors at the college to go to Afghanistan to teach Islam to the Afghanistan people.

2. The detainee stated two scholars he studied under could call for a jihad.

3. The detainee denied that he traveled to Afghanistan at the direction of, or with the permission of, any group or organization, to include the Taliban or al Qaida.

4. The detainee stated he traveled to Afghanistan alone. The detainee departed Medina, Saudi Arabia for Zahran, Saudi Arabia, then to Bahrain, then to Karachi, Pakistan, and then to Peshawar, Pakistan. The detainee traveled via bus to Torkhom, Pakistan and continued to Jalalabad, Afghanistan. The detainee then boarded another bus to arrive at Khowst, Afghanistan, his final destination.

5. The detainee stated he decided to leave Khowst to return to Saudi Arabia in Dec 2001.

b. Training

1. A source stated the detainee attended Khalden Camp.

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ISN 042

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SHALABI, ABDUL R

2. Khalden was a Taliban training camp near Khowst, Afghanistan until about August 2000 for the purpose of teaching basic weapons, artillery, military tactics and topography.

3. A source stated the detainee was in the al Farouq Training Camp when it was bombed by Coalition Forces where he was seriously wounded in the back and shoulder by shrapnel.

4. A source stated missile strikes on al Qaida's camp near Khowst forced the group to relocate to Mes Aynak Camp near Kabul, Afghanistan

5. Usama bin Laden authorized the detainee and some of his other bodyguards to enroll in a commando course at Mes Aynak Camp.

c. Connections/Associations

1. A source stated the detainee came to Afghanistan around 1997 and became a bodyguard for Usama bin Laden after 1998.

2. The detainee was related to a bodyguard for Usama bin Laden.

3. A source stated the detainee was working as a bodyguard for Usama bin Laden.

4. A source stated the detainee was teaching at a madrassa located in Khandahar, Afghanistan, which was funded by senior Taliban officials.

5. A source stated the detainee taught over 300 men at a madrassa in Khandahar, Afghanistan and the detainee was very well known.

6. A source saw the detainee in Kabul, Afghanistan and Jalalabad, Afghanistan approximately ten times with Usama bin Laden in the latter part of 2001 and identified him as Usama bin Laden's security guard.

7. A source saw the detainee speaking directly with Usama bin Laden and was with him at all times while in Tora Bora, Afghanistan.

8. A source saw the detainee with Usama bin Laden at a stone house built into a mountain while they were on their way to Tora Bora, Afghanistan.

9. A personal letter in Arabic, which referenced the detainee by name, was found on a hard drive associated with a senior al Qaida leader.

10. An additional letter was retrieved from the former residence and training camp of Usama bin Laden's al Qaida network, which contained explicit directions for an individual to obtain 4,000 United States Dollars from the detainee.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SHALABI, ABDUL R

d. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee left Saudi Arabia in 1997 for Bahrain.
 2. The detainee stated he left Medina, Saudi Arabia about 1999-2000.
 3. A source stated it was his understanding that Usama bin Laden had ordered all the fighters to leave Afghanistan due to the heavy fighting and bombing at Tora Bora and to report to their respective embassies upon reaching Pakistan.
 4. The detainee stated he escaped Khowst with another individual and joined a group of thirty people escaping Afghanistan.
 5. The detainee identified himself as a Saudi citizen and asked to be taken to the Saudi Embassy. The Pakistani guard took him to a holding facility in Peshawar where he was held for one week. The detainee met with a representative of the Saudi Embassy and was subsequently transferred to United States' authorities.
 6. A source stated the warden of the Pakistani prison informed the group the best thing they could tell United States Forces was they were in Afghanistan for religious studies and to teach the Koran.
4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a. The detainee stated he taught children in the madrassa how to read the Koran in Arabic but it was up to the children's parents to explain the meanings of the Koran because he could not speak their language.
 - b. The detainee stated he did not see any Taliban while he was in Khowst teaching.
 - c. The detainee stated he made one trip to Kabul to make a telephone call to his family.
 - d. The detainee denied any knowledge of any terrorist training camps in Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan, Pakistan or elsewhere.
 - e. The detainee stated he never received any weapons or military training in his life.
 - f. The detainee stated he does not know anyone who knows or works for Usama bin Laden or the bin Laden family. The detainee stated he has never met or heard Usama bin Laden speak.
 - g. A small scar was observed on the detainees left arm. The detainee explained he got in a car accident when he was seventeen. The detainee also has scars on his back and head from the same accident.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SHALABI, ABDUL R

h. The detainee was told the results of the x-rays supported his story of the car accident more than they supported a war wound.

