

# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at U.S .Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

5 October 2006

To: AL BARAYAN, MAJID

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL BARAYAN, MAJID

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. While in England in 1995, the detainee visited the Finsbury Park Mosque on several occasions.

2. Although the detainee claims to have traveled to Malaysia to see tourist sights in approximately January 2001, he could not provide locations or sights where he visited.

3. A source saw the detainee at Usama bin Laden's private airport in Kandahar, Afghanistan in early 2001.

4. A source identified the detainee as a Mujahed from Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, that he met at Qandahar.

5. Another source identified the detainee as being on the front lines near Taloqon, Afghanistan, in April 2001. The detainee was assigned to an anti-aircraft artillery weapon.

6. The detainee resided in a Taliban guest houses in Kabul and Kandahar, Afghanistan. He also resided at a guest house in Quetta, Pakistan.

7. Although the detainee claims to have taught children in an orphanage, he does not know the name of the orphanage. The detainee could not recall any of the orphans' names nor could he remember how many orphans were there. The detainee was unable to provide any concrete details regarding this orphanage.

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL BARAYAN, MAJID**

8. A source identified the detainee as a member of al Qaida.
9. The detainee was armed with a Kalashnikov rifle at Tora Bora.
10. The detainee said it is part of his duty as a Muslim to learn to fight and defend Islam.

**b. Training.**

A source identified the detainee as student at a basic training class at the al Farouq training camp in Afghanistan in early 2001. The detainee's training included: weapons training, basic commando course, topography, and explosives.

**c. Connections/Associations**

1. In October 2001, an al Qaida member saw the detainee at a safe house in Kabul and later in Tora Bora fighting in the Ktal region.
2. An al Qaida member identified the detainee as an al Qaida trained Arab fighter who was fighting the Northern Alliance at Tolaquin when the 11 September 2001 attacks occurred.
3. The detainee was captured with a group of 30 suspected al Qaida members while trying to cross into Pakistan from Afghanistan in December 2001.

**d. Intent**

1. A source stated in April 2003 the detainee tried to organize a fatwa on Lima block. The fatwa stated that if the Americans cut anyone's beard then all the detainees on Lima should refuse to say anything at all to interrogators and should all spit on the guards.
2. The detainee remarked that the United States deserved what they got on 11 September 2001.
3. The detainee expressed admiration for the Taliban. The detainee admires Mullah Omar as a very good man who did a lot of good things for the people of Afghanistan.

**e. Other Relevant Data**

1. When the detainee was asked if things were confusing during the fighting, with people running up the hills and back down again and many people dying, he replied, yes. When the detainee was asked if he fired at the Americans, he replied, no, not at the Americans; we could not see them.

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2. A foreign government agency identified the detainee on a watch and arrest list for a trip to Chechnya.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee denied receiving any type of training at any camp in Afghanistan and further denied any connection or loyalty to al Qaida or Usama bin Laden.

b. The detainee denied being in Tora Bora.

c. The detainee indicated that the citizens of the United States are hard-working and that their lifestyle is good and he would not want to harm the United States. The detainee stated he does not like the terrorist attacks that occurred in the United States on 11 September 2001.

d. The detainee agreed with the idea that the United States is a super power and that they should use its powers to keep world peace.

e. The detainee said he has never met Usama bin Laden and he has never heard of his fatwa against the Jews and Crusaders, authorizing and commanding Muslims to kill Americans wherever they find them.

f. The detainee said he is unfamiliar with Usama bin Laden's messages or his beliefs.

g. The detainee stated he believes the terrorist attack on 11 September 2001 was wrong.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

22 August 2006

TO: AL MURBATI, ISSA

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL MURBATI, ISSA

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee heard about the United States' bombings in Afghanistan and he felt it was a Muslim obligation to go to Afghanistan to help.

2. The detainee delivered an envelope containing 3,000 United States Dollars in 100 bills from a Jammatah speaker to the Sheik at the al Makki Mosque in Karachi, Pakistan.

3. The detainee stated he fell and hurt his back. Al Janadria sent him to Pakistan for treatment since the doctors were better and cheaper there. Before leaving Bahrain, the detainee stated he was given 1,000 United States Dollars for workers compensation from his plumbing company.

4. The detainee was persuaded to go to Afghanistan for jihad by a Sheik. The Sheik is a member of the Jammatah. The detainee owed approximately 44,000 United States Dollars for failed business ventures to various individuals and institutions in Bahrain. The Sheik told the detainee that Allah would take care of his debts if he traveled to Afghanistan to fight in the jihad.

5. On 2 November 2001, the detainee traveled by airplane from al Muharraq, Bahrain to Karachi, Pakistan. The detainee was met and taken to the Makki Mosque where he stayed for twelve days.

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### SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL MURBATI, ISSA

6. Upon the detainee's arrival at the mosque, he met a Sheik and gave him the envelope containing the money.

7. The detainee also gave the Makki Mosque 1,000 United States Dollars of his own money.

8. In one sequence of events, the detainee discovered there was no training available in Kandahar, Afghanistan. Since he did not know how to use a Kalashnikov rifle, he traveled to Kabul, Afghanistan by taxi after learning there would be training there.

9. The detainee has been identified by two individuals as a high level member of al Qaida.

#### b. Training

1. In the summer of 1993, the detainee stated he received training on aircraft arms systems at Lowery Air Force Base, Colorado for approximately two and a half months.

2. The detainee was advised that another individual had identified him as being at the al Farouk Training Camp and receiving medical treatment from a different individual.

3. The al Farouq Training Camp was funded by al Qaida and therefore was more advanced than other training camps in Afghanistan.

#### c. Connections/Associations

1. Jamaat Tabligh is a Pakistan Islamic missionary organization believed to be used as a cover to mask travel and activities of terrorists, including members of al Qaida.

2. The individual that met the detainee was possibly associated with Jamaat al Tabligh, and works out of the al-Makki Mosque in Karachi, Pakistan.

#### d. Intent

The detainee advised he would stay in Cuba forever because he was not going to cooperate.

#### e. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee stated he had visited a number of foreign countries including Afghanistan, Pakistan, Philippines, Cyprus and the United States.

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2. The detainee stayed in a house with twenty other individuals for four days. When the detainee heard the Taliban was pulling out of the North, the detainee decided to get out of Kabul, Afganistan and return to Kandahar, Afghanistan. The detainee sought refuge in a Chinese hospital even though he was uninjured.

3. The detainee decided he wanted to return to Pakistan. The detainee traveled with an unidentified group of individuals on side roads in the direction of Khowst, Afghanistan.

4. The detainee stated while on the way to Khowst, Afghanistan he was injured by shrapnel from a grenade. The detainee was taken to an unidentified hospital and received medical care. Eventually, the detainee left the hospital and traveled by bus to Pakistan where he was arrested by Pakistan police. The detainee was turned over to the United States on 28 December 2001.

5. In another sequence of events, the detainee stated it took two and a half hours to get to Kandahar, Afghanistan from the border area and they arrived at the Chinese Hospital between 9 and 10 am.

6. The detainee stated the next morning they boarded the bus headed for Pashawar, Pakistan where there was a bigger hospital. About one and one-half hours from Pashawar, the bus was stopped at a Pakistan checkpoint. The Pakistanis arrested everyone on the bus except for a Pakistani.

7. The detainee was told that he illegally entered Afghanistan and would be repatriated to his own country. The Pakistanis took the 1,000 United States dollars that the detainee had.

8. The detainee was taken to the airport, handed over to United States Forces and flown to the prison at Kandahar, Afghanistan.

9. When asked to provide specific information regarding his travels in Pakistan and Afghanistan, as well as asked to identify training received at Derunta or Khalden Training Camps, the detainee immediately became belligerent and confrontational.

10. The detainee stated he altered his actual events or changed his story as a result of being intimidated by the United States soldiers.

11. The detainee acknowledged that he provided false accounts in the past, but it was because the Pakistan Officers told him to lie to the Americans once he was in custody. The detainee did not elaborate which stories were false and which were truthful, however he did say that he has already provided a truthful account.

12. The detainee has admitted lying in past interviews. The detainee originally stated he traveled to Afghanistan to help provide humanitarian aid. There are many inconsistencies in the detainee's story.

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL MURBATI, ISSA**

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee denies his involvement with al Qaida or any other terrorist groups. The detainee claims that he was in Afghanistan conducting charity/relief work for the Afghan people.

b. The detainee denied having been to Kabul, Afghanistan or that he had taken a motorcycle across the border.

c. The detainee stated he has not attended any training camps or received any type of terrorist or military training since he left the Bahrain Air Force.

d. The detainee claimed he had been a poor Muslim all his life but had found true Islam just prior to traveling to Pakistan circa October 2001. The detainee claimed he traveled to Pakistan and then to Afghanistan in order to provide aid and Islamic education to Afghan children. The detainee claimed he was falsely accused and imprisoned as a member of al Qaida.

e. The Sheik asked the detainee if he could accompany two van-loads of supplies such as blankets and medicine that were being taking to Kandahar, Afghanistan. The detainee had heard of the bombings of Kandahar, Afghanistan but also heard that things were back to normal. The detainee was concerned for the welfare of the children in the area, so he agreed to go with the shipment.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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000106

# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

9 May 2006

TO: AL MAHAYAWI, SAUD DAKHIL ALLAH MUSLIH

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL MAHAYAWI, SAUD DAKHIL  
ALLAH MUSLIH

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee began his religious pilgrimage in the latter part of 2001. The detainee met an Afghan during a prayer session. The Afghan explained that the people of his country needed to be instructed concerning the Koran.

2. The detainee later contacted the Afghan and expressed interest in going to Afghanistan to teach the Koran, despite the detainee's inability to speak the language.

3. The detainee earned enough money for travel to Afghanistan by selling his business and his car. When he arrived in Peshawar, Pakistan, the detainee contacted the Afghan, who picked him up and transported him to Khowst, Afghanistan. The detainee and the Afghan stayed in the guestroom of a house owned by a third party.

4. After about one month in Afghanistan, the detainee suspected that the Afghan stole about 5,000 Saudi Arabian Riyals from him. As a result, the detainee became very depressed and angry and thought about going home. A short time later, the detainee learned that the war between the United States and Afghanistan had escalated. The detainee feared for his life and expressed interest in leaving Afghanistan.

5. The owner of the detainee's residence got the detainee a guide to take him to the Pakistani border, where the detainee claims he surrendered himself to the Pakistani border patrol. The Pakistani government subsequently turned the detainee over to American authorities.

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ISN 053

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL MAHAYAWL, SAUD DAKHIL ALLAH MUSLIH**

6. The detainee was captured with an individual who stated he first met the detainee in Tora Bora, Afghanistan.

7. An individual captured with the detainee stated that their Pakistani prison warden said that the best thing they could tell American forces when interrogated was that they were in Afghanistan to teach the Koran.

8. The detainee was identified as an al Qaida trained fighter at a guard post in the valley between Jalalabad, Afghanistan and Tora Bora, Afghanistan. The detainee was armed with a Kalashnikov (AK-47) and fired his weapon after coming under fire from Afghans in the valley.

9. The Saudi Ministry of Interior, General Directorate of Investigations arrested the detainee in Makkah, Saudi Arabia for attempting to create a new jihad organization in A'wkadin, Ethiopia. His name was on the list of those forbidden travel for five years per decree dated 23 February 1998, and he was also on the watch and arrest list for his trip to Chechnya per ministerial decrec dated 21 February 2002.

### b. Connections/Associations

1. A senior al Qaida operative identified the detainee and believed he saw him in Afghanistan.

2. Several of the individuals in the group with whom the detainee was captured are believed to have been bodyguards for Usama bin Laden.

3. An individual stated that although the detainee claimed affiliation with Jamat-al-Tabligh, he was actually a fighter at Tora Bora.

4. Jamat-al-Tabligh is a Pakistan-based Islamic missionary organization used as a cover to mask travel and activities of terrorists, including members of al Qaida.

5. The detainee was identified as being a Mujahedin fighter from Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.

6. A variation of one of the detainee's aliases was on a document that listed possible Taliban or al Qaida personnel. This document was retrieved in the vicinity of an al Qaida cave network.

7. The detainee's name was on a list of captured Mujahedin names found on a hard drive associated with a senior al Qaida member.

8. The detainee's name was written in a notebook recovered from the residence where a senior al Qaida member was captured.

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## UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL MAHAYAWI, SAUD DAKHIL ALLAH MUSLIH**

9. The detainee's name appeared on a list of al Qaida Mujahedin and the contents of their trust accounts. The list was found on files recovered from various computer media seized from al Qaida-associated safe houses in Pakistan.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee stated that if he were released he would stay away from any problems with Americans. He stated he would swear on the Koran that he would not fight any Americans.

b. When asked by investigators what he knew of the attack against the United States, the detainee was remorseful and stated that a good Muslim would not attack innocent people.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

18 May 2006

TO: AL ZAYLA, MUHAMMED YAHIA MOSIN

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL ZAYLA, MUHAMMED YAHIA  
MOSIN

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee wished to travel to Chechnya and fight with fellow Muslims.

2. The detainee was told that prior to traveling to Chechnya to fight he was required to obtain military training. The detainee was told of a person to contact when he was ready to begin his military training in Afghanistan.

3. In approximately March 2001 the detainee and two others from Saudi Arabia traveled to Afghanistan in order to train so they could fight in Chechnya.

4. After arriving at the Madafa guest house in Kandahar, Afghanistan the detainee said he was anxious to begin their military training as soon as possible.

5. The detainee decided to leave the hardship of the camp and travel to the front lines to obtain first-hand battle experience.

6. The detainee felt he could be more useful in actual battle than continuing the training at al Farouq.

7. The detainee remained on the front lines for approximately five months.

8. The detainee withdrew from the front lines around Kabul in November 2001.

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ISN 055

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL ZAYLA, MUHAMMED YAHIA MOSIN**

9. The detainee was part of a group of 30 individuals who traveled together for eight days before trying to cross the border into Pakistan. As the teams were crossing the Pakistani border, the teams were arrested by the Pakistani military. All 30 of the individuals were captured.

10. Some of the travelers have been identified as bodyguards for Usama bin Laden

### b. Training

1. The detainee trained at al Farouq training camp approximately 4 1/2 months prior to 11 September 2001.

2. The detainee received training on the use of pistols, assault rifles, and machine guns, as well as mountain survival training.

3. The detainee received training at the front lines on the assembly and disassembly of Kalashnikov rifles and rocket-propelled grenade launchers.

### c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee stayed at the Daftar Taliban Madafa guest house in Quetta for several days.

2. Daftar Taliban is a Taliban office in Quetta, Pakistan, helping Arabs cross the border into Afghanistan by coordinating travel and lodging for a fee. The Taliban office advises Arabs to stay at houses in Kabul and Kandahar, Afghanistan during travel.