i. The detainee stated he did not agree with the killing of civilians, as it is against Islamic law and his religion would never condone such an act. The detainee admitted Usama bin Laden was a murderer.

j. The detainee denied any affiliation with any groups or organizations, including al Qaida or any other terrorist organizations.

k. The detainee denied knowing anyone affiliated with al Qaida and stated that he does not know of any individuals incarcerated with him who are affiliated with al Qaida or the Taliban.

l. The detainee affirmed his intention to cooperate in every way with the United States government.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

13 October 2006

TO: AL HASAN, SAMIR N

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL HASAN, SAMIR N

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee stated he attended the al Mujama Mosque in Taizz, Yemen, where he frequently observed members of the Jamaat al Tabligh. The detainee stated members of Jamaat al Tabligh approached him to join the group, but he declined the offer, although he did consider joining later.

2. The detainee stated he was in Afghanistan as a relief worker for the Islamic Relief Organization and that he received the position from the head of the Islamic Relief Organization.

3. A source stated that the Islamic Relief Organization is also known as al Wafa Organization.

4. A source stated the International Islamic Relief Organization is an Islamic humanitarian organization with headquarters in Mecca, Saudi Arabia, and is financed by Usama bin Laden.

5. The detainee stated he spent about a year in Muzfar Obad, Karachi, Pakistan, participating in relief work then moved to Kandahar, Afghanistan, because of the need in Afghanistan.

6. The detainee stated that in approximately December 2001, he fled the house after he heard gunshots outside his residence in Kabul, Afghanistan, and went to Khost, Afghanistan.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL HASAN, SAMIR N

7. The detainee stated he was offered goods, pay, a house, a wife, and a good life if he would go to Afghanistan and work with the person who recruited him.

8. The detainee stated he traveled from Yemen to Karachi, Pakistan, then to Korta, Pakistan, and onward to Kandahar, Afghanistan.

9. The detainee claimed he did not train in Afghanistan and that he went straight to the front line where he received a Kalashnikov.

10. The detainee stated that after a week in Kabul, Afghanistan, he traveled north of Kabul to a military camp approximately two miles from the front line fighting with the Northern Alliance. Upon his arrival at the camp, the detainee was issued a Kalashnikov rifle and provided a jacket that held ammunition and weapons.

11. The detainee stated he was a foot soldier in the Sadiq unit in Afghanistan.

12. A source stated the detainee came to Afghanistan circa 1999 or 2000, and became a bodyguard circa August 2001. The source stated he does not know if the detainee swore bayat, but he believed that the detainee traveled to Tora Bora, Afghanistan.

13. The detainee stated he was recruited to go to Afghanistan by an individual who was a childhood friend and neighbor whom he trusted.

14. The detainee stated his friend told him they could live a simple life in Afghanistan and make more money there, so they decided travel to Afghanistan to fight in the jihad.

15. The detainee stated after his arrival at a military camp north of Kabul, Afghanistan, he remained at his assigned post and pulled guard duty, but never saw any Northern Alliance soldiers. The detainee stated he did hear gunshots and fighting in the distance, but his position never came under attack from the Northern Alliance. The detainee stated he made several trips from his position on the front line back to the guest house in Kabul.

16. The detainee stated that everyday at approximately 1600 or 1700, a vehicle would arrive at the house where he stayed while in Kabul, Afghanistan, and transport him and others to the front lines. The detainee stated that sometimes he would stay on the front lines for five or six days at a time and then return to his house in Kabul.

b. Training

1. The detainee stated he did not attend any training camps in Afghanistan because an individual had trained him on the use of the Kalashnikov in Ad Dahna, Yemen, located outside Taiz, Yemen.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL HASAN, SAMIR N

2. The detainee stated every Friday for about four weeks, before he traveled to Afghanistan, he and another person went to Ad Dahna, Yemen, to train on the Kalashnikov. The detainee stated he was only trained on static marksmanship and that he was not given any maneuver or tactical training. The detainee stated his marksmanship training was in specific preparation for his trip to Afghanistan.