3. The detainee stayed at the al Ansar guest house that was run by a gentleman who arranged for training at al Farouq camp.

4. The al Ansar Mudafa was a waypoint and support center for Arabs transitioning to and from local training camps in the Kandahar area.

### d. Other Relevant Data

1. In a March 2002 interview, the detainee said that he planned to perform six months of missionary service in Afghanistan, then return to his home to continue his studies at college.

2. The detainee had three \$100 United States bills in his possession at the time of capture and was unable to explain why some of the other individuals he was captured with also had \$100 United States bills.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

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- a. The detainee denies ever seeing Usama bin Laden at the training camp.
  - b. The detainee said that if he returns to Saudi Arabia he would get married and obtain a job. The detainee regrets leaving his family behind and traveling to Afghanistan. The detainee said that as the eldest son, he should have been at home taking care of his family.
  - c. The detainee said he was cooperating because he is tired of religious extremism and religious extremists. The detainee said he is being honest and only wants to go home. He has no desire to fight anyone anymore.
  - d. The detainee considers himself a religious man. The detainee stated that if released he would return to Saudi Arabia and find a job, possibly returning to the mosque where he previously worked as a secretary/handyman.
  - e. The detainee adamantly denies being a bodyguard of Usama bin Laden, and further denies any association to the terrorist group. The detainee said that based on everything the United States interrogators have related to him about al Qaida, he finds it humorous that the United States still considers him a suspected member.
5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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# UNCLASSIFIED

**Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba**

TO: AL HARBI, SALIM SULIMAN

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL HARBI, SALIM SULIMAN

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
  - a. Commitment
    1. The detainee went to Afghanistan in 1990/1991 for the Jihad.
    2. The detainee decided that he wanted to go to Afghanistan in order to make a profit from the drug trade.
    3. The detainee stated that he left Mecca to get away from debts he owed from his failing business. The detainee sold his automobile to finance his trip to Afghanistan.
    4. The detainee left his home to seek an improved life in Afghanistan in early February 2001.
    5. The detainee traveled to Karachi, Pakistan where he stayed ten days. The detainee then traveled to Quetta for ten days. Afterwards, the detainee went to Kandahar, Afghanistan where he stayed for ten days before traveling to Kabul and eventually to Khowst, Afghanistan where he stayed with a drug dealer for four months.
    6. While living in Khowst, the detainee was approached in a local market by a member of the Tablighi Jamaat who traveled with the detainee and other members of the Tablighi Jamaat around Khowst to spread the word of Islam.
    7. The detainee was recruited by a man who was employed as a school teacher outside of the Tablighi Jamaat.

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ISN 057

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## **SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL HARBI, SALIM SULIMAN**

8. The Jama'at Al Tablighi is a Pakistan based Islamic missionary organization used as a cover to mask travel and activities of terrorists, including members of al Qaida.
  9. The detainee acknowledged the possibility of the Tablighi Jamaat assisting the families of Taliban soldiers.
  10. The detainee acknowledged that the Tablighi Jamaat may have been interested in recruiting someone similar to him to exploit his skills involving fraud, theft, drug trafficking, and travel.
  11. The detainee had access to the drug trade in Afghanistan, which was known to be supported by the Taliban as a major source of income.
  12. The detainee was in Khowst, Afghanistan when the coalition bombing campaign began.
  13. The detainee traveled from Khowst to Miram-Shah, Pakistan with two Afghani men from the Tablighi Jamaat.
  14. The detainee was questioned about conflicting statements regarding his injuries he sustained in Afghanistan.
    - a. The detainee was injured in a motorcycle accident, so he headed to Pakistan to seek medical attention. After walking for six to seven hours towards the Afghanistan/Pakistan border, the detainee was intercepted by Pakistani authorities.
    - b. The detainee claims he was on a bus that was hit during a United States air raid and received a head wound which left him unconscious for two days. An Afghan escorted him to the border crossing at Miramshah where he was apprehended by Pakistani authorities.
- b. Connections/Associations
1. After the detainee decided to go to Afghanistan, he was introduced to Darwish al Said, who instructed the detainee to fly to Karachi, Pakistan where he was met by a man he stayed with for ten days.
  2. Darwish al Sayid is also known as Abu Hashim.
  3. Abu Hashim al-Sayyid Darwish's name appears on a list of al Qaida martyrs that was discovered on a computer hard drive seized during the capture of a senior al Qaida operative.

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## **SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL HARBI, SALIM SULIMAN**

4. Many al Qaida operatives had joined the religious organization Jama'at al-Tablighi/JT in order to travel in the guise of Islamic missionaries. The JT is also known as Tablighi Jamaat.

5. The detainee advised that there were approximately ten Afghani men who were part of the Tablighi Jamaat that he was associated with in Khowst, Afghanistan.

6. The detainee's alias was in the pocket litter of a Mujahedin traveling from Bosnia to Croatia in 1996.

### c. Other Relevant Data

1. A foreign government service stated the detainee was jailed in Makkah after some financial problems with Interpol in 1998-1999.

2. The detainee spent two years in prison for stealing and possession of a controlled substance.

3. The detainee was in prison in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia for about one month and was then transferred to a prison in United Arab Emirates. He was imprisoned approximately seventeen months for defrauding a satellite cellular phone company of cellular phones, which he sold on the open market.

4. The detainee's reason for traveling to Afghanistan after he was released from jail, was to get away from everything and stay high. Drugs such as opium and hashish are very cheap in Afghanistan.

5. The detainee stated that he traveled to Afghanistan for drugs and not for the Tablighi Jamaat. The detainee stated that he had compiled a significant debt after leaving prison in the United Arab Emirates.

6. The Tablighi Jamaat has been known to pay off the debts of members willing to travel for the group.

7. The detainee stated he lost his passport in Khowst.

8. The detainee did not have his passport in his possession when he was taken into custody. The detainee indicated that his passport had been stolen during his time in Afghanistan.

9. A foreign government service identified the detainee as a priority target.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL HARBI, SALIM SULIMAN**

- a. The detainee insists that he has never been to the United States.
  - b. The detainee regrets his decision to travel to Afghanistan because of all the trouble it has caused him.
  - c. The detainee denied ever participating in any armed conflict while he was in Afghanistan.
  - d. When the detainee heard that the Americans were coming to Afghanistan, he decided to leave. He wanted nothing to do with the fighting and had no weapon while he was living in Afghanistan.
  - e. The detainee denied having fired a gun of any type during his life.
  - f. The detainee denied knowledge of any training camps located near Khowst.
  - g. The detainee did not know anyone fighting for the Taliban, al Qaida or the Northern Alliance.
  - h. The detainee stated that even though he stayed with members of the Tablighi Jamaat while he was in Khowst, Afghanistan, he was not a member of the group and spent the majority of his time obtaining, using and selling drugs.
  - i. The detainee stated that he was not approached by any members of the Tablighi Jamaat to join forces with the Taliban, al Qaida or any other Islamic Fundamentalist movements.
  - j. The detainee denied having knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on September 11th.
  - k. If returned to Saudi Arabia, the detainee would build a house and open a restaurant. The detainee would not leave Saudi Arabia ever again and would not take up arms against his government.
5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

UNCLASSIFIED

000116

# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

10 September 2006

TO: AL UWAYDHA, SULTAN

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL UWAYDHA, SULTAN

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
  - a. Commitment
    1. The detainee claimed that while attending the Haram al Naboui al Sharif Mosque in Medina, Saudi Arabia, he met a person who had visited the mosque two to three times over a period of a year and a half. The detainee stated that the person invited him to visit Pakistan. The detainee agreed to go to Pakistan because he enjoyed traveling.
    2. The detainee stated that he purchased an airline ticket with his own funds and flew to Karachi, Pakistan where he stayed in a hotel for approximately one week before going to Afghanistan.
    3. The detainee claimed that he and the person who had invited him flew from Karachi to Quetta, Pakistan, took a taxi across the border into Afghanistan and stopped at Spin Buldak, Afghanistan. From Spin Buldak, the detainee and his friend took another taxi to Kandahar, Afghanistan where they stayed near the Abu Hanifa Mosque. The detainee and his friend stayed in Kandahar for 20 to 30 days as tourists before going to Gazni, Afghanistan by taxi.
    4. The detainee stated that he and his friend while en route to Gazni, Afghanistan, stopped in Kabul, Afghanistan and stayed there for two days.
    5. The detainee claimed that he and his friend visited the Amr Ibn al Khatab Mosque after they arrived in Gazni, Afghanistan. The detainee stated that he worked at the mosque over the next eight months teaching Islam to the children.

DMO Exhibit 1  
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UNCLASSIFIED

000117

ISN 059

## UNCLASSIFIED

### SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL UWAYDHA, SULTAN

6. The detainee stated that he stayed at the Omar Ibn Khatab Mosque in Gazni, Afghanistan.

7. The detainee stated that he left Gazni, Afghanistan, in approximately August 2000. The detainee stated that he then went to Medan Shari, Afghanistan, a village near Kabul, Afghanistan where he stayed in a hotel for approximately two weeks before going to Kabul. The detainee stayed in a hotel there for approximately five days.

8. The detainee stated he then went to Khowst, Afghanistan and stayed for two to three days looking for his uncle, who worked and lived at the al Kabir Mosque. Unable to find his uncle, the detainee stated he then went to Aqdan, Afghanistan and lived there for the next two to three months. While in Aqdan, the detainee lived and taught at the Abu Bakur al Sadiq Mosque.

9. The detainee stated that he returned to Khowst, Afghanistan and to the al Kabir Mosque. Because the Northern Alliance had entered Kabul, Afghanistan, the detainee claimed that he and his uncle decided to go to Pakistan after he had been in Khowst for about three days. The detainee's uncle arranged a guide to take them to Pakistan on foot. The detainee stated that there were two or three guides with approximately 30 people in the group going to Pakistan.

#### b. Training

1. While commenting on Usama bin Laden's bodyguards, a senior al Qaida operative stated that the detainee arrived in Afghanistan at the end of 2000 and trained at the al Farouq camp.

2. In comments on the structure of training courses offered in 1993 when he attended al Farouq Training Camp in Afghanistan, a senior al Qaida operative stated that the camp provided a general program that consisted of a 40-day basic course. The camp provided the trainees with fundamental military skills in light and heavy weaponry, field guns, warheads, topography, explosives and so forth.

3. Another person stated the detainee assembled and sighted anti-aircraft guns.

#### c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee stated that after the onset of American bombings near Khowst, Afghanistan, he sought out his uncle to assist his exit from Afghanistan.

2. The detainee was arrested after crossing into Pakistan from Afghanistan with 30 other persons suspected of being Usama bin Laden bodyguards.

3. The detainee's name along with corresponding information were included on the translation of a list of al Qaida Mujahedin and the contents of their trust accounts found on computer media recovered during raids against al Qaida-associated safe houses in Pakistan.

UNCLASSIFIED

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# UNCLASSIFIED

## SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL UWAYDHA, SULTAN

4. A source stated that the detainee came to Afghanistan in 1998 and was a guard for Usama bin Laden since that time, and also that the detainee was close to Usama bin Laden.

5. A senior al Qaida operative recognized the detainee, whom he had seen in 2000, as a driver for a guest house in Kandahar, Afghanistan.

6. While commenting on Usama bin Laden's bodyguards, a senior al Qaida operative stated that the detainee arrived in Afghanistan at the end of 2000 and later joined the security detail.

7. An al Qaida operative recognized a photo of the detainee and stated that he had known the detainee as one of Usama bin Laden's bodyguards in late 2000 and early 2001. The al Qaida operative also stated the detainee was with Usama bin Laden in Kandahar, Afghanistan and Kabul, Afghanistan. Finally, the al Qaida operative stated that the detainee fled with Usama bin Laden to Tora Bora, Afghanistan when they left Kandahar after September 2001.

8. Another senior al Qaida operative recognized the detainee as an Usama bin Laden guard in 2001.

9. A person selected to be a Usama bin Laden bodyguard identified the detainee.

10. An al Qaida operative stated that the detainee had an uncle who also worked as a bodyguard in Afghanistan, as well as a driver for other bodyguards, but not for bin Laden.

11. A source stated that the detainee is related to a man who was married to Usama bin Laden's daughter and was responsible for the movement of Usama bin Laden's family.

12. A source stated that he knew the detainee and that he was probably an Usama bin Laden bodyguard because the detainee was always with Usama bin Laden. The person stated that the first time he met the detainee was at a Kandahar, Afghanistan guest house and that he also saw the detainee at Usama bin Laden's house.

13. Another person identified the detainee and stated that, though he did not know the detainee's name, he saw the detainee multiple times with Usama bin Laden.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee stated that he is familiar with the Jamaat Tabligh and their goal of spreading the word of Islam but claimed that he did not have any contact with members of the Jamaat Tabligh before he left to go and teach the Koran in Afghanistan.

b. The detainee claimed that he traveled to Afghanistan to teach the Koran to poor and disadvantaged Muslims.

# UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL UWAYDHA, SULTAN**

c. The detainee denied ever receiving English language training or small arms training while he was in Afghanistan or Pakistan.

d. The detainee claimed he was not a bodyguard for Usama bin Laden and did not have any relationship with him.

e. The detainee claimed that he had never been arrested in the past and expressed a willingness to cooperate. The detainee claimed he was not aware of any threat to United States interests.

f. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001 and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

UNCLASSIFIED

000120

# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

28 June 2006

TO: KARNAZ, MURAT

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF KARNAZ, MURAT

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee claimed that he learned Islam in mosques in Germany but wanted to increase his knowledge. He felt the lessons in Germany were slow and wanted to learn more quickly. The detainee planned to go to Pakistan for one to two months. He had planned to return to Germany after his training to be with his new wife.

2. On 3 October 2001, both the detainee and a friend attempted to depart a Germany airport for Pakistan. His friend, however, was stopped, questioned, and detained concerning various unpaid legal fees. The detainee was then forced to travel to Pakistan alone.

3. The detainee claimed he traveled to various sites in Pakistan to study the Kuran. He was sponsored by the Jamayat al Tabliq organization.

4. The detainee claimed that Pakistani police officials captured him while traveling by bus to Peshawar, Pakistan.

5. A source identified the detainee as being one of seven individuals that were captured at Tora Bora, Afghanistan. The source also claimed that several of the individuals that were arrested with the detainee were Mujahedin fighters.

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ISN 061

## UNCLASSIFIED

### SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF KARNAZ, MURAT

#### b. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee stated that his father would take him and his brothers to the Kubra Mosque, where he first met individuals from the Jamayat Tabliq.

2. The detainee stated that he traveled from Bremen, Germany approximately fifteen to thirty minutes, by train, to a meeting held by the Jamaat Tabligh. He denied that the Jamaat Tabligh discussed recruitment for fighting while he was at the meeting.

3. According to German open source reporting, the detainee left Germany and headed to Afghanistan. Prior to the detainee's departure, he appears to have met an ethnic Syrian German citizen who was a friend of 11 September 2001 killer pilot Muammad Ata. This individual sent the detainee to Afghanistan for terrorist training, just like Ata's group before him.

4. The detainee identified a picture of the Elalanutas suicide bomber as possibly his former friend.

#### 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001, and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.

b. The detainee denied ever having received any weapons training when he traveled to Pakistan, and also denied ever having a weapon there.

c. The detainee stated that he was not a terrorist. He also claimed to have no association to al Qaida or Usama bin Laden.

d. The detainee stated that no one asked him to fight. He stated that Jamayat Tabliq did not fight with guns and used words to teach instead. The detainee stated that he was not interested in fighting, and that it was not his war.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

UNCLASSIFIED

000122

# Numbers not used

0000123-124

# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

17 August 2006

TO: AL JUHANI, MUHAMMED

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL JUHANI, MUHAMMED

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee claimed that he used his own money to pay for his travel from Saudi Arabia to Afghanistan in June 2000. The detainee traveled to Afghanistan to perform Islamic missionary work after hearing several fatwas issued by Imams in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.

2. A source identified the detainee as one of 30 men who were Usama bin Laden bodyguards and drivers.

3. A source identified the detainee as one who visited Kabul, Afghanistan for approximately two weeks between fighting on the front lines.

4. A senior al Qaida operative claimed that the detainee might have stayed at the Hamza al Ghamdi guest house in Kabul, Afghanistan. The source also stated that the detainee was seen on the front lines at Kabul, Afghanistan.

5. An admitted jihadist identified the detainee as a Mujahedin fighter in Afghanistan and a member of al Wafa called al Irata. The source stated that the detainee taught the Koran, fought at Tora Bora, Afghanistan and was one of Usama bin Laden's bodyguards.

b. Connections/Associations

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ISN 062

## UNCLASSIFIED

### **SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL JUHANI, MUHAMMED**

The detainee's name was found on a chart listing the names of captured Mujahedin. The information was found on a hard drive associated with a senior al Qaida operative.

#### c. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee departed Kabul, Afghanistan and spent eight days traveling by foot with a group of about thirty men headed to Pakistan.

2. In December 2001, the detainee was arrested with a group of thirty men at the Pakistan border.

3. The Pakistani warden in the prison told the jihadists to say they were in Afghanistan to teach the Koran or for religious studies.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee claimed that he did not attend any training camps or swear bayat to anyone. He claimed that he never participated in any type of military training or combat.

b. The detainee stated he was not part of the Taliban or al Qaida.

c. The detainee stated if given the opportunity he would return to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, pick up his life where he left off, and return to driving a taxi.

d. The detainee said he would return to his family in Saudi Arabia if released.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

# UNCLASSIFIED

**Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba**

5 October 2006

TO: AL QAHTANI, MAAD

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL QAHTANI, MAAD

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee stated he first traveled to Afghanistan from Saudi Arabia around the beginning of 2001 in order to participate in jihad, which he deemed a religious obligation. Once in Afghanistan, the detainee attended training at the al Farouq Training Camp.

2. The detainee stated he completed his training approximately three months after he entered Afghanistan, and he was then compelled to swear bayat to Usama bin Laden. The detainee stated he did this in person with Usama bin Laden, without any witnesses, while at Usama bin Laden's residence in Kandahar, Afghanistan.

3. The detainee stated that sometime in the summer of 2001, after he swore bayat to Usama bin Laden, the detainee was approached and asked to conduct a martyr mission from Usama bin Laden.

4. The detainee was instructed by a senior al Qaida operative to obtain British and United States visas. The detainee was then provided airline tickets from Dubai, United Arab Emirates through London, England to Orlando, Florida.

5. The detainee stated that at the time he agreed to conduct the mission there was no specific plan in place. However, the detainee knew that per his bayat and obligation, he would be called upon at a later time to conduct a martyr mission.

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ISN 063

# UNCLASSIFIED

## **SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL QAHTANI, MAAD**

6. The detainee stated he traveled to Orlando, Florida, on 4 August 2001. The detainee was unable to answer questions at airport customs and did not have a return ticket. After being denied entry into the United States, the detainee returned to Dubai, United Arab Emirates. The detainee applied for a second United States visa and after it was denied he traveled to Afghanistan.

7. The detainee stated his decisions for agreeing to conduct a mission stemmed from three basic fatwas. First was a fatwa in which the detainee felt obligated to participate in jihad in Afghanistan. Second was a fatwa in which the detainee felt obligated to swear bayat to Usama bin Laden. The third was a fatwa in which the detainee felt obligated to do whatever Usama bin Laden asked of him including conducting a martyr mission, because he had given bayat to Usama bin Laden.

8. When asked whether he would have completed whatever mission he was assigned when going to the United States, the detainee nodded head indicating he would.

### b. Training

1. The detainee stated that after the completion of his basic training at al Farouq, he attended a city tactics course in Kandahar, Afghanistan, which lasted approximately one and a half months.

2. The detainee attended al Farouq Training Camps for a total of five to six months; initial training lasted approximately two to three months and consisted of indoctrination, small arms (AK, handguns, grenades) and physical training. The second advanced segment of training also lasted approximately two to three months and consisted of small unit tactics and specialized weapons training.

### c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee identified two senior al Qaida members. The detainee admitted to knowing these two individuals and meeting them in a safe house in Kandahar, Afghanistan prior to 11 September 2001.

2. The detainee stated that on approximately 12 February 2001, he traveled from the Arab guest house in Kandahar, Afghanistan to Usama bin Laden's house in Kandahar, Afghanistan to give his allegiance to Usama bin Laden.

3. The detainee stated that on approximately 24 April 2001, after graduating from advanced training, he visited Usama bin Laden at his house to honor and praise him. The detainee told Usama bin Laden that he would continue to serve him as he would the prophet Mohammed. During this visit, Usama bin Laden instructed the detainee to contact a senior al Qaida official for instructions on how to serve his religion.

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## SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL QAHTANI, MAAD

4. The detainee stated that on approximately 22 June 2001, on his own initiative, he met with Usama bin Laden again at Usama bin Laden's house in Kandahar, Afghanistan, to greet him and to tell him that he was ready for his mission to the United States. Usama bin Laden called a senior al Qaida operative and advised him that the detainee had returned from the front line and was ready to complete his mission to America.

5. The detainee stated that on approximately 27 August 2001, he met Usama bin Laden again at Usama bin Laden's house in Kandahar, Afghanistan after the detainee returned from his failed mission to the United States.

6. The detainee was detained while trying to cross into Pakistan from Afghanistan on 15 December 2001, with thirty suspected al Qaida members.

7. The detainee stated that when he returned to Afghanistan after his failed mission to America he saw a known suicide bomber at different guest houses on three separate occasions.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on September 11th, and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States' interests.

b. The detainee insisted that he was a different person now than he was back in the summer of 2001. He then insisted that he would not have done a mission that involved killing women and children. The detainee said that he would have refused to participate in that type of operation and would have asked that he be allowed to return to Afghanistan.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

15 March 2006

TO: AMIN, OMAR RAJAB

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AMIN, OMAR RAJAB

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee stated he wanted to try and help orphans and refugees in Afghanistan. The detainee decided to travel to Afghanistan for two months. The detainee raised approximately 7,000 United States Dollars from friends and family and received a 3,000 United States Dollars donation from a Kuwait City mosque.

2. On 28 September 2001 the detainee traveled from Kuwait to Dubai. He stayed in Dubai for almost two days. The detainee then traveled from Dubai to Bahrain and stayed for two days. The detainee then traveled from Bahrain to Meshut, Iran. From Meshut the detainee traveled to the Afghanistan border and crossed the border using his Kuwaiti passport. On 2 October 2001 the detainee traveled to Herat, Afghanistan. The detainee then traveled from Herat to Kabul, Afghanistan.

b. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee stated he was the deputy director for the Kuwaiti Joint Refugee Committee in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

2. The detainee said that the charity with which he was associated, al Haramayan, was recognized by the Kuwaiti Ministry of Social Affairs.

UNCLASSIFIED

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ISN 065

## UNCLASSIFIED

### **SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AMIN, OMAR RAJAB**

3. The Kuwaiti Joint Relief Committee and al Haramayan allegedly provided financial support to former Arab Mujahedin in Bosnia.
4. The detainee's name appeared on a foreign government service list of members of the Mujahedin Brigade in Bosnia. The document showed the detainee joined the Brigade in 1993.
5. The detainee said the reason he would be listed as a member of the Mujahedin Brigade was because he bought the citizenship. The detainee said the person he worked with probably provided false documents, showing that the detainee was part of the military in 1993, in order to get the detainee citizenship.
6. The detainee was identified as a close friend of a Mujahedin fighter and leader in Bosnia.
7. A foreign government service stated that this Mujahedin fighter has possible involvement in war crimes in Bosnia.
8. The detainee was seen several times at the home of a Kuwaiti who facilitated other Kuwaitis' travels to Afghanistan.
9. This Kuwaiti facilitator is a terrorist financier. He traveled to Afghanistan in 1999 and 2001 to meet with Usama bin Laden to give him large amounts of money.
10. A source said the detainee looks like an Afghan individual he saw in the abu Hamza guest house in Kabul.
11. The abu Hamza guest house was a safe house for Saudi Arabians and Yemeni al Qaida members.
12. An al Wafa member said that he was visited by a Kuwaiti group headed by the detainee at the end of September 2001.
13. The al Wafa member was a leader of Mujahedin fighters in Afghanistan.
14. Al Wafa has been placed on the terrorism exclusion list. An organization can be placed on the terrorism exclusion list if the Secretary of State finds that the organization commits or incites to commit, under circumstances indicating an intention to cause death or serious bodily injury, a terrorist activity; prepares or plans a terrorist activity; gathers information on potential targets for terrorist activity; or provides material support to further terrorist activity.
15. A source stated that he met the detainee at the Saudi Ambassador's guest house.
16. The source also stated that he (the source) was in Afghanistan in charge of the al Wafa office in Kabul, Afghanistan.

UNCLASSIFIED

## UNCLASSIFIED

### SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AMIN, OMAR RAJAB

17. The manager of the Saudi Ambassador's guest house used to take people to and from the front lines.

18. The manager of the Saudi Ambassador's guest house has been in Afghanistan for close to 15 years and he has traveled to Bosnia and Chechnya for jihad. The manager is one of Usama bin Laden's most trusted people and reported directly to Usama bin Laden.

19. An al Haramayan delegation member saw two people, including the detainee, passing by and asked them to take him with them. The delegation member states that he stayed with these two individuals for one month and six days.

20. The detainee's name was on a listing of 324 Arabic names, aliases and nationalities recovered from safe house raids associated with suspected al Qaida in Karachi, Pakistan.

#### c. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee said that in response to the killing of an Arab male, the Bosnian police rounded up a group of Arabic males indiscriminately and began questioning them. The detainee said he was detained for about twenty-four hours and then released without being charged.

2. The detainee met with a Taliban secretary and told him he wanted to meet the official in charge of refugees. The detainee was told the official was not there so the detainee scheduled a meeting in three days.

3. According to a source, the three travelers, including the detainee, met with a Pakistani National. They requested this individual take them to their respective consular officers. The individual agreed to do this for a fee of 100 United States Dollars. After a short period of time, the Pakistani police arrived and apprehended the three.

4. The detainee stated that he turned himself over to the Pakistan Army and that he wanted to go to the Kuwaiti Embassy.

5. The detainee was transferred to United States custody on 27 December 2001 from Peshawar, Pakistan.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee said he is happy that the United States helped his country (Kuwait) protect itself from Iraq. The detainee said he never had the intention to harm Americans.

b. The detainee said he had never fired a gun except for a very small gun. He said it was the type of gun to kill a mouse.

UNCLASSIFIED

## UNCLASSIFIED

### **SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AMIN, OMAR RAJAB**

c. The detainee denied being involved with the Mujahedin Brigade of the Bosnian Army and has no association or knowledge of the Mujahedin Brigade.

d. The detainee said he had never served in the Kuwaiti military and has never associated with Mujahedin.

e. The detainee denies visiting the offices of al Haramayan. The detainee also denies attending meetings or lectures of al Haramayan, or attending any meetings or lectures at which al Haramayan representatives were present. The detainee is unaware of any ties between al Haramayan and any extremist or terrorist organizations or individuals.

f. The detainee said he was in Kuwait on 11 September 2001. When asked for his reaction to the bombings in New York and at the Pentagon, he felt that they had placed Islam in danger.

g. The detainee claims he has no knowledge of the activities of his traveling companions while in Afghanistan.

h. The detainee stated that he never talked to a Taliban government official.

i. The detainee said that he had never been to the Saudi Ambassador's guest house in Kabul, Afghanistan.

j. A source stated that the detainee said he was coming from Kabul and that the detainee was there to help poor people.

k. The detainee denied that he had any weapons training or was in any training camps while in Afghanistan.

l. The detainee stated that he never fought against the Northern Alliance or the United States military.

m. The detainee denied any association with Usama bin Laden.

n. The detainee denied ever having been a member of al Qaida.

o. The detainee did not believe in following Usama bin Laden.

p. The detainee stated he had no plans to fight against United States Forces.

q. The detainee wishes to return home to Kuwait upon leaving Cuba.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available

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## **UNCLASSIFIED**

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AMIN, OMAR RAJAB**

unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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**Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba**

15 September 2006

TO: AL SULAMI, YAHYA

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL SULAMI, YAHYA

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee stated that after graduating from the religious institute in Mecca, Saudi Arabia, he decided to preach the Word of God to the non-Arabs. The detainee stated many religious scholars issued a religious decree regarding the importance of teaching the Koran to the non-Arabs. Therefore, the detainee decided to travel to Afghanistan in order to fulfill this duty.

2. The detainee claimed to have been motivated by the fatwa issued by Shaykh Humud al Uqqla, based in Qasim, Saudi Arabia, calling for missionary work in Afghanistan and by religious orations of various Imams encouraging such missionary work.

3. A source stated Sheikh Hamud al Uqqla was a Saudi mufti who issued a fatwa calling for jihad in Afghanistan. Al Uqqla condoned the 11 September 2001 attacks against the United States and helped raise money for Usama bin Laden until his death in Saudi Arabia in 2001.

4. The detainee stated that a friend convinced him to go to Afghanistan because the friend said there were people there who needed to learn the Koran.

5. The detainee stated he met a man in the Holy Mosque in Mecca, Saudi Arabia, who helped him in his travel arrangements to Afghanistan through Pakistan.

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## **SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL SULAMI, YAHYA**

6. The detainee stated that before he left Saudi Arabia for Pakistan and Afghanistan, he met an individual in a mosque in Saudi Arabia. The detainee further stated this individual gave him 10,000 Riyals to use for his travel expenses on the journey to Pakistan and Afghanistan. The detainee stated that the money was given to him without any obligation to pay it back.