3. A source stated that the detainee attended al Farouq, Afghanistan and that he first saw the detainee in May or June of 2000, but never heard of the detainee being a bodyguard, nor was he aware of the detainee's activities after al Farouq.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee stated that when he arrived in Kandahar, Afghanistan, he stayed at a guest house operated by a Saudi. The detainee stated the guest house housed between 50 to 70 people of various nationalities.

2. The detainee stated his friend's apartment in Kabul, Afghanistan, where he stayed, was bought by the Taliban. The detainee stated he realized his friend was a Taliban recruiter.

d. Other Relevant Data

The detainee stated on 19 February 2004, that information he previously provided was false.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee stated he came to Afghanistan for employment and to start a family and that he never had any intention of fighting.

b. The detainee stated he did not support the fighting between the Taliban and the Northern Alliance because Islam prohibits Muslims from fighting each other.

c. The detainee claimed he never engaged in battle with Northern Alliance or American troops while he was in Afghanistan.

d. The detainee stated that when he gets released he would like to return to Yemen and get his previous job back, which was working at a factory.

e. The detainee stated that he had never been to al Farouk training camp in Afghanistan and does not know anyone who attended the al Farouk camp.

f. The detainee stated he has never taken a bayat.

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g. The detainee stated the Islamic Relief Organization was not affiliated with Usama bin Laden or al Qaida, nor did he have any knowledge of any organization who did sponsor them.

h. The detainee claimed not to be a part of al Qaida and stated he had not heard of it before his trip to Afghanistan.

i. The detainee stated he is not willing to do anything for Usama bin Laden as he claimed not to know him.

j. The detainee claimed that he has no enemies, that he likes everyone, and that he considers Americans friends.

k. The detainee stated that he was not a member of the Taliban but wanted to stay in good with them so he went to the front lines.

l. The detainee stated the Islamic Relief Organization in Kabul, Afghanistan where he worked was used to help the poor Muslims of the Middle East.

m. The detainee stated that he was never a member of the al Wafa and has no information on how they are financed.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

3 November 2006

TO: ABU GHANIM, MOHAMMED R

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ABU GHANIM, MOHAMMED R

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee stated he was a Mujahed, a holy warrior, fighting under the banner: there is but one God, Allah and Mohammed is his prophet.

2. The detainee traveled to Bosnia around late 1994 and that he was among the first in his hometown to go to Bosnia for the purpose of joining the jihad.

3. The detainee fought under the Taliban government. The detainee was asked if he had sworn allegiance to anyone while in Afghanistan. The detainee claimed he did not, but he fought for a known Taliban member and he would fight with his life.

4. The detainee advised that he joined the Taliban, not al Wafa

5. The detainee then claimed he wanted to go to Afghanistan because it was an Islamic state.

6. The detainee traveled to Afghanistan in 2000 or 2001.

7. The detainee joined the Mujahedin fighters and fought against Dostum's Forces in the North.

8. The detainee said he used his true name passport to travel from Yemen to Bosnia. The detainee traveled from Yemen to Syria and continued on to Turkey.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ABU GHANIM, MOHAMMED R

9. While in Turkey, the detainee obtained a visa for travel to Bosnia from the Croatian Embassy. From Istanbul, Turkey the detainee traveled to Ankara, Turkey. Once in Ankara, the detainee claimed that he was met by an individual, who supposedly facilitated the detainee's travel to Bosnia via Zagreb, Croatia.

10. The detainee went to Katibat al-Mujahedin, Mujahedin Battalion Headquarters in Zenica, Bosnia-Herzegovina. Once in Zenica, the detainee said he turned over all his personal belongings to an individual who was in charge of the guest house.

11. The detainee stated he traveled from Yemen to Afghanistan, leaving Yemen approximately six months prior to Ramadan, 2001. The detainee traveled from Sanaa, Yemen to Karachi, Pakistan to Afghanistan.

12. The detainee arrived in Afghanistan via bus. The detainee stayed at three different guest houses for one night each while traveling to the frontline.

13. The detainee was at the frontline six to seven months.

14. The detainee claimed his job was just to attack anyone who attacked him. The detainee never visited Kabul, Afghanistan, and never left the front lines.

15. The detainee fought against the Northern Alliance.

16. The detainee claimed he traveled from Sanaa, Yemen, to Kabul, Afghanistan, via Karachi and Quetta, proceeding directly to the front lines north of Kabul, where he spent just under a year.

b. Training

1. The detainee stated he received weapons training in Bosnia so he had no need to attend another in Afghanistan.

2. From the guest house in Zenica, Bosnia-Herzegovina, the detainee claimed he went to a training camp possibly in Mehrez, Bosnia-Herzegovina.

3. At the camp in Mehrez, Bosnia-Herzegovina the detainee trained on handling the Kalashnikov rifle and RPGs.

4. The detainee joined the Yemeni Civil War fight at the age of 19. He claimed he received basic training from the Yemeni Army. The detainee trained on the Kalashnikovs and basic combat skills. The detainee fought in the Yemeni Civil War for two years, fighting in the northern part of Yemen the entire time.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ABU GHANIM, MOHAMMED R

5. The detainee stated he only carried a Kalashnikov rifle and that he learned how to use it as a child in Yemen.

c. Connections/Associations

1. A source stated although he did not know the name of any group the detainee was a member of, the detainee was normally with Usama bin Laden.

2. The detainee was identified by several sources as a bodyguard for Usama bin Laden.

3. A source stated the detainee was in Bosnia in 1995 and came back to Yemen in 1996 and stayed there until after the USS COLE bombing in October 2000 and then traveled to Afghanistan in February or March 2001 to avoid being arrested.

4. A source stated that the detainee joined the Guard Force in August 2001 and may have gone to Tora Bora with everyone.

5. The detainee's brother-in-law is the leader of a local extremist group in Yemen, who has connections to the USS COLE bombing.

6. The detainee claims he fought with the Taliban while in Afghanistan. He saw the United States drop bombs during the campaign in November of 2001.

7. The detainee fought with the Mujahedin fighters that fought under the support of the Bosnian Army. The detainee went back to Yemen when the Dayton Accords were signed.

d. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee spent eight to nine months in a Saudi Arabian jail beginning in January 1988. The arrest stemmed from an attempt to smuggle Sagger missiles in Saudi Arabia with al Qaida associates.

2. Around November 1999, the detainee and seven other Yemeni citizens were arrested on conspiracy to commit terrorism charges. Among the eight individuals were his brother-in-law, the ringleader and an Afghan veteran with ties to Usama bin Laden; the detainee and a jihadist from Hudaya.

3. The detainee was arrested in Bayt Habra, Yemen for stealing Hertz rental cars, and spent approximately eight months in a Yemeni jail in May 1999.

4. After the Taliban fell, the detainee went to a guest house belonging to someone he met on the frontlines, stayed there 20 days, then walked to the Pakistani border.

5. The detainee was captured on the Afghanistan border with a group of 30 individuals.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ABU GHANIM, MOHAMMED R

6. The detainee stated his last duty position was as a fighter for the Taliban on the frontlines north of Kabul, Afghanistan.

7. The detainee stated there would be a future attack on America bigger than 11 September 2001 and that all Americans will pay for their actions against the Muslim detainees in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. When asked about the detainee's connections with Usama bin Laden, the detainee denied ever meeting or even seeing him and only knows of Usama bin Laden through the media.

b. The detainee denies any involvement in the USS COLE bombing.

c. The detainee advised that he had traveled from Yemen to Afghanistan with another individual, but did not want to give the individual's name. The detainee further advised that the individual not only traveled with him to Afghanistan, but also fought on the frontlines with him.

d. The detainee was asked about his arrest in Yemen. The detainee stated that the authorities arrested his brother-in-law and because the detainee was with him, he was also arrested.

e. The detainee claims he will return to Yemen when he's freed, visit his family and get married.

f. The detainee states he is not a part of any groups, governments or organizations.

g. An individual known to be a member of the al Wafa organization, in the Kabul, Afghanistan office, was unable to identify photographs of the detainee.

h. The detainee immediately claimed he'd never been to a training camp. The detainee never heard of any training camp anywhere in Afghanistan. The detainee claimed to receive his weapons training in Bosnia so he had no need to attend another in Afghanistan.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

19 July 2006

TO: AL RAHIZI, ALI AHMAD MUHAMMAD

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL RAHIZI, ALI AHMAD
MUHAMMAD

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee has stated that he did not go to Afghanistan to fight. The detainee stated that he went to Afghanistan to teach the Koran because the Imam at his mosque told him that the Afghans were using magic and were not following the teachings of Islam.