7. The detainee claimed to have met a person who gave him 5,000 Saudi Riyals to cover travel expenses to Afghanistan. The detainee stated that the person, a religious student at King Abd Al-Aziz University in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, allegedly collected the money from various mosques, imams and religious students to support missionary work.

8. The detainee stated that he departed Jeddah, Saudi Arabia in late July 2001 for Karachi, Pakistan.

9. The detainee stated that upon arriving to Karachi, Pakistan, he contacted Dar Al-Ifta, the House of Religious Affairs, and informed them on his plans to teach the Koran in Afghanistan.

10. The detainee stated that he went to Pakistan for four or five days before going to Afghanistan. The detainee stated that once in Karachi, Pakistan, a religious school, Dar Ifta, provided him a place to stay.

11. The detainee stated that he was transported into Afghanistan along with four Afghans and entered Afghanistan through the Miram Shah, Pakistan border crossing.

12. The detainee stated that upon arriving to Khowst, Afghanistan, he was taken by a person to a mosque. The detainee stated that he resided in a room next to the mosque and taught Afghan children to memorize the holy Koran.

13. The detainee stated that in Khowst, Afghanistan, he stayed initially at a school and started missionary work by assisting in the distribution of money to orphans and widows and by holding Koran recital classes.

14. The detainee claimed he was employed in 2001 as a teacher of Islam and Arabic at a mosque in Khowst, Afghanistan.

15. A source stated that he first met and spoke with the detainee in 2001, one month before Ramadan, in Tora Bora, Afghanistan. The source stated that the detainee told him he was in charge of handling logistical issues and transferring supplies to fighters in Tora Bora.

16. A source stated that the detainee transferred supplies from a guest house to the fighters in Tora Bora, Afghanistan.

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## **SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL SULAMI, YAHYA**

17. A source stated that it was in Murad Beck, Afghanistan, where the detainee told him that since 1995 he had been fighting on a battlefield line in Bagram, Afghanistan.

18. A source stated that during the eighth month of the 2001 of the Islamic calendar, he was in the mountains of Tora Bora, Afghanistan, when the detainee took over as the military leader of the Mehjin region following the death of Mehjin Alta Afee.

19. A source stated that the detainee was an Emir in charge of fighters in a valley near Tora Bora, Afghanistan.

20. A source stated that the detainee was the most senior of all the other fighters based on the detainee's experience fighting in Afghanistan since 1995.

21. A source identified seven other detainees who fought under the command of the detainee at Tora Bora, Afghanistan.

22. A source stated he saw the detainee firing weapons from atop the Tora Bora Mountains, Afghanistan, towards the Afghan fighters who were firing towards them using tanks and mortars.

23. A source stated he saw the detainee kill Afghan fighters using the following weapons: the Kalashnikov rifle, the rocket-propelled grenade, and the Doushka machine gun.

### **b. Training**

1. A source identified the detainee as having been at the al Farouq Training Camp.

2. A source stated that the al Farouq Training Camp in Afghanistan was funded by al Qaida. Basic training at al Farouq consisted of two weeks of weapons training with students shooting approximately 40 rounds, two weeks of basic commando course, two weeks of topography and two weeks of explosives.

3. A source stated that the detainee probably had special mission training. The source stated that the detainee had possessed a computer disc in Afghanistan showing this training and that the detainee knows important people in Yemen and Afghanistan.

### **c. Connections/Associations**

1. The detainee stated he was advised by a mullah, whom he met at the Dar Alaftah House, to travel to Afghanistan.

2. The detainee stated that a person coordinated his travel to and out of Afghanistan.

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## **SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL SULAMI, YAHYA**

5. The detainee stated he lost his passport jumping over the river two or three days before leaving Afghanistan and was told by a person that he did not need it because it was so easy to cross the border. The detainee stated he did not contact the Saudi embassy and did not talk to any Saudi officials until he was jailed in Pakistan.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001, and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.

b. The detainee claimed no knowledge of al Qaida or Usama bin Laden beyond what he had heard from people in the streets and the media.

c. The detainee denied knowing of or seeing anyone with weapons during his five day journey into Pakistan. The detainee denied passing by or seeing any military type camps during his travels.

d. The detainee denied receiving any type of military training, denied any type of association with any known or suspected member of al Qaida or the Taliban, and denied ever commanding or even being in any military position in or near the Tora Bora mountains in Afghanistan.

e. An al Qaida operative stated that although he had seen the detainee several times, he had never met him or ever seen him do anything.

f. The detainee stated he would never go to Afghanistan again nor show interest in taking up arms for jihad.

g. When questioned about his future if he were returned to Saudi Arabia, the detainee stated he wished to be transferred home to live with his family. The detainee stated he would get a job in the market place selling fruits and vegetables.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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## **SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL SULAMI, YAHYA**

3. A source stated that the detainee worked under Mehjin Alta Afee and supervised 20 other workers in the distribution and movement of supplies and weapons up the Tora Bora mountains in Afghanistan to the fighters.

4. A source stated that he met the detainee for the first time in Tora Bora, Afghanistan.

5. A source stated that the detainee had connections in Afghanistan dating back to 1995 with another detainee who was personal friends with Usama bin Laden's son. The source also stated that Usama bin Laden treated the other detainee like one of his own sons, and that the other detainee had access to Usama bin Laden at anytime because of this relationship.

6. A source identified the detainee and stated that he believed the detainee came to Afghanistan after 11 September 2001. The source stated he saw the detainee after 11 September 2001 in a house in Kabul.

7. The detainee stated that after the American attack on Afghanistan, he contacted a man and requested him to arrange for his return to Pakistan. The detainee stated that the man introduced him to two Afghan guides. The detainee stated that the guides were to take him, along with 30 other Arabs, from the city of Khowst, Afghanistan, to Pakistan. The detainee stated they walked for six days in the mountains before they arrived to Pakistan.

8. The detainee was captured with a high level group of 30 Usama bin Laden bodyguards and al Qaida commanders.

### **d. Other Relevant Data**

1. The detainee could not provide the names of anyone who could confirm his story that he taught the Koran at a mosque in a small village near Khowst, Afghanistan, nor could he think of any evidence that could prove that he was in Khowst teaching the Koran during his time in Afghanistan.

2. The detainee stated that he spent four or five months in Afghanistan. The detainee stated that he decided to leave Afghanistan once the bombing started and that he hired a guide to take him to the border of Afghanistan.

3. An al Qaida operative stated that he had seen the detainee in 1999 or 2000 in Kandahar, Afghanistan at the airport village, where the detainee had stayed with other brothers.

4. Another al Qaida operative stated that he saw the detainee in Pakistan in late 2001 and early 2002 and believed the detainee had been captured in Karachi, Pakistan. The source stated that he thought the detainee may have been involved in transferring money via a hawala.

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# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

2 September 2006

TO: RAZAQ, ABDULLAH R

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF RAZAQ, ABDULLAH R

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee claims he would not sacrifice anything in support of Usama bin Laden, but the detainee stated he would go on jihad and martyr himself if ordered to do so by a decree.

2. The detainee stated that about two months after the USS Cole attack, he wanted to leave for Chechnya in order to become a martyr like his brother.

3. The detainee's brother's name is cataloged in the translated list of killed and wounded al Qaida martyrs. The document states the deceased came from a Mujahedin family and the family sent three brothers for jihad.

4. The detainee stated that during his time on the front lines there was gunfire and he did fire his weapon.

b. Training

1. The detainee explained he was at the al Farouq Training Camp for about two months where he spent the first month learning weapons and the second month actually practicing with them.

2. The detainee and his brother received specialized instruction on conducting attacks from motorcycles and cars from a former Khaldan instructor.

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF RAZAQ, ABDULLAH R**

## c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee stated he would often visit with an al Qaida facilitator who was a close friend of Usama bin Laden.
2. A safe house facilitator within Afghanistan made travel arrangements for the detainee to go to the front lines.
3. The detainee attended a speech given by Usama bin Laden while at the al Farouq Training Camp.
4. The detainee shook Usama bin Laden's hand and knew him to be a respected Islamic figurehead.
5. The detainee's name was found on a document listing suspected al Qaida members.
6. A senior al Qaida operative stated the detainee and his brothers had ties to jihad.

## d. Intent

1. The detainee stated he left Saudi Arabia in order to become a martyr like his brother.
2. The detainee repetitively requested to be taken to the front lines.
3. The detainee was taken to an administrative office where he gave up his passport, papers and currency.

## e. Other Relevant Data

1. A source has stated the detainee and his brother received specialized training on SAM-7A and B missiles.
2. The detainee was apprehended with a group of thirty individuals who attempted to cross the Pakistan border. Several of these individuals are thought to have been bodyguards for Usama bin Laden.
3. A source recalled the detainee and stated he saw the detainee training in the Khotal-e-Morcha mountain pass terrorist camp near Kandahar, Afghanistan.
4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
  - a. The detainee denied traveling to Afghanistan to receive any type of training.

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## **SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF RAZAQ, ABDULLAH R**

b. The detainee stated he felt good about telling the truth and said he would continue to cooperate.

c. The detainee advised he had no knowledge of planned SA-7 attacks on United States aircraft at Prince Sultan Air Base, Saudi Arabia.

d. The detainee has stated that he does not know of anyone whom had received surface-to-air missile training.

e. When questioned about the 30 individuals apprehended with the detainee, the detainee replied that he did not know any of the individuals and that his first contact with them occurred subsequent to his arrest.

f. The detainee said that there was talk after 11 September 2001 of the United States entering Afghanistan but the detainee never thought about actually fighting the United States.

g. The detainee advised that he had no knowledge of any al Qaida members or operations in the United States. The detainee claims that he fought for the Taliban; however, he does not consider himself as a member of the al Qaida organization.

h. The detainee stated he had no loyalty or significant respect toward either al Qaida or the Taliban. The detainee stated he never felt any desire to belong to either group.

i. The detainee claims he never swore bayat to either Usama bin Laden or al Qaida because it would violate the teachings of his Imam in Saudi Arabia.

j. The detainee claimed the he would not allow himself to be recruited for al Qaida. Additionally, the detainee stated he would not advise other individuals to join al Qaida or jihad.

k. The detainee stated that he now feels it is his duty to help prevent future acts of terrorism. The detainee stated that in order to stop terrorism, Muslim youths should learn of tolerance and peace through respected Islamic scholars.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

20 November 2006

TO: AL BAWARDI, KHALID S

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL BAWARDI, KHALID S

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee stated he used the same route many Saudi jihadists used to go to Afghanistan. The detainee also used similar housing arrangements: hotel or apartment close to the airport.

2. The detainee stated his guide and translator while the detainee was in Pakistan and Afghanistan was a Tablighi organization representative.

3. The detainee claimed he heard of the fatwa by a Sheiks calling on every Muslim to go for missionary work in Afghanistan and was encouraged by Tablighi personnel in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.

4. The detainee claimed he worked as a missionary teaching the Koran for only about four or five weeks with the remainder of his time in Afghanistan spent in mosques in Kabul, Afghanistan.

5. A source identified detainee as being part of the group of 30 suspected al Qaida members who escaped Tora Bora, Afghanistan and were then captured crossing into Pakistan.

6. The detainee was identified as having fought in the Quodous area and was in charge of locating and site preparation of caves and bunkers.

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ISN 068

# UNCLASSIFIED

## **SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL BAWARDI, KHALID S**

7. The detainee stated that shortly before leaving for Afghanistan he read a fatwa issued by a Sheik that directed all pious men to travel abroad and perform missionary work in under-developed Islamic countries, which the detainee took to mean places such as Afghanistan or Pakistan, choosing to travel to Pakistan.

8. The translation of a document listing Arabic names, aliases and nationalities recovered from safe house raids associated with the suspected al Qaida in Karachi, Pakistan included a name variant and an alias of the detainee and listed the detainee in possession of a Saudi passport and wallet containing important identification cards.

9. The detainee admitted traveling for one week with Arabs and Pakistanis to the Pakistan border.

### **b. Training**

A source stated the detainee trained for three weeks at al Farouq in Afghanistan.

### **c. Other Relevant Data**

1. An immigration arrival/departure document indicates a person with a variant of the detainee's name arrived in Orlando, Florida on 24 July 2000 and departed on 28 August 2000.

2. An immigration arrival/departure document indicates a person with a variant of the detainee's name arrived in Orlando, Florida on 4 July 2001 and departed on 1 August 2001.

3. The detainee denied ever traveling to the United States, or Orlando, Florida, specifically. The detainee denied ever losing his passport or giving it to anyone else to use. The detainee maintained he was in Saudi Arabia during July 2000, and took no trips abroad.

4. On several occasions the detainee coordinated reconnaissance, discussed operational planning of a terrorist suicide bombing and was in charge of the entire plan against oil tankers and U.S. warships.

5. The detainee stated he took about 4,000 United States Dollars into Afghanistan with him, which he claimed was stolen while he was looking for a guide to leave the country.

6. The detainee claims after he fled Afghanistan, he was arrested by the Pakistani police on his way to the Saudi Embassy to seek refuge.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee claimed no knowledge of Usama bin Laden or the al Qaida organization.

# UNCLASSIFIED

## **SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL BAWARDI, KHALID S**

b. The detainee stated he was never recruited to fight for the Taliban or al Qaida. The detainee did not hear of anyone who preached about jihad, and had no knowledge of the training camps throughout Afghanistan.

c. The detainee claims he was in United Arab Emirates for a vacation and to do missionary work only. The detainee claims that if released he will never go on vacation again.

d. The detainee stated he traveled to Pakistan to perform charity work.

e. The detainee related that he traveled to Afghanistan on his own to preach the Koran. The detainee stated that his mind was set on going to preach.

f. The detainee denies any association with al Qaida or the Taliban and stated he did not take part in or see any fighting at all.

g. The detainee stated that Usama bin Laden lied to the Muslims and that the Sheiks in Saudi Arabia should go and tell the truth so that the killing will stop. The detainee defended Muslims and his faith but stated Usama bin Laden is not a good Muslim if he lies and urges the death of innocent peoples and fellow Muslims.

h. The detainee denies any association with the group of 30 Arabs who egressed from Afghanistan.

i. The detainee stated he turned himself in to members of the Pakistani military.

j. The detainee stated if returned to Saudi Arabia he would go home, find a job and never leave Saudi Arabia again even in response to a fatwa.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

12 February 2006

TO: ABDULLAH, YUSEF K

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ABDULLAH, YUSEF K

1. (U) An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. (U) The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. (U) The following primary factors favor continued detention:
  - a. (U) Commitment
    1. The Detainee attended Friday prayer at the Ali Shauk mosque shortly after the Taliban had destroyed the Buddha statues in Afghanistan. The Imam began to preach about the jihad in Afghanistan and the recent destruction of the Buddha statues. The Imam supported the actions of the Taliban and encouraged the congregation to travel to Afghanistan to participate in jihad.
    2. After hearing the talks that supported the Taliban as well as persuasion by his brother, the Detainee agreed to travel and fight in Afghanistan. The Detainee stated that it was his duty to travel to Afghanistan and fight with the Taliban forces who were fighting against the Northern Alliance.
    3. According to the Detainee, religious fatwas helped to fuel his interest in going to Afghanistan.
    4. The Detainee identified the following route of travel to Afghanistan: he flew to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, then to Doha, Qatar, and finally to Karachi, Pakistan. Upon arrival in Karachi the Detainee stayed at the El Haram Hotel.
    5. The Detainee was instructed by his brother to leave Karachi and go to the Daftar Taliban in Quetta, Pakistan.