2. The detainee met a Yemeni in 1997 who spread support for jihad. In 1999, the detainee was approached again by the Yemeni and told that he should go to Afghanistan to teach the Koran.

3. The Yemeni provided the detainee with a Pakistani visa, 450 United States Dollars, round-trip airline tickets and an address to a hotel near Karachi, Pakistan.

4. The detainee left Yemen and proceeded to Karachi, Pakistan. After several days in Karachi, the detainee traveled to Quetta, Pakistan and eventually met a man who brought him to Shurandam, Afghanistan.

b. Training

The detainee has been identified as someone who trained at al Farouq at the end of May 2000.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL RAHIZI, ALI AHMAD MUHAMMAD

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee taught the Koran to Afghan children at the Abu Bakur al Sadiq mosque in Shurandam, Afghanistan. The detainee worked directly for the mosque Imam.

2. The detainee was informed of the war in Afghanistan from the Imam of Shoorandab, Afghanistan, in late 2001. The Imam suggested that the detainee return to Yemen for his own safety.

3. The detainee decided to leave Afghanistan when the war with America got too close. The detainee traveled from Shurandam, Afghanistan to Ghazni, Afghanistan. From Ghazni, the detainee then traveled to Khowst, Afghanistan and then traveled by foot for two days to a small town.

4. At the small town, the detainee joined approximately 30 other Arabs who had assembled to flee into Pakistan. The group of Arabs traveled for eight days and was finally arrested on the Pakistan border by Pakistan authorities

5. The detainee has been identified as an Usama bin Laden bodyguard and also that he was seen several times at the Kandahar, Afghanistan guest house.

d. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee was identified as someone who was in custody in the Kandahar, Afghanistan facility.

2. The detainee was transferred into United States custody on 26 December 2001.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee stated that he has never received any type of military training and the only weapon he knows how to use is the Kalashnikov rifle that he learned about when he was young.

b. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001.

c. The detainee denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.

d. The detainee denied any knowledge or planning of internal uprisings at the Guantanamo Bay detention facility.

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REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL RAHIZI, ALI AHMAD
MUHAMMAD**

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

25 April 2006

TO: ABDALLAH, SAYF BIN

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ABDALLAH, SAYF BIN

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee stated that he decided to become a Mujahedin and take the route of jihad when he was in Italy. The detainee went to Afghanistan during his holiday vacation.

2. The detainee stated that he went to Afghanistan to carry out jihad with the Taliban.

3. The detainee stated that while in Afghanistan for jihad he used the alias Sayf bin Abdallah.

4. The detainee stated that when leaving Italy he used his Tunisian passport and his Italian residency card. The detainee also stated he had his Italian identity card. The detainee stated that he obtained his entry visa in about one day at the Iranian Consulate in Milan, Italy.

5. When departing for Afghanistan the detainee stated that he traveled alone from Turin, Italy, to Milan, Italy some time during July. The detainee then went to the airport in Milan, Italy.

6. The detainee and others passed through Milan, Italy. From Milan they were sent to the Fiumicino Airport in Rome, Italy with forged passports in their pockets, bound for Afghanistan.

7. From Rome, Italy the detainee (along with others) took a plane bound for Tehran, Iran.

8. The detainee stated that one day after arriving in Tehran, Iran, he traveled to Mashhad, Iran. From there the detainee stated he traveled to the border of Afghanistan. From the border,

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the detainee stated that he crossed into Afghanistan and went to the city of Herat, Afghanistan where he stayed the night at a hotel.

9. In Herat, Afghanistan the detainee, along with others, was asked by a Taliban official where they would like to go and they said they would like to go to the front lines in Khat, Afghanistan. The detainee and the others were asked to change into local Afghan style clothing.

10. The detainee stated that the Taliban sent him from Herat, Afghanistan to Kabul, Afghanistan by plane. At Kabul the detainee spent the night at a madafa, or safe house.

11. The detainee stated that in Kabul, Afghanistan he went to the Azzam guest house, where he spent two nights.

12. The Taliban gave the detainee a Kalashnikov and bullets while he was at the Dar al Aman safe house in Kabul, Afghanistan.

13. The detainee stated he was deployed to Jabul Sabr, Afghanistan, a mountain outpost north of Kabul, Afghanistan.

14. A Taliban officer gathered the detainee and others at the Dar al Aman safe house in Kabul, Afghanistan and flew them to Konduz, Afghanistan. From Konduz the detainee and the others were transferred to near the front lines. The detainee and others were transported to Khvajeh Ghar, Afghanistan.

15. The detainee said he went to the front line at Bagram, Afghanistan where he was to defend a position. The detainee stated the Taliban took him to that position.

16. The detainee stated he was stationed at an outpost with four other individuals, with orders to guard the rear lines from Northern Alliance Forces. The detainee said they remained in the camp from July 2001 until around the start of Ramadan on 17 November 2001, at which time they received orders to withdraw to Kandahar.

17. The detainee stated he was transported from Jabul Sabr, Afghanistan to Kandahar, Afghanistan. The detainee said during the trip, while driving through an unidentified village, the truck he was riding in received small-arms fire and he was hit in the right knee by a bullet. The detainee stated that upon arrival in Kandahar, he was admitted to a hospital and treated for his knee injury. The detainee stated that he stayed in the hospital for one night.

18. The detainee said the Taliban transported him from Kandahar, Afghanistan to another hospital in Khowst, Afghanistan where he received continued treatment for his injury. The detainee remained there for about 18 days.

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19. After his stay at the hospital in Khowst, Afghanistan the detainee stated he was escorted alone to an Afghanistan/Pakistan border checkpoint and was dropped off. The detainee said he, along with Arab passengers, were transported to Miramshah, Pakistan. The detainee stated he stayed at a house in Miramshah for two days. The detainee stated he was transported to Peshawar, Pakistan where he was detained and captured by Pakistani officials.

b. Training

1. The detainee was a member of the Tunisian Army from 1993 to 1994.
2. The detainee stated during his service in the Tunisian Army the only weapons training he received was on the Steyr rifle.
3. The detainee stated that at Jabul Sabr he was trained on the rocket-propelled grenade, the Kalashnikov rifle and the DSHK heavy machine gun.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee stated that he went to the Via Baretto Mosque and the Curso Julio Chess Mosque in Turin, Italy where he met an individual who attempted to recruit men to go to Afghanistan for the jihad. This individual also sold audiotapes which talked of jihad in Afghanistan.
2. The detainee stated that he started to frequent the Baretto City Mosque in Turin, Italy where he befriended an individual who talked to him about the Taliban movement, increasing the detainee's desire to go to Afghanistan. The detainee ultimately went to Afghanistan with this individual. The detainee stated that he told his brothers living in Italy that he was going to France.
3. An individual talked to the detainee about Afghanistan at the mosque on Baretto Street, Turin, Italy. The detainee stated that this individual had been to Afghanistan.
4. The phone number of the individual who talked to the detainee about Afghanistan at the Baretto Street Mosque in Turin was found in the offices of groups with links to Usama bin Laden in Peshawar, Pakistan.
5. The detainee stated that while in Italy he heard some audiotapes after prayers. The tape advocated going to Afghanistan to fight the jihad. The detainee stated he bought the tapes with his own money at a kiosk.
6. The detainee stated that once while he was listening to some religious tapes in the mosque in Via Baretto in Turin, Italy he was approached by an Arab who encouraged the

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detainee to fight against communism by going to Afghanistan. The detainee said that he was under the impression that the Russians were coming back to Afghanistan.

7. An al Qaida recruiter in Italy identified and encouraged men to travel to Afghanistan and participate in the jihad. This recruiter identifies possible recruits at mosques in Turin, Italy. The recruiter visits the mosques, gives talks and charges 4,000 Italian Lira apiece for audiotapes that encourage young men to join the jihad in Afghanistan. The recruiter then approaches interested men and recruits them. Once someone decides to join the jihad, the recruiter provides assistance. The recruiter told the detainee to go to the Iranian embassy in Turin and get a visa, since the easiest way to get to Afghanistan was through Iran, and it was easy to get an Iranian visa. The detainee stated that this was the only assistance he received from the recruiter. One of the two mosques in Turin frequented by this al Qaida recruiter is the Baretto Mosque.

8. Trips to Iran are organized through a travel agency in Milan, Italy called Adineh Travel, which is located at Number Eight Via Casoretto. The agency operates almost as a monopoly in regard to visas and flights to and from Iran. It is known that an individual connected to the Islamic Cultural Institute in Milan had been in contact with the agency.