UNCLASSIFIED

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**000146**

ISN 073

# UNCLASSIFIED

## **SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ABDULLAH, YUSEF K**

6. The Detainee traveled by bus to Quetta, Pakistan. Upon arrival at Quetta, he went to the Taliban Building and then traveled to Kabul, Afghanistan. Upon his arrival in Kabul, the Detainee took a taxi to Dar El Aman, which was identified as the house of security.

7. The Detainee was united with his brother after the Detainee arrived in Kabul.

8. The Detainee stated that once he and his brother entered Afghanistan, they stopped in Kandahar at an unknown Taliban guesthouse. The Detainee and his brother then traveled to Kabul, Afghanistan. The Detainee and an al Qaida operative then traveled to the Malek center in Kabul.

9. The Detainee stated that after spending some time in Kabul, Afghanistan, he and his brother took a flight to Konduz, Afghanistan.

10. According to the Detainee, after arriving in Konduz, Afghanistan, he and his brother rode in a truck to Taloqan, Afghanistan.

11. The Detainee and his brother stayed outside of the Malek center before their training began.

12. According to the Detainee, the Malek center is used to support Taliban fighters by training foreign fighters in basic riflanship. The center also provides Taliban fighters who return from the front lines with a place to rest and relax.

### b. (U) Training

The Detainee stated that upon his arrival to the Kwahjaghar area of operation, Afghanistan, he met a Yemeni individual. While in the rear area of Kwahjaghar, the Detainee trained with his brother in the use of hand grenades. After training, both the Detainee and his brother were sent to the front lines of Kwahjaghar.

### c. (U) Connections/Associations

1. The Detainee's older brother left Ta'if, Saudi Arabia to join the Taliban in Afghanistan and called the Detainee a few times from Kabul, Afghanistan to convince him to go to Afghanistan. The Detainee did not want to go at that time.

2. The Detainee stated that one of his brothers advised him how to travel to Afghanistan.

3. The Detainee stated that he received some money from one of his older brothers who was not aware that the money would be used to finance the Detainee's travel to and fighting in Afghanistan.

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ABDULLAH, YUSEF K**

4. The Detainee was stationed with his brother on the front lines of Kwahjaghar at a Taliban position known as Tamim center.

d. (U) Intent

e. (U) Other Relevant Data

1. The Detainee and his brother were at Kwahjaghar with other Arabs.

2. The Detainee has identified the person in charge of the group of Arabs as Abd Al Salam Al Hudrami.

3. The Detainee and his brother were positioned in the village when the bombing campaign began. Shortly thereafter, the Detainee and his brother elected to depart Afghanistan, but Hudrami said that they were unable to leave because the Afghanistan borders were closed.

4. Hudrami was killed during the bombing campaign. Abd Gharib was in charge when the group of Arabs was told to withdraw.

5. The Detainee and the group of Arabs traveled from Kwahjaghar to Konduz, Afghanistan. They were told that the area had fallen and that they must travel to Kandahar, Afghanistan. The group traveled through Mazar-E Sharif on their way to Kandahar.

6. The Detainee and the group surrendered their weapons at Mazar-E Sharif and were then taken to a castle called Jenki and placed in a prison.

7. The Detainee stated there was an explosion and an eruption of gunfire at Jenki during which time he received a gunshot wound to the abdominal area and was rendered unconscious. The Detainee's brother was killed in the prison.

4. (U) The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

1. The Detainee has denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001.

2. The Detainee has denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.

3. The Detainee denied any personal knowledge of planning of internal uprisings at the Guantanamo Bay detention facility.

4. The Detainee had no knowledge of al Qaida recruiting for the Taliban in Saudi Arabia.

**UNCLASSIFIED**

## UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ABDULLAH, YUSEF K**

5. The Detainee has stated that if released, he would like to return to Taif, Saudi Arabia where he would attempt to go to college and continue his education.

6. The Detainee claims that he was never associated with al Qaida.

7. The Detainee claims he had no real knowledge of the cause of the Taliban or the socioeconomic, political, or religious conditions in Afghanistan. The Detainee simply wanted to be with his brother.

8. The Detainee stated that he decided to join his brother in Afghanistan due to their closeness rather than a real desire to participate in jihad.

5. (U) You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

UNCLASSIFIED

# UNCLASSIFIED

**Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba**

23 May 2006

TO: AL RASHID, MISHAL SAAD ABDUL AZIZ

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF  
AL RASHID, MISHAL SAAD ABDUL AZIZ

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee was recruited into jihad in March 2000. He said he received a flyer which contained information about a fatwa issued by Sheikh Hamoud al Uqqla.

2. Sheikh Hamoud al Uqqla is a Saudi Arabian Mufti who issued fatwas and encouraged people to fight jihad against Christians and Jews. Al Uqqla condoned the 11 September 2001 attacks against the United States, and helped raise money for Usama bin Laden until his death in 2001.

3. The detainee identified himself as a soldier of Islam and went to Afghanistan to defend his faith. The defending of Islam was his motivation. The detainee was fighting for the Nation of Islam.

4. The detainee implied that he was an active participant in the practice and beliefs of the Wohabi sect of Islam. Wohabi is a strict sect that does not recognize the existence of other sects of Islam.

5. The detainee said he used his own money for the travel.

b. Training

1. The detainee worked as a guard in Saudi Arabia. He received training with the Britt and Gerturi automatic weapons.

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ISN 074

## UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL RASHID, MISHAL SAAD ABDUL AZIZ**

2. The detainee was sent to the al Farouq camp near Kandahar, Afghanistan. He trained for approximately one month. The detainee said he trained with the Kalashnikov, grenades and the PK machine gun.

3. The detainee was identified at the al Farouq camp as a person who worked with wireless communication systems.

4. The detainee was identified as being in the City Tactics class, on the front line, and at Konduz, Afghanistan after the front line broke.

### c. Connections/Associations/Travel

1. The detainee met a man on a bus from Essar, Saudi Arabia to Qatar. He said they were both planning to fly to Islamabad, Pakistan from Qatar to get into Afghanistan.

2. The detainee said he went to a hotel and the next day traveled to the nearest city to Afghanistan, which was Peshawar, Pakistan. The detainee said he stayed in Peshawar, Pakistan for three days.

3. . The detainee said he took a taxi to the Afghanistan/Pakistan border.

4. The detainee said he met an unknown Pakistani at a phone center and told this person that he wanted to go to Afghanistan to join the Taliban.

5. The detainee stated he and a Pakistani guide crossed the border into Afghanistan. He said they used a route through the mountains to cross the border on foot.

6. After arriving in Afghanistan, they took a taxi to Kandahar, Afghanistan. The detainee said the Pakistani guide took him to a Taliban house.

7. The detainee acknowledged that Usama bin Laden and other al Qaida leaders visited al Farouq.

### d. Detainee Actions and Statements

1. The detainee stated that after receiving training at al Farouq camp, he was sent to Kabul, Afghanistan and assigned to the secondary line.

2. The detainee stated he was a Taliban soldier who fought on the front lines against the Northern Alliance.

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL RASHID, MISHAL SAAD ABDUL AZIZ**

3. The detainee surrendered to General Dostum's forces. The detainee stated he was transported to the prison in Mazar-e-Sharif.

4. The detainee stated he was put in the basement of the prison. He stated he was shot in the thigh and the arm while at the prison.

5. The detainee viewed the current United States operations against Islamic warriors around the world as misguided. The detainee refused to acknowledge that Usama bin Laden had declared war on citizens of the United States.

6. The detainee believes that jihad is legitimate and justifiable when one's family is threatened or when Muslims are being threatened or persecuted.

### e. Other Relevant Data

A document connected with suspected al Qaida in Karachi, Pakistan was recovered. The detainee's name appears on this document.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee said he is an innocent man and the reason why he went to Afghanistan was to fight the Northern Alliance. The detainee said the Northern Alliance is his enemy and not the United States.

b. The detainee denied knowing Abdul Hadi al-Iraqi. He said that he went straight to the front line after al Farouq camp training. The detainee denied knowing about Tarnak Farms.

c. The detainee said he went to Afghanistan to help Muslims.

d. The detainee stated that Usama bin Laden's justification for the events on 11 September 2001 was not proper according to his understanding of Islam.

e. The detainee feels that he made a mistake in going to Afghanistan to fight. The detainee felt that he should have researched the situation fully and spoken to his parents before going.

f. The detainee claims he never intended to fight against Americans. When he found out that Americans were entering the fight, he decided to surrender.

g. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001 and he also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.

## **UNCLASSIFIED**

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF  
AL RASHID, MISHAL SAAD ABDUL AZIZ**

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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**000153**

# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

2 March 2006

To: AL HANASHI, MOHAMMAD AHMED ABDULLAH SALEH

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL HANASHI, MOHAMMAD AHMED  
ABDULLAH SALEH

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
  - a. Commitment
    1. The detainee obtained a cassette tape by a famous Sheik that stated that all Muslims needed to visit Afghanistan because it was perfect for Islam and is the most pure State.
    2. The detainee concluded from the cassette tape that Afghanistan was more of an Islamic society than Yemen.
    3. The detainee immediately decided to go to Afghanistan but had no money to fund his trip. The detainee met a man who gave the detainee money to buy a passport and completely took care of the rest of the trip.
    4. An associate of the detainee was actively looking for a way to get into Chechnya to join the jihad. In Yemen, the associate worked assisting Yemeni men traveling to Afghanistan for training. The associate served as a senior leader at the front lines North of Kabul. The associate later became a well known person in his role as a front line Commander.
    5. The detainee stated that his passport contained the name of Mohammad Ahmed Abdullah Saleh and not his family tribal name of Al Hanashi. The detainee did not tell his parents that he was leaving for Afghanistan.
    6. The detainee traveled from Yemen in March or April of 2001. The detainee traveled to Afghanistan from Yemen via air to Dubai, United Arab Emirates and Karachi, Pakistan, traveled by bus to Quetta, Pakistan and Kandahar, Afghanistan and then took a taxi to Kabul.

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ISN 078

## UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL HANASHI, MOHAMMAD AHMED ABDULLAH SALEH**

7. The detainee stayed in a Taliban guesthouse for two or three days in Quetta, before taking a bus to the border.
8. The detainee rode the bus with a number of Taliban and Jama Tablique members, and stayed in a Jama Tablique house for two to three days and then stayed at a guesthouse called the Dafter Taliban House
9. Jama at Al Tablighi is a Pakistan based Islamic missionary organization used as a cover to mask travel and activities of terrorist, including members of al Qaida.
10. Upon the detainee's arrival in Kabul, the detainee stayed in another Taliban house called Darol Alaman House, where he became aware that he would be fighting against the Northern Alliance.
11. The detainee left home and went to Afghanistan fully intending to fight for the Taliban and die for his God.
12. The detainee was deployed for six months to the Northern front to fight against the Northern Alliance.
13. The detainee stated that he fired at the enemy but did not kill anyone.

### b. Training

The detainee stated that he was not trained on weapons in Afghanistan because he already knew how operate a Kalishnakov and how to handle hand grenades from when he lived in Yemen.

### c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee saw Usama bin Laden in Tora Bora. Usama bin Laden spoke to the detainee's group for three to four minutes.
2. While fighting for the Taliban, the detainee was under the leadership of Abdul Salam and saw Abdul Hadi Al Araqi whom the detainee describes as the General of the non Afghan Taliban troops positioned on the front line.
3. The detainee's name and aliases appears on a document listing 324 Arabic names and nationalities recovered from safehouse raids associated with suspected al Qaida in Karachi, Pakistan.

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL HANASHI, MOHAMMAD AHMED ABDULLAH SALEH**

d. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee traveled with a group of 450 in Taliban trucks to Herat, Afghanistan to surrender and discard their weapons in exchange for their safety. The detainee and a total of 5,000 Taliban soldiers surrendered to the Northern Alliance.

2. The detainee was captured with a Kalishnakov.

3. The detainee had in his possession \$400 United States Dollars when he was captured in Pakistan. The detainee claimed Sa ed Dayan gave him his wallet before he died. Inside the wallet was \$400 United States Dollars and Dayan's will.

4. The detainee readily admitted to having fought with the Taliban, but noted that it was never his intention or desire to fight against the United States.

5. During an uprising following his capture, the detainee was wounded in his left hand and right side of his abdomen by the gunfire. The detainee fell to the ground and lay there while the guards were shooting everyone around him.

6. The detainee was treated for his wounds at Shabraghan Prison and that he spent four days there before being transported to a hospital in the town of Shabraghan for further treatment. The detainee spent approximately 25 days at the hospital before being transported by Americans to the prison in Kandahar for one to one and a half months. After Kandahar, the detainee was transported to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee made the decision to go to Afghanistan with the idea of exploring the culture and country to see if Afghanistan was a true Islamic State and had no intentions of going to Afghanistan to fight.

b. The detainee stated that he has heard of the al Farouq Training Camp for Arabs but has never attended the Camp and does not know anyone who has trained at the Camp.

c. The detainee claimed that the Taliban forced him to be a soldier and claimed that he did not support the Taliban but was unable to leave.

d. The detainee stated that he did not take a Bayat or oath.

e. The detainee cleared up a discrepancy in an earlier interview conducted on 3 September and on 12 September 2002 that he saw Usama bin Laden for three to four minutes in Tora Bora, when Usama bin Laden talked to his group. The detainee corrected his previous statements and advised that he never saw Usama bin Laden and that he had never been to Tora Bora.