9. The detainee and others were enrolled as soldiers of the jihad by the Secretary of the Imam at the Milan, Italy mosque on Viale Jenner. This Secretary is one of al Qaida's most important contact men in all of Italy and had direct contacts with one of the heads of the Afghan training camps.

10. The Secretary of the Imam at the Viale Jenner Mosque in Milan, Italy is also a member of GSPC, a.k.a. the Salafist Group for Call and Combat.

11. The Salafist Group for Call and Combat (GSPC) is currently the most effective armed group inside Algeria. The GSPC continues to conduct operations aimed at government and military targets, primarily in rural areas, although civilians are sometimes killed. According to press reporting, some GSPC members in Europe maintain contacts with other North African extremists sympathetic to al Qaida. In late 2002 Algerian authorities announced they had killed a Yemeni al Qaida operative who had been meeting with the GSPC inside Algeria.

12. On 1 July 2001, from Rome, Italy the detainee, along with another individual, traveled to Tehran, Iran. This individual has links to Es Sayed, who was the key man in the Milan, Italy al Qaida cell.

13. The detainee, along with others, met with an official of the Taliban Ministry of Foreign Affairs located at Herat, Afghanistan.

14. An admitted al Qaida member identified the detainee as someone who served under the head of the Tunisian al Qaida faction in Afghanistan.

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15. The detainee introduced an individual who went to Afghanistan to fight with the Taliban to another individual at the Islamic Institute in Milan, Italy in 2001.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001.

b. The detainee denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.

c. The detainee admits to hearing far-off sounds of battle but denied participating in any combat actions while at the Jabul Sabr outpost.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

10 February 2006

TO: ALHAMIRI, ABDULAH

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ALHAMIRI, ABDULAH

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee was taken to the front lines in Kabul approximately two weeks after 11 September 2001, where he manned an observation post and constructed defensive positions.

2. The detainee stated that he does not like the American Government.

3. The detainee stated that Jihad is the duty of all Muslims and that if an Imam orders it then he would fight.

4. The detainee made it very clear that he would kill Americans if they came against Islam.

b. Training

The detainee received small arms training at a camp in Omarsaif and served as an interpreter for the camp physician.

c. Connections/Associations

The detainee was linked to various individuals suspected of being members of al Qaida.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ALHAMIRI, ABDULAH

d. Intent

1. The detainee stated that any Muslim who allies himself with an American forfeits Islam and paradise.
2. The detainee left the United Arab Emirates in June of 2001 and traveled to Afghanistan to conduct his personal Jihad.

e. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee was a student at Portland State University and left the United States to help the Taliban build an Islamic State in Afghanistan.
 2. The detainee continued to refuse to speak or answer questions posed to him during interviews.
4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

N/A

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

7 July 2006

TO: AL AASMI, ASSEM MATRUQ MOHAMMAD

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL AASMI, ASSEM MATRUQ
MOHAMMAD

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee stated that while staying at a mosque in Mecca, Saudi Arabia he was recruited to go to Afghanistan.

2. The detainee stated that he traveled from Saudi Arabia to Afghanistan using a Saudi Arabian passport.

3. The detainee stated that he spent a couple of nights in Tehran before going to Mashhad, Iran. He then traveled to Herat, Afghanistan where he stayed in an Arab guest house for four days. The detainee then traveled to Kandahar, Afghanistan and stayed in an Arab guest house.

4. The detainee stated that he left his passport at an Arab guest house in Kandahar, Afghanistan and then he left for training.

5. The detainee stated that after two weeks at the al Farouq Training Camp, the 11 September 2001 attacks occurred, so the leaders at al Farouq dispersed the camp. The detainee stated that he went to Khowst, Afghanistan where he slept in a tent.

6. The detainee stated that those who stayed in the tent in Khowst, Afghanistan included Taliban fighters coming back and forth from the front lines and people like him waiting for further instructions. The detainee stated that he and the others in the tent were armed with Kalashnikov rifles.