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL HANASHI, MOHAMMAD AHMED ABDULLAH SALEH**

f. The detainee is not aware of anyone involved in the attack of the U.S.S. COLE or anyone associated with any other terrorist acts.

g. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution of 11 September 2001. The detainee also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.

h. When the detainee gets released, he hopes to go back to Yemen and get married. Once married, the detainee intends to go to school and become a history or geography teacher.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

UNCLASSIFIED

# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

11 July 2006

TO: AL HARAIZI, FAHED

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL HARAIZI, FAHED

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. In or about March 2001, the detainee traveled to Afghanistan to fight the jihad.
2. An alias of the detainee was found on a report providing the by-name roster of nominees who were scheduled to attend the al Qaida trainers preparation course.
3. The detainee was reported to be a trainer at al Farouq Training Camp in Afghanistan.
4. The detainee traveled to the front lines, which were about a three hour drive from Konduz, Afghanistan. The Taliban commander at the front lines was Abdul Salam, a Yemeni.
5. Abd al-Salam was the leader of the Arab units on front lines in northern Afghanistan. Abd al-Salam was killed during Allied air strikes.
6. The detainee was reported as being in charge of keeping people in the rear encouraged during the retreat from the front lines. The detainee was reported to be some sort of administrator who had a walkie-talkie during the retreat.

b. Training

1. While in Kabul, Afghanistan, the detainee attended two weeks of military training, which consisted of assembly, disassembly and shooting the Kalashnikov, B.K. and throwing grenades.

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL HARAZI, FAHED**

2. The detainee was among those who took training at al Farouk to become an instructor.

c. Other Relevant Data

1. On the ninth day of Ramadan, the detainee was captured. On the 10th day of Ramadan, he was taken to a castle in Mazar-e-Sharif.

2. During the uprising at Mazar-e-Sharif, the detainee was shot in the arm by someone unknown.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee said he heard about Usama bin Laden only from the media and has never seen him in person.

b. The detainee said he did not have prior knowledge of the United States attacks nor did he have information pertaining to future attacks on the United States.

c. The detainee said the attacks on the United States were not part of the jihad and, if released, he would not go back and fight for jihad.

d. The detainee claims he is not a member of the Taliban or al Qaida.

e. The detainee said that he went to the front lines with a Kalashnikov but did not shoot his Kalashnikov nor did he see any fighting.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

24 February 2006

TO: ALI, WALID MOHAMMAD HAJ MOHAMMAD

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ALI, WALID MOHAMMAD HAJ  
MOHAMMAD

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee left Sudan in 1997 to work in Saudi Arabia. The detainee worked from job to job for four and one half years. Soon, he felt he was being called upon to spread the message of Islam to other countries. He obtained a visa in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia in order to go to Pakistan.

2. The detainee traveled from Saudi Arabia to Pakistan in February or March of 2001.

3. The detainee drove to Quetta, Pakistan and stayed there for about 30 days in a house located next to a mosque. Many Afghans in this house had broken arms, legs, and other wounds. The detainee understood that this was a recovery house for the Taliban.

4. The detainee and an operative traveled to a guesthouse in Konduz, Afghanistan where they stayed for one day. Many fighters of different nationalities stayed at the guesthouse. Vans transported fighters back and forth between the guesthouse and the front lines.

5. While at Konduz, Afghanistan, the operative gave the detainee two choices: either stay in Konduz, Afghanistan for da'wa or join the operative and his followers to fight in the front line against the Northern Alliance. The detainee chose to fight.

b. Training

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ISN 081

# UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ALI, WALID MOHAMMAD HAJ MOHAMMAD**

1. The detainee fought on the Khvej Ghar front lines outside of Konduz, Afghanistan. The detainee received training on the Kalashnikov at Khvej Ghar.

2. The detainee received about a half hour of training on the Kalashnikov. He became a guard of the bunker area, which was about two or three kilometers from the front line.

3. The detainee was able to visually identify the 7.62mm Kalashnikov, 7.62mm PK, 7.62 RP-46, RPG-7 (rocket-propelled grenade launcher), and the 7.62 SKS/Type 56. He said that he had seen them in Afghanistan.

## c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee identified an individual whom he saw on two different occasions while in Afghanistan. The first sighting of the individual was when he came to the front lines to deliver food. Afterwards, he gave the detainee a pistol to fight, but no ammunition. The detainee did not have any previous weapons training. He also saw this individual handcuffed at Mazar-e-Sharif.

2. The individual was an associate of an al Qaida leader. The al Qaida leader also instructed at the al Farouq training camp.

3. While in Pakistan, the detainee met a Saudi Arabian man. He tried to convince the detainee to go to Afghanistan to teach Islam.

4. The detainee was with Arabs and guarded underground trenches that were used for sleeping and storing weapons.

## d. Intent

N/A

## e. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee remained a guard until the American bombing started. The Taliban people there said that it was time to withdraw. The detainee withdrew to Konduz, Afghanistan, where the Taliban gave him and the others a house to stay in.

2. Konduz, Afghanistan, became surrounded and the Taliban said they reached an agreement with General Dostum's forces allowing the Pakistanis and Arabs to withdraw through Mazar-e-Sharif, Afghanistan.

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## UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ALI, WALID MOHAMMAD HAJ MOHAMMAD**

3. The detainee and the others got on a truck unarmed and went on their way to Herat, Afghanistan, being led by vehicles from General Dostum's forces.

4. The detainee arrived at a castle called Al-Janki, where they were searched and their valuables were taken by Dostum's forces. The detainee was taken to the basement of the castle where he spent the night. The following morning, the detainee was taken out into the yard when an explosion took place in the building. The guards at the castle started randomly shooting and many prisoners were killed. The detainee ran away from the building, but was eventually shot in the back.

5. The detainee was wounded during the uprisings at the detention facility at Mazar-e-Sharif, Afghanistan.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee began providing guidance on Islam approximately five years prior to his capture and traveled to Pakistan to guide Pakistani muslims on how to pray, to fast, and to pray at a cemetery.

b. The detainee believes that Islam is not a religion of fighting.

c. The detainee never met Usama Bin Laden or any high-ranking members of the Taliban or al Qaida. The detainee never heard of any fatwa against America. The detainee does not know of anyone that trained for or was asked to participate in a martyrdom mission.

d. The detainee denied having any knowledge of attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001, and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.

e. The detainee denied having knowledge or planning of internal uprisings at the Guantanamo detention facility.

f. In August 2005, the detainee advised he felt like he was being punished for being honest. The detainee advised he told the first Administrative Review Board that he would kill Americans if they invaded his country. He stated he believes this statement is what is keeping him incarcerated at Guantanamo Bay. The detainee stated if released, he would not go to Iraq to kill Americans and his only desire is to return to Sudan, marry, and start a family. After his experience in Afghanistan, he stated he would never return there.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ALI, WALID MOHAMMAD HAJ  
MOHAMMAD**

unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

20 April 2006

TO: AWAD, WAQAS MOHAMMED ALI

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AWAD, WAQAS MOHAMMED ALI

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. An individual at the Ibn Algiam Mosque located in Alburaikeh, Yemen persuaded the detainee to go to Afghanistan and receive training.

2. The detainee stated he went to Afghanistan to become a fighter.

3. The detainee said he went to Afghanistan to receive weapons training.

4. The detainee arrived in Afghanistan in mid-September 2001.

b. Training

1. The detainee claims no expertise with weapons other than the Kalashnikov rifle. The detainee claimed he learned this at home as everyone in Yemen has a Kalashnikov.

2. The detainee's name appeared in a list of names, possibly of al Qaida trainees, found among a collection of notes and miscellaneous papers recovered by Allied Forces at the al Qaida facility at Tarnak Farms.

3. The Tarnak Farms facility in Afghanistan housed an al Qaida poison and explosive training laboratory and an advanced operational training camp. No one was allowed to train at Tarnak Farms without first passing through basic training at the al Farouq camp. The Tarnak Farms camp was considered the most important al Qaida training camp in Afghanistan since it

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ISN 088

# UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AWAD, WAQAS MOHAMMED ALI**

was where al Qaida operatives received advanced operational training including urban assault and other tactics.

## c. Connections/Associations

1. A senior al Qaida lieutenant identified the detainee as possibly being at the al Zubayr guest house and also perhaps at the front line in Kabul.

2. The detainee's name, and the fact that one of his legs was amputated, was found in a handwritten personal letter from Ammar al-Dhali to Abu-al-Fadhl. Ammar al-Dhali was informing Abu-al-Fadhl of the status of some of the brothers who either were killed in Tora Bora, were captured, or who successfully left the country and returned home.

3. Ammar al-Dhali was associated with a senior al Qaida operational planner and had been identified as one of two Yemeni operatives who would serve as martyrs in a car bomb attack in Karachi, Pakistan.

## d. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee was captured on 2 November 2001 when he was injured near the airport in Kandahar, Afghanistan.

2. The detainee called all Americans evil, men without testicles, and game players. The detainee said interrogators do not interrogate, they just meet with detainees to beautify themselves.

3. The detainee stated that he prays to God every night that the interviewers get tongue and throat cancer so they can no longer interview detainees. When asked if he was threatening the interviewers with his prayers, the detainee said that he was.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee is unsure what he will do when he leaves Cuba. He will figure this out when he is home. Once home, the detainee will relax and spend time with his family. The detainee would eventually like to work as a contractor in construction.

b. The detainee claimed not to be familiar with fatwas ordering Arabs to attack United States citizens and property.

c. The detainee denied any prior knowledge of the 11 September 2001 attacks on the United States. He further denied having knowledge of rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.

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# UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AWAD, WAQAS MOHAMMED ALI**

- d. The detainee admitted it was a mistake traveling to Afghanistan for training.
  - e. The detainee stated that the persons who committed the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks ruined the reputation of Islam.
  - f. The detainee claimed he never became a fighter and he denies all knowledge of any combat activities in Afghanistan.
5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

23 February 2006

TO: TSIRADZHO, POOLAD T

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF TSIRADZHO, POOLAD T

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee stated he saw on television that there was a war in Afghanistan. He then went to Afghanistan to study and look for the Taliban. Upon arriving in Herat, Afghanistan the detainee met with a Taliban officer who sent him to Kandahar, Afghanistan.

2. In the beginning of 2001, the detainee came into contact with the leader of an al Qaida affiliated terrorist group in Kandahar and Kabul, Afghanistan. An al Qaida senior operative met with the leader and tasked him to vet the detainee.

3. The al Qaida senior operative instructed the al Qaida affiliated terrorist group leader that if the detainee proved reliable, then to escort him to Kabul for a meeting with the leader of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU).

4. The detainee had spoken with the leader of an al Qaida affiliated terrorist group and explained his travel route to Afghanistan. The leader of an al Qaida affiliated terrorist group eventually escorted the detainee to Kabul.

5. Once the detainee was in Kabul, the leader of an al Qaida affiliated terrorist group arranged for housing for the detainee in a house where individuals associated with the IMU were living, including a senior member of al Qaida.

6. A short time after the detainee arrived in Kabul, the senior al Qaida member introduced him to the leader of the IMU. A month after the detainee met with the leader of the IMU, he was sent to al Farouq.

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ISN 089

# UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF TSIRADZHO, POOLAD T**

## b. Training

1. While in Kabul, the detainee was issued an AKM-762 rifle. He never received any training for the weapon and he never used the weapon. He was instructed to only use it when directed.

2. A source identified the detainee as having attended basic training at al Farouq, which included a topography course.

3. Another source also identified the detainee as somebody who trained at the al Farouq training camp. The source also stated that the detainee speaks Arabic and Russian.

## c. Other Relevant Data

1. While in Khojahar, the detainee was injured in his right arm during an artillery attack by Northern Alliance Forces. The detainee went from Khojahar to Konduz and remained there for about two months. The detainee eventually surrendered to General Dostum in November 2001.

2. The detainee has been identified as serving on the northern front lines with a senior al Qaida member.

3. The detainee has admitted to attending the Lezgi Mashid mosque every Friday.

4. The Lezgi mosque became known as one of the more extremist mosques where radicals congregated.

5. The detainee was asked during an interview if he would return to Afghanistan to fight against America. The detainee responded, "What has America ever done for me?"

6. The detainee's name was on a list recovered during a raid on a safe house in Karachi, Pakistan. The safe house was suspected of being associated with al Qaida.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee has denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001.

b. The detainee has denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.

c. The detainee has denied any knowledge or planning of internal uprisings at the Guantanamo Bay, Cuba detention facility.

**UNCLASSIFIED**

# UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF TSIRADZHO, POOLAD T**

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

UNCLASSIFIED

# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

6 March 2006

TO: AL SALEH, ABDUL

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL SALEH, ABDUL

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee stated that after his separation from the Yemeni National Police, he saw the fatwa issued by Sheik Abdullah bin Gibreel calling for a jihad against the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan. After reading the fatwa, the detainee decided to go to Afghanistan. The detainee gave 53,000 Saudi Riyals to Mohammed Omar Askar for the detainee's plane ticket to Karachi, Pakistan.

2. The detainee did not tell his family that he was going to fight jihad. The detainee asked his father how he would feel if the detainee went to fight jihad. His father told the detainee that the detainee would not receive any inheritance, which means that the detainee would be disowned as a son.

3. The detainee stated that he did not receive any funding from anyone for his trip to Afghanistan. The detainee stated that he sold his Kalashnikov rifle for 45,000 Yemeni to help pay for his trip.

4. In a May 2003 interview, the detainee stated that he went to fight jihad because of a fatwa he heard in Yemen to fight in Chechnya.

5. The detainee traveled to Karachi, Pakistan, and the next day traveled by bus to Quetta.

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ISN 091

# UNCLASSIFIED

## **SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL SALEH, ABDUL**

6. The detainee told a Taliban representative that the detainee wanted to fight in the jihad in Afghanistan. The next day the detainee left the guest house with five Afghanistan nationals and traveled by taxi for three days to the Jihad School in Kandahar.

7. Following the detainee's arrival at the Jihad School, the detainee informed the individual he talked with that the detainee had been in the military in Yemen and was ready to fight in the jihad.

### b. Training

1. A source identified the detainee as a Yemeni who trained at al Farouq with the Arab group that traveled between the camp and Kabul.

2. The detainee served in the National Police until 2001 and his weapons training was limited to firing six rounds with the Kalashnikov.

### c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee stated that he was a guard in the Taliban who spent approximately five months (June 2001 to December 2001) on the front line at Khvajeh Ghar, Afghanistan.

2. The detainee admitted that he was a fighter with the Taliban.

3. A foreign government service provided a list of al Qaida members who they believed to be in Afghanistan. The detainee's name was on this list.

4. A list was recovered in an alleged al Qaida residence in Karachi, Pakistan. The detainee's name was found on this document.

5. The detainee stated that the men he fought with were issued Kalashnikov rifles, rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs), PK machine guns and hand grenades.

### d. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee surrendered at Mazar-e-Sharif and was taken to Qala-i-Jenki prison.

2. The detainee stated that he was wounded and spent most of the time prior to his capture in the basement of the Qala-i-Jenki prison.