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b. Training

The detainee stated that while at al Farouq Training Camp, he trained on the Kalashnikov rifle, the rocket-propelled grenade, a handgun, and the Bika rifle.

c. Other Relevant Data

The detainee stated that after approximately three months in Khowst, Afghanistan, he was injured in a hand grenade accident, taken to a clinic in Khowst, and then smuggled across the border to a hospital in Pakistan where a pin was placed in his leg. The detainee stated that he was captured by Pakistani authorities and was eventually taken into United States custody.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee stated that he never fired his weapon other than during his training at al Farouq.

b. The detainee stated that he never engaged in combat while in Afghanistan.

c. The detainee stated that he was wounded in an accident, not in fighting.

d. The detainee stated that he is not a member of al Qaida, but he was convinced to go to Afghanistan by a possible al Qaida recruiter and that he did attend an al Qaida training camp.

e. The detainee stated that if released he would go to Saudi Arabia, work for two years, and then return to Gaza and raise a family. The detainee stated that he does not intend to be involved in terrorism.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

23 February 2006

To: AL HUSAYN, ZAID MUHAMAMD SA'AD

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL HUSAYN, ZAID MUHAMAMD
SA'AD

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee reports he left home in Saudi Arabia to provide help to the refugees in Afghanistan.

2. The detainee contacted the Pakistan embassy in Jeddah to obtain a visa. The detainee then took his savings of approximately \$7000 (U.S. Dollars) and departed for Karachi, Pakistan, via Bahrain.

3. From Karachi, Pakistan, the detainee traveled to Kabul, Afghanistan through Quetta, Pakistan.

4. The detainee traveled to the Bamian region and remained there for two to three months. The detainee then traveled to Pol e Khomri region in a convoy with Taliban troops and stayed for one month. The detainee then traveled to the Taloqan region where he remained for two months.

5. The detainee was identified as having fought in the Taloqan region of northern Afghanistan prior to 11 September 2001.

6. The detainee was identified as having been an occasional leader of his group, approximately thirty men, in the Taloqan region.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL HUSAYN, ZAID MUHAMAMD SA'AD

7. The detainee stated he frequented the Dakhmar line to provide donations for the fighters.

8. In October 2001, shortly after the United States began bombing Afghanistan, the detainee decided to leave Taloqan and return to Saudi Arabia. The detainee traveled to Kabul where he felt threatened because of the impending arrival of forces.

9. The detainee then fled to Khowst, Afghanistan, where he stopped in the first Taliban center he came to. During the evening, the Taliban center was bombed and the detainee was injured and rendered unconscious.

10. When he regained his senses, the detainee was in a hospital in Miram shah, Pakistan, where he was arrested and transferred to United States Custody.

b. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee stated he was inspired to go on his mission from flyers from the al Haramayn Foundation that he received in Saudi Arabia.

2. The al Haramayn Foundation (aka Al Haramayn Islamic Foundation (HIF)) is designated as a Tier 1 Non-Governmental Organization (NGO).

3. Tier 1 targets are defined as terrorist groups, especially those with state support, that have demonstrated the intention and the capability to attack United States Persons or interests.

4. The detainee stated he met an Arab in Kabul, who told him he was with the al Wafa organization from Saudi Arabia and helped him exchange money.

5. Shortly after arriving in Kabul, the detainee began working for al Wafa as a laborer.

6. Al Wafa is identified as a tier 2 NGO.

7. Tier 2 targets are defined as terrorist/extremist groups that have demonstrated both the intention and the capability to attack United States persons and interests, but are believed to pose somewhat less threat to United States interests around the world than Tier 1 groups.

8. The detainee was seen and identified by his alias, "Zaid al Ghamdy," at Taloqan.

9. The detainee's alias and Saudi phone number were found in the directory of a cell phone that belonged to a Saudi based financier for the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG).

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10. The Abu Sayyaf Group is an Interagency Intelligence Committee on Terrorism (IICT) Tier 2 organization.

c. Other

1. The detainee states that he carried a weapon for self protection and was carrying a weapon on the day he was injured in the mountains.

2. The detainee admits to having gone to the front lines in the Takhar region for two to three hours, but claims it was to warn that the Madaliar were not religious, and then returned to Talikan.

3. The detainee traveled to the Bamyan region to convert the Shiites and stayed in a Taliban student center. The detainee traveled in a convoy with Taliban troops because of the threat of being attacked by thieves operating in this area.

4. The detainee stated he contacted Taliban authorities in Kabul to find places needing assistance with orphans. The detainee was given the name of three places, Bamian, Pol E Khomri and Taloqan, Afghanistan.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

The detainee denies meeting any al Qaida or attending any training camps sponsored by either al Qaida or the Taliban. The detainee advised he has no knowledge of any pending attacks in the United States or attacks against United States personnel abroad.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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