3. The detainee was arrested by American Forces at the Qala-i-Jenki prison.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL SALEH, ABDUL**

a. The detainee denied knowing any al Qaida. The detainee said that he never fought against any Americans and had no knowledge of any plans for an uprising in Camp X-Ray.

b. When the detainee leaves Guantanamo Bay he plans to go back to Yemen and get married. The detainee will disregard anyone who suggests that he fight jihad. The detainee feels that it was a stupid idea to follow the fatwa.

c. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001, and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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**000172**

# UNCLASSIFIED

**Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba**

27 April 2006

TO: AL ZAHRANI, YASIR TALAL ABDALLAH

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL ZAHRANI, YASIR TALAL  
ABDALLAH

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee decided to go to Afghanistan after hearing a sheik preaching about the jihad in Afghanistan in July 2001. The detainee approached the sheik and expressed his interest in going to Afghanistan. The sheik told him to go to Karachi, Pakistan and gave the detainee the name of a person to contact when he arrived in Karachi.

2. The sheik traveled to mosques where he spoke about the jihad in Afghanistan, and said that it was the duty of good Muslim men to help establish an Islamic army. The enemy of this Islamic army was the Northern Alliance, and specifically Ahmed Shah Masoud.

3. In August or September 2001 the detainee traveled from Jeddah, Saudi Arabia to Dubai, United Arab Emirates and on to Karachi, Pakistan. He purchased a round trip ticket for about 300 United States Dollars using money he earned from selling perfumes and scents during the Hajj in Mecca.

4. The sheik's contact met the detainee in Karachi, Pakistan. The detainee and the contact then traveled through Quetta, Pakistan to Spin Boldak, Kandahar and Kabul, Afghanistan before stopping at the Taliban Training Center in Konduz, Afghanistan.

5. The contact's name appears in a translation of a document listing 324 Arabic names, aliases, and nationalities recovered from safe house raids associated with suspected al Qaida in Karachi, Pakistan.

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ISN 093

## UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL ZAHRANI, YASIR TALAL ABDALLAH**

### b. Training

1. The detainee trained with two Arabs and three Afghans at the Taliban Center for one month. They received training in the use of the Kalashnikov rifle, the Makarov pistol, hand grenades, plus field training. The detainee identified the Afghan trainer at the Taliban Center.

2. The trainer at the Taliban Center was the former governor of Herat Province, Afghanistan.

3. An individual identified the detainee as a Saudi named Yassarand and said the detainee purchased weapons for the Taliban and trained at al Farouq Camp.

4. Weapons training was conducted on numerous weapons at al Farouq, and students learned how to assemble and disassemble each weapon. They received training on the Kalashnikov, AKM and PK machine gun and would fire a total of 30 rounds in the sitting, kneeling, and standing positions. They also familiarized themselves with the rocket-propelled grenade launcher.

### c. Connections/Associations

1. Upon completing training the detainee went to a fighting position 30 minutes outside of Konduz, Afghanistan on the main road to Taloqan, and approximately six kilometers south of the Taliban front line. The fighters were armed with Kalashnikov rifles, PK machine guns, hand grenades, and rocket-propelled grenade launchers.

2. The detainee arrived at the position at the beginning of the second week of September 2001, and remained there for three months. The commander of the position was Mullah Zakir. There were approximately 25 Taliban fighters stationed at the position.

3. Zakir was the Taliban commander for units north of Takharistan.

4. The detainee was involved in food and services to the administration and was always on the front line base camps. After the retreat to Konduz, the detainee was seen helping in the kitchen at the Arab guest house and working with the cook.

5. The detainee's name was found in a document that listed 324 Arabic names, aliases and nationalities. The document was recovered from raids on safe houses associated with suspected al Qaida in Karachi, Pakistan. The detainee was in possession of a Saudi passport.

6. The detainee was very important on the northern line in the Arab group and carried a radio. The detainee was a money courier, and a friend of Abd al Salaam.

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## UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL ZAHRANI, YASIR TALAL ABDALLAH**

7. The detainee is associated with a senior al Qaida commander, and visited the commander's office.

8. This senior al Qaida commander was one of Usama bin Laden's closest commanders and was in charge of al Qaida fighters in the Afghani Northern front.

9. The detainee carried a Kalashnikov rifle and was in the Marwan group. The leader of the Marwan group was a Yemeni who went by Kala.

10. The leader of the Marwan group was an educated Yemeni known to be a very active Taliban and al Qaida recruiter in Yemen, and had experience fighting in both Chechnya and Afghanistan.

11. Another person identified the detainee as Yasser from Saudi Arabia. He knows the detainee from Shabraghan prison and advised that the detainee was part of the Taliban.

### d. Intent

The detainee said that he is a fighter and being imprisoned is part of being a fighter. He said it is God's will that he is here, and it will be God's will when he leaves. The detainee was asked if he was a fighter, would he fight again if released? The detainee responded by saying, "Only God knows."

### e. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee was captured with a group of about 400 at Konduz, and was sent to the prison at Mazar-e-Sharif. The detainee said he did not engage in any fighting.

2. When the fighting broke out at Mazar-e-Sharif the detainee was immediately shot in the leg and foot, and fell to the ground. The detainee stayed where he fell until night came, when some of the other prisoners came out and took him into the underground room.

3. The surviving prisoners were put into trucks and taken to a prison at Shabarghan, Afghanistan where they were kept for one month.

4. When asked what he would do if he was released, the detainee replied that if God wishes, he would return to Saudi Arabia. The detainee then stated that he did not care if his incarceration ended or not. He only cares about one thing: that he does not talk with the interviewers.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee denied that he had any involvement in the fighting at Mazar-e-Sharif.

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL ZAHRANI, YASIR TALAL ABDALLAH**

b. The detainee stated that he was unaware of al Qaida activities in Afghanistan. He further stated that he did not understand the actions of members of al Qaida. The detainee said members of al Qaida do not represent the true beliefs of Islam.

c. The detainee stated he understood why he was incarcerated, and said he would have stopped the 11 September 2001 attacks if given the opportunity. Regarding the Mazar-e-Sharif prison uprising, the detainee said he would have stopped or prevented the killings there, just like New York, if he could have.

d. The detainee stated he did not know that Usama bin Laden and members of al Qaida were hiding in Afghanistan under the protection of the Taliban.

e. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001, and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

19 April 2006

TO: ATABY, MOHAMMED

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ATABY, MOHAMMED

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. In 2000 the detainee met a Pakistani man at a furniture store in his neighborhood. The Pakistani talked to the detainee about training in Pakistan and Kashmir.

2. During the summer of 2000 the detainee decided to travel to Kashmir for military training at the al Aqsa training camp in Lahore, Pakistan.

3. When the detainee arrived in Lahore, Pakistan he called the number on a business card that the Pakistani had given to him and spoke to a representative of the Lashkar-e-Tayyiba organization. The representative transported the detainee from the airport to the Lashkar-e-Tayyiba office. The detainee stayed at the office that day and was transported the next day to the al Aqsa camp.

4. Lashkar-e-Tayyiba is the armed wing of a Pakistan-based anti-United States missionary organization. It is one of the three largest and best-trained groups fighting in Kashmir against India. It is listed by the United States Treasury Department as an organization which is believed to support terrorist groups.

5. After his training at al Aqsa camp, the detainee traveled from Lahore, Pakistan to Quetta, Pakistan and then to Kandahar, Afghanistan. The detainee spent approximately three months in Afghanistan fighting the Northern Alliance and then returned home to Saudi Arabia.

6. In June 2001 the detainee returned to Afghanistan to fight against the Northern Alliance again.

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ISN 096

## UNCLASSIFIED

### SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ATABY, MOHAMMED

7. The detainee stated that he financed his trip through money he saved during his time spent in school. The school gives its students an allowance while they are enrolled there.

8. The detainee traveled from Riyadh, Saudi Arabia to Dubai, United Arab Emirates and then to Karachi, Pakistan. He stayed in Karachi for one day, then traveled to Quetta, Pakistan. The detainee spent one day in Quetta then traveled to Kandahar, Afghanistan. He spent one day in Kandahar then traveled to Kabul, Afghanistan where he stayed for two weeks. During his travels, the detainee stated he did not stay at any mosques, only hotels, and he traveled alone.

9. The detainee traveled from Kabul to northern Afghanistan, stayed at a safe house for a few hours, and then traveled by taxi to the front lines to fight the Northern Alliance.

10. The detainee received a Kalashnikov rifle and went to the front lines. He stated that he was a guard for his unit.

#### b. Training

The detainee spent approximately two months at al Aqsa training camp and was trained on the operation of the Kalashnikov.

#### c. Connections/Associations

The detainee stated that his cousin was Abu Turab Najdi Ribal, who was in charge of some men in Afghanistan. The detainee stated that Abu Turab was killed in action.

#### d. Other Relevant Data

The detainee stated that while at the front in northern Afghanistan, the 11 September 2001 attacks occurred. He heard of the attacks by radio. The detainee became scared because it is forbidden to kill women, children, and innocent people. Many people with him felt the same way. He wanted to leave the front line and return home, but could not get out of Afghanistan because everything was closed down and bombs were being dropped everywhere. Before Ramadan, an Arab leader told everybody to leave. The detainee later surrendered at Mazar-e-Sharif.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. Prior to his surrender, the detainee had no prior arrests. He denied having had any prior knowledge of the attacks on 11 September 2001 or having any knowledge of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.

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## UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ATABY, MOHAMMED**

b. The detainee denied having ever met or seen Usama bin Laden during any of his travels to and through Afghanistan, and further stated that he was not part of al Qaida or the Taliban.

c. The detainee denied any allegiance to the Taliban and further stressed that he was never armed during any period of his time spent in Afghanistan. He further denied any known familial associations to al Qaida. The detainee stated that based upon what he has learned of al Qaida since his capture, he would never support Usama bin Laden or al Qaida's objectives.

d. The detainee stated that if released, he wants to go home. He stated he was interested in continuing his studies and finishing his degree. The detainee also stated he wanted to marry and start a family.

e. When asked if he would join forces with others and fight Americans if he were released, the detainee stated he did not think so; he wants to live a normal life.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

UNCLASSIFIED

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# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

27 February 2006

To: AL RABIESH, YUSEF ABDULLAH SALEH

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL RABIESH, YUSEF ABDULLAH  
SALEH

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee decided to go to Afghanistan after learning about the conflict on internet sites at an internet café in Bariyeh, Saudi Arabia. The detainee read about fatwahs issued by two different sheiks on the internet sites. Both fatwahs were issued to Saudis to help the Taliban with money or personal service.

2. The detainee's brother was in Afghanistan and said that he would help if the detainee decided to come to Afghanistan.

3. The detainee left for Afghanistan in May or June of 2001. The detainee traveled on instructions provided by his brother. The detainee took his clothes, passport and 5,000 Riyals that he borrowed from his younger sisters.

4. The detainee traveled from Riyadh, Saudi Arabia; Bahrain, Dubai; Karachi; Pakistan and then to Quetta, Afghanistan. The detainee met his brother in Quetta and they both went onto Kandahar and stayed three days at a guesthouse there.

5. The detainee's brother arranged for travel to Kabul and there they stayed for two weeks at the Dar Al Aman guesthouse. The detainee said that this was a large guesthouse where the Taliban stayed. The detainee and his brother then went to Konduz, Afghanistan. Finally, the detainee and his brother went to Talukan, Afghanistan and stayed in a Taliban guesthouse for four weeks.

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### b. Training

1. The detainee and his brother trained on the Kalashnikov, PK and grenades. Only the detainee, his brother and the trainer were present at the training. The training consisted of assembly/disassembly and live firing of the weapon. The live firing took place about five kilometers from the front.

2. They received instructions on how to employ grenades.

### c. Connections/Associations

1. After training they went back to Konduz and onto Khoja Ghar, Afghanistan. Amir Juma (Bay) was the leader of the entire frontline in the area. The detainee and his brother then went to the Sa'id Center and from there deployed to an area on the frontline to guard the valleys.

2. The detainee was identified while at Konduz fighting, Janki Fort, Shabraghan prison and Kandahar.

3. The detainee was a member of the Taliban operating in Afghanistan as a foreign fighter. The detainee was captured in the vicinity of Konduz by Dustum forces.

4. At the Janki Fort in Mazar E Sharif, the detainee heard an explosion and Dustum forces started shooting prisoners. The detainee said that many men were killed and there was also an air strike, at which time the detainee's brother was killed.

### d. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee admitted that his previous statement (i.e. that he visited websites to obtain information concerning Afghanistan), were false. The detainee had very little knowledge of how to use the internet.

2. The detainee did not see or hear any fatwahs from any person. The detainee told previous investigators that he received fatwahs and that was his reason to go to Afghanistan.

3. The detainee sold his motorcycle to an unknown person at the market in Buraydah, Saudi Arabia for 5000 Riyals to finance his travel to Afghanistan. The detainee admitted that his previous reports of receiving money from his younger sisters were false.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001 and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans.

b. The detainee was queried regarding any knowledge or planning of internal uprisings had at the Guantanamo Detention facility with negative results.

UNCLASSIFIED

## UNCLASSIFIED

c. The detainee claimed that his motivation to travel to Afghanistan was to convince his brother to return home because their mother and father had medical problems.

d. The detainee said that the 11 September 2001 terrorists events were not good deeds and that those involved should be severely punished and sent to hell. The detainee stated that any Muslim who kills should be sent to hell. The detainee clarified that only the killing of believers would not be tolerated but would not clarify further about non-believers. Regardless, the detainee stated that it is not a good deed to kill.

e. The detainee related that he doesn't think Usama Bin Laden is an Iman that could influence his following. The detainee stated that he never in support of Usama Bin Laden or al Qaida, never fought against the Americans and never was a fighter in anything.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

UNCLASSIFIED

# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

11 May 2006

TO: AL KHALIDI, ABD AL AZIZ SAD MUHAMMAD AWSHAN

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF  
AL KHALIDI, ABD AL AZIZ SAD MUHAMMAD AWSHAN

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee stated that he saw a copy of a fatwa issued by a sheikh from the al Kasseeb mosque for people to defend the Muslims and Islamic nations/lands against the Northern Alliance. The detainee believed in this fatwa and felt it was his religious duty to fight against people who attacked Muslims.

2. The detainee, one exam away from earning his degree, left school early to travel to Afghanistan, after receiving the fatwa.

3. The sheikh issued a fatwa calling for jihad in Afghanistan. He condoned the 11 September 2001 attacks against the United States.

4. The detainee financed his entire trip to Afghanistan. He departed Saudi Arabia with approximately 5000 to 6000 Saudi Riyals, which is equivalent to approximately 1,333 to 1,600 United States Dollars.

5. The detainee traveled from Saudi Arabia to Konduz, Afghanistan via Damascus, Syria; Tehran, Iran; Mashhad, Iran; Taybad, Iran; Herat, Afghanistan; and Kabul, Afghanistan. This is a heavily-used al Qaida infiltration route.

6. While the detainee was staying at a guest house in Konduz, Afghanistan, he was shown how to operate a Kalashnikov rifle.

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ISN 112

## UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL KHALIDI, ABD AL AZIZ SAD MUHAMMAD AWSHAN**

7. The detainee arranged his own travel from Kabul to Konduz, Afghanistan. The detainee took a taxi with two other men who knew where to go because they had been to the front line before.

8. The detainee stated that he was in a bunker and would hear mortar shells and artillery. The detainee was instructed not to shoot his Kalashnikov rifle unless he was in immediate danger.

9. The detainee was in the northern part of Afghanistan on the line between the Taliban and the Northern Alliance.

10. The detainee was captured and ordered to surrender his weapon by the Northern Alliance forces near Mazar-e-Sharif and was transported to prison.

### b. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee was recruited by a sheikh.

2. This sheikh helped raise money for Usama bin Laden until the sheikh's death in Saudi Arabia in 2001.

3. The detainee's brother is a deceased al Qaida operative who died in July 2004 during a foreign security forces raid. He was listed as number fifteen on the Saudi most wanted terrorists list.

4. The detainee's younger brother was also fighting in Afghanistan.

5. The detainee was given a Kalashnikov rifle with ammunition and was given a tour of the front line area by the front line commander.

6. The detainee's name was among 324 names listed on a document recovered from a safe house raid associated with suspected al Qaida in Karachi, Pakistan.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee claimed he only went to Afghanistan to find his brother and not because of a fatwa. The detainee claimed that he lied about the fatwa due to pressure he felt in prison.

b. The detainee stated he never heard of a fatwa issued against the United States or Americans.

UNCLASSIFIED

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## UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL KHALIDI, ABD AL AZIZ SAD MUHAMMAD AWSHAN**

c. The detainee stated he was still in Saudi Arabia when the attack on the World Trade Center occurred on 11 September 2001. The detainee believed the attack was wrong because the Koran stated it was wrong to kill innocent people.

d. The detainee stated that he never attended any training camp and that the only training he did receive was at this guest house.

e. The detainee claimed that he has never fired a weapon.

f. The detainee stated that upon his release he would return home to Saudi Arabia. He said he did not fully understand the situation in Afghanistan prior to his arrival in November 2001, and he would not return to Afghanistan.

g. The detainee was effective in convincing his brother, another detainee, to drink Ensure, thus breaking his fast.

h. The detainee's brother has been taken off total voluntary faster status.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

UNCLASSIFIED

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# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

12 October 2006

TO: MODARAY, YUSEF M

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MODARAY, YUSEF M

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee traveled from Medina, Saudi Arabia to Damascus, Syria. From Damascus, Syria the detainee traveled to Tehran, Iran on Syrian Airlines. The detainee traveled from Tehran, Iran to Mashad, Iran. The detainee traveled from Mashad, Iran to the Pakistan border. The detainee traveled from the Pakistan border to Karachi, Pakistan.

2. The detainee said he traveled to Pakistan alone.

3. The detainee left Saudi Arabia for Afghanistan, and fought alongside the Taliban in the jihad against Massoud and the Northern Alliance.

4. The detainee met with the Taliban and indicated that he was an Arab and he wanted to fight.

5. The detainee became involved in The Calling and going to the Mosque. The Calling consisted of traveling to different Mosques and preaching the Koran.

6. The detainee stayed in Karachi, Pakistan for two and a half months while involved with The Calling. The detainee worked out of a Mosque in Karachi, Pakistan.

b. Training

The detainee received one day of training with grenades and the Kalishnikov rifle.

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### c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee served with the second line of the Kundiz, Afghanistan battlefield with the Arab Corps of the Taliban Northern Army.

2. The detainee's military duties were performed with an unidentified headquarters detachment, rear support area, Arab element of the Northern Taliban Army.

3. The al Dawa al Tabligh is most likely identifiable with the Jamaat al Tabligh, a legitimate Islamic missionary organization based in Pakistan and believed to be used as a cover for action by Islamic extremists. The al Dawa al Tabligh is well known for its support to jihadist causes.

4. The detainee's brother is a known al Qaida operative.

5. A senior al Qaida operative said he might have seen the detainee at a known Taliban guest house.

6. The detainee stayed in a house owned by a known Taliban fighter.

### d. Intent

1. The detainee stated he considers all Americans his enemy. The detainee decided that he hates all Americans because they attack his religion, Islam. Since Americans are the detainee's enemy, he will continue to fight them until he dies.

2. The detainee pointed to the sky and told the interviewing agents that he will have a meeting with them in the next life.

### e. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee knew about the Taliban. The detainee thought that participating in jihad with the Taliban was the right thing to do because the detainee believed that the Taliban were good Muslims.

2. The detainee stated that the FBI, the United States and the interrogators are the enemy.

3. A foreign government identified the detainee as one of their high priority targets among the Saudi detainees held at Guantanamo Bay.

4. The detainee cannot understand why the detainees are held in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba with no trial. The detainee has come to believe the reason is that America wants to destroy Islam.

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5. A source identified the detainee as a Saudi Arabian who was on the backup lines.
6. The detainee fought against the Northern Alliance.
4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

The detainee said that he did not receive any training at a camp run by al Qaeda.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

12 March 2006

TO: SALEH NASER, ABDUL RAHMAN MOHAMED

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SALEH NASER, ABDUL RAHMAN  
MOHAMED

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee decided to go to Chechnya after hearing a Sheikh speak at his mosque about the Chechnya catastrophes. The Sheikh suggested that the detainee go to Afghanistan instead.

2. The Sheikh mentioned above is a prominent scholar who acts as a religious and legal expert for Usama bin Laden.

3. The detainee's brother loaned him 180,000 Riyals or \$1,500 United States Dollars for his travel to Syria and back.

4. The detainee left Yemen for Syria and stayed at a hotel for ten days. The detainee then flew onto Afghanistan.

b. Training

The detainee received training on the front lines by an Emir and an operative. The detainee trained with about forty other troops and fired his weapon once a week for four weeks.

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SALEH NASER, ABDUL RAHMAN MOHAMED**

## c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee reported to an operative in Kabul, Afghanistan and stayed in a guest house. The detainee asked another associate if he could go to the front lines to fight. The detainee was told that he had to wait for the Emir to fight. Once the Emir arrived, the detainee was allowed to fight at the front line.

2. Another operative was a senior commander for an al Qaida commander who worked for the Taliban Government.

3. The detainee spent three or four months at the Karabak lines, then spent six months at Khvajeh Ghar, Afghanistan. The detainee's immediate commander reported to an al Qaida commander.

## d. Detainee Actions and Statements

1. The detainee maintains that he has no trust nor will he ever trust Americans because of the perceived lies they have told him about his release.

2. The detainee asked for video of the 11 September 2001 tragedy of planes flying into buildings because of not being able to see them first hand. The detainee said that he was in the mountains of Afghanistan during the time of the incident and was there through the following December, unable to see the video.

## e. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee stated when the bombing started in Khvajeh Ghar, his friends decided to pull back. They took a cab to Kunduce, Afghanistan and stayed at a guest house with ten other people. The detainee stated that they remained at Kunduce for two weeks.

2. The detainee and his friends left Kunduce, Afghanistan and traveled by truck to Mazar-e-Sharif, Afghanistan where they were immediately captured by General Dostum's troops.

## 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee denied having knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001, and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks in the United States or United States interests.

b. The detainee was queried regarding any knowledge or planning of internal uprisings at the Guantanamo Detention facility with negative results.

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SALEH NASER, ABDUL RAHMAN MOHAMED**

c. The detainee heard about the attacks of 11 September 2001 on the radio while he was in Khvajeh Ghar. The detainee stated that he feels the attacks are a poor reflection of Muslims. The detainee never saw Usama bin Laden while in Afghanistan. In fact, the detainee was warned by a Sheikh to not be associated with Usama bin Laden and al Qaida while in Afghanistan.

d. The detainee knows of no plans to harm the guards at Camp Delta or of plans to escape. The detainee advised that if he were to be released from United States custody, he would return home to the family farm and get married.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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# UNCLASSIFIED

**Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba**

14 April 2006

TO: AL WARAFI, MUKTAR YAHYA NAJEE

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL WARAFI, MUKTAR YAHYA  
NAJEE

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee admitted he decided on his own to travel to Afghanistan and assist the Taliban based on the fatwas that were issued.

2. The detainee related he went to Afghanistan to fight with the Taliban against the mistaken people, the Northern Alliance.

b. Training

1. Once in Konduz the detainee traveled to Khoja Khar, Afghanistan. He trained on the Kalashnikov [AK-47] for about one week and then moved onto the front line to fight against the Northern Alliance.

2. The detainee was trained in first aid and later assisted treating wounded Taliban soldiers at the al-Ansar clinic in Konduz, Afghanistan.

c. Connections/Associations

1. A source claims that the detainee was a Yemeni al Qaida fighter under Abdul Hadi.

2. Abd al Hadi was in overall command of the Arab fighters north of Kabul.

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## **SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL WARAFI, MUKTAR YAHYA NAJEE**

3. A foreign security organization identified the detainee as an al Qaida operative in Afghanistan.
4. The detainee's name was found in a document recovered from an al Qaida-associated safe house.
5. A source recognized the detainee from the frontlines or Konduz.
6. A source claims to have seen the detainee on the Taliban front lines around late 1999 or early 2000.
7. A source identified the detainee as Fawaz from Saudi Arabia. The source knows him from the Khawaja Ghar front line area, Shabraghan and Kandahar prisons.
8. A source claims that he knew the detainee because they both went to a safe house in al Qunds, Afghanistan.

### d. Other Relevant Data

The detainee later related he had heard about the U.S.S. Cole explosion and heard it may be related to Usama bin Laden and al Qaida, but he had no personal knowledge of the incident.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
  - a. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001, and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.
  - b. The detainee stated he was not in Afghanistan to fight the American people.
  - c. The detainee related he has no problems with Americans and no real opinion of them.
5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

29 May 2006

TO: MOHAMMED, SALMAN SAAD AL KHADI

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MOHAMMED, SALMAN SAAD AL  
KHADI

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee's friend told him about a fatwa that had been issued. Based on this fatwa, the detainee went on a jihad to Afghanistan and fought with the Taliban.

2. While in Afghanistan, the detainee received and followed a fatwa issued by a Sheikh. The fatwa stated that the fight in Afghanistan was just and it was every Muslim's duty to fight with the Taliban.

3. The detainee holds a confirmed alliance to the Arab Brigade.

b. Training

The detainee received Kalashnikov training for three days.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee stayed in Taliban guest houses both in Quetta, Pakistan and in Kandahar, Afghanistan.

2. The detainee traveled from Quetta, Pakistan to Spin-Buldak, Afghanistan with a group of Taliban.

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MOHAMMED, SALMAN SAAD AL KHADI**

3. The detainee flew from Kandahar, Afghanistan to Kabul, Afghanistan with other Taliban.
4. The detainee was sent to Konduz, Afghanistan to join the Arab Brigade.
5. The detainee was a member of a Taliban unit that withdrew from Khojaghar, Afghanistan and moved to Konduz, Afghanistan.
6. The detainee stated he and his brother went to Afghanistan to fight the jihad.
7. The detainee stated that he was comfortable being listed as an al Qaida member.
8. The detainee was a member of a Taliban unit in 2001. The detainee's brother met him the day before the unit withdrew.
9. The detainee served under several known Taliban leaders in Afghanistan.

d. Other Relevant Data

The detainee believed the Taliban was the just and fair government of Afghanistan, and that the Northern Alliance, assisted by the United States, was the invading force.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
  - a. The detainee denied having any knowledge of al Qaida before being captured.
  - b. The detainee denied being part of any political or religious organizations, including the Arab Brigade.
  - c. The detainee stated that al Qaida did not run the Arab Brigade.
  - d. Although they received mortar fire, the detainee stated he never fired his weapon while guarding the front line.
  - e. The detainee denied receiving any more training aside from his three days of Kalashnikov training.
  - f. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001 and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or its interests.
  - g. The detainee was queried regarding any knowledge of planning of internal uprisings at the Guantanamo Bay Detention Facility, with negative results.

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# UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MOHAMMED, SALMAN SAAD AL  
KHADI**

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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# UNCLASSIFIED

**Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba**

20 January 2006

TO: AL ATABI, BIJAD THIF ALLAH

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL ATABI, BIJAD THIF ALLAH

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
  - a. Commitment
    1. The detainee heard of a fatwa issued in Saudi Arabia by Sheik Hamood al Aqla and Sheik Abu Abdullah to go and fight the jihad in Afghanistan.
    2. The detainee believed he was going to Afghanistan to fight with the Taliban against Ahmed al Masoud, an Afghani of the Northern Alliance, whom he was told was allied with the Russians.
    3. The detainee advised that he obtained a visa to travel to Pakistan from the Pakistani embassy in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. When he applied for the visa, he advised the person at the embassy that he was going to Pakistan for the Daawa, which meant he was going to fight in the jihad for Islam.
    4. The detainee traveled from Riyadh, Saudi Arabia to Dubai, United Arab Emirates, to Peshawar, Pakistan and then to Jalalabad, Afghanistan.
    5. The detainee stayed in Jalalabad for two days and then traveled to Kabul, Afghanistan where he stayed at a Taliban guesthouse.
    6. The detainee was identified as the "second man in charge" of a military group in Afghanistan and was responsible to feed the group, assist in planning attacks and would take charge of the group when the "number one man" was away until the number one man returned.

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## UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL ATABI, BIJAD THIF ALLAH

7. The detainee is identified as an al Qaida expert on explosives and weapons who has received extensive training.

8. The detainee is identified as a mid-level commander who is well known by al Qaida fighters, as he fought in the Kabul and the Khawaj Alghar regions of Afghanistan.

9. The detainee admitted to being part of the prison uprising in Mazar-E-Sharif.

### b. Training

The detainee went to a training camp run by the Taliban which was close to the frontline and not far from Kabul where he trained with the AK-47 and hand grenades.

### c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee was identified as knowing al Iraqi very well because he always went to al Iraqi's office. He was also seen twice with al Iraqi and with information that was needed on the north line.

2. Al Iraqi was one of Usama Bin Laden's closest commanders and the person in charge of al Qaida fighters on the Afghani Northern Front.

3. The detainee's name was found on computer media that was collected in a raid on an alleged al Qaida residence in Karachi, Pakistan.

### d. Other Relevant Data

The detainee was told by the Taliban to go to Mazar-E-Sharif and surrender to General Dostum. After his surrender, the detainee was placed in a prison at Mazar-E-Sharif. Dostum's soldiers opened fire with their weapons and began killing many of the prisoners. The detainee was wounded in the head. After the riots were over, the detainee and the survivors surrendered to Dostum's men again.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

1. The detainee stated he did not see any combat action and never shot at or killed anyone.

2. The detainee stated he never trained with explosives, chemicals, biological agents or nuclear material nor is he aware of anyone who trained in these areas.

UNCLASSIFIED

## UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL ATABI, BIJAD THIF ALLAH

3. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001, and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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